




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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Aggression From the North

The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign To Conquer South Viet-Nam

President Johnson declared in an address on February 17 that the purpose of the United States in Viet-Nam "is to join in the defense and protection of freedom of a brave people who are under attack that is controlled and that is directed from outside their country." *Aggression From the North* is a 64-page report, illustrated with maps and photographs, which summarizes the massive evidence of that attack and its source of support.

The introduction to the Department's pamphlet closes with these words: "The Government of the United States believes that evidence should be presented to its own citizens and to the world. It is important for free men to know what has been happening in Viet-Nam, and how, and why. This is the purpose of this report."

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THE
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Vol. LII, No. 1345



April 5, 1965

THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR 1966

Statement by Secretary Rusk 482

FOREIGN AID AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Statement by David E. Bell 498

TRADE AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Statement by Assistant Secretary Johnson 502

THE ROLE OF EMERGING NATIONS IN WORLD POLITICS

by W. W. Rostow, Counselor 492

For index see inside back cover

The Foreign Assistance Program for 1966

*Statement by Secretary Rusk*¹

Thank you for the privilege of appearing before you in support of the President's foreign assistance program for fiscal year 1966.

This request will enable the United States to carry forward a program which, as President Johnson said in his message to the Congress in January, offers "*Strength* to those who would be free; *Hope* for those who would otherwise despair; *Progress* for those who would help themselves."²

Foreign aid continues to be an indispensable arm of our foreign policy in building a society of free nations in a stable world. The fundamental reason why we conduct programs of economic and military assistance is to support our interests, in the broadest sense, around the world. Our security is inextricably bound up

with the evolution of a world of independent peace-seeking nations. It is in our most elementary national self-interest to do what we can to help in strengthening the prospects for peaceful progress in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Economic and military assistance can make a crucial contribution to such progress, at very reasonable cost relative to our great economic strength and our vital interest in a decent world order.

We should not let today's crisis or tomorrow's headline obscure the very real advances we have made in the years since World War II. While progress in some countries has been slow and frustrating, in many it has been steady and in some truly outstanding.

This great endeavor will not be completed quickly. It will take patience, foresight, and courage. It will continue to require the understanding and calm judgment of the American

¹ Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Mar. 9 (press release 38).

² BULLETIN of Feb. 1, 1965, p. 126.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LII, NO. 1345 PUBLICATION 7853 APRIL 5, 1965

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department,

as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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people, if this progress is to continue. To have foreign policy that has continuity, relevance, and direction is a constant test of a free people's ability to govern themselves in the modern world. It would be dangerous for our security and tragic for the future of the world if, out of frustration or fatigue, the United States were to turn back when we have come so far down the road.

Winston Churchill said, in his prophetic speech in Fulton, Missouri, 19 years ago this month, "Our difficulties and dangers will not be removed by closing our eyes to them. They will not be removed by mere waiting to see what happens. . . ."

The United States has determined that it could not just wait "to see what happens."

It is, of course, true that the interests of the United States are not always and everywhere the same, in each part of the world, in every country. The first question always faced in considering whether the United States should provide assistance to any country is: What interest do we have in this situation; what are our objectives here?

It is also quite true that the provision of aid is not everywhere or always a necessary or useful expression of United States interests. The second question that is always asked in considering whether assistance should be provided to a country: Can our aid be useful; what is the country prepared to do for itself; is the country prepared to make sacrifices, exercise self-discipline, and commit its own resources in a framework within which American assistance can be effective?

Finally, there are, of course, other advanced countries and a variety of international organizations that can assist the developing countries. And consequently, in each case we ask: What resources are available to this particular country from sources other than the United States; is it necessary for us to be directly involved?

Recognizing these qualifications, it is unmistakably plain that in a substantial number of circumstances assistance from the United States has proved its great worth in the past and is proving it at present.

Aid Tailored to Varying Situations

The program the President has recommended is tailored to the varying situations in which we ought to help. It is highly concentrated in those cases where our assistance is most needed and will accomplish the largest results:

—76 percent of the funds requested for development loans are scheduled to go to seven countries: India, Pakistan, Turkey, Nigeria, Tunisia, Brazil, and Chile;

—88 percent of the funds requested for supporting assistance are expected to go to four countries: Korea, Viet-Nam, Laos, and Jordan.

The total appropriation request for economic assistance in fiscal year 1966 is \$2.21 billion. The military assistance program is \$1.17 billion, for a total request for new appropriations of \$3.38 billion.

The new authorization for the economic portion of the foreign assistance program totals \$848 million. As you know, Development Loan and the Alliance for Progress programs are operating under a continuing authorization.

I urge the Congress to give its prompt approval of the full amount requested.

The Aid Program by Geographic Areas

For *Latin America* we are requesting an appropriation of \$580 million for the coming fiscal year for the Alliance for Progress. The physical accomplishments already registered under the alliance are encouraging. But perhaps more important is that the people of Latin America are beginning to know that the alliance can succeed. Many of the Latin American nations have now turned to the hard tasks of reform and growth. The Castro experiment in Cuba has shown itself to be a failure. The Cuban dictator is becoming more and more isolated.

Brazil provides a striking example of what has happened. Prior to the advent of the new government in Brazil in April 1964, Brazil was seriously threatened by a steady economic and political deterioration which brought recurrent crises and growing popular unrest. Since then, the situation has changed dramatically for the better. Political stability has been restored.

The environment which helped Communists and other extremists to infiltrate and exert a disproportionate influence has given way to an environment which discourages violent or extreme action.

The Brazilian Government has vigorously declared its common purpose with other democratic nations; its foreign policy is typified by the important role that Brazil played in the OAS [Organization of American States] adoption last year of additional measures against Cuban subversion. It has launched a program for economic stability and growth; initiated major reforms; and at the same time maintained democratic institutions and a free press. Much remains to be done, but the first, difficult steps have been taken.

Recent developments in Chile have been similarly encouraging. The victory of the Christian Democrats in last September's presidential election, and in last Sunday's congressional elections, has expressed Chile's preference for peaceful reform. While the road ahead will be difficult, President [Eduardo] Frei has, since his inauguration in November, set the stage for an ambitious economic stabilization and development program, including measures to reduce price inflation, substantially increase internal financing of the development program, and stimulate the agriculture and export industries.

Turning to *Africa*, the picture is highly diverse. Real progress is being made in some countries such as Tunisia and Nigeria; slower improvement in others. Our assistance programs are directed, as they should be, chiefly to training and to the building of institutions needed for planning and executing development activities. These programs are designed to develop human and social resources and to supply the ingredients of economic and social progress—education, technical skills, public administration, and managerial talents. Thus the proposed program for Africa in fiscal year 1966 is \$218 million, 42 percent of which is for technical assistance.

Social and economic improvement is slow, and there are troublesome difficulties. East and Central Africa are subject to active Communist machinations and blandishments. The competition in Africa between the Soviets and Chinese

has intensified, which adds to internal instability.

The Congo, of course, presents a prime and immediate problem in Africa. We continue to support the legally constituted Central Government in response to its request for assistance and in conformity with U.N. resolutions. The Congo is an African problem, and we seek an African solution; we look to other Africans especially through the Organization of African Unity, to work together with the Congolese to this end. We expect that, once a measure of internal stability is established, progress can be made toward a broadly based national government. This has not yet happened, and some fighting continues despite vigorous efforts of the Central Government to bring the rebellion under control. Increased aid to the rebels from external sources has threatened to prolong the struggle and create new difficulty for the Congo for other African states, and for the United States.

The Government of the Congo is faced with grave responsibilities in this trying period. It must better mobilize its own efforts and gain more support from its neighbors. We must continue to help. Without a peaceful Congo there can be no stability in Africa.

In the *Near East and South Asia*, India, Pakistan, and Turkey are making substantial progress in their efforts to create modern economies. These three countries account for over \$685 million—more than 40 percent—of the development assistance proposed for fiscal year 1966. Iran, too, has been making encouraging headway and is moving ahead with programs of economic and social progress.

We have extended aid to most Arab nations in the past, and currently we have programs in several, including the U.A.R. Compared with the size of our assistance to the major recipient countries in this critical area of the world—India, Pakistan, and Turkey—our economic assistance program in the United Arab Republic has been quite small. But the troubled state of our relations with the U.A.R. makes even that small program loom large.

Recent events in the U.A.R. are naturally a matter of great concern to us. The U.A.R.'s support of the Congolese rebels and the con-

tinued presence of substantial Egyptian forces in Yemen have led to some deterioration in our relations with Egypt. This strain was heightened by the destruction of the USIS library in Cairo.

We have sought, and we continue to seek, a basis for continuing a cooperative relationship with the U.A.R. External aid is vital to the U.A.R.'s development, and we believe that the economic progress of the U.A.R. is a necessary element in a growing environment for peace and stability in the Middle East. However, while we desire to assist Egypt in its enormous task of social and economic advancement, there is plainly an inadequate basis of understanding at the present moment. We are, therefore, encouraging the U.A.R. to examine with us the possibilities of reducing areas of difference.

In the *Western Pacific* two countries necessarily have recently occupied the center of our attention: South Viet-Nam, where foreign assistance plays a major role, and Indonesia, where our assistance has been steadily reduced over the last 2 years.

South Viet-Nam has a right, as do all the nations of Southeast Asia and, indeed, in the rest of the world, to live in peace, free from aggression from neighboring countries. Moreover, it has an understandable desire to be left in peace in order to use its resources on the economic and social development of its people, rather than for the harsh necessities of resisting aggression.

Under the President's proposals for fiscal year 1966, we shall continue to provide sizable economic and military assistance. Indeed, the foreign assistance program is the principal vehicle for this support, not only of South Viet-Nam, but for the protection and safety of the nations in Southeast Asia threatened by Chinese Communist aggression.

As you can see in the presentation book before you, the technical assistance program in Indonesia is currently under review. The United States and Indonesian Governments have been at odds on certain policies and courses of action pursued by the Indonesians. Over the past 2 years there has been a significant change in our assistance program in Indonesia. No loans have been made during this period. No ship-

ments under the Public Law 480 sales agreements for surplus food have been made to Indonesia for nearly a year, and the agreement itself has now expired. In the same period, the technical assistance program, largely for universities, training, and malaria eradication, has dwindled. Under present circumstances it is questionable that a basis will exist for further technical assistance in fiscal year 1966.

Elsewhere in the Western Pacific, Taiwan has made such marked gains in growth that it now stands on its own, and no longer requires AID assistance, even though programs under P.L. 480 and military assistance are continuing. The accomplishments of Taiwan, as a result of United States assistance, and their own ability and persistence, are an excellent example of success. South Korea is making considerable progress despite the necessity to maintain large military forces. Her expanding export earnings and economic growth are enabling us to shift increasingly from supporting to developmental aid within the overall program of assistance to Korea. In Thailand our assistance takes fully into account the threat of Communist subversion and infiltration in the northeast. Despite these threats, Thailand has maintained a growing and stable economy over the last decade.

Aid and the Balance of Payments

I should like to turn now to two matters of concern.

First, the level of external public debt of the developing nations has been steadily increasing and, in some cases, alarmingly so. The accumulated burden is now about \$30 billion. Even more significantly, the repayment volume on the debt is nearly \$5 billion per year and is increasing 15 percent annually.

This is a heavy load for countries with limited resources, inconvertible currencies, and low foreign exchange earnings. The United States and other free-world nations must continue their joint efforts to ease this burden, particularly during the early years—the crucial first decade—of major development efforts. That is why it is imperative for the United States to maintain the current low interest rates and grace periods for development loans. That is why we

are continuing to urge other donor nations to soften further the terms on which their aid is given.

If we raise rates on long-term development assistance, the ultimate loser will be not only the recipient country but the American taxpayer as well. For the higher the repayment burden, the longer development will take; and the day when nations will no longer need our aid will be further postponed.

Second, for several years we have given close attention to the relation of foreign aid to our balance-of-payments position.

Since 1961 foreign aid has had a steadily decreasing impact on our balance of payments. The adverse impact is at the lowest level yet achieved. More than 85 percent of the funds requested for the economic assistance program in fiscal year 1966 will be spent directly in the United States for U.S. goods and services.

The drain of dollars that still occurs through the aid program is due primarily to three factors—our contributions to international organizations, dollar expenses of employees overseas, and a small amount of commodity procurement in the less developed countries themselves. It should be added that some of these dollars do return to the United States through such channels as procurement under United Nations projects.

The net drain of funds from the economic aid program, taking into account repayments from prior aid loans, was about \$300 million in fiscal year 1964. In 1961 the comparable drain was almost \$1 billion.

The committee should also bear in mind that foreign aid often opens the way for United States trade. Obviously, that is not the reason we extend foreign assistance, but it is one of the helpful byproducts. Our aim is more trade, less aid. This is what has happened in Western Europe and Japan and is happening in Taiwan, Greece, Israel, and other countries.

United States exports to Western Europe have doubled since 1950; exports to Japan have tripled in that time.

There are substantial future markets in the developing nations. As development picks up momentum, the peoples of these nations will be able to buy more from us and from other countries. The less developed countries are deter-

mined to grow—to buy more and to sell more. The United States can reasonably expect to get its fair share of these expanding markets. In addition, as these economies grow, there will be an increase in returns on growing American private investment in the less developed areas. Thus foreign aid is a minor adverse factor in the current balance-of-payments problems; it is a strong positive factor over the long run.

International Aid-Giving Agencies

The question has been raised whether a larger proportion of our economic aid for development purposes should be channeled through international organizations. It is a proper question and an important one, and we welcome full discussion.

The United States has strongly supported the establishment of international organizations providing assistance to development. We have been a major supporter of the World Bank, and we strongly backed Mr. [Eugene] Black when in 1959 he proposed the establishment of the International Development Association. The United States energetically supported the establishment of the Inter-American Development Bank. We have been strong supporters of the United Nations Special Fund and the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, now in process of merger into a single framework.

In all these cases and others, we have been working for the expansion of aid given on an international basis as rapidly as other advanced countries have been willing to contribute a fair share to the common budget of these organizations. This remains our position. The Congress only last week accepted the President's recommendation and authorized an expansion in funds for the soft-loan window of the Inter-American Development Bank. We look forward to negotiations later this year under the leadership of the World Bank which we trust will result in enlargement of the funds available to the International Development Association.

I believe, therefore, that the executive branch and the Congress are in agreement on the desirability of enlarging the resources available to international aid-giving agencies on the basis of cost-sharing among the advanced countries.

Furthermore, I believe we are in agreement

on the importance of steadily improving the arrangements for multilateral coordination of bilateral aid programs. The United States has taken a leading role in setting up international consortiums such as those for India, Pakistan, and Turkey, and international consultative groups such as those for Nigeria, Thailand, and Colombia. The World Bank is at present considering the possibility of establishing several more consultative groups over the next year or two, and the United States has supported this proposal.

In addition, the United States encouraged the creation of the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (ordinarily referred to as CIAP) as a multilateral coordinating arrangement tailored to the special circumstances of Latin America. The CIAP has made a promising beginning, under strong leadership, and has our full support.

The United States has supported the establishment and the operation of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] in Paris. The DAC has made some headway toward developing a common understanding and common policy positions among the major aid-giving countries.

Thus, both through our support for international development agencies and through our support of multilateral coordination, we have made substantial progress toward achieving greater effectiveness with the aid made available to developing countries and toward a more equitable sharing of the costs of aid among the advanced countries.

It is an impressive fact, as noted in the President's aid message, that "in fiscal year 1966, 85 percent of U.S. development loans in Asia and Africa will be committed under international arrangements. All U.S. aid to Latin America is made available within the international framework of the Alliance for Progress."

In Africa and in Asia, forces are now moving to strengthen multilateral arrangements on a regional basis. Properly organized, such arrangements could lead to more concerted measures of self-help within regions; to the emergence of more and better projects and plans for external financing; and to the mobilization from Europe, Japan, and elsewhere of additional de-

velopment funds. Although the kind of arrangements created in Latin America, through the machinery of the Organization of American States, would not, of course, be exactly duplicated in other regions, we are prepared to play our part in encouraging further development of multilateral regional arrangements which have the effects described above.

To support international aid agencies and multilateral coordination, it is not necessary to derogate or eliminate our bilateral aid programs; quite the contrary. In our judgment, the United States clearly requires strong bilateral aid programs in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The international aid agencies, while growing steadily, cannot hope to replace more than a fraction of the bilateral aid of the United States and other advanced countries in the immediate future. It would be a serious mistake, in our judgment, to abandon the principle of shared funding for the international aid agencies, and this necessarily will limit the rate at which those agencies can be expanded.

Moreover, I believe the executive branch and the Congress are in agreement on the very great importance of establishing proper standards for self-help performance on the part of countries which desire to receive assistance. Some—but not all—of the international aid agencies have done well in this respect. But it is no exaggeration to state that for the last several years the United States has taken the lead, both through its bilateral programs and through its participation in multilateral arrangements, in strengthening the insistence on sound self-help performance by aid-receiving countries.

Nor has this insistence, if executed with full respect for the independence and sovereignty of the countries receiving aid, created unusual difficulties for our international relations. The relationship between donor and recipient is necessarily a delicate one, but it can be constructive and friendly if based on a shared commitment to the mutual objective of economic and social progress in the country in question. Our bilateral relationships are excellent in nearly all the cases where major assistance is involved. The cases in the world where our bilateral relationships are in difficulties do not revolve around aid but around far broader and deeper political issues.

The United States intends to rely to the maximum extent possible on international agencies and multilateral coordinating organizations to establish the self-help standards necessary to make development aid effective. But for the present, certainly it is necessary for us to continue to work bilaterally as well as multilaterally toward this objective.

In summary, it is our conviction that United States interests require us to proceed with a strong bilateral aid program, as well as to contribute to the steady increase of aid funds available to international agencies and to use multilateral institutions or groups where it is appropriate.

We believe our present proposals for bilateral aid authorizations are a prudent and sensible commitment of our resources, allowing concentration on those countries and those programs where they will do the most good. The task of assisting peaceful development in Asia, Africa, and Latin America is a lengthy, difficult, and complex matter which in our judgment requires the best talent we can seek and mobilize on a bilateral as well as a multilateral basis. Relying solely on either form of aid to the exclusion of the other simply does not meet the conditions as they exist.

"The Power To Save the Future"

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would recall that Winston Churchill, again in his Fulton address, spoke of "the power to save the future."

Neither Mr. Churchill, nor any leader of the free world since World War II, has ever maintained that the United States or any nation has the power or the responsibility to control every event in every part of the world. But our experience requires us to reject the idea that we must just wait to see what happens. Inaction in the face of challenge is the sure path to disaster.

Since 1945 the United States has been concerned with the peace of the entire world. Today we can be secure only to the extent that the community of nations is secure—on land, at sea, in the air and the adjoining areas of space.

Our policy has been, and will continue to be, to work patiently but purposefully toward a

world of stability in which all nations are able to grow and prosper without fear of interference from outside.

In pursuit of this goal we are pledged to meet challenges—whether direct attack or subversion—which threaten our own security or the security of those who want to be free.

We employ a variety of tools in this effort. Foreign aid is one of the most important.

Without it, we would be at the mercy of events. And the field would be left to our adversaries.

We must not lose the future by default.

President Reaffirms U.S. Goal of Peace in Southeast Asia

Following is a statement made by President Johnson during a news conference at the LBJ Ranch, Johnson City, Tex., on March 20.

I want to announce this morning Ambassador Maxwell Taylor will shortly resume his periodic visits to Washington for consultation on the Vietnamese situation. He will return to Washington on March 28 and remain approximately a week. There are no immediate issues which make the meeting urgent. It is a regular—repeat—regular periodic visit, part of our continuous consultations to make sure that our effort in Viet-Nam is as effective and as efficient as possible.

Let me say this additionally on Viet-Nam. One year ago this week, on March 17, 1964,¹ I made this statement, and I quote:

For 10 years, under three Presidents, this nation has been determined to help a brave people to resist aggression and terror. It is and it will remain the policy of the United States to furnish assistance to support South Viet-Nam for as long as is required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism under control.

Our policy in Viet-Nam is the same as it was 1 year ago, and, to those of you who have inquiries on the subject, it is the same as it was

¹ For text of a White House statement of Mar. 17, 1964, see BULLETIN of Apr. 6, 1964, p. 522.

10 years ago. I have publicly stated it, I have reviewed it to the Congress in joint sessions, I have reviewed it in various messages to the Congress, and I have talked individually with more than 500 of them stating the policy and asking and answering questions on that subject in the last 60 days. In addition I have stated this policy to the press and to the public in almost every State in the Union. Specifically, last night I read where I made the policy statement 47 times. Well, I want to repeat it again this morning for your information and for emphasis.

Under this policy, changes in the situation may require from time to time changes in tactics, in strategy, in equipment, in personnel. As I said last month,² the continuing actions we take will be those that are justified and made necessary by the continuing aggression of others. These aggressors serve no peaceful interest, not even their own. No one threatens their regime. There is no intent or desire to conquer them or to occupy their land. What is wanted is simply that they carry out their agreements, that they end their aggression against their neighbors.

The real goal of all of us in Southeast Asia must be the peaceful progress of the people of that area. They have the right to live side by side in peace and independence. And if this little country does not have that right, then the question is what will happen to the other hundred little countries who want to preserve that right. They have a right to build a new sense of community among themselves. They have a right to join, with help from others, in the full development of their own resources for their own benefit. They have a right to live together without fear or oppression or domination from any quarter of this entire globe.

So this is the peace for which the United States of America works today. This is the peace which aggression from the North today prevents. This is the peace which will remain the steadfast goal of the United States of America.

²For remarks made by President Johnson at the close of an address before the National Industrial Conference Board on Feb. 17, see *ibid.*, Mar. 8, 1965, p. 332.

Secretary Regrets That Soviets Do Not Support Viet-Nam Accords

Following is the text of a statement by Secretary Rusk released by the Department of State on March 19 after reports of a public statement made at London that day by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko to the effect that the United States would have to deal directly with North Viet-Nam on the Viet-Nam situation.

I agree with Mr. Gromyko that Hanoi is the key to peace in Southeast Asia. If Hanoi stops molesting its neighbors, then peace can be restored promptly and U.S. forces can come home. I regret that the Soviet Union, which was a signatory of the 1954 and 1962 accords, appears disinclined to put its full weight behind those agreements.

Thai Countermeasures to Communist Threat

by Marshall Green¹

We hear much these days about Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. For very obvious reasons the focus is on Viet-Nam and to some extent on Laos, but I would like to draw your attention to another area in Southeast Asia where Communist China and other Asian Communists are involved in expansionism and subversion. I refer to the northeast area of Thailand, where there is an impressive and growing array of evidence that Thailand may become an important target for the Communists. However, this is something that the Thai Government has long foreseen and, with our assistance, has taken effective measures to counteract. Here are some of the facts:

Communist subversive activity within Thailand has centered primarily on the northeast-

¹Excerpt from an address made before the Open Forum, Daytona Beach, Fla., on Mar. 14. Mr. Green, who is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, also spoke extemporaneously on other Far Eastern problems.

ern province of Nakhon Phanom, close to Communist-held areas of Laos. There have been acts of terror. There has been a step-up in attempted recruitment of Communist-type cadres among the villagers and a reported increase in the number of meetings called by Communists and Communist sympathizers, who parrot the Communist line and hand out propaganda materials.

There has also been a step-up in the radio propaganda effort. The voices of Radio Peiping and Radio Hanoi are strongly heard in northeast Thailand. They are supplemented by a clandestine radio, located in Communist-held areas of Laos (and at times in North Viet-Nam), which calls itself the "Voice of the Thai People."

Finally, there have been disturbing indications of Chinese Communist intentions vis-a-vis Thailand. For example, when in January 1965 the clandestine Communist radio announced the formation of a "Thai Patriotic Front," with the declared purpose of overthrowing Thailand's Government, both Radio Peiping and Radio Hanoi repeated the broadcast over their powerful stations and indicated their support of this front group. Further, the Chinese Communists recently purchased \$1 million worth of Thai currency in Hong Kong, for purposes that can only be guessed at. There has been a very great increase recently in the numbers of people being given Thai language and area training in Communist China, the purpose of which seems completely clear. In light of these other indications, the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister's reported remark that insurgency may break out in Thailand in 1965 takes on an ominous ring.

What is Thailand doing about this situation? What are we doing about it?

Taking a lesson from what has happened in Viet-Nam and Laos, the Thai for some time have been making a determined and effective effort to remove the economic and social grievances which often make village people vulnerable to the blandishments of communism. They have on their own initiative put into the field in every northeast province bordering on Laos what are called Mobile Development Units. These MDU's are designed to make an immediate impact upon the villages in the area, both

psychological and material. Teams attached to the units visit the villagers in remote areas, discuss their problems with them, and in many cases take steps to meet those problems. They construct village roads, repair or build bridges, build schools, and supply badly needed medical care.

We are backing this Thai effort by supplying equipment for use by these MDU's. We are also engaged with the Thai in the Accelerated Rural Development program, which will provide the vital followthrough behind the impact projects of the MDU's. The Accelerated Rural Development project will provide public-works capability at the provincial level. It will also give provincial officials greater authority and capability in the field of public works, as well as in agriculture, health, education, et cetera. This decentralization should make the program more effective as well as more responsive to village wants and needs. The leaders of the Thai Government are strongly committed to making this program a success.

The security roads project, which will be completed this year, will for the first time make two areas in north and northeast Thailand—near Communist-held territory in Laos—accessible to Thai security forces throughout the year. These roads will also bring as an extra dividend great economic benefits.

In connection with internal security, we are engaged in retraining and reequipping 16,000 provincial police. A similar but more intensive program has been carried out with the 6,300 men of the border police.

We have supplied a portable radio transmitter in the northeast to help counter the powerful voices of Radio Peiping and Radio Hanoi. This station, broadcasting mostly in the northeast dialect, has become the most popular in the northeast.

On the military side, the Thai are increasingly emphasizing the civic action and counter-insurgency missions of their forces. The Thai armed forces are contributing importantly to the success of the Mobile Development Units which are a joint civilian/military effort. Our military assistance is aimed at encouraging the Thai to continue in these directions and to make their armed forces more effective.

To sum up, the Communist threat to the area is very real, but so are the countermeasures being taken to meet that threat. As the intensity of the Communist effort increases, it will probably be necessary for the Thai Government to intensify its own efforts. However, the important programs which they have developed over the last few years assure that they will not be caught napping by the Communists. A solid basis has been laid for meeting, if necessary, a stronger Communist drive.

After all the painful lessons of the past, it is heartening to see a government and people acting in time to protect the freedom and integrity of their nation.

Korean Foreign Minister Holds Talks With Secretary Rusk

Joint Statement

Press release 45 dated March 17

Foreign Minister Tong Won Lee of the Republic of Korea made a 3-day visit to Washington, D.C., from March 15 to 17, 1965. During the visit, the Foreign Minister called on President Johnson and Vice President Humphrey and held meetings with Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and other high officials of the United States Government for an exchange of views on matters of mutual concern.

During the course of wide-ranging discussions, Minister Lee and Secretary Rusk reviewed the current international situation, in particular, recent developments in Southeast Asia. They recognized that the aggressive policy of Communist China continues to menace the peace and security of Asia, and agreed that the free nations of the region should seek greater unity and coordination of effort as they pursue progress and prosperity under freedom. Secretary Rusk, in this connection, paid tribute to the people and the Government of the Republic of Korea for their contribution to the defense of South Viet-Nam against Communist subversion and aggression.

Foreign Minister Lee and Secretary Rusk exchanged views on the progress recently made

in the negotiations for normalization of relations between Korea and Japan. Secretary Rusk noted that the initialing of the Basic Relations Treaty between the two neighboring countries has established an important momentum for early conclusion of the long-pending talks. Secretary Rusk reaffirmed that normalization of the relations of the two countries would in no way affect the basic U.S. policy of extending military and economic aid to the Republic of Korea for the maintenance of its security and development of its economy.

The Foreign Minister and the Secretary also reviewed the progress of the current negotiations for the Status of Forces Agreement between Korea and the United States. The Foreign Minister expressed the desire of his Government to conclude the long-pending agreement. Secretary Rusk assured him that the U.S. Government would give full consideration to the views of the Korean Government. It was agreed that both Governments would seek to expedite the negotiations so as to achieve final agreement as soon as possible.

President of EEC Commission Meets With President Johnson

Following is the text of a joint communique released at the close of a meeting at the White House on March 18 between President Johnson and Walter Hallstein, President of the Commission of the European Economic Community.

White House press release dated March 18

The President met today with Dr. Walter Hallstein, President of the Commission of the European Economic Community. During his visit in Washington Dr. Hallstein is also having talks with the Vice President; the Secretaries of State, Defense, Agriculture, and Commerce; the President's Acting Special Representative for Trade Negotiations; Senator Fulbright and Representative Boggs.

The President and Dr. Hallstein agreed on the high value of existing close relations between the United States and the Common Market. They agreed that continued progress to-

ward European integration strengthens the free world as European partnership with the United States grows closer.

President Johnson assured Dr. Hallstein of the continued strong support of the United States for the goal of European unity. The President extended his congratulations on the recent decision to merge the executive bodies of the three European Communities, which the President sees as another significant step in the process of European integration.

The President emphasized the importance of the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations. He noted their significance for less developed coun-

tries as well as industrialized nations. He told Dr. Hallstein of the importance which the United States attaches to the liberalization of trade in both industry and agriculture.

Dr. Hallstein emphasized his wish to see an increasingly united Europe assume an important role in the developing Atlantic partnership. He affirmed the intention of the European Commission to work for the successful completion of the Kennedy Round.

The President and Dr. Hallstein agreed to maintain continued close contact on matters of joint concern to the United States and the European Economic Community.

The Role of Emerging Nations in World Politics

by W. W. Rostow

Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council¹

Looking back over the last decade, and leaving Berlin aside, virtually every major international crisis has arisen out of the dynamic process going forward in emerging nations, interacting with Communist and Western policy. The list of such crises is long: Indochina, in all its phases; Suez; Lebanon-Jordan; Algeria; Cuba; the Congo; West Irian; Malaysia; Tibet; and so on.

What I should like to do today is, first, to characterize the dramatic process underway in the southern half of the world; second, to describe Communist policy toward that process; and, third, to suggest what we in Washington hope to achieve in our relations with these nations and peoples, in concert with our Atlantic allies and other more developed nations.

¹ Address made at the University of Freiburg, Freiburg, Germany, on Mar. 15 (press release 44), under the joint sponsorship of the Arnold-Bergstraesser Institute, the University of Freiburg, and the Amerika Haus Freiburg.

What we can observe in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America are more than a billion human beings caught up in revolutionary movements designed to modernize their societies.

In fact, of course, the so-called developing nations represent a wide spectrum, with different problems marking each stage along the road to self-sustained growth and industrial and political maturity. Some of these nations are well along that road; others are just beginning. And in the end, each nation, like each individual, is, in an important sense, unique. What is common throughout these regions is that men and women are determined to bring to bear what modern science and technology can afford in order to elevate the standards of life of their peoples and to provide a firm basis for positions of national dignity and independence on the world scene.

Behind these revolutions is what might be called a reactive nationalism; that is, a wide-

spread desire of nations that, in one way or another, have felt the power and weight of those who were technologically and industrially more mature, to free themselves from this kind of technical inferiority and, in so doing, to find new positions of international status.

Although other impulses enter into the motivation for economic growth in the developing nations—for example, a desire that the children live longer and have wider opportunities for the development of their personalities—the desire for increased national status and dignity on the world scene appears a predominant motivation.

For an historian this is no surprise. When, for example, Jefferson and Hamilton argued in the United States, in the late 18th century, whether industrialization should be undertaken, Hamilton's critical argument was that without industrialization the United States would be helpless in dealing with Great Britain and other more advanced European powers.

Similarly, the impulse to industrialization in France, Germany, Japan, and Russia in the period from, say, 1815 to 1885 arose primarily from this kind of reactive nationalism—from a desire to overcome a sense of relative inferiority. As you will recall, Hamilton's argument was directly translated into German thought in the early 19th century.

In the contemporary world, of course, the reaction has been more explicitly against colonialism and its memories; but similar impulses are evident in less developed nations which long since escaped colonial rule but do feel weighed down by the burdens of relative underdevelopment.

All this yields a sense of impatience and frustration within developing nations. They are anxious to attain quickly a position of dignity and power on the world scene; but they confront the arithmetic of power in a world of modern technology and modern weapons. They desire urgently to see a rapid increase of national income and human welfare; but they confront the inherent human and institutional difficulties of the modernization process which limit the pace at which development can proceed.

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that we see in both the domestic politics of the developing nations and their international re-

lations reflections of this double frustration which sometimes takes the form of bitter struggles within their regions to alter boundaries or settlements laid down, in what is now regarded as an arbitrary or unsatisfactory way, as part of the colonial heritage.

Some of our greatest difficulties flow from leaders in the developing nations who have built on such sentiments ambitious policies of regional expansion or hegemony—policies disruptive in themselves and sedulously exploited by the Communists both to heighten conflict within the free world and to acquire presence, influence, and leverage.

Communist Policy in Transition Period

The Communists study carefully the frustrations within the developing nations. Conscious of the complexities and crossevents inherent in the transition to modernization, it is Communist policy to heighten them. They aim first to expand their influence and to weaken the West by exploiting these situations and, if possible, to produce a failure of the political process and, amidst attendant confusion, to take over power.

Specifically, Communist policy aims to heighten the typical surge of nationalist feeling that is likely to mark the early stages of modernization. They encourage an exaggerated nationalism in order to achieve one or more of these results which serve Communist interests: the heightening of regional conflicts which Communists can exploit; the diversion of scarce energies, resources, and talents away from the constructive tasks of modernization; and the damaging of relations between developing nations and the more advanced democratic nations which must be an important source of external assistance.

In terms of welfare policy within a developing nation, Communists (while adapting their stance to a particular circumstance with increasing flexibility) generally project the view that no important movement toward economic and social development can occur until after there has been a successful Communist revolution. They seek to divert, thereby, the energies of the people away from concrete tasks of development into disruptive revolutionary activity,

while heightening a sense of disappointment with the pace and the unevenness of economic progress, and forestalling the emergence of an effective national consensus.

Finally, in areas where they think the tactic may prove fruitful, they seek to disrupt the efforts to move forward in the direction of effective political democracy, hoping to profit by the breakdown of public order. This, for example, was their objective in Venezuela last year.

These tactics are rooted in a judgment that, unless communism manages to seize power during the complex and difficult transition to modernization, a Communist takeover will prove impossible. Communists sense that once non-Communist methods have demonstrated that regular growth, social equity, and stable democratic political practice are attainable and mutually consistent goals, an historic opportunity will have passed them irreversibly by.

The Communists are, then, the scavengers of the modernization process. They prey on every division, weakness, and uncertainty that is likely to beset a society in the process of its transformation to a modern mold.

U.S. Relations With Developing Nations

What we see, then, sitting in Washington, is a situation where the interplay of the revolutions of modernization and nationalism, with Communist efforts to exploit their inherent frustrations, poses a set of major problems.

What is our policy?

Our first task, of course, is to assist those nations threatened by Communist aggression, direct or indirect, to maintain their independence. For those nations located along the borders of the Communist bloc, this has drawn the United States into a series of direct alliances designed to make clear that overt aggression by Communists against these nations would bring into play the full military power of the United States. Partly because of the success of the free world's effort in Korea, Communists have put their major reliance since that time on techniques of ideological attraction, subversion, and guerrilla warfare. In Southeast Asia, in the Caribbean, and in Africa we are now undergoing a critical test of whether

we can make those techniques as sterile as we rendered the earlier techniques of Communist aggression applied against Western Europe and Korea and the attempt to install missiles in Cuba.

Our second task is to assist the developing regions to the south to establish the longer run basis for their independence through programs of economic and technical assistance and trade. The balance between defense and construction we created in our initial response to Stalin's postwar offensive, in the form of the Truman Doctrine, on the one hand, and the Marshall Plan, on the other, remains relevant down to the present time in other regions; although there is, of course, a difference between the tasks of development and those of postwar European reconstruction. We must face, for example, the hard fact of Communist aggression in Southeast Asia; but we must also conduct programs of assistance, which are at least as important, and use our influence to encourage the governments in that region to get on with the tasks of modernization.

In Latin America, working with well-established international machinery of considerable sophistication, we work together in the Organization of American States, both to render sterile Castro's offensive of subversion and guerrilla warfare against the hemisphere and to make the great adventure of the Alliance for Progress come to life in this decade.

Third, we seek to be of such assistance as we can in achieving peaceful settlements of the regional conflicts which have threatened disintegration in parts of Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East, and important parts of Africa.

In trying to perform these functions—in trying to assist in the maintenance of the independence of nations, in their modernization, and in keeping peace in the regions—the United States finds itself often in a rather complicated position. Our friends in the developing countries are, in one part of their minds, pleased to receive our help and support; but, in another part of their minds, one of the major purposes of revolutions of nationalism and modernization is to achieve a higher degree of independence of the more advanced powers of the world

and, in particular, a higher degree of independence of the United States.

This ambivalence toward the United States we understand very well indeed. As I suggested earlier, we are, after all, the first of the nations to have broken away from colonialism. We were forced to make our way on the world scene amidst more advanced powers, toward whose struggles against one another we practiced a policy of isolation and reserve.

But in the modern world the intimacy of communications and the character of weapons, combined with the Communist assault on the foundations of Western life, require of us all a common objective; namely, that we all do what we can, not merely to pursue conventional national interests but to contribute actively to the building of an orderly world community. Even though the modernizing nations in the south are understandably concentrated on their absorbing domestic tasks, we hope to see them assume enlarged responsibilities for mutual support in defending their independence, for mutual support in their tasks of development, for mutual support in the settlement of their intraregional conflicts. We welcome the impulse in Asia, Africa, and Latin America for the governments and peoples to take a more active role in their regions and on the world scene: for the interest of the United States is not to build an empire—it is to play our part in building an orderly world community.

The Hard Facts of Interdependence

This is a theme, I believe, which deserves some further exploration.

Although these nations and peoples stand at quite different levels of modernization than Western Europe and Japan, and although they command much lower levels of wealth and income, they share with the more advanced countries of the free world a major impulse and objective; namely, they wish to play an enlarged role in determining their own destinies.

In fashioning that role on a rational basis they, like the rest of us, confront certain hard facts of our interdependence. In security matters, for example, none of us—rich or poor—is in a position to guarantee his own security outside the framework of collective arrange-

ments. This is as true of security against Communist techniques of indirect aggression as it is of security against aggression by conventional forces as in Korea, by nuclear blackmail as in Berlin and Cuba in 1961-62, or in the deterrence of nuclear aggression itself. In Southeast Asia, the Caribbean, and in Africa it will require concerted efforts by those in the region, aided by their friends outside, to deter or to deal with guerrilla war conducted across frontiers.

The first and most fundamental limitation on us all in the modern world, in seeking to shape our own national destinies, is the imperatives of interdependence in the field of security.

Second, we are bound even more closely and inextricably together through interdependence in the field of trade, in monetary affairs, and in movements of capital and technology. With respect to the developing countries, in particular, external assistance is of critical importance for many of them in the process of modernization.

How then are developing nations to find ways to diminish their dependence and to increase the dignity of their position, while accepting the international ties required for their security and their development? The answer may lie in following something like the pattern pioneered in postwar Europe and in European relations with the United States.

It is worth recalling that what bound Europe and the United States together from the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan forward was more than a commitment to defend the whole area against Stalin's murderous intent. It was a common desire to revive Europe, to unite it to the maximum possible, and to create in Europe a dignified and effective partner of the United States on a global basis.

In my work in Latin America I find many of the same thoughts and feelings astir that I knew as well in Europe in the immediate postwar years. There, too, men are emerging who are determined to put their nations on their feet, to set them firmly on the path of self-sustained growth. There, too, are men who are anxious to establish a larger and more dignified role for themselves and their countries in dealing with the United States and the whole world community; and, as part of this effort, one can

observe, as in postwar Europe, strong impulses to regional integration.

The predominant mood in Latin America, as in Europe, is not, as nearly as I can perceive it, to break away from the United States. It is to find means of settling a certain range of Latin American problems on a Latin American basis and to deal with the United States, Europe, and the rest of the world from a foundation of increased dignity and effectiveness in areas of inescapable interdependence.

Although institutions capable of supporting such enterprises are less advanced in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa than in Latin America, it may well be that we shall see in the years ahead the emergence of similar regional arrangements—arrangements which are not designed to close off contact from the rest of the world, which respect the irreducible interdependencies of the modern world, but which also give to the developing nations of a region a foundation more firm for their relations with one another and with those outside than can be found on a simple national basis. For example, the Organization of African Unity exists. Despite the inevitable vicissitudes of a young institution, it handled skillfully the disputes between Ethiopia and Somalia and between Algeria and Morocco; in the field of economic development, for example, an African Development Bank has been born.

Meanwhile in the Far East efforts go forward to create an Asian Development Bank, and, with respect to security arrangements, an elaborate set of bilateral and multilateral ties exist between Asian and non-Asian powers. These have been formed *ad hoc* to meet a sequence of security problems as they arose in the postwar years. We may see in the years ahead the emergence of new groupings, notably in the face of the Chinese Communist nuclear capability.

What I am suggesting is this: Although the process can now only be dimly perceived—and it will certainly be long and arduous—there may be a kind of repetition in the other regions of the world of the pattern that we achieved in a generation of postwar work in Europe and across the Atlantic—an effort that is still incomplete and must still be carried forward in many directions.

Common Mission Among the Atlantic Nations

I evoke this possibility here in Germany because it may be our common mission among the Atlantic nations to help encourage the formation of such groupings and to work with them systematically on an Atlantic basis as they take shape.

With respect to Latin America, it is the explicit hope of all of us in the Western Hemisphere, for example, that Europe join the United States and others in working systematically through the machinery we have created in the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP). We are pleased that in the country reviews within CIAP a representative of the Development Assistance Committee of OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] will take part this year and at least one European country will be represented on a national basis as well.

We may, for example, all wish to explore together the implications and the possibilities opened up by the suggestion of Mr. Robert Gardiner, Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa, that economic aid to Africa be organized on a more systematic multilateral basis; and surely the Atlantic nations as a whole share with the United States a vital interest in both the security of free Asia and its economic development—never more than now, when the emergence of a Chinese Communist nuclear capability raises the question of a possible nuclear confrontation in Asia as well as in Europe. We all should be alert to the possibilities of working in concert with such new institutions as may emerge; for example, the Asian Development Bank.

We in the Atlantic came together in the postwar years to master the threat of aggression and to revive the economic, social, and political life of Western Europe. We have extended that agenda to critical fields of trade and monetary affairs. And we are all further committed to work together for the unity of Germany and for a settlement in Central Europe based on the principles of self-determination and security for all.

In the developing nations each European nation has played a role rooted in its historic national interests or in its current national po-

political or economic interests. And these policies have contributed and are contributing greatly to stability and progress; for example, the British in Malaysia, the French in the African *communauté*. But, in fact, the underlying interests of all of us in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America are common interests. The outcome in Southeast Asia, for example, is a vital interest of free men everywhere, as is the success or failure of the economic development efforts of India and Pakistan or the nations of Latin America.

Our policies in the Atlantic must increasingly reflect that underlying common interest. The more systematic organization of the developing regions may not only give them a chance to concert more effectively than in the past but also provide us the occasion for a higher degree of concert.

Partnership for Order and Progress

Let me return now to the title of my talk: "The Role of Emerging Nations in World Politics." I believe their role should be like that of all the rest of us: to work together to form in their regions areas of peace and order, of sanity and regular progress; to work with self-respect and dignity with others in their inescapable areas of interdependence; and to make the maximum contribution they can to converting this dangerous and disorderly planet into a world community living and operating in the spirit and by the rules of the United Nations Charter.

As one who has been privileged to share in the experience of European and Atlantic development since 1945, but has also had the privilege of working with governments and peoples at such earlier stages of development, I am drawn toward this conclusion: Ultimately these differences in stages of modernization are perhaps not so important as certain common underlying aspirations.

It is true, of course, that peoples in the emerging nations suffer from poverty, hunger, and illiteracy on a scale we in the Atlantic

world no longer know. In some cases they are new to national political life and to the international arena. Both economically and politically we must be conscious of these differences in stages of development and historical experience. And we should be as helpful as we can be and are permitted to be in moving them forward.

But beyond these differences are the deeper universal desires of men and nations to shape their own destiny where they can; to conduct their relations of dependence and interdependence with dignity where they cannot; and to try, in ways harmonious with their own traditions and their own ambitions, to make an environment for their children which is safer, which provides more welfare and a greater range of expression for independent talent and personality than contemporary life affords.

It is, I believe, our interest and our duty in the Atlantic world to work together across barriers of relative development, of differing cultures, and of painful memories from the past, to bring them forward into that partnership in maintaining order and progress on this small planet which our common humanity demands.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on March 17 confirmed the following nominations:

Walter M. Kotschnig to be the representative of the United States to the 21st session of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

Armin H. Meyer to be Ambassador to Iran. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated February 11.)

Dwight J. Porter to be Ambassador to the Republic of Lebanon. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 63 dated March 29.)

Foreign Aid and the Balance of Payments

*Statement by David E. Bell
Administrator, Agency for International Development*¹

Thank you for the privilege of appearing before this committee. As Administrator of the Agency for International Development, I am particularly pleased that these hearings are being held, for they present an excellent opportunity to give the facts to the Congress and to attempt to clear up some of the misconceptions surrounding the relation of aid to our balance of payments.

Foreign aid is by its very nature closely involved with the flow of payments. Thus each action and step taken by AID is and must be evaluated from the point of view of our balance-of-payments situation.

The foreign aid program provides goods and services to other countries which they cannot obtain through normal means—through their export earnings and through obtaining capital on commercial terms and by private investment. A successful aid program is one which enables the recipient country to strengthen its economy to the point where it can obtain goods and services it needs for steady expansion and growth by normal trade and normal capital movements—and without further need for aid grants and soft loans. This is what was achieved in Western Europe under the Marshall Plan and has since been achieved in Japan, Spain, Greece, Taiwan, and other countries.

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on International Finance of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on Mar. 9.

It is plainly important to seek to carry out this important national program, like any other, at minimum cost to the United States.

In the first years of the U.S. foreign aid program after World War II, during the Marshall Plan and most of the 1950's, our aid appropriations were, in general, spent wherever in the world prices were lowest. During the Marshall Plan period, of course, the United States was the only major source in the world for most of the goods those countries needed. Therefore most of the aid dollars, although not tied to U.S. procurement, were spent in this country. Later in the 1950's the revived European economies became increasingly effective competitors for U.S. aid purchases.

Beginning in 1959, in response to the changed situation of the U.S. balance of payments, our policies respecting aid purchases were changed. Today, with small exceptions, aid appropriations can only be spent in the United States for goods and services produced in this country. This has undoubtedly raised the cost to the Federal budget of providing a given amount of goods and services under the aid program since some items are being purchased with aid appropriations in the United States which could be bought more cheaply in other countries. But our present policies are intended to minimize the adverse effect of the aid program on the balance of payments, even if that results in some increased cost to the budget.

The "Accounting" Approach to Flow of Dollars

There are two approaches to measuring the impact of AID's expenditures on the balance of payments. The first, which might be called the "accounting" approach, measures the direct result of the AID spending: Are the dollars appropriated by the Congress spent directly in this country, or are they spent abroad or transferred to another country or to an international organization?

Under this method of measurement, which is similar to the Department of Commerce figures on the balance of payments, during fiscal year 1964—the latest data available—the gross adverse effect on the U.S. balance of payments of AID's economic assistance programs was about \$513 million.

We have now received preliminary estimates for the calendar year 1964 which show substantial further improvement. The payments abroad dropped to about \$400 million. This is offset by repayments of past assistance extended by AID and predecessor agencies of over \$150 million, making a net effect of about \$250 million.

The current expenditure rate under our economic assistance program is almost exactly \$2 billion per year. Thus in 1964, for every dollar of economic aid extended, 20 cents showed as a current adverse impact in our balance of payments—not considering current or future receipts.

Put the other way around, 80 percent of AID's expenditures last year represented not dollars going abroad but steel, machinery, fertilizer, and other goods and services purchased in the United States.

Under these circumstances, of course, a cut in AID appropriations would primarily reduce U.S. exports and would have only a very small effect on the balance of payments. Moreover, the proportion of appropriations spent in the United States is rising. Eighty-five percent of new obligations are being committed for direct expenditure in the United States.

The \$400 million of AID offshore payments in calendar 1964 is made up of the following major elements:

—\$120 million representing payments of

U.S. voluntary contributions to international organizations, such as U.N. agencies, the Indus River Project administered by the IBRD, and the Social Progress Trust Fund.

—\$78 million for commodity purchases in other less developed countries—cases where, for example, required goods are unavailable in the United States or shipping costs are too high.

—\$19 million for commodity purchases in other developed countries. These are either tag-end expenditures of major projects approved before aid was tied in 1959 or items unavailable from any other source, approved on a case-by-case waiver basis.

—\$66 million in cash transfers—transfers of funds made in a very few cases where normal procedures for providing assistance are not feasible or made in small amounts to cover local costs of technical assistance projects. The amount of such transfers has been reduced sharply in recent years and is expected to be only \$40 million in calendar 1965.

—\$30 million for local expenses of AID direct-hire personnel stationed abroad. This represents the local expenses which could not be met by use of Treasury-owned local currencies.

—\$87 million for other expenditures outside the United States. This includes payments by U.S. contractors for such necessary items as wages. It also includes payments to schools and hospitals abroad, disaster relief expenditures, offshore expenses of participants, and other project costs.

As indicated above, this \$400 million was offset by about \$150 million in repayments of principal and interest on loans extended by AID and its predecessor agencies.

Indirect Economic Effects

This then is the "accounting" measure of the direct flow of dollars abroad resulting from our economic aid program.

The true net economic effect of foreign assistance on our balance of payments cannot be measured so simply. This is because there are indirect effects not revealed by the direct accounts. A substantial portion of the dollars that go out under our aid program, to the

United Nations, for example, comes back through regular commercial channels for purchases of U.S. goods.

Dollars which go out and enter the economy of a less developed country may be used later by that country to buy needed goods in the U.S. market or may go through trade channels to a third country, which will use the dollars for purchase of goods in the U.S. market.

These are examples of the so-called "feedback" effect, which means that the effect of aid outflows on the U.S. balance of payments is overstated, because dollar outflows to a considerable extent are immediately reflected in increased U.S. export sales for dollars.

But there is another indirect effect in the opposite direction. When an aid recipient is able to buy U.S. imports under a tied loan—that is, has a letter of credit opened in a U.S. bank which can only be spent in the United States—then that country may use the tied dollars to buy goods that it would have otherwise bought with dollars it already owns. These other dollars—free exchange—are thus available for other purchases either in the United States or elsewhere. This is the so-called "substitution" effect, meaning that to some extent aid-financed imports are "substituted" for imports that would have been bought with "free" dollars, and to this extent the effect of tied aid on the U.S. balance of payments is understated.

There are no good estimates of the size of the feedback and substitution effects. Only indirect evidence is available. With respect to the question of how much substitution occurs, for example, it is clear that most of the less developed countries have severe shortages of dollars and need more goods from the United States than they can afford, even with the addition of aid. Furthermore, statistics do not indicate that a dropoff in commercial trade occurs when there is an increase in aid. Quite the opposite. The most frequently cited example is Latin America. While expenditures under the Alliance for Progress have been increasing over the past 3 years, so have Latin American purchases from the United States through regular commercial channels. In fact, according to preliminary estimates, commercial U.S. exports to Latin America increased by \$500 million in 1964 alone. Thus it is the best guess of the

economists who have studied these matters that the amount of substitution is relatively small.

Overall, it is our conclusion that the indirect economic effects of aid on our balance of payments roughly balance each other, and even allowing for some variation from time to time, the true effect of aid on our balance of payments would not differ very much in either direction from the figures shown by the accounting estimates referred to earlier.

To sum up, our balance-of-payments figures show, by the "accounting" measure, the share of our expenditures made directly for U.S. goods and services is 80 percent and rising and the share paid to foreigners and international organizations is 20 percent and falling. These figures do not take into account indirect effects, but it is our best guess that they would be little different if they did. AID dollars spent abroad which return quickly in payment for commercial exports roughly offset the amount of AID financing for goods that would have been exported anyway. As nearly as we can tell, these two imperfections roughly cancel each other out and 15-20 percent is a valid indication of the real adverse impact of aid on the U.S. balance of payments.

Relationship of Aid and U.S. Gold Holdings

I should like to say a word about the relationship of U.S. aid and holdings of U.S. gold.

Some aid recipients have bought gold from the United States in the past few years, mostly to finance their gold subscription to the International Monetary Fund. In the main, however, gold transactions between the United States and aid recipients result in a net gain in U.S. holdings. During 1964, for example, less developed countries purchased \$28 million worth of gold from the United States (of which all but \$3 million was subscribed to the IMF) but they sold \$89 million worth of gold to us for dollars in the same period.

There is thus no direct relation between aid and an outflow of gold to aid recipients. In fact, the reverse is true. The U.S. gold problem lies with the industrial countries of Europe, not in our relations with the aid recipient nations.

I have been speaking thus far of AID expend-

itures. There are other U.S. programs which can properly be referred to as foreign aid in a broad sense. I should like to mention these briefly, with a word about their balance-of-payments impact.

Military assistance consists principally of the provision of U.S.-produced military equipment. Taking into account the costs of U.S. personnel overseas to administer the program, some overseas training costs, and other overseas expenditures, the estimates are that over 85 percent of military assistance expenditures are made directly in the United States and the remainder are made offshore.

The Public Law 480 program provides U.S. surplus agricultural commodities by sale and donation to other countries. In view of the nature of the program, virtually all of the expenditures under it are made directly in the United States, with only minor and unavoidable offshore costs in foreign ports. The same is true of expenditures under the Export-Import Bank loans.

The Peace Corps expenditures are almost entirely for the living expenses of the volunteers abroad and for their training and supervision in the United States. It is estimated that about 75 percent of Peace Corps expenditures are made in the United States and about 25 percent offshore.

Finally, U.S. contributions to international agencies such as the International Development Association are paid in dollars and are shown in the Department of Commerce statistics as 100-percent outflows. In fact, however, a substantial share of the total expenditures of these international organizations is made in the United States. Consequently, the accounting estimate of balance-of-payments impact in this case overstates the true effect.

I should also like to stress that we are seeking in every way we can devices to use local currencies, owned by the United States as a result of Food for Peace sales or other U.S. assistance, to meet the local costs of our aid missions. The net effect of this policy is to enable us in many countries to substitute U.S.-produced commodities for what would otherwise be dollars used to purchase local currencies to cover the local costs of U.S. Government activities.

Offshore Expenditures Kept at Minimum

President Johnson's message of February 10² said:

Until we master our balance-of-payments problem, AID officials will send no aid dollar abroad that can be sent instead in the form of U.S. goods and services.

We are doing just that. I have asked that every project and every commodity order be closely examined. Waiver of tied procurement regulations will be allowed only when it is clearly justified in the U.S. interest. Local costs will be paid for out of U.S. local currency holdings wherever possible.

We expect, as I have indicated, to see some further increase in tied purchases and expenditures in the United States, but we are close to the limit. Some minimum offshore expenditures will remain—principally the local expenditures of our employees and those of our contractors who are stationed overseas, the contributions of the United States to international organizations, and a few special cases where tying to U.S. procurement is unfeasible or unwise.

The President, advised by his Cabinet Committee on the Balance of Payments, has concluded that this small remaining element of offshore expenditures under the aid program is a cost to our country which is far outweighed by the benefits to our own interests that will accrue from the achievement of economic and social progress in the less developed countries.

A similar judgment underlay the distinction drawn by the President in his recent balance-of-payments message between U.S. private investment abroad in advanced countries—which for the time being is to be discouraged—and U.S. private investment abroad in less developed countries, which the U.S. Government is continuing strongly to encourage.

Looking beyond the immediate present, the foreign aid program has a number of effects which are positively beneficial to our balance of payments.

First, our aid today is overwhelmingly in the form of dollar repayable loans—unlike the situation under the Marshall Plan, when 90 percent of our aid was in the form of grants.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 1, 1965, p. 282.

Future repayments of interest and principal on today's loans will be a positive factor in our balance of payments.

Secondly, the evidence is plain that countries which with our aid achieve steady economic growth become increasingly better markets for U.S. exports and more attractive places for U.S. investment abroad. Over the last 15 years our exports to Europe have doubled and our exports to Japan have tripled. As other countries—Spain, Greece, Taiwan, and so on—gain economic momentum and our aid comes to an end, the same kind of result is evident.

Moreover, the aid program in case after case has directly led to the introduction of American products and services in other countries and to follow-on markets unrelated to the aid program. Aid has in fact been one of our best export pro-

motion mechanisms.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to report that since 1961 we have steadily reduced the effect of foreign aid on our balance of payments. We are continuing the efforts to minimize the effect as part of the action program announced by President Johnson last month.

We will do more. But the upper limit may soon be reached, as the adverse impact has already been reduced to \$400 million, not including repayments.

In addition, it is important to recognize that a continuation of the present program will have a long-range positive impact on our balance of payments as a result of a dollar repayment flow, expanding markets for our exports, and improving opportunities for our private investment abroad.

Trade and the Balance of Payments

*Statement by G. Griffith Johnson
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs¹*

I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before this committee to discuss the problems of expanding exports as a contribution to the elimination of our balance-of-payments deficit. The continuation of large deficits in our balance of payments could create major difficulties for the achievement of our economic objectives of sound and steady growth at home and abroad. It is therefore urgent to reduce the deficit sharply and quickly—but without major damage to the international economy. The President's 10-point program meets that need.²

¹Made before the Subcommittee on International Finance of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on Mar. 16 (press release 43).

²For text of President Johnson's message to Congress on Feb. 10 (H. Doc. 83), see BULLETIN of Mar. 1, 1965, p. 282.

In a number of major respects the international financial situation of the United States currently presents a paradox. In 1964 we had an unprecedented surplus in trade and services—\$5.9 billion on commercial account. We had an unprecedented trade surplus—\$3.7 billion in commercial trade—more than 2½ times as large as that of West Germany, whose trade surplus was the second largest in the world.

Since 1960 we have improved our commercial surplus by \$2.2 billion and reduced the net deficit in commercial trade—more than 2½ times by \$1.2 billion. This total improvement of \$3.4 billion almost matches the \$3.9 billion deficit in 1960. Yet in 1964 we still had a deficit of \$3 billion.

What happened, as you know, is that over this period there has been a large increase in

the outflow of private capital, which increased by over \$2¼ billion between 1960 and 1964. Almost \$2 billion of the increase came in 1964 alone, when the gross outflow exceeded \$6¼ billion. It was therefore quite appropriate that the President's program—while calling for action in all areas of international accounts, including exports—focused attention on the capital outflow to the developed countries. This is the area responsible for the persistence of the deficit and where major improvement must be sought at this time.

My main theme here, however, is trade. There is one point I would like to make about the measure of our commercial trade surplus. The figure of \$3.7 billion is exclusive of our Government-financed exports, such as sales under P.L. 480 and our aid programs. If we were to include these exports of goods and services, our trade surplus would be almost \$6.6 billion and our total current account surplus would be \$9.4 billion. We do not include them in an analysis of our current trade position because their contribution to our balance of payments will be spread over a very long period. For example, in 1964 we received dollar repayments of some \$150 million on previous aid loans and used almost \$300 million worth of foreign currencies generated under these programs to substitute for dollar expenditures.

World Competitive Position of U.S.

The performance of our exports recently is reassuring about our world competitive position. In the late fifties and early sixties our exporting industries have had to adjust to the emergence of Western Europe and Japan as major exporters to the world as the process of rehabilitating their domestic economies was virtually completed.

It was in that period that extreme concern was expressed about the loss of the U.S. competitive position in the world. Our share of world exports was declining from the abnormally high levels achieved after World War II, when we were the major supplier to the world. This decline appears to have bottomed out in 1963, and in 1964 we actually increased our share of world exports substantially.

We have been aided in this recovery by a

number of factors: (1) the remarkable stability in our wholesale price level since 1958 while prices for our principal competitors have been rising; (2) our leadership in industrial technology; (3) substantial growth in the economies of Europe, Japan, and Canada; and (4) increased accessibility to major markets abroad as a result of negotiated reductions in tariffs and the elimination of other trade restrictions.

Part of the past decline in U.S. exports as a percentage of world exports can be attributed to the abnormally rapid growth of trade among the countries of the EEC [European Economic Community] and, to a lesser extent, of the EFTA [European Free Trade Association]. Because of tariff reductions within these groups, their internal trade has naturally expanded faster than it otherwise would have, and faster than their trade with the entire world. To get a more objective assessment of the U.S. share of world exports, it is appropriate to exclude intra-EEC trade from the calculation. Using this approach, the U.S. share has declined only marginally—from 17.4 percent in 1960 to 17 percent in 1964—and was higher in 1964 than in any year since 1960.

While our export position today refutes the pessimists of some years ago, competitiveness is a dynamic factor and the loss of it is always a potential threat. Furthermore, while we believe there is cause for optimism over the longer pull, it must be kept in mind that there is no assurance that the trade surplus will develop favorably in any given year.

There is another aspect of competitiveness that should be noticed. In assessing competitiveness, one generally focuses on what is happening to our share of world exports. But the size of imports obviously plays an equal role in determining the size of the trade surplus. In this connection it is relevant to point out two things:

1. As our share of world exports was declining, our share of world imports was also declining. If we start with 1960, for example, we find that our share of world imports declined somewhat faster than our share of commercial world exports. Since the flow of imports reflects in large part the competitiveness of a

country's industries against foreign producers, it would appear that internally the competitive position of the United States has improved vis-a-vis foreign suppliers.

2. Between 1960 and 1964 we increased our exports by \$4.8 billion. Since our imports also increased by less than \$4 billion, our commercial trade surplus increased by \$900 million. Based on this 4-year experience, I think we must recognize that further substantial increases in our trade surplus will at best require a substantial period of time.

Geographical Distribution of U.S. Trade Surplus

Another important aspect of our trade surplus is its geographical distribution. One point stands out clearly. Our commercial trade surplus is predominantly with our competitors.

Dividing the world into two groups—Western Europe, Japan, and Canada on the one hand, and the rest of the world on the other—we find that in 1964 we ran a commercial surplus of between \$3.9 and \$4 billion with the advanced countries and a commercial deficit of between \$200 and \$300 million with the rest of the world. (We export far more to the rest of the world than we import, but when we deduct the aid-financed exports the result is a small commercial deficit.) More than 75 percent of the commercial surplus came from Western Europe and the balance from Japan and Canada. Moreover—and this is important—about 40 percent of our trade surplus was with the Common Market. Our increase in exports to the Common Market since 1960 has been almost double the increase in our imports from there—about \$1 billion of exports as against something under \$500 million of increased imports.

The record clearly shows that we have been able to improve our commercial trade surplus with both Western Europe and the Common Market since 1960 in spite of some decline in our share of world exports.

In this analysis I have concentrated on the trade surplus. This, however, is only part, although by far the largest part, of our transactions in goods and services with these countries. If we took into account tourism, income from investments, shipping expenditures, and

the like, as well as trade, the qualitative picture would probably still be about the same. However, the distribution of our surplus on services would be quite different—returns on direct investment, for example, come mainly from the less advanced countries while our tourist expenditures would be heavily in the advanced countries. To go into this aspect although a vital one in any overall assessment would lead me too far afield from my main topic.

What I have tried to indicate is that the trade account has been a main bulwark of our total balance-of-payments picture in recent years and in any longrun solution of our balance-of-payments problem must play a significant role. Our trade performance has, on the whole, been an encouraging demonstration of the fundamental competitiveness of American industry and agriculture.

Barriers Which Impede U.S. Exports

We think, however, that our trade performance could be even better in a world with fewer impediments to the flow of goods among countries. The committee, I am sure, shares this view and has expressed interest in a more detailed analysis of the barriers which impede our exports. These barriers are both of a tariff and a nontariff nature. Even though I shall treat these two types separately for purposes of discussion, they obviously are part of an inseparable whole since, if any country wants to keep out foreign goods, a tariff barrier, a nontariff barrier, or a combination of both can serve the same end. However, of the two types, it has generally been felt that the nontariff barrier is the greater obstruction to trade. A complete prohibition against imports, for example, of the type that the United Kingdom imposes against American coal, cannot be overcome; a tariff, if its level is not excessively high, does permit trade, as witness the flow of American goods to all countries of the world over tariff barriers. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) recognizes this distinction and is designed to bring about both the elimination of nontariff barriers and the reciprocal lowering of tariff levels.

Following the Second World War, during the period when everyone thought in terms of a dollar shortage, the countries of Western Europe adopted a series of measures to limit their dollar expenditures for nonessential goods and services. Nontariff barriers, and, in particular, quantitative import restrictions, were the major devices used for this purpose. At that point in time, these restrictions did not cut seriously into U.S. exports, since European countries were in any event spending all the dollars they earned or were given by us under the Marshall Plan. As Europe recovered and European dollar shortages turned into substantial European holdings of dollars, their import restrictions began to become meaningful and the United States Government was extremely vigorous in seeking their elimination.

In the industrial field this objective has been largely achieved. The industrial items of export interest to the United States which still remain subject to overt quantitative restrictions in Western Europe are now only a handful. The Danes restrict the import of washing machines; the Austrians have some 12 industrial items under restriction; Spain's restrictions are considerably more extensive, but even here the situation has considerably improved as compared with that of a few years ago. On the other side of the world, Japan has been undergoing a rapid process of removing quantitative restrictions, but its restrictions still are more extensive than those in Western Europe.

I shall not take your time with excessive detail. However, I would like to call your attention to a compilation the Department of State prepared for the Joint Economic Committee, which appears in annex A of a Joint Committee print of 1963 on *The United States Balance of Payments—Perspectives and Policies*, on the quantitative restrictions then maintained by certain foreign countries. In addition, I would like to call your attention to State Department documents released early in 1964³ and again in 1964⁴ on the recent progress achieved in eliminating or reducing foreign barriers to U.S. exports.

³ *Ibid.*, Feb. 10, 1964, p. 214.

⁴ Not printed here.

I have been careful to stress the word "industrial" when talking of the post-World War II progress in reducing quantitative restrictions against our exports in Western Europe and Japan. Agricultural trade, including many processed foodstuffs, still remains encumbered by a myriad of trade restrictions whose complexity almost defies complete analysis. These barriers are also changing in character. For example, as the European Common Market moves to its common agricultural policy, it has eliminated quantitative restrictions on many products and then replaced these by a system of variable levies, which in principle provide just as effective—perhaps even more effective—protection for their farm products. The Joint Economic Committee report which I cited will show that the bulk of the restrictions facing our exports in Europe are in the agricultural field.

However, even here, the picture is not all bleak. We have had some success in reducing and eliminating barriers in this field. The documents I cited will show this. In 1964, for example, we obtained some liberalization by Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Japan, among others, on agricultural products significant to American farmers. The trade figures bear this out. Our commercial agricultural exports in 1962 were \$3.5 billion and rose to about \$4.6 billion in 1964. In addition, P.L. 480 and other aid-financed exports ran about \$1.7 billion in 1964. Even to the countries of the Common Market, 1964 was a good year for agricultural exports; our agricultural exports to these six countries increased from \$1.2 billion to \$1.4 billion from 1963 to 1964—all of them commercial.

In addition to agriculture, European restrictions against the import of U.S. coal remain onerous. As I indicated earlier, the United Kingdom has a complete import embargo against U.S. coal for all practical purposes; Germany has a limited tariff quota; other countries have comparable devices to restrict their coal imports from us. These restrictions prevent the export of a substantial volume of U.S. coal. Since the United States is an efficient producer of coal, we are particularly concerned

about these restrictions and will continue to press vigorously for their reduction and removal.

There are types of nontariff barriers other than quantitative restrictions. For example, we are concerned about road taxes in Western Europe which we believe hit unfairly against American cars as compared with European cars. These taxes may have helped induce automobile investment in Europe by our producers to manufacture European-type cars there. In this case the nontariff tax barrier is augmented by relatively high tariffs, and the combination probably has been significant.

I have spoken at some length about European nontariff barriers. In order to bring this into balance, I should note that the United States also has its nontariff barriers. The Europeans, for example, complain of our import restrictions in agriculture, particularly for dairy products. They are particularly upset about our American selling-price rule for levying import duties on various products, mainly chemicals. Other policies complained about on both sides are "buy domestic" practices and anti-dumping procedures. I mention these to indicate that the discussion of nontariff barriers has nearly all countries as both the accusers and the accused.

Significance of the Kennedy Round

I would like to say a few words about tariffs. We have made remarkable progress in reducing tariffs among developed countries since the reciprocal trade agreements program was instituted in the early 1930's, and particularly through the negotiations held under the GATT since shortly after World War II. We are now engaged in what could be the most ambitious trade negotiating exercise ever, in the Kennedy Round, under the authority provided in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.

In terms of American investment abroad, as well as trade, the Kennedy Round can be of great significance. Since the formation of the European Common Market and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), tariffs among the member countries have been reduced by 70 percent. In a few years member countries of

these groupings will pay no tariffs at all on their exports to each other. By contrast, our exporters will face tariffs, the so-called common external tariff in the case of the Common Market and the individual country tariffs in the case of EFTA. In short, in contrast to their member country competitors, our exporters will face serious tariff barriers.

Much of the investment moving from the United States to Europe has been motivated by the desire to get inside these barriers. I think it is fair to say that the higher the level of tariffs of the EEC and the EFTA, the more reason our producers will have to operate inside the tariff barriers in order to avoid having to overcome them. We therefore believe that a successful Kennedy Round can be a crucial factor in moderating the flow of U.S. investment into the EEC and EFTA countries. The lower their tariffs, the lower the incentive to get inside the tariff walls.

Over and above the investment impact, of course, we have a large trade stake in the Kennedy Round. This stake is worldwide in scope—nearly two-thirds of our commercial exports go to countries outside Europe—but the issue is perhaps focused most sharply in relation to the new regional groupings in Europe. As the EEC and the EFTA move forward in dismantling their internal trade barriers, the degree of discrimination grows against outsiders. As the EEC moves toward a common agricultural policy, with a heavily protected market for its producers, the world's agricultural exporters face increasing difficulties.

In these great regional markets, as indeed in others as well, the vital element is not only the competitiveness of our industry but also the opportunity to display this competitiveness through reduced trade barriers. This obviously works both ways. The lower our tariffs, the more competitive our industries must also be in the face of foreign competition. Our postwar trade record—and our trade performance last year—has made clear that, overall, our industry and agriculture are able to compete. It is the opportunity to compete which we believe a successful Kennedy Round will help to maintain and enhance.

Lead To Improve Monetary System

The question may be raised whether much quicker progress in our exports could be made if those countries which are complaining about "excess dollars" created by our deficits would spend them on imports from the United States. This question makes the basic point that the responsibility for solving major balance-of-payments problems—for facilitating the adjustment process under modern-day conditions—should fall both on the surplus and the deficit countries. We support this position fully.

However, some perspective is needed on the role of the additional dollars created by U.S. deficits. Of the almost \$26 billion held by foreigners, about \$15 billion is held by official monetary authorities. Two points should be made about these official holdings. Historically, the accumulation of dollars was desired to build up reserves to needed levels. By building up these reserves, the shift to convertibility and the reduction of restrictions on trade were made possible. The whole world has been a beneficiary of these developments. At the same time it is clear that the addition of dollars to official reserves cannot continue indefinitely as in recent years. Ideally, countries which find themselves faced with too large an inflow of dollars could, while legitimately urging an end to U.S. deficits, also take measures to assist the adjustment process. One cannot say in advance what should be the proper mix of policy instruments for any one country, but the possibilities are there.

In the case of the almost \$11 billion held by the private sector it should be noted that all these dollars are held voluntarily. Indeed, in 1964 most of the deficit was financed by the dollar accumulations of the private sector. These privately held dollars are used, among other things, for the purpose of financing world trade, to the benefit of all concerned.

These issues go to the heart of the effectiveness of our international monetary system. While its postwar performance in expanding trade and output has been remarkable, it has depended in major measure for additional liquidity on U.S. deficits. These deficits cannot be allowed to continue, and therefore, as previous witnesses

before this committee have testified, the need is for improving the international monetary system to provide necessary financing facilities for world trade and investment without such heavy dependence on the United States.

President Recommends Increase of U.S. Quota in Monetary Fund

The White House on March 17 made public the following letter from President Johnson to Hubert H. Humphrey, President of the Senate. The President sent an identical letter to John W. McCormack, Speaker of the House of Representatives.

White House press release dated March 17

MARCH 17, 1965

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The International Monetary Fund has played a key role in the flourishing economic growth experienced by the Free World in the last two decades. An expansion of the Fund's resources is now needed if it is to continue to contribute effectively to Free World growth in the future. The United States has given its firm support to the Fund since its creation in the Bretton Woods Agreements of 1945. This support must continue.

I recommend to the Congress that the quota of the United States in the International Monetary Fund be increased by twenty-five percent along with the similar or greater increases proposed for other members. The increases proposed for all members will raise Fund quotas by about \$5 billion and bring total quotas to \$21 billion. This expansion is vital to the United States. It will:

—promote the orderly and stable growth of Free World trade and payments in which we so importantly participate;

—maintain the strength and central position of the Fund in the evolution of the international monetary system;

—help finance the temporary swings in balance of payments associated with the growing volume of international transactions;

—support the expansion of bilateral credit facilities which have contributed to the development of the international monetary system; and

—provide to the Fund other major currencies to meet drawings that have mainly been financed by dollars in the past, and thus strengthen the present payments system.

Demands on the Fund's resources have steadily risen as the volume of world trade and financial transactions has grown. In the past five years drawings on the Fund have averaged over \$1 billion per year; during the period 1955-1959, the annual average was \$440 million. This increased use of the Fund reflects both the great expansion of current international transactions since 1959 and the increasingly large international movement of capital since the return to convertibility of the major European currencies. Increased use of the Fund has been especially marked among the large industrial countries. Since 1962 Canada, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States have either drawn on Fund resources or entered into standby arrangements or both.

A significant change in the holdings of the Fund has also occurred. For many years the U.S. dollar was the only currency extensively drawn by other member nations. But because of our balance of payments deficits, the Fund has increasingly provided other currencies to drawing members. As a result its holdings of major currencies other than dollars and sterling have declined by over \$1 billion since 1959. The proposed quota increase will substantially enlarge the Fund's holdings of these currencies.

Moreover, the Fund's credit facilities have been directly useful to the United States. Prior to 1958, the United States attained a large creditor position because of the extensive lending of dollars by the Fund. From 1958 to 1963 reversal of our earlier Fund creditor position financed over \$1 billion of our payments deficit; and since 1963, we have made net drawings of \$260 million of the Fund's resources for this same purpose.

I am transmitting legislation which would authorize the United States Governor of the

Fund to agree to an increase of \$1,035 million in the United States quota, bringing our total quota to \$5,160 million. Three-fourths of the increase, or \$776 million, will be obligated in dollars but will be expended only as needed by the Fund. The remaining \$259 million will be payable in gold. In return for this gold payment, the United States will receive a substantially equivalent reserve asset in the form of a virtually automatic drawing right on the Fund. Arrangements have been made both to minimize the amount of gold sales by the United States to other Fund members for their gold subscription payments, and to mitigate the impact of any purchases that may occur.

The National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems has prepared a report which is being sent separately to the Congress.¹ The report will provide background information for the use of the Congress, and strongly endorses the proposed quota increase.

The increased Fund quotas will contribute importantly to the economic health of the Free World. The increase is clearly in the interest of the United States. I urge that Congress give prompt and favorable consideration to this legislation.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Enclosure.

A BILL

To amend the Bretton Woods Agreements Act to authorize an increase in the International Monetary Fund quota of the United States

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Bretton Woods Agreements Act, as amended (22 U.S.C. 286-286k-1), is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"Sec. 20(a) The United States Governor of the Fund is authorized to consent to an increase of \$1,035,000,000 in the quota of the United States in the Fund.

"(b) In order to pay the increase in the United States subscription to the Fund provided for in this section, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated \$1,035,000,000, to remain available until expended."

¹ *Special Report to the President and to the Congress on Proposed Increases on Quotas of the International Monetary Fund*, March 1965.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences¹

In Recess as of April 1, 1965

Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament (recessed Sept. 17, 1964).	Geneva	Mar. 14, 1962-
U.N. General Assembly: 19th Session (recessed Feb. 18 until September).	New York	Dec. 1, 1964-

Scheduled April Through June 1965

OECD Energy Committee: <i>Ad Hoc</i> Drafting Group	Paris	Apr. 1-2
ICAO Legal Subcommittee on Air Traffic Control Liability	Montreal	Apr. 1-15
OECD Development Assistance Committee: Regional Meeting	Paris	Apr. 5-6
FAO Technical Advisory Committee on Locust Control	Rome	Apr. 5-9
ECE Inland Transport Committee: Working Group on Transport of Dangerous Goods.	Geneva	Apr. 5-9
U.N. Committee on Appropriateness of Studying the Definition of Aggression.	New York	Apr. 5-9
WMO Regional Association VI (Europe): 4th Session	Paris	Apr. 5-24
OECD Special Committee for Iron and Steel	Paris	Apr. 6-8
Inter-American Children's Institute: 46th Session of Directing Council.	Montevideo	Apr. 6-9
UNCTAD Trade and Development Board	New York	Apr. 6-23
U.N. Committee of 24	New York	Apr. 6-
CENTO Ministerial Council: 13th Session	Tehran	Apr. 7-8
ITU Administrative Council	Geneva	Apr. 12-May 18
U.N. ECOSOC Statistical Commission	New York	Apr. 13-May 3
PAHO Executive Committee: 51st Meeting	Washington	Apr. 19-26
International Whaling Commission: Special Session	London	Apr. 20-23
IA-ECOSOC Permanent Technical Committee on Ports: Meeting of Experts.	Lima	Apr. 20-May 1
UNESCO Executive Board: 70th Session	Paris	Apr. 20-May 20
FAO Consultative Subcommittee on the Economic Aspects of Rice: 9th Session.	Rome	Apr. 21-28
ILO Asian Maritime Conference	Tokyo	Apr. 21-30
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 20th Plenary Session	Geneva	Apr. 21-May 7
ICAO Panel of Teletypewriter Specialists: 6th Meeting	Montreal	Apr. 21-May 7
FAO Program Committee: 9th Session	Rome	Apr. 21-May 7
FAO Finance Committee	Rome	Apr. 21-May 7
FAO Joint Finance and Program Committee	Rome	Apr. 26-28
ECE Joint Study Group on Simplification and Standardization of Export Documents.	Geneva	Apr. 26-30
OECD Agriculture Committee	Paris	Apr. 26-30

¹ This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on Mar. 19, 1965, lists international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period April-June 1965. The list does not include numerous nongovernmental conferences and meetings. Persons interested in these are referred to the *World List of Future International Meetings*, compiled by the Library of Congress and available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.

Following is a key to the abbreviations: BIRPI, United International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property; CCIR, Comité consultatif international des radio communications; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; IOC, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OAS, Organization of American States; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; OIE, Office of International Epizootics; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNCTAD, United Nations Committee on Trade and Development; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; UPU, Universal Postal Union; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

Calendar of International Conferences—Continued

Scheduled April Through June 1965—Continued

UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Meeting on Seismic Seawave Warning System.	Honolulu	Apr. 26-30
Inter-American Development Bank: 6th Meeting of Board of Governors.	Asunción	Apr. 26-30
NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping	London	Apr. 26-30
International Sugar Council: 19th Session	London	Apr. 26-May 3
FAO/ECAFE Technical Meeting on Planning the Use of Land for Agricultural and Economic Development in Asia and the Far East.	Bangkok	Apr. 26-May 5
U.N. ECOSOC Social Commission (and its <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee): 17th Session.	New York	Apr. 26-May 1
OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee	Paris	Apr. 27-29
ICEM Executive Committee: 25th Meeting	Geneva	Apr. 27-30
SEATO Military Advisers: 22d Meeting	London	Apr. 28-30
North Pacific Fisheries Commission: Subcommittee on Oceanography.	Vancouver, B.C.	April
GATT Groups on Cereals, Meats, and Dairy Products	Geneva	April
SEATO Council of Ministers: 10th Meeting	London	May 3-5
ICEM Council: 23d Session	Geneva	May 3-7
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 10th Session	London	May 3-7
Economic Commission for Latin America: 11th Session	Santo Domingo	May 4-8
World Health Organization: 18th Assembly.	Geneva	May 4-21
OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices	Paris	May 5-7
OECD Committee for Scientific Research: Consultative Group	Paris	May 10 (1 day)
UNHCR Executive Committee: 13th Session	Geneva	May 10-19
UNCTAD Special Committee on Preferences	New York	May 10-28
NATO Ministerial Council: 34th Meeting	London	May 11-13
OECD Committee for Scientific Research: 13th Session	Paris	May 11-13
ICAO All-Weather Operations Panel	Montreal	May 11-24
U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Industrial Development: 5th Session.	New York	May 11-31
International Conference on Petroleum and the Sea	Monaco	May 12-20
18th International Film Festival	Cannes	May 12-27
ECAFE Working Party on Housing and Building Materials: 8th Session.	Bangkok	May 13-21
UPU Executive Council: Regular Session	Bern	May 14-22
ECE Electric Power Committee: Meeting on Requirements for Electric Power.	Istanbul	May 17-22
International Cotton Advisory Committee: 24th Plenary Meeting	Washington	May 17-30
OECD Development Assistance Committee: Annual Review of U.S. Aid.	Paris	May 18-19
International Rubber Study Group: Management Committee	Washington	May 18-22
OAS Special Inter-American Conference	Rio de Janeiro	May 20-June 5
ILO Governing Body: 162d Session	Geneva	May 21-29
WMO Executive Board: 36th Session	Geneva	May 24-25
U.N. ECE Committee on Housing, Building and Planning: Working Party on Population and Housing Censuses.	Geneva	May 24-27
IMCO Working Group on Watertight Subdivision and Damage Stability of Passenger and Cargo Ships.	London	May 24-28
FAO/WHO Committee of Government Experts on the Code of Principles Concerning Milk and Milk Products: 8th Session.	Rome	May 24-29
International Seed Testing Association: 14th Congress	Munich	May 24-June 1
WMO Executive Committee: 17th Session	Geneva	May 27-June 1
IMCO Working Group on Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea: 9th Session.	London	May 31-June 4
FAO/OIE International Meeting on Hog Cholera and African Swine Fever.	Rome	May 31-June 5
U.N. Committee on Scientific Effects of Atomic Radiation: 14th Session.	Geneva	May
CENTO Council for Scientific Education and Research	London	May
U.N. Legal Subcommittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space	New York or Geneva	May
OECD Economic Forecasters	Paris	May
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions	Geneva	May
UNCTAD Interim Coordinating Committee for International Commodity Arrangements.	London	May
BIRPI Meeting for Revision of Bern Copyright Convention	Geneva	May
NATO Food and Agriculture Planning Committee	Paris	May
Central American Ministers of Government/Interior (Security)	Panama	May
U.N. ECOSOC Special Committee on Coordination	New York	June 1-7
U.N. ECOSOC Special Fund: 14th Session of Governing Council	New York	June 1-8

International Labor Conference: 49th Session	Geneva	June 2-24
UNICEF Committee on Administrative Budget	New York	June 3-4
UNESCO/IOC International Indian Ocean Expedition Coordinators.	Paris	June 7-9
UNICEF Program Committee	New York	June 7-11
IMCO Council: 14th Session	London	June 8-11
ITU CCIR Study Groups I, II, III, V, VI	Geneva	June 9-July 9
OECD Committee for Agriculture at Ministerial Level	Paris	June 10-11
UNESCO/IOC Bureau and Consultative Committee: 5th Session	Rome	June 14-18
Inter-American Commission of Women: 14th Assembly	Santiago	June 14-23
UNICEF Executive Board	New York	June 14-23
U.N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee	Geneva	June 14-25
UNCTAD Expert Group on Monetary and Financial Questions	New York	June 14-July 9
OECD Special Committee for Oil	Paris	June 15-16
OECD Energy Committee	Paris	June 17-18
FAO Council: 44th Session	Rome	June 21-30
OECD Interim Science Committee	Paris	June 22-23
ICAO Assembly: 15th Session	Montreal	June 22-July 19
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 32d Session	New York	June 23-
OECD Committee for Trade	Paris	June 24-25
U.N. 20th Anniversary Session	San Francisco	June 24-26
ILO Governing Body: 162d Session	Geneva	June 25 (1 day)
Pan American Institute of Geography and History: 8th General Assembly.	Guatemala	June 25-July 10
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 39th Session	Geneva	June 29-Aug. 6
OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel	Paris	June
International Whaling Commission: 7th Annual Meeting	London	June
FAO African Forestry Commission: 2d Session	East Africa	June
NATO Industrial Planning Committee	Paris	June
NATO Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport	Paris	June
NATO Science Committee	Paris	June
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 15th Annual Meeting and Scientific Committee Meeting.	Halifax, N.S	June
NATO Petroleum Planning Committee	Paris	June
GATT Trade and Development Committee	Geneva	June
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party II	Paris	June
OECD Development Assistance Committee: Ministerial Meeting	Paris	June
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party IV	Paris	June
OECD Tourism Committee	Paris	June
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 38th Session	Rome	June
U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space	New York	June

Security Council Recommends the Gambia for U.N. Membership

*Statement by Charles W. Yost*¹

Before making my statement on the subject of our agenda, I should like to join in welcoming to the Council table the four new members: Jordan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, and Uruguay. Each one of these nations has already proved in and out of the United Nations that it is devoted to the causes of the charter and of world peace. We are certain that they will continue to give to this Council the benefit of their unique experience and keen devotion to

the difficult tasks which lie before us.

We are happy, too, Mr. President [Arsène Assouan Usher] to welcome you as this month's Council President, and we trust that your tenure in this office will be as fruitful and as auspicious as on those previous occasions when you had so effectively presided over our meetings.

The United States is pleased to vote for the resolution now before the Council recommending the admission of the Gambia to the United Nations.

The Gambia's long history, culminating with the achievement of independence on February 18 of this year, has been one of an industrious people, enriched through its contact with several foreign cultures. The determination and sense of responsibility, the practice in democracy, with which the Gambian people have

¹Made in the Security Council on Mar. 15 (U.S./U.N. press release 4514). Mr. Yost is Deputy U.S. Representative in the Security Council.

advanced toward independence will now serve her well in her efforts to achieve, despite the inherent difficulties which the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom has outlined, the full measure of her economic and political potential. We are happy to hear that just as the United Kingdom has assisted the Gambia to independence so it will provide economic aid to help the new state toward a stable future.

The United States has long enjoyed cordial relations with the Gambia. It was, indeed, a special honor for us to be host to Prime Minister and Mrs. [D. K.] Jawara last year when they visited the United States for a month. This visit established a basis of friendship and understanding which we are confident will continue to strengthen relations between our two countries. It reciprocated, in fact, a visit to the Gambia during World War II of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who thus became the first American President to visit the Continent of Africa. President Roosevelt's first stop on that trip was Bathurst, and he stayed there both en route to and from the Casablanca conference in January 1943.

In the ensuing years, exchanges of visits between the Gambia and the United States have continued. Some 20 Gambians are studying here now. If I may be permitted to inject a personal note, Mr. President, my son is rooming at the university with one of the Gambian students here. We hope that many more will come to the United States in the future.

In the realm of world affairs, Prime Minister Jawara has left no doubt of the Gambia's will to contribute to the building of world peace. The United States welcomes the Gambia, therefore, as a future member of the United Nations with the conviction that the Gambia's role in this body will be a positive and constructive one. In the important work which stands before all of us, we wish her all success and Godspeed.²

²The Council on Mar. 15 unanimously recommended that the Gambia be admitted to membership in the United Nations.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

General Assembly

Report of the United National Conference on Trade and Development. Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions of the administrative and financial implications of the recommendations in the Final Act relating to institutional machinery. A/5837. December 18, 1964. 11 pp.

Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Note by the Secretary-General submitting the text of a letter dated November 25 from the Director General of the International Labor Office. A/5838. December 18, 1964. 3 pp.

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Letters dated September 30, December 22, and December 23 from the Representative of the United States concerning objects launched into orbit or beyond the United States. A/AC.105/INF.79, October 1964, 2 pp.; A/AC.105/INF.85, December 30, 1964, pp.; A/AC.105/INF.86, December 30, 1964, 2 pp.; A/AC.105/INF. 87, December 30, 1964, 2 pp.

Election of non-permanent members of the Security Council. Letter dated December 30 from the Representative of Indonesia regarding the new composition of the Security Council of which Malaysia has become a non-permanent member. A/5844. January 5, 1965. 1 p.

Assistance in cases of natural disaster. Report of the Secretary-General. A/5845. January 5, 1965. 14 pp.

Security Council

Letter dated January 4 from the Representative of Turkey regarding the continued circulation of "entirely fabricated rumors" about Turkish Cypriot activities by the Greek and Greek Cypriot press. S/6133. January 4, 1965. 3 pp.

Letter dated January 5 from the Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo informing the Council of the seizure by Congolese military authorities of "two lorries of Soviet manufacture carrying machine-guns of Chinese origin destined for the Congolese rebellion." S/6138. January 5, 1965. 1 p.

Letter dated January 5 from the Acting Representative of Thailand refuting Cambodian charges (S/6132) of a violation of Cambodian territorial waters by a Thai police boat. S/6139. January 6, 1965. 1 p.

Letter dated January 7 from the Representative of Malaysia regarding the seriousness of the threat of more intensive Indonesian attacks against Malaysia in 1965. S/6140. January 7, 1965. 3 pp.

Letter dated January 7 from the Acting Representative of Thailand protesting the seizure of a Thai fishing boat and the killing of four of its crew members by an armed group of Cambodian soldiers who entered Thai territorial waters on a previously captured Thai fishing boat. S/6141. January 7, 1965. 1 p.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

North Atlantic Treaty—Atomic Information

Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for cooperation regarding atomic information. Done at Paris June 18, 1964.

Notification that it is willing to be bound by terms of the agreement: Federal Republic of Germany, March 12, 1965.

Entered into force: March 12, 1965.

Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for cooperation regarding atomic information. Done at Paris June 22, 1955. Entered into force March 29, 1956. TIAS 3521.

Terminated: March 12, 1965 (superseded by agreement of June 18, 1964, *supra*).

Property

Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, for the protection of industrial property, revised at Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, and at London June 2, 1934. Signed at London June 2, 1934. Entered into force August 1, 1938. TS 941.

Notification that they consider themselves bound: Southern Rhodesia, Zambia, March 6, 1965.

Convention of Union of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 30, 1883, revised at Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, at London June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered into force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931.

Notification that they consider themselves bound: Southern Rhodesia, Zambia, March 6, 1965.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.

Ratification deposited: Afghanistan, January 19, 1965.

Trade

Declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 18, 1960. Entered into force October 14, 1962. TIAS 5184.

Signature: Spain, December 31, 1961.

Declaration on provisional accession of the United Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 13, 1962. Entered into force for the United States May 3, 1963. TIAS 5309.

Signature: Iceland, January 28, 1965.

Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, December 18, 1964.

Second procès-verbal extending period of validity of declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to

the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 18, 1960, as extended (TIAS 5184, 5266). Done at Geneva October 30, 1964. Entered into force for the United States December 18, 1964. TIAS 5733.

Acceptances deposited: Australia, January 6, 1965; Austria,¹ January 4, 1965; Belgium, December 21, 1964; Brazil, January 22, 1965; Chile, January 6, 1965; Denmark, December 23, 1964; Finland, December 30, 1964; France, December 14, 1964; Japan, December 28, 1964; Pakistan, January 18, 1965; South Africa, December 30, 1964; Spain, December 31, 1964; Sweden, December 15, 1964; Turkey, December 30, 1964; United Kingdom, December 21, 1964.

Procès-verbal extending declaration on provisional accession of United Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 13, 1962 (TIAS 5309). Done at Geneva October 30, 1964. Entered into force for the United States December 18, 1964. TIAS 5732.

Acceptances deposited: France, December 14, 1964; Sweden, December 15, 1964; Belgium, United Kingdom, December 21, 1964; Denmark, December 23, 1964; Japan, December 28, 1964; Finland, Spain, Turkey, December 30, 1964; Australia, Chile, January 6, 1965; Pakistan, January 18, 1965; Brazil, January 22, 1965; Iceland, January 28, 1965.

Second procès-verbal extending the declaration on provisional accession of Switzerland to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 22, 1958, as extended (TIAS 4461, 4957). Done at Geneva October 30, 1964. Entered into force for the United States December 18, 1964. TIAS 5734.

Acceptances deposited: Federal Republic of Germany,¹ Sweden, December 10, 1964; France, December 14, 1964; Norway, December 17, 1964; Belgium, United Kingdom, December 21, 1964; Denmark, December 23, 1964; Japan, December 28, 1964; Finland, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, December 30, 1964; Cuba, December 31, 1964; Austria,¹ January 4, 1965; Chile, January 6, 1965; Peru, January 8, 1965; Pakistan, January 18, 1965; Brazil, January 22, 1965.

Declaration on provisional accession of Iceland to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 5, 1964. Entered into force for the United States November 20, 1964. TIAS 5687.

Signatures: Chile,¹ January 6, 1965; Greece, February 15, 1965; Italy, February 2, 1965; Luxembourg, February 9, 1965; Peru, January 8, 1965; Spain, January 7, 1965; Turkey, February 1, 1965; Yugoslavia, December 15, 1964.

BILATERAL

Argentina

Agreement extending the loan of certain naval vessels to Argentina under the agreement of March 4 and April 1, 1960, as amended (TIAS 4455, 4653). Effected by exchange of notes at Buenos Aires February 1 and 17, 1965. Entered into force February 17, 1965.

Kenya

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of December 7, 1964 (TIAS 5727). Effected by exchange of notes at Nairobi February 15, 1965. Entered into force February 15, 1965.

¹ Subject to ratification.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and, in some cases, a selected bibliography. Those listed below are available at 5¢ each.

Afghanistan. Pnb. 7795. 8 pp.
Communist China. Pnb. 7751. 6 pp.
Congo (Léopoldville). Pnb. 7793. 8 pp.
El Salvador. Pnb. 7794. 4 pp.
Ethiopia. Pub. 7785. 6 pp.
Guatemala. Pub. 7798. 4 pp.
Peru. Pub. 7799. 5 pp.
Spain. Pub. 7800. 4 pp.
Venezuela. Pnb. 7749. 8 pp.

The Battle Act Report 1964. Seventeenth report to Congress on operations under the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951. Pub. 7736. General Foreign Policy series 196. 89 pp. 35¢.

Policy, Persistence, and Patience—An Interview With Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Transcript, with minor editorial changes, of a National Broadcasting Co. television program which was broadcast on January 3, 1965. Pub. 7809. General Foreign Policy series 199. 32 pp. 20¢.

Military Missions to Chile. Agreement with Chile, uniting and replacing the Air Force and Naval Missions Agreements of February 15, 1951, as extended and amended, and the Army Mission Agreement of November 15, 1956. Exchange of notes—Dated at Santiago October 27, 1964. Entered into force October 27, 1964. TIAS 5683. 14 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Yugoslavia—Signed at Belgrade October 28, 1964. Entered into force October 28, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5684. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Yugoslavia—Signed at Belgrade October 29, 1964. Entered into force October 29, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5685. 6 pp. 5¢.

Guaranty of Private Investments. Agreement with Liberia, supplementing the agreement of September 6 and 12, 1960. Exchange of notes—Signed at Monrovia September 26 and 29, 1964. Entered into force September 29, 1964. TIAS 5686. 3 pp. 5¢.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Declaration on Provisional Accession of Iceland to agreement of October 30, 1947—Done at Geneva March 5, 1964. Entered into force with respect to the United States and Iceland November 21, 1964. TIAS 5687. 9 pp. 10¢.

Fisheries—King Crab. Agreement with Japan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington November 25, 1964. Entered into force November 25, 1964. TIAS 5688. 5 pp. 5¢.

Education—Commission for Educational Exchange and Financing of Exchange Programs. Agreement with Yugoslavia—Signed at Belgrade November 9, 1964. Entered into force November 9, 1964. TIAS 5689. 5 pp. 5¢.

Interchange of Patent Rights and Technical Information for Defense Purposes—Filing Classified Patent Applications. Agreement with Sweden. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington October 20 and November 17, 1964. Entered into force November 17, 1964. TIAS 5690. 6 pp. 5¢.

Extradition. Treaty and Additional Protocol with Brazil—Signed at Rio de Janeiro January 13, 1961, and June 18, 1962, respectively. Entered into force December 17, 1964. TIAS 5691. 22 pp. 15¢.

Air Transport Services. Agreement, with Annex, with Uruguay—Signed at Montevideo December 14, 1946. Entered into force provisionally December 14, 1946. TIAS 5692. 13 pp. 10¢.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agreement with United Kingdom—Signed at Washington June 29, 1964. Entered into force December 4, 1964. TIAS 5693. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Greece, amending the agreement of October 30, 1963, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Athens November 16, 1964. Entered into force November 16, 1964. TIAS 5694. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Greece—Signed at Athens November 17, 1964. Entered into force November 17, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5695. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Iran—Signed at Tehran November 16, 1964. Entered into force November 16, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5696. 6 pp. 5¢.

Desalination. Agreement with U.S.S.R.—Signed at Moscow November 18, 1964. Entered into force November 18, 1964. TIAS 5697. 4 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of Official Publications. Agreement with Ethiopia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Addis Ababa November 25, 1964. Entered into force November 25, 1964. TIAS 5698. 4 pp. 5¢.

Maritime Matters—Use of Italian Ports and Territorial Waters by the N.S. Savannah. Agreement with Italy—Signed at Rome November 23, 1964. Entered into force November 23, 1964. TIAS 5699. 14 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Guinea, amending the agreement of May 22, 1963, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Conakry July 1 and 11, 1964. Entered into force July 11, 1964. TIAS 5700. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Chile, amending the agreement of August 7, 1962, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Santiago November 17, 1964. Entered into force November 17, 1964. TIAS 5702. 3 pp. 5¢.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Turkey, supplementing the agreements of November 15, 1951, and January 15, 1957. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ankara November 27, 1964. Entered into force November 27, 1964. TIAS 5704. 3 pp. 5¢.

American Principles. The Role of Emerging Nations in World Politics (Rostow) 492

Communism

The Role of Emerging Nations in World Politics (Rostow) 492

Equal Countermeasures to Communist Threat (Green) 489

Congress

Confirmations (Kotschnig, Meyer, Porter) 497

Foreign Aid and the Balance of Payments (Bell) 498

Foreign Assistance Program for 1966 (Rusk) 482

President Recommends Increase of U.S. Quota in Monetary Fund 507

Trade and the Balance of Payments (G. Griffith Johnson) 502

Department and Foreign Service. Confirmations (Kotschnig, Meyer, Porter) 497

Economic Affairs

Foreign Aid and the Balance of Payments (Bell) 498

President of EEC Commission Meets With President Johnson (joint communique) 491

President Recommends Increase of U.S. Quota in Monetary Fund 507

The Role of Emerging Nations in World Politics (Rostow) 492

Trade and the Balance of Payments (G. Griffith Johnson) 502

Europe

President of EEC Commission Meets With President Johnson (joint communique) 491

The Role of Emerging Nations in World Politics (Rostow) 492

Trade and the Balance of Payments (G. Griffith Johnson) 502

Foreign Aid

Foreign Aid and the Balance of Payments (Bell) 498

Foreign Assistance Program for 1966 (Rusk) 482

The Role of Emerging Nations in World Politics (Rostow) 492

Gambia. Security Council Recommends the Gambia for U.N. Membership (Yost) 511

International Organizations and Conferences

Calendar of International Conferences 509

President Recommends Increase of U.S. Quota in Monetary Fund 507

Iran. Meyer confirmed as Ambassador 497

Israel. Korean Foreign Minister Holds Talks With Secretary Rusk (joint statement) 491

Lebanon. Porter confirmed as Ambassador 497

Residential Documents

President of EEC Commission Meets With President Johnson 491

President Reaffirms U.S. Goal of Peace in Southeast Asia 488

President Recommends Increase of U.S. Quota in Monetary Fund 507

Publications. Recent Releases 514

Sri Lanka. Thai Countermeasures to Communist Threat (Green) 489

Treaty Information. Current Actions 513

U.S.S.R. Secretary Regrets That Soviets Do Not Support Viet-Nam Accords (statement) 489

United Nations

Current U.N. Documents 512

Kotschnig confirmed as U.S. representative to 21st session of ECAFE 497

Security Council Recommends the Gambia for U.N. Membership (Yost) 511

Viet-Nam

President Reaffirms U.S. Goal of Peace in Southeast Asia 488

Secretary Regrets That Soviets Do Not Support Viet-Nam Accords (statement) 489

Name Index

Bell, David E 498

Green, Marshall 489

Hallstein, Walter 491

Johnson, G. Griffith 502

Johnson, President 488, 491, 507

Kotschnig, Walter M 497

Lee, Tong Won 491

Meyer, Armin H 497

Porter, Dwight J 497

Rostow, W. W 492

Rusk, Secretary 482, 489, 491

Yost, Charles W 511

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: March 15-21

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Release issued prior to March 15 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 38 of March 9.

No.	Date	Subject
†42	3/16	Ball: "The Danger of Nostalgia" (with minor editorial revisions).
43	3/16	G. Griffith Johnson: statement before Senate Subcommittee on International Finance.
44	3/15	Rostow: "The Role of Emerging Nations in World Politics."
45	3/17	Joint statement by Rusk and Korean Foreign Minister.
*46	3/18	Lewis sworn in as Ambassador to Mauritania (biographic details).
*47	3/18	Moore sworn in as Ambassador to Mali (biographic details).
†48	3/18	Williams: "U.S. Policy in Africa."
*49	3/18	Mann sworn in as Under Secretary for Economic Affairs (biographic details).
*50	3/18	Harrlman sworn in as Ambassador at Large (biographic details).
†51	3/19	Rostow: "United States Policy Toward Europe."
*52	3/19	MacArthur sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations (biographic details).

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Foreign Relations of the United States 1943, Volume V, The American Republics

The Department of State recently released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Volume V, The American Republics*. This volume contains documentation on the regional wartime diplomacy of the American states and on the relations of the United States with Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile.

Of particular interest in volume V are the compilations dealing with the efforts of the United States to assure the defense of the hemisphere, to discourage commercial and financial transactions with the Axis Powers, and to induce the American Republics to declare war on the Axis Powers or, at least, to sever diplomatic relations with them.

Copies of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Volume V, The American Republics* (publication 7813) may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402, for \$3.25 each.

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BULLETIN

Vol. LIII, No. 15/6



April 12, 1965

THE DANGERS OF NOSTALGIA

by Under Secretary Ball 532

UNITED STATES POLICY IN AFRICA

by Assistant Secretary Williams 547

NATO AFTER SIXTEEN YEARS: AN ANNIVERSARY ASSESSMENT

Special Article by Dr. H. Pappas 575

For index see inside back cover

April 4 marked the 16th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This special article, written for the Bulletin by the Director of the Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, describes how the NATO nations have moved beyond a military alliance and applied the techniques of cooperation to translate their common interest into common action.

NATO After Sixteen Years: An Anniversary Assessment

by David H. Popper

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is not the oldest of our collective defense arrangements, but in many ways it is the most important. Its 15 member states, for all their differences, constitute a loose-knit Atlantic community encompassing the bulk of the wealth and strength of the free world. Its partisans hold it, with much justice, to be far more than a simple defense pact. In this sense the term "the alliance," by which it goes in Western diplomatic circles, is something of a misnomer—a word which, to be sure, describes its fundamental purpose but is far from being all-inclusive.

As it reaches its 16th anniversary, NATO is clearly approaching a time of testing. The post-World War II era in which it was created seems irretrievably past. That era has been succeeded by an age with new dimensions, many of which have in large part been shaped by the existence of NATO itself. Because the alliance meets a vital security need for its participants, it will continue; but we cannot be sure precisely how it will be adapted to the circumstances of the future.

Stark necessity provided the impetus for conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LII, NO. 1346 PUBLICATION 7860 APRIL 12, 1965

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department,

as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Price: 52 issues, domestic \$10, foreign \$15; single copy 30 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the Department of State Bulletin as the source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

Victory in war had not been succeeded by a tranquil peace. Instead, weak, war-ravaged Western European states found themselves threatened by the Soviet absorption of Eastern Europe and the rising temper of the cold war. The alarm signals of a menacing communism went out from Berlin to Greece and Turkey. The United States, which for the second time in a generation had just attested with its blood the relationship of the freedom of Western Europe to its own security, again faced a challenge to its safety across the Atlantic.

The situation cried out for common action in the common interest, and for leadership to give that interest concrete form. As a beginning, the Western European states organized themselves to meet immediate military problems. Applying its great residual strength, the United States proclaimed its intention to resist aggression. It provided a new economic underpinning for Europe through the Marshall Plan. And it joined with Canada and its European partners to set the capstone on a North Atlantic association of free nations dedicated to the preservation of their collective welfare and security.

The Treaty signed by 12 North Atlantic nations at Washington on April 4, 1949, was thus in large part a defensive response to external pressure. It was and has remained an instrument for collective defense, created pursuant to the license provided by article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which recognizes such defense as an inherent right.

The purposes of the Treaty have never been aggressive or expansionist. The area it embraces has been extended through the adherence of Greece and Turkey and of the Federal Republic of Germany. It has been diminished through the separation of Algeria from metropolitan France. It forms today an Atlantic neighborhood of relative stability in a turbulent world.

NATO has been a cornerstone of the security policies of its members since its inception. And it has proved its utility. There have been no Communist territorial gains in the NATO area. The military strength of the participants has been pooled, for defensive purposes and such purposes alone. Our own defense frontier has in effect been moved to the Iron Curtain line.

Western nuclear power has been brought to bear in Europe, in a carefully controlled and coordinated manner.

More broadly, NATO military arrangements have made it possible for the energies of free Germany to be linked in constructive cooperation with those of its ex-enemies in the West, in a vigorous and democratic Western Europe. NATO strength has provided a shelter within which European economic recovery has taken place, and a solid base for Europe's dynamic and increasingly integrated economy. It has sustained the Western-oriented societies of Greece and Turkey. Perhaps most important, NATO has epitomized and bolstered the Atlantic partnership in the protection and advancement of common free-world interests.

NATO and Its Problems

Like any significant political organism, the alliance is constantly faced with difficult problems and hard choices. Some of these are the result of its own success. NATO has never been stronger than it is today. The NATO nations have never been so prosperous, and within the NATO area they have never felt more secure. Historically, alliances have flourished under the pressures produced by a common external threat; they have fallen apart when these pressures were—or seemed to have been—removed. NATO is not automatically immune to such disintegrating tendencies. Its members may find it difficult to recall that, though common action for common purposes is seldom easy, it is in the long run the only feasible method of coping with the problems of an increasingly interdependent world.

NATO leaders know that continued unity and vigilance are required if the gains they have made are not to be jeopardized. They know that it is the strength of the North Atlantic nations that has reduced the probability of aggression against their territories. They understand that despite improved political and economic relations with the Soviet bloc countries—a desirable objective in itself—it has not been possible to negotiate arms control or European security arrangements which would reduce the need for a strong and integrated defense.

The ultimate objectives of the Communist world have not changed. Thus, in a minimal sense, NATO represents the kind of insurance a prudent man maintains even when he believes himself to be in the best of health.

The Treaty and the Organization

To understand NATO and its problems, one must start with the realization that the Western alliance exists, as it were, on two levels. There is, first, the North Atlantic Treaty: a legally binding document which commits each of the signatory states to regard an attack upon one of them in the North Atlantic area as an attack against them all, and to respond by taking necessary action, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain security.

The Treaty has other, more general provisions directed toward achievement of broader objectives. These have to do with the peaceful settlement of disputes; the strengthening of the free institutions of the parties; their stability and well-being; economic collaboration; and other, similarly important matters.

But the heart of the Treaty is the collective defense obligation. The Treaty is not limited in time. Since 1959, however—10 years after its signature—it has been open to review. In 1969—after 20 years—any party may denounce it and withdraw on 1 year's notice. The Treaty would then continue in effect among the remaining parties. Contrary to some popular impressions, it would not expire.

One article of the Treaty provides for the establishment of a Council, able to meet promptly at any time, to consider matters concerning the implementation of the Treaty. (It can, in fact, meet on an hour's notice.) The Council is directed to set up such subordinate bodies as may be necessary, in particular a Defense Committee. Beyond this, the Treaty is silent on organization.

What was agreed in 1949, therefore, was a not unusual type of postwar alliance, within the framework of the United Nations, for collective defense. In this sense NATO did not differ radically from other alliances we had formed or have subsequently organized. The North Atlantic Treaty does not call for any special measures of integration, and certainly not for vest-

ing supranational functions in international bodies.

Without breaching this limitation, the members of the alliance have responded to their security needs by building up an organizational structure which sustains military arrangements of unusual power. This represents, as it were, a second level of *de facto* international agreement. It is a structure which could not have been organized without a limited degree of military integration. The structure was built with the assent of all NATO members, and it functions because the members tacitly recognize that its existence is a prime condition for the maintenance of adequate defensive strength.


NATO machinery operates on the basis of consensus: In practice no NATO nation is obligated to take any specific action or step in which it does not acquiesce. It is a tribute to the sense of cooperation and mutual restraint which has existed in the Atlantic area that, over 16 years, the word "veto" has not been current in NATO terminology. Differences have been resolved by consultation, because all parties have been motivated by a common aim.

The life of the alliance resides as much in the way its agencies function as in the legal skeleton of the Treaty itself. The tone is set by its principal deliberative body, the North Atlantic Council—a body which sits at the NATO Headquarters in Paris. High-level ambassadors represent each of the parties on the Council in its permanent sessions. Top policymaking officials from the governments of the NATO nations journey frequently to Paris for discussion of particular issues of interest. And at the NATO summit, so to speak, there are regular semiannual meetings of NATO foreign ministers, in many of which NATO defense and finance ministers also participate.

The Council and its subordinate committees—committees which deal with political, economic, military, and related matters—are supported by an expert international staff. Heading the staff is the NATO Secretary General (now Ambassador Manlio Brosio of Italy), who presides over the Council and who speaks for the NATO organization in a unique way.

Since its representatives speak for governments, the Council is at the apex of the NATO



 Treaty Powers

BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITY

structure. It has a professional military counterpart in the NATO Military Committee, which sits in Washington (where it maintains close contact with U.S. military authorities). All NATO members except Iceland, which has no armed forces, are represented permanently on the Military Committee, by very high-ranking military officers. The military Chiefs of Staff of the NATO nations meet periodically in the committee. The executive agent of the Military Committee is the Standing Group, composed of United States, United Kingdom, and French representatives. These higher military authorities supervise and direct in a general way the entire NATO military operation.

The Military Strength of NATO

NATO's military strength resides not so much in the cumulative totals of its members' military manpower and weapons, tremendous though these are, as in the way in which these resources are organized to act effectively in case of need. In pre-atomic wars, even under *Blitzkrieg* conditions, nations could buy time by sur-

rendering space. Geography and the limits of offensive power gave them the opportunity to work out ways in which they could cooperate, as allies, in the drive to victory. Combined commands could be set up after wars began, sometimes—in fortunate circumstances—on the basis of professional military staff conversations which had taken place in time of peace.

In the missile age, this approach to warfare is utterly anachronistic. The society of any nation could be destroyed in a matter of minutes. Victory in a thermonuclear exchange is likely to be a worthless reward. Survival depends on a level of strength sufficient to deter attack—on a capacity for military response sufficient to prevent small outbreaks of violence from escalating to catastrophic proportions. Time is of the essence. Both deterrence and defense depend critically on the existence of fixed advance plans and on a firm assurance that specific military elements can be counted upon to fulfill their missions as soon as that becomes necessary.

In these circumstances an exclusively individ-

ual national approach to defense problems is bound to be risky. In the cramped and crowded area of Western Europe it is quite irrational. Accordingly, the NATO nations have devised a system for a coordinated military response to meet aggression. It is a system which will produce the desired results without diluting the national character of the military units involved.

The outstanding features of the NATO defense structure are the voluntary commitment of national forces to the defense of NATO, the organization in time of peace of integrated higher commands, and the development of sizable commonly funded and operated facilities to support the NATO forces.

The committed forces represent the first echelons of NATO defense. Their total strength is very considerable. Some of these forces are *assigned* to NATO. These include land and air forces on the continent of Europe, including tactical air forces. American and Canadian forces are strongly represented in this category, as well as units of other NATO nations. Their training in peacetime and their military operations in war are a NATO responsibility, but the forces remain under national control for administration and discipline; and they receive their logistic support from national sources.

A second category of forces is *earmarked*, rather than assigned. Member countries have agreed that these forces would be placed at the disposal of NATO commanders in the event of mobilization or war. Naval forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean fall within this category. Still other forces of the NATO nations remain under full national command, for the defense of the NATO area. Forces may, of course, be withdrawn from commitment for emergency or other national purposes. The practice is not uncommon, but most of the withdrawals are relatively small and are temporary in nature.

To round out their arsenal, NATO-committed forces include certain nuclear delivery systems, mostly of shorter range, in the hands of a number of the allies. Under the NATO stockpile arrangement, nuclear warheads are provided for these systems by the United States

but are retained in American custody, as required by United States law, until their release is authorized. The United States Strategic Air Command is not committed to NATO, but plans for the use of NATO-committed nuclear forces and the missiles and planes of SAC are very closely coordinated.

Control of the NATO-committed military panoply rests in a group of integrated NATO commands which represent the physical authority of NATO in a tangible way. These commands are truly international. Within them the staff officers of 14 nations prepare military plans and work in other ways to enhance the effectiveness of the units they lead. Through periodic maneuvers and exercises, both commands and units acquire the habit of cooperation for alliance purposes. A small but important new Allied Mobile Force of ground and air units contributed by a number of allies is prepared for quick movement by air to the northern (Scandinavian) or southeastern (Greek-Turkish) flank for NATO military action in case of need.

The best known of the commands is the Allied Command Europe, whose headquarters (SHAPE) is located just outside Paris. Its Supreme Commander (SACEUR) has always been an American of the most distinguished character. The present commander, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, is a worthy successor to his great American predecessors: Generals Eisenhower, Gruenther, and Norstad. Similarly distinguished American admirals have commanded the Allied Command Atlantic, with its headquarters at Norfolk, Va. Equally worthy British admirals have headed the Allied Command Channel at London.

All of these commands operate through subordinate international commands situated at strategic points within the NATO area. Canadian-United States regional defense plans are made by a bilateral Regional Planning Group.

The NATO forces are supported by a system of commonly built and owned facilities—graced by the name of “infrastructure”—which enables military units to operate effectively in time of war. Infrastructure includes airfields, depots, pipelines, port facilities, and communications networks; and the investment in infra-

structure now totals billions of dollars. A related NATO undertaking is a new NATO air defense ground control system, which will enable hostile aircraft to be located and intercepted by NATO planes and missiles with the necessary supersonic speeds and accuracy; this alone will involve a \$300 million expenditure, largely for sophisticated electronic equipment to be supplied by a number of NATO countries.

Progress has also been made in standardizing the equipment of NATO-committed forces. NATO nations tend to construct or to purchase only a limited number of specific types of costly equipment, such as planes, armored vehicles, and missile systems. Some of these are manufactured by NATO consortia: that is, by cooperative arrangements in which the production facilities of a number of NATO countries are joined. The same principle applies on the technological military frontier. Joint research and development projects involving two or more NATO nations are common.

Some NATO Military Problems

This recital of NATO military strength should not obscure the existence of serious military problems. Even after 16 years, the NATO nations are not yet fully adjusted to the constraints of close cooperation, in which conflicting interests must be reconciled for the common good.

There are, for example, problems of strategic doctrine. Some European countries maintain that the only way to deter Communist aggression against NATO Europe is to make it plain to the adversary that any substantial attack on his part will be met with a crushing strategic nuclear response—in effect, with full-scale retaliation by strategic nuclear forces. This has long been a prevailing view in NATO circles. The logical corollary of this doctrine is that there is little point in spending large sums on massive, conventional armed forces to fight a lengthy or widespread nonnuclear war.

In recent years American strategists have moved away from this type of approach. It is, of course, acknowledged that if NATO is subjected to all-out aggression, it must and will be defended by whatever means may be necessary, including the full use of our nuclear strength.

At the same time, we believe that sizable non-nuclear forces must be maintained in readiness, to deal with less extensive hostilities which might begin in unforeseen and unpremeditated ways. If we could not check such outbreaks with ready forces equipped with conventional weapons, we might immediately be compelled to choose between surrender and the incineration of the Northern Hemisphere in an apocalyptic nuclear exchange.

Debate on this and similar problems confronts NATO military and political leaders with some very hard and fundamental realities. Few issues provoke greater recalcitrance or are more resistant to compromise. And yet, while the professional discussion continues through the years, the actual NATO force posture, whatever its insufficiencies, continues to represent a massive deterrent to any military adventure anywhere in the NATO area. On the Central European front alone, the Germans are approaching a strength of 12 divisions assigned to NATO: the United States maintains the equivalent of 6 divisions; the United Kingdom, 3; the French, 2; and other allies, smaller forces. The NATO strength in aircraft and in naval units is at least a match for any likely opposition.

Thus, while NATO experts wrestle with the problem of adjusting NATO forces to an agreed and realistic strategic concept, NATO forces remain an effective shield for the alliance.

There is also the question of the organization of the alliance's nuclear strength. Originally NATO relied almost completely on the American Strategic Air Command; and for strategic protection—that is, possible retaliatory attack on targets in the heartland of an aggressor—American strategic forces still afford the bulk of NATO's protection.

Some members of the alliance are quite content to see this situation persist. Others, however, believe that they have reached a stage at which they should have a greater share in meeting the alliance's nuclear responsibilities. They are, after all, within range of hundreds of Soviet missiles aimed against them. Yet it is difficult to spread the burden of nuclear defense without creating dangerous, expensive, and wasteful separate national nuclear forces. Anything we did to encourage such forces could

not fail greatly to increase the risk of nuclear war.

This is a thorny problem. We have moved to meet the desire for shared responsibility in a number of ways. As indicated above, we have provided some of our allies with shorter range nuclear delivery systems, retaining the nuclear warheads themselves under our custody in time of peace. We have worked out agreed general guidelines on the conditions under which nuclear weapons might have to be used for the defense of NATO. We have imparted to our allies a great deal of information on nuclear warfare. We have worked with SACEUR's representatives, at Omaha, to coordinate plans for the use of NATO and United States nuclear delivery systems in the event of hostilities.

Most recently, we have explored the possibility of meeting European desires for greater nuclear responsibility through the creation of some form of collective nuclear force in which European manpower and resources could play a part within the alliance—without creating the dangerous new independent centers of nuclear decisionmaking we should like to avoid. Such an integrated force is still under discussion. Its political and military complexities have not yet been unraveled. But it could provide a solution to what is perhaps NATO's critical military problem, in a way which would meet the honorable concerns of all.

Finally, as in any common enterprise, there is the problem of distributing the burden of defense equitably. There is no perfect solution for this problem and no simple unit of measurement. Defense is incredibly and increasingly expensive. Precisely how heavily a given increment weighs upon a nation's economy can be a subject for interminable argument. Clearly, however, gross disproportions in effort and outlays relative to national economic capability are a source of dissatisfaction, which allies must seek to minimize.

At a time when the apparent danger of aggression is small, a high degree of sophistication is required to avoid ill-advised savings by a ruinous rundown of defensive capabilities. By and large, the NATO nations have resisted this temptation. Thus, the overall picture of NATO's military organization is one of con-

tinued strength and effectiveness, unimpaired by time and the relaxation of international tensions. Problems aplenty confront alliance military authorities, but they are problems incident to change and growth as well as problems of integration.

NATO and Allied Political Cohesion

It would be a mistake to consider NATO solely as a military organization. As we have noted, its founders gave it a political and an economic purpose as well. They had a vision of broad cooperation among the states of the North Atlantic area, based on the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of its peoples. The vision persists, sometimes in the form of the Atlantic partnership described by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, sometimes in other evocations of an Atlantic community.

The North Atlantic Council represents the principal agency for Atlantic political cooperation. Because its meetings are devoted chiefly to matters affecting national security, little publicity can be given to its work. Yet week in and week out, it follows closely the development of East-West relations around the globe and focuses its attention on problems of particular concern to one or more of the allies.

The Council's political activities are undertaken in formal and informal sessions, in special groups of interested parties, and in subsidiary committees. The Council is thus a flexible and versatile instrument. The scope of its political work can best be grasped by a few examples:

(a) Since its Permanent Representatives can meet on short notice, it is an eminently suitable forum for informing and exchanging views with governments in an emergency. During the Cuba missile crisis in October 1962, the allies provided through the Council an extraordinary manifestation of solidarity and support for the United States. Crisis consultation is a principal Council concern.

(b) The Council keeps under continuous review new developments and new policies throughout the Communist bloc. The NATO international staff works with expert committees drawn from the NATO nations to analyze and interpret events and trends; and national representatives in the Council exchange views

KEY STATISTICS ON NATO COUNTRIES

Country	Population ('63) (in millions)	Area (in square miles)	GNP ('63) (in millions of dollars)	Defense expendi- tures ('63) (in millions of dollars)
Belgium.....	9.29	11,779	13,931	445
Canada.....	18.9	3,851,116	42,831	1,576
Denmark.....	4.7	16,619	7,962	239
France.....	47.8	212,822	79,963	4,267
Germany.....	55.4	95,737	94,528	4,981
Greece.....	8.5	51,182	3,921	180
Iceland.....	.186	39,768	262	0
Italy.....	50.5	116,304	45,351	1,649
Luxembourg.....	.325	998	525	7
Netherlands.....	11.96	12,529	14,487	637
Norway.....	3.7	125,065	5,636	206
Portugal.....	9.0	35,599	2,749	210
Turkey.....	30.3	301,381	6,973	365
United Kingdom.....	53.8	94,215	84,183	5,252
United States.....	189.3	3,615,213	585,149	53,242
Total NATO.....	493.7	8,580,327	988,451	73,256

Sources: OECD Observer and NATO Information Service.

as to their significance and the allied responses, if any, which should be made. Thus, the Council might discuss the consequences of a Chinese Communist nuclear explosion; an upsurge of Communist influence in an underdeveloped country; the results of a change in the Soviet political hierarchy; new signs of independence in a Soviet bloc country; or any one of a host of similar developments.

(c) To solicit understanding and support, allies explain in the Council important actions of international import which they may take. Thus, we have explained our steps to apply economic pressures against Cuba, and our objectives in Viet-Nam. Various national policies with respect to Africa and the Middle East have been under discussion.

(d) Allies explore in the Council the extent to which they can coordinate their policies or actions in other international forums—for example, as regards certain problems in the United Nations. Similarly, they often consult to coordinate their replies to notes they receive from the U.S.S.R., and their positions on matters of arms control and European security as these are debated in the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva or in other forums.

(e) The Council is used to coordinate trade and credit policies vis-a-vis the Communist bloc, to the extent that this is possible.

(f) An individual ally may seek guidance from the Council as to how it should react to a particular development or problem.

(g) The Council may help to moderate the harmful consequences of a controversy between two allies, as in the case of Greek-Turkish tension arising from the situation in Cyprus, or the fisheries dispute between the United Kingdom and Iceland.

In addition to all this, the Council is the ultimate organ of political decision regarding alliance military policies. When its activities in permanent session are subjected to review at the semiannual ministerial meetings, the ministers will normally engage in a frank and useful review of the international situation; a discussion of outstanding alliance military problems; a survey of the situation of the alliance in general; and a consideration of specific matters of particular interest to one or more members.

It is hardly necessary to add that the result of all this deliberation is by no means unanimous or automatic agreement. The NATO nations are free countries, nurtured in diversity; they will submerge their individual national interests under the spur of necessity, but they are neither required nor accustomed to relinquish their own policies or views as a result of NATO discussion. Yet the process of political consultation in NATO affords a major hope for increased cohesion in the alliance. A presentation in the Council, followed by critical questioning from Permanent Representatives, inevitably produces a better understanding of differing points of view. It can and not infre-

Mr. Popper's article on NATO is the first of a series being written especially for the Bulletin by officers of the Department and the Foreign Service. Officers who may be interested in submitting original bylined articles are invited to call the editor of the Bulletin, Mrs. Madeline Patton, extension 5806, room 5536.

quently does lead to the creation of a consensus, or to the harmonization of policies by mutual adjustment of positions. And it is sometimes followed by common action which, though it may be taken individually by each ally, is nonetheless an effective manifestation of the will of the group as a whole.

Prospects for the Future

This brief review of NATO activities demonstrates that, if NATO was organized as a classical military alliance, it has long since moved beyond that status and into new ground. Building on a recognition of common interest among the NATO nations, the statesmen and officials who have worked in and for NATO have brought to fruition many of the hopes of its organizers. Without impinging on the sovereign rights of any state, the NATO nations have applied techniques of integration and cooperation so as to translate their common interest into common action. The limits of this process are yet far from having been reached. There is much which can still be done, provided the member states so desire, in the military field, in the nuclear area, and in the harmonization of the political and economic policies of the countries that make up the North Atlantic world.

Not all of this, to be sure, need or can be done within the specific framework of NATO itself. Other agencies with broader membership and different, if complementary, objectives can make equally important contributions to the cohesion of the West. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, for example, is engaged in a broad range of activities keyed to economic policy collaboration, the

coordination of foreign aid policies, the expansion of nondiscriminatory trade, and international monetary measures designed to ease balance-of-payments stresses. It has no organizational tie with NATO, except for a preponderantly identical membership. Yet the success of each organization reinforces the work of the other. In a broad sense, viewed together, the two agencies are unifying elements in the world of the developed nations—agencies which can be helpful in the management of their relations with states and groups of states in both the Communist and the underdeveloped areas.

The great questions for NATO's future have less to do with its existence than with its adaptation to new circumstances. Some of these questions have been mentioned: They relate to the degree of military integration in the alliance; the need for a collective nuclear capability; the nature of NATO defense strategy; the limits of political consultation; economic policy toward Communist countries; and similar matters. But underlying all these is a more fundamental problem—the extent to which the member states can attain a meeting of minds on the community of their interests in the broadest areas of cooperation. There could develop in the NATO community a kind of insularity which would obviously affect the scope of common action.

One can conceive of at least three forms of such insularity. One or more countries might, first of all, decide no longer to participate in NATO defense arrangements, but instead to rely on their own resources and the general obligations of the North Atlantic Treaty for collective defense against attack. If this should happen, the other allies would have to decide how to organize their own forces to preserve as far as possible the benefits of existing and projected joint measures for NATO security.

A second form of insularity could emerge if a group of NATO nations, in Europe, should decide that the kind of Atlantic association with the North American members of NATO which now exists should be subordinated to a purely European organization with particularistic, in-

ward-looking characteristics. This is an unlikely contingency, and it must be distinguished from the present European economic communities and from projected organizations which envisage an Atlantic partnership between North American countries and a politically integrated Europe. As the latter type of European community developed, the United States would anticipate an even more fruitful consultative relationship than now exists, for the divergencies which inevitably arise because of the difference in size and strength among the Atlantic partners would be greatly diminished. We have welcomed the increasingly important role NATO's European members have assumed in the alliance as they have grown in strength and confidence. We would welcome all the more a collective European voice speaking for Europe's interest in the common cause.

There is a third variety of insularity which will have a bearing on NATO's future. It is a matter of outlook. As Secretary Rusk stated on March 6:¹

... Europe and the North Atlantic community cannot preserve their security merely by holding a line across Europe. Their common security is involved also in what happens in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, South Asia, and the Western Pacific. They have a vital common interest in the defeat of active aggression in Southeast Asia. They have a common interest with the free peoples of the developing world in putting an end to aggression by the infiltration of arms and trained fighting men across national frontiers.

What this statement suggests is that the NATO nations, over and above what they have already done, should lift their eyes to new horizons outside the NATO area itself. It is a reminder that no nation and no continent can exist in a sealed compartment. It highlights the interdependence which links the free peoples of Europe and America with those of the rest of the world.

These, then, are some of the forces at work in all the NATO nations—including the United States—as they enter the 17th year of their association. They have it within their power to re-

spond to the new challenges which assail them by modernizing the alliance to cope with new threats and new problems. Or, alternatively, they can, through indifference or timidity, condemn the alliance to a diminishing role in the balance of this decade. It is hard to believe that the 15 NATO members would consciously make the latter choice.

• *Reprints of the above article will soon be available upon request from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.*

President Reiterates U.S. Policy on Viet-Nam

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release dated March 25

1. It is important for us all to keep a cool and clear view of the situation in Viet-Nam.

2. The central cause of the danger there is aggression by Communists against a brave and independent people. There are other difficulties in Viet-Nam, of course, but if that aggression is stopped, the people and Government of South Viet-Nam will be free to settle their own future, and the need for supporting American military action there will end.

3. The people who are suffering from this Communist aggression are Vietnamese. This is no struggle of white men against Asians. It is aggression by Communist totalitarians against their independent neighbors. The main burden of resistance has fallen on the people and soldiers of South Viet-Nam. We Americans have lost hundreds of our own men there, and we mourn them. But the free Vietnamese have lost tens of thousands, and the aggressors and their dupes have lost still more. These are the cruel costs of the conspiracy directed from the North. This is what has to be stopped.

4. The United States still seeks no wider war. We threaten no regime and covet no territory. We have worked and will continue to work for a

¹ BULLETIN of Mar. 22, 1965, p. 427.

reduction of tensions on the great stage of the world. But the aggression from the North must be stopped. That is the road to peace in Southeast Asia.

5. The United States looks forward to the day when the people and governments of all Southeast Asia may be free from terror, subversion, and assassination—when they will need not military support and assistance against aggression but only economic and social cooperation for progress in peace. Even now, in Viet-Nam and elsewhere, there are major programs of development which have the cooperation and support of the United States. Wider and bolder programs can be expected in the future from Asian leaders and Asian councils—and in such programs we would want to help. This is the proper business of our future cooperation.

6. The United States will never be second in seeking a settlement in Viet-Nam that is based on an end of Communist aggression. As I have said in every part of the Union, I am ready to go anywhere at any time and meet with anyone whenever there is promise of progress toward an honorable peace. We have said many times—to all who are interested in our principles for honorable negotiation—that we seek no more than a return to the essentials of the agreements of 1954—a reliable arrangement to guarantee the independence and security of all in Southeast Asia. At present the Communist aggressors have given no sign of any willingness to move in this direction, but as they recognize the costs of their present course, and their own true interest in peace, there may come a change—if we all remain united.

Meanwhile, as I said last year and again last week,¹ “It is and it will remain the policy of the United States to furnish assistance to support South Viet-Nam for as long as is required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism under control.” The military actions of the United States will be such, and only such, as serve that purpose—at the lowest possible cost in human life to our allies, to our own men, and to our adversaries too.

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 5, 1965, p. 488.

Secretary Rusk Discusses Use of Tear Gas in Viet-Nam

Following is a statement made by Secretary Rusk at a briefing for news correspondents on March 24, together with the transcript of the question-and-answer period.

Press release 59 dated March 24

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK

Some of you have asked me for some comment as to the policy aspects of the use in Viet-Nam of gases of the tear-gas family, back in December and January. And I am very glad to respond to those questions.

The shadow of gas warfare has been raised in connection with these incidents. That is not involved. We are not embarking upon gas warfare in Viet-Nam. There has been no policy decision to engage in gas warfare in Viet-Nam. We are not talking about agents or weapons that are associated with gas warfare in the military arsenals of many countries. We are not talking about gas that is prohibited by the Geneva convention of 1925 or any other understandings about the use of gas.

Now, we can understand the concern around the world and in this country about the specter of gas warfare. These memories go back to World War I, when tens of thousands were killed or maimed by what might be called “military gases.”

This is not involved here. We are talking about a gas which has been commonly adopted by the police forces of the world as riot-control agents—gases that are available commercially and have been used on many occasions, some in this country, and on many occasions in other countries.

Now, why is tear gas a part of the equipment of police forces? It is because police forces would like to be able to use the minimum force that is required for the maintenance of law and order. It is a minimum instrument. And my information is that certain situations arose in South Viet-Nam where this problem presented itself.

On one occasion, for example, the Viet Cong had seized a village, was holding the villagers in hostage, and was firing through these villagers at mixed crowds outside the village. The decision was made to employ tear gas to try to deal with that situation as a riot-control type of problem in order to avoid the problem of whether to use artillery or aerial bombs that would inflict great damage upon innocent people.

There is no question here about gas warfare and gas in contravention of established conventions.

Now, it may be that there was a failure in full explanation, in briefing or in reporting, from Saigon on this matter. The initial reports tended to stimulate problems which were not present; for example, the use of the word "experimentation" suggested that something new and esoteric and weird might be involved here. This is not the case.

What has been involved has been well-known, traditional agents, in the hands of police forces in many parts of the world. And under the circumstances in which this gas was used in Viet-Nam, the desire was to use the minimum force required to deal with the situation to avoid death or injury to innocent people.

Now, that is at the heart of the policy question. We are not engaged in gas warfare. It is against our policy to do so, as it is against the policies of most other governments that I know about.

But we are reminded, when something of this sort comes up, of the nature of the war in South Viet-Nam. It isn't a comfortable and easy war. It isn't a war that is going to be decided by troops on parade with blank cartridges. It is a mean, dirty struggle carried out without regard to ordinary norms of conduct by the Viet Cong.

Those who are concerned about tear gas I could hope would be concerned about the fact that during 1961 over 400 civilian officials were killed and over a thousand were kidnaped in South Viet-Nam—village chiefs, schoolteachers, public-health officers. Among other civilians, 1,300 were killed, over 8,000 were kidnaped, and entire villages have been burned to

the ground, and families of those who were in the armed forces were kidnaped and held as hostages.

There is nothing more urgent, from the point of view of the United States, than that peace be restored to that country as quickly as possible. And peace can be restored if Hanoi would stop infiltrating militarily trained personnel into South Viet-Nam, stop the sending of arms into South Viet-Nam, and stop directing these operations aimed at taking over South Viet-Nam against the wishes of the people of that country.

Now, these are the essential policy aspects of the problem. We do not expect that gas will be used in ordinary military operations. Police-type weapons were used in riot control in South Viet-Nam—as in many other countries over the past 20 years—and in situations analogous to riot control, where the Viet Cong, for example, was using civilians as screens for their own operations.

But this does not represent a new departure of policy, the introduction of new weapons, the introduction of any new approach to the very difficult problems in that country.

I would be glad to take a question.

QUESTION-AND-ANSWER PERIOD

Q. Mr. Secretary, to clear up one point, in view of the propaganda furor that has been raised over the use of gas, is any consideration now being given to the thought of not using gas any longer?

A. Well, this is again a problem of general practice among nations. In situations of riot control or situations analogous to riot control, these police instruments undoubtedly will be used. They have been used in many countries and will again be used.

But I think that a good deal of the international reaction has been based upon the first impressions that somehow we were moving into gas warfare, that somehow weapons were being used contrary to the Geneva convention. This is not the case. And I would hope that second thoughts, of which we have already had some

evidence—that second thoughts would realize that the issue that was involved here was the minimum force that was required under the circumstances where otherwise innocent people could be very severely punished in a circumstance over which they themselves had no control.

Q. Is it correct, sir, that gas war, that the use of the tear gas was used initially in order to release some Americans who were being held by the Viet Cong?

A. No. There was one situation, I understand, where there was a suspicion that prisoners might be held—Viet Cong elements holding hostages, perhaps both Vietnamese and Americans—but that was not confirmed because when the area was entered it was found that no prisoners were discovered. So we don't know.

This was not an attempt to direct this particular weapon specifically toward the needs of Americans. This was a general problem in which the South Vietnamese themselves were the primary participants in a situation that seemed to require riot-control methods rather than artillery, 500-pound bombs, and the rest of it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it is true, sir, that you referred to tear gas, whereas many of the stories, of course, refer to nausea gas. Could you clarify the point on that?

A. The tear-gas family, which is available through commercial firms to police forces in this and other countries, includes some gas that produces nausea. I understand that on one incident—in one incident out there that there was some admixture of these two types of gases. But that again does not mean that there has been any new departure in policy or in practice from the riot-control family of weapons in this situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what you're trying to say is that our action in South Viet-Nam was comparable to, say, the British troops and U.N. troops in Cyprus who used tear gas to separate the Greeks and the Turks?

A. Well, these gases have been used on a number of occasions. For example, we ourselves used these gases in connection with the famous

prison riot in Korea, where some of the prisoners were engaging in violence but most of the prisoners were peaceable and wanted nothing to do with it. And the problem there arose as to the minimum force that would achieve the requirements of law and order. And so we used these types of gases in that prison revolt. And these have been used in many situations in different parts of the world. Mr. Harkness?

Q. Sir, this is somewhat of a corollary question. But you referred to the inadequate or incomplete reporting from Saigon. Do you think that our policy and the South Viet-Nam policy of restricting reporters hinders full, accurate reporting?

A. Oh, I think that the information that is available in South Viet-Nam is more extensive, more detailed, more intense than any situation that I know about. I must say that I have some questions about newspapermen picking up a telephone in Da Nang and calling outside—some of them transoceanic calls—saying 20 aircraft departed from Da Nang a few minutes ago headed north, or headed west, or headed somewhere.

In other words, this is a tough fight out there. And the problem of making information available is related to the lives of the people who are directly involved in that situation. So that we have been considering that problem very seriously, and we think that we can work out a basis on which there can be full and complete information to the public, and at the same time protect the essential military requirements of the local situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, just to make it abundantly clear, to me at least, you referred to one occasion in which an admixture was used, but you're not attempting to separate these when you say riot-control gases which have been used?

A. No, no. They are all in the riot-control, commonly called tear-gas, family. In other words, police forces can go to commercial houses and buy these gases. I know of no gas that has been used which is not so available and which is not in the hands of police forces in many parts of the world.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that point, can you

clarify, sir, as to whether there was a policy decision in the United States over the use of these gases? And could you also say whether the forces in the field have authority to use these at any time of their choosing?

A. We have known, of course, that gases of this type are available to the South Vietnamese Government. We have ourselves provided some of those gases to the South Vietnamese Government. They had other similar weapons left over from French days out there, I gather.

So that we knew those weapons were there. We know that they have been used in riot-control situations. We were not specifically asked in Washington on the day before any one of these incidents whether we approved the use of this particular weapon. They were faced with a situation that was analogous to riot control, where the Viet Cong were intermingled with civilians and, as you gentlemen know from other reporting from out there, this has been a problem—is a problem with guerrillas where there is such intermingling, and we have had some problems in attacking the Viet Cong where they are intermingled, because innocent people get hurt.

Now, here was a situation where they tried to meet the problem with a minimum of violence that would deal with the situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you clarify the second portion of that, sir, as to whether from now on also the forces in the field will have authority to use the gases without referral—

A. Oh, I think that there are more of the governments of the world that reserve the right to use these weapons in riot-control situations or situations analogous to riot control.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what distinction do you draw between the tear gases and other non-lethal gases that are incapacitating, which can range in this whole family way up to the mustard gases of World War I fame?

A. I think there is a very sharp difference between the military gases that are a part of the inventory of the military forces in a number of countries and the gases which have no lethal effect, which have a minimum disabling char-

acter, which are normal to police forces all over the world. I think there is no great difficulty in distinguishing between those two.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in which category—

A. And I think from the point of view of the Geneva convention there is no problem in distinguishing between those two.

Q. In which category of gases would you place what are called the psychochemical gases, which destroy your will to resist?

A. I think those would be military in character.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned at the start the use of this in December and January, I believe. Were you saying by this it has not been used since January?

A. It has not been used, as with gases of any type, police or military. There are operational limitations upon their use. I mean—as a matter of fact, in the three incidents which have been reported, it wasn't very effective; when the wind blew it away, it was dissipated, it didn't achieve the purpose. But the purpose was to deal with the problem with a minimum of violence. So I would suppose that this is not going to be a very important part of the effort out there, because in any event, except in the most immediate circumstance of a mob in a city square, there are limitations on the ability of police-type gases to accomplish the job.

Q. Mr. Secretary, as a result of the great public interest and excitement over this issue during the last 2 days, have any new directives or policy decisions been issued to the authorities, the American authorities, in Viet-Nam for dealing with this problem?

A. No new directives have been issued. The anticipation is, of course, that these weapons be used only in those situations involving riot control or situations analogous to riot control. There are many reasons for that. But I mean that is the nature of the weapon. It's a riot-control type of weapon, and where that is not involved it would not be an appropriate weapon.

Q. Mr. Secretary, yesterday Foreign Secretary [Michael] Stewart said that he had

brought up the matter with you and expressed a grave concern of the British people. Can you tell us what you told him yesterday?

A. Well, I think that that was based upon the original reports that indicated that we might be somehow embarking upon something new and different—embarking upon gas warfare as it

is generally considered around the world. This is not involved here. And I think when the character of this weapon becomes known, the limited number of incidents, the special circumstances of incidents become generally understood, I think second thoughts will take over.

Q. Thank you very much, sir.

The Dangers of Nostalgia

*by Under Secretary Ball*¹

Two generations ago a candidate for the Presidency blandly announced that what America needed was “not nostrums but normalcy . . . not submergence in internationality but sustainment in triumphant nationality.” One contemporary observer remarked that these solecisms left “the impression of an army of pompous phrases moving over the landscape in search of an idea.” But in point of fact “a return to normalcy” became more than a loudly trumpeted campaign slogan—it set the pattern of American foreign policy for almost 20 years.

The nostalgia for a return to an earlier era—a period remembered rightly or wrongly as less demanding and more rewarding—is an understandable human impulse. After almost every war, after almost every great period in human endeavor, there comes a time when people begin to look backward with a warm glow and to feel that heroic exertions are no longer required.

In the 1920's and thirties this nostalgia served to heighten and reinforce an authentic and indigenous form of American isolation-

ism—a heritage from the early days of a new nation composed of strong-willed men who had turned their backs on the Old World to concentrate their energies and resources on creating the New.

But the serious and responsible men who are today urging that America reduce her world commitments are not isolationists. Nor should the policy they are advancing be called—as some have suggested—“neoisolationism.” Today's nostalgia for “normalcy” is not solely, or even principally, a homegrown phenomenon. It is the companion of—and, to a considerable extent, the response to—a similar nostalgia in Europe.

On both sides of the Atlantic the argument begins with the assertion that the conditions no longer exist which, in the years after the Second World War, required the extension of American power and responsibility to all corners of the globe. This assertion is grounded on a fact and an assumption.

The fact, which no one challenges, is that the nations of Western Europe have long since recovered from the devastation of the war and are industrially stronger and economically more healthy than ever before.

The assumption—unproven and unprova-

¹Address made before the National Foreign Policy Conference for Nongovernmental Organizations at Washington, D.C., on Mar. 16 (press release 42, with minor editorial revisions).

ble—is that a nuclear war between the free world and the Communist bloc is no longer a serious possibility.

Granted this fact and this assumption, the argument proceeds that it should be possible to return to a more nearly “normal” world regime of power and responsibility in which the role of the United States would be greatly diminished. America can, and should, it is contended, undertake a gradual withdrawal from the farflung activities forced on it by the abnormal conditions of the postwar world.

Proponents of Resurgent Nationalism

Proponents of a resurgent nationalism—increasingly vocal in certain European circles—have found this argument particularly attractive. If their own nations are to regain their prewar power and position in world affairs, their first tactical move must be to reduce U.S. power and influence. This means, among other things, weakening or dismantling the institutions and arrangements through which America and Europe cooperate.

As this step is taken, they see the old Europe falling back into shape again, the individual states resuming their historic pattern of relations, albeit with much more effective economic cooperation. As Atlantic ties are reduced in importance, they look forward to something approaching the restoration of the traditional European system. Finally, they feel that, over the long pull, a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals may be more than a figure of speech—provided, of course, that Europeans are left alone to work it out.

A Beguiling Doctrine

This line of argument is not confined to Europe; it has adherents on this side of the ocean as well. American proponents of this view have, in recent months, contended with increasing vigor that the United States should cease its intense preoccupation with world affairs and concentrate on its domestic business—as though the one excluded the other. They have argued further that the United States should reduce its concern with Europe and with Atlantic problems. Times have changed, they say, and

American policy should reflect those changes. The emphasis placed on the organization of power through Atlantic institutions and Atlantic arrangements is, they assert, both unnecessary and unseemly.

Moreover, they contend, the United States should progressively disengage from most of its responsibilities in Asia, Africa, and the other far reaches of the world. It is all right to maintain some air and sea power, but we should withdraw our forces guarding the outposts of freedom. We should reduce our commitments to far-off peoples, cut back our efforts to provide economic assistance, and vastly reduce our military expenditures. We should cultivate our own garden and not try to deal with the burgeoning weeds in other peoples' vacant lots.

This is unquestionably a beguiling doctrine. Modern Americans have no taste for imperialism, and few would challenge the desirability of reducing our commitments if we could be assured that this would not jeopardize the vital interests of ourselves and our friends. Certainly no American in a position of responsibility today wishes to extend United States commitments farther than is essential for the safety of the free world. But is any substantial curtailment of responsibilities possible without undermining the structure of world security we have worked so hard to construct?

President Johnson has stated on more than one occasion that the state of the Union depends, in large measure, upon the state of the world. In recognition of this fact we have during the postwar period undertaken three major responsibilities:

First, to provide a major share of the defense of free-world interests against Communist aggression.

Second, to contribute technology and resources to the economic and political development of the free nations that have arisen from the ashes of old colonial systems.

Third, to use our prestige and moral leadership to prevent internecine quarrels between other free-world states and to bring about their settlement if they cannot be prevented.

The argument that we should retreat from these responsibilities—that the United States

should withdraw its power and attention from many parts of the world—goes to the heart of our proven policies. Those policies have served us well in the postwar years, and they should not be lightly discarded. For if we do disengage from our responsibilities, who is there to assume them? And if they are not assumed, can we be certain that America itself will be secure?

New Postwar System Needed

In my view we would make a dangerous mistake to accept the arguments of those who call for a return to the pattern of the prewar era.

In the first place, no matter how it may appear from the vantage point of today, that pattern was something less than perfect—and we should not encourage its exhumation. No one aware of Western history over the last 50 years can seriously contend that the so-called European system was an effective arrangement either to maintain the peace or to advance the welfare of the world's peoples.

The Europe of the first four decades of this century—marked as it was by the rivalries of nation states—did not bring peace but devastating conflict. Two world cataclysms have made it clear beyond question that a fragmented Europe is a danger to the world.

Civilization survived with difficulty the ravages of the First World War. It was set back many years by the second. Given the vast destructive power of nuclear arms, it is questionable whether civilization as we know it could survive a third.

What is necessary, therefore, is not the return to a prewar system of national rivalries but a new system that takes full account of the realities of this complex and perilous age. The realization of this need has been one of the great constructive forces of the last 20 years. It has inspired the movement toward economic integration in Europe. But it has yet to bring about the kind of political unity that can assure the end of the rivalries and antagonisms that have caused so much havoc in the past.

Even had the European system of the prewar era proved a stable and effective means of organizing relations among states and peo-

ples, it would be impossible to reconstruct it as a system of world power in the world of the 1960's. For the whole structure of the prewar world has been altered irrevocably by the events of the last quarter century.

One major change—as we are all constantly aware—was the drawing of an Iron Curtain around one-third of the world's people.

A second major change was the narrowing of the ocean—the tightening of relations among the nations that border on the littoral of the North Atlantic—Western Europe and North America. To talk today of the two continents as though they existed wholly apart from one another is unreal and misleading. And it is about the relative responsibilities of the United States and Europe that I would like to concentrate my remaining comments.

As both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson have pointed out, the Atlantic world of today is economically interdependent in a manner unknown before the war. The nations included in that world constitute a great industrial complex which includes 90 percent of free-world industrial capacity. Those nations have scrambled their economic eggs irrevocably. We have all learned the hard lesson that what happens on one side of the northern ocean can have the most profound effects on the other.

If economic interdependence is a hard fact with which we must live, then military interdependence is equally demonstrable. Today—and for the foreseeable future—the ultimate defense of Western Europe is the vast destructive power of the American nuclear deterrent. Over time, we can foresee a greater participation by Europe in the nuclear defense of the West. That is an object of our policy, but what form it will take is a major unanswered question. It may come about through a collective effort such as the United States itself has proposed. Or it may—unhappily for us all—come about through the development of additional independent national nuclear systems.

Many look forward to the ultimate creation of a truly European deterrent. But that will entail the achievement by Europe of a degree of political unity far exceeding that foreseen in the near future by even the most optimistic

proponents of European federalism. And it will mean also the abandonment of the conception that the possession of a national deterrent system is a mark of status.

Atlantic Defense Is Indivisible

Still, whatever arrangements are worked out to enable the peoples of Europe to participate in their own nuclear defense, the nuclear defense of the Atlantic world is, and by its nature must be, indivisible—and this adds a totally new requirement to the organization of Western power. The effective integration of effort between the nations of the Atlantic world is an implacable condition to the defense of the common interests of Europe and North America. As President Johnson said in his state of the Union message,² Europe and the United States have “common interests and common values, common dangers and common expectations. These realities will continue to have their way—especially in our expanding trade and especially in our common defense.”

While over the years, therefore, there will almost certainly be some rearrangements of force within the Atlantic world, I see no possibility that either a prosperous economic life or an effective defense can be sustained without Atlantic cooperation and Atlantic institutions. Never again can it safely rest on a Europe fragmented in the prewar pattern or on an Atlantic world divided by the northern ocean as a moat between America and Europe.

America, therefore, can never cease to be preoccupied with Europe, any more than Europe can cease to be preoccupied with America. For in this highly complex age our destinies are bound together in a very special way by our common interests, our common dangers, and our devotion to a common set of principles and aspirations.

U.S. Position Unique in World History

Nor can America withdraw, as some have suggested, from a high measure of responsibility for the maintenance of order and stability throughout the free world. We can never again

return to a day when the world was policed by the British Fleet and order was kept over large portions of the earth by diligent proconsuls of colonial powers.

For, in addition to the drawing of the Iron Curtain and the narrowing of the Atlantic, a third great change has occurred in the past 20 years which has altered the structure of world power almost beyond recognition. Prior to 1940, at least 1 billion people were controlled by a handful of nations, mostly in Western Europe, that held dominion over vast colonial systems. The sun never set on the British Empire—and only intermittently on the empire of the French. Holland held vast possessions in the East Indies, Belgium a great territory in Africa.

But today almost all of this is gone. In place of a world system of colonial dependencies, there are 50 new nations—a few perhaps born prematurely, almost all born weak. The great industrial nations of Europe and North America have accepted the fact that never again will they exercise power through the control of subject peoples.

One cannot dismantle a vast and highly developed power structure such as prewar colonialism in the brief period of a quarter century without creating power vacuums and power dislocations of major dimensions. Out of necessity, out of idealism, out of a mature sense of reality, the United States has acted in many of these situations to safeguard the liberty of free people from Communist aggression. We have assumed responsibility—not because we abhorred vacuums but because we abhorred tyranny.

Today, as a consequence, we find ourselves in a position unique in world history. Over the centuries a number of nations have exercised world power, and many have accepted at least some of the responsibilities that go with power. But never before in human history has a nation undertaken to play a role of world responsibility except in defense and support of a world empire. Our actions have not been motivated by pure altruism: rather we have recognized that world responsibility and American security are inseparably related. But, nevertheless,

² For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 25, 1965, p. 94.

what America has done is an achievement of which the American people can be justly proud.

Concept of World Involvement

Those who advocate a progressive withdrawal of American power have, it seems to me, never made clear where or how a withdrawal, once begun, could end without great damage to freedom. They have never acknowledged the fact that in today's interdependent world no action by a global power can ever be taken in isolation. They do not seem to understand that what we do in South Viet-Nam will have a profound meaning for people in the other outposts of freedom.

Our power cannot and should not be exercised in the same fashion and to the same degree in every trouble spot throughout the world. We must measure and weigh the nature and extent of each involvement. But it is hardly useful to call for the wholesale withdrawal of American commitments without a careful examination of the consequences in each case.

In view of the ever-present threat of Communist aggression, no one can responsibly urge the removal of United States strength unless convinced that the military, economic, and political needs of the peoples of the area will be met from other free-world sources. In practical terms this can come about only through the resumption of world responsibilities by our Western allies.

The United States has long sought to encourage the Western European nations to play a greater role in world affairs. But, based on the experience of recent years, only a few have been prepared to apply the full strength derived from their economic prosperity to the effective sharing of farflung responsibilities. There are several reasons for this.

The first is that most Western European nations have had little experience in the exercise of responsibility divorced from the defense of territories or the advancement of quite narrow and specific national interests. To undertake—alongside the United States—to play a role of responsibility in a world where colonial empires have largely disappeared would require them to develop a whole new set of attitudes toward world affairs.

Admittedly the assumption of world responsibilities is difficult, even for a global power. But to carry their fair share of world responsibilities is still possible, even for smaller nations. What is required is not unlimited resources but the will to use such resources as are available. Yet this is a concept that nations not organized on a continental scale find difficult to accept. To some extent the problem is psychological. Lacking the resources for a world role, they lack a sense of world involvement. And with the disappearance of their colonial possessions (which defined a specific national interest), they are reluctant to commit what resources they do have to a more generalized common effort.

Concerting Broad Lines of Policy

World involvement, of course, means more than the free expression of views. To play a useful and effective role on the world stage it is not enough for a nation simply to offer advice on all aspects of world affairs. It should be prepared to back that advice with resources. If unwilling to do so, it does not contribute to the interests of the free world by seeking to impose its views on the nations that are carrying the common burden. In fact, when national positions are vigorously promoted without regard to their effect on the responsible common efforts of other states, free-world interests may well be injured.

The problem, therefore, is not how we can encourage the Western European nations to resume their traditional prewar role in world affairs—for that role disappeared with the passage of empires. The problem is rather how we can encourage them to share with us a role that is something new and unique in history, a role of world responsibility divorced from territorial or narrow national interests.

Hopefully we can move toward this objective by continuing to improve the scope and mechanisms of consultation within the Western alliance. We have made progress along this line, and we shall make more. For we recognize that a greater sharing of responsibilities will mean a greater sharing of decisions; it will mean the concerting of broad lines of policy all over the world. This will not be easy. But it must

be done. As President Johnson said last December,³

... we must all work to multiply in number and intimacy the ties between North America and Europe. For we shape an Atlantic civilization with an Atlantic destiny.

Urgency of European Unity

Nonetheless the key problem will still remain—and it cannot be disregarded. Most of the Atlantic nations, as now organized, are too small to participate with an effectiveness commensurate with their talents and resources in the great matters that shape the destiny of all peoples. The lesson of the last few years is clear. A satisfactory allocation of world responsibilities will be possible only when other free-world nations organize their political and economic affairs on a scale adequate to the requirements of the modern age.

This point is well understood by those who have led the drive toward European unity. Much of the momentum behind that drive has stemmed from a deep anxiety that the European peoples would be unable to make their proper contribution to world affairs so long as they were organized as national states small in mid-20th-century terms.

Until 1963 Europe made great strides toward unity. Over the past 2 years, however, we have witnessed a revival of nationalism. Yet the inescapable logic of unity remains a strong latent force. Hopefully, the lost momentum will be recaptured in the months ahead. For the achievement of this objective is unfinished business of the first order of urgency.

The U.S. and World Responsibilities

Until this business is in fact finished, the United States must continue to carry a large part of the responsibilities of the free world for one compelling reason. If we do not, many of those responsibilities will not be met at all. And if they are not met, we shall have gravely jeopardized both our values and our safety.

And so, while it would be comforting to think that our postwar tasks around the world were largely over—that we could now withdraw our

attention from the far corners of the globe with the satisfying feeling of a job well done—that our massive responsibilities could all be shifted to other shoulders—this is simply not the case. For, like it or not, we live in a world that will almost certainly remain for a long time to come turbulent, difficult, frustrating, and complex.

What we dare not do is to turn our backs on the world as it is—and wish it were something different.

The late T. S. Eliot once wrote that “Human kind cannot bear very much reality.” But Americans are a people who take pride in being realistic. Now, if ever, we must demonstrate that quality.

Congress Approves Appropriations for Inter-American Bank

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release dated March 25

I have signed the bill, H.R. 45, under which the Congress has authorized appropriations over the next 3 years of \$750 million as the United States share in an increase in the resources of the Fund for Special Operations of the Inter-American Development Bank.

This bill is another important milestone in continuing United States support for the Alliance for Progress. Since it began operation in 1960, the Inter-American Development Bank has made an ever-increasing contribution to this common effort. In 1964 it made loans totaling \$286.4 million, which represent a significant percentage of all the loans made by public financial institutions participating in the alliance. The Bank's role as the bank of the alliance will be strengthened by this further addition to its resources, and its multilateral character will be enhanced because all members will contribute to the increase.

Along with other member governments, the United States has agreed to make this contribution to the Bank's Fund for Special Operations in three equal installments in 1965, 1966, and 1967. I am asking the Congress to act promptly on a 1965 supplemental request to pay our

³ *Ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1964, p. 866.

first installment; provision for the second has been made in my 1966 budget.

In taking this further step, we are reminded that the Alliance for Progress is more effective every day. For Latin America the alliance offers hope instead of despair, growth and advancement rather than deterioration and destruction. It unites rather than divides and seeks to conquer, not people and nations, but those ancient enemies of mankind—poverty, ignorance, hunger, and disease. In short, it represents the means by which free men of all the Americas have joined together in a peaceful effort to win a better life for themselves and their children.

Looking to the future, we expect the heartening accomplishments of the Alliance for Progress in 1964 to be continued and even surpassed. Dedication and hard work throughout this hemisphere have been the key to the success of our efforts. But the struggle has not been an easy one, and many difficult obstacles remain to be surmounted before our goal is within reach. This year and the years ahead summon us all to even greater effort in our quest for a better life in freedom and dignity.

President Calls for Full Use of Resources in Overseas Programs

Statement by President Johnson¹

All departments—and virtually all agencies—have personnel and programs abroad. From time to time, I have expressed to you individually my views in regard to this. I do not believe it is necessary—or desirable—for the executive branch to duplicate globally the pattern of domestic responsibilities and operations at home.

I have recently been giving much thought to such matters. And today I want to share some observations—and make a recommendation—in this regard.

Our programs around the world are all im-

¹ Made to the Cabinet on Mar. 25 (White House press release).

portant to the accomplishment of our foreign policy objectives. But our resources and money are always scarce. They are never plentiful enough to cover every need and to fulfill every objective.

It is important that all of us—as managers—make certain that our people abroad and the money we spend abroad are used to achieve the maximum support of the accomplishment of our foreign policy objectives. We must insure that every person is being utilized to the fullest and that every dollar spent is a dollar needed to accomplish our purposes.

While I could speak at length on this, I believe action is more needed than words. For that reason, I am today asking the following: that the Secretary of State, who is responsible for recommending our foreign policy objectives, and the Director of the Budget [Kermit Gordon], who is responsible for recommending distribution of resources to accomplish those objectives, meet with all of you who have overseas programs to look at our operations in 10 or 15 countries.

This would be done on an experimental basis—before our next budget enters preparation.

The review should be on a country basis—with all U.S. agencies, all U.S. programs, and all U.S. policies related to people and programs being reviewed country by country. The object should be to determine that we are doing the things that are most essential for us to do, that there are no unnecessary people and no unnecessary programs—and that all our money is being well spent.

In countries where such reviews are conducted, I shall expect each agency to respect the levels established for each of our programs by Secretary Rusk and Mr. Gordon in the allocation of funds and resources for the ensuing year—and in the projection of our plans.

I believe that this kind of country-by-country review—looking at all of our programs as they relate to our objectives in each country—can insure for us better management in the fuller utilization of all our resources. I also believe that this approach can and will materially strengthen the conduct and execution of the foreign policy of the United States.

United States Policy in Africa

by G. Mennen Williams

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs¹

Not too many years ago, a distinguished Congresswoman asked State Department help in planning a trip to Africa. The almost incredulous reply was: "Surely, Madam, *you're* not interested in hunting lions or elephants."

More recently, as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, I took a night off to try to see elephants at Kenya's world-famous Treetops Hotel. I quickly learned, however, that my African friends expected me to visit Africa for better reasons than to see Africa's treasury of wildlife—and, of course, we do have many more important concerns in Africa, important as wildlife conservation is.

The most significant reason Africa is of concern to the United States is, properly, that neither we nor our children can live in peace, freedom, and prosperity in the long run unless the peoples of Africa can develop in peace and freedom and fulfill their fundamental aspiration for a better life. Without such development, the continent's troubles will be a continuing threat to world peace and security.

That conclusion is hardheaded, honest, patriotic pragmatism. That is why we are interested now in helping to build stable and independent countries in Africa and in maintaining cordial and lasting relations with them. And that is why we support African self-determination.

Happily, in favoring this course, our traditional beliefs and our national self-interest coincide completely.

There are many other reasons for our interest in Africa.

¹Address made at Williams College, Williamstown, Mass., on Mar. 18 (press release 48).

For more than a century and a half, American missionaries have been active in many parts of the continent.

Long before our missionaries, however, Africa and America were linked together by the slave trade. Although long dormant, that link has in recent years led Negro Americans to become increasingly proud of, and interested in, Africa—an interest that goes hand in hand with their interest in civil rights.

The United States has long had commercial interests in Africa, going back to the days of clipper ships. Although the volume of our commerce and investment in Africa is still relatively modest in comparison with our volume in other continents, it is not inconsiderable and is of increasing importance.

Some of Africa's mineral resources are of critical importance to American science and technology. For example, our machine-tool industry relies heavily upon Africa's industrial diamonds, and certain comparatively rare African metals are essential to our industrial and scientific community for use at extremes of heat and cold.

In addition, we have important space-age ties with Africa. Our first manned space flight was reported on by two African tracking stations, and African tracking and control stations are essential to our current space experiments and operations.

The United States also relies on various facilities in Africa to maintain our essential worldwide communications net. This rightly suggests that Africa's physical location has important strategic implications. This was dem-

onstrated not only in the past by the use of North Africa as a jumpoff point for the Allied return to Europe in World War II but more recently when Soviet aircraft could not use West African landing facilities during the Cuban missile crisis.

Africa also figures in our concern with Communist subversion, which has turned in the direction of the statement attributed to Stalin: "The backs of the British will be broken not on the River Thames, but on the Yangtze, the Ganges, and the Nile." Communist Party Congresses as early as 1957 resolved to penetrate Africa. Since then, the Communist nations have stepped up their investment of men, money, and subversion in Africa. The entry of Red China into the African Continent, and its competition with Moscow, have increased and made more complex, rather than diminished, the total impact of Communist imperialism in Africa. While it is true that no African country has become a Communist satellite, that danger to African freedom must be of continuing concern to us and to them.

The United States also has an interest in the peoples of Africa because of their tremendous dynamism and their increasingly significant role in world affairs. In the United Nations, where they comprise almost one-third of the voting strength, their vigor and leadership contribute much to the growing importance of the underdeveloped areas of the world.

Furthermore, while American and European interests in Africa are similar to a considerable extent, the United States does have interests and concerns different and apart from those of the European countries that once ruled in that area—such as, for example, Chinese Communist recognition in the U.N.

In brief, then, our interests in Africa must be considered increasingly in the development of our worldwide foreign policy of peace, freedom, and prosperity.

Economic and Social Realities in Africa

Because of our significant interests in Africa, therefore, it is necessary for us to have a clear understanding of that continent's present stage of development and of the realities of African life.

Africa is an enormous continent—more than three times the size of the 50 United States—and, although potentially very rich, for the most part is presently burdened with severe poverty, disease, and illiteracy. Unlike Asia, Africa's 265 million people do not present a problem of overpopulation.

These people speak nearly 1,000 different languages. Although culturally fragmented, the peoples of Africa have many basic similarities in the everyday realities of African life.

For one thing, most of the people of Africa are poor in terms of developed material wealth. The average per capita income for the continent as a whole is about \$120 a year and as low as \$40 a year in some parts of the continent. This is the lowest per capita income of any geographic region in the world—almost twice as low as the next lowest region—and there is little local capital for economic development. Fortunately there is a pattern of economic growth in most parts of Africa.

Although Africa is primarily an agricultural continent and 75 percent of the people make their living from the land, the average African farmer is only about 4 percent as productive as his counterpart in North America.

Education presents much the same picture. While there is a cultural and sophisticated elite, about 85 percent of Africa's people are illiterate. There is a crucial lack of trained people to perform the many vital middle-level functions so necessary to African development. I might point out, however, that educational facilities and opportunities are expanding. Today some 40 percent of Africa's children are in primary school—a vast increase over a decade ago. In addition, secondary school enrollment has risen from 800,000 to 1.8 million in the last 4 years, and the number of universities has gone up from 24 to 35.

Communications and transportation are extremely poor throughout much of Africa. In many parts of the continent a telephone call from a French-speaking country to an English-speaking nation must be routed through Paris and London. Total improved highway mileage in the whole continent of Africa is only 551,530 miles, compared to 2.7 million miles of improved roads in the United States alone.

Health is another major problem. Every known tropical disease exists in the continent, taking the lives of one of every five African children. There is a severe shortage of doctors, nurses, and other health personnel. Where we have one doctor for every 740 people, the ratio for Africa (excluding South Africa) is one for every 22,500 people.

Another important reality of African life is the instability created when traditional African tribal values meet the modern political, economic, and social concepts of new national governments. In much of Africa—but by no means all—the function of decisionmaking is moving from traditional chiefs and elders in the villages into the hands of younger people in the cities.

Political Realities

Alongside Africa's economic and social realities is an imposing list of political realities we must include in our foreign policy formulation.

The first, and most important, of these realities is Africa's drive for freedom and independence. In less than a decade and a half, 33 new nations have come to independence in Africa, and others are on the way. Although we sometimes lose sight of the fact, these new nations made the transition to national sovereignty in cooperation with the former metropolises in peace and good order—except for Algeria and the Congo.

The major territories without self-government lie in southern Africa, where white minority governments control large black majorities and significant numbers of Asians and coloreds, who are people of mixed blood. In most of these areas little, if any, progress is being made toward self-determination in acceptable terms for the people, and because of this, the future for peace in southern Africa is not promising. The lack of progress there is a major concern to independent Africa and an issue which passionately unites and motivates Africans throughout the continent. Until this problem is solved, there will be trouble in Africa, with worldwide impact.

The desire of Africa's new and developing nations to obtain recognition of their dignity as equal, sovereign states in the world community

is another African reality. For this reason they place great faith in the U.N. as a forum where African countries have voices equal to those of other areas of the world.

Later I'll say a word about the African desire for nonalignment and the compulsion toward African unity. These are real and intensely felt African aspirations.

A final African political reality—and one of considerable importance to the United States—is the growing size of Communist activities in Africa. Communist overtures to Africa cover a broad range of activities, from diplomatic on down. To date, the Soviets have 24 diplomatic missions and the Communist Chinese have 16 in Africa. Together, they have extended more than \$1 billion in credits and loans to African nations, although much of that amount has not been drawn upon by Africans. Approximately 7,000 African students go to Communist universities in Europe and Asia on scholarships each year. That is about 1,000 more than the number of African students who come to the United States annually, but far fewer than the 30,000–40,000 in the United Kingdom, France, and other parts of Western Europe. In addition to scholarships, the Communists also have increased their use of publications, radio broadcasting, films, and cultural exchanges as propaganda weapons in Africa. Finally, of course, the Communists widely employ undercover forms of subversion.

Although the growing size of the Communist presence in Africa contributes to the recognition of Africa's importance and dignity and promotes an increasing, although overall small, number of African militants, it is also leading to an increasing African awareness of the true objectives of communism. African leaders have seen or heard about Communist interference in the internal affairs of African governments, efforts to win African support for Communist cold-war objectives, and the treatment of African students in Communist universities. As a result, many Africans are seriously concerned with the way Communist deeds and actions conflict with African national interests and their desires to develop themselves in a peaceful climate in which they are truly independent.

Five Pillars of U.S. Policy

In the light of these realities in modern Africa, what, then, should be a realistic American policy toward Africa?

The primary purpose of all U.S. foreign policy is, of course, the security of the United States, and this concern is reflected in our African policy. This does not mean, however, that the protection of America's interests in Africa is inimical to the best interests of the African people. Indeed, the situation is quite the contrary. The objectives we seek in protecting American interests in Africa are objectives which also promote the real interests of the African people.

As we have no territorial or other special ambitions anywhere, American policy is directed toward the building of a world of peace and freedom. In today's interdependent world, that is the only way we can guarantee our own peace and freedom in the long run. In seeking peace and freedom for ourselves, therefore, we do it best by seeking it for others. For that reason our basic policy toward Africa is designed to advance African interests as much as our own.

American foreign policy toward Africa is based upon fundamental American principles that are an integral part of our national life and express our national ethos. At the same time, however, our policy is as practical in the protection of our national interests and security as the motto "honesty is the best policy" is essential to the successful conduct of a profitable business.

In any event, our tough-minded Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, has emphasized more than once that a scarlet thread of American policy is an insistence that "governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed." In foreign affairs, the counterpart of this is called self-determination and is a leitmotif of our whole policy.

Moroccans still have a warm memory of Franklin Delano Roosevelt because of their belief that he advanced the cause of independence for that country. Likewise, President John F. Kennedy is remembered by Algerians for his 1957 speech in the Senate in which he pointed out that there was only one solution—independence—to the vexing Algerian problem. As

President, his friendship for Africa has made his name indelible on that continent. Senegalese, too, remember the warm rapport established by President Lyndon B. Johnson during his visit to that country's first independence celebration in 1961.

Throughout Africa the United States is either praised or damned—depending upon the point of view—because of our support for independence. It is interesting, too, that at the first Afro-Asian conference at Bandung in 1955 the meeting's heroes were not Marx, Lenin, and Mao Tse-tung, as the Communist Chinese hoped, but the fathers of the American Revolution and their Declaration of Independence. Fundamentally, therefore, I believe I can say realistically that Africans have a basic friendship for Americans.

Of the five pillars of U.S. policy toward Africa, self-determination, then, with the several corollaries that flow from it—such as our acceptance of the African desire for nonalignment—is the first and most important.

The second main pillar of that policy is encouragement of the solution of African problems by Africans themselves and support of their institutions through which solutions can be reached, such as the Organization of African Unity and the Economic Commission for Africa.

The third is support of improved standards of living through trade and aid.

The fourth is the discouragement of arms buildups beyond the needs of internal security or legitimate self-defense.

The fifth is encouragement of other countries of the world, particularly the former European metropolises, to recognize their continuing responsibilities toward Africa.

In this statement of our African policy fundamentals, I have not mentioned opposition to, or containment of, communism. However, there is no question that the support of freedom over communism is basic to and a product of, the aforementioned tenets that guide United States policy in Africa. From time to time special measures may be needed to meet crisis situations—and they will be taken vigorously when necessary—but conditions in Africa are such that the support of true African independence

and development is, in the long run, the surest guarantee that Africa will remain in the world of free choice and keep communism at arm's length.

Support of Self-Determination

Turning to the first pillar, U.S. support of self-determination includes several facets:

First, our support of the right of African countries to choose whether or not they wish to be independent;

Second, the right of Africans to govern themselves;

Third, the right of Africans to choose the kind of institutions under which they want to live;

Fourth, the right of African countries to a foreign policy of alliance or nonalignment; and,

Fifth, our willingness to support a movement of African unity if that is what the Africans themselves want.

On the first facet—independence—the American policy of self-determination has insisted that the African people be given the right to choose independence if that is what they want. This policy is a practical one, showing preference for a peaceful transition and a recognition that the long-term interests of all concerned may best be served by a progressive approach, over a reasonable period of time, within a framework of agreement by all parties.

For example, the United States is satisfied that the several steps toward self-government and ultimate independence worked out between the people of the British High Commission Territory of Bechuanaland and Great Britain fulfill our definition of self-determination. Those steps recognize the necessity for consent of the governed and the choice of independence within an agreeable length of time. On the other hand, the United States agrees with Great Britain that a unilateral declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia, in its present state of limited franchise and representation, does not satisfy self-determination. It seems quite evident that a large proportion of that country's people are dissatisfied with the present amount of self-government. Under present arrangements, they see little hope of acquiring

satisfactory internal self-government in a reasonable period of time.

Special mention must be made of the lack of self-determination in the Portuguese territories in Africa. Our policy there is to use every persuasive force we have to get the Portuguese Government into a dialog with the Africans concerned. We would like to see such a dialog, looking toward a mutually agreed program of development for self-government with the ultimate right to opt for outright independence, some form of community with Portugal, or even union with Portugal. A resolution reaffirming the rights of the people of the territories to self-determination was approved in the United Nations in December 1963, with the support of the United States, after a series of talks between the Portuguese Foreign Minister and a number of African diplomats at the United Nations. It will be noted that our policy does not demand "one man, one vote" tomorrow, but it does contemplate an immediate recognition of the people's timely right to choose independence or other form of association or disassociation. In addition, it recognizes the right to government by the consent of the governed, with steps being taken to prepare the people for such self-government as rapidly as possible.

On the second facet—self-government—independence and government by the consent of the governed are not necessarily the same thing, I should point out. The Republic of South Africa has independence from foreign domination, but it does not have government by the consent of all the governed nor does its system of *apartheid* portend that there will be a government with the consent of the governed. American policy in this situation has been made abundantly clear in word and action at the United Nations and elsewhere. The United States is in complete and unalterable opposition to *apartheid*. We have unilaterally, and with the United Nations, declared an embargo on American arms for the Republic of South Africa. We have sought by every diplomatic means to convince the South African Government that *apartheid* contains the seeds for destruction for South Africa, as well as trouble for the rest of Africa and the world. As in the case of the Portuguese territories, we seek to

impose no special formula upon South Africa. Rather, we seek to induce a dialog between the Government and its citizens with no present voice in that Government, looking toward a mutually agreeable and peaceful transition to government by consent of all the governed.

On the third facet—free choice of institutions—our policy of self-determination also contemplates our acceptance of free choice by African governments of their own form of government and society, so long as they provide government by the consent of the governed and do not injure others. Our policy does not anticipate that every African government will be a faithful copy of the Governments of the United States, Britain, France, or any free-world country, even though we believe in their merit.

In this connection, while we ourselves prefer a two-party system, we can, nevertheless, understand the reasons why many Africans want a one-party system at this time. This is a concept that our policy can live with, especially if it provides a reasonable right to government representative of and responsive to the needs of the people. But this is not to say that we feel the one-party system is an ultimately desirable system.

In judging African one-party systems, however, Americans must be mindful that it wasn't until after a decade of government under our own Constitution that we had national parties ourselves. (The majority of African governments are only 5 years old.) Until recently in some of our States, one-party systems continued to exist. However, within these State one-party systems, there were opposing factions and the people had a choice between them. This also is true in Africa, where the one-party systems have a degree of internal dialog and discussion that distinguishes them from the monolithic one-party systems of Europe, with which we are more familiar.

The question of African "socialism" also falls within the framework of self-determination. Here we must recognize that, in the African context, technical terms do not necessarily have the same meaning as in ours. African socialism is at least as alien to Karl Marx's socialism as today's American capitalism is different from

that described by Adam Smith. There is no African state that does not welcome foreign private investment and capitalist enterprise. Indigenous private enterprise flourishes to some extent in every country, although large-scale private enterprise is not in evidence in many states because their economies are not yet rich enough to permit the accumulation of sufficient private capital.

On the fourth facet—nonalignment—U.S. acceptance of the African desire for a policy of nonalignment is a logical extension of our philosophy of self-determination. There was a time when the United States fretted about "true neutralism." But for 4 years our Government has felt it unnecessary for any country which seeks its own independence to have to be aligned with us to be seeking the same kind of the world we seek. Any country that seeks independence *ipso facto* denies the subservience that communism demands. As President Kennedy said in his state of the Union message in January 1962:²

. . . our basic goal remains the same: a peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future and their own system so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others.

Some may choose forms and ways that we would not choose for ourselves, but it is not for us that they are choosing. We can welcome diversity—the Communists cannot. . . . And the way of the past shows clearly that freedom, not coercion, is the wave of the future.

On the fifth facet—African unity—the United States recognizes the right of Africans to create any form of association among themselves they choose, so long as the purposes of such association are not destructive to the welfare of others. As a practical matter, the United States understands the African desire—I might almost say compulsion—for unity, on the one hand, and, on the other, that unity is so obviously in the best interests of developing economic and political viability for the fragmented and underdeveloped African states. While the United States approves the move for African unity in principle, it is our policy not to take specific action toward this goal unless requested to do so. Thus we have supported

² For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.

he idea of the almost-continent-wide Organization of African Unity and the Economic Commission for Africa, as well as a number of more limited regional groups.

Self-determination inevitably raises practical questions in its application. For example, just who has the privilege of decision? Can a single city, for instance, determine it wishes to be independent from the countryside with which it has been traditionally associated? Specifically, should Katanga, or Orientale, or Kasai Provinces in the Congo have the right to opt for independence?

The United States has felt that, like the question of what constitutes a bargaining unit in labor relations, the right for self-determination has to be based on a practical historical unit in order to permit fast and sensible results. In the Congo, for example, the whole country was defined by a century's experience. In any event, the Africans themselves expressed their respect for the recognition of historical frontiers in the first meeting of the OAU in 1963, and we feel this is a useful and important base and adjunct for our policy of self-determination.

African Solution of African Problems

The second major pillar of U.S. policy toward Africa is our support for African solutions of African problems. This is a natural derivative of the philosophy of sovereign self-determination and the American belief that a solution by neighbors will be more effective than one developed from the outside—not unlike our own idea that the Federal Government should not do those things that local government can do as well or better.

Perhaps two examples will suffice to illustrate how this policy operates. In 1963, after the assassination of President [Sylvanus] Olympio of Togo when the new government took over, although there was some embarrassment because of the long delay, the United States indicated it would not act on the question of recognition until a significant number of African countries had acted. This precedent has been followed in similar, subsequent cases. The United States has welcomed and encouraged the Organization of African Unity in its efforts to

solve the border disputes between Morocco and Algeria and Ethiopia and Somalia. In the present Congo problem, the United States has welcomed OAU cooperation with the Government of the Congo in solving the internal rebellion and outside interference. The United States has consistently and with some success urged Congolese President [Joseph] Kasavubu and Prime Minister [Moise] Tshombe to work with that organization, consistent with the sovereignty of the Congo.

Aid and Trade

The third main pillar of our African policy is our support of African economic development and independence through aid and trade. Aid to Africa is still a relatively new concept, and is only one-tenth of our global aid program. But, in the short time of its existence, our assistance program is beginning to show positive results. For example, as a result of a chicken-hatching program in Nigeria, much-needed protein was provided for the people and the cost of eggs was reduced from \$1.25 to 75 cents a dozen. Likewise, in Tunisia, the ability to produce vegetables for home consumption rose to the point that horticultural imports were cut from \$14.4 million annually in 1959 to about \$1.2 million today.

U.S. aid to Africa is a realistic response to our support of American interest in that continent. There are many reasons why the United States finds it desirable to have an aid program in Africa. One is that the majority of Americans who believe in aid do so because they want to help others less fortunate than themselves. This may sound strange in a day when it is supposed to be more fashionable to be hard-boiled than warmhearted, but it is a fact, nonetheless. And perhaps it is one of the reasons why we have become the great people that we are.

In addition, there are both long-range and short-term practical reasons for our assistance. The most important long-range basis for aid is that it helps build a world in which we and our children can live in security and peace. As President Kennedy said in his inaugural address, "If a free society cannot help the many

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.

who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich." Thus, unless the rest of the world lives satisfied, it will be constantly in turmoil. Under any circumstance such turmoil would breed trouble. But in this age of cold war there is no doubt there would be serious trouble resulting from Communist activity in areas of continued unrest.

In addition to that long-range consideration, the United States also has a number of specific short-term reasons for desiring to maintain good relations with its African friends through an aid program. It can be argued, with good reason, that aid does not buy friends. One can agree with that. But there are realities we must accept in this world. As an affluent major power, we could turn friends against us if we did not give them a helping hand when it is needed. And aid is an important, even essential, element in creating the mutual understanding and cooperation among African countries that help our friends comprehend the many world problems we all face—the threat of Chinese communism, for example, or the need for international scientific cooperation.

Obviously, in a continent where many of the preconditions for rapid economic development are lacking, the tasks of nation building are difficult. Much of our help, therefore, is directed toward encouraging the African nations to do all they can to spur their progress and to help them develop the tools necessary to do the job. We are putting our assistance into projects that not only reach large numbers of people and improve their lives but those which help countries develop their own resources and increase their ability to help themselves.

Aid is also a necessary ingredient of the economic development needed to build political stability. In every African country—certainly in all those I myself have visited—the people are hungry for economic and social improvement. Any government—however progressive and constructive, however cloaked with the glory of winning independence—that fails to reckon with this hunger will find itself in jeopardy and the order and stability of its people gravely disturbed. This not only adversely affects the country involved but, because of its

international repercussions, the United States as well.

African governments are not yet of themselves able to generate the full thrust required for the economic and social improvement needed to satisfy their people. They must seek aid or risk deepening troubles. The key question is from whom aid will be sought, and when it can be delivered and put to work. It is worth noting that in almost every instance the newly independent nations of Africa turned first to the West for aid and looked elsewhere only if they were disappointed by the Western response.

Our overall aid program for Africa embraces a variety of tools—development grants, supporting assistance, development loans, development research, support for international organizations, Food for Peace, and the Peace Corps. We do not conceive the development of Africa as a challenge to the United States alone but a challenge to the whole free world. And this development is a challenge not only to governments but to private enterprise.

As a consequence, the State Department, other departments and agencies of the United States Government, and other organizations—public and private—are initiating and supporting (1) programs to promote aid and assistance to African countries by nations of the free world and (2) all programs to encourage and help private investment and enterprise in Africa.

Africa is magnificently endowed by nature, and with the effective combination of investment, trade, and local initiative, its potential can be realized. For example, the intelligent development of its many important minerals provides scope for private financial and commercial enterprise, as well as an ever-increasing source of livelihood for the African people.

It is no surprise, therefore, that American private companies have shown increasing participation in Africa's development. The need for investment in Africa is great, and the potential of resource development holds much promise for all concerned—Africa, Europe, the United States, and the rest of the free world.

Between World War II and 1957, it is estimated that total investment in Africa

amounted to some \$10 billion, of which the bulk came from Europe. U.S. investment in Africa reached the \$1 billion mark only in 1961. Europe's trade with Africa is about five times that of the United States, which in 1962 totaled approximately \$1.7 billion. We have no desire to disrupt or supplant existing commercial ties between Africa and Europe, but we believe there are many commercial opportunities that have not yet been investigated and we have an increasing interest in exploring those opportunities.

American investment in Africa has increased considerably in recent years, rising from \$248 million in 1950 to nearly \$1.5 billion in 1963. Of that amount, about 40 percent is in South Africa and 60 percent in other African countries. We like to believe that this growth is due to the cooperation between hospitable African countries and the initiative of American enterprise, plus possibly the stress put on the importance of private investment in Africa by U.S. Government agencies. We look forward to further increases as a result of the investment climate and conditions engendered by investment-minded African governments with American government cooperation.

Internal Security and Arms Limitation

The fourth pillar of our policy toward Africa is our desire to discourage arms buildups beyond the needs of internal security or legitimate self-defense.

Our policy is designed to encourage arms limitation in Africa. Generally the military requirements of most African countries have been worked out with the former metropolises, and there has been little need for supplementary arms assistance from the United States. In some cases, however, there is a strong desire to rely on more than one source in this field, and, on request, we have provided limited military assistance.

We feel that the prospects for peaceful settlements of disputes are bettered by avoiding arms races. And, given the very limited economic resources of the newly independent countries, it is imperative for them to devote their resources

to economic and social development rather than arms.

Obviously the Communists would benefit from an arms race in Africa, while the free world would not. For that reason our military assistance is designed primarily to meet the minimum legitimate internal security or self-defense requirements of the recipients, and to contribute to economic and social development wherever feasible.

This program, which is small compared with those in other regions of the world—only some 2½ percent of our worldwide military assistance—is principally confined to providing military and telecommunications equipment and technical assistance. Such assistance, we believe, can help African nations develop the conditions of law and order which are necessary for steady progress. We do not anticipate significant growth in the military assistance program for Africa, and most of all we do not wish to help generate any form of arms race. Even in countries where we are providing major items, we feel that our sincere efforts to be helpful in assisting in legitimate self-defense and the responsible limitations under which we provide such assistance dissuade those countries from turning to others who might be less concerned with the total arms race in Africa. We would prefer a race in overcoming the economic and social problems that now beset the continent.

While we attempt to stress internal security and civic action programs when called upon for legitimate military assistance, wherever possible we seek to build police programs to limit the need for military programs.

Encouragement of European Concern

The fifth, and final, pillar of our African policy that I would like to discuss is our desire to encourage other countries, particularly the former European metropolises, to recognize their responsibilities toward Africa.

To a large extent this already is being done. We recognize Europe's vital and longstanding interests in Africa, and we have cooperated with them to encourage continuing and expanding

mutually beneficial African-European relations. Such relations are well established in many parts of the continent, for which much credit is due both to the former metropolitan powers and to the African countries involved.

With few exceptions colonial ties are being laid aside for new types of cooperative arrangements between Africa and Europe. And, where African aspirations for independence and dignity have been satisfied, it has been the African nations themselves who have sought fruitful and continuing relations with the former metropolises. We consider this sound policy, and we are pleased that the new cultural, economic, and political relationships between the former metropolises and the newly independent African countries are, in most instances, both close and cordial, and politically and economically beneficial. There is no reason why they should not be.

At the same time the young nations of Africa not only want to be independent but they feel compelled to manifest this independence. For that reason they wish to emphasize their individual personalities and characteristics and minimize their dependence upon others in political, economic, or cultural fields. Generally, then, they feel they must avoid exclusive relations with the former metropolises in order not to compromise their feeling or image of independence.

It is our feeling that the United States can give African countries a second "great power" association which will increase their sense of independence. At the same time their connections with the United States will give the African countries a greater political capacity to maintain associations with the former metropolises. We believe that the availability of such an American presence meets the genuine needs of African states without their having to turn to the Communist nations. We believe the United States in this way can enhance the contributions of the free-world community to Africa and contribute to the preservation of the traditional cultural and other friendly relationships. In brief, then, our desire is to supplement and strengthen existing relationships in Africa, not to supplant them, but always recognizing that we have important interests of our

own in Africa. In this way we believe the United States can best serve world peace and African and our own best interests.

In brief conclusion, then, U.S. policy toward Africa is based on our support for the African people to chart their own future, to work out their own problems by themselves if they can, to improve their living standards, to maintain internal security without encouraging an African arms race, and to benefit from continued good relations with other free-world nations, particularly the former European metropolises, without jeopardizing their independence.

In December 1963 President Johnson said:⁴

We in the United States are dedicated to the same goals as the peoples of Africa—justice, freedom, and peace. Under our late President, John F. Kennedy, the United States made significant advances toward the attainment of those goals. We will continue to work toward those same objectives under my administration. We want to help build a world in which all men have a better opportunity to improve their lives, both spiritually and materially. Thus, we will continue to press for equal rights for all—both in my country and abroad—and we will continue to assist the world's new and emerging nations in their efforts to strengthen their foundations of freedom and independence.

In carrying out that policy, the United States hopes:

1. To assist African nations to develop effective governments to assure peaceful progress for their people and to contribute to world peace and stability essential to the security of the United States.
2. To help these nations build solid economic conditions to become self-sustaining members of the world community and not susceptible to Communist overtures.
3. To encourage peaceful application of self-determination to still-dependent Africa.
4. To develop a true community of interests between Africa and the United States.

If we can accomplish those goals in the face of Africa's rapidly changing situation, the United States believes Africa will—in African terms—contribute importantly to world peace, prosperity, and stability in years ahead.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 6, 1964, p. 17.

U.S. and 11 OECD Nations Discuss International Shipping Problems

Representatives of the United States and 11 maritime countries of the free world met March 23-25 at the headquarters of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York to discuss problems of international shipping. The 11 countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) were represented by a group of shipping officials.

U.S. representatives included G. Griffith Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and Adm. John Harlee, USN (retired), Chairman of the Federal Maritime Commission.

The principal subjects discussed related to the regulation of international shipping. The meeting was similar to others among OECD countries on this general subject.

In previous meetings the maritime nations had considered the need of the Federal Maritime Commission for tonnage and revenue information in the U.S. trades to study any disparities between freight rates on U.S. exports and imports. An agreement was reached on December 15, 1964, in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development regarding the exchange of this information. The text of this Agreed Minute¹ was simultaneously released in the countries which were party to it. The operation of this agreement was reviewed in the New York meeting, and the general subject of exchange of information discussed.

The dual-rate contract problem was also discussed. The Bonner Act (P.L. 87-346) provides that shipping conferences in the U.S. international trade offering lower rates to shippers who agree to give a portion of their business to conference lines must use a contract containing certain protective features.

The meeting reviewed the complexity of these problems and the possibility that they might be adjusted through international cooperation.

The talks were informal and exploratory in character, and no decisions were reached. The promotional policies of the United States in the shipping field and the position of the U.S. merchant marine were not considered.

World Trade Week, 1965

A P R O C L A M A T I O N¹

WHEREAS the vigorous growth of our reciprocal trade with nations around the world advances the attainment of a more abundant life for every American; and

WHEREAS the continued expansion of the international exchange of the products of people's labors is mutually profitable to all trading nations and builds greater good will among them; and

WHEREAS we are working together with other nations to enlarge the opportunities for global marketing, by both developed and developing countries, through reciprocal reduction of trade barriers in the Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotiations; and

WHEREAS more and more American businessmen are engaging in trade with overseas businessmen; and

WHEREAS American export progress, serving as an inspiring illustration of the strength of our private enterprise, encourages businessmen throughout the United States to seek new opportunities in the world's growing markets; and

WHEREAS American products, by their quality and variety, offer witness to the vigor and creativity of our economy in all parts of the world; and

WHEREAS it is essential that we continue to expand our export trade, so that we may further improve our international balance of payments, accelerate the progress of our advancing American industry, and increase the employment of American workers;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the week beginning May 16, 1965, as World Trade Week; and I request the appropriate Federal, State, and local officials to cooperate in the observance of that week.


I also urge business, labor, agricultural, educational, professional, and civic groups, as well as the people of the United States generally, to observe World Trade Week with gatherings, discussions, exhibits, ceremonies, and other appropriate activities designed to promote continuing awareness of the importance of world trade to our economy and our relations with other nations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 8, 1965, p. 188.

¹ No. 3647; 30 *Fed. Reg.* 4017.

DONE at the City of Washington this twenty-fourth day of March in the year of our Lord nineteen [SEAL] hundred and sixty-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-ninth.



By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

Department To Hold Conference for Editors and Broadcasters

The Department of State announced on March 24 (press release 58) that it will hold a national foreign policy conference for editors and broadcasters on April 13 and 14 at Washington. Invitations have been extended by Secretary Rusk to representatives of the daily and periodical press and broadcasting stations and groups in all 50 States.

Secretary Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara will address the conference. Among other high officials expected to participate are: David Bell, Administrator, Agency for International Development; George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State; Carl T. Rowan, Director, U.S. Information Agency; William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs; and Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.

Participants in the conference will have an opportunity to meet with other high-level officials in concurrent roundtables covering Africa, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Latin America, the Near East, the Sino-Soviet confrontation, the United Nations, the Western alliance, and disarmament.

The conference will be held on the "background only" ground rule. The sessions will be in the Department of State.

This will be the ninth in this series. The purpose of these conferences is to assist the information media in making available to the American public the maximum possible information in depth on current international relations issues.

New U.S. Spacecraft Tracking Station Opens in Australia

Following is the text of a message from President Johnson to Prime Minister Robert Menzies of Australia on the occasion of the dedication on March 19 of a new U.S. lunar and planetary spacecraft tracking station in the Tidbinbilla Valley near Canberra, Australia.

MARCH 19, 1964.

It is a great pleasure for me to congratulate you on the outstanding and continuing contribution Australia is making to progress in the space age. The standard of performance at the tracking and data acquisition facilities already existing in Australia is excellent. I am confident that at the new space tracking facility at Tidbinbilla we will see the same high level of performance. The station, which is operated entirely by Australians, is now tracking the Mariner satellite on its photographic mission to Mars.

Today, in dedicating this facility, we take another step forward in the close cooperation between our two countries and in the effort of all those around the world who seek to labor together, to share their talents, to assure greater mutual understanding.

This will be the true measure of our success in the exploration of outer space. And it is for this special reason, Mr. Prime Minister, that I extend my deep appreciation and best wishes for the operation of this new station.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 1st Session

- Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. January 14, 1965. 138 pp. [Committee print.]
- Background Documents on East-West Trade. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. February 1965. 299 pp. [Committee print.]
- Semiannual Report of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems for the period January 1-June 30, 1964. H. Doc. 70. February 2, 1965. 96 pp.
- Automotive Products Agreement Between the United States and Canada. Hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. February 10, 1965. 30 pp.

Security Council Renews Mandate of Cyprus Peacekeeping Force

Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council on March 19 by U.S. Representative Adlai E. Stevenson, together with the text of a resolution adopted unanimously by the Council on that day.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR STEVENSON

U.S./U.N. press release 4515

On behalf of my Government, may I also congratulate the Soviet delegation and the Government of the Soviet Union for the most recent achievement of its cosmonauts and of its great scientific community, which makes possible such remarkable achievements in outer space. I have always fancied that to be in a state of weightlessness must be very pleasant. But, alas, I fear it is a state I shall never experience.

But I am sure we all devoutly hope that a state of weightlessness is not the destiny of the United Nations.

Mr. President, as this Council considers the extension of the mandate of the United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus, we are once again the beneficiaries of an excellent report prepared by the Secretary-General.¹ In clear, precise, yet judicious language he has set out for us the essential elements of the current situation in Cyprus. His report makes easier our task of forming balanced judgments on what needs to be done to move closer to the objectives of the Security Council resolution of March 4 [1964].²

I am happy to note, therefore, that all of the speakers who have preceded me have supported the Secretary-General's recommendation that the United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus be extended for a further 3-month

period. My delegation believes that the United Nations force has discharged its delicate task with admirable propriety, efficiency, and energy. And we believe that the continued presence of UNFICYP on Cyprus is still essential to the creation of the conditions necessary to the working out of an agreed solution.

The Secretary-General's report documents the dangers, the provocations, the crises, and the frustrations with which these soldiers of peace must cope from day to day—and in the middle of the night, as well. Yet they have managed to be in the right places at the right time to prevent many ugly incidents from leading to local strife and to keep local strife from spreading throughout this land so long poisoned by communal bitterness.

The service to peace rendered by the men and their leaders who are wearing the insignia of the United Nations on the island of Cyprus has, we believe, earned universal gratitude and admiration. So I wish to join the other speakers and express the thanks of the United Nations for a job well done to General [K. S.] Thimayya and to the officers and men from Canada, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden who stand the peace watch for all of us on Cyprus. We owe our thanks, too, to the contingents of civilian police from Australia, Austria, Denmark, New Zealand, and Sweden who serve in the U.N. Force. And we are grateful as well to the enlightened statesmen of these nations which have made the forces available—in the service of peace and in keeping faith with the first responsibility of this organization.

We welcome, Mr. President, the draft resolution submitted by the delegations of Bolivia, the Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, and Uruguay³ and shall vote for it. We believe that its sponsors have acted wisely not only in proposing the extension of UNFICYP

¹ U.N. doc. S/6228 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1.

² U.N. doc. S. 5575.

³ U.N. doc. S. 6247.

for another 3 months but also in noting the continued uneasiness which prevails at several points, in reaffirming the Council's previous resolutions, and in calling on the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to cooperate fully with the U.N. Force.

The mere presence of the U.N. Force on Cyprus, important as it is, is not enough, Mr. President. To be effective, it must be permitted to carry out the mandate assigned to it by this Council in its resolution of March 4, 1964. My delegation has read with concern in the Secretary-General's report of instances of failure to cooperate with UNFICYP and of instances in which the freedom of movement of UNFICYP was denied or seriously abridged. I think that this Council is entitled to expect that, so long as it keeps a force on the island, the parties will respect the rights of that force and cooperate fully with it—a point that is covered in the draft resolution before us. It was reassuring, therefore, to hear the Foreign Minister of Cyprus [Spyros Kyprianou] state on Wednesday [March 17] that his Government will "strengthen" its cooperation with UNFICYP.

Mr. President, the Secretary-General has called attention to differences of interpretation about UNFICYP's mandate. My delegation is in wholehearted agreement with his interpretation that the force should act neither as an instrument of the Government of Cyprus in extending its authority over the Turkish Cypriot community, nor should it assume responsibilities for restoring the constitutional situation which existed prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1963.

We expect that the mandate of the force as it has been exercised will be respected and that an early manifestation of this will be compliance with the force commander's recommendations regarding the situation which recently developed in the Lefka-Ambelikou area, as described in the supplement to the Secretary-General's report. On numerous previous occasions UNFICYP has helped to "defuse" other potentially dangerous situations.

Both General Thimayya and the Secretary-General's special representative, Ambassador [C. A.] Bernardes, have won the respect of all

the parties to this dispute by their ability, diplomacy, and impartiality. They represent an important resource which both parties should continue to utilize.

Inasmuch as the U.N. Force is on the island to help create conditions which will facilitate a solution, we are naturally disturbed by any increase in tension which obstructs a solution—an anxiety that has been expressed by other members. The Secretary-General has frankly expressed his grave concern over the impact of the increased input of heavy arms into Cyprus. Since his report was issued, there have been further disturbing indications about the arrival of heavy and sophisticated weapons. We share the Secretary-General's concern—indeed the universal concern. Clearly, if the mandate of the United Nations Force, and I quote, is ". . . in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting," increasing heavy armament supplied to one of the communities is not helpful. In fact, a previous report of the Secretary-General raised the question as to whether the importation of any arms was consistent with the letter and spirit of the March 4 resolution, which admonished member states to take no action which might worsen the situation and urged the "utmost restraint" on the leaders of both communities.

