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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

The United States and Africa: A Unity of Purpose

This pamphlet contains President Johnson's address marking the third anniversary of the Organization of African Unity on May 26, 1966. Discussing Africa's "truly remarkable" emergence from colonialism to independence in the last 15 years, the President called for increased aid from all external sources to help the African peoples build "a modern Africa," and cited several "missions on which America and Africa can work together."

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October 3, 1966

SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF SEPTEMBER 16 478

UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF THE U.N. AND THE WORLD

by Assistant Secretary Sisco 487

U.S. AND BURMA REAFFIRM BONDS OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION

*State Visit of General Ne Win,
Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the Union of Burma 483*

INTERNATIONAL ISSUES OF PACIFIC FISHERIES

Article by William C. Herrington 500

For index see inside back cover

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of September 16

Press release 211 dated September 16

Secretary Rusk: Gentlemen, as you know, the General Assembly of the United Nations will be convening the first part of next week. As is my practice, I expect to go up for a period during the beginning portion of the General Assembly. The trade union of foreign ministers normally meets there. There will be a very large number of foreign ministers present, and I look forward to this chance to have a great many talks with them about problems right around the world.

Since I will be away next week—I will be back here the following week—I thought I might meet with you very briefly today. But since I have a good many things on the calendar, quite frankly, the briefer the better from my point of view. But I will take your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Chinese today have protested that American planes bombed Chinese villages on September 9 and that there was an air battle with Chinese fighters. Can you tell us anything about this alleged incident?

A. I checked back on what we had on that. There was an announcement in Saigon, I think, the following—the day after that alleged incident, in which we reported that our pilots had encountered some MIG's about 30 miles south of the Chinese frontier. That is the only information we have. We will be looking into it further, of course, to see if there is any possibility of any mistake.¹

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there a new decision, as has now been widely reported, on the United States stand to keep Communist China out of the United Nations again this session?

A. Well, I am not aware of a specific and new decision in point of time. Actually the basic situation remains very much the same. Those who have been most active in promoting the membership of Peking to the United Nations have at the same time wanted to expel the Republic of China from the United Nations. I have no doubt that there is a substantial majority of the United Nations who would not be willing to undertake that course of action.

Further, so far as we know, Peking has not changed its view that the United Nations itself must undertake substantial reforms before Peking is interested in membership, such as expelling those members who are looked upon by Peking as imperialist puppets. Beyond that, Peking is a major obstacle toward a peaceful settlement of the situation in Viet-Nam.

We are in touch with the governments members of the United Nations regularly on this matter. We will be in further touch with them during the course of the General Assembly. But we do not see the basis on which the United Nations is in a position to vote Peking into membership at this point.

¹On Sept. 19 the Department spokesman read the following statement to news correspondents:

We have investigated the charges relating to September 9 and September 17, and there is a possibility that some inadvertent intrusion of Communist China may have taken place during the breakoff from air engagements over North Viet-Nam. Any such inadvertent intrusion is regretted. With regard to the charges about strikes on Chinese Communist territory, there have been no such strikes by U.S. aircraft, and such strikes would be contrary to orders.

On Sept. 20 the spokesman added that his earlier statement applied also "to the alleged incident of the 5th."

Q. Mr. Secretary, to clarify that a little bit, Ambassador Goldberg and a number of administration spokesmen have been saying for months that this problem of Chinese representation issue was under review here. Now, it seems to be that you have come to the conclusion in your review, and that you have decided to continue the previous policies. Isn't that—

A. No. The question has been under review since 1949.

Q. I am talking about this last vote.

A. The principal thing that we have tried to do in recent months different from the past has been to open up in our contacts with Peking the possibilities of some exchanges and some further contacts and some sort of effort to break through the walls of isolation that Peking has built around itself, thus far without any success. President Johnson has asked us to do that in our talks.

As you know, the Chinese Ambassador in Warsaw has protested rather vigorously about our making any comments at all on those talks. But the net effect of those thus far have been negative.

But of course these questions remain under constant consideration or review—but those words are a little misleading because they are sometimes taken as meaning that major changes of policy are contemplated. We always examine the situation. But as I indicated, the basic situation remains about where it was.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a growing concern among foreign correspondents about a lack of background briefings we used to get during the Kennedy days, but we almost get none now. Do you think that situation could be corrected?

A. Well, I would be glad to have you discuss that with Mr. Donnelley [Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Dixon Donnelley] and my colleagues. Certainly there has been no review of that matter in recent days and a change of policy in that respect. But I will be glad to have them take that up with you.

Q. Mr. Secretary, recently a group of rather prominent Americans have petitioned the President that when Chancellor [Ludwig] Erhard comes here he be informed in no uncertain terms that West Germany is not to get a finger on the trigger of any nuclear weapons under NATO or any other basis. Do you have any comment on this suggestion?

Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

A. Well, I think we need to keep certain things separate and not let these problems get confused and mixed up.

We are opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We have never discussed in NATO or anywhere else any arrangements that would involve the proliferation of nuclear weapons, that is, the transfer of nuclear weapons into the hands of non-nuclear powers or the transfer of control of those weapons into the hands of non-nuclear powers. Our policy on that point is very strong indeed.

Now, the Federal Republic of Germany is about the only nonnuclear state that I know of that has formally forsworn the manufacture of nuclear weapons, its own nuclear weapons capability.

That is one thing.

And if the Soviet Union and others want to talk about the problem of proliferation, they will find that the United States is willing to go all the way to insure that there is no proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Now, if other issues become involved into that problem, simply to confuse it, then the matter gets complicated.

We have an alliance in NATO comprising members who are themselves the target of Soviet nuclear missiles. We have a NATO alliance, some of whose members have nuclear weapons, and the circumstances, the conditions, the occasions on which those weapons might be used are a matter of great importance to all the members of the alliance.

When we are talking about war and peace, I would remind you that, whether we are talking about nuclear weapons or conven-

tional weapons, the question of the circumstances under which the alliance would resort to military action in its own defense is a matter of concern to all the members of the alliance.

Now, we would hope that those things which have to do with proliferation in the true sense, in the genuine sense, could be isolated out so that we could all move toward progress and toward a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. And we would hope that this question would not be complicated by the injection of issues which have nothing to do with proliferation.

Now, it is not true to say that NATO nuclear arrangements, or the possibilities of NATO nuclear arrangements, stand in the way of a nonproliferation treaty, if those who are talking about a nonproliferation treaty are prepared to talk about nonproliferation and are prepared to put other questions to one side.

But we sympathize with the purpose that these gentlemen have in mind. We have no debate with them about the importance of nonproliferation. And I have no doubt that if we could all concentrate on the problem of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, we could make substantial and rapid progress.

I will be having a chance, in the course of the next period in New York, at the General Assembly, to discuss this matter further with foreign ministers, and I hope we can make some progress on this.

Proposals for Asian Consultations

Q. Mr. Secretary, President [Ferdinand] Marcos of the Philippines proposed an Asian political forum that would be capable of considering such problems as Viet-Nam and perhaps setting up conciliation machinery. He also spoke of efforts to get North and South Viet-Nam into contact with each other as a step toward a negotiated settlement. Would you comment on these proposals?

A. Well, on the first point we will see substantial advantage in the development among the Asian nations themselves of systematic machinery for consultation on po-

litical problems and security questions in which they are all involved. We have been greatly encouraged by what has happened in the last several months in just that sort of direction—the meeting of the ASPAC [Asian and Pacific Council] countries in Korea, the recent meeting of the ASA [Association of Southeast Asia] countries which led to the formal proposal by these three nations [Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand] that there be an Asian conference to take up the question of Viet-Nam—so we would think that any development in that direction would be very much on the plus side.

As far as contacts with North Viet-Nam, South Viet-Nam, or perhaps others on a settlement of Viet-Nam, we of course would welcome any contacts that would elicit from Hanoi a readiness to talk about a peaceful settlement in Southeast Asia. It is not my impression that the Government of the Philippines has found thus far such a response from Hanoi. But this is one of the possibilities that ought to be kept open. All possibilities ought to be kept open. And perhaps something might develop from it in the future. But at the moment I am not aware of any major development in that direction.

Q. Could you evaluate General de Gaulle's trip—at least the Asian part of his trip regarding Viet-Nam?

A. I will be seeing the French Foreign Minister, [Maurice] Couve de Murville, in the course of the opening stages of the General Assembly and will have a chance to get his impressions, his evaluation of that visit. I have very little to add to what you know about the public aspects of that visit. I think we and the Government of France see the situation about the same way as far as Cambodia is concerned.

As far as peace in Viet-Nam is concerned, we did not detect in the important statement made in Phnom Penh any suggestion to Hanoi as to what contribution they were expected to make toward a peaceful settlement in Southeast Asia. In the absence of a balanced view we did not find that that was a complete statement of the problem or

a complete description of the solution. But I really ought not to try to make a broader evaluation until I have had a chance to talk to the French Foreign Minister about his own impressions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, with regard to disarmament again, can you give us an assessment of the Geneva conference which has just adjourned, and can you tell us whether or not in your judgment some kind of priority could be given to the ideas of unilateral declarations by nonnuclear countries who are ready to forgo development of nuclear weapons?