The Council cannot fail to be concerned, therefore, in light of the previous history of this problem, that the supply of heavy arms by any member state, coupled with any lack of restraint in their use, could dangerously aggravate the situation. I must note that this danger has increased since our December meeting on the Cyprus problem.¹ At that time we had before us a report which noted a decrease in the rate of arms importation.

Mr. President, is it not high time that the parties to the dangerous and difficult situation they have laid before us place greater confidence in the demonstrated abilities of the U.N. Force and its capable commander to protect the security interests of the people of Cyprus? Is it not high time they turned their attention to a

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 4, 1965, p. 26.

return to normal conditions and to communal reconciliation? Judging by the full attention given it in the Secretary-General's report, this aspect of the United Nations work on Cyprus has not been neglected by the U.N. staff in Cyprus. After a year of heroic efforts by the international community to restore peace to Cyprus, we believe it demands and deserves the urgent attention of the parties concerned.

In paragraph 272 of his report, the Secretary-General states that he is aware that it will become increasingly difficult to maintain UNFICYP because of the special burden on those providing contingents and also because of the growing difficulty of financing the force by voluntary contributions. My delegation knows only too well that the military and financial burden has been borne by a small number of states. We are confident that as long as there is a peacekeeping job to do in Cyprus, they will respond to the need. We hope that their example will inspire other states to come forward and assume a share of the financial burden. In this connection, I am authorized to state that, if the Council extends UNFICYP's mandate, my Government stands ready to contribute up to an additional \$2 million toward defraying the expenses.

Our objective is not just peacekeeping but peacemaking, and this Council and those who are furnishing the forces to keep the peace on Cyprus have a right to expect something more in the way of cooperation and compromise from both sides to make peace in Cyprus. So have those of us who have been contributing the funds and logistical support for the force. And so has everyone who values peace.

We would hope, at last, Mr. President, that despite the bitter history of this dispute, both sides will soon find the will and the means for a more forthcoming attitude toward the United Nations and toward each other.

This mission has now been in force for a year; and a year is time enough to lay out the opposing positions and to clarify the issues. The United Nations mediator, Señor Galo Plaza, has consulted with all the parties on a number of occasions. It is not too soon to expect that his labors might at last be rewarded

by a substantial change in the attitude and behavior of the parties to this dispute.

What is needed now is not a stale repetition of charges and countercharges or a grim adherence to every detail of traditional positions but, on the contrary, a really serious spirit of accommodation and compromise which could revive cooperation and ultimately friendship among the nations and communities concerned, and which at the same time could relieve the United Nations and the world from the burdens and the dangers which this strife has too long imposed upon them.

I'm sorry I have no Shakespearean quotation to enlighten or enliven our discussion, but I do recall that "all is well that ends well." But to end well this situation should end soon.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION

U.N. doc. S/6247

The Security Council,

Noting that the report by the Secretary-General (S/6228 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1) recommends the maintenance in Cyprus of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force created by the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 (S/5575) for an additional period of three months,

Noting that the Government of Cyprus has indicated its desire that the stationing of the United Nations Force in Cyprus should be continued beyond 26 March 1965,

Noting from the Report of the Secretary-General that while the military situation has on the whole remained quiet during the period under review and while the presence of the United Nations Force has contributed significantly to this effect, nevertheless the position remains one of uneasiness in several points, with the consequent danger of a renewal of fighting with all of its disastrous consequences,

Renewing the expression of its deep appreciation to the Secretary-General for his efforts in the implementation of the Security Council resolutions of 4 March 1964, 13 March 1964 (S/5603), 20 June 1964 (S/5778), 25 September 1964 (S/5987) and 18 December 1964 (S/6121),

Renewing the expression of its deep appreciation to the States that have contributed troops, police, supplies and financial support for the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964.

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions of 4 March 1964, 13 March 1964, 20 June 1964, 9 August 1964 (S/5868), 25 September 1964 and 18 December 1964, and the consensus expressed by the President at its 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964;

2. *Calls upon* all Member States to comply with the above-mentioned resolutions;

3. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to co-operate fully with the United Nations Force;

4. *Takes note* of the Report by the Secretary-General (S/6228 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1);

5. *Extends* the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 for an additional period of three months, ending 26 June 1965.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Letter dated January 5 from the Representative of Greece regarding a violation of Greek airspace by three Turkish military jet aircraft. S/6143. January 7, 1965. 1 p.

Letter dated January 8 from the Acting Representative of Thailand regarding investigations by Thai authorities which have established that no Thai police launch violated Cambodian waters and that no Cambodian fishermen were abducted by Thai police as alleged by Cambodia (S/6136). S/6144. January 8, 1965. 1 p.

Letter dated January 1 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cambodia regarding the Republic of Vietnam's "version" of an incident at Anlong Kres (S/6041) and calling the Vietnamese proposal for U.N. mediation "another hypocritical manoeuvre." S/6147. January 13, 1965. 3 pp.

Letter dated January 13 from the Representative of Cambodia reiterating charges of the violation of Cambodian territorial waters by Thai police. S/6149. January 15, 1965. 1 p.

Letter dated January 13 from the Representative of Cambodia rejecting charges by Thailand (S/6141) of the violation of Thai territorial waters by Cambodian soldiers. S/6150. January 15, 1965. 2 pp.

Letter dated January 13 from the Representative of Cambodia protesting an act of aggression by "a band of Thai armed elements" at Thkeam Romeas. S/6151. January 15, 1965. 1 p.

Letter from the Representative of Cyprus transmitting the text of a letter from Dr. Ihsan Ali. S/6152. January 15, 1965. 2 pp.

Letter dated January 18 from the Representative of Greece concerning a violation of Greek airspace by a Turkish jet aircraft. S/6154. January 20, 1965. 1 p.

Letter dated January 20 from the Acting Representative of Thailand rejecting Cambodian charges (S/6151). S/6155. January 21, 1965. 1 p.

Letter dated January 20 from the First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia informing the Secretary-General of his

Government's decision to withdraw from the United Nations because of the seating of Malaysia on the Security Council. S/6157. January 21, 1965. 4 pp.

Letter dated January 20 from the Representative of Turkey regarding the letter of Dr. Ihsan Ali (S/6152). S/6158. January 22, 1965. 2 pp.

Letter dated January 22 from the Representative of Turkey enclosing the text of a telegram from the Vice President of Cyprus regarding a recent change in the date of a bank holiday in Cyprus. S/6159. January 22, 1965. 2 pp.

Letter dated January 23 from the Representative of Turkey regarding Greek and Greek Cypriot preparations for a renewal of hostilities. S/6161. January 25, 1965. 1 p.

Letter dated January 25 from the Representative of Greece regarding discriminatory actions by the Turkish Government against Greek nationals residing in Istanbul. S/6162. January 25, 1965. 3 pp.

Letter dated January 26 from the Representative of Jordan regarding provocative acts by Israeli authorities in the Mount Scopus area in Jerusalem. S/6163. January 26, 1965. 1 p.

Letter dated January 27 from the Representative of Cuba transmitting the text of a note from the Cuban Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding "further incidents directed against the independence and security" of Cuba. S/6164. January 28, 1965. 5 pp.

Letter dated January 28 from the Representative of Cambodia regarding a violation of Cambodian territory by "armed units of the Thai police." S/6165. January 28, 1965. 1 p.

Letter dated January 22 from the Representative of Malaysia replying to the letter of January 20 (S/6157) from the First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia. S/6166. January 29, 1965. 4 pp.

Letter dated January 28 from the Representative of Turkey providing further information on Greek and Greek Cypriot preparations for a renewal of hostilities in Cyprus. S/6168. February 1, 1965. 1 p.

General Assembly

Collection of Contributions as at 17 January 1965. Report of the Secretary-General. A/5847. January 18, 1965. 5 pp.

Collection of Contributions as at 1 February 1965. Report of the Secretary-General. A/5871. February 3, 1965. 2 pp.

Reports of the Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: General introductory chapter covering the work of the Committee in 1964. A/5800, December 31, 1964. 90 pp.; Implications of the activities of the mining industry and of the other international companies having interests in South-West Africa. A/5840, January 5, 1965. 204 pp.

Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Report of the Secretary-General on the administrative and financial implications of the recommendations for convening a committee to prepare a new draft convention relating to the transit trade of landlocked countries. A/5849. January 21, 1965. 3 pp.

Question of Oman. Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Oman. A/5846. January 22, 1965. 281 pp.

The Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. Report of the Secretary-General. A/5850. January 22, 1965. 4 pp.

Accelerated Flow of Capital and Technical Assistance to the Developing Countries. Report of the Secretary-General on the measurement of the flow of long-term capital and official donations to developing countries. A/5732. February 1, 1965. 70 pp.

U.S. and Mexico Agree on Measures To Solve Lower Colorado River Salinity Problem

Following is a statement made by President Johnson on March 22 regarding an agreement between the United States and Mexico on the lower Colorado River salinity problem, together with a joint State-Interior Department announcement containing the text of the agreement.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

White House press release dated March 22

The United States and Mexico have today approved an agreement between the Commissioners on the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico, on measures to be undertaken to achieve a solution to the salinity problem on the lower Colorado River. This agreement is in accordance with the objective to reach a permanent and effective solution, first announced by Presidents Kennedy and López Mateos in their joint communique of June 30, 1962,¹ and reaffirmed with President López Mateos in the joint communique of February 22, 1964.²

The solution agreed upon involves the construction of an extension to the present drainage channel of the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage District in Arizona which would permit the discharge of that district's drainage above or below Morelos Dam, Mexico's main diversion structure on the Colorado River. Under this arrangement Mexico will be able to decide when waters from the Wellton-Mohawk District will be diverted to its irrigation system.

The agreement has been considered by the

Governors of the Colorado River Basin States and by the chairmen of the appropriate congressional committees, and they have all agreed to it. I have, therefore, instructed the Secretaries of State and of the Interior to take the necessary steps to carry out the agreement. Whatever appropriations are necessary will be requested promptly from the Congress.

I am pleased that we have been able to resolve this problem with Mexico through friendly negotiations. Like the Chamizal treaty with Mexico³ and the Columbia River treaty with our northern neighbor, Canada,⁴ both of which we are now implementing, this agreement demonstrates once again that among men of good will any problem will yield to sincere and concerted efforts to resolve it.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF AGREEMENT

Department of State press release 54 dated March 22

Joint State-Interior Press Release

The Presidents of the United States and Mexico on March 22 announced approval of an agreement on the lower Colorado River salinity problem. The agreement takes the form of a "Minute" of the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico. Attached are a copy of the Minute (i.e., record of a Commission decision) and an explanatory

¹ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 23, 1963, p. 480.

² For background and text of treaty, see *ibid.*, Feb. 13, 1961, p. 231; Feb. 10, 1961, p. 139; and Oct. 12, 1961, p. 501.

³ For text, see BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 135.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Mar. 16, 1961, p. 396.

map of the directly affected areas.⁵

Under the arrangements agreed upon for a 5-year period, the United States through the Interior Department's Bureau of Reclamation will, subject to the availability of appropriations, undertake to construct by October of this year an extension of the drainage channel of the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage District in Arizona. The extension will permit discharge of Wellton-Mohawk drainage into the Colorado River either above or below Mexico's Morelos Dam, as Mexico may request. The discharges above Morelos Dam would be diverted for irrigation of Mexican lands, while discharges below the dam would flow to the Gulf of California.

All Wellton-Mohawk drainage will be accounted for as a part of the water delivered to Mexico under the treaty of 1944.⁶ The United States will control the flows in the river reaching Morelos Dam during the winter months so that, excluding this drainage, those flows will meet Mexico's minimum scheduled deliveries under the treaty. The discharge of Wellton-Mohawk drainage above Morelos Dam is to be coordinated, insofar as practicable, with Mexico's scheduled deliveries in order to minimize the salinity of its irrigation water.

The International Commission will keep the operation continually under review. Both Governments reserve all legal rights.

Essentially, the proposed works would be operated so as to discharge the most highly saline drainage water from the Wellton-Mohawk District below Mexico's principal diversion point during the winter months when irrigation requirements in the Mexicali Valley are at their lowest. During this period, this would be accomplished by pumping the most saline drainage water into the extension channel for discharge below Morelos Dam.

At other times, when Mexico schedules increased deliveries of irrigation water, drainage water would be pumped from the less saline wells in the Wellton-Mohawk District so that most or all of it may be discharged from the extension channel into the Colorado above Morelos Dam. There it would mingle with

⁵ Not printed here.

⁶ 59 Stat. 1219.

other Colorado River flows and be diverted by Mexico for irrigation.

Text of Minute

MINUTE NO. 218

RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE COLORADO RIVER SALINITY PROBLEM

The Commission met in the office of the Mexican Section in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, at 12:00 m on March 22, 1965, to comply with instructions it has received from the two Governments, to consider measures "to reach a permanent and effective solution" of the problem of the salinity of the waters of the Colorado River which reach Mexico, as contemplated in the Presidential Communiqués of March 16⁷ and June 30, 1962 and February 22, 1964.

The Commission reviewed the measures which the two Governments have taken to date to alleviate temporarily the problem of salinity of waters of the lower Colorado River, and noted the reduction which has occurred in the salinity of drainage waters from the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage District and that continued improvement is anticipated.

The Commission, with the scientific and engineering studies made by both Governments as a basis, thereupon adopted the following Resolution, subject to the approval of the two Governments, embodying the following *Recommendations*:

1. That the United States construct at its expense an extension to the present Wellton-Mohawk District's drainage conveyance channel, with capacity of 353 cubic feet (10 cubic meters) per second, along the left bank of the Colorado River to a point below Morelos Dam, and a control structure in that extension of the channel in the reach between Morelos Dam and the mouth of the Araz Drain, which structure would permit the discharge of the Wellton-Mohawk District's drainage waters to the bed of the river at a point either above or below Morelos Dam.

2. That the Commission permit execution of the works which may be required for the extension channel to pass through Morelos Dam.

3. That the extension channel and control structure proposed in Recommendation 1 be operated and maintained by the United States at its expense to discharge all of the Wellton-Mohawk District's drainage waters below Morelos Dam, except those which are discharged above the Dam on the days and at such rates as Mexico may request in writing.

4. That during the life of the present Minute and subject to the reservations of Recommendation 11, the Commission account for Wellton-Mohawk District's drainage waters as a part of those described in the provisions of Article 10 of the Water Treaty of Feb-

⁷ For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 542, and Apr. 16, 1962, p. 650.

uary 3, 1944, with the understanding: a) that on he days for which Mexico requests water at the minimum winter rate of deliveries of 900 cubic feet (25.5 cubic meters) per second, the United States control zaters reaching the limitrophe section of the Colorado iver so that without including Wellton-Mohawk District's drainage waters, their flows be not less than 00 cubic feet (22.7 cubic meters) per second, their verage flow be not less than 900 cubic feet (25.5 cubic meters) per second for the total of such days uring each winter period for which the minimum ate is requested, and that the computation of that verage flow not take into account flows in excess of 000 cubic feet (28.3 cubic meters) per second; and) that the winter periods in reference extend from ictober 1 of each year through February of the next ollowing year.

5. That throughout the life of this Minute, Mexico chedule water at the minimum rate of deliveries of 00 cubic feet (25.5 cubic meters) per second, for the aximum practical number of days during each winter eriod, and for not less than 90 days.

6. That the pumping of Wellton-Mohawk District's drainage waters which are to be delivered to Mexico bove Morelos Dam be coordinated, insofar as practica- le, with Mexico's scheduled deliveries of water at the ortherly boundary in order to minimize the salinity of hese deliveries; with the understanding that during the eriod October 1 to February 10 the United States pump t the maximum rate but not to exceed 353 cubic feet er second and, insofar as practicable, from the more aline wells in the District, and also during other pe- iods when the total quantity of the Wellton-Mohawk District's drainage waters is discharged below Morelos am.

7. That the United States endeavor to conclude ar- rangements to permit discontinuance of discharge of wters from the canal wasteways of the Yuma County ater Users' Association to the bed of the Colorado iver below Morelos Dam, and if necessary for this urpose, construct and operate, at the expense of the nited States, works needed so that such waters be de- livered near San Luis, Arizona, and San Luis, Sonora; hat Mexico pay for the increased cost of pumping hich may be required to discharge these waters to Mexico at the delivery point near San Luis, Arizona, and San Luis, Sonora.

8. That this Minute be in effect during a period of five years, beginning on the date on which the exten- sion to the Wellton-Mohawk District's drainage con- veyance channel is placed in operation; and that uring this period the Commission review conditions hich gave rise to the problem and in due time recom- end whether, in keeping with the purpose expressed oy both Governments of achieving a permanent and ef- fective solution, a new Minute should be adopted to become effective upon termination of this period.

9. The construction by the United States of works contemplated in this Minute be completed and the works be placed in operation by October 1, 1965, subject to

the appropriation of funds by the United States Con- gress to implement this Minute.

10. That this Minute be specifically approved by both Governments.

11. That the provisions of this Minute not constitute any precedent, recognition, or acceptance affecting the rights of either country, with respect to the Water Treaty of February 3, 1911, and the general principles of law.

The meeting then adjourned.

J. P. FRIEDKIN
*Commissioner of the
United States*

LOUIS F. BLANCHARD
*Secretary of the
United States Section*

D. HERRERA J.
Commissioner of Mexico

FERNANDO RIVAS S.
*Secretary of the Mexican
Section*

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5281.

Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, March 25, 1965.
Acceptance deposited: Malagasy Republic, March 22, 1965.

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic with annexes. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2187.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Malawi, February 17, 1965.

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations;
Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on consular relations concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes.

Done at Vienna April 24, 1963.¹
Ratification deposited: Gabon, February 23, 1965.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.

Ratification deposited: Malagasy Republic, March 15, 1965.

Property

Convention of Union of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 30, 1883, revised at Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, at London June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered into force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931.

Notifications of accession: Mauritania, March 11,

¹ Not in force.

1965; South Africa, March 17, 1965; Yugoslavia, March 11, 1965.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Enters into force May 26, 1965.

Proclaimed by the President: March 24, 1965.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.

Accession deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, March 6, 1965.

Wheat

Protocol for the extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington March 22 through April 23, 1965.¹

Signatures: Southern Rhodesia, March 23, 1965; United States, March 24, 1965.

BILATERAL

Denmark

Agreement amending the agreement of May 28, 1962 (TIAS 5060), for financing certain educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Copenhagen February 18 and 25, 1965. Entered into force February 25, 1965.

Dominican Republic

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Santo Domingo March 18, 1965. Entered into force March 18, 1965.

Philippines

Agreement regarding the serving of United States Armed Forces on Philippine military reservation at Mt. Cabuyao by establishment thereon of a United States communications facility. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila March 16, 1965. Entered into force March 16, 1965.

United Arab Republic

Air transport services agreement. Signed at Cairo May 5, 1964. Entered into force provisionally May 5, 1964. TIAS 5706.

Entered into force definitively: April 7, 1965.

Yugoslavia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Belgrade March 16, 1965. Entered into force March 16, 1965.

¹ Not in force.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Guinea, amending the agreement of June 13, 1964. Exchange of notes—Signed at Conakry October 7, 1964. Entered into force October 7, 1964. TIAS 5701. 4 pp. 5¢.

Fishing Operations—Northeastern Pacific Ocean. Agreement with U.S.S.R.—Signed at Washington December 14, 1964. Entered into force December 14, 1964. TIAS 5703. 17 pp., map. 25¢.

Defense—Winter Maintenance of Haines Road. Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ottawa November 27, 1964. Entered into force November 27, 1964. TIAS 5705. 2 pp. 5¢.

Air Transport Services. Agreement with the United Arab Republic—Signed at Cairo May 5, 1964. Entered into force provisionally May 5, 1964. TIAS 5706. 9 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan, amending the agreement of October 14, 1961, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Karachi November 28, 1964. Entered into force November 28, 1964. TIAS 5707. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Republic of the Congo—Signed at Léopoldville December 9, 1964. Entered into force December 9, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5708. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet-Nam, amending agreement of January 9, 1964, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Saigon November 30, 1964. Entered into force November 30, 1964. TIAS 5709. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Republic of the Congo, amending the agreements of February 23, 1963, and April 28, 1964, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Léopoldville December 9, 1964. Entered into force December 9, 1964. TIAS 5711. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Guinea, amending the agreement of June 13, 1964, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington December 21, 1964. Entered into force December 21, 1964. TIAS 5712. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Iceland—Signed at Reykjavik December 30, 1964. Entered into force December 30, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5713. 8 pp. 10¢.

Africa. United States Policy in Africa (Williams) 539

American Principles. The Dangers of Nostalgia (Ball) 532

American Republics. Congress Approves Appropriations for Inter-American Bank (Johnson) 537

Australia. New U.S. Spacecraft Tracking Station Opens in Australia (Johnson) 550

Congress

Congress Approves Appropriations for Inter-American Bank (Johnson) 537

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy 550

Cyprus. Security Council Renews Mandate of Cyprus Peacekeeping Force (Stevenson, text of resolution) 551

Department and Foreign Service. President Calls for Full Use of Resources in Overseas Programs 538

Economic Affairs

Congress Approves Appropriations for Inter-American Bank (Johnson) 537

U.S. and 11 OECD Nations Discuss International Shipping Problems 549

U.S. and Mexico Agree on Measures To Solve Lower Colorado River Salinity Problem (Johnson, text of agreement) 555

World Trade Week, 1965 (proclamation) 549

Europe. The Dangers of Nostalgia (Ball) 532

Foreign Aid. Congress Approves Appropriations for Inter-American Bank (Johnson) 537

International Organizations and Conferences. U.S. and 11 OECD Nations Discuss International Shipping Problems 549

Mexico. U.S. and Mexico Agree on Measures To Solve Lower Colorado River Salinity Problem (Johnson, text of agreement) 555

Military Affairs

NATO After Sixteen Years: An Anniversary Assessment (Popper) 518

Secretary Rusk Discusses Use of Tear Gas in Viet-Nam 528

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO After Sixteen Years: An Anniversary Assessment (Popper) 518

Presidential Documents

Congress Approves Appropriations for Inter-American Bank 537

New U.S. Spacecraft Tracking Station Opens in Australia 550

President Calls for Full Use of Resources in Overseas Programs 538

President Reiterates U.S. Policy on Viet-Nam 527

U.S. and Mexico Agree on Measures To Solve Lower Colorado River Salinity Problem 555

World Trade Week, 1965 549

Public Affairs. Department To Hold Conference for Editors and Broadcasters 550

Publications. Recent Releases 558

Science. New U.S. Spacecraft Tracking Station Opens in Australia (Johnson) 550

Treaty Information

Current Actions 557

U.S. and Mexico Agree on Measures To Solve Lower Colorado River Salinity Problem (Johnson, text of agreement) 555

United Nations

Current U.N. Documents 554

Security Council Renews Mandate of Cyprus Peacekeeping Force (Stevenson, text of resolution) 551

Viet-Nam

President Reiterates U.S. Policy on Viet-Nam 527

Secretary Rusk Discusses Use of Tear Gas in Viet-Nam 528

Name Index

Ball, George W. 532

Johnson, President 527, 537, 538, 549, 550, 555

Popper, David H. 518

Rusk, Secretary 528

Stevenson, Adlai E. 551

Williams, G. Mennen 539

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: March 22-28

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to March 22 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 42 of March 16 and 48 of March 18.

No.	Date	Subject
†53	3/22	Ball: "The United States and Canada: Common Aims and Common Responsibilities."
54	3/22	Agreement with Mexico on lower Colorado River salinity problem.
*55	3/22	Vaughn sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs and Coordinator of Alliance for Progress (biographic details).
†56	3/23	Cleveland: "The Building Blocks of World Order."
*57	3/23	Guest sworn in as Ambassador to Ireland (biographic details).
58	3/24	Foreign policy conference for editors and broadcasters (rewrite).
59	3/24	Rusk: news briefing on use of tear gas.
†60	3/25	U.S.-Canadian claims agreement.
†61	3/25	Harriman: "The United States and International Cooperation."
*62	3/26	Program for visit of President Yameogo of Upper Volta.

*Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

Foreign Relations of the United States 1943, Volume V, The American Republics

The Department of State recently released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Volume V, The American Republics*. This volume contains documentation on the regional wartime diplomacy of the American states and on the relations of the United States with Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile.

Of particular interest in volume V are the compilations dealing with the efforts of the United States to assure the defense of the hemisphere, to discourage commercial and financial transactions with the Axis Powers, and to induce the American Republics to declare war on the Axis Powers or, at least, to sever diplomatic relations with them.

Copies of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Volume V, The American Republics* (publication 7813) may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402, for \$3.25 each.

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THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN

Vol. III, No. 1347



April 19, 1965

INTERNATIONAL VISITORS AND THE AMERICAN SOCIETY

Remarks by Secretary Rusk 588

THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: COMMON AIMS
AND COMMON RESPONSIBILITIES

by Under Secretary Ball 572

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION YEAR

International Cooperation: A Realistic Appraisal . . . by M. George Bundy 562

The Building Blocks of World Order . . . by Herbert Goldhamer 595

International Cooperation: A Realistic Appraisal

by McGeorge Bundy
*Special Assistant to the President*¹

The meeting which you are engaged in today is one which marks another stage in the preparations of American citizens and of the American Government for a full effort in this International Cooperation Year.

It is a pleasure for me to tell you that the President takes the deepest interest in this undertaking. He started it during the heat of a campaign last October. He has continued to follow its work in the months since then. The President means exactly what he has said—that the work of the Government in supporting your work in International Cooperation Year is of high importance.

The President has asked me to bring you his personal welcome today and to express his apologies for removing the principal speaker from this meeting. It did seem essential that the Vice President, who is the senior officer of the Gov-

ernment in the field of space, should be at Cape Kennedy today. You are generous in your involuntary acquiescence in this decision, and the President knows as well as all the rest of us do that there is, in fact, no substitute for the Vice President.

Preaching to a group of this kind about the purposes of international cooperation is really not a very fruitful undertaking. I see here men and women who have proven their interest in and understanding of this topic; who, in the last quarter century, have helped make the record of which our nation has reason to be proud; who have understood the connection between the national interest and the common human interest; who have understood the distance between the idea and the execution; and who have shown by their actions the continuing and necessary relationship between the initiative of the individual citizen and the responsibility of the citizen's government.

So I do not come with the thought of sur-

¹ Address made before the National Conference on International Cooperation Year at the Department of State on Mar. 23.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LII, NO. 1347 PUBLICATION 7866 APRIL 19, 1965

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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prising you or of enlightening you, but only with the hope that we on our side, having temporarily a share in the administrative responsibilities of your Government, may be able to reassure you of our continued commitment and our dedication to the kind of activities which you are undertaking and which we will hope to carry forward together.

It is particularly important and satisfying to have a chance to make this act of reassurance at a time when there are heavy burdens upon this country and its Government in situations of international danger—most conspicuously, but by no means uniquely, in Southeast Asia. You need no one to tell you that the President of the United States is spending long hours every day over these problems. It is clear that it is the President who has and is carrying out the final responsibilities of the Commander in Chief and of the civil chief of government in making the judgments week in and week out which are required, in his language, "by the continuing aggression of others" in Southeast Asia.

Nothing has been more encouraging to him in facing these dangers, I think, than the sense of understanding, of support, of determination, and of care which has been conveyed to us in the White House in our contacts with all kinds of leaders throughout the country.

A Dual Responsibility

At the same time nothing is more important, even in a shadowed time like this, than that we should none of us forget that the United States Government must continuously meet a dual responsibility—to construct programs of peaceful cooperation as well as to resist aggression. And herefore, in an immediate and serious sense, to sit together and work on the problem of international cooperation for the prediction of the weather, to sit together on questions of humanity's health, to work together on new proposals for managing mankind's problems of communication—to do these things, and to do them in the spirit of seriousness and commitment which this meeting exemplifies, is in fact to help keep the balance of American policy in a time when necessarily we are also preoccupied with active operations in defense of peoples whose independence is gravely threatened.

In a wider sense, an activity like International Cooperation Year tends to lift the attention of Americans, and one may hope of others as well, to problems which do not automatically get all the attention they deserve. When there is conflict, among men or among nations, those engaged can be counted on to give the necessary level of attention to the defense and advancement of the particular interests to which they are committed. Immediate interest is an extremely strong force. There is, if one may turn to the analogies of physics, a kind of inertia about it; it is quite easy to let that contest continue, to let it work itself out, to let its laws govern the course of events.

And, therefore, even when there is conflict, there is a heavy responsibility upon those who are responsible for the acts of one side or another to watch with care, to think in terms of moderation and restraint, and to guide their action, as the President has so often said, by a clear and continuing sense of what is fitting, what is measured, what is adequate. In a larger sense, there is a responsibility also to drive and force one's attention to those things which do not necessarily and inevitably require attention. And that is the kind of thing which an exercise of this sort is designed to do.

This is not simply a matter of working on other things than those which involve the use of force in international affairs; it is a matter also of turning to look at the other side of the coin in the areas of economics, of ideas, and of national interests. It is very easy in our economic affairs, as we all know from experience, to allow the immediate interest of one side as against another to govern a decision; and it is certainly proper that governments should be responsive to the legitimate interests of their citizens and of their private institutions. It is also clear to all of us that in the field of ideas it is very easy to allow a rigorous commitment to one's own beliefs and convictions to stand in the way of a responsible examination of the beliefs and convictions of others. And, finally, when one thinks in terms of the national interest, it is quite easy to allow that interest to be defined uniquely by what feels good, sounds good, is comforting to us, within our own nation.

Yet in each of these three fields—of eco-

nomics, of ideas, and of national interests—it is more often true than not that the immediate interest itself is not well served by such a narrowly limited concentration upon the problem. It is not by accident that the greed which is narrow economic interest, the prejudice which is a narrow set of ideas and of convictions, and that kind of national pride which is limited in its understanding of the responsibilities and of the real place of one's nation, are in the end self-defeating, even within their own frame of reference. The great advantage of an effort like ICY is that by definition it will help to lift our attention from these narrow constraints—these natural, easy, limited, and dangerous ways of construing our own responsibilities and our own purposes.

The Realities of "Contest" and "Difference"

On the other hand, in such undertakings we must not fall into the opposite error of assuming that, because it is cooperation and because it is international, it is automatically good, automatically right, or automatically deserving of the support of men and women of good will. It is well, I think, to bear in mind that there is real force in the concept of conflict of interest; that it is not easy to arrange for forms of cooperation in which there is genuine advantage to more than one party; that it is quite easy to handle these matters so that the winning of one man must be the losing of another. We do not really serve the cause of international cooperation if we assume that it is a self-executing form of virtue.

That is a lesson which I will not take time to spell out in a company as experienced as this one. It is worth remembering only because we have lived to regret it when we have attempted to place more weight upon a pattern of cooperation than that pattern was really able to carry.

It has been a most important part of the achievement of the United Nations—so great, although so limited—that in its very charter it took account of the limitations built into the world situation, and that it did not in the main set out to achieve things which no international organization in 1945 could have achieved. Even in that case there were excessive hopes in some

quarters, and it is our good fortune that in this country, at least, these excessive hopes did not precipitate a deep disillusionment. Instead, a serious commitment to the purposes and to the meaning of the United Nations remains a strong and steady part not only of the policy of the Government but of the commitment of the people—which is in the end a more determining force.

To take another example—if in our efforts to achieve some slight progress toward a limitation of the arms race, we had found ourselves committed to a form of test ban treaty which did not meet the legitimate concerns of those in this country who are naturally deeply and responsibly engaged in the defense of the national security, if in fact that treaty had not been defensible in those terms and to that legitimate sector of American opinion, then either the treaty would not in fact have won the consent of the Senate to its ratification or the victory thus won would have had a shaky and limited base within our own country.

And so there is a continuing need, I suggest, for wariness and for a sense of real interest in our concern for the development of the instruments of cooperation.

Having stated that limitation and having spoken of the relation of an effort toward new forms of cooperation to the continuing realities of contest and of difference, I would like to speak for a moment about the built-in, constructive, and fructifying influences which mark the effort toward international cooperation when it is carried out with a proper respect for reality and with a proper awareness of its relation to other forms of necessary national action.

This is the kind of thing which can remind a nation that its real interests require attention to its higher interests, that its immediate sense of itself can be enlarged—must indeed in this small world be enlarged—and that the process of enlargement is a form of liberation. Just as there is a requirement for the defense of our own immediate interests in money, in trade, in defense, and in assuring our survival as a nation in the nuclear centuries, so there is an upper edge of our policy which must recognize the problems and hopes of others in these same fields.

If it be true that any man's death diminishes me, it is also true that any man's life or achievement or new hope is enlarging to us all. When all is said and done, it is this wider view of the human adventure which we should have before us in work such as that which you are now starting. And it is right for the United States, while maintaining concern for and responsibility toward its own interests, also to maintain a strong sense of obligation not to be second among the nations which seek a wider standard and which are willing to be judged by that wider standard.

We are engaged at the moment in a national adventure in space which is heavily dependent upon the cooperative and friendly assistance of many other nations—for observation and for contingencies. We are also engaged upon an effort with other nations—but very largely an American effort—to assist the Government and people of South Viet-Nam in resistance against aggression. While we engage in these efforts, we can and should and will keep our purpose open and our hope alive to wider patterns of cooperation both in space and in Southeast Asia. We have repeatedly proposed increased efforts in space cooperation; such cooperation now goes forward with a number of nations in many of the important and new, if less spectacular, fields of action. We have proposed—and we shall propose again—that the nations of Southeast Asia continue to keep before themselves, not simply and only their requirement and interest in independence and freedom from oppression, but also the hope of cooperation in the peaceful development of what should become a rich, important, flourishing, and tranquil section of the globe.

The Urgency of Arms Control

Finally, it seems to me that, just as we keep our attention upon the development and the

maintenance of our own effective overall defense forces, we must help to focus the attention of all the world upon the continuing and urgent requirement that humanity find a way to put still greater limits, still surer controls, upon the weapons which have made our age new in its ultimate possibilities of catastrophe. I put that at the head of the list, in part because it seems to me that whatever may be the immediate prospect of new and large agreements in this field—and until such agreements are actually reached the immediate prospect always seems doubtful—it must be the task of the United States, and it will be the purpose of this administration, to make clear that wherever there is a prospect of progress that serves the common interest of survival in this field of arms control and disarmament, the United States will strive to be in the van.

There is always danger of misunderstanding when a nation attempts to say for itself that it is serving an interest wider than its own. None of us, even as citizens, and still less as public officials, has a right to engage in such self-praise in smugly certain tones. But I think it is fair for us to say that we have a natural and proper obligation to serve a wider interest. The history of our nation, its traditions, and its great documents, from the Declaration of Independence down to the President's speech on the right to vote, make this so.

It is an obligation of Americans, precisely because they are good Americans, to try also to be something more. And I take it that with the wisdom of experience and the wariness of understanding as your badges of admission, you are here to do just that. I can only tell you that those of us who for the time being are full-time practitioners are deeply grateful to you. We wish you every success; we will try to give every support; and we are proud to be a part of your work.

The Building Blocks of World Order

by Harlan Cleveland

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs¹

I am billed on the program for a report from the Cabinet Committee—not an agreed, formal report but a fill-in on where we are and how we got here. So I am not flying blind, but I am flying solo.

I will start by quarreling with the old notion that U.S. foreign policy doesn't have any domestic constituency. The Department of Agriculture has the farmers, so the argument runs; Commerce has the business community; Labor has the trade unions; but the State Department only has the foreigners—and they don't vote.

It is true that the foreigners we deal with from this building don't vote—not in American elections, anyway. But the Americans who want to cooperate with foreigners do. And on just about every subject under the sun there are vocal and active groups of Americans who want to cooperate across national frontiers—and who will have our heads if we don't make that cooperation possible.

So the upshot is that a foreign policy based on cooperation by the United States has an American constituency as wide as the continent and as deep as men's instinct for survival.

One of my jobs hereabouts is to keep our international conference program within reasonable bounds. You may well wonder whether I'm really working at it when we attended 540 Government-level conferences with other na-

tions last year. In the 19th century the United States went to an average of one conference a year; now it's more than one a day.

Five hundred and forty is a lot of conferences. But if the American people had their way, unrestricted by Government bureaucracy and congressional appropriations, they would organize and attend even more of them. Every few days we help eliminate or put off an international conference—and we often hear about it from irate or disappointed Americans who feel that we should cooperate more, not less, with other nations on their especially important subject, with their particular friends abroad.

It may be that our constituents do not understand everything their Government is doing.

It may be that they want money spent for their *own* kind of cooperation but want to economize on *other* kinds of cooperation from which they don't directly benefit.

It may be that people interested in coffee prices or tuna fishing rights or malaria eradication or refugee relief or investment guarantees sometimes don't see the connection between their specialized interest and the healthy growth of a U.N. peacekeeping system.

But every American has some direct stake in some form of international cooperation—and most of them know it.

Certainly every American knows that modern science and technology can kill us or cure us, can starve us or feed us, can make life on this earth wonderful—or make it impossible.

And most Americans perceive, more or less vaguely, that they have a stake in building the

¹ Address made before the National Conference on International Cooperation Year at the Department of State on Mar. 23 (press release 56). Mr. Cleveland is chairman of the Cabinet Committee on International Cooperation Year; for background, see BULLETIN of Mar. 15, 1965, p. 382.

institutions that contain and control and channel into peaceful uses the potential dangers and ambivalent wonders science makes possible.

This is a major goal and preoccupation of U.S. foreign policy—and why it enjoys such wide support from so many people.

Planning for International Cooperation

We who live in this attractive but complicated city of Washington are supposed to be figuring out what kind of international institutions to build, what to do next in every field of international cooperation. Every form of international cooperation crucially depends on what we Americans think, what initiatives we take, how we react to the initiatives of others. Every department and agency of the Federal Government, and every committee of the Congress, has an international program and administers a piece of American foreign policy. The time is long past when the complexities of American foreign policy could all be stuffed into the Department of State.

But let's face it, we don't think ahead hard enough about the next steps in every field of international cooperation. On the crisis subjects—on Viet-Nam or Berlin or Cuba or the Congo—there is of course a great deal of planning ahead: the angles are figured and refigured nearly every day—and always on Sundays.

But do we know just what institutions we want to build next in the field of international health? Do we have a plan for achieving the freedom from hunger we freely endorse? Do we have a clear concept of "next steps" in international education? Have we thought through all the implications, for education and for international politics, of space satellites that can relay a national cultural attraction instantaneously to any part of the globe? Have we considered what the requirement for international peacekeeping may do to the mix of our weapon systems, or to our national budget?

No, not enough. That's the answer to all these questions and to similar questions in most of the fields represented in this distinguished gathering this morning. We in Government have, of course, a tendency to do more planning on matters in an acute state of crisis than on other sub-

jects where the crisis is chronic, less dramatic, and less easy to get excited about.

Government is not unique in this: What university or foundation has thought through the revolutionary role of American education in world affairs? What corporation has correctly assessed the direction and volume of its own international opportunities? We all tend to react mostly to clear and present stimuli, dealing with opportunity as it knocks and trouble as it tribulates.

But it's not good enough. The multiple explosions, the accelerating pace of change, symbolized in our time by "bombs, babies, and bulldozers," can lead either to tragedy or triumph for civilized man—and whether it's to be triumph or tragedy depends, most of all, on what we Americans do. And what we do may depend, in all these fields where the crises are chronic, on what we are launching here in this room today.

For what the President has assigned us is no less than to propose to him a line of policy, a sense of direction, a specific plan of attack, in every major field of international cooperation.

Nor has the President given us the rest of the century to think about these complex and professionally fascinating matters. He has called a White House Conference on International Cooperation for 3 days this fall, from November 29 to December 1, to receive and consider our proposals.

Like most important things, ICY got started almost by accident. Prime Minister Nehru floated the idea in his 1961 address to the U.N. General Assembly, and everybody agreed. The next year the General Assembly voted, unanimously but without much clarification, to call 1965 International Cooperation Year.

Then an interim committee of the U.N.—on which the United States did not even sit—labored for a year and produced a sensible if still somewhat generalized report. ICY, it said, should be used to publicize the progress the nations had already made in cooperating with each other. Each nation should do what it thought best along this line. Apart from some ICY lectures in the U.N. building, few international ICY projects are planned. The committee also

suggested that controversial subjects should be avoided—which would have eliminated a good many interesting topics.

U.S. Approach to ICY

Here in the United States we took a somewhat different tack. Nobody thought the American people needed to be sold on international cooperation as a general proposition. The building of international agencies for cooperation is the chosen instrument of our postwar foreign policy, the preferred way of getting from here to the kind of world we want to live in, the very heart of a bipartisan consensus that had endured war and crisis for two decades.

So we decided to do something more. Once the President had established our Cabinet Committee, we took an interdepartmental look down the road, and this is what we saw:

First, there isn't any such thing as international cooperation in general. There are only very concrete programs and relationships in dozens of special fields of endeavor—in business and labor and agriculture and trade and investment and education and health and housing and communications and every other subject you can think of.

Second, it would obviously be a good thing to review and give special publicity this year to what has already been accomplished, internationally, in each of these fields. It is important to know that international cooperation is not an abstraction, that its virtues are measurable in hard results. It is important to wring the sentimentality out of the term and to know that in practice international cooperation is hard work at functional tasks which are usually unglamorous and sometimes grubby. But this review should not just be the collection of blurbs; it should be a critical, analytical stocktaking, a basis for looking ahead.

Third, we should create a market for ideas about the next steps in international cooperation. In each field we should ask, "What do you think we should be trying to accomplish, over the next few years, in the building and improvement of international institutions?"

Fourth, we should invite into this idea market both the Government agencies active in each

field and also the best nongovernmental thinkers and doers in the same fields.

This conviction that many of the best ideas about what the Government ought to be doing start outside the Government, and the enormous importance of private agencies in our international relations, led the President to invite a distinguished group of citizens from all over the country to the White House last October to witness the signing of his ICY proclamation.²

It led the Secretary of State to ask the United Nations Association to take the lead in organizing a National Citizens Commission, more than half of whose members are here this morning.

It led, finally, to the President's call for a White House Conference, to which citizen groups and Government agencies alike could bring a distillation of their best ideas for Presidential consideration.

Drawing Practical Plans To Build Peace

As we in Government have talked through the plans for International Cooperation Year, some notions, attitudes, and expectations have naturally become a little clearer to all of us. I cannot represent these as a formal consensus of the Cabinet Committee, but I doubt if my colleagues in the executive branch of the Government would disagree very much with what I am about to say.

First, it is important for us not to be bothered by the apparent irony of pushing international cooperation in a year while we can hear the din of daily clashes in Viet-Nam and the General Assembly of the United Nations is still in the drydock. Indeed there would be little excuse for asking such busy people as you to take off your coats and work with us if all the organs of international cooperation were healthy, robust, and growing in a serene fashion into responsible, efficient, untroubled maturity.

Second, we do not begin by taking it for granted that the most desirable next step in every field and every institution of international cooperation is necessarily an expansive one—or an expensive one either. There is nothing

² For background and text of proclamation, see *ibid.*, Oct. 19, 1964, p. 555.

about international life that insures people and organizations from Parkinson's Law, from over-ambition and overexertion, much less from imprecise goals or indiscriminate action. In some areas we may need to pull up our socks before taking the next step.

Third, we are looking forward to some lively encounters between the Government experts and their opposite numbers in the private or semi-private sector. The international record of the United States Government is not without blemish, and the wisdom of public officials is not always infallible. We assume that everyone approaches this exercise in a constructive frame of mind, but we also hope that the critical faculties brought into play will be razor sharp and the mood intentionally provocative. Personally, I can't think of anything I would rather fight about than how to cooperate better.

Finally, I hope that all of you share with us the sense of satisfaction that comes from engaging in this fascinating process of capturing and defining an idea, of relating it to a goal, of investing it with substance, of molding it into operational activity, and of thus leaving our mark upon the record of human affairs.

We can share, too, a sense of tempered excitement. Tempered, because we know that what we do in the months ahead will not save the world—though it may well help. But excitement too, because we are dealing here, in our 28 subdivisions of cooperation, with all of the main building blocks of world order.

Presumably you are here because you think the thing to do about world order is not merely to profess a pious peace, nor yet to cry a despairing havoc. We are all here because we think the way to build peace is to draw practical plans and get on with the hard labor of selecting the next block, deciding where it fits, smearing it with mortar, and lifting it into place.

A little dreaming helps, but we are not moving in a dream. We are here to write down our dreams, negotiate their acceptance, figure their cost, and organize to bring them to pass. Our dreams are worth the efforts, for they are nothing short of a world community where diversity can flourish, ideas can clash, and talented men can compete with each other—without killing each other in the process.

Secretary Rusk Discusses Viet-Nam Situation on BBC

Following is the transcript of an interview of Secretary Rusk by James Mossman, British Broadcasting Corporation correspondent and producer, which was broadcast over BBC at London on April 2.

Press release 67 dated April 2

Mr. Mossman: Is your extension of bombing of the North an attempt to bludgeon them into negotiating, or is it a military attempt to turn the war into one that you can cope with better?

SECRETARY RUSK: Well, the total object is political. That is, the safety and the security of these countries of Southeast Asia. There is a military aspect to it, because the North is sending military men and arms into the South. But I wouldn't try to draw too thin a line as to the precise object of it. Someone is shooting at you; you have to do something about it. You shoot back. But you're prepared to settle the question immediately, if they're prepared to leave their neighbors alone.

Q. I noticed that Mr. Walter Lippmann the other day talked about it as being a carrot and stick policy with all stick and no carrot. And that if you, in other words, wanted to negotiate, you're not giving them too much of an opening.

A. Well, I think they've had plenty of opportunity to hold their hand. I don't myself believe that, when someone is shooting at you, you ask them for unconditional surrender when you ask them to stop shooting. That's not the issue here.

G. You're not asking for unconditional surrender, in fact?

A. We're asking for them to stop shooting. Now, if there are those who call that unconditional surrender, then I can't agree with them. I think that's an abuse of language.

Q. I noticed that some French observers, at least French observers told me, in fact, who had come from Hanoi to Saigon—their impression was that the Communists would rather see the

whole of their heavy industry destroyed than step back from the threshold of victory in the South. Now, if they were to be as adamant as that, would that, as it were, call your bluff in the bombing tactic?

A. There's no bluff here.

Q. Well, I'm putting it badly. Would that undermine your tactic and leave you with another decision to make?

A. I wouldn't want to speculate about the future. I don't know that is Hanoi's view. But if they continue to push, then we will continue to resist.

Q. Any kind of negotiations would not involve any sort of reflection of Laotian settlement there? That is out?

A. Well, we had a negotiation of the Laotian settlement. We would be delighted to go back to that and see everyone comply with it. That would be a major step toward peace in Southeast Asia. But the other side has consistently refused to consider that in any way, shape, or form. Now again, the point here is: What is there to be negotiated? Who is going to negotiate, and to what end? Now, most of the successful negotiations of the postwar period have been preceded by some private contact that indicates that a satisfactory basis of settlement can be found—the Berlin blockade of '48, the Korean war, and so forth. That is missing here; that is missing.

Q. You've had silence, completely?

A. No indication that—despite a number of contacts of various sorts—no indication that Hanoi is prepared to leave Laos and South Viet-Nam alone. So that the issue is posed in the sharpest form today.

Q. There was a great fuss in the European press about the use of this nonlethal gas, and then there was a suggestion in the press that pilots are now being told to go out and find their own targets, on their own initiative. Is that true?

A. Oh, it wouldn't surprise me if pilots go out and look for targets. That's what they're

there for—the mission is clear, and the mission is authorized.

The gas was, unfortunately, based upon a fundamental misunderstanding of what was involved. That was a police-type gas and has nothing to do with gas warfare. It has been used many times, by many governments all over the world.

Q. One hears of a "hard" school of thought in Washington, Mr. Secretary, which would like to use this occasion to settle with the Chinese, in particular to destroy their nuclear capacity before it gets any larger. Would it be true to say (a) that that school existed and (b) that it had increased its effectiveness?

A. I have not heard any discussion of that sort among the responsible levels of the Government. You know, the President has said many, many times that we have no desire to enlarge this war. What we want is the safety and security of South Viet-Nam and of Laos. And if the other side would leave its neighbors alone—and we've said this until it's boring, apparently—then we, our own forces, could come home immediately.

Q. How far do you depend on Russia standing aside, in order to pursue this tactic?

A. When we made our commitment to South Viet-Nam, we did not make it on the basis of what others would "not do." We've been through this before—you and we, in different parts of the world. We've faced the problem of aggression since the seizure of Manchuria in 1931. The United States has taken 160,000 casualties since World War II in meeting this problem of aggression in all parts of the world. Now that means that we're serious about this kind of problem. There's no possibility of organizing a peace in the world if anyone bent on aggression discovers that he can be successful at it, because this is an appetite that grows with eating. There's no end to it. And if we haven't learned that in the last three decades, then we must have been very stupid indeed during this period.

Q. How can you contain China, though? This sounds a naïve question, but—admittedly—assuming that everything you say is absolutely

to be supported, as it is in the West, I don't see how America can compete with China in the end—in influencing Southeast Asia, which is virtually a Chinese backyard—in the end.

A. We have no desire, ourselves, to influence Southeast Asia. We're not looking for political pastures there. We're not looking for a military position, or for bases, or any special privileges. But we consider that it is utterly fundamental that small countries have a right to live safely and independently in the neighborhood of great powers—Canada, Mexico. Why not? These countries in Southeast Asia have the same right to live out their own lives, without being overrun by a force from the outside. Now that is an issue in which more than a hundred smaller countries all over the world have the most fundamental stake. Their national existence depends upon it. If we were to abandon that idea, then the great powers would, what? Revert to the jungle? Enter a race among themselves to gobble up those portions that are within their reach, until they come into massive conflict with each other? That's the sure road to catastrophe.

Q. Do you think the American public could face the prospect of another Korea, over that issue?

A. I think that you can assume, without any question, that the American public, the American Congress, and the American Government are committed to South Viet-Nam, for the duration.

Q. Whatever happens?

A. That is the point.

U.S. Embassy at Saigon Damaged; Funds for New Building Requested

Following is a statement made by President Johnson on March 30 regarding the bombing of the U.S. Embassy at Saigon on that day, together with the text of a letter of April 1 from the President to Hubert H. Humphrey, President of the Senate, transmitting a bill to au-

thorize construction of a new building to replace the damaged chancery. An identical letter was sent to John W. McCormack, Speaker of the House of Representatives.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

White House press release dated March 30

The terrorist outrage aimed at the American Embassy in Saigon shows us once again what the struggle in Viet-Nam is about. This wanton act of ruthlessness has brought death and serious injury to innocent Vietnamese citizens in the street as well as to American and Vietnamese personnel on duty. I extend my deepest sympathy to the families of all who lost their lives.

Outrages like this will only reinforce the determination of the American people and Government to continue and to strengthen their assistance and support for the people and Government of Viet-Nam. The Embassy is already back in business, and I shall at once request the Congress for authority and funds for the immediate construction of a new chancery for the American Embassy in Saigon. This will be one more symbol of our solidarity with the people of Viet-Nam. It is they who are the real targets of the Communist aggressors.

Led by Ambassador [U. Alexis] Johnson, the Americans in Viet-Nam have once again shown outstanding qualities of courage and coolness. They have the admiration of their countrymen.

LETTER TO CONGRESS

White House press release dated April 1

APRIL 1, 1965

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am transmitting herewith a bill to authorize the construction of a new building to replace our damaged chancery in Saigon, Viet-Nam. In this bill I am requesting authorization of \$1 million which will permit us to build a new chancery promptly. This new building may be either complete in itself or the first stage of a larger chancery, as experience dictates. In either case, it will be a

dignified, efficient, economical, secure, and permanent place of business for the United States in Saigon.

This new building will be one more symbol of our solidarity with the people of Viet-Nam. It will show them that the United States has no intention of abandoning them in the face of Communist terrorism and aggression. It will show them that we intend to live up to our commitments.

This new building will also show the Communists in Hanoi and their tools in the Viet Cong that wanton murder of civilians and destruction of civilian property cannot deflect us from our stated purposes in Viet-Nam.

To emphasize this determination and resolve,

I request the Congress to act promptly on this bill.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

A BILL

To amend the Foreign Service Buildings Act of 1926, as amended.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 4 of the Foreign Service Buildings Act of 1926, as amended (22 U.S.C. 295), is further amended by adding the following new sub-section:

“(e). For the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Act in South Viet-Nam, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated, in addition to amounts previously authorized prior to the enactment of this amendment, one million dollars to remain available until expended.”

The United States and Canada: Common Aims and Common Responsibilities

*by Under Secretary Ball*¹

There is an honorable ritual that requires any representative of the United States Government visiting Canada or any Canadian Minister visiting the United States to try to provide a fresh and scintillating assessment of the state of relations between our two countries at the precise moment of his visit. This is not an undertaking without hazards. I still bear the scars of my own effort last year. Nor should it be approached cavalierly. For the relations between your country and mine are too intimate to be easily analyzed and too complex to be taken for granted. They cannot be summed up in a few platitudes and certitudes—and anyone who tries will surely miss the mark.

Our relations, after all, have deep roots.

¹ Address made before the Canadian and Empire Clubs at Toronto, Canada, on Mar. 22 (press release 53).

They are not an affair of the moment. They are compounded of history as well as the events of the day. They are the resultant of many national attitudes and national experiences.

Nor can they be expressed in simple equations. They are composed of complex variables. They are not all of a piece; they exist in a number of different forms and on a number of different levels.

First, there are the bilateral relations between the Canadian and American peoples and between the Canadian and United States Governments. Thousands of our citizens cross common borders each day in opposite directions. Our economic eggs have been scrambled irrevocably. Our Governments are in constant communication on a wide spectrum of problems—defense, foreign policy, civil aviation, fisheries, conservation, emergency planning,

highway improvement, power production, and so on.

Second, there are relations that flow from geography. Your country and mine have common problems and common responsibilities because we are, at the same time, nations of North America and nations of the Western Hemisphere. And our borders on the two oceans give us common interests—and subject us to common dangers—in both the Atlantic and Pacific areas.

Third, we have special relations as fellow members of the Western alliance dedicated to the defense of the NATO area from Communist aggression.

Fourth, as industrialized nations in a highly interdependent world economy, we have responsibilities to manage our affairs with due regard for other nations. We have special responsibilities, in addition, for what has been called the north-south relationship—responsibilities to assist in improving the peoples of the less developed countries.

Finally, apart from the duties and obligations that derive from geography or wealth, our common membership in the United Nations requires us to see to it that both the spirit and the letter of the charter are applied in resolving the problems and conflicts of mankind.

Relations on Many Levels

The fact that our relations exist on many levels complicates the solution of the problems between us. Within the intricate and elaborate structure of world relationships we are each important countries. Whatever either of us does has an impact around the world.

For that reason we are required always to keep in mind that no problem between us exists in isolation. Whatever we do on one level of relationship has its echoes on others.

But if the existence of relations on many levels complicates the solution of problems between us, it can also simplify them.

Some of our difficulties in the past have, I think, come about because we focused on issues too narrowly. From time to time we have both been too self-centered. We have failed to take into account the larger context of our interests and relationships.

We are doing better these days. The year

1964 produced a good harvest of Canadian-American relations. This year promises to be a vintage year.

A Recent Achievement

Let me mention one recent achievement. That is the solution of the problem of our automotive trade. A few months ago a healthy solution of this problem was hard to foresee. Your Government was concerned with the disparity between domestic automotive production and consumption. It had designed an import duty rebate scheme that was causing considerable anguish to some American producers. Those producers were initiating procedural steps that would have led to the imposition of countervailing duties.

Our Governments were starting down a hazardous path of action and response, retaliation and counterretaliation that would before long have wasted our resources and embittered our relations.

By agreeing to eliminate tariff and other barriers to automotive trade we avoided economic warfare.² We have found a solution that should, over the years ahead, greatly benefit producers and consumers on both sides of the border—a solution that should lead to a rationalized and integrated North American industry with lower costs and lower prices.

This agreement demonstrates how, by imagination and good will, we can resolve our differences. It provides, I would suggest, three lessons that should prove useful guides in the future:

First, we were able to reach a healthy and mutually beneficial result because we did not act unilaterally but by common agreement and by a decent awareness of one another's problems and interests.

Second, we followed our liberal economic instincts and did not distort the operation of market forces by piling restriction on restriction.

Third, we did not let ourselves get bogged down in political theory but acted in the tradition of pragmatism that is the heritage of both

² For background, see BULLETIN of Feb. 8, 1965, p. 191.

our countries. We knew good business when we saw it and were not deflected by doctrinal speculation as to the far-out implications of what we were doing.

How Two Nations Can Live Together

The handling of the automotive problem is a good example of how two nations can live together rationally on a single continent. In its simplest terms the central problem that we face together—and I think we are as concerned about it as you—is how we can preserve the distinctive values of two separate national identities while still employing the resources of this vast continent in the most efficient manner.

This is not, I submit to you, a problem that should outrun the imagination of highly ingenious peoples.

After all, in the life of any nation there are many areas where the strict application of economic laws is traditionally tempered to preserve social values. This is almost the universal experience of nations with regard to agriculture and natural resources.

In essence that is what a good part of Canadian-United States relations is all about. Under one heading or another our Governments are constantly consulting as to how to find a balance between common economic logic on the one hand and each nation's social and political objectives on the other.

But since we are nations of realists, I think we should recognize that the area of available maneuver and of national flexibility is being progressively reduced. Competition in international markets is growing constantly more rigorous as other great trading nations—through one device or another, such as the European Common Market—exploit the benefits of the economies of scale.

How we work these problems out between us over the next few years will, therefore, be a test of the wisdom and resilience of both nations. I offer only one strong admonition today: that we do resolve doubts in favor of economic liberalism rather than resort to artificial measures that can in the long run only restrain the growth of productivity at the expense of both our peoples.

"We Can Never Fully Understand Each Other"

We can, as I have suggested, solve most of our problems by a healthy dose of pragmatism and a lively appreciation of one another's interests. But this does not mean that either of our nations will ever fully comprehend the problems of the other with full sensitivity to all the nuances of national anxiety, pride, and history that may be involved.

The beginning of wisdom in achieving effective relations between our countries and our peoples is, I think, the recognition that we can never fully understand each other. No matter how much we read one another's books and magazines, watch one another's movies and television, listen to one another's radios, or even talk together in a calm and rational fashion, neither of us will ever achieve a total comprehension of the other's national interests and attitudes.

For every great nation possesses a kind of interior life, a private family life, in which no outsider can ever fully participate and from which every outsider is to some extent excluded. If we are to avoid disappointment and frustration and serious misunderstanding, we must frankly recognize that fact.

In my own observation, actions that have tended to embarrass the relations between our countries have sometimes been taken, not because one nation ignored the attitudes and interests of the other, but because it thought it understood them when it didn't. I think it may be a wise principle that when a line of policy involves the intimate domestic concerns of either of our countries, the other would be well advised to indulge a sympathetic presumption as to its neighbor's motives and not insist on making a wholly independent judgment.

This observation has special relevance today because we are each preoccupied with an absorbing national problem. In Canada you are seeking to resolve the special difficulties and preserve the special values of a bilingual society. In the United States we are coming to grips with the changes required to achieve a fully effective biracial society.

It would be neither appropriate nor useful for anyone from south of the border to express

a view on your domestic affairs, but it is entirely appropriate for me to offer a few comments as to how we Americans are seeking to resolve our own most pressing domestic concern.

My country, as we are the first to admit, is engaged today in rectifying a grave social injustice. This undertaking is long overdue. Our task is, therefore, more difficult than it might have been had we tackled the problem with comparable determination at an earlier date.

In the past hundred years we have managed, through great fortune and hard work, to develop an American economy that is enormously rich and productive. We have found the means for assuring the majority of our people an adequate standard of living.

But even on the economic plane, we still have far to go. There are still blighted areas in the United States, pockets of unemployment and poverty. Under President Johnson's leadership, the United States has launched a vast program to eliminate these conditions.

Our Negro citizens, in particular, have not shared fully in our rich economic life. More fundamental than that, however, they have been denied social and political equality. Racial injustice is more serious in some parts of the country than in others. But it is a national problem.

Today, at long last, the United States is undertaking to remove a great blight of social inequity, to establish the full equality not merely of Negroes but of all other citizens, to abolish segregation and discrimination in every form, and to assure to all Americans the same privileges and opportunities.

This requires a profound change in our society—a change that we are seeking to bring about within a remarkably short period. I am certain that we will succeed. The momentum achieved within the past few years will continue and accelerate until we have wiped out every last vestige of social, political, and economic injustice.

Meanwhile we are quite aware that events in this peaceful revolution can take ugly forms. No American can be anything but saddened by the incidents in Selma and Montgomery, Ala-

bama, and in McComb, Mississippi. And we know all too well that pictures of police dogs and firehoses are not good advertisements for the United States around the world.

But at the same time we cannot help but be proud of the real meaning of the incidents these pictures portray. I do not refer merely to evidences of individual bravery and forbearance on the part of many people, both Negro and white, but also to the fact that these events are a part of the price we are paying for progress—the by-products of a determined national effort, fully supported by the overwhelming opinion of Americans, to bring about a shining transformation in our national life.

As President Johnson said last week:³

There is no cause for self-satisfaction in the long denial of equal rights of millions of Americans.

But there is cause for hope and for faith in our democracy and what is happening here. . . .

Our mission is at once the oldest and most basic of this country: to do right, to do justice, to serve man.

. . . And should we defeat every enemy, and should we double our wealth and conquer the stars and still be unequal to this issue [of equal rights for American Negroes], then we will have failed as a people and as a nation.

And so I ask your understanding—as good neighbors—while we move forward with our domestic revolution. It may, as I have said, often be difficult, or even impossible, for you fully to comprehend all of the history and emotion, the clashes of interests and feeling that are involved. But we give you our word as your closest neighbor that we are working with speed and effectiveness to remove inequality and prejudice from our land.

Common World Obligations

What we do on the national plane cannot, as I have suggested earlier, be separated from the world obligations that we share in common. Today our two countries are deeply involved in

³ For an address made by President Johnson before a joint session of Congress on Mar. 15, see White House press release dated Mar. 15.

the fight for freedom around the world. Your young men are keeping the peace in Cyprus, as you kept it before in the Congo. American soldiers are helping the people of South Vietnam to protect their beleaguered land from Communist aggression, which, though it has not taken the form of an army in columns crossing a frontier, is as much an invasion as an earlier Communist movement against South Korea.

Our efforts in the far corners of the world in aid of common principles form part of the cement that binds our two countries. For both

think in terms of the world responsibilities that events have imposed upon us.

I have no doubt that we shall both do what history requires of us. For Canadians and Americans alike are proud peoples, fiercely dedicated to liberty and equally selfless in the defense of our common principles.

And as Prime Minister [Lester B.] Pearson said in New York last week, "When the chips are down and there is a real threat to basic values and principles that we cherish, we have stood and will stand together."

United States Policy Toward Europe

by *W. W. Rostow*

*Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council*¹

I am grateful for this opportunity to share with you here in Germany some thoughts about United States policy toward Europe. My last opportunity to speak in Germany was at a quite different moment. I spoke in Berlin on October 18, 1962, on the present state of the cold war.² I spoke then of the unity which the West had maintained since the war in the face of Communist aggression. And I added: ". . . it will be tested again—perhaps gravely tested—before Khrushchev realizes that his continued Berlin crisis is counterproductive." The next day I returned to the United States and was plunged, like all of us, into the midst of the Cuba missile crisis which had, in fact, quietly begun some days before with the aerial photography of the missiles—a crisis which remains one of the major watersheds of modern history.

Before surveying some of the changes in our

¹ Address made before the German Society for Foreign Affairs at Bonn, Germany, on Mar. 19 (press release 51).

² For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 5, 1962, p. 675.

environment and our problems since 1962, it may be helpful to look back at the fundamentals of United States policy toward Europe and the Soviet Union; because, as President Johnson emphasized in his speech at Georgetown University on December 3, 1964,³ there remains a complete continuity in the fundamentals of that policy. In fact, my theme today comes from that speech. President Johnson said:

For almost the first time, the interdependence of nations is not a remote goal or a ringing slogan. It is a fact which we neglect at our own peril. Communication satellites, atomic rockets, jet transports have made distant capitals into close neighbors. One challenge is to transform this reality into an instrument for the freedom of man. Today the cost of failure to communicate is not silence or serenity but destruction and disillusion.

My theme, then, is interdependence and some of its implications for the policy of the United States toward Europe and the whole world community.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1964, p. 866.

Four Commitments

The policy of the United States, which crystallized in 1947 and 1948, can be summarized briefly.

First, we committed ourselves, through the Truman Doctrine, to resist Communist aggression. In Europe that meant not merely defending Greece and Turkey from Communist guerrilla warfare and pressure but also committing ourselves to the defense of Berlin and the central front as a whole. In the years that followed, that commitment was expanded and translated into the elaborate NATO machinery we all now maintain.

Second, we committed ourselves, through the Marshall Plan and its organization, not merely to the revival of Western Europe but to its revival in a framework of European unity. This was a conscious choice. We decided that we wished to see emerge the most powerful partner that our own resources and European energy and leadership could generate. We did not believe that the interests of each of us in the Atlantic community were identical. We did not believe that common policies between Europe and the United States would be achieved without debate and negotiation. But we counted then—as we count today—on the deep, abiding, common interests of Europe and the United States to produce out of European unity a partner in defending and advancing the values and interests of Western civilization that we of the Atlantic world all share.

Third, we committed ourselves to seek by peaceful means the unity of Germany. This meant that we would not accept as legitimate or as historically viable Stalin's regime in East Germany nor would we accept as a fact of history, to which we had passively to accommodate, an Eastern Europe cut from ties to its own past, cut from the natural lines of connection and communication which have long been shared between Eastern and Western Europe. Even in the darkest days of Stalin's rule we counted on the gradual assertion within Eastern Europe of the forces of nationalism and humanism; and we looked to a gradual transformation not merely of Eastern Europe but also a knitting up of the old ties between Eastern Europe and the Western World as a whole. If you will

forgive a personal reference, it was that kind of faith which led some of us in 1947 to help set up the Economic Commission for Europe in Geneva, as an institution which might play in the long run a useful role in linking Western and Eastern Europe, as Stalin's unnatural imprisonment of the East gave way gradually to more natural relations. Neither then nor now did we envisage that the West would seek to project its military power or its military organizations into Eastern Europe. What was sought then—and now—was an arrangement which would reconcile the legitimate security interests of all nations, including those of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, with the principles of national independence and political self-determination as well as with the natural lines of interdependence which should link Eastern Europe to Western Europe and the world community.

Finally, in a nuclear age we have steadily sought to hold out to the Soviet Union and to the world community proposals that would bring the nuclear arms race under control by measures of arms control which embraced effective and reliable means of international inspection—in Europe and on a world basis.

Steps Toward Success

What has been the fate of this policy?

It has succeeded over a period of almost a generation as few policies have succeeded in modern history.

Our common commitments to the defense of Berlin were severely tested in 1948–1949 and then again against Khrushchev's technique of nuclear blackmail in 1958–1962. Western Europe revived in every dimension of its life—economic, social, and political. It has established powerful instruments of economic unity on the Continent. We have developed and maintained important institutions of Atlantic partnership not only in NATO but also in matters of monetary collaboration and over a still wider economic front. Our faith in the abiding character of Eastern Europe's commitments to its history and to an independent, humane role on the world scene is being gradually vindicated.

Nevertheless, in terms of the considerations which set in motion our policy in 1947, the great

objectives are still to be attained. We are in midpassage.

Developing Habits of Interdependence

Berlin, for the moment, is safe; but the wall and all it stands for is still there. And Berlin will only remain safe if the West continues to maintain the highest degree of military and political unity. There is not the slightest evidence that Communist ambitions are constrained by any factor other than the costs and dangers of seeking to expand their power; and those costs and dangers depend mainly on the strength and unity of the West.

The alliance is in the midst of efforts to bring the nuclear and nonnuclear powers of the Atlantic into new partnership arrangements. How this matter is resolved will help shape the alliance for many years to come. Moreover, we have an opportunity to strengthen on a world basis the commitment to collective, rather than narrowly national, systems of defense.

President Johnson has made it crystal clear that, so far as the United States is concerned, we are ready to go forward to make a truly integrated Atlantic force, in which nuclear and non-nuclear nations would participate on a basis of equality, leaving the door open for coordination within NATO for those members which may not wish to join such a force at this time, leaving the door open also to adjustments we might wish to make as Europe moves toward effective political unity. We remain convinced that it is in this direction the right answer lies in the critical matter of nuclear collaboration. If there is one area above others where we must maintain a deep understanding and a common front, it is in nuclear affairs: deterrence and arms control negotiations alike.

We have built in recent years a remarkable system of monetary collaboration. It has permitted a more equal distribution within the Atlantic world of gold reserves. It has permitted the United States to support heavy dollar expenditures in meeting its NATO commitments on a massive scale. It has permitted capital flows within Europe and across the Atlantic, which have helped produce in the whole Atlantic community a phase of growth unexampled in the last hundred years. If our monetary author-

ities had worked together as closely in 1929 as they have in recent years, much of the Great Depression could have been avoided. But evidently our monetary arrangements are incomplete. An expansion in trade more rapid than increases in gold production requires of us an enlarged use of the IMF [International Monetary Fund]; while our common commitments to rapid growth without inflation require not merely policies of self-discipline at home but intensified collaboration abroad. The question before us is this: Shall we go forward to refine the monetary system we have created, as a continuing support for our economic, political, and military interdependence; or shall we lapse back toward national approaches to monetary questions whose consequences can be read in the common experience of the period 1929-1933?

And so it is also with the problems of trade and of assistance to the developing nations. There, too, we are at a midpoint in developing the institutions and habits of interdependence, in learning to define common interests, common responsibilities, and then acting in concert upon them. There, too, we face the choice between going forward into arrangements of greater concert or risking the fragmentation of what we have achieved in a generation's labor.

The Problems of German Unity

Nowhere is this choice more vivid than in the problems that center about German unity.

The achievement of German unity by peaceful means is not in any narrow sense a German question. It involves the whole future of our common relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The outcome will depend upon the unity, the strength, and the policy of the West, on the one hand, and on the other hand, it will depend on changes in the situation and in men's minds to the East.

We are more hopeful than we were a few years ago. There is light at the end of the tunnel. There are forces at work to the East which might, in time, lead peacefully to German unity and to a resolution of this dangerous tension in the heart of Europe. But if we have the right to hope and the duty to work to undo the unnatural division of Europe, it is mainly because the whole Atlantic world has been united

and strong—united in times of crisis and test and steadily gathering that strength and confidence from each other which has made the West once more a natural pole of attraction to those in the East.

Thus, in terms of the most basic and familiar issues of the Atlantic world itself—in terms of the commitments we undertook to each other in the darkest days of the late 1940's—we must not merely stand still but move forward together, if our common interests are to be protected and advanced. Nothing has happened to make a fragmentation of the alliance safe for any of us—in any field.

Resisting Communist Aggression

But there is more to it than that.

The fate of the Atlantic community is bound up not merely with the defense of Europe, with nuclear partnership, with vital housekeeping arrangements in the Atlantic, and with progress toward a German and European settlement. The Atlantic community will also be shaped by events and by our policies in that larger and more populous part of the world community which embraces Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

Although the Communist world is badly split, it should not be lost upon us that it is in these regions that Communists of every variety are expending their energy and resources in order to advance their interests and to damage the interests of the West. They are mounting programs of aid and trade, of diplomacy and ideological attraction, subversion and guerrilla warfare with a renewed intensity.

In 1964 Communist commitments for new economic aid totaled nearly \$1.4 billion, aside from massive aid to Cuba. This compares with a figure of about \$360 million in 1963 and is well beyond the previous high figure of \$1.1 billion in 1961. The military aid figure for 1964 was about \$360 million, bringing the total of such aid extended to some \$3.7 billion. What these figures suggest is the seriousness with which the Communist regimes—all of whom are feeling the limitation of their resources—are pursuing their policies of penetration.

Whereas the central front in Europe has been quiet since the Cuba missile crisis, men have

been fighting and dying—in small engagements and large—in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America in conflicts initiated or purposefully enflamed by Communist policy. Each is capable of causing a further spread of infection and a dangerous expansion of violence. This is not a period that justifies complacency.

Moreover, with the Chinese Communist nuclear explosion we face foreseeably the possibility of nuclear confrontation not merely with the Soviet Union but with Communist China itself. And we face the problem of strengthening and giving confidence and support to free Asian nations which border on an overtly ambitious and aggressive Communist China which commands this new threat.

These are matters which must be of vital concern to the Atlantic community as a whole. The possibility of nuclear engagement cannot be a question of merely regional concern on this small planet.

Communist hopes and enterprises are based, of course, on the fact that the nations of these regions, which contain over a billion human beings, are undergoing an historic transformation. They are altering their economic, social, and political institutions in ways that would permit them to absorb modern science and technology. They are seeking a new status of dignity and authority both within their regions and on the world scene. These fundamental transformations leave them open to Communist penetration and influence.

For the Atlantic nations—and for Japan, Australia, and New Zealand as well—they pose these questions: How shall their independence be protected in the midst of these critical transitions? How can we help them establish the foundations for that kind of economic, social, and political progress which will bring them, in time, into the world community as modern, responsible, and democratic states?

As of this moment we face in Southeast Asia a quite particular test. In its essence it is little different from the problem which pulled the United States out of its postwar impulse toward withdrawal and brought us back to confront Stalin in Europe. The basic issue in South Viet-Nam and Laos is much like the issue in Greece in 1947. Communist forces are seeking,

in a thoroughly professional way, to seize power in those countries, with illegal assistance from outside the country. They are seeking to exploit the terrible arithmetic of guerrilla warfare that decrees a burden of some 15 government soldiers to control one active guerrilla.

In one sense, the issue in Southeast Asia is even more fundamental than was the case in postwar Greece, for the guerrilla war in South Viet-Nam is substantially manned, supplied, and directed from outside the country in a manner which was not the case even in the worst days of the struggle in Greece. At stake is not merely Southeast Asia and the flank of the Indian subcontinent. The question which must be answered is a question much debated in Communist circles. It is whether in subversion and guerrilla war of this kind the Communists have found a method for bypassing the nuclear and conventional military capabilities of mature industrial powers. In Laos and South Viet-Nam we are not facing merely a difficult local situation. We face a test of a strategy with global implications. Preliminary Communist efforts to establish the foundations for this kind of warfare are going forward in northeast Thailand, in parts of Africa, and in the Caribbean.

The fundamental question at issue is just as real in Southeast Asia as it was in Greece in 1947, in the Berlin blockade of 1948-1949, in Korea in 1950-1951, and in the nuclear blackmail crises launched by Khrushchev in Berlin in 1958 and Cuba in 1962. The fundamental question is whether we shall let Communist aggression in any form succeed. To render this form of aggression ineffective is in the interest not merely of the United States but of the whole Atlantic world and in the interest of free men everywhere.

Indeed, it is a matter of universal concern, for it is difficult to envisage serious movement toward arms control and disarmament if Communist regimes feel free to ship arms and men illegally across international frontiers.

The Developing Nations

The vital interests of the Atlantic are also engaged in the great tasks of construction and pacification which we face in Asia, the Middle

East, Africa, and Latin America.

With respect to Latin America, for example, we are living through a decade which will cast a long shadow. In the Charter of Punta del Este the governments of Latin America committed themselves to their peoples to 10 years of maximum effort toward achieving sustained economic growth, increased social justice, and a refinement of their democratic institutions. Observed some 3 years later, there is no question but that Latin America is now seized deeply of these commitments. In every nation these fundamental economic and social matters are the center of debate and of energetic action.

In 1964, aided by a rise in export prices, preliminary figures indicate that Latin America exceeded the Punta del Este target of an increase in gross national product of 2½ percent. The figure may be something like 3 percent per capita in real terms. Even more important than these average statistics is the increasing dedication of governments to these large goals, backed by a younger generation whose competence and determination often remind me of the men in each European country who, during the days of the Marshall Plan, looked forward to the future rather than backward to Europe's tragic experience since 1914 and led the way in European reconstruction.

The Alliance for Progress is a vast human adventure in which the vital interests of Europe and the whole Atlantic are fully engaged. The old ties of culture, religion, and trade across the South Atlantic—as well as the experience, technology, and capital now available here—offer Europe an opportunity to play a large role in this critical decade. We in the United States hope that Europe will seize this opportunity with both hands. For, in the long run, this emerging modern Latin America should move toward partnership in Atlantic affairs, rooted as it is in the same basic Western traditions and values as Europe and North America.

Beyond the commitment to modernization, another interesting theme is emerging in the developing nations. The leaders in these regions, like European leaders in the last decade or so, are seeking ways to take a larger hand in their own fate. This is not a simple reaction

against colonialism or other forms of extreme dependence out of the past. It reflects the beginnings of a mature desire to play an effective role on the world scene. These leaders are coming to understand that, in a world as profoundly interdependent as our own, a simple assertion of nationalism and nationalist policies is not enough. Strong currents of regionalism are coming to the surface.

Thus, following the earlier example of Europe, there is the movement in Latin America toward the Central American Common Market and the Latin American Free Trade Area. Thus, following somewhat the precedent of the Marshall Plan arrangements, the 20 Republics together have created, to help direct the Alliance for Progress, the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress, with a Latin American chairman and six out of seven Latin American members. Thus, in Africa, under more difficult circumstances, we can nevertheless see the beginnings of an effort by Africans to manage their regional affairs through the OAU [Organization of African Unity]; and the executive secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa, Mr. Robert Gardiner, has called for a ministerial meeting to consider ways of handling African economic development and external assistance on a more effective multilateral basis. Thus, in Asia the idea of a regional development bank is being canvassed, while Asian leaders search for new means of consultation and mutual support.

These initiatives may not yield soon in other regions as fully formed and stable institutions as those which exist or are being created in Latin America. But it is logical and right that the nations of these regions, recognizing the inadequacy of simple national policies in the modern world, should increasingly concert both to take a larger hand in their own affairs and to manage with greater dignity and effectiveness their relations with the more advanced nations of the Atlantic and the Pacific.

For us of the Atlantic, such developments could permit the building of new and more systematic postcolonial relations with these regions in economic matters and, where common interests and commitments require, in security affairs as well.

But if we are to play an effective role in relating ourselves constructively to these emerging regions, we ourselves must greatly improve and render more systematic the consultations among ourselves.

The Atlantic Agenda

Viewed in this way, the agenda before us in the Atlantic world is long and challenging: to maintain and refine our defensive arrangements; to solve the nuclear question, as President Johnson put it, in ways which "bind the alliance even more strongly together by sharing the tasks of defense through collective action and meeting the honorable concerns of all";⁴ to mount together policies which would move us toward German unity and a European settlement based on self-determination and security for all; to concert our policies looking toward arms control and disarmament; to move forward in monetary affairs and in trade in ways which draw us closer together and strengthen the economic foundations of the alliance, and which strengthen also the possibilities of trade and development for others; to face together the subtle, diffuse, but still dangerous aggression of Communists in the developing world; to consult on nuclear problems beyond the Atlantic; to develop more systematic programs of assistance to the developing nations and regions.

These are the tasks on which we are prepared to move forward with our Atlantic partners "in a world of great opportunity, in a time of great need."⁴ None of them is easy; but all must be dealt with if we are not to permit the fast-moving currents of a highly interdependent world to risk a generation's collective achievement.

Each of us cannot pick the items from the common agenda which conform to its narrow national interests and leave the rest to others. That way lies the erosion of alliances.

As President Johnson said: "At every turning point for 20 years we have risen above national concerns to the more spacious vision of European unity and Atlantic partnership." No lesser vision will permit us to master this

⁴ *Ibid.*

agenda. But if we remain loyal to that vision—and to the values of the common civilization which underlie it—we can surely move forward. Governed by such a commitment, no issue among

us is beyond our gifts for mutual understanding and accommodation.

It is in this spirit that we in Washington intend to persist.

An Atlantic Partnership and European Unity

by George C. McGhee

*Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany*¹

I am glad to have this opportunity to meet with the International Club and the Europa-Union, an organization dedicated to the achievement of a united Europe. My country has consistently encouraged movement by Europeans toward this goal. Americans believe that they too will gain if Europe unites. Tonight I should like to discuss with you some of the reasons for this identity of interest. First I will outline the political philosophy which underlies American policy toward Europe. Then I will ask you to consider with me how that philosophy applies to certain questions of the moment.

Throughout the postwar period every American President, whatever his party, has supported efforts toward European unity. Let me quote to you the words in which President Johnson has reaffirmed the course that the United States will follow in the years ahead:²

We will continue to work toward European unity and Atlantic partnership, knowing that progress will require initiative and sacrifice from us as well as from Europe, that success will come from years of patient effort and not a single dramatic move, that the steps ahead may be more difficult than the ones behind.

¹ Address made on Mar. 9 at Bad Godesberg, Germany, at the joint invitation of the Presidium of the Europa-Union of Germany and the International Club.

² For the as-delivered text of remarks made by President Johnson at the Alfred E. Smith memorial dinner at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 14, 1964, see White House press release dated Oct. 14.

Ours is not a policy shaped by transient features of the international scene. It takes a long view of the U.S. national interest—interpreted in its largest sense. We have visualized the possibility of a Europe—economically integrated, politically united, encompassing all the major powers of the elder realm of Western civilization. There are many reasons—historical, pragmatic, even, if you like, sentimental—for the unbroken continuity of our postwar policy toward Europe.

Americans, for example, recognized that a major reason for the limited economic development in Europe in the interwar period had been the autarkic conception of national economic activity. This same factor had inhibited the development of the individual American States in the decade following the Revolution. The need for an unrestricted flow of goods, services, and people throughout the whole of the United States had an influence in shaping the closely federal form that our Union chose when its founders drew up our Constitution.

Thus Americans draw from their own history their conviction that it is advantageous to merge the interests of smaller economic units in a single large economy. It worked for us. It seemed to us that it should work for Europe. The beneficial effects for Europe of internal trade liberalization, first under the OEEC [Organization for European Economic Cooperation] and now increasingly under the EEC

[European Economic Community], appear to have borne out this assumption.

Mutuality of Interests

American interest in the state of affairs in Europe has several mutually reinforcing origins. The perspective of distance perhaps once led many Americans to contrast the peaceful blending of European peoples and cultures in the United States with the fratricidal lack of harmony in Europe. We sought to stay out of Europe's quarrels. Nevertheless they engulfed us twice in this century in world wars. As most of us are of transplanted European stock, we take a natural interest in the homelands of our forebears. As people who have built a new country, we have realized that in new circumstances old rivalries can wither away. As realists, we drew the conclusion that our own country could not be safe while Europe remained at odds with itself. It is, therefore, not merely with distant benevolence that Americans have welcomed steps by Europeans to put an end to struggles for dominion by one or another European power—a kind of struggle which has had tragic consequences not only for Europeans but for ourselves.

Americans also are conscious of sharing with Europeans the custody of a cultural heritage. Together, Western Europe and North America represent the essential values of Judeo-Christian and Greco-Roman civilization. They also virtually comprise the world's advanced industrial society. Few Americans would question that what we have in common far outweighs the differences between Americans and Europeans. These similarities seem to us a natural foundation for a cooperative relationship. It has seemed to us that steps toward European unification represent a final triumph of human reason over the instinct of the past for national prestige and domination.

Finally, there is a clear recognition in America that a strong, free Europe is vital to the security of the United States. This fact was the basis for the vast outpouring of American money to assist Europe's reconstruction through the Marshall Plan. This fact is the basis for our NATO commitment—backed up by the continuing presence in Germany of the equivalent

of six American divisions—a stationing of forces abroad which is unprecedented in U.S. peacetime history. We will under no circumstances allow the resources of Europe to be denied to the free world, to which we mutually belong.

Because the United States as a global power also has responsibilities elsewhere, there is a tendency to bring the American commitment to Europe into question whenever events in another part of the world make bigger headlines than what is happening here. This is ironic, for it is precisely the magnitude of the American commitment here which has spared Europe the kind of destructive instability which makes headlines. We have some 25,000 men in South Viet-Nam—however, we have 250,000 in Germany. Let there be no mistake about it. We will under all circumstances fulfill our commitment to Europe.

Moreover, at the same time, as Secretary Rusk said last week,³ "Europe and the North Atlantic community cannot preserve their security merely by holding a line across Europe." Their common security is involved also in what happens in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, South Asia, and the Western Pacific. They have a vital common interest in the defeat of active aggression in Southeast Asia. They have a common interest with the free peoples of the developing world in putting an end to aggression by the infiltration of arms and trained fighting men across national frontiers.

The North Atlantic nations should recognize those vital common interests and join in supporting them. Above all, they should do nothing to encourage aggressors to believe that aggression will be allowed to succeed on the ground or to reap a reward at the conference table.

Adjusting Policy To Meet Current Tasks

As in any long-term endeavor, the means by which the United States carries out its policy toward Europe must be adjusted to the particular tasks at hand. Such adjustments are no indication of change in our purpose—nor of a decrease in our determination. To use an

³ BULLETIN of Mar. 22, 1965, p. 427.

analogy, a skilled climber will use a variety of techniques on his way to a mountaintop, suiting his pace as well as his methods to the difficulty of the pitch which immediately confronts him. We still keep our forces here because the military threat to Europe persists. We do not have to relive the days of the Marshall Plan, which represents a task accomplished.

In the 20 years the United States has been striving for a new kind of relationship with Europe, I doubt that it has occurred even fleetingly to any responsible American that such a relationship could be anything other than one between sovereign equals. The idea of Europe being a satellite of America would be morally repugnant to all Americans. Such a relationship would constitute a denial of the very values which have linked Europe and America together. It could never be strong and lasting.

Historians, I think, will have no difficulty in documenting that America's postwar goal has been the creation of a strong and increasingly unified Western Europe. The first major step in this direction, the formation of the OEEC, was the outgrowth of an American suggestion that the European countries concerned organize themselves to draw up a European plan for cooperation in the use of United States aid. We have continued to encourage European cooperation wherever this seemed possible. In short, the United States has held consistently to a course diametrically opposite to the one we should have followed had we wanted the states of Europe to become dependencies of America. Had that been the case we should have sought to perpetuate Europe's division and weakness.

Practical experience in such forums as NATO and the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] has reinforced our conviction that we chose rightly in urging Europe to unite in its own interest. The economic and military power of Western Europe is very great but unfortunately is divided among many countries of unequal size. This makes the mobilization of Western strength for a common purpose a complicated affair—sometimes an impossible one. Where unanimity is the rule, any one country, however small, can create an obstacle—even when an overwhelming majority

favors action. We Americans would welcome a Europe able to speak with one voice—transcending national boundaries.

This is not simply a theoretical wish. The Kennedy Round of worldwide tariff negotiations at Geneva is, among other things, a practical test of dealings between the United States and a group of European nations which has chosen to speak with one voice. In the field of trade and commercial policy the Commission of the European Economic Community is the single negotiator for the six member countries of the EEC. The Commission, in order to perform this role, must first define the interest of the six countries in a manner acceptable to all of them. This is a difficult process. On occasion it has also been a painful one for the six countries involved. What has emerged from the process, however, has generally turned out to be a community interest which is something more than the sum of the interests of the six.

The rapid development of the EEC is confronting the United States with the emergence of a second free-world economic unit of a size commensurate with our own. In many ways this has created economic hardships for us—as internal EEC customs have gone down more rapidly than its common external barrier. Variable levies imposed by the EEC have resulted in sharp reductions in certain U.S. exports to Europe.

It is obvious that as the growth of the EEC continues, we Americans will have to adapt to it in various ways—not all pleasant ones.

Bases of Partnership

I was asked the other day whether, in view of the hard bargaining which is taking place between the United States and the EEC in the Kennedy Round, we were changing our minds about the EEC. What the questioner failed to grasp is that we welcome the challenge of negotiating with a responsible equal. Even though such negotiations can be difficult, the agreements reached in this way are likely to be more durable than those reached easily. We did not encourage the formation of the EEC in order to make things easy for ourselves. We did so in order to have in Europe an entity capable of joining with us in assuring greater free-

world progress. The relationship of equality between the United States and the EEC most nearly approximates what we have long sought with Europe as a whole. It is the kind of relationship we would like to see expanded into other fields, thus laying the foundation for a broader Atlantic partnership.

We are clear in our minds that such a partnership need not be based on advance agreement to follow identical policies. Europe, with a perspective different from ours, will see many problems differently from us. Latin America is, for example, closer to us—just as Africa is closer to Europe. Even if the United States and Europe do not always define their interests in identical terms, however, their respective interests are bound to run closely parallel. We are, therefore, not alarmed at the prospect of Europe devoting its energies to the promotion of its own genuine interests. A Europe which does, we believe, will find it in its self-interest to work with the United States. We would most assuredly be prepared to negotiate with such a Europe—as an equal—to minimize whatever differences might emerge.

We do not believe that a divergence of its interests from those of the United States is necessary to give Europe an identity of its own—either now or in the future. The idea that Europe, as an emerging political unit, can prove itself only by the clash of its policies with those of others is uncomfortably close to the thesis which prevailed among nations up to the end of the Second World War. The consequences of this narrow conception of self-interest are known to all of us. It would be deplorable if artificial differences were created merely for the sake of demonstrating Europe's independence of America. The only result would be the frustration of the accomplishment of our real common interests.

We in the United States are anxious that the mistakes of the past not be repeated. The liberal spirit of cooperation which has characterized the Atlantic area over the past 17 years has brought not only internal tranquillity but unprecedented well-being to the area. We think it unlikely that Europe will wish to turn its back on that achievement—in which the United States has been Europe's partner. Our policy

rests on the conviction that Europe will want, in its own interests, to continue on the course on which we set out together a generation ago.

Among those who are critical of our European policy two contradictory complaints are heard. One is that the United States is trying to establish a blueprint for European development which intrudes into Europe's own affairs—in extreme form, that the United States is trying to “dominate” Europe. The other is that the United States does not speak out with sufficient clarity on European issues in which it has a stake—as some put it, that we are not providing adequate “leadership.” Neither criticism is justified. In President Johnson's words:⁴

The United States has no policy *for* the people of Europe, but we do have a policy *toward* the people of Europe. And we do have common hopes and common objectives shared with most of the people of Europe. Answers to our common problems must emerge from the consent of free countries, and that consent, in turn, will be based on discussion and debate and respect for the ideas and the proposals of all. But there must be progress.

Our Current Business With Europe

In the meantime, the United States has much current business with Europe. This must be transacted, not with some hypothetical Europe of the future, but with the Europe of today. That Europe consists, on the one hand, of certain community institutions with limited membership and some supranational powers. It includes, on the other hand, national states joined in various ways by treaties—both among themselves and with the United States and others. These interrelationships are complex. Some have suggested their simplification by a clear choice between a wholly European Europe and one within an Atlantic community.

For our part, we do not feel that Europe must make such a choice. We are not dismayed by the complexity. The various relationships which have already been established, both within Europe and with America, are not necessarily contradictory. Many complement each other. For example, Franco-German reconciliation was a necessary precondition for any progress toward European unity. It was necessary

⁴*Ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1961, p. 866.

that these two great nations—neighbors in the very heart of Europe—take steps to assure that there should never under any circumstances be a revival of their traditional rivalry. They could not, however, make their relationship an exclusive one without stunting the development of Europe. The Franco-German relationship, together with all of the other permutations and combinations of bilateral ties among the various European countries, constitutes the warp and woof of European unity. When these strands have been closely enough knit they will become as one—the whole cloth of a united Europe.

We regard the growth of a close-knit Europe as necessary for the establishment of a truly equal Atlantic partnership. Indeed, in dealing with current issues we have carried this conviction one step further to assure that new arrangements of an Atlantic-wide nature not prejudice later steps toward European unity. Proposals presently under discussion for a sharing of nuclear responsibility within the Atlantic alliance provide a case in point. From the beginning of such talks, whatever the form they have taken, we have made clear our willingness to accept a "European clause," which would permit a reconsideration of the terms of the arrangement should conditions change. We have recognized that the extension of European unity to include nuclear defense policy is unlikely to occur overnight. We have no wish to preempt the right of Europeans to determine what form such unity might take. Indeed, it would be rash for anyone—European or American—to predict the future in this respect. Consequently we have always made it clear that none of the proposals presently under discussion should be considered a definitive solution to the problems of nuclear sharing within the alliance.

We have stated our readiness to review whatever arrangements are made in the event of the organization of Europe, or such other major changes in the *status quo* as German reunification or general and complete disarmament. In sum, we have refused to make more difficult for Europeans any of the several possible paths toward the evolution of a united Europe.

While we shall continue to give every support and encouragement to progress toward unity in Europe, the ways and means of achieving

that objective are, and must be, peculiarly a matter for Europeans to decide. We are following with great interest the initiatives that the nations of the Community are now considering. We welcome this further stirring of European effort in the direction of European unification. The increasing unity of Europe adds greatly to Western strength while, at the same time, it helps prevent the resurgence of destructive nationalism. Every step taken toward Europe's unification will, in our view, also lead us closer to Atlantic partnership.

Drawing Artificial Distinctions

The concepts of European unity and Atlantic partnership are both derived from deeply shared values and interests. You and we have no choice as to whether to be involved with one another. Together we can only choose whether our involvement will result in friction between us or a greater community of purpose. People talk about the possibility of Europe cutting loose from the United States, or of the United States returning to isolationism, but seldom of both together. The fact is that, should either occur, it will find its mirror image in the other.

Indeed, in a great many aspects of our affairs it is entirely artificial to draw a distinction between what is European or American and what is "Atlantic." For example, as investment capital flows both ways across the ocean, carrying with it a flow of advanced technology, it benefits the region in which the investment is made as well as its country of origin. At the same time it creates sinews of strength and unity binding together the Atlantic area as a whole. We in America, for our part, would welcome a greater flow of European investment in our economy.

Europe and America are, moreover, not only important to each other in terms of the interchange of goods and capital. The interchange of persons within the Atlantic area, and the interchange of ideas among intellectuals and professional persons, enrich our lives and enlarge our horizons. Doctors, lawyers, university professors, and private citizens, as well as businessmen, on both sides of the Atlantic have profited from this personal and professional intermingling. Through this shared experience they

contribute simultaneously to the creation not only of a European and American but also of an Atlantic outlook.

There is, of course, both in Europe and in the United States a human tendency to talk most about those problems which lie closest to home. I submit, however, that for both Europeans and Americans these close-to-home problems include more than enough common ones to guarantee the durability of our relationship. In truth, the complexities of a technological civilization make it impossible for either continent to find solutions to its most basic problems in isolation from the other. It would be easier for the United States than for any other nation to follow an independent security policy. We have, however, looked our security problem squarely in the face and have discovered that we cannot afford independence. We must rely on you—as you rely on us—for the security of the Atlantic area, which includes both our countries.

In fact, NATO itself provides perhaps the best illustration of the determination on both sides of the Atlantic to get on with a common task—the task of strengthening our common defense—while the construction of Europe proceeds. It would have been dangerous indeed to postpone the urgent security affairs of the alliance until its European members were fully organized to make binding political and military decisions as a group. NATO is, moreover, based on the undeniable fact that the defense of the Atlantic area is, in the last analysis, indivisible. It must indeed be based upon Atlantic partnership.

Let me supply another illustration of interdependence from the field of international monetary policy. Here the same realities apply. The deficit in the balance of payments of the United States is not the result of a lack of health in the American economy. Our economy is thriving and all predictions are that it will continue to expand. Theoretically, the United States could bring its balance of payments into substantial surplus overnight by unilateral action. We have, however, elected to use means which are slower though no less sure. We have taken this course because we recognize the cost that other measures would entail, in terms of

reduced free-world security, decreased foreign aid, and interruption in the flow of capital to regions in need of development.

In today's world the assertion of a so-called "independent" monetary policy by any major nation would produce rude shocks in every corner of the earth. Furthermore, such "independence" would beget more "independence" of the same kind, as other countries, finding themselves in difficulties, took unilateral action to restrict imports of goods and exports of capital. A downward spiral would commence, taking the initiator of "independence" with it.

It is not really a question of choosing between independence and interdependence. It is a question of taking a sensible view of what each country can do for itself and what it cannot do without joining with other countries. That pressing domestic problems await solution both in Europe and the United States makes intercontinental cooperation not less but more essential. Only by agreeing to work with others for the achievement of common benefits can a nation today make efficient use of its own resources for its own good.

Working Together for Common Good

Working together for the common good is the true meaning of Atlantic partnership. It is only within an environment of shared responsibility that both Europe and America can best discharge the great tasks that confront us.

Our common defense in NATO provides for each of us a degree of security which no single nation can achieve for itself at a cost compatible with the social imperatives of a free society.

The further reduction of obstacles to trade through the Kennedy Round negotiations in Geneva will facilitate the freer flow of goods and services between Europe and North America, thus stimulating the most efficient use of resources on both sides of the Atlantic. It will also result in the sharing of these benefits with the rest of the world.

Our cooperation in the development of other regions of the world will assure that these nations will seek their future within the framework of the free world.

A strong Atlantic community will further

enhance the attraction that Western Europe itself already visibly exerts upon the Eastern European countries, making Western Europe one source of a unifying flow of magnetic force for which the national aspirations of the Eastern countries supply the responding pole.

These are some of the purposes that we think a partnership between Europe and the United

States can serve. We do not conceive of an Atlantic partnership as an end in itself—a way of chaining Europe to America, or America to Europe. We regard it as an evolutionary relationship which has already begun and which demands development, because Europe and America face challenges which only both together can meet.

International Visitors and the American Society

Remarks by Secretary Rusk¹

It is a very great pleasure indeed for me to welcome you here to the Benjamin Franklin Room of the Department of State. I think there is some connection. Benjamin Franklin was our first professional diplomat, but he was also our greatest citizen diplomat.

You may be interested in noting, as you leave, that bust of Franklin in the corner over there. That is one of the four original Houdon busts of Franklin, struck, I think, in 1783. We're very proud to have that bust here.

Benjamin Franklin was consumed with an interest in all that he saw, in all those whom he met, both at home and abroad, and the notion of relations among peoples, with a distinction and at a level which is very hard for the rest of us to achieve.

As I move about the country I often get the question, what can I do as a single citizen to contribute to the building of peace around the world? I think the answer has to be, in each case: "Start from where you are. What are the opportunities in front of you, in your community, in your organizations, in your schools, through your money, through your time, through your votes?" There are dozens of ways

in which each private citizen can make an important contribution. A contribution which is multiplied 190 million times moves us a long way down the road to peace.

And so Mrs. Rusk and I would like to tell you how grateful we are to all of you who are lending your hand in assisting us in our relations with the peoples of the rest of the world. I hope that you take away from such meetings as this a deep realization that it is important and it does make a difference.

You've been talking about a changing world. We now have relations with about 115 countries. I believe during the last calendar year there were about 50 elections or changes of government in those 115 countries. And in 1965 we are right on schedule. It *is* a changing world. There are many problems. But one thing I think which you should deeply understand is that the rather simple policies, the rather simple objectives, of the American people in this post-war scene have been a great stabilizing and organizing force in this tumult of world affairs. And as you receive foreign guests into your community, as you spend time with them, one of the things which I hope they will discover is that these utterly simple purposes of the American people are really at the core of American policy.

¹ Made at the first national conference of the National Council for Community Services to International Visitors (COSERV) at the Department of State on Mar. 19.

There are some things that you can't say without being presumptuous, but which they themselves might discover. It's a matter of the greatest historical importance, to me, that the unimaginable power of the United States in this postwar period has been committed in support of these decent purposes of the American people. Power, Lord Acton said, tends to corrupt. But power has not corrupted the American people. You can find our objectives spelled out in the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter: independent states cooperating across national frontiers, settling their disputes by peaceful means, acting together to deal with aggression, building a more decent world in economic and social terms, and strengthening human rights. It's all there in the opening sections of the United Nations Charter.

And that has been the direction of American effort and power in this postwar period. No appetites for territory, no ambition for domination. We've been called aggressors at certain times when we've had to stand across the path of the aggressor; we have had that name thrown upon us. But your representation of what your communities are all about to those who come to visit with you is the basic stuff of which policy is made and represents the genuine and central purpose of America in dealing with the rest of the world.

Developing a Decent World Order

We give effect to these purposes in a great many different ways. Now, for example, we attend some 600 intergovernmental meetings in the course of each calendar year—15 to 20 a week. I thought you just might be interested to know that, in 1964, 69 of these were in the field of agriculture, 14 on communications, 54 on economic development and resources, 15 on fisheries, 20 on fuel and power, 8 on labor, 9 on patents and royalties, 50 in scientific fields, 28 on shipping and ports, 20 on human rights and social welfare, 58 on trade, 9 on transport, et cetera, et cetera.

At least 80 percent of the work of the Department of State is concerned with what we might call the hidden part of world affairs, the quiet and steady and behind-the-scenes and be-

low-the-surface effort to make sense out of this turbulent world.

So foreign policy is not a distant thing. It's not a game. Its central concern is with the security and the well-being of the people of this country and with the development and the stability of a decent world order about us.

I said that that policy comes out of the purposes of the American people. It also needs their support. We have almost a million men in uniform outside the continental United States today. They are drawn from every community in the country. We're called upon to support some of the harsh necessities of life in a troubled world by that intimate and personal claim upon the people themselves. And we need the funds for a strong defense budget; we need the funds for foreign aid to assist other countries to build a decent structure for themselves.

And when I mention those million men in uniform outside the United States, you know I've never yet encountered anyone who has looked me in the eye and said to me that it is not worth three to four cents of our tax dollar for foreign aid to try to get the job done without committing those men to combat if possible. And this is a part of the foreign aid picture—to build that kind of world sketched out in the U.N. Charter, by the processes of peace, in cooperation with others, and not to cast ourselves all around the world in the role of some sort of policeman.

We need funds for our educational exchange programs and of course for our diplomacy.

I must say the Department of State has been doing its best to back the President in his economy drive as far as Government departments are concerned. Three years ago I did not ask for any more people; last year the Congress wouldn't give me any more people; and this year the President said I'd have to get along with fewer people. So it's not just dogs that get their ears pulled in Washington.

Importance of Citizen Participation

I would underline the importance of participation by citizens in the relations among peoples. In 1962 the Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel under the chairmanship of my

distinguished predecessor, Mr. Christian Herter, issued a report on *Personnel for the New Diplomacy*. It spoke of "the need to deal with peoples of other nations, as well as with their governments," and of "the representation of whole peoples before whole peoples of other societies." This relationship, it said, is "most conspicuous in connection with information programs, cultural programs, educational exchanges, trade fairs, and like enterprises."

And our Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, in its first annual report in 1963, spoke particularly about our program for the "exchange of persons—the extraordinary new dimension in the relationship of one country to another . . . conceived as a direct effort of the American people to bring about mutual understanding between themselves and the people of the world." It said: "There has been nothing quite like this—a peaceable, sizable exchange of persons, carried on by a government on behalf of an entire people—in the whole history of human affairs."

Now, this could not be accomplished without the active and dedicated and lively participation of our voluntary citizens groups, such as you here today represent. We are grateful for what you do at your diplomatic posts in your own communities and organizations, day in and day out. For, among other things, the Government itself simply cannot do what you are doing. We can't render that kind of personal and sensitive and imaginative and individual service which you yourselves can render in your own communities. This voluntary spirit is, of course, a keystone in the understanding which other peoples may have of us. It's an asset beyond price in this total world situation.

We can have a Voice of America, and we can have an information program, and our ambassadors can make speeches. But the most eloquent voice we have is what we say to people who visit our communities, what they think we think of ourselves, what they think we think of each other. I have said before that, of all the actions taken by the last Congress, the most important single action it took in terms of our relations with the rest of the world was the passage of the Civil Rights Act. I'm sure you

know that President Johnson's statement a few nights ago² has gone around the world with the speed of light and has stimulated the most extraordinary and exhilarating reaction among people in distant places who never thought much about the United States, and who never expect to come here on a visit, but who are stimulated by what we seem to be trying to do in our own situation here at home.

Now, we understand that most of you have been working primarily with our short-term visitors, the several thousands who come here under the auspices of the Department of State and the Agency for International Development, and a considerable number of military visitors who come here under the auspices of the Department of Defense. There are many others who come under private auspices, as well as under the auspices of some of the other official agencies. I think we can be proud and greatly heartened by what this partnership has done, without detailed blueprints, which leaves to you and your local communities the maximum of choice and imagination, and which has done so much to reflect our friendliness as a people and our basic commitments to the ideals of freedom and peace among the peoples of the world.

I think we may find in the process that we learn more about ourselves as we try to be articulate about ourselves to other peoples. And I have no doubt that we enrich our own communities by drawing upon what our visitors can themselves offer, whether in group discussions or exchange of views or whatever it might be. This is very much a two-way street.

Enriching the Experience of the Foreign Student

I would like to comment very briefly on the foreign student in America, his needs and his opportunities. Many of you see him as a short-term visitor when he drops into your community on a vacation or during other travels. But he is in this country on a somewhat longer term basis. And there are many who are not sponsored—most of them are not sponsored.

² For text of the President's address to Congress on voting rights, see White House press release dated Mar. 15.

That is, they have no one officially concerned about their experience here. I'm not myself distressed that this should be so, because from time immemorial students have traveled—they've wandered about. They don't want to be smothered by undue attention. But nevertheless they're among us—some 80,000-85,000 of them. And we do have some problems from time to time among the nonsponsored students. Like all other students everywhere else, they are sometimes afflicted with precarious finances—I've never seen a student who had enough. They have problems with perhaps insufficient English, inadequate educational background, unsatisfactory institutional arrangements—where they might have hit upon the wrong institution for their particular purpose. They might have overestimated the chances for scholarships and employment after they reached this country.

While most colleges and universities offer these students counseling and guidance, and thousands upon thousands of Americans in hundreds of communities make their services and their homes available, there still are shortcomings in many a student's experience here that may make for misunderstanding and less than a happy memory.

Are there too many of them? I should think that the answer to that is no. The colleges and universities make their own decisions about whom they will admit; the Government exerts practically no influence on the numbers who might come for study. In any event, these foreign students are less than 2 percent of our college and university student body. In some Western European nations, the percentage ranges between 10 and 15. That 2 percent I mentioned is a national average. Howard University has 15. At M.I.T. it is perhaps 12. In other words, we have a lot of foreign students, but we also have a lot of students and we have room for more.

We should have confidence that as a rule our educational institutions can carry out the responsibilities they are placing on themselves when they accept foreign students. It's been rather dramatic in the last 15 years—as I've had occasion from one vantage point or another to watch this process—to see how much finer is the job which our colleges and universities are

doing with foreign students now than, say, 15 years ago.

Numbers are not the criterion in how good a job we're doing. Each individual student is an individual deserving the best opportunity and experience here which he can find. We're moving toward improved screening and selection procedures overseas, so that there is not that traumatic disappointment when the student arrives at the gates of an institution in our country to find that he's just in the wrong place.

For a period there was too much of an exaggeration, I think, among our friends abroad about a very few highly prestigious institutions, and too little knowledge about the fine, strong, active, and energetic institutions that exist all over the country, in which they can have a rewarding experience. I remember when I was with the Rockefeller Foundation—we were giving a considerable number of foreign fellowships each year—that in the first interview about 85 percent of those that we were talking to wanted to go to Harvard. Well, they had heard of Harvard, as most people have. But, in fact, to spread them around the country into institutions closely identified with their main interests, with a great variety of accommodations and circumstances, proved to be their most rewarding opportunity.

President Kennedy once said that the foreign student is often lonely. Now, perhaps he wants to be lonely in some cases, in which case we should leave him alone. Let's don't force ourselves on him. But if he is responsive and receptive and if he is looking for those things in American life that will mean a great deal to him in the future, then we ought to do all that we can to respond. Perhaps we need to think more about certain facilities, particularly at vacation time—hostel arrangements that would ease the travel and the cost of travel, more of the sorts of things that make it easier for the student to get about a vast and somewhat expensive country, in order to enrich his experience.

You know there are some very special things that we can give a number of these students, particularly those from the developing countries. A little more than a hundred years ago we invented the land-grant institutions in this country for the purpose of contributing to de-

velopment. Agricultural and mechanical colleges—that was the original concept. There was the invention of an educational system to help a nation develop its human and material resources. You haven't found that in other places quite so much as here. And that notion is of great value in the underdeveloped countries. It helped us, I think, a good deal over the past century to escape the view that a college or university degree elevates you into an aristocracy which is not supposed to work. The notion that a degree holder can get out in the field and pollinate corn or get out his shovel and test a cement mix is of great value to countries whose educated elite may feel that the practical, ordinary, everyday chores are not for men carrying degrees.

With the help of the United States Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, we are now taking a new look at the foreign student problem as a whole in this country. We hope to get some very useful suggestions from them which we will be glad to pass along to all those who may be interested. I'm sure that we need to find ways to apply overseas some of the superior methods of testing and screening so that the students that are selected will be able to get maximum benefits from their experiences here. I think we have to find some ways also to reach farther into the underprivileged groups, if one wishes to use that term—the have-nots in other societies—to see whether we can open up the doors of opportunity for more of them and help to invigorate and expand and enlarge the educational elites of their own countries.

I don't quite know from an educational administrative point of view how the educational offerings in this country can be more closely and clearly related to the needs of these students upon their return to their own countries. It's a frightful task of curriculum organization. But I'm sure it's one to which we all ought to be continually alive and alert in order to try to anticipate what we can best do for that person when he becomes again a resident of his own country.

We can do a great deal to enrich and diversify a student's experience while here. It is not our

purpose to send him home sentimental about the United States. Understanding is much more than amiability. If the student goes back knowing what it is he does like about us, and knowing what it is he does not like about us, our relations for the future are on a much firmer base than if he goes back thinking that he is obligated to think well of the United States. I say that because I think it's right in principle, but I say that also because, as a practical matter, that's the only way that these relationships can endure.

The American people can afford to be deeply understood. When you look at the effort, the record, that has been made in this postwar period as a part of the great humane tradition of freedom, you realize you are in the middle of those processes which are our greatest strength in world affairs. It's true that we have enormous military strength—and I don't believe that the human mind can comprehend the effect of the application of that military strength—but even that is not the source of our greatest strength. Our strength lies in the fact that we are a nation peopled from all parts of the human race, that we have drunk deeply of its longest and greatest traditions, that we do not consider ourselves to be at the end of that story, but that we are in the process of doing our part to have that great story of freedom still further fulfilled. The notion of freedom is still the strongest and most explosive force in the world today. The simple notion of human dignity, of concern for the family, of protection against the disasters of a sometimes hostile natural environment, the notion that men just don't like to be pushed around too much—these are things which we share with people from all parts of the earth. And these are the things which give us confessed and unconfessed allies when the great issues of freedom come into sharpest contest.

It is not your task as COSERV members to distort or corrupt your work in terms of the day-to-day and week-to-week problems of our relations with other countries. You are working on a human story that is more than 2,000 years old, and that is how you can give that strength of America its additional strength, and in the process enrich and strengthen your own personal lives.

An Assessment of the International Monetary System

by Douglas Dillon
*Secretary of the Treasury*¹

This is the fourth year in which I have had the special privilege of addressing this conference of distinguished leaders in the world of finance. These have been years of remarkable innovation in financial practices and policies—public and private—both within the United States and abroad. Internationally, we have fashioned a framework for mutual consultation and cooperation that—measured against our common objectives of steady growth and flourishing world trade, coupled with substantial price stability—has proved both durable and viable.

But, despite much excellent progress, our international financial system still suffers from a disturbing disequilibrium—one I have discussed with you on previous occasions. This is the seemingly chronic tendency for capital to flow between countries in directions and in amounts that impede the entire process of restoring balance in the payments of deficit and surplus countries alike.

The Group of Ten, in their recent study of the international monetary system,² concluded unanimously that ways must be found to improve the process of balance-of-payments adjustment. The United States wholeheartedly joined in that conclusion and welcomes the systematic studies of this matter now underway in Working Party III of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development]. However, if these studies are to have truly useful results they must face up to the stubborn and extremely difficult problem posed by the deep structural imbalances in the world's capital markets that have enormously complicated the smooth functioning of the adjustment mechanism.

The nature of the problem is clearly illustrated by developments in our balance of payments last year. By 1964, the measures we had undertaken to improve our trade position and to reduce the balance-of-payments impact of our aid and defense programs had achieved visible and gratifying results. Yet, as you know, our deficit last year was once again disappointingly large, primarily because capital had poured out of the United States in unprecedented amounts—in significant part to the strong surplus countries of Western Europe. The recent annual report of the Monetary Commission of the European Economic Community highlighted this point, noting that an improvement of about \$3 billion in United States transactions for goods and services and government accounts had been largely offset by a \$2 billion increase in private capital outflows.

Within the basic limitations set by the needs of an underemployed domestic economy, the United States throughout the last 4 years had been alert to the fact that excessively easy money at home could only aggravate the problem of capital outflows. By shifting much of the burden for promoting domestic expansion to fiscal policy and tax reduction, we have enabled our monetary authorities to move gradually, but steadily, to an essentially neutral monetary policy.

¹Address made before the annual Monetary Conference of the American Bankers Association at Princeton, N.J., on Mar. 19.

²For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 31, 1964, p. 323.

Our short-term market interest rates have climbed significantly since the 1960-1961 recession, responding largely to two half-point increases in the discount rate. With the discount rate now at 4 percent, Treasury bill yields are within $\frac{1}{2}$ percent or so of their postwar high—a high reached only briefly during the period of very tight money in 1959. Loan/deposit ratios of banks have gradually climbed to a postwar peak, and other traditional measures of bank liquidity have confirmed a gradual tightening in their position. The Federal Reserve has rather steadily reduced the free reserves of the banking system, and, for the past month, the banks have actually operated with a small net borrowed reserve position. While corporate cash flow has remained high, liquidity ratios have reached the lowest levels in a quarter of a century.

Clearly, credit has remained readily available in the United States throughout this period, and our bank lending and long-term interest rates are still low relative to most other countries. But it is also a palpable fact that rising investment opportunities and credit demands at home, combined with increases in the Federal Reserve discount rate and greater restraint in the provision of bank reserves, have noticeably reduced the ease of our market. Yet, instead of declining in response to these developments, the capital outflow has accelerated.

Differences in Investment Profitability

This fact alone casts into doubt the thesis of those who view the problem almost entirely in terms of "excessive" domestic liquidity, with tighter monetary policy the simple, effective, and unique remedy. Naturally, if one defines an excess of liquidity as synonymous with an excessive capital outflow, I suppose that position would be unassailable. But that kind of analysis bears no realistic relationship to the difficulty we face today. All it does is to define away the substance of a very real and tough problem.

In my judgment, it is much more enlightening—although still not the entire answer—to analyze the problem in terms of differences in investment profitability, rather than in terms of liquidity. Consider, for example, the outflow of funds for direct investment abroad, which

has continued to rise, reaching \$2.3 billion in 1964. At the present time, many American firms clearly believe that a portion of their available resources can be most profitably invested in subsidiaries abroad. That calculation rests on a variety of familiar considerations—the more rapid growth of certain foreign markets; a desire to operate inside a wall of external tariffs; proximity to readily available raw materials; and lower production costs—to name some of the most obvious factors.

But perhaps most important of all is the fact that United States industrial development so far exceeds that of any other country. This has brought with it a degree of competition that is unknown anywhere else in the world. Add to this our enormous flow of savings, and it is not surprising to find a general acceptance of lower rates of return on capital in this country than prevail elsewhere—rates that only partially reflect differences in risks between investments here and abroad. At the same time, our businessmen and investors tend to place higher capital values on prospective earnings than is the case elsewhere, and our corporations at times find it attractive to pay higher prices in the acquisition of going concerns abroad than would seem reasonable to local investors.

Whatever the specific reason that particular direct investments abroad appear to a given company to be a more profitable use for its funds, the fact is that we cannot effectively influence this judgment by simply reducing liquidity and tightening credit at home. So long as the basic difference in profitability remains, any gain in terms of reduced foreign investment will entail a substantially larger cost in terms of dampening domestic investment as well. There seems, therefore, little warrant either in theory or in practice for basing economic policy on a presumption that corporate managers will permit considerations of the rate and availability of bank credit to affect their decisions on foreign investment, while leaving the domestic economy untouched.

In the broadest sense, international differences in the rate of return on investment—as these differences are reflected in interest rates and the intensity of demands for credit—also lie behind the accelerating outflow of bank loans and other credits abroad. This structural im-

alance forced us to propose the Interest Equalization Tax during the summer of 1963.⁹ It effectively increased the cost of long-term portfolio credit to foreigners in developed countries. As a result the outflow of long-term portfolio capital in 1964 dropped back to the 1960 level.

The plain fact is that foreign borrowers are willing and able to pay higher rates than domestic borrowers of similar credit standing with free access to the vast resources of the American credit market, and foreign loans are thus in many instances more profitable to the lending banks. The same is true for the placement of liquid funds by our corporations. But the massive outflow of these types of credit is also related to other deep-seated structural characteristics of American and foreign capital markets.

As you know, with rare exceptions, foreign financial markets, even in countries with the most highly developed economies, lack a large and fluid short-term money market. Long-term bond markets are usually even more constricted. As a result, in most other countries there is simply no effective mechanism by which private borrowers and lenders—and to a very considerable extent governments—can readily raise or dispose of large sums in short periods of time in the open market. Instead, the available funds within each country are channeled almost entirely through a relatively few big institutions dealing with individual customers on a personalized basis. These institutional markets are fairly well insulated from the short-term money market and frequently respond only sluggishly if at all to the actions of the monetary authorities.

The fluidity and size of the market available to most private borrowers abroad is further impaired by the fact that many foreign governments preempt a very large fraction of the savings available for investment, or direct it into officially sanctioned uses, frequently with a sizable subsidy for preferred borrowers added along the way. This is partly a natural result of basic social decisions to provide, through government social insurance programs, the protection for citizens that we in the United States

furnish to a much larger extent through private insurance and private industry. But it is also a reflection, in many instances, of a conscious desire to provide special preferences to one major group of borrowers or another, and to maintain a high degree of government control of national economic development. In either case, the natural result is to leave those businesses and other borrowers that must look to the remainder of the market more or less perpetually starved for funds and with an impelling desire to seek needed capital from abroad.

All of these factors have contributed to a structure of long-term interest rates in Europe that, with only one or two exceptions, has remained throughout the postwar period at levels that, in the light of past history, are unusually high. Official discount rates, and the money market rates more immediately influenced by the official rates, often bear little relationship to the loan charges payable by local borrowers. And, faced with constricted internal markets, and thus denied a full range of fiscal and monetary tools, the authorities themselves often find it essential to pursue essentially domestic credit objectives—and in some instances even to finance internal budgetary needs—through adjustments in external flows of funds. Sometimes this is done by borrowing directly from abroad and sometimes by seeking to influence the external borrowing or placement of funds by their commercial banks.

Fluidity of U.S. Credit Markets

The sheer size of the United States economy and the tremendous volume of funds raised in our credit markets—estimated last year at over \$70 billion—help account for the much greater fluidity of our markets and their ability to adjust to, and absorb, large domestic or foreign demands with relative ease. But it is not a question of size alone. The relative freedom of the market mechanism, and the intensity of competitive pressures among institutions with a wide variety of investment options, permit funds to flow promptly from one sector of our economy to another in response to changing demands. And a long history of confidence in our currency, further fortified by the stability of our prices in recent years, has encouraged indi-

⁹ *Ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 250.

viduals and investment institutions to commit funds freely at long term.

As a result of the pressure of the huge volume of private savings seeking investment in our market, our long-term interest rate structure has remained essentially stable during the past 4 years, even though money market rates have risen by 1½ percent or more to a range of 4 to 4½ percent. As a result, the differential between short- and long-term rates has almost disappeared. Nevertheless, the bond market has continued to absorb a record volume of long-term financing at stable rate levels.

Another indication of the strength of our longer term markets is that, over the past 4 years, they have not merely provided the vast amount of funds necessary to support high levels of homebuilding, a remarkable expansion in business investment, and the rapidly growing needs of our states and localities. They have also provided funds to the Government equal to the entire \$28.8 billion Federal deficit during the first 4 years of this administration. During that period more than that amount was placed in savings bonds and marketable debt maturing in over 5 years. This achievement is reflected in the increase of almost 1 year, or 20 percent, in the average length of the marketable debt to a level last seen in mid-1956.

In this setting we could not expect moderately tighter monetary policies to bring the needed reduction in the outflow of long-term funds abroad. The disparities in the structure of the capital markets of our different countries are simply too great to permit us to rely heavily on that approach toward adjustment. Much more is needed to bring interest rates here and in other industrialized countries into the rough alinement that is surely necessary if we are to put a permanent end to the destabilizing capital flows that have characterized the past 2 years.

It might, of course, be argued that extremely tight money would be able to do the job if continued over a long enough period. Such a policy rests on the highly doubtful assumption that in spite of our huge volume of savings it would be technically feasible—perhaps by drastically reducing the money supply—to raise the general level of our bank and long-term interest rates by the 1½ to 2 percent that would

be needed to achieve interest rate parity with Europe.

But even granting that assumption, such a policy would surely be self-defeating. Before it could achieve the interest-rate objective, the extreme restriction of credit would surely move us toward domestic recession, and at a time when our economy is already failing to use its resources to the full. A recession would, in turn, delay our fundamental aim of creating a more favorable climate for investment in the United States. At the same time, it would rapidly create forces for easy money that would be likely to prove irresistible. Thus the end result would not be an improvement but rather an aggravation of our balance-of-payments problem.

To cite these limitations and difficulties in the use of monetary policy is not, of course, to say that monetary policy does not have a useful and indeed essential role to play in helping the adjustment process in the United States, as in other countries. It has played such a role, is playing such a role now, and will continue to do so in the future. In fact, as I suggested earlier, one of our chief reasons for relying primarily upon fiscal policy to stimulate the domestic economy was to give monetary policy additional freedom in coping with our balance-of-payments problem. And I can assure you that monetary policy remains fully available for further use should the need arise. But I see no realistic prospect that the full burden for achieving a permanent international adjustment in capital flows can reasonably be thrust on American monetary policy alone, either now or in the foreseeable future.

Instead, as I have suggested before to this group, the only really satisfactory long-range solution to our present problem of excessive capital outflows lies in achieving a more attractive environment for investment within the United States through tax reduction and sustained growth, together with the development of far larger, far more efficient, and far more flexible capital markets abroad. While there has been some encouraging progress in both of these directions, much more remains to be done.

There are, of course, longrun measures, and their influence on capital flows must be expected to emerge only slowly. For the time being, the

existing disequilibrium—and the urgency of reducing our deficit—has required that we seek the cooperation of our banks and other financial institutions, as well as of our industrial firms, in voluntarily reducing the flow of capital abroad.⁴ The response of those asked to participate in this voluntary program has been most gratifying. The effects are already clearly visible both in the foreign exchange markets and in our preliminary payments statistics, which point to a sharp and favorable change since mid-February. But two swallows don't make a summer. We need a considerable period of balance to offset the deficits of the past. We know we can count on your cooperation in achieving this vitally needed result.

Basic Problem of Adjusting Capital Flows

But the success of our present program does not, of course, meet the basic problem. The nations of the free world, working together, must develop better means for influencing capital flows within a basic framework of free markets and national objectives—and without placing intolerable burdens either upon monetary policy or upon the resources of the international monetary system.

We must be under no illusion that a different or improved international monetary system could in any way eliminate the need for adjusting these flows. But these two questions are nonetheless related, for one of the basic functions of the international monetary system is to provide sufficient means for financing deficits and surpluses to permit the working out of an orderly process of adjustment.

This linkage between the process of adjustment and the international monetary system seems to me to be at the source of much of the confusion and difficulty evident in recent international efforts to develop a common approach toward the further evolution of the international payments system. All the major countries are fully agreed, I believe, on the need for developing an assured method of generating international liquidity in adequate, but not excessive, amounts as world trade and production

increases over the years ahead. This much clearly emerged from the studies of the Group of Ten and the International Monetary Fund last year.

But in recent months there has been little progress toward more concrete agreement on methods and approaches. The pronounced divergences in view that have become evident can, I believe, be traced in good part to quite different assumptions about the relationship of international monetary reform to the current United States payments deficit.

The overriding need, in one European view, is to develop a mechanism which would force a prompt end to our payments deficits. We fully agree with these European friends on the necessity for achieving early balance in our international accounts. And we intend to achieve this goal by our own actions, which now for the first time cover all aspects of our payments problem.

But in assessing the problems of the international monetary system, our concern and that of a number of other countries has been to look toward the future, when there will no longer be an American payments deficit pumping dollars into the reserves of other countries. So the thrust of our thinking has been to find the best way of developing supplementary means of providing the liquidity that is likely to be needed. We feel that this can only be done gradually and by building on what we now have. And we emphatically disagree with the thesis recently propounded in some quarters which would turn back the clock and embrace an outmoded and highly restrictive system—a system that would surely cripple the growth of international trade and commerce as our deficit was ended.

Under the circumstances, with these broad differences of approach, any final resolution of the variety of issues that have been raised seems to me highly unlikely until the United States has brought its international payments into balance. As that is done it will become less and less easy to ignore the potential need for supplementary sources of reserve assets and international credit facilities. Meanwhile, difficult and time-consuming technical studies are well underway under the auspices of the Group

⁴For text of remarks made by President Johnson before a group of business and banking leaders on Feb. 18, see *ibid.*, Mar. 8, 1965, p. 335.

of Ten, helping to clarify the issues and to evaluate alternative techniques. These studies will, I believe, provide the basis for timely agreements on ways and means for improving the present monetary system well in advance of any urgent need.

In looking back on the past 4 years and on the postwar period as a whole, there can be no question that the present system—anchored on gold and the dollar, and effectively supplemented by the International Monetary Fund—has served the world well. The extremes of inflation and deflation characteristic of other postwar periods have been avoided. Barriers to trade have been lowered or removed. And in this environment the vast productive capabilities of the free world have been released to the benefit of us all.

The challenge for the future is to build further on this system, recognizing its potential weaknesses and shortcomings, but preserving the elements of strength and flexibility that have contributed so much to our progress.

In this area, as in the area of adjusting capital flows, I have no fixed blueprint to offer to those who will share the responsibility for developing solutions. I remain confident, however, that solutions can and will be found, provided only that the United States discharges its own immediate responsibility to maintain the full strength of the dollar as the world's primary reserve currency by achieving an early balance in its international accounts. And with the help of you gentlemen that is exactly what we are going to do.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U.N. Peacekeeping Committee Meets; U.S. Refutes Charges on Viet-Nam

*Statement by Francis T. P. Plimpton*¹

The United States welcomes the beginning of the activities of this committee, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, authorized by paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 2006 (XIX). We hope, Mr. President [Alex Quaison-Sackey, of Ghana], that under your able leadership and guidance at these meetings, as well as in the consultations provided for under paragraph 1 of that resolution, a way will be found out of the present difficulties which face the United Nations. You may be sure, Mr. President, that the U.S. delegation will bend every effort for the achievement of solutions of these difficulties.

¹ Made in the U.N. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations on Mar. 26 (U.S./U.N. press release 4516). Mr. Plimpton is Alternate U.S. Representative in the committee.

My delegation had hoped that at its first meeting this committee might be permitted to concentrate solely on the business for which we have been convened, namely: to consider how this committee can most effectively undertake the vitally important task entrusted to it by the General Assembly in resolution 2006. I therefore regret that certain representatives have seen fit to inject a discordant, irrelevant, and cold-war propagandist note into this first meeting.

I have no intention of replying in detail, or still less in kind, to the statements that I refer to; most of them do not warrant the committee's serious attention. Nevertheless, out of respect for the truth and for the sake of the record, I feel obliged to take a few moments of the committee's time to reiterate the basic essential facts—facts which have been repeatedly set forth in official statements and publications by my Government during the past few weeks.

Let me briefly review those facts:

First, the fact is that the totalitarian communist regime in Hanoi is conducting a war of

aggression against its neighbor, the Republic of Viet-Nam—that the subjugation by force of the Republic of Viet-Nam is the formal, official, announced policy of the Hanoi regime.

Second, the fact is that this continuing aggression is conducted to a major degree through active assistance and leadership supplied by the North Vietnamese authorities to the Viet Cong. The key leadership of the Viet Cong—its officers, specialists, technicians, intelligence agents, political organizers, and propagandists—have been trained, equipped, and supplied in North Viet-Nam and then sent into the Republic of Viet-Nam under Hanoi's military orders. Most of the weapons and most of the ammunition and other supplies used by the Viet Cong in their effort to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam have been sent from North to South Viet-Nam.

It hardly needs to be pointed out that this continuing pattern of activity by the regime in Hanoi is in violation of the general principles of international law, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, and in violation of the Geneva accords of 1954.

North Vietnamese Aggression

Mr. President, these are the facts, and they are facts that make it unmistakably clear that the character of the conflict in South Viet-Nam, stripped to its bare essentials, is an aggressive war of conquest waged by North Viet-Nam against its neighbor. If it is a type of aggression relatively new to the international community—long-term aggression through infiltration, rather than short-lived aggression through an all-out invasion—it still remains aggression.

I would remind the committee that the defensive measures which the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam and my Government have been taking in recent weeks are designed solely to counter this aggression—to emphasize our joint determination not only to resist the aggression but also to hold Hanoi's aggressive regime fully accountable for that aggression. Although it has been repeatedly stated by my Government, I will say it again now: Our mission is peace; we threaten no regime and covet

no territory; we seek no wider conflict—only the termination of aggression—and peace. Whether or not we can be successful in this course depends upon the actions and attitude of the aggressors who are trying to destroy the freedom, independence, and right of self-determination of the Republic of South Viet-Nam.

The key question, in short, has been and still remains the intentions of Hanoi. Nothing stands in the way of a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam except the determination of Hanoi to continue its efforts to destroy its neighbor by exporting violence and terror. We continue to wait for the first indication from some source that Hanoi is willing to give up this aggressive determination and to return to the ways of peace and a peaceful resolution of this international conflict.

The attempt has been made this afternoon to foster the totally false impression that the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States are embarking upon gas warfare in Viet-Nam. I know of no more effective response to falsehoods, however monstrous, than to state the truth.

And the truth, simple and clear, was pointed out in Secretary of State Rusk's statement to the press on March 24: ²

—No one is embarking upon gas warfare in Viet-Nam.

—There has been no decision to engage in gas warfare in Viet-Nam.

—The gas referred to is entirely nonlethal and no different from the antiriot substances used by many police forces of the world.

I would like to express the same hope that Secretary Rusk expressed only 2 days ago, namely, that

Those who are concerned about tear gas . . . [should] be concerned about the fact that during 1964 over 400 civilian officials were killed and over a thousand were kidnaped in South Viet-Nam—village chiefs, schoolteachers, public-health officers. Among other civilians, 1,300 were killed, over 8,000 were kidnaped, and entire villages have been burned to the ground, and families of those who were in the armed forces were kidnaped and held as hostages.

²For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 12, 1965, p. 528.

That, Mr. Chairman, is something to be really concerned about.

What proof or statistics, other than those proofs or statistics of death and murder, are needed to demonstrate the urgency of restoring peace to Viet-Nam? And peace can be restored quickly if only the Hanoi regime will make the simple decision to stop its aggression and leave the people and Government of South Viet-Nam free to settle their own future.

I would like to quote, Mr. Chairman, from President Johnson's statement of March 25:³

The central cause of the danger there is aggression by Communists against a brave and independent people. There are other difficulties in Viet-Nam, of course, but if that aggression is stopped, the people and Government of South Viet-Nam will be free to settle their own future, and the need for supporting American military action there will end. . . .

The United States still seeks no wider war. We threaten no regime and covet no territory. We have worked and will continue to work for a reduction of tensions on the great stage of the world. But the aggression from the North must be stopped. That is the road to peace in Southeast Asia. . . .

. . . "It is and it will remain the policy of the United States to furnish assistance to support South Viet-Nam for as long as is required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism under control." The military actions of the United States will be such, and only such, as serve that purpose—at the lowest possible cost in human life to our allies, to our own men, and to our adversaries too.

The representative of the Soviet Union repeated this afternoon once again the arguments with which his Government has tried to justify its refusal to pay assessments levied by the General Assembly. In particular, my delegation regrets what we understood to be his reiteration of the Soviet position that *only* the Security Council can take any action for the maintenance of peace and that the General Assembly has no right whatsoever as to the keeping of the peace or its financing.

This means, as I understood the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, that his Government still insists that there must be a perpetual veto by any permanent member of the Security Council on the authorization of any

peacekeeping operations, a veto on the conduct of any peacekeeping operations, and a veto on the financing of any peacekeeping operations. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that I misunderstood the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union. Whether I did or not, the members of this committee and of the General Assembly will have to decide whether that is the position they really want to have prevail in this organization.

Two Problems Before the Committee

To come back to our committee, Mr. Chairman, in broad terms we are faced with two major problems: first, assuring the solvency of the United Nations, and second, arriving at a workable understanding as to the respective roles of the Security Council and the General Assembly in the maintenance of peace.

My delegation is prepared to consider seriously and with an open mind all proposals designed to find solutions for these two problems. We agree with your own thought, Mr. Chairman, that during the weeks ahead perhaps the primary emphasis should be on informal negotiations in order to lay the groundwork for the substantive meetings of this committee. We are prepared to begin those negotiations tomorrow or Monday morning and to continue them as intensively as others concerned are prepared to do. While we recognize the dangers of undue haste, we nevertheless feel that the best use should be made of every day available to us.

Some delegations, Mr. Chairman, have emphasized the importance of negotiations among the so-called greater powers. We consider such negotiations important, but we believe that it is equally important that other members of this committee and indeed other members of the General Assembly of the United Nations should be involved in the informal consultations which lie ahead.

Mr. Chairman, we have no illusions about the difficulty and complexity of the problems we all face. But face them we must—and solve them we must—if the United Nations is to fulfill its essential role, as envisaged in the charter, for the maintenance of the peace the world so ardently desires.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 527.

U.S. Expresses Views on Convening of U.N. Disarmament Committee

*Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson
U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

The United States believes that disarmament is of such primary importance that it should have continuous attention. And that is why we have been pressing vigorously to reconvene the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, which in our judgment is the best forum in which to reach agreement on concrete disarmament proposals.

While we would prefer a negotiating committee to a debating committee, we have no objection to convening the whole membership of the United Nations and affording everyone an opportunity to express his views. So if a majority approves such a meeting, the United States would participate constructively and hope that from the ensuing discussion will come useful and constructive ideas which might then be considered in detail by the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.S. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Letter dated January 28 from the Representative of Malaysia regarding the continuing Indonesian military buildup on the Borneo border. S/6167. January 29, 1965. 4 pp.

Letter dated January 30 from the Representative of the Dominican Republic denying charges made by "the communist Government of Cuba in its note dated 27 January" (S/6161). S/6169. February 1, 1965. 2 pp.

Letter dated February 3 from the Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo regarding aggression committed from the territory of the Brazzaville Government. S/6172. February 4, 1965. 1 p.

¹ Made to news correspondents on Mar. 31 (U.S./U.N. press release 4517) following an announcement by the Soviet Representative, Nikolai Fedorenko, that he had asked the U.N. Secretary-General to seek a reconvening of the U.N. Disarmament Committee.

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. and Japan Broaden Functions of Ryukyus Consultative Committee

Following is an exchange of notes between U.S. Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer and Japanese Foreign Minister Etsusaburo Shiina at Tokyo on April 2.

U.S. NOTE

I have the honor to refer to the discussions concerning the Ryukyu Islands between Prime Minister Sato and President Johnson in Washington on January 12, 1965,¹ and to confirm on behalf of my Government the understanding that the functions of the existing Japan-United States Consultative Committee, as set forth in paragraph 2 of the exchange of notes of April 25, 1964,² are broadened so that the Committee is enabled to conduct consultations not only on economic assistance to the Ryukyu Islands but also on other matters on which Japan and the United States can cooperate in continuing to promote the well-being of the inhabitants of the islands.

I would appreciate it if you would confirm on behalf of the Government of Japan that the foregoing is also the understanding of your Government, and that the present note and your note in reply concurring in the understanding constitute an agreement between our two Governments.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

EDWIN O. REISCHAUER

Ambassador of the United States of America

¹ For text of a communique released on Jan. 13, see BULLETIN of Feb. 1, 1965, p. 134.

² Not printed here; for background, see *ibid.*, May 11, 1964, p. 755.

JAPANESE NOTE

APRIL 2, 1965

I have the honour to refer to your Excellency's note of today's date, which reads in the Japanese translation thereof as follows:

[Text of U.S. note.]

I have the honour to confirm on behalf of the Government of Japan that the foregoing is also the understanding of my Government and that your Excellency's note and the present note in reply constitute an agreement between our two Governments.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your Excellency, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, the assurance of my highest consideration.

ETSUSABURO SHIINA
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Cultural Relations

Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Concluded at London November 16, 1945. Entered into force for the United States November 4, 1946. TIAS 1580.
Acceptance deposited: Malta, January 20, 1965.
Signature: Malta, February 10, 1965.

Marriage

Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for marriage, and registration of marriages. Done at United Nations Headquarters, New York, December 10, 1962. Entered into force December 9, 1964.¹
Ratification deposited: Czechoslovakia, March 5, 1965.

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.
Ratification deposited: Venezuela, March 29, 1965.

Safety at Sea

Convention on safety of life at sea. Done at London June 10, 1918. Entered into force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495.
Notification of denunciation received: Netherlands (including Netherlands Antilles), December 3, 1964; effective May 26, 1966.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.
Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, March 2, 1965.

Wheat

Protocol for the extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington March 22 through April 23, 1965.²
Signatures: Iceland, March 31, 1965; Switzerland, United Arab Republic, April 2, 1965.

BILATERAL

Bolivia

Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio operators of either country to operate their stations in the other country. Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz March 16, 1965. Entered into force April 15, 1965.

Canada

Agreement concerning the establishment of an international arbitral tribunal to dispose of United States claims relating to Gut Dam. Signed at Ottawa March 25, 1965. Enters into force on the day of exchange of the instruments of ratification.

India

Agreement amending the agreement of July 9, 1951 (TIAS 2291), for duty-free entry and defrayment of inland transportation on charges of relief supplies and packages. Effected by exchange of notes at New Delhi January 21, 1965. Entered into force January 21, 1965.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: March 29–April 4

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to March 29 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 51 of March 19; 53 of March 22; and 56 of March 23.

No.	Date	Subject
*63	3/29	Porter sworn in as Ambassador to Lebanon (biographic details).
†64	3/31	U.S. observer delegation to CENTO meeting (rewrite).
†65	3/31	Mann: "International Trade."
†66	3/31	Cleveland: "Peace Comes in Parcels."
67	4/2	Rusk: transcript of BBC interview.
†68	4/2	U.S. protests Soviet harassment of U.S. Navy vessels.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

American Republics. United States Policy Toward Europe (Rostow) 576

Canada. The United States and Canada: Common Aims and Common Responsibilities (Ball) 572

Communism. United States Policy Toward Europe (Rostow) 576

Congress. U.S. Embassy at Saigon Damaged; Funds for New Building Requested (Johnson) 571

Department and Foreign Service. U.S. Embassy at Saigon Damaged; Funds for New Building Requested (Johnson) 571

Disarmament. U.S. Expresses Views on Convening of U.N. Disarmament Committee (Stevenson) 601

Economic Affairs

An Assessment of the International Monetary System (Dillon) 593

The United States and Canada: Common Aims and Common Responsibilities (Ball) 572

Educational and Cultural Affairs. International Visitors and the American Society (Rusk) 588

Europe

An Atlantic Partnership and European Unity (McGhee) 582

United States Policy Toward Europe (Rostow) 576

Foreign Aid. U.S. and Japan Broaden Functions of Ryukyus Consultative Committee (Reischauer, Shiina) 601

Germany

An Atlantic Partnership and European Unity (McGhee) 582

United States Policy Toward Europe (Rostow) 576

Japan. U.S. and Japan Broaden Functions of Ryukyus Consultative Committee (Reischauer, Shiina) 601

Presidential Documents. U.S. Embassy at Saigon Damaged; Funds for New Building Requested 571

Ryukyu Islands. U.S. and Japan Broaden Functions of Ryukyus Consultative Committee (Reischauer, Shiina) 601

Treaty Information

Current Actions 602

U.S. and Japan Broaden Functions of Ryukyus Consultative Committee (Reischauer, Shiina) 601

United Kingdom. Secretary Rusk Discusses Viet-Nam Situation on BBC (transcript of interview) 569

United Nations

The Building Blocks of World Order (Cleveland) 566

Current U.N. Documents 601

International Cooperation: A Realistic Appraisal (McGeorge Bundy) 562

U.S. Expresses Views on Convening of U.N. Disarmament Committee (Stevenson) 601

U.N. Peacekeeping Committee Meets; U.S. Refutes Charges on Viet-Nam (Plimpton) 598

Viet-Nam

Secretary Rusk Discusses Viet-Nam Situation on BBC (transcript of interview) 569

U.N. Peacekeeping Committee Meets; U.S. Refutes Charges on Viet-Nam (Plimpton) 598

U.S. Embassy at Saigon Damaged; Funds for New Building Requested (Johnson) 571

Name Index

Ball, George W 572

Bundy, McGeorge 562

Cleveland, Harlan 566

Dillon, Douglas 593

Johnson, President 571

McGhee, George C 582

Mossman, James 569

Plimpton, Francis T. P 598

Reischauer, Edwin O 601

Rostow, W. W 576

Rusk, Secretary 569, 588

Shiina, Etsusaburo 601

Stevenson, Adlai E 601

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Vol. LII, No. 1548



April 26, 1967

PATTERN FOR PEACE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Address by President Johnson 606

PEACE COMES IN PARCELS

by Assistant Secretary Cleveland 611

THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

by Ambassador W. Averell Harriman 621

THE KENNEDY ROUND

by W. Mitchell Bismarck 628

Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia

Address by President Johnson¹

Last week 17 nations sent their views to some two dozen countries having an interest in Southeast Asia.² We are joining those 17 countries and stating our American policy tonight, which we believe will contribute toward peace in this area of the world.

I have come here to review once again with my own people the views of the American Government.

Tonight Americans and Asians are dying for a world where each people may choose its own path to change. This is the principle for which our ancestors fought in the valleys of Pennsylvania. It is a principle for which our sons fight tonight in the jungles of Viet-Nam.

Viet-Nam is far away from this quiet campus. We have no territory there, nor do we seek any. The war is dirty and brutal and diffi-

cult. And some 400 young men, born into an America that is bursting with opportunity and promise, have ended their lives on Viet-Nam's steaming soil.

Why must we take this painful road? Why must this nation hazard its ease, its interest, and its power for the sake of a people so far away?

We fight because we must fight if we are to live in a world where every country can shape its own destiny, and only in such a world will our own freedom be finally secure.

This kind of world will never be built by bombs or bullets. Yet the infirmities of man are such that force must often precede reason and the waste of war, the works of peace. We wish that this were not so. But we must deal with the world as it is, if it is ever to be as we wish.

The world as it is in Asia is not a serene or peaceful place.

The first reality is that North Viet-Nam has

¹ Made at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., on Apr. 7 (White House press release, as-delivered text).

² See p. 610.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LII, NO. 1348 PUBLICATION 7875 APRIL 26, 1965

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

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Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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attacked the independent nation of South Viet-Nam. Its object is total conquest. Of course, some of the people of South Viet-Nam are participating in attack on their own government. But trained men and supplies, orders and arms, flow in a constant stream from North to South.

This support is the heartbeat of the war.

And it is a war of unparalleled brutality. Simple farmers are the targets of assassination and kidnaping. Women and children are strangled in the night because their men are loyal to their government. And helpless villages are ravaged by sneak attacks. Large-scale raids are conducted on towns, and terror strikes in the heart of cities.

The confused nature of this conflict cannot mask the fact that it is the new face of an old enemy.

Over this war—and all Asia—is another reality: the deepening shadow of Communist China. The rulers in Hanoi are urged on by Peiping. This is a regime which has destroyed freedom in Tibet, which has attacked India, and has been condemned by the United Nations for aggression in Korea. It is a nation which is helping the forces of violence in almost every continent. The contest in Viet-Nam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes.

Why Are We in South Viet-Nam?

Why are these realities our concern? Why are we in South Viet-Nam?

We are there because we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every American President has offered support to the people of South Viet-Nam. We have helped to build, and we have helped to defend. Thus, over many years, we have made a national pledge to help South Viet-Nam defend its independence.

And I intend to keep that promise.

To dishonor that pledge, to abandon this small and brave nation to its enemies, and to the terror that must follow, would be an unforgivable wrong.

We are also there to strengthen world order. Around the globe, from Berlin to Thailand, are people whose well-being rests in part on the belief that they can count on us if they are attacked. To leave Viet-Nam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these people in the

value of an American commitment and in the value of America's word. The result would be increased unrest and instability, and even wider war.

We are also there because there are great stakes in the balance. Let no one think for a moment that retreat from Viet-Nam would bring an end to conflict. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next. We must say in Southeast Asia—as we did in Europe—in the words of the Bible: "Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further."

There are those who say that all our effort there will be futile—that China's power is such that it is bound to dominate all Southeast Asia. But there is no end to that argument until all of the nations of Asia are swallowed up.

There are those who wonder why we have a responsibility there. Well, we have it there for the same reason that we have a responsibility for the defense of Europe. World War II was fought in both Europe and Asia, and when it ended we found ourselves with continued responsibility for the defense of freedom.

Our objective is the independence of South Viet-Nam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves—only that the people of South Viet-Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way. We will do everything necessary to reach that objective, and we will do only what is absolutely necessary.

In recent months attacks on South Viet-Nam were stepped up. Thus it became necessary for us to increase our response and to make attacks by air. This is not a change of purpose. It is a change in what we believe that purpose requires.

We do this in order to slow down aggression.

We do this to increase the confidence of the brave people of South Viet-Nam who have bravely borne this brutal battle for so many years with so many casualties.

And we do this to convince the leaders of North Viet-Nam—and all who seek to share their conquest—of a simple fact:

We will not be defeated.

We will not grow tired.

We will not withdraw, either openly or under

the cloak of a meaningless agreement.

We know that air attacks alone will not accomplish all of these purposes. But it is our best and prayerful judgment that they are a necessary part of the surest road to peace.

The Path of Peaceful Settlement

We hope that peace will come swiftly. But that is in the hands of others besides ourselves. And we must be prepared for a long continued conflict. It will require patience as well as bravery—the will to endure as well as the will to resist.

I wish it were possible to convince others with words of what we now find it necessary to say with guns and planes: armed hostility is futile—our resources are equal to any challenge—because we fight for values and we fight for principle, rather than territory or colonies, our patience and our determination are unending.

Once this is clear, then it should also be clear that the only path for reasonable men is the path of peaceful settlement. Such peace demands an independent South Viet-Nam—securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others—free from outside interference—tied to no alliance—a military base for no other country.

These are the essentials of any final settlement.

We will never be second in the search for such a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam.

There may be many ways to this kind of peace: in discussion or negotiation with the governments concerned; in large groups or in small ones; in the reaffirmation of old agreements or their strengthening with new ones.

We have stated this position over and over again 50 times and more to friend and foe alike. And we remain ready with this purpose for unconditional discussions.

And until that bright and necessary day of peace we will try to keep conflict from spreading. We have no desire to see thousands die in battle—Asians or Americans. We have no desire to devastate that which the people of North Viet-Nam have built with toil and sacrifice. We will use our power with restraint and with all the wisdom that we can command.

But we will use it.

A Cooperative Effort for Development

This war, like most wars, is filled with terrible irony. For what do the people of North Viet-Nam want? They want what their neighbors also desire—food for their hunger, health for their bodies, a chance to learn, progress for their country, and an end to the bondage of material misery. And they would find all these things far more readily in peaceful association with others than in the endless course of battle.

These countries of Southeast Asia are homes for millions of impoverished people. Each day these people rise at dawn and struggle through until the night to wrest existence from the soil. They are often wracked by diseases, plagued by hunger, and death comes at the early age of 40.

Stability and peace do not come easily in such a land. Neither independence nor human dignity will ever be won, though, by arms alone. It also requires the works of peace. The American people have helped generously in times past in these works, and now there must be a much more massive effort to improve the life of man in that conflict-torn corner of our world.

The first step is for the countries of Southeast Asia to associate themselves in a greatly expanded cooperative effort for development. We would hope that North Viet-Nam would take its place in the common effort just as soon as peaceful cooperation is possible.

The United Nations is already actively engaged in development in this area, and as far back as 1961 I conferred with our authorities in Viet-Nam in connection with their work there. And I would hope tonight that the Secretary-General of the United Nations could use the prestige of his great office and his deep knowledge of Asia to initiate, as soon as possible, with the countries of that area, a plan for cooperation in increased development.

For our part I will ask the Congress to join in a billion-dollar American investment in this effort as soon as it is underway. And I would hope that all other industrialized countries, including the Soviet Union, will join in this effort to replace despair with hope and terror with progress.

The task is nothing less than to enrich the hopes and existence of more than a hundred

million people. And there is much to be done.

The vast Mekong River can provide food and water and power on a scale to dwarf even our own TVA. The wonders of modern medicine can be spread through villages where thousands die every year from lack of care. Schools can be established to train people in the skills needed to manage the process of development. And these objectives, and more, are within the reach of a cooperative and determined effort.

I also intend to expand and speed up a program to make available our farm surpluses to assist in feeding and clothing the needy in Asia. We should not allow people to go hungry and wear rags while our own warehouses overflow with an abundance of wheat and corn and rice and cotton.

So I will very shortly name a special team of outstanding, patriotic, and distinguished Americans to inaugurate our participation in these programs. This team will be headed by Mr. Eugene Black, the very able former President of the World Bank.

The Dream of Our Generation

This will be a disorderly planet for a long time. In Asia, and elsewhere, the forces of the modern world are shaking old ways and uprooting ancient civilizations. There will be turbulence and struggle and even violence. Great social change—as we see in our own country—does not always come without conflict.

We must also expect that nations will on occasion be in dispute with us. It may be because we are rich, or powerful, or because we have made some mistakes, or because they honestly fear our intentions. However, no nation need ever fear that we desire their land, or to impose our will, or to dictate their institutions.

But we will always oppose the effort of one nation to conquer another nation.

We will do this because our own security is at stake.

But there is more to it than that. For our generation has a dream. It is a very old dream. But we have the power, and now we have the opportunity to make that dream come true.

For centuries nations have struggled among each other. But we dream of a world where

disputes are settled by law and reason. And we will try to make it so.

For most of history men have hated and killed one another in battle. But we dream of an end to war. And we will try to make it so.

For all existence most men have lived in poverty, threatened by hunger. But we dream of a world where all are fed and charged with hope. And we will help to make it so.

The ordinary men and women of North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam, of China and India, of Russia and America, are brave people. They are filled with the same proportions of hate and fear, of love and hope. Most of them want the same things for themselves and their families. Most of them do not want their sons to ever die in battle, or to see their homes, or the homes of others, destroyed.

Well, this can be their world yet. Man now has the knowledge—always before denied—to make this planet serve the real needs of the people who live on it.

I know this will not be easy. I know how difficult it is for reason to guide passion, and love to master hate. The complexities of this world do not bow easily to pure and consistent answers.

But the simple truths are there just the same. We must all try to follow them as best we can.

Power, Witness to Human Folly

We often say how impressive power is. But I do not find it impressive at all. The guns and the bombs, the rockets and the warships, are all symbols of human failure. They are necessary symbols. They protect what we cherish. But they are witness to human folly.

A dam built across a great river is impressive.

In the countryside where I was born, and where I live, I have seen the night illuminated, and the kitchen warmed, and the home heated, where once the cheerless night and the ceaseless cold held sway. And all this happened because electricity came to our area along the humming wires of the REA. Electrification of the countryside—yes, that, too, is impressive.

A rich harvest in a hungry land is impressive.

The sight of healthy children in a classroom is impressive.

These—not mighty arms—are the achievements which the American nation believes to be impressive. And if we are steadfast, the time may come when all other nations will also find it so.

Every night before I turn out the lights to sleep I ask myself this question: Have I done everything that I can do to unite this country? Have I done everything I can to help unite the world, to try to bring peace and hope to all the peoples of the world? Have I done enough?

Ask yourselves that question in your homes—and in this hall tonight. Have we, each of us, all done all we can do? Have we done enough?

We may well be living in the time foretold many years ago when it was said: "I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live."

This generation of the world must choose: destroy or build, kill or aid, hate or understand. We can do all these things on a scale that has never been dreamed of before.

Well, we will choose life. And so doing, we will prevail over the enemies within man, and over the natural enemies of all mankind.

U.S. Replies to 17-Nation Appeal on Viet-Nam

On April 8 Acting Secretary George W. Ball handed to an ambassadorial delegation the U.S. reply to an appeal on Viet-Nam adopted on March 15 at Belgrade, Yugoslavia, by a conference of representatives of 17 nonaligned nations and delivered to Secretary Rusk for President Johnson on April 1. Following are the texts of the U.S. reply and the 17-nation appeal.

U.S. REPLY¹

We welcome the concern and interest of the governments participating in the Declaration of March 15; just as we welcome any initiative aimed at bringing peace to any part of the world. The Declaration is a constructive contribution to the effort for peace.

We fully agree with the general principles expressed in that Declaration. The fulfillment of those principles, which are an essential part of American policy everywhere, is the purpose of our presence in Vietnam.

The Declaration reaffirms the right of all people to self-determination. And so do we. We seek self-determination for the people of South Vietnam.

The Declaration reaffirms the belief that recourse to force is contrary to the rights of the people of Vietnam to peace, freedom and independence. And so do we. We seek to bring peace and help restore those rights.

The signatory nations point out that they are "deeply concerned" at the aggravation of the situation in Vietnam. And so are we. We should end the war by ensuring the independence of South Vietnam.

THE CAUSE OF CONFLICT

The basic cause of the conflict in Vietnam is the attack by North Vietnam on the independent nation of South Vietnam. The object of that attack is total conquest.

The regime in North Vietnam has sent trained military personnel and weapons of war on an increasing scale into South Vietnam. It has directed and supported a mounting campaign of terror, assassination, and military action against the Government and people of the Republic of South Vietnam.

The Government of South Vietnam has requested the help of the United States in its defense against attack. In fulfillment of our longstanding commitments we have given such help. We will continue as long as we are needed, and until the aggression is halted. In these actions we seek only the security and peace of South Vietnam, and we threaten no regime.

The war against South Vietnam is a war of great brutality. Simple farmers are the target of assassination and kidnapping. Women and children are strangled in the night because their

¹ Handed by Mr. Ball to a delegation composed of Ambassador Berhanou Dinke of Ethiopia, Ambassador Abdul Majid of Afghanistan, Ambassador Veljko Micunovic of Yugoslavia, and Yaw B. Turkson, Counselor, Embassy of Ghana, on Apr. 8 (White House press release dated Apr. 8).

men are loyal to the government. Small and helpless villages are ravaged by sneak attacks. Large scale raids are conducted on towns; and terror strikes in the heart of cities.

We hope that the anger of people in every country will extend to those who commit these daily acts of violence in the South. We hope that the sympathy and compassion of every land will be held out to these victims of unprovoked attack. These are men and women, and even children, who die because they are attacked—not because they are attackers.

THE WAY TO PEACE

Peace in Southeast Asia demands an independent South Vietnam—securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others—free from outside interference—tied to no alliance—a military base for no other country.

These are the essentials of a final settlement.

We will never be second in the search for such a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

There may be many ways to this kind of peace: in discussion or negotiation with the governments concerned, in large groups or in small ones, in the reaffirmation of old agreements or their strengthening with new ones.

We have stated this position over and over again, to friend and foe alike. And we remain ready—with this purpose—for unconditional discussions.

We believe that peace can be achieved in Southeast Asia the moment that aggression from North Vietnam is eliminated. That aggression has many elements. It has meant the training and infiltration of agents and armed forces—the procurement and supply of munitions—the bombing of compounds by night and Embassies by day—murdering secretaries and soldiers alike—in short, a whole campaign of terror and military action that is externally supported and directed. When these things stop and the obstacles to security and stability are removed, the need for American supporting military action will also come to an end.

And when conditions have been created in which the people of South Vietnam can determine their own future free from external interference, the United States will be ready and eager to withdraw its forces from South Viet-

nam. At the same time, it should become possible to work out the future relationships between North and South Vietnam on the basis of mutual respect and a determination to resolve their problems by peaceful means.

Because the aggressor has made great efforts to hide his actions, it will also be important to have new ways and means of assurance that aggression has in fact been stopped. The problems of such control and assurance are not easy. But these difficulties are not at the center of the problem. The center of the problem is in the realities of behavior. Those realities are known and felt in South Vietnam. They are known and understood by those who are responsible for them. It is by their ending in fact that the actions of the United States Government will be governed.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

We also hope that the nations of the world can join in helping the countries of Southeast Asia in their own efforts to improve the life of their people.

We have offered our help for a large-scale program of economic development embracing all of Southeast Asia. We hope that other industrialized nations will join.

We are glad of this Declaration. We believe that the nations which signed it are motivated by a deep and sincere purpose of peace. That is our purpose too. We hope it is shared by all others who are affected by this Declaration.

17-NATION APPEAL ²

THE APPEAL OF THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF SEVENTEEN NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES CONCERNING CRISIS IN VIETNAM

Pursuant to the final Declaration of the Conference of Heads of States or Governments of Non-aligned Countries held in Cairo in October 1964.

² Handed to Secretary Rusk for President Johnson on Apr. 1 by a delegation composed of Ambassadors Dinke, Majid, and Micunovic and Ambassador Miguel A. Ribeiro of Ghana. The appeal was also delivered on Apr. 1 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Governments of Canada, Communist China, France, Poland, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, the Republic of Viet-Nam, and North Viet-Nam, as well as to the "National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam."

we, the undersigned Heads of state or government, have noted with great concern the aggravation of existing tensions and conflicts in South-East Asia and in certain regions of Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, arising from oppression and foreign intervention, and regret the present deadlock in the United Nations which prevents it from exercising fully its responsibility in maintaining and safeguarding peace;

we solemnly reaffirm the right of peoples to self-determination and the principle that all states shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force;

we reaffirm our dedication to the principle of the inviolability of, and respect for, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states;

we express our conviction that recourse to force and pressure in various forms is contrary to the rights of the people of Vietnam to peace, freedom, and independence and can only lead to the aggravation of the conflict in that area and to its transformation into a more generalized war with catastrophic consequences;

we are deeply concerned at the aggravation of the situation in Vietnam and are convinced that it is the consequence of foreign intervention in various forms, including military intervention, which impedes the implementation of the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam;

we are firmly convinced that, irrespective of possible differences in appraising various elements in the existing situation in Vietnam, the only way leading to the termination of the conflict consists in seeking a peaceful solution through negotiations. We therefore make an urgent appeal to the parties concerned to start such negotiations, as soon as possible, without posing any preconditions, so that a political solution to the problem of Vietnam may be found in accordance with the legitimate aspirations of the Vietnamese people and in the spirit of the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam and of the Declaration of the Conference of Non-aligned Countries held in Cairo.

We invite the governments of all countries interested in maintenance of world peace to associate themselves, as soon as possible, with this appeal.

MARCH 15, 1965

MOHAMMAD YOUSUF, *Prime Minister of the Royal Government of Afghanistan*

AHMED BEN BELLA, *President of the Democratic People's Republic of Algeria*

ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS, *President of the Republic of Cyprus*

DUDLEY SENANAYAKE, *Prime Minister of Ceylon*

HAILE SELASSIE I, *Emperor of Ethiopia*

DR. KWAME NKRUMAH, *President of the Republic of Ghana*

SEKOU TOURE, *President of the Republic of Guinea*

LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI, *Prime Minister of India*

MARSHAL ABDUL SALAM MOHAMED AREF, *President of the Republic of Iraq*

JOMO KENYATTA, *President of the Republic of Kenya*

MAHENDRA BIR BIKRAM, SHAH DEVA, *King of Nepal*

GENERAL MOHAMAD AMIN EL-HAFEZ, *President of the Syrian Arab Republic*

HABIB BOURGUIBA, *President of Tunisia*

GAMAL ABDEL NASSER, *President of the United Arab Republic*

JOSIP BROZ TITO, *President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*

KENNETH KAUNDA, *President of Zambia*

MILTON OBOTE, *Prime Minister of Uganda*

U.S.—Japan Economic Committee To Meet at Washington in July

The Department of State announced on April 6 (press release 70 dated April 5) that the fourth meeting of the Joint U.S.—Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs will be held at Washington July 12–14, 1965.

This Cabinet-level Committee was established by the two Governments in 1961.¹ The first meeting was held at Hakone, Japan, in November 1961,² the second at Washington in December 1962,³ and the third at Tokyo in January 1964.⁴

¹ BULLETIN of July 10, 1961, p. 57.

² *Ibid.*, Nov. 27, 1961, p. 890.

³ *Ibid.*, Dec. 24, 1962, p. 959.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Feb. 17, 1964, p. 235.

Peace Comes in Parcels

by Harlan Cleveland

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs¹

For nearly two decades now, Americans have had a kind of love affair with the United Nations. The pollsters regularly turn up nearly 90 percent of the American people who will sign on to practically any pro-U.N. question put to them. Every U.S. President since 1945 and overwhelming majorities on both sides of the aisle of the Congress have backed propositions to strengthen the United Nations.

We have grown accustomed to its face. But now, with the sudden surprise of the unceremonious admirer, we are discovering that the face of the United Nations shows the marks of its birth and the strain of its 20 turbulent years.

We too much resemble the newlywed husband who took his bride and said, "Now that we're married, dear, I hope you won't mind it if I point out a few little defects that I've noticed about you." "Not at all," the bride replied with deceptive sweetness. "It was those little defects that kept me from getting a better husband."

So it should really come as no surprise that, on the eve of its 20th birthday, the U.N. should reveal blemishes serious enough to put it in the constitutional clinic for a few months. The U.N. is, after all, a mirror of the outside world—blemishes and all. And there's a very nasty war going on in Viet-Nam and quite a lot of assorted conflicts elsewhere on this troubled planet of ours.

¹Address made before the National Council of Jewish Women at New York City on Mar. 31 (press release 66).

So let me take up this evening two questions which, in one form or another, people have been firing at us in the Department of State recently.

First, if the United Nations cannot put an end to the war in Viet-Nam, how can we ever depend upon it to preserve the peace of the world?

Second, with all the trouble it is having now, why should the U.N. pick this year to celebrate the achievements of international cooperation—by naming 1965 International Cooperation Year? Isn't there something ironic, maybe even ludicrous, about that?

A Hard Look at World Peace

We can approach both questions by taking a hard look at that state of affairs we call by the name of world peace.

Down through history all but a handful of men and women have prayed and dreamed and longed for peace. But longing for peace got our ancestors nowhere and will do no better for us. How then are we going to achieve a system of order in which sovereign nations can exist and ideas can clash and talented men can compete without killing each other in the process? How *do* we work realistically to secure the peace of the world?

Highly intelligent and rational men and women have been attracted—and still are attracted—to the search for a single answer to the challenge posed by that one word "war." Universal disarmament is the only answer, some people say. The world rule of law, others say.

Nothing will do short of world government, it is said by others.

Or perhaps these answers are drawn together into a single sweeping proposal for a world constitution to establish a system of universal law under a world government with legislative authority and with a world police force to take the place of all national armed forces.

In an abstract sense the case for a central world authority with the wherewithal to guarantee world peace seems entirely logical.

We *do* live in a world in which the imperatives of modern technology increasingly require us to merge national interests in international jurisdictions—for such purposes as aerial navigation and weather forecasting and the use of radio frequencies and a hundred other examples.

Yet, for better or for worse, we also live in a world of fervent nationalism and well-marked national frontiers.

Common interest and common sense *have* drawn the nations in recent years into an impressive start toward building an international community of common institutions working away at scores of practical and urgent tasks—and some exhilarating tasks, too, such as stamping out malaria and providing hot lunches for undernourished schoolchildren.

Yet nationalism has, if anything, been a rising fever in recent years—and not only in the newest of the nations.

Three-quarters of our planet is covered by water free from claims by nations. In outer space where the satellites fly there is no place at all for national sovereignty. Celestial bodies have been declared off limits to nationalism, by unanimous resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Yet that same Assembly has been reluctant to tell the nations of which it is composed that they must pay what the Assembly says they owe the U.N. for helping keep the peace.

And no one questions the right of a few major nations to a veto in the Security Council—that sturdy symbol of the principle of national sovereignty in the very heart of international organization.

The Concept of Sovereignty

So nations are here to stay, after all. And it takes two of them to tango, and usually quite a few more to execute the modern dance of international cooperation in the era of complex technology and accelerating change. To cooperate means that two or more nations must be equally prepared to forgo claims of exclusive national sovereignty over some field of activity—or to admit that the march of science has already removed their claim from the realm of reason.

Nothing illustrates this better than the failure of the so-called Baruch Plan in the very first years of the United Nations. Under this proposal, which seems even more sensational in retrospect than it seemed at the time, the United States was prepared to transfer to an international agency exclusive sovereignty over those processes in nuclear science which could lead to the production of nuclear weapons. For 2 long years of windy debate, the Soviet Union did not budge from its initial position that this proposal was an unwarranted, impossible, and insidious effort to infringe the sovereignty of the Soviet Union.

And to this day, the Soviet Union has been unable to bring itself to admit inspection teams to verify that underground disturbances are earthquakes and not tests of nuclear bombs. Only a few visits a year would be needed for this purpose. They could be very brief. The inspected areas would be very limited. The inspection teams would be under Russian surveillance on Soviet soil. They could even be blindfolded on the way in and out. And still the answer is no.

This is why the test ban agreement does not cover underground tests. Such is the grip of the concept of sovereignty and the related system of secrecy on that nation with which we must primarily seek agreements bearing on world peace and world order.

And such is the reluctance—shared in some degree by all nations—which stands in the way of establishing a world organization to guarantee the peace.

How *are* we going to build a peace system that covers the world? Let's start by thinking about

the nature of the natural world we humans inhabit.

A Plurality of Peacekeeping Systems

Nature is not characterized by sameness but by diversity. No flower, no tree, no cloud, no horse or river or landscape is just like any other.

Every crisis in human affairs, too, is somehow different from all the others—and there are many different sources of frustration and tension and hostility which can lead to conflict.

So, given all this endless diversity, it may well be that world peace is too overwhelming an assignment for any one system or institution to manage anyhow. The whole job of keeping the peace of the world—which means making the necessary changes without violence—is probably beyond the capacity of any conceivable group of human beings who might be given the job, or arrogate it to themselves.

Certainly the idea that any one nation, however big or rich or talented, could run the whole planet is already widely recognized as a monstrous illusion.

But the idea that some single central authority could devise and administer and secure world peace may be equally illusory.

So it seems to me that we must put aside the simplistic temptation to think of the problem of world peace as one problem and think of it, rather, as a large group of problems to be dealt with by a plurality of peacekeeping systems. This may seem to increase the complexity of the undertaking. But, more important, it decreases the complexity of each of its parts.

I think we must learn, too, to stop asking for total "solutions" of these conflicts and start figuring out how to contain them and live with them—how to keep them sufficiently under control so they are merely bothersome and not lethal. This is, after all, what we do about tensions in our personal lives and in our local and national communities.

Once we start thinking of the problem of peace as a large collection of diverse problems in a pluralistic world, then we can think more clearly about how to break the job into more manageable assignments—limited tasks that

may be doable by limited, fallible mortals working through the imperfect institutions that we humans are accustomed to build and operate.

And we can even begin to use a somewhat different vocabulary than the abstractions called "peace" and "order" and "law." Maybe we should stress the verbs rather than the nouns—and talk more about *containing* conflict, and *managing* change, and *administering* the institutions of peace.

Orderly Relations Between Neighbors

And in this light we can begin to see a crude hierarchy of peacekeeping systems at different levels of political organization.

We can begin to see that each nation has the task and the responsibility of settling its own problems with its own neighbors. Treaties of peace and friendship—agreements for joint use and development of resources—settlements of disputes through negotiation, mediation, arbitration, or judicial recourse—joint instruments, joint ventures, joint control boards—add up to one level of international order.

And indeed most nations do in fact maintain a tolerable system of orderly relations with their neighboring states. Because a relatively few do not, we need additional machinery to keep the peace.

Regional Security Organizations

So we turn to the next level of order where wider institutions are needed to work at the job. This is the level of the geographic region, where increasingly elaborate mechanisms have come into being during the postwar years. The most obvious is the inter-American system, which has successfully contained quite a few incipient conflicts.

This is no place for a comprehensive review of regional peacekeeping. But just remember in passing that the Organization of African Unity was still in swaddling clothes—and far from united on most important things—when it faced up to nasty conflicts between Morocco and Algeria and between Ethiopia and Somalia. The underlying problems have not been made to disappear, but the lid was put back on two pro-

spective wars—for the time being, anyway.

But, again, peacekeeping at the regional level does not give us a whole answer. In practice it often appears that the courage to engage in peacemaking varies directly with distance from the dispute. Nations in a region are often quicker to suggest ready solutions for other people's conflicts than for their own. But the courage and machinery to keep the peace will hopefully grow as regional security organizations grow in skill and learn by experience to deal with their own problems.

U.N. Peacekeeping Machinery

At the next level—as close to the global as we can get—is the United Nations peacekeeping system. The United Nations was never intended to be the only piece of peacekeeping machinery lying around in case of crisis. The U.N. was not built to rush to resolve every conflict that arises anywhere.

On the contrary. The charter explicitly calls upon parties to conflicts to seek to solve them by direct negotiation or by recourse to the various techniques of conciliation. The charter also explicitly endorses regional organizations and their role as intermediary peacekeeping systems.

The United Nations, indeed, was conceived by its founders much more as a court of last resort than as the first port of call—more as a reserve system to be available in the event of failure of other systems than as a central organizer of world order.

If we look back over the history of U.N. peacekeeping, we see that the actions have ranged from military defense of a victim of aggression—to the appointment of an investigating committee—to the work of a single civilian mediator.

We see that the instruments employed here have ranged from the United States Marines to a 21-nation international force.

We see that some peacekeeping operations have been authorized by the Security Council and some by the General Assembly—that some have been paid for by the nations directly concerned, some by a consortium of countries on a voluntary basis, and some by the assessment of dues on all members.

We see that at times the U.N. has served as a forum for the airing of a complaint—at times as a channel of mediation—at times as an organizer of field forces, inspectors, and observers—and at times in two or more of these three roles in the same crisis.

Finally, we have seen that in some cases the U.N. has succeeded, sometimes brilliantly, in the role of peacekeeper and peacemaker and in some cases has been unable to act.

This is to say that the record of the U.N. is a record of what its members were or were not willing to do and support under specific circumstances at specific times and in the face of specific problems which never will arise again in just the same form. Such experience defies the most careful efforts to draw clear lessons, make accurate predictions, or derive neat formulas for use in the unknown peace equations of the future.

The charter, of course, remains a noble constant in a troubled time. Its principles, its definitions of the goals of organized man, remain valid from generation to generation as the machinery to advance them changes from month to month.

Thus the U.N., viewed as a practical peacekeeper, is an organization in which particular arrangements can be made to do particular jobs at particular times under particular circumstances.

Resources at the ready for dealing with emergencies can be enlarged—and should be.

Peacekeeping procedures can be improved—and should be.

Experience can be drawn upon for planning and training—and should be.

There is no good reason why the capability and the reliability of the U.N.'s peacekeeping machinery should not be steadily improved. But the *ad hoc* character of U.N. operations in the peacekeeping field probably will be their trademark for some time to come.

Because unprecedented crises were met with *ad hoc* peacekeeping machinery, because there are men wearing the U.N. insignia on duty in Cyprus and the Middle East, in Kashmir and Korea, we can all sleep more securely tonight. In these and other cases the United Nations has

taken on specific assignments that turned out to be manageable. It has not solved the underlying problems that gave rise to the conflicts, but it has contained the fighting so people can go about their business instead of killing each other—and search for more permanent solutions without blood on their hands.

U.S. Support for International Techniques

So there are agreements and techniques and institutions to help keep the peace at the nation-to-nation level, at the regional level, and at the near-universal level. Disputes have, in fact, been settled—more often *contained*—at all three levels more frequently than most people seem to realize.

In fact, there have been at least 20 occasions since the last war when more or less formal hostilities have started—and then been stopped through recourse to some form of peacemaking or through the intervention of one or another kind of peacekeeping machinery—disputes which, in another day, traditionally would have led to declarations of war and to fighting that might well have spread and escalated in wider international violence with more modern weapons.

Yet we also have seen that some conflicts have not yielded to treatment by direct dealings among the parties, nor to regional treatment, nor to treatment by the United Nations system. Berlin is an obvious example and so—so far—is Viet-Nam. In neither case could the United Nations take over the job of enforcing peace; in neither case has it seemed useful to freeze positions through public debate as long as no basis existed for a negotiated settlement among the powers mainly engaged. But in both cases the good offices of the Secretary-General remain available in the event the protagonists have anything to say to each other; and in both cases the United Nations might well have a role in supervising an agreement if one can be reached.

Meanwhile, in our multiplicity of machinery for containing conflict and building up systems for world order, the residual capacity for dealing with conflict and containing violence must reside with our own Armed Forces.

Other peacekeeping elements are clearly pref-

erable to the direct use of American force. This is, of course, why using the techniques of direct settlement is in our national interest—why our support for regional peacekeeping institutions is in our national interest—and why our support for the United Nations in the search for answers is in our national interest too. In every peace-and-security crisis, whenever we can, we bring these international techniques into play to avoid being drawn each time into the more dangerous and more costly way of dealing with violence, which is to employ our own power in our own name.

Celebrating the Constructive Work of the U.N.

All of this is merely the machinery for dealing with conflicts which have reached an advanced stage in the process of combustion. But this machinery is to world order only what the police and fire departments are to civic order.

What of the Departments of Health and Sanitation and Education and Public Works—to name a few—which make civic order worth preserving? What about the constructive side of world politics—which, like the iceberg's bulk, is mostly hidden from view in our crisis-conscious channels of daily news?

It is to celebrate this constructive work of the U.N., and to advance it, that we observe International Cooperation Year when there is armed conflict in Viet-Nam and the General Assembly is in the drydock.

For the World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization and UNESCO [United Nations Scientific, Educational and Scientific Organization] and the International Labor Organization are not in a state of paralysis. Nor is the Special Fund or the U.N. Technical Assistance Program or the Children's Fund—nor any other of that large and lusty international family of agencies affiliated with the United Nations.

They are all busily engaged—not always efficiently, but always usefully engaged—in scores of separate tasks that build order by doing things in an orderly way—tasks that contribute to peace by demonstrating in practice that there is more mileage for everybody in cooperation than in violence.

Some of these agencies and commissions are based at the U.N. level and some at a regional level, but all work mostly on very down-to-earth jobs in very down-to-earth localities. All are engaged in manageable assignments in our charming, confusing, and pluralistic system for maintaining and strengthening the peace.

And some of them are working in the most surprising places. Twelve different U.N. agencies, for example, have been at work for several years in Southeast Asia preparing plans for a multipurpose development project for the Lower Mekong Delta. This despite the warfare, despite broken diplomatic relations, despite the rivalries and hatreds which have been endemic in that area.

A Working System of World Order

It is in this almost endless vista of human activity—this infinitude of tasks which are doable by fallible men and women working through imperfect institutions—that we can glimpse the variety and diversity of elements that must constitute a working system of world order.

Such a system has a central objective: world peace and orderly change. But it is administered through a largely decentralized network of international and regional and national and area-wide and local institutions, mutually reinforcing but not necessarily interdependent.

This is how a so-called system of world order is most likely to be built. And if world peace is to be maintained, if world conflict is to be kept within bounds we can live with, if world tensions are to be channeled in to life rather than death—this, I strongly suspect, is how it will come about.

In the end, the peace may be a far cry from the tranquillity that most people associate with the five-letter word. The order may be hard to see in the midst of diversity, plurality, color, and contest. The politics of peace may be enormously complicated.

But it will be a peace system that reflects the heady pluralism of man and the hearty diversity of his cultures. And if we live with it a while, we'll grow accustomed to its face.

President Yameogo of Upper Volta Visits the United States

President Maurice Yameogo of the Republic of Upper Volta, accompanied by Mrs. Yameogo, made a state visit to the United States March 28–April 7 at the invitation of President Johnson. During his 2-day visit at Washington March 29–30, President Yameogo met with President Johnson, Secretary Rusk, and other Government officials.

Following are an exchange of greetings between President Johnson and President Yameogo on the south lawn of the White House on March 29 and the text of a joint communique released on March 30.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS

President Johnson

White House press release dated March 29

Mr. President: For myself and Mrs. Johnson—and for the people of the United States—I am proud to extend to you and your wife our warmest and most cordial welcome to this country and this capital.

We are particularly pleased that you come today as the first state visitor to Washington since our inauguration earlier this year.

The United States has—and is proud to have—strong and friendly ties with many peoples and many nations on every continent. But we are especially gratified by the growth of such relations with your continent—and with your country.

In these last two decades independence has come for more than 1 billion people in 54 countries. Nowhere has this revolution of national independence had greater impact than in Africa. We are mindful, Mr. President, that less than 200 years ago our own forebears in America chose the course you, and your generation, have chosen in these times.

Mr. President, here in America we understand what is in your heart, and the hearts of your countrymen, when you say, as you did recently:

If we wish to get along with and have relations

with all nations, respecting their ideologies, we intend also and above all to evolve without interference.

History and fortune have smiled upon the United States. We are privileged to have great strength. But we believe that our strength means little unless we use it toward the end of assuring peoples who choose freedom the right to live without interference from neighbors or adversaries. This has been always a commitment of our people.

As a great President, whom I know you admire, Abraham Lincoln, once said of our Declaration of Independence,

It . . . gave promise that in due time the weights would be lifted from the shoulders of all men, and that all should have an equal chance.

In America today, this generation of Americans is determined to fulfill that ideal—by all that we do in the world and by all that we do here at home.

For all the long history of man, there have been injustices, there has been oppression, there has been evil. Today—in these times—we intend that these forces shall find not only their match but their master in the strength of our American nation and the moral resolve of our American people.

Mr. President, we invite and welcome the attention of all nations, young and old, to the agenda of the Congress of the United States. Our concerns are many, and our responsibilities are great. But this week and this session, the American Congress is devoting itself to taking up the challenge of those ancient enemies of all mankind—ignorance, poverty, disease, and discrimination.

And, Mr. President, I want you to know we are determined as a people to prevail against these foes.

You, Mr. President, are committed deeply to economic progress to improve the lives of your people. You seek with neighboring states realistic means of cooperation to promote mutual welfare. You have steadfastly and wisely denied comfort to those who would subvert the hard-won freedom of your continent. These are aims which the American people support, too.

We of this land covet no empire and seek no

dominion anywhere in this world. We seek, as you seek, an Africa of strong and prosperous nations living at peace with their neighbors, free to choose their own paths of progress.

To you, Mr. President, to your people, to all the peoples of Africa, the United States reaffirms its good will, its friendly support, and its resolute determination to stand with you in your struggle for human progress.

President Yameogo¹

White House press release dated March 29

Mr. President, it was in Dakar that I had for the first time the honor of meeting you, and we remember the time when you also met Africa—the impression which you produced on all the chiefs of state assembled there; and the strong impression you gave them has been confirmed and justified today by the responsibilities you have taken.

This being said, Mr. President, I would like to express the very great happiness, the very great honor, which I would like to direct to both the people of the United States and yourself for being here as your guest for a few days, and I am also very happy to express to the First Lady of the United States our admiration for her dynamic and sincere personality—the admiration expressed by my wife in the name of all the women in Upper Volta.

Better than any official contact, it is a direct contact which testifies to the truth because it allows friendship to really blossom in direct action.

It might seem strange and even somewhat unreal that this gigantic country, one of the best equipped in the world, without the slightest doubt might have anything in common with Upper Volta, so small in comparison. However, all men who think, Mr. President, know and understand that the United States and Upper Volta do have an interest in common, do have something in common, and that is a desire and love for freedom, a desire to see men raised toward light, a desire to see a world free from

¹President Yameogo spoke extemporaneously in French.

hatred. That type of community is the most important thing.

Mr. President, this is a struggle, this is a fight which we have to wage again and again every day, but all those who have always opposed hope to despair, hope to injustice, know, Mr. President, that you are in the struggle, the strongest man, the best leader, a man of the size which is needed for someone who presides over the destinies of the United States and responsibilities of the United States. And that is why, Mr. President, I am so honored to be the first Chief of State of Africa to be received here by you. And it is also, Mr. President, because I would like to express the hope that Upper Volta and all of the countries of the third world can use the experience—an experience often difficult—to institute with you a dialog which will be full of interest and also full of construction, because no one ignores, Mr. President, the part played by the United States in building in the world a balance and equilibrium, and no one ignores, either, the fact that things may appear differently from various points of view.

And my presence here, Mr. President, I believe proves that the people of the United States—the United States intends to face its responsibilities to the fullest measure.

Mr. President, in coming here I feel we know you already. We know you, and we have understood you particularly well since your recent speech before a joint session of Congress, which we have distributed very widely in our African press. This, together with everything else, has made us understand how strongly you fight for mankind, for justice, and it is in the name of all of the chiefs of state of Africa—all those among them who love freedom, justice—that I would like to express my admiration because we have a common fatherland, an Africa of freedom and of justice.

Mr. President, I must now speak to you about my country, Upper Volta. Our country is perhaps in the very center, at the very crossroads of western Africa. It has borders—it borders on six different countries, and therefore it may have to face various types of evolutions. It must be always able to face them. Precisely because of being a small nation of only 5 million

inhabitants, it is also a nation which has made a choice which defines it.

This choice, Mr. President, was made at the time when we acceded to independence on August 5, 1960, and the choice is that of fighting always for freedom, of standing always for the dignity of man, of standing, in other words, for the things for which you stand in this country, Mr. President. And if we have to follow this road, a road which is often difficult, a road also which makes those who follow it feel proud of themselves.

As we follow this road, we have found the friendship of the United States. It is a friendship which makes us proud. It makes us proud because not only we trust it but because we trust the future; we trust ourselves. That is why I would like to express to you, Mr. President, my conviction that our two countries will strengthen their ties of cooperation, the ties of their friendship. Long live the United States of America.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

White House press release dated March 30

President Johnson has been extremely pleased to have as his first state visitor since the Inauguration, President Maurice Yameogo of Upper Volta. Their exchanges were both close and cordial and President Johnson was pleased by the identity of principles and purposes which motivate the two governments.

This is President Yameogo's first trip to the United States. The talks in Washington afforded the two Presidents the opportunity to renew and develop a personal acquaintance made at Dakar, Senegal, in 1961, and to discuss in detail matters of common concern. President Yameogo also had conversations with Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

President Yameogo described economic and political matters of importance to Africa, particularly to his country, as well as the efforts of his Government to promote the advancement of the Voltan people. He expressed appreciation for the understanding and cooperative spirit which the United States has shown in assisting the economic development of Upper Volta.

President Johnson recalled the friendship that exists between Upper Volta and the United States and the many bonds that increasingly unite the Governments and peoples of the two countries.

The two Presidents discussed broad international issues, including problems of underdevelopment, African efforts to encourage continental unity, the Congo, and world peace.

President Johnson expressed his admiration for President Yameogo's vigorous efforts to improve the economic and social well being of the Voltan people and to secure cooperation and peace in Africa. In particular, he praised President Yameogo's leading role in the Council of the Entente, the Common Organization of African and Malagasy States and the Organization of African Unity.

President Yameogo expressed his appreciation of the measures taken by the U.S. Federal Government to secure equal rights and opportunities for all American people and lauded President Johnson's leadership of this effort, the effects of which are felt throughout the world.

The two Presidents took great satisfaction in the excellent relations existing between Upper Volta and the United States. They agreed that the visit had further strengthened these relations and pledged faithfully to preserve their cooperation and friendship.

President Yameogo invited President Johnson, as soon as it would be practicable, to visit the Republic of Upper Volta and permit them to repay the gracious hospitality President Yameogo and his party have received.

The United States and International Cooperation

by W. Averell Harriman
*Ambassador at Large*¹

Speaking to you today on the subject of the United States and international cooperation brings back vivid memories of the Marshall Plan and of my intimate relations at that time with Belgium and other European countries. This cooperative venture succeeded beyond anyone's optimistic expectations. And from it we learned much of the value of cooperation among similar-minded nations, the need for economic integration in Europe, and above all the essential importance of economic growth in a modern society. At that time the United States brought to Europe not only much-needed economic assistance but also two basically important concepts: the value of a continent of free

trade and the essential role of increased productivity. Both of these concepts have in the intervening years been incorporated into European economic life and have contributed to the extraordinary dynamic vitality of Europe today.

The role of American business and American investments in Europe is very much in the public eye these days. For this reason, I place particular value on the opportunity to speak to the American Chamber of Commerce in Brussels, which stands for American business at its best—responsible, well informed, and conscientious.

American industry has enjoyed a warm welcome in Belgium. Close and mutually advantageous ties have developed between American and Belgian businessmen. Evidence for this may be found in the fine mood and spirit of

¹Address made before the American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium at Brussels, Belgium, on Mar. 26 (press release 61 dated Mar. 25).

this gathering tonight. It is clear that an organization like the American Chamber is essential to strengthen good relations within the American-Belgian business community in Brussels and to keep American businessmen abroad in close touch with the thinking and policies of both their own and their host governments.

I would like to talk about the importance of open economic systems in today's world.

It may, at the outset, be worth while to recall the fact that this relatively smaller country of Europe has had the foresight to adopt a conscious policy of welcoming capital from abroad. As a result, more than 500 American concerns, many of them represented here tonight, have established outlets or manufacturing subsidiaries in Belgium or entered into partnerships with Belgian enterprises with a direct investment estimated at over \$500 million.

This import of capital and technology has contributed to the prosperity of Belgium today. It has helped keep Belgian industry modern and strongly competitive in the Common Market. It has helped Belgium reduce unemployment to an enviably low level. And this capital has been absorbed without subjecting the Belgian economy in any way to foreign domination, without affecting Belgium's social structure and its own way of life. In fact, although U.S. direct investment has been large, it represented, I understand, only 3 percent of gross capital formation in Belgium in 1963, a typical year.

Economic expansion is fundamental to today's world. We cannot turn back to systems which allowed unemployment, depression, stagnation in the industrialized countries. We must have a system which assists the developing countries to maintain themselves and to grow. We must have a dynamic system which insures that the economic growth and hence the security of one country of the free world strengthens the efforts of other nations.

Such a system provides maximum opportunities for international economic specialization; it stimulates the growth and spread of technology; it encourages capital to flow in directions where it can be most productively employed; it sharpens the role of competition as a productive and modernizing economic force;

and it gives to consumers everywhere a wider range of choice. We can gain these great advantages only by constantly working for them. The system as a whole can succeed only if each nation's economic policies are based on mutual cooperation and an agreed code of responsible behavior.

With 90 percent of free-world industrial capacity included in the complex of nations in the Atlantic world, an economic interdependence now exists among these nations in a manner unknown before the war. Both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson have recognized this economic interdependence and have directed our policies accordingly. In his state of the Union message,² President Johnson said that Europe and the United States have "common interests and common values, common dangers and common expectations. These realities will continue to have their way—especially in our expanding trade and especially in our common defense."

Collective Responsibilities of the Free World

There are voices, on both sides of the Atlantic, however, which contend that America should undertake a gradual withdrawal from the far-flung activities forced on it by the abnormal conditions of the postwar world. In a speech on March 16 in Washington, Under Secretary of State George W. Ball said:³

Proponents of a resurgent nationalism—increasingly vocal in certain European circles—have found this argument particularly attractive. If their own nations are to regain their prewar power and position in world affairs, their first tactical move must be to reduce U.S. power and influence. This means, among other things, weakening or dismantling the institutions and arrangements through which America and Europe cooperate. . . . they feel that, over the long pull, a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals may be more than a figure of speech—provided, of course, that Europeans are left alone to work it out.

In referring to global responsibilities, Mr. Ball continued:

Those who advocate a progressive withdrawal of American power have, it seems to me, never made clear where or how a withdrawal, once begun, could end without great damage to freedom. They have never acknowledged the fact that in today's interdependent

² For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 25, 1965, p. 94.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 12, 1965, p. 532.

world no action by a global power can ever be taken in isolation. They do not seem to understand that what we do in South Viet-Nam will have a profound meaning for people in the other outposts of freedom.

In Viet-Nam the free world faces the outward thrust of Communist China, spearheaded by North Vietnamese aggression. The escalation of military activities going back over a period of years has been from the North in the form of North Vietnamese aggression. And this has been well documented over the years. The Government in Saigon and the Government of the United States both hoped the danger could be met within South Viet-Nam itself. Hanoi chose to escalate the conflict with greater violence; they apparently interpreted restraint as indicating lack of will. The combined U.S.-South Vietnamese response, duly cautious in starting, is designed to make Hanoi realize that it has embarked on an objective it will not be allowed to achieve. The question is up to Hanoi—whether or not to cease and desist in its aggression against South Viet-Nam. The security of South Viet-Nam is no more negotiable now than was the security of Western Europe negotiable when the outward thrust of Stalin's communism threatened it in the late forties.

As Ambassador in Moscow in 1945, I reported that Stalin's intentions were to take over Western Europe. He thought that in the economic chaos that would result from the devastation and dislocations of the war, communism would find a fertile field. His ambitions were frustrated by American and Western European cooperation in the Marshall Plan and NATO. Today we find Western Europe more prosperous and dynamic than ever.

At the same time, however, we find the Communist probings and thrusts in the less developed areas directed from either Moscow or Peiping. The Chinese and Soviet Communists are using every available technique in their effort to enlarge their influence—economic and military assistance, propaganda, subversion, and, where it seems to have possibility of success, so-called "wars of liberation." In short, wherever political or economic weakness exists, there will be heavier pressure from Communist activity on independent nations.

The free world must face up to this problem of Communist subversion squarely wherever

and whenever it threatens. The sooner preventive and repressive steps are taken to stamp out such activity, the less danger there is to the free world of open aggression under the guise of liberation fronts. While maintaining a strong deterrent against the threat of nuclear war, we must be equally vigilant that our collective security is not undermined by unchecked Communist subversion and infiltration.

The deepening conflict between Moscow and Peiping has significance in the long run in shattering the monolithic structure of the Communist international movement. But in the immediate future it is, I believe, adding to the dangers of Communist pressures. For the conflict between the two big Communist powers has stimulated both of them to increase their activities. Each is trying to prove that its methods promise the surest road to Communist takeover. Each is trying to expand its influence not only in Communist parties around the world but with non-Communist parties and peoples as well.

As long as Communist subversion and, particularly, open thrusts of aggression continue to threaten free-world interests and security, all free nations have a collective responsibility, regardless of their size and resources, to give a helping hand to those who are the target of this subversion. We have long looked for the Western European nations to play a greater role in world affairs, and now that their domestic economies have grown so strong, we are counting on their taking increased responsibilities.

Increased Economic Cooperation

The role which Belgium has played in the post war period in world affairs reflects the high sense of purpose and responsibility of its leaders, supported fully by the Belgian people, who live realistically in the present and who look also to the future.

In economic matters both Belgium and the United States have been leaders in pressing forward to greater cooperation. Our commitment to an open system of international trade goes back to 1934 and Secretary of State Hull's reciprocal trade agreements program. After the war, in 1947, we initiated the multilateral tariff bargaining technique which became codified in

the GATT, or the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Under the GATT, deep tariff cuts were made in 1947, and further cuts were made in 1949, 1951, 1956, and 1960-61.

In addition to reducing tariffs substantially during those two decades the major trading nations contracted in the GATT and in the International Monetary Fund to dismantle as rapidly as possible the other chief forms of trade restriction—quotas and exchange controls. This process was begun during the Marshall Plan years and stimulated by the European Payments Union. These have been largely eliminated in the industrial sector.

This persistent exercise in international cooperation led to an unprecedented boom in world trade. The volume of world trade has tripled since 1948. For the first time in this century, trade increased faster than income. Thereby, it accelerated economic growth and raised productivity in all countries.

We have broken free from the web of trade and payment restrictions that were the legacy of the thirties and of the Second World War. We have built an impressive system of international organizations through which we can consult and work together with other nations to make all of us more prosperous and more secure. That is the purpose of organizations such as the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), the GATT, the IMF, the World Bank, and the specialized agencies and regional organizations of the United Nations.

But now we may be at an important crossroad. Progress now—whether in trade, in financial affairs, or in aid programs—will depend increasingly on effective cooperation among all major industrial nations.

The Kennedy Round

The Kennedy Round of trade negotiations, now underway, is a key test of our collective resolution. In concept and in scope, these negotiations represent the most ambitious opportunity thus far to enlarge the benefits of trade for all nations of the free world. A successful Kennedy Round will encourage the continued expansion of world trade. As such, it will be to the common advantage of all participants, industrial and developing nations alike.

Negotiations on industrial products are moving forward. Much hard bargaining lies ahead. All major participating countries bring to these negotiations special and highly charged domestic interests. No country will be able to get all that it would like. But the success of these negotiations will not lie in specific trade advantages any country may gain or disadvantages it may avoid. Rather, it will depend on the progress made toward a better world-trading environment.

In the agricultural area, progress unfortunately has been slow. We look forward hopefully now to the initial negotiations on an important category of agricultural products—grains—in May. We hope they will augur well for the tabling of offers in September and subsequent negotiations on the remainder of agricultural products.

Meeting the Needs of the Developing Nations

While the industrial countries have been highly successful in modernizing and expanding their economies in the postwar period, progress of the billion people of the developing nations has been much slower. Development, as we know, is not an easy task. Fortunately, it is no longer a task for the United States alone to aid the developing nations. In many respects it is the biggest piece of unfinished business that we and other free-world industrial countries face. We and our fellow members of the OECD have enormous industrial and commercial power to put behind a common endeavor. As a group, the United States, Canada, Western Europe, and Japan account for approximately two-thirds of the world's industrial output. We command at least that much of the world's industrial capacity, and we have a major share of its agricultural surplus. Our foreign trade is about two-thirds of total world trade. We must get these assets more heavily engaged in the job of development.

We must succeed in two general tasks:

First, in putting growing amounts of the capital, technology, and organizational skills of the industrial countries to effective use in the developing countries, with emphasis on the contribution of private investment; and

Second, in giving these countries reasonable

access to our markets, at fair and stable prices, enabling them to expand their export earnings and pay more of their own way toward modernization.

In addition to these basic needs—more capital, skills, and trade—there must be a better coordination of effort by the aid donors. The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD is the primary forum for this purpose. There must also be increased coordination by specialists in the recipient country. This will avoid wasted efforts and inefficient use of limited aid resources. It will help to dispel suspicion that one country is carrying a disproportionate share of the load. If conducted with full respect for the sovereignty of developing countries being aided, it is very much in their interest.

Major responsibilities fall on the aided country as well. It should set up a single strong office within its own government to coordinate external aid and avoid, for example, dissipating export credits on prestige projects without due regard for the overall requirements and resources of the country. There must be determination on the part of the country being aided to do all it can to help itself attain economic development.

There are already some good examples in Africa of coordination among U.S. and European contributors, such as the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] consultative committees for such countries as Nigeria, Tunisia, and Sudan. Another example is the joint financing of the Trans-Cameroonian Railroad by the United States, France, and the European Economic Community. In the countries formerly under Belgian administration, numerous projects have been based on the matching of material financed by the United States with Belgian technical assistance. The expansion of Lovanium University, the National School of Law and Administration in Léopoldville, and several other Congolese institutions provide outstanding examples.

It is of paramount importance to the free world that the African countries be helped to maintain their independence and attain economic growth. To its credit, Belgium has acknowledged responsibility in Africa. We

earnestly hope that Belgium's interest will not flag, that it will expand its cooperation, and continue to send material aid and technical personnel, particularly to the countries of Africa formerly under its administration.

U.S. Balance-of-Payments Deficit

Finally, I would speak of the American role and objectives in the international financial field and our balance-of-payments situation. The international monetary system, of course, is not an end in itself. It is an instrument that can either encourage or hinder desirable actions in trade and in domestic economic policy. We have seen the issues sharpened during the past year by the studies and discussions within the International Monetary Fund and the Group of Ten.

The essential problem is to develop a mechanism for providing adequate world liquidity—but not too much—and at the same time to facilitate the process of orderly adjustment in countries which are in imbalance. We are considering with other interested nations how the international monetary system can be made the vehicle for sustained expansion of world trade.

This has special urgency now that we are making concerted efforts to eliminate our own balance-of-payments deficit. Throughout the postwar period that deficit has been the major source of financing for the growth of trade and investment. As the dollar was the only major currency that was fully convertible throughout the period, it had to serve as an international reserve for the rest of the world. The United States also transferred a huge amount of capital and international reserves to the rest of the world through military and economic aid and through long-term loans to foreign governments, as well as through private investment.

Our reserves and capital were put to good use, not only to help secure vital political interests but in economic terms as well. These actions restored the international monetary system and brought us to our present world of booming trade and convertible currencies.

A broader European capital market would be highly useful now in reducing the dependence of Europe upon American sources of capital. We wish to support the cooperative interna-

tional program which the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development is currently undertaking to improve capital markets. Improved capital markets in Europe could contribute substantially to the further economic growth of OECD member countries, to greater trade opportunities for less developed countries, and to capital flows to help correct international payments imbalances. Capital markets are needed which are sufficiently large and efficient to raise with facility the sizable amounts of capital required by today's large-scale industries. This means markets which are increasingly international in scope.

Except during the Suez crisis, the United States has had a balance-of-payments deficit every year beginning with 1950. Our international deficit did not constitute a problem for us or other nations during most of the 1950's. Other nations actually welcomed our deficits as the mechanism whereby we supplied gold and dollars to build reserves depleted during the war and reconstruction era.

By 1960, however, most European currencies were again freely convertible and exchange reserves had reached comfortable levels. The problem now was that our trading partners had not too few but too many dollars. And, as President Johnson stated last month in his balance-of-payments message,⁴

... we cannot—and do not—assume that the world's willingness to hold dollars is unlimited.

There is every reason for confidence that we will be able to deal effectively with the problem of our balance-of-payments deficits and our gold outflow. The facts of our basic financial strength help keep this problem in perspective.

A key element in that financial strength is the \$88 billion of assets owned abroad by the U.S. Government and by American citizens. Deducting foreign claims against our Government and citizens would leave us with net assets of \$30 billion. This does not take into consideration the more than \$12 billion of Government loans to developing countries on longer terms. In addition, we have nearly \$15 billion in gold and a commercial export surplus last year of \$3.7 billion, as well as income received

from private foreign investment over \$4.3 billion.

As President Johnson noted in his balance-of-payments message,

A country which exports far more than it imports and whose net asset position abroad is great and growing is not "living beyond its means."

Our Government has made serious efforts the past 4 years to reduce our persistent large deficits in our balance of payments, and with some success. But the 1964 deficit, with more than half of it occurring in the final quarter, was too large. The President, as you know, has formulated a 10-point program with the firm intention of eliminating our international deficit. The program is designed to cut the deficit without halting the growth of the U.S. economy and without major damage to the international economy.

The major focus of our balance-of-payments program is on private capital outflow. In 1964 private capital outflow soared to well over \$6 billion. The increase that year over 1963 was almost \$2 billion.

As representatives of U.S. firms doing business here in Belgium and elsewhere abroad, I am sure you are especially interested in the situation with respect to direct investment abroad by American companies. Last year such direct investment, with most of it in Europe and Canada, rose to \$2.2 billion. This was \$500 million higher than the rate for 1960 and more than \$300 million above the 1963 rate.

It is reported that during the past 4 years there have been 2,500 new ventures in Europe by U.S. firms. These firms have spent increasingly large sums as they bought into existing European enterprises.

Now, I wish to make it clear that as a basic principle we regard U.S. investment in Europe—and elsewhere in the world—as highly desirable. We know that it brings benefits to the countries where it is made and that ultimately it produces earnings which flow back to the United States. For example, the return flow of income last year from direct investment was \$3½ billion—the same year when the capital outflow for direct investment was \$2.2 billion. But when we are faced with a continuing large deficit in our international accounts over

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Mar. 1, 1965, p. 282.

a period of years, we must raise a question as to how rapid a pace of new foreign investment we can afford.

Speaking of U.S. direct investment in Europe, it is appropriate to recall the historic debt we Americans owe to European investment in the United States during and after our economic infancy. Even today there is considerable European investment in the United States. There does not seem to be general awareness that, according to the latest available figures, European direct investment in the United States totaled almost \$5.5 billion. The comparable figure for U.S. direct investment in Europe as of December 31, 1963, is almost \$10.4 billion. We heartily welcome and appreciate the stimulus that Europe has given to our economy with its direct investments.

Role of American Business Community

But, to revert to our balance-of-payments deficit, we believe we must bring our accounts into balance on an urgent basis. All areas of our payments must make their contribution. As part of the program, our outflows of private capital must now be held to levels consistent with the early achievement of equilibrium. Those levels clearly must be lower than the levels of last year.

Primary responsibility for the program of voluntary cooperation with the American business community to improve our balance of payments lies with Secretary of Commerce [John T.] Connor. He has asked the chief executives of about 600 companies doing the bulk of U.S. international business to determine, on the basis of their own particular circumstances, how each of them can best improve his firm's individual balance on international transactions. He has suggested a number of means to accomplish this, starting with an expansion of exports and development of new export markets. It also is suggested that these firms avoid or postpone direct investment in marginal projects and exercise restraint in financing new direct investments in developed countries with United States funds. Let me underline that we are not attempting to check private investment in the less developed countries.

Other suggestions to the business community:

—Greater use of funds raised in developed countries to finance direct investments in those countries;

—Where appropriate to the company and the country, sales of equities in foreign subsidiaries to residents of host countries; and

—Minimizing the outflow of short-term financial funds and repatriation of such funds previously invested abroad.

Secretary Connor has expressed great confidence in the ability and determination of the business community to meet this challenge—a confidence which I personally share. For, as Mr. Connor has pointed out, the American business community, of which you are important representatives, realizes how important it is to our country and to our business enterprises that we achieve equilibrium in our balance of payments. Having the great stake they do in America and in an expanding international economy, they surely will do what is necessary to strengthen both.

Developing Alternate Sources of Liquidity

We should recognize that our balance-of-payments deficits have been an important source for creating the additional liquidity the world has needed to finance the vast expansion in world trade. As we eliminate the deficit in our balance of payments, it will be necessary to develop alternate sources of liquidity to finance continued expansion in world trade. One major source in this liquidity will be through the International Monetary Fund. Steps now being taken to expand the Fund's resources have our full support.

We agree with our European friends that the present international monetary system needs improvement. It is needed, however, not primarily because of the U.S. deficit but because, with the disappearance of the deficit, further growth of world reserves would be roughly limited by the rate of gold production. And gold will not provide the growth of reserves that will be needed for continued rapid expansion of world trade, the needs of the developing countries, and the extension of international capital markets. We will have to continue to use convertible currencies as reserve assets—along with gold—and possibly some form of new reserve

asset, too. We are not advocating a particular solution at this time, but we are ready to continue to explore different possibilities constructively within the Group of Ten.

Our problem is to meet the increasing liquidity requirements of an expanding world economy, not to force a harsh reduction in the existing level of world liquidity. We must never forget the lessons of the thirties and the self-defeating scramble for gold that preceded it. It is in these terms that we must constantly reexamine and reassess our policies and instruments.

I have summarized what I consider to be the

inescapable economic responsibilities of the United States and the policies we are pursuing in order to fulfill these responsibilities. Above all, I have tried to convey the imperative of cooperation of other free nations, particularly the industrial nations. None of us can find security, none of us can share fully in the benefits of modern society, under policies of economic independence. We have immense stakes in working together. It must be our common goal to enlarge the area of our cooperation if the free world is to keep on growing in strength, if we are to achieve eventually a decent world order and a stable peace.

The Kennedy Round

by W. Michael Blumenthal

*Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations*¹

The main trading nations of the world have been engaged in the Kennedy Round trade negotiations for more than 18 months. Throughout this period, the newspapers have abounded with reports on all aspects of these talks. A great many articles have been written and speeches delivered on the subject. Participants and commentators alike have presented the public with an ample fare of political and economic analyses about the meaning, the implications, the progress—and the lack of it—of this Kennedy Round.

The extent of worldwide public interest in the negotiations is not surprising and reflects a general recognition of the high stakes involved. Tariff negotiations are not traditionally a very exciting subject for the average person; and previous tariff talks did not, in fact, rate similar public discussion. But the Kennedy Round is not just another round of routine tariff bargain-

ing. These negotiations are much broader in scope than any previous ones and vastly more important than anything tried in Geneva in the past.

There are a number of reasons for this. I would like to stress here just one or two which, I suggest, are of particular significance.

In the first place, the negotiations take place in a very special political context. From the point of view of the United States, they represent an important effort at Atlantic cooperation, a major test for ourselves and our friends in Europe of our ability to work together on a common endeavor of great importance to all our peoples and to many nations throughout the world. We see these negotiations as an example of the type of partnership—of the sharing of responsibility among equals—which President Kennedy and President Johnson have stressed repeatedly as, in their view, the sum and substance of a strong and vital Atlantic alliance.

For the European Economic Community,

¹ Address made before the Economic Forum at Kassel, Germany, on Mar. 8.

these negotiations are the first major opportunity to demonstrate the policies to be followed in its economic relations with nonmember countries in Europe and elsewhere. They provide a means to shape these policies, taking into account the vital interests of member states—and of third-country trading partners as well.

The Kennedy Round is a test, with the world watching, of how this new entity of six European nations, growing and prospering rapidly and implementing with gratifying determination the great dream of European unity, will respond to the exciting call for major trade liberalization in world commerce. The Kennedy Round, in other words, provides the Common Market with the opportunity to give practical meaning to those provisions of the Treaty of Rome which envisage an outward-looking and liberal external commercial policy.

Relations With the Developing Nations

The context of the negotiations cannot, of course, be defined exclusively in terms of the bilateral U.S.-EEC setting nor merely with reference to the wider multilateral relationships of the Atlantic nations. An equally important element of the political setting, which distinguishes the negotiations from previous tariff bargaining, concerns the relations with the developing world.

It is of great significance that the Kennedy Round is taking place at a time when the emerging nations of Latin America, Africa, and Asia are making strenuous efforts to speed their economic development; a time when they are calling attention to the importance of increased trading opportunities as a vital goal in their quest toward a higher standard of living for their people.

The success of the Kennedy Round in a lowering of trade barriers for *all* nations, in particular the developing ones, and in serving the interests of people *everywhere* constitutes one of the principal challenges confronting us. It is another reason for the great worldwide interest in our work.

There are, of course, many other factors which explain the importance attached to the Kennedy Round. Not the least of these is that the United States is negotiating with powers

provided by Congress to the President in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which far exceed those available to an American President at any previous time. To cite only one example: During the last tariff negotiation, the so-called Dillon Round of 1960-61, the United States eventually reduced tariffs covering about 20 percent of its imports with an average overall reduction amounting to about 8 percent. Other countries made correspondingly modest commitments. One reason for this no doubt was the limited negotiating authority available to the United States. In the Kennedy Round, on the other hand, we have been in a position to join in a negotiation which is based on offers to reduce virtually all industrial tariffs by as much as 50 percent.

Trade Policy and the Atlantic Partnership

The United States attaches great importance to the Kennedy Round. As Secretary of State Dean Rusk has recently pointed out:²

The Kennedy Round embodies two longstanding and basic lines of American foreign policy. One is the drive for freer trade and an increasing flow of commerce throughout the world. The other is our support for a strong and united Western Europe, capable of acting in partnership with the United States in the great enterprises that lie before us.

We know that an effective Atlantic partnership requires a strong and unified Europe and that our partnership is best achieved between a prosperous Europe, a prosperous America, and a prosperous free world. A cooperative effort between us and other nations to remove trade barriers will, in our view, help all of our peoples to reach higher standards of living and will greatly strengthen the bonds that bind nations of the free world together.

The American policy of encouraging freer international trade through the progressive dismantling of world trade barriers is not new. We found many years ago, through the economic hardships of the period between wars, that no nation can hope to achieve prosperity by erecting trade barriers around its borders and attempting to export its problems rather than its products. We learned from the experience of those bitter years that national consid-

² BULLETIN of Nov. 30, 1964, p. 766.

erations must always be balanced by an awareness of their effect on other countries and that an open system of international trade which encourages the expansion of efficient production is best designed to contribute to the prosperity of all.

In 1930 the United States, like many other countries, was a high-tariff country. The average of our tariffs, I believe, was more than 50 percent. Between 1934, when the first Reciprocal Trade Act was passed, and 1962 we were able, through progressive trade negotiations, to reduce our average tariff level to about 12 percent. During this period our imports rose from \$1.7 billion in 1934 to \$17 billion in 1963 and our exports increased correspondingly—ample proof that a liberal trade policy makes sense!

Tariff Negotiations and the EEC

Your own experiences with the Common Market have, I think, proven two points: First, the Community has benefited from the increasing competition within its internal market. Second, the process of the EEC's development has shown how patient and persevering negotiations can lead to agreement on industrial and agricultural trade of benefit to all parties to the negotiations. There is ample evidence to indicate that as between the EEC, the United Kingdom, other EFTA [European Free Trade Association] countries, Japan, and the United States patient negotiating can also produce very favorable results.

One of the most encouraging facts is that *all* participants in the Kennedy Round fully appreciate that increasing trade is indispensable to sustained economic growth and are prepared to devote their energies to reducing obstacles to trade expansion. Even though the negotiations sometimes appear to assume the character of an adversary relationship, they are, in fact, characterized by a great community of interest.

If we look back on the progress of the negotiations to date, we must acknowledge, first, that it has been neither rapid nor easy and that some of the problems that had to be overcome required considerable effort and good will among all the negotiating partners. We should be neither surprised nor dismayed by this discovery. The technical complexities and the eco-

nomic and political importance of the Kennedy Round are such that it must necessarily take considerable time. The decisions which governments have to make affect all sectors of their economy and will have a great impact for many years to come.

We must also recognize that one of the major negotiating partners, the European Economic Community, is involved in these talks at a time when its own internal system is not yet complete. Under these circumstances, even fairly limited agreements along the road toward a Kennedy Round settlement create problems for the Common Market, since they generally require prior agreement by the six member states. The time needed to achieve this internal common view is often considerable.

I am divulging no secret if I tell you that it sometimes puts some strain on your other negotiating partners who are watching the Brussels deliberations, but it is equally clear from following the press that our journalistic friends occasionally fail to understand this situation. On a number of occasions, reports of deadlock and stalemate in Geneva have merely signified that time was being used to work out a particularly difficult problem—in Geneva or in Brussels—and not that there was any lack of good will or determination by all the nations involved to find a mutually acceptable solution.

Industrial Exceptions Lists

In the industrial phase of the negotiations we have in fact made good progress. After much debate, analysis, and deliberation, the major trading nations of the world tabled their industrial exceptions lists on the 16th of November of last year. Technically, these exceptions lists consist of those industrial items which each of the major participants in the Kennedy Round is withholding from its offer to cut tariffs by 50 percent. As a practical matter, the tabling of these lists amounted to a positive offer to cut tariffs in half on the great majority of industrial goods entering world trade. Taken in the aggregate, the offers tabled November 16th represent an unprecedented opening bid for trade liberalization. This is a major achievement.

There are, of course, some differences in the quality of the offers made. For example, a

number of the EFTA nations have offered a 50-percent cut in *all* their industrial tariffs without exceptions, subject only to the achievement of reciprocity. Other nations have found it necessary to except some items.

We have recently completed a careful multi-lateral examination of these lists in Geneva. This procedure, known as the "confrontation and justification" of exceptions lists, involved each nation which tabled an exceptions list being questioned—or confronted—by other linear participants. The nations participating in the Kennedy Round had previously agreed that only a "bare minimum" of items should be excepted from the 50-percent linear cut and that this should only be in cases dictated by "over-riding national interest." The responses—or justifications—of exceptions were to be based on these agreed criteria.

The confrontation and justification procedure has brought out the fact that some exceptions lists are larger and more important than others. The significance of an exceptions list cannot, of course, be judged in strictly quantitative or mechanical terms. It is not the number of items or even the current trade volumes represented on these lists as much as the more qualitative impact on key sectors of world trade which must be taken into account in the negotiations.

There are items at present included on some exceptions lists which we expect to be taken off and included in the package of full 50-percent reductions. There are other currently excepted items on which important partial offers—that is, offers of 20, 30, or 40 percent—can be made. During the coming year, we will have to negotiate diligently to reduce the exceptions lists which are on the high side so that at the end of the negotiations we can achieve an across-the-board cut in virtually all industrial tariffs by 50 percent.

Again, I am probably divulging no secret if I tell you that some negotiating partners in Geneva, including the United States, consider the exceptions list of the European Economic Community to be a quite large and significant one, particularly in relation to those submitted by the other principal countries. Of course, we fully recognize the great effort made by the Commission and the member states in working

out the complex internal agreements necessary to produce this list. At the same time, we hope that the unprecedented offers which have been tabled by the other countries, including my own, and which, if realized, would bring major trade benefits to the Common Market will provide the necessary inducement to you to reduce your list in the course of the negotiations.

Obviously, the extent of the offers made by the big trading units—such as the Common Market, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan—will, in the final analysis, determine the overall results achieved. If any one of us falls short in our contributions, the total result of the talks will be reduced, to the detriment of everyone. All of us would be the losers, including very specially you in the Federal Republic, who rely so heavily on a growing market for your industrial exports and who would benefit so considerably from the realization of the sweeping offers for tariff cuts which were tabled on November 16th.

Our most stubborn immediate Kennedy Round problems, however, are not in the industrial area. The fact is that, while we have moved quite far in this phase of our talks, we have not yet been able to register comparable progress in another vital sphere. I am, of course, referring to the agricultural negotiations.

Importance of Agriculture in World Trade

The importance of agriculture in world trade is self-evident. In fact, it is almost a truism that no really far-reaching liberalization in industrial trade can be accomplished without a corresponding effort on the agricultural side.

There are many reasons for this. Industry and agriculture are inextricably interwoven in all economies. Reasonably priced farm products are the basis for economic stability and higher living standards in all countries. Workers, businessmen, housewives, young and old alike, all depend on foodstuffs, while the farm population depends on farm earnings for their ability to buy industrial products.

Modest food prices mean faster economic growth and rising standards of living. And under full employment, access to high-quality, inexpensive food eases the pressures of infla-

tion—a problem with which we are all familiar and which is not unknown in Europe at the present time.

Efficient agricultural production and access to low-priced food imports can help to ease the industrial labor shortage in countries like the Federal Republic, where high levels of industrial output and exports are the keys to increasing prosperity.

These are some of the reasons why the ministers of the GATT, in launching the Kennedy Round, determined that the negotiations should encompass all elements of world trade including, specifically, agriculture. For in addition to the importance of a free flow of agricultural goods in international trade for the economies of countries such as your own and mine, the ministers recognized that some Kennedy Round negotiating partners would not be able to participate at all if agricultural trade were not covered.

Trade in Temperate Zone farm products is a life-and-death matter to several nations. Ninety-five percent of the exports of New Zealand, for example, are farm products. To Australia farm products are almost as important. Canada, Argentina, and Denmark are other countries with such vital interests in Temperate Zone agricultural exports that a negotiation of the scope contemplated in the Kennedy Round without an inclusion of the farm sector would be meaningless for them.

As far as my own country is concerned, you all know what a great part farm exports play in our total trade. In 1963, 27 percent, or about \$5½ billion of our total exports were in agricultural goods. Our sales of farm goods to the European Economic Community alone were \$1.2 billion. Our exports of such goods to our other most important trading partners, notably the United Kingdom and Japan, are similarly so great that a trade negotiation with them would make little sense if the farm sector were not to be part and parcel of it.

Agricultural Phase of Kennedy Round

The difficulties which we have encountered so far are not pure coincidence. Agriculture has always been a thorny problem in international trading relationships, and the Kennedy Round

is proving no exception. The reasons are not difficult to understand: Agriculture, first in the United States and now also throughout Western Europe, is undergoing rapid and unprecedented change. A technological revolution is taking place. In the United States yields for many farm crops have doubled or tripled within the last two decades.

Less than 100 years ago some 65 percent of the American people were farmers. Today only 8 percent of our people gain their livelihood from farming. In 1949 the yield per acre for corn in the United States was 38 bushels; in 1961 corn belt farmers averaged 67 bushels per acre.

Economic farm units employing modern agricultural technology are able to grow increasing quantities of food at greatly reduced cost. In both Europe and the United States the revolution in agricultural production techniques is pressing the small traditional farmer to choose either to increase the size of his holdings and employ modern methods or to move to better paying nonfarm occupations. This vast change on the countryside is, of course, a major social and political problem as well as an economic one. And it is a situation not unique to Germany, or to Europe, but a common problem of all industrialized nations, including the United States.

It is not surprising, then, that agreement in the Kennedy Round on how to lower agricultural trade barriers is giving us quite a bit of difficulty. But it would be unfortunate if we failed to find suitable solutions in this area. And it would be tragic indeed if the Kennedy Round, in agriculture and industry alike, should fail as a result of it.

Where do we stand today in the agricultural phase of the Kennedy Round? Let me sketch briefly the history of these negotiations to date.

When the Kennedy Round began in 1963, as I mentioned a moment ago, the ministers wisely decided that the negotiations should embrace all classes of products, including agriculture. They recognized even then that our negotiating techniques for agriculture might have to be different than for the industrial sector, that a linear approach, for example, might well not be appropriate. They laid down the objectives

of the agricultural negotiations to be,³

. . . the creation of acceptable conditions of access to world markets for agricultural products in furtherance of a significant development and expansion of world trade in such products.

We have sought for many months to implement this objective by developing a set of rules for the negotiations. Let us say it plainly: We have failed in these efforts. Rules suggested by some of the exporting countries, including the United States, were not acceptable to certain importing countries and particularly the EEC. A rule proposed by the EEC, the so-called *montant de soutien* approach, was unacceptable to the other nations.

Reasons for Failure To Agree on Rules

The reasons for our failure to agree on agricultural rules can be, at least in part, illustrated by a few basic facts about agricultural production and trade.

First, for the same commodities, very different domestic price levels prevail in some of the key countries. For example, under the recent price decisions in Brussels, EEC farmers are guaranteed DM425 per metric ton of soft wheat, starting in 1967. In my country, for producers not restricting acreage the corresponding market price is roughly DM185 per metric ton, while those who agree to such restrictions receive about DM250.

Second, the scope of national price-support programs varies substantially between countries. For example, the United States has price-support programs in effect for only about 45 percent of its agricultural production. The Common Market, on the other hand, has, or is in the process of adopting, support regulations for well over 80 percent of its agricultural output.

Third, the nature of price supports is often totally different. For example, in important instances our support programs are coupled with obligations by our farmers to restrict acreage to certain limits. Thus, in the case of soft wheat, which I just cited, a farmer can get the higher price only if he restricts his production. No such obligation exists in the EEC

and in certain other countries. Furthermore, whereas the U.S. acreage-restriction program is voluntary for wheat and feed grains, participation by our farmers in such programs is mandatory for certain other commodities, such as peanuts, rice, cotton, and tobacco.

Fourth, the type of frontier protection employed by various Kennedy Round negotiating partners differs substantially. We in the United States, for example, normally use only fixed tariffs to protect our agricultural producers. Only in the case of five commodities—wheat, cotton, sugar, peanuts, dairy products—do we additionally employ certain nontariff barriers at our border. These products account for about a quarter of our farm production. You will note that, except for dairy products, these are precisely the commodities in which we have support and production-control programs, thus making our nontariff barriers a necessity. You in the EEC, on the other hand, use nontariff barriers, and in particular variable levies, on a much more extensive scale. This makes comparison and negotiation quite difficult.

Fifth, the practices of nations with regard to export payments for agricultural commodities differ widely. The United States uses export payments only for a few commodities where special difficulties exist, namely, for wheat, rice, cotton, and dairy products. The Common Market, on the other hand, has regulations for all grains, livestock, and dairy products, which provide for so-called "refunds"—in other words, schemes for export payments equal to or higher than the sum total of your import charges.

Given the differences in domestic price levels which I mentioned a moment ago, the differences in export payments between the United States and the Common Market are quite substantial. For example, average French export subsidies for wheat during the second half of 1964 were about \$40 per metric ton; this compares with a U.S. subsidy which was in the \$4 to \$12 range during the same period.

The bilateral comparison of protection and support measures in the United States and the Common Market shows how great the differences are and why a common set of rules for negotiations in agriculture has been so difficult to find. The problem is, of course, even more com-

³For text of a resolution on trade negotiations adopted on May 21, 1963, see *ibid.*, June 24, 1963, p. 995.

plicated than this brief comparison suggests. After all, agricultural trade is not a bilateral problem, and when the differences in the policies of certain other countries—such as the United Kingdom and Japan, Canada and Australia—are taken into account, the issues become even more complex.

Looking merely at the U.S. and EEC price-support, protective, and export-subsidy data, however, it is perhaps not too difficult to understand why certain nations in Geneva, including the EEC, found it impossible to accept the rule that reduction in agricultural protection by some specified percentage might be the basis for the negotiations. At the same time, other countries would not accept the EEC's suggestion for a so-called *montant de soutien* binding as a general rule, for obvious reasons. The system does not lend itself to the different situations existing in various countries, including the United States. Moreover, you will recognize that it would be a little difficult to convince an American farmer, who receives a return little more than half as great as that of his European counterpart and who has to accept acreage and other restrictions not imposed on your farmers, that a mutual commitment to continue the two systems as at the present is hardly a very equal deal. Obviously, it would be even more difficult to convince that farmer that such a commitment improves trade in agriculture, as stipulated by the GATT ministers.

I will not dwell here on other reasons why the *montant de soutien* approach was not accepted in Geneva, including the view of most of the negotiating partners that the form of binding proposed—namely, a binding in relation to a hypothetical price rather than in absolute terms—is not really a binding at all, creates more problems than it solves, and does not constitute a valid check on agricultural protectionism, let alone leading to some degree of liberalization of trade.

Lest this analysis lead you to too pessimistic a view of the prospect for agreement on agriculture in the Kennedy Round, let me add that the picture is not all black. There are certain fundamental elements upon which substantial agreement does exist and which may provide a hopeful basis for important agreements on agri-

culture in the Kennedy Round. The very fact that our long and arduous discussions in the past have enabled us to understand the particular methods and objectives of each government has also made it possible to establish some important areas of agreement.

Important Areas of Agreement on Agriculture

First, we have already identified certain products, namely, grains, meat, and dairy products, on which we will try to achieve improvements in the world trade situation through agreement on certain multilateral arrangements between exporting and importing countries. We have already gone some distance in agreeing on the elements to be covered in the context of this approach.

Second, we are agreed that the negotiations in the Kennedy Round should not cover merely the protection at the border but must also deal with the implications of the domestic policies, wherever these have a real effect on international trade. This is one fundamental objective which the *montant de soutien* approach also attempts to achieve; and on this question the United States, the EEC, and the other countries are in full accord.

Third, we now seem to be in fundamental agreement that, given the diversity of the various systems of agricultural support and protection in effect in the different countries, no single negotiating formula is likely to be adequate. We have recognized, it would seem, that each country must be free to undertake obligations that conform with its own particular domestic system as long as these commitments are directed toward the implementation of the guiding objective laid down by the GATT ministers, namely, a significant expansion in the trade of agricultural products.

Fourth, we have confirmed and clarified the obvious but important principle that the present commitments which all of us have in the GATT with regard to agricultural trade must be the starting point for the development of wider and further commitments. This means that we are agreed that the Kennedy Round cannot and should not be used as a means for negating previous commitments but, rather, to expand and improve on them.

We are at a crucial stage in our agricultural negotiations. Given the difficulties, and in the light of the areas of agreement which we have achieved, the Executive Secretary of GATT [Eric Wyndham White], who is also the chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee in the Kennedy Round, has suggested a procedure for countries to exchange concrete offers on April 1, designed to achieve ministerial objectives. We in the United States and many other countries in Geneva believe that his proposal is the best one to move the negotiations forward. We have been awaiting the Common Market's reaction to this proposal, which, we understand, has been discussed in Brussels in recent days. We are hopeful there will be a positive response.⁴

In facing the agricultural problem, let us approach it with an open mind and recognize that prudent self-interest, yours and ours, dictates mutual compromises leading to agreements which can benefit all of our people. Some of the decisions that will have to be made will require courage and political will. Some decisions will not be easy in the short run. But only through compromise and the will to succeed will we achieve our objective at all. And if we fail in the agricultural field, the effect on the rest of the negotiations will be serious. It is difficult indeed to see how there can be a successful Kennedy Round without the agricultural component.

Optimism for Future of Kennedy Round

In conclusion, despite the hard work which lies ahead, particularly in the agricultural sphere, I think we have reason to be optimistic for the future of the Kennedy Round.

We are now fully engaged in the negotiations, and I expect most participants are now more acutely conscious of the difficulties involved in this effort to achieve an unprecedented reduction in the barriers to world trade than they

⁴The Trade Negotiations Committee on Mar. 18 adopted procedures for negotiations on agricultural products in the Kennedy Round. Governments which are members of the group agreed to table their proposals on grains by Apr. 26, and negotiations on these proposals will begin in the GATT Cereals Group on May 17. Proposals and offers on other agricultural products will be tabled not later than Sept. 16.

may have been 2 years ago. But this is a necessary phase of the negotiations. We are coming to grips with intricate economic and political issues.

It is only through an understanding in depth of the components of these problems, and the objectives and requirements of the various countries concerned, that we can hope to devise solutions which improve the situation of all. For these are not negotiations in which there must be winners and losers. We are not bargaining in a static situation in which we are seeking to *divide* among ourselves some fixed value. We are, in fact, seeking to create the conditions in which we can *multiply* the benefits of expanding trade for all to share. And as I have already said, while these benefits are important in the economic sphere, they are also significant in the political area. This applies particularly to our effort to create a solid framework based on mutual interest for our Atlantic partnership.

Memorandum Signed on Study of Desalting Plant for Israel

Following is the text of an announcement released concurrently on April 9 by the Department of State, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of the Interior, and the Government of Israel.

Press release 71 dated April 9

A memorandum concerning arrangements for a feasibility study of a proposed dual-purpose power desalting plant for Israel was signed on April 9 by representatives of the United States and Israel. The signing took place at the Department of the Interior, Washington, D.C.

Kenneth Holum, Assistant Secretary for Water and Power Development, Department of the Interior, and James T. Ramey, Commissioner, Atomic Energy Commission, signed for the United States, and Ambassador Avraham Harman for the Government of Israel. The memorandum contains administrative and supervisory arrangements for the jointly financed study to be undertaken by Kaiser Industries,

Inc., Oakland, Calif., with Catalytic Construction Co., Philadelphia, Pa., as subcontractor.

The contract with Kaiser Industries, Inc., for the feasibility study was also signed by officials of the firm and the Department of the Interior. The estimated cost of the contract, \$340,000, will be shared equally by the Governments of the United States and Israel. The study is expected to be completed in October 1965.

The study is being undertaken in connection with the joint United States-Israel water de-

salting program agreed upon by President Johnson and Prime Minister [Levi] Eshkol during June 1964.¹ The study was recommended by a joint team of United States and Israeli experts who reviewed Israel's water and power needs during the summer and fall of 1964.²

¹ For text of a joint communique of June 2, see BULLETIN of June 22, 1964, p. 959.

² For background, see *ibid.*, June 29, 1964, p. 100; Aug. 17, 1964, p. 230; and Nov. 16, 1964, p. 724.

THE CONGRESS

Repeal of Restrictive Trade Clause in Transportation Act Urged

*Statement by Under Secretary Mann*¹

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify on section 1007 of the Housing and Urban Development Bill of 1965, which you have before you. This section would repeal section 9(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act, which requires that contractors "shall use only such manufactured articles as have been manufactured in the United States" in performing work for which loans or grants are made under the act.

The administration believes that section 9(c) should be repealed. Let me set forth the main reasons for this.

First, we have a steadily expanding interest in foreign trade. During the last 4 years our commercial exports rose from \$17.5 billion to \$22.3 billion, an increase of more than 27 percent. Our commercial trade balance in 1964—the surplus of our commercial exports over commercial imports—was \$3.7 billion. Our total

surplus of exports over imports, including Government-financed shipments but excluding military supplies, was \$6.5 billion.

Our expanding exports, and the growing surplus of these over our imports, not only contribute to our domestic prosperity but also are vital to our balance-of-payments situation. They carry the load for balance-of-payments sectors in which we have continuing deficits.

Section 9(c) threatens to cut down on that commercial surplus—because we cannot expect foreign countries to follow relatively liberal policies in trade with us if we refuse to buy their goods. We know from the complaints received from other governments that this action has excited some of their industries to demand that purchases of U.S. goods be hampered. Trade is not a one-way proposition. It is and has to be two-way. If we limit our imports, others will limit our exports.

Second, there is no need for such a provision. Our industry competes very well on the open market with foreign industry. We couldn't have got that \$3.7 billion export surplus if our products were inferior or overpriced. Take the two commodity groups primarily affected by section 9(c)—metals and manufactures, and machinery and vehicles. In those we had a sur-

¹ Made before the subcommittee on housing of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee on Mar. 30.

plus of exports over imports amounting to about \$5 billion in 1963, the most recent full year for which the statistics are available. It is true that on certain products it is more economical to buy foreign—there would be no world trade if this were not sometimes the case. But we are confident that, overall, our goods can compete. We don't need to give our industry absolute protection over and above existing tariffs.

Third, because we have a vital interest in foreign trade and know that we can compete, we have entered into international negotiations to reduce barriers to trade. That is what we are doing right now in the Kennedy Round. Section 9(c) of the Transportation Act is inconsistent with the international trading rules we have accepted as part of the bipartisan-supported trade agreements program we have pursued since the thirties. Because we have put up a new trade barrier just when we are trying to get others to lower theirs through the Kennedy Round, we have weakened our influence in negotiations.

Fourth, section 9(c) goes beyond the "Buy American" Act. In the first place, the "Buy American" Act applies (a) to U.S. Government procurement and (b) for U.S. Government use. The goods and services to be purchased under the Mass Transportation Act are for the purpose of providing transportation services which will not be used by any government but rather will be sold to the general public in terms of fares and tickets. It is precisely this difference which gives us our problems in keeping within the bounds of our international obligations, specifically the principle of national treatment. Second, the "Buy American" Act, as it is applied today, makes it necessary for foreign firms to underbid American firms by certain percentage points. Section 9(c), on the other hand, makes it impossible to buy foreign goods for this program no matter what the price difference is. Third, not only does section 9(c) give an absolute preference to our products, but it also enforces this preference on goods bought with State and local moneys which are commingled with Federal funds. While there are a number of governments which discriminate against foreign suppliers along the broad lines of our "Buy American" legislation, we know

of no discrimination which extends to commingled national and local funds for projects similar to the ones contemplated in the Mass Transportation Act.

When the President signed the Urban Mass Transportation Act, he did it in the knowledge that section 9(c) was a bad provision that could do us harm. He then pledged that he would seek its repeal.

For the reasons stated, I ask you to approve enactment of section 1007 of the bill you have before you.

Funds Requested for Salinity Control on Lower Colorado River

White House press release dated April 1

The President transmitted to Congress on April 1 an amendment to the 1966 budget amounting to \$5.2 million for the Bureau of Reclamation for salinity control measures on the lower Colorado River and initiation of a program of water salvage and drainage for the Yuma Valley.

The amount requested will not increase the totals proposed in the 1966 budget.

The sum of \$2.2 million is proposed to complete construction of the temporary extension to the drainage channel of the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage District of Arizona. Work will be initiated on the extension in 1965 with available funds. The extension will permit discharge of drainage either above or below Morelos Dam, Mexico's main diversion point on the Colorado River, pursuant to an agreement on salinity control measures on the lower Colorado River, signed March 22, 1965, by the Commissioners of the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico.¹ In accordance with the agreement, completion of the drainage channel is scheduled for October 1965.

Another \$3 million is requested to initiate work on a system of wells and drainage facilities in the Yuma Valley. This program will

¹ For background and text of agreement, see *RULES* of Apr. 5, 1965, p. 555.

augment Colorado River water supplies, provide additional capacity to assist in regulating delivery of water to Mexico, and provide drainage benefits to irrigated lands in the Yuma area.

The pending budget request of \$183,450,000 for construction and rehabilitation, Bureau of Reclamation, is revised to \$188,650,000.

President Asks Authority To Remove Duties on Canadian Auto Products

The White House on March 31 made public the following letter from President Johnson to Hubert H. Humphrey, President of the Senate. The President sent an identical letter to John W. McCormack, Speaker of the House of Representatives.

White House press release dated March 31

MARCH 31, 1965

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On January 16, Prime Minister Pearson of Canada and I signed an important agreement looking toward freer trade in automotive products between our two North American countries.¹ This Agreement resolves the serious difference which existed between Canada and the United States over our automotive trade. More significantly, it marks a long step forward in United States commercial relations with her greatest trading partner. It testifies to the goodwill and confidence between us.

The automotive producers of the United States and Canada make up a single great North American industry. The same kind of cars, using the same parts, are produced on both sides of the border, in many cases in factories only a few miles apart. Over 90% of the automobiles sold in Canada are assembled by firms owned in part or in whole by United States companies. The men and women who work in the plants on both sides of the border are members of the same international union.

Tariffs and other restrictions involving Canadian-United States trade in automotive prod-

ucts have been the cause of significant inefficiency in this great industry. Canadian plants produce a great variety of cars, essentially identical with those made in far larger numbers in the United States. Because the Canadian market is relatively small, production runs have been short, and costs and prices have been high. High costs and prices, in turn—supported by the tariff and other restrictions—have contributed to keeping the market small.

Historically, Canada's share in North American automotive production has lagged far behind her share in automotive purchases. In 1963, in an attempt to increase its share of the North American market, the Canadian Government put into effect a plan, involving the remission of tariffs, which was designed to stimulate automotive exports. A number of United States manufacturers, believing they would be injured by the plan, called upon this Government to impose countervailing duties. In all probability, such action would have invited retaliation. We were faced by the prospect of a wasteful contest of stroke and counterstroke, harmful to both Canada and the United States, and helpful to neither. Our broader good relations with our Canadian friends would have suffered serious strain.

To avoid such a dismal outcome, our two governments bent every effort to find a rational solution to the problems of a divided industry. The Automotive Products Agreement that the Prime Minister and I signed in January is the result of our joint labors.

The agreement will benefit both countries. We will have avoided a serious commercial conflict. Canada will have achieved her objective of increasing her automotive production. United States manufacturers will be able to plan their production to make most efficient use of their plants, whether in Canada or the United States. They will save the price of the tariff, and, over the longer run, we will benefit from the faster growth in the Canadian market which lower prices will make possible.

The Agreement has already brought results. The Canadian Government revoked its controversial plan and, on January 18, reduced all relevant duties to zero. I am informed that the Canadian Parliament will be asked to give its approval in the near future.

¹ For background and text of agreement, see BULLETIN of Feb. 8, 1965, p. 191.

We recognize, of course, that full integration of the North American automobile industry cannot be brought about all at once. To allow time for adjustment, the Canadian sector of the industry—less than 1/20 the size of ours—will operate initially under special arrangements. The Agreement itself will be subject to comprehensive review no later than January 1, 1968. We should then be in a position to judge what further steps are necessary.

In signing the Agreement, I pledged myself to ask the Congress to authorize the President to remove all United States duties on Canadian automobiles and parts for original equipment. I am today sending to the Congress draft legislation which would give the President that authority. The proposed legislation would also authorize the President to make similar automotive agreements with other countries, and to make agreements leading to mutually beneficial reduction of duties on replacement parts.

I repeat: In my judgment, the Agreement will benefit both Canada and the United States, and the automotive industry and automotive workers in both countries. However, we recognize that adjustments in an industry of such size could result in temporary dislocation for particular firms and their workers.

To provide appropriate relief, the Bill I propose will make applicable the adjustment assistance of Title III of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The tariff change contemplated in the automotive agreement, is, however, a special case. Tariffs will be cut to zero, *all at one time*. Furthermore, dislocation, if it should occur, may well be due as much to the decrease in exports of certain products as to an increase in imports. Therefore, this Bill calls for special procedures for obtaining adjustment assistance. These special procedures will be limited in application to this Agreement and to a transition period of three years. If a similar agreement is made with another country, or if we should make agreements affecting replacement parts, appropriate adjustment assistance legislation will be recommended to the Congress.

* * * *

The Agreement and this Bill are designed to lead to a more efficient organization of the North American automotive industry. It is based on

mutual trust and will result in mutual benefit—benefit to producers, to labor, and to consumers on both sides of the border.

Canada has acted. It is our turn. In order that we may act, I ask the Congress to approve promptly this legislation.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 1st Session

- Foreign Agents Registration Act Amendments. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S.693. February 16, 1965. 73 pp.
- Foreign Assistance Act of 1965. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Part II. February 17-24, 1965. 172 pp.
- To Amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 672 and H.R. 2998. February 22-23, 1965. 132 pp.
- January 1965 Economic Report of the President. Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee. Part 2. February 24, 1965. 33 pp.
- Report on Audit of the Export-Import Bank of Washington, Fiscal Year 1964, Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 841. H. Doc. 105. March 8, 1965. 28 pp.
- Communication from the President transmitting a report indicating the necessity for a supplemental estimate of appropriation for the Inter-American Development Bank for fiscal year 1965. H. Doc. 112. March 15, 1965. 2 pp.
- Communication from the President transmitting a draft of proposed legislation entitled "A Bill To Amend the Bretton Woods Agreements Act To Authorize an Increase in the International Monetary Fund Quota of the United States." H. Doc. 121. March 17, 1965. 3 pp.
- Attendance at Meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. Report to accompany S. Res. 89. S. Rept. 125. March 18, 1965. 2 pp.
- Special Report of the National Advisory Council on Proposed Increases in Quotas of the International Monetary Fund. H. Doc. 122. March 18, 1965. 22 pp.
- U.S.-Owned Foreign Currencies. Eleventh Report by the Committee on Government Operations. H. Rept. 139. March 22, 1965. 45 pp.
- Amending the Request for Appropriations for the Inter-American Development Bank. H. Doc. 127. March 30, 1965. 2 pp.
- Agreement Concerning Automotive Products Between the United States and Canada. Communication from the President transmitting a draft of proposed legislation. H. Doc. 132. March 31, 1965. 10 pp.
- Foreign Agents Registration Act Amendments. Report to accompany S. 693. S. Rept. 143. April 1, 1965. 31 pp.
- Increasing the International Monetary Fund Quota of the United States. Report to accompany H.R. 6497. H. Rept. 222. April 1, 1965. 27 pp.
- Saigon Chancery. Report to accompany H.R. 7064. H. Rept. 225. April 3, 1965. 4 pp.

Third Annual Meeting of Inter-American Economic and Social Council

by *F. Bradford Morse*¹

Mr. Speaker, between November 30 and December 11, of last year, the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IA-ECOSOC) held its third annual meeting, to review developments under the Alliance for Progress, in Lima, Peru. IA-ECOSOC is one of the three dependent organs of the Organization of American States (OAS) and has provided since 1961 inter-American multilateral direction for the Alliance for Progress.

It was my good fortune to serve with my colleague, Congressman Armistead Seldon, as a member of the U.S. delegation to the conference last December. Congressman Seldon is chairman of the House of Representatives' Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs. His profound knowledge of Latin American affairs was an invaluable contribution to the delegation.

The conference opened with a preparatory 1-week meeting at the expert level preceding the meeting at the ministerial level. The United States delegation at the ministerial meeting was headed by the very able Assistant Secretary of State and United States Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, Thomas C. Mann, recently nominated by the President for Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.² Deputy U.S. Coordinator William D. Rogers headed the U.S. delegation at the meeting of experts. The quality of the work of both of these men deserved high commendation. Certainly, the effectiveness of the United States delegation

was due in large part to their experienced and effective leadership.

Accomplishments of the Meeting

The climate of the conference was both positive and optimistic. The meeting saw the launching of a new special development assistance fund, to be operated and supported on a multilateral basis. The statutes of the fund and its first annual budget were approved. A number of participating nations pledged specific contributions, while others stated their intention to pledge specific contributions in the near future. The fund, with a budget of about \$9 million, will support a number of multilateral alliance activities including technical assistance for planning, technical training programs, public information, and technical assistance for institutional development.

The IA-ECOSOC also considered and approved a number of resolutions in addition to the statutes and budget of the special development assistance fund. Among these were re-

¹ A report made in the House of Representatives on Mar. 24. Congressman Morse was a member of the U.S. delegation to the ministerial meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council held at Lima, Peru, Dec. 5-11, 1964.

² For a statement made by Mr. Mann at Lima on Dec. 8, see BULLETIN of Dec. 28, 1964, p. 898. Mr. Mann's nomination as Under Secretary was confirmed by the Senate on Mar. 9.

quests for the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) to give special attention to certain problems such as external trade, maritime transport charges in relation to the balance of payments, regional integration and capital flight, and the relationship between population growth and social and economic development.

One of the most hopeful reports made at the conference was the Ministers' estimation that in 1964, for the first time, the average per capita growth rate for all of Latin America would equal or possibly exceed the target rate (2½ percent per capita per year) urged in the Charter of Punta del Este. They also noted the substantial increase (at least 8 percent) in export earnings which will probably materialize in 1964, when all the statistics become available.

In the estimation of the Latin American delegates, however, foreign trade continues to be a major problem, particularly with respect to maintaining recent price increases for basic commodities.

On a more pessimistic note, concerning agriculture, the review stated:

... that no great progress has been made, except in isolated cases, in the technical improvement of agriculture, in increasing agricultural productivity, or in carrying out programs of agrarian reform.

The Ministers stressed the need to promote more active participation in the programs for development by all the people, including rural and urban communities, labor unions, business groups, as well as government instrumentalities. This is a very healthy development, in my opinion, and demonstrates a growing understanding of the social aspects of economic development.

In the housing field, IA-ECOSOC recognized the important efforts which many countries have already made. However, the gap between requirements and new housing construction continues to grow. There is no question in my mind that greater efforts will therefore be necessary in this field.

The Latin American delegations were particularly concerned with the relatively slow pace of regional economic integration through the Latin American Free Trade Association, and made a call for early action to accelerate inte-

gration through existing institutions. By contrast, the Central American countries were congratulated on the progress they have made in the completion of the Central American Common Market.

The general satisfaction expressed by all delegations with respect to the work of the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress, which had been created by IA-ECOSOC the year before, was a highlight of the discussion at Lima. CIAP was set up as a sort of year-round multilateral executive committee of the IA-ECOSOC. Among other things, it conducted for the first time a review of each country's performance under the Alliance for Progress.

This country review process is the heart of the economic and social development programs embodied in the alliance. The concept is premised on the thesis that aid is useless unless the recipient country has developed a comprehensive plan which coordinates development problems such as land and institutional reform with monetary and fiscal problems. This was not done a few years ago with regard to Brazil, for example. The result? The United States was supporting the Brazilian currency during a period when the Brazilian Government was taking no steps to control an extremely high and rapidly growing rate of inflation.

External Trade Conditions and Prospects

I was greatly impressed by the preoccupation of Latin American member countries with external trade conditions and prospects. Of course, 1964 was a year that witnessed considerable international attention focused on the trade problems of the developing nations. This attention centered around the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) held in Geneva, March 23 through June 16, 1964. Prior to this conference, the Latin American nations held two meetings, the first at Brasilia and the second at Alta Gracia in Argentina. At Brasilia, the government experts considered a document prepared by the secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). The conclusions adopted at this meeting were subsequently re-

viewed at Alta Gracia by the representatives of 19 Latin American countries under the auspices of the Organization of American States. These meetings were intended to produce a consensus as to the goals of the UNCTAD.

In Lima, most spokesmen were critical of what they feared to be a protectionist tendency of the industrial countries. Substantial improvements by the developing countries, both in export earnings and in terms of trade in 1964, did not prevent considerable concern about the future trade prospects of the region.

Underlying these criticisms is a concern which has been explicit in inter-American relations for the last three decades: The Latin American nations, their economies oriented toward primary products, believe that the trend of the terms of trade is moving against them in favor of the industrial nations. They believe that the basic trend of the ratio of prices of their imports as compared with the earnings of their exports is increasingly unfavorable. Furthermore, they are faced with the prospect of greater balance-of-payment deficits as their imports increase due to development needs, imports made up for the most part of vitally needed machinery and machine products.

An obvious answer to these problems is a diversified economy. Even partial industrialization, however, is a lengthy process, especially in the face of severe social and consequent political strains. The one immediate answer that the Latin Americans see to this problem is expanded exports in stable world markets at higher prices. Under the umbrella of favorable world markets, the developing nations believe they can diversify and expand their economies.

Two things are certain: Most Latin American countries don't earn the import credit that they feel they need to achieve a satisfactory rate of economic growth; and, second, they believe that the answer to their problems lies in some form of regulation of the world markets for primary goods which are controlled in one way or another by the industrial nations. They believe primary products are sold in a buyer's market whereas industrial goods are sold in a seller's market.

It is obviously very frustrating to believe that the solution to one's problems is dependent on

the good will of other nations. In the case of the Latin American nations, the expression to their frustration was found in UNCTAD and the meetings which preceded it.

A North-South Duolog

These meetings are important because they portend a new alinement in world relations. We no longer have an inter-American dialog but a world duolog with industrial nations more or less alined on one side of the conversation and the developing nations alined on the other.

The effects of this alinement were certainly felt at UNCTAD, where the developing nations clearly dominated the proceedings. If it maintains coherence, it will certainly be heard again in international organizations in general and in inter-American relations in particular.

The United States has clearly supported efforts of economic organization in the hemisphere, such as the Latin American Free Trade Association and the Central American Common Market. These groups are directed toward self-help by increasing intraregional trade. However, they also represent a possible base for a future duolog between the north and the south.

I believe that several important observations can be made about this conference:

First. The Latin American governments remain keenly sensitive to the possibility that wide price fluctuations of their principal export commodities may cause a recurrence of serious balance-of-payments deficits, thus wiping out their own efforts and the potential development progress supported by external assistance.

Second. The annual review of the Alliance for Progress is becoming more effective with each meeting. This year the conference spent much less time talking about external assistance and more trying to advance reform and development.

Third. The Lima meetings gave the clear impression that the peoples and governments of Latin America are becoming firmly committed to the principles and objectives of the Charter of Punta del Este.

Fourth. The work of CIAP in its first year of operation basically satisfied the expectations of the delegations. The general feeling was that the Committee had given the alliance better

cohesion and a decided multilateral direction. The report of CIAP to IA-ECOSOC was the basis of much of the debate at the meetings.

Fifth. Finally, as crucial as the economic and trade problems of Latin America are, I believe that more attention must be given social problems, such as public education, during the IA-ECOSOC meetings. In the early stages of development, public expectations are going to exceed accomplishment, substantial though that accomplishment may be. Consequently, the pressure for stopgap solutions which may be more illusory than real will be great.

It is my firm belief that such solutions can only be avoided by accompanying economic progress with sound social reform. IA-ECOSOC presents the nations of the hemisphere with an opportunity to examine the practical problems involved in social reform. I hope more of the Council's time will be spent doing so in the future. Just as meaningful economic development depends in the ultimate on a stable political framework, stable democratic political institutions depend in the long run on a sound foundation of social justice.

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. and Canada Sign Agreement on Claims Relating to Gut Dam

Press release 60 dated March 25

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT

An agreement for the final disposition of claims of nationals of the United States against Canada arising out of the construction and maintenance of Gut Dam across the international boundary in the St. Lawrence River was signed on March 25 at Ottawa by United States Ambassador W. Walton Butterworth and Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin.

The agreement provides for the establishment

of a three-member international arbitral tribunal known as the Lake Ontario Claims Tribunal United States and Canada. The tribunal will determine whether Gut Dam caused damage to American property holders by raising the water level of Lake Ontario and, if it did, the amount of damages sustained and who is liable for the damage. The Canadian Government agrees to pay for all damages for which it is found liable.

The agreement will be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification by the President. After ratification, individual property owners will at the appropriate time be informed about the procedures for filing claims.

The Department of State considers this agreement a further demonstration of the close and friendly ties which characterize the relationship between Canada and the United States.

TEXT OF AGREEMENT

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL TO DISPOSE OF UNITED STATES CLAIMS RELATING TO GUT DAM

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA,

Considering that claims have been made by nationals of the United States of America against the Government of Canada alleging that their property in the United States has suffered damage or detriment as a result of high water levels in Lake Ontario or the St. Lawrence River:

Considering that these claimants have alleged further that the damage or detriment was attributable in whole or in part to the construction and maintenance of a dam in the international section of the St. Lawrence River known as and hereinafter referred to as "Gut Dam" and have claimed compensation for such damage or detriment from the Government of Canada; and

Considering that in the special circumstances associated with these claims the need arises to establish an international arbitral tribunal to hear and dispose of these claims in a final fashion,

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

ARTICLE I

1. An international arbitral tribunal, which shall be known as the Lake Ontario Claims Tribunal United States and Canada, hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal", is hereby established for the purpose of hearing and finally disposing of claims of nationals of

the United States of America including juridical persons that are presented to the Tribunal in accordance with the terms of this Agreement.

2. The Tribunal shall consist of the Chairman and two national members. One national member shall be appointed by the Government of the United States of America within two months after this Agreement enters into force; the other national member shall be appointed by the Government of Canada within the same period; a third member, who shall preside over the Tribunal as Chairman, shall be designated jointly by the two Governments within three months after this Agreement enters into force. If the third member has not been designated within three months after this Agreement enters into force, either Party to this Agreement may request the President of the International Court of Justice to designate such third member. In the event of the inability of any member of the Tribunal to serve, or in the event of a member failing to act as such, his successor shall be chosen in accordance with the same procedure and within the same time limits provided herein for the selection of his predecessor.

3. Each member of the Tribunal shall have one vote. Every decision of the Tribunal shall be reached by a majority vote and shall constitute a full and final determination of the subject matter of the decision.

4. Each member of the Tribunal shall be a judge or a lawyer competent to hold high judicial office in his national State. No member prior to his appointment shall have been associated directly or indirectly with any matter relating to this Agreement.

5. Each member of the Tribunal, before entering upon his duties, shall make and subscribe to a solemn declaration before the Joint Secretaries of the Tribunal stating that he will carefully and impartially examine and decide according to his best judgment and in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement all matters presented for his decision. A duplicate of every such declaration shall be filed with each of the Joint Secretaries of the Tribunal.

ARTICLE II

1. The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide in a final fashion each claim presented to it in accordance with the terms of this Agreement. Each decision of the Tribunal shall be based on its determination of any one or more of the following questions on the basis of the legal principles set forth in this Article:

(a) Was the construction and maintenance of Gut Dam the proximate cause of damage or detriment to the property that is the subject of such claim?

(b) If the construction and maintenance of Gut Dam was the proximate cause of damage or detriment to such property, what was the nature and extent of damage caused?

(c) Does there exist any legal liability to pay compensation for any damage or detriment caused by the construction and maintenance of Gut Dam to such property?

(d) If there exists a legal liability to pay compensation for any damage or detriment caused by the construction and maintenance of Gut Dam to such property, what is the nature and extent of such damage and what amount of compensation in terms of United States dollars should be paid therefor and by whom?

2. The Tribunal shall determine any legal liability issue arising under paragraph 1 of this Article in accordance with the following provisions:

(a) The Tribunal shall apply the substantive law in force in Canada and in the United States of America (exclusive, however, of any laws limiting the time within which any legal suit with respect to any claim is required to be instituted) to all the facts and circumstances surrounding the construction and maintenance of Gut Dam including all the documents passing between Governments concerning the construction of the dam and other relevant documents.

(b) In this Article the law in force in Canada and the United States of America respectively includes international law.

(c) No claim shall be disallowed or rejected by the Tribunal through the application of the general principle of international law that legal remedies must be exhausted as a condition precedent to the validity or allowance of any claim.

3. In the event that in the opinion of the Tribunal there exists such a divergence between the relevant substantive law in force in Canada and in the United States of America that it is not possible to make a final decision with regard to any particular claim as provided by this Article, the Tribunal shall apply such of the legal principles set forth in paragraph 2 as it considers appropriate, having regard to the desire of the Parties hereto to reach a solution just to all interests concerned.

4. The Tribunal shall not have jurisdiction over any claim presented under this Agreement unless the claim is accompanied by an undertaking, signed by the claimant in a form that is valid and binding under United States and Canadian law on any such claimant and his successors and assigns and indicating that he

(a) accepts the decision of the Tribunal as final and binding with respect to the matters to which it relates, and

(b) waives any right he may have to proceed against the Government of Canada otherwise than in a manner consistent with the terms of this Agreement.

5. Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to prevent the Tribunal from making any general finding or findings with respect to all claims submitted to it, or any particular category of claims submitted to it.

ARTICLE III

1. Any claim presented to the Tribunal under the terms of this Agreement shall be considered and dealt with exclusively in accordance with the procedures set out in this Agreement.

2. The Government of the United States of America shall take such action as may be necessary to ensure

that the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States shall discontinue its investigation and determination of all claims relating to Gut Dam.

ARTICLE IV

1. Each Government shall appoint a Secretary of the Tribunal. The persons so appointed shall act as Joint Secretaries of the Tribunal and shall be subject to its instructions.

2. The Tribunal may appoint such other persons, including engineers, as are considered necessary to assist in the performance of its duties, on such terms and conditions as the Tribunal may see fit, subject only to the availability of funds provided by the two Governments for the expenses of the Tribunal.

ARTICLE V

The Tribunal shall meet at such times and places as may be agreed upon by the members of the Tribunal, subject to instructions of the two Governments.

ARTICLE VI

The Tribunal shall, with the concurrence of the two Governments, adopt such rules for its proceedings as may be deemed expedient and necessary, but no such rule shall contravene any of the provisions of this Agreement. The rules shall be designed to expedite the determination of claims.

ARTICLE VII

1. Within 90 days after this Agreement enters into force, the Government of the United States of America shall file with the Joint Secretaries of the Tribunal three copies of the claim of each national of the United States of America alleging damage or detriment caused by the construction and maintenance of Gut Dam that it is submitting for adjudication. It shall also within the same period transmit three copies of each such claim to the Government of Canada. The claims shall be accompanied by all of the evidence on which the Government of the United States of America intends to rely.

2. Within 120 days after the receipt of each claim by the Government of Canada, in accordance with the terms of paragraph 1 of this Article, the Government of Canada shall file with the Joint Secretaries of the Tribunal three copies of the answer it is submitting with respect to such claim. It shall also within the same period transmit three copies of each such answer to the Government of the United States of America. The answer shall be accompanied by all of the evidence on which the Government of Canada intends to rely.

3. Within such time as may be prescribed by the rules adopted by the Tribunal:

(a) The Government of the United States of America shall file with the Joint Secretaries of the Tribunal three copies of a brief with reference to the construction and maintenance of Gut Dam and to any damage or detriment caused thereby and three copies of all briefs being submitted in support of the claims:

(b) The Government of the United States of America shall transmit three copies of each such brief to the

Government of Canada; and

(c) The Government of Canada shall file with the Joint Secretaries of the Tribunal three copies of one or more briefs in reply to the briefs of the Government of the United States of America and transmit three copies of the brief or briefs of the Government of Canada as so filed to the Government of the United States of America.

With the briefs each Government may submit evidence to rebut evidence submitted by the other Government.

4. No other pleadings or other briefs may be submitted by either Government except at the request of or with the approval of the Tribunal.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Each Government shall designate an Agent who shall present to the Tribunal all the pleadings, evidence, briefs and arguments of his Government with respect to any claim filed with the Tribunal in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. To assist the Agent, each Government may employ or appoint such counsel, engineers, investigators and other persons as it may desire.

2. All individual claims shall be presented to the Tribunal through the Agent of the Government of the United States of America.

ARTICLE IX

Whenever under the terms of this Agreement the approval or other form of instructions of Governments is required, such approval or other form of instructions shall be communicated by the Agent of such Government. All other communications required to be made to or by either Government under the terms of this Agreement shall be channeled through its Agent.

ARTICLE X

The Governments shall make all reasonable efforts to ensure that the members of the Tribunal, Agents, counsel and other appropriate persons shall be permitted at all reasonable times to enter and view and carry on investigations upon any of the property covered by any claim presented under the terms of this Agreement.

ARTICLE XI

The tribunal shall keep accurate permanent records of all its proceedings.

ARTICLE XII

1. The Tribunal shall in an expeditious manner render decisions on the matters referred to it and shall from time to time make such interim reports as are requested by the two Governments or as the Tribunal deems advisable.

2. The Tribunal shall submit to the Agents a copy of each decision when rendered. Each such decision shall be supported by reasons in writing and shall be accompanied by a copy of the record of all the proceedings maintained in relation to the hearing of the claim with which the decision is concerned.

3. A minority member may report a dissenting opin-

ion in writing, which shall accompany any decision of the Tribunal submitted under the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article to the Agents.

4. The decisions of the majority of the members of the Tribunal shall be the decisions of the Tribunal and shall be accepted as final and binding by the two Governments.

ARTICLE XIII

Awards of the Tribunal shall be entered in United States dollars. Every award made by the Tribunal shall be paid in United States dollars within one year from the date the Tribunal submits the decision to which the award relates to the two Governments in accordance with the provisions of Article XII.

ARTICLE XIV

The Tribunal shall determine and render decisions on all claims submitted to it within a period of two years from the date of the first meeting of the Tribunal, unless the two Governments agree to extend the period.

ARTICLE XV

Each Government shall defray the expenses incurred by it in the presentation of claims, pleadings, evidence and arguments to the Tribunal and shall pay the salary of its national member. All other expenses of the Tribunal, including the honorarium of the Chairman of the Tribunal, which shall be fixed by agreement of the two Governments, shall be defrayed in equal portions by the two Governments.

ARTICLE XVI

1. This Agreement shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Washington as soon as possible.

2. This Agreement shall enter into force on the day of exchange of the instruments of ratification.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Agreement.

DONE in duplicate at Ottawa, this twenty-fifth day of March, one thousand nine hundred sixty-five.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

W. WALTON BUTTERWORTH

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA:

PAUL MARTIN

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963.¹
Ratification deposited: Ecuador, March 11, 1965.

Property

Convention of Union of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, revised at Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, at London June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered into force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931.
Accession deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, March 17, 1965; effective July 1, 1965.

Satellite Communications System

Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.
Signature: Department of Posts and Telegraphs for Sudan, April 5, 1965.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.
Accession deposited: Malta, March 22, 1965.

Trade

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade with annexes and schedules and protocol of provisional application. Concluded at Geneva October 30, 1947. TIAS 1700.
Admitted as contracting party (with rights and obligations dating from independence): Burundi, February 26, 1965.

Wheat

Protocol for the extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington March 22 through April 23, 1965.¹
Signature: Ireland, April 9, 1965; Italy, April 7, 1965.

BILATERAL

Dahomey

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at Cotonou March 8 and 13, 1965. Entered into force March 13, 1965.

Ecuador

Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio operators of either country to operate their stations in the other country. Effected by exchange of notes at Quito March 26, 1965. Entered into force March 26, 1965.

Israel

Amendment to the agreement of July 12, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3311, 4407, 4507, 5079, 5723), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington April 2, 1965. Enters into force on the date on which each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

Viet-Nam

Agreement relating to mutual waiver of government claims for damages to government property and for injury or death of members of armed services. Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon February 9, 1965. Entered into force February 9, 1965.

¹ Not in force.

Agriculture. The Kennedy Round (Blumenthal) 628

American Republics. Third Annual Meeting of Inter-American Economic and Social Council (Morse) 640

Asia. Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia (Johnson) 606

Atomic Energy. Memorandum Signed on Study of Desalting Plant for Israel 635

Belgium. The United States and International Cooperation (Harriman) 621

Canada

President Asks Authority To Remove Duties on Canadian Auto Products 638

U.S. and Canada Sign Agreement on Claims Relating to Gut Dam (text) 643

Claims and Property. U.S. and Canada Sign Agreement on Claims Relating to Gut Dam (text) 643

Congress

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy 639

Funds Requested for Salinity Control on Lower Colorado River 637

President Asks Authority To Remove Duties on Canadian Auto Products 638

Repeal of Restrictive Trade Clause in Transportation Act Urged (Mann) 636

Economic Affairs

Funds Requested for Salinity Control on Lower Colorado River 637

The Kennedy Round (Blumenthal) 628

President Asks Authority To Remove Duties on Canadian Auto Products 638

Repeal of Restrictive Trade Clause in Transportation Act Urged (Mann) 636

Third Annual Meeting of Inter-American Economic and Social Council (Morse) 640

The United States and International Cooperation (Harriman) 621

U.S.-Japan Economic Committee To Meet at Washington in July 612

Foreign Aid. Third Annual Meeting of Inter-American Economic and Social Council (Morse) 640

International Organizations and Conferences

The Kennedy Round (Blumenthal) 628

Third Annual Meeting of Inter-American Economic and Social Council (Morse) 640

Israel. Memorandum Signed on Study of Desalting Plant for Israel 635

Japan. U.S.-Japan Economic Committee To Meet at Washington in July 612

Mexico. Funds Requested for Salinity Control on Lower Colorado River 637

Presidential Documents

Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia 606

President Asks Authority To Remove Duties on Canadian Auto Products 638

President Yameogo of Upper Volta Visits the United States 618

Science. Memorandum Signed on Study of Desalting Plant for Israel 635

Treaty Information

Current Actions 646

U.S. and Canada Sign Agreement on Claims Relating to Gut Dam (text) 643

United Nations. Peace Comes in Parcels (Cleveland) 613

Upper Volta. President Yameogo of Upper Volta Visits the United States (Johnson, Yameogo, joint communique) 618

Viet-Nam

Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia (Johnson) 606

U.S. Replies to 17-Nation Appeal on Viet-Nam (texts) 610

Name Index

Blumenthal, W. Michael 628

Cleveland, Harlan 613

Harriman, W. Averell 621

Johnson, President 606, 618, 638

Mann, Thomas C. 636

Morse, F. Bradford 640

Yameogo, Maurice 618

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 5-11

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to April 5 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 60 and 61 of March 25 and 66 of March 31.

No.	Date	Subject
†69	4/5	Soviet note of February 22 on ship interference rejected.
70	4/5	Meeting of U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs (re-write).
71	4 9	U.S.-Israel memorandum on desalting study.
†72	4 9	Mann: "Disparities in Progress Between Nations."
†73	4 9	Harriman: Roosevelt memorial dedication.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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The Dangers of Nostalgia

The "nostalgia" to which this title refers is the longing for "a return to an earlier era—a period remembered rightly or wrongly as less demanding and more rewarding. . . ." This pamphlet, based upon an address by Under Secretary Ball, discusses some of the complexities of today's world—resurgent nationalism, the movement toward European integration, the interdependence of the Atlantic nations, and the world responsibilities of the United States. It concludes with the thought that ". . . while it would be comforting to think that our postwar tasks around the world were largely over . . . that our massive responsibilities could all be shifted to other shoulders—this is simply not the case. For, like it or not, we live in a world that will almost certainly remain for a long time to come turbulent, difficult, frustrating, and complex."

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THE
DEPARTMENT
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BULLETIN

Vol. LII, No. 1349



May 3, 1965

TRAGEDY, DISAPPOINTMENT, AND PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Statement by President Johnson 650

CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION MEETS AT TEHRAN 655

ARMS CONTROL—FOUNDATION STONE IN THE RAMPARTS WE WATCH

by William C. Foster 659

THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY 669

For index see inside back cover

Tragedy, Disappointment, and Progress in Southeast Asia

*Statement by President Johnson*¹

This has been a week of tragedy, disappointment, and progress.

Tragedy today came to hundreds of Vietnamese, and many Americans, struck down in the cruel course of battle. On this, of all weekends, we must feel a deep sadness that men must still die, and families still be left homeless, in the brutality of war.

We mourn the death of Joseph Grainger [an area development officer], who worked to improve the life of villagers in Viet-Nam. And we mourn all the others, on both sides, who found this week to be their last.

I regret the necessities of war have compelled us to bomb North Viet-Nam. We have carefully limited those raids. They have been directed at radar stations, bridges, and ammunition dumps, not at population centers. They have been directed at concrete and steel, and not human life.

I understand the feelings of those who regret that we must undertake air attacks. I share those feelings. But the compassion of this country, and the world, must go out to the men and women and children who are killed and crippled by the Viet Cong every day in South Viet-Nam. The outrage of this country, and the world, must be visited on those who explode their bombs in cities and villages, ripping the bodies of the helpless. The indignation of this country, and the world, must extend to all who seek dominion over the others with violent and ruthless disregard for life, happiness, or security. And let us remember, the people of South Viet-Nam, and the Americans who share their struggle, suffer because they are attacked—not because they are attackers.

Window to Peace Still Open

It has been a week of disappointment because we tried to open a window to peace,

¹ Made to news correspondents at the LBJ Ranch, Johnson City, Tex., on Apr. 17 (White House press release (Johnson City, Tex.)).

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LII, NO. 1349 PUBLICATION 7879 MAY 3, 1965

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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only to be met with tired names and slogans and a refusal to talk.

They want no talk with us, no talk with a distinguished Briton, no talk with the United Nations. They want no talk at all so far. But our offer stands. We mean every word of it.

Peace is too important. The stakes are far too high to permit anyone to indulge in slander and invective. We will not reply in kind. The window to peace is still open. We are still ready for unconditional discussion. We will impose no conditions of any kind on any government willing to talk, nor will we accept any. On this basis we are ready to begin discussion next week, tomorrow, or tonight. Nor can the continuation of the war be used to doubt the sincerity of our peaceful purpose.

The infiltrations continue. The terror continues. Death in the night continues. And we must also continue.

To those governments who doubt our willingness to talk the answer is simple—agree to discussion, come to the meetingroom. We will be there. Our objective in Viet-Nam remains the same—an independent South Viet-Nam, tied to no alliance, free to shape its relations and association with all other nations. This is what the people of South Viet-Nam want, and we will finally settle for no less.

Our policy also remains the same, to strive for peace but not to yield to aggression, to use what power we must but no more than we need, to stay until independence is secure but to leave when that independence is surely guaranteed.

And let this also be clear: Until that independence is guaranteed there is no human power capable of forcing us from Viet-Nam. We will remain as long as is necessary, with the might that is required, whatever the risk being and whatever the cost.

We are told by some that there can be no peace and no hope for a better life unless we first surrender and abandon South Viet-Nam. This we will not do, and I hope that a mounting crescendo of world opinion, that is weary of war, that is opposed to aggression, will

Secretary Rules Out Suspension of U.S. Raids on North Viet-Nam

Statement by Secretary Rusk¹

We have thought long and soberly about suspending, for a period, the raids on North Viet-Nam. Some have suggested this could lead to an end of aggression from the North. But we have tried publicly and privately to find out if this would be the result, and there has been no response. Others say such a pause is needed to signal our sincerity, but no signal is needed. Our sincerity is plain.

If we thought such action would advance the cause of an honorable peace, we would order it immediately, but now our best judgment tells us it would only encourage the aggressor and dishearten our friends who bear the brunt of battle.

¹ Read to news correspondents on Apr. 17 by Robert J. McCloskey, Director, Office of News.

finally find a way to reach the ears of those that are now deaf to calls for peace.

Strengthened Unity of American Purpose

This has been a week of progress because it has brought a strengthened unity of American purpose. More than ever, in the Congress and in the press, among people in every section and every occupation, we are united on the need to resist aggression, to pursue peace, and to improve the lives of the people of Southeast Asia.

There has also been progress around the world in understanding the peaceful aim which we share with the Government of South Viet-Nam. There has been renewed appreciation that by defending South Viet-Nam we also stand for the independence of all who have cause to fear their neighbors. And our unyielding determination has strengthened the hope of those men menaced by terror and discouraged those who expect conquest by default.

As a result, news from the battlefield is improving. It is more clear than ever that the real hope for the South Vietnamese is not with the attackers but against them. I join

the Vietnamese Government in a warm welcome to the increasing numbers who choose to leave that false cause and rejoin their countrymen.

Progress in Economic Aid Programs

Progress has also come in the beginning of a massive new effort to improve the lives of the people of Southeast Asia.

These countries are not pawns on a chessboard. They are not simply a battlefield for contending powers or abstract ideologies. Their fields and villages sustain millions of people whose first desire is the food, shelter, and hope for progress.

Last week I suggested that the industrialized countries of the world join in helping them realize those desires.² Since that time, the skills and energies of our own Government have been directed toward examining the most effective contributions that we might make. We have had discussions with leaders of the United Nations. The Secretary-General has taken the lead. Other industrialized nations, like Japan, Canada, and the United Kingdom, have shown their willingness to take a share in this enterprise.

Already ideas are being transformed into programs and intentions into action.

Our purpose should not be misunderstood. We do not seek to buy peace. If the price of ending aggression is blood and men, we are ready to pay that price. We do this because it is necessary to the health and independence of Southeast Asia. We do it because it is right in this world that the strong and the wealthy should help the poor and the weak.

Nor are we neglecting the special needs of battle-torn South Viet-Nam. In the last 10 years we have spent more than \$2 billion for economic progress in that area. Yesterday, only yesterday, I sent a team of rural electrification experts to Saigon to help extend the healing miracles of electricity to the Vietnamese countryside. For in South Viet-Nam, as in all Asia, peace must not simply be an end to conflict. It must be the begin-

ning of progress and hope and of the elimination of material misery.

It is not easy to engage in a struggle whose beginning is obscure, and whose end is not in sight. Peace, like war, requires patience and the courage to go on despite discouragement. Yet we must go on, for there is a world to lose, a world of peace, of order, and of expanding programs for all who live therein.

That will be a world whose institutions are varied as humanity itself. It will be a world in which nations follow where reason and experience lead, never sacrificing man to the abstract arrogance of ideology. It will be a world where each nation is free to take its own path to change.

This is the course of history. Domination and empire, conquest and aggression, are relics of a bloody past. But we must protect our future against that past.

How fortunate we are to have been given the power and the courage to match this vision in this enormous time in the life of man.

The Works of Peace

*Remarks by President Johnson*¹

Three decades ago—30 years ago—the course of history for the world was set upon a tragic direction because other men in other lands misread our American purpose, misjudged our American will, and—not least of all—miscalculated the spirit and the stamina of our American youth.

There must not be any mistakes like that made today, because I am determined to use whatever talents are mine to make certain that America is not misunderstood in the world today.

In this setting, and under these circumstances which mean so much to me, I would like for a moment today to speak from my heart to the hearts of men and women everywhere in all this world, to say a few things:

Beyond these shores, we of America have

¹ Made during an address at the dedication of the Gary Job Corps Center, San Marcos, Tex., on Apr. 10 (White House press release, as-delivered text).

² BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

only one purpose; that purpose is peace in the world for all men—peace for ourselves and peace for all mankind of all countries.

The only wars we seek are wars such as we are fighting here today on these peaceful grounds—as Dr. Singletary mentioned—wars against poverty, wars against diseases, wars against discrimination, wars against ignorance, and wars against war itself.

I started out the early part of the week trying to evolve and enunciate a program that I hoped would be war against war itself, in a tripod, three-pronged speech that I made in Baltimore on Wednesday evening² to the Nation and to the world, in which I made clear our firmness and our commitment, and our determination to carry out our commitment; our readiness and our willingness to engage in unconditional discussions; and our great Christian and humanitarian desire to participate in helping to develop other parts of the world.

And to you young men who may be following in our footsteps not many years from now, I want to observe this: I don't think that this country has ever had a more profitable week in its political history.

Wednesday we were evolving a program of war against war in Baltimore. Thursday we were passing the most far-reaching, comprehensive legislative health program ever enacted by any country at any time through the House of Representatives. Friday we got done what we have been trying to do in this country since 1870—pass a comprehensive, legislative national education bill.

I remember back many years ago—more than 20 years ago—when I was one of two or three men from my section to vote for an education bill, and I was so proud last night when they brought me word that only 17 in the entire Senate voted against one yesterday out of the 100 Senators there.

So, on health, on education, the war on diseases, the war on ignorance, the war against war, and, yes, the war against discrimination—this week, yesterday, we reported from the committees of the House

and of the Senate the most comprehensive, legislative voting rights bill to have been committed from the committees of the Congress.

So we would like to welcome to these works that we are doing, not just the people of our Congress, or our State, but all peoples of all nations. And we were so happy that we could have the distinguished Governor from our sister Republic here on the platform with us today, because it was just a few weeks ago when I talked to his distinguished President here about the program of this administration's war against war, war against ancient enemies of ignorance, and diseases, and poverty, and illiteracy, and I am so happy that their President Dias Ordaz is undertaking a similar program in his country, and he will have our most enthusiastic support and cooperation.

We do not seek to live in a world where all men think alike, but we do seek to live in a world where all men are free to think together.

Peace is our purpose, and the works of peace are the works that we want to do most.

Let no man in any land, any time, misjudge our purpose, or our cause, or our course.

We love peace. We hate war. But our course is charted always by the compass of honor.

We know today, as Americans have always known, that liberty has only one price—and that is eternal vigilance. That price we are able and we are willing to pay.

Where we have given our commitments to others, as I said Wednesday night in Baltimore, we shall keep them, for we have made a binding commitment to ourselves that peace shall not be lost and freedom shall not perish from this earth.

I hope I speak softly but firmly when I say to all, let none misjudge. Let none doubt the will that supports this American purpose of peace and freedom.

I would say also let none today miscalculate either the spirit or the stamina of our American youth. In times past America has asked her young to shoulder arms and to

² For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

fight for freedom on many fields and many forests throughout the world. And I would remind all the world that they have never failed.

These times now we ask our young and the youth of all the lands to give their hands and their hearts to these worthy wars against poverty and disease, illiteracy and discrimination, because we believe the young people of the world are ready to rally to such endeavors. We know this is true of the young people in America, and as I said the other night we would so much enjoy asking our men from the far corners of Southeast Asia to return from the bombs and the bullets of that area, and bring them home, and to help those who live there build a peaceful world that knows no illiteracy and no disease and no poverty.

Today we are spending in Southeast Asia between \$1½ billion and \$2 billion on bombs and bullets and helicopters, and war and disease and development. How much better it would be if we could bring half of the money we are spending there now back in those helicopters with those men to help develop our own young people here at home, and leave the other half out there to help develop their young people so we could work together in brotherly love.

We are determined here in America to give all of our youth their chance. We would like to see that done for all youth everywhere. We in America are committing our resources to the education of our people as never before, to their health as never before, to their happiness and their hope as never before. We are determined that no child born in this land of the free shall ever be deprived by our neglect of realizing his share of America's promise.

That promise of America was once described by Thomas Wolfe in these words:

—To every man, his chance.

—To every man, regardless of his birth, his shining golden opportunity.

—To every man the right to live, to work, to be himself, and to become whatever his manhood and his vision can combine to make him.

—This, seeker, is the promise of America.

All my life, since I left this beautiful little

city of San Marcos, I have been devoted to the fulfillment of this promise, and that devotion was never more positive or more determined than it is today.

But I want the youth of the world today to know, whether they live in the East or the West, in old countries or young countries, that the American President and the American people want to fulfill this promise not just for our own but for them too.

We believe that this is not a dark and dreary hour for mankind, but rather we are convinced this is a bright and precious time when the hope for peace is real, when the chance for progress is great, when the light of liberty can shine forth more brightly than it has ever shined in all of our history. We are determined, we are steadfastly resolved, that the precious opportunity shall not be lost for the youth of America or for the youth of the entire world.

In these purposes we are a nation united, we are a people dedicated, we are a land determined as we have been for 189 years.

Ambassador Bunker Concludes Meetings With Indonesian Leaders

*Joint Communiqué*¹

During his visit in Indonesia, Ambassador [Ellsworth] Bunker, representing President Johnson, has had several meetings with His Excellency President Sukarno, and has met with First Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Subandrio and other Ministers of the Government of Indonesia. These meetings have produced a full and frank exchange of views on the attitudes and desires of the two governments toward the question of the relationship between them.

Both governments have recognized that friendly relations between Indonesia and the United States are of the greatest importance to the people of both countries. Ambassador Bunker has assured President Sukarno that the United States has the objectives of attaining the freedom, welfare and security of

¹ Released at Djakarta, Indonesia, on Apr. 15.

all countries. While it is true that on a range of matters of foreign policy the views of Indonesia and those of the United States are divergent, they have agreed that these differences should not be allowed to affect unduly the general pattern of friendship which has existed for so many years between them.

President Sukarno emphasized that Indonesia regards the issue between Indonesia and Malaysia as being of the greatest importance, and that he wishes to see it settled on the basis of the Manila and Tokyo agreements.² Ambassador Bunker reaffirmed that the United States deeply regrets that the problem exists, and hopes that a peaceful solution to it can be brought about by Asian powers through these or any other means acceptable to those concerned.

At the same time His Excellency the President and Ambassador Bunker recognized that these differences have produced certain tensions between Indonesia and the United States, and that as a result the programs of assistance to Indonesia which the United States has undertaken in recent years should be reviewed and revised on a continuing basis to be sure that they conform to the desires of the two governments. In specific, Ambassador Bunker informed His Excellency the President that the United States would be willing to continue its program of technical assistance to certain Indonesian universities, and the President assured Ambassador Bunker that this program was welcome to and had the full support of the Government of Indonesia.

On the other hand, His Excellency the President and Ambassador Bunker agreed that in light of the current situation the Peace Corps should cease operations in Indonesia. The Peace Corps Volunteers will, accordingly, take the necessary steps to termi-

² The Manila agreement, in August 1963, called for U.N. ascertainment of whether the populace in the British Borneo states favored joining Malaysia. Indonesia rejected the U.N. findings. The Tokyo agreement, June 1964, envisaged the formation of a four-power Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission to help bring about a peaceful settlement.

nate their programs in an orderly fashion and will depart from Indonesia during the next few weeks.

His Excellency the President and Ambassador Bunker concluded that personal communication between President Sukarno and President Johnson was of great importance to both countries, and undertook to see that it will be maintained.

Letters of Credence

The following newly appointed ambassadors presented their credentials to President Johnson on April 13:

Radomiro Tomic Romero of Chile,
Torben Rønne of Denmark, and
Sir Patrick Dean of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

U.S. Protests Harassment of Ships by Soviets; Rejects Soviet Charges

U.S. PROTEST OF APRIL 2

Press release 68 dated April 2

Department Announcement

The United States Government in a note of April 2, 1965, to the Soviet Government protested the dangerous harassment of U.S. Navy vessels by Soviet ships. The note, which was delivered to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, cited six occasions on which reckless harassing maneuvers by Soviet ships endangered U.S. Navy ships in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans as well as in the Mediterranean Sea. Most of these incidents resulted from deliberate Soviet attempts to interfere with U.S. naval operations by approaching ships on collision courses in violation of the International Rules of the Road.

The note reminded the Soviet Government that "it would bear full responsibility for the serious consequences that would result should a collision occur. . . ."

Text of U.S. Note

APRIL 2, 1965

The United States Government requests the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to draw to the attention of the Soviet Government the grave concern of the United States Government to recent harassing tactics employed by Soviet ships. These incidents have violated the Rules of the Road, disregarded the practices of good seamanship, and ignored the principle of the Freedom of the Seas as codified in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas.

The Government of the United States, on February 24, called the attention of the Soviet Government to two recent examples of hazardous activities undertaken by Soviet ships by their persistent presence and maneuvering within United States naval tactical formations in the Mediterranean Sea: the harassing actions taken by the Soviet ship "Kotelnikov" on January 10, which interfered with replenishment at sea operations involving the USS "Sarotoga" and the USS "Neosho;" and the reckless navigation of the Soviet ships "Dzerzhinskii, MB 152," and "Magomet Glazkeyv" which interfered with the flight operations of the USS "Roosevelt" during a two day period, from September 25 through 27, 1964.

Even more recent examples of continuing Soviet harassments are documented in the following situations:

On January 7, 1965, at about 5:45 p.m., GMT, at approximately 56°44' N. Lat., 13°01' W. Long., in the Eastern Atlantic, the Soviet ship "Vertikal," with a lookout stationed on her bow using binoculars, approached from dead astern to within 75 feet of the USNS "Dutton" and crossed over a towed magnetometer cable. This maneuver was made in spite of appropriate warning flags and signals displayed by the "Dutton" indicating a tow astern. Immediately upon retrieval of the cable, it was evident that the cable had been torn by the screws of "Vertikal" and the magnetometer severed and missing. During the cable retrieving, the "Vertikal" played two arc lights on the "Dutton's" stern and continued to close in on her starboard side and stern despite repeated emergency signals on the "Dutton's" whistle. Again, while the "Dutton" was turning to port to stream a second magnetometer, the "Vertikal" closed on the "Dutton's" stern despite additional emergency signals on the latter's whistle to alert the Soviet ship. In view of these actions, it must be concluded that "Vertikal" intended deliberately to interfere with and to harass the "Dutton" during the course of a legitimate survey operation on the high seas and did in fact damage the "Dutton's" tow cable and sever and cause the ship to lose her magnetometer.

On February 16, 1965, the Soviet ship "Zond" harassed the operations of the United States Navy submarine "Lafayette" in the Eastern Atlantic, approximately 35 miles west of Cadiz, Spain. The

"Zond" changed courses and speeds in order to remain close to the "Lafayette" during the morning hours, attempting to cross ahead of the "Lafayette" from port to starboard on six occasions. This caused serious risk of collision in flagrant violation of the Rules of the Road and in complete disregard of good seamanship practices.

On February 24, 1965, in the vicinity of Lat. 32°41' N., Long. 117°46.6' W. off the California coast, the Soviet ship "Arban" maneuvered to interfere with underway fueling operations of the USS "Hornet" and the naval tanker USS "Ashtabula." The "Hornet" was required to break off her approach on the tanker because of serious risk of collision and the "Arban's" illegal change of course to port in violation of the Rules of the Road. The "Arban's" actions throughout this incident were in complete disregard of customary courtesy on the high seas and the practices of good seamanship.

On March 2, 1965, in the waters of the Narragansett Bay, off the coast of Rhode Island, the Soviet trawler "Sverdlovsky" (number M-B MRT 242) for more than one-half hour deliberately harassed the naval exercises of the USS "Courtney," the USS "Hartley," the USS "Keywadin." The "Sverdlovsky" first crossed the "Courtney's" bow from starboard to port and then, immediately after crossing, reversed her course to take position ahead of and in the track of the "Courtney." The "Courtney" was required to turn hard right to avoid collision. Thereafter, the "Sverdlovsky" changed course to head directly for USS "Keywadin," hazarding the particular exercise then underway.

In view of the continuing and dangerous actions of Soviet ships to enter and remain with United States naval task force formations and to harass their operations in violation of international law and in disregard of the principle of the Freedom of the Seas, the United States Government again reminds the Soviet Government that it would bear full responsibility for the serious consequences that would result should a collision occur under these circumstances.

REJECTION OF SOVIET CHARGES

Press release 69 dated April 5

Department Announcement

The United States Government on April 5 rejected the charges in a Soviet note of February 22, 1965,¹ which alleged interference with Soviet ships by U.S. Navy ships and aircraft.

The U.S. reply, which was delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Mos-

¹ Not printed here.

cow, stated that upon investigation by competent U.S. authorities the Soviet allegations were found to be incorrect or exaggerated and that in all cases cited U.S. Navy ships and U.S. aircraft acted in compliance with the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, did not violate the International Rules of the Road, and did not harass, threaten, or interfere with any Soviet ship.

Text of U.S. Note

APRIL 5, 1965

The United States Government refers to the Soviet Government's note of February 22, 1965 and to its interim reply of February 26, 1965.¹ The Government of the United States has studied the Soviet note of February 22 and upon investigation has found the allegations therein to be incorrect or exaggerated. The facts established by the competent United States authorities in all of the alleged incidents show that no United States Navy ship maneuvered in violation of the Rules of the Road; no threat of collision was created at any time; and United States aircraft flights were neither dangerously close nor low. In all of these cases, United States Navy ships and United States aircraft acted in compliance with the principle of freedom of the high seas as provided in Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas.

The verified details of each alleged incident follow:

At 5:00 a.m. GMT January 24, 1965, the USS "Joseph Strauss" sighted a merchant ship at Lat. 22°55' N., Long. 125°15' E. The USS "Strauss" approached the ship on a parallel course and proceeded alongside at a distance of 1,000 yards for a period of only 12 minutes, from 5:25 a.m. until 5:37 a.m., and not for a period of 52 minutes as alleged, in order to identify the ship which proved to be the Soviet merchant ship "Poronaysk." At no time, either during the approach or while proceeding off the beam of the "Poronaysk," did the "Strauss" train its weapons upon the Soviet ship as alleged. Actually, no ordnance or fire control equipment of the USS "Strauss" was manned at any time, all directors, mounts and launchers remaining centerlined. At 5:37 a.m. the USS "Strauss" increased speed and turned away 60 degrees, at the same time signaling, "I wish you a pleasant voyage." In reply, "Poronaysk" hoisted code flags saying, "Thank you."

On January 31, 1965 the USS "Gurke," at about the time and position alleged, did approach the Soviet ship "Poronaysk" in order to identify the Soviet ship. At no time, however, did the USS "Gurke" interfere with the safe navigation of the "Poronaysk," cause any risk of collision, nor train her

ordnance on the Soviet ship as alleged. The USS "Gurke" made a careful approach from the stern and maneuvered at a safe distance off the port beam of the "Poronaysk" merely for the legitimate and legal purpose of identification. The "Poronaysk" was not required to take any avoiding action but, in fact, maintained course and speed throughout the incident.

On January 26, 1965, in position 16°27' N., 109°52' E., at approximately 12:24 p.m. local time, the USS "Ernest G. Small" sighted an unidentified merchant ship five miles to the southeast which was tracked on course 320° at a speed of 12 knots. When the merchant ship failed to respond to the "Small's" signal and refused to identify herself, the United States ship increased speed and approached no closer than one-half mile off the starboard quarter where the merchant ship was identified as the Soviet tanker "Gorky." The "Small" at no time violated any of the Rules of the Road, nor did she maneuver in dangerous proximity to or make any provocative move toward the "Gorky," but, on the contrary complied fully with practices of good seamanship and the principle of the Freedom of the Seas.

With regard to the alleged specified overflights of Soviet ships by United States military aircraft, the record establishes that no overflights were made at dangerously low altitudes but that all were made in compliance with authorized procedures for identification and in no way threatened or hazarded the safety of the ships in question. During the period from January 4 through 25, the Soviet scientific research ship "Yu. M. Shokal'skiy" was approached by United States naval aircraft on some ten occasions but at no time was the ship harassed by dangerously close approaches or directly overflown, and specifically, in no case was the "Shokal'skiy" overflown at a height of 25 to 30 meters, as charged. All approaches were made in compliance with applicable regulations which establish minimum safe heights and lateral distances from the ship to protect adequately both the safety of the ship and the aircraft involved. On January 30, 1965, the Soviet tanker "Fedor Poletayev" was sighted at about 7:26 p.m. GMT, in the position 22°45' N., 49°52' W. No direct overflight occurred and the closest horizontal distance was 500 feet astern for the purpose of distinguishing her name. No objects of any type were dropped by the United States aircraft. On January 29, 1965, United States aircraft did sight and identify the Soviet ship "Dalniy" during daylight hours at the approximate position indicated. One overflight was made at a safe height of 1,000 feet and six other overflights were made at a safe lateral distance from the ship for positive identification. On February 12, 1965, the United States aircraft 151359 did locate and identify the Soviet transport "Chernyakhovsk" at approximately the position indicated in the Soviet note but at no time did the aircraft overfly the ship but rather made four approaches at

¹ Not printed here.

a safe distance off her side. In summary, United States aircraft involved in all of the alleged aircraft incidents complied with authorized identification procedures which provide for the maintenance of safe altitudes and sufficient lateral distances from the ship, and which do not interfere with navigation, pose any threat, or harass the ship in any way.

In as much as the facts do not correspond to the allegations of the Soviet Government, the United States Government is not able to accept the protest contained in the Soviet Government's note of February 22. The United States Government continues to instruct captains of its ships and its aircraft commanders to comply with the Rules of the Road, with flight restrictions and other regulations which will reflect correct behavior and maintain safety in operations at sea and in the air.

U.S. Protests Harassment on Access Routes to Berlin

Following is the text of a note delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the American Embassy at Moscow on April 7. Identical notes were delivered by France and the United Kingdom. The Western Allies were replying to a Soviet note of March 23.

APRIL 7, 1965

The Government of the United States of America cannot accept the views of the Soviet Government concerning the plenary meeting of the German Bundestag and the meetings of committees and fraktions which will take place in Berlin this week. These meetings do not affect the special status of Berlin, as defined in the quadripartite agreements, nor do they place in question the responsibility of the Four Powers for Berlin and Germany as a whole. Moreover, such meetings have taken place repeatedly in the past without provoking any incident.

On the other hand the Soviet and East German authorities have for several days been taking a series of measures against ac-

cess to Berlin, the illegal character of which is evident.

Since April 1 the East German authorities have repeatedly hindered movement on the ground routes to Berlin. Civil freight and passenger traffic between Berlin and Western Germany has been deliberately delayed or stopped by unreasonable searches and interrogations. Since April 5 the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn has been closed to traffic on several occasions and for several hours at a time. The waterways to Berlin have been similarly closed for periods of hours or days. These measures have amounted to a serious violation of the freedom of access to Berlin. In addition the East German authorities have again intensified interference with the free movement of persons between the Western and Soviet sectors of Berlin.

Simultaneously, on the pretext that Soviet and East German maneuvers were taking place in the Berlin area, Allied personnel traveling between Berlin and Western Germany have been turned back by the Soviet authorities on entering the autobahn.

The Soviet controller in the Berlin Air Safety Center has also refused to guarantee flight safety for Allied aircraft using certain flight levels in the air corridors during the whole period of these maneuvers.

These measures taken by the Soviet and East German authorities are contrary to the quadripartite agreements which define the special status of Berlin and establish the conditions of access to the city. They can only provoke tension in Europe.

The Government of the United States of America looks to the Soviet Government to put an immediate end to the harassment of ground communications with Berlin and to take whatever steps may be necessary to prevent a recurrence. It will also hold the Soviet Government responsible for the safety of Allied flights in the air corridors. These flights will continue in accordance with the quadripartite rules on this subject.

Arms Control—Foundation Stone in the Ramparts We Watch

by *William C. Foster*

*Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency*¹

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency which I direct was established by Public Law 87-297 enacted by Congress in September 1961. The act states that this Agency "must have such a position within the Government that it can provide the President, the Secretary of State, other officials of the executive branch, and the Congress with recommendations concerning United States arms control and disarmament policy, and can assess the effect of these recommendations upon our foreign policies, our national security policies, and our economy." This same act includes also the statement: "Arms control and disarmament policy, being an important aspect of foreign policy, must be consistent with national security policy as a whole."

Let us consider briefly the relationship of arms control efforts with our national security interest. Four American Presidents since World War II have been deeply concerned with arms control. Our leaders have understood that mounting stockpiles of nuclear weapons cannot alone insure our security. Four U.S. administrations have realized that military preparedness is not in itself sufficient to assure peace.

The national interest since 1945 has dictated that negotiations be undertaken to seek agreements aimed at reducing the risks of war and at the eventual elimination of the causes of war.

Only fools would deny that our national

security requires the use of force to meet aggression. So we must be firm in the maintenance of superior armed might for use against an aggressive despoiler of freedom. But when a single nuclear weapon can contain several times the explosive force of all the bombs dropped by both sides in World War II, then it becomes clear that our national security requires a search for safeguarded arms control and disarmament agreements to avoid catastrophe for all concerned.

In brief, we should understand that our national security does not always increase as we increase our arms. An arms race moving at increasing speed toward nuclear annihilation inevitably diminishes the security of us all.

In consequence the United States has been engaged since the end of World War II in a quest for balanced, verifiable agreements with other nations. Such agreements would control and limit armaments as a means of averting war and strengthening world peace.

By 1960 it had become increasingly apparent that if we were to be better prepared for negotiations, there was a need for a central agency charged with responsibility for planning and coordinating policy for arms control and disarmament. Such an agency would have to be equipped with an experienced staff fully qualified in the various fields which are involved in planning and negotiating for arms limitation and control.

Accordingly, the late President Kennedy transmitted in 1961² draft legislation for

¹ Address made before the Chemical Industry Council of Southern California at Los Angeles, Calif., on Mar. 31.

² BULLETIN of July 17, 1961, p. 99.

consideration by the Congress which was to result in the establishment of the first agency of its kind in history—an agency for peace.

How the Disarmament Agency Operates

I could dwell at great length on the functions of my Agency, but I have other important matters to bring before you and, regretfully, I will pass up this opportunity to tell you how great my team really is. But there are individuals, probably inspired by extremist literature, who seem to think that ACDA is manned by dreamy-eyed idealists who sit in isolation from the rest of the Government and cook up proposals which would in effect turn over a defenseless America to its enemies. Nothing could be further from the truth, and I shall devote a minute or so telling you why.

Arms control and disarmament proposals generally do originate in the Agency. If they survive the working-group level of other agencies concerned with security, the proposals are put by me before the Committee of Principals. The membership of this unique institution consists of the highest ranking official of each interested Government agency—the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Director of the U.S. Information Agency, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

As a committee, these officials review, discuss, and make recommendations to the President on all arms control and disarmament proposals. Before any measures are set forth in negotiations, the President must give his final approval.

As Director of the Agency I benefit from the advice of two groups of distinguished advisers. One is the General Advisory Committee, composed of experts and prominent citizens appointed by the President from business, labor, academic, military, and sci-

entific fields. It brings an informed non-governmental view to bear on arms control problems. Of this group, Mr. Herman Phleger of Redwood City and Professor Herbert York of San Diego are from California.

The other group, the Social Science Advisory Board, is made up of eminent scholars from leading U.S. universities and represents a variety of social science disciplines. It keeps me apprised of professional research in the field pertinent to arms control and advises on relevant social science developments. Again from California, Professor Gordon Craig of Stanford University and Mrs. Alice Hsieh from Santa Monica make a welcome contribution to this effort.

Since ACDA was established, the United States Government can point to some accomplishments in its efforts to place restraints on the increase and the spread of the arms race. The best known and perhaps the most significant is the limited nuclear test ban treaty negotiated with the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in the summer of 1963 and which now is adhered to by more than 100 nations. That treaty was based on a draft introduced by the United States at the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva the year before. The Washington-Moscow communications link—the “hot line”—agreement was signed in Geneva in June 1963. In October 1963 the U.S.S.R. and the United States sponsored a United Nations General Assembly resolution to refrain from stationing nuclear weapons in space. This proposal had been made by us to the Soviet Union the year before. And just a year ago this nation, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom announced planned cutbacks in the production of fissionable materials for weapons use.

These accomplishments represent small steps down a very long and tortuous path and much remains to be done in placing further restraints on the arms race.

The nature of the modern arms race is vividly shown by testimony given by Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara in February of this year. He estimates that, against the nuclear forces we expect the

Soviets to have during the next decade, we would find it virtually impossible to provide anything like complete protection for our population no matter how large our nuclear forces were.

By spending up to 25 billion additional dollars for defense, we might, he says, reduce our fatalities from around 150 million to perhaps 80 million (assuming 1970 population and force levels). But, by increasing their offensive missile forces, the Soviets could offset our increase in survivors and thus prevent us from achieving even this level of protection. And they could do it at far less extra expense to them for the offensive forces than the extra cost to us for the defense.

An arms race of this nature would be madness. Both sides have an interest in preventing it. One of the immediate tasks of my Agency is to seek an acceptable alternative by means of arms control agreements.

The Defense Department estimates call for a large percentage of our projected strategic offensive forces in the 1970's to play a damage-limiting role. We know that at each successively higher level of U.S. expenditures, the ratio of our costs for limiting damage to the potential aggressor's cost for assured destruction becomes less and less favorable for us. It would appear that further investigation is in order as to whether a disarmament agreement providing for a verified destruction of both U.S. damage-limiting missiles and Soviet assured-destruction missiles might not provide a more effective and reliable means of limiting damage to ourselves and to our allies.

Arms Control and National Defense

At this point let me express some of my convictions as to the role of the arms control measures in our national defense. Such measures can, first of all, help to make adequate national defense possible at present force and armament levels, and ultimately at lower levels. No one will deny that there are uncertainties in maintaining the present rough balance of deterrence as arms continue to build up on both sides. The point

to understand and remember here is that it is possible to maintain military balance at a fixed level—or on a downward plane—rather than on an upward spiral.

Secondly, arms control measures offer a means of correcting a situation in which a disproportionate amount of our national resources goes into armaments. No sensible person would begrudge the spending of more money were such expenditures to afford a necessary increase in our national security. However, when billions more can buy us only the same, or less, security, the effort should be made to have both sides level off and, if at all possible, scale downward under controlled and verified conditions.

Thus it is essential that we attempt to slow down the nuclear buildup—and inhibit the further spread of nuclear weapons—while we still presumably have some control of the situation.

The Threat of Nuclear Proliferation

The most urgent problem before us today is to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. In 1963 President Kennedy spoke to the Nation on this subject:³

I ask you [he said] to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security, and no chance of effective disarmament. There would only be the increased chance of accidental war and an increased necessity for the great powers to involve themselves in what otherwise would be local conflicts.

Last October at a test site near a lake called Lop Nor the Chinese Communists exploded a nuclear device.

A second nuclear test appears to be imminent.

The Soviet Union today has full cause to regret the significant scientific and technological help provided Communist China in the 1950's which made this accomplishment possible. The nuclear weapon is a dangerous toy to place in the hands of a nation devoted

³ *Ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234.

to aggression by whatever means, and which espouses violence to effect social and political change. While Communist China calls loudly for nuclear disarmament, it defiantly boasts that its intention is to become a full-fledged nuclear power. In open defiance of the U.N. Charter, Communist China is busily engaged in spreading its own brand of imperialism by subversion and aggression.

Indeed Communist China has openly challenged Soviet leadership in the Communist world and challenged it with some success.

Communist China leaders will continue to exploit politically their successes in nuclear testing, particularly in Afro-Asian areas, as evidence of their technical, military, and economic development. And there is no reason to believe that given time the Communist China regime cannot produce both medium- and long-range missiles armed with nuclear warheads. This is a disturbing long-range prospect in view of the hostility which the Peiping regime has demonstrated.

The U.S. administration has these facts fully in mind—as our continued presence in South Viet-Nam testifies. President Johnson has reaffirmed our defense commitments in Asia, and our defense plans take full account of Communist Chinese military development.

The Communist Chinese nuclear detonation, however, has created a very real and immediate problem, a problem whose critical portions we can only guess at but whose immediate solution is imperative.

President Johnson, addressing the Nation 2 days after the Chinese Communist detonation, spoke of an added meaning to the explosion at Lop Nor: ⁴

Communist China's expensive and demanding effort [he said] tempts other states to equal folly. Nuclear spread is dangerous to all mankind. What if there should come to be 10 nuclear powers, or maybe 20 nuclear powers? What if we must learn to look everywhere for the restraint which our own example now sets for a few? Will the human race be safe in such a day?

There is the great danger that, should Communist China continue to test, a chain reaction will set in whereby one, then an-

other, and then another nation might make that same fateful decision.

In India today there is a great deal of soul searching on whether or not to go ahead with the nuclear weapons program. Despite the fact that India has already experienced Communist China aggression, that nation is to be commended that it has elected not to pursue nuclear research for military purposes. But that is a decision which could be overturned at any time under given circumstances.

Although the Communist Chinese nuclear test may have dangerous repercussions, it is not this action alone which lends new urgency to the threat of nuclear proliferation. And here we see a paradox. It stems from the rapid worldwide development of the peaceful uses of the atom. Nuclear power plants are a potential source of plutonium. Unfortunately, present measures are far from adequate to insure that the resulting plutonium might not be used for the development of nuclear weapons. There is an urgent need now for agreement among all nations that all transfers of nuclear materials and equipment for peaceful purposes take place under effective international safeguards.

The Political Climate

The threat of nuclear proliferation occurs today against a backdrop of escalating international tensions.

In recent months increased military activity has involved our Armed Forces in Southeast Asia. The United Nations crisis caused by the Soviet Union's refusal to pay its arrears in accordance with article 19 of the charter continues unresolved. It has precluded the use of the General Assembly as a platform for the discussion and possible resolution of international issues.

Why, then, you may ask, should we continue the attempt to address ourselves seriously to arms control and disarmament negotiations? The answer should be self-evident. The dangers of military escalation which attend such tensions only point up the increased need to utilize the conference table, to seek the means whereby to restrain and control the arms race.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Nov. 2, 1964, p. 610.

In the recent past such times of crisis as the Berlin wall and the resumption of atmospheric testing were accompanied by negotiations which resulted in the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Statement of Agreed Principles⁵ and the formation of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee. The "hot line" and the limited nuclear test ban treaty came into being in the aftermath of the Cuban crisis. While the United States and the Soviet Union are not presently in direct military confrontation in Southeast Asia or some other trouble spots, nevertheless, the political climate is one which demands urgent attention to the possibilities of arms control.

Areas of Possible Agreement

What are these possibilities? What must be continued to be discussed and, hopefully, agreed upon at the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva?

Obviously, measures in the nonproliferation category are the most urgent. To curb nuclear spread we seek agreement on an arrangement—as simple in concept as the test ban treaty—to be entered into by nuclear and nonnuclear powers alike. It would prohibit the nuclear powers from giving nuclear weapons or the information necessary to their manufacture into the national control of nations which do not have such weapons. It would provide for a corresponding prohibition of the manufacture or acquisition of control of such weapons by any nonnuclear powers.

As I noted earlier, we also seek agreement that all transfers of nuclear materials and equipment for peaceful purposes take place under effective international safeguards. Safeguards are an integral part of United States agreements for cooperation in the peaceful uses of the atom. Our Atoms for Peace programs are strictly supervised so as to avoid the dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear materials and equipment for peaceful purposes.

Only with effective international safeguards on all nuclear materials and equip-

ment used in peaceful programs can the world have reasonable assurance that no country with a power reactor is storing away some of its plutonium against the day it might decide to make a bomb.

As part of the nonproliferation package we will continue to seek agreement on a verified cutoff of all production of fissionable material for weapons use. Our proposal is coupled with another that the major nuclear powers transfer quantities of nuclear weapons grade fissionable materials to peaceful purposes.

A cutoff and transfer agreement would enhance our security. It would reduce significantly the rising nuclear stockpiles on both sides. It would also be of considerable value in persuading nonnuclear nations to resist temptation to divert their peaceful atomic programs to weapons production.

Another important measure to halt the spread of nuclear weapons is our continuing effort to secure agreement for a comprehensive test ban. This would be a ban on nuclear tests under ground as well as above—a ban which we would, of course, have to be able to verify with acceptable assurance. In previous negotiations we have been unable to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on the question of on-site verification. The Soviets have argued that verification of compliance could be carried out with the use of remote seismometers only. We dispute this point since the present state of the art is such that it is impossible to distinguish between some underground nuclear explosions and some earthquakes on the basis of seismic evidence. And that evidence is our best long-distance check.

In an effort to improve our capability to detect and identify underground nuclear explosions the U.S. Government over the past 5 years has spent about \$300 million and is continuing at about the same rate. There are two developments under active investigation that appear to be particularly promising. These are the use of ocean-bottom seismometers and the use of very large arrays of land-based seismometers. We continue to feel, however, that there will still be a few

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.

natural seismic events every year that may provide us with ambiguous evidence and that we will need some on-site inspections in any treaty.

Now, you may well ask what are the prospects for any of these agreements. Frankly, I do not know. But I am an optimist, or I would not be in this business. I cannot conceive of man, with his incredible achievements since the dawn of civilization, accepting, without challenge, the inevitability of his own and the world's destruction.

And we have several things working for us in this nuclear age. Certainly the possibility of a halt in the spread of nuclear weapons is in the mutual interest of both the United States and the Soviet Union. The destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons cause peoples everywhere to urge new efforts toward controlling the arms race. Arms control and disarmament policies are a major element today in the foreign policy of every nation. Every single foreign minister who spoke at the United Nations this winter emphasized his nation's deep interest in the problem. With this consensus, steps such as those I have outlined can offer restraints and provide the time needed to approach the larger problem of general and complete disarmament.

Again you may ask: Why bother? In today's world "overwhelming superiority" deters an enemy but does not guarantee its possessor against possible annihilation at the hands of a weaker force. This is particularly true when a "superior force" does not include an effective defensive capability against a nuclear attack. Such a defensive capability does not now appear in prospect.

Therefore, we must examine other means that give hope of protecting the national interest. Arms control measures may well become an increasingly important foundation stone in the ramparts we watch.

We hope that our campaign to contain the nuclear threat will move forward in the months ahead. At this point permit me to quote again the words of our President:⁶

⁶ At a news conference on Oct. 3, 1964.

. . . the spread of nuclear weapons is one of the great dangers to peace, and as long as I am President I shall continue to work as hard as I know how to work to seek agreements that will stop that spread.

And I can assure you that, despite the present roadblocks, so will my colleagues and so will I.

United States Expresses Views on Laurel-Langley Agreement

*Statement by William P. Bundy
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs¹*

As you know, this matter [parity question] was discussed between President Macapagal and President Johnson last October, and this was noted in the communique.² Since then there have been continuing consultations, and my Government has given the matter careful consideration. 1974 is a long way off, and it may be premature to be talking about what kind of agreement should replace the Laurel-Langley Agreement.³ That agreement is a very special contract between our two sovereign countries, and I think it has served well both Philippine and U.S. interests in its first 10 years of operation.

During the life of the present agreement, its provisions will naturally continue to be operative. We believe that both countries will want to have a framework for continuity of a trade and investment relationship which will be mutually beneficial when the present agreement ceases. As far as the parity article is concerned—article VI of the agreement—we are aware of Philippine interest in seeing that this provision expires in 1974, and on our side I can say that we have no intention of seeking its extension. We assume, of course, that rights acquired prior to 1974 will be protected in accordance with the Philippine Constitution.

¹ Made upon Mr. Bundy's arrival at Manila on Mar. 8 en route to Baguio for an annual conference of U.S. Chiefs of Mission in the Far East.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 2, 1964, p. 632.

³ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3348.

International Trade

by Under Secretary Mann¹

From our earliest days, New Orleans has been the port serving one of the most vital international trading areas of our nation. Through this port serving the Mississippi Valley goods move to and from all corners of the earth.

Those of you here already know that international trade is good for your region and good for the Nation. For 20 years the Mississippi Valley World Trade Council has provided outstanding leadership in promoting the exports of our heartland. But I believe it is useful to recall some of the reasons why trade serves our national interest.

Perhaps the most important secret of our economic growth is the fact that at the very beginning of our independent national life, a decision was made that all the States of the Union should be free to compete and trade with each other.

Alexander Hamilton, writing in *The Federalist* papers in 1787, said:

An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance the trade of each. . . . The veins of commerce in every part will be replenished, and will acquire additional motion and vigour from a free circulation of the commodities of every part.

He went on to say that:

A prosperous commerce is now perceived and acknowledged, by all enlightened statesmen, to be the most useful, as well as the most productive, source of national wealth. . . .

The United States became, in point of fact, the first true common market. The principle of the free movement of capital, goods, and labor between each of the former colonies became firmly fixed in our Federal system.

The fact that our system has permitted all of our States to compete and trade with one another without restriction of any kind is one of the major reasons why we have been able to attain a level of economic and social development unequaled in the world's history.

Today we are about to enter the 50th

month of the most recent cycle of a dynamic expansion of our economy. In these 4 years of continuing growth our gross national output has expanded by 26 percent. Corrected for price changes, this means it has grown more than 5 percent a year. Real income per person, after taxes, has increased 3 $\frac{1}{3}$ percent a year. Employment has risen by almost 5 million jobs. Profits after taxes have increased by 60 percent. And unlike other expansions of economies in the recent past, the growth in our product has not been marred by rapid increase in cost and narrowing margins of profit. The price level remains stable; in fact, the wholesale price index for January 1965 is at the same level as it was in January 1961.

Without a high level of exports our own domestic economy would not be so prosperous. At the turn of this century our country was exporting at the rate of about \$1 billion annually, while today our exports are around \$25 billion a year.

Speaking last year on this point, President Johnson said:²

Our exports provide jobs for about 3.6 million American workers and outlets for the crops of one out of every four acres of our farms.

It is clear that we need our markets abroad in order to keep our domestic plant going at high and efficient levels of production.

Last year our commercial exports, including those financed by the Government, exceeded \$22 billion. This was an increase of 16 percent over 1963 and 27 percent over the 1960 level. Although imports rose substantially in response to rising levels of economic activity here at home—reaching \$18.6 billion—our commercial trade surplus increased from \$2.3 billion in 1963 to \$3.7 billion in 1964.

Another aspect of international trade which has been of benefit to our people is the stimulus of competition from abroad. This competition has helped to make our productive facilities efficient. It has brought about the production of high-quality products at a low cost.

¹ Address made before the Mississippi Valley Trade Conference at New Orleans, La., on Mar. 31 (press release 65).

² For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 23, 1964, p. 752.

Experience has taught us that industries which are protected from the spur of competition do not conduct research or modernize their plants and methods of production or improve the productivity of the worker. The consumer—and this means all of us—benefits from competition. The worker benefits because by improving the efficiency of production it is possible to raise real wages simply by sharing with the worker increases in individual productivity.

President Johnson has said:³

Our imports . . . maintain a healthy pressure on our own producers and workers to step up their efficiency, offer our consumers a wider choice of goods at competitive prices, and counteract domestic pressures for price increases.

The nation which shuts itself off from the opportunity of competition from the outside world by protective devices will be the nation which finds itself lagging behind while more progressive economies in other countries pass it by on the road to greater efficiency and affluence.

There are, of course, cases where limited protection may be justified. When infant industries have clear prospects of becoming efficient and competitive, some degree of protection for limited periods may be necessary. Other factors must be taken into account. But we must be continually aware that it is the consumer who pays the price of excessive protection. Trade barriers, whether in the form of tariffs or other devices, can be, and often are, subsidies for a relatively few privileged members of the economy.

The final point I would like to make about why trade is good for us is that a high level of international trade is essential to the efforts of the developing nations to achieve stability and progress in freedom—to the achievement, in a word, of the kind of world which offers reasonable prospects of peace.

The low-income countries of Latin America, Asia, and Africa make up half of the free world's population. They have massive economic and social problems and a shortage of the means to meet their aspirations. With

population expanding at an unprecedented rate, especially in these areas, great strains are placed on the political, economic, and social fabric of their societies. It is clearly in our national interest to do what we can to help build viable expanding societies that can provide for the needs and defense of their peoples.

Loans, investment, and technical assistance are ways of helping the low-income countries grow. But more important in the long run is trade.

In the 1950's the developing countries of the free world derived about 12 percent of their foreign exchange receipts from public and private capital flows from abroad. In contrast, about 88 percent of their foreign exchange receipts came from exports.

These countries have been particularly vulnerable because their economies depend so heavily on raw material exports. These exports are subject to wide fluctuations in price, and we have seen in the past that grave problems can be created by sudden drops in the prices of key commodities.

Many of the developing countries have become aware that to become viable they must move together to form free trade areas and common markets. In Latin America, which I know is an area of special interest to you, two such groupings have been formed: the Central American Common Market, embracing the five Central American countries, and the Latin American Free Trade Area, embracing eight countries of the Southern Hemisphere and Mexico. The United States has encouraged these developments and will continue to do so.

The record of the United States in promoting the trade of the developing nations is a good one. We have worked to reduce the vulnerability of their commodities to drastic price fluctuations. We are working to help reduce tariff and nontariff barriers to their trade. In the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations we hope to see significant reductions on a multilateral basis in the barriers to their present exports and to their potential exports of manufactured goods.

To sum up, I would like to use a phrase

³ *Ibid.*

which President John Adams gave us in 1797: ". . . commerce has made this country what it is. . . ."

This is as true today as it was then. And it is our intention to work diligently for the improvement of our international trade patterns.

I hope the Mississippi Valley World Trade Council, which has played an important role in our national and international efforts, will continue to work for the kind of trade that helps us as well as the rest of the free world.

Japanese Issues To Be Exempt From Interest Equalization Tax

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER¹

EXCLUSION FOR ORIGINAL OR NEW JAPANESE ISSUES AS REQUIRED FOR INTERNATIONAL MONETARY STABILITY

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 4917(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as added by section 2 of the Interest Equalization Tax Act, approved September 2, 1964 (Public Law 88-563, 78 Stat. 809), by section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States, it is hereby determined that the full application of the tax imposed by section 4911 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as added by section 2 of the Interest Equalization Tax Act, will have such consequences for Japan as to imperil or threaten to imperil the stability of the international monetary system and it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. The tax imposed by section 4911 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 shall not apply to an acquisition by a United States person of a debt obligation repayable exclusively in United States currency which is issued or guaranteed as to the payment of principal and interest by the Government of Japan (other than an obligation which by its terms is convertible into stock of the obligor) provided that—

(a) Such debt obligation is acquired as all or part of an original or new issue as to which there is filed such notice of acquisition as the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate may prescribe by regulations;

(b) The Government of Japan determines and certifies to the acquiring United States person that his acquisition of such debt obligation complies with the criteria set forth in this section; and

(c) Before or as a result of such acquisition, the aggregate amount of all acquisitions by United States persons excluded from interest equalization tax by reason of this order during the calendar year in which the acquisition is made (or, in the case of acquisitions made during the period beginning on the effective date of this order and ending December 31, 1965, during such period) does not exceed \$100,000,000.

SEC. 2. The Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate is authorized to prescribe from time to time regulations, rulings, directions, and instructions to carry out the purpose of this order.

SEC. 3. This order shall be effective upon its filing for publication in the Federal Register with respect to acquisitions made during the period beginning on the effective date of this order and ending on the date specified in section 4911(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
April 2, 1965.

U.S. and Japan Begin Program of Cooperation in Medical Science

White House press release dated April 8

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

No matter what other problems divide the nations of the world, the peoples of the globe are joined together in a common struggle against suffering and disease. Americans have always stood ready to play our part in that struggle and to join the forces of our science and our medicine with those of others to try to control and prevent disease not only in our own country but in all parts of the world.

When Prime Minister [Eisaku] Sato of Japan was here in January, we agreed that we will cooperate and join our resources and talents in an effort to solve some of the most serious medical problems that afflict our two countries, as well as other countries of Asia.¹

¹ For text of a communique released on Jan. 13, see BULLETIN of Feb. 1, 1965, p. 134.

¹ No. 11211; 30 *Fed. Reg.* 4385.

Today it is my privilege to announce here—concurrently with announcement being made by the Prime Minister following a meeting of the Japanese Cabinet—that we are going ahead to implement that agreement.

An American team, headed by one of our distinguished medical scientists, Dr. Colin MacLeod, Deputy Director of the Office of Science and Technology, and including some of our most able medical experts, will leave soon for Tokyo to begin discussions on April 19 with their Japanese counterparts. The purpose will be to seek ways and means by which our two countries can work with each other and with the other nations of Asia to speed our progress in overcoming diseases which are of importance to our own two countries as well as many others in the Pacific area.

They will map out modes of attack against diseases such as malaria, cholera, schistosomiasis, tuberculosis, virus diseases, heart disease, and cancer, and will discuss further cooperative efforts on problems of air pollution and pesticides.

After this planning conference, we hope to discuss with the countries concerned ways in which the cooperation can be of benefit to other Asian nations.

Our goal is a peaceful world and a better world. We seek a better, fuller, and healthier life not only for all Americans but for all mankind. We can reach that goal if the nations which have talents and resources join hands with each other and those in need of assistance to face common problems together.

We can make progress by giving attention

to those concerns which unite us, while at the same time trying earnestly and unceasingly to solve the questions which divide us. The health of mankind is a problem of the deepest common concern. The cooperation between Japan and the United States and other interested nations of Asia is a significant and hopeful step toward these goals.

It is my hope that the works and results of this program may long commemorate the friendly meeting here in the United States with Prime Minister Sato.

U.S. ADVISORY GROUP

The first planning meeting of the U. S. advisory group with their Japanese counterparts will be held at Tokyo between April 19 and 21. The American delegation will consist of:

Dr. Colin M. MacLeod, *chairman*, Deputy Director, Office of Science and Technology, Executive Office of the President;

Dr. J. Ralph Audy, Director, Hooper Foundation, University of California Medical Center;

Dr. H. Stanley Bennett, Dean, Division of Biological Sciences, University of Chicago;

Dr. Thomas Francis, Jr., Chairman, Department of Epidemiology, University of Michigan School of Public Health;

Dr. James A. Shannon, Director, National Institutes of Health;

Dr. James Watt, Director, Office of International Health, Public Health Service;

Dr. John M. Weir, Director of Medical and Natural Sciences, Rockefeller Foundation; and

Dr. Theodore Woodward, Professor and Head, Department of Medicine, University of Maryland.

The Organization of African Unity

"The first tangible fruit of the dream of Pan-African unity"—that is how the Organization of African Unity, founded at Addis Ababa in May 1963, has been described. Its establishment united divergent groupings among the independent African states and provided an organizational framework for cooperative effort toward solution of the problems confronting its members. Although subject to the strains resulting from inevitable differences among the sovereign states which form its membership, the organization in its first 2 years has shown significant potential for influencing the political and economic development of the African Continent.

Background and Birth

The formal search for African unity began in 1900, when the first pan-African conference was convened in London. From that date until World War II, however, pan-Africanism was essentially a cosmopolitan movement of Negro intellectuals, largely outside Africa and primarily concerned with creating a sense of community among Africans living throughout the world. Although a series of congresses held between 1919 and 1927 called for African participation in the government of colonial and mandated territories in Africa, the movement had little root in the continent, and these specific political objectives remained subordinate to the broader search for "African community."

The Second World War radically altered the situation for Africa and, thus, for pan-Africanism. The war brought Africa more fully into the mainstream of world events and at the same time weakened the ability of the major colonial powers to resist the growing pressure of nascent nationalism. The new mood was reflected in the resolu-

tions adopted in 1945 by the Fifth Pan-African Congress, which named self-government or independence as the initial goals of pan-African aspirations.

For the next decade, the energies generated by the pan-African ideal were therefore channeled into the drive for self-government and independence at the territorial level, and the search for broader African unity fell dormant. Nevertheless, the search for an African personality never ceased, and in both French- and English-speaking parts of the continent there were expressions of this aspiration.

In the late 1950's the pan-African spirit revived and two lines of approach were adopted. The first sought to bring together the peoples, rather than the governments, of Africa, and was pursued in both African and Afro-Asian forums; the second sought to promote unified action at an intergovernmental level. The first Conference of Independent African States was held at Accra, Ghana, in 1958, while cooperation in more limited regional groupings was attempted in the Mali Federation (1959), the Entente (1959—Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, and Dahomey), and the Ghana-Guinea-Mali "Union" (1960).

During 1961 several broader groupings emerged on the African scene. These groups, in some cases with overlapping membership, were generally known by the names of cities

● *Prepared in the Office of Inter-African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State. Reprints are available upon request from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.*

where they had met. Thus, by 1962 there was a "Brazzaville group" (formally organized as the *Union Africaine et Malgache—UAM*), a "Casablanca group," and a "Monrovia group." Each represented a portion of independent Africa. In the winter of 1962–63, however, a call was issued for a meeting of all African nations to be held at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in May 1963, and members of all three of these groupings agreed to participate.

At the conference the foremost item on the agenda was the establishment of an organization of African states capable of giving tangible expression to the long search for African unity. Three proposals for such a body were put before the preliminary meeting of foreign ministers, but when they failed to reach agreement it appeared that the goal might not be reached at Addis Ababa. However, the heads of state and government, meeting immediately afterward, took inspiration from Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie's opening address and successfully resolved conflicting proposals in order to bring the OAU into being.

The representatives of 31 states signed the OAU Charter on May 25, 1963; Morocco, though absent from the conference, signed shortly afterward to bring the number of original members to 32. The subsequent independence and adherence of Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, and The Gambia has brought current membership to 36.

Principles of the OAU

The purposes and principles of the OAU, as set forth in the charter, reflect the historic concerns of pan-Africanism which underlay the organization's founding. The preamble reaffirms the principles of the United Nations and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and also stresses "achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples" and their "total advancement" through political and economic development. Article II of the charter pledges the signatories to "co-ordinate and harmonize their general policies" in several fields in

order to promote African progress and unity, to defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity, to eradicate colonialism from Africa, and to promote international cooperation. In pursuit of these aims member states further affirm in article III their adherence to the principles of noninterference in each other's internal affairs; respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state; peaceful settlement of disputes; condemnation of political assassination or subversive activity against neighboring states; liberation of remaining dependent areas; and "non-alignment with regard to blocs."


Organizational Structure

The work of the OAU is carried on through four "principal institutions" and a number of specialized commissions established by the charter, and through four additional commissions created by special resolution. These organs are shown schematically in the chart on p. 675.

The "Principal Institutions"

The *Assembly of Heads of State and Government*, composed of the heads of all member states or their governments (or their duly accredited representatives), is the "supreme organ" of the OAU. It meets at least once a year in regular session, though extraordinary sessions may be held with the approval of two-thirds of the member states. Decisions at Assembly sessions require a two-thirds majority of the membership (except for procedural questions, decided by simple majority), with each state having one vote. The Assembly is empowered to discuss "matters of common concern to Africa" with a view to overall coordination of OAU policy and may also review the acts of all other organs or agencies of the organization.

Second in importance only to the Assembly is the *Council of Ministers*. Made up of the Foreign Ministers (or other designated ministers) of member states, the Council is required to meet at least twice annually. Like the Assembly, it may meet in extraordinary session if two-thirds of OAU members ap-



prove such a meeting. The Council is responsible to the Assembly for any matters referred to it and for execution of Assembly decisions. Resolutions before the Council are decided by simple majority of the total OAU membership.

Between sessions of the Assembly and Council the day-to-day running of the organization is in the hands of the *General Secretariat*, headed by an Administrative Secretary General appointed by the Assembly. The Secretariat is responsible for executing decisions taken by the Council of Ministers and for such housekeeping functions as maintenance of archives, provision of administrative and technical services for other OAU organs, and preparation of the OAU budget (apportioned in accordance with the U.N. scale of assessments) and of annual and special reports. The Secretary General, Diallo Telli of Guinea, was named to his post in July 1964; he is currently aided by four Assistant Secretaries General.

In order that member states may respect their pledge to settle disputes by peaceful means, the charter provides for a *Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration*. The protocol establishing the Commission, approved by the Assembly at its first regular meeting in July 1964, calls for creation of a panel of 21 members, each from a different member state, to furnish mediation, arbitration, or conciliation services. A President and two Vice Presidents will be appointed by the Assembly from among the members of the Commission, and these three officials will constitute the Bureau of the Commission.

Commission members, to be nominated by OAU governments and appointed by the Assembly, are required to have "recognized professional qualifications." They will be empowered to act in disputes between states referred to the Commission by one or more parties to the dispute or by the Assembly or Council. If any party to the dispute refuses to submit to Commission jurisdiction, the dispute will be referred to the Council of Ministers for consideration. Mediation ef-

orts will be carried on by one or more mediators; conciliation by three members of the Commission plus one conciliator named by each party to the dispute; and arbitration by a tribunal of three Commission members, one chosen by each disputant and the third by the first two arbitrators named. Failing such agreement between the first two arbitrators, the third will be named by the Bureau of the Commission. A few nominations to the Commission had been made by early 1965.

The Specialized Commissions

Article XX of the charter authorizes the Assembly to create "such Specialized Commissions as it may deem necessary" and names the first five such commissions to be established:

1. Economic and Social Commission;
2. Educational and Cultural Commission;
3. Health, Sanitation, and Nutrition Commission;
4. Defense Commission; and
5. Scientific, Technical, and Research Commission.

Two additional specialized commissions were subsequently added by the Assembly at its July 1964 meeting: the Transport and Communications Commission and the Commission of Jurists.

Each of the specialized commissions is composed of the appropriate minister or other designated representative of each member state, and each commission adopts its own regulations subject to approval of the Council of Ministers. Thus far the five original specialized commissions have all met twice (except for the Health, Sanitation, and Nutrition Commission, which has met once) and have drawn up regulations providing for annual meetings and for permanent staffs to operate under the aegis of the General Secretariat. Of the two commissions established in 1964, the Transport and Communications Commission has met once while the Commission of Jurists has not completed its organizational arrangements. All Commissions report to the Council of Ministers.

The Noncharter Organs

In addition to the organs called for by the charter, the OAU has to date created four bodies by Assembly or Council of Ministers resolutions.

A nine-member *African Liberation Committee* was set up by an Assembly resolution adopted at the OAU's founding meeting in Addis Ababa. From its headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, the Liberation Committee exercises responsibility for "harmonizing the assistance from African States" to "national liberation movements" in dependent territories of Africa. The Liberation Committee was also charged by the Assembly with managing a special fund for aid to "liberation movements" and with proposing to the Assembly suitable means of apportioning the sums required among OAU member states.

Meeting in extraordinary session at Addis Ababa in November 1963, the Council of Ministers established a seven-member *ad hoc* Commission on the Moroccan-Algerian Dispute to ameliorate a border dispute between those two countries. Although the *ad hoc* commission was expressly recognized as an expedient required by the fact that the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration had not yet been set up, further delay in organizing the latter body has resulted in the *ad hoc* commission remaining in being until the present time.

Another organ created by resolution of the Council of Ministers is the *Commission on the Problem of Refugees in Africa*, which was formed following the Council meeting held at Lagos, Nigeria, in February 1964. This 10-member body was given responsibility for examining the overall problem of refugees on the continent and ways and means of maintaining these refugees in their countries of asylum and for making recommendations on possible solutions of the problems involved. In July 1964 the Assembly of Heads of State and Government assigned the Commission the further task of drawing up a convention on "all aspects of the problem of refugees in Africa."

After its investigations in East Africa the Commission prepared a draft convention which has been circulated to all member states for their consideration and observations before it is made final. The Secretary General has been authorized to convene a meeting of legal experts from member states of the commission on refugees in order to submit a final draft of the convention to the Council of Ministers meeting scheduled for Accra in September 1965.

In September 1964 an extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers established the youngest of the OAU's noncharter organs, the *Ad Hoc Commission on the Congo*. This 10-member body, under the chairmanship of Kenya President Jomo Kenyatta, was charged by the Council with seeking to restore peace both within the Congo (Léopoldville) and between the Congo and its neighbors, Burundi and Congo (Brazzaville).

What the OAU Has Done

The OAU has been an extremely busy organization in the 2 years since its inception. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government has met once since the founding meeting at Addis Ababa, while the Council of Ministers has already held eight sessions, four regular and four extraordinary. In addition, numerous meetings have been held by the specialized commissions and by the non-charter organs, while the Secretariat has been engaged in establishing its permanent headquarters and staff in Addis Ababa.

During this period the various OAU organs have dealt with a wide range of questions, from housekeeping arrangements to major disputes between member states. For convenience, the principal issues are discussed below under two broad headings: (a) political issues, and (b) economic, social, and technical questions.

Political Issues

The political concerns of OAU member states have been clearly reflected in the resolutions adopted at the regular Assembly and Council sessions. The topics of recurrent

interest have included colonialism, disarmament, the South African racial policy of *apartheid*, the future of the Portuguese territories in Africa, Southern Rhodesia, African representation at the United Nations, and the extent to which the OAU should evolve toward an all-African government.

In their resolutions OAU member states have constantly reiterated their goal of independence for those parts of Africa still under non-African rule. They have sought to hasten "decolonization" of the continent through support of national liberation movements (coordinated by the African Liberation Committee), pressure at the United Nations, appeals to the Western powers, and boycott action against Portugal and South Africa. A special bureau has been set up within the Secretariat to coordinate this boycott action against South Africa and Portugal. South Africa has also come under sharp attack for its *apartheid* policy, with resolutions on this subject often including a condemnation of racial discrimination elsewhere in the world (specifically including the United States). Special appeals have been directed to the British Government to provide for more effective African participation in the government of Southern Rhodesia.

With regard to disarmament, OAU resolutions have called for the removal of foreign military bases from Africa and the declaration of Africa as a denuclearized zone. The resolutions have also urged progress toward "general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control" and have appealed to the major powers to take steps toward this goal.

OAU member states have also been concerned with African representation at the United Nations, which they wish to see increased to reflect the growing number of African members of the world organization. To make present African representation more effective, African members of the United Nations have established a permanent secretariat in New York to coordinate their efforts in accordance with resolutions of the Assembly and Council.

A further subject of continuing interest

has been the future development of the OAU itself. Ghana has proposed that the OAU be transformed into a "union government" for Africa, to which member states would yield elements of their present sovereignty. This suggestion remains under study.


In the area of mutual defense, however, a greater degree of cooperative effort was recently agreed upon at the February 1965 meeting of the Defense Commission at Freetown, Sierra Leone. Here, a Ghanaian proposal for an African force under OAU command led to a compromise proposal under which each member state would designate units for potential use in an OAU force and would undertake to standardize training for such units. The proposal has been referred by the Council to member states for further study.

Relation to Regional Groupings

A final problem relative to the future course of the OAU has turned on the organization's relationship with African regional groupings. The question was formally raised at the Council of Ministers meeting at Dakar, Senegal, in August 1963 with regard to the *Union Africaine et Malgache* (UAM), which grouped 14 French-speaking states. The issue was resolved at that time with a resolution which implicitly reaffirmed the primacy of the OAU, set broad criteria for the establishment of regional groupings, and suggested that preexisting groupings "evolve with a view to their adaptation to the Charter of the OAU." In response, the UAM states dissolved much of their machinery for political consultation and limited their activities to the economic sphere. However, they have recently reorganized with slightly different membership as the *Organisation Communautaire Africaine et Malgache* (OCAM).

In addition to these general issues the OAU has frequently been seized with disturbances or disputes arising on the African Continent. This is most clearly reflected in the four extraordinary sessions of the Council of Ministers convened to consider specific problems affecting one or more member states. The first extraordinary session, held

THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY



at Addis Ababa in November 1963, dealt entirely with the Moroccan-Algerian border dispute and ended with creation of the *ad hoc* commission and with injunctions to both parties to avoid actions likely to jeopardize the commission's success. At Dar-es-Salaam, in February 1964, the Council considered similar border disputes between Somalia on the one hand and Kenya and Ethiopia on the other, and again urged moderation and negotiations. The Dar-es-Salaam meeting was primarily concerned, however, with the aftermath of army mutinies in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika,¹ and recommended that African troops be made available to Tanganyika as it wished to replace the British forces used to suppress the mutiny in that country.

The third and fourth extraordinary sessions of the Council, held at Addis Ababa in September 1964 and at New York in December, both dealt with the situation in the Congo. Resolutions of these meetings emphasized the concern of OAU member states at the conflict in the Congo, urged an end of hostilities and a peaceful reconciliation of all contending parties, and asked that the mercenary troops employed by the Congo Government be dismissed. The resolution of the Addis Ababa session also established the *Ad Hoc* Commission on the Congo, which has sent missions to the United States, the two Congos, and Burundi as part of its search for a Congo settlement, while the resolution adopted at New York in December focused on the situation which developed in the wake of the Belgian-American rescue mission at Stanleyville and Paulis.

Economic, Social, and Technical Questions

Both in the charter and in the resolutions of the founding meeting, the heads of state and government assembled at Addis Ababa in May 1963 made clear their deep concern for the economic and social betterment of

¹ Tanganyika united with the People's Republic of Zanzibar on Apr. 27, 1964, to become the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. On Oct. 29, 1964, the name of United Republic of Tanzania was adopted.

their peoples. Thus the preambular statement of "responsibility to harness the natural and human resources of our continent" was reflected in the charter provisions creating the specialized commissions, and the resolutions of the Assembly carried this one step further. These stressed the desire of OAU member states to collaborate in seeking harmonization of development plans, African free-trade and monetary zones and a payments and clearing union, a restructuring of international trade to improve the position of the less developed African countries, coordinated transportation, and wide areas of cooperation in such fields as education, labor, communications, and health.

In the ensuing 2 years the principal forum for discussion of economic, social, and technical questions has shifted to the specialized commissions as the latter have been organized. The Economic and Social Commission, for example, drew up a set of priorities at its first meeting (at Niamey, Niger, in December 1963) which incorporated the major goals outlined by the Assembly resolutions. It also laid the groundwork for close cooperation with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). At its second session (at Cairo in January 1965) the Economic and Social Commission prepared a more detailed study program, reiterated earlier recommendations on the setting up of an African trade union under OAU auspices, and placed new emphasis on the importance of vocational training to African development.

The other specialized commissions have dealt in similar fashion with their fields of concern. The Educational and Cultural Commission decided at its first session (at Léopoldville in January 1964) to give priority to a reorientation of secondary education, an increase in teacher training, and an expansion in the number of students at all levels. In addition, it discussed such matters as radio and television exchanges, the establishment of an African Press Agency, and the basis for OAU cooperation with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

The Scientific, Technical, and Research Commission has stressed the promotion of research and training, exchanges of information and personnel, and the need for accurate surveys of African resources. It also has been occupied with the now completed assimilation of the Committee for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara (CCTA) to form the nucleus of its technical staff. The administrative headquarters of the Scientific, Technical, and Research Commission will be at Lagos, Nigeria, making this commission the only one of the six so far functioning to be headquartered outside Addis Ababa.

In like manner the Health, Sanitation, and Nutrition Commission has emphasized the raising of health standards, exchanges of doctors and other personnel, reciprocal training efforts, and the relationship between the OAU and the World Health Organization, while the Transport and Communications Commission devoted its initial meeting (at Cairo in October and November 1964) to an examination of African communications problems. Neither this commission nor the Commission of Jurists (which has not met) has yet defined its overall terms of reference as have the five older commissions.

Retrospect and Prospect

Though still less than 2 years old, the OAU has already shown convincingly that it can make an effective contribution to solution of African problems by bringing its member states together in common endeavor. In the political field, for example, the organization has successfully applied the principle of peaceful settlement to several intra-African disputes, and in such broader forums as the United Nations it has given its members a greater degree of unity than had previously been possible. Similarly, the OAU has brought its members into closer collaboration in the economic, social, and technical fields, and the joint approaches fostered by its specialized commissions promise significant benefits for African development.

The OAU thus appears to be taking important steps toward realizing the historic goals

of the pan-African ideal—defined by one African leader as “to share the blessings of a richly endowed continent among all its inhabitants; to make a reality of the brotherhood of the ‘extended family’ in a United States of Africa.”

PRINCIPAL MEETINGS OF OAU ORGANS

ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT

Founding meeting—Addis Ababa, May 22–25, 1963.
First regular meeting—Cairo, July 17–21, 1964.

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Founding meeting—Addis Ababa, May 15–21, 1963.
Regular meetings:

- first—Dakar, August 2–11, 1963.
- second—Lagos, February 24–29, 1964.
- third—Cairo, July 13–17, 1964.
- fourth—Nairobi, February 26–March 9, 1965.

Extraordinary sessions:

- first—Addis Ababa, November 15–18, 1963.
- second—Dar-es-Salaam, February 12–15, 1964.
- third—Addis Ababa, September 5–10, 1964.
- fourth—New York, December 16–21, 1964.

SPECIALIZED COMMISSIONS

Economic and Social Commission—Niamey, December 9–13, 1963; Cairo, January 16–22, 1965.

Educational and Cultural Commission—Léopoldville, January 3–8, 1964; Lagos, January 26–29, 1965.

Health, Sanitation, and Nutrition Commission—Cairo, January 10–15, 1964.

Defense Commission—Acera, October 29—November 2, 1963; Freetown, February 2–4, 1965.

Scientific, Technical, and Research Commission—Algiers, February 1–7, 1964; Lagos, January 21–26, 1965.

Transport and Communications Commission—Cairo, October 24—November 5, 1964.

Commission of Jurists—has not yet met.

NONCHARTER ORGANS

African Liberation Committee—Dar-es-Salaam, June 25–July 4, 1963; Dakar, August 1963; Dar-es-Salaam, December 2–10, 1963, June 2–10, 1964, October 17–22, 1964, November 24–25, 1964; Moshi, February 22–25, 1965.

Ad Hoc Commission on the Moroccan-Algerian Dispute—eight sessions since founding; most recent meetings, Rabat and Algiers, October 20–28, 1964; Addis Ababa, February 18–20, 1965.

Commission on the Problem of Refugees in Africa—Addis Ababa, June 1–5, 1964; field studies, East Africa, November–December 1964.

Ad Hoc Commission on the Congo—Nairobi, September 18–22, 1964, November 27–28, 1964, January 29–30, 1965, February 13, 1965, February 25–March 3, 1965.

Amending U.N. Charter To Enlarge Security Council and ECOSOC

Following is the text of a message from President Johnson to the Senate transmitting, for advice and consent to ratification, two amendments to the U.N. Charter.

White House press release dated April 6

To the Senate of the United States:

I request the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of two amendments to the Charter of the United Nations which are transmitted herewith along with a report to me from the Secretary of State.¹ They are the first amendments adopted by the General Assembly since the founding of the United Nations.

These amendments will strengthen the ability of the United Nations to act as a force for peace and the progress of mankind.

They enlarge the membership of both the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council to bring those bodies into balance with the enlarged membership of the United Nations itself.

History of the Amendments

Amendments to the Charter of the United Nations must first be adopted by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly, and then ratified by two-thirds of the Member States, including all the Permanent Members, according to their constitutional procedure.

In late 1963, the General Assembly considered resolutions proposing the two amendments in question. These resolutions focussed on three points:

First, that the text of the United Nations Charter be changed to increase the size of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, to increase the voting majority of the Security

Council from seven to nine, and to increase the size of the Economic and Social Council from eighteen to twenty-seven. In the Security Council, neither the seats nor the right of veto of the Permanent Members would be affected.

Second, the resolutions provided that Members of the two Councils be elected on the basis of geographic distribution.

In the Security Council, the ten non-Permanent Members would include five from Africa and Asia, one from Eastern Europe, two from Latin America, and two from Western Europe and other areas; the five Permanent Members would remain the same. The present non-Permanent Membership of the Security Council includes two Members from Africa and Asia, two from Latin America, one from Western Europe and one seat split between Asia and Eastern Europe.

In the Economic and Social Council, there would be the United States, twelve African and Asian states, five Latin American states, three Eastern European states (including the Soviet Union), and six states from Western Europe and other areas. The present composition of the Economic and Social Council, in addition to the United States, is five African and Asian states, four Latin American states, three Eastern European states (including the Soviet Union), and five states from Western Europe and other areas.

Third, the resolutions proposed that Member States ratify the amendments by September 1, 1965.

On December 17, 1963, the resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly. On the enlargement of the Security Council, the vote was ninety-seven to eleven, with four abstentions; on the enlargement of the Economic and Social Council, it was ninety-six to eleven, with five abstentions.

In those votes, the United States abstained,

¹ S. Ex. A.

not because it doubted the principle of enlargement, but to maintain complete freedom of action while giving deliberate study to the effects of the specific proposals. The Soviet Union and France voted negatively. China voted for enlargement of the Security Council but abstained on enlargement of the Economic and Social Council. The United Kingdom abstained on both resolutions.

Since that time, sixty-three nations out of the required seventy-six have ratified the amendments. Other governments are now considering them. Of the Permanent Members of the Security Council, the Soviet Union has been the first to approve the amendments.

Reasons for Ratification

The United States should now move to ratify the Charter amendments to enlarge the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council.

First, the amendments are realistic.

The membership of the United Nations has grown from fifty-one in 1945 to one hundred and fourteen in 1965. Almost all of the newer Members are nations which have gained their independence from the peaceful dismantling of empires—a process which brought nationhood to one-third of all the peoples of the world and which is here to stay.

We welcome this growth.

The peoples of the world are more directly represented in the General Assembly of the United Nations today than they were twenty years ago.

We want to work together and cooperate with these new countries, within the United Nations.

If there are differences among us, we want them to be aired and examined within the United Nations.

This is the way to a peaceful and cooperative world.

But just as we welcome the growth of the United Nations, we must also recognize that the present Security Council and the present Economic and Social Council do not now realistically reflect it.

An increase in the representation on both Councils is now clearly necessary to restore the balance which existed between the Councils and the General Assembly when the Charter came into force. An expansion of fifty percent in the case of the Economic and Social Council and less in the Security Council is a reasonable way to adjust to a Membership which has more than doubled. At the same time, the expansion is not such as to make the Councils unwieldy.

Second, the amendments are equitable.

When the Charter was signed in 1945, the Member States from Africa and Asia numbered thirteen out of a total of fifty-one—less than a third. Today, the Member States from these great continents number sixty-one out of a total of one hundred and fourteen—more than a half. The General Assembly resolutions, necessarily and rightly, take this new arithmetic into account.

Moreover, the explicit allocation of the new seats to geographic areas, as provided by Assembly Resolution, is wise. It is designed to eliminate the contentious problem of sharing an inadequate number of seats—which has led to pressures against existing seats, to disputes over the definition of geographic areas, and to split terms on the Security Council to meet competing claims for representation.

Third, the amendments fully protect the basic interests of the Permanent Members. While we have seen that the work of the Security Council can be hampered seriously by the abuse of the veto provision, it nevertheless remains a wise and realistic feature of the United Nations Charter. The veto provision is maintained.

Fourth, because the amendments are at once realistic and equitable, they will strengthen the United Nations.

They will increase the vitality of these Councils and of the United Nations itself by permitting more of the newer Members to take part in the consideration of major world problems.

The amendments, which will ensure that the Councils represent the whole Organization they are intended to serve, will thereby

also ensure that the Councils continue to earn the confidence and support of the Membership at large. Without this confidence and support, the Councils cannot be fully effective.

The Organization as a whole will benefit from fuller participation in the work of the Councils by the new Members who have much to contribute—as they will benefit from the exercise of shared responsibility.

Fifth and finally, the amendments are a reflection and a demonstration of both the stability and the adaptability of the United Nations Charter.

We Americans have always had a healthy respect for the stability of our institutions and a wariness of change for the sake of change. Our American Constitution, which has been amended only fourteen times since the Bill of Rights of 1791, has clearly met the test of stability. The fact that the United Nations Charter has remained as it was written twenty years ago is ample evidence of its stability.

At the same time, we Americans have always recognized the forces of change, and have always known instinctively that the ability of an institution to adapt to changed conditions is a reliable measure of its capacity for survival and growth. Our American Constitution, as evidenced by its amendments, has clearly met this test of adaptability.

Now, with its twentieth birthday approaching, the United Nations is seeking the first two amendments to its basic Charter. And this is welcome evidence of the inherent flexibility of another great institution.

The State of the United Nations

As we consider these first amendments to the United Nations Charter, it is fitting to review briefly the state of the United Nations itself.

The limitations of the United Nations are apparent. It has not been able to prevent aggression in Southeast Asia; it has not been able to rid the world of poverty.

Nor has the United Nations been able to solve all of its internal problems. At the present time a serious financial problem threatens the capacity of the General Assembly to perform its share of peacekeeping.

And if the limitations are clear, the basic reason is plain. The United Nations is not a world government; it is an organization of governments participating by consent. It can move only in the direction and at the pace that its Members want it to move.

And yet the United Nations has served well the cause of world peace and progress—and, therefore, the national interest and the personal interest of every American.

Keeping the Peace

Through the United Nations, the Members have acted to avert wars on at least a dozen occasions—local wars which could have spread.

In Kashmir, the United Nations obtained and still polices a cease-fire line running through a bitterly contested area.

In Suez, the United Nations deployed an Emergency Force which enabled the respective national military forces to withdraw.

In the Congo, the United Nations provided 20,000 troops, assisted a new nation to survive its birth, and forestalled an east-west confrontation in the heart of Africa.

In Cyprus, the United Nations has stationed a force of 6,000 to strengthen that nation's security.

The Office of the Secretary-General has evolved into a sensitive listening post—an ever-ready channel of communication—a potential conciliation service open at all times to the international community of states.

Economic Development

At the same time, the day-to-day work of the United Nations is directed overwhelmingly toward building conditions which make the peace worth keeping.

United Nations experts are now at work in one hundred and thirty countries or territories—bringing modern knowledge and

technology to bear on the universal struggle to liberate man from the slavery of poverty.

The United Nations is in partnership with eighty-nine nations and territories in cooperative pre-investment projects—surveying resources or training men and women in modern skills.

The development lending institutions affiliated with the United Nations have been investing some \$1 billion annually in world development.

All in all, the level of development assistance flowing through the United Nations system of agencies now has reached some \$1.3 billion a year.

Technological Cooperation

Meanwhile, United Nations agencies are performing the vital task of establishing cooperative ground rules which are required in the age of rapid international transport and instant international communication.

Agencies affiliated with the United Nations have developed standards for international air traffic—and for the safety of life at sea.

They have arranged for orderly use of the airwaves by allocating available radio frequencies among nations and users.

They have promoted international weather forecasting and are pioneering in the development of a World Weather Watch of incalculable benefit to peoples of all nations.

They have developed and maintained uniform international quarantine regulations against the spread of communicable diseases—and liberated 800 million people from the threat of the greatest killer of all time: malaria.

In these and other ways—through peace-keeping, through nationbuilding, and through international technical services—the United Nations serves its Members. In doing so, the Organization serves the national interest of the United States. It helps us do things we could not do so well alone and encourages other nations to share the burdens.

Conclusion

In one sense, the smallest Members are in greatest need of the United Nations.

In another sense, the United Nations is of greatest service to the largest nations—for without the United Nations, the nations with the greatest resources would have to shoulder most of these tasks alone.

And in a combined sense, the United Nations serves simultaneously the large *and* the small, the rich *and* the poor—for the peace of one area is but part of world peace, and the prosperity of one country is but an element of the world's well-being.

This is why consistent and effective support for the United Nations has been near the heart of the United States foreign policy for two decades.

This is why the Congress and the public, regardless of politics or party, have been ready to stick with the United Nations through thick and thin.

The Organization has reached a point where the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council need to be enlarged to take account of the great growth of the Organization in recent years.

The proposed amendments offer responsible and equitable plans for meeting this problem.

Because the United Nations will continue to be deeply needed by nations which seek peace—by all nations which seek to raise the levels of human welfare—by all nations which seek to cooperate in putting the achievements of modern technology to work for all mankind—it is in the national interest of the United States to ratify these steps toward making more effective the principal Councils of the Organization.

I therefore request the consent of the Senate to ratification by the United States of these amendments to the Charter of the United Nations.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
April 6, 1965.

The Food for Peace Program and the Challenge of the Future

Following is the text of a message from President Johnson transmitting to the Congress a report¹ on activities carried on under Public Law 480 during the calendar year 1964.

White House press release dated March 31

To the Congress of the United States:

I am sending to the Congress the annual report on activities carried on under Public Law 480, 83rd Congress, as amended, outlining operations under the Act during the calendar year 1964. The report outlines in some detail the significant role of the United States through the years in helping to battle hunger in the world. The record is an impressive one.

The Food For Peace program is one of the most inspiring enterprises ever undertaken by any nation in all of history—and every American can be proud of it, without regard to partisanship or political persuasion.

In cooperation with the developing countries, Food For Peace is directly benefiting more people than ever before. And more importantly, the operating agencies are reaching these people with more meaningful programs. Increasingly the emphasis is on using our agricultural commodities to support projects that help eliminate the need for continued food aid. Today about 40 percent of our government's economic development assistance overseas is in the form of agricultural commodities and local currencies received from their sale. To achieve this record, Food For Peace exports reached a new high in 1964 of 18 million tons of agricultural commodities with an estimated export market value of \$1.7 billion.

Importance of Nutrition

The Food For Peace program has made a significant contribution to the world attack on hunger and malnutrition—still the most grave health problem of the world. We now

¹ H. Doc. 130, 89th Cong., 1st sess.

recognize that food deficiencies are most serious in infants, the pre-school age and, to a lesser degree school age children. Not only does malnutrition result in high death rates and widespread disabling diseases, but research has now established that it produces permanent retardation of mental as well as physical development. Studies suggest that in some developing countries as high as 70 percent of pre-school children are undernourished or malnourished.

Thus, increasing attention is being given to nutrition in Food For Peace. Its importance is underscored by the fact that, of the 100 million recipients of our donated foods, 70 million are children, including more than 40 million in organized national school lunch efforts.

The Agency for International Development recently authorized funds which will be used, in cooperation with the Department of Agriculture, for vitamin enrichment of nonfat dry milk distributed overseas. Experiments will also be undertaken to help developing countries find the techniques and skills needed to process and distribute grain-based high protein foods for children.

Meeting Human Needs

While the effort goes on to increase the nutritional balance in our commodity use, Food For Peace continues to seek the humanitarian goal of using our food to meet human needs:

—During 1964, more than 3 billion pounds of commodities were programed through U.S. and international overseas relief agencies under Title III of Public Law 480 for donation to 67.3 million people. As part of the Alliance for Progress, "Operation Niños" school lunch programs in Latin America are currently feeding 13 million children—compared to fewer than 4 million when this special emphasis was initiated only two and a half years ago.

—Food-for-work community development projects are expanding to broaden and strengthen the base of country development. In 1964, 9 million people benefited from programs providing a supplementary wage of

food—through Food For Peace—as payment for participation in local self-help projects.

—There were fewer large scale disasters in the world during 1964 than in previous years, which accounts for the fact that Food For Peace was called upon to assist only 4 million victims under Title II emergency relief programs—the smallest number since the inception of the program. However, an additional 1 million refugees benefited from these Food For Peace-supported emergency relief programs.

—U.S. commodities are being supplied to 50 of the 72 projects sponsored on a multilateral basis through the World Food Program. Seventy countries share in supporting these development projects now reaching 2.7 million recipients. U.S. support of multilateral programing is also exemplified by Food For Peace commodities provided to UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund] and UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East].

Developing Commercial Markets

As Food For Peace embarks on its second decade, there is growing indication of the program's substantial contribution to the development of commercial markets for our farm products as well as purely humanitarian efforts. Commercial sales of U.S. agricultural commodities overseas reached a new high of \$4.6 billion during this year, more than double the commercial agricultural exports of 1954 when P.L. 480 was first enacted.

The P.L. 480 sales programs are designed to strengthen the economies of the recipient countries and thus hasten the day when they can finance their import requirements on commercial terms. Following are highlights of these sales programs:

—Food For Peace exports under Title I (sales for foreign currencies) reached a record high in 1964 of almost \$1.2 billion. Shipments amounted to more than 14 million tons, surpassing the previous peak of 13.9 million tons set in 1963.

—Public Law 480-generated currencies are paying U.S. overseas expenses, conserving dollars and strengthening our balance of payments position. Reimbursements to the Commodity Credit Corporation through 1964 by U.S. Government agencies utilizing these currencies totaled almost \$1.1 billion. Additional reimbursements also resulted from barter programs as U.S. agencies financed overseas procurement of goods and services with P.L. 480 commodities. Such reimbursements from both programs totaled over a third of a billion dollars in 1964.

—Our balance of payments position is also benefiting from increased activity under Title IV, long-term dollar credit sales. Almost one million tons of agricultural commodities at an export market value of \$93 million, were shipped overseas in 1964 under Title IV, also a new record. Title IV dollar repayments on principal and interest from previous sales are being made in increasing volume. Repayments during 1964 totaled \$5.4 million, compared to \$2.3 million in 1963.

P.L. 480 Supports Economic Development

Agricultural commodities continue to serve as one of our principal assets in international economic development, contributing substantially to the total U.S. overseas aid effort.

—Planned uses of local currencies provided in Title I sales agreements concluded during 1964 totaled \$580.5 million for economic development—\$553.5 million in loans; \$27 million in grants. In addition, agricultural commodities sold to foreign governments on long-term dollar credit under Title IV provided financing for economic purposes. These currencies are being used to supplement capital investment funds and technical assistance support in a wide range of industrial, agricultural, and socio-economic development projects.

—\$57 million in local currencies generated by Title I sales of Food For Peace commodities were loaned in 1964 to U.S. and local private enterprise for business development and trade expansion in 11 countries.

Challenge of the Future

These are only some of the accomplishments of Food For Peace during the past year. The program has come a long way since 1954 when it was so generally considered only as a temporary means to dispose of "burdensome" agricultural surpluses. Food For Peace has proved its worth as an important means to meet human need, encourage economic development and support U.S. foreign policy. It has helped demonstrate to the world that human hunger is no longer an inevitable fact of life. Its elimination is within our grasp.

Yet for all of the many efforts and accomplishments by the United States and other richly endowed countries, millions still suffer from some form of hunger or malnutrition. We have long recognized that an insufficient food supply is one of the leading contributors to human misery and political instability. More recently we have begun to recognize that it is also a major deterrent to economic and social development. The resulting loss, in both human and economic terms, is one of the great tragedies and shortcomings of the Twentieth Century.

The long-range solution to the hunger problem rests in improving the productive capacity of the developing nations themselves. In my Messages to the Congress this

year on agriculture and foreign assistance,² I pointed to the need for increased attention directed to the agricultural sectors of less developed countries—specifically, to help overcome obstacles such as the present deficiency of fertilizer, the lack of adequate government policies in establishing sufficient incentives for the farmer, and the general insufficiency of education so vitally needed to improve farming methods and technology.

Our efforts on these matters must continue. But we must also continue to utilize our own agricultural resources until the day these other countries become self-sufficient. That will be a number of years away—but Food For Peace can shorten this time.

Food For Peace is an important tool for development. It is good international policy and sound domestic policy. Food For Peace is, above all, a program which expresses the great and generous heart of the American people—and is a worthy expression of the compassion always so much a part of America's character. It deserves the continued support of the Congress and of all Americans.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 31, 1965.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 1, 1965, p. 126.

Central Treaty Organization Meets at Tehran

The 13th session of the Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization was held at Tehran April 7 and 8. Following are texts of an opening statement made by Secretary Rusk on April 7 and a final communique issued at the close of the meeting.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary General, Mr. Prime Minister, esteemed colleagues, and distinguished guests: For the fifth time I now have the pleasure of addressing the opening of a Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization. And with today's session I have the special satisfaction of having attended such meetings in the capitals of all five of the participating countries.

First I want to say how pleasant it is to visit again this beautiful and vigorous city and to express my deep appreciation for the warm welcome and thoughtful hospitality which His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah, his Government, and the Iranian people have extended to the visiting delegations. I should like to add the thanks of my delegation for the very gracious message of welcome from His Imperial Majesty, the Shahanshah, brought to us this morning by our old friend and former Washington neighbor, the distinguished Minister of the Imperial Court, Dr. Ghodse Nakhai. The Shahanshah holds a special place in the history of CENTO. Even though still a young man in the prime of life, he has guided the affairs of his nation for more than two decades. During the latter decade—the CENTO decade—His Majesty

has taken a close interest in the development of the organization itself and in our common efforts to insure the security and progress of the region as a whole. We have all drawn strength from the support and counsel that the Shahanshah and his Government have devoted to these objectives.

When we met last year in Washington,¹ I remarked that our first 10 years in CENTO had been a constructive decade of learning and organizing and building. In this year's deliberations, which we are about to begin, we shall have many opportunities to consider our common desire to make our CENTO institutions and facilities still more fruitful.

I do not want to leave the perspective of this 10th anniversary year without sharing a few reflections on some of the things that have changed and some of the things that remain with us from a decade ago.

In 1955, when this organization came into being, it was still fashionable in some circles, for some strange reason, to refer to Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey as being among the "new" nations, despite the great antiquity of their civilizations. If not altogether new, all three of these countries had new aspects. At the end of the Second World War the world community was freshly aware of the basic renewal of the Turkish national consciousness brought about under the leadership of Kemal Atatürk. People in lands far distant from Iran came to know more fully the measure of the transformation achieved in Iran since the beginning of the reign of

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of May 18, 1964, p. 766.

Reza Shah. Ten years ago people in my country and elsewhere were watching with great appreciation the progress of Pakistan in organizing a nation and establishing its identity in the few years that had elapsed since it won its independence under the leadership of the great Mohammad Ali Jinnah.

Now, in 1965, it is not only incorrect but actually misleading to think of these countries as "new" nations. Each has demonstrated time and again its stature among responsible nations in the forefront of the struggle for increased well-being, security, and cooperation among the peoples of the world.

Iran and Pakistan have both provided distinguished Presidents of the United Nations General Assembly, and both have served with distinction on the United Nations Security Council. And Turkey has three times been elected to that primary peacekeeping body of the world organization.

Since the day in 1947 when Pakistan was admitted to membership in the United Nations, 57 more nations have joined. Thus even the "youngest" of the CENTO countries ranks clearly among the veterans in the international council halls.

The internal political stability of the nations represented here also deserves notice. In the past 6 months all five of us have installed new administrations or renewed the mandate of existing administrations. In Pakistan and the United States, incumbent heads of government were constitutionally re-elected. In Turkey and the United Kingdom, new governments came to power by orderly processes. In Iran the change in government was brought about by the tragic assassination of Prime Minister Hassan Ali Mansour. But his distinguished colleague and friend, Amir Abbas Hoveyda, was called to take his place, and there was no pause in the ongoing program already endorsed by the people through national referendum.

The basic political stability and orderly economic and social evolution of the CENTO countries stand in sharp contrast to tumultuous events in some other areas of the world.

I do not draw these comparisons out of

any desire that we indulge in a feast of self-congratulations. But there are good reasons why the CENTO region stands out as an area of stability and hope today. Out of strength of national purpose has come the wisdom of shared experience. The skills which have been developed in the arts of mutual defense and cooperation in CENTO have played no small part in producing the sound mixture of national self-confidence with international responsibility that is demonstrated today by the CENTO partners.

CENTO has to its credit some important cooperative accomplishments, which my colleagues have mentioned. We can all find satisfaction, for example, in the completion of another segment of the Turkey-Iran railway link—a CENTO project that will endure long after the headlines of this April day in 1965 are forgotten. The CENTO communications projects and the CENTO roads and ports projects will promote the welfare and prosperity of this region for decades to come. The young engineers, teachers, nurses, veterinarians, agricultural specialists, and nuclear scientists trained under CENTO's technical assistance program will be serving and helping their fellow countrymen a generation after misguided young people elsewhere have learned, perhaps the hard way, that smashing windows and burning books are tactics of ruffians and barbarians and not of those who value knowledge and human progress. It is a pleasure to note the constructive gains made under the auspices of CENTO.

The gratifying measure of security and stability attained by the members of this alliance releases energies for other long-cherished objectives. An American poet, James Russell Lowell, wrote that "new occasions teach new duties." But let us not allow "new occasions"—or certain novelties of appearance—to distract us from a solid understanding of old truths. The formation of CENTO was brought about in response to the threat of Communist aggression. And it was the threat of Communist aggression that led the United States to associate itself so intimately with the CENTO members.

At our meeting last year I said: ²

So long as the Communist threat of aggression persists, there will be need for the CENTO shield.

That statement still stands. As President Johnson said recently: ³

The world is still full of peril for those who prize . . . freedom.

In Southeast Asia, Communist aggression is more than a threat—it is a brutal actuality. All peoples who value independence and freedom for themselves have a vital stake in the repulse of Communist aggression in Southeast Asia and in deterring threats of aggression elsewhere.

In this area CENTO has stood as a signpost that warns “no trespassing.” We must never make the terrible mistake of encouraging or allowing ambitious aggressors to think that they can attack or molest us with impunity.

The most elementary of the tested truths of our common experience is that the shield forged by CENTO has protected the independence of its members and enabled all of us to work together for economic development and a better life for the peoples of this region. It is a shield of which we can be proud for it threatens no one. Let us, therefore, in this Council, seek new ways to add unity and strength to the family we know as CENTO.

FINAL COMMUNIQUE

The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) Council of Ministers held their Thirteenth Session in Tehran on April 7 and 8, 1965. Delegation leaders were:

H.E. Mr. Abbas Aram, Foreign Minister of Iran.

H.E. Mr. M. Shoaib, Minister for Finance of Pakistan.

H.E. Mr. Hasan Esat Isik, Foreign Minister of Turkey.

The Rt. Hon. Michael Stewart, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom.

The Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, United States of America.

A message from His Imperial Majesty The Shah-

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1964, p. 866.

anshah welcoming the delegations was delivered at the opening ceremony by the Minister of The Imperial Court. The leaders of the delegations expressed their appreciation of the gracious message from His Imperial Majesty and of the warm hospitality of the host country.

With the Foreign Minister of Iran, as host, in the chair, the Council of Ministers welcomed Mr. Stewart and Mr. Isik to their first CENTO Ministerial meeting since assuming their present offices, and Mr. M. Shoaib as leader of the delegation of Pakistan on this occasion.

The Council expressed deep regret at the tragic death of Hassan Ali Mansour, the late Prime Minister of Iran, and paid tribute to Mr. Mansour's distinguished services to the Government of Iran and his valuable participation in the work of the Alliance. They also marked with special respect the passing of the distinguished British leader and world statesman, Sir Winston Churchill, and paid tribute to his enduring place in the history of this century.

The Council conducted a review of international developments as a whole, with special reference to those questions that are of direct interest to one or more of the countries represented.

Taking into consideration existing treaties, Ministers stressed their deep concern over the dangerous situation which continued in Cyprus and expressed their earnest desire for a just and lasting solution of the problem.

The Council agreed that it remained essential, in the present uncertain world situation, to maintain a policy of preparedness and vigilance in self-defence. At the same time they re-affirmed their determination to search for and seize every opportunity to make further progress in the reduction of international tensions, with general disarmament and world peace the ultimate aims in view. They found that the Alliance continued to make its own distinctive contribution to these aims, by discouraging aggression, maintaining regional stability, and developing understanding among its members.

The Council recognized that danger from subversion and aggression still remained in the CENTO area. They welcomed the counter measures which member-countries were taking in this respect.

The Council reviewed the report of the Military Committee. They took note that combined forces of the member-countries had gained valuable experience during the year from naval, military and air exercises successfully carried out under the auspices of CENTO. These broadened the professional skills of the armed forces of regional member States. They also noted the completion and bringing into operation of the CENTO permanent military telecommunications network.

The Council were pleased to note marked progress in major CENTO joint economic projects. The microwave telecommunications system linking Tur-

key, Iran and Pakistan had been completed and was in course of testing before being handed over in the very near future to the Governments of those countries. The final stage of the high-frequency radio system linking the regional capitals and London was also due for completion this summer. An important extension of the railway in eastern Turkey to link with that being extended in Iran had been completed and opened to traffic. They further noted that CENTO programmes of technical cooperation were yielding useful results, in such fields as health, agriculture, scientific and technical knowledge. The practical benefits deriving from these would be enhanced by the unanimous decision of member-countries to increase their contributions to the Multilateral Technical Cooperation Fund.

The Council agreed that, as existing projects were completed, every effort would be made to maintain the momentum and embark on new projects. The future shape of these would be the subject of study by economic experts of member-Governments at a meeting during the year. As a consequence, it is expected that guidelines would be laid down for the economic activities of the Alliance. By further developing its economic activities in the atmosphere of security and stability which the regional countries enjoyed, the Alliance would continue, in its second decade just begun, to help raise the living standards and increase the general well-being of the peoples of the region.

The Council decided to hold their next meeting in Ankara in the spring of 1966.

U.S. Denounces Soviet Circulation of Note on Use of Gas in Viet-Nam

U.S./U.N. press release 4519

Following is a letter from Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to Ambassador Abdul Monem Rifa'i, President of the Security Council.

APRIL 2, 1965

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council on March 27, 1965, the Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union asked that there be circulated as a Security Council document what he described as "a note of March 26 from the Soviet Government to the Gov-

ernment of the United States" (S/6260).

In actual fact, the communication to which the Soviet Representative referred was rejected by the United States Embassy in Moscow. The reason was simple: the Soviet communication was based on the completely false allegation that poisonous gases are being used in South Viet-Nam in connection with resistance to the aggressive campaign of conquest being waged by North Viet-Nam against the Republic of Viet-Nam.

Poisonous gases, the use of which would rightfully concern the conscience of humanity, have not been used in Viet-Nam, nor is there any intention of employing them. The materials which were employed in Viet-Nam are commonly used by police forces in riot control in many parts of the world and are commonly accepted as appropriate for such purposes. They are non-toxic and of course are not prohibited by the Geneva Convention of 1925, nor by any other understandings on the subject. These facts were of course entirely familiar to the Soviet Union when it drafted the tendentious and willfully misleading communication referred to above.

The United States is, of course, assisting—and will continue to assist—the Republic of Viet-Nam in repelling subversion, terrorism, and infiltration. At the same time, there is nothing the United States desires more than to have peace restored to that country as quickly as possible.

The position of the United States Government on the matter raised in the Soviet communication was made incontrovertibly clear by Secretary of State Dean Rusk in a statement on March 24,¹ the substance of which is attached.

I would be grateful if you would have this letter and its attachment circulated as a Security Council document.

Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

ADLAI E. STEVENSON.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 12, 1965, p. 528.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

- Letter dated February 4 from the Representative of Cyprus replying to Turkish charges (S/6161). S/6173. February 4, 1965. 2 pp.
- Letter dated February 7 from the Representative of the United States regarding defensive action taken by U.S. and South Vietnamese air elements against certain military facilities in the southern area of North Viet-Nam on February 7 in response to attacks by Viet Cong forces on South Vietnamese air bases in Pleiku and Tuy Hoa, two barracks installations in the Pleiku area, and on a number of villages in the area of Tuy Hoa and Nha Trang. S/6174. February 8, 1965. 3 pp.
- Letter dated February 8 from the Representative of Turkey transmitting the text of a telegram from the Vice President of Cyprus regarding the situation in Cyprus. S/6176. February 8, 1965. 3 pp.
- Letter dated February 4 from the Representative of Senegal regarding the firing on Senegalese villages from the territory of Portuguese Guinea. S/6177. February 8, 1965. 2 pp.
- Letter dated February 9 from the Representative of the U.S.S.R. transmitting a statement of the Soviet Government concerning "the aggressive acts of the armed forces of the United States of America against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam." S/6178. February 9, 1965. 3 pp.

General Assembly

- Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Information furnished by states launching objects into orbit or beyond: United States, A/AC.105/INF.88, February 11, 1965, and A/AC.105/INF.90, March 11, 1965; U.S.S.R., A/AC.105/INF.89, March 1, 1965, and A/AC.105/INF.92, March 15, 1965; Italy, A/AC.105/INF.91, March 11, 1965.
- Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Letter dated February 18 from the Representative of the United States attaching a statement of the U.S. position on the resolution adopted by the General Assembly concerning the forthcoming elections in the Cook Islands. A/5895. February 18, 1965. 2 pp.
- Letter dated February 19 from the Representative of France stating his Government's reservations with regard to the interim financial arrangements approved by the Assembly on February 18. A/5896. February 19, 1965. 2 pp.
- General Multilateral Treaties Concluded Under the Auspices of the League of Nations. Report of the Secretary-General. A/5759. February 25, 1965. 41 pp.
- Letter dated February 26 from the Secretary-General to the First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia regarding Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations. A/5899. February 26, 1965. 1 p.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention for unification of certain rules relating to international transportation by air and additional protocol. Done at Warsaw October 12, 1929. Entered into force February 13, 1933. 49 Stat. 3000. *Confirmation of continued participation:* Rwanda, December 1, 1964.

Maritime Matters

Convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic. Done at London April 9, 1965. Open for signature April 9 to October 9, 1965.¹
Signatures: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Korea, Lebanon, Malagasy Republic, Malaysia, Monaco, Nicaragua, Philippines, Poland, San Marino, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United States, Yugoslavia, April 9, 1965.

Sugar

Protocol for the prolongation of the international sugar agreement of December 1, 1958 (TIAS 4389). Done at London August 1, 1963. Entered into force for the United States February 27, 1964. TIAS 5744.
Ratification deposited: El Salvador, January 14, 1965.

Wheat

Protocol for the extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington March 22 through April 23, 1965.¹
Signatures: Belgium,² April 13, 1965; Cuba, April 14, 1965; Finland, April 16, 1965; Federal Republic of Germany, April 15, 1965; Israel, April 12, 1965; Sweden,³ April 14, 1965; South Africa, April 14, 1965.

BILATERAL

Ivory Coast

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Abidjan April 5, 1965. Entered into force April 5, 1965.

¹ Not in force.

² Signed for the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union.

³ Subject to ratification.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Designations

William J. Jordan as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, effective April 11. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 75 dated April 17.)

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each leaflet contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and, in some cases, a selected bibliography. Those listed below are available at 5¢ each.

Czechoslovakia. Pub. 7758. 8 pp.
Saudi Arabia. Pub. 7835. 4 pp.
Senegal. Pub. 7820. 8 pp.

Educational and Cultural Diplomacy—1963. This pamphlet reports on the increasing need for education throughout the world and the effective means of meeting the need through international exchange programs and related activities. Pub. 7765. International Information and Cultural series 87. 141 pp. 45¢.

The Atlantic Community—Common Hopes and Common Objectives. Text of an address made by President Johnson at the 175th anniversary convocation at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. Pub. 7804. General Foreign Policy series 198. 11 pp. 15¢.

International Understanding—Through the Performing Arts. A report to the Congress and the public, by the Advisory Committee on the Arts, on the cultural presentations program of the Department of State, July 1, 1963—June 30, 1964. Pub. 7819. International Information and Cultural series 88. 106 pp. 35¢.

International Cooperation Year. Leaflet on President Johnson's proclamation designating 1965 as International Cooperation Year in the United States. It focuses on how the U.S. Government and private citizen organizations may participate in commemorating the 20th anniversary of the United Nations during this year. Pub. 7827. International Organization and Conference series 61. 4 pp. Limited distribution.

Foreign Affairs Outline No. 10—Our Policy in South-east Asia: A Perspective. Article based on an address made by William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, before the Washington Chamber of Commerce, Washington, Mo. Pub. 7832. Far Eastern series 129. 8 pp. 5¢.

The American Republics in Partnership. Pamphlet to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the Inter-American System on April 14, 1965. Pub. 7833. Inter-American series 91. 15 pp. 15¢.

Aggression From the North—The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign To Conquer South Viet-Nam. Massive evidence of Hanoi's aggression obtained by the Government of South Viet-Nam summarized to inform U.S. citizens and the world of what is happening in Viet-Nam. Pub. 7839. Far Eastern series 130. 64 pp. 40¢.

Technical Cooperation. Agreement with Afghanistan, extending agreement of June 30, 1953, as extended Exchange of notes—Signed at Kabul October 31 and November 7, 1964. Entered into force November 7, 1964. Effective March 31, 1964. TIAS 5714. 3 pp. 5¢.

Extradition. Supplementary convention with Belgium, supplementing the convention of October 26, 1901, and the supplementary convention of June 20, 1935—Signed at Brussels November 14, 1963. Entered into force December 25, 1964. TIAS 5715. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Bolivia—Signed at La Paz March 25, 1964. Entered into force March 25, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5716. 14 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with China—Signed at Taipei December 31, 1964. Entered into force December 31, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5717. 23 pp. 15¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with China—Signed at Taipei December 31, 1964. Entered into force December 31, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5718. 22 pp. 15¢.

Trade—Quality Wheat. Agreements with European Economic Community and Member States, extending the date for beginning negotiations under paragraph B(i) of the agreement of March 7, 1962. Exchanges of letters—Signed at Brussels June 11 and July 20, 1964, and June 28 and August 21, 1963. Entered into force July 20, 1964, and August 21, 1963, respectively. TIAS 5720. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Iran, amending agreement of November 16, 1964. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tehran December 15, 1964. Entered into force December 15, 1964. TIAS 5721. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Israel—Signed at Washington December 22, 1964. Entered into force December 22, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5722. 8 pp. 10¢.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agreement with Israel, extending agreement of July 12, 1955, as amended and extended—Signed at Washington August 19, 1964. Entered into force October 1, 1964. TIAS 5723. 2 pp. 5¢.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Equipment, Materials, and Services. Agreement with Japan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tokyo December 4, 1964. Entered into force December 4, 1964. TIAS 5724. 9 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Kenya—Signed at Nairobi December 7, 1964. Entered into force December 7, 1964. With exchange of notes—Signed at Nairobi February 3 and 4, 1965. TIAS 5725. 7 pp. 10¢.

Africa. The Organization of African Unity . . . 669

Agriculture. The Food for Peace Program and the Challenge of the Future (Johnson) . . . 682

Asia

Tragedy, Disappointment, and Progress in Southeast Asia (Johnson) . . . 650

The Works of Peace (Johnson) . . . 652

Chile. Letters of Credence (Tomic Romero) . . . 655

Congress

Amending U.N. Charter To Enlarge Security Council and ECOSOC (Johnson) . . . 678

The Food for Peace Program and the Challenge of the Future (Johnson) . . . 682

Denmark. Letters of Credence (Rønne) . . . 655

Department and Foreign Service. Designations (Jorden) . . . 690

Disarmament. Arms Control—Foundation Stone in the Ramparts We Watch (Foster) . . . 659

Economic Affairs

International Trade (Mann) . . . 665

Japanese Issues To Be Exempt From Interest Equalization Tax (Executive order) . . . 667

Tragedy, Disappointment, and Progress in Southeast Asia (Johnson) . . . 650

United States Expresses Views on Laurel-Langley Agreement (William P. Bundy) . . . 664

Foreign Aid. The Food for Peace Program and the Challenge of the Future (Johnson) . . . 682

Germany. U.S. Protests Harassment on Access Routes to Berlin . . . 658

Health, Education, and Welfare. The Works of Peace (Johnson) . . . 652

Indonesia. Ambassador Bunker Concludes Meetings With Indonesian Leaders (joint communique) . . . 654

International Organizations and Conferences

Central Treaty Organization Meets at Tehran (Rusk, final communique) . . . 685

The Organization of African Unity . . . 669

Japan

Japanese Issues To Be Exempt From Interest Equalization Tax (Executive order) . . . 667

U.S. and Japan Begin Program of Cooperation in Medical Science (Johnson, U.S. advisory group) . . . 667

Middle East. Central Treaty Organization Meets at Tehran (Rusk, final communique) . . . 685

Military Affairs. Secretary Rules Out Suspension of U.S. Raids on North Viet-Nam . . . 651

Philippines. United States Expresses Views on Laurel-Langley Agreement (William P. Bundy) . . . 664

Presidential Documents

Amending U.N. Charter To Enlarge Security Council and ECOSOC . . . 678

The Food for Peace Program and the Challenge of the Future . . . 682

Japanese Issues To Be Exempt From Interest Equalization Tax . . . 667

Tragedy, Disappointment, and Progress in Southeast Asia . . . 650

U.S. and Japan Begin Program of Cooperation in Medical Science . . . 667

The Works of Peace . . . 652

Public Affairs. Jorden designated Deputy Assistant Secretary . . . 690

Publications. Recent Releases . . . 690

Science. U.S. and Japan Begin Program of Cooperation in Medical Science (Johnson, U.S. advisory group) . . . 667

Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . 689

U.S.S.R.

U.S. Denounces Soviet Circulation of Note on Use of Gas in Viet-Nam (Stevenson) . . . 688

U.S. Protests Harassment of Ships by Soviets; Rejects Soviet Charges (texts of notes) . . . 655

U.S. Protests Harassment on Access Routes to Berlin . . . 658

United Kingdom. Letters of Credence (Dean) . . . 655

United Nations

Amending U.N. Charter To Enlarge Security Council and ECOSOC (Johnson) . . . 678

Current U.N. Documents . . . 689

U.S. Denounces Soviet Circulation of Note on Use of Gas in Viet-Nam (Stevenson) . . . 688

Viet-Nam

Secretary Rules Out Suspension of U.S. Raids on North Viet-Nam . . . 651

Tragedy, Disappointment, and Progress in Southeast Asia (Johnson) . . . 650

U.S. Denounces Soviet Circulation of Note on Use of Gas in Viet-Nam (Stevenson) . . . 688

Name Index

Bundy, William P . . . 664

Bunker, Ellsworth . . . 654

Dean, Sir Patrick . . . 655

Foster, William C . . . 659

Johnson, President . . . 650, 652, 667, 678, 682

Jorden, William J . . . 690

Mann, Thomas C . . . 665

Rønne, Torben . . . 655

Rusk, Secretary . . . 651, 685

Stevenson, Adlai E. . . . 688

Sukarno, President . . . 654

Tomic Romero, Radomiro . . . 655

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 12-18

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to April 12 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 65 of March 31; 68 of April 2; and 69 of April 5.

No.	Date	Subject
* 74	4/13	Harriman: "The Sino-Soviet Conflict" (excerpts).
* 75	4/17	Jorden designated Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (biographic details).
* 76	4/16	Program for visit of Prime Minister of Italy.

* Not printed.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia

President Johnson's address at Johns Hopkins University on April 7, 1965, published a pamphlet under the title *Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia*, is a major statement of U.S. policy on Southeast Asia. Here the President proposes broad outlines for a settlement of the conflict in Viet-Nam and suggests a greatly expanded cooperative effort for the development of Southeast Asia.

NATO After Sixteen Years: An Anniversary Assessment

"As it reaches its 16th anniversary, NATO is clearly approaching a time of testing. We cannot be sure precisely how it will be adapted to the circumstances of the future," says Dr. H. Popper, Director of the Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, in a special article written for the Bulletin. This review and forward estimate examines the organization's strengths and weaknesses and discusses some of its current problems.

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN

Vol. LII, No. 1350



May 10, 1965

THE CONTROL OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Address by Secretary Rusk 694

UNITED NATIONS PROCEDURES AND POWER REALITIES:
THE INTERNATIONAL APPORTIONMENT PROBLEM

by Richard N. Gardner 701

PRESENT OBJECTIVES AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

by Leonard Unger 712

DISPARITIES IN PROGRESS BETWEEN NATIONS

by Under Secretary Mann 729

75TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATE
THE RECORD OF THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM

Address by Vice President Humphrey 726

For index see inside back cover

The Control of Force in International Relations

*Address by Secretary Rusk*¹

When this distinguished Society was founded 59 years ago, the then Secretary of State, Elihu Root, became its first president. With the passage of time, the Secretary of State has been elevated to a less demanding role, that of honorary president. Secretary Root himself not only established the precedent of becoming president while Secretary of State; he also superseded it by continuing to serve as your president for 18 years. The *Proceedings* of the first meeting indicate that Secretary Root not only presided and delivered an address but that he also selected the menu for the dinner.

The year 1907, when the first of the Society's annual meetings was held, today appears to have been one of those moments in American history when we were concentrating upon building our American society,

¹ Made before the American Society of International Law at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 23 (press release 82).

essentially untroubled by what took place beyond our borders. But the founders of this Society realized that the United States could not remain aloof from the world. It is one of the achievements of this Society that, from its inception, it has spread the realization that the United States cannot opt out of the community of nations—that international affairs are part of our national affairs.

Questions of war and peace occupied the Society at its first meeting. Among the subjects discussed were the possibility of the immunity of private property from belligerent seizure upon the high seas and whether trade in contraband of war was unneutral. Limitations upon recourse to force then proposed were embryonic, as is illustrated by the fact one topic for discussion related to restrictions upon the use of armed force in the collection of contract obligations. The distance between those

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The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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ideas and the restrictions upon recourse to armed force contained in the Charter of the United Nations is vast. It is to these charter restrictions—and their place in the practice and malpractice of states—that I shall address much of my remarks this evening.

The Kind of World We Seek

Current United States policy arouses the criticism that it is at once too legal and too tough. Time was when the criticism of American concern with the legal element in international relations was that it led to softness—to a “legalistic-moralistic” approach to foreign affairs which conformed more to the ideal than to the real.

Today, criticism of American attachment to the role of law is that it leads not to softness but to severity. We are criticized not for sacrificing our national interests to international interests but for endeavoring to impose the international interest upon other nations. We are criticized for acting as if the Charter of the United Nations means what it says. We are criticized for treating the statement of the law by the International Court of Justice as authoritative. We are criticized for taking collective security seriously.

This criticism is, I think, a sign of strength—of our strength and of the strength of international law. It is a tribute to a blending of political purpose with legal ethic.

American foreign policy is at once principled and pragmatic. Its central objective is our national safety and well-being—to “secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” But we know we can no longer find security and well-being in defenses and policies which are confined to North America, or the Western Hemisphere, or the North Atlantic community.

This has become a very small planet. We have to be concerned with all of it—with all of its land, waters, atmosphere, and with surrounding space. We have a deep national interest in peace, the prevention of aggression, the faithful performance of agreements, the growth of international law. Our

foreign policy is rooted in the profoundly practical realization that the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter must animate the behavior of states if mankind is to prosper or is even to survive. Or at least they must animate enough states with enough will and enough resources to see to it that others do not violate those rules with impunity.

The preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the charter set forth abiding purposes of American policy. This is not surprising, since we took the lead in drafting the charter—at a time when the biggest war in history was still raging and we and others were thinking deeply about its frightful costs and the ghastly mistakes and miscalculations which led to it.

The kind of world we seek is the kind set forth in the opening sections of the charter: a world community of independent states, each with the institutions of its own choice but cooperating with one another to promote their mutual welfare, a world in which the use of force is effectively inhibited, a world of expanding human rights and well-being, a world of expanding international law, a world in which an agreement is a commitment and not just a tactic.

We believe that this is the sort of world a great majority of the governments of the world desire. We believe it is the sort of world man must achieve if he is not to perish. As I said on another occasion:²

If once the international rule of law could be discussed with a certain condescension as a utopian ideal, today it becomes an elementary practical necessity. *Pacta sunt servanda* now becomes the basis of survival.

Unhappily, a minority of governments is committed to different ideas of the conduct and organization of human affairs. They are dedicated to the promotion of the Communist world revolution. And their doctrine justifies any technique, any ruse, any deceit, which contributes to that end. They may differ as to tactics from time to time.

² For an address by Secretary Rusk before the American Law Institute on May 22, 1964, see BULLETIN of June 8, 1964, p. 886.

And the two principal Communist powers are competitors for the leadership of the world Communist movement. But both are committed to the eventual communization of the entire world.

The overriding issue of our time is which concepts are to prevail: those set forth in the United Nations Charter or those proclaimed in the name of a world revolution.

Charter Prohibitions on Use of Force

The paramount commitment of the charter is article 2, paragraph 4, which reads:

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

This comprehensive limitation went beyond the Covenant of the League of Nations. This more sweeping commitment sought to apply a bitter lesson of the inter-war period—that the threat or use of force, whether or not called “war,” feeds on success. The indelible lesson of those years is that the time to stop aggression is at its very beginning.

The exceptions to the prohibitions on the use or threat of force were expressly set forth in the charter. The use of force is legal:

—as a collective measure by the United Nations, or

—as action by regional agencies in accordance with chapter VIII of the charter, or

—in individual or collective self-defense.

When article 2, paragraph 4, was written it was widely regarded as general international law, governing both members and nonmembers of the United Nations. And on the universal reach of the principle embodied in article 2, paragraph 4, wide agreement remains.

Thus, last year, a United Nations Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and

Cooperation Among States met in Mexico City. All shades of United Nations opinion were represented. The Committee's purpose was to study and possibly to elaborate certain of those principles. The Committee debated much and agreed on little. But on one point, it reached swift and unanimous agreement: that all states, and not only all members of the United Nations, are bound to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Nonrecognition of the statehood of a political entity was held not to affect the international application of this cardinal rule of general international law.

But at this same meeting in Mexico City, Czechoslovakia, with the warm support of the Soviet Union and some other members, proposed formally another exemption from the limitations on use of force. Their proposal stated that:

The prohibition of the use of force shall not affect . . . self-defense of nations against colonial domination in the exercise of the right of self-determination.

The United States is all for self-defense. We are against colonial domination—we led the way in throwing it off. We have long favored self-determination, in practice as well as in words—indeed, we favor it for the entire world, including the peoples behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains. But we could not accept the Czech proposal. And we were pleased that the Special Committee found the Czech proposal unacceptable.

The primary reason why we opposed that attempt to rewrite the charter—apart from the inadmissibility of rewriting the charter at all by such means—was that we knew the meaning behind the words. We knew that, like so many statements from such sources, it used upside-down language—that it would in effect authorize a state to wage war, to use force internationally, as long as it claimed it was doing so to “liberate” somebody from “colonial domination.” In short, the Czech resolution proposed to give to so-called “wars of national liberation” the same

exemption from the limitation on the use of force which the charter accords to defense against aggression.

What Is a "War of National Liberation"?

What is a "war of national liberation"? It is, in essence, any war which furthers the Communist world revolution—what, in broader terms, the Communists have long referred to as a "just" war. The term "war of national liberation" is used not only to denote armed insurrection by people still under colonial rule—there are not many of those left outside the Communist world. It is used to denote any effort led by Communists to overthrow by force any non-Communist government.

Thus the war in South Viet-Nam is called a "war of national liberation." And those who would overthrow various other non-Communist governments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are called the "forces of national liberation."

Nobody in his right mind would deny that Venezuela is not only a truly independent nation but that it has a government chosen in a free election. But the leaders of the Communist insurgency in Venezuela are described as leaders of a fight for "national liberation"—not only by themselves and by Castro and the Chinese Communists but by the Soviet Communists.

A recent editorial in *Pravda* spoke of the "peoples of Latin America . . . marching firmly along the path of struggle for their national independence" and said, ". . . the upsurge of the national liberation movement in Latin American countries has been to a great extent a result of the activities of Communist parties." It added:

The Soviet people have regarded and still regard it as their sacred duty to give support to the peoples fighting for their independence. True to their international duty the Soviet people have been and will remain on the side of the Latin American patriots.

In Communist doctrine and practice, a non-Communist government may be labeled and denounced as "colonialist," "reaction-

ary," or a "puppet," and any state so labeled by the Communists automatically becomes fair game—while Communist intervention by force in non-Communist states is justified as "self-defense" or part of the "struggle against colonial domination." "Self-determination" seems to mean that any Communist nation can determine by itself that any non-Communist state is a victim of colonialist domination and therefore a justifiable target for a "war of liberation."

As the risks of overt aggression, whether nuclear or with conventional forces, have become increasingly evident, the Communists have put increasing stress on the "war of national liberation." The Chinese Communists have been more militant in language and behavior than the Soviet Communists. But the Soviet Communist leadership also has consistently proclaimed its commitment in principle to support wars of national liberation. This commitment was reaffirmed as recently as Monday of this week by Mr. Kosygin [Aleksai N. Kosygin, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers].

International law does not restrict internal revolution within a state or revolution against colonial authority. But international law does restrict what third powers may lawfully do in support of insurrection. It is these restrictions which are challenged by the doctrine, and violated by the practice, of "wars of liberation."

It is plain that acceptance of the doctrine of "wars of liberation" would amount to scuttling the modern international law of peace which the charter prescribes. And acceptance of the practice of "wars of liberation," as defined by the Communists, would mean the breakdown of peace itself.

South Viet-Nam's Right of Self-Defense

Viet-Nam presents a clear current case of the lawful versus the unlawful use of force. I would agree with General Giap [Vo Nguyen Giap, North Vietnamese Commander in Chief] and other Communists that it is a test case for "wars of national liberation." We intend to meet that test.

Were the insurgency in South Viet-Nam truly indigenous and self-sustained, international law would not be involved. But the fact is that it receives vital external support—in organization and direction, in training, in men, in weapons and other supplies. That external support is unlawful for a double reason. First, it contravenes general international law, which the United Nations Charter here expresses. Second, it contravenes particular international law: the 1954 Geneva accords on Viet-Nam and the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos.

In resisting the aggression against it, the Republic of Viet-Nam is exercising its right of self-defense. It called upon us and other states for assistance. And in the exercise of the right of collective self-defense under the United Nations Charter, we and other nations are providing such assistance.

The American policy of assisting South Viet-Nam to maintain its freedom was inaugurated under President Eisenhower and continued under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Our assistance has been increased because the aggression from the North has been augmented. Our assistance now encompasses the bombing of North Viet-Nam. The bombing is designed to interdict, as far as possible, and to inhibit, as far as may be necessary, continued aggression against the Republic of Viet-Nam.

When that aggression ceases, collective measures in defense against it will cease. As President Johnson has declared: ³

... if that aggression is stopped, the people and Government of South Viet-Nam will be free to settle their own future, and the need for supporting American military action there will end.

The fact that the demarcation line between North and South Viet-Nam was intended to be temporary does not make the assault on South Viet-Nam any less of an aggression. The demarcation lines between North and South Korea and between East and West Germany are temporary. But that did not make the North Korean invasion of South Korea a permissible use of force.

³ *Ibid.*, Apr. 12, 1965, p. 527.

Let's not forget the salient features of the 1962 agreements on Laos.⁴ Laos was to be independent and neutral. All foreign troops, regular or irregular, and other military personnel were to be withdrawn within 75 days, except a limited number of French instructors as requested by the Lao Government. No arms were to be introduced into Laos except at the request of that Government. The signatories agreed to refrain "from all direct or indirect interference in the internal affairs" of Laos. They promised also not to use Lao territory to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries—a stipulation that plainly prohibited the passage of arms and men from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam by way of Laos. An International Control Commission of three was to assure compliance with the agreements.

What happened? The non-Communist elements complied. The Communists did not. At no time since that agreement was signed have either the Pathet Lao or the North Viet-Nam authorities complied with it. The North Vietnamese left several thousand troops there—the backbone of almost every Pathet Lao battalion. Use of the corridor through Laos to South Viet-Nam continued. And the Communists barred the areas under their control both to the Government of Laos and the International Control Commission.

Nature of Struggle in Viet-Nam

To revert to Viet-Nam: I continue to hear and see nonsense about the nature of the struggle there. I sometimes wonder at the gullibility of educated men and the stubborn disregard of plain facts by men who are supposed to be helping our young to learn—especially to learn how to think.

Hanoi has never made a secret of its designs. It publicly proclaimed in 1960 a renewal of the assault on South Viet-Nam. Quite obviously its hopes of taking over South Viet-Nam from within had withered to close to zero—and the remarkable economic and social progress of South Viet

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

Nam contrasted, most disagreeably for the North Vietnamese Communists, with their own miserable economic performance.

The facts about the external involvement have been documented in white papers⁵ and other publications of the Department of State. The International Control Commission has held that there is evidence "beyond reasonable doubt" of North Vietnamese intervention.

There is no evidence that the Viet Cong has any significant popular following in South Viet-Nam. It relies heavily on terror. Most of its reinforcements in recent months have been North Vietnamese from the North Vietnamese Army.

Let us be clear about what is involved today in Southeast Asia. We are not involved with empty phrases or conceptions which ride upon the clouds. We are talking about the vital national interests of the United States in the peace of the Pacific. We are talking about the appetite for aggression—an appetite which grows upon feeding and which is proclaimed to be insatiable. We are talking about the safety of nations with whom we are allied—and the integrity of the American commitment to join in meeting attack.

It is true that we also believe that every small state has a right to be unmolested by its neighbors even though it is within reach of a great power. It is true that we are committed to general principles of law and procedure which reject the idea that men and arms can be sent freely across frontiers to absorb a neighbor. But underlying the general principles is the harsh reality that our own security is threatened by those who would embark upon a course of aggression

⁵ *A Threat to the Peace: North Viet-Nam's Effort To Conquer South Viet-Nam*, Department of State publication 7308, released in December 1961, Parts I (25 cents) and II (55 cents), and *Aggression From the North: The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign To Conquer South Viet-Nam*, Department of State publication 7839, released in February 1965 (40 cents); for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 20402.

whose announced ultimate purpose is our own destruction.

Once again we hear expressed the views which cost the men of my generation a terrible price in World War II. We are told that Southeast Asia is far away—but so were Manchuria and Ethiopia. We are told that, if we insist that someone stop shooting, that is asking them for unconditional surrender. We are told that perhaps the aggressor will be content with just one more bite. We are told that, if we prove faithless on one commitment, perhaps others would believe us about other commitments in other places. We are told that, if we stop resisting, perhaps the other side will have a change of heart. We are asked to stop hitting bridges and radar sites and ammunition depots without requiring that the other side stop its slaughter of thousands of civilians and its bombings of schools and hotels and hospitals and railways and buses.

Surely we have learned over the past three decades that the acceptance of aggression leads only to a sure catastrophe. Surely we have learned that the aggressor must face the consequences of his action and be saved from the frightful miscalculation that brings all to ruin. It is the purpose of law to guide men away from such events, to establish rules of conduct which are deeply rooted in the reality of experience.

A "Common Law of Mankind"

Before closing I should like to turn away from the immediate difficulties and dangers of the situation in Southeast Asia and remind you of the dramatic progress that shapes and is being shaped by expanding international law.

A "common law of mankind"—to use the happy phrase of your distinguished colleague Wilfred Jenks—is growing as the world shrinks and as the vistas of space expand. This year is, by proclamation of the General Assembly, International Cooperation Year, a year to direct attention to the common interests of mankind and to accelerate the joint efforts being undertaken to further them. Those common interests are enormous

and intricate, and the joint efforts which further them are developing fast, although perhaps not fast enough.

In the 19th century the United States attended an average of one international conference a year. Now we attend nearly 600 a year. We are party to 4,300 treaties and other international agreements in force. Three-fourths of these were signed in the last 25 years. Our interest in the observance of all of these treaties and agreements is profound, whether the issue is peace in Laos, or the payment of United Nations assessments, or the allocation of radio frequencies, or the application of airline safeguards, or the control of illicit traffic in narcotics, or any other issue which states have chosen to regulate through the lawmaking process. The writing of international cooperation into international law is meaningful only if the law is obeyed—and only if the international institutions which administer and develop the law function in accordance with agreed procedures, until the procedures are changed.

Everything suggests that the rate of growth in international law, like the rate of change in almost every other field these days, is rising at a very steep angle.

In recent years the law of the sea has been developed and codified, but it first evolved in a leisurely fashion over the centuries. International agreements to regulate aerial navigation had to be worked out within the period of a couple of decades. Now, within the first few years of man's adventures in outer space, we are deeply involved in the creation of international institutions, regulations, and law to govern this effort.

Already the United Nations has developed a set of legal principles to govern the use of outer space and declared celestial bodies free from national appropriation.

Already nations, including the United States and the Soviet Union, have agreed not to orbit weapons of mass destruction in outer space.

Already the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on Outer Space is formulating international agreements on

liability for damage caused by the reentry of objects launched into outer space and on rescue and return of astronauts and space objects.

Already the first international sounding rocket range has been established in India and is being offered for United Nations sponsorship.

To make orderly space exploration possible at this stage, the International Telecommunication Union had to allocate radio frequencies for the purpose.

To take advantage of weather reporting and forecasting potential of observation satellites, married to computer technology, the World Meteorological Organization is creating a vast system of data acquisition, analysis, and distribution which depends entirely on international agreement, regulation, and standards.

And to start building a single global communications satellite system, we have created a novel international institution in which a private American corporation shares ownership with 45 governments.

This is but part of the story of how the pace of discovery and invention forces us to reach out for international agreement, to build international institutions, to do things in accordance with an expanding international and transnational law. Phenomenal as the growth of treaty obligations is, the true innovation of 20th-century international law lies more in the fact that we have nearly 80 international institutions which are capable of carrying out those obligations.

It is important that the processes and products of international cooperation be understood and appreciated; and it is important that their potential be much further developed. It is also important that the broader significance of the contributions of international cooperation to the solving of international problems of an economic, social, scientific, and humanitarian character not be overestimated. For all the progress of peace could be incinerated in war.

Thus the control of force in international relations remains the paramount problem which confronts the diplomat and the lawyer.