Geneva Disarmament Conference

A. The recent session of the conference in Geneva did not produce dramatic results, although I must say that I felt that the detailed discussions that went on behind the scenes appeared to me to be quite worth while. And I noted with some interest that at the time of their recess the delegates there of all persuasions seemed to speak with some optimism about the possibilities when the conference reconvenes. And my guess is that these questions that were to be discussed at the Geneva conference will be discussed further in detail among some of the foreign ministers as they will be meeting with each other in New York in the next—during the next 2 or 3 weeks. I do not despair myself of the possibilities in the field of nonproliferation. I would hope that we could conclude a space treaty that would insure that space activities are concentrated on peaceful purposes. I would hope that we could make some headway on some of the other proposals that have been made by us and by others having to do with a cutoff in production of nuclear materials for weapons purposes and a freeze on the nuclear delivery vehicles and other matters so that we can begin to make some progress on disarmament, even though some of the outstanding political issues that are so difficult and so dangerous are still unresolved. We can't afford to give up on this effort. And I think persistence might very well pay off. We would like to see some progress on a comprehensive test ban treaty. But thus far we have not been able to solve

the problem of providing sufficient assurances and guarantees of compliance among all those that might be parties to the treaty.

Elections in South Viet-Nam

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been some suggestion that, even though there were killings and quite a bit of propaganda, the Viet Cong effort to disrupt the elections was somewhat halfhearted. Do you have any analysis of that?

A. Well, I saw a story to that effect which came in after the elections. I must say that my own impressions, based upon reports before and during the election, were rather in the other direction. From what we heard from prisoners and defectors and from captured documents and from radio broadcasts by the Liberation Front, Hanoi, and by actual incidents on the ground, it was my impression that the Viet Cong had made an all-out effort to interfere with these elections. They did it through threats of assassination; they did it through the attempt to terrorize the voter by a seizing of voting cards and by attacks on voting booths. So that I am skeptical of reports that somehow the Viet Cong did not really want to interfere with the elections but were pursuing a different policy privately than the one they were pursuing overtly and with every means at their disposal.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the election itself, it is being widely said here that this is—hopefully, that this is setting a new political process in motion in a democratic sense in South Viet-Nam. Is the U.S. prepared to accept the possibility that the Assembly or successor body so elected itself might open negotiations with Hanoi?

A. The Assembly which has just been elected is a constituent assembly; its primary purpose is to draft a constitution. And based upon the program that had been announced as early as last January, the thought has been that they would draft the constitution, the constitution would be approved, there would then be elections under that constitution for a national assembly on the basis of

which a civilian government would be constituted. And I think it may well be that on some matters there would be certainly consultation between the present government in Saigon and these elected representatives who come from all parts of the country and all elements in the population. But its primary purpose is to draft a constitution. I would not think that this constituent assembly would undertake negotiations with Hanoi, for example, or matters of that sort.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you discern any shift of influence within the Peking-Hanoi-Moscow triangle, and, if so, does this seem to portend anything hopeful as far as negotiations are concerned?

A. No, I would not be able to certify as to changes in that regard. It is a matter in which we are greatly interested and that we try to be informed about. But I am not sure that the three capitals that you have mentioned are very well informed about the relative position of the three capitals in these matters. No, I would not be in a position yet to draw any conclusions on that subject.

The Communist Chinese Red Guards

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us some evaluation of what is going on now inside Communist China with the Red Guards and the cultural revolution?

A. I think I have said before that I suspect what is going on is of some importance, but if I were to be frank with you I would have to say that I don't know what it is.

We have been interested in this phenomenon of the Red Guards, the efforts which they have made in some parts of the country to attack elements in the Communist Party apparatus. We noted the period of what seemed to be excesses, followed by attempts by the leadership to restrain those excesses.

But I think that I would be fraudulent if I were to try to say to you that I think we know the real significance of these recent

events. My guess is that there are some very important issues at stake there inside China on these matters, but we will have to wait a little bit to find out just what those are.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security held hearings this week in which various Cubans testified about the conditions and horrors in prisons there in the imprisonment of a great many political persons. They, also, as a rule, appealed for U. S. help. Is there any help the United States can give in that area?

A. It is limited. It is limited because our influence in Havana is not very substantial these days. We have tried to open up the question of the release of political prisoners to permit them to leave Cuba. But very little has happened on that of substance. I don't think that I can add very much to what has been taken up in the testimony on this matter.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do we have any information that the Soviets will release the Peace Corps worker who went across the border into the Soviet Union?

A. Not yet. We would hope that that could occur very quickly. As some of you know from what has been said earlier, this incident occurred along some beaches where it is customary for people to go for recreation. Apparently there was a small stream across which one can walk without too much difficulty. Beyond that stream was a fence, which seemed to be the Soviet frontier. Our Peace Corps man, Mr. [Thomas R.] Dawson, apparently waded across this small stream and between the stream and the fence was picked up by Soviet guards. There seemed to be no signs at the stream itself. I think he assumed that the fence was the border.

It was one of those trivial and unintentional and inadvertent acts—if it did occur. And we would hope that the Soviet Union would immediately recognize the nature of this infraction, if, indeed, it was an infraction, and release him very promptly.

We have asked for consular access to Mr.

Dawson, and we would hope that will be accorded to us very promptly.

Q. Mr. Secretary, U Thant has made something close to a Sherman-like statement, and he has urged the U. N. to begin to consider alternatives. Have we begun to consider these alternatives? And, if not, why not?

A. Well, I think this is something that will be a matter of great interest to all of the delegates as they assemble for the General Assembly.

As you know, we would hope very much that the Secretary-General will continue to serve. I think there is a very strong consensus throughout the United Nations that it would be in the interest of the world organization if the Secretary-General would continue in his present office. But I think it would not be helpful for me to answer your question directly at this point.

Question of Nuclear Matters in NATO

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said the nonnuclear allies have a right to be interested in the circumstances under which nuclear arms would be used. Where do we stand on the issue of actual physical sharing in the possession of nuclear weapons?

A. Well, exactly how NATO ought to organize its nuclear forces is under continuing discussion, but the point I want to emphasize is that we have never, at any time, talked in NATO about any arrangements that involved the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and, therefore, contingent possibilities about NATO organization ought not to be an obstacle to the conclusion of a nonproliferation treaty, because we are opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We have demonstrated it, sometimes at the cost of relationships with some of our friends. We really do believe in nonproliferation; so that I would think that the question of nuclear matters in NATO is for NATO to continue to consider but that these matters should not be allowed to interfere with the conclusion of a nonproliferation treaty.

U.S. and Burma Reaffirm Bonds of Friendship and Cooperation

General Ne Win, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the Union of Burma, made a state visit to the United States September 8-18. He was in Washington September 8-10, where he met with President Johnson. Following are an exchange of greetings between President Johnson and General Ne Win on September 8, a toast by President Johnson at an informal dinner at the White House that evening, and the text of a joint communique issued on September 9 at the conclusion of their talks.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS

White House press release dated September 8

President Johnson

Your Excellency, Madam Ne Win, distinguished guests: It is a very great pleasure for me to welcome you here to the White House today.

I know, Mr. Chairman, that you and Madam Ne Win are not strangers in this country. This visit will provide the opportunity to renew old friendships as well as make new ones.

This occasion has a special significance, for it is the first visit to the United States by a Chief of State of Burma. We greet you today as the leader of a nation with a long and proud history and a rich cultural heritage. We are delighted that you can be here with us.

We have watched with great interest your country's struggle for independence—a struggle to which you have devoted your entire life.

Mr. Chairman, your views and opinions are valued here. And I look forward with anticipation to the next 2 days to discuss many matters of interest and concern to the people of the world and particularly to our two countries.

The world knows and appreciates Burma's

dedication to peace and to the right of all nations to decide their own destinies.

Your country's consistent support of the United Nations, your signing of the limited test ban treaty, and your participation in the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference all demonstrate this dedication. They reflect your country's dedication to peace and international order, qualities which you have shared with the world through the distinguished and devoted service of U Thant as Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Under your leadership Burma has followed an independent foreign policy designed to serve your country's national interests. Burma has sought nothing from its neighbors but to be left in peace and to develop as it sees fit. This is a policy which we in the United States understand. For the right of people to choose their own form of development has been a fundamental principle of United States policy—a deeply held article of national faith for 200 years.

We had the good fortune to grow from a handful of isolated colonies to a position of great responsibility in the world. We did not deliberately seek this position; in a real sense the force of history shaped it for us. We have the duty not only to strive to achieve justice and a better life for all of our own people and the people of the world, but we also have the responsibility to use our strength to help others to protect their right to live and develop in peace.

Nowhere in the world today are the burdens and responsibilities which our position has thrust upon us heavier or more difficult for us than in Southeast Asia.

Mr. Chairman, our goal in Southeast Asia is a simple one. We want the countries in that area to have the opportunity to develop in peace. We want them to be able to prosper free from outside interference or aggression.