—and the man in the street and the man in the rice field. Most of mankind is not in an immediate position to grapple very directly with that problem, but the problem is no less crucial. The responsibility of those, in our profession and mine, who do grapple

with it is the greater. I am happy to acknowledge that this Society, in thinking and debating courageously and constructively about the conditions of peace, continues to make its unique contribution and to make it well.

United Nations Procedures and Power Realities: The International Apportionment Problem

by Richard N. Gardner

Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs¹

I have always looked forward to annual meetings of this Society with anticipation—but never more so than this year. One reason, of course, is the very great honor of participating in this evening's program together with the Secretary of State. The other reason is the particularly timely and important theme to which you are devoting these annual meetings—"The Development of International Law by International Organizations."

Some people, to be sure, may have reservations about the decision to devote all of our meetings this year to this particular subject:

On one side there are those who may feel that the problems of international organizations are not sufficiently "legal" to sustain the interest of practicing lawyers and law teachers.

On the other side there are those who may feel that law and lawyers already have so much to do with foreign policy, in the field of international organizations and elsewhere, and that this program of yours is hardly designed to keep them in their place.

Those who hold this latter view would probably agree with the judgment of Sir Harold Nicolson, the famous British writer on diplomacy, that "the worst kind of diplomats are missionaries, fanatics and lawyers."

Fortunately Sir Harold Nicolson's view on this subject has not prevailed in the United States. Since 1789, 45 out of 52 of our Secretaries of State have been members of the bar. One member of that small band of seven who have not been lawyers—the Secretary of State we honor here tonight—does not conceal the fact that he was studying law when the war intervened. It cut off what undoubtedly would have been a brilliant career at the bar, and it no doubt made him Secretary of State several years sooner.

My views on this subject are undoubtedly self-serving. I am a great believer in the deep involvement of lawyers in foreign policy, particularly in the field of international organization. Those laymen who complain about the lawyer's role in this area tend to think of law as the mechanical application of principles found in cases and textbooks. Few lawyers today would accept so restrictive a definition of their function. Most of us like to think of ourselves as practicing what a

¹ Address made before the American Society of International Law at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 23.

colleague on the Harvard law faculty has described as "Economics—the science of good arrangements."

It is not surprising that in the Department of State today there are many more lawyers outside than inside the Legal Adviser's office. Several, like myself, are in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, trying to apply "the science of good arrangements" to the major tasks of peacekeeping and nation-building which our country is undertaking on a multilateral basis.

Together with our colleagues in the office of the Legal Adviser, we have been applying the lawyer's skills in problem-solving to some of the exciting enterprises undertaken during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations—to developing the institutional components for partial and general disarmament, to negotiating ground rules for U.N. peacekeeping forces, to drafting principles for the peaceful uses of outer space, to establishing interim arrangements for global satellite communications, to inaugurating a U.N./FAO World Food Program, to creating a World Weather Watch under the World Meteorological Organization, to launching new United Nations trade machinery, and to analysis of the possible functions of a United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Growth in Membership and Responsibility

Of all our preoccupations these last 4 years in the field of international organization the one which best illustrates the relevance of law and legal skills has been our effort to adapt the decisionmaking procedures of the United Nations and its family of agencies to take adequate account of world power realities.

The Secretary of State himself called special attention to this problem in his Hammarskjold Lecture at Columbia University on January 10, 1964.² He pointed out that a two-thirds vote could now be put together in the General Assembly, at least in theory, by members representing only 10 percent of the

population of U.N. members and 5 percent of contributions to the regular budget. He noted that the rapid and radical expansion of the organization may require some adaptation of procedures if the U.N. is to remain relevant to the real world and therefore effective in that world.

The reason for our preoccupation with this subject is obvious. The United Nations has grown from 51 to 114 members in the last 20 years. A parallel increase has taken place in the membership of the specialized and affiliated agencies. U.N. membership may reach a total of 125 to 130 before it finally levels off.

What makes this extraordinary increase in membership particularly significant from a constitutional point of view is the simultaneous increase in the U.N.'s capacity to act. The United States has played a leading role in the strengthening of the action responsibilities of the United Nations system in both peacekeeping and development. We want to continue to play this role in the years ahead.

It is obvious that, as the U.N. develops its increasing capacity to act, there will be increasing concern with the procedures by which this capacity is exercised. The manifest disproportion between voting power and real power is now a central preoccupation of persons concerned with the future of the world organization. Unless we can find ways to allay the anxieties felt on this subject in the United States and in other countries, it will be increasingly difficult to use the U.N. in the years ahead for important tasks of peacekeeping and development.

To be sure, it is important not to overstate the problem which is inherent in the present constitutional situation. As Dag Hammarskjold reminded us some years ago in an annual report to the General Assembly [U.N. doc. A/3594/Add. 1], the members of the United Nations may have equal votes but they are far from having equal influence:

The criticism of "one nation, one vote," irrespective of size or strength, as constituting an obstacle to arriving at just and representative solutions, tends to exaggerate the problem. The General Assembly is not a parliament of elected individuals

² For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 27, 1964, p. 113.

members; it is a diplomatic meeting in which the delegates of member states represent governmental policies, and these policies are subject to all the influences that would prevail in international life in any case.

Anyone who believes that United States influence in the United Nations is measured by the fact that it has less than one-hundredth of the votes in the General Assembly fails completely to understand the realities of power as they are reflected in the world organization. These realities include the fact that the United States is the principal contributor to the U.N.'s regular budget, is by far the largest supporter of the U.N.'s peacekeeping and development programs, and is making by far the largest individual contribution to the defense and development of the non-Communist world. On U.N. decisions of vital importance to the United States, the voting of other countries has been considerably influenced by U.S. views. Nevertheless, after these and other qualifications are made, it remains true that the present procedures do need to be improved in the light both of the growth of U.N. membership and the growth of U.N. responsibilities. The last UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] Conference, for example, voted a budget by a large majority of votes which represented less than 30 percent of the funds that had to be raised to make the budget a reality. And at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva last spring there was a disturbing tendency of the 75 (now 77) less developed countries to use their automatic two-thirds majority to vote recommendations for action on trade and development over the opposition of the very minority of developed countries to whom the recommendations were addressed.

On the whole, the majority of small countries have not behaved as irresponsibly as the pessimists have predicted. We hope in the years ahead that the "revolution of rising expectations" will be matched by an "evolution of rising responsibility." But we cannot base our participation in the U.N. on

hope alone. Sound procedural adaptations can help make this hope a reality.

Rationalizing the Decisionmaking Process

The constitutional problem here involved is not unique to the U.N. We have sometimes referred to these difficulties in the U.N. as the "international apportionment problem"—because the word "apportionment" has a very poignant meaning in our domestic political life through the recent actions of our Supreme Court and State legislatures.

Indeed, we are dealing here with problems in the management of power reminiscent of those which confronted our own Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia nearly 200 years ago. In Philadelphia then, as in the United Nations system today, the problem was how to reconcile the sovereign equality of states with the fact that some states are very small and other states are very large.

The sovereign equality of states is one of the fundamental principles of international law. In the words of a famous case decided many years ago by the U.S. Supreme Court: "Russia and Geneva have equal rights." Article 2, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter declares that the United Nations is based on the principle of sovereign equality.

The sovereign equality of states, however, has never meant the equal right to participate in the decisionmaking process of international organizations. The composition of the Security Council and other councils, the veto provision, the amendment process—these and other provisions of the charter all accord special privileges to certain members. So the structure of the United Nations from the very beginning recognized the need to reconcile the principle of sovereign equality with the uneven disposition of real power and real responsibility for implementing U.N. decisions. Appropriate means of balancing these considerations were also incorporated in the constitutions of the specialized agencies.

Quite apart from charter provisions, procedures have been developed over the years to adapt decisionmaking procedures to power realities. In the last several years this

central problem has occasioned a vast amount of staff work in our own and other governments—and a considerable amount of discussion and negotiation in the U.N. system.

We have explored with other nations many different procedures for rationalizing the decisionmaking process. We recognize that no one procedure is appropriate for all cases:

—Certain procedures may be appropriate for the voting of General Assembly resolutions which merely manifest the views of members and have no binding legal effect.

—Other procedures may be appropriate when the General Assembly is exercising its mandatory power to assess.

—Still other procedures may be appropriate in specialized agencies lending substantial sums of money for exchange stabilization or economic development.

So our search for adequate procedures has been undertaken on a case-by-case basis with special regard for the peculiarities of each case.

Before turning to a discussion of possible procedures, it may be useful to identify one solution to the problem which we have not considered. We have rejected the notion that most or all important U.N. operations should be subject to the "principle of unanimity."

Specifically, we have rejected the 20-year-old Soviet demand that all peacekeeping operations of the U.N. should be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Security Council and thus subject to great-power veto. While recognizing that the Security Council has the exclusive right to initiate mandatory peacekeeping actions that impose binding obligations on states, we have consistently recognized the residual authority of the General Assembly to launch voluntary peacekeeping operations. We have defended the charter power of the Assembly to assess the membership for such operations, while recognizing that in practice many peacekeeping operations can be more appropriately financed by methods other than by every-member assessment.

Some Americans, I know, feel strongly that we must not expose the vital interests

of the United States to the possibility that the Assembly would lay mandatory obligations on us against our will. Fears have been expressed that the United Nations would send a force into some area against our political opposition—and make us pay for such ventures besides. It has been suggested that in the arrears issue we are trying to enforce on the U.S.S.R. and France a principle that we would never allow to be enforced against ourselves.

There are several important points to be considered in connection with this assertion. The Congo and Middle East operations were launched with the acquiescence of the Soviet Union and France. The General Assembly has never recommended any peacekeeping operation against the negative vote of a big power. Indeed, the Assembly has only recommended a peacekeeping operation once—the United Nations Emergency Force—and that was with the consent of the territorial sovereign.

The Assembly cannot, in any case, initiate binding enforcement action requiring members to contribute men and logistical support to military operations. It has never attempted to do this—and there is no reason to suppose it ever will. Moreover, the Assembly, indeed the U.N., is estopped by article paragraph 7, of the charter from unlawful intervention in matters within a member's domestic jurisdiction.

Finally, in the light of the article 19 experience, it is clear that the Assembly will be very cautious in the future in exercising its right to initiate and assess for voluntary peacekeeping operations. These considerations are usually overlooked by those who claim that the principle for which the United States has been contending in the article 19 crisis³ is incompatible with our national interests.

The argument that, if we were like the Soviet Union, we would not want to pay for peacekeeping operations we oppose, is unpersuasive for another reason: The policies we pursue do not lead the United N

³ For a U.S. statement, see *ibid.*, Feb. 15, 1965, 198.

tions to undertake peacekeeping actions directed against what we see as our vital interests.

If the United States were engaged in promoting the overthrow of foreign governments and institutions, it would have reason to fear the effective implementation of United Nations principles.

But, in view of what in fact American principles and purposes are, we have every reason to uphold the authority of the United Nations. We have every reason to uphold the law, as the International Court of Justice has found it to be. We have every reason to favor impartially applying the law of the charter, for we have no reason to fear impartial application of that law. If we seek a world ruled by law rather than force, we naturally must seek to apply and defend the law we now have.

In short, the United States has been prepared to take whatever risks are inherent in the principle that voluntary peacekeeping operations may be initiated and financed by the General Assembly free from great-power veto because we recognize a long-term interest in developing this means of containing violence in the nuclear age. We want to minimize these risks, of course, but not at the cost of crippling the capacity of the United Nations to act for peace and security.

To put it another way, we are persuaded of the need to protect the interests of ourselves and other large and middle powers in the United Nations vehicle. But we do not want to do this by draining all the gasoline out of the motor. We prefer to keep the gasoline in—and to keep the vehicle on the road through the introduction of “power steering.”

‘Power Steering’

How can “power steering” be built in to the United Nations vehicle? Diplomats and scholars have explored six main approaches to this problem:

.. Weighted Voting

Most public discussion of the international apportionment question has focused

on proposals to introduce weighted voting in the General Assembly and in the conferences of the major U.N. agencies.

Weighted voting exists, of course, in the four financial agencies of the United Nations system—the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance Corporation, and the International Development Association. In each of these voting power is roughly proportionate to financial contribution. Weighted voting is also employed in the main international commodity arrangements, where it is related to the size of participating countries’ trade in the particular commodity. Except for these financial and trade arrangements, it is not otherwise employed in the United Nations system.

But most U.N. members, while willing to employ weighted voting for decisions on the disbursement of loans or the administration of commodity agreements, are not prepared to introduce this system across the board to cover recommendations of the General Assembly and other bodies.

The obvious practical impediment to the introduction of weighted voting in the General Assembly is that it would require amendment of the U.N. Charter—and therefore the approval not only of the Soviet Union, France, and other members of the Security Council but also of two-thirds of the membership of the General Assembly. In the present state of international relations, it is hard to imagine the permanent members of the Council and two-thirds of the Assembly agreeing on any formula which would assign different weights to their share in the decisionmaking process.

The most likely consequence of pressing for a charter review conference to consider weighted voting, as some have urged, would be to provide a golden opportunity for the Communist countries and others to press for amendments diminishing the powers that the U.N. has developed under the charter during the last 20 years and that have generally promoted the objectives of U.S. foreign policy.

Even if it were possible to amend the charter to provide for weighted voting, it is not at all certain that our national interest would be served by the result. No system of weighted voting could conceivably be negotiated which did not weigh population as a major factor. It is questionable whether such an arrangement would suit a country like ours, which has only 6 percent of the world's population and which, together with its NATO allies, has only 16 percent. If population were a primary criterion, India with its 450 million people and China with its 700 million people might well end up with more votes than the United States.

Of course, it is always possible to construct hypothetical systems of weighted voting congenial to our interests, based mainly on such factors as literacy, per capita income, and military power. But such systems are simply not negotiable—at least, not in the foreseeable future.

The Department of State in 1962 conducted a study of various weighted-voting formulas based on population and contributions to the U.N. budget. When these formulas were applied to 178 key votes that took place in the General Assembly between 1954 and 1961, it was found that, while they would have somewhat reduced the number of resolutions passed over U.S. opposition, they would have reduced much more the number of resolutions supported by the United States and passed over Communist opposition. The same conclusion was reached in projecting these formulas to 1970, having regard to further increases in membership.

The results of this study reflect the fact that the desire for political independence and economic progress has put most U.N. members on the same side as the United States on most important matters—particularly where action is involved as well as talk.

We have therefore concluded that any system of weighted voting taking population substantially into account—and, I repeat, no weighted voting system would be

negotiable that failed to do this—would help Communist countries more than ourselves, by making it easier for them to achieve a blocking one-third vote on U.N. actions for peace and welfare that are in the interest of the United States and other nations of the non-Communist world.

2. *Dual Voting*

Dual voting—or a system of double majorities—has recently been advanced by some commentators as a possible answer. Benjamin Cohen, for example, has proposed that General Assembly decisions on substantive matters should be made in the future by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting, *provided* that the majority includes two-thirds of the members of the Security Council.

Dual voting has two great advantages as compared with weighted voting:

—It does not offend directly the “one nation, one vote” principle.

—It does not require a complicated negotiation involving national prestige in which different weights have to be assigned to different members.

But most members of the United Nations would probably feel that the introduction of dual voting on all substantive matters would require charter amendment. It is doubtful that a sufficient consensus on the desirability of dual voting presently exists for such an amendment to be approved.

It is always possible, of course, that dual voting might be introduced in selected areas of U.N. decisionmaking. At the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva last year the non-Communist industrial countries, in the closing weeks of the conference, proposed a system of dual voting for the new U.N. trade machinery. Under this proposal, decisions on certain important matters in the periodic Trade and Development Conference were to be taken by a two-thirds majority, including a majority of developed countries and a majority of less developed countries; in the Trade and Devel

opment Board such decisions would be taken by a plain majority, including a majority of developed countries and a majority of less developed countries.

This proposal found some support not only among developed countries but also among less developed countries, some of whom recognized the futility of voting self-serving resolutions without the concurrence of at least a majority of those countries to whom the recommendations were addressed.

But the idea involved too great a change in existing procedures to gain approval at Geneva. And some of the Western industrial countries even developed second thoughts on the proposal—on the grounds that special voting procedures of this kind might cause greater significance to be attached to U.N. recommendations than they were prepared to accept.

3. *Bicameralism*

Bicameralism in one form or other is an approach to the international apportionment problem offering greater possibilities in the short run than either weighted or dual voting.

In its extreme form bicameralism would mean treating the Security Council and the General Assembly as an "Upper House" and a "Lower House" and requiring that decisions on some or all matters would have to be passed by both of them. For example, the veto could continue to apply to enforcement action; but voluntary peacekeeping operations and perhaps recommendations in other areas could be adopted by two-thirds of the General Assembly and by 7 of the 11 members of the Security Council (9 members of the enlarged Council of 15).

Here again, this kind of proposal would probably require charter amendment. It is therefore not a practical possibility in the foreseeable future. But more tentative and informal steps in the direction of bicameralism may be possible.

In September 1964 the United States submitted to the Working Group of 21 a proposal covering arrangements for initiating

and financing U.N. peacekeeping operations involving the use of military forces.⁴ We proposed that all proposals to initiate such peacekeeping operations should be considered first in the Security Council. The General Assembly would not authorize or assume control of such operations unless the Council had demonstrated that it was unable to take action.

This proposal would work a change in present procedures. While, under the charter, the Security Council would normally be expected to consider a threat to peace and security in the first instance, there is no requirement that the Security Council should first consider a particular peacekeeping operation. In the Suez crisis, for example, the Security Council met before the General Assembly convened in emergency special session, but it did not consider the proposal for the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force. This proposal was initiated in the Assembly itself.

A new arrangement by which proposals for the establishment of peacekeeping forces would first be submitted to the Council would be a step in the direction of strengthening the primary responsibility of the Council in the peacekeeping field. It should commend itself not only to those members who are seeking to strengthen the Council's role but to all members who want to work out a rational distribution of powers between the Council and the Assembly.

The UNEF, Congo, and Cyprus operations illustrated the importance of getting U.N. troops to world trouble spots without undue delay. Therefore any proposal requiring prior resort to the Council should contain safeguards—perhaps a fixed time limit—to avoid jeopardizing the ability of the Assembly to take timely action under its residual powers.

Enlargement of the Security Council could also aid our efforts to deal with the international apportionment problem through measures of modified bicameralism.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 5, 1964, p. 488.

If the Security Council is to discharge more effectively its primary responsibility in the field of peace and security, it must be sufficiently representative of the U.N. membership as a whole to have the confidence of the membership. This is not possible without enlargement.

The General Assembly has approved the first charter amendments in the history of the United Nations—amendments enlarging the Security Council from 11 to 15 members and the Economic and Social Council from 18 to 27 members. The President of the United States recently sent a message to the Senate asking for advice and consent to the ratification of these amendments.⁵ Hearings will shortly commence upon them in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Affirmative action upon these amendments is clearly desirable.

The enlargement of the Security Council is designed to eliminate the contentious problem of sharing an inadequate number of seats. The new understanding for the distribution of the elective seats embodied in the Assembly resolution proposing the amendment is realistic and equitable. It allocates two seats to Western European countries and others, two to Latin America, one to Eastern Europe, and five to Africa and Asia. Enlargement should reduce the tendency to split terms in Security Council elections and should relieve mounting pressures against seats now held by Western European and Latin American countries.

4. Committees With Selective Representation

Probably the most promising method yet devised for building greater responsibility into United Nations decisionmaking is that of committees with selective representation.

The basic concept was provided in the charter provision for a Security Council with 11 members, including the 5 permanent members which bear the principal responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. The same concept is embodied in the charters of a number of the specialized agencies—for example, in the

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, May 3, 1965, p. 678.

Governing Body of the International Labor Organization, the 10 members of chief industrial importance have permanent seats.

Even where no specific provision is made for permanent seats for a certain category of members, elections to the executive board of U.N. agencies have normally taken account of the special responsibilities of members in the particular functional area of cooperation, whether it be telecommunications, weather forecasting, or medical research. Presumably this will continue to be true in the future as well.

In the case of the Security Council the charter itself declares that "due regard should be 'specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization'" as well as to equitable geographic distribution. This provision has not received the attention it deserves. It would enhance the effectiveness of an enlarged Council if this consideration could be adequately reflected in Council elections in the years ahead.

The members of the United Nations have found committees with selective representation particularly useful in the financial field. The General Assembly's Advisory Committee on Administration and Budgetary Questions bears responsibility for examining and reporting on the Secretary-General's U.N. budget estimates. The United States has supported the effective operation of this small 12-man body, which is not merely representative of the major geographic groups of the United Nations but also reflects comparative contributions to the U.N. budget. We have sought to strengthen the authority of similar groups in the specialized agencies, and we believe members might usefully consider the possibility of creating such groups in agencies which do not have them.

We also favor use of a committee with selective representation in the peacekeeping field. Our working paper to the Committee of 21 last September proposed that the General Assembly establish a standing Sp-

cial Finance Committee. The composition of this committee would be similar to that of the present Working Group of 21—it would include the permanent members of the Security Council and a relatively high percentage of those member states in each geographic area that are large financial contributors to the United Nations. The General Assembly, in apportioning expenses for peacekeeping operations, would act only on a recommendation from the committee passed by a two-thirds majority of the committee's membership.

One great advantage of the committee approach is that it does not require amendment of the U.N. Charter or the constitutions of the various specialized agencies. The proposed Special Finance Committee for peacekeeping operations, for example, could be constituted under and governed by firm rules of procedure by the General Assembly. In effect, the Assembly would be adopting a self-denying ordinance to act only upon proposals first adopted in this new suborgan.

5. *Informal Relations With International Secretariats*

Informal relations with the international secretariats may also provide a useful approach. Obviously, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the heads of the specialized and affiliated agencies engage in a continuous process of consultation with the membership. In these consultations they naturally take account of the differing responsibilities which the members have for supporting the work of their organizations.

During the United Nations Operation in the Congo, for example, the Secretariat systematically consulted an advisory committee of countries that contributed military personnel. More informally, consultation was carried on with key contributors of services and money. For example, the United States and other major contributors were in frequent touch with the Secretary-General and his staff in New York and with the Chief of the U.N. Congo operation in Léopoldville. This was a truly international un-

dertaking. At the same time, its conduct reflected the views of the major supporters of the operation.

So far the heads of U.N. agencies have generally paid close attention to the views of the countries with special financial and other responsibilities. The problem has mainly been the inability of these countries to organize themselves effectively for the timely transmission of their viewpoints to the agency heads.

In recent months the United States Government has made special efforts to deal with this problem. We have sought to take a longer range view of international organization activities and to develop our own position on programs and budgets far enough in advance so that the executive heads of the agencies can take these views into account at the time the program and budget is being formulated.

Our objective here is to put the executive heads of the agencies in a position to take into account the views of their major contributors early in the budget cycle, before their proposals to the executive boards and conferences are frozen. This is immeasurably better than having them formulate their programs and budgets in the dark—only to be met suddenly at the general conference with the opposition of major contributors.

During the past year the United States has begun a systematic series of consultations with some of the other major contributors in an effort to develop common positions on the programs and budgets of the international agencies. We have found this process of consultation very useful. As governmental positions emerge on various issues facing the specialized agencies, they are presented informally to the Directors General.

We believe that, in the long run, this exchange of views among governments and with secretariats will make for more effective participation by the larger contributors in the international organizations—and consequently for more realistic program proposals in the agencies.

6. Conciliation

The most recent, and perhaps the most original, procedural innovation in U.N. decisionmaking is the conciliation procedure established by the last General Assembly for the new U.N. machinery in the field of trade and development.

The need for the conciliation procedure became apparent during the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development at Geneva.⁶ In the closing days of UNCTAD, at which I served as vice chairman of the U.S. delegation, there was an encouraging disposition to reach a consensus on some subjects. But there were also instances when the voting bloc of less developed countries passed resolutions over the opposition of the minority of industrial countries on matters involving important economic interests.

Some delegates argued that this was no cause for concern, since the resolutions were recommendations only—and any resolutions of the new trade machinery would be recommendations only. But the United States and other countries pointed out that the currency of such recommendations would be hopelessly debased if they failed to reflect a substantial consensus among all countries, including particularly the countries bearing the principal responsibility for implementing them.

Trade questions have traditionally been dealt with among nations by negotiation—not legislation. Undoubtedly there is a constructive role for institutions whose primary purpose is to articulate through recommendations the measures which should be undertaken by both developed and less developed countries to deal with the trade problems of the latter. But such institutions can only operate through a process of persuasion.

Persuasion is assisted when delegates seek a consensus through conciliation and express that consensus in resolutions. If it is not assisted, it may even be set back by the passage of self-serving resolutions by auto-

matic majorities. Public opinion in the industrial countries is likely to react adversely to recommendations that are passed over the opposition of the industrial countries but call for concessions by them.

What is wanted, in the last analysis, is not voting, but results. Because this was recognized by most delegations, a last-minute agreement was reached at Geneva that the new UNCTAD machinery should contain procedures

... designed to establish a process of conciliation to take place before voting and to provide an adequate basis for the adoption of recommendations with regard to proposals of a specific nature for action substantially affecting the economic or financial interests of particular countries.

The task of working out these procedures was left to a special committee appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. I had the privilege of serving as the U.S. expert on this committee. The conciliation procedure which the committee devised will operate in the periodic Conference, in the Trade and Development Board, and in its committees.

Under this procedure, conciliation can be initiated and voting suspended on any resolution, upon the motion of a very small number of countries (10 in the Conference, 5 in the Board, and 3 in committees) or upon the motion of the president of the Conference or chairman of the Board.

The initiation of conciliation is automatic. However, guidelines are provided defining the kind of resolutions which are appropriate for the conciliation procedure.

Following a motion for conciliation, a conciliation group is appointed with adequate representation of countries interested in the subject matter. If the conciliation group cannot reach agreement at the same session of the Conference or Board, it reports to the next session of the Conference or Board whichever comes first.

If the conciliation group has reached agreement, the agreed resolution can be voted. If it has not, a decision can be taken continuing conciliation for a further period or the original proposal, or some variation

⁶ For text of the preamble and recommendations of the Final Act adopted by the Conference, see *ibid.*, Aug. 3, 1964, p. 150.

thereof, can be voted in the normal way.

In the event that a vote is taken after unsuccessful conciliation, the resolution will cite the report of the conciliation group (which may contain minority as well as majority views), and the records of the United Nations will show how the members voted on the resolution.

These procedures offer important benefits to all U.N. members:

—For the minority of developed countries, they provide some safeguard against the voting of unacceptable resolutions by automatic majorities and a “cooling off” period of 6 months or more during which efforts at compromise can be sought through quiet diplomacy.

—For the majority of less developed countries, they afford a means of engaging the developed countries in a sustained debate during which the developed countries explain the reasons for their opposition to proposals of the majority.

It is too early to see just how the conciliation procedure will work in practice, but we may hazard one prediction: The main value of the new procedures may be less in their actual use than in the subtle way in which their mere existence influences member governments in the direction of compromise rather than voting on disagreed proposals.

Taking Account of Power Realities

This catalog of procedures for coping with the international apportionment problem should serve to indicate four things:

—First, that the United States and other countries are very much aware of the need to adapt U.N. procedures to take account of power realities.

—Second, that a wide variety of alternative procedures can be developed to come to grips with the problem.

—Third, that the most practical of these procedures can be put into effect without amendment of the U.N. Charter or of the constitutions of other U.N. agencies.

—Fourth, that a great process of proce-

dural adaptation and innovation is already underway throughout the U.N. system.

Of course, procedures in and of themselves are only part of the problem. What is really required is widespread recognition of the common interest in basing U.N. decisions on an adequate consensus—a consensus which includes the support of most of the countries bearing the principal responsibilities for action.

Will such a recognition be forthcoming? The cynic may ask why the majority of small countries should accept any restraint on the use of their voting power. The answer is clear enough.

If United Nations procedures cannot be adapted to take account of power realities, the large and middle powers will increasingly pursue their national interests outside the U.N. system.

If, on the other hand, the necessary procedural adjustments can be carried out, the United Nations and its agencies will be able to assume increasing responsibilities for action in both peacekeeping and development.

This is the fundamental reason why the important procedural adjustments now underway in the United Nations serve the enlightened long-term interests of all its members.

U.S. Willing To Participate in Conference on Cambodia

Statement by Secretary Rusk¹

It has been proposed that an international conference composed of the governments of the countries which took part in the Geneva conference of 1954 be called to consider the question of the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia.

After reviewing this proposal with the President last week, and at his direction, we have informed a number of interested

¹ Made on Apr. 25 in response to inquiries from news correspondents.

governments that if such a conference is called we will gladly participate. The President would appoint Ambassador Averell Harriman as our representative to the discussions.

Cambodia desires independence and neutrality. Here, as elsewhere in Asia, the

United States wholeheartedly supports the right of each nation to shape its own course. To support this right for Cambodia is fully consistent with the purpose of the United States to support the right of every nation in Southeast Asia to lead a free and independent existence.

Present Objectives and Future Possibilities in Southeast Asia

by Leonard Unger

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs¹

The importance of the Southeast Asia issue to every American cannot be overstressed. This became crystal clear to me during the 6½ years I served our Government in that area, and I value this chance to share my thoughts with you.

I shall talk, if I may, to four related sets of questions: First, what are our fundamental objectives in Southeast Asia, and what Communist strategy are we encountering there? Secondly, what are our objectives in Viet-Nam, and how close are we to achieving them? Third, what is the present status of South Viet-Nam—militarily and politically? And finally, what does the future hold for Viet-Nam and for Southeast Asia?

We believe that our objectives in Southeast Asia are shared by the major Western and neighboring nations concerned with its development and by the non-Communist nations in the area itself. Those objectives are:

First, that the nations of Southeast Asia, as with all other Asian states, should develop as free and independent countries according to their own views and toward increasingly democratic structures.

Second, that the nations of the area should not threaten each other or outside nations.

Third, that no single Asian nation should either control other nations or exercise domination either for the whole area or for any major part of it.

And fourth, that the nations of the Far East should maintain and increase their tie with the West in trade and culture, as a major means of knitting together a peaceful and stable world.

These objectives are not just pious generalities, nor is Southeast Asia just a configuration on a map. Distant though it may seem from Detroit, that area has great strategic significance to the United States and the free world. Its location across east-west air and sea lanes flanks the Indian subcontinent on one side and Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines on the other and dominates the gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

In Communist hands this area would pose a most serious threat to the security of the United States and to the family of free world nations to which we belong. To defend Southeast Asia, we must meet the challenge in South Viet-Nam.

¹ Address made before the Detroit Economic Club, Detroit, Mich., on Apr. 19 (press release 77).

Communist "Wars of Liberation"

Equally important, South Viet-Nam represents a major test of communism's new strategy of "wars of liberation." In 1950 the Communists tried to conquer South Korea by direct aggression—by sending North Korean, and later Chinese Communist, troops across the boundary into South Korea. With the Soviets then absent from the U.N. Security Council, the U.N. was able to condemn the aggression and to mount a United Nations Command to assist South Korea. The United States played by far the greatest outside role in a conflict that brought more than 157,000 U.S. casualties and cost us at least \$18 billion in direct expenses. In the end we were able to restore an independent South Korea, although a unified and free Korea was left to be worked out in the future.

In retrospect, our action in Korea reflected three elements:

—a recognition that aggression of any sort must be met early and head on or it will have to be met later and in tougher circumstances. We had relearned the lessons of the 1930's—Manchuria, Ethiopia, the Rhineland, Czechoslovakia.

—a recognition that a defense line in Asia, stated in terms of an island perimeter, did not adequately define our vital interests—that those vital interests could be affected by action in Asia itself.

—an understanding that, for the future, a power vacuum was an invitation to aggression, that there must be local political, economic, and military strength in being to make aggression unprofitable, but also that there must be a demonstrated willingness of a major external power to assist if required.

After the Communists' open aggression failed in Korea, they had to look for a more effective strategy of conquest. They chose to concentrate on "wars of national liberation"—the label they use to describe aggression directed and supplied from outside a nation but cloaked in nationalist guise so that it could be made to appear an indigenous insurrection.

That strategy was tried on a relatively primitive scale, but was defeated in Malaya and the Philippines only because of a long and arduous struggle by the people of those countries, with assistance provided by the British and the United States. In Africa and Latin America such "wars of liberation" are already being threatened. But by far the most highly refined and ambitious attempt at such aggression by the Communists is taking place today in Viet-Nam. Hanoi has worked hard to persuade world opinion that the National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam—which is the formal name adopted by the Viet Cong—is an authentic national movement. But the only thing genuine about the National Liberation Front is the word "Front." And the only liberation being offered the people of South Viet-Nam amounts to domination by Hanoi.

In order to cope with this veiled aggression, free nations must determine the real source of the aggression and take steps to defend themselves from this source. In Viet-Nam this has meant ending privileged sanctuary heretofore afforded North Viet-Nam—the true source of the Viet Cong movement.

The "wars of national liberation" approach has been adopted as an essential element of Communist China's expansionist policy. If this technique adopted by Hanoi should be allowed to succeed in Viet-Nam, we would be confirming Peiping's contention that militant revolutionary struggle is a more productive Communist path than Moscow's doctrine of peaceful coexistence. We could expect "wars of national liberation" to spread. Thailand has already been identified by Communist China as being the next target for a so-called "liberation struggle."² Peiping's Foreign Minister Chen Yi has promised it for this year. Laos, Malaysia, Burma—one Asian nation after another—could expect increasing Communist pressures. Other weakly defended nations on other continents would experience this new

² For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 5, 1965, p. 489.

threat of aggression by proxy.

Even the Asian Communists have acknowledged that Viet-Nam represents an important test situation for indirect aggression. North Viet-Nam's Premier Pham Van Dong recently commented that:

The experience of our compatriots in South Viet-Nam attracts the attention of the world, especially the peoples of *South America*.

General [Vo Nguyen] Giap, the much-touted leader of North Viet-Nam's army, was even more explicit. In another recent statement, he said that,

South Viet-Nam is the model of the national liberation movement of our time. . . . If the special warfare that the U.S. imperialists are testing in South Viet-Nam is overcome, then it can be defeated everywhere in the world.

Our strong posture in Viet-Nam then seeks peace and security in three dimensions: for South Viet-Nam, for the sake of Southeast Asia's independence and security generally, and for the other small nations that would face the same kind of subversive threat from without if the Communists were to succeed in Viet-Nam. As President Johnson has stated frequently: The United States seeks no military bases or special position in Viet-Nam or elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Our simple purpose is to help free people maintain themselves. The United States position has no coloration of colonialism or imperialism. This is clear to the people of South Viet-Nam and to most of the world. We are concerned with the fate of 15 million South Vietnamese, and we will withdraw when their interests have been safeguarded.

I have heard it asserted that there is some kind of historical inevitability regarding the extension of Chinese Communist power over Southeast Asia. This is questionable even as history, for the area has not in fact been dominated by China for most of the last thousand years. Above all, the whole concept of such given spheres of domination is out of keeping both with the realities of the diffusion of power and national self-confidence today and with the kind of peaceful world that must come into being in the next generation.

If we act with deliberation and a measured firmness now, we can help to put time on our side in Asia. The free world has checked Soviet expansionist moves in the past 20 years, and now the Russians have too much to lose to readily think of precipitating a major war. If we can check the Communists in Asia until the time when they have too much to lose materially—until moderating forces have a chance to assert their influence—then the threat of war in Asia may slowly fade away.

U.S. Objectives in Viet-Nam

President Johnson stated our immediate goal in Viet-Nam in the simplest terms. On April 7th he said:³

Our objective is the independence of South Viet-Nam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves—only that the people of South Viet-Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way.

We are in Viet-Nam because the people there have requested our help. President Eisenhower pledged our assistance in 1954, that pledge was renewed by both President Kennedy and President Johnson, and we will continue to honor that commitment as long as aggression from the North persists.

The core of the problem in South Viet-Nam is the infiltration by North Viet-Nam of tens of thousands of trained military personnel, including the hard-core leaders and technicians. Their illegal entry has been compounded by the infiltration through land and sea routes of large amounts of weapons and other military supplies made in Communist China, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere.

In terms of personnel, our best estimate is that the infiltrated manpower from North Viet-Nam—after allowances for casualties at the overall Viet Cong rate of roughly 1 percent per year—represents a majority and certainly the key leadership and technical skill, of the hard-core Viet Cong. In terms of equipment, the Vietnamese Government's losses in weapons on a net basis have

³ For text of an address made by President Johnson at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore Md., see *ibid.*, Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

not exceeded 30 percent of the weapons requirements of the Viet Cong. Therefore, it is clear that, although some small part of the balance has come from weapons cached in 1954, the far greater part—almost certainly a majority and probably between 60 and 70 percent—has come directly from the North.

All this, of course, is contrary to the 1954 Geneva accords on Viet-Nam and the 1962 agreement on Laos. I mention the latter because it is an established fact that Hanoi has been both threatening Laos and using Laos as a corridor for supplying personnel and arms to the Viet Cong.

Our State Department has documented the character and intensity of North Viet-Nam's aggressive efforts since 1959 in the recent white paper,⁴ and in the similar report issued in 1961.⁵ The 1962 report of the International Control Commission for Viet-Nam also spelled out North Viet-Nam's aggressive actions in flagrant violation of the 1954 and 1962 agreements.

What Hanoi was up to then is even more apparent now. In the ICC report of February 13, 1965, the Canadian delegate to the ICC, Mr. J. B. Seaborn, said that,

... the events which have taken place in both North and South Viet-Nam since February 7 are the direct result of the intensification of the aggressive policy of the Government of North Viet-Nam.

He pointed to

... the continuing fact that North Viet-Nam has increased its efforts to incite, encourage, and support hostile activities in South Viet-Nam, aimed at the overthrow of the South Vietnamese administration.

⁴ *Aggression From the North: The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign To Conquer South Viet-Nam*, Department of State publication 7839, for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402 (40 cents). For the text of this pamphlet (without pictures and appendixes), see BULLETIN of Mar. 22, 1965, p. 404.

⁵ *A Threat to the Peace: North Viet-Nam's Effort to Conquer South Viet-Nam*, Department of State publication 7308, Parts I and II, for sale by the Superintendent of Documents (25 cents and 55 cents respectively).

In a recent network television interview Mr. Seaborn said that perhaps even more significant than the actual numbers of North Vietnamese infiltrators is the quality and type of people Hanoi has been sending, in that they are essentially the trained officers and specialists who serve as the backbone of the Viet Cong movement.

Another aspect of this is that within the last year Hanoi has been sending primarily native-born North Vietnamese to fight in the South. From 1959 until last year, North Viet-Nam primarily utilized a pool of South Vietnamese who had fought with the Viet Minh against the French and went north in 1954 to become citizens of North Viet-Nam.

The Communists are fond of saying that whether the Viet Cong are born in the North or South, they are still Vietnamese and therefore an indigenous revolt must be taking place. Certainly, they are Vietnamese, and the North Koreans who swept across their boundary in 1950 to attack South Korea were also Koreans. However, this did not make the Korean war an indigenous revolt from the point of view of either world security or in terms of acceptable standards of conduct.

By the same token, if West Germany were to take similar action against East Germany, it is doubtful that the East Germans, the Soviet Union, and the rest of the Communist bloc would stand aside on the grounds that it was nothing more than an indigenous affair.

The simple issue is that military personnel and arms have been sent across an international demarcation line (just as valid a border as Korea or Germany) contrary to international agreements and law to destroy the freedom of a neighboring people.

The hard-core leaders and technicians serving the so-called National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam are not serving the interests of the people of South Viet-Nam but were sent by and are serving the interests of their masters in the North. In addition to them, there are, of course, a substantial number of South Vietnamese who, largely by terror and intimidation, have

been recruited into the Viet Cong movement.

But, as the President recently put it, Hanoi's support of the Viet Cong is the "heartbeat" of the war.⁶ It is for that reason, and because Hanoi has stepped up its aggression, that the Government of South Viet-Nam and the United States have been forced to increase our response and strike through the air at the true source of the aggression—North Viet-Nam. This does not represent a change of purpose on our part but a change in the means we believe are necessary to stem aggression.

And there can be no doubt that our actions are fully justified as an exercise of the right of individual and collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the United Nations Charter and under the accepted standards of international law.

No Reply From Communists to Peace Appeal

The United States recognizes that peace cannot be secured in Viet-Nam through purely military means. The Communists, on the other hand, appear to think that they can reach their goal—the total control of South Viet-Nam—by military action. President Johnson's Baltimore speech dramatized something that must never be lost sight of: that it is the Communists, and not ourselves, who have kept South Viet-Nam in a state of warfare and bloodshed; that it is the Communists, and not ourselves, who refuse peace. The Communists in Viet-Nam are endeavoring to act out an old dictum of Mao Tse-tung's: "Political power grows from the barrel of a gun."

Almost 2 weeks ago President Johnson declared that we remained ready for unconditional discussions with the Communist governments concerned. He ruled out no path toward arranging these discussions and emphasized that we will never be second in the search for a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam.

The essence of the President's speech was contained in the United States' reply on the

following day to the appeal for peace in Viet-Nam by the 17 nonaligned nations.⁷

The worldwide reaction to these two statements has been gratifying. Many governments which had been either unenthusiastic or disapproved of our strong stand in Viet-Nam said that the President had taken a generous initiative. The consensus of world opinion was that the decision for either continued conflict or peace in Asia was now up to Hanoi and the Communist powers.

Since then, all diplomatic channels have been open. And what has been the Communist response? Of course, the shrill propaganda index from the Communist capitals remains as high as ever, but cutting through the vituperation and invective, the Communist reactions to the President's speech have still appeared clearly negative. None of the Communist capitals involved—Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow—has thus far replied to the peace appeal of the 17 nonaligned nations. We hope that they will shortly do so—and in responsible terms.

Military Situation in South Viet-Nam

Switching from the international sphere, I would like to briefly discuss where we are in Viet-Nam in the military and political spheres. I will preface my remarks by stressing our belief that each of these spheres is essential to the ultimate security and well-being of South Viet-Nam.

As to the military situation, the threat of the Viet Cong in many areas of South Viet-Nam remains a grave one. They have relative freedom of movement in wide areas. Our best assessment is that the Viet Cong exercise practical control over about 25 percent of the population of South Viet-Nam and are capable of varying degrees of organized harassment and intimidation, assassination and terror, in relation to another 35 to 40 percent of the population.

Yet the Government of South Viet-Nam, with our help, still has great assets. For example, the month of March proved an en-

⁶ BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

⁷ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 610.

couraging one for the Viet-Nam Republic. Government forces were on the offensive throughout the country, seeking contact with strong Viet Cong units. Recent experience in Viet-Nam would seem to support the theorem that the attacking unit usually wins the battle. Of the 11 significant Government-initiated engagements in March, the Government won all 11 with the Communist forces suffering heavy losses. But of the seven engagements initiated by the Viet Cong, the enemy won five and lost but two.

There also were encouraging performances by regional and popular forces last month; in no instance did one of these local militia units fail to stand its ground in the face of a Viet Cong attack.

The morale and confidence of the South Vietnamese people and military forces also continued to improve. A number of factors contributed to this: the air strikes against North Viet-Nam, the U. S. air strikes within South Viet-Nam, and the arrival of several contingents of U. S. Marines at Da Nang for security duty. These developments have been rightly interpreted by the South Vietnamese as firm indicators that the United States intends to assist South Viet-Nam until Hanoi ceases its aggression in the South.

In the civilian population, all elements—Buddhist, Catholic, student, university, labor, and business leaders—have voiced support for the recent developments.

I want to make it clear that the Viet Cong must still be defeated in South Viet-Nam. I think the people of South Viet-Nam, with our help, are more than equal to the task. In spite of all their efforts, the Communists have not gotten very far in their campaign to win over the ordinary Vietnamese.

Political Developments Over Last 10 Years

We often read about political instability in Saigon and war weariness in the countryside. But Saigon is far removed from the vast majority of Vietnamese, and our reports show that most Vietnamese villagers and soldiers do not want to be dominated by the Viet Cong.

There is considerable other evidence to support this. First, the South Vietnamese forces would not fight so hard and suffer so many casualties if they did not believe in their cause. While much American blood has been spilled in this important conflict, it is important to remember that by far the greatest amount of fighting and dying is being done by South Vietnamese in defense of their country.

Since 1959 South Viet-Nam has suffered nearly 80,000 military and civilian casualties. This would be the equivalent of nearly 1 million United States casualties in relation to the total population.

Secondly, the South Vietnamese people have not "voted with their feet" toward the Viet Cong but on the contrary are even now heading away in great numbers as refugees from Viet Cong-controlled areas. Since the beginning of the year, more than 200,000 have chosen to leave Viet Cong areas in the northern portion of South Viet-Nam.

In short, when you consider the degree of intimidation and terror of which the Viet Cong have been capable over the last 5 years—something which it is hard to realize unless one has studied the comparable cases of Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines—the behavior of the South Vietnamese people seems clearly to support the conclusion that the great majority of the South Vietnamese people are fundamentally anti-Communist. And it may interest you that this conclusion, in precisely these words, was recently reached by a distinguished Frenchman, General [André] Beaufre, who had revisited South Viet-Nam at length after having known the area intimately as a senior French officer in the early 1950's.

Let me make one other point about political developments in South Viet-Nam over the last 10 years. It is true that there was opposition to the government of President Diem throughout the period of his control, and of course this opposition culminated in his overthrow, and most unfortunately in his death, in November 1963. But the important point is that the domestic opposition to Diem was throughout a totally dif-

ferent movement than the Viet Cong and the Liberation Front, which are the creatures of Hanoi. No significant member of the opposition to Diem ever went over to the Viet Cong, and it is notable that the present Government of South Viet-Nam is headed by the very men who were themselves the leaders of that opposition. There should be no confusion on this point.

So much for the situation within South Viet-Nam. I could say much about it, and particularly about the critical political and economic efforts that are now underway, with our support, in what is in the last analysis a contest for the loyalties and support of the people themselves. But, I repeat, there can be little doubt of the underlying opposition to communism in South Viet-Nam, and there is every evidence that the present Government is going about its job in an increasingly effective way.

Let me touch now on another aspect of the conflict that is sometimes misunderstood. This is the impression, occasionally voiced, that South Viet-Nam and the United States are fighting alone in that area.

Sir Robert Menzies, Australia's Prime Minister, recently paid us high tribute when he said that America's stand in Viet-Nam was the greatest act of moral courage since Britain stood alone at the beginning of World War II. These are gratifying words, and, while it is true that we are providing the greatest share of assistance, a total of 33 free-world nations, including Australia, are providing assistance to South Viet-Nam or have agreed to do so—some in the military field, some in the economic field, and some in both of these sectors. Their assistance is proof that Americans are not the only ones who recognize the importance of what is at stake in Viet-Nam.

Nor does Viet-Nam represent a white man's war against Asians. Koreans, Filipinos, Nationalist Chinese, Malaysians, Japanese, and Thais are assisting the South Vietnamese by either economic aid or military contributions. In particular, the Koreans' 2,000-man force of engineers and security troops is a major contribution in terms of per capita population.

Exciting Possibilities for Economic Progress

Although we possess the capacity for a lengthy conflict in Viet-Nam—and our strength has hardly been tapped—we seek only the path to peace. And we would hope that North Viet-Nam will see that there is a much better course than guns, killing, and terrorism, not only for the people of Viet-Nam but for all the peoples of Southeast Asia.

That course is one of cooperation between all the peoples of that area for the peaceful development of a fertile and potentially rich portion of the world. We hope that the countries of Southeast Asia will associate themselves in a massive cooperative effort to bring those riches to fruition for more than 100 million people.

Many exciting possibilities exist, but the plans to achieve them must come from the leaders of Asia. This program should reflect their wishes and interests. Others could provide assistance only if they desire and request it. We are pleased that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has indicated his readiness to use his great prestige and his intimate knowledge of Asia's needs to initiate work upon these cooperative opportunities.

The President has already indicated that, once this cooperative effort is underway, we would hope to support it generously and that we would hope that other industrialized countries—including the Soviet Union—would join in this development venture.

Great opportunity exists in cooperative effort to harness the energies of the vast Mekong River. Other opportunities exist in every field in Southeast Asia: health and medicine, education, communications, industry, transportation, agriculture, trade, commerce, and science.

North Viet-Nam could, in an environment of peace, benefit greatly by participating in such cooperative ventures. We would hope that a chair would be provided for her and that she would not want to leave it vacant. Her people deserve to share along with others the welfare benefits of economic progress in their Asian area. Meanwhile,

advances in the welfare of the peoples of Southeast Asia must go forward.

In the meantime, two other facts should be restated:

First, that as long as Hanoi persists in her aggression against South Viet-Nam, we will take whatever actions are necessary to convince the leaders in North Viet-Nam that their efforts are self-defeating as well as futile.

Secondly, that our offer for unconditional discussions remains in effect. We will sit down at any time with the governments involved. Although the Communist response has been negative thus far, the offer remains open.

If North Viet-Nam holds to its aggressive path, we can only remind her leaders of President Johnson's words on April 7th:

"We will not be defeated.

"We will not grow tired.

"We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement."

President and Mr. Black Discuss Asian Economic Progress

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release dated April 20

I have had a good talk with Mr. Eugene Black on our efforts to assist in the economic progress of Southeast Asia.¹ He has given me an encouraging report on the discussions which he had in New York with the Secretary-General and other leaders of the U.N.

Mr. Black tells me that those discussions strongly support our view that this is centrally a matter for Asian leadership. Our hope is to act in cooperative support of the efforts of the Asian peoples themselves. Mr. Black tells me that this position is understood in the U.N.

Mr. Black has reported that he is deeply

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

impressed by the quality of the work which has been carried forward under the Lower Mekong Basin Coordinating Committee. He has expressed to the Secretary-General our strong support for the work of this committee and for the pattern of cooperation among the Mekong states which it represents.

Mr. Black has discussed with me the project for an Asian Development Bank. He reports that, after discussions both in New York and Washington, he finds agreement within this Government that under appropriate conditions and with sound management such a bank would be of considerable value in promoting regional development in Asia. I agree with this position and believe that the United States would wish to participate if such a bank can be established.

In addition to regional plans and programs Mr. Black and I have discussed more immediate actions to increase the direct flow of food and medicine and other supplies from this country to the people of Southeast Asia. At my direction, plans for this purpose are being developed urgently in appropriate agencies of the government.

President To Keep Schedule of Visits to Minimum

White House Announcement

White House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated April 16

In light of the congressional workload for the next 2 or 3 months and the situation in Viet-Nam, the President is not planning any trips abroad and is keeping his schedule to a minimum. We have already had several visits this year, and the President has agreed with other governments that some anticipated visits will be scheduled for the fall instead of late spring. The Governments of Pakistan and India have graciously agreed to the postponement of the prospective visits of President [Mohammed] Ayub [Khan] and Prime Minister [Lal Bahadur] Shastri.

Disparities in Progress Between Nations

by Thomas C. Mann

*Under Secretary for Economic Affairs*¹

It is gratifying for me to be able to participate in this meeting with members and guests of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Your Academy has made so many valuable contributions to a better understanding about the world in which we live that I could only hope that ways can be found for a more adequate dialog between those of us who work in the Department of State and those, like yourselves, who are knowledgeable about foreign affairs.

It is a particular pleasure to meet Arthur Whitaker. I have read and admired some of his writings and, I must confess, have used some of his ideas and some of his phrases from time to time to good advantage.

Since the arrangements for this evening were made, I have been given a new assignment, and Mr. [Jack Hood] Vaughn has been put in charge of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. In deference to these changes, I should like to alter somewhat the subject assigned to me and think with you instead for a few minutes about some of the causes of disparities in the degree of economic and social progress which different nations have been able to achieve.

I should like to make clear in the beginning that I have no intention of propounding a theory or doctrine. Theories are, at best, only aids for thought, and, at worst, they impair objectivity, perspective, and balance.

¹ Address made before the American Academy of Political and Social Science at Philadelphia, Pa., on Apr. 9 (press release 72).

In recent decades we think we have learned—mostly by trial and error—something about techniques for helping to promote economic and social progress in other lands, but these techniques are still far from being an exact science.

I hope no one will deduce from what I am about to say that I am suggesting how developing nations should manage their affairs. Each developing country and each regional trading group must find its own path to progress. Conformity is neither feasible nor desirable. I would go one step further: The important thing is whether a particular economic and social system, not in theory but in fact, produces the greatest good for the greatest number of its people within a framework of freedom. It is the result, not the theory, that matters in the end.

Within this framework of ideas, I should like to begin by recalling that less than 200 years ago our country began its independent political life. Our material assets were limited. We had very little capital of our own. Our educational plant was primitive and inadequate. We had no industry to speak of. Our countryside, where all but a fraction of our people lived, was equally primitive, and where it was not primitive, it was feudal. Sailing ships were our principal connection with the outside world. Inflation was rampant, and confidence in our currency was low. "Not worth a continental" is a phrase that comes down to us in our own history.

Yet our country—and I should emphasize that the same may be said of a good many other highly industrialized nations—has made astonishing progress on both the economic and social fronts in a relatively short span of time.

Similarly, some developing nations have made good progress even though they still face formidable problems common to their stages of development. Still other less developed countries have made very little.

It would be folly to try within the short space of these remarks to reduce to a simple formula the many and complex causes for these disparities. However, one factor which immediately suggests itself is the matter of time. Some nations have but recently gained their independence and, preoccupied with political problems, have not yet had adequate opportunity to put their collective minds to the economic and social aspects of nation-building. Others, which have enjoyed longer periods of political independence, only recently have begun to think seriously about economic development and social progress.

I recall, for example, that in my first assignment abroad in the early 1940's I was somewhat surprised to learn that intellectuals and political leaders were principally concerned with political and cultural theories. Discussions usually settled on such topics as maintenance of the values of Greco-Roman culture, poetry, travel, and various political topics. Only 20 years ago such phrases as "common market," "gross national product," "terms of trade," and "per capita income," which today one hears on every hand, were seldom, if ever, mentioned. Indeed, the principal criticism of the United States in those days in that area was that we had sacrificed the good things of the spirit for a crass materialism which had made us slaves to money and "comfort."

So, when we become impatient with the rate of progress today it is well to recall that some parts of the developing world have only recently—very recently—begun to put their minds and hearts into the business of national economic and social reform. Nevertheless, political leaders and economists in

the developing regions are better prepared today to manage a modern society than were their predecessors of only two decades ago. Assuming that developed and developing nations can both keep their eyes on the issues of economic and social progress—assuming peoples do not become distracted by excessive nationalism, doctrinalism, or short-term political considerations—we shall see rapid improvement in important areas of the developing part of the world, and this in spite of the population explosion which lays such a heavy burden on those working to improve individual income and opportunity.

Aid and Trade—Components of Development

The potential of improving and accelerating progress is very much greater today than it was in the past. In spite of all the difficulties, the rate of growth in underdeveloped countries was already much higher in the past decade than in previous decades. It can increase and improve further.

In earlier times it was perhaps thought—or more accurately, assumed—that aid programs by themselves would rapidly bring about economic and social progress. Great expectations were created. Criticisms of the United States in those days were largely centered on the size of our aid program. The assumption was that large aid programs would bring prompt solutions to development problems.

Later, when it became clear that these programs, while an important component of development, were no substitute for sustained internal effort and discipline, high expectations gave way to a certain amount of disillusionment. And this, in turn, has led to proposals for a restructuring of world markets and of trade flows so as to bring about a larger transfer of resources from developed to developing areas. In this sense, it can perhaps be said that what is proposed are new policies which would use trade as a supplement to existing flows of capital.

Trade is of course an important component—there is perhaps no more important component—of progress. I can only express the hope, however, that none of us will per-

mit our attention and energy to be diverted from the equally important business of creating internal conditions which are propitious for progress and without which no amount of external resources will get the job done.

Let us not make trade the only tree in the forest as we once did with aid.

Aside from this, and speaking of the merits and demerits of the proposals developed at the recent meetings on trade and development at Alta Gracia and Geneva, we have viewed some of them with sympathy and others with misgivings.

The press has spoken a great deal about our attitude toward preferences. As you know, we have followed since the 1930's a policy of liberal, nondiscriminatory trade. That is still our policy. We have made no proposals or counterproposals about trade preferences, nor do we have any plans to do so. Developing nations themselves are not wholly in agreement on how the proposed preferences should be applied in practice, and we would in any case have to know a great deal more about their several views before we would come to conclusions.

Perhaps I should add, in passing, that the new trade proposals do not explain how it is that so many nations, in a world environment less hospitable than today's, were able to accomplish so much with so little outside help. They do not explain the great disparities which exist between developing nations themselves. They do not explain our own experience in foreign economic cooperation: Why is it that the very same programs—loans, technical assistance, trade, and capital flows—have produced very rapid progress in some countries and, in others which have received the same level of assistance per capita, very little progress or none at all?

Developed nations indeed have a very heavy responsibility in the shrinking world in which we live. We ought to be good and cooperative neighbors, not only because this is in our tradition but because world progress and peace and understanding serve our true national interests as well as the true national interests of others. We must not only main-

tain an adequate level of aid, but we must seek to make its use more effective. We must maintain policies of liberal trade, not only because we must import in order to export but because developing nations must be able to earn the foreign exchange with which to pay for capital imports. We must help others progress by making available on a continuing basis improved technology and know-how, which are the products of advanced research. We must continue to make available United States private sector loans and investments for those who need and want them.

Factors of Economic and Social Progress

But we should not deceive ourselves: Only the developing nation itself, and the regional trading group itself, can create the internal conditions essential for a high and sustained rate of economic growth and social progress. Developed nations can supply what Dean Acheson once referred to as "missing components in an otherwise favorable situation." But they cannot, by themselves, create favorable internal situations in developing nations.

We have in our country an unusual capacity for self-criticism and self-doubt, perhaps even a tendency to have complexes of guilt. It is necessary that we continue to put the spotlight on ourselves as well as on our shortcomings, which are perhaps considerable, and on our problems, which are formidable. But I would hope that we can from time to time have the spotlight swing in a more balanced arc so that we can look more carefully at the responsibilities which developing nations have for their own progress.

Allow me to suggest some of the questions we might ask ourselves about the policies of developing countries:

1. Is an adequate degree of competition permitted within the national territory—at least are conditions conducive to competition being built into the system—or is the economic system set up to protect monopolies owned by a state or a few individuals? If we accept the thesis—which I believe all experience in the free-market economies and

in the centrally planned economies has proven—that vigorous competition is essential to efficiency throughout the economy, then without competition:

How is the consumer to have access to quality goods at a fair price?

How is the worker to obtain increases in his real wages if inefficient industries preclude improvement in his productivity?

How is the economy to earn foreign exchange if its monopolies cannot compete abroad?

2. Is a real effort being made to create the right kind of free-trade area or other regional trading arrangement? Because we believe that national markets are often not large enough to support efficient industry, we have supported the Common Market in Europe and the Central American Common Market, as well as the Latin American Free Trade Area. This is still our policy. The real question is whether regional trading arrangements in the developing nations will actually take full advantage of these larger markets by permitting an adequate level of competition between the developing countries themselves or whether they will frustrate this opportunity by not only being inward-looking in respect of the outside world but also restrictive, through devices of various kinds, in terms of their trade with each other and in a degree which will hamper their own development.

3. In the case of government-owned and -managed business enterprises, have meaningful measures been taken to make them efficient and self-sustaining, or, under the guise of political expediency, are they permitted to incur large annual deficits which substantially reduce the government's ability to use its funds for development? There are those who believe that privately owned enterprises are more efficient. Others think differently. What matters is that they should be efficient. Apart from doctrine, the question of achieving greater efficiency in those state-owned enterprises which have long incurred large annual deficits nevertheless remains. It is a simple question of achieving a productive use of scarce resources, a simple question of eco-

nomie waste and diminished opportunities for social progress.

4. Is inflation, of a kind incompatible with sustained progress, encouraged by monetary, fiscal, and other policies of the developing country, or is there a program to achieve monetary stability, without stifling growth, by the exercise of the necessary disciplines?

5. Are the affairs of government managed in such a way as to build among its own people a feeling of confidence, an incentive for effort and risk, and a sense of a development mission? And, related to this: In any society, day-to-day transaction of official and private business depends on the faithful execution of agreements. Society increasingly depends on contractual arrangements as the process of development gathers pace and brings with it new complexities—the building of confidence that individuals and governments will honor their contracts, freely entered into, is an essential component of progress. The incentives and security which people believe they have, or the lack of them, are vital in determining whether there will be a high rate of investment or flights of capital, a high rate of personal labor effort or a lack of it; indeed, political institutions themselves may ultimately rest on the degree of confidence and security which people feel toward their own governments.

6. Is there a *bona fide* and sustained effort to improve tax collections and modernize tax policies where these are needed? A better mobilization of resources is indispensable if governments are to provide infrastructure and the education and other facilities needed to create equality of opportunity for all their people.

7. Is there land reform designed not only to bring about a more equitable distribution of the land but to provide the farmer, the poorest and most oppressed member of so many societies, with all of the things he needs to make the land produce and so contribute to his own income and the well-being of the national economy?

These are not by any means all of the factors that have to do with economic and social progress. They are illustrative only.

But they do suggest that the tasks before us, more developed and less developed nations alike, developing nations all, are not simple or easy.

But if there are no simple solutions or pat formulas, the rewards for success are great in terms not only of national achievement but also in terms of the improvement and enrichment of the spiritual and material lives of all human beings. This is our greatest vision and our ultimate goal.

Group To Study Trade Relations With Eastern Europe and U.S.S.R.

The White House announced on April 4 the membership of a Special Presidential Committee on U.S. Trade Relations With Eastern European Countries and the U.S.S.R. This committee of private citizens is exploring the possibilities and implications of expanding peaceful trade with the countries of Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. On completion of its investigations, the Committee will report its findings and recommendations to the President.

The members are as follows:

- J. Irwin Miller, *chairman*, chairman of the board, Cummins Engine Co., Inc.; member, executive committee, World Council of Churches.
- Eugene R. Black, chairman, Brookings Institution; past president, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
- William Blackie, president, Caterpillar Tractor Co.; director and chairman of the Foreign Commerce Committee, U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
- George R. Brown, chairman of the board, Brown and Root, Inc.; chairman, board of trustees, Rice University.
- Charles W. Engelhard, Jr., chairman of the board, Engelhard Industries; director, Foreign Policy Association.
- Dr. James B. Fisk, president, Bell Telephone Laboratories; past member, President's Science Advisory Committee.
- Nathaniel Goldfinger, director of research, AFL-

CIO; trustee, Joint Council on Economic Education.

Crawford H. Greenewalt, chairman of the board, E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co.; chairman Radio Free Europe Fund.

William A. Hewitt, chairman of the board, Deere and Co.; trustee, U.S. Council of the International Chamber of Commerce.

Dr. Max F. Millikan, professor of economics and director, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; president, World Peace Foundation.

Charles G. Mortimer, chairman of the board, General Foods Corp.; trustee, Committee for Economic Development.

Dr. Herman B. Wells, chancellor, Indiana University; former U.S. delegate to U.N. General Assembly.

President Orders New Study of Watch Movements Imports

The White House on April 5 released the following letter from President Johnson to Buford Ellington, Director of the Office of Emergency Planning.

DEAR MR. ELLINGTON: I should appreciate your initiating an investigation, in accordance with Section 232(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, to determine the effects on the national security of imports of watch movements. A long period has elapsed since the last full investigation of this matter, which led to the issuance of a report in early 1958 by the Office of Defense Mobilization, and it would seem useful to have an up-to-date assessment of the situation.

I hope that the experience which OEP's predecessor agency, along with the Departments of Defense, Commerce, and Labor, gained in the earlier investigation would mean that a new review involving these and other agencies, could be concluded within the next six months.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

President Notes Anniversary of American Specialist Program

Letter to Secretary Rusk

APRIL 15, 1965

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Friendly relations with other nations are increasingly served by American citizens working in ways very different from those traditionally associated with foreign policy.

I am glad that this is so. It is one of the most hopeful of the foreign policy developments we have seen in the two decades since World War II.

In our preoccupation with day-to-day problems we sometimes overlook the importance of these steady, unflagging efforts to broaden the foundations for peace.

I therefore commend the Department of State for directing public notice to this 15th anniversary of the "American Specialist" program. A great variety of American citizens have gone abroad to serve as "American Specialists"—to meet and talk with their counterparts in other countries in their roles as authors, judges, professors, actors, artists, coaches, composers, and many others.

They represent the diverse fabric of American life. They go abroad to tell of their professions and activities, and to tell of the America of which these activities are a part. And they go to *learn*—through direct exchanges with citizens of other countries, often including vigorously inquiring young people. These face-to-face exchanges open doors to greater mutual understanding.

In the midst of the critical issues that currently divide us from the ruling governments of some countries, we must not forget that there are common interests and insights that unite us with peoples all over the world. Cooperation between men begins when they understand this elemental fact. It is the road to progress and hope for all mankind.

This is the peaceful road our people want to travel. Our history has shown this countless times and in countless ways.

One such way is this virtually world-wide program, in which private citizens carry with them to other countries an authentic sense of America—not only in demonstrating their career specialties, but also in expressing our basic commitment to a better life for all men.

Some 2,500 Americans have now done this, under this program. Some 300 currently go out each year. I hope there will be many, many more in the future.

To all who have served America in this way I want to express our nation's deep gratitude.

What each such representative does in his two or three months abroad cannot, by itself, make a peaceful world. But hundreds and thousands like him—under both public and private programs, and representing the many aspects of American life that interlock with life in other lands—*can* make a difference over the years.

They help to increase that margin of safety—that margin of understanding among peoples—on which peace for all mankind must ultimately depend.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 1st Session

Communism in Latin America. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, February 16-March 30, 1965, 123 pp.; report of the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, H. Rept. 237, April 14, 1965, 18 pp.

January 1965 Economic Report of the President. Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee. Part 3. February 25-27, 1965. 199 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1965. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Part IV, March 9-15, 1965, 166 pp.; Part V, March 16-19, 1965, 105 pp.; Part VI, March 23-25, 1965, 158 pp.; Part VII, March 25-31, 1965, 132 pp.

Aggression From the North: The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign To Conquer South Viet-Nam. Department of State publication 7839, released February 1965. H. Doc. 136. March 11, 1965. 64 pp.

75th Anniversary of the Organization of American States: The Record of the Inter-American System

Address by Vice President Humphrey¹

It is so good and refreshing to be here with you, my brothers and sisters of the Americas, in this *Casa de las Americas*. This House of the Americas is a beautiful home and one that is very dear to all of us.

We meet today as members of a flourishing inter-American system whose roots go back 139 years to the Congress of Panamá convened in 1826 by that great patriot of this hemisphere, Simón Bolívar. Then Bolívar saw our hemisphere as "independent nations bound together by a common set of laws which would govern their foreign relations and afford them a right to survival through a general and permanent congress." He was a man of vision and history.

We meet today to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the Organization of American States, which in 1890 institutionalized this idea of hemispheric cooperation into a functioning international system. We meet to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the oldest and, I think, the most successful international organization in existence, a model for other nations who wish to move from the uncertainty of nationalism to the stability of a functioning regional system.

So, Mr. Chairman, Ambassadors, and

¹ Made before a protocolary session of the Council of the Organization of American States at the Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., on Pan American Day, Apr. 14 (as-delivered text).

fellow Americans, I am honored to accept your invitation to be with you in this Hall of the Americas on this memorable occasion. I am honored to join the representatives of the free Republics of Latin America, with whom, as President Johnson has stated, ". . . our country has always felt . . . special ties of interest and affection."²

We are friends; we are partners; and we are good neighbors. Let me pay my respects to the heroes of the Americas: the Father of our own country, George Washington; one whose death we have commemorated and yet whose great works we have commemorated—Abraham Lincoln; and Simón Bolívar, San Martín, Hidalgo, O'Higgins, Sucre, Morazán, and Martí, just to mention a few. These are names of history, and they bind us together into a family of brothers and friends.

During the past 75 years, the nations of the hemispheric system have developed instruments to preserve the peace and the security of this hemisphere. We have made a distinct contribution to peace. The cause of peace—peace in the hemisphere and peace in the world—is well served by the cooperation and the solidarity which have developed in the Americas. Friend and foe alike would do well to take note of this living cooperation

² BULLETIN of Jan. 25, 1965, p. 94.

and solidarity, for it has signified our mutual dedication to common goals and common progress. There is no greater service that one can perform than to build for an enduring peace.

The United States has made known its dedication to hemispheric development and security through many measures and many men. We have done this through Franklin Roosevelt's good-neighbor policy—and we are reminded of Franklin Roosevelt this week because it was just 20 years ago that he left us, after a lifetime of service to the cause of freedom. We have made known our dedication through the Rio Pact, and more recently through idealism in the commitment of the Alliance for Progress. These American initiatives have made this hemisphere safe, while laying the groundwork for long-term social and economic development.

The Alliance for Progress

During the past decade, we have gone beyond preserving security against external threats. We have begun to confront the internal threat posed by economic and social inequality. Building upon the previous proposals of Latin American statesmen, the late, beloved President of the United States, John F. Kennedy, 4 years ago proposed a new charter of freedom and hope, a new Alliance for Progress to “assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty.”³

I think some of us here remember that evening in the East Room of the White House when this great proposal was enunciated,⁴ and we recall so vividly the sense of the new spirit, the new strength, that it gave to all of us. Today the world knows and will long remember the change and the changes that have resulted in this hemisphere because of that initiative and what has followed from it.

³ *Ibid.*, Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.

⁴ For an address made by President Kennedy on Mar. 13, 1961, at a White House reception for Latin American diplomats and Members of Congress, see *ibid.*, Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.

The Alliance for Progress is our alliance. The alliance represents a peaceful revolution against human injustice and deprivation here in our hemisphere. As is stated in the preamble to the Charter of Punta del Este,⁵ the alliance aims “to unite in a common effort to bring our people accelerated economic progress and broader social justice within the framework of personal dignity and political liberty.” It is not, however, merely designed to promote economic development—important as that may be—but to bring all men in the Americas out of the shadows of injustice and despair and into the bright sunshine of human rights and human dignity, to bring us out of the lethargy of social neglect and into lively participation in the political, social, and economic life of the community.

Symbols of Hope and Imagination

The Alliance for Progress represents the latest development in the life of the inter-American system. Four years of experience under the alliance have deepened our understanding of this new development and have sharpened our perception of what the Alliance for Progress is and what it is not.

Looking at it today, what does this new development in the inter-American system represent? Today we realize that the success of the alliance depends on much more than economic development. We realize that for it to succeed it must have a political content and an ideological substance, in addition to a strong program of economic development. Man does not live by bread alone. He is also moved deeply by ideas as well as by his need for material things.

The alliance needs symbols of hope and imagination. It is not just a matter of satisfying physical needs and raising the material standards of living. What is equally important is inspiring hope in the people, commanding the intellectual and emotional allegiance of those who will shape the future of their country.

What can be accomplished in a material

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

sense in a very limited period of time will always fall short of our expectations. This should not discourage us. What is important is that we are prepared to give some evidence that progress is being made, that material betterment is on the way, and that there is sound reason for believing that the unmet material problems of society can and will be solved in the future.

It has been said many times, but it needs to be said again, that the longest journey is the first step. My fellow Americans, we have made the first step. The first step was firm, and it was one that has started us on the journey to success.

I am speaking in essence of the politics of hope, because man must have hope and the belief that he can overcome his problems, that he can find solutions to his difficulties. This means, of course, that there must be both short-range, socially oriented programs to give visible evidence of immediate progress and long-range development projects which are essential to the building of a viable economy. It isn't a choice of one or another; the need is there for both. Both of these must be pursued within the framework of responsible government, responsible fiscal and monetary policies essential to a growing economy. To do less than that would be to thwart our hopes and would be to deceive the people.

Global War on Poverty

Although the observation that Latin America is in the midst of a political, economic, and social revolution has become a commonplace, it is true. Today in most Latin American nations there is a burning awareness of the enormous human cost of perpetuating systems which are based on social inequality. There is also a well-developed consciousness that the system can be changed, that significant improvement in economic and social well-being of people can be achieved through deliberate, thoughtful, systematic, and democratic free political action. This is most important—the realization by the people and their leaders that

change can be brought about through orderly processes.

Poverty, illiteracy, and disease are no longer a load to be patiently borne, but a burden to be cast off. This is true in all the Americas, North and South. The war on poverty is not just a local war, in the highways, in the byways, in the cities, in the rural areas of these United States, but it is a global war. It is the one war that this nation wants to fight, and it is the one war in which we ask as allies every nation on the face of the earth.

The policy of peaceful social and economic revolution is a correct characterization of alliance policy. We do not hesitate to identify ourselves with it in this hemisphere, just as President Johnson associated himself with it in his "war on poverty" throughout the world when he recently stated, ". . . if a peaceful revolution is impossible, a violent revolution is inevitable."⁶

Alliance Is "Partnership, Not Paternalism"

The past 4 years have taught us that the Alliance for Progress must combine basic reform with political freedom, social justice with economic development, ideological substance with inspiration and hope. We have also learned much about the implementation of specific programs of political, social, and economic development under the terms of the alliance. We understand more fully that Latin America is a continent of diversified peoples, varied economies, different cultures, and both highly advanced and seriously underdeveloped regions. We understand that the actions of Latin American countries are far more important than those of the United States in accomplishing the goals of the alliance.

My fellow citizens of this Republic must remember that the main burden of the alliance is not borne by this Republic but by all of the Republics of the Americas. We are

⁶ For remarks made by President Johnson on May 11, 1964, at an informal White House meeting with ambassadors of Latin American nations, see *ibid.*, June 1, 1964, p. 854.

but a partner. We understand that discipline and self-help are absolutely crucial in the achievements of our goals. We understand above everything else that the alliance is partnership, not paternalism.

It is no surprise, therefore, that the development of the alliance has been uneven, that some nations have made great progress and others have made less. Where the indispensable ingredient of responsible political leadership has appeared, internal mobilization of resources has followed. Where this has occurred, the infusion of external capital and technical assistance can be a stimulant to economic development. Of the three forms of external resources readily available—aid, trade, and private investment—all three are and will continue to be essential for the foreseeable future to the success of the Alliance for Progress. But, as Under Secretary of State Thomas Mann stated recently: ⁷

Unless conditions favorable to development are created by each country, all the aid from and trade with the outside world will not achieve the goals of the alliance.

CIAP and the Inter-American Bank

In implementing the Alliance for Progress we have converted the original concept of the alliance as a cooperative effort into a concrete, multilateral decisionmaking body, the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress. Once again, the resilience and the adaptability of the inter-American system has been demonstrated. Is it any wonder that throughout this hemisphere today the press, the columnists, and the commentators herald joyfully this 75th birthday of this great Organization of American States? Today CIAP is a vigorous operational instrument, possessing the flexibility and independence which an operational instrument must have.

Our experience with CIAP is showing that new instruments, operating directly with governments and international lending institutions on a day-to-day basis, can be harmoniously blended into the existing in-

ter-American system. This follows a similar experience with another new and vital part of the inter-American system, the Inter-American Development Bank. Already this Bank has made an impressive record in assisting in economic and social growth. Aided by the strong support of the United States Government and the active participation and support of other members, it can play a vital role in accomplishing the economic integration of this hemisphere.

New organizations like CIAP and the Inter-American Development Bank are part of a growing inter-American system. I emphasize this because our institutions are not static; they are not something just for the history books. They are living, viable instruments of social, political, and economic progress. They have brought order and system to bear against complex problems which cross national boundaries. Within this system the OAS Council will continue to play a very important role in settling disputes between nations, in preserving the peace and security in the hemisphere, and in promoting the general welfare of this hemisphere.

U.S. Support for Economic Integration

But if the system has been successful in meeting the problems of the past, it must undergo new development if it is to meet the challenges facing us in the present or the future. To many perceptive observers, the most urgent step in supplementing the programs already functioning under the Alliance for Progress is the acceleration of economic integration in the hemisphere. Just as the nations of postwar Europe united to form a European Economic Community, so the nations of Latin America naturally see their destiny more and more in terms of an economically integrated region of continental proportions. The development of regional markets—in a manner guaranteeing the efficiency which only competition can bring—is now recognized as essential to the economic growth of many Latin American countries.

We welcome the recent efforts to stim-

⁷ *Ibid.*, Oct. 26, 1964, p. 593.

ulate bold action to achieve economic integration. As in the case of CIAP and the Inter-American Development Bank, there is no reason why arrangements developed to deal with integration cannot be appropriately related to other institutions of the dynamic inter-American system.

We support effective economic integration because it is essential to economic and political development under the Alliance for Progress. We support it because the modern Latin America which can emerge from effective economic integration will be a more effective partner in all the great common world tasks which confront those who share the common values of Western civilization. We support it because, as our postwar experience demonstrated, our most fruitful and mutually advantageous trade and financial relations are with industrialized and diversified areas of the world. Finally, we support it because economic integration is a fundamental part of the Alliance for Progress, the alliance program to which we committed ourselves at Punta del Este.

Other Urgent Problems To Be Solved

In a year holding great promise for further growth of the inter-American system, I would hope that two additional subjects might be considered. Although the nations of the hemisphere are united in their preference for representative democracy and free institutions, we have not yet perfected institutional means of bringing the full weight of the inter-American system to the defense of representative constitutional government when it is threatened—from either the right or the left. This remains an urgent problem for all nations of the hemisphere, large and small.

Finally, it is difficult to see how the economic and social aspirations of the people of Latin America can be achieved if the competition in modern weapons of the Old World is emulated by the New. Surely economic growth and social welfare are to be preferred to the proliferation of costly weapons, which could only convert friend

into foe through a costly and dangerous military rivalry.

Some day we would hope to see open boundaries from Canada to Chile, just as we have today between Mexico and the United States, and Canada and the United States. We favor control over all modern weapons, and we hope that careful consideration will be given to discovering the ways of controlling these weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in this hemisphere.

Hemispheric Security

If I have emphasized here today the new developments in the inter-American system, I would not want to overlook the solid accomplishments of the past. Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of hemispheric security. Aided by the Rio Treaty of 1947, we have successfully resisted military penetration of the hemisphere by hostile powers.

Our present concern with social and economic problems should not obscure the need for vigilance to protect the security of this hemisphere, because there can be no progress, no social and economic development, if this hemisphere is made the battleground for either open aggression or subversion and terrorism.

We in the United States know that hemispheric security is our security. We know that your security is ours, and we believe that you know that our security is yours. Indeed, hemispheric security is the security of every nation of the Americas, large or small. We must never forget that any penetration of this area of freedom by outside powers is a threat to the whole system. This remains as true today as it was in 1962.

Latin America and the Western World

In confronting the new problems it is well to remember that the inter-American system has demonstrated a capacity for growth. As our Latin American neighbors progress along the path of economic and social modernization, they naturally will

desire to enlarge their independence, to play a more prominent role in world affairs. This is as it should be. The inter-American system should naturally reflect that change.

There are those who contend that the solution to the problems of Latin America lies outside the hemisphere, outside our inter-American system. In considering the destiny of the nations of the Western Hemisphere, we should all ponder the words of a bold new statesman, the President of Chile, Eduardo Frei. Speaking of his own country in September 1964, President Frei stated this:

We certainly may share some economic problems [referring to the African and Asian countries] as producers of raw materials who want to project themselves into an industrial age. But Chile belongs to the Americas, where our ideas have been nourished by the Judeo-Christian ethics of the Western World. It is within this sphere that we must try to resolve our problems.

It seems to me that that statement succinctly tells us where we are to look for our solutions, how we are to proceed. In keeping with these views, the solution to our present problems can be found within the inter-American system.

But the hemispheric unity presupposed by that system need not be interpreted in any exclusive sense that would discourage a greater Western European contribution to the social, economic, and cultural development of Latin America. We welcome our European friends, not as rivals for power but as partners for progress. One of the most encouraging signs of recent years is the increased involvement of Europe in Latin America, both in terms of long-term development assistance and expansion of existing cultural and education programs. Latin American countries will and should continue to be different from one another, and different from both the United States and Europe, but they need not see their own future destiny in terms of the non-Western southern half of the world.

On this 75th anniversary of the OAS I have tried to touch on the accomplishments of the past, some of the challenges and

problems of the future. The record of our inter-American system, I submit to the world, is an impressive one. A century ago, the Argentine poet José Hernández wrote:

America has a great destiny to achieve in the fate of mankind. . . . One day . . . the American alliance will bring world peace. . . . America must be the cradle of the great principles which are to bring a complete change in the political and social organization of other nations.

It would be well for us not only to read those words but to reflect upon them and act on them.

This week we observe not only the 75th birthday or anniversary of this great inter-American system, but with a note of sadness we observe the 20th anniversary of the death of a great friend of freedom and of the Americas, Franklin Roosevelt. President Roosevelt always inspired the people to whom he spoke; he was indeed a powerful force in a troubled world. He said, as he was penning those last words before death took him from us:

The only limit to our realization of tomorrow will be our doubts of today. Let us move forward with strong and active faith.

I submit that that is a challenge worthy of the Americas, and one that we should embrace and make our call to action.

United Nations Day, 1965

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS the year 1965 will mark the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the United Nations Charter in San Francisco; and

WHEREAS the year 1965 has been designated by the United Nations General Assembly as International Cooperation Year, and I have so proclaimed it for the United States;² and

WHEREAS our own peace and prosperity is directly interwoven with the peace, prosperity, and development of the rest of mankind; and

WHEREAS our future is made more secure when we can share with other members of the United

¹ No. 3652; 30 *Fed. Reg.* 5415.

² BULLETIN of Oct. 19, 1964, p. 558.

Nations the responsibility for keeping the peace and building a better world; and

WHEREAS the United Nations, despite many difficult problems, is the best organization yet devised in which nations can work together for world peace; for promotion of fundamental human rights, justice, and the rule of law among nations; and for social progress and better standards of living; and

WHEREAS it is essential in our democratic society to maintain informed public support for United States policies in the United Nations; and

WHEREAS enlightened public opinion in this regard requires accurate and timely information about the United Nations and its large family of agencies whose activities serve the United States and all other members; and

WHEREAS the General Assembly of the United Nations has resolved that October twenty-fourth, the date of the coming into force of the United Nations Charter in 1945, should be dedicated each year to making known the purposes, principles, and accomplishments of the United Nations:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim Sunday, October 24, 1965, as United Nations Day, and urge the citizens of this Nation to observe that day by means of community programs which will contribute to a realistic understanding of the aims, problems, and achievements of the United Nations and its associated organizations.

I also call upon officials of the Federal and State Governments and upon local officials to encourage citizen groups and agencies of communication—press, radio, television, and motion pictures—to engage in special and appropriate observance of United Nations Day this year in cooperation with the United Nations Association of the United States of America and other interested organizations.^a

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this ninth day of April in the year of our Lord nineteen [SEAL] hundred and sixty-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-ninth.



By the President:
GEORGE W. BALL,
Acting Secretary of State.

^a President Johnson announced on Apr. 11 (White House press release dated Apr. 11, for release Apr. 12) that Robert S. Benjamin, chairman of the board of the United Nations Association of the United States of America, will serve as national U.N. Day chairman again this year.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Trade

Protocol amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and development and to amend annex I. Open for acceptance, by signature or otherwise, at Geneva from February 8 until December 31, 1965.

Signatures: Brazil (ad referendum), February 16, 1965; Gambia, March 2, 1965; Malawi, March 4, 1965; Tunisia, February 19, 1965; United Arab Republic, March 3, 1965.

Wheat

Protocol for the extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington March 22 through April 23, 1965.¹

Signatures: Argentina, April 22, 1965; Australia, April 21, 1965; Austria, April 23, 1965; Brazil, April 19, 1965; Canada, April 22, 1965; Costa Rica, April 23, 1965; Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, April 22, 1965; France, April 21, 1965; Greece, April 23, 1965; Guatemala, April 22, 1965; India, April 19, 1965; Japan, April 21, 1965; Korea, April 19, 1965; Liberia, April 21, 1965; Libya, April 23, 1965; Mexico, April 21, 1965; Netherlands, New Zealand, April 23, 1965; Nigeria, April 22, 1965; Norway, April 19, 1965; Philippines, April 23, 1965; Portugal, April 21, 1965; Saudi Arabia, April 22, 1965; Spain, Tunisia, April 23, 1965; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (with a statement), April 22, 1965; United Kingdom, April 23, 1965; Vatican City, April 20, 1965; Western Samoa, April 23, 1965.

Notification of undertaking to seek acceptance: Japan, April 21, 1965.

BILATERAL

Australia

Agreement amending the agreement of January 3, 1964 (TIAS 5510), relating to a program of research on aerospace disturbances. Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra April 12, 1965. Entered into force April 12, 1965.

China

Agreement concerning the establishment of the Sino-American fund for economic and social development. Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei April 9, 1965. Enters into force July 1, 1965.

Costa Rica

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Signed at San José April 9, 1965. Enters into force on the date of notification from Costa Rica that the agreement has been approved in conformity with Costa Rica's constitutional procedures.

¹ Not in force.

**President Submits Promotion List,
Asks FSO Appointments for USIA**

Letter to Vice President Humphrey

White House press release dated April 13

APRIL 13, 1965

DEAR MR. VICE PRESIDENT: I have forwarded to the Senate (1) a list of 655 Foreign Service Officers who have been recommended for promotion by the Secretary of State, based upon the findings of the 18th Selection Boards, and (2) a list of 760 Career Reserve Officers of the United States Information Agency who have been recommended by the Secretary of State for appointment to the Foreign Service of the United States under Section 517 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946.

Those of us who bear the burden of foreign affairs decision-making in an uneasy world are grateful for the knowledge and advice of the men and women of the Foreign Service of the United States. The submission of these promotion and appointment lists enables me to reiterate anew my confidence in the professional ability and dedication of those who serve in this noted government institution. I am eager to do so. For nothing is more important, in my judgment, than that all officers of the United States Government should be proud of their responsibilities and certain of the backing of their superior officers.

It is well known to all that I yield to no one in the concern for military strength and fully effective defenses. This has been constant and unchanging for more than 30 years. I consider the Foreign Service to be a necessary part of the effective defense of our country, and my interest in sustaining, improving, and strengthening our diplomatic corps is unswerving.

Fortunately, we have been able to rely

upon the Foreign Service for wise and informed counsel over the years. It has my assurance that it can rely on my desires for a diplomatic corps second to none. I am confident that the Congress shares this desire.

The diplomatic corps has served us well in the peaceful pursuits we prefer and in the dangerous missions that are forced upon us. In South Vietnam, the dangers to which our military men are exposed are well known. Recent events there have again emphasized that the Foreign Service likewise faces grave hazards in the front lines in our quest for peace and freedom.

We can be proud as Americans of the manner in which the Foreign Service has discharged its responsibilities under the leadership of a great Secretary of State.

The promotion list which has been forwarded this day to the Senate is representative of the changes that are taking place in the Foreign Service. All sections of our country and all segments of our society are represented in this list. The list is based solely on the merit of the individuals involved. The list reflects an upward movement of more youthful officers into senior positions. I urge early and favorable action on these nominations.

The second list submitted today represents another significant milestone in the development of our Foreign Service. By bringing into the Foreign Service a group of career officers of proven ability and experience in the conduct of our foreign information programs, we take a step forward toward that unity of outlook and purpose which is so important to the efficient conduct of our relationships with the other nations of the world.

The officers on this list were all carefully selected under the same procedures that apply for Foreign Service Officers. Their duties, objectives, and tasks are closely interwoven with those of our career Foreign Service Officers. By bringing this group into the Foreign Service, we point the way toward a unified and flexible career Foreign Service of the United States which will meet the requirements of other agencies of the gov-

ernment with responsibilities in the field of foreign affairs. I ask that these nominations be favorably considered at this time.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Honorable HUBERT H. HUMPHREY,
President of the Senate,
Washington, D.C.

Confirmations

The Senate on April 21 confirmed the following nominations:

Walter M. Kotschnig to be representative of the United States to the 20th plenary session of the Economic Commission for Europe of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

Morris B. Abram to be the representative of the United States on the Human Rights Commission of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

Designations

Robert M. Sayre as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, effective April 15. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 79 dated April 19.)

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 19-25

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Release issued prior to April 19 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 72 of April 9.

No.	Date	Subject
77	4/19	Unger: Detroit Economic Club.
†78	4/19	Rusk: Michigan Committee for Immigration, Detroit.
*79	4/19	Sayre appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs (biographic details).
†80	4/22	Rostow: "Economic Development in Asia."
*81	4/23	Program for visit of Prime Minister of Italy.
82	4/23	Rusk: American Society of International Law.
*83	4/23	Harriman: address on 20th anniversary of opening of San Francisco Conference (excerpts).
†84	4/23	Williams: "Congo Realities and United States Policy."
†85	4/24	Rostow: joint meeting of Research Institute of Japan and International Problems Research Institute, Tokyo.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

American Republics
 Sayre designated Deputy Assistant Secretary 734
 75th Anniversary of the Organization of American States: The Record of the Inter-American System (Humphrey) 726

Asia
 Present Objectives and Future Possibilities in Southeast Asia (Unger) 712
 President and Mr. Black Discuss Asian Economic Progress (Johnson) 719
 Cambodia. U.S. Willing To Participate in Conference on Cambodia (Rusk) 711
 Communism. Present Objectives and Future Possibilities in Southeast Asia (Unger) 712

Congress
 Confirmations (Abram, Kotschnig) 734
 Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy 725
 President Submits Promotion List, Asks FSO Appointments for USIA (letter to Vice President Humphrey) 733

Department and Foreign Service
 Confirmations (Abram, Kotschnig) 734
 Designations (Sayre) 734
 President Submits Promotion List, Asks FSO Appointments for USIA (letter to Vice President Humphrey) 733

Economic Affairs
 Disparities in Progress Between Nations (Mann) 720
 Group To Study Trade Relations With Eastern Europe and U.S.S.R. 724
 Present Objectives and Future Possibilities in Southeast Asia (Unger) 712
 President and Mr. Black Discuss Asian Economic Progress (Johnson) 719
 President Orders New Study of Watch Movements Imports 724

Educational and Cultural Affairs. President Notes Anniversary of American Specialist Program (letter to Rusk) 725

Europe. Group To Study Trade Relations With Eastern Europe and U.S.S.R. 724

Foreign Aid. 75th Anniversary of the Organization of American States: The Record of the Inter-American System (Humphrey) 726

India. President To Keep Schedule of Visits to Minimum 719

International Information. President Submits Promotion List, Asks FSO Appointments for USIA (letter to Vice President Humphrey) 733

International Law
 The Control of Force in International Relations (Rusk) 694
 United Nations Procedures and Power Realities: The International Apportionment Problem (Gardner) 701

International Organizations and Conferences.
 Kotschnig confirmed as U.S. representative to ECE 734

Military Affairs. Present Objectives and Future Possibilities in Southeast Asia (Unger) 712

Pakistan. President To Keep Schedule of Visits to Minimum 719

Presidential Documents
 President and Mr. Black Discuss Asian Economic Progress 719
 President Notes Anniversary of American Specialist Program 725
 President Orders New Study of Watch Movements Imports 724
 President Submits Promotion List, Asks FSO Appointments for USIA 733
 United Nations Day, 1965 731

Treaty Information. Current Actions 732

U.S.S.R. Group To Study Trade Relations With Eastern Europe and U.S.S.R. 724

United Nations
 Abram confirmed as U.S. representative on Human Rights Commission 734
 The Control of Force in International Relations (Rusk) 694
 United Nations Day, 1965 (proclamation) 731
 United Nations Procedures and Power Realities: The International Apportionment Problem (Gardner) 701

Viet-Nam
 The Control of Force in International Relations (Rusk) 694
 Present Objectives and Future Possibilities in Southeast Asia (Unger) 712

Name Index

Abram, Morris B 734
 Gardner, Richard N 701
 Humphrey, Vice President 726
 Johnson, President 719, 724, 725, 731, 733
 Kotschnig, Walter M 734
 Mann, Thomas C 720
 Rusk, Secretary 694, 711
 Sayre, Robert M 734
 Unger, Leonard 712

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia

President Johnson's address at Johns Hopkins University on April 7, 1965, published as a pamphlet under the title *Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia*, is a major statement of policy on Southeast Asia. Here the President proposes broad outlines for a settlement of the conflict in Viet-Nam and suggests a greatly expanded cooperative effort for the development of Southeast Asia.

NATO After Sixteen Years: An Anniversary Assessment

"As it reaches its 16th anniversary, NATO is clearly approaching a time of testing we cannot be sure precisely how it will be adapted to the circumstances of the future," says I. H. Popper, Director of the Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, in a special article written for the Bulletin. This review and forward estimate examines the organization's strengths and weaknesses and discusses some of its current problems.

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NAME

ADDRESS

CITY, STATE

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN

Vol. LII, No. 1351



May 17, 1965

U.S. ACTS TO MEET THREAT IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 238

PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND SECRETARY McNAMARA
REVIEW SITUATION IN VIET-NAM 248

UNITED STATES SUMMARIZES POSITION ON DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL
Statement by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson 262

U.S. CALLS FOR DEEDS, NOT WORDS, IN U.N. COMMITTEE ON DEFINING AGRESSION
Statement by Ambassador Francis T. P. Plimpton 275

SOVIET ADHERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL PATENT CONVENTION

Special Article by Harold A. Levin 277

U.S. Acts To Meet Threat in Dominican Republic

Following is a series of statements relating to actions taken by the United States after the outbreak of a revolution in the Dominican Republic on April 24, together with texts of three resolutions adopted by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, APRIL 28

White House press release dated April 28

I just concluded a meeting with the leaders of the Congress. I reported to them on the serious situation in the Dominican Republic. I reported the decisions this Government considers necessary in this situation in order to protect American lives.

The members of the leadership expressed their support in these decisions. The United States Government has been informed by military authorities in the Dominican Republic that American lives are in danger. These authorities are no longer able to guar-

antee their safety, and they have reported that the assistance of military personnel is now needed for that purpose.

I have ordered the Secretary of Defense to put the necessary American troops ashore in order to give protection to hundreds of Americans who are still in the Dominican Republic and to escort them safely back to this country. This same assistance will be available to the nationals of other countries, some of whom have already asked for our help.

Pursuant to my instructions, 400 Marines have already landed. General [Earle G.] Wheeler, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has just reported to me that there have been no incidents.

We have appealed repeatedly in recent days for a cease-fire between the contending forces of the Dominican Republic in the interests of all Dominicans and foreigners alike.

I repeat this urgent appeal again tonight. The Council of the OAS has been advised of the situation by the Dominican Ambassador

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LII, NO. 1351 PUBLICATION 7886 MAY 17, 1965

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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[José Antonio Bonilla Atilas], and the Council will be kept fully informed.

LETTER TO PRESIDENT OF SECURITY COUNCIL, APRIL 29¹

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to inform you that on April 28 the President of the United States ordered American troops ashore in the Dominican Republic in order to protect American citizens still there and escort them to safety from the country. The President acted after he had been informed by the military authorities in the Dominican Republic that American lives were in danger, that their safety could no longer be guaranteed, and that the assistance of United States military personnel was required. The text of the President's statement is enclosed.

At the request of the United States, the Council of the Organization of American States is meeting to consider the situation in the Dominican Republic.

I request that you circulate copies of this letter, together with a copy of the text of the President's statement to the Delegations of all Member States as a Security Council document.

Sincerely yours,

ADLAI E. STEVENSON

ACTION IN THE OAS

Resolution Convoking Meeting of Consultation²

WHEREAS:

The Ambassador Representative of Chile, on April 29, 1965, addressed a note to the Chairman of the Council in which his Government requested "that a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs be convoked for the first day of May 1965";

As the agenda for the aforesaid Meeting, which

¹ Transmitted by Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to Abdul Monem Rifa'i, President of the U.N. Security Council (U.S./U.N. press release 4536).

² Introduced by Chile; adopted on Apr. 30 (early a.m.) by a vote of 18 to 1 (Uruguay), with 1 abstention (Dominican Republic).

would be held pursuant to the terms of Article 39 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, the Ambassador Representative of Chile has proposed the following:

"Serious situation created by armed strife in the Dominican Republic"; and

The urgency of the convocation makes it necessary to call attention to the provisions of Article 42 of the Charter of the OAS, adopting as regulations those approved by the Council at the meeting held on March 1, 1951, and designating the Pan American Union, in Washington, D.C. as the site of the Meeting;

THE COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

RESOLVES:

1. To convoke, pursuant to Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics for May 1, 1965.

2. To approve as the agenda of this meeting the following:

"Serious situation created by the armed strife in the Dominican Republic."

3. To approve as the Regulations of the Conference those approved by the Council of the Organization of American States at the meeting held on March 1, 1951.

4. To designate the Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., as the site of the Meeting.

5. To request the Secretary General to inform the governments of the member states of the OAS of this decision, in the most rapid way possible, calling attention to the provisions of Article 42 of the Charter of the Organization of American States.

6. To appoint a committee to begin today to study the preparations for this Meeting, in the more urgent aspects not covered in this resolution.

Statement by U.S. Representative³

El Señor Presidente: The resolution is adopted. In spite of the lateness of the hour and because of the urgency with which my Government views the situation in the Dominican Republic, I should like to ask the indulgence of the members to make a statement on behalf of my Government.

Since last Saturday afternoon, at the outbreak of hostilities, the Government of the United States has consistently urged on all the parties the necessity of a cease-fire. Several cease-fires have actually been ar-

³ Made by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker before the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on Apr. 30 (early a.m.).

ranged but none of them have been kept. And since the Americans and other foreigners have been in great danger, we have—at the same time that we have been requesting a cease-fire on both sides—we have evacuated some 1,400 citizens of my country and of other nations.

Unfortunately, before the evacuation was completed, there was further deterioration rather than a cease-fire, and an equal number of American citizens and many more nationals of other countries are still in the Dominican Republic. At this time there are some 650 additional persons at the polo grounds awaiting evacuation.

I may say that among those evacuated there have been 150 other nationals—other than the United States citizens—including citizens of the Latin countries, French, Dutch, Swedish, German, Spanish, British, and Canadians. Beginning today the United States Embassy has been under heavy fire throughout the day, and according to our information the diplomatic inviolability of at least five American Embassies has been violated; one of them, I understand, the Embassy of El Salvador, has been sacked and burned, and the Embassies of Mexico, Guatemala, and Peru, as well as that of the United States, have been violated.

We are, therefore, in our summation, faced with an immediate problem of how to restore law and order in order to protect not only the citizens of foreign countries, private and official; not only to proceed with evacuation in an orderly way; but also to stop the excessive vandalism which many people are wreaking on their fellow Dominican citizens, and I promise to keep the Council fully informed of developments.

I want to also state the fact that we are reinforcing our forces in Santo Domingo tonight, with the purpose of adequately protecting the lives of our citizens and the citizens of other countries who are there. Therefore I would request that, as a matter of great importance and urgency, the Council this very night direct an appeal for a cease-fire to all sides. My Government for its

part will heartily join in such an appeal.

But if the appeal is made and goes unheeded we are still faced with the problem—because of the solemn duty which each state has to protect its citizens—to protect them from violence in a situation where there are no authorities to insure their protection. The United States must therefore reserve its right to take the necessary measures to protect its own citizens and officials from violence in a situation of anarchy.

There are many precedents for this kind of a situation. None of this is inconsistent with the inter-American obligations. We wholeheartedly subscribe to these obligations, including the doctrine of nonintervention and self-determination.

We are not talking about intruding in the domestic affairs of other countries; we are talking simply about the elementary duty to save lives in a situation where there is no authority able to accept responsibility for primary law and order. We believe that this is a matter of the greatest urgency for the OAS to deal with within the family of the hemisphere in which all of us have a great stake.

The United States obviously has no candidate for the Government of the Dominican Republic; this is a matter for the Dominican people themselves. It is for the OAS to find the means to assist the Dominican people to constitute a government which reflects their wishes and a government which can undertake the international obligations of the hemisphere.

We therefore request that the organ which has just been created here by this resolution recognize the urgency and the gravity of the situation, issue a call for a cease-fire, and constitute a committee to go at once to the Dominican Republic to arrange such a cease-fire and to consult with responsible Dominican elements as to the means by which they return as quickly as possible to constitutional government.

I must state quite frankly to this Council that events are moving with great rapidity and it may not be easy for the Organization

of American States to keep pace with those events, but I can assure you that the United States is prepared to transfer its responsibility to the Organization of American States at the earliest possible moment. If in the hours ahead it is necessary, for the elementary humanitarian protection of the lives of innocent people, for the United States to take any action for the protection of its own nationals, everything that we might be called upon to do would be designed to make it possible for the OAS to carry out its heavy responsibilities and will be subject to such action as the OAS itself may decide to take.

Gentlemen, I should like to suggest and propose a resolution with reference to the cease-fire, which I will take the liberty of reading:

[At this point Ambassador Bunker read the resolution calling for a cease-fire.]

In support of this resolution and especially of the second paragraph, I want to say to the members that I have been informed tonight of the desperate condition of the hospitals in Santo Domingo and the serious need for the proper care and treatment of the wounded, and I suggest that the Organization of American States call upon all of the contending parties to respect Red Cross personnel, vehicles, and insignia so that the sick and wounded may be properly cared for. This is an additional reason, it seems to me, for the need for speed and for the need of adopting an urgent call for a cease-fire on the part of all of the parties and of all sides engaged in conflict within the country.

Resolution Calling for Cease-Fire⁴

THE COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES,

RESOLVES:

1. To reiterate the call of April 29, 1965 upon all the authorities, the political groupings, and the opposing forces to pursue immediately all possible means by which a cease-fire may be established and all hostilities and military operations

⁴Introduced by the U.S.; adopted on Apr. 30 by a vote of 16 to 0, with 4 abstentions (Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela).

suspended in order to prevent any further tragic loss of life or injury as well as material damages in the sister Dominican Republic.

2. To make an urgent appeal to the same authorities, political groupings, and forces on both sides to permit the immediate establishment of an international neutral zone of refuge, encompassing the geographic area of the city of Santo Domingo immediately surrounding the embassies of foreign governments, the inviolability of which will be respected by all opposing forces and within which nationals of all countries will be given safe haven.

3. To inform the Security Council of the United Nations of the text of this resolution pursuant to Article 54 of the United Nations Charter.

Resolution Establishing OAS Committee

THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. Decides to establish a committee composed of representatives of the following five member states: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and Panama;

2. Instructs the Committee to go immediately to the city of Santo Domingo, to do everything possible to obtain the re-establishment of peace and normal conditions, and to give priority to the following two functions:

a. To offer its good offices to the Dominican armed groups and political groups and to diplomatic representatives for the purpose of obtaining urgently:

i. a cease-fire; and

ii. the orderly evacuation of the persons who have taken asylum in the embassies and of all foreign citizens who desire to leave the Dominican Republic; and

b. To carry out an investigation of all aspects of the situation in the Dominican Republic that led to the convocation of this Meeting;

3. Requests the Committee to submit a report to the Meeting on the progress of its work, including the conclusions and recommendations that it may consider appropriate, in the shortest time possible;

4. Requests the American governments and the Secretary General of the Organization of American States to extend their full cooperation in order to facilitate the work of the Committee; and

5. Instructs the Secretary General of the Organization of American States to transmit to the Security Council of the United Nations the text of this resolution, in accordance with the provisions of Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations.

⁶Introduced by Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and the U.S.; adopted on May 1 by a vote of 19 to 0, with 1 abstention (Chile).

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, APRIL 30⁶

The United States forces in Santo Domingo are completing the establishment of an international neutral zone of refuge covering a limited area in the western section of the city. This neutral zone was established in response to a resolution passed by the Council of the Organization of American States earlier this morning.

This OAS resolution appealed to all authorities, political groupings, and forces on all sides of the conflict to permit such a zone to be established. The zone of refuge encompasses the area where many foreign embassies are located and is designed to provide a safe haven for nationals of all countries pending the restoration of law and order.

The operative paragraph of the OAS resolution is:

2. To make an urgent appeal to the same authorities, political groupings, and forces on both sides to permit the immediate establishment of an international neutral zone of refuge, encompassing the geographic area of the city of Santo Domingo immediately surrounding the embassies of foreign governments, the inviolability of which will be respected by all opposing forces and within which nationals of all countries will be given safe haven.⁷

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, APRIL 30⁸

White House press release dated April 30, as-delivered text

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen: For 2 days American forces have been in Santo Domingo in an effort to protect the lives of Americans and the nationals of other countries in the face of increasing violence and disorder. With the assistance of these American forces, over 2,400 Americans and other nationals have been evacuated from the Dominican Republic. We took this step when, and only when, we were officially notified by police and military officials of the Do-

⁶ Read to news correspondents by Robert J. McCloskey, Director of the Office of News.

⁷ Mr. McCloskey said it was his understanding that an area of approximately 9 square miles was involved.

⁸ Broadcast over a nationwide radio-TV network.

minican Republic that they were no longer in a position to guarantee the safety of American and foreign nationals and to preserve law and order.

In the last 24 hours violence and disorder have increased. There is great danger to the life of foreign nationals and of thousands of Dominican citizens, our fellow citizens of this hemisphere. By an outstanding effort of mediation the Papal Nuncio has achieved an agreement on a cease-fire which I have urged all those concerned to take. But this agreement is not now, as I speak, being fully respected. The maintenance of the cease-fire is essential to the hopes of all for peace and freedom in the Dominican Republic.

Meanwhile there are signs that people trained outside the Dominican Republic are seeking to gain control. Thus the legitimate aspirations of the Dominican people and most of their leaders for progress, democracy, and social justice are threatened and so are the principles of the inter-American system.

The inter-American system, and its principal organ, the Organization of American States, have a grave and immediate responsibility. It is important that prompt action be taken. I am informed that a representative of the OAS is leaving Washington very shortly for the Dominican Republic. It is very important that representatives of the OAS be sent to the Dominican Republic, just as soon as they can be sent there, in order to strengthen the cease-fire and in order to help clear a road to the return of constitutional processes and free elections. Loss of time may mean that it is too late to preserve freedom, which alone can lead to the establishment of true democracy. This, I am sure, is what the people of the Dominican Republic want. Late action, or delay, in such a case could mean a failure to accomplish the agreed objectives of the American states.

The eyes of the hemisphere are now on the OAS, both in its meeting today and on the meeting of its foreign ministers contemplated tomorrow. The wisdom, the statesmanship, and the ability to act decisively of the OAS are critical to the hopes of peoples in every land of this continent.

The United States will give its full support to the work of the OAS and will never depart from its commitment to the preservation of the right of all of the free people of this hemisphere to choose their own course without falling prey to international conspiracy from any quarter.

**STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON,
MAY 1**

White House press release dated May 1

United States forces in the Dominican Republic have the necessary mission of establishing a neutral zone of refuge in the western zone of Santo Domingo in the terms called for by yesterday's resolution of the OAS Council.

This is a means of carrying out the goal of protecting the life, and insuring the safe evacuation, of all foreign nationals.

However, the forces in this area are thinly spread and subject to continuing attack and sniper fire. Their current responsibility extends over 9 square miles of a largely urban area. They also have the responsibility for keeping the port area of Haina free from attack from any side. Under current circumstances their capability is not adequate to this mission. For this reason we are lending additional forces. Those forces consist of two battalions of the 82d Airborne Division comprising approximately 1,500 men and additional detachments of Marines.

These forces are engaged in protecting human life. It is our earnest hope that it will not be necessary for them to defend themselves from attack from any quarter.

**STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON,
MAY 1**

White House press release dated May 1

The Organization of American States has demonstrated why, as Franklin Roosevelt said, it is the oldest and most successful association of sovereign governments in the history of the world.

Today, faced with a threat to the principles of the inter-American system and the

peace of the hemisphere, the OAS acted decisively.

A committee made up of five member states will soon be on its way to the Dominican Republic. Its mission is to reestablish peace and normal conditions in that strife-weary island.

The good offices of this commission, representing the entire hemisphere, will be available to every group and party in the Dominican Republic. It will work for a cease-fire. It will try to insure the safe evacuation of foreign nationals. And it will investigate every aspect of the current volatile situation in that island.

We look forward, as do all the American states, to the success of the mission and to any recommendations and suggestions the commission might make.

For our part, the United States is ready to support—with every resource at its command—the inter-American system. We will help carry out the solemn judgments of the assembled American Republics.

And we once again join in the common appeal to put an end to violence. For only when shooting and bloodshed stop will it be possible to work toward the aspirations and hopes of the Dominican people. Progress and justice do not flourish at the point of a gun.

The daily work of the inter-American system is filled with hope for the progress of the American peoples. But it is in moments of crisis such as this we truly test the vitality of our association. We prove that independent and proud nations can work together in the common cause of peace and human liberty.

Our goal in the Dominican Republic is the goal which has been expressed again and again in the treaties and agreements which make up the fabric of the inter-American system. It is that the people of that country must be permitted to freely choose the path of political democracy, social justice, and economic progress. Neither the United States, nor any nation, can want or permit a return to that brutal and oppressive despotism which earned the condemnation and punishment of this hemisphere and of all civilized

humanity. We intend to carry on the struggle against tyranny no matter in what ideology it cloaks itself. This is our mutual responsibility under the agreements we have signed and the common values which bind us together.

**STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON,
MAY 2⁹**

White House press release dated May 2

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen: I have just come from a meeting with the leaders of both parties in the Congress, which was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. I briefed them on the facts of the situation in the Dominican Republic. I want to make those same facts known to all the American people and to all the world.

There are times in the affairs of nations when great principles are tested in an ordeal of conflict and danger. This is such a time for the American nations.

At stake are the lives of thousands, the liberty of a nation, and the principles and the values of all the American Republics.

That is why the hopes and the concern of this entire hemisphere are on this Sabbath Sunday focused on the Dominican Republic.

In the dark mist of conflict and violence, revolution and confusion, it is not easy to find clear and unclouded truths.

But certain things are clear. And they require equally clear action. To understand, I think it is necessary to begin with the events of 8 or 9 days ago.

Last week our observers warned of an approaching political storm in the Dominican Republic. I immediately asked our Ambassador [W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.] to return to Washington at once so that we might discuss the situation and might plan a course of conduct. But events soon outran our hopes for peace.

Saturday, April 24—8 days ago—while Ambassador Bennett was conferring with the highest officials of your Government, revolution erupted in the Dominican Republic. Elements of the military forces of

that country overthrew their government. However, the rebels themselves were divided. Some wanted to restore former President Juan Bosch. Others opposed his restoration. President Bosch, elected after the fall of Trujillo and his assassination, had been driven from office by an earlier revolution in the Dominican Republic.

Those who opposed Mr. Bosch's return formed a military committee in an effort to control that country. The others took to the street, and they began to lead a revolt on behalf of President Bosch. Control and effective government dissolved in conflict and confusion.

Meanwhile the United States was making a constant effort to restore peace. From Saturday afternoon onward, our Embassy urged a cease-fire, and I and all the officials of the American Government worked with every weapon at our command to achieve it.

On Tuesday the situation of turmoil was presented to the Peace Committee of the Organization of American States.

On Wednesday the entire Council of the Organization of American States received a full report from the Dominican Ambassador.

Meanwhile, all this time, from Saturday to Wednesday, the danger was mounting. Even though we were deeply saddened by bloodshed and violence in a close and friendly neighbor, we had no desire to interfere in the affairs of a sister Republic.

On Wednesday afternoon there was no longer any choice for the man who is your President. I was sitting in my little office reviewing the world situation with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and Mr. McGeorge Bundy. Shortly after 3 o'clock I received a cable from our Ambassador, and he said that things were in danger; he had been informed the chief of police and governmental authorities could no longer protect us. We immediately started the necessary conference calls to be prepared.

At 5:14, almost 2 hours later, we received a cable that was labeled "critic," a word that is reserved for only the most urgent and immediate matters of national security.

⁹ Broadcast over a nationwide radio-TV network.

The cable reported that Dominican law enforcement and military officials had informed our Embassy that the situation was completely out of control and that the police and the government could no longer give any guarantee concerning the safety of Americans or any foreign nationals.

Ambassador Bennett, who is one of our most experienced Foreign Service officers, went on in that cable to say that only an immediate landing of American forces could safeguard and protect the lives of thousands of Americans and thousands of other citizens of some 30 other countries. Ambassador Bennett urged your President to order an immediate landing.

In this situation hesitation and vacillation could mean death for many of our people, as well as many of the citizens of other lands.

I thought that we could not and we did not hesitate. Our forces, American forces, were ordered in immediately to protect American lives. They have done that. They have attacked no one, and although some of our servicemen gave their lives, not a single American civilian or the civilian of any other nation, as a result of this protection, lost their lives.

There may be those in our own country who say that such action was good but we should have waited, or we should have delayed, or we should have consulted further, or we should have called a meeting. But from the very beginning, the United States, at my instructions, had worked for a cease-fire beginning the Saturday the revolution took place. The matter was before the OAS Peace Committee on Tuesday, at our suggestion. It was before the full Council on Wednesday, and when I made my announcement to the American people that evening, I announced then I was notifying the Council.

When that cable arrived, when our entire country team in the Dominican Republic, made up of nine men—one from the Army, Navy, and Air Force, our Ambassador, our AID man, and others—said to your President unanimously: Mr. President, if you do not send forces immediately, men and women—

Americans and those of other lands—will die in the streets—well, I knew there was no time to talk, to consult, or to delay. For in this situation delay itself would be decision—the decision to risk and to lose the lives of thousands of Americans and thousands of innocent people from all lands.

I want you to know that it is not a light or an easy matter to send our American boys to another country, but I do not think that the American people expect their President to hesitate or to vacillate in the face of danger, just because the decision is hard when life is in peril.

The revolutionary movement took a tragic turn. Communist leaders, many of them trained in Cuba, seeing a chance to increase disorder, to gain a foothold, joined the revolution. They took increasing control. And what began as a popular democratic revolution, committed to democracy and social justice, very shortly moved and was taken over and really seized and placed into the hands of a band of Communist conspirators.

Many of the original leaders of the rebellion, the followers of President Bosch, took refuge in foreign embassies because they had been superseded by other evil forces, and the Secretary General of the rebel government, Martínez Francisco, appealed for a cease-fire. But he was ignored. The revolution was now in other and dangerous hands.

When these new and ominous developments emerged, the OAS met again, and it met at the request of the United States. I am glad to say they responded wisely and decisively. A five-nation OAS team is now in the Dominican Republic, acting to achieve a cease-fire to insure the safety of innocent people, to restore normal conditions, and to open a path to democratic progress.

That is the situation now.

I plead, therefore, with every person and every country in this hemisphere that would choose to do so, to contact their ambassador in the Dominican Republic directly and to get firsthand evidence of the horrors and the hardship, the violence and the terror, and the international conspiracy from which

United States servicemen have rescued the people of more than 30 nations from that war-torn land.

Earlier today I ordered two additional battalions—2,000 extra men—to proceed immediately to the Dominican Republic. In the meeting that I have just concluded with the congressional leaders—following that meeting—I directed the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to issue instructions to land an additional 4,500 men at the earliest possible moment. The distribution of food to people who have not eaten for days, the need of medical supplies and attention for the sick and wounded, the health requirements to avoid an epidemic because there are hundreds that have been dead for days that are now in the streets, and other protection and security of each individual that is caught on that island require the attention of the additional forces which I have ordered to proceed to the Dominican Republic.

In addition, our servicemen have already, since they landed on Wednesday night, evacuated 3,000 persons from 30 countries in the world from this little island. But more than 5,000 people, 1,500 of whom are Americans—the others are foreign nationals—are tonight awaiting evacuation as I speak. We just must get on with that job immediately.

The evidence that we have on the revolutionary movement indicates that it took a very tragic turn. Many of them trained in Cuba, seeing a chance to increase disorder and to gain a foothold, joined the revolution. They took increasing control. What began as a popular democratic revolution that was committed to democracy and social justice moved into the hands of a band of Communist conspirators. Many of the original leaders of the rebellion, the followers of President Bosch, took refuge in foreign embassies and they are there tonight.

The American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere. This was the unanimous view of all the American nations when, in January 1962, they declared,¹⁰ and I quote:

“The principles of communism are incompatible with the principles of the Inter-American system.”

This is what our beloved President John F. Kennedy meant when, less than a week before his death, he told us:¹¹ We in this hemisphere must also use every resource at our command to prevent the establishment of another Cuba in this hemisphere. . . .”

This is and this will be the common action and the common purpose of the democratic forces of the hemisphere. For the danger is also a common danger, and the principles are common principles.

So we have acted to summon the resources of this entire hemisphere to this task. We have sent, on my instructions the night before last, special emissaries such as Ambassador [Teodoro] Moscoso of Puerto Rico, our very able Ambassador Averell Harriman, and others to Latin America to explain the situation, to tell them the truth, and to warn them that joint action is necessary. We are in contact with such distinguished Latin American statesmen as Romulo Betancourt [former President of Venezuela] and Jose Figueres [former President of Costa Rica]. We are seeking their wisdom and their counsel and their advice. We have also maintained communication with President Bosch who has chosen to remain in Puerto Rico.

We have been consulting with the Organization of American States, and our distinguished Ambassador—than whom there is no better—Ambassador Bunker, has been reporting to them at great length all the action of this Government, and we have been acting in conformity with their decisions.

We know that many who are now in revolt do not seek a Communist tyranny. We think it is tragic indeed that their high motives have been misused by a small band of conspirators who receive their direction from abroad.

To those who fight only for liberty and justice and progress I want to join with th

¹⁰ For text of Resolution I adopted by the Eight Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, see BULLETIN of Feb. 19, 1962, p. 278.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Dec. 9, 1963, p. 900.

Organization of American States in saying—in appealing to you tonight to lay down your arms and to assure you there is nothing to fear. The road is open for you to share in building a Dominican democracy, and we in America are ready and anxious and willing to help you. Your courage and your dedication are qualities which your country and all the hemisphere need for the future. You are needed to help shape that future. And neither we nor any other nation in this hemisphere can or should take it upon itself to ever interfere with the affairs of your country or any other country.

We believe that change comes, and we are glad it does, and it should come through peaceful process. But revolution in any country is a matter for that country to deal with. It becomes a matter calling for hemispheric action only—repeat, only—when the object is the establishment of a Communist dictatorship.

Let me also make clear tonight that we support no single man or any single group of men in the Dominican Republic. Our goal is a simple one. We are there to save the lives of our citizens and to save the lives of all people. Our goal, in keeping with the great principles of the inter-American system, is to help prevent another Communist state in this hemisphere. And we would like to do this without bloodshed or without large-scale fighting.

The form and the nature of the free Dominican government, I assure you, is solely a matter for the Dominican people, but we do know what kind of government we hope to see in the Dominican Republic. For that is carefully spelled out in the treaties and the agreements which make up the fabric of the inter-American system. It is expressed, time and time again, in the words of our statesmen and the values and hopes which bind us all together.

We hope to see a government freely chosen by the will of all the people.

We hope to see a government dedicated to social justice for every citizen.

We hope to see a government working, every hour of every day, to feeding the hun-

gry, to educating the ignorant, to healing the sick—a government whose only concern is the progress and the elevation and the welfare of all the people.

For more than three decades the people of that tragic little island suffered under the weight of one of the most brutal and despotic dictatorships of the Americas. We enthusiastically supported condemnation of that government by the Organization of American States. We joined in applying sanctions, and, when Trujillo was assassinated by his fellow citizens, we immediately acted to protect freedom and to prevent a new tyranny, and since that time we have taken the resources from all of our people at some sacrifice to many, and we have helped them with food and with other resources, with the Peace Corps volunteers, with the AID technicians; we have helped them in the effort to build a new order of progress.

How sad it is tonight that a people so long oppressed should once again be the targets of the forces of tyranny. Their long misery must weigh heavily on the heart of every citizen of this hemisphere. So I think it is our mutual responsibility to help the people of the Dominican Republic toward the day when they can freely choose the path of liberty and justice and progress. This is required of us by the agreements that we are party to and that we have signed. This is required of us by the values which bind us together.

Simón Bolívar once wrote from exile: "The veil has been torn asunder. We have already seen the light and it is not our desire to be thrust back into the darkness."

Well, after decades of night the Dominican people have seen a more hopeful light, and I know that the nations of this hemisphere will not let them be thrust back into the darkness.

And before I leave you, my fellow Americans, I want to say this personal word: I know that no American serviceman wants to kill anyone. I know that no American President wants to give an order which brings shooting and casualties and death. I want you to know, and I want the world to know, that as long as I am President of this

country, we are going to defend ourselves. We will defend our soldiers against attackers. We will honor our treaties. We will keep our commitments. We will defend our nation against all those who seek to destroy not only

the United States but every free country of this hemisphere. We do not want to bury anyone, as I have said so many times before. But we do not intend to be buried.

Thank you. God bless you. Good night.

President Johnson and Secretary McNamara Review Situation in Viet-Nam

Following is a statement made by President Johnson at a news conference at the White House on April 27, together with the transcript of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's news conference of April 26.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

White House press release dated April 27

We are engaged in a crucial struggle in Viet-Nam.

Some may consider it a small war. But to the men who give their lives, it is the last war. And the stakes are huge.

Independent South Viet-Nam has been attacked by North Viet-Nam. The object of that attack is conquest.

Defeat in South Viet-Nam would be to deliver a friendly nation to terror and repression. It would encourage and spur on those who seek to conquer all free nations within their reach. Our own welfare and our own freedom would be in danger.

This is the clearest lesson of our time. From Munich until today we have learned that to yield to aggression brings only greater threats—and more destructive war. To stand firm is the only guarantee of lasting peace.

At every step of the way we have used our great power with the utmost restraint. We have made every effort to find a peaceful solution. We have done this in the face of the most outrageous and brutal provocation against Vietnamese and Americans alike.

Through the first 7 months of 1964, both Vietnamese and Americans were the targets

of constant acts of terror. Bombs exploded in helpless villages, in downtown movie theaters, even at a sports field. Soldiers and civilians, men and women, were murdered and crippled. Yet we took no action against the source of this brutality—North Viet-Nam.

When our destroyers were attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin, we replied with a single raid. The punishment was limited to the dead.

For the next 6 months we took no action against North Viet-Nam. We warned of danger; we hoped for caution in others.

The answer was attack, and explosions, and indiscriminate murder.

It soon became clear that our restraint was viewed as weakness. Our desire to limit conflict was viewed as a prelude to surrender. We could no longer stand by while attack mounted, and while the bases of the attackers were immune from reply.

And so we began to strike back.

But we have not changed our essential purpose. That purpose is peaceful settlement. That purpose is to resist aggression. That purpose is to avoid wider war.

I say again that I will talk to any government, anywhere, and without any conditions if any doubt our sincerity, let them test it.

Each time we have met with silence, slander, or the sound of guns.

But just as we will not flag in battle, we will not weary in the search for peace.

I reaffirm my offer¹ of unconditional dis-

¹ For an address made by President Johnson at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., on April 7, see BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

cussions. We will discuss any subject, and any point of view, with any government concerned.

This offer may be rejected, as it has been in the past. But it will remain open, waiting for the day when it becomes clear to all that armed attack will not yield domination over others. And I will continue along the course we have set: firmness with moderation, readiness for peace with refusal to retreat.

For this is the same battle which we have fought for a generation. Wherever we have stood firm, aggression has been halted, peace restored, and liberty maintained.

This was true under President Truman, President Eisenhower, and President Kennedy. And it will be true again in Southeast Asia.

MR. McNAMARA'S NEWS CONFERENCE

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I should like to report to you briefly this morning upon our latest estimates of the strength of the Communist forces in South Viet-Nam, of the support which they are receiving from North Viet-Nam, and of certain of the actions which we are taking to reduce that level of support.

The clandestine infiltration of personnel and materiel from North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam continues to play a vital role in providing the Communist Viet Cong with the leadership, with the technical competence, with the weapons, and with the ammunition which they need to carry on their insurgency directed against the established Government in South Viet-Nam.

Recent evidence both from captured prisoners and from captured documents has increased our estimates of the number of infiltrators to a total of 39,000. Reports to date confirm the infiltration of between 5,000 and 8,000 men in 1964 alone.

In view of the normal timelag between the actual active infiltration and our confirmation of it, I think it is probable that we are in excess of 10,000 men infiltrated from the North into the South during the past year.

Viet-Nam Area Designated Combat Zone for Income Tax Purposes

White House press release dated April 24

President Johnson on April 24 issued an Executive order¹ that gives Armed Forces personnel serving in Viet-Nam the same income tax relief extended to American servicemen who served during the Korean conflict. The President made the special tax relief retroactive to January 1, 1964.

Under the order signed by the President, section 112 of the Internal Revenue Code becomes applicable to all American military personnel serving in Viet-Nam and the adjacent waters, which extend roughly 100 miles from the entire coast of North and South Viet-Nam. Section 112 permits enlisted personnel to exclude from their gross income, for Federal tax purposes, all compensation which they receive for service in that area, or during any period of hospitalization resulting from such service. Officers may exclude up to \$200 per month of such compensation.

¹ No. 11216; 30 *Fed. Reg.* 5817.

Furthermore, recent captures indicate that approximately 75 percent of these men sent from the North to the South were born in North Viet-Nam. It is clear that the Communists are determined to keep up this level of support despite the drying up of the supply of former Southerners, men born in South Viet-Nam, ordered north by the Viet Minh at the time of the 1954 Geneva accords. Many of the recent captives are young draftees called into infiltration units that marched south through Laos in units 500 to 600 strong.

I think you are familiar with the general routes of infiltration. On this map² we have shown North Viet-Nam, Laos, South Viet-Nam. This is the South China Sea, Hainan Islands of the Communist Chinese, Thailand, the 17th parallel, which divides North and South Viet-Nam.

The infiltration routes proceed down the

² Throughout the news conference, Secretary McNamara used maps and photographs to illustrate his remarks.

rail and highway lines north and south, they cross the east-to-west laterals into Laos, proceed down through Laos and into South Viet-Nam.

With the changing course, changing nature, particularly the intensification of infiltration both of arms and personnel into South Viet-Nam, the course of aggression pursued by the government of North Viet-Nam has grown progressively more flagrant and more unconstrained.

Viet Cong Weapons From External Sources

The latest step has been the covert infiltration of a regular combat unit of the North Vietnamese Army into South Viet-Nam. Evidence accumulated within the last month now confirms the presence in northwest Kontum Province—that is in the central highland area of South Viet-Nam, around Pleiku and north of Pleiku—recent evidence which we have received confirms the presence in that northwest Kontum Province of the 2d Battalion of the 325th Division of the regular North Vietnamese Army. It is important to recognize, I think, that the great bulk of the weapons which the Viet Cong are using and with which they are supplied come from external sources.

Since 1960 the Viet Cong have captured approximately 39,000 weapons from troops of the South Vietnamese Government.

During that same period of time the Viet Cong lost to those Government troops about 25,000 of their weapons, and therefore the Viet Cong had a net gain of about 14,000 weapons during this 5-year period. Thus they gained only 10 to 15 percent of their overall weapons requirements. The remainder of the weapons, those for their 38,000 to 46,000 regular troops and for their 100,000 irregulars, have come from external sources.

Moreover it appears that the Viet Cong main force units, their regular units, are being entirely reequipped and entirely retrained with the newest Chinese Communist family of weapons. For example, 101 weapons were captured recently—3 weeks ago on the days of April 5 and 6—from elements of the

Viet Cong regiment in Chuong Thien Province. That regiment was operating far to the south in the Camau Peninsula. The weapons which are captured are believed to be representative of the weapons mix of Viet Cong main force units.

They included 1 U. S. M-1 rifle, 4 U.S. carbines, an East German machinegun, Czechoslovakian assault rifles, and the remainder were Chinese Communist weapons, including 72 modern rifles, 11 assault rifles, 4 machineguns, 2 60-millimeter mortars, 3 rocket launchers, and a 75-millimeter recoilless rifle.

I have here one of the new family of Communist Chinese weapons. This is a light machinegun of their 7.62 class; ammunition for this can only be supplied from Chinese sources. This gun bears the Chinese arsenal mark and has obviously been manufactured in that country, supplied by China to North Viet-Nam, infiltrated by North Viet-Nam into the South.

In this particular instance—I am referring to that of April 5 and 6—over 90 percent of the small arms and 100 percent of the larger pieces were of Communist bloc origin, mainly Chinese.

Prisoners captured in that battle stated that they and their units had been quiet in the past 2 months because they had withdrawn to the U Minh Forest, which is on the most southerly coast of South Viet-Nam, where they had received and been trained and reequipped with the new family of Chinese Communist weapons.

The ammunition supply for these weapons, of course, will have to come from Communist China via North Viet-Nam.

Success of U.S. Airstrikes

Now, the current South Vietnamese Air Force and U. S. Navy and U. S. Air Force strikes against North Viet-Nam have been designed to impede this infiltration of men and materiel, an infiltration which makes the difference between a situation which is manageable and one which is not manageable internally by the Government of South Viet-Nam.

The airstrikes have been carefully limited to military targets, primarily to infiltration targets, to transit points, to barracks, to supply depots, to ammunition depots, to routes of communication, all feeding the infiltration lines from North Viet-Nam into Laos and then into South Viet-Nam.

More recently there have been added to this target system railroads, highways, and bridges which are the foundation of the infiltration routes. The strikes against the bridges have been particularly successful. During the last 3 weeks, between April 3 and April 26, Vietnamese and U. S. aircraft struck a total of 27 rail and highway bridges along key lines of communication in North Viet-Nam.

The primary emphasis has been placed upon the routes south of 20 degrees north. 20 degrees north runs through this area. Hanoi is at about the 21st parallel. Thanh Hoa is at the 20th. Our strikes are concentrated on the lines of communication running south and east and west, south of 20 degrees.

Twenty-four of the bridges have been destroyed, or they have been so badly damaged as to be rendered incapable of supporting traffic. The basic objective of the strikes has been to inhibit, to reduce, to deflect, the movement southward of men and materiel. We have sought to deny them the use of their primary lines of communication and to force dependence on an inadequate secondary road system and inadequate means of support.

The strikes have been designed to increase the dependence on an already overburdened road transport system by denying the use of the rail lines in the South. In summary, our objectives have been to force them off the rails onto the highways and off the highways onto their feet.

A total of 10 highway bridges have been struck. Ten have been destroyed along the key north-south coastal highway. You can see that on this map. This is a map of North Viet-Nam. This is the key north-south route running from Hanoi down to the demarcation line, with its laterals going east and

west to the passes that run into Laos: this line, Route 7, running into Laos over the Barthelemy Pass and onto the Plaine des Jarres; this route, number 8, running into Laos over the Nape Keo Neva Pass and then south into Viet-Nam; this route, number 12, running over to the Mu Gia Mugin Pass, then south into Viet-Nam. The strikes have been designed to interrupt this north-south route and the east-to-west route.

As I say, a total of 10 of the highway bridges have been struck and destroyed along that north-south route. In addition, two railway and two combination railway and highway bridges, which are the foundation of that route, which lie between Thanh Hoa, being here, and Vinh here, have been struck, one of them here, and one here.

This has effectively interdicted and destroyed the capability to move by rail south of Thanh Hoa.

Destruction of these railroad bridges will result in increased dependence on the highway system, and destruction of the highway bridges will complicate the movement of the vehicle convoys southward.

Nine bridges have been struck and destroyed on the routes leading into Laos, primarily on these two routes which, as I said, feed the north-south traffic through Laos and into South Viet-Nam.

U.S. strikes against these bridges in North Viet-Nam have been extremely accurate, and they have been very effective. Spans and piers have been dropped and destroyed. You can see that on some of these typical pictures. This is the railroad bridge at Dong Phong Thuong. You can see the span lying in the river. Now, this is a major highway bridge over a deep river at Phuong Can. This span has been completely destroyed. The river is so deep it has sunk into the river, and you can't see it on the picture. This is the Tom Da railroad and highway bridge located here. You can see the span completely destroyed. Next is a very important Thanh Yen highway bridge on a major route into the Dong Hoi area.

This Dong Hoi is a location of barracks

and depots and ammunition dumps from which men and equipment are infiltrated into the South. This is the Sang Ko Chai highway bridge, a very high bridge over the deep gorge. You can see the span completely dropped. We have noticed with our reconnaissance aircraft large convoys of trucks traveling this route. You can imagine the difficulty they will have in spanning that point, and so on with the others.

Supplementing the bridge strikes, armed reconnaissance is being conducted along truck convoy routes against maritime traffic and rolling stock on the rail lines.

These carefully controlled rail strikes will continue as necessary to impede the infiltration and to persuade the North Vietnamese leadership that their aggression against the South will not succeed.

I will be very happy to take your questions.

No Use of Nuclear Weapons Planned

Q. Mr. Secretary, over the weekend in Washington some confusion has been created by remarks of high officials on the eventuality of the use of the nuclear weapons in Viet-Nam. Could you clarify the position of your Government?

A. Yes, it is perfectly apparent. There is no military requirement for the use of nuclear weapons in the current situation, and no useful purpose can be served by speculation on remote contingencies.

Q. Why was it done then, Mr. Secretary?

A. I don't know that it was done. I am simply responding to the gentleman's question.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do the North Vietnamese get around these bridges, or aren't they?

A. They will get around them to the extent they can by building ferries in the area, but I think you can see from some of these pictures this is going to be quite a task and will take a considerable period of time. Secondly, they will get around them by diverting traffic from the main routes to secondary routes, which increases the time and labor required in supplying the infiltration.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what efforts are made to avoid hitting civilians in our airstrikes?

A. Each target is chosen after a very careful review of all reconnaissance photographs. We have carried out very complete reconnaissance of this entire area. Each target is chosen after careful review of reconnaissance photographs to insure that it is isolated and separate and apart from urban population or civilian population areas. To the best of our knowledge there have been few, if any, civilian casualties associated with our strikes to date.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been a number of statements over the weekend by Secretary Rusk that—and the President is having a news conference tomorrow, and you are having one today. Does this indicate we are reaching somewhat of a showdown or turning point?

A. No, it does not. I am responding to your oft-repeated request for a news conference.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you say you have successfully isolated the battlefield, and if you have, would that preclude the movement of large forces from the North?

A. No, I would not say we have isolated the battlefield. I hope I have not given you that impression. We have impeded the progress of men and materiel from North Viet-Nam through Laos and into South Viet-Nam. We have not stopped it, and we surely have not isolated the battlefield.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in what way were the Viet Cong, which are operating in South Viet-Nam, affected by the airstrikes against North Viet-Nam?

A. In two respects. First, as I say, we have slowed down the movement of men and materiel, and this has adversely affected the Viet Cong, although I don't wish to over-emphasize the degree to which it has affected them so far.

Secondly, the airstrikes against North Viet-Nam and also the increased tempo of airstrikes by the Vietnamese Air Force and the U.S. Air Force in South Viet-Nam have significantly and adversely affected the morale of the Viet Cong troops in the South. We know this from our interrogation of Viet Cong captured within the last 4 to 8 weeks

North Viet-Nam Deploying Regular Forces

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what the size is of the North Vietnamese battalion now operating in the South and what is the significance of the fact that a regular unit is operating?

A. I can't be too specific or accurate in estimating the size of that battalion. I guess it is on the order of 400 to 500 men. As to its significance, I think it is primarily significant in indicating that the North Vietnamese have used up or dried up the source of individual fillers who could be recruited, trained, and sent back to fight in South Viet-Nam and that they are now having to call upon the regular units of their forces for that purpose. This is understandable.

I believe I am correct in saying that in the past 4½ years the Viet Cong, the Communists, have lost 89,000 men killed in South Viet-Nam. Now, not all of these men have been infiltrated from the North, but an important number have been. With that, plus the expansion of the Viet Cong forces in the South, you can see the heavy drain upon the filler resources in the North and the reason why they have to go turn to their regular military units to continue the supply of men over these infiltration routes; the supply is absolutely essential to them if they are to offset the continuing casualties.

I mentioned before that these casualty rates are high, both those suffered by the Viet Cong and those suffered by the South Vietnamese. The South Vietnamese are suffering casualties at rates higher than we have ever experienced in our history. I think this is an indication of their will to fight and defend their own country and Government.

Q. Secretary McNamara, there have been reports of additional deployment of combat units and planned combat units to South Viet-Nam—U.S. combat units—can you tell us if these combat units are going out there and secondly why? Is there a serious threat of attack to a major U.S. base in that area?

A. We will never comment upon future movements of U. S. combat forces; so I cannot answer Mr. Norman's question.

Q. Mr. Secretary, your figures here of the Viet Cong main force of 38,000 to 46,000 are somewhere

between 4,000 and 10,000 larger than the estimates of a month ago. Does that indicate—estimates given us—does that indicate that the infiltration has been continuing during the airstrikes?

A. No, that by itself does not indicate it, although I believe it has. Our information on infiltration in terms of specific numbers of men or specific numbers and types of weapons lags the actual event by several weeks. So that I can't give you any specific figures on the volume of infiltration that has occurred during the airstrikes. The figures are higher, however, than those received by you a few weeks or months ago because of continuing indication from captured Viet Cong and continuing evidence from captured documents that our original estimates were low and that the volume of infiltration in 1963 and '64 was higher than we had previously estimated.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what has been done to stop infiltration by sea?

A. It seems probable that as the Viet Cong depend more and more upon North Viet-Nam for their ammunition and, as I suggested, this particular weapon, which is a 7.62 light machinegun, and the associated rifles and other weapons of that family, will depend exclusively upon Communist sources for supply.

As that supply requirement increases in terms of pounds and tons, no doubt they are seeking to supplement their land routes by sea routes. We have had some indication of that. You may recall that within the past 2 months a coastal vessel was captured and sunk at Vung Ro Bay.³ That single vessel had on it 4,000 weapons. There have been two or three other indications recently of fairly substantial efforts to infiltrate arms by sea.

Therefore, we have joined with the South Vietnamese in expanding the sea patrol, which already includes 400 or 500 junks, and to which we have added U.S. naval vessels and U.S. naval aircraft to detect and allow the South Vietnamese to inspect

³ For background, see BULLETIN of Mar. 22, 1965, p. 404.

and, where necessary, destroy men and equipment being infiltrated from the North.

Q. Sir, you say the Northerners are now hard pressed to supply Southerners to the battle in the South and they are forced to resort to using a regular battalion of armed forces. Do you anticipate the appearance of other regular units from the North in the South and if so what does it—

A. I can't answer your question because I can't project the actions of the North Vietnamese government. I anticipate they will continue to endeavor to offset their losses in the South.

There is only one way for them to do this effectively, and that is to continue to infiltrate men and equipment over these lines of infiltration through Laos or along the seacoast. It is to impede that, to deter it, that we are carrying on the airstrikes and enlarging the sea patrol.

Q. Mr. Secretary, your words here today about nuclear weapons mean that if we saw a military requirement for use of small nuclear weapons that we would not use it, and if we saw a reason to bomb some other big cities in enemy territory that we would not?

A. I don't wish to add to the statement I already made on that subject.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there any way in which the infiltration could be significantly cut down at the 17th parallel and at the access routes into South Viet-Nam from Laos?

A. It seems unlikely that the infiltration is actually crossing the parallel in any substantial volume. It goes around the parallel either through Laos or by the sea route. I think it will be possible to interdict infiltration by sea by putting in effect a sea patrol across the parallel and extending it into the international waterways, and this we are doing.

Communist Strategy

Q. Mr. Secretary, a personal question. As the fighting has increased in Viet-Nam, more and more of the U.S. critics of the administration's policy have been referring to this as "McNamara's war." What is your reaction? Does this annoy you?

A. It does not annoy me because I think it is a war that is being fought to preserve

the freedom of a very brave people, an independent nation. It is a war which is being fought to counter the strategy of the Communists, a strategy which Premier Khrushchev laid out very clearly in that very famous speech which he made on January 6, 1961.

You may recall that at that time he divided all wars into three categories. He spoke of world wars, meaning nuclear wars; he spoke of local wars, by which he meant large-scale conventional wars; and then he spoke of what he called "wars of liberation."

He ruled out world wars as being too dangerous to the existence of the Communist states. He ruled out local wars because he said they could very easily escalate into nuclear wars which would lead to the ultimate destruction of the Communist states. But he strongly endorsed "wars of liberation" and made it perfectly clear that it would be through application of that strategy that the Communists would seek to subvert independent nations throughout the world, seek to extend their domination, their political domination, of other nations.

It is very clear that that is the Communist Chinese strategy in Southeast Asia. It is a strategy I feel we should oppose, and, while it is not my war, I don't object to my name being associated with it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask a question a little removed from Viet-Nam. I would like to know why the election results of our Armed Forces and other absence balloting have not been revealed. I understand the survey is completed, the release is made, and I believe it is in Mr. Sylvester's [Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs] office.

A. I am very sorry, I don't know the answer. I will endeavor to find it out. I myself have been very anxious, as has my wife, who has been associated with the League of Women Voters, to extend the privilege of voting to the Armed Forces. If we have not done it effectively, I will take action to correct it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what new equipment will be

bought to carry out the increased action in South Viet-Nam—equipment and weapons?

No New Equipment Procurement Planned

A. We don't have plans to increase procurement above the previously established levels. As you know, we have vastly increased the stocks of tactical aircraft during the past 4 or 5 years. I think we have already taken delivery on some 3,500 tactical aircraft during the past 4 years.

We have increased the number of squadrons and the number of tactical aircraft, for example, tactical fighter aircraft, in the Air Force units by about 30 to 40 percent during that period.

The losses at the present time in Southeast Asia are really quite low in relation to our aircraft procurement schedule. We have no immediate plans for increasing that. Similarly we have over the past 4 years greatly increased our inventories of conventional munitions, bombs, ammunition of all kinds, and they appear adequate at the present time. If at any point either our aircraft inventory or our ammunition stock appears to need replenishment, we will of course initiate procurement immediately.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what political or psychological effect does the bombing seem to be having on the Hanoi regime?

A. It is very difficult for me to give you an accurate answer or definitive answer because I don't have access to the thoughts of that regime. But I can see some evidence that it is affecting them.

There is clear evidence from the interrogation of Communist prisoners in South Viet-Nam that it is adversely affecting the morale of the Communists in South Viet-Nam. There is clear evidence, I think, from these pictures that it is affecting the ability of the North Vietnamese to continue to supply the Viet Cong forces in the South. There is clear evidence from other pictures and reconnaissance that we have that they are being forced to divert their limited resources to a greater degree to the aggression they are

carrying on in the South. Beyond that I really can't say.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us about the Russian Sams?

Q. Mr. Secretary, the infiltration of that North Vietnamese battalion—does that suggest to you that the Viet Cong may be trying to move into the third stage of insurgency?

A. No, it does not suggest that to me. They have had battalions operating in the South heretofore. They have simply been organized from individuals sent as individuals into the South. The difference here is not in the form of operation in the South. As I say, they have operated in battalion-size units heretofore. The difference is that they recruited men from a battalion, organized it as a battalion, sent it down as a battalion into the South. I think it has more bearing on their manpower problems than it does on their operational tactics.

Q. Mr. Secretary—

Q. In the event there is no radical change in the complex of the war, such as Russia or China entering it in a major way, what is your best estimate of how long a war we are in for before the tide turns?

A. I can't predict the future. I think we have all recognized for a long period of time that this will be a long and difficult road. Beyond that I can't say.

Q. You pointed out the manpower problems of the Viet Cong. How do you assess the reports from Moscow and Peiping that they may send volunteers there to help with this recruiting problem?

A. I really can't assess it, Jack. I don't know what action they will take. I think it will be very difficult for them to recruit men, train them in guerrilla tactics, which are a unique form of combat operations, and infiltrate them through these very long and difficult routes of communication.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there were reports of Soviet surface-to-air missiles in the Hanoi area. Could you tell us something about that. Are there more than one site? Also any Chinese Communist troop movements?

A. No, I can't comment upon any sur-

face-to-air missile sites in North Viet-Nam. To the best of my knowledge there are no operational sites at the present time, but I think we should assume that there will be and plan accordingly, and we are so planning.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there are reports out of Honolulu, from intelligence sources made public yesterday, I believe, that the Communists are planning to make Da Nang into another Dien Bien Phu. Is there any evidence of a large troop buildup in that area?

A. There are indications that in the highland areas to the west of Da Nang—that is Da Nang on the coast—that in the highland areas west of Da Nang there have been substantial buildups of Viet Cong forces during the last 12 months. What plans they have for the use of those forces, I can't say; I don't know. We have a very large base at Da Nang.

We have an important airbase at Phu Bai, between Hue and Da Nang. It is to protect the substantial quantities of U.S. equipment and the substantial number of U.S. forces at these bases that we have recently introduced into that area certain Marine battalions. There are four there at the present time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, as the destructiveness of the airstrikes increases, isn't there some likelihood that the political or deterrent effect that you might expect from them will be less in that the North will have less to lose?

A. They obviously will have less to lose when they have lost some 23 bridges, but I doubt very much that the effect will be less. The infiltration continues, as I suggested, along these routes. Our airstrikes are now concentrating on armed reconnaissance, flying over the routes, attacking military trucks and military convoys.

I do not anticipate that the effect of those strikes will be less in the future than it has been to date.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you consider it possible for the Communist side to bottle up Americans somewhere like Da Nang and turn it into a Dien Bien Phu? Is it possible for us to get into that kind of a fix?

A. The war in South Viet-Nam is a war

that must be fought primarily by the South Vietnamese. It is a guerrilla war. They are the major elements of the antiguerrilla forces. We must depend upon them for that antiguerrilla combat. They are fighting for the preservation of their own Government, their own nation. So I think the answer to your question is no.

Q. Mr. Secretary, aren't we endangering the American forces in South Viet-Nam by letting Soviet bloc ships and Russian ships daily land arms at Hi Fong without doing anything about it?

A. The arms we are talking about are Chinese arms that are coming in from China to the best of our knowledge.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you at all discouraged by the results so far of the controlled escalation tactics?

A. I think the effects are quite clear, the physical effects are clear, and the obvious effects on the rate of infiltration and the increased effort that these strikes are causing the North Vietnamese are much to our advantage.

Cost of U.S. Effort in Viet-Nam

Q. How much is our effort currently costing us in South Viet-Nam?

A. It is extremely difficult to estimate the cost of this operation, simply because we are dealing with costs that are difficult to allocate. How would you allocate the Pentagon, for example, between all of our other operations worldwide and those in South Viet-Nam? But making the best allocation we can, it is something on this order:

Economic aid is probably running \$300-million a year. I will check the accuracy of this for you a little later. P.L. 480 contributions—these are contributions of food and agriculture products—probably running on the order of \$70 million a year. It seems likely that the military assistance program for South Viet-Nam for fiscal 1965, our current fiscal year, will approximate \$330 million. And very, very roughly, I would estimate the cost of the U.S. forces operating in the waters of South Viet-Nam and in the air and the cost of our advisory and logistical support, is running on the order of \$800

million a year. So that we have a cost approximating a billion and a half dollars at the present time.

I think that is all, gentlemen. Thank you very much.

The press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Foreign Policy Conference To Be Held at Portland

Press release 95 dated April 30

The Department of State will hold a foreign policy conference at Portland, Oreg., on May 24, cosponsored by the World Affairs Council of Oregon and Portland State College. Over 30 other State and community organizations in the Northwest are cooperating in the conference.

Invitations will be extended to organizational leaders and to members of the press, radio, and television in the States of Alaska, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana.

The purpose of the meeting is to bring together citizen leaders and media representatives with Government officials responsible for formulating and carrying out foreign policy.

Officials participating in the conference will be W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador at Large; William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs; Richard Pedersen, Counselor, U.S. Mission to the U.N.; Raymond G. Leddy, Department of State Adviser, U.S. Army War

College; Charlotte M. Hubbard, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs; and Peter Solbert, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

United States Reiterates Position on Polish-German Boundary

On April 27 the Department of State issued the following statement with respect to the recently concluded Polish-Soviet Friendship Treaty which referred to the Oder-Neisse Line as a "state frontier."

The State Department has repeatedly expressed its views concerning the final determination of the Polish-German boundary. For example, it was stated in the Department's reply¹ to a Polish Embassy note of July 20, 1960, that ". . . the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, when defining in Article VIII B of the Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference those former German territories which were to be under the administration of the Polish State, reaffirmed their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement."

The position of the United States Government on this matter remains unchanged.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 5, 1960, p. 363.

The Soviet Union's decision to participate in the International Patent Convention has created worldwide speculation and interest. This article, written especially for the Bulletin by the Chief of the Department's International Business Practices Division, assesses the Soviet action and its significance for international economic relations.

Soviet Adherence to International Patent Convention

by Harold A. Levin

The decision of the Soviet Union to adhere to the Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property has attracted considerable attention and stimulated new interest in the convention itself. Soviet adherence, which becomes effective July 1, 1965, may serve to expand the exchange of peaceful technology between the Soviet Union and other nations. The degree to which it does will depend in the long run basically on the opportunities for profitable use of foreign patents in the Soviet Union and of Soviet patents abroad.

Such opportunities in most convention countries are determined by market demand. In the Soviet Union they are determined by Government decision. But the Soviet authorities seem to want to increase Soviet use of foreign inventions by obtaining more patent licenses, with underlying know-how, from foreign firms. This requires that the Soviet Union attract more foreign patenting. The Soviet Union also seems to want to increase the profitable use of its own inventions abroad by licensing more patents to foreign firms; this, in turn, requires more Soviet patenting abroad. These factors seem to underlie Soviet adherence to the convention.

The Paris Convention is the major multilateral agreement in the patent field.¹ Its

members constitute a "Union," generally called the "Paris Union," for the protection of patents, trademarks, and other forms of industrial property.² Any country may adhere at its request, automatically undertaking all the obligations and receiving all the advantages of the convention.

The Soviet Union is the 68th country to adhere to the convention. Prior to Soviet adherence, the Paris Union had already included all the countries of Eastern Europe except Albania, all the industrialized non-Communist countries, and many developing countries. The United States adhered in 1887.

The specifics of national patent systems vary rather widely. Some countries grant patents both on products and on the processes by which they are made. Some countries grant only "process" patents, or no patents at all, in specified fields. The duration of the patent grant ranges from 5 to 20 years. Criteria of patentability, search and examination procedures, and fees differ considerably.

¹ Concluded in 1883, the convention was subsequently revised at Brussels in 1900, at Washington in 1911, at The Hague in 1925, at London in 1934, and at Lisbon in 1958.

² These include, under the convention, utility models, industrial designs, trade names, indications of source, and appellations of origin.

The members of the Paris Union are permitted this diversity. But they guarantee to one another, under convention provisions, "national treatment" and certain special rights. These basic provisions of the convention are supplemented by clauses establishing certain principles of uniform law. Adherence to the convention is therefore important for any country wishing to attract an increasing number of patent applications from foreign nationals and to increase its own patent applications abroad.

Under the convention's "national treatment" provisions, each member state guarantees to the nationals of each other member state the same treatment it gives its own nationals. Soviet law makes no distinction between a foreign and a domestic patent applicant, except that the foreigner must appoint the Soviet Chamber of Commerce as his agent. The Soviets' announcement of their decision to adhere stated that foreign nationals already receive national treatment in the Soviet Union—as Soviet nationals already do in the United States—not only in respect to applications but also in respect to rewards and to protection under Soviet law and jurisprudence. Doubts on this score may sometimes have inhibited potential foreign applicants for Soviet patents. Soviet adherence may be intended, in part, to remove such doubts while at the same time assuring the Soviets of national treatment in all other member states.

The most important special right member states grant one another is the "right of priority." The convention provides that if a patent application is filed in one member state and followed within 1 year by an application in any other, the latter member state must treat the application there as if it had been filed on the same date as the first application. Whether a patent is granted in any member state depends on the patent law of that state. But the right of priority gives the applicant who was the first to apply for a patent in the Paris Union an advantage, for 1 year, over later applicants throughout the Union. Moreover, public disclosure of the invention after the

first filing in the Paris Union cannot for 1 year invalidate the first applicant's later filings in other convention countries. In establishing the right of priority as between itself and other member states, the Soviet Union has made it easier for foreign nationals to obtain Soviet patents on inventions with which they were first and has paved the way for increased Soviet patenting abroad of inventions with which the Soviets were first.

Soviet System and Foreign Patenting

In the Soviet Union inventors can choose between patents and "inventors' certificates."³ A Soviet patent, like an American, gives the inventor exclusive rights in his invention. The conduct of business in the U.S.S.R. being a state function, however, the patent owner cannot himself produce or sell his invention. He can only sell his rights to a state enterprise, or license his patent to such an enterprise for a lump-sum payment or royalties. Few arrangements of either type have thus far been made, to the knowledge of the U.S. Government. Under the inventors' certificate, all rights in the invention go to the state. But the recipient of the certificate is remunerated by cash award and emoluments such as housing or various privileges. The total amount of his reward depends on the economic benefits of his invention to Soviet society. Soviet inventors therefore have almost always applied for inventors' certificates rather than patents, and foreigners occasionally have also.

Patents taken out in the Soviet Union in recent years have averaged fewer than 100 annually as against 9,000-10,000 inventors' certificates. Nearly all of the patents have been obtained by foreigners. Their purposes, in light of the limited past opportunities to

³ The literal translation from the Russian is "authors' certificates," but Paris Union members have recently been using "inventors' certificates" to avoid confusion with copyrights. (The principal multilateral agreements in the copyright field are the Universal Copyright Convention and the Berne Copyright Convention. The United States belongs to the former. The U.S.S.R. belongs to neither.)

profit from use of a Soviet patent, appear generally to have been "defensive"—such as to prevent Soviet production for export in competition with the patentee in foreign markets or to prevent Soviet importation of imitations.

Whether Soviet adherence will be followed by a major increase in foreign patenting in the Soviet Union will depend on whether the Soviets do in fact create significant new opportunities for foreign nationals to license their Soviet patents to Soviet organizations for reasonable compensation.

Some fears that have existed about Soviet protection in the patent field may, despite Soviet adherence to the convention, limit the speed with which foreigners move to obtain Soviet patents in order to take advantage of increased opportunities to license them profitably. But foreigners have thus far had little patent experience in the Soviet Union. It can be hoped that further experience there will serve to reassure foreign nationals not only on patent protection itself but also on related questions they have sometimes voiced, such as whether underlying know-how furnished to patent licensees can be effectively protected by contracts and whether means are available to assure that royalty payments under licensing arrangements based on patent usage accurately reflect actual usage.

In connection with rather widespread Western publicity about Soviet "pirating" of Western inventions, it might be noted that copying an invention, or importing a copy, is not illegal in the Soviet Union, the United States, or any other country if the invention has not been patented in that country. Moreover, the U.S. Government knows of no instance in recent years of Soviet copying or "pirating" of an American invention patented in the Soviet Union.

Prospects for Soviet Patenting Abroad

Soviet patent applications abroad are already increasing. In the United States they rose from a 1960-62 average of 20 per year to 134 in 1963 and 262 in 1964. According to Soviet indications the 1965 figure will

probably be higher—reflecting, apparently, the increasing Soviet interest in licensing patents here and also increasing interest among American firms in using Soviet technology.

While a continued increase in Soviet patent applications in the United States and other convention countries will depend basically on the opportunities for profitable use of Soviet-held patents abroad, it will be influenced by whether the United States and those other foreign parties to the convention that do not already do so recognize inventors' certificates for the purpose of right of priority. The convention does not mention such certificates. A means of amending the convention to provide for granting the right of priority on the basis of inventors' certificates has recently been worked out in principle by a Committee of Experts on Inventors' Certificates meeting at the Paris Union's headquarters, the United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property,⁴ in Geneva. (It was there, through a Soviet observer delegation, that the U.S.S.R. on March 16 announced its decision to adhere to the Paris Convention.) The next conference for revision of the Paris Convention, however, is not scheduled until 1967, at Stockholm. The United States and many other countries may also have to amend their own laws before they can recognize inventors' certificates as a basis for right of priority.

Importance of Patent Cooperation

International cooperation in the patent field is becoming increasingly important, and the U.S. Government is currently devoting new attention to possible ways of improving such cooperation. With greatly expanded world trade, foreign-origin patent applications in recent years have been increasing markedly in many countries. According to U.S. Patent Office figures, U.S. nationals are currently filing about 20 percent of all patent applications abroad and

⁴ The Bureaux use "intellectual property" to encompass industrial, literary, and artistic property.

foreign nationals are filing about 25 percent of all patent applications in this country. The economic importance foreign patent licensing arrangements can have to a country is indicated by the fact that, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce, such arrangements by U.S. firms brought into the United States in 1964 close to half a billion dollars in royalty payments.

Our interest in international patent cooperation is demonstrated in an Executive order issued by President Johnson on April 9 establishing the President's Commission on the Patent System. The Commission is charged with examining the U.S. patent system in its entirety, "including its relationship to international and foreign patent systems." The order stresses that the U.S. Government is "concerned with improving systems for the protection of industrial property to promote the beneficial exchange of products and services across national boundaries" and that "the extensive international economic interests of the United States require that this Government take a leading role in international cooperation for the protection of industrial property."

The United States, which this year celebrates the 175th anniversary of the enactment in 1790 of its first patent law,⁵ has long encouraged foreign governments to develop patent protection of their own and supported widespread international patent cooperation through the Paris Convention. In the interest of mutual understanding, the U.S. Government favors broadening the avenues of peaceful contact and cooperation with the Soviet Union in economic and other fields. The U.S. Government therefore welcomes the decision of the Soviet Union to join the nations cooperating in international patent protection through the Paris Convention.

⁵ The United States Constitution, in article I, section 8, empowers Congress "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."

President Gratified by Report on U.S.-Japan Health Program

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release dated April 29

I am most pleased and gratified by the preliminary report I have received today [April 29] from Dr. Colin MacLeod on the recent meetings in Tokyo to explore the joint U.S.-Japan undertaking to improve the health of the peoples of Asia.¹

I am especially grateful for the courtesies extended to our representatives and particularly for Prime Minister [Eisaku] Sato's personal interest in meeting with Dr. MacLeod.

The peoples of Asia have endured for centuries the oppression of many diseases and illnesses. Today the stifling effects of ill health stand in the way of fulfillment for the progress toward a better life which we of the United States so much want the peoples of Asia to enjoy.

In Japan, as in the United States, progress has been made for developing medical science and research, which are bringing rising standards of health to the peoples of both lands. It is my hope—as I expressed to Prime Minister Sato during his visit to Washington in January²—that we might pool our knowledge, talents, and resources to mount more successful attacks upon the diseases afflicting the lives of the people who live around the rim of the Pacific.

On the basis of the talks in Tokyo, I am confident that this joint effort will move forward effectively and successfully and will make a contribution of historic dimensions to the health of Asia. We are honored and privileged to be associated with Japan in this important humane endeavor.

¹ For a statement made by President Johnson on Apr. 8, see BULLETIN of May 3, 1965, p. 667.

² For text of a communique released on Jan. 13, see *ibid.*, Feb. 1, 1965, p. 134.

United States Summarizes Position on Disarmament and Arms Control

*Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson
U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

My delegation attaches great importance to this meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which has not convened for several years, and therefore we felt that the competence and the impartiality of the chairman was most important. Accordingly, your unanimous selection is very reassuring to my delegation. We congratulate you, sir, and look forward to an orderly and, we hope, a productive session of this Commission under your leadership.²

We had hoped that the Soviet Union's motive in calling this meeting would turn out to be mainly a constructive purpose. I am afraid that this morning's Soviet attack on the United States, so reminiscent of the period before Khrushchev, has only served to confirm widespread doubts about the Soviet Union's motives in convening this meeting.

In any case, I regret that I must reply to this morning's irrelevant assault, and I hope we will thereafter be able to return to the subject of disarmament exclusively.

The representative of the Soviet Union has laid down a barrage of words against virtually every action of the United States

to resist Communist expansion—overt or covert—since 1945. In one of the standard Soviet approaches he has focused much of his polemic on foreign bases.

But as usual he neglected to mention why these bases have been established. They have been established, I am obliged to repeat, because independent states subjected to or threatened by Communist aggression have asked for protection and assistance. I only need remind the Commission of the Berlin blockade and other Soviet actions in Europe which brought about the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to organize the defense of Europe; of the unprovoked aggression against South Korea which brought about the defensive United Nations action in that country which still continues; of North Vietnamese aggression in South Viet-Nam and Laos since 1954, when the ink was hardly dry on the Geneva accords. The need for bases stems directly from this pattern of aggression and threats of aggression which will be vastly amplified. It is as simple as that.

My distinguished colleague, Ambassador [Nicolai T.] Fedorenko's broad-brush description of world events has suffered from the same defect which characterizes much of the Soviet Union's polemics—an utter disregard for the facts of history, history at

¹ Made in the U.N. Disarmament Commission on Apr. 26 (U.S./U.N. press release 4532).

² Mohamed Awad el-Kony, of the United Arab Republic, was elected chairman of the Commission on Apr. 21.

least as it is recorded, read, and taught outside of the Soviet Union, and like societies.

Mr. Chairman, I was and I remain one of those who found it genuinely heartening that the post-Stalin leadership in the Soviet Union was moved, albeit belatedly, to acknowledge and condemn the multitude of sins and outrages which that leader of the Soviet Union perpetrated upon his own countrymen during the quarter of a century that he dictated to both party and state.

But it remains incomprehensible, to me at least, that the post-Stalin era has not witnessed a similar acknowledgment and condemnation of the sins and outrages perpetrated against other states and other peoples. Every step to increase our military capability—since our unilateral disarmament, which was not reciprocated by the U.S.S.R. at the end of World War II—has been taken in response to the expansionist policies of the Communist world, first the Soviet Union and now Communist China.

Record of Soviet Outrages

It is well to remember that during the course of World War II and its immediate aftermath, the Soviet Union forcibly added over 264,000 square miles and over 24 million people to its own territory and population.

There was the outrage against Poland in 1939, when—and here I quote from Mr. Molotov—“. . . a quick blow against Poland, first by the German army and then by the Red army, sufficed to leave nothing remaining of the ugly offspring of the Versailles Treaty.”

Then only a few months later the seizure of the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

There was the outrage against the people of Iran in 1945 and 1946, when the Soviet Union blocked the entry of Iranian troops into part of Iran's own territory and proceeded with the installation of a puppet regime on Iranian soil.

Then there was the Soviet behavior throughout Eastern Europe, where, in violation of the agreement reached at Yalta, the

Soviet Army remained—in what I suppose its representatives would *not* call an abnormal stationing of troops abroad in peacetime—to occupy Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, East Germany, and most of Czechoslovakia, denying the very right of self-determination which the Soviet Union has professed to cherish so dearly and proclaims in these halls so frequently.

There was Soviet-fomented guerrilla warfare in Greece and efforts to obtain control of the Dardanelles in Turkey.

Nor were such outrages limited to Europe. In Malaya, in the Philippines, in Indochina, and elsewhere, Communist adherents, under the then unchallenged leadership of the Soviet Union, incited, encouraged, and supported guerrilla uprisings against national governments. Then, in 1950, the Soviets supported and the Chinese joined in the aggression against South Korea—perhaps the most blatant effort in the postwar era to extend domination and impose their will by force of arms.

There followed the suppression of the East German uprising in 1953 and the Hungarian revolution in 1956; a series of Soviet-manufactured crises over Berlin designed to succeed where the 1949 blockade had failed; the erection of that shameful wall in Berlin, not to keep anyone out of the East but to prevent even greater numbers from fleeing to the West; and the Soviet Union's attempt in 1962, acting with stealth and deception, to transform Cuba into an offensive bridgehead of nuclear blackmail.

After this record the Soviet Union presumes to lecture to the United States about aggression and in the wrong forum and under an agenda item on disarmament!

We in the West have not in recent times spoken of these deeds. It is not that we have forgotten them, nor that we expect thereby to mollify Soviet leadership. Rather have we been hoping—and I, for one, continue to hope—for an evolution which will bring to Soviet leaders greater realization and greater esteem for the rights of states and societies lying outside their borders. Perhaps as a new and more aggressive power presses

its militaristic views on the world, the U.S.S.R. will begin to see the advantages of cooperation with others for a peaceful world more clearly.

In recent years, certainly, the aggressive efforts of Communist China have required increasing world vigilance. When Tibet was seized with military force in 1959, too few voices were raised against that outrage. The constant pressures of Communist China have since alerted the world to the true nature of her intentions. Even the Soviet Union has publicly protested Communist Chinese pressure on their long mutual border and transferred troops to its far eastern sectors. Certainly since the time of Peiping's overt military attack on India in 1962, all pretenses of its peaceful aims must have been exposed.

It is not accidental, therefore, that in Southeast Asia we are now faced with the greatest current threat to peace in the new form of aggression mounted by North Viet-Nam against South Viet-Nam with the blessing, possibly for different reasons, of Communist China and the Soviet Union.

Truth About U.S. Use of Tear Gas

It is perhaps not surprising that a large portion of the speech we heard this morning was another attack upon the policies of the United States in Viet-Nam and another presentation of his version of what has happened and was happening to the valiant people of South Viet-Nam. While I am not surprised—on the basis of the record of 20 years—I confess I had hoped, I repeat, that this meeting, which he called and which we all agreed to attend in good faith to discuss disarmament, would be used for the purpose intended and not for more of the familiar polemics about Viet-Nam.

The Soviet Union seems bound and determined, however, to express its views on the situation in Southeast Asia in every United Nations forum at its disposal, except the proper forum—the very forum which the Soviet Union insists is the only forum competent to take any action upon the situation. I do not doubt that there are reasons for

the Soviet Union's unwillingness to resort to that forum. Not the least, I venture to guess, is the contemptuous rejection by their Communist partners in Asia of any United Nations role in the Southeast Asian situation.

The Soviet Union, to begin with, has repeated the wholly false charge—which it knows to be false—that the United States is engaging in gas warfare in Viet-Nam. The President of this country,³ the Secretary of State of the United States,⁴ and I, myself, in a letter of April 2⁵ to the President of the Security Council have all made clear that the United States has not engaged in gas warfare in Viet-Nam. It should not be necessary to do so again, but, since the Soviet Union appears to be unable to desist from these spurious charges, I would assure this Commission that the United States has not engaged in gas warfare in Viet-Nam and I will again state the already well-known facts.

Only riot-control agents have been used to avoid death or injury to innocent persons. The use of such agents has nothing to do with gas warfare, which is waged with deadly poisonous gas. The obvious purpose of these charges is to divert attention from the real problem in Viet-Nam today, which is the armed intervention in the Republic of Viet-Nam by the authorities of North Viet-Nam.

Hanoi's Aggression in South Viet-Nam

I am sure that members have noted that the representative of the Soviet Union did not once touch upon the fact that it is Hanoi, not the Republic of Viet-Nam or my Government, which has as an official, publicly proclaimed policy the subjugation by force of a neighboring country. You need not take my word for it. The records of the Third Congress of the Communist Party held in Hanoi in 1960 include in the final resolution "the liberation of South Vietnam" as one of the two tasks of the party. The resolution

³ At a news conference on Apr. 1.

⁴ For a statement made by Secretary Rusk on Mar. 24, see BULLETIN of Apr. 12, 1965, p. 528.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, May 3, 1965, p. 688.

called for the "stepping up" of the revolution in South Viet-Nam. In other words, the Communist Party in one country resolves to step up Communist military attacks on the government and people of another.

It is clear from Communist Chinese sources, too, that they see the situation in Viet-Nam for what it is—an effort by the North to take over the South. The recent commentaries on the Vietnamese situation flowing from Peiping are remarkably frank. The People's Daily editorial of April 16, for example, took contemptuous note of the fact that the United States has asked that "the people of North Viet-Nam immediately discontinue their support to the compatriots in the south." The same editorial went on to note derisively that President Johnson had asked "trained men who flow in a consistent stream from north to south must be withdrawn." There is no denial that such aggression is in fact taking place. On the contrary, there is only an out-of-hand rejection of the demand that it stop.

The statement of the Soviet representative this morning furthermore did not once touch upon the fact that Hanoi not only has initiated a policy of aggression against South Viet-Nam but that it is actively carrying it out. Not once did it note the fact that Hanoi has established and continues to direct and control on the territory of its neighbor a movement to overthrow by force that neighbor government. The statement did not once touch upon the fact that Hanoi is training and sending soldiers under military order across international boundaries into the territory of its neighbor. It did not once touch on the fact that some 40,000 armed personnel have been so infiltrated.

And there are accounts in the newspapers even this morning of organized units of the North Vietnamese Army fighting in South Viet-Nam.

The role of my Government in assisting the Republic of Viet-Nam to resist this aggression and to maintain its independence, as in so many previous cases since the war, has been clearly explained in numerous public statements, both in and outside of the United Nations.

The action of the United States Government is wholly consistent with its goal of helping to protect the integrity of South Viet-Nam—securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relations to all others—free from outside interference—tied to no alliance—a military base for no other country.

The United States has striven and will continue to strive to achieve this goal by peaceful means, but we will not yield or falter in our resistance to aggression.

Mr. Chairman, we want nothing for ourselves—only that the people of this country be permitted to develop and guide their future in their own way. They could begin to do this now, peacefully, if their neighbor and its Communist partners were to accept rather than ridicule the repeated and still valid offer to enter on the path of discussions, the path of peaceful settlement, as the only sane alternative to the effort, painful for all concerned, to impose their domination and will by means of force. They could begin to do this now fruitfully, if their neighbor to the North and its Communist partners were willing to match their professed dedication to the welfare of the peoples of South Viet-Nam and all of Southeast Asia by joining in a collective effort to develop rather than to destroy the vast human and natural resources of this strife-torn area.

German Problem Unrelated to Current Talks

Mr. Chairman, one of the most disingenuous attacks which we heard from the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union today was his long polemic against the Federal Republic of Germany, no doubt timed as part of a campaign geared to the 20th anniversary of the ending of World War II. Such charges, unrelated in tone or in substance to our work, have also in the past been features of Soviet disarmament statements elsewhere. Their introduction here is the more regrettable as they have been fully answered on several occasions in the past by my Government and by other governments.

Not only has Western Europe faced the constant series of Soviet expansionist pres-

tures that I have already reviewed, but for many years it has also been subject to the threat of hundreds of Soviet nuclear missiles targeted directly against European cities. It is not surprising that, after the Soviet Union rejected efforts designed to avert such a missile growth, the countries of Western Europe developed a grave concern for their security and a legitimate interest in a strategic nuclear deterrent which protects them to this day.

One of these countries, the Federal Republic of Germany, represents the front line of Western Europe's defense. Yet despite its vulnerable position, the West German Government has committed its armed forces entirely to international military command through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Moreover, its leaders have emphatically denied that they seek nuclear weapons. They have repeated countless times their renunciation of the use of force for attainment of political ends and their desire to settle the German boundary question by peaceful negotiations only.

Let me add that every nuclear weapon that the United States has placed in Europe to offset Soviet missiles is under United States control. The Soviet Union is well aware of these facts, and the political motivation for these perpetually unfounded attacks is obvious. It is also aware of the facts regarding the suggestions for a multilateral nuclear force. It would be fully consistent with the firm opposition to the dissemination of nuclear weapons capabilities of the United States and with the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1665 calling for a nondissemination agreement.

The Soviet Union maintains that it is deeply concerned over the dangers of nuclear dissemination. I might note in this connection, parenthetically, that the only country to embark on a nuclear weapons program with the help of a nuclear power was Communist China—and it was not the United States which furnished that help.

A nondissemination agreement in accordance with the Irish resolution proposed by

the delegation of Ireland would be the best way to meet this concern, and we urge the Soviet Union to join in seeking such agreement. If we argue endlessly about future fears and let pass our chance to conclude a nonproliferation agreement while there is yet time, we will all lose. The surest way to prevent proliferation is to sign an agreement based on this resolution and as soon as possible.

The charges against Germany have nothing to do with talks on disarmament, but the Soviet authorities will no doubt print them in their press as they have done many times before, hoping that they can wring a little more support from their own citizens. But such charges do little more than disguise an unwillingness to seek real progress toward a just solution of the German problem. Certainly history will find it lamentable and bitter that two decades after the end of World War II the Soviet Union could not devise a better idea for Germany than partition, nor a better idea for Berlin than the cruel wall that divides that city and its inhabitants.

Central Purpose of the Commission

Now, Mr. Chairman, we meet at a time of increasing international tension, which makes our work all the more imperative. The opinion of the world, marshaled and articulated by this Commission, can be a powerful and constructive influence in these critical times. I hope, therefore, that we can agree that our discussions in this Commission should remain focused on the central purpose for which this body was created. For among the problems which beset our nations, the menacing mountain of armament dwarfs all others and casts a shadow over all mankind.

The arms race involves the very future of man on this planet, and the fact that we have endured this threat for a number of years should not lessen our resolve to remove it. We must act soon and wisely, for in this situation time is not our ally.

Beginnings have been made during the past 2 years: the "hot line" agreement, the

limited test ban treaty, the United Nations resolution against the orbiting of nuclear and other mass-destruction weapons, and the announcements concerning reductions in planned production of fissionable materials. I might add, Mr. Chairman, that, contrary to the charge by the Soviet representative this morning that the United States is not interested in disarmament, each of the measures I have just enumerated came about as the result of an initiative taken and a proposal made by the United States.

But we cannot rest with these beginnings. If they have slowed the arms race, they have certainly not brought it to a halt.

In the present circumstances it is important that we maintain a certain sense of perspective about the prospect for fruitful discussions and negotiations, especially during periods of increased tension. A period of relaxation of tensions would obviously improve the prospects for progress through negotiations, but periods such as this need not be barren. Indeed, they afford opportunities for the relief of tension and danger by collateral action.

Thus in 1961, during the period of high tension occasioned by events relating to Berlin, a Joint Statement of Agreed Principles to govern disarmament negotiations was negotiated by the Soviet Union and the United States.⁶ It became the basis for negotiations in the 18-nation conference. In 1963, a few months after the height of the grave world crisis occasioned by the secret installation of missiles in Cuba, the direct communications link between Moscow and Washington—the first arms control agreement of the postwar period—was signed. And shortly thereafter, and indeed as a result of initiatives undertaken in the immediate shadow of the Cuban missile crisis, the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space was signed.

Recalling these events, we are entitled to retain our hopes for the present and our expectations for the future.

At the same time, we cannot be compla-

cent about the results of the discussions in the 18-nation conference last year. The optimism that the breakthroughs of 1963 would quickly be followed by comparable agreement in 1964 was not fulfilled. Yet the momentum of progress was not entirely lost.

The United States and the Soviet Union found it possible to announce some reductions in their military budgets. Moreover, as I have noted, during 1964 the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain announced their intentions to make reductions in their planned production of fissionable materials.⁷ These were not agreements. Nevertheless they were contributions to peace.

While the 18-nation conference did not produce formal agreements, there was value in the new proposals introduced, and in the clarification of positions. There was also some narrowing of differences.

The reasons for the failure to reach agreements are numerous, and the story would undoubtedly vary with the teller. I am sure there would be general agreement in this room that some of the reasons lay outside the conference hall. For our part, however, I wish to say that the United States does not intend during our discussions here to engage in recriminations with respect to the intentions and motives of other parties.

The representative of the Soviet Union opened his speech by listing a series of disarmament issues on which he alleged that the Soviet position had been entirely positive and the United States position entirely negative.

It is precisely sweeping distortions of this kind which caused me, in the recent speech which Mr. Fedorenko quoted, to characterize Soviet proposals as "slogans."⁸ Of course, these slogans are appealing because they ignore all the practical problems and pro-

⁷ For an address made by President Johnson before the Associated Press at New York, N.Y., on Apr. 20, 1964, see *ibid.*, May 11, 1964, p. 726.

⁸ For an address made by Ambassador Stevenson before the Bureau of Advertising of the American Newspaper Publishers Association at New York, N.Y., on Apr. 22, 1965, see U.S./U.N. press release 4530.

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.

pose to carry out disarmament by making pledges or waving a magic wand. Needless to say, there would be no effective inspection to determine whether the magic wand had worked and any real disarmament had taken place.

I do not propose to compete with Mr. Fedorenko in misleading the Commission by indulging in misrepresentation. I do not propose to compete with him in trying to raise the temperature of our deliberation by loose and groundless charges. What I propose to do, on the contrary, is to inform the Commission of exactly what the U.S. has proposed in the field of disarmament and exactly what it concretely and realistically proposes be done to relieve the world of the threat and burden of armaments.

My Government hopes that the Soviet Union is genuinely interested in reaching agreements in the field of disarmament and arms control. The Soviet Union has no reason, on the basis of the record, to take a different view of our intentions. Accordingly, there can be no nourishment in recriminations about motivations. Indeed, the cry of bad faith is seldom the herald of the serious negotiator.

There is a related consideration which is important for fruitful discussion. It is that the governments represented here do not need to be persuaded of the advantages of progress in disarmament. We have progressed so far into the nuclear age that all of us are fully conscious of the necessity, the imperative necessity, of controlling the arms race. After almost two decades of discussion, we are well beyond the slogan stage and our attention should be focused on the harder task of developing the specific plans—I repeat, specific plans—that will bring our easily expressed and common aspirations within reach.

This meeting of the Disarmament Commission takes place following the inability of the General Assembly to discuss disarmament at its last session. It can serve as an opportunity to acquaint the other members of the United Nations with the work of the 18-Nation Committee and with the views of

the various participants in those negotiations. It also offers the opportunity for all member governments to express their views and to offer such suggestions as they may feel would contribute to the resolution of existing differences.

I should like now to discuss briefly the approach of my Government to the vital task of arms control and disarmament.

U.S. Proposals on Disarmament

We are determined to work for general and complete disarmament as part of our common, long-term effort to achieve a better and safer world through the application of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the steady development of international law and effective peacekeeping arrangements.

The outline for a treaty on general and complete disarmament which the United States has submitted and discussed in Geneva would, in our view, provide a sound framework for this common effort.⁹

But if we are to achieve this goal, we must first halt the present arms race, and particularly the nuclear race, and turn it back. We must begin with those areas of arms control and reductions where agreement seems possible—and we must begin now. We must avoid the lure of easy slogans and deceptive generalities and face the fact that agreements in this area involve complex matters of military balance, scientific technology, and, where necessary, of verification.

This approach was reflected in the program of action which the United States placed before the 18-nation conference in Geneva. Our proposals were outlined in President Johnson's message of January 21, 1964,¹⁰ to the conference. As our President stated in the opening words of his message:

There is only one item on the agenda of this Conference—it is the leading item on the agenda of mankind—and that one item is peace.

In this spirit President Johnson outlined

⁹ For text, see BULLETIN of May 7, 1962, p. 747.

¹⁰ For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 10, 1964, p. 224.

five major types of agreement for study and negotiation.

First, he stated that the United States would be prepared to discuss means of preventing the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly—whether by aggression, subversion, or clandestine supply of arms—to change boundaries or demarcation lines; to interfere with access to territory; or to extend control or administration over territory by displacing established authorities.

This remains an area of central concern for all of us who seek to make the rule of law and pacific settlement become the only rule of international behavior.

The *second* suggestion submitted by the President was that while the conference continued its efforts to achieve a safeguarded program for general and complete disarmament, an effort should be made to halt further increases in strategic armaments. Specifically, the United States proposed that the United States, the Soviet Union, and their respective allies explore a verified freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles. The President pointed out that such a measure would prevent the further expansion of the deadly and costly arms race and would open the path for reductions in all types of forces.

In the same spirit of attempting to halt the arms race now, rather than at some distant future time, the President, in his *third* proposal, reiterated the offer of the United States to halt all production of fissionable material for weapons use. Implementation of this measure would halt the stockpiling of the nuclear explosives which are the essential and central ingredient of nuclear arsenals. The President indicated our further flexibility with regard to this proposal by offering to begin this action through both sides closing comparable production facilities on a plant-by-plant basis, with mutual verification.

As a *fourth* area for consideration, my Government proposed that further steps be taken to reduce the danger of war by accident, miscalculation, or surprise at-

tack. President Johnson indicated that, in consultation with our allies, we would be prepared to discuss proposals for the creation of a system of observation posts as an initial move in this direction. Agreement on such a system could open the way to broader political advances.

The President's *fifth* proposal was directed at the urgent task of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. To this end he urged, first, a nonproliferation agreement; secondly, acceptance by the major nuclear powers of the same type of inspection of their peaceful uses of nuclear materials which they recommend for other states. In the third place, he recommended a verified comprehensive test ban agreement.

During the course of the Geneva talks last year the United States delegation set forth in detail its suggestions for the specific terms and methods of implementation of its various proposals. We sought both in the conference and in private discussion to clarify our positions, to advance additional proposals, and to search for areas of agreement. And, I might add, we gave careful attention to the views and proposals of other delegations.

In March the United States delegation proposed¹¹ that a start be made in the actual destruction of some armaments by the United States and the Soviet Union, each agreeing to destroy over a 2-year period some 720 medium jet bombers. It was our view that such bombers might lend themselves to an early start in actual arms reduction because of the relatively equal number possessed by both parties and their comparable position as the basic medium bombers of the two countries. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union did not see fit to agree to this measure.

Nevertheless, as I shall later indicate, the United States has initiated action to phase out large numbers of these bombers from its operational inventory. This is part of our basic philosophy of taking such self-restrain-

¹¹ For text of a U.S. statement of Mar. 19, 1964, see *ibid.*, Apr. 20, 1964, p. 643.

ing actions as are possible, while still maintaining a Military Establishment within the bounds of our security needs. The proposal made last March, however, would already have given us some practical experience in the actual destruction of armaments by agreement. It would have speeded up the process of destruction of our medium bombers and, one assumes, would have hastened the process of reduction of Soviet bombers. Such a measure could also play an important part in preventing the dissemination of such strategic delivery vehicles, with the unsettling effects this could have around the world. And it would have been a start in positive arms reduction by agreement—a start that must be made somewhere, and the sooner the better.

The proposals I have just outlined are as concrete and practical as they are far-reaching. They are clearly defined and are accompanied by the necessary scientific and technical detail. They were the result of months of hard work by a technically qualified staff. We did not expect that they would necessarily be accepted when first offered. But we did hope that they would at least be subjected to as intensive study by others as we had put into their formulation.

To facilitate such study, I should like to add a few words of explanation about two of these proposals.

The "Freeze" Proposal

The philosophy underlying the proposal to explore a freeze in the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles was that the most direct and logical way to halt the nuclear arms race was to stop the production of these vehicles. We felt it advisable to explore a freeze limited to strategic vehicles because of widespread agreement that this was the place to begin. These long-range vehicles carry the greatest destructive force. The verification of a freeze on such vehicles is easier than in the case of some other kinds of armaments. Finally, a freeze of such costly vehicles would release the largest amount of resources for the

constructive work of economic and social development.

During the Geneva talks last year the United States delegation also submitted the results of extensive studies as to how, given the scientific and technical facilities available at the time, such an agreement could be adequately verified with a minimum amount of intrusion. If we are ever to proceed beyond the talking stage of agreements involving very complicated weapons systems, the negotiating parties must be prepared to deal with complicated technical details. I commend to those of you who are interested the presentation on the strategic vehicle freeze submitted by the United States delegation to the Geneva conference on August 27 of last year.¹² It will be found in the verbatim record of the conference's 211th meeting.

It should be a matter of concern to all of us that this measure has not already been implemented. To halt the production race in the most dangerous of all weapons systems would be an accomplishment far more significant than any other confidence-building measure possible at this time. And it is one that could be accomplished now. The United States continues to believe that this is an area for negotiation which holds great promise. We urge the Soviet Union to join us in exploring further its possibilities. Our position is flexible; we are willing to consider constructive suggestions from any source. There is no reason, then, why the United States and the Soviet Union could not jointly explore the area covered by this proposal, for it could show the way and open the door to reductions in all types of forces.

Halting Fissionable Material Production

Let me turn now to the United States proposal for a halt in the production of fissionable material for weapons.¹³ This would be another important step that the nuclear

¹² For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 21, 1964, p. 413.

¹³ For texts of U.S. statements of June 18 and 25, 1964, see *ibid.*, July 27, 1964, p. 123.

powers could now take to halt the spiraling arms race.

During the discussions in Geneva the United States submitted a working paper on inspection procedures and arrangements for this measure. This paper was the result of an intensive effort by my Government to develop an adequate verification system with the minimum amount of inspection. The working paper, dated June 25, 1964, is included in the report of the Geneva conference as ENDC Document 134.

Pending agreement on such a measure, the United States has sought to take such action as it could in this direction consistent with its security. As President Johnson indicated in two announcements last year concerning reductions in planned production of fissionable materials,¹⁴ the United States is making reductions in the production of plutonium and U-235. Three of our production reactors have already been shut down, and a fourth will be shut down later this year. The power level of the gaseous diffusion plants has already been reduced by 20 percent. These reductions will continue until by 1969 the United States will be producing enriched U-235 at a level of production 60 percent lower than that planned before these cutbacks were announced.

We were encouraged by the announcement made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union on April 21, 1964, concerning reductions of planned Soviet production. We presume we will hear from representatives of the Soviet Union as to what progress they have made in this direction.

The progress achieved in this manner is welcome. However, it is the desire of my Government to proceed faster to halt the "nuclear explosive" buildup. This, of course, can only be done by agreements. If such agreements can be reached, not only can we halt this central aspect of the arms race now, but we can begin immediately to reduce fissionable material stockpiles for weapons use.

In conjunction with a cutoff in the pro-

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Jan. 27, 1964, p. 110, and May 11, 1964, p. 726.

duction of fissionable material, the United States has proposed to transfer sizable, agreed quantities of fissionable material to uses other than for weapons. Moreover, the United States took into consideration the fact that we have been a producer of such material for a longer period than the Soviet Union, and, therefore, we stated our willingness to consider unequal transfers. As an illustrative suggestion, we proposed that the United States transfer 60,000 kilograms of weapons grade U-235 to nonweapons use if the Soviet Union would, for its part, transfer 40,000 kilograms.

Again we deeply regret that the Soviet Union's response has not been more affirmative. We believe the time is ripe for an agreement to reduce the existing supply of nuclear explosives for weapons and to halt altogether future production.

Preventing Nuclear Proliferation

Mr. Chairman, I would like now to discuss another area in which none can deny that progress is urgently needed. I say area rather than measure because the problem cannot be dealt with by a single measure. I refer to the problem of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. We are here talking about one of the central consequences of the arms race about which we have been warning each other for over a decade. We may be approaching our last chance to halt the spread of nuclear weapons before effective action becomes impossible.

I am sure I need not dwell on the dangers of nuclear proliferation. Many thoughtful people are saying that to stop it while there is yet time is the most urgent test of international reason and cooperation the modern world has ever faced. A number of non-nuclear nations already have the capability to develop their own nuclear weapons. Yet the ability to make them is no assurance that the necessary effort and expenditure would be forthcoming to provide for the effective safety and control of such weapons. And, as the number of nuclear powers increases, so does the possibility of irresponsible or irra-

tional acts. Moreover, proliferation begets more proliferation. As each nation feels its security menaced by nuclear weapons next door, the political pressure rises to protect itself by the same means; and then the process will be repeated in the next nation, and so on. Thus, we face the possibility of nuclear anarchy.

We all recognize that the nuclear powers have themselves an obligation to halt the buildup and begin the reduction of nuclear arms. After a decade of frustration, a beginning has been made. Much more significant progress can and must be made in the near future if we grasp the opportunity now at hand.

The United States has borne steadfastly the awesome responsibility that goes with being a major nuclear power. We believe the Soviet Union also recognizes this responsibility.

My country has in the past taken action in accord with this responsibility. President Truman initiated the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, designed to halt the spread of nuclear weapons until international control could be achieved. President Eisenhower proposed the Atoms for Peace plan, which led in 1957 to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency to assist in the peaceful use of the atom and to protect against the diversion of materials to military purposes. President Kennedy's initiative in seeking the limited test ban treaty was further evidence of our determination to curb the spread of nuclear weapons and the dangers of fallout from atmospheric tests.

The United States has, moreover, declared that it will take no action inconsistent with General Assembly Resolution 1665 (XVI) of 1961 against proliferation.¹⁵ We have encouraged expansion of the IAEA system of safeguards to large reactors and have also urged that the IAEA should safeguard several peaceful nuclear projects we have helped other countries to build. We have offered the large Yankee power reactor in Rowe,

¹⁵ For texts of U.S. statements of Feb. 6 and Mar. 5, 1964, see *ibid.*, Mar. 9, 1964, p. 376, and Apr. 20, 1964, p. 641.

Massachusetts, for IAEA inspection, and visits by IAEA inspectors have already taken place.

Much has been accomplished. But much more is needed.

The initiation of a broad program to halt the spread of nuclear weapons is essential. We believe we must work together to that end while there is yet time. Otherwise, the future depends on the exercise of a degree of self-restraint for which history offers little comfort.

What is needed now, and as soon as possible, is a nonproliferation agreement that will record our determination to avoid nuclear anarchy. The agreement should be consistent with the resolution introduced by the delegation of Ireland and unanimously adopted by the General Assembly in 1961. We need an agreement in which the nuclear powers pledge themselves not to relinquish control of nuclear weapons or provide assistance necessary for their manufacture to nations not possessing them. And at the same time the nonnuclear powers would pledge not to manufacture or seek or receive the assistance necessary for their manufacture or otherwise acquire control of nuclear weapons. This would be a simple and effective act.

Moreover, the members of this Commission could indeed declare the intentions of their governments to follow such a policy pending the time when a formal legal commitment for adherence by all has been drafted in the 18-nation disarmament conference. The drafting of this solemn legal document should be given the highest priority when the 18-Nation Committee resumes its work. Such an agreement has been delayed too long by alleged Soviet concerns relating to discussions among the NATO powers of a multilateral nuclear force. Why should we not conclude a nonproliferation agreement now and, by so doing, provide reassurance that any future nuclear arrangements between any group of allies will be consistent with the principle of nondissemination?

As responsibility for prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons cannot be ne-

glected, so also the security of nations that forgo nuclear weapons must be given consideration. For the United States, President Johnson has stated:¹⁶

The nations that do not seek national nuclear weapons can be sure that, if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it.

This important subject is of concern to many and should be considered more fully by the United Nations and by the principal nuclear powers.

Comprehensive Test Ban

A further step in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban agreement.

The long history of the test ban negotiations is more familiar to some of you than to others. It is replete with high hopes and great disappointments, of fruitful and of barren scientific and technical consultation. The negotiations occurred in a period when the expansion of existing knowledge in such relatively new fields as seismology both increased and lessened the problems of the negotiator.

Throughout this period, the scientific progress we have made in detection and identification capabilities has been reflected in the proposals covering underground testing that we have submitted. My Government has sought to speed up the assistance which science could give to the resolution of the remaining differences by the expenditure of many millions of dollars to improve verification capabilities. We have made significant progress in this area. This progress will be reflected in our efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban agreement acceptable to all parties concerned.

While all present scientific evidence indicates that a number of inspections continue to be necessary to provide verification, the U.S. continues to be willing to explore what would constitute an adequate verification system in the light of recent and pro-

spective developments in our capabilities. If such exploration indicates that verification requirements can be satisfied by a different number and type of inspection from those previously proposed, we will take those facts into account. We remain prepared to discuss these questions with the other parties primarily concerned.

We believe the time is ripe for an agreement on a comprehensive test ban, an achievement that will be in the interest of all nations interested in stopping the arms race and the spread of nuclear weapons. We believe it is important that negotiations on this subject be resumed as soon as possible by the 18-nation conference so that the work begun with the treaty signed in Moscow in 1963 can be completed.

Prospect for Constructive Negotiation

Mr. Chairman, I have not discussed in this opening statement all of the subjects considered in the 18-nation conference. I have not discussed the various proposals submitted by the Soviet Union over the past several years, which were restated in the Soviet memorandum of December 7 to the General Assembly.¹⁷ Suffice it to say at this point in our discussions that we have not, unfortunately, so far been able to discover many areas for fruitful discussion in these proposals. A number of them are not disarmament measures so much as they are proposals for bringing about strategic re-deployments of forces in a manner which would obviously benefit the Soviet Union, given its central location. This, of course, does not apply to those Soviet proposals that are common to both sides, for here, in spite of differences that do exist, there is a prospect for agreement.

I should also say, Mr. Chairman, that while we discuss actions to be taken to limit and reverse the arms race, we should all be conscious of what we ourselves can do. Each nation has an obligation to make its contribution in the way that is in the first instance most immediate—by its own

¹⁶ For an address made by President Johnson on Oct. 18, 1964, see *ibid.*, Nov. 2, 1964, p. 610.

¹⁷ U.N. doc. A/5827 and Corr. 1.

actions. For its part, the United States has taken some actions which we hope will be reciprocated. I have mentioned the effort made by my Government that has resulted in reduction of military expenditures; I have noted the reductions in the planned production of fissionable material; and I have commented on the program initiated to begin the reduction of B-47 strategic bombers from our active inventory.

In connection with this last point I might observe that by mid-1966 the United States will have inactivated or destroyed over 2,000 B-47 bomber-type aircraft. I might also add that none have been provided as potential strategic nuclear vehicles to other countries. In addition, the United States will make a reduction during 1965 in the number of B-52 heavy strategic bomber aircraft in the existing operational forces. These reductions also will be accomplished by destruction of aircraft.

Moreover, the United States now plans to forgo the construction of some advanced-design Minutemen missiles which were included in our plans, as well as further increments of such missiles for the future.

These are examples of restraint on the part of a nation which is capable of far greater military production. There are limits, however, to the restraints or other actions that can be taken unilaterally without reciprocity. We believe that all nations should exercise restraint in the armament field. Indeed, we believe it might be well for each nation to ask itself whether or not it could profitably engage in constructive discussions with its neighbors, either regionally or under other arrangements, to restrain the temptation for competition in arms. This might also apply to nations which do not have large military establishments but whose military establishments could be of concern to their neighbors.

Mr. Chairman, I have attempted in this opening statement to summarize the United

States position on certain specific measures which offer the prospect for constructive negotiation.

I believe it will be most constructive if we hear what each has to say during the opening meetings of this Commission and then attempt in all seriousness to ponder the prospects for early action. We should, I believe, make a habit of listening to each other and not merely talking at each other.

If we can but begin the process of disarmament, we can not only begin to dissipate the shadow of fear and mistrust that lies across our lands but we can also press on with the massive task of meeting the social and economic needs of all our peoples.

My Government has great plans for improving the quality of our society and great hopes that more of the resources of our economy can, with safety, be redirected to these ends and to the creation of a safer, saner, better world.

Since the end of the last World War the United States has given many billions to aid others. We are proud of this effort, but it has taught us to dream of even further horizons of man's accomplishments. We believe that we and other nations must seek a massive redirection of the efforts of nations to meet the needs of the family of man.

Mr. Chairman, the President of the United States on April 7 made the following statement:¹⁸

We often say how impressive power is. But I do not find it impressive at all. The guns and bombs, the rockets and the warships, are all symbols of human failure. They are necessary symbols. They protect what we cherish. But they are witness to human folly.

We have had enough of human folly. But it will not surrender to pious hopes or to invective. It will surrender to men of good will who work with sincerity, generosity, and a decent respect for the concerns of others to redirect the course of history.

¹⁸ BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

U.S. Calls for Deeds, Not Words, in U.N. Committee on Defining Aggression

Following are statements made before the U.N. Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression by Francis T. P. Plimpton, U.S. Representative to the third session of the committee.

STATEMENT OF APRIL 5

U.S./U.N. press release 4520

This committee has been convened not to formulate a definition of "aggression" but—in the words of its terms of reference—"for the purpose of determining when it shall be appropriate for the General Assembly to consider again the question of defining aggression."

The question before us might naturally be thought to involve two parts: first, whether it is desirable in general for United Nations organs to seek to formulate a definition of the concept of aggression contained in the charter.

On this question, the United States is well aware that there have been differences of opinion. The members of the committee are no doubt familiar with the points which have been brought out in the several United Nations forums in which both procedural and substantive aspects of the question of defining aggression have been discussed in years past. The United States, for its part, must reaffirm the serious doubts which it has consistently expressed about the utility, or indeed the wisdom, of trying to produce what purported to be a definition of "aggression"—even assuming the requisite agreement on such a definition could be obtained.

But leaving this question aside, Mr. Chairman, there is a second question, which makes it unnecessary to dwell on the first. Indeed, in the view of the United States, that second question makes it hardly appropriate for us to consider the first. Whatever opinions might be held in the committee as to the desirability, in the abstract, of trying to agree on a definition of "aggression," is this a time when the General Assembly should deploy its energies in such an endeavor?

The answer, in the view of the United States, is "No."

This is not because present circumstances give us no cause for concern with the problem of aggression. On the contrary, it is because of the very gravity and immediacy of the aggression confronting the world community at this very hour—a modern form of aggression and warfare which relies upon threats, wanton murder, kidnaping, and other varieties of terror against civilians, the continuous training and infiltration of armed personnel into the territory of another state with orders to do anything and everything necessary to overthrow its government, and the continuous dispatch of arms, ammunition, and other supplies to the infiltrators to enable them to pursue their terroristic subversion. The pattern of these activities constitutes aggression—the subjugation by force of the people of another country—and amounts to armed attack on the victim.

For the most egregious, cruel, prolonged, and current example of this modern form of aggression, we need only turn our eyes to Southeast Asia, where the Republic of

Viet-Nam is in a valiant defensive struggle against the unrelenting pressure of aggression from its northern neighbor. The people of South Viet-Nam, a people who a decade ago had supposed themselves protected by solemn international agreements, are being subjected to systematic and ever-widening aggression directed from the north.

The real nature of the modern aggression being waged against the Republic of Viet-Nam is, perhaps, not yet thoroughly understood in some parts of the world. But there is no question that North Viet-Nam's commitment to seize control of the South is no less total than was the commitment of the regime in North Korea in 1950. Knowing the consequences of the latter's undisguised attack, however, the planners in Hanoi have tried desperately to conceal their hand. They have failed—and their aggression is as real as that of an invading army.

But however new the technique of aggression, however great the distance from any one of us, and however thick the smokescreen of propaganda—the hard facts and irrefutable evidence, visible to anyone who is willing to see, lead to one inescapable conclusion: The Republic of Viet-Nam is the object of aggression unleashed by its neighbor to the north. The phrase “inescapable conclusion” has not been chosen for rhetorical effect. In the face of the following facts, it is undeniable that South Viet-Nam is the victim of aggression.