We look forward to the day when the energy and resources now being used in conflict can be used instead in a great cooperative effort to create a better life for all of the peoples of that area.

This is America's hope, Mr. Chairman. This is our dream. This is our goal. That day cannot come too soon for us.

Finally, I want to express my very sincere hope that the friendship between our two peoples, based upon mutual understanding and appreciation, will grow steadily through the coming years.

Mrs. Johnson and I are very pleased to extend a very warm welcome to you, your lovely wife, and your distinguished party to Washington and the United States.

General Ne Win

Mr. President, first of all, may I express to you and Mrs. Johnson and to the American people our heartfelt thanks for the warm welcome extended to me and my wife and the members of my party.

I have come to Washington on a mission of friendship and good will. I have great pleasure in conveying the warm greetings and sincere good wishes of the Union of Burma to the people of the United States of America.

It is my fervent hope that my visit will promote greater understanding between our two peoples and strengthen the bonds which bind our two countries in cordial friendship.

I have looked forward to meeting you, Mr. President, and other American leaders, because I am convinced that such personal contacts will serve to create a better understanding and appreciation of each other and thereby enable us to cooperate fruitfully in the common task of building a peaceful and prosperous world.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S TOAST

White House press release dated September 8

Chairman Ne Win, Madam Ne Win, distinguished guests: Today every man, no matter where he stands, stands in the center of the world. And we Americans, who want to reduce the distance between friends, believe that no man comes from so far off that he cannot find a welcome among us.

So today we welcomed you as a guest in our country. And tonight, we welcome you as a guest in our home.

About you tonight, Mr. Chairman, though you have come from halfway across the world, you see old friends—and you see others who have a deep interest in your country and want to know it better.

For most of us, Burma has traditionally been a land of beauty and serenity, of golden temples, elephants, deep forests, and precious gems. But we know that behind that exotic exterior, your country is a land of hard-working people whose goals are very similar to ours.

We are both family people. We love our children, and we believe in living in peace with our neighbors, provided they stay on their side of the fence and out of our melon patch.

As nations, too, we share common dedications: to national independence, to progress, and to peace. Both our countries emerged from a colonial past and treasure independence all the more for that. Both have been blessed by Providence with a bountiful land.

On the world scene, we both place high value on the just resolution of international differences and on the search for universal peace. This search has led us along different paths—for our situations and our responsibilities have not been the same. But the ultimate goal is there, one in which we both can share.

For our part, I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that just as we shall never shirk our responsibilities, so shall we never fail in our efforts to find a secure and just peace. For the present, the problems of our world place burdens upon us all. And we must be prepared to live with them until all nations have finally become convinced that aggression and terror have no place in human society.

The day of peace will eventually come, a day when all nations will be able to live in their own way, free from threat and fear. When that day arrives, we shall be able to devote all our talents and resources to the

war against the real enemies of mankind—poverty, sickness, and illiteracy—in a vast cooperative effort. Thus shall we raise the hopes and enrich the lives of people throughout the world.

Meanwhile, tonight in this room, we are among friends. And we should, for the moment, put aside our cares and concerns and enjoy each other's company.

Ladies and gentlemen: I ask you to rise and join me in a toast to His Excellency General Ne Win, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the Union of Burma.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

White House press release dated September 9

At the invitation of President Johnson, His Excellency General Ne Win, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the Union of Burma, has paid a state visit to the United States of America. During his visit, the Chairman met with the President and leading members of the United States Government.

The Chairman and Madame Ne Win and the members of their party were accorded a warm welcome and were extended cordial hospitality by the government and the people of the United States. The Chairman expressed his sincere thanks to the government and the people of the United States for their welcome and hospitality.

During the visit the President and the Chairman discussed the further development of the friendly relations existing between the United States and the Union of Burma and exchanged views on international questions of common interest. These discussions were held in an atmosphere of cordiality and mutual understanding.

The President expressed his understanding of the policy of peace and non-alignment pursued by the Union of Burma and his respect for its sovereignty and independence. The Chairman expressed his understanding of the policy of the United States towards Burma and appreciation for the friendly at-

titude of the American people. The two leaders affirmed their determination to strengthen the friendly relations between their two countries in the mutual interest of their two peoples and in the service of the cause of peace and international understanding.

During their discussions, the President and the Chairman reviewed recent developments in South and Southeast Asia in the context of the universal desire of people everywhere to achieve peace and a better life. The President expressed his deep and abiding interest in the achievement of peace and stability in Southeast Asia which would permit the countries of the area in friendly cooperation with each other to devote their energies to economic development and the enrichment of the lives of their peoples. In this connection, he explained the policies the United States is pursuing to help the people of the Republic of Vietnam to defend their freedom and to reconstruct their war-torn society and his efforts, which he is determined to pursue with the greatest vigor, in behalf of an early settlement for peace with justice. The Chairman expressed Burma's desire for a political settlement of the Vietnam question on the basis of respect for her sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity.

The two leaders reaffirmed their earnest desire for an early and peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

The President and the Chairman reaffirmed their belief that mutual respect, non-interference, and equality among all states are the basic principles underlying the crea-

tion of a stable, peaceful international order. The two leaders agreed that every nation should have the right to choose its own political, economic and social system and its own way of life free from any outside interference or pressure.

The President and the Chairman reiterated the support of their countries for the United Nations and emphasized the need for it to develop into an increasingly effective instrument not only for the maintenance of international peace and security but also for the promotion of friendly relations and cooperation among nations and peoples for their economic and social advancement.

The two leaders stressed the urgent need to secure general and complete disarmament under effective international control. They were deeply concerned over the serious dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear weapons and expressed the hope that the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would be extended to cover underground tests as well and that the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee would devote itself with a sense of urgency and determination to the conclusion of a treaty to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The President and the Chairman expressed their satisfaction at having the opportunity to become personally acquainted. They were confident that the personal esteem that marked their frank and friendly talks would promote greater understanding between the United States and the Union of Burma and further strengthen the bonds of friendship and cooperation between them.

Unfinished Business of the U.N. and the World

by Joseph J. Sisco

*Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*¹

It is a privilege to be at this great university and to address this distinguished audience. My pleasure at being here is diminished only by the fact that Secretary Rusk is unable to fulfill his engagement with you this evening. As you know, he is recovering from the flu. I am sure that he would be the first to say that while it has put him out of commission temporarily, this is a minor battle compared with some of the other struggles of a policy character which he takes on every day.

I must confess, when I was asked at the last minute to come here and take the Secretary's place, I was reminded very much of a story going back to President Wilson's days. Some of you may know this one. It appears that Wilson was awakened about 4 one morning by a call from a very aggressive and very eager young officeseeker who said the Commissioner of Highways had just died. Wilson wondered what he was supposed to do about it at that hour of the morning and merely said, "Well, I am very sorry to hear this." This young man went on, "I know that he will be a hard man to replace, Mr. President, and I thought I would be a good man to take his place." Wilson responded with his well-known acid humor, "Well, I think that sounds all right. It is certainly all right by me, if it is all right by the undertaker."

In thinking about the sort of things we might discuss this evening, I concluded that

you gentlemen, as businessmen, would be more interested in hearing about reality than theory.

The reality with which we in the government must deal day after day is the application and obligations of American power. The central object of our foreign policy, and therefore of the application of our power, is the same as it has been since this Republic was founded: "to secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." And to this should be added our determination, expressed so eloquently in the United Nations Charter, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

Translating these objectives into practice means coping with a myriad of problems with a host of countries in countless ways. As comforting as it might be to think that we could retreat to a Fortress America concept—and there are such murmurings of isolationism in the United States—the world is just not made that way today.

Science has brought us closer and made us interdependent. We are no longer distant relatives of the Nigerians and Micronesians. The frontier is becoming crowded, and there is nowhere to move or to hide. When we vault into outer space we need rules to govern traffic. When we communicate by satellite we need to allocate frequencies. When there is disease and famine in any part of the world we cannot draw our cloaks around us and expect epidemics to pass by. The sparks touched off by hunger, overpopulation, and poverty can be fanned into a fire threatening our own homes.

¹ Address made before the Manufacturers Association of Connecticut, Inc., at Yale University, New Haven, Conn., on Sept. 8 (press release 203).

As the world becomes smaller, the problems of achieving our aims become more complicated and more pressing.

In assuming the obligations of power we have become involved with the world in many ways. While we have no desire to be the world's policeman, the interdependence of mankind today leaves us no escape from involvement in most of the major troubles of our times.

We are involved in a complicated network of international relationships. To begin with, we have direct bilateral relations with some 120 different states. Many of these bilateral relations involve provision of American economic or military assistance. Moving beyond this direct relationship, we find a series of multilateral or regional arrangements, such as the Organization of American States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which connect us with some 40 different states in 5 continents. And, on a more universal basis, we conduct our policy through the United Nations. Since this is my particular field of responsibility, I would like to talk to you tonight primarily about current subjects of interest as they appear in the U.N. context.