Facts About Aggression in South Viet-Nam

Fact I. The regime in Hanoi has as one of its formal, official, publicly stated policies the destruction and subjugation by force of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

This fact emerges clearly in the following passages taken from the resolution adopted at the Third Congress of the Lao Dong (Communist) Party in Hanoi in September of 1960:

In the present stage, the Vietnamese revolution has two strategic tasks: first, to carry out the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam; second, to liberate South Viet-Nam. . . .

To take the North toward socialism and make it more and more powerful in every field will benefit the revolutionary movement for the liberation of the South. . . .

The common task of the Vietnamese revolution at present is: to strengthen the unity of all the people; to struggle resolutely to maintain peace, to accelerate the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam while at the same time stepping up the national people's democratic revolution in South Viet-Nam. . . . (emphasis supplied).

Hanoi's aim of destroying the Republic of Viet-Nam is equally evident from statements which have been made by North Vietnamese leaders. Ho Chi Minh, for example, told the opening session of the Third Lao Dong Congress in September 1960:

The North is becoming more and more consolidated and transformed into a firm base for the struggle for national reunification.

The previous year, in an article in the Belgian Communist publication *Red Flag*, Ho stated:

We are building socialism in Viet-Nam, but we are building it in only one part of the country, while in the other part we still have to direct and bring to a close the middle-class democratic and anti-imperialist revolution.

Among the other North Vietnamese leaders who spoke to the Third Lao Dong Party Congress in September 1960 was the Minister of Defense, Vo Nguyen Giap. His speech, no less than that of Ho Chi Minh, was explicit and frank in stating that Hanoi actively works for the overthrow of the Republic of Viet-Nam:

After thoroughly surveying the international and domestic situation, the political report of the party Central Committee sets forth the revolutionary task to be carried out by our people in the present phase as follows: “to strengthen the unity of all the people; to struggle resolutely to maintain peace; to accelerate the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam while at the same time stepping up the national people's democratic revolution in South Viet-Nam. . . .

Earlier in the same year, in an article in the Lao Dong Party journal, Minister Giap was even more precise:

The North has become a large rear cchelon of our army. . . . The North is the revolutionary base for the whole country.

Lest anyone fail to realize the full significance of the statements I have just been quoting—statements which can be multiplied manyfold—I would emphasize that they are not the utterances of some small, clandestine, dissident group within South Viet-Nam; on the contrary, they are the official voices of the Communist Party, the ruling party in North Viet-Nam, and its leaders.

Fact II. The so-called Liberation Front for South Viet-Nam, the organization which Communist propaganda tries to picture as an organization established and run by the people of South Viet-Nam, is a creation of Hanoi.

The so-called Front is neither southern nor independent, and the only "liberation" it seeks is the assassination and kidnaping of South Vietnamese leaders and the subjugation of the South Vietnamese people. The so-called Front grew out of a meeting of North Vietnamese Communist leaders in Hanoi in September 1960. And even before its creation was announced—in Hanoi, significantly—the Communist leaders of North Viet-Nam were issuing orders and defining what the Front's mission would be.

And today it remains a subordinate unit of Hanoi's Central Office for South Viet-Nam, an integral part of Hanoi's government machinery.

Fact III. The key leadership of the Viet Cong—its officers, specialists, technicians, intelligence agents, political organizers, and propagandists—has been trained, equipped, and supplied in North Viet-Nam and sent into the Republic of Viet-Nam under military orders issued by Hanoi.

There are special training centers in North Viet-Nam for these infiltrators—the principal one, Xuan Mai, being located not far from Hanoi itself. In addition, there are special units responsible for taking these men, once trained, to the south: the 70th Transportation Group for overland infiltrations via routes which pass through Laos—a Laos which by international agreement was to be free from such

incursions and violations of its neutrality—the Maritime Infiltration Group for sending supplies and men into South Viet-Nam by sea. To demonstrate Hanoi's thoroughness, it has established regular routes—complete with way stations, rest and medical facilities, and guides—for those who infiltrate by land.

We are not speaking of infiltration from the north to the south on a small scale. Since 1959, some 20,000 officers, soldiers, and technicians for the Viet Cong are positively known to have entered South Viet-Nam from the north under orders from Hanoi. On the basis of additional information, it is estimated that during this same period another 17,000 to 20,000 infiltrators were dispatched to the south by the regime in Hanoi. Moreover, the rate of infiltration has increased during the past 6 years—reaching an estimated figure of over 7,000 during 1964.

The total number of infiltrators during the past 6 years—up to 40,000—would be impressive by any standards. It is even more impressive when measured against the size of the Viet Cong forces in the south—currently estimated at a hard core of 35,000. These figures make it apparent that, allowing for casualties, outside infiltrators from the north make up the vast majority of the so-called hard core of the Viet Cong.

Fact IV. The wherewithal needed by the infiltrators in their subversive mission—weapons, ammunition, and other supplies—has also largely been sent from North Viet-Nam into the south.

In 1959, when Hanoi launched the Viet Cong campaign of terror, violence, and subversion in earnest, the Viet Cong relied mainly on stocks of weapons and ammunition left over from the war against the French. Later, the Viet Cong depended heavily on weapons captured from the Armed Forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam. As the pace of war quickened, however, Hanoi undertook a campaign to re-equip its forces with Communist-produced weapons. And today large and increasing

quantities of military supplies are being supplied to the Viet Cong from outside the country, with North Viet-Nam serving as a convenient channel for material that originates in Communist China and other Communist countries.

Dramatic new proof of Hanoi's elaborate program of furnishing its forces in the south with weapons, ammunition, and other supplies was exposed less than 2 months ago—in mid-February—when a carefully camouflaged ship, built in Communist China and coming from North Viet-Nam, was discovered moored in South Vietnamese territorial waters, just offshore in Phu Yen Province, in the central part of South Viet-Nam. The ship, sunk by an air strike by the South Vietnamese Air Force, was found to have brought into the area a huge cargo of arms and ammunition—literally thousands of weapons, ranging from rifles to heavy machineguns, and more than 1 million rounds of ammunition—almost all of Communist origin.

Fact V. Finally, the most tragic facet of the evidence of the aggression against the people of South Viet-Nam lies in the death, human misery, and physical destruction which have been unleashed on them by the Viet Cong.

The Viet Cong and their Hanoi masters talk about "socialist construction"—about building a "peaceful" and "rich" Viet-Nam—about laying the foundations for "a new life full of freedom and happiness."

But they practice the opposite of what they preach. They have practiced no construction—"socialist" or otherwise—only destruction. They have practiced nothing to enrich the people or the country, not a single program of social or economic reform; instead, they have practiced terror, murder, kidnaping, destruction, and impoverishment.

Factories, railways, roads, bridges, police stations, agricultural stations, hospitals and medical clinics, antimalaria teams—precisely what every developing country needs in greater abundance—all have been

the victims of Viet Cong sabotage and destruction. Schools have been among the Viet Cong's favorite targets, and they have succeeded—through harassment, assassination, and sabotage—in closing or destroying hundreds of schools and interrupting the education of thousands of children.

The "new life" the Viet Cong have brought to Viet-Nam could not be farther removed from a "new life full of freedom and happiness." They have, rather, brought to those they claim to be "liberating" a life full of fear, destruction, and death. In the aggressive war which they unleashed against South Viet-Nam, they have—since 1960—killed over 22,000 members of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, men who have given their lives in defending their country and their people against that aggression. And the Viet Cong terror is against the Vietnamese people itself: They seek to destroy—by murder and kidnaping—the civilian leaders who are working to improve the lot of the Vietnamese people, whether in government, education, agriculture, or medicine. In 1964 alone, the Viet Cong killed outright 436 South Vietnamese hamlet chiefs and other Government officials and kidnaped another 1,131. Viet Cong bombings and sabotage killed more than 1,350 civilians, and in addition they kidnaped at least 8,400 other civilians.

It is not difficult to imagine—though it is impossible to calculate—the extent to which such killings, by depriving the South Vietnamese people of leaders qualified to carry through programs of social and economic betterment, weaken the social fabric and hamper the social progress which the people yearn for. Nor is it difficult to imagine—though again it is impossible to provide figures—the countless thousands who live in mortal terror that they or their loved ones will be next on the Viet Cong list.

Such is the tragic face of the new brand of aggression which has been unleashed against South Viet-Nam. There, as elsewhere, the natural response of the victim has been to defend himself with everything

at his command and to appeal to friends for moral and material assistance. And there, as in Greece and Korea, the response of the United States has been simple and straightforward: to help insure that the aggression will not succeed—nothing more, but certainly nothing less.

Irony of Defining "Aggression" Now

It is against this stark background that we must judge any suggestion that the time has come for this committee to recommend to the General Assembly that it now attempt to set down a definition of the concept of "aggression."

The people of South Viet-Nam could not be expected to take much comfort from such an exercise. They need no handbook prepared by the Assembly to assist them in identifying the aggression in their midst—there can be no doubt that the campaign of terror and armed attack inspired, directed, supplied, and controlled by the regime in Hanoi is exactly that. What the people of South Viet-Nam *do* need, no paper formulation of definitions could be expected to provide.

What they do need is to have their rapacious neighbor to the north leave them in peace and in the exercise of their right of self-determination. Failing this, what they do need is the moral and material support necessary to enable them to repel the aggression and restore peace to their embattled country.

In brief, Mr. Chairman, it would be acidly ironic if the committee were now to suggest to the Assembly that, in the face of the agony and travail of the Republic of Viet-Nam, we should now show our concern with international aggression by merely gathering around committee tables debating nice points of analysis in the remote hope that somehow, sometime, there could be agreement on a static definition of an ever-changing concept.

The problem of aggression is not one of definition, as shown by the facts of the aggression in South Viet-Nam today.

Soviet Misrepresentation of Facts

The representative of the Soviet Union has once again sought to lay down the familiar smokescreen of propaganda to hide the true nature of the aggressive campaign by which Hanoi is striving to overthrow the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam and subjugate the South Vietnamese people by force. He has again brought forward the cynical claim that the situation in South Viet-Nam amounts to a "civil war," a spontaneous local uprising among the indigenous inhabitants of South Viet-Nam—a struggle for "national liberation."

This misrepresentation of the true facts of the situation in Viet-Nam is—at one and the same time—fallacious, presumptuous, and ominous.

It is fallacious in that it ignores the facts emphasized in my statement before this committee: the fact that the Hanoi regime is formally, officially, and publicly committed to a policy of destroying and subjugating by force the Government and people of South Viet-Nam; the fact that the so-called Liberation Front for South Viet-Nam is a creature of Hanoi; the fact that the key leadership of the Viet Cong—officers, specialists, technicians, intelligence agents, political organizers, propagandists—has been trained, equipped, and supplied in North Viet-Nam and sent into the south under Hanoi's military orders; the fact that the wherewithal required for the subversive mission of these infiltrators—weapons, ammunition, and other supplies—has also largely been sent from North Viet-Nam into the south; and, finally, the fact of death, human misery, and physical destruction which have been wrought by this aggression from the north.

This misinterpretation is presumptuous because, at its core, it rests on the claim that the Government represented by my colleague from the Soviet Union is somehow able to assess and understand the true sentiments of the South Vietnamese people better than the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam itself.

Finally, the misinterpretation of the sit-

uation in South Viet-Nam as a struggle for "national liberation" is ominous because it makes clear that the "struggle for national liberation"—a cause which the Communists pretend is so dear to their hearts—is in essence nothing more than a cynical misnomer for a new brand of aggression. The Communists in Southeast Asia—apparently aware from the experience of their brethren elsewhere in the period since World War II that outright, large-scale, massive aggression carries with it intolerable, even suicidal risks to the aggressors—have now fallen back on aggression by planned and systematic infiltration across national boundaries of trained military personnel and their arms and supplies.

It is long past the time that the entire international community should have come to recognize clearly and unequivocally that this too—despite the false title "struggle for national liberation" given by the Communists—is a form of aggression. This is not a problem in which others have no stake; indeed, the very existence of more than a hundred small nations, particularly those that have acquired independence since World War II, might well be involved in this at any time.

Charges of Aggression From South Refuted

Finally, I wish to address myself briefly to the charges made by the representative of the Soviet Union that it is North Viet-Nam—not South Viet-Nam—which is the victim of aggression in Southeast Asia.

The charge will come as a surprise only to those ignorant of the facts or to those who have forgotten the inverted logic and contempt for truth which lay at the basis of such propaganda charges. Indeed, with exactly the same inverted logic and contempt for truth, the Communists had the effrontery to claim nearly 15 years ago—in 1950—that the North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea was somehow a case of aggression from the south. The present charge—that North Viet-Nam is the victim of aggression—is equally false.

I would remind the representative of the Soviet Union that neither the Republic of Viet-Nam nor my Government has as an official, formal, public, or private policy the "liberation" of North Viet-Nam. Neither the Republic of Viet-Nam nor my Government has undertaken to sponsor, direct, support, and staff a movement whose avowed aim is the "liberation" of North Viet-Nam and the overthrow of the North Vietnamese government by means of force. Neither the Republic of Viet-Nam nor my Government has engaged itself in the massive infiltration to North Viet-Nam of militarily trained personnel with a mission of destroying the government in that area. Neither the Republic of Viet-Nam nor my Government is engaged in an elaborate program to send to North Viet-Nam on a regular, large-scale, and continuing basis the material wherewithal needed by a movement created with such a subversive mission.

Certainly, Mr. Chairman, aggressive policies of this nature are being pursued in Viet-Nam—but they are being pursued by the Communists against non-Communists, by the North against the South, by Hanoi against Saigon.

The only aim of the military assistance which my Government has provided in response to appeals from the Republic of Viet-Nam—in recent months as well as beforehand—is to assist the Republic of Viet-Nam to defend itself by putting an end to Hanoi's campaign of armed aggression. As President Johnson has stated,¹ the defensive countermeasures the Republic of Viet-Nam, with our assistance, has taken in this effort have been, and will continue to be,

... those which are justified and those that are made necessary by the continuing aggression of others. These actions will be measured and fitting and adequate.

Yet these are the defensive countermeasures

¹ For remarks made by President Johnson at the close of an address before the National Conference Board on Feb. 17, see BULLETIN of Mar. 8, 1965, p. 332.

which the Soviet representative, with twisted logic, has tried to term "aggression."

Neither we nor the Republic of Viet-Nam are anxious to continue the struggle against Hanoi's aggression—for the resistance entails not only a tragic loss of life but also waste and destruction of resources which the area can ill afford. The United States would greatly prefer to devote its assistance and its resources to an international effort to assist in the economic and social development of the peoples of that area. Nevertheless, both the Republic of Viet-Nam and my Government remain determined to continue their resistance and struggle against aggression until it is stopped—until the people of South Viet-Nam are permitted to work out their destinies in their own way.

Essentials of U.S. Policy in Viet-Nam

In a statement on March 25th President Johnson outlined the essentials of the situation in Viet-Nam and U.S. policy there.² They are essentials which remain valid today—and they warrant constant repetition and careful study by all who genuinely seek the restoration of peace in strife-torn Viet-Nam.

The central cause of the danger there is aggression by Communists against a brave and independent people. There are other difficulties in Viet-Nam, of course, but if that aggression is stopped, the people and Government of South Viet-Nam will be free to settle their own future, and the need for supporting American military action there will end.

The people who are suffering from this Communist aggression are Vietnamese. This is no struggle of white men against Asians. It is aggression by Communist totalitarians against their independent neighbors. The main burden of resistance has fallen on the people and soldiers of South Viet-Nam. . . .

The United States still seeks no wider war. We threaten no regime and covet no territory. We have worked and will continue to work for a reduction of tensions on the great stage of the world. But the aggression from the North must be stopped. That is the road to peace in Southeast Asia.

The United States looks forward to the day when the people and governments of all Southeast Asia

may be free from terror, subversion, and assassination—when they will need not military support and assistance against aggression but only economic and social cooperation for progress in peace. Even now, in Viet-Nam and elsewhere, there are major programs of development which have the cooperation and support of the United States. Wider and bolder programs can be expected in the future from Asian leaders and Asian councils—and in such programs we would want to help. This is the proper business of our future cooperation.

. . . We have said many times—to all who are interested in our principles for honorable negotiation—that we seek no more than a return to the essentials of the agreements of 1954—a reliable arrangement to guarantee the independence and security of all in Southeast Asia. At present the Communist aggressors have given no sign of any willingness to move in this direction, but as they recognize the costs of their present course, and their own true interest in peace, there may come a change—if we all remain united.

Meanwhile, as I said last year and again last week, "It is and it will remain the policy of the United States to furnish assistance to support South Viet-Nam for as long as is required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism under control." The military actions of the United States will be such, and only such, as serve that purpose—at the lowest possible cost in human life to our allies, to our own men, and to our adversaries too.

Soviets Repeat False Charge of Gas Warfare

The representative of the Soviet Union has chosen to use the forum provided by this committee to repeat once again the wholly false charge—and there is no question he *knows* it to be completely false—that the United States has engaged in "gas warfare" and has employed poisonous gases in connection with the assistance it is rendering to resist and bring to an end the aggression being directed against the Republic of Viet-Nam.

This same charge was made in a note which the Soviet Foreign Ministry tried to present to the American Embassy in Moscow on March 26. That note was rejected, precisely because it was based on a wholly false allegation—and my delegation finds the repetition of this wholly false allegation today equally unacceptable.

Although experience has shown it is idle to suppose that respect for the truth will

² *Ibid.*, Apr. 12, 1965, p. 527.

prevent the repetition of such blatantly propagandistic falsehoods by representatives of Communist countries, one might have hoped that out of respect for the intelligence of this audience, the representative of the Soviet Union would have refrained from repeating the falsehoods here today. Clearly, however, the importance of making propaganda has again taken precedence over the respect accorded to the intelligence of his audience.

By way of reply to this wholly false, wicked, and monstrous charge, I wish to read to this committee portions of the letter which my Government submitted to the President of the Security Council only last Friday: ³

Poisonous gases, the use of which would rightfully concern the conscience of humanity, have not been used in Viet-Nam, nor is there any intention of employing them. The materials which were employed in Viet-Nam are commonly used by police forces in riot control in many parts of the world and are commonly accepted as appropriate for such purposes. They are non-toxic and of course are not prohibited by the Geneva Convention of 1925, nor by any other understandings on the subject. These facts were of course entirely familiar to the Soviet Union when it drafted the tendentious and willfully misleading communication referred to above.

Those facts are likewise entirely familiar today to the representative of the Soviet Union. Yet he has repeated the false charges.

Dreary Record of Communist Aggression

I do not intend to reply in any detail to all of the verbal aggressions which the representative of the Soviet Union has launched this afternoon against my country. I simply wish to point out, Mr. Chairman, that in the last unhappy 25 years there has been a great deal of aggression in the world.

The aggression against South Viet-Nam is only the latest in a series of Communist aggressions over those years. While countries of Africa and Asia were achieving independence during that period, other areas in Asia and Europe either lost their independence or were threatened with its loss.

The dreary record is familiar. In 1940

³ For text, see *ibid.*, May 3, 1965, p. 688.

Soviet armed forces entered and subdued three independent countries with ancient cultures and traditions of their own—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—and forcibly absorbed them into the Soviet Union. Mass deportations and cruel repressions have frustrated the hopes of these peoples to regain their independence.

I might remark, Mr. Chairman, on the statement of the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union who referred to Hitlerite aggression—I would remind my colleague that that Hitlerite aggression was made possible by the Hitlerite alliance with the Government which my distinguished colleague represents.

In the 1940's the Soviet Union took a slice of Finnish territory, seized Bessarabia from Rumania, and absorbed other territories of Eastern Europe. Soviet forces remained in much of Eastern Europe to insure that Communist regimes would take power and keep power. Neither size of country nor declared policies of neutrality has protected nations against Soviet aggression when it served Moscow's purpose. A heroic revolution by Hungarian patriots in 1956 was brutally and ruthlessly crushed by Soviet troops and tanks.

Communist invaders and infiltrators also threatened the independence of Iran and Greece, but the fierce patriotism of their governments and peoples, which we were proud to support, turned back the Communist threat.

In Asia the picture is bleak. In 1950 the Communist regime in North Korea invaded its neighbor to the south. Valiant fighting by the people and the army of the Republic of Korea and by the United Nations forces repelled the invasion and might have achieved a free, independent, and united Korea had it not been for the massive invasion of Chinese Communist troops.

During the 1950's, Chinese Communist forces invaded Tibet and, with unparalleled cruelty, subdued that peaceful country. We know of no other imperialistic invasion which can match the cruelty of this one. More recently, Chinese Communist troops have

invaded Indian territory. While India was able to withstand the invasion, it could do so and secure its independence only at tragic cost in lives and resources which are desperately needed for India's development.

I would like to quote, Mr. Chairman, a statement by an authority on aggression, namely, by Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Chinese Communist regime on July 10, 1964. He said:

The U.S.S.R. is taking too much territory. The U.S.S.R. took Bessarabia from Rumania, and besides that, has sliced off parts of East Germany, Poland, and Finland and included them in Soviet territory. There are also those who have said she is occupying Sinkiang and the Amur River. The U.S.S.R. is increasing her troop strength on her borders. She should stop these partitions.

Mao Tse-tung calls them "partitions"—the real word is "aggressions."

This pattern of Communist aggression, designed to achieve a Communist world, has been and remains the main obstacle to a thoroughly peaceful world in which all peoples may live according to their own principles.

The aggression that disturbs the peace of the world today is Communist aggression—the often proclaimed imperialist Communist determination that communism must conquer the world, must bury those who prefer freedom, and bury those who wish to have their right of self-determination, and that communism must win by so-called "liberation"—another word for terroristic subversion against lawful governments—potentially any government here represented.

Problem Is How To Deal With Aggression

Mr. Chairman, I would like to return to the point at which we started: Exactly what is it that a theoretical definition of aggression, if one could be arrived at, could be expected to achieve?

This is unfortunately not an area in which a declaration by the United Nations as to what "aggression" means can or will—in the light of the nature of the organization and of the problem—effectually alter people's behavior. The charter is not a national

criminal code. There are, of course, both in and out of the United Nations, those who transgress the charter, and there are those who defend the charter's violation by others. But their actions—in Viet-Nam or elsewhere—stem not from any matter of definition, not from any doubt as to meanings, not from any conviction that the charter's provisions have fortunately somehow overlooked their goals. Their actions stem, rather, from a basic unwillingness to carry out the charter's provisions when those provisions stand in the way of their objectives—and a corresponding willingness to thwart the efforts of the United Nations to apply and enforce those provisions, as the history of the Security Council alone so clearly indicates.

Violations of the charter's standards of conduct are not explainable by any *bona fide* ignorance of the fact that those standards were applicable. Nor could such violations have been prevented by any definition reiterating the already known and obvious. The states which have embarked on aggression over the past 20 years—and North Viet-Nam today—have been under no illusion that their actions were anything but conscious, deliberate violations of the charter. The provisions of the charter are clear and unambiguous. The remedy to aggression lies in strengthening respect for and support of the rule of the law we already have—not in embellishing it in the hope of making it plainer or more attractive to those who set it aside when it suits their interests.

We are unimpressed, Mr. Chairman, by statements such as those of the Permanent Representative of the U.S.S.R. circulated in Document A/AC.91/Add. 2 and that made by him here today. These statements piously take the position—to which I have alluded earlier—that a definition of aggression is important, since it might help to check aggression. But it is noticeable that the Soviet Government makes no effort itself to check the Hanoi aggression in Viet-Nam; indeed, its statements have carefully ignored that aggression and have been aimed at those seeking to help resist that aggression.

Mr. Chairman, what is needed is not defini-

tion of obligations but *performanee* of obligations clearly understood. We need no labored enunciation of a code of international behavior. We have one. What we need rather is:

First, the will to fulfill the plain charter obligations which we all understand—obligations so basic to civilized life that they are binding on all states, whether members of the United Nations or not; and

Second, we need the will and the ability to resist—by political means where possible, by military force where necessary—breaches of those charter obligations, a resistance which must be not only individual but collective; and

Third, we need international institutions which are able to deter the outbreak of aggression, to judge it when it nevertheless occurs, and to act effectively to suppress it; we need processes and institutions of peaceful settlement, backed by processes and institutions of collective security and collective defense.

To put it simply, Mr. Chairman, the real problem is how to deal with aggression rather than how to define it. The new forms of aggression unleashed in the world in recent years—and now so evident in Viet-Nam—make this an urgent task. Let us not permit our attention to be diverted from it by proposals that we substitute words for deeds.

Mr. Chairman, it will be clear from what I have said that the United States does not believe that it would be helpful or meaningful at this time for this committee to inform the General Assembly that it should now consider again the question of defining aggression.

[In a further statement Ambassador Plimpton said:]

I listened with interest to the reading, by the representative of that totalitarian, dictatorial monolith known as the Soviet Union, of quotations from American periodicals and American public officials in critical comment on policies of this Government. I appreciate the compliment by the Soviet representative to the freedom of the press and freedom of

speech which prevail in this country.

I would hope that some day, somehow, one might be able to read some criticism of some Soviet policy in some Soviet periodical or by some Soviet official. When that happy day comes, we will rejoice for the Soviet people and for the possible dawn in the Soviet Union of those freedoms of the press and of speech which alone promise real international understanding and real international peace.

STATEMENT OF APRIL 8

U.S./U.N. press release 4523

In the proceedings of this committee to date, I believe I would be safe in saying that there is no question which has been the subject of more comment than the situation in Viet-Nam. For this reason I have asked to speak briefly today to draw the committee's attention to the speech delivered by the President of the United States last night.⁴

The President's speech, aside from cutting through to the very core of the problem in Viet-Nam, bears moving testimony to the determination of my Government to do everything that is absolutely necessary, but no more, to help the Republic of Viet-Nam to resist and defeat the aggression against it; moving testimony to the will of my Government to seek a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam; and moving testimony to the desire of my Government to join with others in a cooperative effort to bring to Viet-Nam and other countries of Southeast Asia the fruits of peace.

My delegation will request that copies of the speech be circulated as a Security Council document, and I urge all members of this committee, as well as all states, whether or not members of the United Nations, to give the speech the very closest attention.

For us on this committee, I believe that the speech offers a basic contribution to the understanding of the problem of aggression in today's world, and particularly the prob-

⁴ *Ibid.*, Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

lem of aggression in South Viet-Nam.

I would like now, if I may, to address myself very briefly to the two draft resolutions before the committee.

The job of the committee is, of course, to advise the General Assembly as to the time when the committee considers it appropriate for the Assembly "to consider again the question of defining aggression." The committee met in 1959, decided that the time was not appropriate, and adjourned until 1962. In 1962 the committee again considered the question and, after deciding that the time was not propitious, adjourned. It is now the committee's task to decide whether it considers the present time appropriate.

For the reasons set forth in our statement of April 5, my delegation shares the view expressed by many other members of this committee that the time is not appropriate. For this reason we are opposed to the adoption of the Soviet resolution⁵ which, of course, takes the contrary view. For the same reason my delegation supports the resolution sponsored by Argentina and the United Kingdom,⁶ for which many other delegations have already expressed their support.

Because it is difficult to state now whether it will be fruitful to have this committee meet again after the conclusion of the 20th General Assembly or at any particular time, the flexibility provided for in the Argentine and United Kingdom resolution is, we think, highly desirable. By this procedure the committee will have the opportunity to meet again if events within the United Nations or without would lead a majority of the committee to think such a meeting would be useful—flexibility which we think is very desirable. Some have argued that there might be some impropriety in the committee leaving flexible the time of its next meeting. We find no basis for this contention.

Clearly, this committee, like other such committees created by the Assembly, may determine the frequency and method of con-

vening its sessions to the extent that the General Assembly has not itself done so. Indeed, this is precisely what the committee did in 1959, in 1962, without objection. The terms of Resolution 1181 (XII) clearly envisaged the likelihood that the committee would have more than one session, as the composition provided for is not merely the General Committee of the 12th General Assembly. Having envisaged possible subsequent sessions and having made no provision as to the frequency and method of convening them, it is clear that the Assembly intended that the committee itself determine these matters.⁷

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Cultural Relations

Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Concluded at London November 16, 1945. Entered into force for the United States November 4, 1946. TIAS 1580.

Signature and acceptance: Portugal, March 11, 1965.

Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization. Done at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force April 7, 1948; for the United States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808.

Acceptance deposited: Malawi, April 9, 1965.

Trade

Protocol amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and development and to amend annex I. Open for acceptance, by signature or otherwise,

⁷ The third session of the committee adjourned on Apr. 16 after adopting, without opposition, a draft resolution submitted by Cyprus (U.N. doc. A/AC.91/L.15) in which it was decided: "To reconvene in April 1967 . . . unless a majority of the members of the Committee, who will be consulted in writing in January 1966 by the Secretary-General, considers that it is desirable for the Committee to meet in April 1966."

⁵ U.N. doc. A/AC.91/L.12.

⁶ U.N. doc. A/AC.91/L.11.

at Geneva from February 8 until December 31, 1965.¹

Signatures: Ceylon, March 19, 1965; Denmark, April 13, 1965; Jamaica, April 1, 1965; Togo, April 13, 1965; Turkey, April 2, 1965; United Kingdom, April 20, 1965.

BILATERAL

Brazil

Agreement extending and amending the agreement of June 26, 1953, as extended and amended (TIAS 4130, 4586, 5050, 5521), for a cooperative program of agriculture and natural resources in Brazil. Effected by exchange of notes at Rio de Janeiro December 31, 1964, and April 5, 1965. Entered into force April 5, 1965.

Congo (Leopoldville)

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of April 23, 1964 (TIAS 5565), as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Leopoldville April 21, 1965. Entered into force April 21, 1965.

Greece

Agreement extending the agreement of December 13, 1958, and January 15, 1959, as supplemented (TIAS 4308), relating to the loan of certain vessels to Greece. Effected by exchange of notes at Athens March 16 and 23, 1965. Entered into force March 23, 1965.

Italy

Agreement extending the agreement of April 27, 1954, as extended (TIAS 3124, 4418), and the agreement of August 18, 1959 (TIAS 4365), relating to the loan of vessels to Italy. Effected by exchange of notes at Rome March 31 and April 17, 1965. Entered into force April 17, 1965.

Japan

Arrangement providing for Japan's contribution for United States administrative and related expenses for Japanese fiscal year 1965 pursuant to the mutual defense assistance agreement of March 8, 1954 (TIAS 2957). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo April 23, 1965. Entered into force April 23, 1965.

Korea

Agreement supplementing the agreement of February 19, 1960 (TIAS 4431), so as to provide for additional investment guaranties authorized by new United States legislation. Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul April 16, 1965. Entered into force April 16, 1965.

Philippines

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Manila April 23, 1965. Entered into force April 23, 1965.

United Nations

Agreement amending the postal agreement of March 28, 1951, as amended (TIAS 2399, 2711). Effected by exchange of letters at New York April 15 and 19, 1965. Entered into force April 19, 1965.

¹ Not in force.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Double Taxation—Taxes on Income and Property. Convention with Luxembourg—Signed at Washington December 18, 1962. Entered into force December 22, 1964. TIAS 5726. 30 pp. 15¢.

Guaranty of Private Investments. Agreement with Mauritania. Exchange of notes—Signed at Nouakchott May 4 and July 3, 1964. Entered into force July 3, 1964. TIAS 5727. 5 pp. 5¢.

Combined Military Exercises, 1965. Agreement with China. Exchange of letters—Signed at Taipei December 10 and 19, 1964. Entered into force December 19, 1964. TIAS 5728. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with India, amending the agreement of September 30, 1964. Exchange of notes—Signed at New Delhi December 31, 1964. Entered into force December 31, 1964. TIAS 5729. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Republic of Korea—Signed at Seoul December 31, 1964. Entered into force December 31, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5730. 9 pp. 10¢.

General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade. Procès-Verbal extending the declaration of November 13, 1962, on provisional accession of the United Arab Republic to the General Agreement—Done at Geneva October 30, 1964. Entered into force with respect to the United States December 18, 1964. TIAS 5732. 8 pp. 10¢.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Procès-Verbal extending the declaration of November 13, 1960, as extended, on the provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement. Done at Geneva October 30, 1964. Entered into force with respect to the United States December 18, 1964. TIAS 5733. 8 pp. 10¢.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Procès-Verbal extending the declaration of November 22, 1958, as extended and amended, on the provisional accession of the Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement. Done at Geneva October 30, 1964. Entered into force with respect to the United States December 18, 1964. TIAS 5734. 8 pp. 10¢.

Defense—Release of Drydock Facilities at U.S. Naval Station, Trinidad. Agreement with Trinidad and Tobago. Exchange of notes—Signed at Port-of-Spain, December 2 and 5, 1964. Entered into force December 5, 1964. TIAS 5736. 9 pp. 10¢.

Education—Commission for Cultural Exchange and Financing of Exchange Programs. Agreement with Spain. Exchange of notes—Signed at Madrid March 13, 1964. Entered into force March 18, 1964. TIAS 5737. 10 pp. 10¢.

American Republics. U.S. Acts To Meet Threat in Dominican Republic (Bunker, Johnson, Stevenson, texts of OAS resolutions) 738

China, Communist. U.S. Calls for Deeds, Not Words, in U.N. Committee on Defining Aggression (Plimpton) 775

Communism. U.S. Acts To Meet Threat in Dominican Republic (Bunker, Johnson, Stevenson, texts of OAS resolutions) 738

Disarmament. United States Summarizes Position on Disarmament and Arms Control (Stevenson) 762

Dominican Republic. U.S. Acts To Meet Threat in Dominican Republic (Bunker, Johnson, Stevenson, texts of OAS resolutions) 738

Economic Affairs. Soviet Adherence to International Patent Convention (Levin) 758

Germany. United States Reiterates Position on Polish-German Boundary 757

Health, Education, and Welfare. President Grati- fied by Report on U.S.-Japan Health Program (Johnson) 761

International Organizations and Conferences. U.S. Acts To Meet Threat in Dominican Republic (Bunker, Johnson, Stevenson, texts of OAS resolutions) 738

Japan. President Grati- fied by Report on U.S.- Japan Health Program (Johnson) 761

Military Affairs
President Johnson and Secretary McNamara Review Situation in Viet-Nam 748
Viet-Nam Area Designated Combat Zone for Income Tax Purposes 749

Poland. United States Reiterates Position on Polish-German Boundary 757

Presidential Documents
President Grati- fied by Report on U.S.-Japan Health Program 761
President Johnson and Secretary McNamara Review Situation in Viet-Nam 748
J.S. Acts To Meet Threat in Dominican Republic 738

Public Affairs. Foreign Policy Conference To Be Held at Portland 757

Publications. Recent Releases 786

Science. President Grati- fied by Report on U.S.- Japan Health Program (Johnson) 761

Treaty Information
Current Actions 785
Soviet Adherence to International Patent Con- vention (Levin) 758

J.S.S.R.
J.S. Calls for Deeds, Not Words, in U.N. Com- mittee on Defining Aggression (Plimpton) 775
United States Reiterates Position on Polish- German Boundary 757
United States Summarizes Position on Dis- armament and Arms Control (Stevenson) 762

United Nations
J.S. Acts To Meet Threat in Dominican Re- public (Bunker, Johnson, Stevenson, texts of OAS resolutions) 738

U.S. Calls for Deeds, Not Words, in U.N. Committee on Defining Aggression (Plimpton) 775

United States Summarizes Position on Dis- armament and Arms Control (Stevenson) 762

Viet-Nam
President Johnson and Secretary McNamara Review Situation in Viet-Nam 748
U.S. Calls for Deeds, Not Words, in U.N. Com- mittee on Defining Aggression (Plimpton) 775
United States Summarizes Position on Dis- armament and Arms Control (Stevenson) 762
Viet-Nam Area Designated Combat Zone for Income Tax Purposes 749

Name Index

Bunker, Ellsworth 738
Johnson, President 738, 748, 761
Levin, Harold A 758
McNamara, Robert S 748
Plimpton, Francis T. P 775
Stevenson, Adlai E 738, 762

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 26-May 2

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Wash- ington, D.C., 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
†86	4/27	Mann: statement before House Ways and Means Committee on Canadian auto legislation.
*87	4/27	Rostow: "American Policy in an International Perspective."
*88	4/27	Harriman: dedication of Winston Churchill pavillion at World's Fair (excerpts).
*89	4/27	Strong recipient of National Civil Service League Career Service Award (biographic details).
†90	4/28	Rusk: statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- tee on amending U.N. Charter.
*91	4/28	Rusk: death of Edward R. Murrow.
*92	4/28	Cultural exchange (Europe, Israel).
†93	4/29	Meeker: "Prospects of Law in a World of Conflict."
*94	4/30	U.S. delegation to SEATO minis- terial meeting.
95	4/30	Foreign policy conference, Port- land, Oreg.
†96	4/30	USAF plane attacked by MIG's off North Korea.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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Vol. LII, No. 1352



May 24, 1965

THE 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF V-E DAY

Address by President Johnson 790

CONGRESS APPROVES SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION FOR VIET-NAM

Remarks by President Johnson and Message to the Congress 816

THE REFORM OF OUR BASIC IMMIGRATION LAW

Address by Secretary Rusk 806

SECRETARY URGES RATIFICATION OF U.N. CHARTER AMENDMENTS 827

CONGO REALITIES AND UNITED STATES POLICY

by Assistant Secretary Williams 793

For index see inside back cover

The 20th Anniversary of V-E Day

*Address by President Johnson*¹

Twenty years ago the guns fell silent in Europe.

Today we know those who gave their lives in that conflict did not die in vain.

We still live in an uncertain world. Men have not yet stopped war or put an end to poverty. Freedom, as always, demands courage and unyielding vigilance and, occasionally, the life of man. And the alliance of the West is marked by arguments among its members.

But on the whole, this 20 years has been a time of shining achievement, of promises realized, of hopes fulfilled.

Nowhere does this emerge more clearly than in the dramatic contrast between this 20 years and the 20 years which followed World War I.

On November 11, 1938—the 20th anniversary

of the Armistice—Munich was just 6 weeks old and war less than a year away. Depression scarred the face of Europe and the Americas. The League of Nations, hopeful herald of a new era, had dissolved in bitter nationalism, unchangeable suspicion, and endless, useless debate. And when new aggression threatened, Western leaders yielded, to find that weakness only increased the appetite of tyrants.

In all of this America shared by failing to support the League and by standing apart from the troubles of Europe.

And war came. Again the lights went out.

When the dawn arrived, 20 years ago today, it was a gray dawn. Tens of millions were dead and nations were shattered. Almost before the ashes had cooled, the shadow of Soviet ambition fell across the face of Europe.

It was, perhaps, fortunate that new danger came when past failure was fresh. For we learned from the folly of the past.

¹ Broadcast to Europe on May 7 by the Early Bird communications satellite (White House press release dated May 7).

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LII, NO. 1352 PUBLICATION 7893 MAY 24, 1965

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department,

as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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First, instead of revenge we sought reconciliation. The result is that Western Germany, and Italy, and Japan are today trusted and flourishing members of the community of free nations.

Second, the narrow nationalism of rival states was replaced by a drive toward a unified Europe, growing in intimacy and partnership with the United States. The Marshall Plan—history's most generous act by one country toward others—provided the foundation for this unity.

Third, we found policies that replaced the fear of depression with the reality of prosperity. The Common Market, and closer economic ties between all the nations of the Atlantic, have been the catalysts of abundance. Compared with 1938, America's production has almost tripled. Free Europe's production has doubled. The flow of goods between us has tripled. And, together, we have opened the door to a world without poverty.

Fourth, the Atlantic nations replaced appeasement with firmness. We made it clear, in Greece and Turkey and in Berlin, that we would not yield one inch of European soil to aggression. As a consequence Europe is safer from attack and closer to enduring peace than at any time since V-E Day.

These, then, are the achievements of two decades: in place of depression, abundance; in place of division, unity; in place of isolation, partnership; in place of weakness, strength; in place of retreat, firmness; in place of war, peace.

A Continuing Task

We must not now forget in success and abundance the lessons we learned in danger and isolation.

None of us has sought—or will seek—domination over others. We have resisted the temptation to serve only our own interests. We have been successful because we have acted in a wider interest than our own alone. Thus the European nations have found strength and prosperity in building communities that stretch beyond old frontiers. The United States has committed its

resources to European reconstruction and its military strength to European defense. America has steadily sought the strength of European unity rather than to exploit the weakness of European division. Our policy has had a single aim—to restore the vitality, the safety, and the integrity of free Europe. And with our help, Europe is better able to resist domination—from within or without—than ever before.

There are some efforts today to replace partnership with suspicion, and the drive toward unity with a policy of division.

The peoples of the Atlantic will not return to that narrow nationalism which has torn and bloodied the fabric of our society for generations. Every accomplishment of the past has been built on common action and increasing unity.

Are our people more prosperous?

Is peace nearer?

Is the future brighter?

If so, it is because we have drawn together the strands of union. And there is no problem we now face which will not yield more easily to common and united action. The kind of nationalism which would blight the hopes and destroy the dream of European unity and Atlantic partnership is in the true interest of no free nation on earth. It is the way back toward the anguish from which we all came.

Of course there will be differences among us, but they can be resolved through reason founded on respect.

Of course there will be difficulties, but they can be overcome by determination founded on belief.

Of course there will be dangers, but they can be faced by unity founded on experience.

So let us therefore continue the task we have begun, attentive to counsel but unmoved by any who seek to turn us aside. We will go all together if we can, but if one of us cannot join in a common venture, it will not stand in the way of the rest of us. Each of our nations will, of course, respect and honor the achievements, and the culture, and the dignity of its neighbors. But we do this better joined in common trust than di-

vided by suspicion. For we do have a civilization to build.

Unfinished and Urgent Business

Here is some of our unfinished and urgent business.

First, we must hasten the slow erosion of the Iron Curtain. By building bridges between the nations of Eastern Europe and the West we bring closer the day when Europe can be reconstituted within its wide historic boundaries. For our part, after taking counsel with our European allies, I intend to recommend measures to the United States Congress to increase the flow of peaceful trade between Eastern Europe and the United States.

Second, we must work for the reunification of Germany. The people of Germany, east and west, must be allowed freely to choose their own future. The Four Powers have special responsibilities for Germany and Berlin. The shame of the Eastern Zone must be ended. It serves the real interest of none. We must set the Germans free, while still meeting the history-laden concerns that all understand. The United States is ready to play its full part in such arrangements.

Third, we have a wide range of economic problems to resolve. Despite obstacles, we will continue to press for greater European integration and a freer flow of trade across the Atlantic. We will also devise new proposals to expand world monetary reserves and to modernize the system of international payments.

Fourth, we must begin a new effort to find common instruments for helping the developing world. We are the rich nations in a world of misery. We are the white nations in a colored world. The treasured values of our civilization tell us it is right—morally right—that we should help others. The lessons of experience and wisdom tell us that if we fail to help now, then some day the tides of unrest will be surging along our own coasts. In fact, they already are there.

Fifth, we must work out more effective forms of common defense. All Atlantic nations who wish to do so have a right to share

in collective nuclear defense, while halting the spread of nuclear weapons. Just as long as they are needed and wanted, strong United States forces—backed by strong nuclear power—will remain in Europe.

Sixth, we must work toward agreement with the Soviet Union. Our firmness in danger has shown that the door to conquest in the West is forever closed. Thus the door to peaceful settlement is now open. It is in the interest of the Soviet Union, and in our own, to seek an end to tensions. I am sure that all the nations of the West share our own desire to work together toward any agreement that can hasten lasting peace.

These are a few, and only a few, of the great issues which face us as we move toward the third decade of increasing European unity—and stronger Atlantic partnership.

My country is engaged in towering and troubling enterprises around this struggling globe. American troops fight to hold back Communist aggression today in Viet-Nam. Others try to protect the freedom of the Western Hemisphere. In Africa and the Middle East our energies are engaged with the responsibility that great power brings. Everywhere we seek to serve the common interests of the free.

But the heartbeat of our policy and our expectations is with the nations of the Atlantic. We must all—Americans and Europeans—vow never to repeat the errors which have led to disaster: for America to stand proud in isolation, or Europe to fall apart in rancor.

But it is not enough to keep from past mistakes. We must build the new achievements of our future: a future, one in purpose, hope, and temper—reaching across the Atlantic to the civilization which it bred and taught, and which Europe now welcomes in common trust.

In 1778 the French Government said of the struggling new United States of America: “. . . the glory, the dignity and essential interest of France demands that she should stretch out her hand to those states.”

Well, the Atlantic tides have risen many times since then. Her waters have seen many a great captain, many goods, and dozens of armies make the passage. Yet the old dream stays—a great civilization touching both Atlantic shores.

How much grander is that dream than any

hope to which a single nation can reach. How much more filled with the prospect of peace and the increasing welfare of man.

The glory, the dignity, and the essential interest of all our states command us to the majesty of that Atlantic civilization.

It shall be ours.

Congo Realities and United States Policy

by G. Mennen Williams

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The Congo, along with Cuba and Viet-Nam, has been a top U.S. foreign policy headache for 5 years. It has caused sharp divisions in U.S. opinion. It has provoked serious crises for the U.N. It has at times created differences between ourselves and some of our friends. It has brought U.S. policy in Africa both praise and criticism. It has both united and caused divisions among African nations. It has complicated the problem of self-determination in southern Africa and is used by white supremacists there to justify their reactionary positions. It has for several years contained the seeds of a major East-West confrontation.

As a speech subject it is utterly frustrating, as it provides material not simply for a speech, or even a book, but for a library.

American public opinion has been confused and split about the Congo, largely because of differences over how best to create the conditions in which independence and territorial integrity can be maintained there. The role of the U.N. in the Congo and the personality

of Moise Tshombe also have been controversial issues. Hopefully, trends now developing will shortly lead to a broader agreement on existing policy.

Few subjects have caused more turbulence at the U.N. than the Congo. The U.N.'s Congo peacekeeping effort of 1960-64 was one of the most important and difficult the U.N. ever mounted. That effort, however, because it ultimately offended the Soviet Union, provoked both the Russian "troika" proposal—which aimed at emasculating the power of the U.N. Secretary-General—and precipitated the U.N.'s current financial and constitutional crisis.

Perhaps the less said about the Congo as a cause of differences among friends, the better, because at this time there is close agreement and cooperation. Nevertheless, such differences have existed between our friends and us. However, relations between the United States and Belgium, in the person of Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak, have long been marked not only by cooperation and general accord but also by cordiality, absolute respect, and confidence.

What the Congo has done to U.S. relations with African countries is more dramatic.

¹ Address made before the Ford Hall Forum at Boston, Mass., on Apr. 25 (press release 84 dated Apr. 23).

Our generally good image in Africa reached a remarkable apogee when we fully supported the U.N. in ending the secessionist movement in Katanga. That effort at secession was regarded by other Africans as counterrevolutionary and a return to colonialism. Just about 2 years later, however, widespread misunderstanding of the humanitarian U.S.-Belgian rescue mission at Stanleyville evoked much African criticism of the United States.

While it is true that the reaction of African leaders was in part due to Africa's inability to cope with the Congo rebellion and to the damage to the African image which stemmed from sensational stories of primitive savagery, their main motivation was resentment with what they considered American and Belgian support of Congolese Prime Minister Moise Tshombe. Many African leaders refused to support Mr. Tshombe because of his leadership of Katangan secession, his alleged connection with the death of former Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, and his connections with Portugal, the Republic of South Africa, and the Belgian mining company, Union Minière du Haut-Katanga.

Although some rancor against the United States still exists, time and events are beginning to modify earlier differences of opinion and misunderstandings. The Security Council debate—which was as vituperative a debate as we have encountered in that body—ended with general agreement on a resolution which pointed the way for future constructive action. If that trend continues—and I believe it will—I feel the United States is on the road back to a more solid understanding with all African leaders.

The Congo has had a major impact on the external affairs of other African nations. For about 3 years—from 1960 through 1963—the majority of African nations were united in opposing Katangan secession, although they responded differently to the secessionist movement in Stanleyville (Orientale Province) under Antoine Gizenga but without mutual friction. Since then, however, reaction to Prime Minister Tshombe's

government and his use of white mercenaries has caused a sharp difference of opinion between African governments. This is reflected in the difficulties faced by the Organization of African Unity in trying to act on the Congo.

The excesses that have occurred in the Congo and the breakdown of law and order there have acted as a buffer to the extension of independence and self-government to the areas farther south. There is no question that those who would deny the choice of self-determination to nonwhites in those areas have used events in the Congo to buttress and harden their longstanding opposition to black African participation in self-government. They overlook the heartening progress being made in most of the other 36 independent and self-governing countries of Africa. At the same time, the Congo is frustrating progress toward self-determination in southern Africa because independent African states and well-wishers are pinned down by the intra-African debate over how to handle the Congo situation under Mr. Tshombe's leadership.

The hand of communism in Congolese affairs has been both specter and substance. Indigenous tribalism and not-always-justifiable resentment against Central Government administrative inadequacies have played no small part in the Congo's troubles. But there is no question that Communists would welcome control of the Congo as a rich prize, and it is indisputable that both Russians and Chinese are meddling dangerously.

Factors Behind the Congo Problem

The problem of the Congo, like many human problems, has a complex history and a complicated present. Comprehension of the problem is obscured by misunderstanding sensationalism, and conflicting partisanship. Today, therefore, I would like to try to put into focus some of the basic realities in the Congo and how United States policy relates to them.

To begin with, the Congo is (1) the geographic and strategic heart of Africa and

(2) potentially very rich. On the other hand, the Congolese are (3) widely dispersed over a vast area without adequate communications; (4) divided by tribalism; (5) without adequate preparation for self-government; (6) without trained personnel; and (7) with an ill-prepared security force. And, in addition, (8) the Congolese had been isolated for decades from contacts with other Africans.

The *first* and perhaps most important background fact is that the Congo is the geographic and strategic heart of Africa. What goes on in the Congo has a major impact on all its many neighbors and the rest of Africa. For those reasons, along with its great wealth, control of the Congo has been—and is—a prize sought by many. The United States, for its part, never has had any desire to control the Congo—or any other part of Africa, or the world, for that matter—nor does it now. We seek for the Congo only continued independence with a viable economy to support it. But the United States, in the interests of African and world peace and harmony, is concerned that the Congolese and not Communists control the Congo.

The *second* point is that with peace and security the Congo could become economically viable in about 3 years, according to many experts. This would put the Congo in a class almost by itself among African countries. In addition to its agricultural potential, it is the world's principal producer of industrial diamonds and a major source of copper, tin, manganese, and a number of scientifically important minerals. Yet the annual per capita income today is only \$80—more than some of its neighbors but less than the African average of \$120.

Ninety-six percent of the \$2 billion in private investment in the Congo is Belgian or came from Belgian profits in the Congo. Direct U.S. investments in the Congo represent only about 1 percent, which clearly indicates our concern there is certainly not protection of U.S. economic interests, as sometimes alleged.

The *third* reality is that the Congo, as big as the United States east of the Mississippi,

is largely isolated for lack of adequate communication. With 14 million people, compared with our 122 million east of the Mississippi, the Congo has only 3 percent of our railroad mileage and 6 percent of our highway mileage, of which less than 1 percent is hard-surfaced. In the rainy season much of the country is shut off. The Congo river network and commercial aircraft carry a part of the transportation and communication load, but the net result is far from adequate.

A *fourth* Congo reality is the divisive factor of tribalism. The country is comprised of nearly 200 tribes who speak some 300 principal languages and many more dialects. There is no such thing as a single *lingua franca* in the country. It is true that French is the official language of the country, but it is estimated that less than 10 percent of the people speak it.

Tribal loyalties and ancient enmities have impeded and thwarted the development of national unity. As a matter of fact, the centrifugal forces of tribalism are such that, if secession ever were successfully maintained, the Congo could break up into dozens of little unviable areas, each subject to extremist infiltration.

Tribalism also is a prime cause for the lack of national political unity. Political parties are based more on ethnic or personal loyalties than on national political platforms. Most attract support only in limited local areas, and only a few can claim to be even regional in scope. There are no nationwide political parties.

A *fifth* Congolese reality is the lack of preparation for self-government after 50 years of colonial rule and four centuries of exploitation. Between the 15th and 20th centuries the Congo was a principal source of slaves. According to reliable authorities, some 30 million Congolese—more than twice the country's present population—were enslaved.

The Berlin Conference of 1884 gave King Leopold of Belgium control of the Congo. Public controversy arose over reports of brutality under this arrangement, and the country was taken over as a colony by the

Belgian Parliament in 1908.

Under Belgian Government rule, the Congo began to prosper economically and became the center of the greatest industrial concentration and the most extensive primary educational system in tropical Africa. Many skilled and semiskilled workers and office personnel were developed, although the vast bulk of the population remained dependent upon subsistence agriculture.

Despite the Congo's economic development, however, almost no thought or preparation was given to Congolese independence. In 1955 a Belgian professor, A. J. J. van Bilsen, published *A Thirty-Year Plan for the Political Emancipation of Belgian Africa*. This plan, long-range as it was, caused an uproar and was considered highly idealistic and unrealistic.

However, the wind of freedom elsewhere in Africa was to bring independence to the Congo in 5, rather than 30, years. A serious outbreak of rioting in 1959 led to the calling of a Brussels Round Table Conference with Congolese leaders in January 1960, at which the date of June 30, 1960, was agreed upon for Congolese independence. Most Belgians, and some Congolese as well, did not anticipate that independence would result so quickly from the Brussels Round Table Conference. A whole new system of government was developed and launched in the 6-month period that followed.

This brings us to the *sixth* Congolese reality—a lack of trained personnel needed to run that vast country. Under Belgian rule, Europeans—some 10,000 of them—handled all of the important administrative and other public responsibilities, yet Belgium itself had a difficult time administering the Congo and maintaining order.

Because of a lack of previous preparation and the speed with which independence came when the movement finally started, there was no time to train the indigenous administrators necessary for the tasks to be done. At the time of independence, there were less than two dozen Congolese who were university graduates. Although the claimed Congolese literacy rate was high by

African standards, there was little secondary and no postsecondary education for black Africans in the Congo until 1954, except for seminarians.

Congolese lack of training and experience has been a serious detriment to sound administration. The difficulties inherent in relations between the Central Government and local administrators in this large nation have led to such problems as failure to pay teachers and local officials. This has led to great resentment against the national government in many parts of the country.

This same lack of preparation is behind the *seventh* Congolese reality—the inadequacy of the Congolese National Army, the ANC.

At the time of independence there was not a single Congolese officer in the entire officer corps. A week after independence, elements of the ANC mutinied. The Belgian commander was dismissed, as were practically all of the European officers, and Congolese noncommissioned officers were elected or appointed to positions of responsibility. Public order broke down very quickly, and Belgian troops entered the Congo to protect Belgian lives and property.

Within 2 weeks of independence, Congolese President Joseph Kasavubu and the then Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba had to call upon the United Nations for military assistance to restore order.

An *eighth* Congolese reality is the relative isolation of the Congolese from the other countries of Africa. In former French areas the leaders of the different countries met in Paris during their periods of higher education and during service there in French legislative councils. During the independence movement, many French-speaking leaders worked together in the RDA (the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain*), which embraced most of former French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa. Likewise, in the British area, there was often a common educational experience and London contacts among English-speaking African leaders. The Congolese enjoyed no such common background with their neighbors

Whether cause or effect, they were about the last by years to become a part of any of the various African regional groupings. The combination of isolation and a feeling not unjustified by history that their rich land was coveted by others has aroused in the Congolese suspicions of foreigners that still tend to keep them apart from their neighbors.

U.S. Policy in the Congo

It is against those realities that the Congolese have had to work out their government and the United States has had to formulate and carry out a Congo policy over the past 5 years. The policy we have developed is consistent with our overall foreign policy and is an integral part of our general African policy of supporting the growth of truly independent African states.

In the Congo, American policy is designed to support the principles of national unity and independence, internal security, and territorial integrity.

Nearly 4 years ago, Under Secretary Ball stated our long-term objectives in the Congo.² We seek to achieve there, he said:

The same thing that we seek to achieve in other areas of Africa: a stable society under a stable and progressive government . . . it should be strong enough and determined enough to safeguard its real independence. . . . We wish to insulate the African Continent from the kind of military intervention by the Sino-Soviet bloc that has created such problems in other parts of the world.

The United States has faithfully and consistently supported the Central Government of the Congo since June 1960—under President Eisenhower, under President Kennedy, and under President Johnson—and under Congolese President Kasavubu and his Prime Ministers Lumumba, Ilco, Adoula, and Tshombe.

Execution of U.S. policy can best be discussed by dividing postindependence Congolese history into three phases: (1) independence and secessions; (2) national reconciliation; and (3) U.N. withdrawal and renewed rebellion.

Phase I—Independence and Secessions

The initial phase of modern Congolese history opened with independence on June 30, 1960. Within a week, the new government faced its first crisis when part of the Congolese army in Léopoldville and Thysville mutinied, demanding promotion and pay increases. Disorder spread rapidly, and Belgian troops entered the Congo to preserve order.

To halt the chaos, the Congo's legally constituted government, under President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba, first asked the United States for military help on July 9. While the United States was prepared to support the Congolese Government economically, we refused to provide troops in order to avoid a direct East-West confrontation in the Congo. President Eisenhower suggested that the Congo invite the United Nations to help maintain its security. The U.N. responded immediately to this appeal.

The United States, in July and August of 1960, joined with other members of the Security Council in adopting resolutions which authorized Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld to provide the Congolese Government with necessary military assistance. The Security Council requested all states to "refrain from any action which might undermine the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo" and called upon Belgium to remove its troops.³ Our support of the Congo was channeled through the U.N. in the form of financial and diplomatic support, transport aircraft and military equipment, and food supplies. Up to July 1964, U.S. assistance to the Congo amounted to more than \$400 million in value.

The second Congolese crisis was the secession of Katanga Province on July 11, 1960. Provincial President Moïse Tshombe proclaimed Katanga an independent country, appealed to Belgium for military help, and criticized the U.S. for failing to support his secession.

² BULLETIN of Jan. 8, 1962, p. 43.

³ *Ibid.*, Aug. 8, 1960, p. 223.

Some Americans have asked why Katanga secession was not viewed as a form of self-determination, particularly since they felt Moise Tshombe was the only Congolese anti-Communist. There were at least four reasons against that course of action.

First of all, self-determination legally applies only to a recognizable national unit. Katanga, during 50 years of Belgian rule, was one of six Congolese provinces. It was so recognized at the Brussels Round Table Conference, where all Congolese leaders, including Kasavubu, Lumumba, and Tshombe, agreed to the country's boundaries, and in the constitutional charter emanating from that meeting.

Second, as a practical matter, if Katanga seceded, then up to 20 other areas might want to do the same thing. This would have led to chaos and opened the door for Communist and extremist penetration.

Third, partition would have torn apart the economic fabric of the Congo and destroyed its prospects for economic viability.

Fourth, Mr. Tshombe was only one among many anti-Communists in the Congo. Cyrille Adoula, for example, who later became Prime Minister, was an anti-Communist Catholic trade unionist who helped end the Communist-supported Stanleyville secession. President Kasavubu and General Mobutu, too, curbed Soviet diplomats when they tried to take over the Congo.

The third crisis for the new Republic was caused by Soviet intervention. Although the Soviet Union supported the Security Council resolution calling for U.N. assistance to the Congo, by August 1960 it was introducing its own agents, planes, and equipment into the country. The Soviets made a determined effort to penetrate central Africa and attempted to promote a Communist takeover in the Congo. In fact, Communist activities in the early days of Congolese independence caused a falling out between President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba and led the Congolese Government to close the Soviet and Czech embassies in September 1960.

In February 1961 the Soviet Union mounted an intense assault on the person and powers of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld. In addition, the Soviet Union and a number of Communist and other countries recognized the Stanleyville regime set up in December 1960 by Lumumba's Vice Prime Minister, Antoine Gizenga, who termed his government the "legitimate" government of the Congo after Lumumba was deposed. The Soviet Union also unsuccessfully attempted to introduce a "troika" directorate into the U.N. Secretariat, essentially to give them a veto over action by the Secretariat. From September 1960 on, in fact, the Soviet Union consistently opposed the U.N. Operation in the Congo and refused to pay its properly assessed share of the costs, despite the fact that originally it had voted in the Security Council to send U.N. military units to the Congo.

The fourth crisis of the first phase of Congolese independence was the power struggle between Kasavubu and Lumumba. A series of events in August 1960 led to increasing opposition to Lumumba and, eventually, the Kasavubu-Lumumba confrontation. In that period, Lumumba ordered the expulsion of the Belgian Ambassador; recalled Congolese students from Belgium; declared a state of emergency; attacked the Catholic Church for criticism of his government; imposed martial law, press censorship, and a ban on public meetings; arrested a number of political opponents in Léopoldville and Stanleyville; and accepted Soviet aircraft, equipment, supplies, and technicians, which could have led to an East-West confrontation.

On September 5, 1960, President Kasavubu dismissed Prime Minister Lumumba on the grounds of provoking discord, depriving citizens of fundamental liberties, and plunging the country into civil war. He named Joseph Ileo to be the new Prime Minister. At the same time Lumumba declared that Kasavubu was no longer President.

At this point the U.N. closed the Léopold-

ville radio station and all major airports to traffic other than that of the U.N., to prevent either side from bringing in supporting forces.

With the help of Colonel (now General) Joseph Mobutu, President Kasavubu was able to unseat Lumumba and place him under house arrest. The Parliament voted to support Lumumba, but the vote was taken without a quorum because a number of deputies stayed away as a result of intimidation. At this point Parliament was dismissed by President Kasavubu, and a temporary military government established a College of High Commissioners to administer the country.

On November 27 Lumumba escaped to join his supporters in Stanleyville but was recaptured on December 1 and returned to Léopoldville. On January 17, 1961, he was moved to Katanga and was killed either en route or in Katanga. His death was surrounded by mysterious circumstances which are still unclear, but the U.N. commission that investigated his death declared he probably was murdered.

The first phase ended with the Soviets thwarted and a radical takeover blocked. But there was a constitutional crisis, in which two governments at Léopoldville and Stanleyville claimed legitimacy, and two areas, Katanga and South Kasai, proclaimed secession. Furthermore, the Léopoldville Government was without a Parliament and without a parliamentary-approved Prime Minister.

Phase II—National Reconciliation

The most urgent need as the second phase of Congolese independence began was to restore parliamentary government. President Kasavubu, therefore, invited officials from Katanga, Stanleyville, and South Kasai to a reconvening of Parliament at Louvanium University in Léopoldville in July 1961, but Katanga refused to participate. That 14-day parliamentary meeting was held behind locked doors, barbed wire, and a guard of United Nations troops. Two hundred of the

Parliament's 221 members attended. It was marked by a sharp clash between the moderate forces of Kasavubu and the radical forces of Gizenga.

The conflict was resolved when President Kasavubu exercised his influence and urged Parliament to forget differences and unite on a mutually acceptable candidate, Cyrille Adoula, an African nationalist. He was ultimately elected by a near-unanimous vote. All factions of the country except Katanga joined in this government of national reconciliation. Mr. Gizenga was named Deputy Prime Minister, a post in which he served briefly, but shortly thereafter he led Orientale Province into secession. This time Congolese troops, aided by the United Nations, took Stanleyville in January 1962, to end its secession, and Gizenga was imprisoned shortly thereafter.

Attention was focused on Katanga again in September and December of 1961, when the United Nations sought to preserve the unity of the Congo. Katangan forces, including mercenaries, clashed with United Nations troops, however, and the United Nations forces struck back in heavy fighting. Those encounters eventually led to a temporary cessation of hostilities, and negotiations began between Prime Minister Adoula and Mr. Tshombe.

In December 1961 President Kennedy asked United States Ambassador Edmund Gullion to help arrange a meeting between the Central Government and Mr. Tshombe. Ambassador Gullion flew to Katanga and accompanied Mr. Tshombe to Kitona, near Léopoldville.⁴ After a promising start, an agreement reached at Kitona between Prime Minister Adoula and Mr. Tshombe failed to be carried out by Katanga.

Peaceful United Nations overtures were made to Katanga throughout 1962, including Secretary-General U Thant's U.N. plan for Congo reconciliation.⁵ Regrettably, peace-

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, Jan. 1, 1962, p. 10.

⁵ For text, see U.N. doc. S/5053/Add. 13 and Corr. 1.

ful measures were unsuccessful. Finally, Katangan troops resisted United Nations forces who were in Katanga in performance of their duties in December 1962, and the United Nations troops, whose equipment and supplies had been strongly built up for such a contingency, counterattacked and ended the Katangan secession movement in January 1963.

The importance of this event must not be underestimated. It did more to restore African confidence in the United Nations and the West—and particularly in the United States—than any other event in the last 5 years. The Soviets, who were ready to support the Central Congolese Government in terminating Katangan secession by violent means if the United Nations did not, were thwarted. They were denied what would have been, under those circumstances, a sure, popular, and Africa-wide approved return to power and influence in the Congo.

By 1963 the United Nations Operation in the Congo and the Central Congolese Government had prevented disaster from sweeping over the country. Secession was halted, a good start toward economic stabilization had begun, the United Nations instituted monetary reform without inflation, unity was restored and order reestablished. A broad-gaged technical assistance and economic development program was initiated under United Nations auspices. The threat of a big-power confrontation had been averted. The only major shortcoming was that no agreement could be reached between the U.N. and the Congolese Government to retrain the Congolese National Army.

The burden which the Congo operation had placed upon the United Nations' financial and human resources led the United Nations to withdraw the last of its military forces on June 30 of last year, although the United States would have preferred to see them there longer. There was also a strong feeling among many United Nations members that the United Nations had largely accomplished its military task and that it was

now time for the Congo to look after its own security.

The provisions of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions regarding the Congo continue to apply. The United Nations, moreover, continues its significant role in the Congo as a nation-builder, a function which in the long run is as important as maintaining the Congo's integrity and security. With substantial financial help from the United States, the United Nations has provided extensive technical assistance to the Congo and has about 1,600 technicians, educators, administrators, and doctors working there. For the last 4 years, some 400 Nigerian civilian police have been serving under a U.N. program in the Congo, and Nigeria is participating with the U.N., the United States, and Belgium in a police training program for the Congolese.

Phase III—U.N. Withdrawal and Renewed Rebellion

Unfortunately, as the anticipated withdrawal of the United Nations troops in 1964 drew near, new tribal fighting and rebellious uprisings erupted in parts of the Congo. Those actions brought a new threat to the country's security and national integrity.

The first stage of rebellion came in the form of an anti-Government uprising by rebellious bands in Kwilu Province in the western part of the Congo in January 1964. That insurgency, led by Pierre Mulele, a Congolese trained in Communist China, flared violently but was contained by the Congolese National Army.

A second series of revolts broke out in the eastern Congo in April 1964. Those revolts were triggered and sustained by various Congolese tribal factions, Rwandan refugees, and other disaffected political and youth groups that moved about ransacking villages and cities where the Central Government's authority has never been strong.

The leaders who headed the revolt in the eastern part of the Congo included Christophe Gbenye, Gaston Soumialot, and "Gen-

eral" Nicolas Olanga, who were connected with the so-called National Liberation Committee. The National Liberation Committee (CNL) had its headquarters at Brazzaville, the capital of the former French Congo, across the Congo River from Léopoldville. Some of the rebel leaders also appeared at Bujumbura, Burundi, where they made contacts with the Chinese Communists.

The Chinese embassies in Brazzaville and Bujumbura (before the latter was closed down by the Burundi Government last February) provided Congolese rebel leaders with advice, instructional materials, and money. For example, copies of Mao Tse-tung's writings on guerrilla warfare turned up in the eastern Congo. More recently, very large amounts of Chinese and Russian military equipment have been captured by Congolese military forces who have overrun rebel strongholds in the northeast Congo.

The rebels did succeed in capturing most of the large towns and controlled the northeast quarter of the country for a while last year. As a matter of fact, there was concern in Léopoldville that the capital itself might fall if Bukavu were captured. Fortunately, although Bukavu was attacked seriously and invaded several times, it held out against the rebels.

Despite the many rebel gains, however, they were for the most part taking advantage of the elements of discontent mentioned earlier and were filling a vacuum rather than taking over from well-established authorities. A "popular republic" was proclaimed by the rebels, but no effective administration was ever set up.

By late 1964 the rebels had slaughtered thousands of trained Congolese in the eastern Congo simply because they were literate and assumed to be Government supporters. In addition, a number of foreigners were killed, and the rebels were holding citizens of at least 25 countries—including Americans and Belgians who were held as hostages under threat of death. Other thousands of civilians, Congolese and foreign, had been subjected to inhumane and unlawful

treatment by the rebels.

Following months of unsuccessful attempts by the U.N., the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Organization of African Unity, and direct negotiation with the rebels to secure the release of hostages, the Governments of the Congo, Belgium, and the United States took direct action to prevent a massacre.⁶ On November 24, with the authorization of the Central Congolese Government, Belgian paratroopers were flown to Stanleyville by U.S. Air Force planes. The rescue mission was completed and the troops were out of the Congo by November 29. As a result of this operation, more than 2,500 persons—Africans, Asians, Europeans, and Americans (58)—were evacuated.

During the rebellions in 1964, the Government's leadership was placed by President Kasavubu in the hands of Moise Tshombe, who returned from exile in Europe in June 1964 and took over as interim Prime Minister in July.

The United States had no forewarning or knowledge that President Kasavubu would select Mr. Tshombe as Prime Minister, and there is, I might add, absolutely no truth to the assertion that we encouraged his return. As the former leader of Katanga, his relations with a number of African leaders, as well as with us, were less than cordial. Regardless of personal relations, however, we decided to continue the same policies toward his government that we had with its predecessors, because our objective in the Congo has been constant and Mr. Tshombe declared his willingness to work to preserve the integrity, independence, and unity of the Congo.

Mr. Tshombe immediately attempted to reconcile all the dissident elements of the Congo. He released Antoine Gizenga from prison, where he had been for 2½ years. Albert Kalonji, former head of the South Kasai secession movement, returned from Europe to take a Cabinet post. André Lu-

⁶ For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 14, 1964, p. 838, and Dec. 21, 1964, p. 891.

baya, a member of the Brazzaville-based CNL, returned to Léopoldville to take a Cabinet position. Despite these efforts, however, Mr. Tshombe's attempts at national reconciliation were unsuccessful, because the CNL rebels refused to try to work out their differences.

Instead, their military operations in the eastern Congo increased, and Stanleyville fell to the rebels on August 4, 1964. Faced with a worsening situation, Mr. Tshombe appealed to Ethiopia, Liberia, the Malagasy Republic, Nigeria, and Senegal for troops. Although several countries indicated a willingness to assist the Congo militarily—if other African nations would join them or with OAU approval—they failed by one vote to get the necessary endorsement at a special meeting of the Organization of African Unity in Addis Ababa in September 1964.

Meanwhile, Mr. Tshombe had felt compelled to hire white mercenary soldiers to help the ANC put down the rebellion. The United States regrets that this was necessary, and we neither condone nor approve of such a policy. We can, however, understand the considerations which led the Congolese Government to use mercenaries, which it has every legal right to do to defend its sovereignty.

We hope that adequate arrangements consistent with the maintenance of Congolese internal security can be made so that the Congo can, as soon as possible, dispense with the services of mercenaries, whose presence causes so much controversy in Africa.

Current U.S. Policy

American policy in the present situation is continued support of the Central Government, just as we supported it under three former Prime Ministers—Lumumba, Ileo, and Adoula. This policy today is progressing along three tracks—peacekeeping, diplomatic, and nation-building.

The U.S. Government believes that the Congo problem cannot be solved militarily alone, but that there must be a political solution. This is the general opinion of all

concerned. However, until a viable political solution can be found, the rebellion must be contained and outside intervention halted.

At the request of President Kasavubu and under the Prime Ministerships of Adoula and Tshombe, we have provided military transport and material to help Congolese Government forces restore law and order and to permit a return to peaceful pursuits.

Our military assistance is consistent with previous U.N. resolutions on the Congo and in accordance with the July 1963 bilateral military aid agreement we already had with the Adoula government.

Let me make clear, however, that we have absolutely no intention to engage U.S. forces in combat operations in the Congo, nor is any consideration being given to such a course of action. In all, there are only some 200 American military personnel in the Congo, including the normal attaché personnel. Most of our military people there are the air crews, maintenance men, and guard detail for our three C-130 transport aircraft.

As of the moment, the ANC, with the support of the mercenaries, appears to have regained most of the area lost to the rebels, sealing off the northern borders and discouraging outside intervention. Several large pockets of rebel activity remain, and in a number of rural areas the rebels are still in the bush. However, all the principal strategically located cities and towns, and most of the smaller ones, are in Government hands.

On the diplomatic track, we are encouraging the development of an African solution to the Congo crisis. As I said in the Congo when I was last there, in August 1964,

The assistance which the United States is giving in response to the Congolese Government's request is with full recognition that the Congo is and always will be an African nation, and that it is free and peace-loving African nations themselves which should take the initiative in assisting the Congo.

Thus, while we are responding to urgent requests from the Congolese Government, we

do not regard our aid as more than supplementary to the efforts of the Congolese and others.

The United States believes the Organization of African Unity can make a constructive contribution to a Congo solution. Several times we have offered to give appropriate assistance to the OAU, if requested. We have, as we could, encouraged the Congo to cooperate with the OAU and its members.

But to say that there must be an African solution to the Congo problem is not to usurp the Congo's right to enjoy the same attributes of sovereignty as other independent African countries. Nor should the Congo be reduced to tutelage under foreigners, whether European, American, or African. There are many possibilities within an African context for finding a constructive and satisfactory solution to the Congo's difficulties, and we hope that the African genius for political accommodation will carry the continent's nations toward a positive course of action.

One factor that has made it difficult for African nations to coordinate their Congo policies has been the open intervention on the side of the rebels by several African countries. There have been public admissions of aid to the rebels by Algeria, the United Arab Republic, Sudan, and Uganda.

The danger in this course is obvious. Intervention on the side of rebels in the Congo would set a precedent for intervention on the side of rebels in any of the 36 other independent African nations. Intervention is in blunt violation of United Nations and OAU resolutions and charters. Should such interventions succeed in the Congo, it is quite likely that the country would be fragmented beyond recognition and cause turmoil in the rest of Africa.

Fortunately more and more African leaders are coming to realize that there is no feasible alternative to support of the Central Congolese Government and the United Nations and OAU resolutions. They have noticed, too, that the population of the rebel-controlled areas is becoming more dis-

enchanted with rebel occupation, that there is no assurance rebel leaders actually control the rebellion, and that the rebels' conditions for reconciliation are unacceptable. Furthermore, they have observed the great difficulties disunity among rebel leaders is causing for countries initially sympathetic to rebel aims.

Nigeria, which supplied troops for the U.N. forces in the Congo and has civilian police there today, has long had an interest in peace and order in that country. Its Congo policy is based on the OAU Charter principles of noninterference in a country's internal affairs and respect for territorial integrity and sovereign equality. Nigeria reaffirmed its belief in those policies at the United Nations last fall, in a speech by former Foreign Minister Jaja Wachuku, who gave his country's strong support to the Central Congolese Government.

Subsequently, at Nouakchott, Mauritania, in February, the leaders of 13 French-speaking nations associated in the Common Organization of African and Malagasy States adopted a strong resolution opposing outside interference in the internal affairs of African countries and supporting the legal government of the Congo. We are gratified, too, that the February-March conference of OAU foreign ministers at Nairobi, Kenya, showed increased understanding by African statesmen of the far-reaching ramifications of the Congo problem. Even though the conference did not reach definite conclusions regarding the Congo problem, it narrowly failed of a majority vote to provide military aid to the Congo and rejected a motion to hear the Congolese rebels.

Mr. Tshombe's personal diplomacy also is a strong factor in gaining support for himself. Although he was excluded from the Cairo OAU conference last July, he successfully participated as a member of the recent Nairobi conference. Furthermore, he has been active in sending emissaries to other African nations and is opening Congolese embassies in a number of countries. More recently he invited representatives from

a number of African nations to observe the conduct of the elections now being held in the Congo.

The third track that is being pursued in the Congo is nation-building, which is going forward despite the rebellion.

The Congolese are forging ahead, not only to pacify the northeast part of the country but to introduce capable, trained administrators to the area to improve the well-being of the population and revitalize the economy. The United States is assisting those efforts by providing food to the Congolese people in outlying areas. The United Nations technical assistance programs, to which the United States contributes generously, are continuing. A number of Belgian administrative personnel, chosen by the Congolese Government, are going to the northeast Congo to help speed the area's recovery. They will operate out of Stanleyville, the headquarters of civil administration for the entire northeastern part of the country, which is headed by Congolese Colonel Leonard Mulamba.

Some progress also is being made toward reopening the Congo River to shipping. Initial shipments from Léopoldville have reached Stanleyville, and efforts are being made to resume regular service.

At the present time the Congolese are holding national and provincial elections which began on March 18. They will continue throughout the provinces until April 30. Within 8 months thereafter, the Congolese Parliament and provincial assemblymen will elect a President.

At least 50 Congolese parties have presented candidates for election to the Parliament. As evidence of the free atmosphere in which the elections are being carried out, I might point out that a member of the opposition MNC-Lumumba party was elected to Parliament at Jadotville in Mr. Tshombe's home province.

We hope that these elections, as the expression of the desires of the Congolese people, will help to achieve stability and order. We welcome the courage and good sense of Congolese leaders in holding elec-

tions during this crucial period, and we hope they will contribute to a resolution of the Congo's problems.

The United States, as its contribution to nation-building, conducts a program of aid in the Congo. We believe, however, that Belgium, as the former metropole, is in the best position to contribute to the Congo's economic recovery and prosperity. Indeed, Belgium already is taking significant steps to assist Congolese progress.

Even during the heavy postindependence rioting, many Belgian businessmen, religious men, educators, and technicians remained in the country. Their numbers decreased sharply from a preindependence high of some 90,000 to about 15,000 at one time, when diplomatic relations between Belgium and the Congo were severed for a while in 1960 and 1961. Following restoration of diplomatic relations in December 1961 and a gradual improvement in the internal security situation, Belgians began returning to the Congo. There are perhaps 50,000 to 60,000 Belgians there now. Both the Belgian and Congolese Governments have made strong efforts to improve relations between the two countries. A number of outstanding issues between the two countries have been resolved. Most important were the division of responsibility for servicing the outstanding Congolese debt inherited from preindependence days and the turnover to the Congolese Government of the portfolio of shares in Congolese companies originally owned by the old Belgian Congo Government.

With the gradual improvement in relations, the Belgians are taking on greater responsibilities toward the nation-building process in the Congo. The Belgians, for example, 2 years ago agreed, at the request of the Congolese, to play a major role in the reorganization of the Congolese Army. Belgium maintains some 2,050 technical assistance personnel in the Congo, of whom about 1,200 are teachers.

In addition there has been a substantial increase in both secondary and postsecondary education in the Congo. At the time of

independence nearly 1.5 million Congolese children were in primary school; today there are some 2 million. The number of pupils in secondary schools has risen from 29,000 in 1959-60 to more than 85,000 today. Louvainium University in Léopoldville increased its enrollment from 33 in 1954-55 to 1,087 in 1963-64, and it is expected to rise to 2,000 by 1967. Belgian teachers have worked closely with the Congolese Government and UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] in aiding secondary and university education.

No people know the Congo better than the Belgians do, and no single country has greater interests in the Congo than Belgium. By the same token, the Congolese are familiar with the Belgian method of doing things, and most of them have received their education in Belgian-run institutions.

We welcome the improving relations between the Congo and other nations—both African and European—and we are pleased with constructive efforts many friendly nations are making to assist the Congo. We believe that closer ties between the Congo and other free nations will be of considerable benefit to both parties.

Encouraging Signs of Progress

Looking ahead along the three tracks of American policy in the Congo, then, we can hope for a more favorable situation.

The security situation is improving, and aid to the rebels seems to be pretty well sealed off. The country's major cities are back under Central Government control. Pockets of rebel activity still exist in isolated locations in the interior, but their leadership is badly disorganized. Congolese National Army training is proceeding rapidly to better enable it to take over full responsibilities for maintaining law and order in that country.

In diplomacy, an increasing number of African statesmen are moving to support for the Central Government. There are encouraging signs that they believe the Congo's unity should be maintained and that they want to avoid the precedent of upsetting legitimate governments by violent means.

In nation-building there also is progress. The holding of elections at this time is a significant step forward and demonstrates the Government's genuine desire to have the Congolese people express their political wishes. Many sectors of the Congolese economy, too, are moving ahead despite the rebellion.

Taking everything into account, the Congo's internal situation today is better than at any time since the U.N. troops left the country.

Looking to the future, unquestionably there will be serious difficulties ahead for the Congo, but, hopefully, those difficulties will not be of crisis proportions. One problem that will be with the Congo for many years is a shortage of trained administrators, without whom all nation-building tasks will be difficult. Another urgent need is a more effective, well-trained security force.

We believe that the resolution of the Congo's troubles is an urgent and important matter for all peace-loving nations, particularly African. Only with the restoration of peace and order can that vast country in the heart of Africa get on with its task of building a strong and viable nation.

We shall continue our policy toward the Congo of support for the country's unity, independence, security, and territorial integrity, and we trust that such a policy will assist the Congolese and other Africans in building peace and prosperity in Africa's heartland, to the mutual advantage of all of us.

The Reform of Our Basic Immigration Law

*Address by Secretary Rusk*¹

It is a pleasure to be here in Detroit with the Michigan Committee for Immigration. Although I have testified on immigration before committees of Congress on several occasions,² this is the first chance I have had to discuss the subject outside Washington. It seems to me altogether appropriate that I should speak on immigration here. Michigan is one of the most cosmopolitan States in the Union. I understand that there are approximately 50 different nationality groups in this State, about 40 with sizable numbers in Detroit.

Michigan has demonstrated leadership in the field of immigration in many ways:

The sponsors of this meeting embrace, I am informed, 76 nationality, religious, and civic organizations.

Senator Philip A. Hart is the leadoff sponsor in the Senate of the President's immigration bill.³ He was chairman of the Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees and is now a member of the Immigration Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee.

Governor Williams was the first Governor in the country to appoint a Commission on Displaced Persons and Refugees.

I note the work of Mayor Cavanagh's City Commission on Refugees.

¹ Made before the Michigan Committee for Immigration at Detroit, Mich., on Apr. 19 (press release 78).

² For a statement made by Secretary Rusk on Feb. 24 before the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization, see BULLETIN of Mar. 15, 1965, p. 384.

³ For text of the proposed legislation and a section-by-section analysis, see H.Doc. 52, 89th Cong., 1st sess.

Both Governor Romney and Mayor Cavanagh have strongly supported your Michigan Committee for Immigration and, I am told, plan to file statements in favor of the President's bill.

"Unpartisan" Support of U.S. Foreign Policy

Unmistakably this meeting is bipartisan, or nonpartisan, or, to use the word favored by the late Senator Vandenberg, "unpartisan."

Senator Vandenberg will live in history as one of the master architects of the postwar foreign policies of the United States. He played a major role in bringing into being the United Nations, the Rio Pact, aid to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic alliance—institutions and programs which have served well to defend and promote the cause of freedom and the aspirations of the American people for a just and stable peace.

During the postwar years, this nation has had the great good fortune to have in the White House and in Congress leaders of both parties who have risen above partisan politics in dealing with the vital issues of national security and peace.

When Senator Vandenberg was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Harry S. Truman was President. They stood together on most basic questions of foreign policy, and every bill, treaty, and resolution reported out of the Foreign Relations Committee was by unanimous vote.

President Eisenhower was supported on basic issues of national security and foreign policy by such Democratic leaders as Sena-

tors Walter F. George and Lyndon B. Johnson.

Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, in turn, have had powerful support from key Republicans, both in and out of Congress. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., formerly a close partner of Senator Vandenberg on the Foreign Relations Committee, accepted the difficult post of Ambassador to Viet-Nam and is now actively assisting the President of the United States. My distinguished predecessor as Secretary of State, Christian A. Herter, is the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations.

As Secretary of State, I have testified many times at executive sessions of committees of Congress. I have encountered many differences of view. But in those closed sessions I have never experienced a division along party lines. When the national safety is at stake—and it is at stake in all important questions of foreign policy—all good men put the national safety first. And although men and women differ in their ideas of how the national interest can best be served in specific international situations, it has been possible to achieve and maintain a rather broad consensus on basic issues. This has given our policies strength, stability, steadfastness. For that, not only we but all other free peoples have reason to be grateful.

I hope that the matter on which you asked me to speak tonight—immigration policy—will muster the same sort of “unpartisan” support—not only in Michigan, where you are showing the way, but throughout the Nation.

Major Defects in National-Origins System

The principal reform called for by the immigration legislation requested by the President is the elimination of the national-origins quota system. That system is, in the President's words, “incompatible with our basic American tradition.” As he said in his message to Congress on January 13 of this year: ⁴

Over the years the ancestors of all of us—some 42 million human beings—have migrated to these shores. The fundamental, longtime American attitude has been to ask not where a person comes from but what are his personal qualities. On this basis men and women migrated from every quarter of the globe. By their hard work and their enormously varied talents they hewed a great nation out of a wilderness. By their dedication to liberty and equality, they created a society reflecting man's most cherished ideals.

The national-origins quota system was designed to preserve the balance of national and racial origins as it existed in the United States in 1920. It heavily favors Northern European countries and discriminates against countries of Southern and Eastern Europe and Asia and Africa. Indeed, fully 70 percent of the total annual quota was reserved for three countries: the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Germany. The remaining 30 percent has been shared by more than 100 other countries and areas.

The national-origins system has four major defects.

First, it has inhumane results. It has kept families divided. Even elderly parents of American citizens have had to wait for admission under a national quota—often a very small national quota. A man could bring in a domestic servant from any one of several countries, but not his own mother.

Secondly, the national-origins system deprives us of immigrants with valuable skills.

Thirdly, it embarrasses us in our international relations. It seems to say that we regard a great majority of the people of this earth as inherently inferior.

Fourthly, and most important, it contravenes our own basic commitments. Like the denial of full civil rights to all Americans, it is a flaw which we owe it to ourselves to correct—quite apart from its effect on the opinion which others hold of us.

As you know, Congress, over the years, has recognized these injustices by enacting special legislation and private bills to overcome them. Beginning in 1948, it has progressively liberalized our immigration laws to permit families to be reunited and to admit refugees from natural calamities and political upheavals.

⁴ For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 1, 1965, p. 146.

But special legislation and private bills have not eliminated the bad effects of the national-origins quota system. And we continue to be judged abroad by that basic provision, which seems to suggest that we judge people by their national and ancestral origins instead of by their personal qualities and abilities. On various occasions foreign ministers have emphasized to me that they were complaining not about numbers but about a principle which they considered fundamental.

The administration's bill would eliminate the national-origins system on a gradual basis by reducing all quotas by 20 percent each year for 5 years. The present authorized total annual quota of 158,000 would be increased to approximately 166,000 by raising the minimum quota for any country to 200.

The bill establishes a quota reserve pool from which all quota numbers would be allocated during the fifth year of transition and thereafter. In each of the 5 years of transition the pool would consist of (1) the numbers released from national-origins quotas each year under the 20-percent progressive reduction plan and (2) numbers assigned to the old quotas but unused during the previous year because of an insufficient qualified demand for them. However, the maximum allotment of numbers in any one fiscal year could not exceed the sum of all immigration quotas in effect on the date of enactment of the bill, roughly 166,000.

To prevent disproportionate benefits to the nationals of any single country, a maximum of 10 percent of the total authorized quota is set on immigration attributable to any quota area. However, this limitation would not operate to reduce any quota in any of the 5 years of transition by more than 20 percent.

Why do we propose to spread the change over 5 years? The reason is to avoid reverse discrimination against those countries in which registrations are not presently necessary because of their large quotas. These include some of our closest allies. For this same reason, the bill would authorize the President to reserve up to 30 percent of the

annual quota reserve pool for allocation to qualified immigrants who could obtain visas under the present law but not under the terms of the proposed new legislation, and whose admission would further our national interests.

Other Proposed Changes

One of the most discriminatory provisions of the present law is that which classifies immigrants of Asian stock according to their racial ancestry instead of their place of birth. This is a special form of discrimination against more than one-half of the people of the world. It also has inhumane consequences: For example, the Indian wife of a Burmese immigrant must await her place in the heavily oversubscribed Indian quota instead of being chargeable to the Burmese quota, which is open so that she could enter immediately.

The administration's bill would remove this special discriminatory provision affecting the so-called Asia-Pacific Triangle.

The administration's bill would also remove an accidental discrimination against two new nations of the Western Hemisphere: Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago. It would exempt persons born in those countries from immigration quotas, just as the present law exempts persons born in the Western Hemisphere countries which were already independent when the present law was enacted.

Protective Features of Law Preserved

The administration's bill preserves the protective features of the present law. A prospective immigrant must demonstrate satisfactorily that he will not become a public charge. Applicants who would be entering the labor force become excludable if the Secretary of Labor certifies that domestic workers are available to perform the work or that the alien's employment in this country would adversely affect wages and working conditions.

During 1959-62, less than half of the annual average of quota immigrants was added to our labor force—approximately 48,600 out

of 97,600 per year. It is estimated that the new bill would increase the annual number of quota immigrants entering the labor force by less than 24,000 a year. This would not be a significant quantity in a labor force estimated to reach 86 million by 1970. But qualitatively it might be of great significance by providing increased immigration for persons of good education, specialized experience, and exceptional abilities.

Let us remind ourselves that our immigrants during the 1952-61 period included 14,000 physicians and surgeons, approximately 28,000 nurses, some 4,900 chemists, nearly 1,100 physicists, more than 12,000 technicians, about 9,000 machinists, and 7,000 tool and die makers—all of which were in short supply at the time of their admission.

Under the administration's bill, as under the present law, first call on the first 50 percent of quota numbers would be available for immigrants of exceptional training, education, or experience, whose talents would be especially advantageous to the United States.

I shall not take the time here to review all the specific provisions of the bill. Many of you are already familiar with them, and any of you who are not can readily obtain the information, and the explanations for the proposed changes, from your own experts on your Michigan Committee on Immigration.

I would emphasize these points:

Four successive Presidents of the United States have called attention to serious defects in our existing immigration laws.

The present bill has been carefully prepared, and we believe that its enactment would serve our national interests and welfare in many ways.

The President is wholeheartedly behind this bill. Four of his Cabinet members have testified strongly in its support.

The bill is in harmony with the results and intent of liberalizing special legislation and private bills which Congress has enacted during the past 17 years. It would put the principles of our basic immigration laws in line with our basic ideals as a nation and people.

United States and Italy Reaffirm Close Ties of Friendship

Aldo Moro, President of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Italy, visited the United States April 19-24 at the invitation of President Johnson. He met with the President and other U.S. officials at Washington April 20 and 21. Following are an exchange of greetings between President Johnson and Prime Minister Moro on the south lawn of the White House on April 20 and the text of a joint communique released on April 21.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS

President Johnson

White House press release dated April 20

Mr. Prime Minister, distinguished visitors: This is an occasion that gladdens the hearts of all Americans. Our country is proud and grateful for friendships we enjoy with peoples and governments around the world.

Over the years no people have honored us more highly than have the people of Italy who have come to live as our neighbors and as valuable contributors to the success of our society.

Mr. Prime Minister, your coming today gives us an opportunity that we especially welcome, the opportunity to honor and salute you for all the many contributions to the strength and success of your great country.

While this is your first visit to the United States, we feel that we know you well. We know how valuable has been your courage and imagination and the efforts to restore freedom to the Italian people and lead them to the greatest prosperity of this century. We have looked forward to meeting you and to talking to you, receiving your wise counsel on the course our nation and all free nations may pursue together on the challenges that may face us ahead.

In our world today there are no problems which may fairly be described as exclusively

Italian, American, or European. There are only world problems, only human problems which beset all of mankind without regard to national boundaries. Our two nations joined so closely by boundaries of blood and culture are privileged nations. By devotion to progressive purposes we have brought better lives to our people, greater strength to the cause of freedom, and greater justice for all peoples.

Now we are challenged together to devote our finest efforts to the highest of goals, true and lasting peace for men everywhere.

For the United States, Mr. Prime Minister, let me say, as an early American President, Thomas Jefferson, said more than 160 years ago, peace is our passion. Our purpose is to assure peace with honor, freedom, and justice for men everywhere. I know that is the purpose of your efforts too. But the works of peace begin at home. Devotion to democracy must be a daily practice. We admire your own devotion to this standard. We apply this standard here in our own land in order that we do battle against poverty, against ignorance, against disease, against injustice. You have given much to the cause of democracy, Mr. Prime Minister. You know as we know that democracy may sometimes be difficult and that it is always demanding, but you believe as we believe that, when it is given the opportunity to work against the demands of extremists who seek its destruction, democracy succeeds and stands where other systems perish and fall.

In this spirit our two countries were never more closely allied than today. We both believe in peace. We both believe that war is not inevitable. We both are ready to make peace honorably as we both stand ever ready to defend freedom fully.

Our country and our city is honored today by your presence and the presence of your distinguished Foreign Minister, Mr. [Amin-tore] Fanfani. We welcome you and we look forward to meetings which we believe will add new strength to the growing strength of freedom in the world.

Prime Minister Moro

Unofficial translation

Mr. President, I thank you for the kind and warm words with which you have welcomed me. I am happy to bring the greeting of a friendly and allied Italy to this great country which has the possibility of exerting a decisive impact on the history of the world and the development of human civilization; to you, who with wise inspiration lead its destiny that is closely related to the establishment of the democratic ideals of liberty, justice, and peace; to all American citizens and, among these, to the American citizens of Italian origin who live on this hospitable soil.

When one sets foot on this land and when one's eyes encompass its vast plains and scan the towering heights of the buildings that lead one's sight toward the skies, the old designation of "New World" loses its traditional meaning as a simple definition of an historical boundary. This definition stands in fact for an extraordinary phenomenon of civilized progress, of economic development, of moral and intellectual conquests, of meaningful presence with respect to all human values.

These thoughts are to us a confirmation that the close ties the European peoples have created and loyally maintained with this country are fully justified, as it is justified to speak among us of a common destiny.

On one side is Europe, and in Europe Italy, which, risen once, again has attained a level of prosperity never reached in the past and is proud to contribute to the development of modern civilization with its reserves of experience and culture and its constant capability to link technical and economic progress to the dignity and to the liberty which are a growing reality in human society. On the other side is America, which from the forefront of the history of our time offers to the West and to the entire world the benefit of its admirable creative resources, its courage, its experimenting boldness, its concep-

tion of man, which is at one time expression of the wishes and the conquests of a contemporary world and of the classical and Christian tradition so deeply felt in our countries.

There is, therefore, between us a link which is moral and political before being military, and it is a link which tends to develop to the point of creating a community.

Yet there is no community of free nations, as the one of which we are part, which can fulfill all human hopes. We are, therefore, deeply aware of the complex problems affecting the evolution of international relations and of an ever-increasing human association among peoples.

It is in this context that the essential elements of our policies are to be placed. Our policy is a policy of friendship toward your great country, Mr. President. It is a policy of loyal adherence to the Atlantic alliance, which corresponds to the paramount objective of peace in security. This alliance has made us feel safe in a difficult hour for our country and has made it possible for a contrast of forces to develop into a dialog not devoid of perspectives even though in a world inspired by principles that are different from ours. Furthermore, Mr. President, as Italians and Europeans, we look at a united Europe as a great promise. It is an act of faith we offer to the natural and constructive evolution in the life of peoples and in the spirit of the civilization to which we are honored to belong.

Italy, together with her European friends, has been faithfully devoting for years her best energies to the affirmation of these ideals which we wish to see translated into reality in a democratic spirit, open to all, and in a balanced and close connection with the United States.

The present hour is indeed not an easy one because contrasting ideologies, diverging interests, different political and moral outlooks are facing each other in the arduous search for a stabilization of the world. In the past and present circumstances, we have

been and are by the side of the American people in friendly understanding and respect, because we believe that the ideals firmly pursued by this people are ideals of justice and peace for itself and for all. In your Baltimore speech,¹ Mr. President, you have confirmed this with noble and clear words that represent a pledge for all of us. "For centuries"—and I quote you, Mr. President—"nations have struggled among each other. But we dream of a world where disputes are settled by law and reason. And we will try to make it so."

I wish to thank you, Mr. President, for this meeting which bears renewed witness to Italian-American solidarity and, by our very presence here, embodies the happy relationship that exists between our two Governments and countries.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE

White House press release dated April 21

The President of the United States and Prime Minister Aldo Moro of Italy met in Washington April 20 and 21. Also participating were Secretary of State Rusk and Foreign Minister Fanfani.

President Johnson warmly welcomed the opportunity to have the Prime Minister in Washington as his guest in response to a longstanding invitation. They met for official discussions in an atmosphere reflecting the intimacy and cordiality of traditional Italian-American friendship.

A comprehensive exchange of views also took place on the situation in Southeast Asia and in Viet-Nam in particular.

President Johnson described the objectives that the United States pursues in that part of the world, in order to insure freedom and peace.

Prime Minister Moro, restating the Italian position as already publicly defined in Parliament, expressed his full understanding for the position and responsibilities of the United States.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

Both the President and the Prime Minister expressed the hope that conditions would materialize which will permit a peaceful and stable solution in freedom, justice, and security.

The two leaders expressed deep satisfaction with the broad convergence of views between their Governments on the importance of building a united Europe within the Atlantic community. They reaffirmed the validity of the Atlantic alliance as an instrument for safeguarding the peace and as an essential element for assuring stability and balance in the world. They agreed on the desirability of the construction of a united Europe as a vital element in the framework of Western civilization and as an important factor in the maintenance of world peace.

In reviewing the objectives and policies of their Governments, President Johnson and Prime Minister Moro noted that their Governments share the objectives of freedom, peace, and international cooperation and of assuring a good life for all of their people based on the principles of democracy and social justice.

The two leaders also agreed to explore possibilities of further and closer cooperation in the common effort to foster progress of the peoples of developing countries and to combat poverty in the world.

The Prime Minister and his party will conclude the Washington phase of their visit and depart for New York via Philadelphia on the morning of April 22. They will leave for Italy on the evening of April 24.

Letters of Credence

The following newly appointed ambassadors presented their credentials to President Johnson on May 5:

Julio Sanjines Goitia of Bolivia,

Lambertus Palar of the Republic of Indonesia, and

Khalifa Abbas el Obeid of the Republic of the Sudan.

USAF Plane Attacked by MIG's Off North Korean Coast

Department Statement

Press release 96 dated April 30

An RB-47 aircraft of the U.S. Air Force, tail number 53-4290, was proceeding on a routine mission on April 28 in international waters over the Sea of Japan. The aircraft had proceeded to a point at 39 degrees 38 minutes north latitude and 129 degrees 20 minutes east longitude, or some 45 nautical miles parallel to the North Korean coastline, without any incident occurring. Shortly before 3:26 a.m. Greenwich time, April 28, two MIG-17 fighter aircraft bearing North Korean Air Force markings were observed in an unfriendly attitude closing fast on the RB-47. These aircraft began making firing passes at the U.S. aircraft at 3:26 a.m. Greenwich time. A total of five firing passes were made, two by one of the MIG-17's and three by the other.

The first attack was initiated at a point some 50 nautical miles from the North Korean coast in the general area of 39 degrees 40 minutes north latitude and 129 degrees 30 minutes east longitude. The attacks continued until approximately 3:32 a.m. Greenwich time, at which point the RB-47 was in the same general area but approximately 75 nautical miles from the North Korean coast.

The U.S. aircraft did not return fire until after the first firing attack by the MIG-17, when fire was returned and one of the MIG's appeared to have been hit. The RB-47 took rapid evasive action, descending from 33,000 to 16,000 feet and taking advantage of an overcast sky to make its withdrawal. The skill of the USAF crew enabled the aircraft to return safely to Japan, although it was seriously damaged and returned on four of its six engines.

The facts indicate clearly that a USAF aircraft, which was well out in international waters, and at no time in its flight approached North Korean territory closer

than 40 nautical miles or exhibited an unfriendly attitude until fired upon, was attacked without warning of any kind by North Korean aircraft at a point 50 nautical miles from the North Korean coast. That attack continued until the skill and determination of the RB-47 crew enabled the U.S. aircraft to break off action at a point approximately 75 nautical miles from the North Korean landmass.

The United States Government takes an extremely serious view of this unprovoked attack. U.S. planes have traditionally operated freely over the high seas, in accordance with the rights guaranteed by international law to aircraft of all nations. They will continue to do so, and the United States will take whatever measures are appropriate for their defense.

U.S. and France Agree To Share Cost of Exchange Program

Press release 102 dated May 7

The Governments of France and the United States signed on May 7 at Paris an agreement extending the program of educational exchanges inaugurated by the two Governments in 1948.

The new agreement revises and enlarges the original agreement of 1948. It incorporates for the first time the principle of cost sharing by the two Governments.

Under the new agreement, the United States proposes to make available to the Franco-American Commission for Educational Exchange at Paris the French franc equivalent of \$4,770,200, in annual installments to be arranged, and subject to appropriation by Congress. The Government of the French Republic proposes to make available to the Commission the sum of 7,791,300 French francs (\$1,590,061), also in annual installments.

The ceremonies were held in the office of Eric de Carbonnel, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who signed for France. American Ambassador Charles

E. Bohlen signed for the United States.

Other governments that have now signed cost-sharing agreements with the United States are Australia, Austria, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden.

The Franco-American Commission, which administers the program in France under the general supervision of the Board of Foreign Scholarships, consists of 12 members, 6 of whom are citizens of the United States and 6 of France. The U. S. Chief of Mission in Paris appoints the Americans and the French Government the French members. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs and the U. S. Chief of Mission are honorary chairmen of the Commission.

In all, there are now 48 such binational commissions, which operate under agreements covering 49 countries. (Belgium and Luxembourg are served by one commission.)

The new agreement, which has been under negotiation since February 1963, enlarges the scope of the previous one by giving the Franco-American Commission permissive authority to carry out the full range of exchange-of-persons and related activities authorized under the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (the Fulbright-Hays Act—Public Law 87-256).

The amounts that will be made available to the Commission each year by the two Governments are to be determined by agreement between the two Governments. These contributions are subject to the availability of U.S. appropriations and to the allocations of credits made annually to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.

During the current academic year, 1964-65, the Commission, in cooperation with the Department of State and private American and French educational institutions, provided for a total of more than 500 exchange grants to senior scholars, teachers, students, and specialists. Of these, about 210 were for American citizens and about 290 for citizens of France.

U.S. To Propose International Adverse Drug Reaction Center

White House press release dated April 21

The President on April 21 approved a recommendation by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare calling for establishment of an international system to monitor and report adverse reactions to drugs.

The proposal will be offered by the U.S. delegation to the World Health Assembly convening at Geneva on May 4. Under its provisions, an International Adverse Drug Reaction Center would be created by the World Health Organization to develop a worldwide early-warning system for drugs. Such a system could help prevent widespread tragedy of the sort which resulted from the use of thalidomide.

The President announced,

We have already established an excellent national system for monitoring adverse drug reactions, under the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. The expansion of this into an international system would be of direct benefit to the American people since it would include the monitoring of adverse reactions throughout the world. This is one of the many instances in international technological cooperation where everybody gains and no one loses.

On June 10 last year, the President in a speech at commencement exercises at Holy Cross College spoke of cooperative endeavors in the field of health when he declared,¹

During International Cooperation Year we will expand our efforts to prevent and to control disease in every continent, cooperating with other nations which seek to elevate the well-being of mankind.

No nation can stand idly by while millions suffer and die from afflictions which we have the power to prevent.

As a result of the President's directive,² a review of international policy in 28 specialized fields has been undertaken by the United States Government as part of ICY observance. The drug-effects plan is the first proposal to emerge from this review.

The International Adverse Drug Reaction Center would be similar to WHO-designated

centers in other fields which are currently in operation in the United States and other countries. These centers include: the International Shigella Center at the Communicable Disease Center of the Public Health Service, at Atlanta, Ga.; the International Rickettsial Disease Center at the Rocky Mountain Laboratory of the National Institutes of Health, at Hamilton, Mont.; the International Center for Biological Standards at the State Serum Institute, at Copenhagen, Denmark; and the World Influenza Center at the National Institute for Medical Research, at London, England.

Anniversary of Sovereignty of German Federal Republic

Following is the text of a message from President Johnson delivered to Dr. Heinrich Lübke, President of the Federal Republic of Germany, on May 5, the 10th anniversary of the assumption of sovereignty by the Federal Republic.

Press release 97 dated May 5

Today on the tenth anniversary of the assumption of sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Germany, I extend personally and on behalf of the American Government and people our congratulations to you and the German people. We express our appreciation for the vital contribution which the Federal Republic has made and is continuing to make to the strength of the free world.

Germany's entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ten years ago and its constructive role in that alliance of free nations have contributed immeasurably to the collective efforts to assure peace in Europe and the world.

The freely and democratically elected government of the Federal Republic has not only restored freedom and material prosperity to its people, it has also made it possible for the people of Germany to resume their rightful role in the world community of nations. Until Germany is reunited in freedom, the Government of the Federal Re-

¹ BULLETIN of June 29, 1964, p. 990.

² For background, see *ibid.*, Oct. 19, 1964, p. 555; Dec. 14, 1964, p. 857; and Mar. 15, 1965, p. 382.

public will remain the only legitimate spokesman for the German people.

The United States reaffirms its responsibility to help resolve the German problem. We are firmly convinced that the cause of peace requires that Germany be reunified on the basis of self-determination. We intend to continue to work with the other responsible powers to achieve this goal.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Income Tax Protocol With Japan Enters Into Force

Press release 99 dated May 6

On May 6, Secretary Rusk and the Japanese Ambassador, Ryuji Takeuchi, exchanged the instruments of ratification of the protocol between the United States and Japan, signed at Tokyo on August 14, 1962,¹ modifying and supplementing the convention of April 16, 1954, as modified,² for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income.

The supplementary protocol was brought into force by that exchange of instruments of ratification.

The 1954 convention, like income tax conventions in force between the United States and numerous other countries, contains provisions designed to eliminate as far as practicable double taxation with respect to taxes on income. A supplementary protocol of May 7, 1960,³ which was brought into force on September 2, 1964, clarifies certain provisions of the 1954 convention and expands certain exemptions accorded thereby or modifies certain rules set forth therein.

¹ BULLETIN of Sept. 10, 1962, p. 397.

² Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3176.

³ TIAS 5637.

The modifications effected by the 1962 protocol are intended, in general, to bring the 1954 convention into conformity with other income tax conventions to which the United States is a party. It modifies to some extent the definitions in the 1954 convention, particularly with respect to "permanent establishment," "Japanese corporation or other entity," and "industrial and commercial profits." It makes technical changes in provisions for exemption from tax of the source state with respect to industrial and commercial profits derived by an enterprise of the other state. It provides that interest and royalties received from sources within one of the states by residents, corporations, or other entities of the other state shall not be taxed at a rate exceeding 10 percent if the recipient has no permanent establishment in the former state or has a permanent establishment of the type described in article 1 (1) of this protocol. It adds to the convention a new article to accord tax treatment with respect to dividends in conformity with the treatment presently accorded under provisions of other income tax conventions to which the United States is a party. It amends the provisions of the convention relating to compensation for labor or personal services. It makes technical changes in the convention provisions relating to source rules, broadening the source rule dealing with compensation for labor or personal services and modifying the source rule on royalty income to conform to the expanded definition of such income. It amends the credit article of the convention as modified by the 1960 protocol.

The 1962 protocol contains varying provisions regarding the applicability of specified amendments. Provision is made for the gradual imposition over a 4-year period of Japanese withholding tax upon dividends and for the related reduction in the amount of the deemed credit by the United States under the 1954 convention. The protocol will continue in force concurrently with the 1954 convention.

Congress Approves Supplemental Appropriation for Viet-Nam

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, MAY 4¹

Ladies and gentlemen of the Congress, I appreciate very much your responding so promptly in coming here this morning.

Late yesterday afternoon after a series of meetings I concluded that it was indicated it would be desirable to meet with the six most important committees in the Congress dealing with our relations with other nations and the security of the country.

I am prepared to submit to the Congress very shortly recommendations. Before I do that, however, I want to review with you some of my thoughts and get your judgment and your counsel and, I trust, your cooperation.

Under existing law we have transfer authority where we can use moneys already authorized and appropriated to meet any unusual needs of the services that we might have. I think I need not tell you the developments of the last few days, that we do have unusual and unanticipated needs in both the Viet-Nam theater and the Dominican Republic. We have been called upon to use men and materials at substantial costs that were not reflected in the budget when it was originally presented to the Congress. Therefore I am giving serious consideration to asking the Congress to appropriate at an early date an additional \$700 million to meet the

mounting military needs primarily in Viet-Nam and such expenses as we have had in the Dominican Republic and that we may have in the days to come.

This is in no way a routine appropriation. For each Member of Congress who supports this request is voting to continue our efforts to try to halt Communist aggression. Each is saying that the Congress and the President stand before the world in joint determination that the independence of South Viet-Nam shall be preserved and that Communist conquest shall not succeed.

In fiscal 1965 we spent about \$1,500,000,000 to fulfill our then commitments in Southeast Asia. The pace of activity, however, has been steadily rising because the aggression has been rising and they have stepped up their tempo. The additional funds are needed to make sure that our American boys have not only the best but the most modern supplies and equipment in adequate quantities. They are needed to keep an abundant inventory of ammunition and other expendables. They are needed to build facilities to house and to protect our men and our supplies. I would contemplate that the entire \$700 million would be used in the present fiscal year between now and June 30. Nor can I guarantee to you this will be the last request as things are now developing. If the need expands, I will of course immediately again turn to the Congress for help. We must do whatever must be done to insure our success. This is the firm and the irrevocable commitment of our people and our nation, whatever the risk and whatever the cost.

¹ Made at the White House before members of the House and Senate Appropriations and Armed Services Committees and the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees (White House press release dated May 4).

Resistance to Aggression

I have reviewed the situation in Viet-Nam many times with the Congress. I have reviewed it many times with the American people, with the diplomats of the world, and in broadcasts which were reproduced throughout the world. South Viet-Nam has been attacked by North Viet-Nam. It has asked our help. We are giving that help. We are giving it because of our commitments, because of our principles, and because we believe that our national interest demands it.

This is not the same kind of aggression which the world has long been used to. Instead of the sweep of invading armies there is the steady and the deadly attack in the night by guerrilla bands that come without warning, that kill people while they sleep.

In Viet-Nam we pursue that same principle which has infused American action in the Far East for a quarter of a century. There are those who ask why this responsibility should be ours. The answer, I think, is simple. There is no one else who can do the job. Our power alone, in the final test, can stand between expanding communism and independent Asian nations.

Thus, when India was attacked, it looked to us for help, and we gave it immediately. We believe that Asia should be directed by Asians. But that means that each Asian people must have the right to find its own way, not that one group or one nation should overrun all the others.

Now make no mistake about it, the aim in Viet-Nam is not simply the conquest of the South, tragic as that would be. It is to show that American commitment is worthless, and they would like very much to do that, and once they succeed in doing that, the gates are down and the road is open to expansion and to endless conquest. Moreover, we are directly committed to the defense of South Viet-Nam beyond any question.

In 1954 we signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and that treaty committed us to act to meet aggression against South Viet-Nam. The United States Senate was called upon to act upon that

treaty. It ratified that treaty and that obligation by rollcall vote of 82 to 1. Less than a year ago, the Congress, by an almost unanimous vote, a vote of 502 to 2, said that the United States was ready to take all necessary steps to meet its obligations under that treaty.² That resolution in the Congress expressed support for the policy of three successive American Presidents to help the people of South Viet-Nam against attack.

Thus we cannot and we will not and we must not withdraw or be defeated. The stakes are too high, the commitment too deep, the lessons of history too plain.

Moderation in Use of Power

We will not use our great power in any reckless or casual manner. We have no desire whatever to expand that conflict. We will do, though, what must be done, and we will do only what must be done. For in the long run there can be no military solution to the problems of Viet-Nam, and we all realize that. We know that we must find some way, somehow, a path to peaceful settlement, and all the resources and brains of our Government are relentlessly pursuing every possible alternative.

Time and time and time again we have worked to open that path. As I talk to you this morning, our allies are cooperating with us in attempting to open that path and find that solution. As I have said to you so many times and to the American people likewise, we are ready to talk any time, anywhere, with any government, without conditions. We will go anywhere. We will discuss any subject. We will listen courteously and patiently to any point of view that may offer possibilities of a peaceful solution.

You don't know how much I regret the necessity for ever issuing an order to bomb anything, particularly North Viet-Nam. But we began those bombings after I had been in the Presidency some 14 months and only when patience had been transformed from a virtue into a blunder.

² For background and text of a joint resolution of Aug. 10, 1964, see BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 258.

Time and time and time again men, women, and children—Americans and Vietnamese alike—were bombed in their villages and their homes while our forces made no reply. There was, last November, an attack on the [Bien Hoa] airfield; there was the Christmas Eve bombing of the Brinks Hotel in Saigon; there was the February attack at 2 o'clock in the morning while our American soldiers slept at Pleiku—where [15] Americans were killed and [245] seriously wounded.

These are just a few examples of their campaign of terror and attack.

We then decided that it was no longer advisable to stand by with our arms folded and see men and women and children murdered and crippled while the bases of these aggressors were immune from reply.

But we have no desire to destroy human life. Our attacks have all been aimed primarily at strictly military targets, not hotels, not movie theaters, not American compounds, not embassy buildings. We destroy bridges that are made up of steel and concrete and bleed little blood; so it is harder for our adversaries to convey their instruments of war from the North to the South. When they get to a bridge that is blown up, they must unload everything they have and, if possible in crossing a swift stream, take their ferries, and load it on a ferry, and try to get it across and unload it and load it back again, taking increased time and increased effort and slowing down their aggression. We destroy radar stations—some 10 of them—in order to keep them from spotting our planes and shooting down our American pilots. We destroy central depots for the infiltration of men and arms to the South, depots that furnish the manpower that attacked Pleiku. We patrol trails in an attempt to halt the invaders. We destroy the ammunition dumps to prevent the use of explosives against our men and our allies.

Who among us can feel confident that we should allow our soldiers to be killed while the aggressor sits secure in his sanctuary, protected by a border which he himself has violated a thousand times or more? Well, I do not believe that is the view of the Amer-

ican people, and I hope that is not the view of the American Congress.

Constant Search for Peace

The bombing is not an end in itself, as we all know. Its purpose is to bring us closer to the final day of peace, and whenever it will serve the interests of peace to do so, we will immediately end it. But let us remember, when we began the bombings there was no talk of negotiations. There were few worldwide cries for peace. Some who now speak loudly were content to permit the Americans and the Vietnamese to continue to die and to suffer at the hands of terror without protest.

Our firmness and the actions we have taken in the last few weeks may well have already brought us much closer to peace.

The conclusion is plain. We will not surrender. We do not wish to engage in a larger conflict. We desire peaceful settlement and reasonable talks. Yet the aggression continues, although we have sent the adversaries messages of our views day after day. Therefore, I see no choice but to continue the course that we are on, filled as it is with peril and uncertainty and cost in both money and men.

I believe the American people support that course. I believe they have learned a great lesson of this generation. Wherever we have stood firm, aggression has ultimately been halted, peace has ultimately been restored, and liberty has been maintained. That was true in Iran; that was true in Greece; that was true in Turkey; it was true in the Formosa Straits; that was true in Lebanon; and it was true in Korea. It was true in the Cuban missile crisis, and it will be true again in Southeast Asia.

Our people do not flinch from sacrifice or risk when the cause of freedom demands it, and they have the deep and abiding and true instinct of the American people: When our nation is challenged, it must respond. When freedom is in danger, we must face up and stand up to that danger. When we are attacked, we must not turn tail and run; we must stand and fight.

I know that the Congress shares these beliefs, and I believe the people they represent do likewise.

Proof of National Unity

I do not ask complete approval of every phase and every action of your Government. I do ask for the support of our basic course. What is that? That is resistance to aggression. That is moderation in the use of power. That is a constant search for peace. Nothing will do more to strengthen your country in the eyes of the world than the proof of such national unity which an overwhelming vote for this appropriation would clearly show.

I asked the Armed Services Committees of both Houses, the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees, and the Appropriations Committees to come here. As I said earlier, we can use transfer authority and supply us temporarily for these funds. We need them now, we need them tomorrow, we need them in the days ahead. If there is a genuine unanimity and willingness to provide them, I should like to submit forthwith a message to Congress asking that those learned in our relations with other nations give careful consideration to our recommendation and Appropriations Committees meet and act promptly, if that can be done. If it cannot, then we will try to proceed under the authority we have.

I dislike very much to disrupt your schedule and target dates that you have for various bills, but I know of nothing that is needed more just now. Although the volume of money is not excessive in terms of total military appropriations, the volume of information that it will convey is quite important, and therefore, unless there is serious objection, with the approval of the leadership I shall seriously consider transmitting to the Congress before the day is over the specifics of an appropriation for \$700 million and ask the House to go into immediate session if it can, and its committees, and try to report that situation as early as possible.

I have been President now for about 17 months. We have suffered losses that can

never be replaced. But our allies have suffered losses too. In South Viet-Nam, that little country of 14 million people has lost more than 10,000. During that same time they have killed 25,900 Viet Cong. In the last few days it is apparent something is taking place there we cannot speak of with certainty, but the incidents that the Viet Cong initiate have diminished. The losses they have suffered have substantially increased. The arrogance and adventure they once displayed has to some degree been curbed.

I have considered every alternative that I know to consider. I have listened to every voice that sought to give me information.

There are those who feel that we should take our strategic forces and try to obliterate the enemy and destroy his cities and wipe out his population. We have hoped to avoid that.

There are some who sincerely and genuinely feel we ought to be out of Southeast Asia altogether and retire to our own shores—that we really have no great interest there and that we ought to pull out. That argument would have had much more force if we had not concluded otherwise as a policy of the Congress and had not entered into treaties that bound us there. But if our word and our treaties in Southeast Asia is no good, it is no good in Berlin and it is no good with all the other dozens of nations that we have made commitments to and that we are bound to with treaty.

There are those who frequently talk of negotiations and political settlement and that they believe this is the course we should pursue, and so do I. When they talk that way I say, welcome to the club. I want to negotiate. I would much rather talk than fight, and I think everyone would. Bring in who you want us to negotiate with. I have searched high and wide, and I am a reasonably good cowboy, and I can't even rope anybody and bring them in who is willing to talk and settle this by negotiation. We send them messages through allies—one country, two countries, three countries, four or five countries—all have tried to be help-

ful. The distinguished British citizen, Mr. [Patrick Gordon] Walker, has been out there, and they say, we won't even talk to you. All our intelligence is unanimous in this one point, that they see no need for negotiation. They think they are winning and they have won and why should they sit down and give us something and settle with us.

So we can't go North and we shouldn't go South and we can't negotiate. So what do we do? Well, this is the situation that I inherited. It is the policy we decreed in 1954. So with the problem confronting me, they are the facts as I see them. I have tried to provide the maximum amount of deterrence to aggression with the minimum loss of life to ourselves and to our allies. That we will continue to do until somehow, somehow, we find a civilized solution and a readiness to exchange views across the conference table.

Situation in Dominican Republic

Now, the expenditure is not great in the Dominican Republic, but we do have many thousand men there.³ We do have 5,000 people yet to evacuate.

We were sitting quietly in my little office last Thursday afternoon, I believe—Wednesday afternoon maybe—discussing the logistics involved in the Viet-Nam situation with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara, and a cable came from our Ambassador [W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.], who is an experienced man in the Foreign Service for 20 years, an expert on the Dominican Republic, and because he had been there before and had tours of duty there we sent him back. He said that he had been notified by the governmental authorities and by the police authorities, including the chief of police, that American lives were in danger, that they could not give them any more protection, that we were on our own and we should immediately take measures to protect them.

The Ambassador said this concerns me but I am not prepared at this moment to recommend that you take this action, but I

³ For background, see *ibid.*, May 17, 1965, p. 738.

do want to alert you and see that you have a contingency plan ready.

We had anticipated difficulty there. The intelligence reports each morning indicate difficulties in dozens of spots throughout the world. We were due at least one revolution in another country yesterday. It didn't come through, but the intelligence reports had indicated it might. Because we had that information and because we knew the difficulty and we knew the unsettled political condition, we asked Ambassador Bennett to come back to the United States, and he was here when the government was overthrown. We immediately rushed him back. This was his cable informing us that he had had official notification that they could no longer guarantee the safety of our people.

We immediately alerted the forces who had had previous plans and some of them had been working on building them up and carrying them out, and continued our discussions when another wire came in at 5:16, almost 2 hours later, and said there is firing in the streets, there is great danger to all personnel in this area, land the troops immediately to protect our people. It was a rather strong and compelling and almost distressed message. Thanks to the expert management of Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara and the forces under his command, we passed out an order immediately to land our troops.

I had to attend a balance-of-payments meeting with some bankers who were in town, but I asked while I was attending they call the leadership of the Congress and they did, and they came to the White House around 7 o'clock. While we were talking to them I had a report that our troops had already landed, showing the speed and efficiency of that group.

Since that time we have evacuated approximately 3,000 persons. It has been necessary for a few Marines to go out and take an old lady and her little belongings and with a crippled hip, carry her down through the streets where the firing is taking place, but we carried 3,000 that way without the loss of a single civilian up to now.

There remain 5,000 others—1,500 Americans and some 3,500 other nationals. Six or eight of the embassies have been torn up. There has been almost constant firing on our American Embassy. As we talked to Ambassador Bennett, he said to apparently one of the girls who brought him a cable, he said, please get away from the window, that glass is going to cut your head, because the glass had been shattered, and we heard the bullets coming through the office where he was sitting while talking to us.

We have sufficient manpower to continue that evacuation, and some 200 are coming out today that we have gathered. We will continue until all who will come will be evacuated.

In our first meeting that night from 3 o'clock, when we got our cable, until 7 o'clock, when we met with the congressional leaders, our intelligence indicated that two of the prime leaders in the rebel forces were men with a long history of Communist association and insurrections. One had fought in the Spanish Civil War, and both had been given detailed lengthy training in operations of this type.

As reports came in, as they do every few minutes, it developed there were eight of those who were in the movement that had been trained by Communist forces. Alerts were set up, and our men continued to ferret out and study the organization. Up to yesterday they had the names and addresses and experience and numbers and backgrounds of some 58. As those 58 came forward and cream began to rise on that crock of milk, they came to the surface and took increased leadership in the movement and the leaders and friends of ex-President Bosch were more or less shoved in the background and stepped aside. Our military people outlined a plan, and that plan has been consummated.

It is our hope that the OAS [Organization of American States] will, after a visit on the grounds, come up with recommendations as to an interim government that will not involve either communism or dictatorship, until we can have free elections and self-determination.

On Saturday, when the revolution took place, we asked for a cease-fire. On the following Tuesday our Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Latin American affairs, Mr. [Jack Hood] Vaughn, met with the Peace Committee of the OAS and explained the gravity of that situation. On Wednesday morning, before our intervention Wednesday afternoon, the OAS met and discussed the matter thoroughly and in some detail but then adjourned without taking any action. Wednesday afternoon, after getting the 3 o'clock wire and 5 o'clock wire, I had no choice but to take action or to sacrifice American lives.

I took the action and simultaneously notified the OAS again and asked them to act. They met. They discussed the matter, and then they adjourned over an extra day. When I found that out the next morning, I asked Secretary Rusk and our very able diplomat, Mr. [Ellsworth] Bunker, to give them an urgent appeal not to stay out of session today but to come back and immediately send some delegation there to view the situation. They had agreed to send Secretary General [José A.] Mora, and he went that night and they met the next day and debated it that day and sent the delegation down there, and it is there now.

We want very much to work and cooperate with them, and as soon as they have outlined a program for a stable and peaceful interim government we would hope that we could embrace their suggestions and contribute what we need to contribute along with other nations.

We have sent able emissaries to explain all that I have said to you to other countries because a man's judgment is no better than his information and there hasn't been full information on this subject. We have indications that some of the Latin American countries might perhaps, maybe, be willing to supply some of their forces to engage in the protection during this period. We would certainly hope that is true.

Now that is where we stand. The primary reason for asking you to come here this morning is to let you know that the situations that confront us had not been planned

when we submitted our budget to you, that our Armed Forces now are in need of \$700 million. We are prepared to testify on it this afternoon or any time that may meet your pleasure. We would hope that you could thoroughly and carefully consider it and with a minimum of difficulty and discord say to the rest of the world that we are going to spend every dollar, we are going to take every action, we are going to walk the last mile in order to see that peace is restored, that the people of not only the Dominican Republic but South Viet-Nam have the right of self-determination and that they cannot be gobbled up in the 20th century and swallowed just because they happen to be smaller than some of those whose boundaries adjoin them.

I think it is well to remember that there are a hundred other little nations sitting here this moment watching what happens and what the outcome is in South Viet-Nam, and if South Viet-Nam can be gobbled up the same thing may happen to them.

Secretary Rusk is here to give you any details on the political developments. Secretary McNamara is here to give you any of the details on the posture of our troops, the missions they are performing.

I think there is one point I'd like to make before I close. We are not the aggressor in the Dominican Republic. Forces came in there and overthrew that government and became alined with evil persons who had been trained in overthrowing governments and in seizing governments and establishing Communist control, and we have resisted that control and we have sought to protect our citizens against what would have taken place.

Our Ambassador reported that they were marching a former policeman down the streets and had threatened to line a hundred up to a wall and turn a machinegun loose on them. With reports of that kind, no President can stand by. So we resisted their aggression to the extent that (a) we protected our own people and (b) we hope that we have exposed what leadership attempted to seize that little land. We have a good many people there. We are trying to feed all the

people. I notice this morning they demanded none of the labels have American food on them, but some of the people haven't eaten in 4 days.

We have from 1,000 to 1,500 bodies that are dead in the street and possibilities of a serious epidemic breaking out. We are trying to avoid that. We have our mobile hospital units that are trying to give treatment to the wounded and the casualties who have not yet died.

We are doing what we can to preserve order, yet the sniping is still taking place. There are men still standing on rooftops that are shooting at not only our own Embassy but other people, and just fortunately none of our civilians yet have been killed. But we do have 5,000 yet there that must be moved individually, one by one, to our ships.

While we are doing that, we optimistically hope and pray that the OAS and this inter-American group can make some satisfactory suggestions.

If it is agreeable, the press will excuse themselves now. I would like for Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara to go into details with some of you.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, MAY 4¹

To the Congress of the United States:

I ask the Congress to appropriate at the earliest possible moment an additional \$700 million to meet mounting military requirements in Vietnam.

This is not a routine appropriation. For each Member of Congress who supports this request is also voting to persist in our effort to halt Communist aggression in South Vietnam. Each is saying that the Congress and the President stand united before the world in joint determination that the independence of South Vietnam shall be preserved and Communist attack will not succeed.

In fiscal year 1965 we will spend about \$1.5 billion to fulfill our commitments in

¹ H. Doc. 157, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (White House press release dated May 4).

southeast Asia. However, the pace of our activity is steadily rising. In December 1961, we had 3,164 men in South Vietnam. By the end of last week the number of our Armed Forces there had increased to over 35,000. At the request of the Government of South Vietnam in March, we sent Marines to secure the key Danang/Phu Bai area; 2 days ago, we sent the 173d Airborne Brigade to the important Bien Hoa/Vung Tau area. More than 400 Americans have given their lives in Vietnam.

In the past 2 years, our helicopter activity in South Vietnam has tripled—from 30,000 flying hours in the first quarter of 1963 to 90,000 flying hours in the first quarter of this year.

In February we flew 160 strike sorties against military targets in North Vietnam. In April, we flew over 1,500 strike sorties against such targets.

Prior to mid-February we flew no strike sorties inside South Vietnam. In March and April, we flew more than 3,200 sorties against military targets in hostile areas inside the country.

Just 2 days ago, we dispatched Gen. C. L. Milburn, Jr., Deputy Surgeon General of the Army, to assist U.S. representatives in Vietnam in formulating an expanded program of medical assistance for the people of South Vietnam. We are contemplating the expansion of existing programs under which mobile medical teams travel throughout the countryside providing on-the-spot medical facilities, treatment, and training in rural areas.

The additional funds I am requesting are needed to continue to provide our forces with the best and most modern supplies and equipment. They are needed to keep an abundant inventory of ammunition and other expendables. They are needed to build facilities to house and protect our men and supplies.

The entire \$700 million is for this fiscal year.

The Secretary of Defense will today support this request before the appropriate congressional committees.

Nor can I guarantee this will be the last

request. If our need expands I will turn again to the Congress. For we will do whatever must be done to insure the safety of South Vietnam from aggression. This is the firm and irrevocable commitment of our people and Nation.

I have reviewed the situation in Vietnam many times with the Congress, the American people and the world. South Vietnam has been attacked by North Vietnam. It has asked our help. We are giving that help because our commitments, our principles, and our national interest demand it.

This is not the same kind of aggression with which the world has been long familiar. Instead of the sweep of invading armies, there is the steady, deadly stream of men and supplies. Instead of open battle between major opposing forces, there is murder in the night, assassination, and terror. Instead of dramatic confrontation and sharp division between nationals of different lands, some citizens of South Vietnam have been recruited in the effort to conquer their own country.

All of this shrouds battle in confusion. But this is the face of war in the 1960's. This is the "war of liberation." Kept from direct attack by American power, unable to win a free election in any country, those who seek to expand communism by force now use subversion and terror. In this effort they often enlist nationals of the countries they wish to conquer. But it is not civil war. It is sustained by power and resources from without. The very object of this tactic is to create the appearance of an internal revolt and to mask aggression. In this way, they hope to avoid confrontation with American resolution.

But we will not be fooled or deceived, in Vietnam or any place in the world where we have a commitment. This kind of war is war against the independence of nations. And we will meet it, as we have met other shifting dangers for more than a generation.

Our commitment to South Vietnam is nourished by a quarter century of history. It rests on solemn treaties, the demands of principle, and the necessities of American security.

A quarter century ago it became apparent that the United States stood between those who wished to dominate an entire continent and the peoples they sought to conquer.

It was our determined purpose to help protect the independence of the Asian peoples.

The consequence of our determination was a vast war which took the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans. Surely this generation will not lightly yield to new aggressors what the last generation paid for in blood and towering sacrifice.

When the war was over, we supported the effort of Asian peoples to win their freedom from colonial rule. In the Philippines, Korea, Indonesia, and elsewhere we were on the side of national independence. For this was also consistent with our belief in the right of all people to shape their own destinies.

That principle soon received another test in the fire of war. And we fought in Korea, so that South Korea might remain free.

Now, in Vietnam, we pursue the same principle which has infused American action in the Far East for a quarter of a century.

There are those who ask why this responsibility should be ours. The answer is simple. There is no one else who can do the job. Our power is essential, in the final test, if the nations of Asia are to be secure from expanding communism. Thus, when India was attacked, it looked to us for help, and we gave it gladly. We believe that Asia should be directed by Asians. But that means each Asian people must have the right to find its own way, not that one group or nation should overrun all the others.

Make no mistake about it. The aim in Vietnam is not simply the conquest of the South, tragic as that would be. It is to show that American commitment is worthless. Once that is done, the gates are down and the road is open to expansion and endless conquest. That is why Communist China opposes discussions, even though such discussions are clearly in the interest of North Vietnam.

Moreover, we are directly committed to the defense of South Vietnam. In 1954 we

signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. That treaty committed us to act to meet aggression against South Vietnam. The U.S. Senate ratified that treaty and that obligation by a vote of 82 to 1.

Less than a year ago the Congress, by an almost unanimous vote, said that the United States was ready to take all necessary steps to meet its obligations under that treaty.

That resolution of the Congress expressed support for the policies of the administration to help the people of South Vietnam against attack—a policy established by two previous Presidents.

Thus we cannot, and will not, withdraw or be defeated. The stakes are too high, the commitment too deep, the lessons of history too plain.

At every turning point in the last 30 years, there have been those who opposed a firm stand against aggression. They have always been wrong. And when we heeded their cries, when we gave in, the consequence has been more bloodshed and wider war.

We will not repeat that mistake. Nor will we heed those who urge us to use our great power in a reckless or casual manner. We have no desire to expand the conflict. We will do what must be done. And we will do only what must be done.

For, in the long run, there can be no military solution to the problems of Vietnam. We must find the path to peaceful settlement. Time and time again we have worked to open that path. We are still ready to talk, without conditions, to any government. We will go anywhere, discuss any subject, listen to any point of view in the interests of a peaceful solution.

I also deeply regret the necessity of bombing North Vietnam.

But we began those bombings only when patience had been transformed from a virtue into a blunder—the mistaken judgment of the attackers. Time and time again men, women, and children—Americans and Vietnamese—were bombed in their villages and homes while we did not reply.

There was the November 1 attack on the

Bien Hoa airfield. There was the Christmas Eve bombing of the Brinks Hotel in Saigon. There was the February 7 attack on the Pleiku base. In these attacks 15 Americans were killed and 245 were injured. And they are only a few examples of a steady campaign of terror and attack.

We then decided we could no longer stand by and see men and women murdered and crippled while the bases of the aggressors were immune from reply.

But we have no desire to destroy human life. Our attacks have all been aimed at strictly military targets—not hotels and movie theaters and embassy buildings.

We destroy bridges, so it is harder to convey the instruments of war from north to south. We destroy radar stations to keep our planes from being shot down. We destroy military depots for the infiltration of men and arms to the south. We patrol routes of communications to halt the invaders. We destroy ammunition dumps to prevent the use of explosives against our men and our allies.

Who among us can feel confident that we should allow our soldiers to be killed, while the aggressor sits smiling and secure in his sanctuary, protected by a border which he has violated a thousand times. I do not believe that is the view of the American people or of the Congress.

However, the bombing is not an end in itself. Its purpose is to bring us closer to the day of peace. And whenever it will serve the interests of peace to do so, we will end it.

And let us also remember, when we began the bombings there was little talk of negotiations. There were few worldwide cries for peace. Some who now speak most loudly were quietly content to permit Americans and Vietnamese to die and suffer at the hands of terror without protest. Our firmness may well have already brought us closer to peace.

Our conclusions are plain.

We will not surrender.

We do not wish to enlarge the conflict.

We desire peaceful settlement and talks.

And the aggression continues.

Therefore I see no choice but to continue the course we are on, filled as it is with peril and uncertainty.

I believe the American people support that course. They have learned the great lesson of this generation: Wherever we have stood firm aggression has been halted, peace restored, and liberty maintained.

This was true in Iran, in Greece and Turkey, and in Korea.

It was true in the Formosa Strait and in Lebanon.

It was true at the Cuban missile crisis.

It will be true again in southeast Asia.

Our people do not flinch from sacrifice or risk when the cause of freedom demands it. And they have the deep, abiding, true instinct of the American people: When our Nation is challenged it must respond. When freedom is in danger we must stand up to that danger. When we are attacked we must fight.

I know the Congress shares these beliefs of the people they represent.

I do not ask complete approval for every phrase and action of your Government. I do ask for prompt support of our basic course: Resistance to aggression, moderation in the use of power, and a constant search for peace. Nothing will do more to strengthen your country in the world than the proof of national unity which an overwhelming vote for this appropriation will clearly show. To deny and delay this means to deny and to delay the fullest support of the American people and the American Congress to those brave men who are risking their lives for freedom in Vietnam.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE, *May 4, 1965.*

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, MAY 7⁵

Members of the Congress and my fellow Americans:

Congress has acted with dispatch and

⁵ Made at the signing of the supplemental appropriations bill (White House press release dated May 7).

clear purpose to approve the request that I made on Tuesday for \$700 million to meet our mounting military requirements in Viet-Nam.⁶

I am very proud to be signing this resolution only 3 days after it was sent to the Congress.

Let the meaning of this action be clear. To the brave people of South Viet-Nam, who are fighting and who are dying for the right to choose their own way of life, this resolution says: America keeps her promises, and we will back up those promises with all the resources that we need.

To our own boys who are fighting and dying beside the people of South Viet-Nam, this resolution says to them: We are going to give you the tools to finish the job.

To the aggressors, to those who by assassination and terror seek conquest and plunder, and to those who encourage and guide their aggression from afar, this resolution says: We will not be defeated. We will not grow tired.

This money will be spent for arms, for weapons of war, for helicopters, for ammunition, for planes, not because we want war but because the aggressors have made them necessary.

We will lay aside these weapons when peace comes—and we hope it comes swiftly. But that is in the hands of others besides ourselves.

For months now we have waited for a sign, a signal, even a whisper, but our offer of unconditional discussions has fallen on un-receptive ears. Not a sound has been heard. Not a signal has been sighted. Still we wait for a response. Still America is anxious for peace.

I wish it were possible to convince others with words of what we now find it necessary to say with guns and planes—that armed hostility is futile. Because once this is clear, it should also be clear that the only path for reasonable men is the path of peaceful settlement.

⁶ The bill was passed by the House on May 5 by a vote of 408 to 7, and by the Senate on May 6 by a vote of 88 to 3.

But our willingness to talk must not be taken as a symbol of cowardice. Until there is a response, until the aggressors have indicated their willingness to talk, we intend to press on. Our patience and determination are unending.

This is why this resolution, that you patriotic men and women so promptly considered and so wisely passed, is so important. It is not the money but it is the message that matters. And that message is simple. I think that message is honest and clear. We will do whatever must be done to insure the safety of South Viet-Nam from aggression. We will use our power with restraint, and we will use it with all the wisdom that we can command. But we will use it.

Once this message is clearly understood by all, all the aggressors, there should be much greater hope for peace. For then the men who now seek conquest by force will learn to seek settlement by unconditional discussions—the talks that we have invited and that we want will start, and the road then to the peace, that the people of the world want so much, will finally be open.

On behalf of all the American people, I say to this Congress, made up of patriots of both parties: You have acted wisely. You have acted patriotically. You have acted promptly. Again you have measured up to the finest American tradition.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 1st Session

- Amending the Foreign Service Buildings Act of 1926. Communication from the President transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to authorize construction of a new building to replace damaged chancery at Saigon, Viet-Nam. H. Doc. 133. April 1, 1965. 2 pp.
- Amending the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as Amended. Conference report to accompany H.R. 2998. H. Rept. 233. April 12, 1965. 2 pp.
- Twentieth Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Information. H. Doc. 140. April 12, 1965. 17 pp.
- Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses (PIANC). Report to accompany S. 1501. S. Rept. 164. April 13, 1965. 4 pp.

Secretary Urges Ratification of U.N. Charter Amendments

Statement by Secretary Rusk¹

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Foreign Relations Committee: I am here today to urge this committee to recommend that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification of the two amendments to the Charter of the United Nations which were transmitted to the Senate by the President on April 6.²

These are the first two proposed amendments to the charter which the members have been asked to ratify—and this is enough by itself to endow the event with a note of considerable significance.

I therefore have no doubt you will want to consider this matter against the background of the current state of affairs at the United Nations. Ambassador Stevenson will be here tomorrow to give you some first-hand impressions as seen from New York.

I assume, as well, that you will want to weigh this request within the general context of our foreign policy. I therefore thought it would be appropriate for me to begin these hearings with a few comments on how the United Nations and its future development fits into our national objective of helping to create a more reasonable world order. With your permission, I shall address myself to this point in something of a summary fashion.

Mr. Chairman, as you well know, the first function of the United Nations is to help

keep the peace and to help restore the peace if it should be breached.

Fifteen years of United Nations experience with peacekeeping problems have shown that the United Nations has been useful in minimizing the dangers of a great-power collision, in smothering brush-fire conflicts, and in supervising truces while negotiated settlements are being worked out.

Experience over the past decade and a half also demonstrates how diverse the requirements for peacekeeping machinery turn out to be in practice. Peacekeeping missions have been performed

—by a handful of observers to report on compliance with cease-fires in Indonesia and Kashmir;

—by a small band of military observers to supervise the truce on the Arab-Israeli armistice lines;

—by an observer corps to help expose and prevent illegal infiltration in Greece and Lebanon;

—by a security reserve for the United Nations temporary administration of West New Guinea;

—by an emergency 5,000-man buffer force in Gaza and Suez;

—by more than 20,000 troops from 28 countries to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo;

—by a 7,000-man force to restore order and keep the peace in Cyprus; and

—by a unified combat command from 16 nations under United States leadership in Korea.

¹ Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Apr. 28 (press release 90).

² S. Ex. A; for text of President Johnson's transmittal message, see BULLETIN of May 3, 1965, p. 678.

There can be no doubt that in performing these peacekeeping tasks the United Nations has served the vital interests of the United States—for we have no greater national interest than in preventing armed conflict and seeing to it that the great tides of change are kept within peaceful channels.

Expansion of available callup forces and improvement in procedures for financing and managing versatile peacekeeping machinery in the service of the United Nations would manifestly serve our interests in the future.

Economic and Social Programs

Our national interests are similarly and deeply engaged in the economic and social programs of the United Nations agencies. These are directed at things that make the peace worth keeping—and therefore can be thought of as preventive peacekeeping.

In point of fact, the peace and security matters which so preempt our time and thoughts and energies are but a small fraction of the United Nations work. Almost 17 of every 20 United Nations employees and nearly 93 cents of every United Nations dollar are engaged in economic, social, and technical enterprises.

We have a direct national interest in the success of the United Nations work with communicable diseases, with milk and malnutrition, with illiteracy and education, with overpopulation and underproduction, with the mechanics of trade and development.

All the agencies of the United Nations family are dealing with one or another aspect of human security—the kind that comes from safety standards for the operation of steamships, aircraft, and atomic reactors; or the kind of security that is reinforced by decent standards of nutrition and education.

There is neither need nor time to delve more deeply into these interesting and useful functions, except to say that these activities go on unabated because they are needed—and undebated because almost everyone knows they are needed. And I doubt if any thoughtful person would quarrel with the

conclusion that the economic, social, and technical services of the United Nations also serve our national interests.

This will be so in the future, as it has been in the past.

Limitations of U.N.

Nor is it necessary to deal at any length before this committee with the limitations which the United Nations has demonstrated in action. So I shall confine myself to brief comments on four general but central points on this score.

First, the scope of international organization, at this stage in history, is limited by the stubborn persistence of a strong spirit of nationalism—and not only in the newly independent areas. Most of the peoples of this world appear to be ready to share their traditional sovereignty in cooperative enterprise only when the task at hand cannot be done at all on a national basis or when the technical advantages of international cooperation are overwhelmingly clear.

The political traditions centering around the conception of unrestricted national sovereignty place a strict and not altogether undesirable governor on the rate of institution building in the international community.

Second, the job of keeping the peace of the world turns out, in practice, to be beyond the capacities of any one nation or any one institution. Any workable system of world order for the foreseeable future will be a pluralistic system in which the United Nations, regional organizations, bilateral diplomacy, and national defense forces play their several and sometimes mutually reinforcing parts.

Third, while the United Nations has been conspicuously successful in damping down conflicts that might easily have spread to world war, it has been less successful in resolving the underlying disputes. This suggests, not so surprisingly, that even a very efficient police force is not enough—that perhaps the United Nations should somehow move in the direction of a more systematic, sustained effort to sponsor conciliation of

the political disputes that underlie tests of armed strength.

It would not be difficult to devise an agenda of, say, territorial disputes which have festered too long for safety.

Fourth, we live in times of such pervasive change—such deep transformation—that any viable international institution has to be endowed with inherent flexibility to adapt to changing needs and conditions. In fact, the United Nations has shown just such a capacity. But if it is going to prosper in the years ahead, it must never be caught for long in a procedural or constitutional straightjacket.

We are involved in just such a problem today.

These are, indeed, substantial limitations on the capacity of the United Nations to live up to the great vision of the charter.

But despite nationalism, the international community must continue to grow as science and technology continue to internationalize human affairs—and the United Nations is the principal foundation of world community.

Despite the need for pluralistic peacekeeping systems, the United Nations is an important—and perhaps indispensable—alternative for peacekeeping services in a security crisis.

Despite the fact that the United Nations has been better at damping down fires than in removing the sources of dispute, where else should we turn for more effective techniques of international conciliation?

And despite the fact that adjustments are needed to take account of changing conditions over the past decade, the organization has proved remarkably flexible in the past and there is no inherent reason why it should not be in the future.

The Charter Amendments

This brings me to the two charter amendments now being proposed—for they are concerned with one of the essential adaptations which the United Nations must make to meet changed conditions.

Whatever else has to be done—and what-

ever may be said about the complexity of the larger political environment—the justification for these amendments is simple and overwhelming: The membership of the United Nations has more than doubled, while representation on its two major Councils has remained fixed in the pattern of 1945.

To redress this patent case of obsolete apportionment, the first of these amendments would enlarge the membership of the Security Council from 11 countries to 15 and raise the requisite majority from 7 to 9 members. The other amendment would increase the size of the Economic and Social Council from 18 to 27 members.

The amendments were adopted by an overwhelming majority of the United Nations General Assembly in 1963 and require ratification by two-thirds of the membership, including all the permanent members, before entering into effect. Approval by the United States therefore is essential to give effect to the proposed amendments.

The General Assembly resolution requested all members to act by September of this year. Sixty-five of the required 76 members have already ratified, including the Soviet Union, which initially voted against them. Another permanent member, the United Kingdom, has announced its intention to ratify.

Neither amendment would affect this country's membership on these two Councils or alter our veto rights in the Security Council, as established by the charter.

Mr. Chairman, the advantages of these amendments are quite clear and straightforward, and the argument for them stands on its own feet.

First, they would modernize the current obsolete apportionment of seats on the two Councils in line with the present membership.

Second, they would add to the prestige of the Councils and to the confidence of the membership at large that they are fairly represented in these principal organs which are charged with serving the interests of all members.

Third, they would alleviate the present severe pressures on the original allocation of seats, which has led to bickering and to such unsatisfactory practices as split terms on the Security Council.

Fourth, the proposed distribution of seats in the enlarged Councils, which is included in the Assembly resolution, should help minimize contentious rivalries for seats on the Councils and help to assure that a greater number of countries over the years will have opportunity to participate in the affairs of the Councils.

The proposed enlargements are reasonable and equitable without expanding the Councils to unwieldy sizes.

The proposed voting majorities are fair and workable—and in our judgment would not materially change the voting alignment from the present situation.

These, it seems to me, are persuasive arguments for United States ratification of the charter amendments.

But let me also say, in a more general vein, that the United States welcomes the entrance of the new members into the open society of the United Nations.

They have gained their full independence in the greatest sweep of national liberation in all history.

They have knocked on the door of the world community and been invited in to speak their pieces and make their contributions and take on whatever share of responsibility they are able and willing to shoulder.

And our world is a better and a more democratic world because they have taken their rightful places in the councils of our times.

I am sure this committee agrees with me when I say that this is the last nation on the face of the earth to shun diversity, or to reject the open forum, or to fear the growth of democratic practices.

Expansion of the two Councils of the United Nations to take account of this welcome expansion of the United Nations is not only within the strict national interests of this country but is consistent with our longer range purposes.

I have no reservations in urging the committee to recommend the consent of the Senate to ratification of the first two amendments to be proposed to the Charter of the United Nations.

Department Supports Bill To Carry Out Auto Agreement With Canada

Statement by Under Secretary Mann¹

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: Last January President Johnson and Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson signed an important agreement² directed toward freeing trade in automotive products between the United States and Canada. The legislation before you now is necessary to carry out that agreement.

Before discussing the legislation itself, it may be helpful for me to review with you briefly the background of this legislation and the agreement that it implements.

Canada and the United States are each other's most important trading partners. The value of the trade between us is more than \$8 billion annually—the greatest between any two nations in the world. Our trade last year in automotive products alone was \$700 million and is growing rapidly.

The Canadian and United States automotive industries are strikingly similar. Consumers in both countries prefer the same kinds of cars. Over 90 percent of the automotive products manufactured in Canada are made by subsidiaries of United States companies. And Canadian automotive workers belong to the same international union. For these reasons, it has been generally recognized that the separation of our two automotive industries by artificial trade barriers is economically unsound.

Before the automotive products agreement, Canada imposed a duty of 17½ percent on motor vehicles and up to 25 percent on parts.

¹ Made before the House Committee on Ways and Means on Apr. 27 (press release 86) in support of H.R. 6960.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 8, 1965, p. 191.

In addition, a "Commonwealth content" provision encouraged Canadian manufacturers to include at least 60 percent of Canadian value in their output. For our part, the United States imposed a 6½ percent duty on automobiles and an 8½ percent duty on parts.

The protective devices maintained by Canada stimulated the growth of its automotive industry, but not a fully efficient one. Canadian subsidiaries of United States manufacturers built plants that duplicated similar facilities in the United States. But because of the more limited Canadian market, they were unable to achieve the economies of scale realized by their parent companies. The same automobile costs a Canadian about 10 percent more than it costs an American.

Faced with high-cost production and higher priced products, a lagging growth rate in its industry, and a steadily increasing trade deficit, the Canadian Government sought to correct this situation.

In November 1962 it announced a duty-remission plan to encourage increased Canadian production of a few automotive products and to stimulate Canadian exports. The plan was extended in 1963 to cover all automobiles and parts for original production. Under this plan Canadian manufacturers who increased their automotive exports would receive an import-duty rebate on a comparable value of automotive imports.

A number of United States manufacturers became concerned that this plan might give Canadian parts manufacturers an unfair advantage. Particular concern was felt by the United States manufacturers of replacement parts because the Canadian plan gave credits for exports of such parts but did not allow a corresponding duty reduction for imports of these parts.

These manufacturers petitioned the Government to impose countervailing duties on Canadian automotive imports under section 303 of the Tariff Act, which provides for the imposition of such duties when "bounties and grants" are given by foreign countries for exports to the United States.

While the question of imposing countervailing duties was under investigation, the

administration examined the entire problem of our automotive trade with Canada. There was some question as to the legality of imposing countervailing duties. There was also every reason to believe that if countervailing duties had been applied, we would be headed down a path of retaliation and counterretaliation that would have both wasted the resources of our two countries and embittered our relations. This could have had a disastrous effect on sales of United States automotive parts in Canada; it could have radically reduced our favorable balance of trade with Canada in automotive products; and it could have led to substantial loss of employment in the United States.

Most important, the imposition of countervailing duties would not have reached the heart of the problem—the fact that the automotive industries of our two countries are a single North American industry, divided by artificial economic barriers—the Canadian tariff and other requirements on the one hand and the United States tariffs on the other.

The agreement signed by President Johnson and Prime Minister Pearson last January provides for the elimination of most of these barriers. In my judgment it is one of the most significant international economic initiatives that we have taken in a number of years. Canada has laid aside the alternative of an autonomous automotive industry and has joined with us to create a rationalized and integrated North American automotive industry. Duplication will be avoided. Production costs will be reduced. Canadian subsidiaries of United States companies will be able to produce longer runs of fewer models, lower their prices, and expand their markets. The economies of both countries will benefit.

Important Features of Agreement

Three features of the agreement are particularly important.

First is its long-term purpose to liberalize automotive trade and to develop conditions in which market forces may operate effectively to attain the most economic volume of investment, production, and trade.

Second is the immediate action it calls for. The Canadian Government agreed to eliminate all duties on United States automobiles and original parts imported into Canada under the terms of the agreement. For our part the United States Government agreed to seek prompt enactment of legislation authorizing duty-free treatment for such products of Canadian origin.

Third, the two governments agree to undertake, no later than January 1, 1968, a comprehensive review of progress toward the objectives of the agreement.

The agreement is specific that it does not preclude action by either Government consistent with its obligations under part II of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This preserves the right to take escape-clause action if necessary. The agreement also provides that, at the request of either Government, the parties will consult concerning the application of the agreement to new automotive producers in Canada and for other purposes. The parties may accord to other countries access to their markets on similar terms. The agreement is intended to continue indefinitely but may be ended by either party on 12 months' written notice.

The agreement came into provisional effect on the date of signature and will come into definitive effect after appropriate action is completed in the legislatures of both countries.

Provisions of Legislation

The principal provisions of the legislation to carry out the agreement may be simply stated:

First, it would authorize the President to remove duties on all Canadian automotive products covered by the agreement—as Canada has already done for such United States products—retroactive to last January. The President would also be authorized to include other automotive products that may be subsequently developed.

Second, the President would be authorized to carry out agreements similar to the Canadian one with other countries if he should de-

termine that such agreements would afford mutual trade benefits.

Third, the President would be authorized to carry out an agreement with Canada for the reduction or removal of duties on automotive replacement parts. We were unsuccessful in our efforts to include replacement parts in the coverage of the present agreement, and it is desirable to have this authority available if the opportunity arises to use it.

If we conclude agreements with other countries similar to the Canadian one, the President would also be authorized to agree with such countries on the mutual reduction of duties on replacement parts.

Fourth, the legislation includes detailed provisions for adjustment assistance. Secretary [of Labor W. Willard] Wirtz will discuss these provisions with you, but I do want to emphasize the support of the entire executive branch for them.

Fifth, the legislation provides for the modification of our tariff schedules and lists the automotive products on which the duties are to be eliminated.

Finally, the legislation provides for an annual report to the Congress concerning the implementation of the legislation.

Remaining Restrictions

The agreement, and the legislation to implement it, are, as I have said, major steps forward. They will not, however, immediately free the United States-Canadian automotive industry of all trade barriers. The Canadian industry is about one twenty-fifth the size of our own, and the Canadians have understandably insisted on transitional protections until their industry can adjust its operations to the vastly larger North American market.

Under the agreement, Canada accords duty-free entry to automobiles and parts only when they are imported by or on behalf of manufacturers, and those manufacturers must maintain their assembly operations at existing rates. Furthermore, because the Canadian replacement parts industry is particularly vulnerable, replacement parts are

not at this time covered, although we hope that such coverage will be possible in the years ahead.

Canada also wanted to be certain that its automotive industry would gain a fair share of the increase in the Canadian market that will be stimulated by the agreement. Therefore Canada asked each of the Canadian producers for a letter concerning their plans for expanding production in Canada.

The United States Government was not a party to the letters, but in the course of the intergovernmental negotiations the Canadian Government informed us of their general terms. Taken together, they indicate an intention by the United States subsidiaries to increase their Canadian production by approximately \$241 million over the 4 model years ending in 1968 above the increase that would otherwise have occurred.

The agreement provides for a comprehensive review of all aspects of the United States-Canadian automotive trade no later than January 1, 1968. We expect that during the course of this review it will be possible to agree on further steps to make our automotive trade with Canada free of restrictions.

Relation of Agreement to Other Countries

Finally, I should say a word about the relation of the agreement and implementing legislation to other countries. The Canadian arrangement deals with a unique situation. Its purpose is to make possible a single North American automotive industry, and it goes far beyond a typical reduction of tariffs in a trade negotiation. We did not, therefore, think that the agreement's provisions should be automatically available to other nations. Such an action would be unfair to the United States since many other automobile-producing nations not only have much higher tariffs but also have nontariff barriers that seriously impair United States sales. The agreement does provide, however, that "Access to the United States and Canadian markets . . . may by agreement be accorded on similar terms to other countries."

We have discussed the agreement in some detail with our GATT partners and have made clear that we do not expect it to divert

trade or otherwise change the competitive positions of third countries in the North American market. We are, therefore, confident that we will reach a satisfactory understanding with our GATT partners on this matter.

In concluding, let me recall to you the words of the President in proposing the legislation to carry out the agreement with Canada. The President said:³

"The Agreement and this Bill are designed to lead to a more efficient organization of the North American automotive industry. It is based on mutual trust and will result in mutual benefit—benefit to producers, to labor, and to consumers on both sides of the border.

"Canada has acted. It is our turn. In order that we may act, I ask the Congress to approve promptly this legislation."

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Labor

Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the International Labor Organization. Done at Montreal October 9, 1946. Entered into force April 20, 1948. TIAS 1868.

Acceptance: Malawi, March 22, 1965.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.

Ratification deposited: Cyprus, May 7, 1965.

Safety at Sea

Convention on safety of life at sea. Done at London June 10, 1948. Entered into force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495.

Notifications of denunciation received: Viet-Nam, March 23, 1965; Yugoslavia, April 22, 1965; effective May 26, 1966.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a global commercial communications satellite system. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.

Approval deposited: Switzerland, May 6, 1965.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 26, 1965, p. 638.

Telecommunications

Telegraph regulations (Geneva revision, 1958) annexed to the international telecommunication convention, 1952, with appendixes and final protocol. Done at Geneva November 29, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960. TIAS 4390.

Notification of approval: Cambodia, March 9, 1965.

Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the international telecommunication convention, 1959. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4893.

Notification of approval: Cambodia, March 9, 1965.

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 1959) with annexes and additional protocol. Done at Geneva November 8, 1963. Entered into force January 1, 1965. TIAS 5603.

Notifications of approval: Cambodia, March 9, 1965; Canada, December 22, 1964; Finland, December 30, 1964; India, December 31, 1964; Ireland, December 24, 1964; Israel, January 24, 1965; Italy, January 4, 1965; Japan, December 23, 1964; Kuwait, January 13, 1965; Lebanon, January 29, 1965; Malawi, December 10, 1964; Malta, January 1, 1965; Morocco, December 14, 1964; New Zealand, January 15, 1965; Nigeria, January 19, 1965; Paraguay, January 15, 1965; Rwanda, November 26, 1964; Sweden, January 15, 1965; Thailand, January 27, 1965; Trinidad and Tobago, March 6, 1965; Tunisia, February 12, 1965; Viet-Nam, December 3, 1964.

BILATERAL

India

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of September 30, 1964, as amended (TIAS 5669, 5729). Effected by exchange of notes at New Delhi April 21, 1965. Entered into force April 21, 1965.

Iran

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 16, 1964, as amended (TIAS 5696, 5721). Effected by exchange of notes at Tehran April 28, 1965. Entered into force April 28, 1965.

Japan

Protocol modifying and supplementing the convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Tokyo August 14, 1962.

Ratifications exchanged: May 6, 1965.

Entered into force: May 6, 1965.

Morocco

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709). Effected by exchange of notes at Rabat April 23, 1965. Entered into force April 23, 1965.

Somali Republic

Agreement extending the technical cooperation program agreement of January 28 and February 4, 1961, as extended (TIAS 5332, 5508, 5738). Effected by exchange of notes at Mogadiscio April 7 and 19, 1965. Entered into force April 19, 1965.

Thailand

Agreement extending the agreement of May 19, 1959 (TIAS 4235) relating to the loan of a destroyer escort to Thailand. Effected by exchange of notes at Bangkok April 22, 1965. Entered into force April 22, 1965.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 3-9

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to May 3 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 78 of April 19; 84 of April 23; 86 of April 27; 90 of April 28; and 96 of April 30.

No.	Date	Subject
97	5/5	Johnson: message to President of Federal Republic of Germany on anniversary of assumption of sovereignty.
* 98	5/5	Program for visit of President of Korea.
99	5/6	Income tax protocol with Japan enters into force.
† 100	5/6	SEATO Council communique.
* 101	5/7	Adair sworn in as Ambassador to Panama (biographic details).
† 102	5/7	Educational exchange program with France.
† 103	5/8	Rusk: interview on U.S. action in Dominican Republic.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

Bolivia. Letters of Credence (Sanjines Goitia)	812	Japan. Income Tax Protocol With Japan Enters Into Force	815
Canada. Department Supports Bill To Carry Out Auto Agreement With Canada (Mann)	830	Korea. USAF Plane Attacked by MIG's Off North Korean Coast	812
Congo (Léopoldville). Congo Realities and United States Policy (Williams)	793	Military Affairs	
Congress		Congress Approves Supplemental Appropriation for Viet-Nam (remarks by President, message to Congress)	816
Congress Approves Supplemental Appropriation for Viet-Nam (remarks by President, message to Congress)	816	USAF Plane Attacked by MIG's Off North Korean Coast	812
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy	826	Presidential Documents	
Department Supports Bill To Carry Out Auto Agreement With Canada (Mann)	830	Anniversary of Sovereignty of German Federal Republic	814
Secretary Urges Ratification of U.N. Charter Amendments	827	Congress Approves Supplemental Appropriation for Viet-Nam	816
Dominican Republic. Congress Approves Supplemental Appropriation for Viet-Nam (remarks by President, message to Congress)	816	The 20th Anniversary of V-E Day	790
Economic Affairs		United States and Italy Reaffirm Close Ties of Friendship	809
Department Supports Bill To Carry Out Auto Agreement With Canada (Mann)	830	Sudan. Letters of Credence (Abbas el Obeid)	812
Income Tax Protocol With Japan Enters Into Force	815	Treaty Information	
Educational and Cultural Affairs. U.S. and France Agree To Share Cost of Exchange Program	813	Current Actions	833
Europe. The 20th Anniversary of V-E Day (Johnson)	790	Department Supports Bill To Carry Out Auto Agreement With Canada (Mann)	830
France. U.S. and France Agree To Share Cost of Exchange Program	813	Income Tax Protocol With Japan Enters Into Force	815
Germany. Anniversary of Sovereignty of German Federal Republic (message of President Johnson)	814	U.S. and France Agree To Share Cost of Exchange Program	813
Health, Education, and Welfare. U.S. To Propose International Adverse Drug Reaction Center	814	United Nations	
Immigration and Naturalization. The Reform of Our Basic Immigration Law (Rusk)	806	Congo Realities and United States Policy (Williams)	793
Indonesia. Letters of Credence (Palar)	812	Secretary Urges Ratification of U.N. Charter Amendments	827
International Organizations and Conferences. U.S. To Propose International Adverse Drug Reaction Center	814	U.S. To Propose International Adverse Drug Reaction Center	814
Italy. United States and Italy Reaffirm Close Ties of Friendship (Johnson, Moro, communique)	809	Viet-Nam. Congress Approves Supplemental Appropriation for Viet-Nam (remarks by President, message to Congress)	816
		<i>Name Index</i>	
		Abbas el Obeid, Khalifa	812
		Johnson, President	790, 809, 814, 816
		Mann, Thomas C	830
		Moro, Aldo	809
		Palar, Lambertus	812
		Rusk, Secretary	806, 827
		Sanjines Goitia, Julio	812
		Williams, G. Mennen	793

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

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Vol. LII, No. 1353



May 31, 1965

VIET-NAM: THE THIRD FACE OF THE WAR

Address by President Johnson 838

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA

by W. W. Rostow, Counselor 845

OAS FOREIGN MINISTERS PROVIDE FOR ESTABLISHMENT
OF INTER-AMERICAN FORCE IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

*Statements by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, Texts of Resolutions
and Act of Santo Domingo 854*

SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORIZES U.N. REPRESENTATIVE
IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Statements by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, Text of Resolution 854

Viet-Nam: The Third Face of the War

*Address by President Johnson*¹

The war in Viet-Nam has many faces.

There is the face of armed conflict—of terror and gunfire—of bomb-heavy planes and campaign-weary soldiers. In this conflict our only object is to prove that force will meet force, that armed conquest is futile, and that aggression is not only wrong but it just will not work.

And the Communists in Viet-Nam are slowly beginning to realize what they once scorned to believe: that we combine unlimited patience with unlimited resources in pursuit of an unwavering purpose.

We will not abandon our commitment to South Viet-Nam.

The second face of war in Viet-Nam is the quest for a political solution—the face of diplomacy and politics—of the ambitions

and the interests of other nations. We know, as our adversaries should also know, that there is no purely military solution in sight for either side. We are ready for unconditional discussions. Most of the non-Communist nations of the world favor such unconditional discussions. And it would clearly be in the interest of North Viet-Nam to now come to the conference table. For them the continuation of war, without talks, means only damage without conquest. Communist China apparently desires the war to continue whatever the cost to their allies. Their target is not merely South Viet-Nam; it is Asia. Their objective is not the fulfillment of Vietnamese nationalism; it is to erode and to discredit America's ability to help prevent Chinese domination over all of Asia.

In this domination they shall never succeed.

And I am continuing and I am increasing the search for every possible path to peace.

¹ Made before the Association of American Editorial Cartoonists at the White House on May 13 (White House press release; as-delivered text).

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LII, NO. 1353 PUBLICATION 7B98 MAY 31, 1965

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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The Face of Human Need

The third face of war in Viet-Nam is, at once, the most tragic and most hopeful. It is the face of human need. It is the untended sick, the hungry family, and the illiterate child. It is men and women, many without shelter, with rags for clothing, struggling for survival in a very rich and a very fertile land.

It is the most important battle of all in which we are engaged.

For a nation cannot be built by armed power or by political agreement. It will rest on the expectation by individual men and women that their future will be better than their past.

It is not enough to just fight against something. People must fight *for* something, and the people of South Viet-Nam must know that after the long, brutal journey through the dark tunnel of conflict there breaks the light of a happier day. And only if this is so can they be expected to sustain the enduring will for continued strife. Only in this way can longrun stability and peace come to their land.

And there is another, more profound reason. In Viet-Nam communism seeks to really impose its will by force of arms. But we would be deeply mistaken to think that this was the only weapon. Here, as other places in the world, they speak to restless people—people rising to shatter the old ways which have imprisoned hope—people fiercely and justly reaching for the material fruits from the tree of modern knowledge.

It is this desire, and not simply lust for conquest, which moves many of the individual fighting men that we must now, sadly, call the enemy.

It is, therefore, our task to show that freedom from the control of other nations offers the surest road to progress, that history and experience testify to this truth. But it is not enough to call upon reason or point to examples. We must show it through action and we must show it through accomplishment, and even were there no war—either hot or cold—we would always be active in humanity's search for progress.

This task is commanded to us by the moral values of our civilization, and it rests on the inescapable nature of the world that we have now entered. For in that world, as long as we can foresee, every threat to man's welfare will be a threat to the welfare of our own people. Those who live in the emerging community of nations will ignore the perils of their neighbors at the risk of their own prospects.

Cooperative Development in Southeast Asia

This is true not only for Viet-Nam but for every part of the developing world. This is why, on your behalf, I recently proposed a massive, cooperative development effort for all of Southeast Asia.² I named the respected leader, Eugene Black, as my personal representative to inaugurate our participation in these programs.

Since that time rapid progress has been made, I am glad to report. Mr. Black has met with the top officials of the United Nations on several occasions. He has talked to other interested parties. He has found increasing enthusiasm. The United Nations is already setting up new mechanisms to help carry forward the work of development.

In addition, the United States is now prepared to participate in, and to support, an Asian Development Bank, to carry out and help finance the economic progress in that area of the world and the development that we desire to see in that area of the world.

So this morning I call on every other industrialized nation, including the Soviet Union, to help create a better life for all of the people of Southeast Asia.

Surely, surely, the works of peace can bring men together in a common effort to abandon forever the works of war.

But, as South Viet-Nam is the central place of conflict, it is also a principal focus of our work to increase the well-being of people.

It is in that effort in South Viet-Nam

² For text of an address made by President Johnson at Johns Hopkins University on Apr. 7, see BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

which I think we are too little informed and which I want to relate to you this morning.

Strengthening Viet-Nam's Economy

We began in 1954, when Viet-Nam became independent, before the war between the North and the South. Since that time we have spent more than \$2 billion in economic help for the 16 million people of South Viet-Nam. And despite the ravages of war, we have made steady, continuing gains. We have concentrated on food, and health, and education, and housing, and industry.

Like most developing countries, South Viet-Nam's economy rests on agriculture. Unlike many, it has large uncrowded areas of very rich and very fertile land. Because of this, it is one of the great rice bowls of the entire world. With our help, since 1954, South Viet-Nam has already doubled its rice production, providing food for the people as well as providing a vital export for that nation.

We have put our American farm know-how to work on other crops. This year, for instance, several hundred million cuttings of a new variety of sweet potato, that promises a sixfold increase in yield, will be distributed to these Vietnamese farmers. Corn output should rise from 25,000 tons in 1962 to 100,000 tons by 1966. Pig production has more than doubled since 1955. Many animal diseases have been eliminated entirely.

Disease and epidemic brood over every Vietnamese village. In a country of more than 16 million people with a life expectancy of only 35 years, there are only 200 civilian doctors. If the Vietnamese had doctors in the same ratio as the United States has doctors, they would have not the 200 that they do have but they would have more than 5,000 doctors.

We have helped vaccinate, already, over 7 million people against cholera, and millions more against other diseases. Hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese can now receive treatment in the more than 12,000 hamlet

health stations that America has built and has stocked. New clinics and surgical suites are scattered throughout that entire country; and the medical school that we are now helping to build will graduate as many doctors in a single year as now serve the entire population of South Viet-Nam.

Education is the keystone of future development in Viet-Nam. It takes a trained people to man the factories, to conduct the administration, and to form the human foundation for an advancing nation. More than a quarter million young Vietnamese can now learn in more than 4,000 classrooms that America has helped to build in the last 2 years; and 2,000 more schools are going to be built by us in the next 12 months. The number of students in vocational schools has gone up four times. Enrollment was 300,000 in 1955, when we first entered there and started helping with our program. Today it is more than 1,500,000. The 8 million textbooks that we have supplied to Vietnamese children will rise to more than 15 million by 1967.

Agriculture is the foundation. Health, education, and housing are the urgent human needs. But industrial development is the great pathway to their future.

When Viet-Nam was divided, most of the industry was in the North. The South was barren of manufacturing and the foundations for industry. Today more than 700 new or rehabilitated factories—textile mills and cement plants, electronics and plastics—are changing the entire face of that nation. New roads and communications, railroad equipment, and electric generators are a spreading base on which this new industry can, and is, growing.

Progress in the Midst of War

All this progress goes on, and it is going to continue to go on, under circumstances of staggering adversity.

Communist terrorists have made aid programs that we administer a very special target of their attack. They fear them, because agricultural stations are being de-

stroyed and medical centers are being burned. More than 100 Vietnamese malaria fighters are dead. Our own AID [Agency for International Development] officials have been wounded and kidnaped. These are not just the accidents of war. They are a part of a deliberate campaign, in the words of the Communists, "to cut the fingers off the hands of the government."

We intend to continue, and we intend to increase our help to Viet-Nam.

Nor can anyone doubt the determination of the South Vietnamese themselves. They have lost more than 12,000 of their men since I became your President a little over a year ago.

But progress does not come from investment alone, or plans on a desk, or even the directives and the orders that we approve here in Washington. It takes men. Men must take the seed to the farmer. Men must teach the use of fertilizer. Men must help in harvest. Men must build the schools, and men must instruct the students. Men must carry medicine into the jungle, and treat the sick, and shelter the homeless. And men—brave, tireless, filled with love for their fellows—are doing this today. They are doing it through the long, hot, danger-filled Vietnamese days and the sultry nights.

The fullest glory must go, also, to those South Vietnamese that are laboring and dying for their own people and their own nation. In hospitals and schools, along the rice fields and the roads, they continue to labor, never knowing when death or terror may strike.

How incredible it is that there are a few who still say that the South Vietnamese do not want to continue the struggle. They are sacrificing and they are dying by the thousands. Their patient valor in the heavy presence of personal physical danger should be a helpful lesson to those of us who, here in America, only have to read about it, or to hear about it on the television or radio.

We have our own heroes who labor at the works of peace in the midst of war. They toil unarmed and out of uniform. They know

the humanity of their concern does not exempt them from the horrors of conflict, yet they go on from day to day. They bring food to the hungry over there. They supply the sick with necessary medicine. They help the farmer with his crops, families to find clean water, villages to receive the healing miracles of electricity. These are Americans who have joined our AID program, and we welcome others to their ranks.

For most Americans this is an easy war. Men fight and men suffer and men die, as they always do in war. But the lives of most of us, at least those of us in this room and those listening to me this morning, are untroubled. Prosperity rises, abundance increases, the Nation flourishes.

I will report to the Cabinet when I leave this room that we are in the 51st month of continued prosperity, the longest peacetime prosperity for America since our country was founded. Yet our entire future is at stake.

What a difference it would make if we could only call upon a small fraction of our unmatched private resources—businesses and unions, agricultural groups, and builders—if we could call them to the task of peaceful progress in Viet-Nam. With such a spirit of patriotic sacrifice we might well strike an irresistible blow for freedom there and for freedom throughout the world.

I therefore hope that every person within the sound of my voice in this country this morning will look for ways—and those citizens of other nations who believe in humanity as we do, I hope that they will find ways to help progress in South Viet-Nam.

This, then, is the third face of our struggle in Viet-Nam. It was there—the illiterate, the hungry, the sick—before this war began. It will be there when peace comes to us—and so will we—not with soldiers and planes, not with bombs and bullets, but with all the wondrous weapons of peace in the 20th century.

And then, perhaps, together, all of the people of the world can share that gracious task with all the people of Viet-Nam, North and South alike.

Secretary Discusses Situation in Dominican Republic

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Rusk by John Hightower of the Associated Press.

Press release 103 dated May 8

Mr. Hightower: When the decision was being made to send U.S. Marines into the Dominican Republic last week,¹ was consideration given to the fact that this would break a precedent dating back about half a century?

SECRETARY RUSK: The gravity of the decision to send U.S. Marines into the Dominican Republic was fully appreciated. It was not, however, an action which broke "a precedent dating back about half a century." Our decision to send troops to the Dominican Republic was aimed at saving lives. The situation in the Dominican Republic was one of anarchy; there was no authority able to accept responsibility for law and order and the protection of foreign nationals. Police and military authorities normally exercising such functions told us that they were unable to carry them out. They asked for our assistance. Under similar circumstances governments from time immemorial have been recognized to have not merely the right but the obligation to take whatever action is necessary to save the lives of their nationals. It had nothing to do with 19th-century types of intervention.

Q. What elements of the situation in the Dominican Republic could justify such a departure from long-established policy?

A. I have already indicated that the action taken in the Dominican Republic was not "a departure from established policy." The situation in the Dominican Republic contains unique elements which in a time of revolution contributed to chaos. Decades of dictatorship had stunted the development of a general civic order. It had been impossible to develop solidly based institutions for the

expression of the national will and to build the basis for an effective national political life. Thus at a time of sudden crisis there were no elements in the country that could take effective responsibility for law and order. The result was total chaos.

Q. Is it correct to say there were two phases in the intervention covering (1) a rescue operation and (2) a move to prevent a Communist takeover? If so, when did the United States' purpose change; and did the change affect the number of troops required?

A. The first action taken by the United States was indeed a rescue operation, and there is voluminous evidence to indicate that the Marines arrived just in time to avoid a major calamity. The mission of the U.S. forces did expand in keeping with the necessities of the changing situation and to support the decisions of the OAS [Organization of American States]. For example, the rescue of American and foreign nationals proved to be a larger problem than was at first anticipated; the OAS requested that an international neutral zone of safety be promptly established; a major effort was required to provide food and medicines to sustain the elementary public health of the country; and the OAS committee arrived and needed support. In short, after the initial emergency, United States forces were necessary to preserve the situation in the Dominican Republic until the OAS could take charge. Meanwhile the evidence was mounting that the Communists had captured the revolution according to plan, and the danger of a Communist takeover was established beyond question.

Q. Why did the United States not seek OAS approval before it took any action at all?

A. Time factors were crucial. Earlier in the afternoon of April 28 the American Ambassador reported that he was not prepared to recommend the use of American armed forces. At 5:15 he informed us that the situation had deteriorated very badly and very rapidly, that the police and military authorities had informed him that

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of May 17, 1965, p. 738.

they could no longer control the situation, that American and foreign nationals were in desperate danger, and that outside forces were required. As presently organized, the OAS does not have standby forces or the political machinery for the immediate decisions required to deal with such urgent contingencies. As soon as the action was taken, ambassadors to the OAS were informed and a meeting was called to enable the OAS to take jurisdiction.

Q. Do you think that subsequent OAS action has been extensive enough and fast enough to deal with the situation?

A. Given the circumstances and the necessity for OAS ambassadors to obtain instructions from their governments, OAS action has been prompt. However, the pace of events in this case does indicate that the OAS should consider standby forces and political arrangements that would enable that organization to make decisions and to take action in any future emergency with a speed required by the course of events.

Q. President Johnson said in a speech Sunday night on the Dominican crisis:² "Our goal, in keeping with the great principles of the inter-American system, is to help prevent another Communist state in this hemisphere." He also said: "The American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere." Do those statements or others like them constitute a new policy or "Johnson doctrine," as some now call it?

A. The President's statement was deeply rooted in the declared policy of the hemisphere and followed rather closely the formally adopted statements of the foreign ministers of this hemisphere in their meeting at Punta del Este in 1962.³ They declared, "The principles of communism are incompatible with the principles of the inter-American system" and "adherence by any member of the Organization of American States to Marxism-Leninism is incom-

patible with the inter-American system and the alignment of such a government with the communist bloc breaks the unity and solidarity of the hemisphere."

Q. Is the United States returning to some elements of the policy of intervention employed in the 19th century and first two decades of this century when Marines were sent into various countries of this hemisphere for political purposes?

A. As I said in connection with the first question, recent U.S. actions in the Dominican Republic have had nothing to do with 19th-century forms of intervention for the purpose of collecting revenues, protecting concessions, or changing governments. We went in to save lives. We are there in support of the OAS and the inter-American system.

Q. If there was a threatened Communist crisis in countries like Venezuela, Haiti, would the United States send in Marines or other troops to prevent a Communist seizure of power?

A. U.S. action in the Dominican Republic was related specifically to the facts of that situation. It would serve no useful purpose to speculate on possible responses to any future events elsewhere, particularly when we have no basis for expecting them to occur.

Q. You have spoken of the danger created by what the Communists call "wars of liberation," which you have denounced as a cover for hidden aggression. You have identified the conflict in Viet-Nam as such a war. Did you see that pattern developing in the Dominican Republic?

A. The situation in the Dominican Republic is, of course, quite different from that in Viet-Nam. What began in the Dominican Republic as a democratic revolution was taken over by Communist conspirators who had been trained for, and had carefully planned, that operation. Had they succeeded in establishing a government, the Communist seizure of power would in all likelihood have been irreversible, thus frustrating the declared principles of the OAS. We acted to preserve the freedom of choice of

² *Ibid.*, p. 744.

³ *Ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.

the Dominican people until the OAS could take charge and insure that its principles were carried out. It is now doing so.

Q. Do you think the OAS is capable of acting swiftly and decisively enough to deal with any threat of "wars of liberation" in the Western Hemisphere?

A. I believe the OAS has acted with dispatch and with a high degree of responsibility and effectiveness in dealing with the Dominican situation during the last 8 days. As Ambassador [Ellsworth] Bunker has indicated,⁴ the United States believes that it would be helpful to consider what further OAS instrumentalities and procedures might be developed for ready availability in the case of any future needs.

New Educational Exchange Agreement Signed With U. K.

Press release 104 dated May 10

A new educational exchange agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States, incorporating for the first time the principle of cost sharing by the two Governments, was signed at London on May 10. The new agreement revises and enlarges the original agreement of 1948. The ceremonies were held at the Foreign Office. American Ambassador David K. E. Bruce signed for the United States and Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart for the United Kingdom.

Under the new agreement, the U.S. Government proposes to deposit in the United Kingdom the British pound equivalent of \$5 million in installments. This sum is to be drawn upon as required to meet 80 percent of the approved budget of the United States-United Kingdom Educational Commission, which administers the program in the United Kingdom under the general supervision of the Board of Foreign Scholarships. Twenty percent of the approved budget will be provided by the Government of the United Kingdom.

⁴ See p. 854.

All sums to be made available to the Commission will be determined by annual budgets approved by the Secretary of State of the United States and the Secretary of State for Education and Science of the United Kingdom. The U.S. contribution is subject to appropriation by Congress and that of the United Kingdom to the availability of funds to the Secretary of State for Education and Science.

The Commission, which is continued by the new agreement, has 14 members, 7 being U.S. citizens and 7 U.K. nationals. The Ambassador appoints the American members and the Government of the United Kingdom the British members. The American Ambassador is the honorary chairman.

In all, there are now 48 such binational commissions, which operate under agreements covering 49 countries. (Belgium and Luxembourg are served by one commission.)

The new agreement, which has been under negotiation since 1963, enlarges the scope of the previous one by giving the Commission permissive authority to carry out the full range of exchange-of-persons and related activities authorized under the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (the Fulbright-Hays Act—Public Law 87-256).

A cost-sharing agreement with France was signed at Paris on May 7¹ by American Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen and Eric de Carbonnel, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic. Besides the United Kingdom and France, other governments that have now signed cost-sharing agreements with the United States are Australia, Austria, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. During the next academic year, 1965-66, the Commission, in cooperation with the Department of State and private American and British educational institutions, expects to provide more than 500 exchange grants to senior scholars, teachers, and students. Of these some 300 would be for U.K. nationals and about 230 for U.S. citizens.

¹ BULLETIN of May 24, 1965, p. 813.

Economic Development in Asia

by *W. W. Rostow*

*Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council*¹

To talk of the economic development of any great region is by definition to consider a wide variety of problems. During the Marshall Plan in Europe, for example, in a region which is generally regarded as homogeneous, we faced together with our European friends problems as different as those of Greece, on the one hand, and of Denmark, on the other. In the Alliance for Progress we now face together with our Latin American friends problems which range from the relatively early stage of development of, say, Ecuador to the highly sophisticated problems of Argentina and Brazil.

Even within the United States and Canada there are important regional differences which constitute, in effect, the coexistence of different stages of growth within a given nation; for example, it is only in the past generation that one could say with confidence that a takeoff had occurred in important parts of the American South and in Quebec. And in the end, each nation, like each individual, is unique. Although similar problems must be confronted at each stage of development, the correct answer can only be devised on the spot, in the light of each nation's resources and history, its traditions and ambitions.

To lay before you, therefore, some reflections on the present state of economic development in Asia is a somewhat dangerous adventure in generalization. Leaving

Japan and Hong Kong aside, the level of gross national product per capita runs from over \$250 in Malaysia to something like \$55 in Nepal, a range of something like five to one. What is called in Asian bureaucratic parlance "the developing ECAFE region"—that is, excluding Japan and the other advanced nations of Asia—contains a few countries which have an excellent balance between population and natural agricultural resources, notably such food exporters as Burma, Thailand, and, in normal times, South Viet-Nam. But it also contains regions where population increase presses hard against the land. In the free world as a whole, the population density is 55 per square mile; but it is 425 in Ceylon, 368 in India, 273 in Pakistan. Asia contains some nations which already command a capacity to produce not only a wide range of consumer goods but also many heavy industry products; but it also includes nations just beginning the earliest forms of industrial activity.

There are, nevertheless, some generalizations about Asian development and our experience of the first postwar generation which can usefully be made. I shall try to focus my remarks around four major issues: the present stage of industrial development in Asia; the role of agriculture; the problem of expanding and diversifying exports; and the scope for regional cooperation. I shall conclude with some observations on the relevance of certain aspects of Japan's historical and contemporary experience for other Asian nations and on Japan's capacity

¹ Address made under sponsorship of Asahi Shimbun at Tokyo, Japan, on Apr. 23 (press release 80 dated Apr. 22).

to help carry forward the next stage of development throughout the region.

Need for a New and Wider Strategy

If one examines in general the pattern of Asian development in the last decade, it is clear that, despite many vicissitudes, a great deal of progress has been made in manufacturing industry. With relatively minor exceptions, the contribution of industry to the domestic production of Asian countries has been rising, in some cases rising at a high rate—averaging between 6 percent and 11 percent per annum over the past decade, as against an average increase of GNP of 4 percent.

An initial concentration on industry and a relative neglect of agriculture in Asian development were quite natural in political terms and also reflected an understanding at the time of what was economically desirable. The modernization of an economy consists, in its essence, in the progressive diffusion and absorption of what modern science and technology can offer; and industrial activity is the most dramatic and obvious form for the incorporation of modern technology.

As in other developing areas—for example, Latin America—a good deal of Asian industrialization has been concentrated on the production of consumers goods in substitution for imports. The economy of a developing country can benefit from this kind of activity in two ways. In the first instance, it begins to learn to solve the problems of industry itself; and, by cutting down the import of certain manufactured consumers goods, it reserves more of its foreign exchange earning capacity for the import of capital goods and essential industrial raw materials. But the development of import-substitution industries does not have, of course, a simple one-way effect on imports. By raising the level of income, it increases the demand for imports in general; and by advancing industrialization itself, it sets up an enlarged demand for imported capital goods.

The argument for an overriding emphasis

on industry in the first phase of industrialization was reinforced by a widespread sense that industry was the essence of modernization while the continued concentration on agriculture and agricultural exports was a sign of continued inferior or colonial status. I recall in the early postwar years listening in Geneva to many speeches in the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, in which representatives from developing countries argued the priority of industry over agriculture, using as a technical base the simple and true fact that productivity per man was generally higher in industry than agriculture and, if productivity was to rise, a shift from agriculture to industry was necessary. And, indeed, the reduction of the proportion of the working force engaged in agriculture remains one highly relevant measure of modernization.

The possibilities of import substitution of consumers goods have by no means been wholly exhausted throughout the region in this first phase of Asian industrial development; but there is a growing sense in the region—and a correct sense—that a new strategy is called for. Import substitution of consumers goods will no longer suffice.

The need for a new and wider strategy arises from two massive facts. First, in many critical parts of Asia the population increase is outstripping the rate of increase of food production. And the region, taken overall, has become increasingly dependent on food imports. Second, the relatively slow rate of expansion in traditional Asian export products, combined with weak international prices for some Asian exports, has posed sharply the question: How can the developing nations of Asia earn more foreign exchange? Industrialization requires an endless expansion of imports, as the history of Western Europe, Japan, and North America indicates down to the present day.

There is no doubt that in the first generation of postwar development the importance of rural development to the total modernization of developing societies was underrated in many parts of Asia, and the

doctrines and policies for rural development, applied both by many Asian nations themselves and by those providing external assistance, were inadequate. It was not fully understood within many developing nations that agriculture is not merely an essential source of food for a rapidly expanding and urbanizing population, which was bound to use a large part of whatever increase in income that occurred to improve its diet, but that, in addition to this basic role in supplying food, agriculture is a critical source of raw materials for industry itself and, properly exploited, an important source for the earning of additional foreign exchange.

Finally—and this is only now becoming fully understood—mature industrialization requires much larger markets than the rather narrow urban markets which were sufficient to sustain the first phase of import substitution of consumers goods. The farmer is needed by urban industry not merely to supply food and raw materials and foreign exchange earnings; he is also needed as a customer for industrial products, if industrial momentum is to be sustained and Asian industry is to move on from its import-substitution phase to maturity.

Industrialization and Agriculture

This interconnection between industrialization and agricultural development becomes clear if one examines carefully what we have learned from the success stories and the failures in agricultural development in this first postwar generation. It is quite evident that agricultural development must be regarded as a complex, multifaceted system—just as industrial production is such a system. There are certain necessary and sufficient conditions which must be met if a sustained rise in agricultural production and productivity is to occur.

The question of essential infrastructure (roads, schools, et cetera) is, evidently, basic. This dimension of rural development is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the modernization of the countryside. The following four further factors appear to

be essential to produce a true modernization of agriculture in a developing region.

First, the farmer must be offered a fair, and reliable return for his product. In many cases this most simple precept has not been honored. In some Asian countries there are too many intermediaries between the farmer and the consumer. In other cases a traditional trading class exploits a monopoly position as an intermediary. Some governments deliberately keep farm prices low in order to keep down the urban cost of living. Finally, the lack of land reform or inadequate enforcement of existing land-reform measures often limits the farmer's return.

Second, the farmer needs credit at reasonable rates if he is to acquire the means to raise his productivity or shift to high-productivity cash or commercial crops.

Third, the farmer needs practical technical assistance relevant to his soil, his rainfall conditions, and to the change in method or product which is most efficient for him in his particular setting.

Finally, the farmer needs to have available two types of manufactured goods at reasonable prices: agricultural inputs, such as fertilizers, tools, and pesticides; and consumers goods of good quality at reasonable prices to make it attractive for him and his family to make the extra effort to increase his production and productivity.

A fair and reliable price; credit at reasonable rates; relevant technical assistance; and manufactured products at reasonable prices—these seem to be the necessary and sufficient conditions for success, where roads, schools, and other basic infrastructure are provided.

If one examines the failures and frustrations in agricultural development in postwar Asia, one can find that one or more of these elements in the system was missing.

There are a variety of ways in which these elements can be provided to the farmer. Producers cooperatives, for example, have proved effective in some cases; in others, modern food-processing activities have been able to provide the critical ele-

ments in the system, as have well-run plantations.

But it is important to note that a consensus has emerged from our sometimes frustrating efforts in many parts of the world over the past generation that the agricultural problem must be dealt with on all four of these fronts if we are to get the increase in production and modernization of rural life which is needed.

Agricultural Development Programs

India has attacked some of these problems in imaginative ways; but the scale of the problem has thus far outstripped the financial and administrative resources devoted to it. There has recently been an increased recognition in India of the need to devote more resources to agriculture.

Many of the countries of Southeast Asia have undertaken programs of agricultural development which have included producers cooperatives, government programs for provision of agricultural credit, and technical assistance through community development and extension programs. Typically, however, these programs have suffered from lack of attention and from inadequate administration. Land tenure arrangements and inadequately enforced land reforms have kept price incentives lower than is desirable. (Taiwan is an important exception in regard to land reform.)

Malaysia is an outstanding case of a country which is devoting major investment resources to agriculture to useful effect. The political situation in Malaysia has favored such a course. Malaysia's marketing system is effective, and both producers and consumers goods are readily available in rural areas at reasonable prices, although in the Malaysian case these goods are still obtained primarily through imports rather than by local manufacture. The heart of the Malaysian agricultural program is a land development scheme under which the Government helps individual farmers get started, through provision of land on reasonable terms, initial planting material for cash crops, and supporting technical assistance. Thus, through a com-

bination of governmental and private action the necessary elements are brought together.

In Thailand, a combination of agricultural research, the introduction of improved seed, and the opening of new agricultural lands through the development of roads and a malaria eradication program have produced a quite remarkable development of corn production. Thailand is now one of the world's leading corn exporters. It sells most of its crop to Japan.

In Pakistan, too, one can see a heartening expansion in agricultural production, accompanied by wide-ranging measures to modernize the countryside.

Improving Marketing Arrangements

Within the whole agricultural complex it is worth looking with particular attention at marketing arrangements—both marketing from the farm to the city and marketing to the rural areas of manufactured goods.

In modern development economics and policy there has been a systematic tendency to underestimate the importance of the marketing links between urban and rural life. This neglect stemmed, in part, from the initial concentration on industrial development and on the major initial tasks of building the economic and social infrastructure, notably education, transport, and the supply of electric power. But it is perhaps appropriate for an economist to point out that all of us have been trained in a tradition, going back to the 18th century, which tends to emphasize production and leaves distribution to be dealt with as a second order of business.

The archaic and expensive methods of distribution which mark most developing nations take on, however, a critical role at the present stage in Asian development, for it is impossible to offer the farmer the inducements he needs if there is an extravagant gap between the price he gets and the price of his product in the city; and, unless there is greater efficiency in the distribution of manufactured products to rural areas, the selling price of such goods to the farmer will be so

high that the market for manufactures cannot be widened at his inevitably low level of income.

What I am asserting as a general proposition, then, is that economic development in Asia can no longer be based on the immediate postwar rationale for industrialization. It is no longer a question of the priority of industry over agriculture. It is a question of modernizing rural life in Asia as a basis for continued rapid industrialization. Without the modernization of rural life, industrialization can be damped down or even throttled, not only by the pressure of population on food supplies or by the lack of adequate industrial raw materials or agricultural exports abroad but by the inadequacy of the domestic market itself.

Although the symptoms of this damping of industry by inadequate attention to agriculture can be observed in several countries of Asia, the most extreme case is, of course, Communist China, where failures in the agricultural sector led to the collapse after 1958 and to a present situation where industrialization over a wide front has been slowed down or stopped and scarce foreign exchange must be used on a large scale to buy food abroad for the coastal cities.

Future of Foreign Trade in Developing Asia

This chain of thought bears also on the searching question of the future of foreign trade in developing Asia.

It is clear that the capacity of the developing Asian countries to earn foreign exchange, and to earn it on a sufficient scale so that their growth becomes self-sustaining, requires an increase in what are often called nontraditional exports. We must all do what we can to facilitate exports of traditional Asian commodities and, by international agreements and other devices, to help sustain their prices; but of their very nature, and especially in a world of modern technology, there are relatively low ceilings on what we can expect from these efforts. This means Asia, in its effort to generate an increased flow of foreign exchange, must

look to new kinds of agricultural products and raw materials, to agricultural and raw materials processed to higher stages, and to manufactured goods.

There are two observations I would make on this pervasive problem of the developing regions of Asia and elsewhere.

The first is that the development of new lines of exports is hard and serious work. It is, if you like, an important dimension of development itself. Although foreign investment can play an important role in improving the competitiveness of exports through the import of foreign technology, no amount of assistance from outside can substitute for the energy and attention of the government and the business community of the developing country.

The possibilities of diversifying and expanding exports must be studied at home. Potential markets must be studied abroad. An export-mindedness must be made to pervade commercial and industrial groups which, in the first generation, have been able to sit in relative comfort, making high unit profits behind tariff barriers erected to sustain import-substitution industries. Bureaucratic arrangements for exporting must be simplified and financial arrangements provided which encourage an enlarged flow of exports. Diplomatic missions abroad must help the private sector establish reliable markets. Serious and sustained efforts at quality control must be introduced.

When these efforts are made, there is ample evidence that the skills available to developing countries make it possible for them to find sales outlets abroad for manufactured products. The remarkable export expansion of the Republic of China and of Hong Kong in the postwar period, as well as the longer experience of Japan itself, has demonstrated this proposition.

Those who aim to assist in Asian development should be prepared to help at every stage in the generation and sale of such new export products.

A second observation is, perhaps, less familiar; and it is an observation which would

link what I had to say earlier about the expansion in domestic markets to the capacity of developing countries to expand their foreign trade.

The most effective base for the export of manufactures is a large domestic market. It is no accident that for many developing countries the first manufactured product to be exported has been cotton textiles. Indeed, this was how the Industrial Revolution began in Britain in the late 18th century. Britain was followed as an exporter by the United States in the early 19th century; then by many other countries, notably Japan and India; and now it is true of others. The reason is, of course, that even in countries with low levels of per capita income, the market for textiles is large; and it is natural that efficiency in production, distribution, and quality control should first be attained in such a mass consumption industry.

The history of manufactured exports is, in large part, the history of a series of projections abroad of skills developed in exploiting a large domestic market. In this century the United States was the first country to develop a large export trade in automobiles, because we began the era of the mass automobile in the 1920's; and it is wholly natural that, now that several countries in Europe, as well as Japan, have entered the age of the mass automobile, the United States faces a number of effective competitors in the international markets.

What I am asserting, then, is that the expansion of the domestic market which is required to produce a modernization of rural life and an ample market for domestic industry is also the proper base for the development of diversified exports.

In the first generation of postwar development in Asia, then, there was a concentration on consumers goods import-substitution industries and infrastructure. Both must continue to engage our attention and our resources in the decade and generation ahead. But our basic strategy for Asian development must shift, I believe, toward the modernization of rural life and the building of new interconnections be-

tween industry and agriculture, on the one hand, and toward a new seriousness in developing efficient and diversified export sectors.

How Regional Cooperation Can Help

In executing this strategy it is worth asking ourselves the question: How can regional cooperation help? How can groups of nations in the same general region behave in such a way as to make their development strategy mutually reinforcing? The first generation of development has been, in many ways, inward-looking. Each country concentrated on its first phase of industrialization and on basic national infrastructure, looking abroad mainly to sell its traditional exports and for capital to support these activities. To what extent should the developing nations of Asia now look outward and especially to each other, within their region, in support of the new strategy?

Although economic development must, in the end, depend mainly on the efforts of the citizens within each country, there are, I believe, five ways in which the nations of Asia can help one another in this next phase of the region's economic evolution.

First, through intensified intraregional trade. Relatively low transport costs and an intimate knowledge of the tastes and requirements for particular products should make it possible to generate a disproportionate increase of intraregional trade, as production and exports diversify. The Asian nations should look, of course, for markets in every quarter of the globe. But there clearly are natural possibilities within the region that deserve systematic exploitation.

Second, systematic efforts can also be made to harmonize development plans in such a way as to permit Asian nations to concentrate in fields of greatest natural advantage and to reduce the possibilities of overproduction and idle industrial capacity. For example, in Asia, as in other developing regions, particular attention is required, in the present state of population pressure on food supplies, to the efficient production, distribution, and trade in chemical fertiliz-

ers. The exploitation of chemical fertilizer resources in Asia might proceed more swiftly and rationally if it were based on regional rather than simply national perspectives. And this may be true of other heavy industries. An intensive and regular examination of the region's development plans and programs should permit substantial economies in capital as well as enlarged opportunities for trade of mutual advantage.

Third, in both Europe of the Marshall Plan days and contemporary Latin America, it has been found helpful to create regional arrangements in which each nation's development program is regularly and systematically examined in a multilateral process, with the presence and cooperation of the governments and international institutions prepared to assist in external financing. Such country reviews—now an annual feature of the Alliance for Progress—may reveal significant additional opportunities for external assistance; and they provide a means for mobilizing additional development funds, as more effective self-help measures are taken by each country.

In this connection it is the view of the United States Government that a well-designed Asian Development Bank, which has substantial financial and other support within the region, could be extremely useful in promoting regional and subregional development and in focusing the major sources of capital and technical assistance around national development programs. We look forward to the further discussions of this scheme scheduled for this summer.

Fourth, certain of the countries within the region may wish to generate even more intensive measures of economic cooperation than are possible on an all-regional basis. This has always been the hope which lay behind, for example, the schemes to develop the Mekong River basin. And there are, as we all know, many unexploited opportunities for intense economic cooperation between neighboring countries; for example, between India and Pakistan, whose relations are now unfortunately inhibit-

ed but whose possibilities for mutual economic support we all hope will be exploited in the fullness of time. There may also be possibilities for certain countries to compensate for the small size of their national markets by forming subregional common market arrangements, as the countries of Central America have so successfully done.

Finally, in the setting of the strategy outlined here, there would certainly be an enlarged role for intensified technical assistance on a regional basis, notably in the fields of agriculture, marketing, and export promotion.

Japan's Potential To Assist Others

In this next phase of Asian development, Japan evidently commands an enormous potential to assist others. It is evident that the strategy for Asian development I have outlined conforms to that which Japan itself has pioneered in emerging to its present position as a great world industrial power. From the earliest days after the Meiji Restoration, Japan never made the mistake of neglecting its agricultural resources nor its agricultural population. The educational system established in rural, as in urban, areas in 19th century Japan remains one of the remarkable achievements of modern economic and social history. Japan's land reform, from the beginning, left the farmer and his family with powerful incentives to increase productivity. Japan pressed not only the efficient use of water for double cropping but also showed the way in Asia in the intensive use of chemical fertilizers, on which, it is not too much to say, modern industrial Japan has been built.

Moreover, Japan has used its agricultural resources and domestic rural market as a foundation for its industrialization. Japan's agriculture has supplied not merely food for the cities but raw materials for industry and export earnings, starting with the silk exports of the 19th century, which first brought the disciplines of quality con-

trol and commercial marketing to the Japanese countryside.

Contemporary Japan, perhaps more than any other nation which developing Asia might study, has demonstrated what can be done to make the rural population a market for industrial products and how, on this foundation, an export trade can be built of the most diversified and sophisticated kind.

Moreover, Japan demonstrated that part-time industrial work could be woven into the rhythm of rural life.

In short, deep in the living experience of this nation are the lessons and the know-how which ought to be made available in the next decade and generation to all of developing Asia. Each nation will, of course, devise its own particular methods and institutions. But there can be no more relevant storehouse of practical experience than that which modern Japan incorporates—notably, as I say, in the fields of agriculture and the diversification of foreign trade.

Within the various kinds of multilateral enterprises which, we all hope, developing Asia will mount in the years ahead, Japan evidently has a constructive role which its human and material resources now permit it to fulfill. Japan has already played, in recent years, an important and constructive part in such regional activities as ECAFE [Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East], the Colombo Plan, and the Asian productivity organization—as well as in the emergence of the concept of an Asian Development Bank.

U.S. Prepared To Play an Active Part

In such ventures the United States is prepared to play an active part along with other developed countries who share an interest in the success of the economic and social development of free Asia. But we are conscious that there is a growing and healthy desire in Asia, as elsewhere, for nations and peoples to take a larger hand in shaping their own fate through the strengthening of regional organizations.

The inescapable interdependencies which

govern our common life on this small planet require us to work together very closely in matters of defense and in matters of economic development, monetary affairs, and trade. Simple, old-fashioned nationalism can provide our peoples neither safety nor prosperity in the modern world. This is as true of the United States as it is true of any of the Asian nations.

Increased collaboration among the nations of free Asia can, however, permit them to achieve higher levels of development and, at the same time, to establish more effective relations of partnership and interdependence with the United States and others concerned for their safety and their welfare. It was in this spirit that President Johnson made his recent proposals for the concerted development of Southeast Asia²—proposals that we hope will be given shape by leaders in Asia, both on their own initiative and under the initiative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In the evolution of free Asia over the years ahead, we look forward to working with our friends across the Pacific in intensified multilateral ventures.

The object of the United States in the exercise of its world responsibilities since the Second World War has not been to build an empire: It has been to play our part in helping build a peaceful and orderly world community. Within such a community—governed by the principles of the United Nations Charter—each nation ought to find a role of dignity, pressing forward its legitimate national interests while respecting the interests of others and respecting the interdependence of all nations in a world of modern technology and communications.

Creative Capacity of Free Asia

Looking back over this first postwar generation, we all have a right to feel a deep underlying confidence. Despite the Korean war and the current crisis in Southeast Asia, despite the unrelenting intent of some Communists to disrupt the life of free Asia

² BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

and to extend their power, the free peoples of Asia have demonstrated an enormous vitality. The development of Japan since 1945 has been, of course, a true miracle. But in many other parts of Asia there has also emerged a will to build modern nations, true to their old traditions, culture, and history, true to their own visions of the future, increasingly capable of absorbing and using for their own purposes modern science and technology.

There is nothing in the Communist performance in Asia or elsewhere to lead us to believe that history is not on the side of free men. On the contrary. By every test of creative capacity, free Asia is outstripping that part of Asia now under Communist rule.

With respect to economic and social development, then, Asia can go forward with the conviction that it is on the right track. It should, we believe, go forward following a strategy something along the lines of that which I have outlined today—a strategy which would widen the horizons of development by the modernization of rural life, combined with intensified efforts to trade and to cooperate with other nations, accompanied, of course, by accelerated industrialization.

In executing that strategy, Japan has a major mission to perform; and we in the United States are prepared to work side by side with you, assisting with resources, technical assistance, good will, and faith that a new, free, and modern Asia shall emerge.

U.S. Unwilling To Maintain Consular Relations With Cambodia

Following is the text of a letter from Secretary Rusk to Cambodian Foreign Minister Koun Wick, delivered at Phnom Penh on May 7.

Press release 105 dated May 10

MAY 6, 1965

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's message of

May 4¹ in which you explain the Cambodian position on the maintenance of consular relations. I wish, on my side, to clarify the position of the United States.

The United States not only accepts but supports the safety, independence, neutrality and prosperity of Cambodia and of the Cambodian people. We have demonstrated that through the postwar period in many ways, including through substantial resources placed at the disposal of the Royal Cambodian Government. We have further, in response to the proposal of your government, indicated our readiness to attend a conference of the governments attending the 1954 Geneva Conference for the purpose of providing Cambodia further international assurances on these matters. Whether or not such a conference takes place, the United States will continue to respect the neutrality of Cambodia. We trust that the Royal Cambodian Government for its part accepts the responsibilities incumbent on this neutral status.

I know of no issues affecting Cambodia which cannot be resolved through the normal processes of diplomacy, whether bilaterally or through such a conference. We take note of the fact that the Royal Cambodian Government has not maintained diplomatic representation in Washington since April 1964 and that it has now moved to break relations, a step requiring the withdrawal of the American Embassy from Phnom Penh. The Royal Government of Cambodia must therefore accept the consequences of the disappearance of the normal bilateral diplomatic machinery through which states of the international community attempt to resolve their differences and increase the range of common interest and cooperation.

It seems quite clear that the maintenance of consular relations, subject to the unilateral conditions imposed by the Royal Government of Cambodia, is not consistent with general international practice. Nor would such an attitude on the part of the

¹ Not printed here.

Royal Government of Cambodia serve such activities as tourism and trade, for the benefit of which the Cambodian Government has suggested that consular relations be maintained.

The United States Government, for its part, desires normal relations with the Royal Government of Cambodia, but it is manifest that such relations are not possible in the absence of mutuality and reciprocity. Since reciprocity unfortunately is not present, we have no alternative but to accept the

conclusions of the Royal Cambodian Government and to withdraw all official representation from your country.

Let me conclude, Excellency, by saying that the Government of the United States is prepared at any time to consider with the Royal Cambodian Government the restoration of relations on a mutually acceptable basis.

Please accept, Excellency, assurances of my high consideration.

DEAN RUSK
Secretary of State

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

OAS Foreign Ministers Provide for Establishment of Inter-American Force in Dominican Republic

The Tenth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics convened at Washington, D.C., on May 1 to consider the situation in the Dominican Republic. Following is a series of statements made by U.S. Representative Ellsworth Bunker, together with texts of resolutions adopted by the Meeting of Consultation and the Act of Santo Domingo.

STATEMENT OF MAY 1¹

Mr. Chairman: I should like to comment briefly on the statements made today by the distinguished Ambassador of Venezuela and the distinguished Ambassador of Chile with regard to the dispatch of United States forces to the Dominican Republic.

¹ Made in plenary session.

As I stated in the early hours of yesterday morning,² this is not intervention in any sense by the United States in the affairs of the Dominican Republic. United States forces were dispatched purely and solely for humanitarian purposes, for the protection of the lives not only of United States citizens but the lives of citizens of other countries as well. I stated yesterday morning that there were many precedents for this kind of situation, that none of this is inconsistent with inter-American obligations, and that we wholeheartedly subscribe to these obligations, including the doctrine of self-determination and nonintervention. We are not talking about intruding in the domestic affairs of other countries. We are talking simply about the elementary duty to save lives in a situation where there is no

² BULLETIN of May 17, 1965, p. 739.

authority able to accept responsibility for primary law and order. We believe this is a matter of the greatest urgency for the Organization of American States to deal with within the family of the hemisphere, in which all of us have a great stake.

Obviously we have no candidate for government in the Dominican Republic. This is a matter for the Dominican people themselves, and it is for us to find the means to assist the Dominican people to constitute a government which reflects their wishes and a government which can undertake the international obligations of the hemisphere.

I may add, Mr. Chairman, that the forces of the United States arrived barely in time to avoid far greater casualties and greater bloodshed than actually took place. At the time of the arrival of those forces, firing had begun on foreign nationals assembled at the polo grounds for the purpose of seeking evacuation from the Republic, and I might also point out that, in continuation of the humanitarian purpose for which our forces are there, we have sent in some 30,000 pounds of medical supplies, that there are three medical teams assisting people of all groups in the Dominican Republic, and that food is being distributed to all groups there.

Mr. Chairman: I would like to call attention to the statement of President Johnson made last evening on the situation in the Dominican Republic,³ in which the President reiterated the statement that this step which we have taken was taken only when we were officially notified by the police and the military officials of the Dominican Republic that they were no longer in a position to guarantee the safety of American and foreign nationals and to preserve law and order. The President also stated that:

... there are signs that people trained outside the Dominican Republic are seeking to gain control. Thus, the legitimate aspirations of the Dominican people and most of their leaders for progress, democracy, and social justice are threatened, and so are the principles of the inter-American system.

The President went on to say, Mr. Chairman—and I take the liberty of reading part

of his statement because I think it is extremely important for the purposes of this meeting:

The inter-American system, and its principal organ, the Organization of American States, have a grave and immediate responsibility. It is important that prompt action be taken. I am informed that a representative of the OAS is leaving Washington shortly for the Dominican Republic. (As we know, the Secretary General, Dr. [José A.] Mora, is already there.) It is very important that representatives of the OAS be sent to the Dominican Republic, just as soon as they can be sent there, in order to strengthen the cease-fire and in order to help clear a road to the return of constitutional processes and free elections. Loss of time may mean that it is too late to preserve freedom, which alone can lead to the establishment of true democracy. This, I am sure, is what the people of the Dominican Republic want. Late action, or delay, in such a case could mean a failure to accomplish the agreed objectives of the American states.

The eyes of the hemisphere are now on the OAS, both on its meeting today and on the meeting of its foreign ministers contemplated tomorrow. The wisdom, the statesmanship, and the ability of the OAS to act decisively are critical to the hopes of peoples in every land of this continent.

The United States will give its full support to the work of the OAS and will never depart from its commitment to the preservation of the right of all of the free people of this hemisphere to choose their own course without falling prey to international conspiracy from any quarter.

I may add, Mr. Chairman, too, that my Government regrets that there was no inter-American force available to respond to the request of the authorities and the needs of the people of the Dominican Republic and for the protection of the lives and the safety of other nationals. My Government would welcome the constitution of such a force as soon as possible.

Mr. Chairman, I suggest that the matter of greatest urgency is for this meeting to get on with the business of constituting the committee to go to the Dominican Republic, to make recommendations, to make an investigation, and to attain peace, order, and conditions under which the people of the Dominican Republic may order their own lives. Mr. Chairman, my delegation submitted a draft resolution which would, I trust, start this process, and I will ask, Mr. Chairman, that the Secretary read this draft resolution.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 742.

FIRST STATEMENT OF MAY 3⁴

I asked for convocation of this meeting because I have undertaken to keep the member representatives informed of whatever steps may be undertaken by my Government in connection with the tragic situation existing in our sister Republic. I will devote my remarks at this time to the matter which has been so urgently presented by our members and the chairman of our distinguished committee presently in the Dominican Republic.

In the statement last evening,⁵ President Johnson said that the distribution of food to people who have not eaten for days, the need for medical supplies and attention for the sick and wounded, the health requirements to avoid an epidemic because there are hundreds who have been dead for days and whose bodies are now in the streets, and other protection and security of each individual who is caught on that island, require the attention of the additional forces which are ordered to proceed to the Dominican Republic.

The information which my Government has received corresponds to the information which our Committee has just presented in its telegram, and I should like to mention some of the steps which my Government has taken to meet this very urgent, pressing need.

There is a steamer, the *Alcoa Ranger*, now in Puerto Rico ready to proceed to the Dominican Republic with food for the population. We have dispatched yesterday Mr. [Anthony M.] Solomon, the Assistant Secretary of State, designate, for Economic Affairs, to the island to help the mission in the coordination of relief programs for the provision and distribution of food, of clothing, of blankets, of tents—which we understand are required—of medical supplies, and of medicines and personnel. There are already three medical teams in the Republic which are giving assistance to citizens of

⁴ Made before the third session of the General Committee.

⁵ BULLETIN of May 17, 1965, p. 744.

whatever group, whatever nationality, as required. As the President said, the danger of epidemic is imminent. The facilities of my Government are available for the transportation of supplies and of personnel to the Dominican Republic from any source in order to relieve this very urgent situation now existing. And I would hope that the first order of business of this meeting might be some action in the form of a resolution carrying out the request of our distinguished Committee and making an appeal to the member states to respond to the extent of their capacity to these requirements, which are so urgently needed in the Dominican Republic.

I think, Mr. Chairman, I would like to postpone the rest of my report and remarks on other measures taken until some action has been taken on this request of the Committee, and I would suggest that this take priority over any other matter that we might wish to discuss.

RESOLUTION ON URGENT AID⁶

WHEREAS:

The Committee appointed by a resolution of May 1, 1965, of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation has reported by radiogram from Santo Domingo on the appalling conditions in the city and the urgent need for the dispatch of food, medicines, medical supplies, doctors, and nurses; and

The United States Representative has informed the Meeting of the plans already undertaken by the United States Government to supply such items on an urgent basis and of the offer of that government to use its facilities to transport similar assistance from other American republics,

THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

RESOLVES:

To address an urgent appeal to all the member states to place at the disposal of the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, within the limits of their capabilities, food, medicines, medical supplies, and trained medical personnel to be sent immediately to the Dominican Republic for the humanitarian purpose of giving succor to the population of that country, on the basis of need, without regard for their participation in the disturbances.

⁶ Adopted unanimously in plenary session on May 3.

SECOND STATEMENT OF MAY 3⁷

Mr. Chairman: I should first like to report further on other steps which my Government has deemed it necessary to take, which were referred to in the statement made by President Johnson last evening, in part.

President Johnson announced the fact that he had instructed some 4,500 additional troops to be sent to the Dominican Republic. There were several reasons for this move. As he said, our servicemen since they arrived last Wednesday have evacuated 3,000 persons from 30 different countries in the world. There are more than 5,000 people, 1,500 of whom are United States citizens, the others are of foreign nationalities, who are awaiting evacuation. And, as the President said, we must get on with that job immediately, for the task which our forces there are having to perform is a very extensive one.

The zone of refuge which was set up in accordance with the resolution adopted by the Council on April 30⁸ embraces an area of 9 square miles, including many embassies, the Embajador Hotel, where many of those awaiting evacuation are assembled, and the polo grounds, where others are assembled. This is a very large zone requiring protection on its perimeters. There are two means of evacuation—one through the small Port of Haina, which is some 6 miles west of the city of Santo Domingo; the other is the airport, which is some 7 miles to the east. There is consequently a long line of communication to be protected, some 25 miles in extent, on a 24-hour basis. This obviously requires a very substantial number of troops. The question of protecting the line of communication, I understand, was put to the committee and the Secretary General yesterday afternoon, who approved of the protection and of the necessity of doing so.

May I read also the message which the Papal Nuncio asked to be transmitted to President Johnson, which said:

⁷ Made before the third session of the General Committee.

⁸ For text, see BULLETIN of May 17, 1965, p. 741.

I want to express my personal gratitude to President Johnson for the humane contribution and for the protection of the foreign embassies as well as for the contribution to a cease-fire and the saving of human lives within the terms of the OAS appeal. This is an expression of personal gratitude. Signed, Monsignor Emmanuel Clarizio.

The Secretary General of the OAS expressed also his appreciation as well and said that the arrival of U.S. forces to establish an international security zone in accordance with provisions of the OAS resolution contributed a great deal in the situation. The Secretary General also reported that he hoped to see Colonel Caamaño [Francisco Caamaño Deño] to establish contact and talk about widening the security zone to include embassies such as those of Ecuador, El Salvador, and Guatemala.

Yesterday afternoon our Ambassador [W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.] reported that at the meeting of the diplomatic corps, the Argentine Ambassador reported that his Embassy had been fired on more than 24 hours after the cease-fire signing by the rebel leader Colonel Caamaño, and that at the same meeting various other ambassadors reported continuing difficulties and harassment by rebels. The Guatemalan and Italian Ambassadors described constant conditions of menace at their Embassies and asked that the security zone be extended to cover them. The Israeli Ambassador stated that whatever one's personal views or philosophies, and without regard to legalistic niceties, he had felt greatly relieved when the United States forces arrived and felt that the United States was due a vote of thanks for landing forces to protect innocent people.

Those are the reasons, Mr. Chairman, for the increase in the force which is considered necessary to protect not only a very large area as the zone of refuge, which as you know has been asked by various embassies to be still further enlarged, but also a very long and tenuous line of communication.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I should like to speak of the resolution which my delegation presented, having to do with the establish-

ment of a multilateral inter-American force, the purpose of which would be to assist the committee, established by resolution of this body on May 1 last,⁹ to carry out its mission of putting an end to the tragic situation existing in our sister Republic, of reestablishing peace, and of bringing about normal conditions, in the words of the resolution.

As I stated at the meeting on May 1, my Government regrets that there was no such inter-American force available to respond to the request of the authorities and the needs of the Dominican people and for the protection of the lives and the safety of other nationals. I stated then that in the absence of such an inter-American force, the forces of the United States arrived barely in time to avoid far greater casualties and bloodshed than have actually occurred, tragic as these have been. Firing on foreign nationals who were assembled at the polo grounds, now within the zone of refuge set up pursuant to the resolution which was approved at the meeting of the Council on April 30, had already begun when our troops arrived. Had an inter-American force such as I have mentioned been available, it could have assumed the functions which it has been necessary for our forces to carry out and perform those measures of emergency relief to the people of this stricken country.

The task, Mr. President, is an enormous one. We have no desire to carry it alone, and we hope that all other members of the organization will assist as they can and to the extent of their capabilities, which is what the resolution itself says. But we are faced, as I have said, Mr. Chairman, and repeatedly, with an immediate and most urgent situation. The draft resolution presented by my delegation is intended to provide that inter-American mantle which we all seek and favor in the Dominican Republic. That is the very essence of why this Meeting of Consultation has been convoked and that is literally the purpose for which we have dispatched a five-nation committee which is today in the Dominican Republic

⁹ For text, see *ibid.*

acting on behalf of this organization. Adoption of this draft resolution before us will make it possible for the American governments to contribute in the most direct way to meet the emergency and to promote the establishment of democratic institutions in the sister Republic, which is the ultimate goal of the Organization of American States.

It is the ultimate goal expressed, I think, with great eloquence, by President Johnson last evening. The President said, and I should like to quote from his statement:

Let me also make clear tonight that we support no single man or any single group of men in the Dominican Republic. Our goal is a simple one. We are there to save the lives of our citizens and to save the lives of all people. Our goal, in keeping with the great principles of the inter-American system, is to help prevent another Communist state in this hemisphere. And we would like to do this without bloodshed or without large-scale fighting.

The form and the nature of the free Dominican government, I assure you, is solely a matter for the Dominican people, but we do know what kind of government we hope to see in the Dominican Republic. For that is carefully spelled out in the treaties and the agreements which make up the fabric of the inter-American system. It is expressed, time and time again, in the words of our statesmen and the values and hopes which bind us all together.

We hope to see a government freely chosen by the will of all the people.

We hope to see a government dedicated to social justice for every citizen. We hope to see a government working every hour of every day to feeding the hungry, to educating the ignorant, to healing the sick—a government whose only concern is the progress and the elevation and the welfare of all the people.

Mr. Chairman, the resolution contains the practical measures which are necessary to effectively organize and to carry out this joint hemispheric effort. The governments must work out directly the technical details of the operation. This requires the special skills and the techniques of the ministries of the military staffs responsible for the complex planning and carrying out of the task, and I would recall, Mr. Chairman, that this has been successfully done in the past.

I would cite as precedent the resolution of the Council acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation on November 5, 1962. By that

decision it was resolved that the forces operating jointly in the waters of the Caribbean arrive at agreements relating to command coordination. And I have, Mr. Chairman, section 2 of the resolution which gives effect to that formulation.

Mr. Chairman, in proposing this resolution, which I think and hope carries out the spirit and the desires which have been expressed in this conference room for joint and multilateral action in the solution of this tragic situation which exists in our sister Republic, I should like to refer to the words of President Johnson last night, again. He said:

Simón Bolívar once wrote from exile: "The veil has been torn asunder. We have already seen the light and it is not our desire to be thrust back into the darkness." Well, after decades of night the Dominican people have seen a more hopeful light, and I know that the nations of this hemisphere will not let them be thrust back into the darkness.

Mr. Chairman, that is our common duty and our common task, and I beseech the other members to join with my country in fulfilling them, and I believe, Mr. Chairman, that in the adoption of this resolution which has been presented by my delegation, and which is designed to assist the work of the committee which is now there in the Dominican Republic, we will be taking a long step in aiding the mission to fulfill the task which has been assigned to it by the Organization of American States.

I would like to suggest one additional amendment, Mr. Chairman, to the resolution as the members have it before them, and that is in the resolution itself, in paragraph 1, which reads now "to request governments of American states that are capable of doing so to make contingents of their military, naval or air forces available, . . ." I would suggest having it read, ". . . to make contingents of their military, naval, air or police forces available," because I believe that there may be some countries who would prefer to supply police rather than military, naval, or air forces. I think any contribution of that kind would be most helpful.

And so, Mr. Chairman, I would ask this

Meeting of Consultation to give very earnest consideration to this proposal which I have the honor to present on behalf of my delegation.

THIRD STATEMENT OF MAY 3¹⁰

Mr. Chairman: I have listened with respectful attention to the remarks of my distinguished colleagues, and to the statement of the distinguished Ambassador of Colombia. I have been greatly interested in their observations, and I should like to make a few comments regarding them.

I may say that for my own delegation and Government I do not accept that there has been any violation of the OAS Charter by my Government. As I stated at the very first meeting we had here in relation to the tragic situation existing in our sister Republic, the United States sent forces there to save lives when the Dominican authorities said they could not assure order. I said that there were many precedents for this kind of situation; none of it is inconsistent with inter-American obligations. I stated then that we wholeheartedly subscribe to these obligations, including the doctrine of nonintervention and self-determination, and I may say for my Government that we yield to no one in our respect for the sanctity of treaties. We sent forces there in the absence of any standing OAS force that might have been sent promptly to the Dominican Republic; and I said that my Government regretted the absence of such a force.

The resolution which we are proposing now is intended to fill this gap, at least temporarily. In my opinion, this question of the establishment of such a force is something which might well be brought up for discussion in the forthcoming meeting which is to take place in Rio de Janeiro this month.¹¹ The United States forces that are there have been employed to help carry out the

¹⁰ Made before the fourth session of the General Committee.

¹¹ On May 12 the OAS Council adopted a resolution postponing the Second Special Inter-American Conference, originally scheduled to convene at Rio de Janeiro on May 20.

resolutions of the Organization of American States. I mentioned this morning the sentiments expressed by the Papal Nuncio, by Secretary General Mora, and by members of the diplomatic corps there as to the usefulness of this force and the functions they were performing. We are anxious, as I have said, through the passage of this resolution to create a multilateral force. We would hope that member countries would supply forces so that we might withdraw some of our own. We would hope that all forces could be withdrawn at the earliest possible moment.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I have listened, as I say, with respectful attention to the views expressed by my distinguished colleagues, and I should like to propose some changes in the resolution which my delegation proposed in the interest of trying to harmonize some of the views which have been expressed at this meeting. I would hope that some of the changes which I have to suggest would go a considerable distance to bridge these differences, which are regretful and which I think can be overcome.

In the operative part of the resolution which I have submitted on behalf of my delegation, I would suggest—the changed resolution is now being distributed, and I will point out the additions that I think may prove helpful. Mr. Chairman, I believe everybody has a copy now of the proposed changes. In the first paragraph of the operative part of the resolution there were added the words, “for the formation of an inter-American armed force.” In the second paragraph, in the provision which provides for the governments to work out directly among themselves and with the committee the technical measures necessary, the new words are, “to establish an OAS unified command for the coordinated and effective action of their forces in assisting the committee.” If I have understood correctly, Mr. Chairman, some of the observations which have been made here, I would think that these changes might meet the objections to the original draft which some of my distinguished colleagues felt and that this might be considered from

their viewpoint an improvement over the original resolution.

The distinguished Ambassador from Ecuador, I believe, made the observation that the third paragraph should provide more specific instructions, but it seems to me that it is quite specific. It provides that this meeting shall continue in session not only to keep the situation under review and to receive the report and recommendations of the committee but, in light thereof, to take the necessary steps to facilitate the prompt establishment of constitutional government and the withdrawal of foreign forces—two major objectives, I take it, of this body. Mr. Chairman, I submit this for the consideration of this distinguished body.

FIRST STATEMENT OF MAY 4¹²

Mr. Chairman: In accordance with my undertaking to keep the Meeting of Consultation informed of the U.S. actions in the Dominican Republic, I would like briefly to outline some of the steps that we are taking in establishing an emergency food program in that country, and also some undertakings in the field of health and general welfare.

Today and tomorrow we are unloading emergency food supplies from the steamer *Alcoa Ranger*, which, as I mentioned yesterday, had been in Puerto Rico. For this distribution we are using 15 8-ton trucks borrowed from the Sugar Corporation and 10 from the Beer Corporation and are calling on the United States military forces to provide drivers, although we rely primarily on Dominican civilian drivers if a sufficient number of them can be found.

A 90-ton food airlift also begins today, which will be a daily airlift. The distribution of beans, milk, and flour began yesterday to various points in the city and to the foreign embassies, hospitals, and Red Cross clinics. I have been informed that an additional distribution of 3 tons of beans and 4 tons of condensed milk was received along the line of communication with a great deal

¹² Made before the fifth session of the General Committee.

of enthusiasm. And we are also bringing daily 60 tons of rice, which we have arranged to borrow from the stocks of the Banco Agrícola. We expect the first supplies to arrive in 2 or 3 days. This amount, I have been informed, can feed about a quarter of a million people. I am also informed that the distribution of food supplies has been going very smoothly. By the end of today, there should also be in operation three centers for food distribution to the public at large outside of the downtown area. These centers will be manned by various civilian groups. We also have in mind that distribution may be necessary in certain country areas outside of Santo Domingo, and it is expected that the food supply situation will improve as movement on the roads becomes easier. However, it seems that it will be necessary to continue the emergency feeding program for some time.

The United States is also setting up a 100-bed field hospital near San Isidro, and a 60-bed hospital near the Hotel Embajador. The sick and wounded, both military and civilian, are being transported from the rebel zone to these hospitals today. In addition, equipment is being made available to the Dominican Red Cross for distribution to rebel hospitals and medical centers in the rebel zone.

As to Ambassador Bonilla Atilés' suggestion yesterday that there is need for doctors, I may report that 30 Dominican doctors who were in Puerto Rico have been flown from Puerto Rico to the Dominican Republic to help man the emergency hospitals.

SECOND STATEMENT OF MAY 4¹³

Mr. Chairman: I should like to speak very briefly. I've listened with attention and interest to the statements from our distinguished colleagues this afternoon. I appreciate the statements made by the distin-

¹³ Made before the fifth session of the General Committee.

guished representatives of Costa Rica and Brazil in support of the resolution which my delegation introduced. I have listened and taken note of the other statements from our distinguished colleagues.

I shall not take the time of the meeting now to respond to some of the statements which have been made, but I should like to reserve the right to respond at some later time; but it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that time is running out, as the distinguished Ambassador of Colombia has remarked. We are faced with a practical, urgent situation. We can go on debating about the juridical and the legalistic aspects of the situation in the Dominican Republic while this sister nation travels the tragic road to destruction, and we can go on debating the legal and juridical aspects of the actions of my Government, which, I may say, as I have said many times here before, have been motivated by the wish to save the lives of citizens of my own and some 30 other countries and of helping to bring about conditions of peace and of normality and to bring about conditions which, as stated in the last paragraph of the last resolution which my delegation has introduced, would facilitate the prompt restoration of constitutional government and the withdrawal of foreign forces.

As I've said many times before, we wish to withdraw our forces at the earliest moment. It seems to me that we should get on with the response to the request made by the committee which is now in the Dominican Republic, pursuant to the resolution passed by this distinguished body, who've said that it would be useful, in order to aid in bringing a return of the Dominican situation to normality, for the member states to establish a combined inter-American military force. I think we should attempt to respond as rapidly as possible to that suggestion and request of the committee.

I welcome the remarks of the distinguished Ambassador of Colombia; it is quite true, as he has said, that we have come much closer in our views in the last 24 hours. I have reason to believe that we

can work out through consultation some agreement on terms, on wording of a resolution, which should be acceptable to certainly a very great number of the members assembled here.

In view of the urgency of this situation, Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that we recess the present session, to have an opportunity for some further consultation, and that we meet again tomorrow to continue and hopefully to conclude some action. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF MAY 5¹⁴

Mr. Chairman: On behalf of my delegation, I am happy to accept the amendments presented by the distinguished Ambassador of Colombia and to have them incorporated into the original resolution presented by my delegation on May 1st.

I should also like to make a statement regarding paragraph 4 of the operative part of the resolution. With reference to paragraph 4, I am authorized by President Johnson to state that when the unified command of the Organization of American States determines that the Inter-American Armed Force is adequate for the purposes contemplated by the resolution adopted by this body on May 1st and that United States forces are not needed as part of the Inter-American Armed Force, they will be withdrawn from the Dominican Republic. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

FIRST STATEMENT OF MAY 6¹⁵

Mr. Chairman: I would appeal to my distinguished colleague, the Ambassador of Venezuela, not to press this amendment.¹⁶ I think it is not necessary actually, in view of paragraph 4 of the operative section, which reads:

That at such time as the OAS Unified Command shall have determined that the Inter-American Armed Force is adequate for the purposes contemplated by the resolution adopted by this Meeting on May 1, 1965, the full responsibility of meeting these purposes shall be assumed by that Force.

That paragraph, Mr. Chairman, taken in connection with the statement which I made on the authorization of President Johnson that, at such time as the unified command determines the Inter-American Armed Force adequate for the purposes contemplated in that paragraph, that part of the United States forces not needed as a part of the Inter-American Armed Force will be withdrawn from the Dominican Republic.

That seems to me, Mr. Chairman, to accomplish the purposes which the distinguished Ambassador from Venezuela has in mind, and, therefore, we are unable to accept the amendment proposed by the Ambassador from Venezuela.¹⁷

RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING INTER-AMERICAN FORCE¹⁸

WHEREAS:

This Meeting at its session of May 1, established a Committee to proceed to the Dominican Republic to seek the re-establishment of peace and normal conditions in the territory of that republic;

The said resolution requests the American governments and the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States to extend their full cooperation to facilitate the work of the Committee;

The formation of an inter-American force will signify *ipso facto* the transformation of the forces

¹⁴ Made before the sixth session of the General Committee.

¹⁵ Made before the sixth session of the General Committee (May 6, early a.m.).

¹⁶ Ambassador Enrique Tejera Paris, of Venezuela, had proposed that the third preambular paragraph of the draft resolution be amended to read: "The formation of an inter-American force will signify *ipso facto* the withdrawal of the forces presently in Dominican territory and the substitution of another force that will not be that of one state or of a group of states but that of the Organization of American States, which Organization is charged with the responsibility of interpreting the democratic will of its members; . . ."

¹⁷ The third paragraph of the draft resolution, without amendment, was adopted by the General Committee on May 6 (early a.m.) by a vote of 14 to 4, with 1 abstention.

¹⁸ Adopted in plenary session on May 6 (early a.m.) by a vote of 15 to 5 (Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay), with 1 abstention (Venezuela).

presently in Dominican territory into another force that will not be that of one state or of a group of states but that of the Organization of American States, which Organization is charged with the responsibility of interpreting the democratic will of its members;

The American states being under the obligation to provide reciprocal assistance to each other, the Organization is under greater obligation to safeguard the principles of the Charter and to do everything possible so that in situations such as that prevailing in the Dominican Republic appropriate measures may be taken leading to the re-establishment of peace and normal democratic conditions;

The Organization of American States being competent to assist the member states in the preservation of peace and the re-establishment of normal democratic conditions, it is also competent to provide the means that reality and circumstances require and that prudence counsels as adequate for the accomplishment of such purposes; and

The Committee of the Organization of American States that proceeded to the Dominican Republic, in its second report to this Meeting, advises the formation of an inter-American force to achieve the objectives determined by the Meeting of Consultation,

THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

RESOLVES:

1. To request governments of member states that are willing and capable of doing so to make contingents of their land, naval, air or police forces available to the Organization of American States, within their capabilities and to the extent they can do so, to form an inter-American force that will operate under the authority of this Tenth Meeting of Consultation.

2. That this Force will have as its sole purpose, in a spirit of democratic impartiality, that of co-operating in the restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican Republic, in maintaining the security of its inhabitants and the inviolability of human rights, and in the establishment of an atmosphere of peace and conciliation that will permit the functioning of democratic institutions.

3. To request the commanders of the contingents of forces that make up this Force to work out directly among themselves and with a Committee of this Meeting the technical measures necessary to establish a Unified Command of the Organization of American States for the coordinated and effective action of the Inter-American Armed Force. In the composition of this Force, an effort will be made to see that the national contingents shall be progressively equalized.

4. That at such time as the OAS Unified Command shall have determined that the Inter-American Armed Force is adequate for the purposes con-

templated by the resolution adopted by this Meeting on May 1, 1965, the full responsibility of meeting these purposes shall be assumed by that Force.

5. That the withdrawal of the Inter-American Force from the Dominican Republic shall be determined by this Meeting.

6. To continue in session in order to keep the situation under review, to receive the report and recommendations of the Committee, and in the light thereof to take the necessary steps to facilitate the prompt restoration of democratic order in the Dominican Republic.

7. To inform the Security Council of the United Nations of the text of this resolution.

SECOND STATEMENT OF MAY 6¹⁹

I want to say that my delegation is deeply gratified by the adoption of this resolution, which has been greatly improved since it was originally introduced by the very constructive and very serious suggestions made by those distinguished representatives who presented and sponsored the amendments to it. I think this may well be an historic occasion for the Organization of American States.

As I said many days ago, when we first began discussions on the formation of an inter-American force, my Government regretted that there was no such force in existence, at the time of the crisis in our sister Republic, to respond to the needs of the people of the Dominican Republic and to save the lives of not only our own citizens but those of many other countries.

It is interesting, I think, that as of this morning 1,373 citizens of 43 different countries and some stateless persons have been evacuated, in addition to those citizens of the United States who have also been evacuated. It seems to me that this may well establish a precedent for cooperative action, which could be followed up, and I hope may be followed up, perhaps at our meeting in Rio de Janeiro, where the question of establishing some permanent organization of this kind might well be discussed.

I want to pay tribute again to the very brilliant contributions made by the distin-

¹⁹ Made in plenary session (May 6, early a.m.).

guished Ambassadors of Colombia and Costa Rica, and the Representatives of Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela, and others who participated in the drafting and perfecting of this resolution. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF MAY 8²⁰

Mr. Chairman: I would like to express on behalf of my delegation, and indeed on behalf of my Government, appreciation and praise to all of the members of the committee of the meeting, individually and collectively, who, under the brilliant leadership of my friend and colleague, Ambassador Colombo,²¹ have accomplished so much in so brief a period and under, as they have described to us, the most difficult and trying circumstances.

We have heard the report of the committee this evening, and I am confident that this meeting will agree with me that the Act of Santo Domingo marks an outstanding achievement in what has been our priority objective under the terms of the resolution; an agreement on an effective cease-fire in the Dominican Republic.

As Ambassador Colombo has reported, the Secretary of State has communicated to the Committee that the United States supports its work in Santo Domingo and pledges to cooperate fully in the observance of the provisions of the Act of Santo Domingo.²²

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that the questions which have been put by my distinguished colleagues to the committee, and the answers of the members, have shed further light and have made a very great contribution toward a greater understanding of the situation existing in the Dominican Republic, a contribution so valuable that I

²⁰ Made in plenary session (May 8, early a.m.).

²¹ Ambassador Ricardo M. Colombo, of Argentina, chairman of the Special Committee of the 10th Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States.

²² For text of a letter of May 7 from Secretary Rusk to Ambassador Colombo, see p. 868.

think it should become public knowledge, Mr. Chairman. I believe that it was agreed at our previous meeting that the proceedings of the private meetings and the records would become public. I trust that that will be so in this case, because I think the record is extremely valuable to provide a much wider public knowledge of the actual conditions in the Dominican Republic.

The committee has succeeded in taking this first step of major importance. It seems to me that this meeting can now move to a second major stage of the task, for I think we can all agree that much remains to be done before conditions return to normal in that tragic and torn country. It is quite obvious, from what the committee has said, that there is today no effective national government in the Dominican Republic. There are contending forces, each in control or perhaps quasi-control in separate areas, but no political grouping or faction can lay a well-founded claim to being the government of the country. I say "quasi-control" because we had word from our Embassy in Santo Domingo today that the palace inside the rebel zone, in which 400 people, I believe, have taken refuge, had been attacked three times during the day. This may be indeed a violation of the cease-fire.

But it remains, Mr. Chairman, for the Dominican people, with the help of the OAS, to which I understand they are looking, from the words of the committee, to organize a government and to provide for future constitutional arrangements of their own choosing. It seems to me that it is of the greatest importance that the OAS should endeavor to assist patriotic and outstanding citizens of the Dominican Republic, and I am sure they can be found, to establish a provisional government of national unity, which could eventually lead to a permanent representative regime through democratic processes.

Mr. Chairman, we must now seek to find paths of peace and to build on the base which has been established by this Act of Santo Domingo. I want again to express the appreciation of my Government for the

splendid work of this committee, because they have established, through what they have done here, really the first and essential base for any further progress. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF MAY 10²³

Mr. Chairman: I wish to support the resolution offered by the distinguished Ambassador of Costa Rica. I have already, in the plenary session of last Saturday, expressed the great appreciation and gratitude of my Government for the work of the committee. I think they have performed a magnificent work under very tiring and difficult conditions. I think it is extremely important that the committee continue in existence, as the resolution provides, to carry out the tasks that were assigned to it, which are very broad, no less than the reestablishment of peace and normal conditions in the Dominican Republic.

There are also very important functions provided in paragraph 3 of the operative part of the resolution adopted on May 6th, requesting members to supply military contingents for an inter-American force.

Consequently, I think it is of great importance that this committee—since provision was made for a committee, to cooperate with the military commanders in working out the unified command—it is extremely important that this committee should take on this function as well, and, as the resolution says, request the Inter-American Defense Board for technical collaboration. Mr. Chairman, my Government views the situation with such an urgency that at this point I should like to make a statement on its views of the situation existing at the present time.²⁴

Since the situation in the Dominican Re-

²³ Made before the seventh session of the General Committee.

²⁴ The following six paragraphs of Mr. Bunker's statement were also released as Department of State press release 107 dated May 10.

public was brought to the attention of the Organization of American States, it is taking collective decisions to send to the Dominican Republic a five-member committee, this committee to obtain the reestablishment of peace and normal conditions and to create an Inter-American Force.

These actions have contributed greatly to a diminution of violence in Santo Domingo. I must, however, Mr. Chairman, emphasize the fact that 2 weeks have now gone by without the restoration of the peaceful and normal conditions which it is the objective of the OAS to obtain.

It is urgently necessary that the meeting now move from the stage of maintaining an uneasy and precarious cease-fire to an effective program to establish a single civil Dominican government. This is essential, Mr. Chairman, in order to provide for the immediate necessities of the Dominican people, to permit people to return to work in safety, to open the channels of commerce and industry, and to prepare the way for an early return to democratic processes.

The present situation cannot continue much longer. Unless peace and normal conditions are quickly restored, there is the clear and present danger of a rapid deterioration of the situation into large-scale hostilities with needless bloodshed.

Several days ago the creating of an additional "committee of wise men" to undertake the urgent and delicate task of negotiating a peace and reestablishing normal processes of government was proposed. The United States supported this suggestion. We continue to do so.

Meanwhile, Mr. Chairman, I urgently appeal to this meeting to take whatever action is deemed necessary to reestablish the presence of the committee in the Dominican Republic so that it can proceed forthwith to carry out its mandate. Let us act with the wisdom and dispatch necessary for effective collective action in this hemisphere in defense of the principles for which we all stand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

RESOLUTION CONTINUING EXISTENCE OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE²⁵

WHEREAS:

On May 1 the Tenth Meeting of Consultation adopted a resolution by which a committee was established, composed of representatives of five member states, to go to the city of Santo Domingo for the purpose of doing everything possible to obtain the re-establishment of peace and normal conditions; and

At the session held on May 6, the Meeting adopted a resolution, by which it requested the member states to contribute contingents to form an Inter-American Armed Force that would operate under the authority of this Meeting and provision was made for the establishment of a Unified Command of the OAS for its coordinated and effective action,

THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

RESOLVES:

1. To express the thanks of this Meeting to the Special Committee established by the resolution of May 1 for the outstanding work it has done so far.
2. To continue the existence of that Committee so that it may carry out the tasks that were assigned to it in that resolution.
3. To request that Committee to assume the functions of the committee referred to in paragraph 3 of the operative part of the resolution adopted by this Meeting on May 6.

STATEMENT OF MAY 14²⁶

Mr. Chairman: With respect to the incident which is the first order of business for the meeting convoked by my distinguished colleagues, I wish to state that my Government considers the attack to constitute a breach of the cease-fire agreement, and that my Government has lodged a protest with the Special Committee. I should like to read the text of this note, which is dated May 13th. This is a note addressed to His Excellency Ricardo Colombo, chairman of the OAS Special Committee, on May 13th:

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: This afternoon at approximately 2:15 p.m. aircraft presumed to be under the control of the Dominican Air Force fired into the northeast corner of the safety zone, en-

²⁵ Adopted in plenary session on May 10, by a vote of 14 to 5 (Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay), with 1 abstention (Venezuela).

²⁶ Made in plenary session.

dangering the lives of U.S. troops. This brought counter fire from our forces.

Assuming our assumption to be correct, I must protest this violation of the cease-fire agreement and request that you and your distinguished Committee make representations to General Imbert [Antonio Imbert Barrera] in order to prevent further violations of this kind.

Yours very sincerely,

W. TAPLEY BENNETT, JR.
American Ambassador

I may say, Mr. Chairman, that the attacking aircraft flew over United States positions, endangering the lives of the United States troops, and these took the necessary protective measures with anti-aircraft weapons. I am informed that one of the planes was shot down, probably as a result of the United States fire, and I believe, Mr. Chairman, that this demonstrates that our forces are impartially carrying out their strict orders, which are not to fire unless fired upon, and then only to the degree needed to protect themselves.

The fact that the United States Embassy was attacked can be verified very easily, because it happens that our Ambassador was talking on the telephone with Ambassador Colombo, precisely about violations of both the letter and the spirit of the Act of Santo Domingo. That conversation was suspended briefly as a result of the attack but resumed moments later when, as our Ambassador reports, he finished his diplomatic protest from under the desk.

The protest made by my Government for the attack endangering United States positions yesterday is by no means the sole complaint we have filed formally with the Special Committee. In fact, Mr. Chairman, we have since May 8 sent a note each day to the Chairman of the Committee detailing and protesting the several incidents that took place on the preceding day, and we have offered each time to cooperate fully with the Special Committee in carrying out an investigation of each cease-fire violation. Thus, I can report that on the following dates we have protested by note the indicated number of incidents and violations:

on May 8; 6 violations (I have the text of the note here) ;
on May 9; 5 violations;
on May 10; 6 violations;
on May 11; 15 violations;
on May 12; 17 violations;
on May 13; 17 violations (including the note which I just read).

I am informed that our Embassy is about to deliver a note to the Special Committee today which details 34 separate shooting incidents yesterday. The total of all these violations amounts to 101 separate and distinct incidents, already protested, some of which have resulted in tragic deaths and wounded. In addition, 36 more violations had been reported by our forces as of 2 p.m. today, and at this rate, we can anticipate that our note of tomorrow will include some 50 to 60 incidents.

In addition, Mr. Chairman, to the protest I have listed above, my Government has also directed three separate protests dated May 8th, 9th, and 13th regarding the irresponsible and strident tones of broadcasts carried out by Radio Santo Domingo. In our opinion these constitute a dangerous incitement to violence in a situation which is already tense and precarious. I believe that if this continues, the major accomplishments of our Special Committee to date will be imperiled, and I believe that the Meeting of Consultation should examine the means by which this virulent and distorted information can be stopped. We have indeed several times raised with the committee the desirability of the OAS taking over all broadcasting operations in the Dominican Republic in the interest of promoting harmony, rather than destroying the prospects for a settlement. I understand that this is being considered, Mr. Chairman, by the committee.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to register my concern and the concern of my Government at what appears to be a concerted effort of the so-called constitutional regime to discredit the OAS and its Special Committee. By provoking serious incidents and by continuing to incite the population, it seeks to establish that the inter-American

President Expresses Hope for Success of OAS Mission

Statement by President Johnson, May 15

White House press release dated May 15

I continue to hope that the OAS mission presently in the Dominican Republic will rapidly find a solution that will at the same time assure for the Dominican people the principles of a democratic constitution and a government of national unity able to maintain economic and political stability. If the good offices of the OAS succeed in achieving this solution, the United States Government will render all available assistance toward rapid economic development.

system is powerless to bring about a solution to the grave crisis in the Dominican Republic. In a telegram to the United Nations Security Council, the Caamaño foreign minister has flatly stated that the OAS is ineffective and incapable and that the city of Santo Domingo must be saved from slaughter. I submit, Mr. Chairman, that these exaggerated statements do not contribute to the goal we are all striving for, which is the restoration of peace and tranquillity in the Dominican Republic and the reestablishment of a truly constitutional government as a result of free elections.

ACT OF SANTO DOMINGO

Exchange of Letters

Ambassador Colombo to Ambassador Bennett

SANTO DOMINGO, May 5, 1965

SIR: I have the honor to transmit to you, Sir, under instructions of the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States, a certified copy of the Act of Santo Domingo signed today by the parties who entitle themselves, respectively, "Military Junta of Government" and "Constitutional Government."

As item 4 of the Resolution of May 1, 1965,²⁷ of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation "requests the American governments to extend their full coopera-

²⁷ For text, see BULLETIN of May 17, 1964, p. 741.

tion in order to facilitate the work of the Committee," this Committee hopes that your government will cooperate with it in observing the stipulations of the Act of Santo Domingo.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

RICARDO M. COLOMBO
Representative of Argentina
Chairman of the Committee

The Honorable
W. TAPLEY BENNETT
Ambassador of the United States
of America to the Dominican Republic
Santo Domingo de Guzmán,
Dominican Republic

Secretary Rusk to Ambassador Colombo

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1965

EXCELLENCY: I have been advised by the United States Ambassador to the Dominican Republic of Your Excellency's communication to him of May 5, transmitting a certified copy of the "Act of Santo Domingo" and expressing the hope that the United States Government will cooperate in its observance. Since the Commission has now returned to Washington, I am taking the liberty of replying directly to you.

I have the honor to express my government's gratitude for and support of the work of the Commission in Santo Domingo. The United States will cooperate fully in the observance of the provisions of the Act of Santo Domingo. I do not have before me the map attached to the Act of Santo Domingo, but I assume that the boundaries of the International Safety Zone coincide with those that now exist and that the line of communication crossing the Duarte Bridge as it now exists is shown on the map.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

DEAN RUSK

His Excellency
DR. RICARDO M. COLOMBO,
Representative of Argentina on
The Council of the Organization
of American States.

Text of Act of Santo Domingo

The Parties signing below who declare that they represent, in the capacities mentioned, respectively, the "Constitutional Government" and the Military Junta of Government hereby place on record that they have reached the following agreement as a result of the discussions held with the two Parties by the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, whose

members also sign the present Act as a guaranty of its compliance and execution, functions that both Parties agree the Committee may carry out.

1. The Parties who sign the present Act ratify the cease-fire agreement signed on April 30 last.

2. The Parties accept the establishment of a safety zone in the city of Santo Domingo, demarcated within the boundaries indicated on the map attached to this document and signed by the same Parties who sign the present Act.

3. The Parties bind themselves especially to respect this safety zone, within which there is guaranteed, in the manner that the Organization of American States may deem appropriate, adequate protection and safety for all persons found within that zone of refuge.

4. The Parties undertake to give all necessary facilities to the International Red Cross or to the international agency that the Organization of American States may designate to carry out in any part of the city of Santo Domingo or of the Dominican Republic the distribution of food, medicine, and medical and hospital equipment that are being sent as a result of the appeal made by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. They also undertake to provide all facilities required by the Organization of American States so that medical and sanitary personnel sent by the governments can be transported to any point in the city of Santo Domingo or Dominican territory, to perform their services.

5. The Parties undertake to provide all necessary safety measures for the evacuation of asylees in foreign embassies or diplomatic missions who so request of them.

6. The Parties undertake to respect the diplomatic missions and to offer all cooperation necessary to guarantee the safety of all personnel of those missions and of asylees or refugees therein.

7. The Parties declare that they accept and recognize the full competence of the Special Committee appointed by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, for purposes of the faithful observance of what is agreed to in this Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the present document, which shall be known as the Act of Santo Domingo, is signed in four original copies, of which one shall be deposited in the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, one shall be for each of the Parties, and one shall be for the files of the Committee.

The Secretary General of the Organization of American States shall transmit certified copies to each of the member states.

May fifth, one thousand nine hundred sixty-five.

For the Military Junta:

Colonel PEDRO BARTOLOMÉ BENOIT
Dominican Armed Forces

Colonel ENRIQUE A. CASADO SALADÍN

National Army

Captain OLGO SANTANA CARRASCO

Navy

For the Constitutional Government:

Colonel FRANCISCO CAAMAÑO DEÑO

Constitutional President

Lieutenant Colonel Doctor AUGUSTO JIMÉNEZ

HERRERA

Lieutenant RAMÓN MANUEL MONTES

Major HÉCTOR L. ACHAPPELL

Doctor HÉCTOR ARISTE

Minister of the Presidency

For the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States:

Ambassador RICARDO COLOMBO

Representative of Argentina, Chairman of the Committee

AMBASSADOR ILMAR PENNA MARINHO

Representative of Brazil

Ambassador ALFREDO VÁZQUEZ CARRIZOSA

Representative of Colombia

Ambassador CARLOS GARCÍA BAUER

Representative of Guatemala

Ambassador FRANK MORRICE, JR.

Representative of Panama

Security Council Authorizes U.N. Representative in Dominican Republic

Following are statements made in the U.N. Security Council by U. S. Representative Adlai E. Stevenson during debate on the Dominican Republic question, together with the text of a resolution adopted unanimously on May 14.

STATEMENT OF MAY 3

U.S./U.N. press release 4538

Mr. President, we have heard from the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union about the Congo, about Viet-Nam, about Panama, about Cuba. We have even heard some comments about Alabama and about American business. After the recent experience that we have had in the bodies of the United Nations with Soviet polemics reminiscent of the days of Stalin and Vishinsky, I must say that I am not surprised that the Soviet Union has again used a United Nations body, this time the Security Council, to digress into a whole catalog of complaints about United States resistance to Communist expansion or assistance to those resisting aggression.

I used to marvel at the audacity of the Soviet Union in pointing an accusing finger at others—the Soviet Union, which signed a

pact with Hitler, which forcibly added 264,000 square miles and over 24 million people to its own territory and population in the aftermath of World War II, which subjugated all of Eastern Europe, crushed the uprisings in East Germany and Hungary, and which has persistently sought to enlarge its domination elsewhere beyond its borders.

When one hears, as we did this morning, the Soviet Union, which has politically enslaved more people than any nation in this century, attack the good faith, the sincerity, and honesty of the Government of the United Kingdom, which has politically liberated more people than any nation in this century, one gets the measure of the Soviet's cynical disdain for fact or fairness in the pursuit of its goals.

Whenever there are difficulties in the Western Hemisphere in which the United States is in any way involved, we know from experience that the Soviet Union will issue a loud and self-righteous blast accusing the United States of aggression or intervention—or both. Of course, it did not do so when it itself installed long-range nuclear missiles in Cuba. Nor does it hesitate to denounce the United States while itself aiding and abetting the Castro regime to foment the forceful overthrow of established governments

throughout the Caribbean area. But whenever any defensive action against subversion or disorder is taken, it is the first to cry "aggression."

Of course, the Soviet Government knows perfectly well that the Western Hemisphere has an active and effective regional organization, the Organization of American States, to which the Republics of the Western Hemisphere are deeply attached and which they prefer to be the vehicle for resolving the problems of this hemisphere. The Soviet Government also knows that the OAS has for several days been dealing with the situation in the Dominican Republic and has made substantial progress.¹

But since the Soviet Union cannot use the OAS Council for its customary attacks, it always hastens to bring such matters to the United Nations Security Council, where it can. Most of the members of the United Nations are quite familiar with these tactics and the traditional charges they always involve. You will remember similar charges last year, that the United States was committing aggression against Panama. I believe it is now apparent to all that Panama continues to enjoy its full sovereignty and independence.

The same will be true of the Dominican Republic—if the agents of the Cuban dictator do not succeed in first exploiting and then taking over a democratic revolution as they did in Cuba, and as they have tried and are trying to do in Venezuela and in other countries of the region. That this is the objective in the Dominican Republic is apparent from the very eagerness of the Soviet Union and of Cuba to exploit the present ambiguous situation in the Security Council before the full facts about this desperate strike for a Communist takeover in the Dominican Republic become more obvious.

History of Dominican Turmoil

I do not propose here to review in great detail the history of the Dominican Republic over the past 5 years or to speculate at any length on the origins or the political motiva-

tions of the mixed forces which have led to a state of anarchy in that unfortunate country. However, I do believe it relevant to our discussions to recall that the people of the Dominican Republic have suffered from constant turmoil and political conflict following in the wake of the long tyrannical reign of the former dictator, Trujillo.

It is also relevant to recall that the final overthrow of that regime was brought about, in part, by the action of the Organization of American States in adopting diplomatic sanctions against the Trujillo dictatorship. At the time, and in the period both preceding and following the election of Juan Bosch as President of the Dominican Republic, the Government of the United States supported every effort of the Dominican people to establish a representative democracy.

After the last remnants of the Trujillo regime had departed and the Council of State was established, my Government, in conjunction with the OAS, assisted in the preparation of an electoral code, made available information and procedures on the mechanics of elections, and finally, again in conjunction with the OAS, observed the actual elections, the first free elections held in the Dominican Republic in over 30 years. Both prior to and following this election my Government has pursued extensive efforts to build a stable and free society, capable of economic, social, and political development. Let there be no doubt in anybody's mind of our devotion to the cause of representative government.

The members of this Council know well the instability which often follows the end of authoritarian regimes and the difficulties of a people unfamiliar with the practices of democracy in establishing effective government. The Soviet Union itself has had some experience with the difficulties of transferring power without public participation and approval.

About a week ago the instability which has plagued the Dominican Republic since the fall of Trujillo erupted and the officials who had governed there for a year and a half were violently forced out. Rival groups strove

¹ See p. 854.

to capture power, fighting broke out between and among them, and the Dominican Republic was left without effective government for some days.

As the situation deteriorated, certain of the contending forces indiscriminately distributed weapons to civilians; armed bands began to roam the streets of Santo Domingo—looting, burning, and sniping—law and order completely broke down.

The Embassies of Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, Ecuador, and the United States were violated, and the Embassy of El Salvador burned.

Communist Attempts To Seize Control

The great majority of those who joined in this insurgent cause in the Dominican Republic are not Communists. In particular, my Government has never believed that the PRD—the Dominican Republican Party led by President Bosch—is an extremist party. United States cooperation with President Bosch and his government during his tenure following the ouster of Trujillo speaks for itself.

But while the PRD planned, and during its first hours led, the revolutionary movement against the government of [Donald] Reid Cabral, a small group of well-known Communists, consistent with their usual tactics, quickly attempted to seize control of the revolution and of the armed bands in the street.

Quite clearly this group was acting in conformity with directives issued by a Communist conference that met in Havana in late 1964 and printed in *Pravda* last January 18. These called for assistance and continuing campaigns in support of the so-called “freedom fighters” to be organized “on a permanent basis so that this work will not dwindle to sporadic manifestations or disunited statements.” “Active aid,” it went on to say, “should be given to those who are subject at present to cruel repressions—for instance the freedom fighters in Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay and Haiti.”

This deliberate effort of Havana and Mos-

cow to promote subversion and overthrow governments in flagrant violation of all norms of international conduct is responsible for much of the unrest in the Caribbean area.

In the face of uncontrollable violence, the government which had replaced the Reid Cabral government also quickly crumbled in a few days. Many of its leaders, and also others from the initial leadership of the revolt against the Reid Cabral government, also sought asylum.

In the absence of any governmental authority Dominican law enforcement and military officials informed our Embassy that the situation was completely out of control, that the police and the government could no longer give any guarantee concerning the safety of Americans or of any foreign nationals, and that only an immediate landing of American forces could safeguard and protect the lives of thousands of Americans and thousands of other citizens of some 30 other countries.

At that moment, the United States Embassy was under fire; the death toll in the city, according to estimates of the Red Cross, had reached 400; hospitals were unable to care for the wounded; medical supplies were running out; the power supply was broken; and a food shortage threatened.

Faced with this emergency, the threat to the lives of its citizens, and a request for assistance from those Dominican authorities still struggling to maintain order, the United States on April 28th dispatched the first of the security forces we have sent to the island.² Since their arrival, nearly 3,000 foreign nationals from 30 countries have been evacuated without loss, although a number of United States military personnel have been killed and wounded.

We have made a full report to the Organization of American States; we have successfully evacuated some 2,000 Americans and about 1,000 persons of other nationality; we have established the secure zone of refuge called for by the OAS; we have supported the dispatch by the OAS of a committee

² For background, see BULLETIN of May 17, 1965, p. 738.

which is at present in Santo Domingo; we have proposed that other American states make military forces available to assist in carrying out the mission of the committee—and the OAS is considering such a resolution today.

Sequence of Events

To refresh your recollection of last week's events, let me remind the Council of the sequence.

On Tuesday, April 27th, this situation was considered by the Peace Committee of the OAS. On Wednesday, April 28th, also, the OAS was formally notified by the Ambassador of the Dominican Republic [José Antonio Bonilla Atilés] about the situation in his country and my Government called for an urgent meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States to consider ways to bring an end to the bloodshed by a cease-fire and to restore order so that the people of the Dominican Republic could settle their own political affairs without further recourse to arms.

At the same time my Government notified the President of the Security Council of the action it had taken to evacuate its citizens and other foreign nationals and to set in motion the machinery of the Organization of American States.

The Council of the OAS met on Thursday, April 29, and as a first step called for an immediate cease-fire on all sides and addressed an appeal to the Papal Nuncio in Santo Domingo requesting him to use his good offices to help effect a cease-fire and a return to peace.

The Council continued in session and in the early hours of April 30 took a second action urgently calling upon all parties

. . . to pursue immediately all possible means by which a cease-fire may be established and all hostilities and military operations suspended in order to prevent any further tragic loss of life. . . .

This same resolution made

. . . an urgent appeal to the same authorities, political groupings, and forces on both sides to permit the immediate establishment of an international neutral zone of refuge, encompassing the geographic

area of the city of Santo Domingo immediately surrounding the embassies of foreign governments, the inviolability of which will be respected by all opposing forces and within which nationals of all countries will be given safe haven.

At the same time, on the initiative of the delegate of Venezuela, an urgent meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States was called for May 1 to consider what further measures should be taken to restore peace to the Dominican Republic.

The Security Council was immediately informed by the OAS of all these actions in accordance with article 54 of the charter. In accordance with the OAS resolution of April 30, U.S. forces in the Dominican Republic have now established a zone of safety. Three thousand persons, as I have said, have now been evacuated—not only United States citizens, but nationals of 30 countries, including 14 countries of this hemisphere. More than 5,000 persons—1,500 of whom are American, the others of other foreign nationality—are still awaiting evacuation.

These evacuations continue, and efforts are being made to secure the safety of some 5,000 people awaiting evacuation, including more than a thousand American citizens and 500 citizens of other countries who remain in peril throughout the Dominican Republic.

In addition, my Government has distributed more than 6,000 tons of food and medical supplies, to all elements in Santo Domingo, to relieve the suffering of the population.

The Council of the OAS on the afternoon of April 30 dispatched the Secretary General of the organization, Dr. José Mora, to the Dominican Republic. He departed on Saturday and is now working with the Papal Nuncio and others to restore order.

On Saturday the OAS again convened as a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This time it dispatched a five-member committee composed of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and Panama "to go immediately to the city of Santo Domingo, to do everything possible to obtain re-establishment of peace and normal

conditions. . . ." The committee was directed to give priority to two tasks:

In the first place,

To offer its good offices to the Dominican armed groups and political groups and to diplomatic representatives for the purpose of obtaining: i. a cease-fire; and ii. the orderly evacuation of the persons who have taken asylum in the embassies and of all foreign citizens who desire to leave the Dominican Republic. . . .

Second,

To carry out an investigation of all aspects of the situation in the Dominican Republic that led to the convocation of this Meeting.

This committee is now actively at work in the Dominican Republic.

Members are no doubt aware that, as a result of these repeated appeals, a cease-fire was first agreed to—on the initiative of the Papal Nuncio—late in the afternoon of April 30 by the military leaders and by some of the leaders of the opposition forces, and on May 1 also by Colonel Caamaño [Col. Francisco Caamaño Deño]. Although the leaders of the opposition forces declare that they no longer control many elements who are still shooting in Santo Domingo, this agreement began to take effect among organized forces Saturday and Sunday, and the situation in the city was much improved by Sunday afternoon.

However, lawlessness and disorder have by no means been eliminated. It has become clear that Communist leaders, many trained in Cuba, have taken increasing control of what was initially a democratic movement, just as they once did in Cuba, and many of the original leaders of the rebellion—the followers of President Bosch—have taken refuge in foreign embassies. The American nations will not permit the establishment of another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere. This was the unanimous view of all the American nations when, in January 1962, they declared,³ "The principles of communism are incompatible with

the principles of the Inter-American system."

"This is and this will be the common action and the common purpose of the democratic forces of the hemisphere," as President Johnson has said.⁴ "For the danger is also a common danger, and the principles are common principles. So we have acted to summon the resources of this entire hemisphere to this task."

At the same time we have increased our own forces in the light of the urgency of the situation.

The OAS Committee now in the Dominican Republic has called for the urgent shipment of more food and medical supplies to be made available to Dr. Mora, Secretary General of the Organization, and the OAS adopted a resolution to that effect this morning.⁵ The United States will respond promptly.

The OAS has before it today a resolution⁶ which would request governments of the American states that are capable of doing so to make available to the OAS contingents of their military, naval, or air forces to assist in carrying out the mission of the committee. The same resolution also would provide for the Meeting of Consultation to continue in session in order to take the necessary steps to facilitate the prompt restoration of constitutional government in the Dominican Republic and the withdrawal of foreign forces.

In this connection, I want to reaffirm the statement made by Ambassador [Ellsworth] Bunker, representing the United States, in the OAS meeting on Saturday [May 1]:⁷

. . . my Government regrets that there was no inter-American force available to respond to the request of the authorities and the needs of the people of the Dominican Republic and for the protection of the lives and the safety of other nationals. My Government would welcome the constitution of such a force as soon as possible.

Mr. President, the efforts of the OAS to deal with this tragic crisis in the Domini-

³ For text of Resolution I adopted by the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, see *ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1962, p. 278.

⁴ *Ibid.*, May 17, 1965, p. 744.

⁵ See p. 856.

⁶ See p. 862.

⁷ See p. 854.

can Republic have been carefully considered, prudent, and reasonable. Heroic efforts to end the bloodshed by cease-fire have been made by the Papal Nuncio. The Secretary General of the OAS, Dr. Mora, is on the island contributing his prestige and abilities to this effort. The inter-American committee is also in Santo Domingo and functioning actively.

The Soviet effort—in the face of these energetic and productive steps—to exploit the anarchy in the Dominican Republic for its own ends is regrettable, if familiar.

But my delegation welcomes the discussion in the Security Council of the situation in the Dominican Republic. Members of the Council are well aware, however, that article 33 of our charter states that efforts should be made to find solutions to disputes “first of all” by peaceful means, including “resort to regional agencies or arrangements.”

This, of course, does not derogate from the authority of this Council. It merely prescribes the procedures and priorities envisaged by the authors of the charters of the United Nations and the OAS for dealing with disputes of a local nature, procedures and priorities that have been followed consistently in analogous situations in the past.

U.S. Intends To Work Through OAS

In light of all the action by the OAS, it would be prudent, constructive, and in keeping with the precedents established by this Council to permit the regional organization to continue to deal with this regional problem. The United Nations Charter in article 52 specifically recognizes the authority of regional organizations in dealing with regional problems. The Council recognizes the desirability of encouraging regional efforts, and, I may add, the confidence of this Council in the abilities of regional organizations to deal with their own problems has been justified by the historical record.

In closing, Mr. President, I wish to make two things clear.

First, the United States Government has no intention of seeking to dictate the politi-

cal future of the Dominican Republic. We believe that the Dominican people under the established principle of self-determination should elect their own government through free elections. It is not our intention to impose a military junta or any other government. Our interest lies in the reestablishment of constitutional government and to that end to assist in maintaining the stability essential to the expression of the free choice of the Dominican people. This intent is in full accord with the basic democratic tenets of the OAS and the inter-American system, the charter of which calls for the maintenance of systems of political organization “on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy.”

The United States intends to continue to work with the OAS in assisting the Dominican people to return as soon as possible to constitutional government.

With the good will and sincere support of all parties concerned, we are confident that the Dominican people will ultimately be able to have the democratic and progressive government which they seek. And we feel that the members of this body should encourage such a peaceful and orderly evolution in this small Republic which has suffered so long from tyranny and civil strife.

Second, as President Johnson has emphasized,⁸ the United States

... will never depart from its commitment to the preservation of the right of all of the free people of this hemisphere to choose their own course without falling prey to international conspiracy from any quarter.

Our goal in the Dominican Republic is the goal which has been expressed again and again in the treaties and agreements which make up the fabric of the inter-American system. It is that the people of that country must be permitted to freely choose the path of political democracy, social justice, and economic progress. Neither the United States, nor any nation, can want or permit a return to that brutal and oppressive despotism which earned the condemnation and punishment of this hemisphere and of all civilized humanity. We intend to carry

⁸ For statements made by President Johnson on April 30 and May 1 and 2, see BULLETIN of May 17, 1965, p. 738.

on the struggle against tyranny no matter in what ideology it cloaks itself. This is our mutual responsibility under the agreements we have signed and the common values which bind us together.

We believe that change comes, and we are glad it does, and it should come through peaceful process. But revolution in any country is a matter for that country to deal with. It becomes a matter calling for hemispheric action only—repeat, only—when the object is the establishment of a Communist dictatorship.

Let me also make clear . . . that we support no single man or any single group of men in the Dominican Republic. Our goal is a simple one. We are there to save the lives of our citizens and to save the lives of all people. Our goal, in keeping with the great principles of the inter-American system, is to help prevent another Communist state in this hemisphere. And we would like to do this without bloodshed or without large-scale fighting.

The form and the nature of the free Dominican government, I assure you, is solely a matter for the Dominican people, but we do know what kind of government we hope to see in the Dominican Republic. For that is carefully spelled out in the treaties and agreements which make up the fabric of the inter-American system. It is expressed, time and time again, in the words of our statesmen and the values and hopes which bind us all together.

We hope to see a government freely chosen by the will of all the people. . . . We hope to see a government working, every hour of every day, to feeding the hungry, to educating the ignorant, to healing the sick—a government whose only concern is the progress and the elevation and the welfare of all the people.

STATEMENT OF MAY 4

U.S./U.N. press release 4541

I had thought to speak this afternoon in reply to some of the charges made yesterday by the representatives of the Soviet Union and of Cuba against my Government and its motives and actions during the past week in the Dominican Republic. However, in view of the speeches this afternoon by the distinguished representative of Uruguay and the proposals advanced by the distinguished representatives of Bolivia and the United Kingdom, I would prefer to examine these speeches and suggestions further and add what further observations I may have when we resume again tomorrow.

However, Mr. President, although I make no pretense of being a military historian—and, indeed, I am more interested in the efforts historical and present of my Government in the peaceful settlement of international disputes—I cannot refrain from pointing out that the Soviet Union—Ambassador [Nikolai T.] Fedorenko—has just circulated a publication of my Government, namely, part of the State Department *Bulletin* of July 31, 1950, as an official document of the Council.⁹

I confess to feeling somewhat flattered by his apparent acceptance of this publication as a reliable source of information. There have been times when I thought perhaps he questioned the United States version of any history.

I note, however, that he has not asked that the entire contents of that section of the *Bulletin* be circulated. Perhaps there is a reason. Anyone certainly familiar with the writing of history in the Soviet Union is aware of the proclivity to expunge from the record past events and persons which the Soviet Government would prefer to pretend never existed. In this connection I noted recently in the April 6th—I think it was—edition of the New York Times, another source which the Soviet representative frequently quotes when it serves his purpose, a report to the effect that the names of Nikita Khrushchev and his close associates are now being deleted out of the revised history of the Soviet Communist Party.

With this reminder fresh in mind, I am sure the representative of the Soviet Union will understand it when I state that I shall now request that the rest of the relevant contents of the *Bulletin* of July 31, 1950, be circulated as an official document.¹⁰ Therein, in fact for the first six pages, will be found the text of President Truman's message to Congress of July 19, 1950, on why the United States was resisting Communist aggression in Korea.

Let me quote what one of the deleted por-

⁹ U.N. doc. S/6325.

¹⁰ U.N. doc. S/6331.

tions of the *Bulletin* says:

This memorandum [a Department of State memorandum dated July 3, 1950] is directed to the authority of the President to order the Armed Forces of the United States to repel the aggressive attack on the Republic of Korea.

As explained by Secretary Acheson to the press on June 28, as soon as word of the attack on Korea was received in Washington, it was the view of the President and of all his advisers that the first responsibility of the Government of the United States was to report the attack to the United Nations.

Accordingly, in the middle of the night of Saturday, June 24, 1950, Ambassador [Ernest A.] Gross, the United States deputy representative at the Security Council of the United Nations, notified Mr. Trygve Lie, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, that armed forces from North Korea had commenced an unprovoked assault against the territory of the Republic of Korea.

The President, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, has full control over the use thereof. He also has authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States. Since the beginning of United States history, he has, upon numerous occasions, utilized these powers in sending armed forces abroad. The preservation of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace is a cardinal interest of the United States. Both traditional international law and article 39 of the United Nations Charter and the resolution pursuant thereto authorize the United States to repel the armed aggression against the Republic of Korea.

This message might serve to remind those with short memories of the extremes to which Communists will go—in this case all-out armed intervention in pursuit of world dominion.

For now, Mr. President, let me add I only raise this entirely irrelevant subject to afford my distinguished Soviet colleague an opportunity to use some of his additional speeches in exercise of his right of reply.

STATEMENT OF MAY 5

U.S./U.N. press release 4543

We have by now heard the complete catalogue of all the past sins—relevant and irrelevant, real and imaginary—committed by the United States Government over the past century or so.

Mr. President, there is something ludi-

crous—and transparently false—in the spectacle of Ambassador Fedorenko talking about the sanctity of the doctrine of nonintervention. I shall not detain you with the long and sorry record of interventions and attempted interventions by Communist-controlled states in the affairs of other nations. It is enough to recall the following statements of the Havana Conference of the Communist Parties of Latin America last November:

Active aid should be given to those who are subject at present to cruel repressions—for instance, the freedom fighters in Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, and Haiti.

An active movement of solidarity of all the Latin American countries with the liberation struggle of the people of Venezuela should be organized on a continent-wide scale.

It is necessary to intensify the movements of solidarity with the people of Panama who are waging a struggle against imperialism in difficult conditions.

And this recalls the opening statement of the representative of Cuba, in which he expressed with moving eloquence his passionate devotion to international law and international organization and nonintervention. This display of feeling comes from the representative of a government which invited Soviet missiles into Cuba, which has ostracized itself from the peaceful society of the Western Hemisphere, which has proclaimed its contempt for the Organization of American States and all its works, which works to subvert the governments and destroy the machinery of the inter-American community.

Well, Mr. President, enough of this. The Security Council is not seized with the subject of Viet-Nam, of the Congo—nor with responsibility for passing historical judgments on events that occurred in the last century or in the last generation. The Security Council is seized with the subject of the Dominican Republic in the here and now.

I therefore propose to address myself once again to the Dominican Republic situation and to review once more in simple and factual form the activities of my Government in connection with those events. I hope we

can then recognize that effective action is currently being taken by the proper regional body, the OAS, and permit it to do its work.

Purpose of U.S. Action

The basic nature and the overriding purpose of my Government's action can be summed up in one simple sentence (which I shall read slowly: The United States action in the Dominican Republic was emergency action taken to *protect lives* and to give the inter-American system a chance to deal with a situation within its competence.

On April 28 unburied bodies lay in the streets of Santo Domingo, while unorganized and rival bands roamed the city committing murder and arson. Agents trained abroad for internal subversion were passing out arms and taking control of marauding groups. The embassies of half a dozen nations were attacked.

The rebels claimed to have formed a government, but some of their leaders were taking refuge in foreign embassies. The fact of the matter is that no one was in charge and no one was capable of taking charge. In brief, a human and political tragedy of the first magnitude was at hand.

And this is not our judgment but the judgment of Dominican security officials, who notified the United States Embassy that the situation was completely out of hand, that the city police force had disintegrated, and that no guarantees could be given for the safety of thousands of foreign residents of Santo Domingo, including several thousand citizens of the United States.

On the same day—April 28—the only apparent responsible authority in Santo Domingo addressed a request to the United States Government to send in armed forces.

At this point the United States Government had three choices of action.

First, we could have decided not to do anything—at least for the time being. But the lives of thousands of people from nearly 30 countries hung in the balance.

Second, we could have recognized the military junta claiming to be the government and could have responded to its request for mili-

tary support. But this would have amounted to taking sides in an internal struggle among Dominican political factions, and such a course of action would have been inconsistent with the principles that govern the inter-American system.

Third, we could send in our own security forces on a provisional basis until the Organization of American States could meet and consult and decide what to do.

It is at moments like this that nations which possess the capacity to act must make their decisions to exercise or not exercise the unwanted responsibility that sometimes devolves upon them suddenly and unexpectedly. In this case—when hours and even minutes counted—there was no time for deliberate consultation and for the organization of international machinery which did not yet exist.

My Government elected the third alternative.

The United States initially landed troops under these emergency conditions to preserve the lives of foreign nationals—nationals of the United States and of many other countries. Such action is justified both on humanitarian and legal grounds.

Protecting Lives of Foreign Nationals

I am aware, Mr. President, that some have felt that perhaps we moved too hastily—that more time should have been allowed for the OAS to go into action. My reply to them is this: Try to imagine, if you can, the fate of Santo Domingo if the United States had not acted when it did.

A full week has passed since April 28, and the only effective forces of law and order in and around the capital city of Santo Domingo this afternoon are still—much to our regret—the United States forces dispatched there during the past week.

As it turned out, the emergency dispatch of these forces was undertaken just in time to avert wholesale deaths by violence and terrorism, compounded by the threat of disease and starvation. The death toll already had reached at least 1,000 and probably more than 1,500. By now, some 4,067 persons

have been evacuated, of whom 2,694 are United States citizens and about 1,373 are citizens of 41 other nations and 4 stateless persons.

Emergency shipments of medical supplies and of food have been rushed to the scene. They are now being distributed to all persons in need without regard to their political affiliation by the Dominican Red Cross, CARE, a relief organization of the Catholic Church, and by United States forces. This morning food from this country has been distributed in the so-called rebel-held area by clergymen and officials of the Dominican Red Cross.

This is a task of considerable magnitude and of great urgency. Economic activity has been at a standstill for 10 days. People in Santo Domingo are not working, and they are not being paid. Increasing numbers of them are hungry.

We are now bringing in 60 tons of rice daily, which is enough to feed about one-quarter of a million people. Distribution is being made from checkpoints around the neutral security zone, and three food distribution centers are being established in areas outside the center of town to be manned by Dominican businessmen and clergymen. Twenty-five trucks have been borrowed to handle the food supplies for distribution to Santo Domingo and in areas of the countryside which are dependent upon the city for their supply of food.

So I leave it to the conscience of every fair and humane person to decide for himself whether the United States acted in precipitate haste a week ago tonight.

I am aware, Mr. President, that some have questioned the need for such a large force as the United States has dispatched to the Dominican Republic. Perhaps a few words on this point would prove enlightening.

In times of peace and tranquillity a police force of 8,000 men is employed to maintain law and order in the city of Santo Domingo alone. Is it surprising that roughly twice that many men would be needed to restore order in circumstances that amounted to civil war? Would a larger or smaller force

minimize the number of casualties on all sides?

Moreover, this force has many tasks. It has the task of evacuating civilians; and despite the speed at which it has worked, several thousand foreign residents have still not been evacuated.

It has the task of establishing and guarding a large neutral security zone against sniper fire around the clock; and only yesterday two more foreign embassies urged the extension of the security zone to include their property.

It has the task of handling and distributing food and medical supplies; and this part of the job grows daily heavier rather than lighter.

It has the task of protecting and supporting the emissaries of the OAS who are seeking to mediate the underlying dispute and to arrange conditions under which the people of the Dominican Republic can exercise their right to choose their own officials without outside subversion or interference of any kind.

Now, Mr. President, that concludes my review of the basic facts with respect to the first of the two purposes of the action undertaken by my Government: to protect lives and sustain life in a large city paralyzed by violence and anarchy.

The mission has been carried out with extraordinary skill and bravery, and we are rewarded by the gratitude of those who have been protected and guided to safe havens. And we feel we have done our humane duty by supplying emergency medical care to the wounded and sick and food to hungry thousands.

I might mention in passing that the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union has tried to make something of the fact that not a single citizen of the United States had been killed in Santo Domingo. And let me inform him that not a single other foreign resident has been lost in the evacuation. I do not suppose Ambassador Fedorenko would have insisted on either U.S. citizens or other foreign nationals being killed as a condition precedent to our action. The rea-

son why no one was killed is obvious: Their rescuers got there in time, in sufficient force, and acted with sufficient dispatch to get them to safety.

Preserving Capacity of OAS To Function

Now for the second purpose for which we acted: to give the inter-American system an opportunity to deal with a situation within its competence.

The United States continues its presence in the Dominican Republic for this additional purpose of preserving the capacity of the OAS to function in the manner intended by its charter—to achieve peace and justice by securing a cease-fire and the reestablishment of processes within which Dominicans can choose their own government, free from outside interference.

The primary purposes for which the American states established the OAS, as set forth in article 1 of its charter, were “to achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and their independence.” Please note, if you will, that the first purpose of the Organization of American States is “an order of peace and justice.”

There are, of course, certain basic principles which the OAS seeks to promote throughout the hemisphere. One of these is respect for the fundamental rights of the individual; and in Santo Domingo last week not only were these rights being obliterated but individuals were being obliterated.

Another fundamental principle of the inter-American system is the effective exercise of representative democracy. This principle is clearly set out in the Charter of the OAS, the Rio Treaty, and the Charter of the Alliance for Progress. But in Santo Domingo the prospects for representative government have been violently challenged.

After United States forces arrived, it became apparent that the structure of government had broken down to a point where

there was not only no authority capable of preserving law and order but there was no mechanism by which the Dominican people could freely choose their own government.

The obligations of nonintervention contained in articles 15 and 17 of the OAS Charter did not preclude the use of armed forces for the humanitarian purpose of saving lives of foreigners. Nor did those obligations require the United States to withdraw its forces immediately, when it was apparent that there was no local means of keeping order pending the creating of a government capable of keeping order. It would have been irresponsible for the United States to withdraw its forces when such a course would have endangered the lives of those not yet evacuated and would have led to full-scale resumption of bloody warfare among the contending Dominican factors.

The United States has acted to preserve the situation so that the organs of the inter-American system may carry out their intended responsibilities under inter-American treaties and assist the people of the Dominican Republic in reestablishing democratic government under conditions of public order.

On the same evening—April 28—when the United States initially dispatched forces to Santo Domingo, my Government also requested an urgent meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States. A meeting of the Council was held on the morning of April 29, and organs of the OAS proceeded to meet in continuing session thereafter.

The OAS first issued a call for a cease-fire and appealed to the Papal Nuncio in Santo Domingo to use his good offices in an effort to help bring it about; then it called for the establishment of the neutral international safety zone; then it dispatched the Secretary General to give assistance on the scene; then it sent a five-nation commission to the Dominican capital to mediate an end to hostilities and the beginning of a political settlement.

In the course of these proceedings, Mr.

President, the United States delegate, in addition to supporting the resolutions adopted, has reaffirmed our adherence to the inter-American system, including the doctrines of nonintervention and self-determination. He has urged the OAS to help restore constitutional government by free choice, deplored the lack of available inter-American machinery to deal with such emergencies, and approved the establishment of such machinery as soon as possible.

We have asked the OAS repeatedly to assume responsibility in the Dominican Republic as a common duty and a common task. And we have earnestly requested the organization to act with a sense of urgency to relieve the United States of an unwanted burden.

As things stand now, the OAS commission is on the scene and appears to be making hopeful progress. Although it has not been fully respected by all hands, an initial cease-fire was arranged on April 30. And yesterday the commission reported by cable that agreement had been reached with the contending parties on confirmation of the cease-fire, demarcation and enlargement of the security zone to include all embassies, evacuation of asylees and refugees, and distribution of food, medicine, and medical equipment to all sectors of the population without regard to parties.

And today the commission also informed the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OAS as follows:

We consider that it would be useful, in order to aid in bringing a return of the Dominican situation to normalcy, for the member States that are in a position to do so to establish a combined inter-American military force under the Organization of American States to achieve the objectives that are set by the Meeting of Consultation.

This is to say that the commission which is on the scene has recommended adoption of a resolution which the OAS is now considering for an inter-American force to perform the peacekeeping duties which my Government reluctantly assumed under the desperate conditions prevailing a week ago tonight. We are now hopeful that such action will be taken very soon.¹¹

And President Johnson has stated:¹²

All we are in the Dominican Republic for is to preserve freedom and to save those people from conquest. The moment that the Organization of American States can present a plan that will bring peace on the island, and permit us to evacuate our people, and give us some hope of stability in government, we will be the first to come back home.

Mr. President, it is evident on the face of things that it is only the temporary presence of our forces in Santo Domingo which has made it possible for the Organization of American States to carry out its consultations, to organize its machinery, and to take its proper place on the scene of the fighting in the Dominican Republic.

Communist Activities in Dominican Republic

These are the essential facts of the situation in the matter before us. Obviously the situation is still far from clear, and there are unknowns or imponderables in the swirling affairs of the Dominican Republic in recent days and weeks. Indeed, wherever conspiracy lurks there are hidden factors and secret forces at work—a fact which no doubt has much to do with the angry distortions and maliciously false allegations which we have heard from two speakers at this table in recent days.

The fact of the matter is that it appears that what began as a democratic revolution was quickly penetrated by a group of trained Communists. If that movement had succeeded in establishing itself as the government of the Dominican Republic, the events would have been irreversible. The OAS would have been deprived of any realistic possibility of assisting the Dominican people to determine their political future by the free exercise of self-determination.

It is not the "bogey of anticommunism," or a "timeworn record," or an imaginary danger with which we are concerned—to borrow some of Ambassador Fedorenko's words.

¹¹ For text of a resolution adopted in the OAS on May 6, see p. 862.

¹² For remarks made by President Johnson before the Building Trades Council on May 3, see White, House press release dated May 3.

In the Dominican Republic there are three Communist political organizations. They are the Partido Socialista Popular Dominicano (PSPD—Dominican Popular Socialist Party), which follows Moscow's direction; the Movimiento Popular Dominicano (MPD—Dominican Popular Movement), a small but aggressive Marxist-Leninist revolutionary party which follows the Chinese Communist ideological line; and the largest of the three, the Agrupación Política Catorce de Junio (APCJ—Fourteenth of June Political Group), which is Castro-oriented and with connections to Soviet and Communist Chinese regimes as well.

All three of these parties have representatives in Cuba and have received training and financial support from abroad. All have participated in armed revolutionary attempts: the PSPD in the invasion of 1959; the MPD in guerrilla fighting in 1963; and the APCJ in the unsuccessful Castro-style guerrilla attempt of late 1963.

Direct involvement of Castro in Dominican affairs is also of long standing. As long ago as 1959 Castro organized, trained, and equipped an expedition which invaded the Dominican Republic, whose leadership included a Cuban army officer, and which was escorted to Dominican shores by the Cuban navy.

In November 1963 it launched another action against the Dominican Republic, unsuccessfully sending a paramilitary team with supplies of weapons to the north coast of the island.

In 1963 also the Castro and the Chinese-oriented Communist parties of the Dominican Republic launched an open guerrilla warfare movement in the hinterland of the Dominican Republic. Dominicans known to have received training in Cuba took part in that abortive effort. The bulk of the captured rebels were deported in May 1964, and most of them became political exiles in France. From there, many have since traveled in the Soviet bloc countries, including Cuba and Communist China.

Last year Dominican Communists published the Marxist justification for their

revolution in terms of national liberation, a handbook entitled *Seven Themes of Study*. Later, in September, they issued a call for unity of the "forces of the left under the leadership of the Dominican Communist Party."

And in November the Havana Conference of the Communist Parties of Latin America, to which I have already referred, called for "active aid" to the so-called "freedom fighters" in Latin America.

Beginning in late 1964, various of the exiled Castro and Chinese party leaders began to infiltrate back into the Dominican Republic, some clandestinely, to rejoin their respective political organizations.

Then on the very evening of the army officers' revolt inspired by the PRD—the party of Juan Bosch—April 24, these top-level Communist leaders, especially those of the Moscow-oriented old-line Communist Party, the PSPD, seized upon the unstable situation as ripe for subversive exploitation. Word was issued to party members and to other extremist groups calling for agitation and the staging of "spot rallies and demonstrations" in the streets.

Within 1 or 2 hours of the first rebel moves, members of the Castroist movement were busy in the streets of Santo Domingo.

Communist and Castroist leaders shortly thereafter got quantities of arms and ammunition from the armory at the "27 February" camp outside Santo Domingo, where rebelling army officers had seized control as the opening act of the coup. A sizable quantity of arms and ammunition thus fell into the hands of leaders of the PSPD (the Moscow party), and the members of this party were quickly formed into armed paramilitary teams which fanned out in the downtown and *barrio* (slum) areas, taking control of secondary targets and organizing the inhabitants. At the same time a party military headquarters was established, and arms collected from loyalist police and military personnel were stored there.

With relatively tight discipline and effective organization, the extreme leftist groups, particularly the PSPD but also, promi-

nently, the MPD and the Castro movement, were soon providing a significant portion of the rebel forces and were decisively influencing the political leadership of the rebellion, which in the beginning had been in the hands of the democratic leaders of the Bosch party.

This was the complexion of the rebellion when the key PRD leaders, who had organized the revolt to restore Bosch, began to take asylum.

The Communist Leaders

Now, who are some of these leaders who have sought to turn this rebellion into a Communist takeover?

Playing a key role in the tactical direction of the rebel forces is Manuel González González, an experienced Spanish Communist Party activist who has been in the Dominican Republic since 1940 and is a member of the Moscow party and a purported Cuban intelligence agent.

Other PSPD leaders active in the revolt include Buenaventura Johnson, whose house is one of the party's munition dumps and strongholds, and Fidelio Despradel, who received guerrilla training in Cuba in 1963. Leading the organization of paramilitary units were Jaime Durán, who received paramilitary training in Cuba in 1962, and Juan Ducoudray, who has been a liaison link between Cuba and the Dominican Republic for the supply of weapons.

Also participating actively, among others:

Rafael De La Altagracia Mejia Lluberés, an APCJ leader, longtime Communist revolutionary. He was involved in a 1963 attempt to overthrow Venezuelan President Betancourt and has had guerrilla training and political indoctrination courses in Cuba in 1963.

Nicolas Quirico Valdez Conde, a high-level PSPD member, who has lived in Moscow, speaks Russian fluently, and was Russian interpreter for Fidel Castro in Cuba.

Miguel Angel Deschamps Erickson, an MPD member, who received guerrilla warfare training and explosives courses in Cuba

in 1962 and carried instructions from Cuba to the Dominican Republic for MPD in 1963.

Juan Miguel Roman Diaz, a high-level member of APCJ, who was key man in guerrilla activities in the Dominican Republic in late 1963 and was subsequently deported and went to Cuba in June 1964.

Mr. President, it may, of course, be said—I think accurately—that the bulk of the participants in the rebellion are not Communist and that even in the present leadership non-Communists are active. I do not purport to predict the future.

But I would remind you that only 12 men went to the hills with Castro in 1956 and that only a handful of Castro's own supporters were Communists. I would also remind you that Castro, too, came into power under cover of constitutionalism, moderation, and cooperation with others. But within months the true complexion appeared, and the list of leaders imprisoned, expelled, or forced to flee once control was achieved is well known. It is an impressive list: the first Provisional President of the Revolutionary Government, Dr. Manuel Urrutia; the first Prime Minister, Dr. José Miró Cardona; the first President of the Supreme Court, Dr. Emilio Menendez; nearly two-thirds of Castro's first cabinet, including Minister of Foreign Affairs Roberto Agramonte, Minister of Treasury Rufo Lopez Fresquet, Minister of Labor Manuel Fernandez, Minister of Agriculture Humberto Sorí Marín, and Minister of Public Works Manuel Ray; companions-in-arms of Fidel Castro, such as Sierra Maestra commanders Hubert Matos, Mino Diaz, and Jorge Sotus; labor leaders such as David Salvador and Amaury Fragnals; editors and commentators such as Miguel Angel Quevedo and Luis Conte Aguero; even Juan Orta, the head of the Prime Minister's own office; and ultimately Castro's own sister.

Mr. President, participation in the inter-American system, to be meaningful, must take into account the modern-day reality that an attempt by a conspiratorial group

inspired from the outside, to seize control by force can be an assault upon the independence and integrity of a state. The rights and obligations of all members of the OAS must be seen in the light of this reality.

But the fact remains that the action of the United States in the Dominican Republic was not for the purpose of intervening in the affairs of the Dominican Republic or for the purpose of occupying that country. There is no new "doctrine" at work in that part of the world.

The fact remains that United States forces are not asserting any authority to govern any part of the Dominican Republic, nor do we want any such authority even in that neutral zone within the city of Santo Domingo. The fact remains that United States forces are not taking sides in the Dominican conflict—and explicitly declined to do so.

Thus the United States is in no sense acting against the Dominican Republic but in the interests of the Dominican people.

Our action is for the purpose of helping to restore order and to preserve for the people of that nation their right to freely choose their government.

To preserve that right, the United States has protected and evacuated foreign citizens from the danger zone and has provided the Organization of American States with the necessary time to take over its responsibilities in the area of its competence.

Whatever else has been said around this table, that is the whole story as far as it can be known, and these are the relevant facts in the matter before this Council.

The case is now in the hands of the competent regional organization. There is an official OAS commission on the scene actively engaged in negotiations which appear to have reached an advanced stage. The Council of the OAS was in session this morning.

I therefore trust that this Council will keep the question of the Dominican Republic under review until the Organization of American States completes its work and the people of the Dominican Republic have been able to exercise their own political choice.

STATEMENT OF MAY 11

U.S./U.N. press release 4550

The remarks of Ambassador Fedorenko this morning add little to what we have heard from him on several occasions during most of the past week. He has again grossly distorted the views and the policies of the United States. The true perspective on the action that we have taken has already been stated by me here in the Council. I shall attempt, once more, to state it in capsule form.

First, the United States action in the Dominican Republic is to protect the lives of foreign nationals and to give the inter-American system a chance to deal with the situation in the Dominican Republic, which is within its competence.

Second, the United States forces are not asserting any authority to govern any part of the Dominican Republic and are not taking sides in the conflict.

Third, the United States fully supports the vigorous action which the Organization of American States has taken to deal with this situation, including the historic step establishing an inter-American force.

Fourth, the United States forces will be withdrawn from the Dominican Republic when the OAS Command of the inter-American force determines that they are not needed.

Fifth, we believe that the people of the Dominican Republic, as I have said repeatedly, should freely choose their own government. Our action had the purpose of preserving that right, a choice which would have been denied—perhaps irretrievably—if the forces at work to capture the revolution last week had succeeded.

As to the question of intervention in the internal affairs of other states, the Soviet representative is no doubt an expert. His Government as a matter of principle and of policy has been carrying on such intervention for decades by the open use of armed force in Eastern Europe, by conspiracy and subversion elsewhere. This Communist intervention is no myth; it is no rhetorical dream; it is no debating point, but a night-

marish reality to which hundreds of thousands of refugees all over the world have testified. The Soviet Union cannot expect that such intervention, which they ironically call the progressive march of history, will not be firmly, continuously, and decisively resisted. I can assure them that it will be—and not by the United States alone.

I am sure that most of us here at the Council table hope that the inter-American system will be able to bring to a satisfactory conclusion this violent and unhappy situation in the Dominican Republic so that its people can enjoy calm and stable conditions and achieve the reconciliation of their conflict on the basis of which free and representative political institutions can be restored to that land.

Now, Mr. President, I have listened most carefully to the statement of the representative of Uruguay here this morning and to the resolution which he has read to the Council.

We deeply appreciate the profound concern of the representative of Uruguay about the Dominican Republic, his affirmation of the right of the Dominican people to express freely their right of self-determination, and also we share his respect for the Charter of the United Nations. And I think we can understand his desire that the competence of the Security Council in this case be acknowledged and be exercised. To strengthen the United Nations in every way possible I am sure is his objective, and to that end the Security Council should adopt the resolution that he has proposed and that has been endorsed by the distinguished representative of Jordan.

Well, we have just seen his text. I repeat that I have the greatest respect for his views, though it must be remembered that the majority of the members of the Organization of American States disagreed with those views when it adopted its recent resolution on the situation in the Dominican Republic. For our part, I regret to say that we cannot agree that this resolution which he has proposed would be helpful at this point. The Organization of American States is acting vigorously in this case. I do not

believe there can be any dispute about that. Its authority is fully provided for by the Charter of the United Nations as well as by the Charter of the Organization of American States. It has adopted many decisions. It is due to the action of the OAS that a cease-fire was achieved. It is due to the efforts of this regional organization that an investigation has been undertaken and a commission of good offices appointed. It is due to the efforts of the OAS that an inter-American force is being established. It has reported these decisions to the Security Council, and more reports will doubtless follow.

The resolution proposed by the distinguished representative of Uruguay, I am afraid, seeks to interpose the Security Council into the situation at this time, just when the regional organization seems to be dealing with this situation effectively. This is not a question of whether the Security Council may or may not exercise its authority. That certainly is not at issue at all. The issue is whether the action—the steps taken by the OAS—have been deficient or whether they have been satisfactory and, therefore, whether the Security Council should intervene now. In our view there is no doubt that the OAS has acted promptly and effectively and vigorously and, indeed, with a sense of historical movement.

The Charter of the United Nations provides that a regional solution is one of the methods to be sought first of all. That solution is well underway. We would not be shirking our responsibilities—we would, indeed, be following them—if now after this long discussion we were to conclude that the Security Council does not need to interpose itself. This, of course, does not mean that it could not do so were the situation different and where the regional agency is acting improperly or deficiently; and it would thus not deprive the Security Council as a matter of its own responsibility from acting in other situations at earlier stages or in resuming its activities in this case if it becomes necessary to do so.

The result of the adoption, I suspect, o

this resolution would tend to complicate the activities of the OAS by encouraging concurrent and independent considerations and activities by this Council. There are also some implications in the preambular language which would prejudge the situation, imply conclusions which the OAS has not reached, and introduce substantive concepts which would prove contentious.

We do not believe that this would help in the situation. Indeed, it could tend to bring the highly contentious atmosphere of world politics so sharply manifested in our debates back into a situation which is now moving toward a solution. The harsh Stalinist approach toward the problem introduced into this Council is not encouraging in this respect. I thus suggest that the adoption of this resolution would not be wise and that it might hamper rather than promote a solution in the Dominican Republic which will allow its people to choose their own government in conditions that will permit them to make a free and unfettered choice.

Our charter says that the Security Council should encourage—it uses the word “encourage”—pacific settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements. Our view is that, if a resolution of some kind should be adopted in order to manifest the admitted competence and concern of the Security Council, then the resolution should have no ambiguity, no inferences, especially inferences that the Security Council is not encouraging the regional organization.

Now, Mr. President, speaking for my delegation, I have no objection to a postponement of the vote on the Uruguayan resolution as requested by the representative of Jordan and if the members of the Security Council so desire. I would suggest, however, that the Soviet resolution be brought to a vote now. It has been before the Council for many days. The views of various members have been fully expressed, and I believe it would be useful if we are concerned with the imagination and the effectiveness and the efficiency of the United Nations to have an expression of views on

that resolution now by a vote. Surely after this prolonged discussion the members will agree that we should make some progress.

[In a further statement, Ambassador Stevenson said:]

Mr. President, while I do not agree with my distinguished friend from Uruguay's interpretation of the rules, I certainly shall have no objection to continuing the meeting and taking no action today, if that is the majority view of the members of the Council.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION¹³

*The Security Council,
Deeply concerned at the grave events in the Dominican Republic,*

1. *Calls for a strict cease-fire;*
2. *Invites the Secretary-General to send, as an urgent measure, a representative to the Dominican Republic for the purpose of reporting to the Security Council on the present situation;*
3. *Calls upon all concerned in the Dominican Republic to cooperate with the representative of the Secretary-General in the carrying out of his task.*

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on May 5 confirmed the following nominations:

Charles W. Adair, Jr., to be Ambassador to Panama. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 101 dated May 7.)

Nathaniel Davis to be Ambassador to Bulgaria. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 108 dated May 12.)

William C. Foster to be deputy representative of the United States on the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

Henry A. Hoyt to be Ambassador to Uruguay. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 114 dated May 18.)

Henry J. Tasea to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Morocco. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated April 18.)

¹³ U.N. doc. S/6355; adopted unanimously on May 14.

William R. Tyler to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of the Netherlands. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 118 dated May 19.)

Jack Hood Vaughn to be representative of the United States in the 11th session of the Economic Commission for Latin America of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Cultural Relations

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21, 1952.¹

Acceptance deposited: Uganda, April 15, 1965.

Labor

Convention (ILO No. 53) concerning the minimum requirement of professional capacity for masters and officers on board merchant ships. Adopted at Geneva October 24, 1936. Entered into force March 29, 1939; for the United States October 29, 1939. 54 Stat. 1683.

Ratification deposited: China, December 10, 1964.

Convention (ILO No. 58) fixing the minimum age for the admission of children to employment at sea (revised 1936). Adopted at Geneva October 24, 1936. Entered into force April 11, 1939; for the United States October 29, 1959. 54 Stat. 1705.

Ratification deposited: China, December 10, 1964.

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol bringing under international control drugs outside the scope of the convention limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs concluded at Geneva July 13, 1931 (48 Stat. 1543), as amended (61 Stat. 2230; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Paris November 19, 1948. Entered into force for the United States September 11, 1950. TIAS 2308.

Acceptance deposited: Uganda, April 15, 1965.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at

Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.

Ratification deposited: Lebanon, May 14, 1965.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Gambia, April 27, 1965.

Patents

Agreement for the mutual safeguarding of secrecy of inventions relating to defense for which applications for patents have been made. Done at Paris September 21, 1960. Entered into force January 12, 1961. TIAS 4672.

Ratification deposited: Portugal, May 11, 1965.

War

Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners of war;

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea;

Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian persons in time of war.

Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1950; for the United States February 2, 1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363 and 3365, respectively.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Gabon, February 20, 1965.

BILATERAL

Greece

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 17, 1964 (TIAS 5695).

Effected by exchange of notes at Athens April 9 and 27, 1965. Entered into force April 27, 1965.

Japan

Agreement relating to the broadening of the functions of the Japan-United States Consultative Committee for the Ryukyu Islands established under the agreement of April 25, 1964 (TIAS 5606). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo April 2, 1963. Entered into force April 2, 1965.

Protocol modifying and supplementing the convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Tokyo August 14, 1962. Entered into force May 6, 1965.

Proclaimed by the President: May 13, 1965.

Malawi

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in Malawi. Effected by exchange of notes at Blantyre and Zomba March 4 and April 20, 1965. Entered into force April 20, 1965.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

American Republics
 OAS Foreign Ministers Provide for Establishment of Inter-American Force in Dominican Republic (Bunker, resolutions, Act of Santo Domingo) 854
 President Expresses Hope for Success of OAS Mission (statement) 867
 Vaughn confirmed as U.S. representative in 11th Session of ECLA 885
Asia. Economic Development in Asia (Rostow) 845
Bulgaria. Davis confirmed as Ambassador 885
Cambodia. U.S. Unwilling To Maintain Consular Relations With Cambodia (Rusk) 853
Congress. Confirmations (Adair, Davis, Foster, Hoyt, Tasca, Tyler, Vaughn) 885
Department and Foreign Service. Confirmations (Adair, Davis, Foster, Hoyt, Tasca, Tyler, Vaughn) 885
Disarmament. Foster confirmed as deputy U.S. representative on U.N. Disarmament Commission 885
Dominican Republic
 OAS Foreign Ministers Provide for Establishment of Inter-American Force in Dominican Republic (Bunker, resolutions, Act of Santo Domingo) 854
 President Expresses Hope for Success of OAS Mission (statement) 867
 Secretary Discusses Situation in Dominican Republic (Hightower, Rusk) 842
 Security Council Authorizes U.N. Representative in Dominican Republic (Stevenson, resolution) 869
Economic Affairs. Economic Development in Asia (Rostow) 845
Educational and Cultural Affairs. New Educational Exchange Agreement Signed With U.K. 844
International Organizations and Conferences
 OAS Foreign Ministers Provide for Establishment of Inter-American Force in Dominican Republic (Bunker, resolutions, Act of Santo Domingo) 854
 President Expresses Hope for Success of OAS Mission (statement) 867
 Vaughn confirmed as U.S. representative in 11th session of ECLA 885
Japan. Economic Development in Asia (Rostow) 845
Morocco. Tasca confirmed as Ambassador 885
Netherlands. Tyler confirmed as Ambassador 885
Panama. Adair confirmed as Ambassador 885
Presidential Documents
 President Expresses Hope for Success of OAS Mission 867
 Viet-Nam: The Third Face of the War 838
Treaty Information. Current Actions 886

United Kingdom. New Educational Exchange Agreement Signed With U.K. 844
United Nations
 Foster confirmed as deputy U.S. representative on U.N. Disarmament Commission 885
 Security Council Authorizes U.N. Representative in Dominican Republic (Stevenson, resolution) 869
Uruguay. Hoyt confirmed as Ambassador 885
Viet-Nam. Viet-Nam: The Third Face of the War (Johnson) 838

Name Index

Adair, Charles W., Jr. 885
 Bunker, Ellsworth 854
 Colombo, Ricardo M 867
 Davis, Nathaniel 885
 Foster, William C 885
 Hightower, John 842
 Hoyt, Henry A 885
 Johnson, President 838, 867
 Rostow, W. W 845
 Rusk, Secretary 842, 853, 868
 Stevenson, Adlai E 869
 Tasca, Henry J 885
 Tyler, William R 885
 Vaughn, Jack Hood 885

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 10-16

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to May 10 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 80 of April 22 and 103 of May 8.

No.	Date	Subject
104	5/10	Educational exchange program with United Kingdom.
105	5/10	Rusk: letter to Cambodian Foreign Minister.
*106	5/10	Harriman: "The Sino-Soviet Rift" (excerpts).
107	5/10	Bunker: statement at OAS meeting on Dominican Republic.
*108	5/12	Davis sworn in as U.S. Minister to Bulgaria (biographic details).
*109	5/12	Program for visit of President of Korea.
†110	5/12	East-West Center review board meeting (rewrite).
†111	5/13	Bundy: "Reality and Myth Concerning South Viet-Nam."
*112	5/14	Bundy: "A Progress Report on Viet-Nam."
†113	5/13	NATO communique.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Aggression From the North

The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign To Conquer South Viet-Nam

President Johnson declared in an address on February 17 that the purpose of the United States in Viet-Nam "is to join in the defense and protection of freedom of a brave people who under attack that is controlled and that is directed from outside their country." *Aggression From the North* is a 64-page report, illustrated with maps and photographs, which summarizes the persuasive evidence of that attack and its source of support.

The introduction to the Department's pamphlet closes with these words: "The Government of the United States believes that evidence should be presented to its own citizens and to the world. It is important for free men to know what has been happening in Viet-Nam, and how and why. That is the purpose of this report."

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THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN

Vol. III, No. 1354



June 7, 1965

REALITY AND MYTH CONCERNING SOUTH VIET-NAM

by Assistant Secretary Bundy 899

PROSPECTS OF LAW IN A WORLD OF CONFLICT

by Leonard C. Meeker 999

OAS SECRETARY GENERAL TO REPRESENT MEETING OF CONSULTATION
IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC; BRAZILIAN TO COMMAND INTER-AMERICAN FORCE

Statements by Ambassador Ellsworth Barker, Texts of Resolutions 1098

U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERS SITUATION IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Statements by Ambassador Arthur D. Starnes 1061

Reality and Myth Concerning South Viet-Nam

by William P. Bundy

Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs¹

I am glad to be with you tonight, to discuss frankly our policies in South Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia. The topic is a vital one to all of us as Americans.

I am sure you all are familiar with the President's speech of April 7th,² and you have probably also noted his many other statements on the subject as well as those of Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and others in the administration. I shall not try tonight to cover the central points that have surely been made fully clear in these various speeches and statements. Rather, I should like to take a few of the aspects of the situation and examine them in some depth, explaining what we believe to be the reality of the situation and at the same time exploring, and I hope showing as faults,

some of the myths that have now come into circulation on various aspects. If I do less than justice to what you would like to know about the details of the current situation, I hope you will allow me to make up for this in the question period following.

Let me speak then, first, to the reality of what has happened in South Viet-Nam since 1954, dealing in the process with some of the myths that have arisen about that story.

Secondly, I would like to discuss the wider implications of the type of Communist aggression we are seeing in South Viet-Nam—its relation to Communist objectives and to our own basic policy of seeking a peaceful world of free and independent nations able to determine their own destinies.

The South Viet-Nam Story

In 1954, after the fall of the French stronghold at Dien Bien Phu, the Geneva accords of July 20 signified the end of hos-

¹ Address made before the Dallas Council on World Affairs at Dallas, Tex., on May 13 (press release 111).

² For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIII, NO. 1354 PUBLICATION 7900 JUNE 7, 1965

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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ilities and the end of 90 years of French rule in Indochina. The country was roughly cut in half at the 17th parallel, creating the Communist regime of Ho Chi Minh in the North and a non-Communist state in the South.

When the Republic of Viet-Nam was formed in 1955, and recognized as independent by 35 nations, the South was a shambles; 13 years of fighting that ended with the signing of the Geneva accords had left its physical as well as human toll in Viet-Nam. The Government and people of South Viet-Nam had all the aspirations and hopes of any lesser developed country, but they also had more than the usual number of liabilities facing a new nation. These included:

—900,000 refugees who had fled their homes in the North at the time of partition in order to escape Communist rule;

—a long-term military threat from the North, which had emerged from the war with large military forces;

—a Government nearly paralyzed by long years of war and lacking sufficient trained officials for effective self-government;

—acute economic dislocation and lack of Government revenues; and

—persisting pockets of southern territory that had long been held by Communists and other dissident groups.

In the face of such problems, hopes were not high for the survival of the fledgling Republic of Viet-Nam. But the Communists had underestimated the most important resource in the South—the Vietnamese people. The people in the South had intelligence and native skill—but, more importantly, the determination to avoid the totalitarian destiny of their fellow Vietnamese in the North.

So, from 1954 to 1959, great progress was made. In Ngo Dinh Diem a staunchly nationalist and anti-Communist leader was found. Against all odds, including the opposition in 1954-55 of old-line military leaders and religious groups, he took hold. Under his rule the nationalist feeling of the newly formed country—which does differ to a significant degree from the North—was aroused, and it

soon became and has remained clear that, whatever the extent of their attachment to particular governments in their own country, the great mass of the people of South Viet-Nam do not wish to be ruled by communism or from Hanoi.

On the economic and social front, education was vastly expanded, major land reforms carried out, and the economy grew at a rapid rate, far outstripping what was happening under the Communist yoke in the North. Instead of decaying and dropping by default into communism, South Viet-Nam was in a fair way toward becoming really able to stand on its own feet.

In all this the United States played a major helping role. On the military side we helped to create a fairly decent army almost from scratch, with a normal military assistance advisory group of a few hundred men. That army was never big enough to threaten the North, nor was it meant to be; it may well have been too much oriented to conventional warfare and not to the handling of a sophisticated guerrilla aggression.

Then, beginning roughly in 1959, two trends got underway that are still today at the heart of the problem.

First, the Diem government, instead of steadily broadening its base and training key groups for responsibility, began to narrow it. More and more the regime became personal in character. Opposition parties, which had previously been active in relatively free elections, were driven underground, and there began a process of repression which, while never drastic by the standards we should apply to governments in new nations—much less by those of Communist countries—nevertheless alienated increasing numbers of the all-too-small pool of trained men capable of helping to govern effectively.

Second, Hanoi went on the march. Seeing itself thwarted in both South Viet-Nam and Laos, Hanoi began to send trained guerrillas into the South and increasing cadres to assist the Communist Pathet Lao forces in Laos. In South Viet-Nam there had been from the start thousands of agents and many pockets

of Communist influence left behind in the division of Viet-Nam, and as early as 1957 a campaign of assassination of local officials had begun that tallies on the map almost exactly with the areas under strongest Communist control today. In 1959 such activity was stepped up, guerrilla units formed, and the real campaign got underway.

That campaign is sometimes referred to as a civil war. But let us not delude ourselves. Discontent there may have been, and local recruiting by the Viet Cong, largely through intimidation. But the whole campaign would never have been possible without the direction, personnel, key materiel, and total support coming from Hanoi, and without, too, the strong moral support, and key materiel when needed, provided by Peiping and, up to 1962 at least, by the Soviet Union. Thousands of highly trained men coming from the North, along with the crucial items of equipment and munitions—these have been from the start the main-spring of the Viet Cong insurgency. This has been all along a Communist subversive aggression, in total violation of the Geneva accords as well as general principles of international behavior.

Indeed the true nature of the struggle has been publicly stated many times by Hanoi itself, beginning with a 1960 Communist Party conference in North Viet-Nam which declared the policy of, as they put it, "liberating" the South.

By early 1961 South Viet-Nam was clearly in difficulty. President Johnson, then Vice President, visited the country in the spring, and we stepped up our military supplies and tried to turn our training emphasis increasingly to the guerrilla front. Then, in the fall of 1961, a series of key assassinations and raids on government centers brought South Vietnamese morale to a critical point. Something more was needed. President Kennedy considered and rejected the sending of United States combat units to fight the Viet Cong. Instead he responded to the request of the South Vietnamese Government for American military advisers with Vietnamese units, and for Americans to furnish helicopter and air transport lift, combat air

training, communications, and in short every possible form of assistance short of combat units.

But the military effort was and is only one aspect of the struggle. The economic front was equally important, and a smaller but extraordinarily dedicated group of civilian Americans went into the dangerous countryside, unarmed and often unescorted, to help in the creation of the fortified hamlets that soon became, and remain, a key feature of strategy, and to bring to the villages the schools, fertilizer, wells, pigs, and other improvements that meant so much and would serve to show the Government's concern for its people.

The basic strategy adopted in early 1962 was sound and was indeed in key respects the same as the strategy that prevailed against communism in Malaya, Greece, and the Philippines. It is a strategy that takes patience and local leadership, and that takes learning and experience as well. The Vietnamese and we are still learning and changing today, and will go on doing so.

But even as we recognized that the struggle must be won in the South, and continued to give every possible U.S. assistance to that end, it became clear in early 1965 that something more was needed. Attacks against the North, the source of the aggression, would all along have been justified as a basic measure of self-defense by the South Vietnamese Government and by our own Government acting at its request. By early February we were confronted with increased infiltration from the North and with a stepped-up pace of terror and hostile action that culminated in the attack on several American and South Vietnamese installations at Pleiku and elsewhere.

You all know the result. The President, acting at the request and urging of the South Vietnamese Government, directed that United States aircraft join with South Vietnamese aircraft in a campaign of measured and carefully directed attacks against military targets in North Viet-Nam. This was not a change of policy—it was a change in the measures taken to carry out policy, made necessary by the actions of the other

side, in order to show Hanoi, as well as our friends in the South, that we were prepared to see the struggle through so that South Viet-Nam would be free from external interference.

Myths on the South Viet-Nam Story

This is the simple basic story of what has happened in South Viet-Nam since 1954. Let me now turn to certain myths that have arisen concerning that story.

First, there is the question of the attitude of the South Vietnamese Government and ourselves toward the reunification of Viet-Nam through free elections. The 1954 Geneva accords had provided for free elections by secret ballot in 1956, and it has been alleged that the failure to proceed with these elections in some way justified Hanoi's action in resorting to military measures, first slowly and then by the stepped-up infiltration beginning in 1959 and 1960.

The facts are quite otherwise. The Eisenhower administration had fully supported the principle of free elections under international supervision, in Viet-Nam as in other situations where a country was divided, Korea and Germany.

A similar position was taken by President Diem of South Viet-Nam. For example, in January 1955 Diem made it clear to an American correspondent that:

The clauses providing for the 1956 elections are extremely vague. But at one point they are clear—in stipulating that the elections are to be free. Everything will now depend on how free elections are defined. The President said he would wait to see whether the conditions of freedom would exist in North Viet-Nam at the time scheduled for the elections. He asked what would be the good of an impartial counting of votes if the voting had been preceded in North Viet-Nam by the ruthless propaganda and terrorism on the part of a police state.

I do not think any of us would dissent from this description of what is required for free elections. And the simple fact is that, when the issue arose concretely in 1956, the regime in Hanoi—while it kept calling for elections in its propaganda—made no effort to respond to the call of the Soviet Union and Great Britain, as cochairmen of the 1954 Geneva conference, for the setting up of the

appropriate machinery for free elections.

The reason is not far to seek. For North Viet-Nam in 1956—and indeed today—is a Communist state and in 1956 North Viet-Nam was in deep trouble. Its own leaders admitted as much in their party congress in the fall of 1956 in a statement by General [Vo Nguyen] Giap referring to widespread terror, failure to respect the principles of faith and worship in the so-called land reform program, the use of torture as a normal practice, and a whole list of excesses which even the Communists had come to realize went too far.

So the answer is, I repeat, simple. There was no chance of free elections in North Viet-Nam in 1956. We shall wait to see whether there will ever be such a chance in the future.

Second, there is the myth that the Viet Cong movement has any significant relationship to the political opposition to President Diem. I have referred already to the unfortunate trends that developed after 1959 in President Diem's rule. There was unquestionably opposition to him within South Viet-Nam, and that opposition included many distinguished South Vietnamese, some of whom went into exile as a result. Others stayed in Saigon, and some were imprisoned.

But the point is this. The men who led the opposition to Diem are not today in the Viet Cong. On the contrary, the present Prime Minister, Dr. [Phan Huy] Quat, and his group of so-called Caravellistes, all of whom opposed Diem, are today the leaders of the Government. These men, and their followers, are nationalists and strongly anti-Communist; not one of them, of any significance, went over to the Viet Cong.

This brings me to the question of the so-called National Liberation Front, which is the political facade, made in Hanoi, for the Viet Cong movement. I doubt if any of you can name a single leader of the National Liberation Front. But these are faceless men installed by Hanoi to give the appearance of bourgeois and truly South Vietnamese support for the operation.

Lest you think I exaggerate, I refer you to the excellent recent account by Georges Chaffard, a French correspondent for *L'Express* in Paris, who recently visited the Viet Cong and interviewed some of its "leaders." Chaffard describes vividly what these men are, including their strong desire to find a replacement for the obscure lawyer named Tho who is the titular head of the front and who apparently is the only figure Hanoi can find who was even in Saigon or participating in South Vietnamese political life during the latter Diem period. Chaffard's conclusion, which I quote, is that:

The Front for National Liberation structure is the classic structure of a "National Front" before the taking over of power by the Communists.

So there should be no doubt of the true nature of the Viet Cong and its Liberation Front, or that they are a completely different movement from the political opposition to Diem. As to the latter, and its present emergence into a truly nationalistic amalgam of forces—regional, religious, military, and civilian—I can perhaps best refer you to the excellent lead article by Mr. George Carver, an American with long experience in Saigon, in the April issue of *Foreign Affairs*. Mr. Carver tells a fascinating story of the emergence of these new nationalistic forces in South Viet-Nam, with all their difficulties and weaknesses, but with the fundamental and overriding fact that they are the true new voice of South Viet-Nam and that they have never had anything to do with the Viet Cong.

The Stakes in South Viet-Nam

The face of war in the 1960's is not the one familiar to most Americans. It does not have the countenance that rallied millions of Americans and our allies in defense of ideals and freedom in World Wars I and II, and in the Korean War. In those conflicts, the attackers—the enemy—were easily identifiable; they had openly crossed marked frontiers in violation of international agreements, and committed other overt hostile actions.

This was the case as recently as the early

1950's, when the Communists tried to conquer South Korea by direct aggression. They sent North Korean—and later Chinese Communist—troops pouring across the South Korean boundary line in a brazen attempt to seize that country. It took a United Nations Command—in which we played by far the greatest outside role—3 years to convince the Communists that such aggression could not succeed. It was an important lesson for the Communists—and a necessary but costly experience for us: The United States suffered more than 157,000 casualties in Korea, and our direct expenses for the war amounted to at least \$18 billion.

In retrospect, our action in Korea reflected three elements:

First, a recognition that aggression of any sort must be met early and head on or it will have to be met later and in tougher circumstances. We had relearned the lessons of the 1930's—Manchuria, Ethiopia, the Rhineland, Czechoslovakia.

Second, a recognition that a defense line in Asia, stated in terms of an island perimeter, did not adequately define our vital interests—that those vital interests could be affected by action in Asia itself.

Finally, it reflected an understanding that, for the future, a power vacuum was an open invitation to aggression, that there must be local political, economic, and military strength in being to make aggression unprofitable, but also that there must be a demonstrated willingness of major external power to assist if required.

The Korean War also had an important message for the Communists—and as a result we may have seen the last of the old classical war of open invasions. Korea proved to the Communists that they had to find a more effective strategy of conquest. They chose to refine a technique that they had used on a primitive scale and to their ultimate defeat in Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines. I am referring to the so-called "war of national liberation." This is the label Khrushchev employed in 1961 to describe Communist strategy for the future—aggression directed and supplied from outside a

nation, but disguised in nationalist trappings so that it might pass as an indigenous insurrection.

There is no denying that it is a clever strategy. The great bulk of the world's people are sympathetic to any genuine revolutionary struggle by an oppressed people against their oppressors. Just revolutions are appealing to us as Americans—for, after all, America represents the first great democratic revolution. Thus any rebellious movement that can be cloaked to appear bona fide—to represent a real quest for freedom and self-determination—has every chance of attracting wide support from peoples everywhere.

The Communists have expanded upon their "wars of liberation" technique. Africa and Latin America are already feeling the threat of such thrusts. But by far the most highly sophisticated and ambitious attempt at such aggression by the Communists is taking place today in Viet-Nam.

We recognize this "war of liberation" in Viet-Nam for what it is—a war designed to destroy the freedom of a neighboring state—and we intend to meet that threat, as we have met other less concealed aggressions for more than a generation.

In his Baltimore speech on April 7 President Johnson summed up the threat with these words:

The confused nature of this conflict cannot mask the fact that it is the new face of an old enemy.

Free nations, then, must determine the real source of these veiled aggressions—and take actions to defend themselves accordingly. In Viet-Nam this has meant ending the privileged sanctuary heretofore afforded North Viet-Nam—the clear source of the Viet Cong movement.

The "wars of liberation" strategy is at this time an essential element of the expansionist policy of Communist China and her Asian ally, North Viet-Nam. If we allow it to succeed in Viet-Nam, we would be confirming Peiping's assertion that armed struggle is a more productive Communist course than Moscow's doctrine of peaceful coexistence. "Wars of national liberation" would

most certainly spread. Red China has already identified Thailand as the next target for a so-called "liberation struggle," and its Foreign Minister Chen Yi has promised that it will be launched before the end of this year.

The major test to date of this new Communist strategy is taking place today in Viet-Nam. Even the Asian Communists have acknowledged the larger implications of this confrontation. Not long ago General Giap, the well-known leader of North Viet-Nam's army, declared that,

South Viet-Nam is the model of the national liberation movement of our time. . . . If the special warfare that the U.S. imperialists are testing in South Viet-Nam is overcome, then it can be defeated everywhere in the world.

In another recent comment, North Viet-Nam's Premier Pham Van Dong said that:

The experience of our compatriots in South Viet-Nam attracts the attention of the world, especially the peoples of *South America*.

The *People's Daily*, Peiping's official newspaper, echoed those statements in an editorial on May Day this year. It said:

The Vietnamese people's struggle against U.S. imperialism has become the focal point of the international class struggle at this moment. This is an acid test for all political forces in the world.

Our firm posture in Viet-Nam, then, seeks peace and security in three related dimensions: for South Viet-Nam, for the sake of Southeast Asia's independence and security generally, and for the other small nations everywhere that would face the same kind of subversive threat from without if the Communists were to succeed in Viet-Nam. We seek no military bases or special position in Viet-Nam or elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Our simple purpose is to help free people maintain themselves.

These are our objectives. As the President has made clear, we are prepared at any time for unconditional discussions that could lead to an honorable settlement that would remove the threat of external interference from South Viet-Nam. Equally, he has made clear our readiness to play a major part in plans for the development of the whole of Southeast Asia, including North Viet-Nam, in conditions of peace. But alongside our

readiness for discussions and to participate in development there must always be the crucial factor of our continued determination to take the necessary actions, no more and no less, to bring the Communist side to the realization that the South Viet-Nam of the future, and Southeast Asia as a whole, must remain free to work out their own destinies.

Mr. McNamara Reports on Use of Supplemental Appropriation

White House press release dated May 18

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

President Johnson on May 18 released the following memorandum from Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara describing the manner in which the \$700 million emergency supplemental appropriation for Southeast Asia will be spent.¹ In releasing the memorandum, the President said:

As I have stated on numerous occasions, the entire resources of the Federal Government are available to assist our men in South Viet-Nam. Our soldiers, sailors, and airmen have a blank check for the equipment they need to assist the South Vietnamese. We seek no wider war, but so long as American men are in South Viet-Nam, they shall have the very best support that this country can give them. The speedy action by the Congress on this appropriation is a testament to the support our men have from the American people.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You asked the Congress on May 4 to appropriate an additional \$700 million to meet mounting military requirements in Vietnam. Two days later Congress passed and sent you an additional appropriation for that amount as an emergency fund for Southeast Asia.

When you approved this appropriation on May 7, you said, "This money will be spent for arms, for weapons of war, for helicopters, for ammunition,

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of May 24, 1965, p. 816.

for planes, not because we want war but because the aggressors have made them necessary."²

During the last four years we have substantially increased our stocks of ammunition and other war consumables and the number of our tactical aircraft and helicopters to insure that our forces could be supported in combat for sustained periods of time. Since 1961 we have:

—Increased the number of tactical fighter squadrons by 44%

—Increased the number of combat helicopters by 45%

—Increased the bomb carrying capability of our tactical aircraft by 95%

—Increased by 500% the number of sorties which our tactical fighters can fly with the modern ammunition in our inventories.

While our inventory for combat consumables, tactical aircraft and helicopters has been substantially increased, as the House Committee on Appropriations said on May 5 in reporting out the \$700 million supplemental appropriation favorably, "a position of plenty—militarily—is to be desired in the light of world conditions."

To provide added insurance for our forces in Vietnam and to assure that we continue our "position of plenty", we intend to allocate the \$700 million as follows:

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Total
Procurement of Ammunition & Ordnance	\$117.9	\$135.9	\$115.0	\$368.8
Operation & Maintenance Expenses	46.6	56.2	49.8	152.6
Military Construction Projects	44.8	22.0	41.0	107.8
Procurement of Aircraft	8.7	32.0	14.0	54.7
Other Operating Items	—	4.9	11.2	16.1
Total	\$218.0	\$251.0	\$231.0	\$700.0

Procurement of Ammunition and Ordnance—\$368.8 Million. Although the consumption rate of combat supplies in Vietnam is still quite small in relation to our current inventories and to projected deliveries from future production, we believe it is prudent at this time to replace the stocks now being consumed in order to ensure that the planned build-up of our war reserve inventories continues. Accordingly, the \$368.8 million will be allocated to the procurement of those ammunition and ordnance items which are being consumed in Vietnam. Included in this category are 2.75 air-to-ground rockets, 7.62 mm and 20 mm cartridges, a variety of modern, aircraft-delivered bombs, aircraft flares and other illuminating devices, bomb racks, gun pods and ordnance handling equipment.

² *Ibid.*, p. 825.

Operations and Maintenance Expenses—\$152.6 Million. This money will be used to defray the costs of moving U.S. forces and their equipment and supplies to Vietnam and to support the increased overhaul and maintenance loads (including the procurement of additional spare parts) growing out of the more intensive use of and combat damage to aircraft and other equipment employed in Vietnam.

Military Construction Projects—\$107.8 Million. This money will be devoted to the construction of additional facilities required to support the expansion of U.S. military forces in Southeast Asia and to protect our men and equipment there. Facilities must be provided for the growing number of U.S. military personnel in that area and warehouses, shops and repair facilities must be constructed for the supplies and equipment. Port facilities and airfields must be improved to accommodate the increased flow of materiel and the growing number of combat aircraft. Additional petroleum storage, transportation and dispensing facilities must be provided for the increased inventories of aircraft and the higher levels of operations. This money will also be used to construct hospitals to serve our men in South Vietnam.

Procurement of Aircraft—\$54.7 Million. Aircraft attrition rates in Southeast Asia have been lower than the attrition rates during World War II and the Korean conflict and they are quite modest when compared with current inventories and production rates. Nevertheless, it would be prudent at this time to make the necessary preparations for higher production rates of selected aircraft should such production rates be required in the future. Accordingly, \$54.7 million will be utilized for the procurement of long lead-time components for such aircraft as the UH-1B helicopter, the F-4 fighter/bomber and the TA-4E fighter/bomber. The TA-4E aircraft are being procured to replace the A-4Es now being used by the Navy for training purposes. The acceleration of this program would release additional A-4Es for South Vietnam, if such aircraft are needed there.

Other Operating Items—\$16.1 Million. The balance of the \$700 million—\$16.1 million—is required for a variety of other operating items, including some small, fast patrol boats, special tropical gear, communications equipment, etc.

The allocation of the \$700 million as I have described will, in my judgment, fully meet our essential short-range needs. Nevertheless as you noted in your message to the Congress on May 4, no one can guarantee that "this will be the last request."³ I will continue to keep the situation in Vietnam under constant review and I will advise you of any additional needs in funds or equipment

as soon as such needs arise. As you know, we have given our forces in South Vietnam first call on any of the resources of the Department of Defense.

ROBERT S. McNAMARA

Memorial to President Kennedy at Runnymede

Remarks by Secretary Rusk¹

Your presence here, Your Majesty, Your Royal Highness—

This nation, Mr. Prime Minister, which has nurtured freedom for so many in so many parts of the world—

The British people, Mr. Macmillan, Lord Harlech, who have generously joined their affection and their resources to give life to the Kennedy Memorial Trust—

This quiet and lovely Runnymede, the field of the Great Charter, which began to lay the hand of "the law of the land" upon the exercise of power—

The extraordinary, incandescant man, Mrs. Kennedy, whom we honor here today—

All these make this an unforgettable moment for us and for those we represent.

President Johnson has asked me to exercise personally, on his and our nation's behalf, my statutory privilege of accepting this acre of land. I do so with the joy, and the sadness, which shall forever mark those of us who served with John Fitzgerald Kennedy.

When the American people learned about this tribute to our beloved late President, we were deeply moved—not only because you decided to share with us this Runnymede, which is a common and precious symbol, but also because what you have done reflects so sensitive an understanding of John F. Kennedy himself.

No one of us more than he searched out the best of our past as a guide to present

¹ Made at Runnymede, England, on May 14 at the dedication of a British memorial to President Kennedy.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 822.

commitment and to future action. He would have been the first to recall—

—that his own Massachusetts, in 1641, adopted a “Body of Liberties” in response to a need for what John Winthrop called a fundamental law “in resemblance to a Magna Carta.”

—that the lineage of our common liberties runs through the Petition of Right, the Habeas Corpus Act, your Bill of Rights of 1689, and our own Bill of Rights in the Federal Constitution.

—and that there is unfinished business in the endless struggle for human dignity and freedom, at home and abroad.

No one of us more than he was concerned for the future. You have generously provided fellowship opportunities for young men and women to enlarge their capacity to build that decent future which was his passionate concern.

The words you have inscribed on this tablet express not only the deepest resolve of John F. Kennedy but the abiding commitment of the American people:²

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.

We know, because you have proved it on many crucial occasions, that this is also the abiding commitment of the British people.

On behalf of President Johnson and the American people, I thank Your Majesty, your Government, and your people. We shall cherish this memorial to a President who shall be forever young. “At the going down of the sun and in the morning” we shall remember him. And we draw strength and confidence from the knowledge that all who pass this way shall be reminded of the common dedication of the British and American peoples to the cause of human liberty—a reminder which has its roots here in seven and a half centuries and its promise through all time to come.

Thank you, Your Majesty, Mrs. Kennedy.

² For text of President Kennedy’s inaugural address, see BULLETIN of Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.

Tenth Anniversary of Signing of Austrian State Treaty

*Remarks by Secretary Rusk*¹

Mr. Chancellor, Mr. Vice Chancellor, Members of the Federal Government, Members of the Federal Parliament, distinguished guests:

It is a genuine pleasure to be with you here today and to join my colleagues, the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France, in commemorating with you the 10th anniversary of the signing of the State Treaty for the Reestablishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria.² Before I left Washington, President Johnson asked me to convey a message to Chancellor [Josef] Klaus and to the Austrian people on this important occasion. This is the President’s message:

On this, the Tenth Anniversary of the signing of the treaty which restored Austria’s independence, the American people join with me in extending to you and your countrymen our very best wishes. We recall with deep admiration the courage of the people of Austria during the long years of foreign occupation and their unwavering determination to regain their freedom.

In the ten years since Austria rejoined the community of free and sovereign nations, the Austrian Government and the Austrian people have demonstrated time and again their dedication to democratic principles, their determination to protect their freedom and their devotion to peace. Indeed, in the pursuit of these goals, Austria has served as an inspiration to freedom-loving peoples everywhere.

We Americans not only look back with pride at our part in helping the Austrian people regain their freedom; we also look to the future with full confidence that the democratic and humanitarian ideals which bind our two peoples together will continue to serve as a solid foundation for close and friendly relations between Austria and the United States.

When my distinguished predecessor, the late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, returned from Vienna 10 years ago, he described to the American people in a nationwide television broadcast the tremendous joy of the Austrian people at the prospect of

¹ Made at Vienna, Austria, on May 15.

² For text, see BULLETIN of June 6, 1955, p. 916.

regaining their freedom. It was an experience, he said, which he would never forget. His heart was warmed by the thought that the United States had been able to contribute to the spirit of happiness which the Austrian people felt on that historic day.

The conclusion of the State Treaty was above all an achievement of the Austrian people and their farsighted and courageous leaders.

It is sad to reflect today that so many of the Second Republic's distinguished statesmen and patriots, who never for a moment lost the vision of an independent Austria, are no longer with us. The names of Karl Renner, Julius Raab, Theodor Koerner, Adolf Schaerf, and Leopold Figl will long be honored for their role in bringing that vision to a reality. Our hearts are especially heavy today at the recent death of Leopold Figl, who, as Federal Chancellor from 1945 to 1953 and Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1953 to 1959, inspired his colleagues and countrymen with his own resolute purpose and unflagging courage in the cause of Austria's independence.

When 10 years ago today in this very room Leopold Figl affixed his signature to the State Treaty, the world witnessed an outstanding success for sound principles pursued with firmness and determination. These principles are set forth in the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter. They envisage a decent world order—a world of independent nations, each free to choose its own institutions, but cooperating with others—a world in which nations respect the rights of their neighbors and in which international disputes are settled by peaceful means—a world subject to the rule of law.

The Austrian State Treaty was a major

success in resolving difficult problems arising from World War II. As we commemorate that achievement today, it is my earnest hope that our common efforts in seeking solutions to other significant international problems will be marked with equal success.

During the 10 years that have passed since the signing of the State Treaty, Austria has made a proud record. While fully honoring her international obligations under the treaty and scrupulously adhering to the policy of neutrality which she adopted in October 1955, Austria has not hesitated to follow an independent and positive foreign policy in the interests of international justice and peace.

Especially noteworthy in this regard have been Austria's active participation in the United Nations, its contributions to the work of the United Nations special committees, and its cooperation with other United Nations members in humanitarian and peacekeeping activities in various parts of the world.

Austria's success in following this course of dynamic neutrality has been a source of great satisfaction to the Government and people of the United States. It shows that the Government and people of Austria recognize that freedom and independence are blessings not only to be cherished and defended by those who possess them, but that they involve serious moral responsibilities toward others. We Americans share these views. That is why President Johnson has said that where men stand up for their own freedom, we will stand with them; where men strive for a better life for their children, we will strive with them; and where men are ready to seek sincerely after peace, we welcome them to join with us in its pursuit.

Prospects of Law in a World of Conflict

by Leonard C. Meeker
*Acting Legal Adviser*¹

Observance of Law Day in San Francisco this year has a special meaning and significance, a particular appropriateness for all who care about developing law to govern the community of nations. It was just 20 years ago at this time when the United Nations Conference on International Organization was meeting here in San Francisco to hammer out the essentials of a new world order. From these efforts came the charter and the founding of the United Nations. The events of 1945 constituted a landmark in man's efforts to create a world of order and law.

If we are struck today by the existence of international discord and open conflict in the world, we should reflect for a moment on the change in intellectual climate which has been occurring even in our own time. Intellectual climate is important. While it may not govern the events of today, it creates the premises and assumptions of tomorrow and forms the matrix for next year's decisions and actions.

Until World War I had become history, it was commonly accepted that war was an instrument of national policy, as the Kellogg-Briand Pact described this view, or "an extension of policy by other means," as Clausewitz wrote in the 19th century. It was the Great War of 1914-1918 that brought home a terrible awareness of the deadly ma-

chine that modern warfare is. Captain Wilfred Owen wrote in France, not long before he was killed on the Western Front, that the war "slew . . . half the seed of Europe, one by one." It took this terrible slaughter to instill in the international community the beginnings of a firm belief that war should be regarded as unlawful, except in self-defense or comparable special circumstances.

The countries of the world sought to translate these ideas into reality through the formation of the League of Nations. This organization—the legacy of President Wilson's active and inventive mind—may seem primitive by the standards of judgment that are current today. Some nations withdrew from the League. Others gave it less than wholehearted support. And the United States withheld its participation altogether. The League of Nations failed in the 1930's, and World War II broke out both in Asia and Europe. Once more, aggressor nations sought to profit from the disorganization of the world community. It is worth recalling now that one of the offenses successfully prosecuted at Nürnberg was the waging of aggressive war.

The United Nations Charter

When the conference met in San Francisco 20 years ago, the delegates began the text of the new charter with these words:

We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind. . . .

¹ Address made at the Law Day—U.S.A. luncheon of the Bar Association of San Francisco at San Francisco, Calif., on Apr. 29 (press release 93). The Senate on May 17 confirmed the nomination of Mr. Meeker to be Legal Adviser of the Department of State.

The belief that war is not an acceptable means of gaining national ends, and of settling international differences, was accompanied by another and related belief. I refer to the growing conviction—expressed in the provisions of the San Francisco charter of 1945—that armed force can be used most responsibly if decisions regarding its use are made collectively and in accordance with agreed procedures.

The scheme of the United Nations Charter, as originally thought out, was not complicated. The charter stated a basic rule that members "shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." To give effect to the law of the charter, primary responsibility was conferred upon the Security Council to take action for keeping the peace. The Council was to have at its disposal armed forces provided by the member states in agreement with the Council.

Residual responsibilities for peacekeeping were given by the charter to the General Assembly and to regional organizations.

Finally, article 51 preserved the customary right of individual or collective self-defense in case of armed attack.

As all of us know, the original plan of the United Nations never functioned as it was intended for so much as a single day. The Security Council never had at its disposal any armed forces provided by the member countries, and the numerous vetoes cast by the Soviet Union quickly made clear that the Council would not be able to function effectively in the area of its primary responsibility.

What has happened in the intervening years is that the members of the United Nations have adapted the processes of the organization to cope as best they could with the conflicts and crises that have beset the world. The record of United Nations peacekeeping operations is a remarkable one. It began with Iran in 1946 and runs through Greece, Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, Korea, Trieste, Suez, Lebanon, Laos, Congo, West

New Guinea, Yemen, and, most recently, Cyprus.

In some cases sufficient agreement was attainable in the Security Council so that the Council could reach decisions and make them effective on the disputing countries so as to avoid a breakdown of peace and resort to force. At the time of the Communist invasion in Korea in 1950, the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council. This enabled the Council to function effectively during a crucial initial period when the political resources of the United Nations could be marshaled for the defense of the Republic of Korea.

When the Soviet boycott ended and it became apparent that the Council would again be paralyzed by Soviet vetoes, the General Assembly adopted a resolution confirming its residual powers for the maintenance of peace and security and specifying procedures for Assembly action in case of need. It was under this authority, and through the action of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General, that the United Nations was able to end the hostility in the Middle East at the time of Suez and place a United Nations Emergency Force in the field to maintain the armistice. The same powers were drawn upon by the Assembly again later in the case of the Congo, when Soviet obstruction once more rendered the Security Council ineffective.

In looking back, we see that the presence of a United Nations Commission in Korea and a series of timely actions by political organs of the United Nations made a substantial and perhaps indispensable contribution to the defense of the Republic of Korea against the Communist invasion.

In the Middle East, United Nations observers, armistice commissions, and organized forces in the field have, by and large, been keeping the peace for 17 years.

It was a comprehensive United Nations effort, including United Nations forces, that provided the Republic of the Congo with much-needed assistance during a crucial period between 1960 and 1964. The United Nations presence there prevented the Congo from becoming a battleground of contending

external powers and gave the newly created Republic a fair chance to get started on its course. We all know the very great difficulties experienced by the Congo during the last 9 or 10 months. At present there is good reason to hope that continuing progress can be made in building a free, stable and progressive country.

U.N. Financial and Constitutional Crisis

But the history of the United Nations as a world effort to create international order on a basis of law does not end with the Congo. We must follow it further into a later and still current chapter. I am referring to the present financial and constitutional crisis of the organization.

This crisis stems from the two major peacekeeping operations which the United Nations has mounted in the last 10 years: the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and the United Nations Operation in the Congo. Financing these two operations put a heavy burden on the organization. The costs of these two peacekeeping enterprises were greater than all the rest of the United Nations budget.

The General Assembly, exercising its budgetary authority under the charter, assessed these costs against the whole membership. Some of the members did not pay their peacekeeping assessments and questioned whether they were legally liable for them. When faced with this situation and the prospect of mounting debts, the Assembly asked the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion as to whether the peacekeeping assessments were binding obligations of the members.

It is not often that an international question emerges as a clear legal issue capable of being put before a court, and where the countries concerned decide that they want the issue adjudicated. Even today the Court at The Hague subsists on a remarkably thin docket.

In 1962 the International Court ruled that the peacekeeping assessments *were* obligatory. An opinion in a case like this is, by definition, advisory only. But, in the instance

of the peacekeeping expenses, the General Assembly voted to *accept* the opinion of the Court. Thus, the law of the case, as found by the Court, was also affirmed as the policy of the Assembly.

In the case of many United Nations members the Court's opinion had the desired effect. Almost 30 countries which had previously paid nothing on their Middle East and Congo assessments now proceeded to make payments. But the success was not universal, and several states—most notably the Soviet Union and France—continued to refuse to pay.

The United Nations Charter contains a sanction for continued nonpayment by a member of its financial obligations. Under article 19 a member state loses its vote in the General Assembly if its arrears equal the amount of contributions due from it for the preceding 2 years. By 1964 the U.S.S.R. and several of the bloc countries had come within the reach of this loss-of-vote provision.

The General Assembly, originally scheduled to meet in September of last year, was twice postponed and opened only on December 1. The session commenced pursuant to an understanding that there would be no voting. While there was debate, virtually no business was transacted and the Assembly limped along, with numerous postponements, for the next 3 months. Various efforts during this period to find a solution to the impasse proved unsuccessful. The Assembly adjourned at a stalemate.

The membership was evidently unwilling to impose the loss-of-vote sanction on the delinquent members. But, at the same time, the Assembly was unwilling to disregard the provisions of the charter and thus refrained from transacting normal business that entails voting.

This state of affairs has meant a paralysis of the General Assembly. The Assembly has not been able to exercise its responsibilities. If during the last year the General Assembly had been called upon to play a role in relation to any serious situation involving world peace, it might have proved unable to act. This is obviously an unsatis-

factory, and indeed a hazardous, condition from the standpoint of world peace and security. It is often said that the United Nations is indispensable, but this statement will count for little unless the organization is able to function.

Further negotiating efforts are now in progress, and it is to be hoped that some solution to the crisis will be found—a solution that will enable the Assembly to resume its proper functioning, while having appropriate regard for the relevant dispositions of the United Nations Charter.

Regional Organizations

I have been speaking about the role played by political organs of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace, in giving application to the law—the rules of conduct set forth in the charter. We have seen the historical limitations on the ability of these organs to bring about law observance in the world. The veto can frustrate action by the Security Council. A financial and constitutional crisis can paralyze the General Assembly.

However, world law does not end with the ability of the United Nations bodies to apply it. Regional organizations may be called upon to play a part. In the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 the Organization of American States voted under the Rio Treaty to recommend that measures be taken to bring about the removal of Soviet strategic missiles from Cuba and to insure against their reintroduction. Thus the United States instituted a defensive quarantine of Cuba at that time with the authorization of the regional organization in this hemisphere.

Individual Responsibilities of Nations

To carry the analysis further, it should be recognized that application of international law to questions of peace and security is not the exclusive preserve of international organizations, whether worldwide or regional. In the absence of any action by an international organization, it may fall to individual nations to take steps on their own in defense of international rights.

The United States is deeply engaged today in the defense of the Republic of Viet-Nam against armed aggression from North Viet-Nam. This war in Southeast Asia is a different kind of conflict from that which occurred in Korea. Instead of massed armies invading across a border and carrying on warfare in a defined theater of operations, armed personnel and quantities of military equipment have been infiltrated into South Viet-Nam from the North. The aggressors are waging a war of terror, ambush, and brutality.

United States participation in this conflict is at the request of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam. South Viet-Nam and the United States are engaged in collective self-defense against an attack planned and mounted from Hanoi.

As President Johnson said at Baltimore on April 7, our objective in this conflict is a South Viet-Nam “securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others—free from outside interference—tied to no alliance—a military base for no other country. These are the essentials of any final settlement.”²

Some commentators have leveled criticism against the United States for its part in the Viet-Nam conflict. Complaint has been made that we have not relied upon United Nations processes for dealing with the situation in Southeast Asia. It seems evident enough that the United Nations has not been in any position to assume responsibility for restoring international peace and security in that area.

But, putting aside this very practical consideration, I would call attention to the provision in the United Nations Charter expressly stating that nothing in the present charter shall impair the right of individual or collective self-defense against armed attack. The charter does not require that the victim of an armed attack, and all other states, should refrain from measures of defense until an international organization acts to respond to the situation. The charter preserves the inherent right of self-defense and

² For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

recognizes the right of other countries to join in defense against an attack.

The obligation imposed by the charter in such circumstances is that measures taken in exercise of the right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Secretary-General. I would recall here that the United States made just such a report last August after the Gulf of Tonkin attacks on United States destroyers and the subsequent air strikes on bases in North Viet-Nam.³ The United States Government again reported to the Security Council the measures it began to take in February 1965.⁴

Some have asked why the United States is engaged in a military conflict half way around the world and whether our involvement can possibly help in promoting the growth of law. President Johnson, in discussing the reasons for United States action, has said: ⁵

Let no one think for a moment that retreat from Viet-Nam would bring an end to conflict. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next.

It was important that aggression in Korea should not succeed. It is of equal importance that aggression in the guise of a "war of national liberation" shall not succeed in Viet-Nam. To turn back aggression in Viet-Nam will help to make other countries and peoples more secure. This is a part of the effort that must be made if there is to be a world order under law, within which nations can work out their destinies free from the interference of external force.

I have devoted a good deal of attention to efforts of the world community at developing and applying law so as to control the use of armed force and keep the peace among nations. This is an area of maximum difficulty in the field of international law. The conflicts are sharpest. The departures from international standards are most striking. Large events in the politicomilitary

arena are most threatening to the fabric of such peace and order as the world knows.

It would be a mistake to think of events in this area as representative of the whole field of world law. We may be inclined to overlook entirely the fact that every day countries all around the globe conform their conduct, in countless respects, to the requirements of international law.

They do this in their bilateral relations—in matters of diplomatic immunity, commercial agreements, tax treaties, and countless others. Countries abide by the law that is established in many multilateral treaties—on trade, the law of the sea, civil aviation, copyrights, to mention just a few such treaties. Countries also live by the law through their regular and loyal participation in numerous multilateral organizations—the International Labor Organization, the World Health Organization, the Universal Postal Union, and many others.

A distinguishing feature of all these instances of the living effectiveness of international law is the virtual absence of any machinery for enforcement. Lack of an international sheriff has often been pointed to as a weakness, perhaps a fatal weakness, of the international order. In thinking about this, we would do well to remember that even in the United States—where our legal system is highly developed and where elaborate means of enforcement are provided—the rule of law is effective and successful only as it rests upon agreement within our society that the law is just and should be followed. There are not enough jails, not enough policemen, not enough courts, to enforce laws that are not supported by a popular consensus.

On the international level it has been possible to work out a consensus in many areas of common interest. In the nuclear age countries around the world have come to recognize and acknowledge their common interest in controlling the arms race. It was this common interest which made possible the limited nuclear test ban treaty of 1963. Today 79 countries have joined in this first concerted action to limit and turn back the arms race. It is the policy of the United

³ *Ibid.*, Aug. 24, 1964, p. 272.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Mar. 22, 1965, p. 419.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

States to continue and enlarge the efforts at international arms control.

The experience of history gives us cause to hope that the common interest in peace will come to be ever more widely shared. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson said in Boston just a week ago: *

As Russia advances, its aggressions lessen. One day, the Chinese, too, may settle for bourgeois peace.

A world order based on law is necessary for the survival of civilization and life on this planet as we know it. Just as nations have cooperated because of common interest in trade, they are likely increasingly to cooperate in matters of international peace and security. The problems of world politics may seem more intractable than those of economics, but they are not insoluble.

We may expect that the consensus among nations will widen—as to the subjects of common interest, and including an increasing number of countries around the world. It is reasonable to look forward to more international cooperation and to a world order in which law plays an ever greater part.

Foreign Policy Conference To Be Held at Pittsburgh

Press release 123 dated May 21

The Department of State will hold a regional foreign policy conference at Pittsburgh on June 17, cosponsored by the World Affairs Council of Pittsburgh and the World Trade Council of the Chamber of Commerce of Greater Pittsburgh. Over 40 community organizations are cooperating in the conference.

Invitations will be extended to business and community leaders, representatives of national nongovernmental organizations, and members of the press, radio, and television from the western portions of New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, eastern Ohio, and West Virginia.

* For text of an address made by Ambassador Stevenson at the dedication of the Prudential Center at Boston, Mass., on Apr. 20, see U.S./U.N. press release 4527 dated Apr. 19.

The purpose of the meeting is to bring together citizen leaders and media representatives with government officials responsible for formulating and carrying out foreign policy.

Government officials now scheduled to participate in the conference include George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State; Charles W. Yost, Deputy U. S. Representative to the United Nations; Charlotte Moton Hubbard, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs; John M. Cabot, U.S. Ambassador to Poland; and Peter Solbert, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

East-West Center Review Board Holds First Meeting

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Department of State announced on May 12 (press release 110) that the members of the National Review Board for the East-West Center, Hawaii, would be sworn in and would hold their first meeting at the Department of State on May 13 and 14.

The 10-member board was appointed in February¹ to represent the national interest in the Center and advise the Secretary of State on its operations. Gov. John A. Burns, of Hawaii, is chairman.

Located at Honolulu, the Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West was established to promote understanding among the peoples of Asia, the Pacific area, and the United States. It is a meeting ground for some 600 graduate students annually, 300 technicians, and a smaller group of advanced scholars from 25 countries ringing the Pacific basin.

Members of the National Review Board, in addition to Governor Burns, are: Hugh Borton, president, Haverford College; Hung Wo Ching, president, Aloha Airlines, Honolulu; Francis Keppel, U.S. Commissioner

¹ BULLETIN of Mar. 15, 1965, p. 383.

of Education; Roy E. Larsen, chairman, executive committee, Time, Inc.; Mrs. Mary Lasker, president, Albert and Mary Lasker Foundation, Inc.; Laurence J. McGinley, former president, Fordham University; Harry C. McPherson, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs; Otto N. Miller, president, Standard Oil Company of California; and Logan Wilson, president, American Council on Education.

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON ²

Members of the Congress, members of the Board, ladies and gentlemen: We hear of wars and rumors of wars, but too often the clod and steady work of achieving peace goes unnoticed in this world in which we live.

Yet to me and to this country there is nothing that really matters more than working toward peace, trying as best we can to replace strife and suspicion with respect and with understanding between men.

So it is a very special, personal pleasure for me to come here and meet with you distinguished people this evening, who are working so hard, so long, to create understanding—better understanding—in the world.

It was more than 5 years ago, when I was in the Senate, that I sponsored the legislation which established the East-West Center. This is almost a holiday anniversary of when I made the speech on May 9, 1961, and dedicated the Center in Honolulu. I said at that time, and I want to quote:

The ultimate defense of freedom lies not in weapons systems nor in the implements of arms. These we must maintain. But freedom's surest defense, and freedom's greatest force, is the enlightenment of the minds of all of the people. Arms can never make us invulnerable, nor our enemies invincible, but the support that we give to education can make freedom irresistible.

The East-West Center is helping to prove the truth of that statement every day. After only 4 years of operation it has already sent young men and young women back to their homelands equipped with new knowledge to

aid in the development of their nation.

More than 1,500 scholars, trainees, senior specialists from throughout Asia, and the Pacific, and the United States have benefited from this program and have profited from its conferences.

Hundreds of persons from East to West have worked together at the Center to share and to exchange and to enlarge their knowledge. And we, of this great land of ours, are privileged to be part of and to be close to both the West and the East—the Atlantic and the Pacific. While our ties are old and many with the Atlantic world, Americans have always had an interest and an appreciation and a very great aspiration for the peoples of the lands of the Pacific.

Only 4 years ago this week, I was visiting in those lands of Southeast Asia and I was going down their highways and byways and their streets, visiting as Vice President. There was danger then as there is danger now, but I came away then greatly inspired by the people and by their faith.

In all that I do here now, and in all that we do as a great nation, I pray that we may work with those peoples, that we may be able somehow, someday, to help them a little bit to realize their dreams of peace, and prosperity, and freedom.

Our languages may differ, our cultures do vary, but I hold to the belief that East and West share a common destiny and that destiny is freedom.

So I welcome this chance this evening to meet with these distinguished members of the National Review Board to discuss the Center's future.

I want to especially thank Congressman [John J.] Rooney and Governor Burns, both of whom have been my friends throughout the years, whose interests and whose energy have helped to build and to sustain this great East-West Center.

I want to thank all the Members of the Congress, of both parties, who worked so valiantly and so dedicatedly to help us bring the Center into fruition.

In a world of danger and potential destruction, all of you, particularly the mem-

² Made at the White House on May 13 (White House press release).

bers of this Board and the Members of the Congress here this evening, are contributing to a most noble work.

Earlier in the day I gave my views on some of the things we have done to make life better and happier for the people of that area of the world.³ In the days to come I hope that it will be our constant goal and always our determined view that what we have must be shared with others so that all of us can live in a world ultimately of peace, of friendship, and of a reasonable and decent standard of living for all humankind, wherever you live, whatever its religion, whatever the color of its skin, in whatever area of the world they may exist.

So thank you very much for coming here. Please pardon me for delaying you.

U.S. Citizens in India May Buy Counterpart Currency

Press release 119 dated May 20

The Department of State and the Treasury Department announced on May 20 that the American Embassy at New Delhi and the American consulates at Madras, Calcutta, and Bombay, India, have been authorized to sell to American citizens Indian rupees received by the United States from the sale of surplus agricultural commodities.

To insure that maximum use of U.S.-owned foreign currency is made for the benefit of the U.S. balance of payments, the President recently ordered a government-wide reexamination of foreign currency utilization. In support of this effort American tourists are encouraged to purchase their local currency needs from U.S. sources in countries where such sales are authorized.

³ BULLETIN of May 31, 1965, p. 838.

By buying their local currency needs at the respective embassies or consulates in these countries, American citizens are in effect keeping their dollars at home and are assisting the U.S. balance of payments.

The initiation of Indian rupee sales to American citizens in India brings to three the number of countries where such sales of local currency, held in amounts excessive to the needs of the U.S. Government, are now in effect. The United States has been selling Israeli and Egyptian pounds to U.S. citizens in those two countries for some time.

The action announced on May 20 was taken in accordance with a provision of an amendment signed on December 31, 1964, to the Food for Peace agreement of September 30, 1964, with India.

American tourists and businessmen, upon presentation of their passports for identification, can obtain Indian rupees at the official rate of exchange at the Embassy or consulates in exchange for U.S. currency, personal checks drawn on a bank in the United States, or U.S. traveler's checks.

In most of the countries throughout the world the U.S. Government holds foreign currencies only as working balances. This area includes all of Western Europe, Latin America, Africa with the exception of Guinea, and the Far East except for Burma, India, and Pakistan. In these nations, the Government-owned balances of foreign currency are inadequate or barely adequate to cover official requirements and supplemental purchases are made with dollars. There is, therefore, no balance-of-payments benefit to be gained by sale to private persons.

As additional sales for foreign currencies are made, as repayments under previous agreements are received, and as U.S. official requirements change, arrangements will be negotiated, where possible, and procedures established for sales to private U.S. citizens.

OAS Secretary General To Represent Meeting of Consultation in Dominican Republic; Brazilian To Command Inter-American Force

*Following are statements made by U.S. Representative Ellsworth Bunker in plenary sessions of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, together with texts of notes from Mr. Bunker regarding U.S. contingents for the Inter-American Force and resolutions adopted by the meeting.*¹

STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR BUNKER

Statement of May 18

Department of State press release 117 dated May 19

I should like to inform all members of the OAS of the efforts which have been made during the past few days by high-ranking officials of the United States Government who have been sent by the President to the Dominican Republic.² Their instructions were to lend maximum assistance to the OAS and to the people and leaders of the Dominican Republic:

—to help bring an end to the fighting and bloodshed;

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of May 17, 1965, p. 738, and May 31, 1965, pp. 854 and 869.

² On May 17 George Reedy, Press Secretary to the President, announced that President Johnson had on May 14 authorized a group, including McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, to go to the Dominican Republic to perform certain duties for the Government. Also included in the group were Thomas C. Mann, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; Cyrus R. Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense; and Jack Hood Vaughn, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. The group left Washington for the Dominican Republic on May 15.

—to aid in the establishment of a broadly representative government based on democratic, constitutional principles;

—to help eliminate the threat of present or future subversion of the Government of the Dominican Republic by Communist or other extremist elements who might attempt to establish a regime incompatible with the oft-declared principles of the inter-American system;

—to facilitate the arrangements for the inclusion of United States forces in the Inter-American Force and to plan the progressive reduction and eventual withdrawal of those forces as the OAS succeeds in restoring peace and civil order.

The achievement of these elementary objectives would make it possible for the OAS to accomplish other necessary tasks, such as the organization on an emergency basis of the distribution of food and essential supplies for the Dominican people and the development of plans for economic assistance to be available as soon as peace and a stable democratic government are established.

It also became clear that a special problem exists in the Dominican Republic because of the depth of the bitterness and hostility engendered by the war, not only between the opposing military leaders but also in the population generally. This has raised the acute and fundamentally important question as to whether a stable government can be formed unless certain military leaders on each side are willing to step aside. From time to time, preliminary explorations have indicated the possibility—although it is not a

certainly—that some or all of those leaders recognize this problem.

The U.S. representatives have collaborated closely with the OAS mission. They have kept it fully informed of all events and have offered, invited, and received participation at various stages.

Despite the bitterness of the fighting and the intense propaganda from both sides, they have found sentiment in the Dominican Republic favoring certain principles which are essential to the establishment of a stable government.

First, civilian and military leaders on both sides recognize that the Communists present a continuing threat to any democratic government. They recognize that these Communists, some of whom were trained abroad, must be dealt with effectively, vigorously, and definitively to prevent the Dominican Government and people from falling under their control.

Second, responsible Dominican leaders have discussed the makeup of a broadly based government of integrity and competence, vigorously excluding the extreme right and the extreme left. There is reason to believe that able and experienced men of this type—reflecting a wide spectrum of political, economic, and social views—are available to serve in a new government.

Third, the government must be essentially civilian, and, if possible, the new chiefs of the military services should be acceptable to both factions so as to avoid friction and to facilitate separation of the armed forces from politics.

We sincerely hope that these principles, if they command sufficient support so that they may be made operative, will result in the emergence of a democratic, constitutional government in the Dominican Republic, composed of able civilian leaders, responsible to the people, free of Communist and other extreme influence, and devoted to the welfare and future of the Dominican people.

The United States will continue to offer its assistance in every possible way to the implementation of a program such as that described—or to any other program which does not depart from the basic principles

which have been described. We will continue in every way to cooperate fully with the OAS and the responsible leaders of the Dominican Republic.

It is still our hope and belief that the agony of this present conflict may become an avenue to true democracy for the people of the Dominican Republic.

First Statement of May 20

Department of State press release 121

In view of some reports appearing in the papers this morning as to the action of the U. S. forces in the Dominican Republic, I should like to make a statement about the position of the U. S. forces there.

I would like to reaffirm to this meeting what I have already stated many times. The U. S. forces in the Dominican Republic are not there to support either side against the other. They have very specific and strict orders not to fire except when fired upon, and they are adhering to these orders in spite of the mounting toll daily of dead and wounded by sniper action.

As of last evening 19 of our troops have been killed and 99 wounded, and we have repeatedly protested infractions of the cease-fire rule.

In particular, I want to counter reports which have appeared in the press and on television which allege that U. S. forces have entered into the present conflict for the purpose of supporting forces of the so-called Government of National Reconstruction. I think that many of these reports stem from actions which have taken place near the line of communication between the security zone and the Duarte Bridge which was established, with OAS concurrence, during the early phase of the crisis. I have also stated before that U. S. forces have strict orders not to allow armed forces from either side into the line of communication. This too has been adhered to, although I am informed that through an error there was a single exception about 1 week ago, of which the Special Committee was informed. During the fighting which took place yesterday there were attempts by armed bands to enter or cross

through the line of communication of our troops. Our troops were subjected to fire, and, pursuant to their orders, they responded in order to protect themselves.

From what information I have been able to gather this morning, this was the nature of the action which resulted in the deaths of two major rebel leaders, Lieutenant Colonel Rafael Fernandez Dominguez and Juan Miguel Roman, which the press reports this morning. We regret these deaths. I gather that this skirmish took place at the rear of the National Palace, where, I understand, a band of some 20 so-called rebels were probing the palace defenses. Taking advantage of their proximity to the line of communication, this group fired into the U.S. line. In keeping with their instructions to defend themselves, U.S. forces returned the rebel fire. Loyalist forces within the palace also opened fire. The rebel band was caught in the crossfire between the National Palace and from our own lines. But I categorically refute the cynical propaganda that the Caamaño headquarters has put out that these men were "assassinated from behind." And I also deny that the U. S. forces are providing arms and ammunition or that we are using helicopters to transport troops or to act as spotters. As my colleagues on the Special Committee know, we have denied the use of the line of communication and the Duarte Bridge to troops of both sides, and I understand that the tanks which have been used by the so-called Government of National Reconstruction forces made a long detour around the city before they could be committed.

With respect to press reports that the so-called GNR radio has announced that the United States is helping the so-called loyal forces to win the battle against international communism, I can only say that I have not seen any confirmation of the allegation. However, I would like to recall my earlier statement that the U. S. Government believes that during the present period of tension and uncertainty, inflammatory broadcasts from both sides should be stopped and

that the OAS should take responsibility in this matter.³ I still think, Mr. Chairman, that it would be most advisable for the OAS to take control of all the radio stations in order to prevent the inflammatory and inaccurate broadcasts which are only adding to the difficulty in trying to restore peace and effect the cease-fire and to reestablish the normal conditions which the resolution of May 1 requested the Special Committee to bring about.

Second Statement of May 20

I should like to recall, Mr. Chairman, to my distinguished colleague of Uruguay the statement which I made on May 18 in connection with the commission to which he refers. I said then that their instructions were to lend the maximum assistance to the OAS, to the Special Committee, and to the people and the leaders of the Dominican Republic, in order to help bring an end to the fighting and bloodshed, to aid in the establishment of a broadly representative government based on democratic and constitutional principles, to help eliminate the threat of present or future subversion of the Government of the Dominican Republic by Communist or other extremist elements who might attempt to establish a regime incompatible with the oft-declared principles of the inter-American system, to facilitate the arrangements for the inclusion of the United States forces in the Inter-American Force, and to plan the progressive reduction and eventual withdrawal of those forces as the OAS succeeds in restoring peace and civil order.

As I said then, Mr. Chairman, it was hoped that these elements, if they could be of any assistance in helping to achieve these objectives, would also make it possible for the OAS to accomplish other necessary tasks, such as the distribution of food, economic assistance, and the development of plans for economic assistance when peace and a stable government were established. I said also, Mr. Chairman, that they had endeavored to keep the committee fully informed and had offered, invited, and received participation at various stages, as the

³ For a statement made by Mr. Bunker on May 14, see BULLETIN of May 31, 1965, p. 866.

Ambassador of Colombia has mentioned.

This mission, Mr. Chairman, was there only to assist the OAS, not to confer a mandate or power on anyone; to act in any way it could to attempt to get the two sides together, which had not been possible up to that time.

The committee's report states their difficulties in attempting to confer with Colonel Caamaño, who gave an excuse for not meeting them which was without foundation in fact. Consequently, the mission which went there, sent by President Johnson, was there to attempt in any way to assist in a solution to this problem; to assist in trying to get the two sides together; only to aid the work which the OAS is doing, which my Government has supported from the very beginning—supports with every resource at its disposal, I may say, Mr. Chairman. We have, obviously, no intention in any way to interfere with the work of the committee. On the contrary the sole objective was to support the work of the committee—to act, if you will, as a catalytic agent, perhaps, if we could with some elements there, but to help to bring about, through the commission, the objectives which are outlined in the resolutions which were adopted here on May 1 and again on May 6. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Statement of May 21

Mr. President, I welcome the announcement of the distinguished representative of Brazil that his Government is sending an important contingent of 1,250 men to become part of the Inter-American Force set up by a resolution of this meeting of May 6th.

This will greatly enlarge the number of troops from other countries, and I am very happy, Mr. President, that I am authorized to say that, upon the arrival of these troops, my Government will withdraw a number of troops equivalent to the total number from other countries in the Dominican Republic and that we hopefully look forward to contingents coming from other countries and to a further withdrawal of the United States troops.

I am sure that the formation of the Inter-

American Force, as I said when we adopted the resolution, will prove to be a historic step and a very effective means of keeping the peace and of providing the means to carry out the purposes of paragraph 2 of that resolution, which very clearly stated the purposes of the Force. Thank you, Mr. President.

Statement of May 22

In connection with the statements reported by Dr. Mora [OAS Secretary General José A. Mora], in which I am sure we all feel deep satisfaction, I would like to report that our present information is that the forces under General Imbert are substantially in control of the area of the city north of the line of communication and the safety zone previously established by the U.S. forces at the request of the OAS.

The forces led by Colonel Caamaño now appear to be concentrated in the downtown area of Santo Domingo, bounded on the north by the line of communication, on the west by the safety zone, on the east by the river, and on the south by the sea.

U.S. forces have been instructed to prevent any attack on the forces in that southern portion of the city. We will prevent any such attack by land or sea. As far as air attacks are concerned, U.S. forces have effectively blocked the use of San Isidro airfield for combatant purposes.

Our hope is that an effective end to the fighting among the Dominican factions will permit political discussions to proceed. Dr. Mora is working day and night to bring about the local peace and reconciliation necessary to enable the Dominicans to work out their own political destiny.

I hope that this posture of the U.S. forces will be of assistance to Dr. Mora in the work which he is carrying out with such vigor and, I hope, with success.

TEXTS OF U.S. NOTES

Note of May 15

No. 116

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the resolution adopted by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on May 6, 1965, and

to the communication of May 13 from His Excellency, Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa, President of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. By paragraph 1 of the resolution of May 6, governments of member states willing and capable of doing so were requested to make contingents of their land, naval, air or police forces available to the Organization of American States to form an Inter-American Force that would operate under the authority of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation. In accordance with earlier statements by President Johnson and by myself, I have the honor to advise you formally that the United States hereby offers to make available to the OAS to become part of the Inter-American Force its military, naval and air forces presently in the Dominican Republic for the execution of the mission and purposes contemplated in the relevant resolutions of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation.

Arrangements are presently being made for appropriate notification of the composition of the United States forces included in this offer.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.

ELLSWORTH BUNKER

*Ambassador, Representative of the
United States of America on the Council of the
Organization of American States*

The Honorable

WILLIAM SANDERS

*Assistant Secretary General of the
Organization of American States*

Note of May 22

No. 116

SIR: I have the honor to refer to my Note No. 115 of May 15, 1965, conveying the offer of the United States to make available its military, naval and air forces presently in the Dominican Republic to become part of the Inter-American Force for the execution of the missions and purposes contemplated in the relevant resolutions of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

The composition of the United States forces presently in the Dominican Republic, and which are therefore included in this offer, is as follows: Army units totaling 14,400; a Marine Brigade totaling 6,100 and Air Force support units totaling 1,000.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.

ELLSWORTH BUNKER

*Ambassador, Representative of the
United States of America on the Council of the
Organization of American States*

The Honorable

WILLIAM SANDERS

*Assistant Secretary General of the
Organization of American States*

TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS

Resolution Urging a Cease-Fire ⁴

THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

RESOLVES:

To again urge the parties in conflict to cease fire and thereby to create conditions favorable to peace and normality in the Dominican Republic.

Resolution on Mission of OAS Secretary General ⁵

WHEREAS:

The Special Committee established pursuant to the resolution of May 1, 1965, considers that it has completed its mandate;

The Meeting considers that it should continue to be represented on a permanent basis in the Dominican Republic, in an effort to restore peace and the normal conditions that will make it possible to establish the bases for the functioning of democratic institutions in that country; and

The Secretary General of the Organization is now in the Dominican Republic fulfilling a mission entrusted to him by the Meeting of Consultation and is in a position to further the objectives set forth in the preceding paragraph,

THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

RESOLVES:

1. To reiterate the gratitude of the Meeting to the Special Committee for the outstanding service it has rendered.

2. To entrust the Secretary General of the Organization of American States with carrying out the following activities in the Dominican Republic, on behalf of the Meeting of Consultation:

a. To negotiate a strict cease-fire in accordance with the Act of Santo Domingo;

b. To provide his good offices to the Parties, with a view to the establishment of a climate of peace and reconciliation that will permit the functioning of democratic institutions in the Dominican Republic;

c. To coordinate, insofar as relevant, action leading to the attainment of the objectives set forth in this resolution, with that which the Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations is undertaking;

d. To keep the Meeting duly informed on the negotiations he carries on, and on the results thereof.

⁴ Adopted unanimously in plenary session on May 19.

⁵ Adopted in plenary session on May 20 by a vote of 16 to 0, with 4 abstentions (Chile, Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay).

Resolution on Permanent Cease-Fire⁶

WHEREAS:

At the session of May 19, 1965, this Meeting unanimously decided once again to urge the parties in conflict to cease fire;

These parties have agreed upon a 24-hour truce for humanitarian purposes; and

The Secretary General of the Organization is in Santo Domingo and this Meeting, by resolution of May 20, entrusted him, among other activities set forth in the resolution, with the negotiation of a strict cease-fire in accordance with the Act of Santo Domingo,

THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

RESOLVES:

1. To urge the parties to convert the truce into a permanent cease-fire in accordance with the Act of Santo Domingo and the resolution of this Meeting of May 19.

2. To entrust the Secretary General of the Organization, as Representative of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, with communicating the text of this resolution to the parties and with doing everything possible to accomplish its objectives.

Resolution on Inter-American Force Command⁷

THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

RESOLVES:

1. That the Secretary General of the Organization of American States shall assume the functions referred to in paragraph 3 of the resolution adopted by this Meeting of Consultation on May 6, 1965.

2. That this Meeting shall indicate the mission and objectives of the Inter-American Force in accordance with the sole purpose set forth in paragraph 2 of the resolution of May 6.

3. To request the Government of Brazil to designate the Commander of the Inter-American Force and the Government of the United States to designate the Deputy Commander of that Force."

4. To appoint a committee composed of those members designated by the President of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation to study the functioning and

maintenance of the Inter-American Force,⁸ and to present a report to the present Meeting of Consultation.

U.N. Security Council Considers Situation in Dominican Republic

Following is a series of statements made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative Adlai E. Stevenson during debate on the Dominican Republic situation.¹

STATEMENT OF MAY 19

U.S./U.N. press release 4555

Mr. President, for our part we appreciate the information that you have communicated to us from Dr. Mayobre [José Antonio Mayobre, personal representative of the U.N. Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic] and hope that in due course members of the Council will be furnished with copies of his information, or such portions of it as may be available, for more careful examination.

I also noted with interest our President's report that he had been advised that a report of the commission of the Organization of American States was coming to the Council in the course of the day.² I would hope likewise that we would have an opportunity to examine this report with the care that I suggest it may deserve.

I thought we had come here this afternoon to hear the representatives of the two factions who were invited to appear at our last meeting. We evidently have that still ahead of us. Meanwhile, we have heard another speech from the representative of the Soviet Union. This time, however, it includes a new accusation.

¹ At this same session, the President of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation appointed as members of the committee the delegations of Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the United States, as well as those of other member states that contribute contingents to the Inter-American Force.

² For background, see BULLETIN of May 31, 1965, pp. 854 and 869.

³ U.N. doc. S/6364.

⁶ Adopted unanimously in plenary session on May 21.

⁷ Adopted in plenary session on May 22 by a vote of 14 to 4 (Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru), with 2 abstentions (Argentina and Venezuela).

⁸ General of the Army Hugo Panasco Alvim, of Brazil, has been designated Commander of the Force, and Lt. Gen. Bruce Palmer, Jr., of the United States, Deputy Commander.

He asked me the question why some high-level representatives of the United States Government went down to Santo Domingo.³ Well, I think perhaps I can enlighten him on that. They went down to help stop the fighting and to help reconcile the factions, if they possibly could. These special representatives have collaborated closely with the OAS mission; they have kept it informed of all of their conversations and of their efforts. They have also been in touch with Dr. Mayobre, the special representative, as Dr. Mayobre himself has just reported. That is the answer to the question posed with such dramatic indignation. And one may wonder why the—

[Interrupted on a point of order by the representative of the Soviet Union.]

To continue where I left off when I was interrupted—one may wonder why the Soviet representative is so opposed to any efforts, be they by the OAS or by the United States or by both, to restore peace to the Dominican Republic.

The allegation has been made again—I suspect for the seventh or eighth time—that the United States is giving aid to the Imbert forces and the Government of National Reconstruction, as it is called. I repeat that the United States has avoided scrupulously giving military assistance either to the forces of the Government of National Reconstruction or the Constitutional Government of Colonel Caamaño. Not only has the United States refrained from giving aid to either side in this conflict, but we have prohibited the armed forces of either Imbert or Caamaño from using the zone of safety established under the OAS resolution as a refuge or sanctuary, or using or crossing the line of communication which connects the zone with the Duarte Bridge.

It is important, I think, to note that the United States forces are neither present nor in control of the area outside of the zone and of the line of communication. The pres-

ent activity of the Imbert forces is reported to be in the northern part of the city, north of both the zone and of the line of communication. It is reported also that the Imbert forces crossed the river by a bridge in this northern section which is not under our control.

As far as the Duarte Bridge is concerned, which leads through the line of communication into the zone of safety, United States forces have not permitted use of the bridge by military units of either of the opposing factions. Individuals in uniform are permitted to pass only when it is established that they are not armed.

Now, with regard to the San Isidro airfield. This field is not controlled by the United States but by the Dominican Air Force. The United States is a user nation of this airfield, exactly like other contingents from Latin American forces earmarked for use with the Inter-American Armed Force. However, we have repeatedly urged the Dominican Air Force not to undertake any combat missions from this field. And with the exception of the attack of May 13, we have been successful in dissuading them from using the field for that purpose.

Let me repeat, Mr. President, that the United States forces are not taking sides in this conflict but are functioning within the framework of the OAS actions which were directed to assisting in the evacuation of persons in danger—which has been accomplished—to establishing a zone of safety, to assisting in humanitarian efforts related to the care and emergency feeding of the people in the cities. And we have carried out these latter services without regard to the factions of the individuals who are in need.

As I have said earlier, we have no mandate to do more; and I think it is important, if I may say so, for the Council to realize that. We have been accused both of using force or of not using it. The forces of the United States do not have a general peacekeeping role or a mandate to enforce a cease-fire. The resolutions of the OAS deal only with the creation of an international

³ See footnote 2, p. 908.

neutral zone and the lines of communication, and we are operating in that context alone. We have stated that we are not occupying the country nor do we have any wish to do so, and we have stated it repeatedly. And who would want to occupy the country or have any continuing responsibilities there?

Finally, let me repeat a few of the facts which I have already previously explained clearly time and again, but I think not as often as Ambassador Fedorenko [Soviet Representative Nikolai T. Fedorenko] has seen fit to repeat the distortions, the calculated falsehoods within the worst tradition of the cold war, which latterly seems to have become his constant habit.

First, on April 28, in the absence of governmental authority or law enforcement, the military officials then exercising such authority as there was in the Dominican Republic informed us that the safety of foreign nationals could not be guaranteed any longer and that an immediate dispatch of forces was necessary to safeguard their lives. United States forces were sent only after that request, and we promptly notified both the OAS and the United Nations.

Second, on the weekend of April 29-31, it became clear that Communist agents, trained outside the Dominican Republic and acting in accordance with the Havana communique calling for active aid to so-called "freedom fighters," were rapidly penetrating the original revolution and attempting to turn it into a classic coup under the guise of the so-called "movement of national liberation."

Third, the purpose of the United States action in the Dominican Republic was to protect the lives of foreign nationals and to give the inter-American system a chance to deal with the situation in the Dominican Republic, which is within its competence, if it could do so.

Fourth, the United States forces are not asserting any authority to govern any part of the Dominican Republic and, as I have said, are not taking sides in the conflict.

Fifth, the United States fully supports

the vigorous action which the Organization of American States has taken to deal with this situation, including the call for a cease-fire, the good-offices commission, the establishment of the international security zone, and the establishment of the Inter-American Force.

Sixth, the United States forces will be withdrawn from the Dominican Republic when the OAS Command of the Inter-American Force determines that they are not needed. And the sooner that is, the better it will be for us.

Seventh, we believe that the people of the Dominican Republic—again, as I have repeatedly said—should have a government of their own choosing. Our action had the purpose of preserving that right, a choice which would have been denied, perhaps irretrievably, if the forces at work at the outset of the revolution had succeeded.

Mr. President, we can go on here indefinitely exchanging accusations and responding to them. I think it is apparent to all of the members that the situation in the Dominican Republic is extremely dangerous, that it has been impossible up to this point to reconcile the conflicting factions, to bring about a coalition government to restore peace and order, to stop the fighting. I think that there is too little appreciation that in the Dominican Republic there is a depth of bitterness and of hostility engendered by the fighting, not only between the opposing military leaders but within the population, and that the roots of this bitterness and this hostility are old and deep, that they are ancestral, indeed, and that they affect women and children—that Trujillo is dead but that the legacy of his long dictatorship lives on. And this creates an ugly situation.

The fundamental question as to whether any stable government can be formed in the Dominican Republic perhaps can be resolved only when certain military leaders who have the life and the death of the population somewhat in their hands on each side will step aside and permit the forces of reconciliation to do their healing work.

STATEMENT OF MAY 20

U.S./U.N. press release 4557

Mr. President, I asked for the privilege of speaking at the outset of the meeting this afternoon in order to give the Council as promptly as possible the information available to my Government about the incident which is the subject of the telegram from Mr. [Carlos Jottin] Cury, the foreign minister in Colonel Caamaño's government, which the President has just called to our attention.

The allegations, the assertions in this message, wholly distort the situation by failing to include all of the relevant facts and by drawing on unwarranted and premature conclusions.

Colonel Fernandez [Rafael Fernandez Dominguez] was a Dominican patriot whose death my Government deeply regrets. To the extent that it has been possible to ascertain the facts of his death at this time, they are as follows:

Colonel Fernandez was in the company and possibly leading a group of 20 or more members of the Caamaño forces that was apparently engaged in probing the defenses of the National Palace, which is located near the security zone and the line of communication. This group approached the palace from the rear. Firing broke out between the group as it approached the palace and the forces inside the palace defending it—the forces of General Imbert. At the same time, and for reasons which are not clear, the Fernandez group began firing also into the line of communication, whereupon the United States forces stationed along the corridor returned the fire. Three United States paratroopers were wounded, one gravely, in this exchange.

I have already informed the Council repeatedly that their orders prohibit the American forces from initiating fire but authorize them to fire back in self-defense.

It was during this attack on the palace, so called, and the accompanying exchanges of fire that Colonel Fernandez was killed. Now, whether he was killed by fire from the palace or by fire from the forces in the line

of communication returning the fire of his group is unknown. Also killed in this attack, which the telegram does not mention, was, we understand, Juan Miguel Roman, one of the chief Communist military strategists, who has traveled widely on missions in Cuba, in Czechoslovakia, and in the Soviet Union since 1961. He was the key man in the guerrilla activities in the Dominican Republic in late 1963 and was deported to Cuba in 1964. He was one of the active agents whom I identified before the Council in a list that I presented here on the 5th of May.⁴

Some other members of this group attacking the palace were also killed and wounded during this action. So much for that.

Details are not yet available on the many other stories appearing in the press about yesterday's events. I repeat, however, that the President's instructions to our troops were and are to observe neutrality. These instructions of impartiality have been reaffirmed repeatedly and again today.⁵

Questions about other operational matters, including the stories appearing in the press today, are being answered this afternoon in Santo Domingo by Mr. Vance [Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance] and will doubtless appear in tomorrow's newspapers.

Let me repeat that our forces do not fire unless fired upon. Out of more than 460 violations of the cease-fire by forces under control of Colonel Caamaño, in many instances our troops did not return fire for fear of harming innocent civilians within the line of fire. But in the one known violation by forces on the other side, our forces reacted strongly with automatic fire. That was the instance of the strafing of the Radio Santo Domingo in the corner of the safety zone, and one of the offending aircraft crashed shortly thereafter.

We have refused and will continue to refuse any requests from either side to allow troop movements through the line of com-

⁴ BULLETIN of May 31, 1965, p. 876.

⁵ See p. 909.

munication and through the security zone. Since our forces landed on the 28th of April, we have given no arms to the military forces on either side.

We distribute food and medical care regardless of a person's political allegiance. We distribute food in several areas of the rebel zone almost daily. We allow unarmed free passage through the safety zone without distinction as to political loyalties.

If you check the press of the last few days, we believe you can find frequent complaints voiced publicly by General Imbert and his associates regarding our attempts to find an equitable political solution.

Now, Mr. President, I should like also to say that I trust that the members of the Council will carefully consider the current situation and in particular the relations between this organization and the OAS, whose second report you now have before you.⁶ I believe I have said here on several occasions that we were in danger of disturbing the relationship between two harmonious parts of the system of international institutions which we have built. The OAS had already negotiated a cease-fire agreement and still is undertaking the burden of restoring its effectiveness since it was broken by the renewed fighting.

All the same, my Government concurred in the Security Council's call for a strict cease-fire, reaffirming what the OAS has already called for, and in sending a representative of the Secretary-General, who is now authorized to do two things: to report and to achieve the humanitarian suspension of hostilities.

It now appears clearly from the report of the OAS commission that is before you that these steps that it has been taking have, in fact, produced institutional strains. We believe it essential before any other action is considered by this Council that this relationship between the OAS and the United Nations be given much more serious attention than it has been so far. The fact that this Special Committee of the OAS felt it necessary to

call the attention of the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics to this problem is evidence of the awkwardness of the situation that may develop.

The OAS commission has done very useful work. It helped to negotiate the cease-fire, to see to the orderly evacuation of the asylees in the embassies and of all foreigners wishing to leave the Dominican Republic, and to help provide food, medicine, and equipment necessary to mitigate the sufferings of the Dominican people. It has attached to the report of the OAS a long list of contributions by many American Republics to these ends. The OAS is actively carrying forward its efforts to help achieve the re-establishment of peace and normality in the Dominican Republic.

Its Secretary General, Mr. [José A.] Mora, is in the Dominican Republic now and active in this regard. The Inter-American Armed Force which was authorized in the OAS resolution of May 6 to help restore normal conditions, maintain security of the inhabitants and the inviolability of human rights, and to establish an atmosphere of peace and conciliation is in the process of formulation.

Contingents from three Latin American countries are already on the ground, and other countries are moving through their governmental processes to obtain authority to provide units for this force. We anticipate with confidence that it will be very largely augmented in the next few days. Perhaps even before that, action will follow creating a unified command. The United States forces in the Dominican Republic at that time will go into the command of the commander of the Inter-American Force.

In addition, the OAS is meeting today to consider the report of its Special Committee, which has also been filed with the Security Council and is before you. As will be noted from this report, the committee has recommended as an immediate measure that a distinguished representative replace the commission with a view to making further urgent and effective efforts to achieve the earliest possible peaceful solution of the dif-

⁶ U.N. doc. S/6370 and Add. 1.

facilities. I am informed that the Organization of American States is at this moment discussing this and other proposals and that an early decision is expected. I will have more to report, I hope, in this connection in the near future.

Now, the establishment of the Inter-American Force, the negotiation of the cease-fire, the humanitarian work with respect to the evacuation of asylees and of Dominicans and of all foreign nationals, the efforts that have been made to restore peace and order in the Dominican Republic—and that continue—and to reinstate the cease-fire, all testify, it seems to me—together with the actions presently contemplated to create an international force and unified command and to take further steps to increase the representation, to enlarge the representation, of the OAS in the Dominican Republic—all testify to the resolve of this regional organization to do what is necessary to insure that normal conditions are restored and that a climate is created in which democratic institutions can be reborn in this unhappy land.

I hope all of these considerations will not escape the very careful consideration of the membership.

STATEMENT OF MAY 21

U.S./U.N. press release 4558

I have asked to speak this morning, Mr. President, first because since we met here yesterday certain important developments have occurred which contribute light to our discussions of the Dominican Republic case here in the Security Council.

As our Secretary-General has reported, a 24-hour truce beginning at noon Dominican time has been arranged for the humanitarian purpose of permitting the Red Cross to carry out its traditional task of caring for the wounded and of removing the dead. And I am sure that you have echoed, Mr. President, the gratitude of all of the members of the Council to all who have participated in arranging this truce.

During this 24-hour truce we, like everyone else, I am sure, hope that it will prove

possible to reestablish conditions insuring against further hostilities and leading to a strict observance of the cease-fire, which was agreed upon previously pursuant to the Act of Santo Domingo.⁷

In the second place, I spoke yesterday of the continuing efforts of the OAS and noted that the Meeting of Consultation was then in session. Last night the OAS meeting, concluding its consideration of the report of the commission which had been in Santo Domingo pursuant to the earlier OAS action, empowered its Secretary General, as the President has already informed us, to undertake certain activities in the Dominican Republic. This assignment is, as you will note, first, to seek reaffirmation of the Act of Santo Domingo, in other words, to bring about strict observance of the cease-fire agreed upon in that act; secondly, to provide his good offices to the parties with a view to the establishment of a climate of peace and reconciliation that would permit the functioning of democratic institutions in the Dominican Republic; and third, to keep the Meeting of Consultation, that is to say the OAS, duly informed of the negotiations carried out as well as the results thereof.

But I call your attention to the fact that the resolution contains another instruction of particular interest to the Security Council. It provides that the Secretary General of the OAS shall coordinate the action leading to the fulfillment of the objectives set forth in that resolution with that undertaken by the representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Now, as we all know, Dr. Mora, the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, has remained in Santo Domingo and has never relaxed his efforts to work out a peaceful solution in the Dominican Republic which will enable its people to exercise freely their right of self-determination. I am sure that all of us fervently wish his efforts to succeed and trust that this Council will also wish to do everything in its power to encourage and to facilitate all of the ef-

⁷ For text, see BULLETIN of May 31, 1965, p. 867.

forts of the regional organization to bring about a peaceful solution.

I mentioned yesterday that the inter-American peace force was already on the scene and that additional forces were expected. We understand that yesterday the Brazilian Senate voted to send troops to participate in that force, a further indication that the states members of the OAS mean to have their efforts succeed in bringing peace to the troubled Dominican Republic.

Mr. President, I wish now to submit a resolution to the Security Council that would assure United Nations and OAS coordination in achieving the mentioned objectives of the organizations, which are entirely mutual. Its purpose is threefold:

In the first place, it takes note of the various developments that I have hurriedly reviewed.

In the second place, it reiterates this Council's appeal for adherence to the cease-fire.

And in the third place, it urges the Organization of American States to intensify its efforts to establish a basis for the functioning of democratic institutions in the Dominican Republic and, in particular, to assure observation of the cease-fire agreed upon in the Act of Santo Domingo.

Finally, it covers the critical and the fundamental constitutional issues about which I spoke here yesterday by providing for coordination of the efforts of the United Nations and of the OAS. It recognizes that we should encourage the OAS, the competent regional organization, to achieve the objective of a peaceful settlement in accordance with the charter. Of course, the United Nations and we here in the Security Council have precisely the same objective. There must be no conflict in our efforts. There need be no conflict or competition between organs of the United Nations system. And so in our proposal not only should we urge the OAS and its representative, Dr. Mora, to get on with his efforts, but also we request Dr. Mayobre, as the representative appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to carry out his responsibilities in coordination with Dr. Mora in the light of

the OAS resolution.

Mr. President, I would most earnestly urge that this resolution be adopted. I hope the Council will see fit to act upon it unanimously and promptly. By such action we can make an immediate, positive contribution to the difficult tasks of producing the peaceful settlement in the Dominican Republic which we all desire and of laying the basis, as the resolution adopted by the OAS yesterday put it, for the functioning of democratic institutions in that country. We can also remove any frustrating and unseemly conflict or competition in our collective desire to do the same thing, which can only injure the institutional machinery that we have been so laboriously building up for the past 20 years to insure the peace of the world.

Mr. President, I now ask the Council's indulgence to read the full text of the resolution that we are proposing and which I presume will be duplicated and distributed to the members of the Council very shortly. The draft sponsored by the United States reads as follows: ⁸

The Security Council,

Taking note of the reports of the Organization of American States,

Taking note also of the reports of the Secretary-General,

1. *Notes with satisfaction* the temporary suspension of hostilities agreed to for humanitarian purposes;

2. *Calls for* observance of a strict cessation of hostilities;

3. *Notes* that the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States has appointed its Secretary General to represent it in the Dominican Republic and entrusted him with carrying out the objectives established by the Organization of American States;

4. *Urges* the Organization of American States to intensify its efforts to establish the basis for the functioning of democratic institutions in the Dominican Republic and in particular to assure observation of the cease-fire agreed upon in the Act of Santo Domingo;

5. *Requests* the representative appointed by the Secretary-General, in carrying out the responsibilities assigned to him by the Security Council, to coordinate with the Secretary General of the OAS in light of the resolution adopted by the OAS on May 20.

⁸ The Council did not vote on the U.S. resolution.

SEATO Council Ministers Hold 10th Meeting at London

Following is a statement made by Under Secretary Ball at London on May 3 at the opening session of the 10th meeting of the Ministerial Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, together with the text of a communique issued at the close of the meeting on May 5.

STATEMENT BY UNDER SECRETARY BALL

The Ministerial Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization is concerned with several areas of actual or potential conflict.

I shall, however, confine my comments this morning principally to the struggle now underway in South Viet-Nam.

Pursuant to the 1954 accords, Viet-Nam was divided into two parts at the 17th parallel. A Communist government was established in the North, a non-Communist government in the South. From the beginning, the new Government of South Viet-Nam faced formidable tasks.

Much of the South Vietnamese countryside was controlled by armed Communist cells or by armed religious sects. South Viet-Nam was not producing enough food to feed its own people—thousands of peasants had crowded into the cities, vast areas of riceland were untended. Railroads had been wrecked. The city of Saigon was largely under the control of a secret society of armed gangsters and pirates.

This chaos was compounded by the addition of nearly 1 million refugees from North Viet-Nam, who fled their ancestral homes and all their possessions rather than live under communism. Many were suffer-

ing from starvation and disease. Some bore the scars of torture.

Many—in the West as well as Asia—placed a low estimate on South Viet-Nam's chances for survival. But over the next 5 years the South Vietnamese people confounded the pessimists. The refugees from the North were settled. A land reform program was pressed forward. A comprehensive system of agricultural credit was set up. Thousands of new schools and more than 3,500 village health stations were built. Rail transportation was restored, and roads were repaired and improved.

South Viet-Nam was not only able to feed itself but also resumed rice exports. Sugar and rubber production increased sharply. New industries were started. Per capita income rose by 20 percent.

Meanwhile the doctrinaire methods pursued by the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam were producing quite different results. The North Vietnamese witnessed failure after failure in the agricultural sector and in industry. Per capita food production dropped 10 percent. Relative to South Viet-Nam, the North Vietnamese standard of living declined significantly.

Success in the South and failure in the North were an obvious embarrassment to the Communist regime in Hanoi. Events had made clear that South Viet-Nam would not—as they had expected—fall into their laps. If they were to extend Communist power to the South, they needed different tactics.

Accordingly, in 1960 the Communist Party of North Viet-Nam—the Lao Dong Party, which is in practical effect the Hanoi government—ordered the “liberation” of South Viet-Nam. It set in motion a systematic plan

for subverting and taking over South Viet-Nam. As their instrument for this purpose, the Communists created a classical type of Communist front organization—the National Liberation Front. In accordance with their plan, they began infiltrating into the South arms and men specially trained for sabotage and guerrilla warfare. In the beginning the cadres infiltrated were drawn largely from the 90,000 South Vietnamese who had gone North to join the Communist ranks in 1954 and had become residents of North Viet-Nam. But this reservoir of manpower has apparently now been exhausted. Since January of last year the percentage of native North Vietnamese among the ranks of the infiltrated has steadily increased. There are now whole units of the North Vietnamese Army in South Viet-Nam.

Role of U.S. Assistance

The relation of my Government to these events goes back to the beginning.

Soon after the 1954 accords, the Government of South Viet-Nam asked the United States for assistance. In response to this request, we provided economic aid and military advice and assistance, within the limits set by the Geneva accords. But in 1961, as the North Vietnamese aggression increased in scope and momentum, it became clear that we had materially to increase the scale of our help. In the fall of 1961, we undertook a full review of all aspects of the problem. As a result, President Kennedy decided to send several thousand military advisers to South Viet-Nam and to step up our supply of equipment.

In providing assistance to the South Vietnamese people, my Government has, from the beginning, been guided by very clear considerations.

We have provided assistance for one purpose only—to help the South Vietnamese people resist aggression and maintain their independence.

We have no territorial ambition in South Viet-Nam. We are not there for economic gain. We seek no military base.

We have provided assistance for the same reason that we aided Greece and Turkey in 1947, that we fought in Korea, that we joined in forming NATO, and ANZUS, and SEATO, that we support CENTO, and that we have bilateral defense agreements with other free nations.

Deliberate Aggression From the North

And let there be no doubt about the threat in Viet-Nam and the nature of the struggle now being waged. The evidence establishes beyond the shadow of a doubt that South Viet-Nam is the victim of deliberate aggression—a Communist “war of national liberation.” The Communists have sought to present their attack as a “civil war.” But this is a hollow disguise.

During the last 5 years, North Viet-Nam has infiltrated into South Viet-Nam approximately 40,000 trained guerrilla fighters. If those men had moved across the demarcation zone in a single body, as in Korea, no one would be confused about the nature and source of the aggression. In Viet-Nam, however, the Communists chose the tactic of guerrilla warfare supported by terror and intimidation, by murder and torture. Last year alone the Viet Cong kidnaped, murdered, or seriously wounded more than 1,500 local officials. They have killed and maimed thousands of innocent women and children by bombing trains, playgrounds, roads, buses, schools, theaters, and other civilian facilities.

Yet the South Vietnamese are a tough and valiant people. In the past 5 years the South Vietnamese have suffered nearly 80,000 military and civilian casualties. That is the equivalent of 280,000 for the United Kingdom and 1 million for the United States.

But they continue to fight—and fight well. Of 10,000 men who entered the South Vietnamese Army in March, 7,000 were volunteers.

This, then, is the war in Viet-Nam as we see it—a war valiantly fought by a people determined to be free and to control their own destiny, a war against an enemy who has sought to conceal by stealth an insidious

invasion but whose purposes are clear for those who will read the evidence.

The Central Issue

How should such an aggression be resisted?

For several years now the South Vietnamese, with assistance from the United States and other free countries, have been trying to root out the invaders and restore peace and order in the countryside. Thirty-three other nations, including all the members of SEATO, are providing or have promised to provide some form of economic or military aid, or both, to South Viet-Nam. These efforts have been greatly expanded just within the year since our last meeting.

As the invasion intensified with the increased infiltration of men and equipment, the air forces of South Viet-Nam and the United States undertook 10 weeks ago a series of airstrikes against military targets in the North. These strikes have been limited, carefully measured, and controlled. They have been directed at impeding the movement of arms and trained men into South Viet-Nam. They have been designed to bring home to the regime in Hanoi the risks and costs of continued aggression.

The world has, I think, generally understood why those airstrikes have been necessary. Yet voices are raised here and there asking that they be halted either on humanitarian grounds or because they might lead to an escalation of the conflict.

I understand the good intentions of those people. All of us deplore violence. But I still find it curious that many who bewail the destruction of bridges and munitions in the North speak so little of the torture and intimidation and loss of human life suffered in the South by the victims of the aggression.

Certainly the United States does not enjoy sending its airplanes against North Viet-Nam and losing its own citizens in that effort. Nor have we enjoyed the 160,000 casualties that we have taken since the Second World War in the defense of freedom. Nor

do we enjoy maintaining nearly 2,700,000 of our young men under arms or spending more than \$50 billion a year on armaments. We would vastly prefer to have our sons safe at home and to devote those energies and resources to the constructive tasks of peace, including the major contribution we are prepared to make to projects for the development of Southeast Asia, worked out by Asian nations themselves and now being considered by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

We have, however, come to realize from the experience of the past years that aggression must be dealt with wherever it occurs and no matter what mask it may wear. Neither we nor other nations of the free world were always alert to this. In the 1930's Manchuria seemed a long way away, but it was only 10 years from Manchuria to Pearl Harbor. Ethiopia seemed a long way away. The rearmament of the Rhineland was regarded as regrettable but not worth a shooting war. Yet after that came Austria. And after Austria, Czechoslovakia. Then Poland. Then the Second World War.

The central issue we face in South Viet-Nam should, I think, be clear for all to see. It is whether a small state on the periphery of Communist power should be permitted to maintain its freedom. And that is an issue of vital importance to small states everywhere.

Moreover, it is an issue that affects the security of the whole free world. Never has that point been more succinctly stated than by one of the greatest of all Englishmen, Sir Winston Churchill. "The belief," he said, "that security can be obtained by throwing a small state to the wolves is a fatal illusion." And let us not forget that General [Vo Nguyen] Giap, the head of the North Vietnamese armed forces, has said quite explicitly that if the so-called "war of liberation" technique succeeds in Viet-Nam, it can succeed "everywhere in the world."

We, of course, would welcome a peaceful solution of the Vietnamese conflict, and we will not cease to search for such a solution.

President Johnson made clear on April 7, 1965,¹ that we were prepared at all times for "unconditional discussions" with any government concerned. But he made clear at the same time that we were not seeking a solution that was no better than a meaningless agreement.