Optimism Tempered by Hard Facts

The 21st U.N. General Assembly will open in 2 weeks. It will begin its work under the clouds of the Secretary-General's reluctance to continue in office, continuation of the war in Viet-Nam, the persistent militancy of Communist China, and fevered emotions arising from the denial of human rights in southern Africa. Moreover, the U.N. General Assembly gets back to business with a shaky financial structure and a lack of clarity as to where it is going in the peace-keeping field.

A list of the unfinished business of the U.N., and indeed the world, is enough to turn any observer into a pessimist. But I am not a pessimist. Looking ahead, I believe we can take some comfort in the lessons we have learned from 21 years' experience since World War II. This is so particularly if we recall where we stand today and where we

stood 21 years after World War I. At that time, you will remember, the League of Nations was dead and Hitler was unleashing the bloodiest conflict the world has known.

So while we are not yet where we want to be, things could be worse. Moreover, our optimism is tempered by the hard facts which we have learned about the intractability of problems and the limitations of international institutions to deal with them. We have learned that there are no panaceas for world problems, that the U.N. has both capacities and limitations, and the ways in which it can help promote peace depend on the members who make it up. It has no mysterious power of its own. Nevertheless, the U.N. continues to be a useful vehicle to achieve our aims.

U.N. machinery has already proved its worth in such diverse situations as Indonesia, Greece, Palestine, Kashmir, Korea, Suez, Lebanon, Laos, the Congo, West New Guinea, the Yemen, and Cyprus. You and I can sleep more soundly tonight because the U.N. Emergency Force is helping to keep the lid on the situation in the Gaza Strip and the U.N. Force in Cyprus is keeping warring factions apart.

Yet the United Nations has not been able to deal effectively with all threats to the peace.

For example, the United Nations has not been able to do much about the one conflict which I assume is most on your mind—Viet-Nam. But that is not because the U.N. wasn't given a chance. We brought the issue before the Security Council,² but it got nowhere at all because of the attitude of some of the members of the United Nations—and, I might add, the attitude of some nations who are not members.

Now, there are those who charge that our policy in Viet-Nam is an abandonment of charter principles and a confession of lack of faith in the U.N. This is simply a distorted notion of what the U.N. and the charter are all about. The basic purpose of American policy in the Western Pacific as

² For background, see BULLETIN of Feb. 14, 1966, p. 229.

elsewhere is—and I am quoting the Secretary of State—“to establish peace by deterring or repelling aggression.”³ Our goal in Viet-Nam is that of the U.N. Charter: to safeguard the right of the peoples of Southeast Asia to settle their affairs peacefully and to select their form of government by principles of self-determination.

U.S. Policy on Viet-Nam and China

President Johnson has repeatedly made clear and reaffirmed again and again that our policy is totally compatible with our obligations to the U.N.

Let me remind you of the fundamentals of our policy:

We are not trying to wipe out North Viet-Nam.

We are not trying to change their government.

We are not trying to establish permanent bases in South Viet-Nam.

We are not trying to gain one inch of new territory for America.

And we are prepared to withdraw our forces from South Viet-Nam as soon as the people there are enabled to determine their own future without external interference.

As President Johnson said just 3 days ago:⁴

If anyone will show me the time schedule when aggression and infiltration and might-makes-right will be halted, then I, as President of this country, will lay on the table the schedule for the withdrawal of all of our forces from Viet-Nam.

We could, of course, take the easy way out by abandoning our commitment and by turning a blind eye to aggression against South Viet-Nam. But this we cannot do without encouraging the forces of violence and aggression everywhere.

We want a peaceful solution—there can be no doubt of President Johnson’s resolve in this regard.

³ For text of Secretary Rusk’s address at Denver, Colo., on June 14, see *ibid.*, July 11, 1966, p. 44.

⁴ For an excerpt from President Johnson’s remarks at Detroit, Mich., on Sept. 5, see *ibid.*, Sept. 26, 1966, p. 455.

If this desire and determination of the United States is matched by others, peace can be quickly restored in Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, there has so far been no sign that North Viet-Nam is prepared to settle the war unless South Viet-Nam is delivered into Communist control.

Behind North Viet-Nam, of course, stands a militant and restless Communist China. China’s self-isolation in world affairs and the question of Communist China’s representation in the United Nations will come up again this year. It is a subject to which we have given detailed consideration. The real question is Red China’s conduct in world affairs. It has talked and acted in ways that are contrary to the purposes and aims of the organization. Under any and all circumstances we will keep our commitment to the Republic of China on Taiwan. We oppose any proposal to replace the Republic of China with Red China.

The exclusion of Red China from the United Nations during the past 16 years has largely been self-exclusion. Whether and when their attitude will change remains to be seen. Marshal Lin Piao, whose star is evidently on the rise in Peking, is author of the theory that it is China’s unlimited right and duty to foment revolutionary wars against established governments. The developing nations do not welcome this kind of help, and the offer of it has not advanced Peking’s cause in the U.N.

Within the past 48 hours the newspapers have been full of fierce Red Chinese words from Warsaw and moderate words from Peking. If the moderate words prove authentic we will welcome them—but in the end the only words that count are those backed up by deeds.

Another focus of danger to which the United Nations will be giving a lot of attention this fall is the southern part of Africa. Nearly a third of the 117 members of the United Nations are African. They show understandable frustration with U.N. inability to accelerate progress to self-determination and full human dignity in many areas of southern Africa.

Our history and traditions place us firmly with those seeking human dignity, equality, and self-determination. We share their abhorrence of *apartheid* and impatience with white supremacy and obstacles to self-determination. President Johnson told the African ambassadors in his speech on the anniversary of the Organization of African Unity in May: ⁵

The United States has learned from lamentable personal experience that domination of one race by another leads to waste and injustice. Just as we are determined to remove the remnants of inequality from our midst, we are also with you—heart and soul—as you try to do the same.

We believe, as you do, that denial of a whole people's right to shape their national future is morally wrong.

We know from our own history that these problems are not met overnight and that they are never solved except by the patient, practical exercise of man's growing wisdom about himself. Certainly they are never solved by recourse to violence and coercion which belie the very aspects of human dignity, equality, and self-determination which the international community seeks. It would be unreasonable to expect the 21st session of the General Assembly to produce dramatic cures for the ills of southern Africa. It can take only limited measures to help move along the slow but sure progress toward self-determination and to expand the area in which human dignity is protected. What we can and must expect is for the world community to search out the ways to convince the authorities in southern Africa that the strength of their future must be built on the talents and dignity of all of their people and on the respect of their neighbors.

The U.N. and the "Rich-Poor Gap"

I have mentioned some of the important political issues facing the United Nations. Let me now mention a side of its work that should be of particular interest to you as businessmen: the economic. It is in this area that the organization, quietly and with little

fanfare, has perhaps achieved its most substantial accomplishments. Yet despite the important initiatives taken under the U.N.'s Decade of Development, the gap between aspiration and achievement remains wide.

The food problem alone is staggering. Between the mid-1930's and the mid-1960's, for instance, the developing countries shifted from being exporters of 11 million metric tons of food grains a year to being importers of 30 million tons. At this rate, by 1985 the food deficit will be too large to be met by the entire food-exporting capacities of all the food-surplus countries in the world.

In other words, in 20 years much of the world's population will face starvation again unless something now not foreseen or contemplated is done.

Or take another statistical example. The per capita income in the less developed countries as a group now averages only \$120 a year. If we limit ourselves to present efforts the per capita income in these countries will grow only to \$170 by the turn of the century.

It is not hard to see, then, why economic problems are high on the list of "action" matters among the U.N. members from the underdeveloped parts of the globe. These nations feel that unless they can master the technological skills and obtain access to capital necessary for economic growth their independence will have little meaning. They are aware that while investment from the advanced countries in their areas in 1965 totaled about \$9 billion, this figure was well under 1 percent of the gross national product of the investing countries.

The "rich-poor gap" is no simple matter. It is not a mere matter of the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer. Paradoxically, both are getting wealthier, but the poor are not getting wealthier rapidly enough. The gap between the two is getting wider.

The United Nations is trying to respond to this problem. The Special Fund under Paul Hoffman attracted capital totaling more than \$1 billion at a cost to the U.N. of about \$32 million. The Expanded Program

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, June 13, 1966, p. 914.

of Technical Assistance (EPTA), now merged administratively with the Special Fund, has invested about \$500 million in projects such as manpower training, agricultural development, and health education. These projects are particularly vital because they provide needed skills and training to local technicians.

That is not all. The great financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Development Association, as well as such agencies as the Food and Agriculture Organization, World Health Organization, and the International Labor Organization, are all United Nations agencies. Their contributions to economic and social development add significantly to what is being accomplished by the United Nations itself.

Aid through international channels has been an increasingly important supplement to our own bilateral aid programs.

In the past 15 years we have moved in the right direction—but very slowly—in advancing the concept that responsibilities for economic decisions must be shared among donors and recipients. More resources and a new impulse are needed. This is a task for the international community that will certainly continue in our lifetime. It is one version of the moral and political substitute for violent change.