For we are determined to do what is necessary to make it possible for the people of South Viet-Nam to maintain their freedom. And we are convinced that—with our help and the help of other free nations—they can and will succeed.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE

Press release 100 dated May 6

1. The Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization held its tenth meeting in London from May 3 to 5 under the chairmanship of the Right Honorable Michael Stewart, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom. The inaugural address was delivered by the Right Honorable Harold Wilson, M.P., Prime Minister of Her Majesty's Government.

2. All member governments were represented at the Council meeting. The Government of France was represented by an observer.

General Observations

3. In its discussion of the international situation, the Council recognized that the problems in the Treaty area are closely interrelated with those in other parts of the world. It expressed satisfaction that the Alliance, with member nations drawn from several geographical regions, provides valuable opportunities for exchanges of views on matters of both regional and worldwide importance.

4. The Council noted that the exercise of a policy of restraint by the SEATO powers with the purpose of seeking the peaceful settlement of international disputes, together with the maintenance of their capability and readiness to take prompt defen-

sive action if called upon, continues to serve as a stabilizing factor in Southeast Asia. It affirmed its belief that the rule of law should prevail and that international agreements should be honored and steps be taken to make them operative.

5. Noting that member nations of the Alliance are pursuing policies which have promoted the well-being of their peoples, the Council agreed that greater economic co-operation among the member nations would be mutually beneficial. It undertook to seek means by which this could be achieved.

Republic of Viet-Nam

6. The Council considered at length the dangerous situation caused by the aggression against the Republic of Viet-Nam—an aggression organized, directed, supplied and supported by the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam in contravention of the basic obligations of international law and in flagrant violation of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962. The Council noted with grave concern the increasing infiltration of arms and combat personnel from North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam and the evidence that this infiltration includes members of the regular armed forces of North Viet-Nam.

7. The Council heard a report from a representative of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam who attended the closed sessions as an observer. The Council expressed the deep sympathy and strong friendship of the member governments and peoples for the Government and people of the Republic of Viet-Nam. It voiced admiration for the determined resistance of the Government and people of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

8. The Council noted that the Communists themselves have proclaimed their assault on the Republic of Viet-Nam to be a critical test of the tactic of infiltrating arms and trained men across national frontiers. It agreed that history shows that the tolerance of aggression increases the danger to free societies everywhere.

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

9. The Council reaffirmed its conclusion at Manila a year ago² that the defeat of this Communist campaign is essential not only to the security of the Republic of Viet-Nam but to that of Southeast Asia, and would provide convincing proof that Communist expansion by such tactics will not be permitted. Member governments recognized that the state of affairs in Viet-Nam, as described above, constitutes a flagrant challenge to the essential purpose for which they had associated together under the Treaty: to resist aggression.

10. The Council recalled that its members also agreed at Manila that they would remain prepared, if necessary, to take further concrete steps within their respective capabilities in fulfillment of their obligations under the Treaty. Pursuant thereto, substantial assistance and reinforcement have been given during the past year by certain member governments in order to assist South Viet-Nam in resisting aggression from the North. The member governments agreed to continue and, consistent with their commitments elsewhere, to increase their assistance to South Viet-Nam.

11. At the same time, it was agreed that every effort should be made to promote a satisfactory and lasting settlement of the conflict that would ensure the right of the South Vietnamese people to pursue their future in peace and complete freedom from external interference. The Council welcomed and expressed warm support for the policy of the United States Government as outlined by President Johnson on April 7, 1965, when he affirmed the determination of the United States to provide assistance to South Viet-Nam to defend its independence, stated the readiness of the United States for unconditional discussion with the governments concerned in the search for a peaceful settlement, and offered the prospect of enriching the hopes and existence of more than 100 million people by a program of economic and

² For text of a communique issued at Manila on Apr. 15, 1964, see BULLETIN of May 4, 1964, p. 692.

social assistance in Southeast Asia.

12. The Council stated that peace could be restored to South Viet-Nam if the Communist aggressors would honor the agreements of 1954 and 1962. It declared it to be self-evident that, if the aggression were ended, the Governments and peoples of both South and North Viet-Nam could live in peace and devote their energies to economic and social progress.

13. The Council agreed that, until the Communist aggression is brought to an end, resolute defensive action must be continued.

Laos

14. The Council expressed concern that the Geneva Agreement of 1962 continues to be violated by the presence of North Vietnamese military forces and supplies in Laos, by the activities of the Pathet Lao, and by North Vietnamese use of the territory of Laos to send men and material to the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam. It regretted that the International Control Commission is unable to act effectively to investigate violations in the Communist-held sections of the Kingdom where they occur. The Council expressed its support for the 1962 Geneva Agreement and for the efforts of the Government of National Union under the Prime Minister, Prince Souvanna Phouma, to preserve the sovereignty, independence, unity, territorial integrity and neutrality of Laos.

15. While appreciating the position stated in paragraphs 6-14, the Pakistan Delegation expressed to the Council their special concern over the consequences of the continuance of the armed conflict in Viet-Nam and voiced the hope that determined efforts would also be made to restore peace in that area through negotiations on the basis of the existing Geneva Agreements.

Thailand

16. The Council noted with concern evidence of increasing Communist subversion from outside the country against Thailand, notably in the northeastern part of the

country.³ It noted the announcement by a clandestine radio of the establishment of a "Thai independence movement" which urges the overthrow of the Government of Thailand and endorsement of the "movement" by Radio Peiping and Radio Hanoi. The Council also noted the statement of the Communist Chinese Foreign Minister that Thailand would be the next target and that there might be a guerrilla war going on in Thailand before the year is out. The Council members expressed their determination to do whatever is necessary to assist their ally to meet this threat.

Malaysia

17. The Council also expressed grave concern at the situation arising from Indonesia's confrontation of Malaysia as constituting a serious threat to peace in the area of Southeast Asia. Certain member governments noted that they had provided both military forces and other aid to assist in the defense of Malaysia and it was recognized that the strength and determination of this support had contributed materially to the stability of the area.

The Council expressed the hope that an honorable and secure settlement would be arrived at on a basis acceptable to the Asian nations concerned.

18. The Pakistan Delegation expressed its concern at the continuance of the Indonesian/Malaysian dispute and stressed the view that this dispute could be resolved by peaceful means, that efforts should be pursued towards that end and that nothing should be done further to aggravate the existing conflict.

Counter-Subversion

19. The Council agreed that Communist subversion continued to be a serious threat to the Asian member nations. It agreed that measures envisaged, namely, material and other aid at the request of the countries affected, should be continued.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Apr. 5, 1965, p. 489.

Economic, Medical and Cultural Cooperation

20. The Council reviewed the progress of SEATO projects in the fields of economic development, medical research and cultural interchange. These projects include, among others, the SEATO Graduate School of Engineering, the skilled labor projects, the Regional Community Development Technical Assistance Center, the Thai-SEATO Vehicle Rebuild Workshop, the research fellowships, undergraduate and graduate scholarships and professorships, and the SEATO General Medical Research Laboratory, the SEATO Cholera Research Laboratory and the SEATO Clinical Research Center. The Council agreed that emphasis should be placed on such projects in the years ahead.

Military Planning and Exercises

21. The Council approved the report of the military advisers and expressed satisfaction at the way in which the military planning office continued to function.

22. The Council reaffirmed its belief that the capability and readiness of defense forces serves as a deterrent to aggression and thus contributes to peace. It stated that SEATO's military defense exercises have provided valuable experience to the armed forces of the member nations, an important asset to the Alliance should it be called upon to act to meet the common danger.

Staff Changes

23. The Council announced that Lieutenant General Jesus M. Vargas of the Philippines has been appointed by the Council to serve as Secretary-General as of July 1, for a term of three years.

24. The Council expressed its appreciation to the Secretary-General, Mr. Konthi Suphamongkhon, whose tour of duty is expiring. The Council placed on record its recognition of his untiring efforts in improving and strengthening the Organization.

Secretariat-General

25. The Council expressed its warm ap-

preciation to the staff of the Organization for their valuable services.

Next Meeting

26. The Council accepted with pleasure the invitation of the Government of Australia to hold its next meeting in Canberra.

Expression of Gratitude

27. The Council expressed its gratitude to Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom for its hospitality and for the excellent arrangements made for the meeting. The Council voted warm thanks to the Chairman, the Right Honorable Michael Stewart.

France

28. The French observer indicated that, as he had not participated in preparing this communique, the French Government does not consider itself to be committed by it.

Leaders of National Delegations

29. The leaders of the National Delegations to the Council Meeting were:

The Honorable Paul M. C. Hasluck, M.P.,
Minister for External Affairs of Australia;

The Honorable D. J. Eyre, M.P., Minister
of Defense of New Zealand;

His Excellency Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan;

The Honorable Librado D. Cayco, Under
Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines;

His Excellency Thanat Khoman, Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Thailand;

The Right Honorable Michael Stewart, M.P.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of
the United Kingdom;

The Honorable George W. Ball, Under Sec-
retary of State of the United States.

Observers were:

His Excellency M. Achille Clarac, Council
Representative for France;

His Excellency Vu Van Mau, Ambassador
of the Republic of Viet-Nam in London.

North Atlantic Council Meets at London

Press release 113 dated May 13

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE¹

1. The North Atlantic Council held its Spring Ministerial Meeting in London on May 11 and 12, 1965.

2. In a comprehensive survey of the international scene, the Ministers noted that so far as Europe was concerned, the situation was basically unchanged. There had been no major crisis or confrontation, and the trend towards increased contacts between East and West had continued.

3. Nevertheless, the fundamental causes of tension still persist, and little if any progress has been made towards removing them. Germany is still divided, and recent interferences with freedom of communication with Berlin² have once again shown the dangers of this situation. In these circumstances, the Council associated itself with the declaration issued by the Government of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America on May 12, 1965 (which is attached as an annex to this communique). At the same time, the Council confirmed the terms of its declaration of December 16, 1958,³ with regard to Berlin.

4. Member states are determined to work together, in accordance with the fundamental principles of the Alliance for Peace, freedom and the rule of law. They remain ready to seize any opportunity for achieving progressively a genuine improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. The Ministers agreed on the continuing necessity within the Alliance of exchanging information and views to the greatest extent possible, and of maintaining the maximum degree of harmonization in the policies pursued by member countries.

¹ Issued at London on May 12.

² For background, see BULLETIN of May 3, 1965, p. 658.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 5, 1959, p. 4.

5. The Ministers welcomed the continuing progress in political consultation within the Alliance. They observed with satisfaction that the practice had become more frequent of Ministers and high officials from capitals attending regular meetings of the Council in permanent session for discussion of subjects of special interest. They also noted that the Council in permanent session had embarked on the study of the state of the Alliance which it had been directed at the last Ministerial Meeting to undertake.⁴ They instructed the permanent representatives to continue the examination of this question with a view to submitting to the Ministers suggestions which could be discussed, if appropriate, at the December Ministerial Meeting.

6. The Ministers reviewed comprehensively the international situation with particular attention to areas of tension or conflict such as Malaysia, Vietnam, the Dominican Republic and some African states, where grave threats have arisen to international security and peace. They reaffirmed the right of all peoples to live at peace under Governments of their own free choice.

7. With regard to Greek-Turkish relations, the Ministers took note of the Secretary General's report on the "watching brief" which he continues to hold in conformity with the decision taken by the Ministers at the Hague meeting.⁵ In the course of the Ministerial meeting, contacts took place between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Greece and Turkey. Taking note of this, the Council expressed its satisfaction and its desire that these contacts should continue in a constructive spirit with a view to normalizing relations between these two member countries and promoting an improvement in the situation in Cyprus by assisting the efforts of the United Nations Force in Cyprus. It also expressed the hope that the search for an agreed equitable solution of the Cyprus problem, in conformity with the relevant resolution of the United

Nations Security Council, would thus be facilitated.

8. The hope was expressed that, without prejudging the legal and political position of any member country, an early solution would be found to the difficulties facing the United Nations, in order that the world organization might be enabled to play its proper role in helping to preserve international peace and security.

9. The Ministers reaffirmed their interest in the stability and the economic and social welfare of the developing countries.

10. The Ministers expressed their regret that so little progress had been made towards disarmament. For their part, they will continue to press for active negotiations to achieve measures of disarmament under effective international control. They also emphasized the importance they attach to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

11. So long as the threat of aggression, direct or indirect, persists, the prime task of the Atlantic Alliance will be to maintain a defensive posture adequate to deter attack and meet it effectively should the need arise. The Council expressed the hope that the meeting of Defense Ministers to be held in Paris on May 31 and June 1 would lead to further progress in elucidating the complex and inter-related problems of strategy, force requirements, and resources.

12. A meeting of the Council at the ministerial level will be held in Paris in December 1965.

ANNEX TO COMMUNIQUE

THREE-POWER DECLARATION ON GERMANY

The Governments of the Republic of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, together with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, have recently undertaken a further examination of the German problem and of the prospects for a resumption of discussions on this subject with the Government of the Soviet Union. The three Governments have taken this action by virtue of the obligations

⁴ For text of a communique issued at Paris on Dec. 17, 1964, see *ibid.*, Jan. 4, 1965, p. 2.

⁵ *Ibid.*, June 1, 1964, p. 852.

and responsibilities concerning Germany, including Berlin and access thereto, devolving upon them since the end of the Second World War and which they share with the Government of the Soviet Union.

Further study will be given to the possibility of an approach to the Soviet Government on this subject, with due regard to the prospect of such an approach leading to useful results.

The three Governments consider that in the absence of a real solution of the German problem, based on the exercise in the two parts of Germany of the right of self-determination, the situation in Europe as a whole will remain unsettled and that in consequence peace will not be fully assured on that continent. This solution is necessary not only in the interest of the German people, which asks for its reunification, but in the interest of all European peoples as well as other peoples concerned.

It is evident that the necessary settlement can only be achieved by peaceful means and in circumstances involving a general agreement assuring the security of all European states. The three Governments are convinced that the Government of the Federal Republic, which has solemnly renounced the use of force, is in agreement with them on these points. They reaffirm their belief that, in the interests of the peace of Europe and of the world, the necessary decisions cannot be indefinitely postponed.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Letter dated February 11 from the Representative of Czechoslovakia transmitting a statement of his Government concerning the "recent acts of aggression committed by the United States against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam." S/6187. February 11, 1965. 3 pp.

- Telegram dated February 12 from the President of Cyprus denying Turkish charges that Cyprus Government forces are preparing an offensive against Turkish Cypriots. S/6188. February 12, 1965. 1 p.
- Letter dated February 12 from the Representative of Turkey denying charges of violations of Greek airspace by Turkish aircraft. S/6189. February 12, 1965. 1 p.
- Letter dated February 12 from the Representative of Poland transmitting a statement of his Government concerning the "acts of aggression launched by the United States against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam." S/6190. February 15, 1965. 2 pp.
- Letter dated February 16 from Chargé d'Affaires a.i., of Portugal rejecting accusations by Senegal (S/6177). S/6192. February 17, 1965. 2 pp.
- Letter dated February 19 from the Representative of Turkey referring to the telegram of February 12 (S/6188) from the President of Cyprus and notifying the assurances given therein. S/6193. February 19, 1965. 4 pp.
- Letter dated February 19 from the Representative of Cyprus reiterating charges against Turkish Cypriots made in his letter of February 4 (S/6175) and reasserting the right of the Cyprus Government to maintain law and order. S/6194. February 19, 1965. 2 pp.
- Letter dated February 24 from the Acting Chargé d'Affaires of Senegal protesting a further incident of an attack on a Senegalese village by Portuguese soldiers. S/6196. February 24, 1965. 1 p.
- Letter dated February 18 from the Prime Minister of the Gambia applying for U.N. membership. S/6197. February 25, 1965. 2 pp.
- Letter dated February 18 from the Cambodian Minister for Foreign Affairs protesting allegations contained in the Thai letter of February 2. S/6198. February 25, 1965. 2 pp.
- Letter dated February 23 from the Representative of Turkey protesting a violation of Turkish airspace by Greek military aircraft. S/6199. February 23, 1965. 1 p.
- Letter dated February 23 from the Representative of Turkey denying Greek charges (S/6154) that Turkish aircraft had violated Greek airspace. S/6200. February 23, 1965. 1 p.
- Letter dated February 20 from the Representative of Hungary transmitting a resolution of the National Assembly of the Hungarian People's Republic concerning the "recent acts of aggression committed by the United States against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam." S/6201. February 25, 1965. 3 pp.
- Letter dated February 23 from the Representative of Mongolia transmitting a statement by his Government concerning "armed aggression by the United States" against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. S/6203. February 26, 1965. 3 pp.
- Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the text of a letter of February 25 from the Republic of Viet-Nam submitting "evidence of the systematic and continued aggression of the Hanoi regime against the Republic of Viet-Nam." S/6204. February 26, 1965. 3 pp.
- Letter dated February 27 from the Representative of Cyprus referring to the letter of February 19 from Turkey (S/6193) and reiterating the right of the Cyprus Government to maintain law and order. S/6205. February 27, 1965. 3 pp.
- Letter dated February 27 from the Representative of the United States transmitting a special report entitled *Aggression From the North: The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign To Conquer South Viet-Nam*. S/6206. February 27, 1965. 2 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica

The Antarctic Treaty. Signed at Washington December 1, 1959. Entered into force June 23, 1961. TIAS 4780.

Accession deposited: Denmark, May 20, 1965.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964.¹

Ratification deposited: Brazil, March 25, 1965.

Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

Acceptances deposited: Rumania, April 28, 1965; Trinidad and Tobago, April 27, 1965.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.

Ratification deposited: Kuwait (with a statement), May 20, 1965.

Property

Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, for the protection of industrial property, revised at Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, and at London June 2, 1934. Signed at London June 2, 1934. Entered into force August 1, 1938. TS 941.

Notification of adherence: Yugoslavia, May 7, 1965.

Safety at Sea

Convention on safety of life at sea. Done at London June 10, 1948. Entered into force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495.

Acceptance deposited: China, February 23, 1965.

Notification of denunciation received: United Kingdom (including Hong Kong), April 23, 1965; effective May 26, 1966.

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965.

Acceptances deposited: Finland, May 11, 1965; Saudi Arabia, May 3, 1965.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement establishing interim arrangement for a

¹ Not in force for the United States.

global commercial communications satellite system. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.

Approvals deposited: Argentina, May 19, 1965; Chile, May 18, 1965; India, May 17, 1965.

Notification of withdrawal of reservation of ratification: Greece, May 19, 1965.

Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.

Signature: Ministry of Communications, Directorate General of Telecommunications for Greece, May 19, 1965.

Trade

Declaration on relations between contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Government of the Polish People's Republic. Done at Tokyo November 9, 1959. Entered into force November 16, 1960. TIAS 4649.

Signature: Peru, April 2, 1965.

Declaration on provisional accession of Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 22, 1958. Entered into force for the United States April 29, 1960. TIAS 4461.

Signature: Iceland, March 8, 1965.

Declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 18, 1960. Entered into force October 14, 1962. TIAS 5184.

Signature: Malaysia, March 9, 1965.

Proces-verbal extending and amending declaration of provisional accession of Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 22, 1958 (TIAS 4461). Done at Geneva December 8, 1961. Entered into force for the United States January 9, 1962. TIAS 4957.

Signature: Iceland, March 8, 1965.

Protocol amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and development and to amend annex I. Open for acceptance, by signature or otherwise, at Geneva from February 8 until December 31, 1965.²

Acceptance deposited: Dahomey, April 30, 1965.

BILATERAL

Ecuador

Agreement extending, with modifications, the agreement of February 24, 1960 (TIAS 4429), relating to a cooperative program in Ecuador for the observation and tracking of satellites and space vehicles. Signed at Quito May 10, 1965. Entered into force May 10, 1965.

Guatemala

Agreement relating to the status of the Army and Air Force missions to Guatemala. Effected by exchange of notes at Guatemala April 29 and May 4, 1965. Entered into force May 4, 1965.

United Kingdom

Agreement for financing certain programs of educational and cultural exchange. Signed at London May 10, 1965. Entered into force May 10, 1965.

² Not in force.

President Asks Strengthening of Foreign Affairs Agencies

Following are letters from President Johnson to Vice President Humphrey, President of the Senate, and John W. McCormack, Speaker of the House of Representatives, together with a letter to Secretary Rusk and the text of an Executive order "Providing for the Appointment in the Competitive Service of Certain Present and Former Officers and Employees of the Foreign Service."

White House press release dated May 6

LETTER TO PRESIDENT OF SENATE¹

MAY 6, 1965

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In my message of January 14, 1965, to the Congress relative to foreign aid,² I stated that we would develop "a program which is designed to strengthen the personnel capabilities of all the foreign affairs agencies of the Government."

As part of this program, I have already taken certain important steps. On April 13, 1965, I transmitted for the advice and consent of the Senate a list of 760 USIA career officers for appointment as Foreign Service Officers.³ By this action, we take a big step towards a unified and flexible career Foreign Service of the United States better equipped to meet the pressing needs of modern diplomacy. Today I have signed an Executive Order "Providing for the Appointment in the Competitive Service of

¹ An identical letter was sent to the Speaker of the House.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 1, 1965, p. 126.

³ For text of a letter of Apr. 13 from President Johnson to Vice President Humphrey, see *ibid.*, May 10, 1965, p. 733.

Certain Present and Former Officers and Employees of the Foreign Service." This will permit qualified Foreign Service personnel to obtain appointments to Civil Service positions without re-examination. This will assist me in placing the right man in the right job.

The appointment of U.S. Information Agency officers as Foreign Service Officers and the signing of this order are two steps in the plan to improve and strengthen the administration of personnel employed in the agencies whose business is foreign affairs. Additional reforms will require legislation. Towards this end, there is pending in the House of Representatives a measure (H.R. 6277) to provide much needed Amendments to the Foreign Service Act of 1946. That bill has been ably developed by Congressman Wayne Hays of Ohio, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations, following discussions with Administration officials. Enactment of a bill along the lines of the Hays bill is another vital step.

I urge the Congress to enact amendments to the Foreign Service Act this year. I say "this year," so that the Secretary of State and I, and the other officials, can get on with the task of providing the very best personnel system we can produce for foreign affairs.

Our ability to seize the opportunities and to use our vast resources to further the aims of the United States foreign policy must in large measure rest on the dedication and capabilities of people involved in our foreign activities. In no other area of governmental activity is it more vital to our national interest to develop and retain a corps of well-qualified men and women. It must also attract the outstanding youth of today so that tomorrow's work will be in capable hands.

The new system we seek to establish will be based on the following principles:

(a) There will be a single Foreign Affairs Personnel system, broad enough to accommodate the personnel needs—domestic as well as overseas—of the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, and the U. S. Information

Agency, and to cover appropriate personnel of other agencies engaged in foreign affairs.

(b) This system must be fully responsive to Presidential requirements and the changing conditions in our foreign relations.

(c) Although certain basic policies and prerequisites will be applied to all members of the system, full recognition will be given to the differences between the various categories of personnel and their respective conditions of service.

(d) The heads of the participating agencies will be responsible for implementing personnel policies and for the management control of their own personnel.

(e) Free interchange of personnel among the foreign affairs agencies and between these agencies and the other departments and agencies of the Executive Branch will be sought.

(f) Maximum flexibility will be sought in the assignment process to enable management to meet unique requirements and crisis conditions with maximum efficiency and at a minimum cost.

(g) Increased coordination with the Civil Service system will be provided by closer liaison with the Civil Service Commission on various personnel activities.

(h) Appointments, promotions and selection-out of personnel will be based on the principle of competitive evaluation.

To carry out these principles, legislation is needed to do a number of things. Among these are:

(1) Provide a new category of professional career officers who would serve in the Foreign Service without time limitation, primarily for service in this country. This category should be called Foreign Affairs Officers. They should have personal rank and be subject to the same merit principles with respect to appointment, promotion, and selection-out as the other categories. Provision should be made for Foreign Affairs Officers of classes 1, 2, and 3 to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and those of classes 4 through 8 to be appointed by the President alone or by the Secretary of State when di-

rected by the President.

(2) Provide a transitional period of three years during which civil service employees of the foreign affairs agencies may decide to become participants in the new system without screening and without loss of compensation. Those who do not wish to participate will be assisted in obtaining suitable employment in other Government agencies. But after the transitional period the dual Foreign Service-Civil Service personnel systems of the foreign affairs agencies would be ended, and only the unified Foreign Service would apply. The Secretary of State will be responsible for its overall management.

(3) Eliminate restrictions on the periods of service of Foreign Service personnel in the headquarters of Government agencies.

(4) Reduce the requirements regarding length of service in other Government agencies prior to establishing eligibility for appointment into the Foreign Service Officer classes 1 through 7.

(5) Eliminate present restrictions on re-appointments of Foreign Service Reserve officers.

(6) Permit extension of selection-out and severance pay provisions, now limited to Foreign Service officers, to all officers and employees of the Foreign Service.

To meet the present-day realities of service abroad, legislation also is needed to provide important changes in benefits available to Foreign Service personnel. These have been made necessary by trouble-spot situations of service, such as in the Congo or in Viet-Nam. It is only right that we properly and compassionately look after the men and women whom we must send to such places to do our Government's business. These changes are:

—Amendment to the Annual and Sick Leave Act to permit continuation of employees in duty status if they incur injury or illness arising from a hostile act in line of duty or stemming from the fact that they were located abroad.

—Amendment to the Overseas Differentials and Allowances Act to permit in-

creasing the differential from the present limit of 25% to a limit of 50% when an employee is assigned duty in a foreign area where there is unusual danger of injury directly due to hostile activity.

—Amendment to the Foreign Service Act, Section 911, to permit the payment of travel expenses of employees and dependents when warranted by extraordinary conditions, or circumstances involving unusual personal hardship.

Representatives of the Department of State, the Civil Service Commission, and others are prepared to explain the Administration's position on this measure and to help in any way they can.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

LETTER TO SECRETARY RUSK

MAY 6, 1965

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have today written the enclosed letters to the Congress regarding our program for strengthening the personnel capabilities of all the foreign affairs agencies of the Government. I have also signed the Executive Order "Providing for the Appointment in the Competitive Service of Certain Present and Former Officers and Employees of the Foreign Service."

These documents emphasize the need for legislative action this year. I ask you and other interested officials to do all you can to assure timely enactment.

It is important in the management of foreign affairs that you and I have the improved legal framework for foreign affairs personnel that the proposed amendments to the Foreign Service Act will provide. I fully support the objectives of the proposed foreign affairs personnel program and would appreciate it if you would assume responsibility for its full development and implementation.

I also ask that you work with the Civil Service Commission and the Bureau of the Budget in undertaking necessary and adequate consultations with representatives of

affected employee groups. We must be sure to protect the legitimate interests of every one involved. It is very important that both officers and memberships of employee organizations understand what reforms we are attempting to bring about.

I shall expect you to insure that personnel policies and actions of the Department, AID, and USIA are guided by uniform standards and criteria. Perhaps this could be accomplished through continued use of the Board of the Foreign Service, including on it representatives of AID and USIA. I shall expect the continued fair administration of the Foreign Service, with due regard to the principles of merit, that has been the mark of that Service since its modernization under the Rogers Act in 1924.

Because the proposed amendments will expand the coverage of the Foreign Service Act to additional employees of agencies other than the Department of State, a broadened interagency role will result for those involved in the administration of the Act. Accordingly, while the Director General of the Foreign Service will continue to be appointed by the Secretary of State, I would believe it appropriate that, when any future appointment to that position is proposed, you consult with the heads of other agencies participating in the foreign affairs personnel system and obtain the President's approval before the appointment is made.

Our continued high goal is to get the very best people we can to do the work of this Government. Work in foreign affairs is particularly important. It must be so managed with skill and dedication as to assure success in our relations with other countries.

I have the highest appreciation of the abilities and devotion of all those who are now working in the foreign affairs field. Enactment of a legal framework unifying them into a single foreign affairs personnel system will enhance their total usefulness to their country. I am confident the new Foreign Service will make us better able to fulfill America's role throughout the world.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

EXECUTIVE ORDER 11219⁴

PROVIDING FOR THE APPOINTMENT IN THE COMPETITIVE SERVICE OF CERTAIN PRESENT AND FORMER OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 1753 of the Revised Statutes and the Civil Service Act (22 Stat. 403), and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. Under regulations and conditions prescribed by the Civil Service Commission, a present or former officer or employee of the Foreign Service may be appointed in the competitive service if he:

(a) Is qualified for the position in the competitive service;

(b) Was appointed in the Foreign Service under authority of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended, or legislation that supplements or replaces that Act;

(c) Served in the Foreign Service under an unlimited, career-type appointment and, immediately before his separation from that appointment, he completed at least one year of continuous service under one or more nontemporary appointments in the Foreign Service which may include the service that made him eligible for his career-type appointment; and

(d) Is appointed within 3 years after his separation from the Foreign Service, or he completed at least 3 years of substantially continuous service under one or more nontemporary appointments in the Foreign Service immediately before his separation from the unlimited, career-type appointment in that Service which may include the service that made him eligible for such appointment, or he is entitled to preference under section 2 of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, as amended.

SEC. 2. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, a person appointed under Section 1 of this Order becomes a career conditional employee.

(b) A person appointed under Section 1 of this Order becomes a career employee when he:

(1) Has completed at least 3 years of substantially continuous service under one or more nontemporary appointments in the Foreign Service immediately before his separation from the unlimited, career-type appointment in that Service which may include the service that made him eligible for such appointment;

(2) Is appointed to a position in the competitive service required by law or Executive order to be filled on a permanent or career basis; or

(3) Has completed the service requirement for career tenure in the competitive service.

For the purpose of subparagraph (3) of this paragraph, service in the Foreign Service is creditable

⁴ 30 Fed. Reg. 6381.

in meeting the service requirement only if the person concerned is appointed to a nontemporary position in the competitive service under Section 1 of this Order within 30 days after his separation from the Foreign Service.

SEC. 3. A person appointed to a nontemporary position in the competitive service under Section 1 of this Order acquires a competitive status automatically on appointment.

SEC. 4. Any law, Executive order, or regulation that would disqualify an applicant for appointment in the competitive service shall also disqualify a person for appointment under Section 1 of this Order.

SEC. 5. For the purpose of this order, a person is deemed to be an officer or employee in the "Foreign Service" if he was appointed in any agency under authority of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended, or legislation that supplements or replaces that Act.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
May 6, 1965.

Confirmations

The Senate on May 17 confirmed the following nominations:

Mercer Cook, now Ambassador to the Republic of Senegal, to serve concurrently as Ambassador to The Gambia. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated May 8.)

Leonard C. Meeker to be Legal Adviser of the Department of State. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 125 dated May 26.)

George A. Morgan to be Ambassador to the Republic of Ivory Coast. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated May 8.)

Anthony M. Solomon to be an Assistant Secretary of State. (For biographic details, see White House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated April 18.)

Designations

William C. Trimble as Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, effective May 20.

Correction

BULLETIN of May 3, 1965, p. 656: In the text of the U.S. note of April 2, the fourth paragraph should read: "On February 7, 1965, at about 5:45 p.m., GMT, . . ."

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Technical Cooperation. Agreement with Somali Republic, extending the agreement of January 28 and February 4, 1961, as extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Mogadiscio December 29 and 30, 1964. Entered into force December 30, 1964. TIAS 5738. 4 pp. 5¢.

Cultural Relations. Arrangement with Rumania—Signed at Washington December 23, 1964. Entered into force December 23, 1964. TIAS 5739. 9 pp. 10¢.

Maritime Matters—Use of Portuguese Ports and Territorial Waters by the N.S. Savannah. Agreement with Portugal. Exchange of notes—Signed at Lisbon November 12, 1964. Entered into force November 12, 1964. TIAS 5740. 10 pp. 10¢.

Trade in Cotton Textile. Arrangement with Portugal—Signed at Lisbon March 12, 1964. Entered into force March 12, 1964. With related notes. TIAS 5741. 10 pp. 10¢.

Naval Training and Air Force Missions to Peru. Agreement with Peru, extending the agreement of July 31, 1940, and October 7, 1946, as amended and extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Lima March 15, April 21, and June 2, 1961. Entered into force April 21 and June 2, 1961, respectively. TIAS 5742. 5 pp. 5¢.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Laos. Exchange of notes—Signed at Vientiane December 29, 1964. Entered into force December 29, 1964. TIAS 5746. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Iceland—Signed at Reykjavik December 30, 1964. Entered into force December 30, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5748. 9 pp. 10¢.

Claims of United States Nationals. Agreement with Yugoslavia—Signed at Belgrade November 5, 1964. Entered into force January 20, 1965. With minute and exchange of notes. TIAS 5750. 9 pp. 10¢.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Republic of Korea. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington January 26, 1965. Entered into force January 26, 1965. With exchanges of letters. TIAS 5751. 14 pp. 10¢.

Fisheries—King Crab. Agreement with U.S.S.R.—Signed at Washington February 5, 1965. Entered into force February 5, 1965. TIAS 5752. 9 pp. 10¢.

Defense—Military Assistance to India. Agreement with India. Exchange of notes—Signed at New Delhi January 13, 1965. Entered into force January 13, 1965. TIAS 5753. 6 pp. 5¢.

Trade in Cotton Textile. Agreement with China, amending the agreement of October 19, 1963, as

amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington January 13, 1965. Entered into force January 13, 1965. TIAS 5754. 3 pp. 5¢.

Tracking Stations. Agreement with Mexico, extending the agreement of April 12, 1960, as extended and amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at México January 27, 1965. Entered into force January 27, 1965. TIAS 5755. 3 pp. 5¢.

Trade in Cotton Textile. Agreement with Spain, amending the agreement of October 30, 1964. Exchange of notes—Dated at Washington January 22 and February 3, 1965. Entered into force February 3, 1965. TIAS 5756. 2 pp. 5¢.

Defense—Extension of Loan of Vessels to Brazil. Agreement with Brazil. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rio de Janeiro January 19 and 21, 1965. Entered into force January 21, 1965. TIAS 5757. 3 pp. 5¢.

Defense—Extension of Loan of Vessels to Spain. Agreement with Spain. Exchange of notes—Signed at Madrid January 11, 1965. Entered into force January 11, 1965. TIAS 5758. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Dahomey—Signed at Cotonou December 31, 1964. Entered into force December 31, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5759. 13 pp. 10¢.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 17-23

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to May 17 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 93 of April 29; 100 of May 6; 110 of May 12; and 111 and 113 of May 13.

No.	Date	Subject
*114	5/18	Hoyt sworn in as Ambassador to Uruguay (biographic details).
†115	5/18	<i>Foreign Relations</i> volume released.
†116	5/19	Amendment to cotton textile arrangement with Japan.
117	5/19	Bunker: statement before OAS Foreign Ministers on Dominican Republic.
*118	5/19	Tyler sworn in as Ambassador to the Netherlands (biographic details).
119	5/20	Sale of counterpart currency to U.S. citizens in India.
*120	5/20	Trimble designated Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs (biographic details).
121	5/20	Bunker: statement before OAS Foreign Ministers on Dominican Republic.
†122	5/21	Supplementary income tax protocol with Belgium.
123	5/21	Foreign policy conference, Pittsburgh, Pa.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

Africa. Trimble designated Deputy Assistant Secretary 933

American Republics. OAS Secretary General To Represent Meeting of Consultation in Dominican Republic; Brazilian To Command Inter-American Force (Bunker, resolutions) 908

Asia

East-West Center Review Board Holds First Meeting (Johnson) 905

SEATO Council Ministers Hold 10th Meeting at London (Ball, communique) 920

Austria. Tenth Anniversary of Signing of Australian State Treaty (Rusk) 898

Congress

Confirmations (Cook, Meeker, Morgan, Solomon) 933

President Asks Strengthening of Foreign Affairs Agencies (letters to Humphrey, McCormack, Rusk; Executive order) 930

Department and Foreign Service

Confirmations (Cook, Meeker, Morgan, Solomon) 933

Designations (Trimble) 933

President Asks Strengthening of Foreign Affairs Agencies (letters to Humphrey, McCormack, Rusk; Executive order) 930

Dominican Republic

OAS Secretary General To Represent Meeting of Consultation in Dominican Republic; Brazilian To Command Inter-American Force (Bunker, resolutions) 908

U.N. Security Council Considers Situation in Dominican Republic (Stevenson) 913

Economic Affairs

Solomon confirmed as Assistant Secretary 933

U.S. Citizens in India May Buy Counterpart Currency 907

Educational and Cultural Affairs. East-West Center Review Board Holds First Meeting (Johnson) 905

Gambia, The. Cook confirmed as Ambassador 933

India. U.S. Citizens in India May Buy Counterpart Currency 907

International Law. Prospects of Law in a World of Conflict (Meeker) 900

International Organizations and Conferences. OAS Secretary General To Represent Meeting of Consultation in Dominican Republic; Brazilian To Command Inter-American Force (Bunker, resolutions) 908

Ivory Coast. Morgan confirmed as Ambassador 933

Military Affairs

Mr. McNamara Reports on Use of Supplemental Appropriation 896

OAS Secretary General To Represent Meeting of Consultation in Dominican Republic; Brazilian To Command Inter-American Force (Bunker, resolutions) 908

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. North Atlantic Council Meets at London (communique) 926

Presidential Documents

East-West Center Review Board Holds First Meeting 905

Mr. McNamara Reports on Use of Supplemental Appropriation 896

President Asks Strengthening of Foreign Affairs Agencies 930

Public Affairs. Foreign Policy Conference To Be Held at Pittsburgh 905

Publications. Recent Releases 934

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. SEATO Council Ministers Hold 10th Meeting at London (Ball, communique) 920

Treaty Information. Current Actions 929

United Kingdom. Memorial to President Kennedy at Runnymede (Rusk) 897

United Nations

Current U.N. Documents 928

Prospects of Law in a World of Conflict (Meeker) 900

U.N. Security Council Considers Situation in Dominican Republic (Stevenson) 913

Viet-Nam

Mr. McNamara Reports on Use of Supplemental Appropriation 896

Reality and Myth Concerning South Viet-Nam (William P. Bundy) 890

Name Index

Ball, George W 920

Bundy, William P 890

Bunker, Ellsworth 908

Cook, Mercer 933

Johnson, President 896, 905, 930

McNamara, Robert S 896

Meeker, Leonard C 900, 933

Morgan, George A 933

Rusk, Secretary 897, 898

Solomon, Anthony M 933

Stevenson, Adlai E 913

Trimble, William C 933

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Aggression From the North

The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign To Conquer South Viet-Nam

President Johnson declared in an address on February 17 that the purpose of the United States in Viet-Nam "is to join in the defense and protection of freedom of a brave people who are under attack that is controlled and that is directed from outside their country." *Aggression From the North* is a 64-page report, illustrated with maps and photographs, which summarizes the massive evidence of that attack and its source of support.

The introduction to the Department's pamphlet closes with these words: "The Government of the United States believes that evidence should be presented to its own citizens and to the world. It is important for free men to know what has been happening in Viet-Nam, and how and why. That is the purpose of this report."

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THE
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BULLETIN

Vol. LII, No. 1355



June 14, 1965

SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF MAY 26 938

PRINCIPLES OF U.N.-OAS RELATIONSHIP IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Statements by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson 975

THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL LIQUIDITY

by Frederick L. Deming 955

DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Statements by Harland Cleveland and Adrian S. Fisher 997

For index see inside back cover

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 26

Press release 126 dated May 26

SECRETARY RUSK: Gentlemen, we were outranked from our regular room for our press conference. This does not mean that we will be rattling around in here in later press conferences. This is just a temporary adjustment.

The Situation in the Dominican Republic

As you know, since May 1 there has been meeting a Consultation Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of American States. Up to this point each foreign minister has designated a representative, but tomorrow a number of foreign ministers will attend personally in order to take stock of the situation in the Dominican Republic and decide what further steps are necessary.¹

I think a stocktaking is of some value at this point, because a number of things have been accomplished and there is certain unfinished business still in front of us.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of May 17, 1965, p. 738; May 31, 1965, p. 854; and June 7, 1965, p. 908.

At the very beginning the principal pre-occupation was the elementary question of the safety of American and foreign nationals. We have evacuated more than 4,000 people from the Dominican Republic, about 1,800 Americans and about 2,300 foreign nationals of some 46 countries. I think that we, given the facts as we knew them at that time, agree with what seems to be the consensus of the diplomatic corps stationed in Santo Domingo, that the prompt arrival of American forces averted a major disaster. Now, that part of the mission was successfully accomplished.

Then you will recall that the Organization of American States called for the establishment of an international safety zone and later the associated lines of communications required for that zone. That was established, and I have no doubt whatever that that safety zone and its accompanying facilities has had a great deal to do with the reduction of bloodshed in that island and a provision of an area of stability and peace which would be available to all elements, foreign and domestic, in that situation. And so that mission was successfully carried out.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOL. LII, NO. 1355 PUBLICATION 7909 JUNE 14, 1965

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the Department of State Bulletin as the source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

Then we had to give very serious thought to the needs, the daily needs, of some 3½ million Dominicans. It was very important that the essential structure of the country not disintegrate despite the anarchy and chaos that existed in and around Santo Domingo itself, and so very large quantities of foodstuffs and of course smaller quantities of medicine had to be made available, regardless of political problems, regardless of political sides or orientation, in order to keep the essential structure of the country going during this period.

A number of countries have contributed. We ourselves have made very large supplies available. A number of the Latin American countries have sent in food and medicine that has had to be distributed to both sides, and that has been accomplished.

Then it became apparent that there was a possibility that extremist elements would attempt—were attempting—to capitalize on the anarchy and the disorder to seize control of the mobs and to try to assert a position of power that would destroy the democracy of the Dominican Republic. I think that threat has been very substantially reduced, although not completely eliminated.

And then our forces, and more lately the inter-American forces, have had responsibility for assisting in the maintenance of a cease-fire. We hope that that can continue to be successful. That does not mean that the cease-fire has been completely observed on all sides, but we are pleased to see that in general the bloodshed has been largely stopped, although there continue to be snipers and there continue to be problems. I think in the last 10 days there have been over 500 breaches of the cease-fire of which we have had to take account. Just yesterday, for example, there were some 20 violations of the cease-fire, and on 8 of those occasions our own forces were required to return fire. But, broadly speaking, that cease-fire called for by the OAS and later by the U.N.² has been pretty well established.

Therefore we can take considerable satisfaction in what has been accomplished thus

far. The principal piece of unfinished business is that of constituting among the Dominicans and by the Dominicans a broadly based provisional government which can accept responsibility for the affairs of that country pending elections and pending full return to the democratic and constitutional process.

Now, that is a difficult matter. We recognize the difficulty against the background of decades of violence. As one of the Dominican leaders put it the other day, the primary problem of any Dominican leader is to stay alive in that situation. But nevertheless not only we but others throughout the hemisphere and most responsible Dominicans hope very much that there can come into being a broadly based government which will be able to provide for the Dominicans the kind of democratic and constitutional society which is, we believe, their basic wish and their basic purpose.

There have been many consultations on that subject in recent days. We were pleased when last Friday [May 21] the Organization of American States gave its distinguished Secretary General, Dr. [José A.] Mora, an important responsibility in this regard. The earlier factfinding commission of the OAS apparently did not feel that it had such a mandate from the Organization of American States. Dr. Mora has been working on that matter very diligently with great competence. Our own people down there have worked closely with him and have been in touch with various elements of the Dominican Republic.

We cannot report that there has been broad success yet in that enterprise, though we are encouraged to believe that most elements in the Dominican Republic believe that the answer must be found through the processes of discussion and agreement on a broadly based government rather than on the processes of violence or further military action.

Looking ahead into the future a bit, I think that the Organization of American States can take some satisfaction from the fact that they have constituted an Inter-American Force to deal with this hemispheric problem. There are, I think, five contingents there now. There will be certain others com-

¹ *Ibid.*, May 31, 1965, p. 869.

ing shortly. This will make it possible for us to reduce our own forces. We have announced certain reductions already.

We will be in consultation with the Commander of the Inter-American Force, the distinguished Brazilian General [Hugo Pansco Alvim], about what he considers to be his requirements in the immediate future, and it may well be that further and prompt reductions in our forces can be accomplished.

But, looking ahead, the hemisphere needs to take up again the question of constituting some standby forces on a continuing basis, on prompt call, and the organization of a political machinery for taking hemispheric decisions promptly in the face of fast-moving events. Now, I have no doubt that that will be discussed in some detail as various foreign ministers gather tomorrow to see where we go from here.

That is a very brief and perhaps too short a summary, but I just wanted to make those opening remarks before we began.

Mr. Hensley.

Question of Communist Threat

Q. Mr. Secretary, much of the criticism about the American operation in the Dominican Republic would appear to boil down to the assertion that the United States overreacted, particularly with respect to the Communist threat, when the President said on May 2³ that the Communists had seized control of the rebellion and that this is making the political way back a bit difficult. Could you address yourself to that assertion?

A. I don't know how one draws the line between overreaction and underreaction and exactly what is right under the circumstances. There is no question at all in our minds that there was a very serious threat for a period that elements of the extreme left had in a very professional and highly organized way seized control of mobs who had been armed, and some of these elements were not under the discipline of any of the recognized political leadership of the Domini-

³ *Ibid.*, May 17, 1965, p. 744.

can Republic on either side, and that there was a very substantial threat.

And I am not impressed by the remark that there were several dozen known Communist leaders and that therefore this was not a very serious matter. There was a time when Hitler sat in a beer hall in Munich with seven people. And I just don't believe that one underestimates what can be done in chaos, in a situation of violence and chaos, by a few highly organized, highly trained people who know what they are about and know what they want to bring about.

We have had very reliable information from the responsible elements of all groups on both sides about what some of these people were doing, and although it would not be wise for me to go into detail on personalities or individuals, I think that you should assume that at least, whether you agree with us or not, we feel that we were acting on the basis of solid information, and that there were many others working with us down there on both sides in the Dominican Republic, as well as in the foreign diplomatic corps, who thoroughly agreed with our concern about this problem.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to clear up two points which depend partly on the correct understanding of the chronology that the administration has presented, and I hope it is right. In the early days, before the total chaos, before the American troops landed, a period that the President has described that the rebellion had noble purposes, it has now been said that at various points Colonel Caamaño [Francisco Caamaño Deño], Mr. Guzmán [Antonio Guzmán Sylvestre], and others had presented themselves at the U. S. Embassy and were given rather short shrift in their pleas for help to arrange a cease-fire and other forms of political assistance. Could you tell us whether this is true?

A. I don't recall personally that Mr. Guzmán came to the Embassy in that period. I think that there were talks with Mr. Caamaño. But when you go back to the Saturday morning in which the violence first erupted, there were strenuous efforts made

on all sides, by our own Ambassador [W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.], by the very distinguished and courageous dean of the diplomatic corps, the Papal Nuncio, and others to try to get the elements on both sides together to halt the fighting and to work out a pattern for a peaceful settlement of the internal situation.

Our own role at that time was precautionary in terms of the possible need to evacuate our own people. As you know, most governments have contingency evacuation plans for their own nationals and in regard to most situations, and our contingency evacuation plans involved moving of certain vessels into the area in the event they were needed for the evacuation of American citizens.

It was not until Wednesday, the 28th, in the late afternoon that we had before us the problem that there was violence which such authority as existed in the island could not control, that American and foreign nationals were in desperate danger. They were actually under fire at the time, and it was necessary to move promptly at that time if their safety was to be assured.

Q. The second point, sir, was that at that point, when there seemed to be a threat of the Communists taking over, the army forces of the Dominican Republic had been virtually defeated and it was not until our troops had arrived and specifically until former Ambassador [John Bartlow] Martin was on the ground that, with our encouragement, the junta of General Imbert [Antonio Imbert Barrera] was reconstituted. That would be the second.

A. Yes. It seems to me there was never any likelihood that either side would be wholly successful from a military point of view. As far as the civilian military group under General Imbert's leadership is concerned, we did encourage them to form a group which could try to assure the normal processes of the countryside which was not involved in downtown Santo Domingo. There were over 3 million people in the countryside, and it was necessary that they have the essential elements of civic order and civic life

if the needs of these 3 million people were to be taken care of. And so we did encourage these gentlemen to associate themselves and to try to help deal with the problems of those areas of the country that were not directly involved in the violence in Santo Domingo itself.

Q. Mr. Secretary, M. Peyrefitte [Alain Peyrefitte, French Minister of Information] this morning called the American presence in Santo Domingo foreign intervention and predicted that this will lead to some kind of escalation. This being an official French Government statement, I wondered if you would care to comment.

A. Well, I think that in Paris they might give more attention to the fact that the countries of this hemisphere as a group are dealing with this problem and that this is not a matter on which the French Government carries a very active responsibility.

Consultation With OAS

Q. Mr. Secretary, why did the administration not consult with the OAS before moving in the troops or at least concurrently inform the OAS about this action?

A. I think the answer to that is a very simple one indeed.

On Tuesday, the 27th, we did call together the Peace Committee of the OAS for a discussion of the situation in the Dominican Republic. It was the general view of the Peace Committee that it did not have a charter or a mandate itself to take up this situation because it was constituted to deal with disputes among governments and at the request of the several governments or the two governments that might be involved in the dispute.

We then, on the morning of the 28th, asked for a meeting of the Council of the OAS for a further discussion of the Dominican situation. That was before any decision was made to put in any troops. That was discussed, and I would have to say that we did not ourselves ask that specific action be taken with respect to troops or anything else, either in

the Peace Committee or in the Council of the Organization on the morning of the 28th, because we ourselves did not believe that the situation called for it.

As late as 4 o'clock in the afternoon of that Wednesday, we had in front of us reports from our Ambassador in which he himself was not recommending that we use our own forces with respect to that situation. But then, as you now know from other sources, the President and Secretary of Defense and I were in a meeting on another matter and about 5:15 we were handed a telegram from our Ambassador, saying that the situation had completely deteriorated, disintegrated, that the police and the military authorities there had indicated that they could no longer undertake responsibility for the security of American and foreign nationals, and that if these people were to be safe, U. S. forces would have to be employed.

Now, it was that telegram which was emergent, which was what we call a "critic telegram," that is, it's the fastest and most emergent kind that we have. That is, that telegram indicated that there was a most immediate problem on the scene. Hundreds were gathered in the Embajador Hotel, and there were people running around the hotel, shooting it up with tommyguns, and so forth. There were large numbers of people gathered on the Polo Grounds who were then apparently under fire.

When the Marines got there at 7 o'clock, or thereabouts, they in fact found that these people were under fire. So that at the time the decision was made, the decision was also made by the President to inform the troops, inform the OAS, and inform the Congress.

We had a meeting of the congressional leadership around 7 or 7:15, or thereabouts, and we immediately began calling Latin American ambassadors here to inform them. We met early the next morning to go into this situation.

Now, in retrospect, I suppose that one could say that it might have been somewhat better for us to have insisted upon a meeting that same evening. It might have looked better. But, in fact, when they met the next

morning, they felt that under the Charter of the OAS the Council standing alone was not empowered to act, that it was necessary to convene the Organ of Consultation in order to be able to take action.

And the general decision at that first morning's meeting was to give themselves 48 hours in order to get instructions from their governments and convene such a meeting. We were able to get a further meeting within 24 hours, that is, the next day, to take certain preliminary steps that were of assistance in the Dominican Republic.

But here's one of those situations where events themselves made it necessary that some action be taken before the formal machinery could be convoked and could act upon it on a multilateral basis. That has occurred before in a number of situations.

But what we would hope is that the Organization of American States would look at the experience in this particular problem to see whether the OAS itself needs to take additional steps to gear its own machinery to the requirements of a fast-moving situation. And that involves, of course, the possibility of standby inter-American forces that might be available in such a circumstance.

Mr. Gulick?

Q. Mr. Secretary, now that there is an indefinite period ahead without an interim government—at least for the time being—in the Dominican Republic, could you outline what aid steps the United States might be contemplating?

A. Well, I think that, first, the Secretary General of the OAS has a very large responsibility there at the present time with respect to several resolutions passed by the OAS, and that includes offering his good offices to the several elements on the island to see if they cannot reach a peaceful settlement of the problem on the island.

We feel that it is very important that the 3½ million people on that island not themselves suffer from these events if that can be avoided. We have moved in large quantities of foodstuffs and medicine. We have taken strenuous efforts working with local Domini-

can individuals and agencies and authorities to try to keep the economy of the country going, to keep production up, try to get pay to the workers, both in government, in private, in the private sector, so that the country doesn't just collapse, pending a final settlement of the governmental problem.

Now, we have put substantial resources in there already, but we are prepared to do what's necessary to try to sustain that country and the daily life of the people pending the final settlement and the general agreement on the government with which we can deal more efficiently. We are making a major effort in that connection.

The Situation in Viet-Nam

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you appraise the situation in South Viet-Nam, in view of Ambassador [Maxwell D.] Taylor's return this weekend?

A. Well, I think when he was here—when was it?—in March, when he was back last time, we indicated that he would be coming back from time to time, and we feel that it is desirable that he come back now for a full review of the situation.

There has been no dramatic change in the situation there. There has been some increase in Viet Cong activity in the last 2 weeks as compared with, say, the month or so before that. We believe that the Government has been moving with effectiveness in both its civilian and its military obligations. We want to see what can be done further to support the Vietnamese Government in its undertaking there. We will have a broad review with Ambassador Taylor when he gets back, but I see no major change in the situation there.

Q. In light of that, sir, Cyrus Eaton recently talked with [Soviet] Premier [Aleksai N.] Kosygin. And he quoted the Premier as saying that the increasing flow of American troops into South Viet-Nam meant that, according to Kosygin, that this was a challenge that Russia could not back down from, and that Kosygin further said that in a fairly

short time both Russia and China would move into the Vietnamese situation in some strength. Would you like to comment on that?

A. Well, I don't attach undue importance to what Mr. Cyrus Eaton has said. If the Soviet Government has views that it wishes to send to the United States Government, there are well-established channels for doing so.

I think it is very important, however, that no one misunderstand the gravity of the situation. If, in fact, those who are supporting North Viet-Nam, or feel themselves associated with North Viet-Nam, feel that they can drive us out of our commitments there in Southeast Asia—these commitments are serious, they are of long standing—we are determined. We have tried on many occasions over the last 4½ years to find a peaceful settlement of the situation in Southeast Asia. We thought that we had made a substantial step forward in that regard with the Laotian accords of 1962, but those failed through lack of performance on the other side from the very moment of their signature. We have never succeeded, in all of the discussions that have occurred in 4½ years, in establishing any basis of agreement on the situation in South Viet-Nam itself.

Now, this is a serious matter with us, and I think it is very important that people on the other side understand that it is utterly serious and that prudence and wisdom on all sides requires an attempt to find a peaceful settlement of this matter promptly.

You see, we have here once again the difficulty of bridging the gulfs of misunderstanding that exist because of ideological differences and ideological commitments. When we ourselves say, as we have said for a long time, that we don't want a larger war out there in Southeast Asia, that all we are interested in is the safety of these people in South Viet-Nam, their right to be left alone by their neighbors, it would be a great mistake if the other side should think that that means that they can have a larger war with impunity and that a larger war on their side

would remove us from Southeast Asia.

This is always the problem in getting across, to people who are on another ideological base, what the real situation is in a problem of this sort. We have been there before, since World War II and on other occasions; so this is not a new kind of problem. We have had other times when the other side has said, "What is ours is ours, and what is yours must be talked about and must be divided up again."

These are things in which everyone must cut through ideological differences and realize that there are very serious issues engaged here and that we are determined, but that we can make peace tomorrow if these people would leave their neighbors alone out there.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what effect has recent U.S. policy in Viet-Nam, specifically since the beginning of the airstrikes north, had on Soviet-Chinese relations?

A. Well, we have never had any serious discussion with either Moscow or Peiping about their relations with each other. Neither one of them confides with us on this matter. We do observe what they say publicly to each other through their public statements. There obviously continue to be very important differences between Moscow and Peiping, and the situation in Southeast Asia has been caught up in one way or another in those differences. But I can't really estimate at this point what the effect of that might be if these two capitals compete with each other on the subject of who is best supporting Hanoi in its aggression toward the South.

The net result of that doesn't do us any good, even though this may reflect important differences between Moscow and Peiping. But I think that both those capitals have some very serious policy considerations to think about.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been reports in recent days that not one but a number of missile sites have been spotted by reconnaissance planes in the Hanoi area. I wonder, sir, if you could give us an estimate of how extensive this construction is? And, secondly, whether you regard this in some way

as a deepening of the Soviet commitment to North Viet-Nam?

A. Well, I think we have already indicated that we have confirmed the one and that there may be a second in the immediate Hanoi area. We don't know whether there may be others in that area, in terms of the normal geographic positioning of such sites around a heavily populated area.

In answer to your second question, "Does this involve a deepening in the commitment?" I think the answer to that is yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, neither in your opening statement nor subsequently in reply to questions have you used the word "Communist" in referring to this possible takeover in the Dominican Republic. You prefer to call it "leftist" or "leftist extremists." I wonder if there is anything significant in that?

A. None at all. I will be glad to call them Communists.

Q. And, also, could you tell us how the threat has been reduced? In other words, presumably these 55 Communist leaders are still in the rebel zone. Is that correct?

A. Well, we suspect that some of them have, shall we say, returned underground, but that others are active and are known to be there.

As you know, in that unfortunate incident near the National Palace the other day one of them was killed along with one of Mr. Juan Bosch's close associates—a rather curious episode that we still don't fully understand.

But they have been active in there from the beginning. They are still active, some of them.

I think, however, that when I talk about a reduced threat, I think what I am basically saying is that it is now clear to everyone that a solution here is not going to be found by violence and military means; that the solution must be found by the political processes of discussion and agreement, and the processes of a constitutional democratic society.

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes.

The Inter-American Force

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us some idea of how long our troops will have to be in the Dominican Republic, do you think?

A. Well, we would hope that the situation would soon reach a point where there could be substantial reductions. But I think the question of the duration of the presence there of an Inter-American Force, of which our troops would be a component part, would be something that the Organization of American States would take up in connection with its estimate of the total situation. I wouldn't want to predict precisely. I should think some of them may be there for a while, but we would hope there could be a substantial reduction before too long.

Q. Sir, you have been involved in negotiations with India and Pakistan in restoring peace on the borders. I was wondering, sir, what the status is and what has been the outcome of the efforts.

A. We, of course, fully support the efforts made by the British Government. It is in touch with both sides to try to arrange a cease-fire and a resumption of political discussions of differences that divide these two great countries of the subcontinent. We are in touch with both Governments frequently on this matter, and we would hope very much that these discussions could come to a good conclusion.

I think as far as details are concerned that I wouldn't want to elaborate at this point, because I think the processes of peace here are too important to get into prematurely and I wouldn't want to make things more difficult for those who are trying to work out a peaceful settlement in both countries and between both countries.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you appraise the role of Guzmán in the Dominican Republic in relation to the charges that have been brought against him in the last day or two?

A. Well, I am not advised as to what the source of those charges might have been. The auditors' report itself does not implicate Mr. Guzmán, does not itself point any finger

at him. We have no information ourselves indicating irregularities on Mr. Guzmán's part. When the matter first reached the press a day or so ago, we felt that since we ourselves were not informed in detail on the Agricultural Bank and its operations, that it would be better for Mr. Guzmán to comment himself. And I gather that the auditors have also commented on that matter.

I think that's about all I can say on it. But we do not have any indication that Mr. Guzmán has been involved in irregularities.

You see, when he was Minister of Agriculture under the Bosch government, for example, he was ex officio member of the board of that Bank but did not, we understand, take a very active part in its actual operations.

Now, it is true, as far as the Bank is concerned, our own people have been in touch with them over the past 2 years about the way in which our aid (to the extent that it involves the Bank)—our aid is administered. We have had assurances and satisfaction on the relationship between the Bank and our own aid activities in the island. But I think there is nothing more I can add to that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do we regard Mr. Guzmán as a likely person to head the government down there?

A. Well, I think that the question of personalities is still one for discussion. As you know, we have been talking frequently with Mr. Guzmán about the possibilities of a coalition government. But it is in the nature of a coalition government that it have broad representation and be based upon a broad agreement among different political elements.

I think, therefore, it would not be for me to answer your question precisely. This is a matter for the Dominicans to work out through these processes of mediation and discussion that have been going on for the last 10 days or 2 weeks.

Q. Mr. Secretary, many observers in Santo Domingo say that if a free election were to be held tomorrow Colonel Caamaño just might win. Would the United States con-

template a place for him in any provisional government?

A. Well, I think the matter of agreeing on a provisional government for the purpose of administering the country until an election can be held is the first requirement here. Now, what the Dominican people would do in their own choices in such an election, and who the candidates might be, would be very much for the future.

I just don't know what the results would be. I have not heard the particular point that you have just made.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does the United States have any specific proposals to make to the OAS in connection with this standby force, or the new machinery?

A. Well, we will be discussing that matter. As you know, we had hoped to convene a general meeting of the inter-American system in Rio in May—this month. But that was postponed for a period, a short period, because of the Dominican problem, and the preoccupation of most of the foreign ministers with that problem, and the interruption which it injected into the preparations for the conference. I think we undoubtedly will be discussing informally with the foreign ministers while they are here this matter. But whether final action or formal action would be taken prior to an inter-American meeting, I think it would be too soon to say. We want to know what the others think about it.

Yes, sir.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in yesterday's briefing there was a rather agonizing discussion about ethics and about writers who write and demands that you hold a press conference so you could be asked about it. And Mr. McCloskey [Robert J. McCloskey, Director, Office of News] said he was entering that in the record, and I wondered if he is holding out on you, too. (Laughter.)

A. Well, why don't you ask your question? Here I am.

Q. Well, I wonder if you could discuss the

ethical question of Mr. Martin's writing about the Dominican situation?

A. Yes. There is no problem on that, unless you gentlemen have a problem about not having written it first. (Laughter.)

Mr. Martin was not down there on an official appointment. He was not down there as a salaried employee of the Government. He was a former Ambassador, and particularly was Ambassador during the Presidency of Mr. Juan Bosch. He was asked to go down to establish contact with many of the people that he had known during that period, a good number of whom were in the downtown area of Santo Domingo.

You see, an ambassador normally knows best those people who are in the government while he is accredited to that particular capital. We felt that Mr. Martin might be able to be of considerable assistance to Mr. Bennett by being in touch with people that Mr. Martin had known when he was serving there as an ambassador during the Juan Bosch government.

He has been on our consultant list in the Department of State. Since he has returned, we have asked him to take on certain things for us. But his status down there was that of a private citizen who had been asked to go down by us here in Washington to be of assistance in this situation. This is not an unusual circumstance at all.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have said that the provisional government was a matter for the Dominicans themselves. There have been some current reports from Santo Domingo that objections by at least some United States officials to some of the proposed candidates for the coalition have also contributed to the deadlock. Can you say whether we as well as the Dominicans are haggling over names?

A. Well, I think that all the governments of the hemisphere would be interested in the character of the government that emerges in the Dominican Republic. But I can assure you that differences which we might have had with one or another person pale to insignificance compared to the differences among the Dominicans themselves.

Secretary Discusses Dominican Situation on NBC-TV

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Rusk by John Chancellor, which was part of an NBC television program of May 28 entitled "Santo Domingo: War Among Friends."

Press release 131 dated May 28

Mr. Chancellor: Mr. Secretary, I think most people would like to know how long must American troops remain in Santo Domingo? I realize you can't give us a precise answer, but is it likely to be a long time?

SECRETARY RUSK: That would depend on further decisions of the Organization of American States.¹ As you know, a very distinguished Brazilian general is commanding that force; we would be prepared to remove our force just as rapidly as he feels it is militarily prudent and safe to do so. The President this week has announced certain reductions as a first step, but we feel we should not give—all of us in the hemisphere—should not give the commander of the Force important missions and then take away the resources that he would need to carry out the mission. I would think that they would be there for some weeks. It is possible that they could be there—some of them could be there longer, but that will depend on the evolution of the situation.

Q. Well, may I ask you then a political question based on that? Do you see any easy or quick solution to the Dominican political problem?

A. Well, this is a problem which was at the heart of the beginning of this affair, and it, of course, is the key question about winding it up. We are convinced that the solution must be a Dominican solution, that Dominican leaders themselves must find the answer to a government which can govern the country pending elections. Now, it's not just the

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of June 7, 1965, p. 908.

Q. Mr. Secretary, just for the sake of clarity, when you spoke a moment ago about some SAM sites in North Viet-Nam, were you talking about completed sites, sites under construction, or missiles present?

A. We understand that in one of these sites there is present a missile-associated equipment. I wouldn't want to go into detail. But I would suppose that we could all assume that if they build SAM sites they don't build them to let them remain empty.

Q. Sir, one more question, if I may ask. What has bothered the people abroad greatly is your commitment to the charter, not only to the OAS Charter but to the U.N. Charter. I was wondering whether you can reconcile your intrusion into the Dominican Republic with the two charters, legally speaking?

A. Both the Organization of American States and the Security Council have had a full opportunity to pass judgment on that matter, and neither one of them has considered what we have done in violation of the charters—of either charter.

Q. Mr. Secretary, since the Martin question was raised, I don't think you answered the question, which was concerning the ethics. You made a good case as to why he was valuable to Mr. Bennett at the time. But what I would like to ask is, one, whether (I don't know whether this is ethics)—but, one, whether his article was cleared for publication by the White House and the Department. Because this raises the question as to whether, private citizen or not, he was putting on the public record information which had not yet been disclosed officially, if he were doing so.

A. Yes, he was giving an account of his personal experiences in this situation. He himself is a former newspaper man, as you know.

I will be glad to sit down with you gentlemen at some length in a private session to talk about ethics, if you like. (Laughter.)

The Press: Thank you very much.

United States that takes the view that extremes on both sides should not take part in any such arrangements. You will recall that the Organization of American States applied sanctions against Trujillo. You also recall that at the Punta del Este conference in January 1962, and again last summer when we were considering the Venezuelan case, this hemisphere made it very clear that Communist regimes are incompatible with the institutions of this hemisphere.² So we should forget those two extremes and try to find among Dominicans a moderate group—a center group—a coalition group—that can take responsibility for the country until the people themselves can decide how they want to be governed.

Q. Would you say, sir, that, given this formula, Colonel Caamaño or General Imbert could figure in to lead or dominate a coalition government?

A. Well, this is a matter that is difficult to talk about. Personalities are hard to get into at this point, but I would think that the feelings that have run so high during this past month are such that those who have taken the most active part would probably not be the basis for a government. Now that does not mean that one or another of them might not have some role to play in the Dominican Republic, but the very controversy itself, I think, makes it a difficult matter to bring these people together.

Q. What about the OAS role? While the Dominicans are sorting out their political problems, which, as you say, may take a very long time, is there the possibility of an OAS trusteeship? What would be your view on that?

A. I think we should reject the idea of a trusteeship. The Dominican people, I think, would resent it. I think the Organization of American States would be very reluctant to attempt to impose a trusteeship on one of the countries of the hemisphere. On the other hand, the OAS will have to provide a lot of assistance to the Dominican Republic during

² For background, see *ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270, and Aug. 10, 1964, p. 174.

this period: the Inter-American Force, the provision of food and medicine, the help that is needed to get the economy of the country into full operation, perhaps some technical assistance in many fields, but also assistance in helping the Dominicans themselves get together on a government. In other words, there is room here and a need for very important OAS assistance, but I would stay away from the concept of trusteeship.

Q. Sir, the United States has been criticized for overreacting to a Communist searce in the Dominican Republic. Were we justified in sending in all those extra troops because we felt the rebellion was menaced by communism?

A. Well, I wouldn't call these troops extra. It's very hard to draw an exact point at which you have just enough, not too few and not too many. In your opening remark you pointed out some very large missions that these forces have had. The evacuation of 6,000 people, the provision of food and medicines throughout the island and to both sides, the establishment of a safety zone that runs about 16 miles in length which has to be patrolled regularly on a 24-hour basis by neutral soldiers. These were very large responsibilities. Now, it was also important that those who might be seeking an answer by violence on the island—whether the two opposing sides in the more formal sense or some of these irresponsible elements that had seized arms in the downtown area and were under no control—it's very important that all of those elements realize that there is no military solution available to them. Otherwise, there could be no cease-fire, and we would be faced with a prospect of a blood-bath that could take literally tens of thousands of lives. And so the presence of substantial forces there, I think, had a very important part to play in bringing about a cease-fire and keeping the peace.

Q. The President said on May 2d that the rebellion had been taken over by Communists.³ Now what has happened, sir, in the meantime to change our views?

³ *Ibid.*, May 17, 1965, p. 744.

A. Well, I think that in the first place it became apparent to some of these extreme elements downtown, who were supported by irresponsible bands of armed civilians who had been given arms in the first day or two of the so-called rebellion, that they themselves could not succeed by such means. I think some of them have undoubtedly gone back underground, but there are some of them still active there in the downtown area. We have seen some of them, and on one occasion we have exchanged fire with one of these bands under such leadership. I would suppose that the reduction of the threat consists primarily not in the departure of the individuals but in recognition by them that there is no future along the path in which they were embarked.

Q. Given our response in the Dominican Republic, sir, can't the Communists thwart any genuine democratic uprising against a dictatorship by sending in some identifiable Communist?

A. Well, that generalizes a problem in the Dominican Republic, I think, a little too much. I think that the people here in the hemisphere and other countries would be sophisticated enough to draw the line between a real threat and a pretended or sham threat that might be used for other purposes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, where do we draw the line? If we will intervene to stop a potential Communist takeover in the Caribbean, would we do so in Africa or other parts of the world?

A. Well, we do not have a general policy of intervention. We have 42 allies all over the world. We are very active in South Viet-Nam at the present time because that country is under direct attack by Communist infiltrators from North Viet-Nam, but we have assisted Greece when they were under guerrilla operations. We have had large aid programs all over the world to support and assist democratic countries and constitutional regimes to support themselves and to develop viable institutions. No, I wouldn't say that one should generalize on a world-

wide basis on the experience of the Dominican Republic.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what about the press coverage? We've heard a lot about it in these past few weeks. Has it hurt you, helped you, what is your reaction?

A. Of course, a situation like the Dominican Republic attracts enormous attention by the press. There were many reporters in the Dominican Republic. It was a very confused situation with violence in the key areas of the city. Deadlines made it difficult sometimes for reporters to check out both sides of a particular piece of information. There was a lot of good reporting. There was some reporting that was not so good, but I think, broadly speaking, the American people got a pretty good picture of what was going on down there during this period. Now, there were some points where we had information which we could not ourselves disclose because it would lead to direct danger to some of the individuals who were the sources of that information, and that made it difficult for us to prove exactly everything that we had to say.

Q. I want to thank you for taking time out of your busy schedule, Mr. Secretary, for joining us tonight. Thank you very much.

Foreign Relations Volume Issued on American Republics for 1943

Press release 115 dated May 18, for release May 23

The Department of State on May 23 released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Volume VI, The American Republics*. This volume completes the series of annual volumes for the year 1943. The first of the annual volumes for 1944 will be issued in the near future.

This volume contains documentation on all the American Republics except Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile. Coverage of these four states was included in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Volume V*, released on March 9, 1965.

Of interest in this volume are compilations dealing with the wartime diplomacy of the United States vis-a-vis the other American Republics, discussions and agreements respecting staple Latin American commodities and strategic materials, and efforts of the United States to promote the defense of the hemisphere.

Copies of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Volume VI, The American Republics* (ix, 869 pp.; publication 7848) may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402, for \$3.25 each.

United States and Korea Reaffirm Strong Bonds of Friendship

President Chung Hec Park of the Republic of Korea made a state visit to the United States May 16-26 at the invitation of President Johnson. He met with the President and other U. S. officials at Washington May 17-19. Following are an exchange of greetings between President Johnson and President Park and the text of a joint communique released on May 18.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS

White House press release dated May 17; as-delivered text

President Johnson

Mr. President and distinguished, welcomed guests: Mr. President, it is a very happy privilege for me to welcome you once again to this country and to this Capital City of Washington.

You have honored us by your presence on previous occasions. Today we are very proud to honor you, and through you, to honor the people of Korea, for the numerous and the notable advances made by the Republic of Korea.

The economy of your country is growing in strength. Progress is being realized in the life of your people at home. In the world, Korea's role and influence is broadening.

And all of this is coming as your democratic institutions grow in stability and meaning under the leadership of representative civilian government, which you promised for the Korean people.

These advances are deeply gratifying to us here in the United States, Mr. President. The bonds between your land and ours are close and lasting.

Fifteen years ago—in the wake of history's most terrible war—your people and our people, and all the peoples of the earth, yearned only for peace. Yet it was at the great moment of hope and opportunity the enemies of peace drew their sword and plunged it into your land and into your people.

In the first moments of that clear and present challenge, the United States moved to stand at once at your side—and there, Mr. President, we still stand. Our sons and your sons stand together guarding the peace today.

Enemies of peace and the foes of freedom still move in the world now, seeking to impose their will by aggression and subversion. But their chance to prevail is a much lesser chance now because of the response that was made in Korea by those United Nations which showed a decent respect for the values—as well as the opinions—of all mankind.

We welcome this strength that your land offers now to the defense of freedom not only in Korea but in Viet-Nam as well, Mr. President.

—We have given our commitments to the security of your land, and I assure you that those commitments are durable and continuing so long as danger remains. But we have committed ourselves beyond military concerns alone, and I assure you that we shall work steadfastly with you to better the lot and the lives of your people.

The central contest of this century is the struggle against mankind's oldest oppressors—poverty, hunger, illness, and ignorance. Korea is making progress in its struggle against these enemies, and, Mr. President, we stand resolutely with you in your prog-

ress toward self-sufficiency.

All around the world, this is the work which the American people want us most to do—to help others help themselves toward lives of decency and justice and opportunity under peace and freedom. Whether the struggle be near to our shores or far away, our resolve is firm and our resources are great; our faith is unyielding and it is unchanging.

So, Mr. President, a group of distinguished Americans from all the Government are here this morning to welcome you to the United States, as a friend of the United States, as an ally, and as a coworker in the building of a better world for all mankind everywhere.

President Park

Unofficial translation

President Johnson, Mrs. Johnson, ladies and gentlemen: I have just crossed the "bridge of friendship and faith" which links our two countries across the Pacific, to come to Washington.

I am very happy to express my heartfelt gratitude to President Johnson for his kind invitation which enabled me to make this visit and also to extend, in the name of the people of Korea, my sincere greetings to the American people.

During this visit I shall meet many of the distinguished leaders of your country and discuss with them various matters of our common concern. Thus our visit will, I trust, contribute to strengthening further the traditional friendly ties between our two countries.

It is well known that for a long time Korea and the United States have been bound together with a bond of friendship too strong ever to be broken. Our two nations have been making concerted efforts, in cooperation with other freedom-loving nations—and sometimes spearheading them—in seeking preventive measures against any untoward distress mankind may encounter. It is my firm belief that such relations between our two countries will never change, even in the remote future.

Along the truce line in Korea, in the jungles of Viet-Nam, your beloved sons and husbands now share the same encampment and trenches with our own men to defend freedom from Communist aggression. They are carrying out their common duty of safeguarding the free world from aggression of the Communists, the modern provocators of war.

In discharging this duty, there should be no optimistic appraisal of the international situation and no retreat based on easy rationalization.

I expect that frank exchanges of views on those political, economic, and military problems related to the execution of our common task might well result in further strengthening the existing friendly cooperation between our two countries.

Dear friends in the United States, this is my third official visit to your country, beginning in the fall of the year 1961, when my dear friend, now departed, President Kennedy, whom I will never forget, invited me to America.¹ On each visit I came from a different Korea; that much has Korea been making remarkable progress with a firm national foundation based on the freedom and peace-loving spirit of the United States and of the United Nations. I am proud to say your support and assistance given Korea are now bearing fruit more successfully than at any time in the past and perhaps more successfully than anywhere else.

Thanks to the continuing friendly cooperation between Korea and the United States, and to Korea's own resources of youthfulness and effort for self-help, Korea is now developing into a country of righteousness and resoluteness. I wish to present Korea to you today as a new country packed with aspirations.

I affirm with pride that the Korean people are today as ever determined in our pursuit of social justice and to stand in Asia for freedom in alliance with the people of the United States.

¹ For text of a joint communique released at the White House on Nov. 14, 1961, see BULLETIN of Dec. 4, 1961, p. 928.

Dear American friends, in closing I wish to convey to you that your beloved sons and husbands in Korea are doing magnificent work, hand in hand with my fellow countrymen in uniform. Again, I thank you for the warm welcome you have extended me today. Thank you.

TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE

White House press release dated May 18

1. At the invitation of President Lyndon B. Johnson of the United States, President Chung Hee Park of the Republic of Korea arrived in Washington on May 17, 1965, for a 10-day state visit to the United States, and met with President Johnson on May 17 and 18 to exchange views on the current international situation and matters of common interest to their countries. Deputy Prime Minister Key Young Chang, Acting Foreign Minister Duk Choo Moon, Defense Minister Sung Eun Kim, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and other high officials of both Governments participated in the meetings.

2. President Park and President Johnson reaffirmed the strong bonds of friendship traditionally existing between the Republic of Korea and the United States and their firm determination to maintain the closest cooperation in the pursuit of their common objective of a secure and lasting peace based on freedom, justice, and prosperity for all.

3. The two Presidents reviewed the current situation in the Far East and Southeast Asia and agreed upon the need for making secure the freedom and independence of the countries of the area. They affirmed that the free nations should further strengthen their solidarity and cooperation to advance the cause of peace and progress under freedom.

4. President Johnson noted with deep appreciation the contribution of the Republic of Korea toward the defense of Viet-Nam. The two Presidents reaffirmed their intention to continue to cooperate closely in sup-

port of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

5. The two Presidents reviewed the vital importance of mutual defense ties between the Republic of Korea and the United States. President Johnson reaffirmed the determination and readiness of the United States to render forthwith and effectively all possible assistance including the use of armed forces, in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954, to meet the common danger occasioned by an armed attack on the Republic of Korea. He said that the United States will continue to maintain powerful forces in Korea at the request of the Korean Government, and will assist in maintaining Korean forces at levels sufficient, in conjunction with U.S. forces, to insure Korea's security. Subject to applicable legislation and appropriations, military assistance to preserve the Korean forces' effectiveness will continue to be provided, and a large part of the local currency (*won*) funds generated by U.S. assistance will continue to be made available to the Korean defense effort. In addition, the Military Assistance Transfer Program has recently been revised to enable the Korean Government to realize a saving in foreign exchange. It was agreed that the program should be reviewed each year in light of the condition of the Korean economy.

6. The two Presidents took cognizance of the ardent desire of the Korean people for the reunification of their homeland and deplored the fact that the Communists have persisted in their refusal to accept established United Nations objectives and principles for the unification of Korea through free elections under United Nations supervision, thus prolonging the artificial division of Korea. Both Presidents reaffirmed that they would continue to make the utmost efforts to bring about a unified, free and democratic Korea in accordance with the objectives and principles set forth in the United Nations resolutions on Korea.

7. President Park reviewed the negotiations between Korea and Japan for an agreement to establish normal relations, the components of which have already been initialed

and are now being drawn up in treaty form. President Johnson praised this achievement and expressed the expectation that this agreement, when completed, would strengthen the free nations of Asia as well as further the mutual interests of the two countries immediately involved. He confirmed that U.S. military and economic assistance to Korea would continue to be extended, as set forth in paragraph 9 below, after normalization of Korean-Japanese relations.

8. President Park explained the situation and prospects of the Korean economy. President Johnson congratulated President Park on the progress made by the Korean Government and people toward stabilization and development of their economy. He noted Korea's impressive increases in exports and in industrial and agricultural production, and its investment in programs of social progress. President Park reviewed the Korean Government's economic development programs, under which the Government is pursuing its goals of food self-sufficiency, greater exports, accelerated industrialization, increased national savings, and continued financial stabilization, so as to increase national income and assist the nation in attaining its long-range goal of a self-sustaining economy.

9. President Johnson reaffirmed assurances previously stated by Secretary of State Rusk and other United States officials that the basic policy of the United States Government of extending military and economic aid to Korea would be continued. In addition to assistance directed toward maintaining Korea's security and independence, he stated that the United States would continue to assist Korea toward promoting a self-supporting economy, balanced economic growth and financial stability. He specifically stated that it is the intention of the United States Government, subject to applicable legislation, appropriations, and aid policies, to help Korean efforts to achieve stable economic growth by:

A. Continuing supporting assistance as appropriate to assist in financing Korea's es-

sential imports in connection with programs agreed upon as required for Korea's economic stability.

B. Making available to Korea \$150 million in development loan funds for programs and projects to be proposed by the Korean Government and to be agreed to by the United States Government. These funds will be made available as rapidly as possible as the Korean Government develops and presents acceptable programs and projects. After the use of these funds, it is anticipated that further development loan monies would be made available. President Johnson pointed out that these programs of long-term lending at low interest rates respond to the expanding investment requirements of the Korean economy. Such development loan funds would be made available in accordance with legislation and joint economic judgments, to finance such import programs as may be agreed and projects which will expand power resources and social overhead capital, increase efficiency and consequently output in agriculture and fisheries, and further technical and industrial development—small, medium, and large—benefiting all segments of the population and promoting balanced economic growth.

C. Continuing technical assistance and training.

D. Providing substantial assistance in agricultural commodities under the Food for Peace program, especially cotton and food grains; continuing to provide Food for Peace donations for development projects and for relief of unemployment and poverty.

10. The two Presidents agreed that this long-term United States economic aid to Korea, coupled with Korea's own efforts and resources that might be expected from other sources, should assure the Korean people of ever-widening opportunities for economic growth and for fruitful participation in world economic relationships.

11. President Park emphasized that the achievement of a self-supporting economy in Korea depends greatly upon its ability further to expand trade with other countries

and requested the continued cooperation of the United States in expanding the export of Korean products and commodities and in providing Korea with continuing opportunities to participate in procurements funded through United States assistance programs. President Johnson expressed his understanding of the importance to Korea of expanded exports and indicated that the United States would continue to cooperate with Korea in efforts to improve Korea's foreign trade position.

12. The two Presidents, recalling their respective earlier careers as schoolteachers, discussed together the needs, challenges and opportunities of education at all levels in both countries. President Park welcomed President Johnson's offer to send his Science Adviser to Korea for the purpose of exploring with industrial, scientific and education leaders possibilities for U.S. cooperation in establishing there an Institute for Industrial Technology and Applied Science. It was President Johnson's thought that the institute and its laboratories could both provide technical services and research for developing Korean industry and afford advanced Korean specialists trained in the United States opportunities to continue their research.

13. In the course of President Park's visit to Washington agreement was reached in principle on major issues of a status-of-forces agreement. Therefore it is expected that remaining issues will be resolved so that a status-of-forces agreement can be concluded in the near future.

14. President Park extended a cordial invitation to President Johnson to visit Korea at his earliest convenience. President Johnson expressed his desire to visit Korea. Both Presidents expressed their desire to maintain close personal contact to continue to serve the cause of freedom and peace.

President Acknowledges Report on East Europe and Soviet Trade

*Following is the text of a letter dated May 20 from President Johnson to J. Irwin Miller, Chairman of the Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations With East European Countries and the Soviet Union.*¹

White House press release dated May 20

DEAR MR. MILLER: I wish to thank you and the other members of the Special Committee for the time, effort and careful thought you have devoted to preparing your excellent Report on U.S. Trade Relations with East European Countries and the Soviet Union.² The Report provides a searching and balanced analysis of a complex and important subject. It will be of great help to me and to the Congress, and to all interested citizens, in making up our minds about how best to use peaceful trade to help build bridges between ourselves and the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe.

I have asked appropriate members of the government to review the Report, and to recommend to me what steps we should take in the light of the Committee's recommendations.

I congratulate you on a difficult job well done. You have rendered a signal public service.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Mr. J. IRWIN MILLER
*Chairman of the Board
Cummins Engine Company, Inc.
Columbus, Indiana*

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of May 10, 1965, p. 724.

² A limited number of copies of the report, dated Apr. 29 and released by the White House on May 6, 1965, are available upon request from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

The Problem of International Liquidity

by Frederick L. Deming

*Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs*¹

Fifteen days ago, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Harold Wilson, devoted a section of his major public speech in New York to consideration of international liquidity. He took the view that the world should push forward promptly in comprehensive planning to avoid a liquidity squeeze which might result from the disappearance of the United States balance-of-payments deficit.

Some weeks ago President de Gaulle suggested that the world should return to a gold-standard system, and Mr. Jacques Rueff, a well-known French economist, has recently proposed the same course of action, with the additional suggestion that the price of gold be doubled in order that reversion to a gold-standard system might take place without drastic deflationary consequences for the world economy.

The President of the German Bundesbank, Karl Blessing, recently endorsed the present international monetary system but suggested the possible desirability of standardizing the composition of national reserves by agreeing on an appropriate ratio between holdings of gold and reserve currencies.

Former Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon in his last press conference suggested that one of the major questions with which

his successor would have to wrestle would be that of the future adequacy of world liquidity. Secretary Fowler [Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury] has agreed that "the greatest challenge in this area is to work out a steadily improving international monetary system so as to facilitate a continuing expansion of trade and economic development in the Free World."

The United States position with respect to the liquidity issue has been made very clear by President Johnson, who said in his message to Congress on the balance of payments:²

The measures I have proposed in this message will hasten our progress toward international balance without damage to our security abroad or our prosperity at home. But our international monetary responsibilities will not end with our deficit. Healthy growth of the free world economy requires orderly but continuing expansion of the world's monetary reserves.

During the past decade, our deficits have helped meet that need. The flow of deficit dollars into foreign central banks has made up about half of the increase in free world reserves. As we eliminate that flow, a shortage of reserves could emerge. We need to continue our work on the development of supplementary sources of reserves to head off that threat. . . .

We must press forward with our studies and beyond, to action—evolving arrangements which will continue to meet the needs of a fast growing world economy. Unless we make timely progress, international monetary difficulties will exercise a stubborn

¹ Address made on Apr. 29 at Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, in connection with the Distinguished Lectures in Monetary Policy jointly sponsored by the university and the Ohio Bankers Association.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 1, 1965, p. 282.

and increasingly frustrating drag on our policies for prosperity and progress at home and throughout the world.

Today I would like to discuss with you just what it is that all of these distinguished people are talking about and why there is this general and widespread interest in international liquidity.

Role of International Reserves

We might start with a very simple statement as to the purpose of international reserves. Their primary purpose is to permit a country to ride through any balance-of-payments deficit while making an orderly adjustment of its international and domestic policies to restore balance-of-payments equilibrium. In this, the purpose of international reserves is very similar to the purpose of individuals and businesses in setting aside and holding liquid assets for an emergency. A complication with which I shall not deal today is that international reserves in many countries play an additional role as partial determinants of the domestic money supply.

International reserves, of course, are not held in the same form as the reserves of a private business. The traditional reserves of nations are gold and reserve currencies. A reserve currency, if you will excuse the tautology, is a currency which, by general agreement, nations are prepared to hold in their reserves. The dollar is today the major reserve currency. The pound sterling is held rather widely, particularly by sterling area countries, and the French franc is regarded as a reserve currency in some parts of Africa.

Each nation makes its own decision as to what it will regard as a reserve currency. It bases its decision on the extent to which that currency can be widely used in international transactions, the confidence it has in the stability of that currency in terms of gold and in terms of goods, and the ease with which it may invest and disinvest both its working balances and additional holdings of the currency in question.

The status of the dollar as a reserve currency developed over the years, particularly

since the Second World War, from the voluntary decision of many countries that this was the currency which best met their needs as a reserve asset. The reserve currency status of the dollar is greatly buttressed by the fact that the United States is the only country which stands ready to deliver gold at the fixed price of \$35 an ounce to foreign monetary authorities upon request.

Broad Dimensions of International Liquidity

But international liquidity has broader dimensions than gold and reserve currencies. When representatives of the Group of Ten leading industrial countries began a couple of years ago to study what has come to be called the "liquidity problem," they placed emphasis upon a broad liquidity spectrum which shaded from owned reserves through certain credit availabilities.

It was agreed that the first additional asset to be included in the broader liquidity concept should be the "gold tranche" position of member countries in the International Monetary Fund. The International Monetary Fund has 102 member countries, and each of these has a borrowing quota for which it has paid one-quarter in gold and three-quarters in its own national currency. As a result, one-quarter of its drawing or borrowing rights in the Fund are referred to as its "gold tranche" rights. Any member country is entitled to borrow from the Fund, virtually without question, any currency it may need up to the amount of its gold tranche position. There is general agreement, accordingly, that the aggregate of gold tranche positions in the Fund, amounting to approximately \$4 billion, should appropriately be considered an element in international liquidity. I might mention parenthetically that such gold tranche positions will be increased to \$5 billion when the 25 percent increase in Fund quotas now underway has been completed.

There are other forms of international credit about as liquid as gold tranche positions in the Fund. In the last 4 or 5 years a network of short-term credit facilities has been created among monetary authorities

and central banks of the highly industrialized countries. These are generally referred to as "swap" lines. They consist of agreements that the authorities of one country will make its currency available to its swap partners up to agreed amounts, usually for an initial period of 90 days. If, for example, Italy should find itself in need of dollar currency, it could deposit lire to the account of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Reserve System would deposit an equivalent sum in dollars to the credit of the Italian authorities. These agreements represent a highly liquid asset for the countries concerned. Swap lines can be activated on only a few hours' notice, and many of them have been so activated throughout the network in many directions in recent years. The total of swap agreements at the present time throughout the network amounts to more than \$2½ billion.

Another substantial element in international liquidity is represented by special Government bonds which the United States has issued to certain of its creditors in recent years to help finance the United States balance-of-payments deficit. These may be denominated in the currency of the holder and are convertible at short notice by the holders into cash. Foreign currency bonds now outstanding amount to \$1.1 billion. Foreign monetary authorities holding these bonds regard them either as part of their reserve assets or as an asset similar to reserves.

In considering international liquidity, it is also appropriate to take into account the availability of credit from the International Monetary Fund beyond the gold tranche positions. As I have said, one-quarter of a country's quota represents its gold tranche; three-quarters represent its drawing rights beyond the gold tranche. These borrowing rights are not so automatic as gold tranche drawing rights and, hence, not so highly liquid. Consequently, they are not generally regarded as *reserves*. However, they are available in accordance with well understood standards and have been widely used for many years. They represent an important element in total international liquidity.

Growth of Reserves From 1954 to 1963

The report of the Deputies of the Group of Ten, released in August of last year, following their study, brought out several interesting points relative to the growth of international liquidity, as the report defined it, during the 10 years from 1954 to 1963. As noted, they dealt with international liquidity as being a spectrum divided into two broad categories: "reserves" and "credit facilities." The dividing line between these two closely related classifications was fixed in this manner. Credit availabilities that had not been utilized were, broadly speaking, treated as "credit facilities," and these might be available to potential deficit countries in the future, subject to individual credit arrangements. Reserve assets represented the claims of creditor countries that had been established by the extensions of credit to others in the past on their part, through the International Monetary Fund or directly, and that could readily be mobilized for their own use in case they, in their turn, needed foreign exchange resources. This latter category included also the gold tranche claims on the Fund acquired by past subscriptions of gold to the IMF.

During the 10-year period the reserves of all the countries in the free world rose about \$17 billion, or nearly a third. Gold accounted for nearly \$6 billion. Foreign exchange, principally in the form of dollars and sterling, rose nearly \$8 billion, and \$3 billion was contributed by increased claims on the Fund and by the use of bilateral credit facilities.

You will note that only about a third of the total addition to reserves, defined broadly to include the reserve assets noted, was provided by gold. At the end of 1963 countries held in their reserves about \$40 billion in gold, or about 57 percent of the total reserves of \$70 billion. Twenty-five billion dollars was held in the form of foreign exchange, one-half in sterling and one-half in dollars. These foreign exchange holdings were official reserves and take no account of some \$15 billion in liquid assets held by nonofficial private entities, almost entirely as claims in dollars or sterling.

Apart from the global picture, it is useful to pause a moment to look at the regional aspects of this growth in reserves. During the 10-year period the eight major non-reserve-currency countries of the Group of Ten and Switzerland acquired \$18½ billion of reserve assets, or \$1½ billion more than the world as a whole. This group of countries includes the major part of a persistent surplus area in continental Europe, which has had an unexampled prosperity and an unprecedentedly strong balance-of-payments position. Moreover, this group of countries acquired nearly \$11 billion in gold, nearly twice the total of new gold supplies available for monetary use in the world as a whole. They were able to do so through a substantial redistribution of the gold reserves of the United States.

This was the pattern of the 10 years prior to the study undertaken by the Group of Ten in 1964. Against this pattern the Ministers and Governors concluded that:³

... for the international monetary system as a whole, supplies of gold and reserve currencies are fully adequate for the present and are likely to be for the immediate future. These reserves are supplemented by a broad range of credit facilities. The continuing growth of world trade and payments is likely to entail a need for larger international liquidity. This need may be met by an expansion of credit facilities and, in the longer run, may possibly call for some new form of reserve asset.

The Ministers and Governors of the Group of Ten then took several decisions looking toward the future of the monetary system. They undertook a thorough study of the measures and instruments best suited for avoiding and correcting large and persistent international imbalances, compatibly with the pursuit of essential internal objectives. They recommended a procedure for "multilateral surveillance" of the ways and means of financing balance-of-payments disequilibria. Looking further into the future, since there was a possibility that the supply of gold and foreign exchange reserves may prove to be inadequate for the overall reserve needs of the world economy, they authorized a

³ For text of a ministerial statement of Aug. 10, 1964, see *ibid.*, Aug. 31, 1964, p. 323.

study group to examine various proposals regarding the creation of reserve assets either through the IMF or otherwise. Finally, they agreed that they would support a moderate general increase in quotas of the IMF.

Why Concern Over Future of Liquidity?

It might be asked why there was so much concern regarding the future of international liquidity when reserves had increased so rapidly in the previous 10 years. The eight members of the Group of Ten and Switzerland nearly tripled their reserves during the 10-year period, 1954 to 1963. In fact, some of these countries consider that the growth in their reserves has been excessive and has been a contributing factor to inflationary pressures on the European Continent. Thus they are particularly concerned that the growth in reserves not be excessive in the future, as a result of continuing deficits in the United States balance of payments.

At the same time they join with the United States in recognizing that there may be conditions in the future, given the remarkably vigorous expansion of world trade and investment, when annual supplies of new monetary gold would alone be insufficient to provide an adequate secular growth in reserves. You will recall that new gold supplied only about one-third of the 10-year growth in reserve assets.

The United States also looks forward to a changing situation; it is not in our interest to continue substantial balance-of-payments deficits, to pay out increasing amounts of dollars to the rest of the world, and then to be faced with financing a substantial part of that deficit in gold because other countries no longer wish to accumulate important amounts of dollars in their reserves. There is certainly no fixed or absolute level or ratio of our short-term dollar liabilities to our gold reserves. But officially held dollar claims of a liquid character are now just about equal to our gold reserves. They have been rising for about 15 years, and rising quite sharply since 1958. It is quite essential that we bring this long series of balance-of-payments deficits to a halt. In doing so, we will also

stop the process of providing gold and dollar reserves to the rest of the world.

When this happens, there may then be a question as to how to provide supplementary reserves in some form, to add to gold and the existing holdings of dollars and sterling exchange. It is, in my view, unrealistic to assume that the world can or should attempt to do away with these existing foreign exchange holdings. The gold exchange standard in itself is a useful and meritorious instrument. But at the same time we must exercise moderation in its use and realize that it has been overstrained by the size and persistence of U. S. deficits and the resulting supply of dollars.

It is no secret that some European countries feel that the long-continued deficit of the United States has been at best made possible and at worst encouraged and stimulated by the ability of the United States to finance a very substantial portion of its deficit during the past 7 years by paying out dollars that have been added to foreign reserves. If the U.S. deficit had been settled entirely in gold, they assert, the United States would have taken earlier and more rigorous steps to bring its payments into equilibrium.

Liquidity and the Gold Standard

Accordingly some of these countries are prepared to argue that the international monetary system at the present time is experiencing a surplus of liquidity, not a shortage. This is perhaps the basis for the suggestion of General de Gaulle that the world should return to a gold-standard system. A return to a gold standard would imply a sharp curtailment of world reserves and world liquidity and would carry the threat of worldwide deflation. I need not—for this audience—spell out the detailed mechanism by which this would come about.

I mentioned Jacques Rueff, who recently expressed his support for a return to the gold standard in public statements in the United States. Recognizing that this alone would create dangerous deflationary pressures, he couples his proposal with the suggestion that the price of gold be doubled and that the

United States then pay off its liquid liabilities to foreign central banks in gold at the new price. That would mean redeeming some \$14.5 billion of dollar reserves of foreign official holders at a rate of \$70 for an ounce of gold rather than the existing \$35 per ounce. The United States would be left at the end of the operation with gold reserves near the present level, according to the new valuation, and would have wiped out its official liabilities to foreign monetary authorities.

Such a proposal is thoroughly unacceptable to the United States. It combines the proposal that the world once again accept automatic regulation of its money supply according to the vagaries of world gold production with the proposal that the implied and stated commitments of the gold exchange standard be repudiated to the advantage of a few and the disadvantage of many. It is easy to see how it might be appealing to the major gold-producing countries, including the Republic of South Africa and the U.S.S.R., and to some countries holding a high proportion of their reserves in gold. It would, of course, be discriminatory against countries which have kept a substantial fraction of their reserves in the form of reserve currencies. Our commitment to maintain the fixed parity of \$35 an ounce between gold and dollars is basic to the stability of the world monetary system. President Johnson has reiterated our unchanging determination to maintain this parity.

We share fully, however, the European view that our balance-of-payments deficit should be promptly corrected. We do not believe that the existence of the present monetary system has weakened our resolve to eliminate our balance-of-payments deficit. We have, however, insisted that the deficit be eliminated by measures which would have a minimum impact both on the rate of economic growth in our own country and on the continued economic prosperity of the rest of the free world. We have ruled out measures which would have denied our responsibilities in defense of the free world or in the economic development of less developed countries—and we have done so in the interest of

free men everywhere. Our deep reluctance to adopt more restrictive monetary or fiscal policies at home has derived from the unshakable conviction that a strong and growing economy in the United States is a prerequisite both to lasting correction of our balance-of-payments difficulties and to continued prosperity in the Western World.

I shall not digress at any length to review the extent to which our balance-of-payments position has, in fact, been strengthened in recent years. The splendid record of price stability which we have maintained through 50 months of steady economic growth has established for us a strong competitive position in world trade, and our trade balance is highly favorable. We have reduced the balance-of-payments impact of our military and foreign aid operations without retreating from our commitments in these areas. More recently, measures have been taken to dampen the outflow of capital from the United States by means of the voluntary cooperation of the banking system and the business community.⁴ The United States will, however, continue to be an important source of productive capital.

Advocates of Floating Exchange Rates

Before I resume commenting briefly on what I think will be the principal issues to be decided as we cooperate in working out arrangements to assure that adequate world liquidity will be maintained when our deficit has been corrected, I should acknowledge that there is a school of thought—and one which appears to be quite strong in academic circles—that believes in solving the liquidity problem not by increasing liquidity but by reducing the need for liquidity. Members of that school are the advocates of floating exchange rates. They hold that fixed exchange rates alone create the need for large reserves. More importantly, perhaps, they feel that fixed exchange rates constitute a restraining influence, preventing individual countries

⁴For remarks made by President Johnson before a group of business and banking leaders at the White House on Feb. 18, see *ibid.*, Mar. 8, 1965, p. 335.

from following domestic policies which might be deemed appropriate for domestic aims. If exchange rates were free to move up and down in the market, a balance-of-payments deficit would be reflected in a cheapening of the country's currency rather than in a loss of reserves. The cheapening of the currency, in turn, the argument runs, would bring about adjustments in the trade pattern—lower imports and higher exports, among other changes—which would restore balance-of-payments equilibrium. No country would need to hold large reserves, and each country could choose its internal monetary and fiscal policies according to its own system of priorities and without regard for balance-of-payments effects.

I am not going to try to argue the case for or against floating rates. I would admit, as any student of economics will admit, that the theoretical arguments for floating exchange rates can be presented with great precision and appeal. Operation of the system in a world of imperfect knowledge, imperfect governmental and monetary institutions, and conflicting national ambitions and policies would be something else again. I will merely express the opinion, which is shared by an overwhelming majority of commercial and financial interests, that such a system, in practice, would prove extremely disruptive to world trade and financial transactions. The Ministers and Governors of the Group of Ten have ruled out consideration of any such system, and the International Monetary Fund has operated for nearly 20 years in defense of a regime of generally fixed exchange rates, with individual exchange rate adjustments regarded as appropriate from time to time when individual countries have fallen into a position of fundamental disequilibrium.

Assuring Adequate Future Liquidity

As we consider possible methods for assuring adequate liquidity in the future, the next question is whether some new *type* of asset should be created or whether liquidity needs can be met by further development and refinement of existing credit mechanisms.

On the credit side, agreement has already

been reached, in principle, on a 25 percent increase in International Monetary Fund quotas. I say "in principle" because, while more than 80 percent of the membership favored the increase, each member must now determine for itself, in accordance with its own legislative procedures, whether it will accept its appropriate share of such increase. The United States administration is seeking congressional approval for an increase of \$1,035 million in the U.S. quota.⁵ The House of Representatives voted favorably on this bill on Tuesday of this week [April 27].⁶ We are confident that the total of aggregate quotas in the Fund will be increased from about \$16 billion to about \$21 billion when this operation has been completed. That will provide an appreciable addition for international liquidity in the form of credit facilities.

The most intriguing aspect of the liquidity question, however, doubtless lies in efforts to devise a new type of reserve asset. I mentioned that the Deputies of the Group of Ten, in their report to the Ministers, announced that they had established a Study Group on the Creation of Reserve Assets to study the problem which its name implies. The group is meeting periodically. It is expected to present to the Deputies some time this summer a study which will "assemble the elements necessary for evaluation of the various proposals" which have been put forward.

I cannot speak in detail about the work of this group. But its terms of reference are public information. The Deputies to the Group of Ten spoke of two types of proposals:

... one for the introduction, through an agreement among the member countries of the Group, of a new reserve asset, which would be created according to appraised over-all needs for reserves; and the other based on the acceptance of gold tranche or similar claims on the [International Monetary] Fund as a form of international asset, the volume of which would, if necessary, be enlarged to meet an agreed need.

Proposals of the first type vary substan-

⁵ *Ibid.*, Apr. 5, 1965, p. 507.

⁶ The bill was passed by the Senate on May 24.

tially in detail. Essentially, however, these schemes provide that a limited group of countries, by depositing their own currencies or gold, establish a central pool of monetary resources which would provide the backing for a new reserve unit. Members would receive in exchange for their respective subscriptions an equal value of reserve units. These would represent proportionate claims upon the aggregate pool of resources, and these claims or units would be transferable among the members in settlement of surpluses or deficits. The reserve unit itself would be held or used much as gold is now held in reserves or used in international settlements. By agreement among the members it would assume the nature of gold, it would be held as reserves, its value would be fixed in terms of gold, its acceptance by any member would be automatic according to stipulated conditions.

For example, some proposals would call for creation of a limited amount of reserve units and for the use of these units in fixed proportion with gold in making all settlements among members. The economic effect would be little different from the gold standard itself. It would operate like the gold standard with some reserve units added. Like a return to the gold standard, itself, it could call into question the continuing usefulness of reserve currency holdings and would probably encourage the conversion of some holdings into gold. To the extent such conversions should occur, the world would face a decline in total world liquidity rather than an increase.

A second important condition would be that dealing with the manner in which decisions would be made for increasing or, if necessary, decreasing the amount of units in existence. To oversimplify, it would be in the apparent interest of creditor countries to resist—and of debtor countries to favor—the creation of additional units. If new issues were to be subject to a unanimous agreement, which is to say if any country could veto an expansion or a contraction, it would hardly be accurate to say that decisions regarding the adequacy of international liquidity had

been placed under international control in any meaningful way.

The importance of the conditions which might govern creation of new assets would be no less if new reserve assets should be created in the International Monetary Fund. Proposals of this type call for creation of claims on the Fund that can be drawn upon at will to meet balance-of-payments deficits. For example, automatic drawing rights could be accorded against some part of the existing credit tranches in the Fund. Another proposal is that the Fund might be authorized to invest some of its holdings of currencies in member countries, thereby providing those countries with assets usable internationally.

Again, a number of questions would have to be considered. Would operation of the normal weighted voting procedures in the Fund serve the interests of creditor and debtor countries equitably? Should reserve assets be created for all countries or for only those countries that might be expected to be in both surplus and deficit over a period of years?

However additional reserves are created, their use implies a credit operation. The original creation could take the form for each participating country of an equal increase in its liabilities and in its assets, the latter becoming, by terms of the agreement, an international reserve asset. There would be no real economic impact at this stage. But as soon as the newly created asset or unit began to be used, those surplus countries which accumulated the unit would be extending credit to the deficit countries. And the extension of credit from one country to another reflects the transfer of real assets. The surplus country forgoes present consumption in exchange for higher reserves—or for future potential consumption. A creditor country has, of course, considerable freedom of action in controlling the credit it will extend. There are many acceptable ways in which a balance-of-payments surplus can be reduced. Study of the adjustment process to determine appropriate policies to be followed—both by deficit countries to correct their deficits and by surplus countries to reduce

their surpluses—is another area to which the Group of Ten is giving attention.

With respect to the deficit countries, no country can expect to receive unlimited automatic credit from its trading partners. The search for assurance that adequate international liquidity will be maintained in the future will not in any sense be a search for automatic credit for persistent debtors.

Three Broad Questions

I have mentioned a few of the issues connected with the liquidity discussions without giving any clear indication of what the answers should be. The answers must await continued hard study and, at an appropriate stage, perhaps hard negotiations. I will advance only three questions for your consideration at this time.

First, how can we make certain that any new scheme will be entirely compatible with the evolution of the existing system? This will require that nations should not be penalized—nor benefited—as a result of the composition of their reserves, when and if some new liquidity asset is developed.

Secondly, how can we assure that any new system will increase and not reduce world liquidity? World liquidity would be reduced to the extent that existing reserve currency holdings are converted into gold. What, then, should be our attitude toward proposals which might stimulate such conversion or cast doubt upon the stability or the convertibility of existing reserve currency holdings?

Thirdly, how can we make sure that any new system will maintain machinery for giving appropriate weight to the views of both creditor and debtor countries? Should it be subject to the arbitrary control of either, or to the veto of a single country?

These are three broad questions, among many, that will need to be kept in mind as we proceed to examine most carefully the various ideas that have been or may be suggested. We are conscious that the creation of any new type of reserve asset by international agreement would be a step of profound significance. We must be sure that it is a step

in the right direction. The mechanism of the international monetary system is an intricate and complicated mechanism, the successful functioning of which is of worldwide concern. We must make certain that any adjustments made in that mechanism will be the best that experience and intelligence and concern for the welfare of all nations can devise.

The Balance-of-Payments Program and the Congress

White House press release dated May 13

CABINET REPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM : The Secretary of the Treasury
SUBJECT: The Balance of Payments Program and the Congress

The Congress has demonstrated a keen awareness of the serious national problem arising from our balance of payments deficit and related gold losses. By its actions, the Congress—with a large measure of bipartisan support—has demonstrated a determination to deal with this urgent problem.

The following developments testify to this Congressional resolve:

1. The Federal Reserve Act has been amended to make the gold reserve requirement applicable only to Federal Reserve Notes outstanding.

Within a matter of five weeks after legislation was submitted, the Congress by votes of 300 to 82 and 74 to 7 in the House and Senate, respectively, passed the required legislation. 255 Democrats and 45 Republicans supported the measure in the House, and 50 and 24 in the Senate. This measure was and is of both practical and psychological importance, representing a move to sustain the pledge of the U.S. that its commitment to maintain the interconvertibility of gold and the dollar at \$35 per ounce would not be impaired, while assuring that domestic economic ex-

pansion would not be held back by lack of an adequate money supply.

2. A highly desirable expansion in the resources of the International Monetary Fund, from roughly \$16 billion to some \$21 billion, is well along; the U.S. quota will rise from \$4,125 million to \$5,160 million.

The House, by a vote of 301 to 88, passed the authorizing legislation on April 27. A total of 227 Democrats and 74 Republicans supported the legislation. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has voted, without opposition, to send the bill to the Senate, where strong bipartisan support is also expected.¹

3. The measure to reduce the duty-free allowance for returning residents has moved through its first major step.

The House Committee on Ways and Means has voted to reduce the existing \$100 wholesale exemption for returning tourists to a \$50 exemption, retail value. This measure will bring balance of payments gains in the order of \$100 million.

4. Legislation to permit U.S. commercial banks to pay rates on deposits of foreign official holders of dollars in excess of the regular ceilings imposed by present law.

This measure, passed by the House Banking and Currency Committee by a unanimous voice vote, is being considered by the Senate Banking and Currency Committee. It will make it possible for American banks to continue to compete effectively for the time deposits of foreign official dollar holdings without any adverse repercussions on domestic interest rates. Such successful competition for longer term time deposits will help to improve our balance of payments, and reduce potential pressure on our gold stock.

This is the Congressional record of action to date. However, much remains to be done before Congress adjourns. Those legislative

¹ The Senate passed the bill on May 24.

proposals requiring action include such measures as:

1. Legislation to exempt from certain anti-trust provisions necessary meetings of financial officials to implement the voluntary restraint program launched by the President.

This legislation is being considered by the House Judiciary Committee and has been referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. The Senate Committee has held hearings but no action has yet been taken by the House group. This legislation will assure the flexibility that may be required to implement this part of the President's program.

2. Legislation to make foreign investment in the United States more attractive along the lines recommended in the Presidential Task Force Report of April 28, 1964.²

United States investment in foreign securities last year totaled nearly \$900 million; foreign investment in our securities actually declined by more than \$100 million. Legislation to eliminate existing tax barriers to foreign investment in the U.S. has been introduced. The legislation includes changes in the areas of estate taxes, non-business income, and factors relating to capital gains as they apply to foreigners.

3. Legislation to broaden and extend the Interest Equalization Tax for two years to December 31, 1967.

This measure is crucial to the balance of payments program because it helps to restrain capital outflows. It has been highly successful in the portfolio areas at which it was directed. U.S. purchases of foreign securities in the first six months of 1963 were running at an annual rate of \$2 billion. In 1964, those purchases fell to less than \$900 million. The IET, broadened to apply to longer term lending by banks and non-bank financial corporations, coupled with the voluntary restraint program, promises substantial assistance to our bal-

ance of payments gains. Extension of the IET is thus essential.

The responsible and determined actions by the Congress—as well as further Congressional decisions that will be required to complete necessary legislation—must and will be paralleled by continued and determined action by the Executive Branch wherever further balance of payments gains are possible. For example:

1. The President has ordered an intensive review of foreign currencies owned by the United States to determine whether increased balance of payments benefits can be obtained from their use. This intensive reexamination is well under way and the results will shortly be available for follow-up action to the extent indicated.

2. Constant effort is being exerted to bring government dollar expenditures abroad—for defense, for aid, or for any other purpose—down to the minimum necessary to meet essential needs.

3. Other administrative actions to help our balance of payments should be taken as promptly as possible. These include: (a) appropriate action to eliminate freight rate differentials that discriminate against American exports; (b) assurance that adequate financing is available for our exports and (c) intensification of efforts on the "See the U.S.A."

Hard, responsible decisions have been made by the Congress in the balance of payments area. I have every reason to believe that its members will show the same determination on pending legislation.

The President's program of voluntary cooperation, involving the financial and business community, seems to be off to a satisfactory start.

Administrative action by the Executive Branch must and will accompany these efforts. I shall convene another meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments in the next three weeks to make certain that we in the Executive Branch maintain the momentum of the progress we have begun.

HENRY H. FOWLER

² For background, see BULLETIN of May 18, 1964, p. 804.

Five Areas No Longer Exempt From Interest Equalization Tax

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

White House press release dated May 14

The President has signed an Executive order which will have the effect of terminating the designation of the Bahamas, Bermuda, Ireland, Kuwait, and Portugal as less developed countries for purposes of the interest equalization tax. Previously, on April 6, 1965, the President had notified Congress of his intention to take this action.

The interest equalization tax is generally applicable to the acquisition of foreign securities by United States persons from foreigners and has been in effect since July 19, 1963. The tax is designed to reduce the outflow of capital from the United States and thereby improve the country's balance-of-payments position. The tax does not apply to acquisitions of stock and debt obligations issued by countries which are designated by the President to be less developed countries and by certain corporations and residents of such countries.

The effect of the President's action will be to apply the interest equalization tax to acquisitions by United States citizens and other United States persons from foreigners of stock and debt obligations originating in the three countries and the Bahamas and Bermuda, which previously had not been subject to the tax because of the less developed status of these areas. However, acquisitions made pursuant to firm commitments which existed prior to April 6, 1965, will continue to be exempt.

The decision to issue the Executive order was made in connection with the intensified program announced by President Johnson on February 10, 1965,¹ to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit of the United States. A review of the current economic status of the areas designated as less de-

veloped countries for purposes of the interest equalization tax disclosed that the Bahamas, Bermuda, Ireland, Kuwait, and Portugal have progressed to the point where none should enjoy a privileged position in the acquisition of capital in the United States. Each is experiencing satisfactory domestic economic growth, and each has relatively large international resources to draw upon if additional financing is required. Kuwait has become a net exporter of capital. The other four, in addition to their own domestic capital resources, have access to the capital markets of Europe.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 11224²

DESIGNATION OF CERTAIN FOREIGN COUNTRIES AS ECONOMICALLY LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES FOR PURPOSES OF THE INTEREST EQUALIZATION TAX

WHEREAS the Senate and House of Representatives have been duly notified of my intention to terminate the designation of the Bahamas, Bermuda, Ireland, Kuwait, and Portugal as economically less developed countries for purposes of the tax imposed by section 4911 of the Internal Revenue Code:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by section 4916 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as added by section 2 of the Interest Equalization Tax Act, approved September 2, 1964 (Public Law 88-563), by section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. *Economically less developed countries.* For purposes of the tax imposed by section 4911 of the Internal Revenue Code, the following areas are designated as economically less developed countries:

(a) All foreign countries (including Trust Territories) in existence on or after the effective date of this order, other than Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, and any foreign country within the Sino-Soviet bloc, as defined in section 2:

(b) Each territory, department, province, and possession (other than the Bahamas, Bermuda, and Hong Kong), of any foreign country in existence on or after the effective date of this order, other than a foreign country within the Sino-Soviet bloc, as de-

¹ For text of message of the President to the Congress, see BULLETIN of Mar. 1, 1965, p. 282.

² 30 Fed. Reg. 6679.

fined in section 2, if the territory, department, province, or possession is overseas from the foreign country of which it is a territory, department, province, or possession; and

(c) The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and all possessions of the United States.

SEC. 2. *Definition of the term "foreign country within the Sino-Soviet bloc."* For purposes of this order, the term "foreign country within the Sino-Soviet bloc" shall mean Albania, Bulgaria, any part of China which is dominated or controlled by International Communism, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, any part of Korea which is dominated or controlled by International Communism, Latvia, Lithuania, Outer Mongolia, Poland (including any area under its provisional administration), Rumania, Soviet Zone of Germany and the Soviet Sector of Berlin, Tibet, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Kurile Islands, Southern Sakhalin, and areas in East Prussia which are under the provisional administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and any part of Viet Nam which is dominated or controlled by International Communism.

SEC. 3. *Prior acquisitions and commitments.* Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of this order, any area which had the status of an economically less developed country under section 4916 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code prior to the effective date of this order shall be deemed to be an economically less developed country for purposes of section 4916 with respect to an acquisition of stock or a debt obligation—

(a) If such acquisition was made prior to the effective date of this order;

(b) If such acquisition is made pursuant to an obligation to acquire which, prior to April 6, 1965, was unconditional or was subject only to conditions contained in a formal contract under which partial performance had occurred; or


(c) If, with respect to such acquisition, the acquiring United States person (or, in a case where two or more United States persons are making acquisitions as part of a single transaction, a majority in interest of such persons) had taken every action prior to April 6, 1965, to signify approval of the acquisition under the procedures ordinarily employed by such person (or persons) in similar transactions and had sent or deposited for delivery to the foreign person from whom the acquisition was made written evidence of such approval in the form of a commitment letter, memorandum of terms, draft purchase contract, or other document setting forth, or referring to a document sent by the foreign person from whom the acquisition was made which set forth, the principal terms of such acquisition, subject only to the execution of formal documents evidencing the acquisition and to customary closing conditions.

SEC. 4. *Rules and regulations.* The Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate is authorized to pre-

scribe from time to time regulations, rulings, directions, and instructions to carry out the purposes of this order.

SEC. 5. *Effective date.* This order shall become effective upon its filing for publication in the Federal Register.

SEC. 6. *Inapplicability of Executive Order 11071.* Executive Order No. 11071, dated December 27, 1962, is hereby superseded to the extent that such order applies to section 4916 of the Internal Revenue Code.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
May 13, 1965.

U.S. and Argentina To Launch Meteorological Sounding Rockets

White House press release dated May 21

The White House announced on May 21 that United States and Argentine space scientists will begin launching meteorological sounding rockets this year in a search for clues to Western Hemispheric weather patterns.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Argentine Space Commission (CNIE) signed an agreement on that day at Mar del Plata, Argentina, providing for an experimental program which may lead to an operational system of weather rocket launching stations throughout the Western Hemisphere.

Argentine scientists initiated discussions of this project, and Argentina is the first Latin American country to join with the United States in this effort to gather weather data simultaneously from rockets launched at stations running from Argentina to Canada. The data gained by this experimental meteorological network will assist studies of atmospheric structure and behavior in the Southern Hemisphere, help explain differences and similarities between the Northern and Southern Hemispheres, and improve weather forecasts for the Western Hemisphere as a whole.

Research has shown that the atmosphere

must be studied as a global entity before structure and behavior can be adequately understood and predicted. However, little data has been obtained in the 30-60 kilometer (18.6-37.3 miles) region in the Southern Hemisphere. The small amount of available data has indicated significant differences as well as similarities in the circulations of the Southern and Northern Hemispheres.

Under the terms of the agreement, Argentina will provide the launching facilities in Argentina, transport the rockets and equipment from the U.S. to Argentina, assemble and launch the rockets, and provide meteorological data obtained to other participants who may join the network.

NASA will loan ground support equip-

ment, such as a radar, to CNIE; provide eight instrumented rocket payloads; train Argentine personnel in the use of equipment, in handling of sounding rockets, and in reduction of meteorological data; and provide meteorological data obtained at NASA's Wallops Island Station, Va., to the other participants in the network. The project would entail no exchange of funds between the two countries.

The first launchings in the program are scheduled to take place from Wallops Island and Chamental at 30° south latitude in Argentina, before the end of the year.

The project, part of NASA's continuing program of cooperative space research, will contribute to observance of 1965 as International Cooperation Year.

THE CONGRESS

Disarmament and International Cooperation

Following are statements made on May 12 by Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, and Adrian S. Fisher, Acting Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, during hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Senate Concurrent Resolution 32.

STATEMENT BY MR. CLEVELAND

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I am very glad to come at your invitation to discuss Senate Concurrent Resolution 32. The aim of the resolution is to support the President in his efforts "to achieve peace and disarmament under legally effec-

tive controls and to develop international institutions capable of permanently keeping the peace." Helping the President move toward these goals is of course a daily preoccupation of a good many of us in the Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and elsewhere around the Government.

The question, of course, is not whether we want to move toward these goals—that is easy. The difficult question is how do we get there from where we have to start—which is here, and today.

"Here" is a world of international ironies.

It is a world with 20 million men under arms and military budgets of \$120 billion—which has trouble finding 20,000 men and

\$120 million for international peacekeeping by the United Nations.

It is a world in which the big powers urge the smaller powers to stay away from nuclear weapons, yet feel they have to build their own nuclear stockpiles for their own national purposes—or for the common defense.

It is a world in which the small nations complain that the nuclear powers are not getting on with disarmament, while they themselves negotiate for the best deal in a squadron of jet fighters or a package of second-hand howitzers and flamethrowers.

To talk about disarmament without talking about political disputes is to talk about only part of the problem. I shall not try to answer the chicken-and-egg question whether political settlements or arms control agreements come first. We have to work at both, all the time.

No disarmament negotiation in the foreseeable future is likely to be the last one; bargaining about arms control will be a feature of international diplomacy for as far as we can see into the future. And no great peace conference can weld the world into amiable solidarity; international bargaining about borders and trade and human rights and self-determination will be an enduring feature of the political landscape, too.

We can thank our stars that the United Nations has been able to damp down a series of dangerous conflicts which otherwise could have raged out of control.

But somehow we *are* better at discouraging violence than we are at encouraging settlements that endure. Korea, Kashmir, the Congo, Cyprus, and the Arab-Israel conflict bear witness.

But stopping bloodshed has not settled the basic problems that cause the bloodshed and could bring on a renewal of mutual murder.

The same is true of the relations between the great powers. The nations that know the most about nuclear armament have looked deeply into the dangers—and have signed nuclear test bans and started talking about reducing the quantum of fissionable materials in the world. But the problems which created the nuclear arms race—the

thwarted ambitions of which a divided Berlin and a divided Korea are the continuing symbols—are not settled, merely stalemated.

No Alternative to Peace

The central problem of international relations in our time was once summarized by President Eisenhower in a memorable phrase: There is no alternative to peace.

So the central problem of diplomacy in our time is to devise a system in which nations can share their freedom of action with others—a system in which nations can find national security in international guarantees and international institutions.

I think it is fair to say that the United States Government knows this, and practices it nearly every day in bilateral relations, in helping to build international organizations, and in negotiating about arms control and disarmament.

I think it is fair to say that the Government of the Soviet Union lags well behind the United States in applying to its foreign policy the simple idea that, in the presence of modern technology, national security can only be assured by international arrangements. It is still impressed, perhaps—as some people in every nation are still impressed—with the obsolescent idea that a nation can assure its own destiny by its national efforts alone.

That is our inherited wisdom; but in the nuclear age, it is more heritage than wisdom.

Thus on the fundamental arrangements for “permanently keeping the peace,” the two most powerful nations in the world remain something like a generation apart in their thinking—even while they are only minutes apart as the missile flies.

Improving the Machinery of Peace

In this kind of world, the process of creating a tolerable order requires us to work at several levels—and through a wide variety of institutions—and with a mix of techniques at one and the same time. It is not a very precise process, nor is it amenable to precise planning. Indeed it is often quite messy

and involves a multitude of grubby tasks.

Nonetheless we can plot out the major avenues toward a workable system of international order; and we can identify a rough hierarchy of levels at which order can be organized.

The first level—and it is all too easy to overlook—is the nation-to-nation level. Treaties of peace and friendship—agreements for joint use and development of resources—settlement of disputes through negotiation, mediation, arbitration, or judicial recourse—joint instruments, joint ventures, joint control boards—add up to the first level of international order.

Most nations do in fact maintain a tolerable system of orderly relations with their neighboring states. But some conflicts need the attention of friends and neighbors not directly involved in the dispute. So we work also on the regional level, where increasingly elaborate mechanisms have been created during the postwar years.

There are limitations, of course, to regional peacekeeping capability. NATO, for example, was unable to cope with the conflict in Cyprus. On the other hand, the Organization of African Unity, which is only just getting organized, already has helped put out two brush-fire wars, between Morocco and Algeria and between Ethiopia and Somalia.

And in the period immediately ahead we shall be working hard with our neighbors in this hemisphere to develop a ready capability on the part of the Organization of American States to deal with crises quickly.

It seems obvious on the face of it that if regional organizations can settle disputes within a regional community, so much the better.

But near neighbors sometimes cannot negotiate a cease-fire or mediate a settlement. Courage and objectivity are sometimes proportional to distance from the problem. The necessary power to dampen conflict, or the will to use such power as does exist, are not always present in the region, or in the regional security organization. And in most of Asia there is no inclusive regional security organization anyway.

That is why we have recourse so often—on a dozen major occasions in 20 years—to the peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations.

The goal of world peace and world order and social progress and human rights is all there in the charter—a luminous goal that the nations of this world could agree to adopt only with the close memory of great agony and in the false dawn of a new age.

At this point it all seems a long way down the road, but the goal is clear. And the way to get there is clear enough, if complex. It is to work everlastingly at the tough, practical jobs of strengthening U.N. machinery for keeping the peace and for peaceful settlement, improving U.N. machinery for development assistance, working at technological tasks within world agencies, extending the reach of international law and the writ of the International Court, and negotiating persistently for international agreements for the regulation and reduction of armaments.

The U.S. in the International Community

In each of these categories of tasks there is a record of hard-won progress. In each there are discernible “next steps” to be negotiated. In each there is a mixture of obstacles and opportunities. And in each the United States cannot move forward by itself, for it must move in agreement with others. In bilateral diplomacy it used to be said that it takes two to tango. The modern dance of multilateral diplomacy requires much more complex choreography.

It is surely true that the United States Government, over the past 20 years, has been second to none in inventing, sponsoring, supporting, and working through the international agencies which make up the existing system of world order—and on which we will have to build if we are some day to secure peace in a disarmed world. Our most familiar posture in the international community is to be somewhat out in front of the most cooperative of our colleagues—urging the others to join us in taking the next step. But there is no point in the U.S. Government being so far in front that we

lose touch with the parade.

We send delegations every year to more than 500 international conferences to work cooperatively at the world's business.

We are dues-paying members of 53 international organizations.

We typically provide 40 percent of the financial resources of the international development agencies.

We have supported every U.N. peacekeeping mission, have made a number of proposals for strengthening the machinery which have been adopted, and have been a leading exponent of a flexible call-up system which provides the peace forces when the U.N. membership decides to use them.

The lesson of all this is that the building of world order is a process of dynamic growth. Progress comes mostly at moments of crisis; if each crisis is skillfully handled, a residue of international machinery and experience is left behind to help prevent the next similar crisis.

The lesson is that we need, not a new U.N. Charter, but the will and the skill to make maximum use of the extraordinarily flexible charter we already have.

And the lesson of the 19th General Assembly is that the international community had not reached the point where it was ready to apply a legal sanction written clearly into an international treaty, interpreted by the International Court of Justice, and adopted by the Assembly in accordance with its own procedures. The constitutional crisis in the United Nations will be worked out somehow by negotiation; we can only hope enough members of the U.N. will want to strengthen, not weaken, the organization's capacity to act for peace.

So we hold high the goal, and we slog down the road toward international order—just as rapidly as others can be induced to travel with us.

International Cooperation Year

None of this is meant to imply a complacent conviction in the executive branch that we are doing everything that could be done to get as quickly as possible from where we

are to "peace under conditions of general and complete disarmament effectively guaranteed by adequate inspection and controls."

Quite the contrary: We are actively in the market for the best ideas to help the President "in his efforts to achieve peace and disarmament . . ."—efforts which President Johnson has called "the assignment of the century."¹

The President has recently established a Cabinet Committee and helped bring into being a National Citizens Commission to review the state of international cooperation.² To do this work, 28 government committees, and 28 parallel groups of private experts, have been formed in fields ranging from international law to meteorology. They are to recommend next steps beyond the current boundaries of cooperation, in every major field of human endeavor.

This is how the United States is celebrating International Cooperation Year and the 20th anniversary of the signing of the U.N. Charter—by working hard on plans for more and better international cooperation. The work of these committees will be brought together at a White House Conference, already scheduled by the President for November 29th to December 1st of this year.

Speeding Up the Growth of World Order

Mr. Chairman, we share the goal of this resolution with unqualified conviction, and we salute the objective of making it clear to one and all where the United States Congress stands on the issues of peace and disarmament.

We share a high sense of urgency about getting on with the job of creating a workable system of world order.

We share in the disappointment that the nations which cohabit this planet move ponderously when we think they should move more quickly, in a straighter line, toward goals that seem both desirable and inevitable to most Americans.

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 19, 1964, p. 555.

² For background, see *ibid.*, Dec. 14, 1964, p. 857, and Mar. 15, 1965, p. 382.

And we share with the sponsors of this resolution an uncomfortable feeling that there must be something else that we ought to be doing or saying or thinking about, to speed up the organic growth of world order at one or another of the levels where world order is organized.

We therefore welcome with open minds a dialog with this committee on steps toward world peace and world disarmament.

STATEMENT BY MR. FISHER³

Mr. Chairman: The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency warmly welcomes the support which Senate Concurrent Resolution 32 gives to the President's "efforts to achieve peace and disarmament under legally effective controls and to develop international institutions capable of permanently keeping the peace." Moreover, we believe that the resolution is useful in restating the necessary relationship between comprehensive disarmament and the establishment of effective means for verification and for keeping the peace.

The overall goals sought by the resolution are disarmament and peace. These have been the best hopes of mankind almost since the beginning of recorded history. They were recently well articulated by the Congress when the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was created,⁴ and I quote:

An ultimate goal of the United States is a world which is free from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of armaments; in which the use of force has been subordinated to the rule of law; and in which international adjustments to a changing world are achieved peacefully.

President Johnson has repeatedly given strong support to these objectives. He is responsible for the submission to the 1964 sessions of the Geneva Disarmament Conference of more concrete proposals for safeguarded and realistic agreements than have been made to any such conference in any

³ Presented for the record. Mr. Fisher also made an oral statement.

⁴ Public Law 87-297.

year since World War II. He has instructed the Agency to leave no stone unturned in its search for new proposals to submit to the Geneva conference when it reconvenes in 1965, as we hope it will.

By word and deed he has repeatedly expressed his support for the Agency and the objectives of disarmament and peace. This is amply demonstrated by the memorandum submitted to this committee on April 29 by Secretary Rusk.⁵

What the Resolution Calls For

Section 2 of Senate Concurrent Resolution 32 requests the President to formulate proposals for the establishment of an international authority to keep the peace under conditions of general and complete disarmament. Since 1962 the Geneva conference has had before it a United States proposal entitled "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World."⁶ This plan has been amplified in statements by U.S. representatives to the conference in 1962, 1963, and 1964. The plan and the statements contain numerous U.S. proposals which seem to me to be of the kind described in the resolution as relating to "international machinery for the supervision of disarmament and the maintenance of peace."

International Disarmament Organization

Specifically, the resolution calls *first* for proposals for an International Disarmament Organization. The U.S. plan contains several pages of proposals concerning an International Disarmament Organization, and statements have been made on it by the U.S. representatives. Of course, the exact nature of any international organization responsible for monitoring a disarmament treaty will depend upon the nature of the disarmament steps agreed upon, the parties, and the kind of verification system to be utilized. Proposals cannot, therefore, be too detailed until a

⁵ Not printed here.

⁶ For text, see BULLETIN of May 7, 1962, p. 747.

greater consensus has been achieved on these matters.

We are, however, giving continuing study to the kinds of organization which might monitor a comprehensive test ban treaty, a freeze on the numbers and characteristics of strategic bombers and missiles, major arms reduction measures, and comprehensive disarmament. Such studies have been and are being made by ACDA staff and by ACDA contractors. For instance, we have just begun a study on the subject by a group of experts in the practical problems of international organizational arrangements—including a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.

World Peace Force

Second, the resolution calls for proposals for a World Peace Force. The U.S. plan contains proposals in each of its three stages relating to a U.N. Peace Force. Given the lack of consensus that exists on this subject at the present time, little use would probably be served in being more specific now. We are continuing, however, to give time and attention to staff and contract studies on this subject. Not long ago, for example, the Agency entered into a contract for detailed exploration of the experience of a recent U.N. Peace Force.

Tribunals for Peaceful Settlement

Third, the resolution calls for proposals for world tribunals for the peaceful settlement of all international disputes not settled by negotiation. The United States plan calls for utilization of arbitration, mediation, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, submission to the Security Council or the General Assembly, or other peaceful means in addition to negotiation. It contains several specific provisions with respect to the International Court of Justice.

It has been my observation that many institutions for peaceful settlement of international disputes already exist but that what is lacking is the political will of most nations to use them. Under these circumstances, additional proposals for new institutions

would not seem particularly useful. The executive branch continues, however, to give a great deal of attention both to particular trouble spots where peaceful settlement is needed and to general proposals providing for greater utilization and effectiveness of peaceful settlement procedures.

Other Enforcement Institutions

Fourth, the resolution urges proposals for other international institutions for enforcement of world peace under the rule of law. The U.S. plan calls for measures to strengthen the structure, authority, and operation of the United Nations itself; for the progressive development of rules of international conduct relating to disarmament; and for the establishment of a U.N. Peace Observation Corps. The Peace Observation Corps would consist of a standing cadre of observers who could be dispatched promptly to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or a breach of the peace. In this connection the Agency has received a thorough and helpful contract study of the actual experience with peace observation arrangements since 1920.

U.S. Disarmament Plan

The United States plan is serving two useful functions at the Geneva Disarmament Conference. *First*, it makes clear the United States position that comprehensive disarmament could not be established or maintained except in a peaceful world. The plan is, in fact, a road map of the route to general disarmament, showing the steps which would have to be taken along the way to improve procedures for keeping the peace. These steps would clearly require considerable change in the existing practices and attitudes of nations.

Second, by showing this clearly for all to see, the plan, and the debate it has produced, have demonstrated the unreality of the Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament in 4 years. In essence, that proposal was: Lay down your arms and there will be peace. It provided little in the way of inspection to see that the Soviets gave up

all their arms, and less in the way of effective procedures to maintain the peace after we had given up ours.

The Soviets charge that U.S. proposals designed to strengthen the charter are in fact violations of it. They insist that their "principle of unanimity" applies to peaceful settlement of disputes, peacekeeping institutions, and apparently even to any international organization which would monitor compliance with a disarmament agreement. They even insist on the right of Communist countries to pursue their objectives in a disarming world through so-called "wars of liberation."

The debate on these subjects at Geneva has been instructive, if not productive of agreement. By pointing to the areas of disagreement, it has helped the conference in its search for areas where agreement might yet be possible. In so doing it has, in my judgment, contributed in a small way to the achievement of the test ban treaty and the other first-step measures already taken.

Let us not ignore the significance of these steps. As President Johnson said to the conferees at Geneva as they concluded their deliberations last year:⁷

"Already the world is somewhat safer because of the efforts of the nations represented here. The air we breathe is no longer being contaminated by nuclear tests. Nuclear weapons are being kept out of space. Announcements have been made that planned production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons is being limited. Better means of emergency communications exist to help prevent an unintended nuclear exchange. For the first time, friends and adversaries alike have taken steps together to bring the nuclear arms race under control.

"Limited as they are, these achievements are cause for some satisfaction. They followed sixteen years of post-war disarmament talks which produced neither agreement nor the basis for agreement."

⁷ For text of the President's message, see *ibid.*, Oct. 12, 1964, p. 524.

Arms Control and Disarmament: Some Sober Truths

Remarks by President Johnson¹

Ladies and gentlemen: I want to thank you for your presence here today. I welcome you to the White House Rose Garden.

I want to discuss with you some sober truths of the age in which we live. A full-scale nuclear war, if it should occur, might come and go as swiftly as one of our thundershowers. Yet it could wreak more destruction than a lifetime of earthquake, and fire, and flood. It could render life on earth intolerable for many, many years to come.

One modern warhead today carries enough firepower to make the nuclear blast of 20 years ago seem a very pale flicker by comparison. One jet bomber today carries weapons equal in explosive force to all—repeat—all the bombs that were dropped in World War II.

The fearsome engines of today are not mere symptoms of intention. Weapons have themselves become a cause of fear and a cause of distrust among other nations. As weapons become more numerous and more deadly, fear and tension grow.

These are not pleasant thoughts. But they are in my mind as I do my job each day. So when I say to you that I hope for peace, I am making no idle talk.

Today we have come here to mark a very small but a very significant step toward a durable peace. This act will extend for 3 years the life of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. As I sign this act, we can reflect with satisfaction upon the successes in arms control which have been achieved in the last 4 years. The nuclear test ban of 1963 is helping to keep the air free from nuclear contamination. A United Nations resolution, supported by the United States and Soviet Union, has put space off

¹ Made in the White House Rose Garden on May 27 (White House press release) on the signing into law of H. R. 2998, authorizing the continuation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for 3 years.

limits to the instruments of nuclear war. A Washington-Moscow communications link established in 1963 is open at this very moment, and it is a symbol of our determination to prevent an unintended nuclear exchange.

In addition, we have taken steps to limit our own supplies of nonessential armaments. We recognize that the accumulation of obsolete weapons, the production of unnecessary weapons, accelerate the arms race without contributing to overall security.

These acts are only part of the story. A less dramatic but an equally important aspect of arms control lies behind the steps that I just described—in patient, enduring work by the staff of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

This Government has repeatedly stated its conviction that steadily mounting nuclear stock does not—repeat—does not insure the security of any nation and that the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries threatens the security of all.

We believe that nuclear war must be avoided. And that is why we place such high hopes in the works of this Agency. That is why our prayers go with these able and patient men when they travel to the conference table.

Many times over many years I have been involved in efforts to moderate differences between men. I know that governments cannot easily be persuaded to cease their ancient rivalries or to lay aside their weapons or their arms, but I also know that the nations of mankind that are huddled together on a crowded globe have a common interest in survival.

I do believe it is possible through reason and through patient effort to translate that common interest into concrete proposals.

We meet here today to reaffirm those beliefs and to assert once again our faith that man can turn from violence in order to build a world in which the only conquests that nations seek are greater liberty, are deeper understanding, and a fuller life for all the people.

Thank you very much.

Bill Authorizing New Embassy at Saigon Signed by President

Statement by President Johnson, May 25

White House press release dated May 25

Eight weeks ago a terrorist explosion outside our Embassy in Saigon killed 2 Americans and 19 Vietnamese, wounded 156 persons, and did serious damage to the embassy building as well as to nearby structures.¹

This outrage showed the ruthless nature of the Communist Viet Cong. It underlined the need for improved security for our people who are working under such difficult conditions in South Viet-Nam.

On April 1, I requested authorization from the Congress for a \$1 million appropriation for a new embassy chancery at a location which would provide greater security for the Americans working there. It would also remind all concerned that we shall remain in Viet-Nam as long as we need to be. The House with dispatch and energy approved the authorization with a vote of 378 to 0 on April 5. The Senate moved to concur by a voice vote.

I signed this bill [H. R. 7064] with increased heart for the future.

This is another example of the united support of the Congress and the country in what we are trying to do in that beleaguered part of the world. When our fleet was callously attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin, the Congress rose to the challenge. On August 10, House Joint Resolution 1145 was presented declaring this nation's firm and unyielding resolve to stand against aggression and subversion. That resolution passed the Congress 504 to 2.²

Once again in May, the Congress spoke in a clear voice of unity when it approved the \$700 million supplemental appropriations bill for Viet-Nam. On May 5 the House passed

¹ For a statement by President Johnson on Mar. 30 and a letter from the President to the Congress on Apr. 1, see BULLETIN of Apr. 19, 1965, p. 571.

² For background, see *ibid.*, Aug. 24, 1964 p. 258, and Aug. 31, 1964, p. 302.

it 408 to 7. On May 6 the Senate with equal quickness approved by a vote of 88 to 3.³

Now, with the Congress again expressing itself, we will begin a new embassy building in Saigon. It will be a visible symbol of our resolve to stand by the side of the Vietnamese people as they defend themselves against terror and aggression. We will not desert them or fail them.

President Signs Bill on Coffee Agreement

Statement by President Johnson, May 24

White House press release dated May 24

I have signed into law S. 701, an act to carry out the obligations of the United States under the International Coffee Agreement.¹ Pursuant to section 8 of the act, I have made and have had transmitted to the Congress, on the basis of the facts, technical analysis, and counsel available to me, the determination that the act will not result in an unwarranted increase in coffee prices to United States consumers.

The United States is now in a position to do its full part in making the International Coffee Agreement an effective instrument for stabilizing the world coffee market in the interests of both consumers and producers.

Coffee dominates the economy of Latin America and many countries in Africa and Asia as well. More than 20 million persons depend directly on coffee for their livelihood. The hopes of these countries and these people for economic and social progress are tied to coffee. A weak and disorderly coffee market is of deep concern to them and to us.

The United States helped to develop the International Coffee Agreement, as we promised we would when the Alliance for Progress was launched. It is the purpose of the agreement to keep coffee prices on an even keel both to protect our consumers and

to enable the countries so dependent on coffee for their well-being to have stable earnings that grow as consumption grows.

It is important that the Coffee Agreement achieve its purpose. We will use the authority granted in this act to help assure that this purpose is achieved.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Principles of U.N.-OAS Relationship in Dominican Republic

Following are statements made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative Adlai E. Stevenson during debate on the situation in the Dominican Republic.¹

STATEMENT OF MAY 22

U.S./U.N. press release 4564

The news which we have received from the Secretary-General about the suspension of hostilities is not as ominous as some feared this morning. In view of the predisposition of the forces of the two factions, north and south of the line of communication, the action which United States forces are taking to prevent any attacks across the line of communication or through the safety zone or by air or by sea is, of course, the most effective possible assurance against further fighting on any large scale.

All of us here, I am sure, are determined that the hostilities must cease. The cessation of hostilities is, of course, ultimately a question of fact, not a question of agreement. The truth of the matter is that the truce, or the suspension-of-hostilities agreement, was immediately checked yesterday afternoon and found to be in effect. It is the fact of hos-

³ *Ibid.*, May 24, 1965, p. 816.

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5505.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of May 17, 1965, p. 738; May 31, 1965, pp. 854 and 869; and June 7, 1965, pp. 908 and 913.

ilities that concerns us. An agreement as an indication of intent is greatly to be desired, but it is no guarantee of an absence of fighting. That is a question of fact.

We now have the statement of General Imbert that he does not intend to resume hostilities unless he is fired upon. I gather, but am not sure, that Colonel Caamaño takes the same position. If we have further information available as to that, it would be very welcome.

There are now no hostilities, to the best of our knowledge. I hope there will be none. Furthermore, we now have the complete information on the factual situation, as conveyed, as I said, by the Secretary General of the OAS. I should like to quote again the last paragraph of the statement that he [General Imbert] transmitted to our Secretary-General through Mr. Mayobre [José Antonio Mayobre, personal representative of the U.N. Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic] from Dr. [José A.] Mora:

For these reasons, the Government of National Reconstruction will abstain from resuming fire unless provoked, while conversations continue with the Secretary General of the OAS to arrive at a definite solution of the conflict.

In the circumstances the urgency has diminished, but other implications of the texts before us presented first by the United Kingdom and then by France become more important. We were prepared to vote for the resolution presented by the representative of the United Kingdom,² which welcomes the recent decisions of the OAS and calls for a complete cessation of hostilities. We consider that such a reference to the OAS decisions is the minimum necessary to reciprocate the express desire of the OAS to work in cooperation with this Council.

We were surprised that immediately after the presentation of the United Kingdom's text, the representative of France submitted another text,³ whose main divergence was to eliminate any reference to the OAS.

We would of course prefer that the United Kingdom resolution would have retained its

priority, because we believe it more accurately reflected both the normal courtesies between agencies of the United Nations and the true feelings of the majority of the members of the Council, who are anxious to get along with the conclusion of this work, not to mention the true feelings of the majority of the members of the OAS.

The appropriate relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations such as this one, the OAS, can be summarized in terms I think of six principles.

One, the members of the United Nations pursuant to articles 33 and 52 of the charter should seek to deal with threats to the peace within a geographical region through regional arrangements before coming to the United Nations. This is precisely what the members of the OAS have done in the Dominican case.

Second, regional organizations should not of course take enforcement action without the authorization of the Security Council. But in the Dominican Republic the Organization of American States did not take the kind of action that would require Security Council approval.

Third, action taken by regional organizations must be consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. This is obviously the case with the actions of the OAS in the Dominican Republic case.

Fourth, the Security Council should at all times be kept fully informed of actions undertaken by regional organizations. The OAS is keeping the Security Council fully informed; witness the report you have just had from Dr. Mora through Mr. Mayobre this afternoon. And the Council has also arranged to keep itself informed through a representative of the Secretary-General.

Fifth, the Security Council has the competence to deal with any situation which might threaten international peace and security. This competence is not at issue here.

But sixth, the Security Council should not seek to duplicate or interfere with action through regional arrangements so long as those actions remain effective and are consistent with our charter. The purposes of

² U.N. doc. S/6375.

³ U.N. doc. S/6376.

the United Nations Charter will hardly be served if two international organizations are seeking to do things in the same place with the same people at the same time.

As a matter of sound practice and the wise use of discretion, the Security Council under present conditions should keep itself fully informed but not undertake any activity, either diplomatic or on the ground, which would hinder the efforts and the responsibilities of the competent organization. It will serve the purposes of the United Nations Charter best if the OAS achieves what it has set out to accomplish, and that is to restore peace and achieve reconciliation so that the Dominican people can develop their own democratic institutions.

In the circumstances we have considered introducing an amendment to the French text to restore appropriate references to the work now underway by the OAS which the delegate of France has eliminated. We have not done so only because the Soviet Union's negative vote against the Uruguayan text this morning made it clear that the U.S.S.R. would veto any reference whatsoever to the Organization of American States for its purposes. We do concur, however, that the more formal extension of the temporized cessation of hostilities into a permanent cease-fire is desirable in spite of the fact that the fighting has stopped.

As I have already said, the Secretary General of the OAS is actively at work, as are representatives of the United States and others, to achieve this purpose. And our decision to interpose our forces is the most practical possible way to achieve this objective.

As the resolution does not encourage the regional activity which article 52, paragraph 3, of the charter enjoins the Council to do, we cannot vote for it. However, because the resolution does not impede the OAS in the exercise of its functions, because of the desirability of further steps to extend the truce in a formal fashion, and because all concerned in restoring peace to the Dominican Republic are perforce in fact working in consultation, the United States will not seek to prevent

the adoption of this resolution, and we will abstain.⁴

STATEMENT OF MAY 24

U.S./U.N. press release 4566

Mr. President, I had assumed that the afternoon's session would be preceded by the reading of the reports by the Secretary-General, Documents S/6378 and 6380, which we have recently received.

However, let me proceed by reminding the Council that the Organization of American States adopted a resolution on the 6th of May which authorized the establishment of an Inter-American Force which would operate under the authority of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.⁵ This resolution was furnished to the Security Council in Document S/6333 dated May 7 of this year.

The text makes very clear that this Inter-American Force has but one purpose. That purpose is to cooperate

. . . in the restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican Republic, in maintaining the security of its inhabitants and the inviolability of human rights, and the establishment of an atmosphere of peace and conciliation that will permit the functioning of democratic institutions.

Now, sir, as we are all aware, several Latin American members of the Organization of American States now have their initial contingents on the ground in Santo Domingo. These countries currently represented are Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Brazil, and the United States. In addition, the Republic of Panama is being represented by a group of civilian doctors.

On Saturday last, May 22, the Organization of American States adopted a resolution which requested the Government of Brazil that it designate the Commander of the Inter-American Force and the Government of the United States to designate the Deputy Com-

⁴The French resolution was adopted by the Security Council on May 22 by a vote of 10 to 0, with 1 abstention (U.S.).

⁵For text, see BULLETIN of May 31, 1965, p. 862.

mander.⁶ The Government of Brazil has designated as Commander in Chief of the Inter-American Force General Hugo Panasco Alvim of the Brazilian Army.

The meeting on Saturday last of the Consultation of Foreign Ministers in that same resolution reaffirmed that the sole purpose of the Inter-American Force was that set forth in the May 6th resolution, which I have just quoted in part.

I am pleased to report that the act⁷ establishing the Inter-American Force was signed at 7:45 p.m., EDT, on Sunday, May 23. With the official establishment of the Inter-American Force yesterday evening, all United States forces in the Dominican Republic are now assigned to the Inter-American Force and have donned the yellow and blue arm-bands of that organization.

Following the signing of the act establishing the Force, the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, Dr. Mora, said,

. . . the purpose of the Inter-American Force is clearly not one of intervention but rather one of rendering assistance to the people of a sister nation.

The creation of the Force demonstrates once more the capacity of the Organization of American States to adjust to new conditions and to deal with new problems, problems having characteristics perhaps not even envisaged at the time the charter and the Rio Treaty were ratified. It is clear, however, that the objectives for which the Inter-American Force was created fall within those broad provisions of the charter which are concerned with matters affecting the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere. Peace, prosperity, and justice are indivisible and interdependent. Where these are lacking in one nation it must be a matter of concern to all.

The Organization of American States' activities in the Dominican Republic are directed toward the fostering of peace and tranquillity under conditions which will permit the Dominican people to establish a democratic civil government of their own choosing, to heal the wounds and the bitterness of civil strife, and to begin the path of relief and reconstruction.

Still another significant development has taken place since we last met, through the consultations among the members of the Organization of American States. The Brazilian Foreign Minister has proposed that Ameri-

can states be represented commencing on May 27, that is, Thursday of this week, in the Meeting of Consultation by the foreign ministers themselves. The United States supports this Brazilian initiative, and a considerable number of foreign ministers will attend the meeting on Thursday. It is a further demonstration of the determination of the OAS to take every possible step to insure that its efforts are effective.

Turning for a moment to another aspect of the current situation, I invite the Council's attention to the report of the Secretary-General in Document S/6378 of this date, distributed, I believe, this morning. It informs the Council about certain allegations made by Colonel Caamaño with regard to hostilities against his troops. It fails, however, to inform the Council about the ensuing investigation.

The results of this investigation have now been reported to the Security Council in Document S/6380, and the Council will note that the investigation failed to sustain the allegations made by Colonel Caamaño.

The investigation reveals, if I may invite the members' attention to these two reports of the Secretary-General, that on the afternoon of May 22, that is, Saturday, 34 violations of the cease-fire were committed by the Caamaño forces on United States troops. One of these instances of violation occurred when the Caamaño forces fired on United States soldiers along the southern edge of the line of communication with light and heavy machinegun fire. Two United States soldiers were wounded. United States forces returned the fire and took action to silence this heavy volume of fire against these troops. After carrying out this maneuver, United States forces returned to their original positions and did not establish any new positions.

Later in the afternoon of May 22, the Caamaño forces again fired without provocation against troops located on the southern edge of the line of communication in the vicinity of Avenue the 30th of March. Under this fire, four United States soldiers were wounded, one losing an eye. The United States troops returned the fire but did not move from their original positions. Later in

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, June 7, 1965, p. 913.

⁷ Not printed here.

the evening complaints were made by the United Nations team that the Caamaño forces had alleged that the United States troops were using mortars against them. This charge was also flatly contradicted. United States forces have not fired a single round of mortar fire in the Dominican Republic.

Later, at 10 o'clock on that same night, Saturday, it was charged that United States troops were pushing forward from the United States corridor and establishing a new post in the vicinity of the 30th of March Avenue. This allegation was denied as equally false. The area and action described was that mentioned as the area in which four soldiers were wounded by fire initiated by the forces of Colonel Caamaño.

With regard to the allegation that the corridor has been extended three times during the last week, as reported in the Secretary-General's report, S/6378, attributing to our forces the statement that the corridor will be extended as and when United States forces deem it necessary, I can inform the Security Council that the following statement was issued in Washington today to remove any doubt on that score: *

General Palmer [Lt. Gen. Bruce Palmer, Jr.] states that the assertion that the corridor has been extended three times during the past week is incorrect. The only departures from the established line have been temporary and limited maneuvers in self-defense while under fire. There will be no extension of the corridor except upon request of the OAS and with prior notification by the OAS to both sides.

I think it also relevant to note that at the time the United States representatives met with the United Nations team to discuss these allegations, the United States authorities expressed their deep concern with regard to the continuance of the cease-fire situation for humanitarian reasons and in a wider sense pointed out that the political situation in the Dominican Republic was only made more difficult in an atmosphere of accusation and counteraccusation.

*The following statement was read to news correspondents on May 24 by Marshall Wright, Deputy Director of the Office of News, Department of State.

Let me add that there is one enlargement of the security zone which the OAS is attempting to negotiate with both factions. That would be an extension of the security zone to include the Presidential Palace, which at present constitutes an enclave held by General Imbert's forces within the Caamaño-held territory and is one of the points at which the cease-fire is most frequently violated and has been since the beginning of the trouble. If the OAS can obtain the agreement of the two factions to this particular enlargement of the zone, it would make an important contribution to the maintenance of a strict cease-fire.

So much for the current situation. Let me now address myself to the draft resolution which was tabled by the United States delegation on the morning of May 21.⁹ Since then several events have occurred.

First, the Council was informed in Document S/6372 that the OAS had adopted a resolution which *inter alia* entrusted its Secretary General with negotiating a strict cease-fire in accordance with the Act of Santo Domingo, with providing his good offices to the parties with a view to establishing a climate of peace and reconciliation that would permit the functioning of democratic institutions in the Dominican Republic, and with coordinating where appropriate with the representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in action leading to the attainment of these objectives.

Second, we were informed in Document 6374 of a further resolution of the Organization of American States which *inter alia* called upon the parties to transform the suspension of hostilities into a permanent cease-fire in accordance with the Act of Santo Domingo and to request the Secretary General, who is in the Dominican Republic, to do everything possible to achieve this objective.

Third, the Security Council itself on the 22d of May, last Saturday, adopted a resolution which requested that the suspension of hostilities in the Dominican Republic be

⁹ U.N. doc. S/6373; for background, see BULLETIN of June 7, 1965, p. 918.

transformed into a cease-fire.

In light of these actions taken by the Security Council and by the OAS, the United States resolution previously presented to the Council, which dealt with these same points, is no longer timely and pertinent. Therefore I no longer see any need of requesting the Council to act upon the U.S. resolution and accordingly withdraw it from the Council's further consideration.

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. and Japan Amend Bilateral Cotton Textile Arrangement

Press release 116 dated May 19

JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Governments of the United States and Japan announced on May 19 certain amendments to the bilateral arrangement concerning trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States for the period from 1963 to 1965.¹ The revisions are the result of bilateral consultations initiated by the Government of Japan under paragraph 10(b) of the arrangement, which provides that either Government may propose modifications to the arrangement.

The two Governments reviewed the operation of the arrangement during its first 2 years and in the light of this review agreed to certain modifications consistent with the purposes of the arrangement. Notes effecting the amendments to the arrangement were exchanged on May 19 by Ambassador Ryuji Takeuchi and Acting

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5408; for background and text of the arrangement, see BULLETIN of Sept. 16, 1963, p. 440.

Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Philip H. Trezise.

The principal features of these amendments are:

1. Certain category ceilings within the limit for "all other" fabrics, as well as the specific ceilings on table damask (category 33) and gloves and mittens (category 39) will be deleted from the arrangement. Exports in all of these categories, however, remain subject to the group ceilings and to the provisions of paragraph 5(b) of the arrangement, which entitles the United States to request consultations if an undue concentration of trade should threaten disruption of the U.S. market in these categories.

2. For a limited number of categories Japan will be entitled to exceed the limits or ceilings established for calendar year 1965 by not more than 5 percent. However, exports in these categories remain subject to the aggregate and the applicable group limits of the arrangement.

3. The United States also agrees that Japan may exceed the limit for zipper tape, n.e.s., by 16,155 pounds in 1965.

4. The notes effecting the amendment also include certain other technical revisions in the provisions of the arrangement.

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE

MAY 19, 1965

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of today's date, which reads as follows:

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the recent discussions held in Washington between the representatives of our two Governments for the modification of the Arrangement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Trade in Cotton Textiles, effected by the Exchange of Notes on August 27, 1963, and to propose, on behalf of my Government, in accordance with paragraph 10 and other relevant provisions of the said Arrangement, that the following modifications be made with respect to the said Arrangement:

1. In numbered paragraph 2 of the Arrangement

the sentence commencing with "Within the annual aggregate limit" shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

"Within the annual aggregate limit, the limits for Groups I, II, III and IV may be exceeded by not more than 5 percent, provided that this provision for 'flexibility' shall permit an increase only in accordance with paragraph 5 in Annex A or in the 'Other' categories referred to in each group in Annex A."

2. The last sentence in numbered paragraph 5 b of the Arrangement shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

"During the course of such consultations, the Japanese Government will maintain exports in the products in question on a quarterly basis at annual levels not in excess of 105 percent of the exports of such products during the twelve most recent months for which relevant export data are available to both Governments."

3. Paragraph 1 c in Annex A shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

"c. Within 'All Other Fabrics', the following specific ceilings shall not be exceeded:

	<i>Thousand Square Yards</i>
(1) Duck (part of Categories 26 and 27)	1,750
(2) Handkerchief Cloth, yarn-dyed fabrics, n.e.s. (part of Category 32)	2,250"

4. Paragraph 1 f in Annex A shall be deleted.

5. Item (4) of paragraph 2 a in Annex A shall be deleted. Accordingly, items (5) and (6) of paragraph 2 a shall be renumbered as (4) and (5) respectively. The new item (5) shall be modified to read as follows:

"(5) All other made-up goods (Categories 31, 33, 36 and part of Category 64 as specified in paragraph 6, below) 1,000 syd. equiv. 12,321"

6. Paragraph 2 b in Annex A shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

"b. Any shortfall below the limits specified in (1), (2), (3) and (4) of paragraph 2 a may be transferred to (5) 'All Other Made-Up Goods.'"

7. Item (1) of paragraph 3 a in Annex A shall be deleted. All the remaining items in paragraph 3 a shall be renumbered accordingly. The new item (12) shall be modified to read as follows:

"(12) All Other Apparel (Categories 39, 40, 44, 47, 55 through 59, 61, 62 and part of Category 63 as specified in paragraph 6, below) 1,000 syd. equiv. 3,095"

8. Paragraph 3 b in Annex A shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

"b. Any shortfall below the limits specified in (1) through (11) of paragraph 3 a may be transferred to (12)—'All Other Apparel'."

9. The list of items in paragraph 3 d in Annex A shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

<i>Category No.</i>	<i>Description</i>
46	Sport shirts
49	All other coats
50-51	Trousers
54	Playsuits"

10. The first sentence of paragraph 4 a in Annex A shall be modified by inserting the following immediately after "*Miscellaneous cotton textiles*": "provided that the limit for zipper tapes, n.e.s., for 1965 may be exceeded by 16.155 lbs."

11. The following new paragraph shall be inserted as paragraph 5 immediately after paragraph 4 in Annex A. Accordingly, present paragraph 5 in Annex A shall be renumbered as paragraph 6 and the phrase "paragraph 5" in item (2) of paragraph 4 a shall be deleted and replaced by the phrase "paragraph 6":

"5. Within the annual aggregate limit and the limitation for each group provided for in paragraph 2 of the Arrangement, the limits and ceilings set for specific products, except those for categories 5, 6, 7, duck, 45, 46, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54 and 60, may be exceeded by not more than 5 percent."

If the foregoing proposals are acceptable to your Government, I have the honor to propose that the present Note and your reply concurring therein shall constitute an agreement between our two Governments to modify the aforementioned Arrangement, which shall enter into force on the date of your reply.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

I have the honor to inform you that the proposals set forth in your note are acceptable to my Government. Accordingly, your note and this reply shall constitute an agreement between the two Governments, which shall enter into force on this date.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

For the Secretary of State:

PHILIP H. TREZISE

His Excellency
RYUJI TAKEUCHI,
Ambassador of Japan.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Customs convention on temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943.

Accession deposited: Uganda, April 15, 1965.

Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.

Adherence deposited: Togo, May 18, 1965.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964.¹

Ratification deposited: Poland, April 19, 1965.

Accession deposited: Uganda, April 15, 1965.

Marriage

Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for marriage, and registration of marriages. Done at United Nations Headquarters, New York, December 10, 1962. Entered into force December 9, 1964.²

Accession deposited: Uganda, April 15, 1965.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol to the international convention for the Northwest Atlantic fisheries of February 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089), relating to harp and hood seals. Done at Washington July 15, 1963.²

Adherence deposited: Federal Republic of Germany (including Land Berlin), May 26, 1965.

Property

Convention of Union of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, revised at Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, at London June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered into force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931.

Notifications of accession: Kenya, Uganda, May 14, 1965.

Telecommunications

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 1959) with annexes and additional protocol. Done at Geneva November 8, 1963. Entered into force January 1, 1965. TIAS 5603.

Notifications of approval: Malagasy Republic, April 1, 1965; Overseas territories for the international relations of which the Government of the United Kingdom are responsible, April 8, 1965.

Trade

Declaration on provisional accession of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva

November 13, 1962. Entered into force April 27, 1963. TIAS 5678.

Signature: Peru, April 2, 1965.

Ratification deposited: Italy, January 26, 1965. Second procès-verbal extending declaration on provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 12, 1959 (TIAS 4498). Done at Geneva December 12, 1963. Entered into force November 24, 1965.

Signatures: Chile, February 11, 1965; Czechoslovakia, February 18, 1965; Denmark, April 13, 1965; Federal Republic of Germany (subject to ratification), February 4, 1965; Luxembourg, February 9, 1965; Sweden, February 19, 1965.

Ratification deposited: Austria, March 1, 1965.

BILATERAL

Afghanistan

Agreement extending the technical cooperation program agreement of June 30, 1953 (TIAS 2856), as extended. Effected by exchange of notes at Kabul May 1 and 4, 1965. Entered into force May 4, 1965.

Belgium

Protocol modifying and supplementing the income tax convention of October 28, 1948, as amended 1965. Enters into force upon exchange of ratification (TIAS 2833, 4280). Signed at Brussels May 21, 1965.

Bolivia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at La Paz May 12, 1965. Entered into force May 12, 1965.

Canada

Agreement relating to the establishment, operation, and maintenance of a torpedo range in the Strait of Georgia with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa May 12, 1965. Entered into force May 12, 1965.

France

Agreement concerning certain academic and cultural exchanges and programs in the field of education. Signed at Paris May 7, 1965. Enters into force when each Government notifies the other Government by diplomatic note of approval of the agreement.

Israel

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of December 6, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5220, 5490, 5557, 5596, 5610). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 26 and 27, 1965. Entered into force May 27, 1965.

Panama

Agreement extending agreement for a communications cable between Tocum National Airport, Panama City, and the Canal Zone of March 31, 1949 (TIAS 1932). Effected by exchange of notes at Panamá March 9 and April 1, 1965. Entered into force April 1, 1965.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

American Republics. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 26 938

Argentina. U.S. and Argentina To Launch Meteorological Sounding Rockets 966

Bahamas. Five Areas No Longer Exempt From Interest Equalization Tax (Executive order) 965

Bermuda. Five Areas No Longer Exempt From Interest Equalization Tax (Executive order) 965

Congress

Arms Control and Disarmament: Some Sober Truths (Johnson) 973

The Balance-of-Payments Program and the Congress (Fowler) 963

Bill Authorizing New Embassy at Saigon Signed by President (statement) 974

Disarmament and International Cooperation (Cleveland, Fisher) 967

President Signs Bill on Coffee Agreement (statement) 975

Disarmament

Arms Control and Disarmament: Some Sober Truths (Johnson) 973

Disarmament and International Cooperation (Cleveland, Fisher) 967

Dominican Republic

Principles of U.N.-OAS Relationship in Dominican Republic (Stevenson) 975

Secretary Discusses Dominican Situation on NBC-TV 947

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 26 938

Economic Affairs

The Balance-of-Payments Program and the Congress (Fowler) 963

Five Areas No Longer Exempt From Interest Equalization Tax (Executive order) 965

President Acknowledges Report on East Europe and Soviet Trade 954

President Signs Bill on Coffee Agreement (statement) 975

The Problem of International Liquidity (Deming) 955

Europe. President Acknowledges Report on East Europe and Soviet Trade 954

International Organizations and Conferences

Principles of U.N.-OAS Relationship in Dominican Republic (Stevenson) 975

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 26 938

Ireland. Five Areas No Longer Exempt From Interest Equalization Tax (Executive order) 965

Japan. U.S. and Japan Amend Bilateral Cotton Textile Arrangement (exchange of notes) 980

Korea. United States and Korea Reaffirm Strong Bonds of Friendship (Johnson, Park) 950

Kuwait. Five Areas No Longer Exempt From Interest Equalization Tax (Executive order) 965

Portugal. Five Areas No Longer Exempt From Interest Equalization Tax (Executive order) 965

Presidential Documents

Arms Control and Disarmament: Some Sober Truths 973

Bill Authorizing New Embassy at Saigon Signed by President 974

Five Areas No Longer Exempt From Interest Equalization Tax 965

President Acknowledges Report on East Europe and Soviet Trade 954

President Signs Bill on Coffee Agreement 975

United States and Korea Reaffirm Strong Bonds of Friendship 950

Publications. Foreign Relations Volume Issued on American Republics for 1943 949

Science. U.S. and Argentina To Launch Meteorological Sounding Rockets 966

Treaty Information

Current Actions 982

President Signs Bill on Coffee Agreement (statement) 975

U.S. and Argentina To Launch Meteorological Sounding Rockets 966

U.S. and Japan Amend Bilateral Cotton Textile Arrangement (exchange of notes) 980

U.S.S.R. President Acknowledges Report on East Europe and Soviet Trade 954

United Nations

Disarmament and International Cooperation (Cleveland, Fisher) 967

Principles of U.N.-OAS Relationship in Dominican Republic (Stevenson) 975

Viet-Nam

Bill Authorizing New Embassy at Saigon Signed by President (statement) 974

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 26 938

Name Index

Chancellor, John 947

Cleveland, Harlan 967

Deming, Frederick L 955

Fisher, Adrian S 967

Fowler, Henry H 963

Johnson, President 950, 954, 965, 973, 974, 975

Park, Chung Hee 950

Rusk, Secretary 938, 947

Stevenson, Adlai E 975

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 24-30

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to May 24 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 115 of May 18 and 116 of May 19.

No.	Date	Subject
†124	5/24	Air talks with Mexico (rewrite).
*125	5/26	Meeker sworn in as Legal Adviser (biographic details).
126	5/26	Rusk: news conference of May 26.
†127	5/27	U.S. delegation to International Labor Conference (rewrite).
†128	5/27	William P. Bundy: University of California, Berkeley, Cleveland: "The Politics of Outer Space."
†129	5/27	Rusk: death of former Under Secretary Joseph C. Grew.
*130	5/26	Rusk: NBC interview on the situation in the Dominican Republic.
131	5/28	Rusk: NBC interview on the situation in the Dominican Republic.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Foreign Relations of the United States 1943, Volume VI, The American Republics

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Volume VI, The American Republics, recently released by the Department of State, completes the series of annual volumes for the year 1943. This volume contains documentation on all the American Republics except Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile. Coverage of these four states was included in volume V.

Of particular interest in volume VI are compilations dealing with the wartime diplomacy of the United States vis-a-vis the other American Republics, discussions and agreements respecting staple Latin American commodities and strategic materials, and efforts of the United States to promote the defense of the hemisphere.

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THE
DEPARTMENT
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BULLETIN

Vol. LII, No. 1356



June 21, 1965

THE PEACE OF MANKIND

Address by President Johnson 986

THE SEARCH FOR A DURABLE PEACE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Address by President Johnson 989

A PERSPECTIVE ON U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM

by Assistant Secretary Bundy 1001

THE POLITICS OF OUTER SPACE

by Assistant Secretary Cleeland 1007

REGIONAL ORGANIZATION: A PLANNER'S PERSPECTIVE

Special Article by W. W. Rostow, Counselor 997

For index see inside back cover

The Peace of Mankind

*Address by President Johnson*¹

In this city of Chicago, 28 years ago, a President of these United States then described the condition of the world in these words:

Without a declaration of war and without warning or justification of any kind, civilians, including vast numbers of women and children, are being ruthlessly murdered. . . . ships are being attacked . . . without cause or notice. Nations are fomenting and taking sides in civil warfare in nations that have never done them any harm. . . . Innocent peoples, innocent nations are being cruelly sacrificed to a greed for power and supremacy which is devoid of all sense of justice and humane considerations.

The world did not heed the vision or the wisdom of Franklin D. Roosevelt when he called upon all peace-loving nations to join together to quarantine the aggressors. And

¹ This is the substantive portion of an address made before the Cook County Democratic Party at Chicago, Ill., on June 3 (White House press release; as-delivered text).

those who loved peace above all else lost their peace and all else.

That history need not—and that history must not—be allowed to repeat itself full course again in our time.

The peace of mankind must not, and will not, be lost again.

If similarities are many between the worlds of 1937 and 1965, the differences are far more numerous. The peace-loving nations are not weak now as they were then, not lacking in will now as they were then. Educated in the adversity of a great war, tested in the trial of continuing danger, united in the face of ever-present peril, the peace-loving peoples have built strength in the 1960's that they never had in the 1930's.

That strength has one unmistakable meaning. For aggression there is no prize. At the end of the road of conquest, the only sure reward is sure ruin.

For 20 years we have applied what Abra-

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The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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ham Lincoln said would be the great lesson of peace:

. . . teaching men that what they cannot take by an election, neither can they take it by war; teaching all the folly of being the beginners of a war. . . .

Common Interests of Peoples of East and West

But there are other differences, too, between 1937 and tonight in 1965. The people of Communist countries are somewhat wiser too. While their leaders have chosen to close a curtain about them to keep out knowledge of the free world's peaceful intention, the people of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe really know, above all other peoples on this earth, what the cost and the catastrophe is to their homeland of 20th-century warfare.

The men and women of Russia, the men and women of all the nations of Eastern Europe, I believe, want peace and want the taste of its sweet fruits. And none want them to have peace more than do we, the people of the United States of America.

Between the great powers of East and West, there is no history of conflict on the battlefields of the past. Between the people of the Soviet Union and the people of the United States, there has been friendship and there can be greater understanding.

The common interests of the peoples of Russia and the peoples of the United States are many, and this I would say to the people of the Soviet Union tonight: There is no American interest in conflict with the Soviet people anywhere. And no true Soviet interest is going to be served by the support of aggression or subversion anywhere in the world. We of the United States of America stand ready tonight as always to go with you onto the fields of peace, to plow new furrows, to plant new seed, to tend new growth, so that we and so that all mankind may some day share together a new and a bountiful harvest of happiness and hope on this earth.

Jefferson said of Americans: "Peace is our passion." And I say to you here in Chicago tonight—peace is our passion still.

In this Union and this hemisphere, in every

region of this world, in every forum of nations, the United States is working for peace, and that work will never cease.

A Course of Action for the Free World

But as I have spoken to Communist countries, let me also tonight speak to the free world. I carry in my pocket, and I often read to those who visit the White House, some wise words that were written by a man of peace, the late Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld. The words are these:

The qualities that peace requires are those which I feel and believe that we all need today—perseverance and patience, a firm grip on realities, careful but imaginative planning, a clear awareness of the dangers—but also of the fact that fate is what we make it.

In the 1930's we made our fate not by what we did but what we Americans failed to do. We propelled ourselves and all mankind toward tragedy, not by decisiveness but by vacillation, not by determination and resolution but by hesitancy and irresolution, not by action but by inaction.

The failure of free men in the 1930's was not of the sword but of the soul. And there just must be no such failure in the 1960's.

So let us not delude ourselves again by the belief that peace can be secured by submissiveness or peace can be extended by expediency. Let us not adopt again the arrogance that peace is less important to the peoples of less important countries because they are distant or different from our own. Let us not return again to the impulsiveness which accepts as safe every promise of peace from the enemies of peace and rejects as dangerous every proposal for strength from its friends.

Persevering and patient, firmly gripping realities, proceeding in clear awareness of the dangers, let us proceed with the careful but the imaginative planning that is necessary to assure peace and justice and progress for all the peoples of the earth.

This is the course that we of the United States have chosen. And this is the course that we shall faithfully hold, for we believe that this course leads to peace in the world.

Let me make it clear to all here and all listening in other parts of the world that the United States seeks dominion over no people. Everywhere in the world we, the United States, seek decency for all.

Out among the earth's peoples Americans are working tonight as few peoples have ever worked before to bring learning and light, and health and housing, and hope to the family of man. Food from our fields is feeding 100 million people, including 70 million children. Medicine from our laboratories is saving the lives of many millions more, and I dare say there is not one citizen present here tonight who would have their country conduct its course otherwise.

George Washington once told us that we would have one option: "Whether to be respectable and prosperous or contemptible and miserable as a nation."

Today we are prosperous, as the able Senator [Paul] Douglas told you, more prosperous than any other nation in all the history of man. We have enjoyed 51 consecutive months of economic expansion—the longest ever known in any peacetime—and the end is not yet in sight. Our people are happy. They are prospering. They are moving on and on and on, and upward. Just last year the number of families living on less than \$3,000 income decreased by 18 percent and the number of families with more than \$10,000 income per year increased by 22 percent.

Moral Force at Work Among Americans

But I must remind you that money is no measure of the moral force at work among Americans today. For we are committed by a broad and a broadening consensus to bringing brightness into lives where darkness dwells. We are committed to opening beauty to lives that are closed over by ugliness and guaranteeing the rights that God gave them to those man had forgotten.

The consensus within America tonight is a consensus of courage, and let none abroad believe that this consensus stops at the water's edge. For there is in our beloved America a consensus, a strong and a deep and an abiding majority consensus, that the

world shall not walk again the road to darkness that led mankind into the valley of war 30 years ago.

The united will of the American people is itself the ultimate and the most profound difference between 1937 and 1965, and let neither friends of peace or foes underestimate the meaning of that unity. The American people want to be a part of no war. But the American people want no part of appeasement or of any aggression.

Over the years of our history our forces have gone forth into many lands, but always they returned when they are no longer needed. For the purpose of America is never to suppress liberty but always to save it. The purpose of America is never to take freedom but always to return it, never to breach peace but to bolster it, and never to seize land but always to save lives.

One month ago it became my duty to send our Marines into the Dominican Republic, and I sent them for these same ends.

I have been informed tonight by the Commander in Chief of the Inter-American Force, General [Hugo Panasco] Alvim, and the Deputy Commander, Lieutenant General [Bruce] Palmer, that conditions in the Dominican Republic now permit further reductions of our military personnel, and I am therefore accordingly ordering the withdrawal of all remaining units of the United States Marine Corps, totaling approximately 2,100 men.

America's purpose is and always will be to serve the peace of mankind.

The Way of the Peacemaker

Let me say this to you: A man does what he must in spite of personal consequences, in spite of obstacles and dangers and pressures—and that is the basis of all human morality.

Those words are not mine. They were written by the man whose great steps I follow—John Fitzgerald Kennedy. But I would want you to know that it is that spirit which guides me in all that I do.

For men, as for nations, the way of the peacemaker is never an easy way.

While all men hate war, they too often hate

still more the discipline and the duty and the demands of acting to preserve the peace that they love. I am certain that this generation of Americans is willing to accept demands that are stern in order to enjoy a world that is safe.

For we know as all men must know wherever they live that, after losing peace twice in this century, mankind just must not lose that peace again, and it is the united will of all the people of our beloved America that it shall not be lost.

The Search for a Durable Peace in the Dominican Republic

*Address by President Johnson*¹

Mr. President, members of the Board of Trustees, faculty, student body, my fellow Americans:

This is a moment I deeply wish my parents could have lived to share. In the first place, my father would have enjoyed what you have so generously said of me—and my mother would have believed it.

More than that, the honor you pay me is, in a real sense, honor that is due my mother. All of her life she spoke often of Baylor—a trait I have found not uncommon among all of your alumni. Her pride in Baylor—and in being the granddaughter of a president of Baylor—passed on to me early and influenced the course of my own life more constructively than I could ever describe.

So I am most grateful to you for this moment—and for its meaning to me.

Woodrow Wilson once told the men of Princeton that: “It is not learning—but the spirit of service—that will give a college place in the public annals of the nation.”

For 120 years Baylor University has touched the lives of many generations with an unusual spirit of selfless service. That spirit—expressed in the works of ministers

and missionaries, public servants and public school teachers, of devout parents and dedicated citizens—has not only won for Baylor a place of esteem in this State and this nation. It has served the betterment of the condition of man to the remote ends of this earth.

On this occasion we meet here today at an historic hour in the life of the American nations.

In Washington leaders of this hemisphere are meeting to work together to open a road to durable peace in the Dominican Republic.

Their efforts will have our full support. For at stake is the future not only of one of our sister Republics but the principles and the values of all the American Republics.

We are members of an inter-American system in which large and small nations are partners in the defense of freedom and in the progress of economic welfare and social justice.

That partnership must be constantly strengthened. Our common aim and our combined ability must increase—in crisis as well as in calm. The tragedy of the past 4 weeks in the Dominican Republic renews our common resolution to accept common responsibility in dealing with common dangers.

In that unfortunate nation, 4 weeks ago, the legacy of dictatorship exploded in fury

¹ Made at commencement exercises at Baylor University, Waco, Tex., on May 28 (White House press release (Waco, Tex.); as-delivered text).

and anarchy.² Hundreds of Dominicans died, leaving thousands of widows and orphans of war. Nineteen of our own American boys lost their lives. The capital city, birthplace of the Western Hemisphere, was split asunder. Blood and hate drowned ideals. And for days freedom itself stood on the edge of disaster.

In those early terrible hours, we did what we had to do. Remembering Simón Bolívar's admonition that "to hesitate is destruction," as your President, I did what I had to do.

Since then, working with the Organization of American States and its distinguished Secretary General, José Mora, the forces of democracy have acted. The results are clear.

More than 6,500 men and women and children from 46 different countries have been evacuated. Not a single life was lost.

A cease-fire was achieved, bringing an end to the threat of wholesale bloodshed.

An international zone of refuge was opened as a haven for all men of peace, and a safe corridor 17 miles long was established by American men.

More than 8 million pounds of food have been distributed to the Dominican people.

A well-trained, disciplined band of Communists was prevented from destroying the hopes of Dominican democracy.

Political avenues were opened to help the Dominican people find a Dominican solution to their problems.

Today those achievements are guaranteed—guaranteed by the troops of five nations representing this hemisphere. They are under the command of the able Brazilian general, General [Hugo Panasco] Alvim.

For the first time in history the Organization of American States has created and sent to the soil of an American nation an international peacekeeping military force.

That may be the greatest achievement of all.

The United States made its forces a part of that Inter-American Force. And, as the contributions of the Latin American nations

have been incorporated into the OAS force, in the past 2 days the United States has removed 1,600 troops from the island.

I am issuing orders this morning to remove an additional 1,700 men on Saturday. I have also instructed our commander, General Palmer [Lt. Gen. Bruce Palmer, Jr.], to discuss possible further withdrawals with General Alvim. Such action will be taken when the military commanders believe it is safe and warranted by the arrival of further Latin American forces and by the continued stabilization of the military situation.

Outlines of a Reasonable Settlement

Now we ask ourselves this morning: What is next?

The answer to that question rests partly with the people of the Dominican Republic and partly with their neighbors throughout this hemisphere.

Already, under the distinguished leadership of Secretary General Mora, the broad outlines of a reasonable settlement are beginning to emerge—outlines which meet the needs and respond to the desires first of the Dominican people themselves and then of all the people of this hemisphere.

First, the Dominican people—and the people of their sister Republics—do not want government by extremists of either the left or right. That is clear. They want to be ruled neither by an old conspiracy of reaction and tyranny nor by a new conspiracy of Communist violence.

Second, they want—as we do—an end to slaughter in the streets and to brutality in the *barríos*.

Third, they want—as we do—food and work and quiet in the night.

Fourth, they want—as we do—a constitutional government that will represent them all—and work for all their hopes.

Fifth, the Dominican people know they need the help of sympathetic neighbors in healing their wounds and in negotiating their divisions—but what they want ultimately is the chance to shape their own course.

Those are the hopes of the Dominican people. But they are our hopes, too. And they

² For background, see BULLETIN of May 17, 1965, p. 738; May 31, 1965, p. 854; and June 7, 1965, p. 908.

are shared by responsible people in every nation of this hemisphere.

Out of the Dominican crucible the 20 American nations must now forge a stronger shield against disaster.

The opportunity is here now for a new thrust forward—to show the world the way to true international cooperation in the cause of peace and in the struggle to win a better life for all of us.

We believe the New World may most wisely approach this task guided by new realities.

The first reality is that old concepts and old labels are largely obsolete. In today's world, with the enemies of freedom talking about "wars of national liberation," the old distinction between "civil war" and "international war" has already lost much of its meaning.

Second is the reality that when forces of freedom move slowly—whether on political, economic, or military fronts—the forces of slavery and subversion move rapidly, and they move decisively.

Third, we know that when a Communist group seeks to exploit misery, the entire free American system is put in deadly danger. We also know that these dangers can be found today in many of our lands. There is no trouble anywhere these evil forces will not try to turn to their advantage. We can expect more efforts at triumph by terror and conquest through chaos.

Fourth, we have learned in the Dominican Republic that we can act decisively and together.

Fifth, it is clear that we need new international machinery geared to meet the fast-moving events. When hours can decide the fate of generations, the moment of decision must become the moment of action.

Basic Principles of U.S. Policy

Just as these lessons of the past 4 weeks are clear, so are the basic principles which have guided the purpose of the United States of America.

We seek no territory. We do not seek to impose our will on anyone. We intend to

work for the self-determination of the peoples of the Americas within the framework of freedom.

In times past large nations have used their power to impose their will on smaller nations. Today we have placed our forces at the disposition of the nations of this hemisphere to assure the peoples of those nations the right to exercise their own will in freedom.

In accordance with the resolution of the eighth meeting of the ministers at Punta del Este,³ we will join with the other OAS nations in opposing a Communist takeover in this hemisphere.

And in accordance with the Charter of Punta del Este,⁴ we will join with other OAS nations in pressing for change among those who would maintain a feudal system—a feudal system that denies social justice and economic progress to the ordinary peoples of this hemisphere.

We want for the peoples of this hemisphere only what they want for themselves—liberty, justice, dignity, a better life for all.

More than "a few agitators" was necessary to bring on the tragic and the cruel bloodshed in the Dominican Republic. They needed additional help and a deeper cause. And they had both.

For the roots of the trouble are found wherever the landless and the despised, the poor and the oppressed, stand before the gates of opportunity seeking entry into a brighter land.

They can get there only if we narrow the gap between the rich nations and the poor—and between the rich and the poor within each nation. And this is the heart of the purpose of the United States.

Here on the campus of Baylor University we will reaffirm that purpose on June 26 when almost 50 Peace Corps volunteers will begin training for service in the Dominican Republic. These young men and women will go to the *barrios* of Santo Domingo and Santiago to work with and to work for the people of the Dominican Republic in attaining a new life and new hope.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1962, p. 278.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

At home, with the strong cooperation of our Congress, we are waging war on poverty; we are opening new paths of learning for all our children; we are creating new jobs for our workers; we are providing health care for our older citizens; we are eliminating injustice and inequality; we are bringing new economic life to whole regions. These objectives we will continue to pursue with all of our strength and all of our determination.

As peace returns to the Dominican people and as a broad base is laid for a new Dominican government responsive to the people's will, the United States will be prepared to join in full measure in the massive task of reconstruction and in the hopeful work of lasting economic progress.

For in bold ink our signature is on the charter of the alliance. That charter commands a peaceful, democratic, social revolution across the hemisphere. It asks that unjust privilege be ended and that unfair power be curbed. It asks that we help throw open the gates of opportunity to these millions who stand there now knocking.

Just as we have joined in the Dominican Republic to bring peace to a troubled land, we have joined with these forces across the hemisphere who seek to advance their own independence and their own democratic progress.

We work with and for those men and women not because we have to. We work because morality commands it, justice requires it, and our own dignity as men depends on it. We work not because we fear the unjust wrath of our enemy but because we fear the just wrath of God.

In Santo Domingo the last month has been grim. The storm there is not yet over. But a new sense of hope is beginning. Across the angry arguments of the opposing forces, the voice of good sense is now beginning to be heard.

As the Organization of American States recommits itself to the hard efforts of peace-making, the Government and the people of the United States proudly pledge full support to the peacemakers.

The path ahead is long, the way ahead is

hard. So we must, in the words of the prophet, "mount up with wings as eagles . . . run, and not be weary."

Thank you.

President Comments on Situation in Dominican Republic

WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL¹

The situation in the Dominican Republic continues to be serious. That is why we welcome the additional efforts which are being made in the OAS today to enlarge and strengthen the effort to find a peaceful settlement. We continue to give our full support to Secretary General [José A.] Mora in his outstanding service under existing OAS resolutions, but we share his judgment that a strong and sustained effort will be needed.

Meanwhile, I have been advised today by General [Hugo Panasco] Alvim, the Commander of the Inter-American Force, and Lieutenant General [Bruce] Palmer, the Deputy Commander of the Inter-American Force, that conditions in the Dominican Republic now permit further withdrawal of the United States military personnel from the Inter-American Force. This recommendation has the concurrence of Secretary General Mora and Ambassador [W. Tapley] Bennett.

I am accordingly ordering the immediate withdrawal of one battalion landing team of United States Marines plus headquarters and support personnel, totaling approximately 2,000 personnel.

EMERGENCY RELIEF WORK

White House press release dated June 1

I want to call your attention to the very effective and selfless emergency relief work done by representatives of our Government in cooperation with the OAS.

¹ Read at a news conference at the White House on June 1 (White House press release).

From the very earliest days we have been distributing food and medical supplies to ward off starvation and epidemic. This work has been under the very able direction of Mr. Anthony Solomon, who is being sworn in this afternoon as Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

Under his direction we have now distributed more than 9 million pounds of food, and distribution continues at a rate of half a million pounds a day. We have given out rice, cornmeal, powdered milk, beans, and flour.

In the same way, we have provided medical supplies from U. S. Army sources in repeated shipments. They have included antibiotics and other medicines, oxygen tanks, serums for immunization, power generators for the hospitals, and surgical supplies.

Both food and medical supplies have been distributed all over the country by nine food teams of Spanish-speaking Americans working to relieve need on a straight humanitarian basis. These teams have cooperated fully with private charitable agencies like Catholic Relief, CARE, and the Church World Service. They have been subjected to harassment in about equal measure by suspicious members of both contending groups.

We have also reopened lines of fuel supply for the civilian economy while at the same time we have resisted pressure to provide fuel for either of the contending military forces.

It is entirely natural that while the shooting continued, public attention focused heavily on the fighting. But it is time now for us all to pay tribute to the work of these peaceful representatives of our country. They have saved uncounted lives, and they have taken the lead in the first steps toward the peaceful reconstruction of the Dominican Republic.

NATO Defense Ministers Meet at Paris

Following is the text of a communique released at Paris on June 1 at the conclusion of a meeting of the ministers of defense of the member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Ministers of Defence of the NATO member countries met in Paris on 31st May and 1st June, 1965 for an exchange of views upon the defence problems of the Alliance.

2. The Ministers took note of the progress, since their last meeting in December 1964, of the studies of the important and inter-related questions of strategy, force requirements, and resources which are being conducted by the Council in Permanent Session. They directed the Council in Permanent Session, with the assistance of the NATO Military Authorities, to continue its studies as a valuable part of the process of planning which will ensure the most rational and economic use of available resources and will provide forces designed to deter any aggression and, should deterrence fail, able to react swiftly and effectively to it.

3. Special attention was paid to the defence problems of Greece and Turkey, in the light of their economic situation.

4. At the conclusion of an extensive and fruitful discussion the Ministers reaffirmed their determination to maintain the defensive capability of the Alliance and renewed their endorsement of the strategic concept of a forward defence posture. In this connection, they also agreed that further consideration should be given to a proposal for ways in which consultation might be improved and participation by interested allied countries extended in the planning of nuclear forces, including strategic forces.

"Increasing interest in the building of regional organizations is one of the most interesting features on the world scene today," says the Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council. In this article, prepared especially for the Bulletin, Mr. Rostow sketches the regional pattern that provides the background for major U.S. foreign policy decisions.

Regional Organization: A Planner's Perspective

by W. W. Rostow

The Policy Planning Council of the Department of State is a group which works, in a practical way, on the solution of major unsolved questions. We take the view that a planner's job is not to come up with a bright idea and then leave it to someone else to figure out how to make it work. A planner must, of course, create new ideas; but he must also engage in the real problems of making those ideas operational. He is both an inventor and an innovator.

To understand the kinds of problems the Department of State faces today, one needs to go back at least to the Cuba missile crisis. That crisis ended, for the time being at least, one phase of the two-pronged offensive that Khrushchev began after the launching of Sputnik in 1957.

Khrushchev decided that he would use his thermonuclear capability in a systematic way, in a program of blackmail, to try to force us out of Berlin and, later, to put pressure on us from Cuba. This was one of the great postwar tests. It determined whether the Soviet nuclear capability could or could not be used for offensive purposes to break free-world diplomatic positions.

With its setback in the Cuba missile crisis, the Soviet Union has faced a somewhat diminished position on the world scene. The

fear of the Soviet Union has been reduced, and Khrushchev and his successors have faced a series of searching problems: in the deceleration of their economy; in their relations with Eastern Europe; in their relations with Communist China; and in the world Communist movement.

The second part of Khrushchev's post-Sputnik offensive focused on the developing areas of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. There was apparently an honest belief in Moscow, at the end of the 1950's, that somehow the mixture of aid and trade, subversion and guerrilla warfare, and appeals to anticolonial nationalist sentiment—all of this in the setting of the inherently disrupted political life of developing nations—would give the Communists great opportunities to extend their power and influence. After the Cuba missile crisis, the Chinese moved forward to try to take the leadership in this enterprise, using this period to enhance their position in the Communist movement and in the developing world.

At the core of the Chinese Communist position is the doctrine that the conduct of guerrilla warfare by the shipment of arms and men across international frontiers is a way of winning major victories for a power

which is not industrialized, against a major, mature, industrial power like the United States. There were many arguments in the late fifties and early sixties within the Communist movement as to whether this kind of guerrilla warfare would permit the Communists to outflank the main strength of United States military power. On the whole, the Russians took a rather cautious view. They reasoned that somewhere along the line Communists would run into a confrontation with the main strength of the United States if they took excessive risk—and they did not want that. The only safe way, they decided, was the Castro way—to seize a revolutionary movement from within, with great care exercised about external involvement.

In any case, it is clear that the number-one problem facing the free world is to prove that this form of aggression can be sterilized successfully, as we have sterilized the blockade of Berlin, the use of conventional forces across a frontier—as in Korea—and, of course, the use of nuclear blackmail.

That is the essential nature, from a policy planner's point of view, of what is going on in Southeast Asia. Of course, the region itself is at stake. The flank of the Indian subcontinent is at stake. But beyond that is the overriding issue—whether or not the Communists shall be allowed to conclude that this kind of aggression can succeed. Already, in Africa and in the Caribbean, there are Communists who are experimenting with it; and, if we should fail in Southeast Asia, there is no doubt they would go forward, as they quite explicitly are laying the base for going forward in northeast Thailand.

This is our number-one security problem at the moment.

The New Nationalism

The Cuba missile crisis, by diminishing the fear of Russia throughout the non-Communist world and demonstrating that the West could maintain its unity and successfully face down nuclear blackmail, has tended to accentuate certain forces in the world which have existed for a long time. They exist within the Communist world, as

well as the free world. Those forces can be described as a desire by nations and peoples on both sides of the Iron Curtain to assert a greater control over their own destiny, a desire to diminish their dependence on the United States—or, in the Communist case, on the Soviet Union—a desire for greater independence. There is throughout the world a wave of what might be called assertive nationalism.

From our point of view this is no surprise. In fact, it has been an object of United States policy since the war to give the nations of Europe, and others, a firmer foundation for their independence. We did not get involved in the world after the war in order to build an empire. We got involved in the world, reluctantly, after dismantling our armed forces, because there were power vacuums which had to be filled if the Communists were not to move in.

Our policy has been systematically to strengthen the foundations for national independence. As people gather strength and confidence and seek a new status on the world scene, our task is to try to organize these more assertive, stronger, national states in ways which will make the world community more orderly and peaceful.

The need for organization arises because simple nationalism has limitations in the kind of world in which we live. There has been a rise, for example, in Western Europe and Japan of wealth, political confidence, and social stability. But there has not been an equivalent rise in military power. The nature of the military problems we all face still requires collective security arrangements which bring the power of the United States into play.

So the first limitation, from their point of view and from ours, in meeting the legitimate desire of people to shape their own destiny is that the problem of their safety still depends on collective security arrangements and on the continued commitment of the United States to their safety.

The second limitation is, simply, that the conventional nation state in the modern world does not have much capacity by itself

to solve its major economic problems or even its major political problems. We are so bound up with the developing countries in monetary affairs, in trade, in technical assistance, and the supply of capital that it is not rational for them to try to solve their problems by themselves. This situation prevails also in countries as rich as Japan and in the major countries of Western Europe.

There is, therefore, an emerging tendency to try to reconcile these imperatives—that is to say, the desire of people to assert greater control over their destiny, their continued dependence on collective security, and the need for collective arrangements to solve economic and political problems—by the building and strengthening of regional organizations.

Regional organizations do not close out relations with the United States, but they provide a more dignified and a stronger basis for dealing with the United States and, in the case of other parts of the world, with the more advanced powers in Europe. This increasing interest in the building of regional organizations is one of the most interesting features on the world scene today.

In some regions, aside from the attempt to reconcile a greater role for the peoples of the region with collective security and collective solutions to economic problems, there are two other kinds of problems. One has to do with quarrels over boundary settlements. There is the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Kashmir dispute, some very awkward disputes on either side of Cambodia, and so on. There is also the case of Cyprus, in the Mediterranean. These pose extraordinarily searching problems which are a part of our nation's working agenda.

The other major fact is that in some parts of the world there are certain powers which have the vision of emerging as dominant regional powers. This is General de Gaulle's evident objective with respect to continental Western Europe. So it is with Nkrumah in West Africa, Ben Bella in North Africa, Nasser in the Arab world.

These thrusts for regional hegemony are,

again, a part of our working agenda and of the framework in which regional problems are posed.

Western Europe

In Western Europe we face, in the years ahead, an impressive array of issues that must be viewed as a whole—as a package: the longrun monetary arrangements that will be required to give a stable basis for all our currencies; the trade negotiations, under the Kennedy Round, with a particularly acute problem in agriculture; the problem of finding a solution to Europe's nuclear role in the whole Atlantic complex. Add to these the rising problem of German unity, which is not narrowly a German question but a question of the totality of the West's future relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In my judgment, that problem will rise as an issue on the common agenda in the future.

There is also the need to have better consultation within the Atlantic community on the problems of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America—on the areas outside of NATO—getting Europe geared to play its role in a more substantial way; for example, in foreign aid, where Europe's contribution has excessively taken the form of short-term credits to the suppliers of European exports.

In all of these fields there is staff work going forward. In some we are making progress. In others progress is slow. But a consensus is emerging that these are the problems we must solve. I believe we shall see forward movement in the years ahead.

Latin America

We have come to a most interesting moment in the evolution of Latin American political and economic life. It is clear that Latin America is going to be an increasingly important region on the world scene.

I spent about 3 years in postwar Europe working on problems of European economic reconstruction. I saw the beginnings of the

European unity movement. Sometimes, in dealing with my Latin American friends, I have the feeling I am living, for a second time, through the kind of experiences that we shared in Europe in the late forties and early fifties.

The Alliance for Progress is going better than I would have guessed at this stage. My own view in 1961 was that it would be a success, that it would work in a rhythm like the Marshall Plan, but that it would take twice as long. You may recall that the first 2 years of the Marshall Plan were disappointing. It was regarded as a dry creek. It was only in the last 2 years that the cumulative effect of everyone's efforts became clear. I remember saying to President Kennedy that we might have to go through 4 or 5 years of frustration before the Alliance for Progress took hold; but I was confident that toward the end of the sixties we would have a success.

In 1964 there was, from that point of view, a somewhat premature turning point. There was a helpful rise in the prices of Latin American exports. There was also a series of political events that were stabilizing and reinforcing—the Brazilian revolution that supplanted Goulart with a truly serious, competent government; the success of the Venezuela elections; the emergence of Belaunde in Peru; Frei in Chile; Illia in Argentina; the gathering momentum of the Central American Common Market. The overall statistical result was that last year the 2½ percent per capita goal of the Punta del Este Charter was exceeded, and the momentum was fairly evenly spread.

We have just finished a meeting of CIAP, the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress. In taking stock we point to the problems that still exist, but the best guess is that, unless the coffee price caves in or we have some major, unexpected disasters, we are going to have a second year of widespread forward momentum in Latin America.

My personal confidence in the success of the alliance is not rooted in the statistics.

The statistics do look better; and the number of serious development plans, tax plans, land reform schemes coming forward is increasing. All of that is true. But my own confidence derives from the knowledge that there is now emerging in Latin America, in governments and in economic and social life—both public and private—a new and vigorous generation of men who are competent, who are serious, who do not mistake the passing of resolutions for substantive action, who are determined that Latin America shall become a modern industrial society and take a proud place in the world in harmony with its old humanistic traditions.

I do not for one moment underestimate, nor do my colleagues in CIAP underestimate, the distance we still have to go. There is serious inflation in a number of Latin American countries. In Brazil there is now a brave and interesting attempt to end inflation. I am sure the problem will be faced in the next couple of years in Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and elsewhere. There will have to be a radical change in attitude of businessmen who have lived behind high tariff barriers, with no competition. They must now go out and compete in Latin America and on the world scene and learn to open up their national markets. Add to these the problems of agricultural development and diversification—all are tough. But there are men in Latin America now who are seriously trying to come to grips with them.

At the same time we see a rising impulse within Latin America to unify the region economically, much as Europe did after the war.

The Latin Americans are in a mood to take a larger hand in their own fate. We recognized in the São Paulo meeting of 1963 that the Alliance for Progress could not work well unless the Latin Americans took the leadership. Thus, the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress was created.

There are seven members of CIAP—all Latin Americans but myself. The chairman

Mr. Rostow's article is one of a series being written especially for the Bulletin by officers of the Department and the Foreign Service. Officers who may be interested in submitting original bylined articles are invited to call the editor of the Bulletin, Mrs. Madeline Patton, extension 5806, room 5336.

is Dr. Carlos Sanz de Santamaría, former Finance Minister of Colombia, a former Ambassador to the United States—an able, practical, and deeply dedicated man. We work as a collegial body, as a board of directors, not as a negotiating body. We do not have a nickel to pass out. What we do is to coordinate the resources of the United States Agency for International Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund—and now the Europeans are beginning to come in. We all work together as a team, country by country, problem by problem.