An essential part of the emerging world order, if we are to assure stability, is to get away from the concept of the handout to that of the handclasp, as we have in our own domestic community. It not only means that we must do more but also that the developing countries must take more vigorous measures of self-help.

The ending of the colonial era poses the need to find politically acceptable substitutes for the administrative and economic

aid formerly furnished by the mother countries. The new countries have a special attachment to the U.N. because they can trust it to give aid without substituting one master for another. It is in our interest as well as theirs to realize that the U.N. can furnish such help without compromising their independence and without raising the specter of hostile takeover of their lands. Our interests are served because these programs are helping the developing countries to stand on their own feet.

Looking at the world and at the U.N. from the vantage point of the United States—with our awesome responsibilities and the obligations of the greatest power in the world—we must be clear where our true interests lie. They lie not in the direction of isolation and the withdrawal of our power—but in widening the areas in which our responsibilities can be shared.

If we are to pursue our abiding national interest, we must take to heart what President Johnson recently said—in the context of Asia, but it has universal application:⁶

“The peace we seek . . . is a peace of conciliation between Communist states and their non-Communist neighbors, between rich nations and poor, between small nations and large, between men whose skins are brown and black and yellow and white, between Hindus and Moslems and Buddhists and Christians.

“It is a peace that can only be sustained through the durable bonds of peace: through international trade, through the free flow of people and ideas, through full participation by all nations in an international community under law, and through a common dedication to the great task of human progress and economic development.”

⁶ For text of President Johnson's radio-TV address on July 12, see *ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1966, p. 158.

The Coming of Age of the U.N.

by Arthur J. Goldberg
*U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

I am a great believer in the importance of the Congress in our foreign policy. The President, of course, is in charge of our foreign relations; but under our system of checks and balances, the Congress, too, has important constitutional responsibilities in the foreign policy area. These include not only the advice and consent of the Senate in regard to treaties but also the appropriating role, which gives both Houses of Congress a very great degree of stewardship over the conduct of foreign relations by the executive. In addition, the Congress has the very important power to hold hearings; and, finally, each Member has the individual right of public dissent, just as every citizen does.

The responsible exercise of this right of dissent is not a source of weakness to our country, as is sometimes suggested, but rather a great source of strength.

Recently, for example, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in a speech dissenting from some aspects of our foreign policy, very responsibly and explicitly made a distinction—lest our adversaries should misunderstand him—between his own views and the majority view on these issues. It is important that our adversaries understand the point he is making. The system in which such mutually respectful dis-

sent is possible is not a weak system but a strong one.

It is now a little more than a year since I took up my duties at the United Nations, and so there has been time to reflect on some of the requirements of this job. I think one of the chief qualities it requires is endurance. The issues at the U.N. have a way of persisting. They don't just last a few weeks or months, like most labor disputes; they even go on longer than a New York newspaper dispute; they go on for years and sometimes for decades. Nor is it like the Supreme Court, where one could write a Court decision ending with those wonderfully satisfying words, "It is so ordered." The scope within which the U.N. can give orders to member nations is very narrow indeed. Sometimes I find myself wondering which will last longer—me, or the issue. I feel a little bit like the aged malefactor who came up for sentencing before a notoriously severe judge, and the judge gave him 20 years. "Twenty years, Your Honor!" said the old man. "I'm 86 years old, and I don't expect to live that long." And the judge said, "Do the best you can."

Since the 21st General Assembly will convene in another 2 weeks, we are now in the midst of the annual stocktaking and soul-searching process that every government goes through as it considers the major questions that are likely to come up during the session. Let me touch on some of the most

¹ Address made before the Providence World Affairs Council at Providence, R.I., on Sept. 5 (U.S./U.N. press release 4908).

important of these matters as they affect the United States.

I will begin with the most important of all for most Americans right now, namely, Viet-Nam.

U.S. Policy on Peace in Viet-Nam

Viet-Nam is not formally on the General Assembly agenda, but it is in the minds of all the members and will undoubtedly come up often in the debates. As I said at the United Nations last week, we still hope the organization can play an important role in bringing about an honorable peace in Viet-Nam.² For our part, we remain determined to exercise every restraint and will pursue every effort in order to prevent a major war and to achieve an early end to the present fighting. We will go to Geneva, to Southeast Asia, or anywhere else where an honorable settlement can be negotiated. Our sole aim is to help secure for the people of South Viet-Nam the right to determine their own future free of external interference. When that one aim is accomplished, we are prepared to withdraw our troops.

Those are some of the main points of the American policy on peace in Viet-Nam which we shall be explaining at the U.N. this fall—and not only explaining it, but listening and probing for any sign that our desire and determination for peace is reciprocated by the other side, and especially by the Soviet Union.

Thus far the United Nations has functioned in the Vietnamese situation chiefly as a center of diplomatic contact. We have made strenuous efforts to have it play a greater role. Its inability to do so is no reflection on the organization; it results from the policies of particular members—especially the Soviet Union, which is apparently not yet ready to use its influence for a peaceful negotiated settlement. When such a settlement does become possible—which we hope and pray will happen before too long—we may then look to the United Nations to play a considerable role in carrying out the settlement.

Another focus of danger to which the United Nations will be giving a lot of attention this fall is the southern part of Africa. Nearly a third of the 117 members of the United Nations are African. It is understandable that they should show strong feelings of indignation on issues of colonialism and racial injustice. We will continue to hear about Rhodesia, the Portuguese territories, South Africa, and the mandated territory of South-West Africa as long as the rights of the people are denied in those areas. Because of the very unhelpful decision of the World Court this summer on the question of South-West Africa,³ that question is likely to be the first item debated at the Assembly in the coming session.

And we shall also undoubtedly be hearing more about the continuing crisis in Rhodesia, where the British, with support from the United Nations and from the United States individually, are still seeking to restore legitimate government. Our view of what is necessary in Rhodesia is still the view so clearly stated by President Johnson: namely, the restoration of legitimate government in order “to open the full power and responsibility of nationhood to all the people of Rhodesia—not just 6 percent of them.”⁴

We hope the United Nations will deal effectively and responsibly with all these African issues. For our part, we have no choice but to be faithful to our principles of freedom and equal rights for people of all races.

The mention of these political conflicts points up still another important issue, or combination of issues, facing the General Assembly—namely, how to restore and strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations as a peacekeeper and peacemaker.

There are quite a number of danger spots

² For a statement by Ambassador Goldberg concerning the extension of the U.N. Secretary-General's term of office, see BULLETIN of Sept. 19, 1966, p. 434.

³ For a Department statement of July 27, see *ibid.*, Aug. 15, 1966, p. 231.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, June 13, 1966, p. 914.

in the world. United Nations forces and military observers and truce supervisors even today stand guard in the Middle East, in Cyprus, and in Kashmir. Emissaries of the Secretary-General are active in a number of other delicate situations. It would be most imprudent to assume that these peace agents of the U.N., and others like them in other places, will not be needed in the years to come.

But the future readiness of the U.N. to provide sizable forces, and to finance and maintain them, is by no means certain. Even the financing of the existing U.N. Force which has been keeping the peace in Cyprus has recently been on an almost hand-to-mouth basis. One of the priority tasks of this General Assembly, therefore, will be to put the financing and availability of U.N. peace forces on a sound and practical footing. We can't afford to have the fire department closed for repairs the next time the fire alarm goes off.

The future effectiveness of the U.N. will also depend in great measure on the qualities of the man who serves it as Secretary-General. Virtually all sections of the membership have urged the able U Thant to remain in office for another 5-year term. We continue to hope that, despite his statement last Thursday, and despite all the inevitable burdens and frustrations of his job, he will reconsider his decision and stay on.

Progress Toward the Rule of Law

Of course, we are not content at the U.N. to cope with the political crises that arise. In an affirmative sense we strive also to extend and enlarge the areas of peaceful cooperation and of the rule of law. This fall we hope to take a number of steps of this kind.

Perhaps the most important and promising of these affirmative steps is the treaty on the peaceful exploration of outer space, including celestial bodies. Last May President Johnson proposed early discussion of such a treaty.⁵ In June both the United States and the Soviet Union formally proposed draft treaties—which shows that we

are not the only ones to feel the importance and urgency of this subject.⁶

Our progress has been gratifyingly rapid. On July 12 the Legal Subcommittee of the U.N. Committee on Outer Space met in Geneva.⁷ In less than 4 weeks of negotiation we reached agreement on 13 major provisions of a treaty. Among these are a ban on the placing of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in outer space or on a celestial body and a ban on the use of celestial bodies for military bases or fortifications, for the testing of any types of weapons, or for military maneuvers. This treaty thus contains, in addition to its positive provisions for peaceful cooperation, some very important provisions in the realm of arms control and disarmament.

There are still significant differences to be negotiated. One is our insistence on the open reporting of information obtained in the course of space exploration. Another is our insistence on the right of access by the parties to each other's installations on celestial bodies, similar to the access that prevails in Antarctica under the treaty governing that area. We hope very much to solve all the remaining issues quickly. The negotiating subcommittee will meet again in New York a week from today. If all concerned share our desire for progress, we should have a treaty ready for this session of the General Assembly to endorse before it adjourns.