CIAP has been operating for only 9 months. We have a limited amount of practical experience, but thus far I think it has been a successful experience. Thus far the Latin Americans, the financing agencies, and the Government of the United States have confidence in CIAP. At the Lima meeting last November the governments of Latin America overloaded us with new tasks. I had the feeling we might sink to the ground like an overloaded llama. But we are all working this year to carry this load, and it is a most interesting enterprise.

Above all, it is clear that the Latin Americans have accepted this responsibility well.

The impulse toward regional economic unity in Latin America has the same two foundations as did the movement toward regional economic unity in Europe; that is to say, it makes economic sense to have wider markets and more rational investment policies, and unity would give Latin America a stronger base from which to deal with the United States and the rest of the world—a base of greater dignity.

The inter-American system has proved

vital and capable of change, as it is now demonstrating in the searching test of the Dominican crisis. There will undoubtedly be structural changes in the years ahead, because the inter-American system was never designed to do as much economic business as it is now doing; but all of this is taking place at a good moment in Latin American economic and social development.

Africa

In Africa the situation is different. The Africans have had less political experience than the Latin Americans and are not as far advanced economically. They also have the extra burden of extremely tense race problems between black Africa and the residual colonial areas in Africa, as well as the tragic problem of South Africa. There is a systematic attempt by the Communists to exploit these frustrations—political, economic, and racial. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see the beginnings of regional organization in Africa.

The Organization of African Unity is a new institution. Yet it has been able to settle, on its own, two difficult disputes in the region, without Western intervention. One was the dispute over the frontier between Morocco and Algeria; the other was the Somali-Ethiopia dispute. Although the whole problem of the Congo has been a searching one in the politics of Africa, the tendency has been increasingly toward a moderate approach, with reduced outside interference.

Africans are also beginning to face some of their economic problems on a regional basis. The head of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa is a distinguished Ghanaian economist, Mr. Robert K. A. Gardiner. There is an African Development Bank in existence, under an extremely able man named Mamoun Beheiry, a former Finance Minister of Sudan.

It is clear that, despite all the difficulties, there is an impulse among the Africans to organize regionally, so that they can deal with their own problems better and have

stronger and more systematic relations with the outside world.

Asia

In Asia, of course, it will be hard to get a regional program started until the issue of Southeast Asia is settled. But already there are most interesting stirrings. The Governments of Korea and Japan have initialed an agreement that, when completed, will establish new economic relations between them and settle the old quarrels. The Koreans are not only anxious that the United States maintain its role there but also that they become part of a larger Asian grouping.

Japan, after the most astonishing of post-war economic miracles, is now thinking of ways to play a larger role on the world scene in economic affairs and in the political life of Asia. Japan has been encouraging the exploration of new regional developments, including the idea of an Asian Development Bank, which is now under active negotiation. In Australia, in the Philippines, and elsewhere, there are stirrings in the region to group in such a way as to take a larger hand in the solution of the region's problems.

There are many problems, of course, to be confronted. No Asian regional organization is likely to emerge, full-blown, immediately. But the impulse is there—the groping for institutions, and the reaching out to group themselves in new ways, as they look ahead.

The Middle East

The Middle East is the most difficult, from this point of view, of all the regions. It is troubled by multiple quarrels and struggles for power. All of these are systematically exploited by the Communists with arms deals and by other devices.

Although the binding interest among the members of the Arab League has been, of course, the effort to present a common front on the Israeli question, there have been other aspects of the League which, in time, may prove fruitful. At the moment, however, these intense quarrels prevent any serious and systematic regional work.

The Role of the United States

The regional pattern which I have described is a good background against which to view certain key questions much discussed in the press: Is the world one in which the United States can safely withdraw? Is neoisolationism justified? Is the world safe enough for us to pull back, and not get so involved, and mind our own business at home?

The answer is that the state of the world in no way justifies a retraction of our security commitments around the world. There is no power other than the United States capable of containing Soviet conventional and nuclear strength. There is no power other than the United States capable of containing Communist ground forces on the Asian mainland. There is no evidence that either the Russians or the Chinese Communists would not try to move forward if they felt there were openings.

So, until the day when Moscow and Peiping change their fundamental outlook on the world, we must maintain our capacity to deter them; and we must maintain the linkages in the world necessary to sustain the independence of nations which do not have the power on their own to contain Chinese Communist and Soviet power.

Secondly, in economic matters—economic development, trade, monetary affairs—in our own interest and in the interest of others, we must maintain expanding relations with the rest of the world. It is interesting to see what has happened as Europe has moved partially toward unity. We now have a Europe which in monetary affairs and trade, and in economic matters generally, is strong. It is a partner, a negotiating partner—we argue, we debate, we negotiate. On the other hand, the intensity of our economic relations with Europe—whether measured in terms of the collaboration of central bankers, or trade negotiations, or private business interests—has increased as Europe has become stronger and moved toward unity.

I think that will be the general lesson.

We have never been closer to Latin America than we are now in the Alliance for Progress; and my prediction would be that, if they do go forward to economic unity in Latin America, our relations with them will also intensify.

This is the pattern. The kind of world we are living in does not yield itself to retraction. What may happen is that, as nations around the world show a capacity to translate their greater economic and political strength into regional organizations, an increasing part of our relations with them will be through these organizations. We are a long way from that, even in Europe, and still further down the road in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The peoples of the regions must, basically, do the job. But we should encourage the constructive moves that have been made by others. For example, the President's proposal for Asian regional development is already strengthening the impulse to regional organization in Asia.

If we see the Viet-Nam crisis through—and I'm confident that, if we all stay the course, we can see it through—we should be able to enter a phase of rather rapid and constructive forward movement on the world scene. If we maintain the unity and will of the West, nuclear blackmail is not going to be attractive. To revive the crossing of frontiers, as in Korea, will not look attractive. And if this game of guerrilla warfare across frontiers, which is obviously the greatest current hope of the Communists, can be dealt with, there will be few avenues for rational military action open to them.

Confidence in the Future

In terms of the overall historical competition with communism—in rates of growth, in social equity, in the capacity to build an interesting society, in the test of cultural, scientific, and other achievements—there is, looking back at the postwar generation, no

reason why we should not have the deepest confidence that free men can do better than Communist-run societies.

We will not see the sudden emergence of a peaceful world community overnight. But if all the forms of military aggression, including guerrilla warfare across frontiers, can be rendered unattractive, there will be a great decline of fear in the world; and somewhere down the line, if we can keep the free world moving forward, the moment will come when those responsible for power in Moscow will be prepared to enter the two great negotiations on which the ending of the cold war depends—namely, negotiations for German unity and negotiations for arms control based on effective international inspection.

There is a long road ahead; but, despite the continuing crises, despite all sorts of noise and confusion in the world, we are on a path which can lead, not only the free world but the whole world, toward something which we can all recognize as peace.

When a planner scans the whole horizon, he feels an underlying confidence, not only in the general direction in which the United States is going, but also in the prevailing currents of world history.

Australia To Protect U.S. Interests in Cambodia

Press release 135 dated June 2

The Department of State announced on June 2 that the Government of Australia has assumed responsibility for the protection of United States interests in Cambodia.

Following the severance of diplomatic relations by Cambodia on May 3,¹ the American Embassy in Phnom Penh was closed and American personnel assigned elsewhere.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of May 31, 1965, p. 853.

A Perspective on U.S. Policy in Viet-Nam

by William P. Bundy

Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs¹

In this opening statement I shall not seek to discuss the details of the current situation in South Viet-Nam. Rather, I should like to try to put our policies in South Viet-Nam into their wider and fundamental perspective. For they reflect, and are based on, the objectives and ideals we seek as a nation in the world, the role we are seeking to play in Asia, and finally the particular history of Viet-Nam itself.

Our Central Purposes

Three years ago, on this campus, President Kennedy stated our central purposes in the following words:²

Wisdom requires the long view. And the long view shows us that the revolution of national independence is a fundamental fact of our era. This revolution will not be stopped. As new nations emerge from the oblivion of centuries, their first aspiration is to affirm their national identity. Their deepest hope is for a world where, within a framework of international cooperation, every country can solve its own problems according to its own traditions and ideals.

It is in the interests of the pursuit of knowledge, and it is in our own national interest, that this revolution of national independence succeed. For the Communists rest everything on the idea of a monolithic world—a world where all knowledge has a single pattern, all societies move toward a single model, all problems and roads have a single solution and a single destination. The pursuit of knowledge, on the other hand, rests everything on the opposite idea—on the idea of a world based on diversity,

¹ Address made before the Faculty Forum of the University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, Calif., on May 27 (press release 128).

² For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1962, p. 615.

self-determination, and freedom. And that is the kind of world to which we Americans, as a nation, are committed by the principles on which the great Republic was founded.

That is the kind of world we seek—and it is the kind of Asia we seek. Though Pearl Harbor brought us into war in 1941, surely our underlying purpose was to prevent the domination of Asia by a then-militarist Japan and to permit a new Asia of independent nations to emerge. It was that same view that lay behind our pledge of independence to the Philippines in 1936 and our grant of that independence in 1946, on schedule. It was that view that lay behind our support for the independence of Indonesia and for the release of colonial bonds in Asia, in Africa, and throughout the world.

Our Role in Asia

That same view has been the central thread of our policy in Asia ever since the war.

In essence, that policy has been to lend our great and inevitable weight in Asia, as and when our help was desired, to the support of free nations in two tasks—their efforts to meet the tremendous economic and social problems they would face in any event and in their efforts to maintain their own independence and security from external interference.

The two parts of that policy are inseparable. As President Johnson has said, we would all prefer to use our resources to fight disease and poverty and to help nations develop so that they might enjoy the stability

of consent that we know as democracy but for which other nations may find other methods and institutions than ours.

But this far more attractive part of the job cannot be done unless we also assist in the area of security and the preservation of freedom from external interference. That second part of the task is, of course, not merely military but embraces the same economic and social factors that are a part of development.

The twofold task has not been easy, and it will not be easy in the future. It took a war in Korea to beat back aggression and make possible the great economic effort of the South Korean people, which with our help is now beginning to bear real fruit. It took the defeat of the Communist Huk rebellion in the Philippines, and of Communist insurgency in Malaya. And it now requires that we stand off the combined threat of North Viet-Nam and Communist China in Southeast Asia, so that we can move, under the lead of Asian nations and the U.N., to carry out the far-ranging expansion of existing economic plans and efforts to which President Johnson pledged his support on April 7th.³

For the underlying fact is that there cannot be a balance of power in Asia without us. Under the control of a Communist regime still at the peak of its ideological fervor, a unified mainland China today does threaten the outnumbered newly independent nations of Asia, not merely in the sense of influence but in the sense of domination and the denial of national self-determination and independence—not necessarily drastically or at once, for the Chinese Communist leaders are patient; not necessarily, or even in their eyes preferably, by conventional armed attack, but surely and inexorably, as they see it, through the technique of spurious national movements deriving their real impetus and support from external and Communist sources.

And in this central Communist effort, the other Communist nations of Asia, North

Viet-Nam and North Korea, are willing partners. They have their national character, they are not true satellites—indeed, deep down, they too fear Chinese domination. Yet so long as the spoils are fairly divided, they are working together with Communist China toward a goal the opposite of the one we seek, subjugation of the true national independence of smaller countries, an Asia of spheres of domination.

That kind of Asia *could* come about over the next 25 years. History is not made up of sure things, and all policy is a bet on the future. Yet we must recognize that it makes a tremendous difference not only to our ideals but to our most concrete national interests—quite possibly the difference between a third world war and none—that it should *not* come about. And as we look at the odds we have faced and surmounted just since the war in other areas of the world—in the apparently hopeless situation of Greece in 1947, in Europe as a whole in 1948 and 1949, to name but two—let us never lose faith in our own capacity to help or, above all, in the great tide of national feeling that we are supporting and that must surely, over time, be the tide of history.

The Viet-Nam Situation

Now, some of you may not agree that these are the stakes in Asia or that this is the role the United States should be playing at this stage of world history. If so, let us debate on that basis, trying to see what the consequences would be if we did not play that role.

Others of you may have a narrower focus, agreeing basically with what I have said to this point but feeling that South Viet-Nam is not a clear case fitting the framework I have drawn. Again, let us look together at the facts, as well as we can weigh them, having always in mind what our alternatives would be if we were not acting as we are in South Viet-Nam.

For South Viet-Nam is the outcome of a very particular slice of recent Asian history. Only in Viet-Nam was a genuine nationalist movement taken over by Communist leaders

³ *Ibid.*, Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

and transmuted into the Communist state of North Viet-Nam. And so the French, instead of yielding gradually or with the fullest possible preparation for self-government, as the British wisely did in India, Pakistan, and Malaysia, were effectively driven out in 1954 and Viet-Nam was divided.

The government controlling South Viet-Nam was already in 1954 an independent state. When Diem defeated Bao Dai in elections held in 1955, he changed the title to the Republic of Viet-Nam, which was given diplomatic recognition almost at once by 35 nations, including virtually all the major non-Communist nations of the world.

More basically, in those first 2 years South Viet-Nam proved that it had a basis of nationhood. With the odds and difficulties what they were, perhaps this was a "miracle"—to use the language of an eminent scholar of international affairs writing in 1956; at any rate it was a fact. The country was united, not necessarily by loyalty to its specific government at any one time—as so many countries, including at least one great European nation in recent memory, have not been—but by strong regional feelings and perhaps most of all by opposition to Communist rule from Hanoi.

By 1956, to paraphrase the same eminent scholar, Communist China and North Viet-Nam, all propaganda to the contrary notwithstanding, simply were not willing to risk the loss of South Viet-Nam in elections, and, perhaps most crucial, the conditions for free elections did not prevail in either North or South Viet-Nam. So the date passed, and the dividing line between the two Viet-Nams became a political division as in Germany and Korea, with reunification left to the future. And in the course of time another 30-odd nations recognized South Viet-Nam, and recognize it today.

(By the way, the eminent scholar I have just been citing was Professor Hans J. Morgenthau, writing in a pamphlet entitled "America's Stake in Viet-Nam," published in 1956. One of the other participants in that conference was the then junior Senator from Massachusetts. He was a bit more down-

right than the professor, saying that "neither the United States nor Free Viet-Nam is ever going to be a party to an election obviously stacked and subverted in advance.")

Since 1956 two different strands have dominated developments in South Viet-Nam. One is a genuine nationalist internal political ferment, in which the South Vietnamese themselves are seeking a lasting political base for their country—in the face of the same problems other new nations have faced, but compounded by the colonial heritage of lack of training and divide-and-rule tactics. That ferment should not surprise us; almost every new nation has gone through it—for example, Korea and Pakistan. Under Diem it drove many distinguished South Vietnamese to exile or prison, from 1962 until early this year it seriously weakened the defense of the nation, and it now has brought into power a regime led by men who were the real opponents of Diem and are something close to the true voice of South Vietnamese nationalism—men, too, who are already widening the base of support and holding local elections.

Obviously, this has not been a happy or easy process. But it represents, in essence, the very search for national destiny that President Kennedy spoke of in the statement I quoted at the outset.

The other, and entirely different, strand has been Hanoi's effort to take over the South by subversive aggression. On this the facts are plain and have been fully set out, though still in summary form, in the white papers published in December of 1961 and February 1965.⁴ If these do not convince you, read Hanoi's own pronouncements over the years, the eyewitness accounts of the tons of weapons found just in recent months, the personal interrogation of a typical infiltrated Viet

⁴ *A Threat to the Peace: North Viet-Nam's Effort To Conquer South Viet-Nam*, Department of State publication 7308, released in December 1961, Parts I (25 cents) and II (55 cents), and *Aggression From the North: The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign To Conquer South Viet-Nam*, Department of State publication 7839, released in February 1965 (40 cents); for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 20402.

Cong by Seymour Topping in Sunday's New York Times, or the recent accounts by the Frenchman, George Chaffard, who concluded that the so-called National Liberation Front was a classic example of the type of Communist organization used to take over another country.

In short, North Viet-Nam has been from the start, quite proudly and unashamedly, what President Johnson has called the heart-beat of the Viet Cong. As in Greece, the Viet Cong have won control of major areas of the country, playing in part on propaganda and the undoubted weaknesses of Diem and his successors, but relying basically on massive intimidation of civilians. Over the years, the rate of civilian casualties—deliberate action casualties, killed, wounded and kidnaped—has been about 40 a day in South Viet-Nam; civilian officials have been particular targets, with the obvious aim of crippling the government structure.

Yet, in the face of terrific pressure, the people of South Viet-Nam have stood fast. The Army, drawn from the people, has maintained and is now increasing its strength and is fighting well. The peasant in the countryside, with every opportunity to "vote with his feet" to Viet Cong areas, has never done so; on the contrary, in recent months a large number of refugees has moved out of Viet Cong area into areas controlled by the government, giving up their homes and lands to do so. And the politicians and religious leaders in the cities, even though often divided among themselves, have remained anti-Communist, supporting the war and with no significant defection to the Viet Cong.

Are we, then, to call this anything but aggression? Or to say that the Viet Cong is a true nationalist revolution instead of, in a very real sense, counterrevolution and the imposition of an external system by force? Or to argue that, because South Viet-Nam has had grave political problems and defects within a framework that does permit protest and change, we should acquiesce in its falling under a political system that permits neither?

I think not. Surely the essential fact is that the South Vietnamese Government is

acting in its own self-defense and that we and the 30-odd other nations who are helping South Viet-Nam are acting rightly and in our own highest principles.

I come now to the choice of methods. Till 1961 President Eisenhower and President Kennedy limited our help to a massive economic effort and to the supply of military equipment under the terms of the Geneva accords. When, after 2 years of intensified effort from the North, the situation had become serious in late 1961, President Kennedy made the decision to send thousands of our military men for advisory and other roles short of the commitment of combat units. President Johnson intensified this effort in every possible way and only in February of this year took the further decision, urged by the South Vietnamese themselves, to do what would have been justified all along—and had never been excluded—engage in highly selective and measured military bombing of the North itself, still coupled with every possible effort to assist in the South in the struggle which only the South Vietnamese can win there.

None of these were easy steps, or without risk. All were taken, not to threaten Hanoi or anyone else, but *after* the tide of aggression had progressively mounted. All were taken by men who knew war, at first hand, for what it is—but who knew, too, that patient determination and firmness can be the only road to peace and that failure to act can have its own and greater risks.

No one, of course, supposes that the outcome can in the end be anything but a political solution. Equally, no serious observer of the past few years, particularly the last 2 months, can suppose that Hanoi is ready for this *yet*—on any terms other than a Hanoi/Communist takeover. But we for our part remain prepared for unconditional discussions and have made it clear that our objective in such discussions—or perhaps through a sequence of actions—will remain inflexibly the freedom of South Viet-Nam to determine its own future without external interference, including the right to work out its relations to the North by peaceful means.

We seek no more than this and will with-

draw our forces when it is achieved. But any less than this would mean a vindication to the Communist side, especially the Chinese Communists, of the technique of external subversion; a gravely increased threat to the rest of Southeast Asia; at least some damage to the value of U. S. commitments elsewhere; and—above all—a defeat for the basic principles of the right of nations to work out their own destinies.

America's Commitment to Social Justice and Progress for All

*Excerpt From an Address by
President Johnson*¹

As is true for many national issues, we have had much discussion here of late about the various aspects of American foreign policy. I have disagreed with some of the views that have been expressed.

I know that the large majority of Americans support our country's efforts everywhere to stop aggression. But I also know that such discussion is one of the great strengths of American democracy. How rare is the land and extraordinary the people who freely allow and really encourage, as I have on many occasions, the citizens of our nation to discuss and to debate their nation's policies in time of danger.

So, let no citizen that is secure in his own liberty ever forget how precious it is and how brave we must be if we are to keep it, how many generations of men have perished in order to guard its light, and how many scattered throughout the world are dying still to protect it.

Our soldiers are falling in Viet-Nam. Twenty have died and 100 have been wounded on guard in the Dominican Republic so that men may always rise with perfect safety to criticize and to try to in-

¹ Made at commencement exercises at the National Cathedral School, Washington, D.C., on June 1 (White House press release; as-delivered text).

fluence the leadership of their government.

Nor should we forget that the purpose of liberty is not merely to allow error but to discover truth, not only to restrict the powers of the government but to enrich the judgment of the nation. So, by testing ideas in the forum of the nation, we discover their strength as well as their wisdom.

As the Bible says: "Where no counsel is, the people fall: but in the multitude of counsellors there is safety."

Therefore we welcome and we ask for new ideas from serious and concerned men and women, from universities and journals and public platforms all across this land. We are constantly searching for views and proposals which might strengthen and unite and help our Government.

Of course, there can be no decision with which we all agree. But all will be heard. And let no one ever think for a moment that national debate means national division. For even among those who do not support our Government policies, the very process of discussion rests on a broad and deeply set foundation of shared belief, principle, faith, and experience.

There are, first of all, the assumptions of American democracy. Thus most of those who disagree are really trying to influence the democratic process and not rip it and tear it apart. They are really seeking to exercise their own freedom and not deny it to others. They try to affect the decisions of the Nation, not flout or ignore them.

Secondly, even among those who quarrel with particular acts, most believe, as I believe, in the principles which have shaped American world policy for more than a generation.

We seek neither conquest nor domination. We seek to work toward a goal where every country can run its own affairs, can shape its own progress, can build its own institutions according to that country's own desires and needs—and to do all that can be done to find enduring peace at the same time, while we are resisting aggression by any who wish to subdue others and gobble them up and really try to destroy us.

We seek to reserve our special friendship for those governments that are dedicated to social justice and progress for all of the people—and *all* the people, not just a privileged few.

It is these principles which I am trying so hard, as best I can, for your Government to support in every continent of the world today. Because I think these are also the beliefs of the American people. Therefore we need never shrink from debate, because debate can only strengthen our determination and our ability to follow this course.

In a democracy the people have to want to do what must be done. And that particularly includes students like you.

I have visited many campuses and I have talked to many students, and I can tell you that this generation of young Americans is a generation of which I am deeply proud. And I think you are very lucky to be joining them.

This is not the lost generation or the silent generation or the indifferent generation. This is the concerned and the committed generation. And I, for one, believe that adult America should be proud and should be thankful that young America—youthful America—is so concerned for their country, so committed and dedicated to a genuine understanding of all of America's problems, and they are uncowed in their determination to be a part of the answers that we are seeking and that we need.

This world that we live in is a restless world. It is a world filled with revolution and even violence, and we must never make the sad mistake of thinking that this is only the work of our enemies.

Of course our enemies are at work, like ants, constantly united and dedicated and determined. But they thrive on the desperate struggle by the poor of the world to try to create a more hopeful life.

Our life in America is good. Our land is rich. Our comforts are many. But more than 2 billion of the 3 billion people in the world

have an income of less than \$20 per month. Half of the world's children today have no school to go to at all and have never darkened a schoolroom. Two hundred million people in the world today have no safe water to drink any day of their lives. More than half the population of Asia and Africa and Latin America, by our standards, have no homes at all in which to live.

This is the world that you live in, and, whether you know it or not, it is a world with slums and shacks; it is a world without lights or water in the homes; it is a world without food on the shelves or health in the bodies; a world with too few teachers and too few doctors. In Viet-Nam they have 200 doctors, and if they had the same ratio of doctors that we have in this country they would not have 200—they'd have 5,000.

So this is a world where hope is too rare and help is too scarce. Wherever and whenever men struggle to escape this misery, no nation ought to be neutral—whatever be the continent or the creed or the color of those who reach upward striving and yearning for a better life.

Were there no cold war and no communism at all, this planet would still be wracked and seething with man's heroic battle to secure justice for himself.

For myself, I do not propose that this powerful nation which I lead shall stand alone or shall stand apart from this most decisive struggle of our times. Concerned as I am with the future of freedom for America, concerned as I am with the world that my daughters shall know, I would commit the American nation to face up to its obligation to be with the world's people on their march toward the life that all God's children should know on this earth.

This is not a political commitment, nor even an economic commitment that we alone must make. This is a moral commitment that we have made and that we must keep in all that we do.

The Politics of Outer Space

by Harlan Cleveland

*Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*¹

There are plenty of good reasons for getting excited about the age of voyage and discovery in outer space. But we all have to look at so immense a subject through our own professional keyholes. So, as a political scientist, my good eye is glued to the politics of outer space—because the politics of outer space may have a lot to do with those rather abstract goals of ours called “peace” and “world order.”

As one of the junior vice presidents in charge of worrying about world order, I was privileged to be much involved in the staff work that led the United States to launch the Charter of the United Nations beyond the gravity pull of our own planet.

It was already Year Number Five in the Age of Space when we proposed, the Soviets cosponsored, and the United Nations General Assembly unanimously voted a landmark resolution on the law of outer space.²

You know that by this resolution space and celestial bodies have been placed beyond the claim of nations. We have all agreed that the principles of the U.N. Charter should apply to men from earth no matter how far they get from home.

(We do not yet know whether those principles will commend themselves to whatever intelligence we may meet Out There. But the preamble and the first two articles of the

charter are a pretty good summary of what we have learned from several thousand years of feuding and fighting among men who are brothers and brothers who are different from each other. So if we do meet anybody Out There, and he or she is intelligent, maybe the logic of this concentrated wisdom will turn out to have a wider appeal.)

Sometimes, in my unscientific dreams, I wonder what one of our astronauts, a first envoy of the human race, would have to say if he met a being from another planet. Suppose the Martian or Venusian said, “Tell me, in a few words, what’s the essence of what you on earth have learned from your brief half-million years’ experience with life.” Would our man try to explain to Mars and Venus the issues in the cold war? Or would he talk about what we have learned, with much stalling and much grinding of our political gears, about how groups of men can cooperate with each other?

I think our astronaut would be more likely than most Americans to talk about international cooperation. For he operates under an act of Congress which enjoins NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration] to conduct its space program in cooperation with other nations. He knows that every shot from Cape Kennedy requires a web of interlocking agreements with other lands. And he would know, I suppose, that we are even now negotiating an international agreement in which the nations that experiment in outer space assume the liability for accidents they cause and every other nation

¹ Address made before the fifth bicentennial space symposium at St. Louis, Mo., on May 27 (press release 129).

² For background and text of resolution, see *BULLETIN* of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 180.

would agree to return to his land of origin an astronaut or his vehicle which fell to earth in the wrong part of the globe.

From where I sit, it is clear that so far the exploration of outer space has drawn men and nations together more than it has spread them apart.

The same is true, by the way, of Antarctica, that empty, windy land populated by penguins who know how to picket but who don't carry signs. Maybe the lesson of this analogy is that it is easier to cooperate where there aren't any people.

But a more relevant lesson is surely this: Where nations perceive a common interest, they can readily come to clear and enforceable agreements.

The law of outer space is like the law of your own community: Your freedom and my freedom to do damage to others is restrained in the interest of my freedom and your freedom to walk unmolested the streets we share. There is no other basis for freedom or civil order, whether in Missouri or on the moon.

Conditions for International Cooperation

Our experience tells us that three conditions have to be fulfilled before nations can agree to work together—even if they continue to argue vigorously about *why* they are working together.

First, the technology to make cooperation necessary has to be there.

The airplane made international air safety regulations both possible and necessary.

When scientists found that mosquitoes carried malaria and mosquitoes could be killed with DDT, it became possible to eradicate malaria from the face of the earth—and ridiculous not to do so forthwith.

Once space began to fill up with castoff hardware and other technological garbage, we had to start moving toward the registration of launchings—which the U.N. now does—and toward an international agreement about liability for accidents.

But technology does not speak for itself. So, *second*, national leaders who understand its promise and its peril must come to feel the

need to cooperate, to channel and contain the inventions of the scientists and the innovations of the engineers. We see again and again that a nation can perceive its own interest in cooperating with others about one subject, while carrying on political quarrels on other subjects. In dealing with other men it is hard for us to trust them in compartments—to sign an agreement on one subject and fight with them or haul them into court on another subject. Yet that is just what nations do, because technology makes it imperative.

It is not enough for technology to require, and a nation's leaders to perceive, the need for a breakthrough in international cooperation. There must, *third*, be international institutions to reflect the common interests, to put the technology in the service of felt needs.

Let us now bring these abstractions down to earth—if that is a permissible manner of speaking at a symposium on space. Let us at least bring it down as far as the atmosphere that envelops the earth. For that cliché of Mark Twain's is obsolescent; somebody *is* doing something about the weather these days.

What is happening to weather reporting and forecasting is both clear and exciting. And beyond that, what man might do to modify the weather makes a political scientist blink at the political fallout of the atmospheric science.

Science of Meteorology Comes of Age

Men have always known that their livelihood, and often their lives, depended upon the weather; but until very recently that's about all they knew of it. That is why they endowed the elements with the attributes of gods. You may have seen the lovely Tower of the Winds built in Athens in the first or second century B.C., or the sculptures of the fierce Rain God of the Maya civilization in Mexico, or the Pueblo Indian dance to appease the Sun God. In any event, the chances are that in the past 24 hours you have uttered or heard some superstition that comes to us

out of the rich mythology about weather which is still deep in our culture and our conscience.

Until recently the best a sailor could do about the weather was to wet his finger and watch the sky and repeat the inherited folk wisdom: "Red sky in the morning, sailor take warning; red sky at night, sailor's delight." Some farmers who lived close to the earth acquired, as a function of their joints if not of their reason, mysterious and often misleading hunches about the weather. The hunches didn't help very much; the rain still fell before the hay was in, and the ground was still parched and dustblown when the sun shone too hot for too long.

What *did* help were the first steps in the transition from mythology to technology.

I won't review the long and stirring history of that technology. In the middle of the 17th century one of Galileo's graduate assistants developed a primitive barometer, and in the early 18th century Fahrenheit, in Holland, invented the mercury thermometer—and as such tools were invented, the cussed curiosity of men led to the beginnings of a systematic science of the atmosphere.

For a while there were some rudimentary tools but no theory to work with. Then in the 18th century a brilliant theoretical physicist named Helmholtz worked out the basic theoretical equations of hydrodynamics. Now, nobody knew how to apply the theory to the way the atmosphere actually worked. And so, for much of the two centuries that followed, theory ran ahead of the tools in the newly emerging science called meteorology.

Then suddenly new inventions came along rapidly. The electric telegraph made it possible to collect enough data fast enough to make the first stab at forecasting the weather without depending on old wives' tales or plying the gods with questions.

Then came the radio—and the airplane—and photo transmission by wireless. And the Second World War came, too, with its suddenly expanded and urgent requirements for greatly extended upper air observations, and especially with the new electronic computer.

Soon the science of meteorology was coming of age due to the convergence of three major developments.

One was a refinement and simplification of Helmholtz' theories of hydrodynamics and their application to the atmosphere. Meteorologists came to understand much more about the physical processes occurring in the upper air. They could begin building more complex models of the earth's atmosphere as a basis for long-term weather forecasting.

Then the electronic computer opened the prospect of processing enough data fast enough to make longer term forecasting mechanically possible before the weather had come and gone.

And when observation and communication satellites came along, they offered the potential for collecting enough data for processing and then for distributing it in time to do the receivers some good.

The marriage of these technologies for the first time made it possible to think seriously about the atmosphere of the earth as the single, self-contained physical system it is now considered to be—in other words, to view world weather as the Lord has presumably viewed it right along.

Putting Available Technology to Work

With the technology as well as the theory in sight, the weathermen got excited; and since everybody is interested in the weather, it was not long before the second condition of progress was manifest—a felt need for international cooperation.

There remained the need for an international institution to put available technology to work in the common interest. This would complete the preconditions for agreement on the things that draw nations together.

In 1951—just 14 years ago and only 6 years before the first Sputnik—an ancient professional society called the International Meteorological Organization had become an intergovernmental agency with executive capacity called the World Meteorological Organization, affiliated with the United Nations as a specialized agency.

Just 4 years ago—which was 4 years after Sputnik I—President Kennedy laid down a challenge to the United Nations: to design a global weather reporting and forecasting system for the benefit of every nation in the world—a World Weather Watch, as it came to be called.³ With such a system it may be possible to provide daily weather forecasts for periods of up to 2 weeks ahead, compared to 3 days at the best today.

The implications are simply breathtaking—for agriculture, for flood control, for navigation, for tourism, for sports and recreation—for every nation with airplanes to fly, every firm with work to be done outdoors, every family planning a weekend outing or a wedding reception on the lawn.

This will not be ready tomorrow, but the planning is moving ahead at the WMO and in the national weather bureaus, especially our own. There is plenty of engineering ahead—political and social engineering, as well as the other kind. But we are on our way, and there is no reason to think we won't have a functioning World Weather Watch by early in the decade of the seventies.

And the story will not end there. Somewhat further in the future lies the exciting prospect of purposeful modification of the weather by man—of minimizing the incidence and the severity of hurricanes, tornadoes, and other violent storms, of influencing the level of precipitation and perhaps modifying temperatures.

This will depend upon basic research which is not yet done but which is getting underway. There is no sound basis at this time for predicting when we may acquire the awesome power to alter the climate upon which human and all organic life depends. But when the time comes—as almost surely it will—it is a power that cannot rest in the hands of any one nation.

President Johnson said it when he sent to Congress earlier this week a National Science Foundation report on weather modification: “. . . it is clear that large scale weather or

climate control schemes cannot be contained within national boundaries.”⁴

We won't want other nations modifying *our* weather, and so we will certainly have to accept some restraints on our freedom to modify theirs.

Merits of Functional Organizations

The agreements that will make a world system of the world's weather envelope are just an illustration—but a good one—of the proposition that international politics is not a “zero-sum game” in which an inch gained by our player must mean an inch lost by another.

The reality is that international agreements *can* be reached—and international organizations *can* be formed—and international common law *can* be elaborated—on subjects which draw nations together even as they continue to quarrel about the frontiers and friends and ideological frenzies which keep them apart.

So let's look for a moment at the political merits of functional organizations—the kind that work at peace through meteorology, or health, or food, or education and training, or communications, or culture, or postal service, or children, or money, or economic growth—or the exploration of outer space—organizations, that is, for the pursuit of some specific and definable task beyond the frontiers of one nation—a task for which the technology is already conceived or conceivable, for which a common interest is mutually recognized, for which institutions can, and therefore must, be designed.

—Organizations like these begin by taking the world as it is. No fundamental political reforms are needed; no value systems have to be altered; no ideologies have to be seriously compromised.

—These organizations start from where we are, and then take the next step. And that, as the ancient Chinese guessed long ago, is the only way to get from here to there.

³ For text of an address by President Kennedy before the 16th session of the U.N. General Assembly, see *ibid.*, Oct. 19, 1961, p. 619.

⁴ For text of a message of Mar. 24 from President Johnson to the Congress, see White House press release dated Mar. 24.

—These organizations tackle jobs that can be managed through imperfect institutions by fallible men and women. Omniscience is not a prerequisite; the peace of the world does not stand or fall on the success of any one organization; mistakes need not be fatal.

—These limited-purpose organizations bypass the obstacle of sovereignty. National independence is not infringed when a nation voluntarily accepts in its own interest the restraints imposed by cooperation with others. Nobody has to play who doesn't want to play. But for those who do play, there are door prizes for all.

—These organizations, built around an agreed task, can readily achieve a reasonable balance between power and representation in the control of the organization. In the General Assembly of the United Nations the principle of one vote for each nation is sacrosanct. But in a functional organization it is possible to work out ways in which those who contribute most of the resources can take a larger responsibility for decisions as to how those resources will be used. In the International Labor Organization the industrial nations have a special position; in the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization the big shipping nations, including Norway, have a special voice. In the U.N.'s outer space committee there is an unwritten rule that the nations actually engaged in exploring space will act by consensus rather than fail to act by taking votes. And in the U.N.'s Security Council, of course, the special right of veto is reserved to the great powers by the charter itself.

—Finally, these task-oriented organizations can readily grow with the need and adapt to the new tasks made possible by new technologies. Healthy institutions, like healthy cells, grow organically, by evolution.

None of these advantages of the functional approach to world integration are theoretical. The Universal Postal Union survived two world wars that left the wreckage of political agreements scattered all over Europe. The League of Nations fell apart, but its functional organizations—for weights and measures, narcotics control, labor standards, and

the rest—all survived and are going stronger today than when Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese walked out of the League. At the height of each Berlin crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union persist in cooperating to regulate the hunting of seals in the Bering Sea—as they have done for several decades.

Two examples from the front pages of our newspapers are more than enough to clinch the point. The General Assembly of the United Nations has been out of business for the past year over a political-constitutional point which so far has proved insoluble—while the specialized agencies and affiliated organs working at functional tasks proceed apace. And in the midst of the military, political, and diplomatic turmoil of Southeast Asia, the organization charged with the regional development of the Lower Mekong Basin has continued to work in routine and astonishing harmony.

Peacekeeping Also a Functional Task

International technological agencies, then, can guide peaceful enterprise and weave the nations together with functional strands despite their political conflicts. Yet they obviously cannot by themselves keep the peace of the world. International peacekeeping machinery is needed for that.

But isn't peacekeeping *also* a specialized, functional task?

And if so, can we learn something about peacekeeping by remembering what is needed for successful cooperative work at other functional tasks, like world weather forecasting? The analogy is not exact, of course, but perhaps it is instructive.

We can dismiss at once the first test—that of adequate technology for peacekeeping. If there is anything that is surplus in this world, it is the physical tools for the enforcement of order.

The next requirement is the felt need—the perception of a common interest. And in a crude sense I think it can be said that it is precisely a recognition of common interest in survival which has led to the partial ban of nuclear weapons tests, to the installation

of the "hot line," to the banning of weapons in outer space, to the cutback in production of fissionable materials, and to mutual steps toward some reduction in armaments expenditures by the Soviet Union and the United States. There is, in short, recognition of a common interest in the prevention of a nuclear war.

And I think this extends to conventional wars as well—because conventional war could lead to nuclear war. It was 15 years ago that an invading army was last marched against an opposing force across a boundary line fixed by international agreement. And I think that Korea proved that there is no more nourishment for anybody in old-fashioned aggression—that there is a common interest in the prevention of conventional as well as nuclear war.

But when we get to the modern doctrine of militant violence—to what the Communists call "wars of national liberation" and what we call clandestine aggression—we meet the greatest threat to world security today. For on this subject there is no felt need for international cooperation, no recognition yet of a common interest; indeed, there is total disagreement over where the interests of the nations lie.

And it is here that the third precondition for cooperative action—the institutional machinery to use available technology to serve common interests—is sadly lacking.

We are hopeful that out of the Dominican experience will come a recognition of a common interest in the Western Hemisphere in providing our hemispheric institutions with adequate peacekeeping machinery.

The framers of the Charter of the United Nations, like the founding fathers of the Organization of American States, did not foresee the emergence of a doctrine of hidden aggression. The U.N.'s peacekeeping machinery was conceived for the purpose of coping with traditional conflict. It is not yet fully adequate to deal even with more familiar threats to the peace. But it has not found the handle to deal, so far, with recent aggression, masquerading as "wars of national liberation," in Africa and Southeast Asia.

The most hopeful thing that can be said about this state of affairs is that the institutional gap for dealing with contemporary threats to the peace has been made glaringly evident—which is usually the precondition for institutional invention.

The "Contagion of Peace"

Clearly we need functional organizations both to keep the peace and to foster a progressive international community—the first needed to sustain enough order in the world while the second proceeds to integrate the world along functionally useful lines.

Obviously the two interact with each other. If we cannot contain the so-called "wars of national liberation" by international action, political temperatures may rise to the point where nations become unwilling to cooperate, even where it is obviously in their common interest to do so.

On the other hand, whenever organizations of a functional world community succeed, then political quarrels may seem so damaging to shared national interests that the quarrels have to be resolved or submerged.

And this is why, as a political scientist working at the nuts and bolts of peace on earth, I am excited about the politics of outer space.

Space is not a new subject or function—or academic discipline, for that matter. It is, rather, a new place in which all the old familiar arguments and uncertainties are born again. But in this newly accessible place called space, the new uncertainties are so massive that even the largest temporal powers, feeling even smaller in an expanding universe, are drawn together in the search for God knows what.

So far, at least, the environment of outer space is favorable for international cooperation—not only in weather but in communications, in medicine, and in law. Two Presidents have even suggested that we go to the moon as envoys, not of nations but of mankind at large.

Whatever cooperation you can achieve with other nations in preparing, launching, track-

ing, and using the scientific satellites of man's intelligence will be part of the contagion of peace—that mysterious process by which nations become so accustomed to working with each other for mutual benefit that the emotional rivalries of the past are pushed aside, not to be settled but, better, to be forgotten.

Thus when you meet to deliberate on the peaceful uses of outer space, you are dealing with the prospects of peace on earth.

President Johnson Meets With Antarctic Policy Group

Following is a statement made by President Johnson on May 1, when he received the first report of his Antarctic Policy Group,¹ together with remarks he made on May 20 after a meeting with the Group at the White House.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT, MAY 1

White House press release dated May 1

I have been deeply impressed by the sensible way in which the 12 nations active in Antarctica work together. In that frozen continent we have, through international cooperation, shown how nations of many different outlooks can cooperate for peaceful purposes and mutual benefit. National differences are no barrier to a common effort in which everyone gains and no one loses. The scientific findings of all countries are pooled for the benefit of all. Men in danger or in need can call for help knowing that it will be given unstintingly by any country that can provide it.

¹The Antarctic Policy Group was established on Apr. 10 by Acting Secretary of State George W. Ball. Members of the group are: Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, who serves as chairman; Leland Haworth, Director of the National Science Foundation; and John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The group consults other departments and agencies of the Government as necessary.

We are now celebrating International Cooperation Year. It is my earnest hope that the same success that has marked the Antarctic program can be extended to every field of international endeavor, not only during this special year but in future years as well.

The United States today pursues a vigorous program in Antarctica. We have begun to explore the southern ocean and the last great unknown reaches of the Polar Plateau. We have established new research stations in West Antarctica and on the Antarctic Peninsula. We have completed geologic surveys of most of the ice-free areas of West Antarctica. We have photographed hundreds of thousands of square miles for mapping purposes. We are conducting scientific programs to study the unique physical and biological features of the area.

We are pioneering new concepts of operations on the ice. We introduced nuclear power to Antarctica. Advanced construction techniques soften the rigors of polar life. Specialized aircraft and surface vehicles enable us to reach any point on the continent, and to operate effectively when we get there.

From our activities and those of other countries we acquire increased knowledge of the world in which we all live and which we must understand better to meet the challenge of the future. Already the research program has disclosed facts which may affect profoundly the future of communications, of space travel, and of the world's food supply.

The kind of international cooperation that has become accepted practice in Antarctica is both practical and mutually beneficial. Argentina provided transportation and logistic support for three U.S. biological teams this year and has also made facilities available to us at its Melchior Station. The United States and four other nations man an Antarctic Weather Center in Melbourne, Australia.

This year the first leg of a great traverse across the savage and unknown Polar Plateau was made by an American team which included a Belgian and a Norwegian.

A number of Chilean scientists participate

in our activities. When our research ship, the *Eltanin*, encountered a medical emergency, the Chilean Air Force and Navy provided drugs to the ship at sea and hospital facilities in port.

New Zealand continues to welcome our advance headquarters in Christchurch, New Zealand, and to participate in the research programs on the ice. We, in turn, provide them with transportation and other logistic support.

This year again an American scientist is doing research at the Soviet Mirnyy Station and a Soviet scientist is studying at our McMurdo Station. One of the monitoring instruments of our cosmic ray program is installed at a Soviet station, where the Russians are operating it for us.

France, Japan, South Africa, and the United Kingdom are actively cooperating with the United States on a variety of Antarctic projects.

The peaceful framework on which these widespread activities depend is the Antarctic Treaty.² The countries adhering to the treaty have pledged that Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. No activities of a military nature are permitted. Nuclear explosions or dumping atomic waste is prohibited. But scientific research is open to all, and international cooperation in that research is encouraged.

Any signatory country may satisfy itself that the treaty is being observed by inspecting any station or expedition anywhere in Antarctica. In short, the United States and other signatories have agreed that it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord.

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT, MAY 20

White House press release dated May 20

Ladies and gentlemen, while you were having your briefing, Secretary Cleveland and Mr. Haworth and the others briefed me

² For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 21, 1959, p. 914.

on some of the material that I am going to discuss and some of the charts in the room. If you have the time and it is agreeable with them, at the conclusion of the brief statement that I will make, which will be available to you after the ceremony is over, I will ask them to review a part of this demonstration with you that I find very interesting.

There is much tension and discord in the world as we meet here this morning, and so it is particularly pleasing to me to have met with the Antarctic Policy Group a little earlier and to have heard their encouraging reports of practical, peaceful cooperation among the nations of the earth.

Four years ago the Antarctic Treaty came into effect. Since then it has proved a most valuable tool of international agreement and a most useful way of freeing Antarctica from destructive confrontations between nations.

Our objectives in Antarctica can be summarized in four very simple statements: We stand behind the Antarctic Treaty and will do everything in our power to insure that the Antarctica region will be a place of peace rather than a place of hostile international rivalries. We strongly favor international cooperation among the nations which are active in Antarctica. We support, with all of our resources, scientific research in Antarctica, further exploration and charting of Antarctica, the development of new methods of transport and logistics in that vast region, and the preservation of unique plant and animal life there. Finally, we earnestly hope that these great projects of peaceful cooperation in Antarctica will yield resources which every nation needs and every nation can use.

The world toward which we are all working is one in which the earth will yield up enough for every man in every country, a world of peace in which the very deserts bloom and the polar ice is turned to enrichment of man's life.

The actions of the Antarctic Policy Group are important steps toward achieving such a world and steps toward lasting peace among nations.

I am grateful for the effort of the group,

and I have asked them to remain with you and discuss their great work in more detail as they have discussed with me a few minutes ago.

I now present with great pleasure, the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Harlan Cleveland.

President Urges Implementation of Florence Agreement

White House press release dated June 1

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

I am releasing the text of a letter to the Vice President and Speaker of the House of Representatives urging passage of legislation to implement the Florence Agreement. This legislation would eliminate duties on imports of educational, scientific, and cultural materials.

Forty-seven countries have already carried out the Florence Agreement. Enactment of such legislation would benefit our schools and universities, science laboratories, libraries, museums, and other institutions.

Freedom of access to the knowledge and culture of other nations is the hallmark of open society. I urge prompt congressional consideration of this measure during International Cooperation Year.

TEXT OF LETTER

JUNE 1, 1965

DEAR MR. VICE PRESIDENT: (DEAR MR. SPEAKER:) The Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific and Cultural Materials, commonly known as the Florence Agreement, was opened for signature at Lake Success, New York, on November 22, 1950. This Agreement is now in force in forty-seven countries.

The United States participated in the negotiation of the Florence Agreement. It was signed on behalf of the United States on June

24, 1959, and the Senate gave its advice and consent to its ratification on February 23, 1960.¹ It now remains for the Congress to approve the legislation to permit the United States to implement this important Agreement.

The purpose of the Florence Agreement is to promote the growth of international understanding by reducing trade barriers to the flow of knowledge in all directions across all frontiers.

Enactment of the legislation would be of very material benefit to our schools and universities, science laboratories and research foundations, libraries, art galleries, museums and institutions and organizations devoted to the welfare of the blind.

The fullest freedom of access to the knowledge and culture of other nations is the hallmark of the open society.

Passage of this legislation would be particularly timely in 1965, which has been designated as International Cooperation Year.

Accordingly, I ask the Congress to approve promptly the legislation implementing the Florence Agreement.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Federal Civilian Employment in Foreign Countries Reduced

White House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated May 31

The Budget Bureau has reported to President Johnson that Federal agencies aided the drive to improve the U.S. balance-of-payments position by reducing civilian employment in foreign countries more than 6 percent in 1964.

Federal civilian employment in foreign countries was 125,761 as of December 1964—a reduction of more than 8,600 from December 1963.

The Department of Defense led the way with a reduction of 7,106—almost 8 percent of its overseas civilian employment. The re-

¹ For background and text of agreement, see BULLETIN of Sept. 21, 1959, p. 422; Feb. 16, 1960, p. 261.

duction in Defense was generally achieved through a vigorous program to improve our support and administrative structure overseas. The Agency for International Development followed with a drop of 1,524—almost 11 percent of its overseas total—due largely to tighter controls on employment of foreign nationals. The U.S. Information Agency trimmed 241 people from its overseas rolls, while nine other agencies produced reductions totaling 134 persons.

In contrast, no large increases were recorded by agencies during 1964. The Department of State increased by 216—less than 2 percent of its overseas total. While 10 additional agencies added overseas personnel during 1964, their combined increase was only 175.

These totals include American citizens and foreign nationals employed by the U.S. Government overseas; they do not include employees who work directly for Government overseas contractors.

Federal Employment in Foreign Countries

	December 1963	December 1964	Increase or decrease
Defense -----	90,564	83,458	-7,106
State -----	17,306	17,522	+216
Agency for International Development -----	14,048	12,524	-1,524
U.S. Information Agency	8,575	8,334	-241
Agriculture -----	635	680	+45
Commerce -----	556	510	-46
Interior -----	442	478	+36
American Battle Monu- ments Commission ---	408	408	—
Peace Corps -----	354	377	+23
Veterans' Administration	331	328	-3
All other agencies ----	1,156	1,142	-14
Totals -----	134,375	125,761	-8,614

U.S. and Mexico Hold Air Talks

The Department of State announced on May 24 (press release 124) that representatives of the United States and Mexico would meet at Mexico City on May 25 to discuss air transport relations between the two Governments. The United States delegation was headed by Philip Trezise, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and the Mexican delegation by José Antonio Padilla Segura, Secretary of Communications and Transport.

**Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy**

88th Congress, 2d Session

Rates, Fares, and Practices in Foreign Air Transportation-1964. Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 1716, H.R. 6400, and S. 1540. May 19-June 1, 1964. 238 pp.

88th Congress, 1st and 2d Sessions

International Agreements for Cooperation. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Agreements for Cooperation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. September 5, 1963-June 30, 1964. 191 pp.

89th Congress, 1st Session

East-West Trade. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Part II. February 24-26, 1965. 304 pp.

Continuation of Higher Interest Rates on Time Deposits of Foreign Official Institutions. Hearing before the House Committee on Banking and Currency on H.R. 5306. March 4, 1965. 19 pp.

Foreign Assistance, 1965. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the Foreign Assistance Program. March 9-April 7, 1965. 772 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1965. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Part VIII. April 1-7 and March 10, 1965. 149 pp.

International Coffee Agreement Act of 1965. Report to accompany S. 701. H. Rept. 252. April 19, 1965. 6 pp.

Amendments Reducing Request for Appropriations for Mutual Defense and Development and the Peace Corps. Letter of transmittal from the President. H. Doc. 150. April 22, 1965. 2 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1965. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 1837, S. Rept. 170, April 28, 1965, 72 pp.; report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 7750, H. Rept. 321, May 7, 1965, 93 pp.

The Foreign Assistance Program. Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1964. H. Doc. 95. May 1965, 124 pp.

Message from the President transmitting a request for an additional appropriation to meet mounting military requirements in Vietnam. H. Doc. 157. May 4, 1965. 5 pp.

Saigon Chancery. Report to accompany H.R. 7064. S. Rept. 175. May 5, 1965. 4 pp.

Supplemental Appropriation for the Department of Defense, 1965. Report to accompany H.J. Res. 447. S. Rept. 176. May 5, 1965. 1 p.

Supplemental Appropriation for Military Functions of the Department of Defense. Report to accompany H.J. Res. 447. H. Rept. 286. May 5, 1965. 2 pp.

Communication from the President transmitting a supplement to his message of January 14, 1965, relative to foreign aid, to develop a program which is designed to strengthen the personnel capabilities of all the foreign affairs agencies of the Government. H. Doc. 161. May 6, 1965. 3 pp.

Authorizing Construction of Replacement Vessels for 17 Coast Guard Patrol Boats Deployed to Vietnam. Report to accompany H.R. 7855. H. Rept. 293. May 6, 1965. 4 pp.

OAS To Help Restore Democratic Order in Dominican Republic

Following is a statement made by Secretary Rusk on June 2 (early a.m.) at the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, together with the text of a resolution adopted at the same session.¹

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK

Press release 133 dated June 2

Mr. Chairman, I should like, despite the lateness of the hour, just to make two or three very brief remarks. I particularly want to comment on the very interesting statement made by our distinguished colleague from Argentina on two points.

One, on the matter of the responsibility of the Commander of the Inter-American Force for the operation of those forces. I would urge my colleagues here not to pay attention to a press report which, in fact, was inaccurate on this particular point. It is quite true that any government, anywhere in the world, has the ultimate responsibility for its own armed forces, but that has not prevented, beginning with World War I, the effective cooperation in combined commands, under a combined commander, and there is no doubt whatever that it is the policy of the United States that its forces assigned to the Inter-American Force will operate under the command of the Commander of that Force.

This, I must say, is one of the reasons why we think it important—and on this I agree fully with my colleague, the distinguished Foreign Minister of Brazil—that the Organization of American States is sure that that Commander has broad political guidance and all the assistance possible from this organization.

With respect to the withdrawal of forces, I indicated to this meeting some days ago that it was our intention, as soon as the combined commander, that is the Commander of the Inter-American Force, has had an opportunity to make his own judgments—it is our intention to take his advice with respect to the strength of the American contingent. He has had an opportunity to do that and has recommended that reductions in our forces be made. I think it is obvious to everyone there is a certain imbalance in the forces of the Inter-American Force at the present time. I did not observe at that time that there was any objection to a reduction in the U.S. contingent there. That was discussed, of course, with the Secretary General, who under existing regulations has such responsibilities as we have thus far provided for giving guidance or a general oversight to the Inter-American Force.

I do wish to conclude by remarking that there is one matter on which we are all in agreement and that is the deep concern for the Dominican people and the decency of their political future. This organization has had since 1960 occasion to concern itself with that problem, and I think that it is generally

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of May 17, 1965, p. 738; May 31, 1965, p. 854; June 7, 1965, p. 908; and June 14, 1965, p. 975.

reflected around this table that the Dominican people ought to have their own chance to make their own decisions to set themselves firmly on the road of democratic government. Any of those of us who were in Punta del Este in January 1962 will recall the moving occasion in which the Dominican representative rejoined the family of the Western Hemisphere, and I think all of us have been grieved that the events of the past several weeks have inflicted so much suffering upon the Dominican people, but now we have a chance to help them and end this great undertaking, not by imposing anything upon them but as friends to help them find their way to the full promise of the democracy which lies at the heart of the inter-American system. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION²

DESIGNATION OF AN AD HOC COMMITTEE ENTRUSTED WITH ALL MATTERS RELATING TO THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRATIC ORDER IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

WHEREAS:

The situation prevailing in the Dominican Republic continues to be a danger to peace; and

The Organization of American States should continue to exert efforts and to take the steps necessary for the prompt restoration of democratic order in that republic so that the Dominican people may freely decide their own destiny,

THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

RESOLVES:

1. To reiterate its confidence in the Secretary General of the Organization of American States and its gratitude for the way in which he has been carrying out the missions that the Council of the Organization of American States and the Tenth Meeting of Consultation entrusted to him.

2. To appoint an *ad hoc* committee made up of representatives of Brazil, El Salvador, and the United States of America,³ which will act on behalf of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation for the following purposes:

² Adopted in plenary session on June 2.

³ Ambassador Ilmar Penna Marinho (Brazil), Ambassador Ramón de Clairmont Dueñas (El Salvador), and Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker (United States of America) were designated by their respective governments to serve on the *ad hoc* committee. [Footnote in original.]

a. To continue the task, that was begun by the Special Committee and is now being carried out by the Secretary General, of providing good offices to all the parties for the purpose of achieving the establishment of a climate of peace and reconciliation that will permit the functioning of democratic institutions in the Dominican Republic and its economic and social recovery;

b. To provide the Inter-American Force, through its commander and on behalf of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation under whose authority it functions, with the directives necessary for the effective accomplishment of that Force's sole purpose, as defined in paragraph 2 of the resolution⁴ adopted by this Meeting on May 6, 1965; and

c. To keep the Tenth Meeting of Consultation duly informed of its activities and the results thereof.

President Notes 20th Anniversary of United Nations

*Statement by President Johnson*¹

This month of June marks an historic anniversary in the affairs of man.

Twenty years ago, while war still raged in the world, the nations of earth assembled at San Francisco to sign the charter of hope that brought into being the United Nations.

Men were mindful then that in these times humankind must choose between cooperation or catastrophe. At San Francisco there was brought into being a great instrumentality for cooperation—and we can believe today that the cooperation engendered by the United Nations has helped to avert catastrophe in this century.

Today we have to work not on the things that divide but on the things that unite nations in the bonds of common interest.

On June 24, 25, and 26 the General Assembly of the United Nations will meet for a commemorative session in San Francisco. It is my hope at this time to be in San Francisco and to address the delegates during the session there.

⁴ For text, see BULLETIN of May 31, 1965, p. 862.

¹ Read at a news conference at the White House on June 1 (White House press release).

United States Delegations to International Conferences

International Labor Conference

The Department of State announced on May 27 (press release 127) that the United States would be represented by the following tripartite delegation at the 49th session of the International Labor Conference at Geneva, Switzerland, June 2-24:

REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegates

George L-P Weaver, *chairman*, Assistant Secretary of Labor for International Affairs
George P. Delaney, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

Alternate Delegate

John F. Skillman, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Commerce

Congressional Advisers

William H. Ayres, House of Representatives
Adam Clayton Powell, House of Representatives

Alternate Congressional Advisers

Robert P. Griffin, House of Representatives
James Roosevelt, House of Representatives

Advisers

Herbert W. Baker, Labor Attaché, American Embassy, Rio de Janeiro
George H. Goss, Assistant to the Director, Food for Peace, Executive Office of the President
Roger W. Grant, Chief, Division of International Cooperation, Department of Labor
Howard L. Hill, Economic Research Service, Department of Agriculture
Mrs. Mary Dublin Keyserling, Director, Women's Bureau, Department of Labor
John E. Lawyer, Director, Office of International Affairs, Department of Labor
Irvin S. Lippe, Labor Attaché, U.S. Mission, Geneva
Edward B. Persons, Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State
Howard T. Robinson, Labor Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State

Theodore Sellin, *secretary of delegation*, Office of International Conferences, Department of State
William N. Steen, African Area Specialist, Department of Labor

REPRESENTING THE EMPLOYERS OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegate

Richard Wagner, Director and Past President, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Washington, D.C., and Consultant, Champlin Petroleum Co., Barrington, Ill.

Advisers

Richard J. Anton, Manager, Business Education Service, Management Development and Employee Relations Services, General Electric Co., New York, N.Y.
Richard P. Doherty, President, Television-Radio Management Corp., Washington, D.C.
Frank J. Fogarty, Executive Vice President, Meredith Broadcasting Co., Omaha, Nebr.
Harry J. Lambeth, Attorney, Labor Relations Department, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Washington, D.C.
Edwin P. Neilan, Chairman of the Board, Bank of Delaware, Wilmington, Del.
Robert W. Norris, Director of Corporate Relations, Philip Morris, Inc., New York, N.Y.

REPRESENTING THE WORKERS OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegate

Rudolph Faupl, International Representative, International Association of Machinists, Washington, D.C.

Advisers

George M. Harrison, Chief Executive Officer, Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, Cincinnati, Ohio
Edward J. Hickey, Jr., Attorney, Mulholland, Hickey & Lyman, Washington, D.C.
John J. McCartin, Assistant General President, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industries of the United States and Canada, Washington, D.C.
Ralph Reiser, President, Glass and Ceramic Workers of North America, Columbus, Ohio
Bert Seidman, European Economic Representative, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, Geneva, Switzerland
Miles C. Stanley, President, West Virginia Labor Federation, East Charleston, W.Va.

United States and Belgium Sign Income Tax Protocol

Press release 122 dated May 21

On May 21, 1965, American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim John M. McSweeney and Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Paul-Henri Spaak signed at Brussels a protocol modifying and supplementing the convention of October 28, 1948, between the United States and Belgium for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, as amended by supplementary conventions of September 9, 1952, and August 22, 1957.¹

The supplementary protocol has as its primary purpose the adjustment of the 1948 convention, as amended, to the provisions of the new Belgian income tax law of November 20, 1962. The convention as thus modified will continue to follow in general the pattern of existing income tax conventions between the United States and numerous other countries.

Article I of the supplementary protocol contains the substantive provisions in eight numbered paragraphs. Article II contains the procedural provisions.

Article I(1)(b) of the 1948 convention specifies the Belgian taxes to which the convention relates. That subparagraph is amended by article I(1) of the supplementary protocol.

Article II (1)(a) of the 1948 convention defines the term "United States." The words "the Territories of Alaska and of Hawaii" are deleted by Article I (2) of the supplementary protocol.

Article VIII (2) of the 1948 convention, as amended by article I(b) of the 1952 sup-

plementary convention, relates to Belgian tax on dividends. That paragraph is amended by article I (3) of the supplementary protocol so that, subject to certain conditions, the rate of Belgian tax on dividends derived from Belgian sources by a resident, corporation, or other entity of the United States not having a permanent establishment within Belgium shall not exceed 15 percent of the amount actually distributed. In certain cases, as prescribed, the Belgian tax on such dividends shall not exceed 15 percent of the taxable amount of such dividends determined in accordance with Belgian law in force on the date of signature of the protocol. The term "dividends" is defined as including income from invested capital taxable as such to members of Belgian companies other than joint stock companies.

Article I (4) of the supplementary protocol inserts a new article VIIIB relating to (1) exemption of dividends and interest paid to a resident, corporation, or other entity of the United States not having a permanent establishment within Belgium from the Belgian additional personal property prepayment provided for in the Belgian law in force on the date of the signature of the protocol, (2) exemption of dividends and interest paid by a Belgian corporation to a person other than a citizen, resident, corporation, or other entity of the United States from United States tax, and (3) exemption of dividends and interest paid by a United States corporation to a person other than a resident, corporation, or other entity of Belgium from Belgian tax unless such income is collected in Belgium.

In article IX (1) of the 1948 convention relating to rentals or royalties from real property or in respect of the operation of mines, quarries, or other natural resources, the sec-

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2833 and 4280.

ond sentence reads: "A resident of Belgium, or a corporation or other juridical person created or organized in Belgium deriving such rentals or royalties from sources within the United States may elect for any taxable year to be subject to United States tax as if such resident, corporation, or other entity were engaged in trade or business within the United States through a permanent establishment therein in such taxable year." By article I (5) of the supplementary protocol, the words "on such income" are inserted in that sentence between the words "tax" and "as."

In article XII of the 1948 convention, as modified by article I (d) of the 1952 supplementary convention, paragraph (2) relates to the allowance by the United States of a deduction from United States income taxes of the "appropriate amount of taxes paid to Belgium, whether paid directly by the taxpayer or by withholding" and paragraph (3) relates to the allowance by Belgium of certain percentage reductions from Belgian taxes with respect to certain items of income derived from sources within and taxed by the United States. Those two paragraphs are replaced by two paragraphs as set forth in article I (6) of the supplementary protocol, the new paragraph (2) dealing with the allowance of a credit against United States income taxes payable by a citizen, resident, or corporation of the United States for taxes paid to Belgium and the new paragraph (3) setting forth in seven subparagraphs provisions with respect to various exemptions from or credits against Belgian taxes.

Article I (7) of the supplementary protocol, in order to clarify an apparent divergence between English and French texts of article XV (1) of the 1948 convention, inserts into the French text certain words relating to the availability of information under the respective taxation laws of the contracting states.

Article XXII of the 1948 convention contains provisions relating to procedure for extending the operation of the convention to "colonies or overseas territories." That article XXII is deleted by article I (8) of the

supplementary protocol.

Article II of the supplementary protocol provides that the protocol shall be ratified and instruments of ratification shall be exchanged, the protocol to enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification and to be applicable according to a formula set forth in subparagraphs with respect to income in various categories.

The supplementary protocol will be submitted to the United States Senate for advice and consent to ratification.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations;
Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on consular relations concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes.

Done at Vienna April 24, 1963.¹

Ratification deposited: Switzerland, May 3, 1965.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Accession deposited: Zambia, March 1, 1965.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.

Ratification deposited: Tunisia, June 3, 1965.

Safety at Sea

Convention on safety of life at sea. Done at London June 10, 1948. Entered into force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495.

Notifications of denunciation received: Finland, May 11, 1965; Federal Republic of Germany, Kuwait, May 25, 1965. Effective May 26, 1966.

International regulations for preventing collisions at sea. Approved by the International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, London, May 17-June 17, 1960. Enters into force September 1, 1965.

Acceptance deposited: Kuwait, May 14, 1965.

Satellite Communications System--Arbitration

Supplementary agreement on arbitration (COM-SAT). Done at Washington June 4, 1965. Enters into force when it has been signed by all signatories to the special agreement of August 20, 1964 (TIAS 5646), and in respect of which that agreement is in force.

Signatures: Overseas Telecommunications Commission of Australia, Régie des Télégraphes et

¹ Not in force.

Téléphones of Belgium, Canadian Overseas Telecommunication Corporation of Canada, Directorate General of Telecommunications of China, Colombia, Generaldirektoratet for Post og Telegrafvesenet of Denmark, France, Deutsche Bundespost of the Federal Republic of Germany, Dewan Telekomunikasi of Indonesia, An Roinn Poist Agus Telegrafa of Ireland, Ministry of Posts of Israel, Società Telespazio of Italy, Kokusai Denshin Denwa Co., Ltd., of Japan, Lebanon, Libya, Netherlands, Administração Geral dos Correios, Telégrafos e Telefones of Portugal, Spain, Kongl. Telestyrelsen of Sweden, Direction Générale des PTT of Switzerland, Her Britannic Majesty's Postmaster General of the United Kingdom, Communications Satellite Corporation of the United States, June 4, 1965.

Trade

Declaration on provisional accession of Iceland to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 5, 1964. Entered into force April 19, 1964; for the United States November 20, 1964. TIAS 5687.

Acceptances deposited: Belgium, March 31, 1965; Central African Republic, February 22, 1965; Ceylon, March 22, 1965; Cyprus, March 3, 1965; Malawi, March 12, 1965; Malaysia, March 23, 1965; Mauritania, March 22, 1965; Nicaragua, February 22, 1965; Niger, March 9, 1965; Trinidad and Tobago, March 2, 1965; United Arab Republic, March 3, 1965.

Ratification deposited: Austria, February 18, 1965. Second procès-verbal extending period of validity of declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 13, 1960, as extended (TIAS 5184, 5266). Done at Geneva October 30, 1964. Entered into force for the United States December 18, 1964. TIAS 5733.

Acceptances deposited: Czechoslovakia, February 18, 1965; Federal Republic of Germany (subject to ratification), February 4, 1965; India, March 24, 1965; Luxembourg, February 9, 1965; Malawi, March 12, 1965; Malaysia, March 9, 1965; Malta, March 1, 1965; Netherlands, February 2, 1965; New Zealand, April 5, 1965; Norway, February 17, 1965; Trinidad and Tobago, January 27, 1965.

Procès-verbal extending declaration on provisional accession of United Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 13, 1962 (TIAS 5309). Done at Geneva October 30, 1964. Entered into force for the United States December 18, 1964. TIAS 5732.

Acceptances deposited: Czechoslovakia, February 18, 1965; Federal Republic of Germany (subject to ratification), February 4, 1965; Greece, February 15, 1965; India, March 24, 1965; Luxembourg, February 9, 1965; Malawi, March 12, 1965; Malta, March 1, 1965; Netherlands, February 2, 1965; New Zealand, April 5, 1965; Norway, February 17, 1965; Trinidad and Tobago, January 27, 1965.

Wheat

Protocol for the extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington March 22 through April 23, 1965.¹

Acceptances deposited: France, May 25, 1965; Ireland, June 2, 1965.

¹ Not in force.

Notification of undertaking to seek acceptance:
Federal Republic of Germany, June 1, 1965.

BILATERAL

Afghanistan

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Kabul May 22, 1965. Entered into force May 22, 1965.

Chad

Agreement relating to investment guarantees. Effected by exchange of notes at Fort-Lamy May 12, 1965. Entered into force May 12, 1965.

Japan

Agreement modifying arrangement concerning trade in cotton textiles of August 27, 1963 (TIAS 5408). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 19, 1965. Entered into force May 19, 1965.

Turkey

Amendment to the agreement of June 10, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3320, 4748), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 3, 1965. Enters into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 31-June 6

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to May 31 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 122 of May 21; 124 of May 24; and 127, 128, and 129 of May 27.

No.	Date	Subject
*132	6/1	Solomon sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs (biographic details).
133	6/2	Rusk: OAS meeting on Dominican Republic.
†134	6/2	Humphrey: U.S. National Council for ICY.
135	6/2	Australia to protect U.S. interests in Cambodia.
*136	6/4	Cleveland: Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (excerpts).
*137	6/4	Morgan sworn in as Ambassador to Ivory Coast (biographic details).
†138	6/6	Ball: "The New Diplomacy."
†139	6/6	Rusk: George Washington University.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

American Principles

America's Commitment to Social Justice and Progress for All (Johnson) 1005
 The Peace of Mankind (Johnson) 986

American Republics

OAS To Help Restore Democratic Order in Dominican Republic (Rusk, text of resolution) 1017
 The Search for a Durable Peace in the Dominican Republic (Johnson) 989

Antarctica. President Johnson Meets With Antarctic Policy Group 1013

Australia. Australia To Protect U.S. Interests in Cambodia 1000

Aviation. U.S. and Mexico Hold Air Talks . 1016

Belgium. United States and Belgium Sign Income Tax Protocol 1020

Cambodia. Australia To Protect U.S. Interests in Cambodia 1000

Communism. Regional Organization: A Planner's Perspective (Rostow) 994

Congress

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy 1016

President Urges Implementation of Florence Agreement (statement, letter to Vice President and Speaker) 1015

Department and Foreign Service. Federal Civilian Employment in Foreign Countries Reduced 1015

Diplomacy. Regional Organization: A Planner's Perspective (Rostow) 994

Dominican Republic

OAS To Help Restore Democratic Order in Dominican Republic (Rusk, text of resolution) 1017

President Comments on Situation in Dominican Republic 992

The Search for a Durable Peace in the Dominican Republic (Johnson) 989

Economic Affairs

Federal Civilian Employment in Foreign Countries Reduced 1015

United States and Belgium Sign Income Tax Protocol 1020

Educational and Cultural Affairs.

President Urges Implementation of Florence Agreement (statement, letter to Vice President and Speaker) 1015

International Organizations and Conferences

International Labor Conference (delegation) 1019
 OAS To Help Restore Democratic Order in Dominican Republic (Rusk, text of resolution) 1017

The Politics of Outer Space (Cleveland) . . 1007

Regional Organization: A Planner's Perspective (Rostow) 994

Labor. International Labor Conference (delegation) 1019

Mexico. U.S. and Mexico Hold Air Talks . . 1016

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO Defense Ministers Meet at Paris (communiqué) 993

Presidential Documents

America's Commitment to Social Justice and Progress for All 1005

The Peace of Mankind 986

President Comments on Situation in Dominican Republic 992

President Johnson Meets With Antarctic Policy Group 1013

President Notes 20th Anniversary of United Nations 1018

President Urges Implementation of Florence Agreement 1015

The Search for a Durable Peace in the Dominican Republic 989

Science

The Politics of Outer Space (Cleveland) . 1007

President Johnson Meets With Antarctic Policy Group 1013

Treaty Information

Current Actions 1021

President Urges Implementation of Florence Agreement (statement, letter to Vice President and Speaker) 1015

United States and Belgium Sign Income Tax Protocol 1020

United Nations

The Politics of Outer Space (Cleveland) . . 1007

President Notes 20th Anniversary of United Nations 1018

Viet-Nam. A Perspective on U.S. Policy in Viet-Nam (William P. Bundy) 1001

Name Index

Bundy, William P 1001
 Cleveland, Harlan 1007
 Johnson, President 986, 989, 992, 1005, 1013, 1015, 1018
 Rostow, W. W 994
 Rusk, Secretary 1017

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Foreign Relations of the United States 1943, Volume VI, The American Republics

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Volume VI, The American Republics, recently released by the Department of State, completes the series of annual volumes for the year 1943. It contains documentation on all the American Republics except Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile. Coverage of these four states was included in volume V.

Of particular interest in volume VI are compilations dealing with the wartime diplomacy of the United States vis-a-vis the other American Republics, discussions and agreements respecting staple Latin American commodities and strategic materials, and efforts of the United States to promote the defense of the hemisphere.

Copies of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Volume VI, The American Republics* (publication 7848) may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402, for \$3.25 each.

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THE
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BULLETIN

Vol. LII, No. 1357



June 28, 1965

THE MORALITY OF NATIONS

Address by President Johnson 1026

GUIDELINES OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Address by Secretary Rusk 1030

THE NEW DIPLOMACY

by Under Secretary Ball 1042

NATIONAL POWER AND THE CREATION OF A WORKABLE WORLD COMMUNITY

Remarks by Vice President Humphrey 1048

GEOGRAPHY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Special Article by G. Etzel Pearce 1052

The Morality of Nations

*Address by President Johnson*¹

On this campus dedicated to the glory of God, it is fitting that we meet on this first day of the week. For this is the day kept by Christendom as a day of remembrance, a day of renewal, a day of rededication to the moral values by which we guide our lives.

In our temporal affairs, no less than in the affairs of the spirit, this is a season for remembrance, for renewal, for rededication to the moral values by which men guide the course of their governments on this earth.

On this occasion, then, I come to speak, at this time and at this place, about the morality of nations. For while I believe devotedly in the separation of church and state, I do not believe it is pleasing in the sight of God for men to separate morality from their might.

Your nation is a mighty nation, the might-

¹ Made at commencement exercises at Catholic University, Washington, D.C., on June 6 (White House press release; as-delivered text).

iest in all the millenniums of man. But let none who would measure that might—or test it—be deceived, and let us never deceive ourselves.

The strength of our society does not rest in the silos of our missiles nor lie in the vaults of our wealth, for neither arms nor silver are gods before which we kneel. The might of America lies in the morality of our purposes and their support by the will of our people of the United States.

It was Jefferson who said that “Our interests . . . will ever be found inseparable from our moral duties.” That standard guides us still. For America’s only interests in the world today are those we regard as inseparable from our moral duties to mankind.

This is the truth—the abiding truth—about your land, America. Yet all through this century, men in other lands have, for reasons of their own, elected to discount

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as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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moral duty as the motivation that moves America.

In its place they have erected and embraced myths of their own creation—the myths of American isolationism and imperialism, the myths of American materialism and militarism.

Refuting Myths About America

I would recall the words once spoken by a man who deeply understood these times, this land, and the truth about them—our late, beloved John Fitzgerald Kennedy. For he once said: “. . . the great enemy of the truth is very often not the lie—deliberate, contrived, and dishonest—but the myth—persistent, persuasive, and unrealistic.”

If we cannot persuade other men to disbelieve their own persistent, persuasive, and unrealistic myths about America's motivations, we, at least, can urge them to seek after the truth—for the truth about America has been chronicled on every continent in this century.

Twenty-one years ago today—on the 6th day of June 1944—it was neither isolationism nor imperialism that sent our sons ashore in Normandy to intervene in the destiny of the continent of Europe, where our culture was cradled.

Nor was it materialism that moved this nation to the works of the postwar world—committing her crops to the care of the hungry, dedicating her dollars and determination to reconstruct the ruined lands of friend and foe, sharing her skills and resources to strengthen the foundations for emerging nations all around the globe.

Neither was it militarism that motivated this nation to dismantle her arms in good faith when victory was won and offer up the atom in good faith for control by all nations. Nor is it militarism now that motivates America to stand her sons by the sons of Europe and Asia and Latin America in keeping a vigil of peace and freedom for all mankind.

What America has done, and what America is doing around the world, draws from deep and flowing springs of moral duty, and

let none underestimate the depth of flow of those wellsprings of American purpose.

On this let me speak forthrightly—to you and to the entire world.

All through history the doubt of men for the morality of their own generation has been exceeded only by their doubt for the morality of the next generation. As long ago as ancient Chaldea—when history was just beginning—there was a popular verse, saying:

We are fallen upon evil times,
And the world has waxed very old and wicked,
Politics are very corrupt,
The sons of men are not so righteous
As their parents were.

Whatever some may say, you of this Class of '65 know that words such as these do not describe your America in these times. This is a new time in our land—a time that is young in spirit, a time of renewal, a time of resurgence for those forces which fashion a finer and a fairer society.

The people in their politics are keeping faith with America's ideals as never before. They are doing it in education, in health, in the human environment. That great American commitment to equality for all men—in the sight of the law as in the sight of God—is, at last, being fulfilled. Sons of men—and their daughters, too—are giving of themselves as volunteers for good and noble works in a manner their parents never thought of doing.

So if men elsewhere say they have never met such an America before, they are right—and we are honored and proud. For this is an America morally aware, morally aroused—an America determined to end at home the compromise of its own moral duty which has, for much too long, given credence to those who would doubt us or misrepresent us elsewhere in the world.

Myths, misrepresentations, and misunderstandings are enemies of truth—and enemies of America—but they shall not be masters of either. The truth of America's purposes cannot be veiled.

Sure of its moral purposes—surer of its own moral performance—America shall not

be deterred from doing what must be done to preserve this last peace man shall ever have to win or lose. We have—as our forefathers had—a decent respect for the informed opinions of mankind, but we of this generation also have an abiding commitment to preserve and perpetuate the enduring values of mankind. And we shall keep that commitment.

Cherishing the Right of Free Choice

Our purpose, our policy—our constant and continuing commitment—was set forth just 18 years ago this weekend by the then great Secretary of State, George C. Marshall. In a speech the world will never forget, that great citizen of war and peace said this for the United States: ²

. . . Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be . . . to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.

Well, that is America's purpose now—our only purpose—in the hungry and poor and desperate and chaotic lands to the farthest corners of this earth. In the policies that guide us abroad—as in the principles that govern us at home—we of the United States cherish the right of others to choose for themselves what they shall believe and what their own societies and institutions shall be.

On this right rests all morality among nations, and we intend to guard and defend this right for others as for ourselves.

But the shade of a shield is not enough to cause stable societies to grow and free institutions to flower in integrity. Pope John XXIII reminded us that peace would be only “an empty-sounding word” unless it rested upon, as he put it, “an order founded on truth, built according to justice, vivified and integrated by charity, and put into practice in freedom.”

That is the next imperative of morality among nations—to integrate the system of nations and peoples by charity, not the char-

ity of callous and calculating dole, but the compassionate charity of learning and love.

This, too, has been—and will continue to be—the purpose of the American people: to maintain in our policies toward all nations a spirit of compassion and caring. For we believe as Pope John said:

There is an immense task incumbent on all men of good will, namely the task of restoring the relations of the human family in truth, in justice, in love and in freedom.

And that, finally, is the highest morality of nations—the noblest purpose to which great powers can put their great persuasion: to restoring relations between the human family.

A Call To Reason Together

Our world has been scarred and sundered by war since the beginning of time and man. On every continent men of every color, and every creed, live with memories of wars that are past and the dread of wars yet to come.

Peace is still a stranger—knocking at the door. We of America—and we of all the free world—are ready, as we are always ready, to open that door and invite peace to enter, to dwell in the house of all nations forever.

For on this Sunday morning, as you are here to bear witness, then, I would say to the people—and to the leaders—of the Communist countries, to the Soviet Union, to nations of Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia, we extend to you our invitation: Come, now, let us reason together.

As peace knocks, our door is unlatched. Our table is set. We are ready—and we believe mankind is ready with us.

So we wait only for those of the human family who have barred their doors and closed their windows to pull back your curtains and signify to mankind that you are ready, too, to welcome peace to the table of man.

A great American President—Franklin Delano Roosevelt—once said: “The most serious threat to our institutions comes from

² BULLETIN of June 15, 1947, p. 1159.

those who refuse to face the need for change.”

Today, in both the open world of freedom and in the curtained world of communism, men and their families are enjoying the comfort and contentment of a life none have ever known before. There is still discontent, but there is less despair. There is still need, but the wants are not so mean. There is still futility today, but there is much more faith for tomorrow.

The most serious threat—the only threat—to this improving condition of all peoples lies with those who refuse to face the need for change and who refuse to face the need for renouncing war in all of its ugly guises. The will of the world—the great and growing moral force of mankind—presses for that renunciation. For men know today, as they have not been able to know before, that war serves no necessary end of any nation anywhere on earth.

A Time To “Take a Walk Toward Peace”

Only a few days ago an American stepped out into the void of space and walked his way from the coast of the Pacific to the coast of the Atlantic over this continent. When his walk was complete, he did not want to return to the capsule from which he had emerged. And, in many ways, this epitomizes our age. The peoples of earth—in lands that are old and young—are today enjoying experiences that man has never known before, and they will not willingly return to the old world of war from which they have finally emerged.

On this campus, then—on this day of peace and promise—I would offer one message to men everywhere and to their leaders in every nation:

We of the United States welcome the gains and the progress that all people have realized since the brutal and bitter years of war and devastation and exploitation.

We are grateful for the progress that we ourselves have achieved. We are pleased and we are determined to press forward, not for our gain and our greatness alone but rather

for the gain and the good of all mankind everywhere.

But the need of man—the need of these times—is not for arms races or moon races, not for races into space or races to the bottom of the sea. If competition there must be, we are ready and we are willing always to take up the challenges and to commit our country to its tasks. But this is a moment when the opportunity is open and beckoning for men of all nations to come and to take a walk toward peace.

The stranger knocks. Peace seeks admission at all our doors. Let us, then, open our doors and go forth together to walk at each other's side toward peace. For let us never forget, the longest journey begins with a single step.

ANZUS Council Meets at Washington

Press release 148 dated June 10

The Prime Minister of New Zealand, Keith J. Holyoake, and the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Paul M. C. Hasluck, will be passing through the United States in late June after attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in London. It has accordingly been decided to take advantage of their presence in the United States to hold a meeting of the ANZUS Council on June 28 in Washington. Secretary of State Dean Rusk will represent the United States at the meeting.

The most recent of these annual meetings was held on July 17-18, 1964, in Washington.¹ ANZUS Council meetings normally rotate each year among the capitals of the signatory nations, but it was decided to hold the meeting in Washington this year for mutual convenience. The meetings provide the medium for discussion and exchange of views in implementation of the ANZUS pact.

¹ For text of a communique, see BULLETIN of Aug. 3, 1964, p. 146.

Guidelines of U.S. Foreign Policy

*Address by Secretary Rusk*¹

Mr. President, members and guests of George Washington University, members of the graduating class: It is my first duty to express to you very simply my personal gratitude for the compliment you have paid me in inviting me to become a member of the scholarly community of George Washington University. I shall cherish this distinction as an admirer and a neighbor and now as a member of this great university.

Let me say to the graduating class that I am fully aware, as the dean so gently hinted, that I am the last obstacle between you and your degrees. And I shall try to conduct myself as befits that circumstance.

If you were to ask me to tell you about the future, I would not be able to do so. I do not know very much about the future, and I am very weary of those who feel that they do.

If you were to ask me, "For what should I be prepared?" I would have to say simply, "For whatever comes," because we are in a world of breathtaking change.

But I am quite sure that every resource which you have obtained or strengthened here at George Washington University will stand you in good stead as you face the future with hope and confidence.

I think I can say with a certain amount of assurance that the rest of the world is going to walk with you for the rest of your lives. Events will not allow you to forget your stake in the foreign policies of the

United States. For that stake includes survival.

When I was an undergraduate we felt safe in our continental home. And, in fact, during peacetime we *were* reasonably safe, even with the smallest military forces and a relatively passive foreign policy. But those days have passed. Science and technology have wiped out the margins of distance and time which gave us relative security. Today no part of the planet is more than a few minutes away and we cannot be indifferent to what happens anywhere on earth or even in adjacent areas of space.

The conduct of foreign policy therefore is not something that is marginal to your life. It will impress itself upon your home, your community, your job, your future.

And yet the ordinary citizen cannot be an expert in all aspects of a rapidly changing scene. Even those who devote full time to them cannot be truly expert in more than a few parts of the whole. But the ordinary citizen can readily understand the fundamentals of our foreign policy, and shape them and guide them, for they are rooted in our basic commitments as a people. And he can take a thoughtful and responsible interest in the way in which these fundamentals are applied in particular situations.

So I would urge you to try to develop and maintain a broad perspective—both geographically and historically—in which you can think about current problems as they arise.

In making judgments about specific foreign policy issues, the citizen can ask:

¹ Made at commencement exercises at George Washington University, Washington, D.C., on June 6 (press release 139, revised). Secretary Rusk was awarded an honorary degree of Doctor of Laws.

a. What are the facts? For he needs solid information on both current happenings and the relevant background.

b. What are the basic interests of the United States that are involved?

c. What is each of the parties to an international dispute really trying to achieve?

d. What are the courses of action open to the United States—and their probable consequences?

These questions are obviously much easier to ask than to answer. The facts are not always easy to get—especially when they are clouded by dispute. The fundamental interests of the United States in some situations are not crystal clear and may be even in conflict with one another. The real objectives of some parties to a dispute may not be what they claim they are. And the consequences of each course of action open to the United States can never be foreseen with complete certainty.

But there are a number of ideas, drawn both from experience and from analysis of the present scene, which can serve as guidelines, as helpful household hints, in thinking about our foreign relations. I should like to refer to just a few of those this evening.

A Few Caveats

First, a caveat or two:

—We, as a free and sovereign nation, can regulate our internal affairs. Generally speaking, we can make our own decisions by constitutional process on what we as a people will do about our situations here at home. But we have no such capability in international affairs. There we deal with other peoples who also make their own decisions—and we encourage them to do so freely, without external compulsion. We can influence them at times—more in some situations than in others. But we are not omnipotent. We have neither the authority nor the power—and, I hope, not the desire—to regulate the affairs of the rest of the world. And so, if there are any among you who think there are any nations, large or small, far or near, who simply salute and click

their heels when they hear us speak, forget it. The world is not like that.

—Let us remind ourselves that the world looks different when seen from central Africa or south Asia than when seen from Washington or New York or San Francisco. It tends to look different to a small or weak nation than to us, with our political stability and unmatched economic and military strength.

—We have to deal with societies and individuals who have their own sensitivities, their own preoccupations, their own ambitions. We cannot expect all members of a diversified family of states to develop just as we might like to see them develop. For diversity means that they are free to develop in their own way. We sometimes see what we might think are some strange results—but the alternative is the well-known monolith, the dictatorial world order opposed by all people who love freedom.

—Our foreign policy must work with many unknowns. We ourselves have had our political upsets as well as our close elections, which must have disturbed the calculations of interested foreign observers. In an average year there are 30 or 40 changes of government in the world—and not all of them through orderly processes—and many of these will, you may be sure, run contrary to our own expectations or perhaps even hopes. Science and technology continue to pour out new surprises. We can never surely foresee the future. For 3 billion other unpredictable people in some 120 other nations are helping to shape that future.

—No one problem in foreign policy can be completely separated from all the other problems. Each interlocks with the rest. And so we are constantly trying to find how to take hold of a manageable part in order to resolve at least a portion of the problem, where the whole is too large to grasp.

—You must surely sense that most decisions in complex questions of foreign policy are “on balance” decisions; the easy ones are made by junior officers at home and abroad.

—Few important actions in difficult situations command universal approval in the free world or even at home. But many actions that we have taken have had much wider support from other nations than one would suppose from listening to critics who wring their hands over “world opinion.” “World opinion” needs examination. When someone asserts that “world opinion” is against what we are doing in Viet-Nam, I wonder by what alchemy he excludes the majority of nations, which, in one way or another, have indicated their support, and particularly those nations who sense that their own national survival depends upon the ability of a small country to live unmolested by its neighbors.

Most of these caveats grow out of the fact that the world is turbulent and ever changing. More accurate information and second thoughts often clarify what seemed perplexing at first. But if, when all is said and done, you as an observer sometimes remain a little unclear and you may feel that you are a little confused—take heart, because you may merely be in closer touch with reality than you realize.

Some Fundamental Principles

Let me turn to certain other more positive points which the intelligent citizen will keep in mind:

—Peace, in the world as it is, must be protected—if necessary by force. It is not maintained by declarations of good intent.

—Aggression feeds on success. The appeasement of powerful aggressors leads either to surrender or to a larger war. The least costly time to stop aggressions is in their early stages—and preferably before they begin. Because free peoples ignored these elementary points a generation ago, the world suffered the disaster of a great war. The penalty for ignoring them now could be catastrophe.

—The surreptitious infiltration of arms and trained men across frontiers is no less an aggression because it proceeds gradually over a period of time. The infiltration from North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam is as

much of an aggression as was the overt Communist march into the Republic of Korea.

—In the Communist lexicon “peaceful co-existence” means perhaps the avoidance of armed conflicts which the Communists cannot win. The Soviet leaders themselves endorse in principle what the Communists, in their upside-down language, call “wars of national liberation.” The Communists themselves have proclaimed the war in South Viet-Nam to be a critical test of that technique. General [Vo Nguyen] Giap, head of the North Vietnamese armed forces, has asserted that if this technique succeeds in South Viet-Nam, it can succeed anywhere in the world. And therefore I think we are understood when we say that all small nations have a vital stake in the defeat of this aggression.

—Nothing in international law or morality confers on an aggressor immunity against reprisal. There can be no privileged sanctuary if we are to organize a decent world order.

—International agreements are made to be kept. *Pacta sunt servanda*—unless the world is to succumb to the law of the jungle. Right does not lie part way between those who break the law and those who are trying to enforce it, between the robber and the policeman.

—We ourselves have no desire to be, and cannot be, gendarmes for the entire world. But we do know that our security is bound up with the security of other free societies. We have very great economic and military strength, which should inspire us with a deep sense of responsibility. Much as we should like to do so, we cannot always escape involvement in disputes between nations within the free world. For the parties to such disputes seek our support and sometimes ask for our good offices. Local disputes divert energies and resources which should be devoted to constructive tasks. And, unless settled, local disputes may lead to small wars and thence to bigger ones. And so we are often obliged to intervene in quarrels in which we have no direct interest—except that they be settled—and in the process find

ourselves the object of grumbling by both sides in the dispute.

—I should like to remind you of something that often escapes attention. That is that foreign policy is not concerned alone, or even primarily, with crises. It is concerned much more with building a world in which crises are less likely to occur, a world that is peaceful and safe for free societies. This constructive work goes on day and night. It is the hidden part of our diplomacy, but it is a major part of it. It is a process by which men and women are getting on with their daily tasks despite national frontiers, ideological differences, or, in many situations, even war and violence. There is steadily growing what Wilfred Jenks has called "the common law of mankind," as people through their governments and their own private resources order the relations across the national frontiers in the interest of that decent society.

—Diplomacy is often most effective when it is quiet and almost invisible, sometimes dealing with small details that build up to fulfill greater plans.

—Our central goal is the kind of world sketched in the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter. And if you have not read those sections recently, I hope you will again very soon because those articles talk about a world community of independent states, each with its own institutions but cooperating with one another to promote their common interests and banding together to resist aggression, a world increasingly subject to the rule of law, a world of freedom and opportunity for the entire human race. We believe that that is also the goal of a great majority of mankind. This identity of basic purpose gives us friends and allies in many nations which are not formally alined with us—and friends even among the peoples behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains.

—Innovation for its own sake is not necessarily a virtue. The new ideas of today are often old ideas which were discarded yesterday as unsound. Sound policies should be adhered to even when they do not produce quick and dramatic results. Often

the principal requirement for success is persistence. In any event, the United States is so powerful that our conduct must be predictable on the basis of well-understood policies if others around the earth are to find a basis for arranging their own relations with us and others.

—More and more problems lie beyond the effective reach of individual nation states, even one so large and powerful as ours. Larger groupings are needed for effective action—in Europe, in Latin America, in Asia, and in Africa. Effective regional organizations do not conflict with the United Nations, provided they act in harmony with the principles of the charter. Indeed, the charter not only specifically provides for regional arrangements and agencies, but accords to them certain priorities.

—We have vital national interests in the economic and social progress of the developing nations. For a world composed of a few rich and many poor is neither stable nor just. It is not in our power to make all nations rich. But it is in our power to work with them to achieve regular forward momentum. And confidence that the lives of the children will offer more opportunities than were open to their parents is the basis for political and social stability.

—All free nations should understand that power and responsibility go together. Those who seek for more consultation and a larger share in decisions must be prepared to shoulder a fair share of the burden of carrying out the decisions.

—In our dealings with our adversaries we must search unceasingly for common interests. An international agreement does not necessarily mean that one side loses while another gains. The most useful agreements are those through which all the parties gain. We believe that the Soviet Union recognizes a common interest with us, for example, in avoiding a thermonuclear holocaust. And from that should stem various corollary common interests.

—Change is underway within the Communist world, as well as within the free world. Most of the smaller Communist states of Eastern Europe are restoring, more

and more, their historic ties with Western Europe and the United States. They are recovering their individuality and becoming less rigid in their internal policies. And these processes of evolution are visible within the Soviet Union too.

—We must never flag in our quest for workable agreements to reduce armaments, with safeguards to assure compliance. And we must recognize that, even with reliable control and inspection, there are limits beyond which it could be unwise to go in disarming before the critical issues which divide the Communist and the free worlds are settled—such dangerous situations as the division of Berlin and Germany.

—The burdens we carry in protecting and building the strength of the free world are not light. But they are well within our capacity. We cannot afford not to carry them.

—The basic bipartisan foreign policies which we have evolved and which have been pursued over the last 20 years have produced good results for the cause of freedom. Perhaps we erred sometimes by being slow to act. We have not erred when we have stood firm against aggression and when we have assisted other free nations to make economic and social progress.

Personal Commitment to Freedom

If I could conclude on a personal word to each of you—I was very much interested in the point which Mr. Heclo [Hugh Heclo, graduating class speaker] made so eloquently on a matter of commitment. I do hope that you will take away with you from this great university some of the great humane content of the story of man in which the American people played an important part.

I hope that you will not be timid or bored about committing yourself to the simple notion that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. For that is the most powerful and

explosive political force at work in the world today. This should not be surprising, because men simply do not like to be pushed around too much. It is a simple idea which we share with ordinary men and women in every corner of the earth even though they may articulate that notion to themselves in somewhat different terms.

I hope you will not feel that it has become old-fashioned to support the United Nations. Can you somehow recall that that charter was written while we were still engaged in the greatest war in history, when men were thinking long and soberly about the nature of the world in which we wish to live? We sat down and tried to sketch out a decent world order in which we could relieve mankind of the scourge of war.

But to you young men and women, 20 years later, let me say in the greatest sincerity we shall not have a chance to learn the lessons of world war III and try it again. The lessons of world war III are there in that charter, and we must find some way to bring them to life and give them strength and make our personal commitments to them and nourish them and cherish them day in and day out. Because learning lessons from war is finished. We have got to learn ahead of time in order not to let that war occur.

So in these great efforts to build a decent world order, don't look timidly over your shoulder; look out with confidence. Of course there are burdens to bear. Some of you will bear them in uniform, others in other forms of public service, all of us in taxes. There are many ways in which these burdens shall be borne. But whoever thought that there were not burdens to be borne for freedom? And whoever thought that a decent world order could be built without effort?

So that is your prospect. I assure you we are saving some interesting problems for you to solve. But turn your hand to them—and good luck in the process.

The myriad ways in which geographic analysis relates to international affairs are the subject of this article written for the Bulletin by the Geographer of the Department of State. Questions of boundaries, territorial waters, natural resources, military strategy, communications, trade—all are tied to the geographic base which largely determines a nation's role in the world community.

Geography and Foreign Affairs

by G. Etzel Percy

Geography—the science stressing adjustment to the natural environment—is a study of the basic inventory from which all states essentially derive their sustenance. Assets may include tons of exploitable minerals and acres of arable soils, or such unmeasurable items as strategic location and stimulating climate.

Artificial boundaries of political and administrative design cutting across the environment—itsself a mosaic of transitions rather than sharp cleavages between one type of landscape and another—are seldom consistent with human desires and aspirations. Herein lies the crux of international tension and strife, graphically portrayed on a map of the world by 278 international boundaries delineating sovereign control by national groups.

Any given state's share of the world's wealth can be no more than a segmented part of greater wealth. A state, like an individual, a family, or a community, seeks to maintain and improve its position. Whether this improvement is intended for the common good or for the propagation of authority in control, the struggle continues unabated as long as there is a national will to be asserted and stirred into action. Too often the complexities of protocol, political philosophies, administrative systems, and

other cultural screens seal people off from the stern realities of the physical environment upon which they must ultimately rely for existence.

In order to support the thesis that a state's geographic base helps or hinders its role in the world community, one must recognize geographic features which cut across international boundaries. It is not enough to study the national scene; there must be an overall appreciation of the great overlaps of interest within the world community, whether economic, cultural, or political.

Sovereign states utilize their physical bases in different ways; so one must take account of the human element and the response to the raw elements of the earth itself. For example, to understand the significance of this relationship one needs only to note how the American Indians reacted to the U. S. countryside as contrasted to the present-day population. A more modern example lies in the possible difference of a state's use of resources under a dictatorship as contrasted to that with a democratic form of government. Even the ownership of land and its resources, which we take for granted, ranges from complete control by the individual to state domination with no individual rights.

A farmer in France, for example, may own land for agricultural purposes, but must forgo to the government any mineral rights.

Boundary Problems

Boundaries at once become associated with geography at the international level. Seldom are two adjacent countries free of problems on their common boundary; at times tension may be sufficiently high to create crises or armed conflict. The term "border skirmish" is all too frequent in the news of the day. By its very nature any boundary alinement must be directly superimposed upon some geographic feature or global position, as the thalweg of a river (the deepest line of the main navigable channel), the crest of a mountain range, or a line of latitude, or in some arbitrary way it must be associated with the landscape over which it runs.

The United States enjoys excellent relations with its two neighbors—Canada and Mexico—and our boundaries with them are frequently cited as models of international accord. Yet both to the north and south problems do arise, requiring not only skillful statesmanship but an understanding of the terrain and its hydrographical pattern in order to bring about rational negotiations.

In the Pacific Northwest 4 square miles of land, known as Point Roberts, project south of the 49th parallel, which separates the United States from Canada, permitting no land exit from that part of U. S. territory other than through Canada. Despite discontent of a local nature, the unique situation has never occasioned demands by one country on the other.

Along the southern border of the United States a river which continually slashes away at its banks creates problems of a physical nature. The Rio Grande, by altering its course through the semiarid lands of the Pacific Southwest, may suddenly cause U. S. territory to appear on the right bank, or Mexican territory to appear on the

left bank—"our side" of the river. Such a problem was settled by convention between the two countries in 1963, when a small area of 437 acres in the vicinity of El Paso, known as the Chamizal tract, reverted to Mexican sovereignty. It was fairly recognized that the situation was due to the forces of the elements, in this instance a shift in the channel of the Rio Grande.

U. S. policy also takes note of 276 other international boundaries which divide the world land surfaces into sovereign entities. On the millions of official maps of foreign areas published by U. S. mapping agencies it is necessary to represent all boundaries accurately, free from any prejudices in favor of one country over another. Disputed boundaries are normally shown by a dashed line or some other symbol distinguishable from that for a regular international boundary. The boundary between Algeria and Morocco south and west of the oasis city of Figuig lacks adequate documentation to show agreement by both countries, so must be shown in this indefinite fashion. Obviously all pertinent treaties as well as the circumstances of geographic alinement must be taken into full consideration before a firm policy decision is made on a boundary question.

In addition to precise alinements the politicogeographic background of any boundary problems must be understood before guidelines of U. S. policy can be programed. When the Chinese army overran the India-Tibetan boundary in the high Himalaya in 1962, it was advantageous for the Department of State to maintain a manuscript map which showed the day-to-day situation on a topographical map: route accessibility, troop movements, and other changing elements—even meteorological conditions.

Recently an incident involving military action took place close to a boundary in Southeast Asia, requiring examination of maps at a scale of 1:50,000 (1 inch equaling about four-fifths of a mile). The side of the line on which gunfire was employed determined the diplomatic procedure which followed.

Boundary changes also receive serious attention on the part of Departmental officers, whether brought about by award through arbitration, negotiation, or war. At times research may take an odd turn, for the identification of some out-of-the-way stream deep in a jungle landscape—if it should be associated with boundary alignment—could have critical repercussions in more than one world capital.

Territorial Waters

The United States faces the sea along approximately 11,650 miles of coastline. This maritime periphery, important in the past, now assumes even greater significance as a zone of contact with other states. There is international competition for the fish which abound in coastal waters, while more and more resources on and under the seabed prove exploitable.

How close to the shoreline of the United States may a foreign fishing vessel lower its net? Conversely, how far out into the Atlantic or Pacific may U. S. commercial interests extend in a search for oil or mineral globules? In the interests of a fast-developing oceanographic science, where, over the surface of the sea, may survey ships go and be within their legal right? From a security point of view how do coastal waters safeguard our territorial integrity, or conversely, what hazards do they imply? Answers to these problems and an appreciation of their ramifications necessarily penetrate the field of geography.

Configuration of the coastline and location of offshore islands form the setting upon which all limits of jurisdiction among states must be superimposed. Basic premises concerning sovereignty of the sea narrow down to two primary concepts: (1) How far offshore does the sovereignty, or other jurisdictional rights, of a coastal state extend? and (2) What determines the offshore boundaries between jurisdictions of any two neighboring states along the coast?

Much has been said about the breadth of the territorial sea, defined as a zone of

water along a coast over which the coastal state has sovereignty and beyond which lie the high seas, void of any sovereignty. The United States has long upheld a policy of a 3-mile territorial sea in the face of considerable international pressure from states adamantly adhering to claims for a greater breadth—up to 200 miles.

Regardless of international politics, the geographer must step in to provide a means of measuring territorial waters, irrespective of their breadth. A baseline must be established from which measurements can be accurately and fairly projected. Such a baseline, seemingly simple in that it merely needs to follow the shore, actually requires sufficient flexibility to allow for such natural features as mouths of rivers, bays, and other indentations of the coast, islands including archipelagoes, and tides which alternately cover and uncover coastal features.

Offshore jurisdictional limits between states must be determined from the same baseline, allotting to each that part of the surface of the sea which lies closer to its land territory than to the land territory of any other state. In some instances such limits must thread in and out among fringing islands or pass through water channels separating states of different sovereignties. No two stretches of coastline are the same, and since the total number of islands in the world exceeds a million, much use must be made of geographic investigation and evaluation in arriving at precise measurements and rendering realistic decisions.

Numerous offshore incidents reflect the intricate jurisdictional situation of the coastal zone. For example, when a fishing boat is warned or seized, the exact location with respect to the nearest land must be taken into account, including the sovereign status of that land. In many instances there are international agreements which regulate activities of one state off the shores of another state. Here, too, the geographical situation is the foundation for the regulation.

Resources and Aid

All aid programs sponsored by the United States are contingent upon the geographical aspects of the recipient. Environmental shortcomings are prone to register acutely in any country's welfare and the potency of its foreign relations. Candidates for aid are obviously the lesser developed countries which, until the present at least, have suffered from handicaps that have kept them from achieving status as ranking powers in the world community. Remote location, mountainous terrain, debilitating climate, and inadequate resources are some of the most evident bases for depressed national stature. In turn, more effective utilization of existing resources, improved distribution patterns, better transportation, attention to population problems, and the building of morale offer remedies which should lead to the best possible use of environmental assets.

Geography is closely tied to the economic problems that are being attacked by the Agency for International Development and other U. S. programs abroad. For example, studies of basic needs and priorities reveal river basin development which can be justified, adjustments in manpower distribution which can ease pressure of population, and new techniques of food production which can raise living standards.

Rewarding work in reclamation has been accomplished in the basin of the Blue Nile in Ethiopia. Similarly, the United States participates in the United Nations-sponsored program to develop the lower basin of the Mekong River in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and South Viet-Nam. Like the Tennessee Valley Authority, but much more grandiose in dimensions, this project is a four-pronged assault on untamed countryside, intended to provide power, irrigation, flood control, and transportation.

Much emphasis has been placed on the role of industrialization in the building of more balanced national economies for the less developed countries. Although few countries possess the prerequisites for complex manufacturing, nearly all can specialize in

some types of industries to make better use of available resources. Particular stress is placed on activating or furthering those industries which satisfy the basic needs of the region itself and on the processing of raw materials found in short supply elsewhere. Steel mills must be located carefully with regard to their economic sustenance, but nearly any state can support plants producing relatively simple but widely used items such as fertilizer, cement, and common household items.

Aerial photography has proved to be an invaluable means of investigating resource potential and optimum land use. Mapping teams of qualified experts may also go into the field to take inventory of a region prior to development and redevelopment plans. Another, and more economical, plan which was put into effect for the Dominican Republic in recent years consisted of searching the existing documentation to produce an area inventory. Under any circumstance, the focus is upon economic advance, which in turn serves as a stimulus to political stability.

Military Problems

Diplomacy as an instrument of statesmanship is closely related to the other instruments of foreign policy. In a world afflicted by cold war, the military power which can be called upon as an instrument to implement policy is especially relevant. Our diplomacy, therefore, must be based on an awareness of both the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military power. Similarly, Pentagon planning must be relevant to our diplomatic policy.

Geography is so interwoven into military problems that a special division of the discipline, military geography, has evolved. Within the past few years more than 1,000 articles on various aspects of the subject have appeared in various professional and technical journals. They cover topics ranging from the effect of terrain types on guerrilla warfare to grand strategy of global dimension. One committee of the Association of American Geographers concerns it-

self with this branch of geography, striving to establish guidelines and provide maximum support for the U.S. defense effort.

Numerous problems of a military nature require geographic solutions. The advancing technology of warfare has extended the horizons of potential armed conflict to encompass greater and greater distances. There is need, for example, for studies related to the trajectories of missiles which would take account of the effects of weather and terrain in the target area. The maneuvering of tanks requires detailed information on the trafficability of soils as well as angle of slope and opportunities on the landscape for camouflage and concealment.

Military operations always involve accessibility, keyed to environmental barriers or distance, or both. When a government decides that military action is to take place, the geographical setting is always critical and may be a deciding factor. Stationing of U. S. fleets demands a precise, carefully planned geographical evaluation which takes into consideration the configuration of coastlines.

The standby position of the 7th Fleet with respect to the Tonkin Gulf incident in early August 1964 illustrates the U. S. naval technique in the Western Pacific. From the standpoint of the United States the geographic location of South Viet-Nam is particularly difficult with regard to accessibility and distance. Saigon is on the exact opposite side of the globe from the eastern United States (Hartford, Conn.); it takes an extremely long supply line to support any military activities there. It is perhaps surprising to note that on a direct line from San Francisco to Saigon the northern part of the Japanese Islands—thought to be quite distant from conterminous United States—is but little over one-half the total distance.

Transportation and Communications

Progress in the mid-20th century is in part measured by new and rapid means of travel and communications. Air transport speeds roughly figured at 2 hours for each

Dr. Pearcy's article is one of a series being written especially for the Bulletin by officers of the Department and the Foreign Service. Officers who may be interested in submitting original bylined articles are invited to call the editor of the Bulletin, Mrs. Madeline Patton, Office of Media Services, extension 5506, room 5536.

thousand miles have stepped up the tempo of foreign affairs. It is possible to carry on negotiations anywhere in the world, not only without loss of more than minutes for the transmission of words but with only hours required for the movement of individuals from continent to continent. A government official from Washington may go to Europe on a diplomatic mission and be back in his office in a day or two.

Diplomatic action by its nature relates to places and to the interrelation among them. Geographical implications of this concept assume proportions of great complexity; all of the 125 independent countries of the world have occasion or may have occasion, in theory at least, to be in contact one with another. A communications system to take care of this composite need would require 15,500 channels of transmission. The so-called "hot line" from Washington to Moscow illustrates a device which transcends geographic barriers that normally have obstructed lines of communication. Passenger travel at supersonic speeds and satellite communication loom as innovations which may still further contract the distances among world centers.

Fast transportation often receives credit for knitting the world community closely together. If followed through, results of this process would be registered in improved international cooperation and greater sympathy and understanding among peoples of varying nationalities. Such are the goals of many existing international organizations, including the United Nations and the Organization of American States, in each of which the United States participates as a strong member.

Unfortunately, however, tension and ill

will also tend to build up more readily with increasing ease of transportation, for discord as well as accord travels rapidly. Conflicting interests become apparent as communications bring nations closer together. Thus it is important to take advantage of the world's effective transportation net to promote international cooperation and good will and to screen out discordant notes.

Trade Policies

The foreign trade pattern of the United States necessarily involves the economic potential of world regions. Despite strong political inclinations in favor of, or restrictions against, trading with any given country, the geographic distribution and accessibility of resources inevitably control the broad pattern of world trade. The briefest glance at our export and import statistics reveals names of countries of origin and destination in virtually every corner of the free world. Even a limited amount of trade is carried on with areas within the Communist realm.

The actual channels of trade are relatively flexible, for the origin and destination of U. S. imports and exports depend upon the wealth and prospects of various countries as weighed against domestic production and needs. Situations frequently change, as mineral deposits become depleted, governmental sanctions override economic considerations, or the tastes and prevailing sentiments of the American public shift. Too, in a day of intricate manufacturing processes and international financing structures, foreign trade is not a simple exchange of raw materials for manufactured goods. Perhaps contrary to popular opinion, U. S. trade with developed countries generally outstrips that with less developed countries. For example, our trade with Belgium exceeds that with all of the countries of Central America combined.

Elaborate lists of strategic materials have been compiled to indicate which ones are critical to our security. Tin from Malaysia and Bolivia and nickel from Canada illus-

trate materials which must be stockpiled to insure a supply in time of emergency. Beyond this type of import comes a myriad of items for which there has been created a huge American demand, usually reflecting some resource or product not found in abundance in the United States. For example, large shipments of coffee from Brazil and other producers have come to be regarded as routine trade.

Exports also run a gamut of items pouring out of American factories into international marketing channels. Except for the ban on strategic materials to unfriendly countries, there are but few restrictions on what goes out of the country. Particularly critical at this time is the weak U. S. balance-of-payments situation, placing emphasis upon a lively export trade. To fit these and other overall trade objectives into a world so diverse requires cognizance of the distribution of natural resources; the quality and quantity of labor, markets, and capital; and the accessibility of lines of transportation.

The petroleum industry offers a serious problem in trade policy, principally because the world's greatest reserves happen to be in an area both remote from the United States and critical on the diplomatic agenda. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and other of the oil-rich Middle East countries lie close to the southern border of the Soviet Union. The latter country has great reserves of its own; so it does not need to put this item on its list of critical imports. On the other hand, Western Europe, a highly industrial region, is lacking in oil to turn its wheels. Thus, Middle East oil finds a ready market in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and other countries of the region—a circumstance which the U. S. Government wishes to remain unchanged. New sources of oil recently discovered in North Africa, particularly in Libya and Algeria, have given Western Europe a broader base of supply.

The relations of one country with another usually include some issues focusing on trade. In fact, trade may often be the key-

stone to those relations, for diplomatic rapport can stand or fall with the economic barometer.

The Leavening Process—A Summary

Geographic analysis, then, is a definite dimension of international affairs, notably in such matters as boundary questions, military strategy, transportation, and trade. And its application can serve to improve the welfare of individual countries by stimulating the discovery of new resources and putting in balance the delicate relationship between the physical environment and the society superimposed upon it.

Today the international implications of scientific development are leading geographers into new fields of research. The adventures of men in space call upon geographers, as well as experts in the other sciences, to help define the extent of the voids of the universe as they apply to the earth. A common question—not yet answered—has to do with the height above the earth at which space starts, a problem loaded with technical ramifications.

Delving, finally, into the electronic possibilities, it may not be too early to visualize a number of startling innovations in the wings of our federal buildings: map libraries with no maps, cartographic laboratories with no draftsmen, and geographical analysis by pushbutton. Such prospects match those in other fields and promise to aid the statesman in his efforts to cope with the complexities of international relationships.

Letters of Credence

The newly appointed Ambassador of Iran, Khosro Khosrovani, presented his credentials to President Johnson on June 7.

Mission of U.S. Troops in Viet-Nam Defined

*White House Statement*¹

There has been no change in the mission of U.S. ground combat units in Viet-Nam in recent days or weeks. The President has issued no order of any kind in this regard to General [William C.] Westmoreland recently or at any other time. The primary mission of these troops is to secure and safeguard important military installations like the air base at Da Nang. They have the associated mission of active patrolling and securing action in and near the areas thus safeguarded.

If help is requested by appropriate Vietnamese commanders, General Westmoreland also has authority within the assigned mission to employ these troops in support of Vietnamese forces faced with aggressive attack when other effective reserves are not available and when, in his judgment, the general military situation urgently requires it. If General Westmoreland did not have this discretionary authority, a situation could easily arise in which heavy loss of life might occur and great advantage might be won by the Viet Cong because of delays in communications.

This discretionary authority does not change the primary mission of U.S. troops in South Viet-Nam, which has been approved by the President on the advice and recommendation of responsible authorities.

However, I would emphasize that any such change of primary mission would obviously be a matter for decision in Washington.

¹ Read to news correspondents on June 9 by George E. Reedy, Press Secretary to the President.

The New Diplomacy

by Under Secretary Ball¹

The commencement address is a venerable ritual of distinguished lineage that in an earlier and more erudite age was declaimed in Latin. Its survival to the present day—when it is frequently delivered in slovenly English—rests on two unspoken postulates.

The first is that graduation marks the departure of the graduate from cloistered academic life to the hard realities of the outside world.

The second postulate is that anyone with gray hair who is listed in *Who's Who* or the *Directory of Directors* can, at such a cataclysmic time and out of the distillation of a presumptively rich experience, provide the graduate with a kind of Mothersill's remedy that will ward off seasickness on the perilous voyage he is undertaking.

I respect our American traditions—in fact I sometimes think we don't have enough of them—and I am not making the subversive suggestion that we do away with commencement addresses. But I can't help noting that the two postulates on which their continuance is based may in this mid-20th century be getting a little shaky if not downright obsolete.

In the first place a commencement ceremony such as this does not mean that all of you are leaping from academic life into the hard, cold world. Many of you who are this

¹ Address made at commencement exercises at Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, on June 6 (press release 138).

day completing your undergraduate studies are merely passing from one phase of academic life to another—from the arts to graduate study. And you who are completing your graduate studies may simply be moving from learning to teaching—two occupations that hopefully will not, in your case, prove mutually exclusive.

Nor is it necessarily true that my generation can make many useful suggestions to yours at this critical juncture in world history. The proposition that age is the equivalent of wisdom was invented by the old, and—Ben Franklin to the contrary—individuals do not necessarily learn from experience. In all too many cases, experience serves merely to harden preexisting prejudices—or it may even teach the wrong lessons.

And since a solemn ceremony such as this should be a moment of truth, I confess a certain effrontery in my speaking to you at all today. For, after all, my generation has not conducted the affairs of the world with such wisdom and foresight that we can afford to be very smug about it—though, in all candor, I doubt that your generation will do much better.

Critical Changes in Less Than a Generation

Particularly in foreign policy we should be wary of too trusting an acceptance of the lessons of experience. The precedents of the past, if not critically dissected, can prove deceptive guides to the problems of the

present. In the words of Sir Harold Nicolson, "We can learn little from history unless we first realize that she does not, in fact, repeat herself."

Certainly history has not been repeating herself very faithfully in the past two decades. In that period—in fact, within the lifetime of the youngest graduate here today—the world has embarked on new and strange courses.

What are some of the critical changes that have occurred in less than a generation?

First, the world has divided like an amoeba into two opposing systems of ideology and power—one based on free choice, the other on the subservience of the individual to rigid dogma. The affairs of nations around the world are affected by the interaction of those competing forces.

Second, the great empires, the vast colonial systems, have been dismantled—systems that two decades ago held one-third of the human race under the direct control of a handful of metropolitan powers.

Third, more than 50 new states have emerged from the wreckage of these colonial systems. Most of these states were born weak, some prematurely, but all share a common purpose—to improve the living standards of their peoples and to find for themselves a respected place in the society of nations.

Fourth, the United States has become the world's richest and most powerful nation and has assumed the responsibilities that go with preeminent power and wealth—responsibilities for maintaining and protecting the interests and security of free peoples around the globe.

Fifth, man has fashioned weapons of mass destruction from the power of the atom. Today no corner of the world is immune from the dangers of nuclear devastation.

Sixth, the great powers have looked over the brink and not liked what they saw. They have come to recognize that a world war fought with nuclear weapons could well

mean the incineration of a great part of the earth.

Seventh, the nations of Western Europe have set in train a process—still continuing—to put aside the national rivalries that have caused so much disaster in the past in an effort to achieve economic and, hopefully, political unity.

Eighth, the two great power centers of the Communist world, Moscow and Peiping, have clashed in a bitter and vitriolic contest for leadership of the world revolution.

The Revolution in Diplomacy

These events of epic dimensions, crowded into less than two decades—a mere moment in time—have produced massive shifts in the world power balance. They have radically changed the relations between continents and nations. They have profoundly affected the manner in which those relations must be conducted—or, in other words, have revolutionized not merely the practice but the substance of diplomacy.

To understand the thrust and extent of that revolution, to appreciate the limitations and requirements that events have imposed on our diplomacy, I think it may be useful to consider a few specific examples.

Let me briefly compare:

First, the manner in which the great powers of the 19th century dealt with Crete and the problems we now face in dealing with Cyprus.

Second, the practices we followed in dealing with a problem in the Dominican Republic at the turn of the century and the steps we have taken to cope with another problem on that same island within the past few weeks.

Third, the problems we faced in counter-ing aggression in Korea 15 years ago and the problems we are facing in South Viet-Nam today.

Each of these examples shows the increasing complexity of foreign policy in an inter-dependent world, gripped by a cold war and faced with the brooding danger of nuclear

destruction, yet a world in which two-thirds of mankind are making a serious effort to resolve their disputes without armed conflict and with a decent respect for the will and aspirations of the peoples concerned.

International Action in Crete and Cyprus

Crete and Cyprus are both tiny islands. Each is less than one-tenth the size of Ohio; each has a population about the same as Cincinnati; each has deeply involved the conflicting interests of Greece and Turkey; and each has threatened to plunge the world into war.

In the latter part of the 19th century Crete was under the control of the Ottoman Empire but the majority of its population was Greek. In 1896 the Greeks revolted—as they had repeatedly done before—and declared for union with Greece.

The Turkish Government moved to reinforce its garrisons on Crete. Greece sent its fleet to assist the rebels.

In the gathering crisis the great powers of Europe acted promptly and decisively. They sent a fleet to intercept the seaborne Turkish reinforcements while forcing the Greek ships to retire. They landed an army and compelled the insurgents to cease firing by occupying key coastal towns. They forced Turkey—which meanwhile had overwhelmingly defeated the Greek Army in Thessaly—to make peace with Greece on terms favorable to the loser. Finally, after presenting identical notes to Athens and Constantinople, the great powers decreed that Crete was neither to join Greece immediately nor revert to the Sultan's rule.

This settlement was imposed upon the Greek and Turkish populations of the island, as well as on the Greek and Turkish Governments without seeking their consent. It was possible because the great powers of the day were quite ready to use their combined power ruthlessly—without concern for the rights of sovereignty, for the integrity of territory, or for the abstract principle of self-determination.

The environment of international action is, of course, quite different in the mid-20th

century. There is no longer a Concert of Europe; in fact, the two greatest world powers are in opposing camps. Moreover, in the intervening years mankind has established rules and institutions designed to discourage the direct intervention by nations in one another's affairs. All this has been made amply clear during the last year and a half by another crisis on another Mediterranean island—Cyprus.

The conditions in Cyprus bear a striking surface similarity to those in Crete during the last century. In each case peace was threatened by a deep and bitter conflict between the Greek and Turkish populations of the island. And this led, in each case, to the threat of war between Greece and Turkey.

But this time the great powers did not try to keep the peace by sending dreadnoughts. Instead, the peace has been kept by United Nations forces, while representatives of that body, and of the United States and other free-world powers, have searched for a solution that would reflect the will of the peoples and nations concerned.

The dangers have been great—greater even than in the 19th century. A war between Greece and Turkey today would have far-reaching implications. It would threaten the stability of the right flank of our NATO defenses. It could escalate into a larger conflict. And because the Soviet Union has sent armaments to Cyprus, this local quarrel could mean the intrusion of Soviet power into the strategic area of the eastern Mediterranean.

But so far the world has been able to avert war by intensive diplomacy—diplomacy practiced in the Security Council in New York, in the forum of the NATO Council in Paris, and by an intensive series of complicated bilateral dealings with the governments concerned—in which the President of the United States has played a salient role.

The Cyprus problem is not yet finally resolved. But today armed forces with blue berets maintain peace on the troubled island—the forces of a United Nations army

under United Nations command composed of elements drawn from countries that have no direct interest in the conflict.

Such are the methods of diplomacy in the 20th century in a period of cold war.

Diplomacy in Two Dominican Crises

If the difference between the old and new diplomacy has been demonstrated on two islands in the Mediterranean, it has also been shown in the different handling of two crises on an island nearer home.

In 1916 the Dominican Republic was the scene of almost total civil disorder. The country had no effective government. The island was approaching anarchy. Twelve years earlier the United States had taken over control of the customs houses on the island. In 1916 it took complete control of the island's affairs. Without a word to any other nation, we landed Marines and established "The Military Government of the United States in Santo Domingo" under our Navy Department. We took over the education, transportation, financial, and other governmental functions, including the reorganization of the army and police.

And we stayed there for 8 years.

Six weeks ago chaos again threatened Santo Domingo.² American troops were once more disembarked on that troubled island. But that is where the resemblance ends. For this was not an exercise of dollar diplomacy, nor the classical kind of great-power intervention—as the record of events makes crystal clear.

For ever since the advent of the good-neighbor policy the United States and other American Republics have striven to evolve an inter-American system through which the nations of the hemisphere can work together on the common tasks of peace.

And so—as soon as rebellion broke out in the Dominican Republic—our Government consulted with the governments of other American states about the developing crisis. Even before the climactic events of April 28 we had discussed this problem in the

² For background, see BULLETIN of June 21, 1965, pp. 989, 992, and 1017.

Peace Committee of the Organization of American States and bilaterally with 14 member states of the OAS.

During the first days of the rebellion our Embassy in Santo Domingo was engaged in evacuating citizens of the United States and of other foreign countries who were seeking to leave the island.

On the afternoon of April 28 undisciplined forces invaded the hotel where evacuees were assembled and began firing sub-machineguns. Our Embassy, which had only the usual handful of Marine Guards, cabled a request that troops be immediately put ashore to protect the lives of more than 400 men, women, and children who were under fire.

President Johnson responded to this call for help in the only way possible. But when he gave the order to disembark an emergency force of Marines, he simultaneously directed that the machinery be set in motion to call the OAS into emergency session.

Representatives of that body met within a matter of hours. The Secretary General of the OAS was promptly dispatched to the Dominican Republic to arrange a cease-fire. Two days later a commission was sent to find the facts.

We turned over our responsibilities to the OAS as soon as that organization was able to assume them.

Today peace is kept in Santo Domingo by an Inter-American Force that includes not merely all United States troops on the island but components from five countries. The force is commanded by a Brazilian general, who takes his instructions directly from the Organization of American States. A commission of the OAS is in Santo Domingo working with the Secretary General in an effort to assist the Dominican people to establish a government of their own choosing.

In the diplomatic environment of 1916 the United States intervened by force in the Dominican Republic to protect its financial interests and to prevent other powers from gaining a foothold in that beleaguered

island. Today the American states together are keeping the peace in the Dominican Republic both to protect human life and to carry out the fundamental decision of the American states that the extension of Marxist-Leninist power into this hemisphere is incompatible with the inter-American system.

What is involved in our action today—unlike the earlier incident a half century ago—is not a unilateral effort to govern the Dominican people but a collective effort of the American states to preserve for the Dominican people their freedom—a freedom they would have lost irrevocably if the country had fallen under the control of that hard core of disciplined Communists who were seeking to capture the rebellion.

Communist Tactics in Korea and Viet-Nam

The Dominican problem is by no means solved. But the machinery of the inter-American system has been brought to bear on its solution. And meanwhile we and the other American states are pushing forward with the enormous task of economic reconstruction that should do away with much of the hardship and injustice that contributed to the recent crisis.

That crisis was greatly complicated by the active efforts of trained Communists to exploit a situation of anarchy and confusion. Half the world away, in Southeast Asia, we face another problem—again involving Communist ambitions—that, in its larger implications, is far more dangerous.

The significance of the struggle in Southeast Asia is not merely that it represents a systematic effort to extend Communist power but that it illustrates the Communist employment of a type of warfare which poses a special challenge to the free world—and which, if not effectively dealt with, will provide a pattern for Communist conquest in other areas.

The Communist effort in South Viet-Nam has the same purpose as the Communist effort in Korea a decade and a half ago—to impose a Communist regime on a free people. In both cases a country had been split in

two. In both cases the Communist half was unprepared to let its neighbors alone.

But while the intent of the Communists in both Korea and Viet-Nam was the same, the tactical method chosen to achieve that objective was different.

In Korea the Communists moved in a traditional manner by advancing their troops into the non-Communist area. But the repulse and frustration of this Communist drive in Korea and elsewhere has now led the Communists to give up this classical type of invasion for a more insidious tactic which is known in their dialectic as the “war of national liberation.” Such a war depends not on the invasion of armies in fixed formations but on the military tactics of stealth, infiltration, and guerrilla attack and on the political tactics of deception and confusion.

What the regime in North Viet-Nam has sought by its tactics in the South is to deceive the world as to its methods and purposes. It has tried to create the impression that the struggle in South Viet-Nam is merely an indigenous revolt and that North Viet-Nam is simply providing sympathy and encouragement to an anticolonialist conflict.

The proof is clearly to the contrary. The war against South Viet-Nam was planned by the Hanoi regime before the ink was dry on the 1954 Geneva agreements. It was begun on signal from the North and is carried on under the day-to-day direction of Hanoi.

From 1959 through 1964 we know that over 20,000 and probably more than 39,000 have been secretly sent by the Hanoi regime into South Viet-Nam. Prior to 1963 they were, for the most part, native South Vietnamese whom the Communists sent north at the time of the 1954 partition. In the last 2 years, however, the supply of South Vietnamese youth has largely dried up and the Hanoi regime has become bolder. The forces infiltrated since 1963 have consisted, therefore, largely of Vietnamese from the North who have never before seen the soil of South Viet-Nam.

The basic tactic of the Viet Cong is to intimidate the population, to break their will to resist, and to undermine existing local institutions of government. During the past few years the Viet Cong have assassinated and kidnaped literally thousands of local officials.

For over 10 years the Government and the people of South Viet-Nam, in the exercise of their inherent right of self-defense, have fought back against these efforts to extend Communist power south across the 17th parallel. We have assisted them with equipment and training not for any purposes of self-aggrandizement—we seek no military bases, no territory, no favored position. We have acted out of a sense of world responsibility, out of respect for our commitments and the need to protect our own security and that of all free peoples. We see the two today as inseparably related. For what we do in South Viet-Nam has a profound meaning in every other outpost of freedom around the world.

Meeting Shifting Problems of a World in Flux

The contrast between the crises in Crete and Cyprus, between the two incidents in the Dominican Republic, and between the two types of warfare in Korea and Viet-Nam—these are examples of the extent to which the tactics and methods of both diplomacy and defense must be continually revised to deal effectively with the shifting problems of a world in flux.

It is not easy to keep pace with the changing requirements of such a world. Yet if our society is to operate effectively, it is almost a banality to say that we must keep continually aware both of its progress and its problems.

I have, therefore, noted with interest that some of the same people who a year ago were expressing alarm at the apathy of college students toward the major issues of the day have recently been decrying the intensity of interest in those same issues which students have shown during the past year. The placards and the protests, the teach-ins

and the demonstrations have signalized concern about unquestionably great problems—a concern I devoutly believe is a sign of health and vigor.

One can quarrel, of course, with some of the more flamboyant aspects of this expression of interest. And I would urge at least some of you to devote more attention to analysis than to publicity. For the problems facing the United States in all corners of the world are not simple, and they are not likely to become so. And so it behooves all of us—whether in Government, in the academic world, or in the press—to avoid by eternal vigilance that most dangerous disease which may be called “infectious omniscience.” It is a peculiarly insidious and physiologically baffling malady in which the heart takes over the functions of the brain.

Tough-mindedness is particularly important in considering problems such as Viet-Nam and the Dominican Republic, where the situation contains elements of ambiguity.

There are, for example, no doubt some in South Viet-Nam who seek the violent overthrow of their country's government—but are not Communists. Yet this does not make the war merely an indigenous revolt, as the Communists would have us believe. For those who command and direct it from Hanoi have but one objective—to impose their Communist regime on South Viet-Nam.

In the Dominican Republic the bulk of the rebels are not Communists. But it is nonetheless clear that a disciplined group of hard-core Communists were seeking to capture the rebellion and establish their system on that Caribbean island.

The Great Forces Behind Every Detail

These, then, are difficult problems—difficult of analysis, difficult of solution. I do not ask that, in approaching them, you indulge a special presumption in favor of governmental wisdom—although I would hope you would avoid the temptation to assume that your Government is necessarily wrong.

What is essential is that you apply the critical discipline you have learned in your student years to the intricate—and often intractable—problems faced by your country at the height of world power.

More than half a century ago Justice Holmes observed on another ceremonial occasion that a man could best fulfill his responsibilities to himself and his country by seeing as far as he may and feeling the great forces that are behind every detail.

I can give you no better advice than this.

National Power and the Creation of a Workable World Community

*Remarks by Vice President Humphrey*¹

I just want to thank you on behalf of the President and myself for what you are doing and for being here with us today.

And I should like to leave with you just one thought. It is perhaps a simple thought, but it is central to our whole approach to this mutual enterprise we call International Cooperation Year. The point is this: In the long run, our real and lasting influence in this world will depend less upon our military capacity than upon our capacity for constructive enterprise.

We have had to use our national power directly to support the Vietnamese in defending themselves from clandestine aggression. And we have used our national power directly in the Dominican Republic to avert chaos and reestablish some semblance of order so free decisions can be made by the Dominican people themselves.

In neither case did the United States prefer this course of action.

In Viet-Nam national power was brought to bear because international agreement was violated and because the international ma-

chinery for enforcement of the agreement was inherently incapable of doing its job.

In the Dominican Republic we acted because there was no available international alternative at the moment—and we have since moved to transfer responsibility to international sponsorship.

Our purpose is to see to it that international peacekeeping machinery is designed and perfected to the point where direct use of national military strength will no longer be necessary in crises of the future.

It may seem paradoxical at first blush that the more powerful a nation is—and the greater its commitment is to preserve the peace—the greater is its need to share its power with others under international sponsorship. Yet such are the facts of life in a world in which local conflicts can become regional, and regional conflicts can become global, and global conflict would be the suicide of our civilization.

Obviously it is less dangerous, militarily and politically, when responsibility for peacekeeping is shared on a collective basis. And it is less costly, too.

So even from the viewpoint of national security we are driven to seek international cooperation, international machinery, and international action to deal with armed violence. And that is why we have committees on peacekeeping machinery and on peaceful settlement of disputes among the committees working on International Cooperation Year projects.

But peacekeeping, critical though it is, cannot in itself create a progressive international community. It can at best only keep the lid on explosive situations until a world can be built which is no longer prone to explode on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.

U.S. Leadership Required

I do not have to stress to this group the benefits or the scope and potential of international cooperation in medicine and public health, in food and agriculture, in education and training, in field after field in which more can be done, or done better, or done

¹ Made at a reception honoring the U.S. National Council for International Cooperation Year at the Department of State on June 2 (press release 134). For a note of May 17 reporting to the U.N. Secretary-General on U.S. activities relating to the ICY, see p. 1067.

more quickly or more cheaply, by organized international effort.

I do not need to remind you that cooperation among sovereign states also is the most effective way to pursue the national interest. And in more and more cases international cooperation is the only way to do the things that science and technology have made possible, and desirable, and even imperative to do.

But what I do want to stress is the relevance of our national power to the creation of a progressive world community.

Here is the long-term significance of our great wealth, our great industrial and agricultural systems, our great scientific community, and—yes—our great social inventions which have created a nation devoted to the justice and welfare of all citizens while retaining the free enterprise system.

These things—these incomparable material and political assets—represent our true power, our ultimate ability to influence the world in the direction of peace and order and tolerance and prosperity.

We, alone among nations, have the resources and the will to invent great programs of constructive enterprise around the world.

And when nations undertake cooperative action on the basis of fairly sharing the responsibility, the very weight of our economic, financial, and technical resources requires us to accept a position of leadership.

Let there be no doubt about it. Our capacity—because of our great national power—to help build a cooperative and progressive international community based on common interest is unique in this world and unique in history. If we do not lead, nobody else will.

Time and again we have risen to the occasion—with the Marshall Plan, the Point Four Program, Atoms for Peace, Food for Peace, the Alliance for Progress. We bore almost the whole burden of launching the global program to eradicate malaria—until others began to do their share. Just last week the President threw our full support

behind another program to wipe another ancient disease from the face of the earth—smallpox.²

And even now we are working at forced draft on blueprints for a great project for the multipurpose development of the Lower Mekong Delta. When the President proposed, and offered massive U.S. support, for this project, it was promptly referred to as a “Marshall Plan for Southeast Asia.” Be that as it may, the Mekong project would do for the peoples of the four riparian nations much of what TVA did for the people of the four States which share the Tennessee Valley.

Learning the Habit of Cooperation

But it is not just the big projects that count, not just the glamorous ones, and not just the ones involving some form of assistance from the rich to the not-so-rich of this world. What also counts—and in the end may count more—is cooperation among nations on that vast, pervasive range of activities in which human beings get their business done on a day-to-day basis. Most of this is functional and technical. Often it is grubby work in which people get their hands dirty working at the nuts-and-bolts business of community life. And it almost never makes the papers because it is nonviolent and therefore not newsworthy.

But this is where cooperation assumes breadth and depth—and takes on continuity. This is where the habit of cooperation is learned and becomes ingrained. This is how cooperation becomes so patently valuable, so manifestly in the national interests of all participants that they may learn to put aside their political quarrels as irrelevant obstacles to more important goals.

And this is not just wishful thinking. There are good, practical, and inherent reasons why nations can get together and cooperate on functional tasks even while they continue their political quarrels.

You do not have to reconcile conflicting

² For a White House announcement, see White House press release dated May 18.

ideologies to agree that aerial navigation requires the adoption of international safety standards.

You do not need compatible social systems to perceive a common interest in agreeing to the international allocation and use of radio frequencies.

You do not have to eliminate the Berlin wall to agree to create a global weather-reporting system.

When the technology exists to make international cooperation a sensible affair, when national leaders perceive the existence of a common interest in working together, and when international institutions exist or can be designed, you have all the necessary elements for another step forward in international organization for some definable, limited purpose.

This, I suspect, is how world community ultimately will be achieved—and with it world order and world peace.

This, I believe, is the true relevance of United States power in the second half of the 20th century—our capacity to contribute to a workable world community.

And this, of course, is where you come in.

Our work under the rubric of the International Cooperation Year therefore is dealing not with the frills but with the substance of United States foreign policy—not with things that would be nice to do if we did not have more pressing problems but with high-priority necessities.

I am told that some of the Government committees are coming up with some extremely interesting proposals, setting high standards of quality in their world. But because the President and the top members of his administration necessarily are absorbed from day to day—and at night too—with the vital security interests of the Nation, with the crises that seem to be endemic to our times, we are counting heavily on the private leaders of the American community to help show the way in creating, piece by piece and brick by brick, a cooperative international community hard at work and secure in peace. I know that your chairman, Bob Benjamin, is providing bold leadership in this regard.

And I want to assure you that the President wants hard ideas and specific advice. He wants to know what you think and what you are planning to do about the next steps toward international cooperation and organization. He wants you to help us to use the power of the most powerful nation in the world to make peace as well as to keep it.

The Purpose That Binds America and Australia

Following is a toast made by President Johnson on June 7 at a White House luncheon in honor of Sir Robert Menzies, Prime Minister of Australia, who visited the United States June 6-9.

White House press release dated June 7

Mr. Prime Minister, distinguished guests: Under any circumstances, this would be a very happy day for us in this country and in this house.

After a momentous journey of more than 1 million miles our two American astronauts have splashed down safely in the Atlantic Ocean. We are proud of them and happy for the success of this peaceful adventure on mankind's newest frontier.

But, in this house, there is an added cause for happiness today. After a journey of somewhat fewer miles—but not many less—the Prime Minister has “splashed down” here in the White House. And we are very proud to have him with us for this occasion of friendship and fellowship.

The affection and mutual admiration between Americans and Australians is well and widely known. Over the years of this century that friendship has been a source of strength for the cause of freedom—and a source of despair and frustration for the purposes of those who have followed the path of aggression.

We of the United States are honored, Mr. Prime Minister, that your flag and our flag fly together, side by side, in the efforts these times require to preserve the peace of the world.

All through these times men in other lands have questioned whether the democracies would stir themselves to stop aggression and save freedom. At the same time, there have been those in the free countries who, so long as danger seemed far away, have asked whether such efforts should be made.

I remember that in 1940, before he became Prime Minister of Great Britain, Winston Churchill said that sometimes he was asked: "What is it that Britain and France are fighting for?" To that question, Churchill answered: "If we left off fighting, you would soon find out."

The appetite of aggression feeds on success. If the strong nations should fail or forfeit their trust, both the strong and the weak would today "soon find out" what it is and why it is that we make our efforts together today.

On this same day, 21 years ago, sons of all our countries were united in the great effort to push ashore in Normandy and liberate the peoples of Europe and bring relief from the ravages of war experienced brutally by the peoples of the Soviet. There was a common purpose then—a full unity and a full accord on our objectives. Because of that unity and that accord peace was finally won. I do not despair of an abiding personal belief that the peoples—and the leaders—of the free democracies can achieve the same unity and find the same great common purpose in peace that we had in war.

The events in space remind us that all mankind has entered a new age. The world of 1965 is greatly changed from the world of the 1940's. At no other time—in all history—have peoples of earth had so much to unite them, so many tangible opportunities to work together in peace, so little provocation to walk different roads toward war and ruin. We want them to walk together toward peace.

We live by no illusion that the way toward peace is easy or that the distance is short. We know that the course is steep, the obstacles are many. The tests will come often, and the trials will be demanding. But

all of us—in lands both rich and poor—have gained too much to gamble on either aggression or appeasement.

All through this country's program of manned space flight, the paths of our spacecraft have crossed over the land from which our visitor comes. Most often the flight has passed Australia during the darkness of night. On such occasion the citizens of cities of Australia have turned on their lights—testing to see whether those lights are visible to man up among the stars.

In many ways this is symbolic. All around the world, where there is darkness, men are willing, I believe, to turn on their lights. And America is looking for those lights, looking through the darkness and shadows to see the signals that will mean there is hope for peace. We are searching the horizons now, looking for the glimmer of light that will tell us and will tell the world that others are ready to join with us in peace and understanding for the gain and the good of all mankind.

This is the purpose that binds America and Australia together always.

To this purpose then—to the purpose of peace and to the friendship between our peoples—I ask you now to join with me in raising your glass, as we express our gratitude for the privilege and pleasure of sharing this hour with our good friend, His Excellency the Prime Minister.

Chancellor Erhard of Germany Talks With President Johnson

Chancellor Ludwig Erhard of the Federal Republic of Germany visited the United States May 31 to June 4. He was in Washington on June 4 for a meeting with President Johnson. Following is the text of a joint statement issued by President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard at the close of the meeting.

White House press release dated June 4

President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard met today at the White House with their senior advisers.

The President and the Chancellor expressed their satisfaction with the close and

cooperative relations between their two countries and the political, economic, and military strength of the Atlantic Alliance. The President and the Chancellor also agreed on the continuing importance of maintaining an intimate and dynamic Alliance.

The Chancellor welcomed the President's assurance that the United States would maintain its forces in Europe, backed by nuclear power, so long as they were wanted and needed for the peace and security of Europe.

The Chancellor emphasized Germany's vital interest in the continued progress of European unity. And the President, in turn, agreed that European unity was an important factor in the strengthening of the Alliance. The President also expressed his appreciation for the Federal Government's efforts to further European economic integration and to contribute to the development of increasingly closer economic ties between Europe and America and the rest of the world.

The Chancellor told the President of his appreciation for the President's strong support to efforts to resolve the German problem. The President and the Chancellor agreed that their governments, together with the other responsible powers, must continue to seek all available means to end the unjust division of Germany as soon as possible.

They agreed too that improvements in relations with the countries of Eastern Europe would help to contribute to peace and security and that a common allied policy would contribute to this end.

The President and the Chancellor also discussed the serious threats to peace and stability in a number of other areas of the world, and especially in Southeast Asia. In this connection, the Chancellor emphasized the importance of mutual solidarity in dealing with communist aggression. He told the President of his support for the American determination to turn back aggression in Viet Nam and welcomed the United States Government's efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement of that conflict. The Chancellor also told the President of his interest in the projected Asian Development Bank and the German Government's desire to par-

ticipate in it and also provide economic assistance which would contribute to the establishment of political and economic stability in this area of the world.

The President and the Chancellor also expressed their hope for continuing progress in the Dominican Republic, leading to the restoration of peace and representative government there.

Finally the President and the Chancellor reaffirmed the strong and close friendship of their peoples and governments, working together for peace and freedom in the future as they have in the past. For this reason, they agreed to meet regularly and to discuss questions of common interest.

U.S., Japan Hold Second Meeting on Use of Natural Resources

Joint Communiqué

Press release 150 dated June 10

The second United States-Japan Conference on Development and Utilization of Natural Resources was held on June 8-10, 1965 in Washington. This Conference, as well as the first Conference that was held in Tokyo last year,¹ grew out of the meeting in January, 1964 of the Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs,² which agreed that both countries could benefit from new government-to-government exchanges of technical personnel and research findings in the area of human and natural resources.

The United States delegation was headed by the Honorable John A. Carver, Jr., Under Secretary of the Interior, who also acted as chairman of the Conference. The Japanese delegation was headed by Dr. Shunichi Kurosawa, Science Counselor, the Science and Technology Agency.

Other members of the United States dele-

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of May 11, 1964, p. 737.

² For text of a joint communiqué, see *ibid.*, Feb. 17, 1964, p. 235.

gation were Herman Pollack, Acting Director, International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State; Robert A. Kevan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; Dr. William W. Eaton, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology, Department of Commerce; Dr. G. E. Hilbert, Director, Foreign Research and Technical Programs, Department of Agriculture; and Dr. John C. Calhoun, Jr., Consultant and former Science Adviser, Department of the Interior.

Other members of the Japanese delegation were Dr. Arimasa Baba, Director, Agency of Industrial Science and Technology, Ministry of International Trade and Industry; Dr. Nobuo Tatebayashi, Director, Environment Sanitary Bureau, Ministry of Health and Welfare; Kichiro Imaizumi, Research Counselor, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Research Council, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry; and Kiyohiko Tsurumi, Minister, Embassy of Japan.

The delegates reviewed the progress which has been made in the seven subjects selected last year to initiate the program. These seven subjects were:

- 1) the desalting of sea water and utilization of by-products;
- 2) air pollution;
- 3) water pollution;
- 4) energy developments alternative to established sources;
- 5) forage crop seed production;
- 6) suppression of water evaporation from reservoirs and paddy fields by monomolecular films; and
- 7) studies on botulinus and other toxic micro-organisms.

Reports were heard about the activities of the panels of experts from the appropriate government agencies that had been designated by each side to coordinate the exchanges. Illustrative of these activities was the progress that has been made in planning for cooperative investigation in the field of forage crop seed production. It was noted

that, in addition to exchange of correspondence and literature, cooperation had been facilitated through the several meetings and many visits that the specialists of the two countries had carried out. For example, a joint panel meeting on air pollution was held in Tokyo in May 1965, at which technical capabilities were explored and specific areas of cooperation defined. The Conference concluded that promising progress had been made during the brief time that the program had been in existence.

The delegates also selected two additional subjects to be included in the program: 1) national park management, and 2) mycoplasmosis of domestic animals and birds.

A report detailing the activities to date was adopted for presentation at the coming meeting of the Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs in July 1965.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on June 2 confirmed the following nominations:

Marshall Green to be Ambassador to the Republic of Indonesia. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 152 dated June 11.)

Mrs. Patricia Roberts Harris to be Ambassador to Luxembourg. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated May 19.)

Joseph J. Jova to be Ambassador to Honduras. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 158 dated June 21.)

Ridgway B. Knight to be Ambassador to Belgium. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 145 dated June 9.)

John M. Leddy to be an Assistant Secretary of State. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 155 dated June 16.)

Thomas C. Mann to be U.S. Alternate Governor of the International Monetary Fund for a term of 5 years.

Thomas C. Mann to be U.S. Alternate Governor of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for a term of 5 years.

Southeast Asia Aid Program

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON¹

This afternoon I am sending the Congress a special message requesting an additional \$89 million dollars to help in the peaceful economic and social development of Southeast Asia.

This is another forward step toward carrying out my April proposal for a "massive effort to improve the life of man in that conflict-torn corner of our world."²

We do not intend that the enemies of freedom shall become the inheritors of man's worldwide revolt against injustice and misery. We will lead in that struggle, not to conquer or to subdue but to give each people the chance to build its own nation in its own way.

My personal representative, Mr. Eugene Black, has already begun extensive and hopeful discussions with interested parties around the world.³ Thus the groundwork is being laid for a long-range development plan for all of Southeast Asia—led by Asians—to improve the life of Asians.

In South Viet-Nam brave and enduring people carry on a determined resistance against those who would destroy their independence. They will win this fight. And we will help them.

But there is another and more profound struggle going on in that country. It is the

struggle to create the conditions of hope and progress which are the only lasting guarantee of peace and stability.

The 16 million people of South Viet-Nam survive on an average income of \$100 per year. More than 60 percent of the people have never learned to read and write. When disease strikes, medical care is often impossible to find. There is only one doctor for every 29,000 people compared with one for every 740 in the United States. This poverty and neglect take their inevitable toll in human life. The life expectancy is only 35 years—about half that in our own country.

These are the common enemies of man in South Viet-Nam. They were there before the aggressors struck. They will be there when aggression has gone. These enemies, too, we are committed to help defeat.

Today's request will be used to

- help develop the vast water and power resources of the Mekong basin;
- bring electricity to small towns in the provinces;
- build clinics and provide doctors for disease-ridden rural areas;
- help South Viet-Nam import materials for homes and factories.

In addition members of the American Medical Association have agreed to help recruit 50 surgeons and specialists to go to Viet-Nam to help heal the wounds of war as well as the ravages of unchecked disease.

This is a part of the beginning. In the future I will call upon our people to make further sacrifices. But this is the only way

¹ Read at a news conference at the White House on June 1 (White House press release).

² BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, May 10, 1965, p. 719.

in which we can win—not only the military battle against aggression but the wider war for the freedom and the progress of man.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS⁴

To the Congress of the United States:

The American people want their government to be not only strong but compassionate. They know that a society is secure only where social justice is secure for all its citizens. When there is turmoil anywhere in our own country, our instinct is to inquire if there is injustice. That instinct is sound. And these principles of compassion and justice do not stop at the water's edge. We do not have one policy for our own people and another for our friends abroad.

A vast revolution is sweeping the southern half of this globe. We do not intend that the Communists shall become the beneficiaries of this revolt against injustice and privation. We intend to lead vigorously in that struggle. We will continue to back that intention with practical and concrete help.

In southeast Asia today, we are offering our hand and our abundance to those who seek to build a brighter future. The effort to create more progressive societies cannot wait for an ideal moment. It cannot wait until peace has been finally secured. We must move ahead now.

I know of no more urgent task ahead. It requires more of us, more of other prosperous nations, and more of the people of southeast Asia.

For our part, I propose that we expand our own economic assistance to the people of South Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos.

I propose we start *now* to make available our share of the money needed to harness the resources of the *entire* southeast Asia region for the benefit of all its people. This must be an international venture. That is why I have asked Mr. Eugene Black to consult with the United Nations Secretary General and the leaders of the poor and ad-

vanced nations. Our role will be vital, but we hope that all other industrialized nations, including the Soviet Union, will participate.

To support our own effort, *I ask the Congress to authorize and appropriate for fiscal year 1966 an additional \$89 million for the Agency for International Development for expanded programs of economic and social development in southeast Asia.*

This money will serve many purposes:

1. *Approximately \$19 million* will provide the first installment of our contribution to the accelerated development of the Mekong River Basin. This is an important part of the general program of regional development which I outlined at Johns Hopkins University on April 7. This money will enable us to meet a request for half the cost of building the Nam Ngum Dam, which the international Mekong Committee has marked "Top Priority" if the Mekong River is to be put to work for the people of the region. This will be the first Mekong power project to serve two countries, promising power to small industry and lights for thousands of homes in northeast Thailand and Laos. The funds will provide also for—

powerlines across the Mekong, linking Laos and Thailand;

extensive studies of further hydroelectric, irrigation, and flood control projects on the Mekong main stream and its tributaries;

expansion of distribution lines in Laos.

2. *Five million dollars* will be used to support electrification cooperatives near three provincial towns—Long Xuyen, Dalat, and Nha Thang—in South Vietnam. Co-ops, which have been so important to the lives of our rural people, will bring the benefits of low-priced electricity to more than 200,000 Vietnamese. We hope this pattern can be duplicated in towns and villages throughout the region. I will ask that we provide further support if the pattern meets the success we believe possible.

3. *Seven million dollars* will help provide improved medical and surgical services, especially in the more remote areas of Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. South Vietnam is tragically short of doctors; some 200 civilian

⁴H. Doc. 196, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (also released as White House press release dated June 1).

physicians must care for a population of 15 million. In Laos the system of AID-supported village clinics and rural hospitals now reaches more than a million people. But that is not enough. We propose to extend the program in Laos, assist the Thailand Government to expand its public health services to thousands of rural villages, and to organize additional medical and surgical teams for sick and injured civilians in South Vietnam.

Better health is the first fruit of modern science. For the people of these countries it has far too long been an empty promise. I hope that when peace comes our medical assistance can be expanded and made available to the sick and wounded of the area without regard to political commitment.

4. *Approximately \$6 million* will be used to train people for the construction of roads, dams, and other small-scale village projects in Thailand and Laos. In many parts of Asia the chance of the villager for markets, education, and access to public services depends on his getting a road. A nearby water well dramatically lightens the burdens of the farmer's wife. With these tools and skills local people can build their own schools and clinics—blessings only dreamed of before.

5. *Approximately \$45 million* will be used to finance increasing imports of iron and steel, cement, chemicals and pesticides, drugs, trucks, and other essential goods necessary for a growing civilian economy. This money will allow factories not only to continue but, through investment, to expand production of both capital and consumer goods. It will provide materials for urgently needed low-cost housing. And it will maintain production incentives and avoid inflation. It is not easy for a small country, with a low income, to fight a war on its own soil and at the same time persist in the business of nation-building. The additional import support which I propose will help Vietnam to persevere in this difficult task.

6. *An additional \$7 million* will supplement the present program of agricultural development and support additional government services in all three countries, and will

help in the planning of further industrial expansion in the secure areas of Vietnam.

* * *

Much of the additional assistance I request is for Vietnam. This is not a poor and unfavored land. There is water and rich soil and ample natural resources. The people are patient, hard-working, the custodians of a proud and ancient civilization. They have been oppressed not by nature but by man. The failures of man can be redeemed. That is the purpose of the aid for which I now ask additional authorization.

We are defending the right of the people of South Vietnam to decide their own destiny. Where this right is attacked by force, we have no alternative but to reply with strength. But military action is not a final solution in this area; it is only a partial means to a much larger goal. Freedom and progress will be possible in Vietnam only as the people are assured that history is on their side—that it will give them a chance to make a living in peace, to educate their children, to escape the ravages of disease, and, above all, to be free of the oppressors who for so long have fed on their labors.

Our effort on behalf of the people of southeast Asia should unite, not divide, the people of that region. Our policy is not to spread conflict but to heal conflict.

I ask the Congress, as part of our continuing affirmation of America's faith in the cause of man, to respond promptly and fully to this request.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE, *June 1, 1965.*

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK ⁵

We appreciate this committee's prompt consideration of the President's request for increased economic assistance funds for Southeast Asia. I regret that it was not possible to quantify these additional fiscal year 1966 requirements during the committee's regular consideration of the Foreign Assistance Act.

⁵ Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on June 3.

The President, in his message to the Congress on Tuesday [June 1], put the purpose of our presence in Viet-Nam succinctly when he said:

We are defending the right of the people of South Vietnam to decide their own destiny. Where this right is attacked by force, we have no alternative but to reply with strength. But military action is not a final solution in this area; it is only a partial means to a much larger goal. Freedom and progress will be possible in Vietnam only as the people are assured that history is on their side—that it will give them a chance to make a living in peace, to educate their children, to escape the ravages of disease, and, above all, to be free of the oppressors who for so long have fed on their labors.

Our effort on behalf of the people of southeast Asia should unite, not divide, the people of that region. Our policy is not to spread conflict but to heal conflict.

The President's current request is for funds required to serve this purpose, at this juncture, in South Viet-Nam, Laos, and Thailand.

In the President's statement on Viet-Nam on March 25,⁶ and again in his historic address at Johns Hopkins University on April 7, the President invited Asia to respond to his offer of a United States role in meeting the basic human needs of the peoples of Southeast Asia. The Secretary-General of the United Nations and his colleagues in New York, Bangkok, and elsewhere have taken up his invitation to explore institutional and program possibilities. We are gratified that the Asian governments, and notably the Government of Japan, have commenced the study of means to improve the welfare of the peoples of Southeast Asia. The greatest contribution to this goal would be, of course, to end violence and to relieve peoples of the burdens they bear today for support of military organizations and operations. But we cannot await tranquillity in the area to begin needed expanded processes of social and economic development. And so we must begin and chart a course which permits those whose ideas and political systems may differ amongst themselves all to participate either

as beneficiaries or as donors. Happily, the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East is an institution which benefits from the leadership of the United Nations Secretariat in New York and is currently led by a dedicated group of international servants. To it already belong most of the countries of Asia and the Far East, and adherence of others should not present great difficulties.

We would like to hold open the possibility that a peaceful North Viet-Nam might share in the benefits that would come from peace itself and also from participation in such multilateral institutions and programs as appear to meet the common need for economic and social development.

The magnificent successes of the Marshall Plan in Europe grew from a simple, unelaborated idea which took account of political, economic, and security realities. The Marshall Plan was not imposed upon Europe. We do not intend to impose a U.S. plan on Asia. However, the President has given us the concept. Both within the Government of the United States and within governments and multilateral institutions elsewhere, plans and possibilities are being explored for fulfilling a noble goal.

Basic and Urgent Purposes To Be Served

The President has requested an increase of \$80 million in the authorization for supporting assistance and \$9 million for technical cooperation, all for expanded programs of economic assistance in Southeast Asia. Two basic and urgent purposes would be served:

1. These funds would permit the first concrete action in carrying out the President's April 7 proposal to launch an intensified international campaign to stimulate Southeast Asian economic and social progress and promote closer regional economic cooperation. This request and the congressional response to it should, we believe, demonstrate to other prosperous nations and the Southeast Asian countries that we are ready to do our part if they do theirs. As Asian institutions and plans are developed, we will

⁶ BULLETIN of Apr. 12, 1965, p. 527.

prepare for submission to Congress next January a more complete presentation of requirements for this special effort. When the necessary steps have been taken with respect to the projected Asian Development Bank, we plan to ask for funds to make a United States contribution through appropriate legislative channels.

2. These funds also would enable South Viet-Nam to undertake expansion of industrial production and investment, increased low-cost housing construction, transportation and other public works improvements while carrying out an expanded defense effort.

The expanded development program for Southeast Asia will require larger contributions through multilateral arrangements, both existing and newly established, as well as increased bilateral assistance. The former will include funds fully administered by international bodies—such as the expected U.N.-sponsored consortium for the Nam Ngum Dam in Laos and the proposed Asian Development Bank—as well as funds for projects planned and coordinated by regional agencies but implemented as national projects. Excluded from what we describe as the expanded *development* effort are our police assistance programs and the large commodity import programs required to sustain the military efforts of weak economies.

In his message to the Congress⁷ submitting the foreign assistance proposals last January, the President pointed out that the minimum budget proposed did not allow for major increases which might be required during the year. If they should arise, he said, "I shall not hesitate to inform the Congress and request additional funds." Anticipating increases in South Viet-Nam's requirements for economic or military assistance, he asked for a special standby authorization for additional appropriations for our assistance to Viet-Nam only.

The House of Representatives decided to broaden the proposed standby authorization to cover all Southeast Asia. This committee preferred to reserve any further authoriza-

tion pending specific requests and hearings.

In the past 2 weeks the size of the additional bilateral U.S. economic aid requirements in Viet-Nam, Thailand, and Laos has become clearer.

Mekong Water Resource Projects

At the same time, it has become evident that our broader purpose of stimulating regional economic cooperation requires prompt action on available multinational projects, without waiting for a complete set of regional institutions to emerge. We propose, therefore, to commit approximately \$19 million to Mekong Basin projects early in fiscal year 1966 if feasibility reviews now underway prove favorable and other conditions are met.

The Mekong water resource projects include:

The *Nam Ngum Dam in Laos*, serving both Laos and northern Thailand: \$13.5 million. The first stage of this 20,000 kilowatt power project on a Mekong tributary is estimated to cost about \$27 million. The Mekong Committee has asked the World Bank to manage construction, using funds granted by the United States and other advanced countries. Subject to a finding of economic and financial feasibility, we propose to commit the United States to a grant of half of the total cost, provided other countries contribute the balance in grant funds.

A *power transmission line* linking Vientiane, Laos, and Nongkhai, Thailand, across the Mekong River. Ancillary to this would be an expansion of distribution lines in the Vientiane area. Cost estimate: \$500,000.

Phase II engineering studies of the proposed *Pa Mong Dam*, a very large Mekong main-stream project between Laos and northeast Thailand: \$4.5 million in fiscal year 1966 technical cooperation funds. Continuation of a long-term study by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation of this major project of the basin development scheme was dropped from the initial fiscal year 1966 AID presentation because of uncertainty as to the findings of the first-phase study on irrigation demand. We are now informed

⁷ *Ibid.*, Feb. 1, 1965, p. 126.

that the Bureau of Reclamation team will recommend going ahead with the engineering reconnaissance, including aerial mapping, site testing, and canal alinement.

Feasibility studies of *irrigation dam projects on the Mun and Chi Rivers* in northeast Thailand. Acceleration of this work, also by the Bureau of Reclamation, will require an increase of at least \$500,000 in technical cooperation funds above previous estimates.

Improvement of Health Services

Nothing is more fundamental to progress in Southeast Asia than improved health services. The severe shortage of doctors and other health services in the rural areas of Viet-Nam, Laos, and Thailand has long been a major concern of their governments, and of AID. We propose to intensify our assistance by:

—providing additional medical and surgical teams, both military and civilian, to serve sick and injured civilians in provincial and other rural towns of South Viet-Nam;

—broadening our assistance to rural public health programs in Thailand, particularly in provision of equipment to provincial hospitals, health centers, and drug distribution agents; and

—rehabilitating or better equipping rural dispensaries in Laos, supplementing our present extensive health and sanitation program, which now provides pharmaceuticals and more than 100 Philippine doctors and nurses who train Lao medics and care for the sick throughout the country.

These additional efforts will require additional supporting assistance, largely in Viet-Nam, and additional technical cooperation funds, largely in Thailand.

Assistance for Rural Development

The third field of expanded assistance to the people of Southeast Asia is the training and equipping of local engineering and public works agencies for rural development work—simple roads, water wells, irrigation ponds, schools, et cetera.

We propose expansion of previously planned projects of this sort in northeast Thailand and, for the first time, in the southernmost provinces of Thailand. In Laos we propose to expand the existing program of training and equipping the Highway Department staff by applying an on-the-job training approach to the rehabilitation of the road from Vientiane to Luang Prabang.

Rural electrification cooperatives have played an important role in the development of the United States and other countries. In cooperation with the U.S. National Rural Electric Cooperative Association we propose to help the people of three selected areas of South Viet-Nam establish electric co-ops. We hope these pilot projects will become models for bringing light and power for the homes and small industries of Southeast Asia within reach of their incomes. This represents \$5.5 million of the supporting assistance increase requested.

Expanded technical assistance to Lao agricultural development, particularly agricultural credit and marketing, and the introduction on a wider scale of improved livestock and seeds are proposed.

Industrial expansion in Viet-Nam, both now and immediately after the cessation of hostilities, will be essential to the country's rehabilitation and progress toward self-support. Without waiting for peace, we propose to contract with potential private American investors and other expert groups to conduct feasibility studies looking to the establishment of new plants in such lines of production as fertilizer, cement, and kraft paper. Related public works, particularly port development, also will require additional funds for feasibility studies.

Commodity Import Support for Viet-Nam

The largest element of the supplemental request is for \$45 million in additional supporting assistance to finance Viet-Nam's commercial imports. In testimony before the congressional committees this spring, we have pointed to the necessity of using a then-undetermined amount of the proposed

standby authorization for this purpose. In the past 2 weeks we have been able to refine somewhat our calculations of the impact of increased defense and police budgets and expanded public works and investment programs on the demand for imported goods. We now estimate that in addition to the commodity import support previously programmed for basic support of the economy, about \$45 million will be required to maintain economic growth and avoid destructive inflation.

This increased dependence on our aid results partly from Viet Cong interdiction of rice shipments, rail and road sabotage, and terrorism—all combining to prevent any rice export earnings in 1965.

In the eight northern coastal provinces of Viet-Nam alone, some 215,000 refugees have fled their homes because of Viet Cong terror, 9,000 in just the past week. This mass movement of people requires more construction materials, medicines, and food—not to mention the other economic and social consequences of such mass uprootings.

In addition to these war-connected requirements, there is a growing need for investment in urban and rural areas as a demonstration of the Government's determination to emerge from this conflict a viable country, dedicated to the longrun task of nation-building.

At the same time, further expansion of the Vietnamese armed forces and police and of security forces construction has expanded the demand for goods in the marketplace.

To meet these requirements for basic economic support, we proposed last January, in the fiscal 1966 budget now before the Congress, supporting assistance plus such additional amounts later found to be required to support a higher but then-undetermined level of Vietnamese military and civil operations. After taking into account currently available estimates of Vietnamese foreign exchange requirements and earnings, including receipts from U.S. military forces in Viet-Nam, we now see a probable shortfall of \$40 to \$50 million. This request would cover a midpoint in that range of estimates.

These funds would finance imports of a variety of goods such as construction materials, pharmaceuticals, fertilizers, pesticides, tires and tubes, and trucks.

We hope, Mr. Chairman, that these programs will meet the approval of the committee and that you will add the request to the pending authorization bill.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 1st Session

- African Refugee Problems. Hearing before the Subcommittee To Investigate Problems Connected With Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Judiciary Committee. January 21, 1965. 62 pp.
- Balance of Payments Voluntary Agreements. Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 5280, a bill to provide for exemptions from the antitrust laws to assist in safeguarding the balance-of-payments position of the United States. March 3-11, 1965. 112 pp.
- Miscellaneous Merchant Marine Legislation. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. April 27, 1965. 70 pp.
- United States-Canada Automotive Products Agreement. Hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee on H.R. 6960, "The Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965." April 27-29, 1965. 312 pp.
- United Nations Charter Amendments. Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Executive A, 89th Congress, 1st session. April 28, 1965. 138 pp.
- Increased Quota in International Monetary Fund. Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on H.R. 6497, to amend the Bretton Woods Agreements Act to authorize an increase in the U.S. quota in the International Monetary Fund. May 6, 1965. 36 pp.
- Tariff Schedules Technical Amendments Act of 1965. Report to accompany H.R. 7969. H. Rept. 342. May 12, 1965. 81 pp.
- Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1965 (Bureau of Customs). Hearings before the Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization of the Senate Government Operations Committee on S. Res. 102, to disapprove reorganization plan No. 1 transmitted to the Congress by the President on March 25, 1965. May 12-14, 1965. 158 pp.
- Sino-Soviet Conflict. Report on Sino-Soviet Conflict and Its Implications by the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, together with hearings held by the subcommittee March 10-31, 1965. May 14, 1965. 412 pp.
- Persecution of Persons by Soviet Russia. Report to accompany S. Con. Res. 17, S. Rept. 190. May 14, 1965. 4 pp.
- Increasing the U.S. Quota in the International Monetary Fund. Report, together with supplemental views, to accompany H.R. 6497. S. Rept. 196. May 19, 1965. 18 pp.

U.S. Expresses Views on Southern Rhodesian Independence in U.N. Committee of 24 and Security Council

Following are texts of statements made in the Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Committee of 24) by U.S. Representative Marietta P. Tree and in the Security Council by U.S. Representative Adlai E. Stevenson.

STATEMENT BY MRS. TREE, APRIL 14

U.S./U.N. press release 4526

I have asked to speak on Southern Rhodesia to state firmly the views and the position of my Government at this session of the Committee.

Since we last considered this question, there have been some developments which I would term for the better and some which could only be considered for the worse. But I think overall in Southern Rhodesia there has been a downward trend characterized perhaps best in the report¹ of the Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. [Arthur] Bottomley, and [the Lord Chancellor] Lord Gardiner, when they pointed out that the main impression they received on their recent visit to Southern Rhodesia was one of a hardening of attitudes among both Europeans and Africans. This trend, a trend which all of us have witnessed since first we began considering this issue in the

United Nations, is one which fills us with great apprehension about what the future may hold for all the peoples of Southern Rhodesia.

It requires only a cursory glance at the statements made by the United States representatives over the past 3 years in the Assembly, in the Security Council, and in this Committee to note that it is this very trend of polarization, of separation, of hardening of attitudes between the two main segments of the Southern Rhodesian population that has most concerned the United States. While there are factors outside the country which can help, hinder, or influence developments in Southern Rhodesia, in the end a just and equitable solution must be based and can only be based on a full and honest expression of the will of the people, *all* the people, of Southern Rhodesia. In the atmosphere existing in Southern Rhodesia today, the necessary agreement and expression of the will of the people should come about through, first, communication; second, understanding; and finally, wisdom and sensible negotiation. But the Commonwealth Secretary suggests that the trend is going in the opposite direction.

In the past year no move has been made which has succeeded in promoting a climate which could foster the necessary communication or understanding among Southern Rhodesians. But, above all, the Government of Southern Rhodesia, which world opinion looks to in taking the lead in seeking real-

¹ U.N. doc. A/AC. 109/L. 187.

istic means out of the current impasse, has instead resorted to measures resulting in a worsening of the atmosphere. It has persisted in the exercise of sweeping police powers which my Government has deplored in the past. It continues to detain a large number of its citizens without trial under "security measures," about which the majority of the population has not been consulted and to which the majority of the population has not assented. It continues to play the futile game of seeking or claiming to seek independence under minority rule, without a genuine expression of opinion on the part of the people of Southern Rhodesia.

Instead of seeking independence under minority rule, it would seem that the needs of the situation cried for a dedicated effort on the part of the Southern Rhodesian Government to lead all its people to the enjoyment of fundamental human rights and to economic and social advantage which this richly endowed country can so well afford. A sincere effort to stamp out the growing breach of discrimination between the races in Southern Rhodesia and to strive to provide equal opportunity and satisfaction to all would do much to insure a promising future for Southern Rhodesia and would obtain the sympathetic support of the entire world.

But the contrary seems the case. Not only are we ever conscious of the Government's seeking independence under minority rule, but we cannot be deaf to the ill-considered statements of certain political leaders in Southern Rhodesia calling for a unilateral and unconstitutional declaration of independence from the United Kingdom. Our view on this question has not changed from last year, when Ambassador [Sidney R.] Yates expressed our conviction that such a unilateral act could make an eventual resort to violence inevitable. You may also recall in this connection the public statement my Government issued on October 28, 1964,² which said:

The United States Government has followed the course of events in Rhodesia with intense interest and mounting concern.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 16, 1964, p. 721.

We have on frequent occasions expressed our hope that a solution would be found to the Rhodesian problem acceptable to the majority of the people. We continue to hope that Rhodesia will gain independence as a united nation with a government based upon the consent of the governed. We have been encouraged by the forthright position taken by the British Government in insisting that it would not sanction independence for Rhodesia until satisfied that the people have been allowed the full exercise of self-determination. Prime Minister [Harold] Wilson's message to the Rhodesian Prime Minister [Ian Smith], published yesterday [October 27], makes clear some of the serious consequences which could befall all Rhodesians should their Government continue to follow its present course.

The United States hopes that the Rhodesian Government will continue to discuss with the United Kingdom Government ways to achieve a satisfactory solution.

Last year my delegation put great importance on the necessity that the Government of Southern Rhodesia should be fully informed of the consequences which might flow from any unilateral declaration of independence, both as regards its grave significance for the people of Southern Rhodesia and the incalculable danger such an action might bring for tranquillity and peace in southern Africa. However, I think none could argue now that the Government of Southern Rhodesia could be in any doubt about the consequences and outcome of such a step. These consequences were set forth unequivocally in the communication sent by the United Kingdom Government to the southern Rhodesian Government on the 25th of October last. And I think it is safe to say that the overwhelming majority of nations of the world endorsed this declaration and the policy on which it was based.

My delegation has always found it difficult to conceive of Southern Rhodesian independence, achieved under conditions which did not have the approval of the substantial majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia, obtaining international approval and recognition. No, the answer to the painful problems in Southern Rhodesia is not immediate independence. Those both inside and outside the Southern Rhodesian Government who look for a cure-all in this course of action are either misled or indulging in self-deception.

In the beginning of my statement I suggested that there were some developments which were for the better. I have already touched on one of these when I mentioned the unequivocal manner in which the United Kingdom Government made known to the Government of Southern Rhodesia its views as to the possible consequences involved in a unilateral declaration of independence. I think that it is clear that the United Kingdom Government has exhibited a vigorous leadership, taken a number of initiatives, indicated it would utilize whatever meager opportunities were available for assisting Southern Rhodesia to find a way out of its difficulties.

The United States appreciates that the United Kingdom has a particular and heavy responsibility in bringing Southern Rhodesia to independence under terms acceptable to all the peoples of Southern Rhodesia. And we are confident that the United Kingdom will continue to search for workable means of bringing the parties closer together for at least an informal discussion if no other possibilities are available.

We have always placed the greatest emphasis on and continue to plead the necessity of finding some means of establishing genuine communication between the various parties in Southern Rhodesia. It is only through this means that there can be a genuine exercise of self-determination by all the peoples of Southern Rhodesia which could lay the grounds for an independence formula acceptable to a substantial majority of the people. A unilateral declaration of independence would wreck any possibility of this and seems to us therefore to represent the greatest immediate danger in the situation.

While it is not for the United States, for the Committee, or other outsiders to choose or forecast the formulas which would be acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia, we can see no other approach which could offer the hope of a peaceful and flourishing future which we all would wish for all the people of Southern Rhodesia. We continue to look with confidence to the United King-

dom, calling on the wealth of its experience in colonial matters, to assist in moving toward a solution which would be acceptable to all concerned.

Finally, lest there be any misunderstanding, let me summarize our position in the words used by Ambassador Yates last year:

We believe the people of Southern Rhodesia should be given the opportunity for self-determination, of the development of a government deriving its just powers from the consent of the governed—all the governed (and I stress *all the governed*). We would hope and expect to see changes in the constitution which would provide for a realistic liberalization of the franchise looking to universal adult suffrage.

Secondly, we would hope and expect to see steps provided for to break down patterns of racial discrimination, to permit the development of a society which would allow each man to exercise his talents to the fullest, free from the imposition of any racial barriers.

Thirdly, we would hope and expect that such self-determination would bring the establishment of peaceful and advantageous relations between Southern Rhodesia and its neighbors in Africa, in an association founded on the freely given support of a majority of the people concerned.

STATEMENT BY MR. STEVENSON, MAY 5

U.S./U.N. press release 4545

Mr. President, since last Friday, at the request of 35 African states, the Council has been considering the situation in Southern Rhodesia. The concern of the African states as set forth in their letter³ to the President of the Council centers principally around what they term the continuing deterioration of the situation in that territory. The distinguished Foreign Ministers of Algeria and Senegal have presented in detail to the Council the concerns of the African nations and have particularly focused their anxiety on the intentions of the Southern Rhodesian Government in calling at this time for elections under the present constitution.

Mr. President, the United States representative in the Committee of 24 reiterated on the 14th of April that the United States shares the apprehensions of the African nations—apprehensions which have been uni-

³ U.N. doc. S/6294.

versally voiced by all who have spoken in the Council.

First, there is the serious situation in Southern Rhodesia today; second, we wonder where that situation may lead; and finally, what are its implications not only for the peoples of Southern Rhodesia but for the continent of Africa. The United States has never minimized the dangers inherent in the current situation in Southern Rhodesia. We first hoped, then urged, then pleaded that the territory's constitution be amended to provide for liberalization of the franchise in a manner which would speedily lead to universal adult suffrage. We have emphasized again and again the importance of immediate steps to break down patterns of discrimination and to repeal discriminatory laws. We have repeatedly expressed our view that independence for Southern Rhodesia must be achieved, and can only be achieved, under conditions acceptable to the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia and that such an exercise of self-determination would be essential to the establishment of peaceful relations between Southern Rhodesia and its neighbors. We had hoped, and we continue to hope, that these events would come about through the process of peaceful change and negotiation.

These then are the essentials of my Government's position to which I would like to add one further clarification. I feel this is necessary in the light of the statement of the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union that my country maintains an "embassy" in Southern Rhodesia. This is not correct. The United States, of course, does not treat Southern Rhodesia as an independent sovereign state. My country maintains a consulate general in Southern Rhodesia, which is a practice we have followed in a number of nonindependent territories. The Government of Southern Rhodesia for its part has, as suggested by the distinguished delegate of the Soviet Union, a representative in this country. This representative is a member of the British Embassy in Washington. This is also a practice which has been followed in the past in the cases of other dependencies.

I have spoken earlier of our anxiety to see the process of change through negotiation take place in Southern Rhodesia peacefully and quickly. But unfortunately, although negotiations are going forward, developments in Southern Rhodesia have taken a very different turn. All of us were, I think, distressed and alarmed by the report of Mr. Bottomley, the Commonwealth Secretary, and Lord Gardiner, when they pointed out that the main impression they received on their recent visit to Southern Rhodesia was one of a hardening of attitudes among both the Europeans and the Africans. This impression has been reinforced by a number of irresponsible statements and actions in Southern Rhodesia, many of them related to the question of a unilateral declaration of independence. It is such statements and actions which have made it necessary for the United Kingdom to set forth unequivocally, on two separate occasions within the last 6 months, the serious consequences of such an illegal undertaking which has been so persistently courted by the government of Mr. Ian Smith.

I think the speakers who have come before me, and in particular the distinguished Foreign Ministers of Algeria and Senegal, have covered in detail the situation in Southern Rhodesia and the events leading to the situation as it exists today with its inequities, its repressive legislation and discriminatory practices. I think the unfolding of these events is well known to all of us. There is, of course, a new element in the picture, repeatedly mentioned by previous speakers, namely, the elections scheduled to take place the day after tomorrow. It is not for my delegation to interpret the meaning of these elections or the intentions of the Southern Rhodesian Government in calling these elections. Nor can we predict what events may flow from the elections. We are somewhat, but reservedly, encouraged by the fact that the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia has indicated that the elections are not connected with an intention of making a unilateral declaration of independence and that it is the intention of the Southern Rhodesian Government to con-

tinue to seek independence through negotiation. We equally hope that it is not the intention of the Southern Rhodesian Government, as has been suggested both within and outside Southern Rhodesia, to use the elections as the grounds on which to make constitutional amendments which would in effect further restrict the rights of certain segments of the Southern Rhodesian population. Our anxiety on both these counts cannot be too strongly emphasized.

The representative of the United Kingdom in his first statement before the Council presented the very difficult position of his Government, as well as its mounting concern, with frankness and clarity. He set forward three principles which guide his Government's actions and policy in undertaking to find a peaceful resolution to the problems in Southern Rhodesia. I believe that these principles and the actions flowing therefrom effectively meet the situation as it exists.

First of all there is the principle that independence should be granted on a basis acceptable to the people of the country as a whole. This principle is fundamental and has been endorsed by all the speakers in the Council.

Second, that the means of achieving such a goal must be through negotiation, in other words, through peaceful change. My delegation has repeatedly insisted that peaceful change can best be accomplished through communication, through consultation, through reestablishing the broken links of contact among the various factions in Southern Rhodesia. We have consistently supported and encouraged the particular role and special responsibility of the United Kingdom in attempting to reestablish this vital communication.

Finally, the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom said it was a basic principle of his Government's policy that "no one must be left in any doubt of the true constitutional position or of the political and economic consequences which would flow from an illegal declaration of independence." As has been evident in the

speeches of all the members of the Council and the distinguished foreign ministers, it is a possibility whose consequences are almost universally accepted as disastrous. The U.K. Government first in its statement of the 27th of October and more recently and equally firmly in the statement of the British Prime Minister before the House of Commons on the 29th of April has made this clear. It is difficult for my delegation to believe that the Southern Rhodesian Government in the face of these two unequivocal statements by the United Kingdom, in the face of the rejection by the Rhodesian Tobacco Trade Association of the conclusions of the Government's recent white paper on the consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence, in the face of the warnings recently published by the Rhodesian branch of the Institute of Directors, could still seriously harbor aspirations to undertake such an unwise course.

The United States agrees completely with the estimate set forth by the United Kingdom in the two statements I have referred to, as well as the estimate of other speakers, that a Southern Rhodesia which had achieved its independence under conditions which did not have the approval of the substantial majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia would find itself isolated and unrecognized in the world community. Nor can we be unmindful of the possible internal consequences of such an action—consequences which could culminate in bloodshed and violence. No, we urge the Government of Southern Rhodesia to cease considering rapid accession to independence on a basis other than one approved by the majority. As Ambassador Tree said last week, immediate independence is not the answer to the problems in Southern Rhodesia, and those both inside and outside the Southern Rhodesian Government who see a cure-all in this course of action are either misled or indulging in self-deception.

But it is not enough to speak solely in terms of preventive action, nor is it enough to dwell on ways of avoiding a worsening of the situation in Southern Rhodesia. Our prime task here should be to seek ways and

means toward achieving the overall goal of majority government and respect for the rights of all. From this we should not be diverted. The United States has always felt that the key to progress was the reestablishment and strengthening of communication between the various sectors. As pointed out by the Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Bottomley, and Lord Gardiner, however, there has been a hardening of attitudes, and with this hardening there seems to be a further reduction in communication.

The United States therefore welcomed the recent visit of the Commonwealth Secretary. We welcomed it because it was a positive step on the path of negotiation charted by the United Kingdom, and a positive undertaking to communicate with and to obtain the views of all segments of the population of Southern Rhodesia. We see in the United Kingdom's ability and willingness to talk with all the parties a prelude to that welcome day when the parties can begin to deal directly with each other. We have consistently held that if a constitutional conference is not possible for the moment, then informal discussions which touch on the views of all parties concerned should be commenced. We hope and believe that the sort of discussions initiated in the visit of the Commonwealth Secretary will be vigorously pursued. This negotiation and consultation seems to us the most helpful path to a solution of this stubborn deadlock which can do Southern Rhodesia no good in the long run.

I have spoken of the initiatives, responsibilities, and constructive actions of the United Kingdom. But the key party in this issue at this point is the Government of Southern Rhodesia. The whole world—as this hearing in the Security Council so amply demonstrates—looks anxiously to the authorities in Salisbury for an encouraging response to the legitimate aspirations of all its people.

The Southern Rhodesian Government must face reality; it must face up to its responsibilities—responsibilities which encompass the entire population of Southern Rhodesia. It lies within the power of the Southern

Rhodesia Government to reverse the trend of fear, repression, and reaction. The presently ruling white minority must give a signal, if any confidence is to be established, that it does not intend blindly to attempt to cling to its position of predominant power and special privilege. The Rhodesian Government and the white Rhodesians must recognize that their present attitude not only appears to ignore the course of history in the 20th century, to run against the trend of events on their own continent, but would seem only to spell future unhappiness and isolation for their own country.

Finally, Mr. President, let me express a hope that the people of Southern Rhodesia, and in particular the members of the Government of Southern Rhodesia, will have followed carefully the Council's deliberations. Let us hope that they will detect the deep concern of the Council, the concern of the African nations, the concern of the world. May they also detect the sympathy and understanding which most of the speakers in the Council have shown for the difficulties which they face in the immediate future.

We hope that both the deliberations and the decisions of this Council will assist the Southern Rhodesians and the United Kingdom in moving ahead with dispatch on a course of peaceful evolution for Southern Rhodesia.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Letter dated March 9 from the Representative of Rumania transmitting a statement of his Government on "aggressive military actions of the United States against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam." S/6224. March 9, 1965, 3 pp.

Letter dated March 9 from the Representative of the U.S.S.R. transmitting the text of a statement of

the Soviet Government concerning "the provocative actions of United States armed forces against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam." S/6225. March 9, 1965. 3 pp.

Letter dated March 27 from the Representative of the U.S.S.R. transmitting a note from his Government regarding the use of "poison gases" in South Viet-Nam. S/6260. March 27, 1965. 4 pp.

Letter dated April 2 from the Representative of the United States regarding the "completely false allegation" contained in the Soviet note (S/6260) on the use of gas in Viet-Nam. S/6270. April 2, 1964. 4 pp.

Letter dated May 18 from the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples transmitting the text of a resolution adopted by the Committee on May 17 concerning the situation in Aden. S. 6368. May 19, 1965. 3 pp.

U.S. Reports to United Nations on ICY Activities

Following is the text of a letter from Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to Ambassador Paul Tremblay, chairman of the U.N. Committee for the International Cooperation Year, together with a copy of a U.S. note to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

U.S./U.N. press release 1563 dated May 21

TEXT OF LETTER

MAY 20, 1965

DEAR AMBASSADOR TREMBLAY: It is my pleasure to transmit to you and to the United Nations Committee on International Cooperation Year a copy of our May 17 note to the Secretary-General on action undertaken in the United States to examine, publicize, and extend where appropriate, the many governmental and non-governmental activities in this country designed to increase international cooperation.

I believe that the late Prime Minister Nehru in launching the concept of International Cooperation Year was right in looking beyond the difficult and trying issues which are often in the forefront of international relations to the broader and deeper problems of building a safer and more prosperous international community. This community is constructed—as are our own

towns, cities, and nations—not out of a single organizational pattern but out of a complex network of contacts, relationships, interests, and shared beliefs which stretch across the often artificial boundaries which separate men and nations from each other. It is these common interests and beliefs which are the bases of international cooperation, and it is to them that we are addressing ourselves in the United States during International Cooperation Year. For we know that continued growth of international law and order, which is the guarantee of constructive change, can be no stronger than the community of shared interests and beliefs.

Yours sincerely,

ADLAI E. STEVENSON

U.S. NOTE TO SECRETARY-GENERAL

MAY 17, 1965

The Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honor to refer to note No. PU 112 2 (9-2-3) from the Chairman of the Committee for the International Cooperation Year, dated March 8, 1965, requesting information on the plans and intentions of the United States for the International Cooperation Year.

On October 2, 1964, President Johnson signed a Proclamation designating 1965 as International Cooperation Year in the United States. At that time, he asked the Department of State to take the lead for the Government, and the United Nations Association of the United States to do the same for the private sector, in carrying out an International Cooperation Year Program based on a unique partnership between the American public and government.¹ Since October, 1964, the following developments have taken place:

On November 24, 1964, the President appointed a Cabinet Committee representing nineteen agencies and departments of the government.² Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland was designated Chairman of the Cabinet Committee. By mid-March 1965, the Committee had met three times and had formed 30 working committees, covering areas of international cooperation ranging from Arms Con-

¹ For a statement by the President and text of the proclamation, see BULLETIN of Oct. 19, 1964, p. 555.

² *Ibid.*, Dec. 14, 1964, p. 857.

trol to Youth Activities.³ A National Citizens Commission has been formed in the private sector, consisting of approximately 230 distinguished Americans representing all aspects of American society.

The National Council for International Cooperation,⁴ which includes both the Cabinet Committee and the National Citizens Commission, has established 30 joint ICY committees in order to submit recommendations to the President at the White House Conference on International Cooperation, which has been scheduled for November 29-December 1, 1965. The purposes of the joint committees are: (1) to inform the President and the people where we now stand internationally in the major functional areas of international cooperation; (2) to suggest where we ought to be going in each of these areas; and (3) to recommend how best to get there.

The thirty committees will deal with the following subjects: Agriculture and Food, Arms Control and Disarmament, Atomic Energy, Aviation, Business and Industry, Communications, Culture and Intellectual Exchange, Development of International Law, Disaster Relief, Education, Finance and Monetary Affairs, Health, Human Rights, Labor, Meteorology, Peacekeeping Operations (UN), Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Population, Public Information, Research on Development of International Institutions, Resource Conservation and Development, Science and Technology, Social Welfare and The Aging, Space, Technical Cooperation and Investment, Trade, Transportation, Urban Development, Women's Activities and Youth Activities.

The National Citizens Commission was formed by the United Nations Association of the United States, a privately supported educational and research organization, in response to the request of the Secretary of State that it play a central role in coordinating the participation of the private sector in International Cooperation Year. The Commission is expected to accelerate and focus the wide variety of activities that this observance of the United Nations' 20th anniversary has already launched.

The National Citizens Commission will also work with non-governmental organizations in the country to undertake a nationwide educational program on international cooperation as a basic necessity of our time and a precondition for peace, economic growth and social progress.

Non-governmental organizations in other countries which wish to strengthen existing programs of international cooperation involving the United States will, it is expected, work directly through the American organizations with which they are already in contact; those which wish to establish new programs might best channel inquiries or proposals to the

United Nations Association of the USA, 345 East 46th Street, New York, New York 10017, which will in turn forward them to the appropriate Committee of the National Citizens Commission.

First Results of the US Program for ICY

In his first report to the White House on ICY, Mr. Cleveland indicated that as the program is now developing, it seems capable of serving other important purposes besides making proposals for cooperative action. As currently planned, it could: (1) focus attention on highly important international programs that are often obscured by international crises; (2) serve as a market place and laboratory for new ideas; (3) reflect a broad consensus between the Government and the citizenry as well as political bipartisanship. Where such agreement exists, the ICY program could be used to dramatize and consolidate public understanding and support.

The first specific recommendation to emerge from the review undertaken in the specialized fields was the proposal of an international system to monitor and report adverse reactions to drugs. On April 21 the President announced that the United States Government would make such a proposal at the World Health Assembly which convened in Geneva on May 4.⁵ The United States Delegation has proposed an International Adverse Drug Reaction Center which would be created by the World Health Organization, to develop a world-wide early warning system for drugs. Such a system could help prevent widespread tragedy of the sort which resulted from the use of thalidomide.

The President announced on April 21, "We have already established an excellent national system for monitoring adverse drug reactions, under the United States Food and Drug Administration. The expansion of this into an international system would be of direct benefit to the American people since it would include the monitoring of adverse reactions throughout the world."

The International Adverse Drug Reaction Center would be similar to WHO-designated centers in other fields which are currently in operation in the United States and other countries. These centers include: the International Shigella Center at the Communicable Disease Center of the Public Health Service, in Atlanta; the International Rickettsial Disease Center at the Rocky Mountain Laboratory of the National Institute of Health, in Hamilton, Montana; the International Center for Biological Standards of the State Serum Institute, in Copenhagen, Denmark; and the World Influenza Center at the National Institute for Medical Research in London, England.

A second American response to the General Assembly's ICY resolution concerns cooperative action in the Antarctic. On May 1, 1965, President Johnson made a special announcement upon the receipt of the first progress report from his recently formed Ant-

³ *Ibid.*, Mar. 15, 1965, p. 382.

⁴ For text of remarks made by Vice President Humphrey before the National Council on June 2, see p. 1048.

⁵ BULLETIN of May 24, 1965, p. 814.

arctic Policy Group.⁶ In his announcement the President noted that the Group's work has taken on "special importance as part of the United States Government's observance of the International Cooperation Year." The President went on to say, "I have been deeply impressed by the sensible way in which the 12 nations active in Antarctica work together. In that frozen continent we have, through international cooperation, shown how nations of many different outlooks can cooperate for peaceful purposes and mutual benefit. National differences are no barrier to a common effort in which everyone gains and no one loses. The scientific findings of all countries are pooled for the benefit of all. Men in danger or in need can call for help knowing that it will be given unstintingly by any country that can provide it.

"We are now celebrating International Cooperation Year. It is my earnest hope that the same success that has marked the Antarctic program can be extended to every field of international endeavor, not only during this special year, but in future years as well."

The United States Government will continue to make available information on the International Cooperation Year Program in the United States as developments warrant further reports.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, with annex, as amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284.

Acceptance deposited: Cyprus, June 7, 1965.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964.¹

Accession deposited: Malawi, May 19, 1965.

Labor

Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the International Labor Organization. Dated

⁶ *Ibid.*, June 21, 1965, p. 1013.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

at Montreal October 9, 1946. Entered into force April 20, 1948. TIAS 1846.

Admission to membership: Yemen, May 20, 1965.

Postal Services

Universal postal convention with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution, and provisions regarding air mail, with final protocol. Done at Ottawa October 3, 1957. Entered into force April 1, 1959. TIAS 4202.

Adherence: Malta, May 21, 1965.

Safety at Sea

Convention on safety of life at sea. Done at London June 10, 1948. Entered into force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495.

Notifications of denunciations received: Denmark, Norway, May 26, 1965; effective May 26, 1966.

International convention for the safety of life at sea. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.

Acceptances deposited: Canada, May 26, 1965; Federal Republic of Germany (including Land Berlin), May 25, 1965; Korea, May 21, 1965.

Satellite Communications System—Arbitration

Supplementary agreement on arbitration (COM-SAT). Done at Washington June 4, 1965.²

Signatures: Secretaría de Estado de Comunicaciones of Argentina, June 7, 1965; Bundesministerium für Verkehr und Elektrizitätswirtschaft, Generaldirektion für die Post- und Telegraphenverwaltung of Austria, June 8, 1965; Permanent Secretary in charge of Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications of Ceylon, June 7, 1965; Ethiopia, June 10, 1965; Ministry of Communications, Directorate General of Telecommunications of Greece, June 9, 1965; Postmaster-General of New Zealand, June 9, 1965; Telegrafstyret of Norway, June 7, 1965.

Trade

Second procès-verbal extending the declaration on provisional accession of Switzerland to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 22, 1958, as extended (TIAS 4461, 4957). Done at Geneva October 30, 1964. Entered into force for the United States December 18, 1964. TIAS 5734.

Acceptances deposited: Czechoslovakia, February 18, 1965; Greece, February 3, 1965; Iceland, March 8, 1965; India, March 24, 1965; Luxembourg, February 9, 1965; Malawi, March 12, 1965; Malta, March 1, 1965; Netherlands, February 2, 1965; Trinidad and Tobago, January 27, 1965; Tunisia, February 19, 1965.

Protocol amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and development and to amend annex I. Open for acceptance, by signature or otherwise, at Geneva from February 8 until December 31, 1965.²

Acceptances deposited: Australia (with statement), May 19, 1965; Malta, May 20, 1965.

United Nations

Amendments to the Charter of the United Nations (TS 993). Adopted at United Nations Headquarters, New York, December 17, 1963.²

Ratification advised by the Senate: June 3, 1965

² Not in force.

Wheat

Protocol for the extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington March 22 through April 23, 1965.²

Acceptances deposited: India, June 10, 1965; Saudi Arabia, June 8, 1965.

BILATERAL

Austria

Amendment to the agreement of July 22, 1959 (TIAS 4402), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 11, 1965. Enters into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

Brazil

Agreement relating to radio communications between amateur stations on behalf of third parties. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 1, 1965. Entered into force June 1, 1965.

British Guiana

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Signed at Georgetown May 29, 1965. Enters into force on the date of notification from British Guiana that the agreement has been approved in conformity with British Guiana's constitutional procedures.

Portugal

Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio operators of either country to operate their stations in the other country. Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon May 17 and 26, 1965. Entered into force May 26, 1965.

Viet-Nam

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Saigon May 26, 1965. Entered into force May 26, 1965.

² Not in force.

Yugoslavia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of December 28, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4923, 5009, 5571). Effected by exchange of notes at Belgrade May 21, 1965. Entered into force May 21, 1965.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: June 7-13

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to June 7 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 134 of June 2 and 138 and 139 of June 6.

No.	Date	Subject
*140	6/7	U.S.-Japan conference on use of natural resources.
†141	6/8	<i>Foreign Relations</i> volume released.
†142	6/8	Rostow: "Peace: The Central Task of Foreign Policy."
*143	6/9	Tasca sworn in as Ambassador to Morocco (biographic details).
†144	6/9	Cotton textile agreement with Colombia.
*145	6/9	Knight sworn in as Ambassador to Belgium (biographic details).
*146	6/9	Annual honor awards ceremony.
†147	6/9	Meeker: Foreign Law Association, New York, N.Y.
148	6/10	ANZUS Council meeting.
*149	6/10	Harriman: Iona College Alumni Association, New York, N.Y. (excerpts).
150	6/10	U.S.-Japan communique on use of natural resources.
†151	6/10	Rusk: First Inter-American Conference of the Partners of the Alliance.
*152	6/11	Green sworn in as Ambassador to Indonesia (biographic details).

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

American Principles
 Guidelines of U.S. Foreign Policy (Rusk) . . . 1030
 The Morality of Nations (Johnson) . . . 1026

Asia. Southeast Asia Aid Program (Johnson, Rusk) 1054

Australia
 ANZUS Council Meets at Washington . . . 1029
 The Purpose That Binds America and Australia (Johnson) 1050

Belgium. Knight confirmed as Ambassador . 1053

Congress
 Confirmations (Green, Harris, Jova, Knight, Leddy, Mann) 1053
 Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy 1060
 Southeast Asia Aid Program (Johnson, Rusk) 1054
 Cyprus. The New Diplomacy (Ball) 1042

Department and Foreign Service. Confirmations (Green, Harris, Jova, Knight, Leddy, Mann) 1053

Diplomacy
 Geography and Foreign Affairs (Pearcy) . . 1035
 Guidelines of U.S. Foreign Policy (Rusk) . . 1030
 The New Diplomacy (Ball) 1042

Dominican Republic. The New Diplomacy (Ball) 1042

Economic Affairs. U.S., Japan Hold Second Meeting on Use of Natural Resources (joint communique) 1052

Europe. Leddy confirmed as Assistant Secretary 1053

Foreign Aid. Southeast Asia Aid Program (Johnson, Rusk) 1054

Geography. Geography and Foreign Affairs (Pearcy) 1035

Germany. Chancellor Erhard of Germany Talks With President Johnson (joint statement) 1051

Honduras. Jova confirmed as Ambassador . 1053

Indonesia. Green confirmed as Ambassador . 1053

International Organizations and Conferences
 ANZUS Council Meets at Washington . . . 1029
 Mann confirmed as U.S. Alternate Governor of IMF and IBRD 1053

Iran. Letters of Credence (Khosrovani) . . . 1041

Japan. U.S., Japan Hold Second Meeting on Use of Natural Resources (joint communique) 1052

Laos. Southeast Asia Aid Program (Johnson, Rusk) 1054

Luxembourg. Mrs. Harris confirmed as Ambassador 1053

Military Affairs. Mission of U.S. Troops in Viet-Nam Defined (White House statement) 1041

New Zealand. ANZUS Council Meets at Washington 1029

Non-Self-Governing Territories. U.S. Expresses Views on Southern Rhodesian Independence in U.N. Committee of 24 and Security Council (Stevenson, Tree) . . . 1061

Presidential Documents
 Chancellor Erhard of Germany Talks With President Johnson 1051
 The Morality of Nations 1026
 The Purpose That Binds America and Australia 1050
 Southeast Asia Aid Program 1054

Southern Rhodesia. U.S. Expresses Views on Southern Rhodesian Independence in U.N. Committee of 24 and Security Council (Stevenson, Tree) 1061

Thailand. Southeast Asia Aid Program (Johnson, Rusk) 1054

Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . 1069

United Nations
 Current U.N. Documents 1066
 National Power and the Creation of a Workable World Community (Humphrey) . . 1048
 U.S. Expresses Views on Southern Rhodesian Independence in U.N. Committee of 24 and Security Council (Stevenson, Tree) . . . 1061
 U.S. Reports to United Nations on ICY Activities (note to U.N. Secretary-General) 1067

Viet-Nam
 Mission of U.S. Troops in Viet-Nam Defined (White House statement) 1041
 The New Diplomacy (Ball) 1042
 Southeast Asia Aid Program (Johnson, Rusk) 1054

Name Index

Ball, George W 1042
 Erhard, Ludwig 1051
 Green, Marshall 1053
 Harris, Patricia Roberts 1053
 Humphrey, Vice President 1048
 Jova, Joseph J 1053
 Johnson, President 1026, 1050, 1051, 1054
 Khosrovani, Khosro 1041
 Knight, Ridgway B 1053
 Leddy, John M 1053
 Mann, Thomas C 1053
 Pearcy, G. Etzel 1035
 Rusk, Secretary 1030, 1054
 Stevenson, Adlai E 1061, 1067
 Tree, Marietta P 1061

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

NEW STATE DEPARTMENT FILM

"The Unending Struggle"

This 29-minute, 16 mm., black-and-white documentary film, photographed entirely in Ecuador portrays various aspects of U.S. national interests abroad—political, economic, military, cultural—and shows some of the ways in which the American "country team" works to protect and advance these interests.

The scenes range from a meeting in the Presidential Palace between the U.S. Ambassador and the heads of Ecuador's Government to the jungle near Santo Domingo, where U.S. Army guerrilla warfare experts are training Ecuadorean soldiers in counterinsurgency techniques, to the steaming docks of Guayaquil, where American labor attachés are at work among workers and officials of the banana loaders trade union.

The film is available for loan (the only charge is return postage) to schools and colleges, television stations, public service organizations, and any other interested groups. Prints can also be purchased for \$39.54. A discussion guide to accompany the film has been prepared by the Department of State Film Library.

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