Another very important affirmative policy we are pursuing in the U.N. is United States adherence to the United Nations convention against racial discrimination, which was approved by the General Assembly last year. In the very near future I shall have the honor of signing this convention for the United States, and it will then go to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. This step will bring our international position on racial equality into line with our

⁵ *Ibid.*, June 6, 1966, p. 900.

⁶ For text of the U.S. draft treaty, see *ibid.*, July 11, 1966, p. 61.

⁷ For statements made in Geneva by Ambassador Goldberg on July 12 and Aug. 3, see *ibid.*, Aug. 15, 1966, p. 249, and Aug. 29, 1966, p. 321.

national laws and principles at home. It will thereby end a lot of needless confusion in other countries about United States purposes in this all-important field.

Finally, on the affirmative side, we shall continue to strive to make the United Nations and its related agencies more effective in their very important contributions to economic and social progress of the less developed nations. Their progress during the first 5 years of the U.N. Decade of Development has been disappointingly slow. The U.N. has a vital job to do in this field.

These are just a few of the hundred or so topics we expect to consider in the General Assembly this fall—each of them important in the many-sided search for peace.⁸

U.N. Progress Depends on Its Members

What progress we will make nobody can predict. The Assembly has no real power except what its members put at its service when they act together to give effect to the charter. But that power can change history. It was the General Assembly that created the U.N. Emergency Force and ended the fighting over Suez; also the U.N. force in the Congo, which prevented the disintegration of that country. It was the General Assembly that proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and sponsored pioneering conventions in that field. It was the General Assembly that launched pioneering efforts in economic development, such as the U.N. Development Program. It was the General Assembly that welcomed into its midst, with full and equal privileges in the world forum, some 50 new nations which gained their independence since the U.N. was founded. It was the General Assembly that first set forth many principles later accepted as binding international law—as we hope will be the case with the pending treaty on outer space.

We hear it said that the U.N. this year, at age 21, is "coming of age." This reflection may be reassuring when we consider that the League of Nations, 21 years after its

founding, was dead and Europe was engulfed in Hitler's war. But there isn't much safety in this kind of numbers. The U.N. is not a person but an institution. At age 21 it could be in its infancy, dotage, its second childhood, or the prime of life. Which it is depends on the members, including the United States.

Indeed, our country is in a fortunate position in the United Nations compared to some members. We cannot dominate it—no member can, and we don't try. But we do have certain advantages. Among these I do not think our national power is the most important, because others have power, too. Rather, I think that our greatest advantage in the U.N. is the fact that its whole philosophy and approach are congenial to our national tradition and our temperament as a free and open society.

The U.N. deals in persuasion more than in command; so do we.

The U.N. holds that tolerance is a necessary virtue and that two parties can differ emphatically in free debate without coming to blows or wishing to destroy each other. As Sir Winston Churchill said, "The purpose of parliament is to substitute argument for fisticuffs." That is the U.N. method, and it is our method, too.

Next, the U.N. holds, as we do, that underlying every human conflict a common interest exists which can serve as the basis for a peaceful settlement.

And finally, the U.N. declares, as all American history declares, that all men are created equal and that no peace can long endure which is not founded on this just spirit of equality.

Equality and peace—these are the two inseparable principles that Pope Paul VI set forth so eloquently in his historic address to the General Assembly last fall. First he spoke of equality: "Let no one be superior to the others: not one *above* another . . . for it is pride that shatters brotherhood." Then he spoke of peace in those climactic words: "Never again one *against* another. . . . Never again war, war never again!"

As we go into the 21st General Assembly,

⁸ For the provisional agenda of the 21st session of the General Assembly, see *ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1966, p. 353.

I think above all that we must be true to this vision—which is the common vision of America at its best and of other nations at their best. There is no greater mistake than to believe that such visions are impractical—for history proves that the most impractical and disastrous course of all is to have no vision and to become wearily resigned to

the status quo. Simply accepting the stubborn realities of this moment—war and prejudice, ignorance and poverty—is not enough. We must indeed accept these realities; but then we must move them and reshape them into something better. With your understanding and support as good citizens, that is what we are determined to do.

President Johnson Pays Tribute to Peace Corps Volunteers

*Remarks by President Johnson*¹

Today—for the sixth time—a President of the United States is signing a Peace Corps Act.

Some of you may remember the first year this was done.² At that time the Peace Corps was only an idea. There were doubters in those days who called the Peace Corps a “juvenile idea.” I remember the advice we received, from many sources, that we should not send boys out into the diplomatic world, or to visit other countries, to do a man’s job. I recall someone claiming that little good could be done in the world by just a “regiment of cheerleaders.”

Even some supporters of the Peace Corps thought it would be little more than a gesture, that it was little more than a token of good will.

The doubters today are much quieter.

Twenty thousand Peace Corps volunteers in 50 countries have already proven them wrong.

Twenty thousand Peace Corps volunteers

¹Made at ceremonies marking the signing of S. 3418, An Act To Amend the Peace Corps Act (P.L. 89-572), at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., on Sept. 13 (White House press release).

²For a statement made by President Kennedy on Sept. 22, 1961, see BULLETIN of Oct. 9, 1961, p. 603.

in 50 countries have given the world a formula for action: conviction, courage, youthful competence, and character—in equal parts.

I understand that another Texan named Johnson is in your group of volunteers. When I decided to come over here, someone showed me what Charles Richard Johnson of Houston, Texas—where I once taught school—said in his Peace Corps application: “I do not expect,” he wrote, “to create any great forces of good that will change or reshape the world. However, I would like to feel that I have tried to do my bit for the benefit of mankind and for the benefit of my country. Sometime in the future I would like to be able to say that I at least attempted, in some small way, to help.”

Charles Richard Johnson, as far as I know, is no relative of mine. I doubt that he would claim it. But here and now I would like to observe that I claim kin with any man who really has that kind of spirit, that kind of vision, and that kind of feeling for his fellow man.

To hunger for use, and to go unused, is the worst hunger of all. Recently a father told me of the regret of his teenage son who said to him, “No matter what I do or how hard

I try, there is not much chance that I can shape things for better or for worse.”

A lot of people feel that way very often. They think of life as a cul-de-sac without meaning and without release.

It is true that few men have the power by a single act or by a single lifetime to shape history for themselves. Presidents, for example, quickly realize that while a single act might destroy the world they live in, no one single decision can make life suddenly better or can turn history around all for the good.

But Presidents do know that a nation is the sum total of what we all do together; that the deeds and desires of each citizen fashion our character and shape our world—just as one tiny drop of water after another will ultimately make a mighty river.

That is what the Peace Corps is really all about. Most of you are here this morning not for one reason but for several. All of you decided to become a part of “the needs and temper of our times.” You have decided to participate—and that is a great word, “participate”—in the struggle of the day, of the time, of the hour: in the fight against sickness and want and despair that imprison millions of people who live on this globe with us.

This involvement, more than anything else, unites the volunteers of the Peace Corps. It lies at the very heart of the way you look at things.

The Message of the Peace Corps

Much of this world stands poised at the foot of a ladder, ready and eager to start the climb. To these people your message is vital, the message that men can improve their lives by their own efforts. Peace Corps volunteers have been passing this message along—softly so as not to disrupt the pride of their listeners, but they have passed it along very effectively.

The voltage generated by this simple friendliness has created new energy in one community after another in one country of the world after another. So without sham and pretense, volunteers have appeared in overseas neighborhoods as persons who

genuinely wanted to help their fellow man—help them as human beings, one to another.

Earlier this year I submitted to Congress a plan that promised a new dimension for the Peace Corps.³ It would establish:

—an expanded school-to-school program, to enable American schools to help their sister schools in other lands through the Peace Corps;

—a new Exchange Peace Corps, to bring volunteers from other countries to teach and learn about our own land.

We won only a partial victory in the Congress. But we will operate the school-to-school program. Furthermore—although this act does not include what we requested to launch the Exchange Peace Corps—we intend to carry out Congress’ suggestion to test the idea under existing authority.

We cannot afford to lose any time in our quest for understanding.

Soon, very soon, you will be going to an unfamiliar place. You will go there to teach and to learn. Few of the young people you serve will speak English. Most of them will be children of poverty. You may find that your work is difficult and discouraging; most of the works of peace are just that. But this experience which stretches your patience will also enlarge your understanding.

I know. I learned it first when I taught the children from the slums of Houston. I learned it among the Mexican-American children in a place in deep south Texas on the Mexican border called Cotulla. And it has affected me and my work all my life.

In 2 years you will return, and I think you may find a surprise. You may find that helping the good people of Brazil has qualified you uniquely to help the good people of America—to help us solve the problems of our cities, of education, of economic progress, how to live longer and how to keep from dying. America is very much on the move, and you are in the vanguard of the march. For it was the Peace Corps which

³ For text of President Johnson’s message on the International Education and Health Act of 1966, see *ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1965, p. 328.

helped begin one of the most dynamic movements of our time: the mass movement of young people into fields of service.

Today the spirit of the Peace Corps shines in dozens of ways, in dozens of places: in VISTA, in the Job Corps, in the Teachers Corps, in the Neighborhood Youth Corps, in State and local programs of youth service throughout the Nation.

It was just 8 days ago in Dayton, Ohio, that I announced my hope to develop a manpower service program for young people which could work at every level to transform our society.

Already we are beginning to formulate such a program.

Already we are making plans to ask our leading governors and our mayors across the country to counsel with us and to help us in the formulation of this program.

At the heart of this movement will be the spirit expressed in these words: "Not to change the world—but not to leave it the same."

The Peace Corps gave us those words.

So I take double pleasure this morning in signing this bill: pleasure in what the Peace Corps has done; pleasure in the accomplishments that I can see ahead.

This act could help us lead to a better day and I hope it will:

—a day when some form of voluntary service to the community and the Nation and the world is as common in America as going to school; when no man has truly lived who only served himself.

—a day when every nation has a Peace Corps, and when those who now call themselves adversaries are busy in the labor of reconciliation, and Peace Corps volunteers from each are working across the borders that are now closed by hostility or suspicion or conflict.

—a day when more and more people will share Charles Richard Johnson's hope to be able to say some day, ". . . I at least attempted in some small way to help."

I saw again on television this morning, before I came out here, a reminder of what our

late beloved President John Fitzgerald Kennedy said to the American people in his inaugural address some 6 years ago: ". . . ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country."

You took him seriously. Every person who joined the Peace Corps took him seriously and answered the call to service. For John F. Kennedy touched the most vital nerve in American life, and inspired the highest instinct of mankind—the instinct to do something for someone else, to serve others, not just serve self.

Increasing the Chance for Peace

I am convinced that what does endure in this life is really what do we do for others. This is why government service is so satisfying. It seeks reward only in the well-being of others. It gives people like you a chance to think of someone other than yourself.

In that, I think, you increase the meaning of life and the chance for peace.

It would be good for the 3 billion people of this world if every human being, with understanding, could engage in a little introspection. And some day in the week, some week in the month, and some month in the year, every year, every month, every week, ask himself the question: Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country.

And if we did ask ourselves—a teacher or a preacher, the doctor or the nurse, the government servant or the leader, the worker or the businessman—not what is there in this for me, but what can I do to help my fellow man—and if we could get up in the morning and chart a course that would permit us to do something to help others all day long until we got weary and had to go to sleep, what a much better world this would be.

So I would hope in these critical days when things are going rough and some people are inclined to give up, and some get frustrated, some get critical, and some complain, I would hope that they could each engage in this introspection. Let them say to

themselves: What else can I do to help other people? Not: What is there in this for me? How much can I get out of this? What kind of a profit can I make?

If we can just put those petty things in the background, then prosperity, peace, happiness, satisfaction—all those things that are so important—could come to pass.

The road to peace, I have discovered in 35 years of public life, is riddled with mistrust and sometimes it is raked with criticism and cynicism. Potholes of poverty and ignorance are deep enough to ensnare the bravest apostles of peace. If humanity ever hopes to pave this road, it must accomplish an understanding that is deeper and more durable than the world has ever known.

We are fortunate enough to have most of the blessings that most of the world seeks and hopes for so earnestly. Since we do have most of them, we ought to be thankful and we ought to reciprocate.

I always think of a little class motto I had in my high school graduating class, when six of us finished the Johnson City High School. It said, "Give to the world the best you have and the best will come back to you."

So this morning to you young people and to the young people of this nation and all the world, I would say, ask not what your country can do for you, ask what can you do for your country and for all your fellow human beings—some of whom, a good many of whom, most of whom, do not enjoy the blessings of freedom, liberty, and comfort that are yours.

U.S.—Canadian Friendship Symbolized by New Park

*Statement by President Johnson*¹

In signing this law authorizing the addition of the San Juan Island National Historical Park to the National Park System, we once again demonstrate the deep-rooted

friendship and cooperation between Canada and the United States.

We have the Roosevelt Campobello International Park along our common boundary in the east, the International Peace Park in the heart of our two nations, the Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park, and now the San Juan Island National Historical Park on the west.

In 1859, two great powers—Great Britain and the United States—became involved in a bitter dispute over "The Affair of the Pig." This affair, which did not develop into actual armed conflict, derived from the shooting of a British-owned pig found rooting in the garden of an American settler. For 13 years these two great nations maintained armed forces in the disputed San Juan Archipelago. The question of sovereignty was resolved by the Treaty of Washington in 1871, and the final arbitration of the question was accomplished by the German Emperor in 1872. For the first time in the history of the United States there was no boundary dispute with Great Britain.

Many well-known American military figures were associated with this island in the 1850's. Yet "The Affair of the Pig" and the prominent Americans are not the primary purpose of this wonderful new park. Instead, it commemorates the final settlement, through arbitration, of a hotly contested dispute and the peaceful relationship that has existed between the United States and Canada since that time.

Historians have said that the Treaty of Washington, which this new park symbolizes, was an event of cardinal importance in the history of relations between the two English-speaking powers.

Here is proof to all that even the most explosive international issues can be resolved by means other than war—if men are prepared to negotiate their differences at the conference table, rather than silence them through violence on the battlefield.

¹ Made upon signing of S. 489, a bill establishing the San Juan Island National Historical Park in the State of Washington, on Sept. 9 (White House press release).

"Great Fleets of Foreign Fishermen on Our Coast Imperil Our Fisheries," a Seattle newspaper warned. And a Peruvian paper charged that "Yankee Fishermen Are Pirating Our Tuna." What are the issues behind these headlines? The Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife discusses them in this article based on a speech he made recently at San Francisco before the Commonwealth Club of California.

International Issues of Pacific Fisheries

by William C. Herrington

Prior to World War II the Western Hemisphere countries had the eastern Pacific fisheries much to themselves. U.S. vessels fished off Canada, and Canadian fishermen did some fishing off the United States, mostly along the coast of Alaska. U.S. tuna fishermen were beginning to get the hang of catching the tropical tunas found along the coasts of southern California and Latin America. Japan had tried some salmon fishing in the eastern Bering Sea but backed off on protest from Secretary of State Cordell Hull. The Soviet Union had shown no great interest in high-seas fishing.

After World War II the picture changed. The development of large stern-ramp trawlers, factory ships, and supply ships greatly extended the practical radius of fishing operations, and brought the fishery resources of the seven seas within range of man's fishing implements.

Japan and the Soviet Union have been in the forefront. Japan, with a great number of fishermen crowded into her coastal waters and an ability to build low-cost ships, had a pressing desire to use these facilities in exploiting the common property resources of the seas. The U.S.S.R., not traditionally interested in high-seas fishing, was compelled

to turn to the oceans increasingly as her need for animal protein increased and her agricultural programs failed to meet assigned quotas.

On the U.S. side, our eastern Pacific tropical tuna fishery expanded rapidly. This resulted from the spectacular growth of the U.S. market for canned tuna and the development of able, long-range tuna clippers capable of cruising thousands of miles and of preserving their catches for weeks or months by refrigeration.

The principal current international fishery issues in the Pacific involving the United States boil down essentially to two main issues: (1) securing assurance of adequate conservation measures by fishing countries and (2) determining who gets the fish.

In seeking to achieve U.S. objectives in respect to these two issues we must keep in mind that since the high seas are not subject to the jurisdiction of individual countries, the rights and duties respecting fisheries of the high seas are determined by international law or practice, not by domestic law.

Prior to the Law of the Sea Conference at Geneva in 1958, there was little agreement among states on rights and duties bearing on fishing and conservation. Out of that

conference came the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas.¹ The United States has signed and ratified this convention, which came into effect early in 1966 when the Netherlands provided the 22d ratification.

The parties to this convention have agreed that "All States have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas, subject (a) to their treaty obligations, (b) to the interests and rights of coastal States as provided for in this convention, and (c) to the provisions . . . concerning conservation," and that all states have the duty to adopt necessary conservation measures and to cooperate with other states in conservation programs.

The convention defines "conservation of the living resources of the high seas" as the "aggregate of the measures rendering possible the optimum sustainable yield from those resources so as to secure a maximum supply of food and other marine products."

The convention recognizes that a coastal state has a special interest in the maintenance of the productivity of the resources in any area of the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea. Special privileges go with this, one of these being the right to adopt unilateral measures of conservation under certain conditions.

Conservation

Fish, like trees and wild game, are a self-renewable resource. Properly used they will furnish a valuable supply of food in perpetuity. If they are overfished, the annual supply is diminished or the resource may be reduced to economic extinction. The Antarctic whale stocks almost reached this point before the present conservation measures were agreed upon. On the other hand, if a stock of fish is not fished or is underfished, a potential continuing supply of food is wasted. From these considerations there developed the international definition of the objective of conservation which is included in

¹Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5969; for background and text, see BULLETIN of June 30, 1958, p. 1110.

the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas.

The principle of conservation is universally accepted. With an increasingly hungry world and the results of several international conferences devoted to conserving the living resources of the high seas, conservation has achieved something of the international status of peace and motherhood.

However, achieving conservation in practice is difficult. The science of fishery management is not precise. More often than not, an adequate research program, if undertaken at all, is not instituted by the fishing country until there are clear signs of overexploitation. In this situation, particularly when world fishing efforts are being rapidly expanded, it usually is impossible to assemble convincing evidence of the condition of the stock and the kind of conservation measures needed before the stock has been seriously depleted. This is particularly true where one or another of the fishing countries is not eager to initiate a regulatory program which would limit its fishermen or prevent the expansion of its share of the total catch. In these situations a country may utilize its research talent to disprove or discredit any conclusion that limitations are necessary.

For the regulation to be effective on the high seas, every country participating in the fishery on a substantial scale must agree on conservation measures and cooperate in their effective implementation. Experience has shown us that such unanimous cooperation becomes increasingly difficult to achieve as the number of countries participating in the fishery increases.

Who Gets the Fish?

The second issue—who gets the fish—is growing steadily more important as worldwide fishing intensity increases and more stocks of fish are fully utilized. The ever-expanding range of fishing equipment enables countries to extend their fishing operations to distant shores to harvest underutilized stocks of fish and place more pressure on stocks already being fished to the optimum. This is taking place at present off

the coasts of Oregon, Washington, Alaska, and British Columbia and can be expected shortly off the California coast.

The reaction of the U.S. fishing community and some of the public has been loud and angry. Proposals for Government action range from extending U.S. jurisdiction to exclude all foreign fishermen from wide areas off our coasts to negotiating an open-ended fisheries convention under which all countries now or in the future fishing the North Pacific would cooperate in research and conservation management and participate in the fishery on a first-come, first-served basis.

Before seeking to analyze what we can and should do about this problem of foreign fishing off our coasts, let us consider its more important components.

First, consider foreign fishing on stocks of fish which we do not use at all. In this situation, our chief concern should be that the foreign fisherman does not overfish these stocks. Operations should be conducted under such restraints that the resource continues in a healthy, productive condition, available to our fishermen at such time as they find it economic to engage in the fishery. To seek to limit foreign operations more than this would be to promote a situation which would waste some or all of the sustainable yield. To seek to do less would mean accepting a condition of overfishing and reduction of stock and sustainable yield.

Second, consider foreign fishing on stocks which we are only partially utilizing. As long as the foreign catch plus our own does not exceed the "maximum sustainable yield," the foreign catch does no damage to the resource. Therefore, our concern should be that sufficient knowledge is secured regarding the effect on the stock so that we know whether overfishing is taking place.

The Abstention Principle

Third, consider the initiation of foreign fishing on stocks which we are already fully utilizing, such as halibut and salmon.

The U.S. Government for some 15 years has supported a policy of abstention, which relates to situations where coastal countries

have, through research and restraints on their fishermen, maintained or increased the productivity of stocks of fish. When such stocks are being fully utilized, countries not participating in the fishery should be required to abstain from participation. An exception is made for coastal states adjacent to the waters in which the stocks occur.

The abstention procedure takes into account that productivity of the stocks of fish is the result of action by the participating countries and that participation of additional countries would not result in an increase in the amount of useful products and might remove much of the incentive for maintaining conservation programs.

Although a resolution commending the abstention procedure received wide support at the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, it did not receive the two-thirds vote required for adoption. Such fully utilized stocks remain vulnerable to the fishing operations of other nations unless it is possible to negotiate abstention agreements. In the absence of such agreements the stocks remain open to exploitation by any nation and we are limited to such cooperative measures of research and regulation to prevent overfishing as we can negotiate.

Gear and Operations Impact

Another major impact of foreign fishing operations along our coast arises from their physical effect on U.S. fisheries. If the fishing gear or method of operation of the foreign fishing fleet is such as to damage or destroy U.S. gear or interfere with the operations of U.S. fishermen, the effect can be serious—even to the point of forcing the fisherman to abandon his traditional fishing areas. Trawling, particularly at night, in areas where our fishermen are operating with fixed gear, such as setlines or crab pots, may cause substantial losses of equipment and place a very heavy burden on the usually individually owned U.S. vessels.

With good will on both sides this problem can be resolved by agreement on marking gear, exchange of information on how the gear operates, agreement on so-called "rules

of the road" for fishing and courteous behavior, or sometimes on separate fishing areas. We have one such agreement with the Soviet Union and are working with several of the European countries on "rules of the road" for the Atlantic. We expect to further consider this problem in the Pacific with the Soviet Government in the near future. The problem appears to be amenable to solution under procedures which are presently available.

A new gear or operations problem has developed off our coast with the appearance of large fleets of Soviet vessels operating in a coordinated pattern to systematically cover a limited area. In such situations it becomes difficult or impossible for the smaller and usually slower U.S. vessels, operating individually, to fish effectively and thus, in effect, the large fleet preempts the grounds.

Where the fish stock is relatively limited, such a concentration can rapidly reduce the availability of fish to levels indicating severe and at least localized and temporary overfishing. If this stock is relatively independent of stocks in other areas, it may take years to recover. If there is considerable intermigration between this stock and those in nearby areas, it will recover more rapidly, provided these other stocks are not similarly reduced. The mobile fleet of large vessels is not particularly handicapped by this situation, for it can move on to other areas. However, the smaller, short-range coastal vessels may be severely affected, for they must continue to make their living from the nearby fishing grounds.

Operations of this kind and magnitude are a new development in this hemisphere, and there are no current international rules or practices capable of resolving the problem. Use by the United States of similar boats or fleet tactics offers no solution; our fishing methods—smaller boats and no factory ships—are more economic for U.S. fishermen along our coast.

We are seeking agreement with Soviet fisheries representatives on a number of measures to improve the operations situation. These measures include proposals that fleet

operations should keep clear of certain areas, fishing pressure should be reduced, and large concentrations of trawlers should be dispersed. Unless an effective solution is found for this problem, not only along our coast but along other coasts as well, there can be no doubt that U.S. fishermen and those of coastal countries in general will increasingly press for broader fishing jurisdiction and changes in international law to protect the small-boat coastal fisheries.

Salmon and Halibut Fisheries

Other international fishery issues of the North Pacific important to the United States involve the salmon and halibut fisheries extending from California north to the Aleutians.

Back in the 1920's and 1930's, the United States and Canada negotiated agreements through which the two countries undertook to cooperate in research and conservation management of the Pacific coast halibut stocks and the sockeye salmon of the Fraser River. These stocks were fished only by United States and Canadian fishermen. The halibut stocks had decreased greatly and were still declining, because of overfishing. The Fraser River sockeye salmon stock was greatly reduced as the result of rock slides which had blocked off a large part of the spawning run and by subsequent overfishing. Through joint efforts involving extensive research and stringent regulation, the decline in the stocks was halted. The halibut stocks have been restored to the level of maximum sustainable yield, and the Fraser River salmon stock has been substantially restored.

Both the U.S. and Canadian Governments maintain that newcomers should not harvest these stocks of salmon and halibut as long as it can be shown that research and regulation are adequate and the resource is being fully utilized. Japan is not allowed to participate under the terms of the North Pacific fishery convention,² and she is seeking to modify the convention to eliminate this restriction. The U.S.S.R. maintains her

² TIAS 2786, 5385.

right to enter these fisheries but has not exercised that right. This issue probably will continue as an active source of discussion and contention.

U.S. Tropical Tuna Operations

The U.S. fishery for tropical tunas off the Pacific Coast from southern California south to northern Chile compares in some respects to foreign fishing off the coasts of the United States. However, there are basic differences.

The U.S. fleet is far smaller in number, and the vessels operate individually. Consequently, they do not develop concentrations of gear and fleet tactics. The fishery built up to the present level slowly so that there was an opportunity to determine the extent of the resources, the effect of fishing, and the conservation measures needed. The conservation work was done by the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, an international commission constituted in 1949 and strongly supported by the United States.

Finally, the behavior of tuna differs substantially from that of stocks of other fish. The tropical tunas are highly migratory; they move great distances, both along the coast and offshore. In order to maintain a fishery the tuna fishermen must be able to cruise great distances to find fishable concentrations.

Nevertheless, there have been complaints from some countries of the effects of the operations of our fleet on local fisheries. These complaints have been discussed with the countries concerned, and we have been prepared to agree on measures to minimize the impact on short-range local fisheries where damage can be demonstrated.

However, in the face of the insistence of some of these countries on jurisdiction over territorial seas to extreme distances, our at-

tempts to resolve the problem of local fisheries have not been successful. From time to time U.S. tuna vessels have been arrested and required to pay fines or purchase licenses. The U.S. Government has strongly protested these actions, but there are no real indications that the countries involved are receding from their claims, and it is likely that the problem will long be with us.

Resolving Fishery Problems

These, briefly, are the more important international fisheries issues of the Pacific affecting U.S. interests. There are many others which affect us to a lesser extent. For example, we have some fishery problems with Canada, and we recognize that arrangements to resolve fishing problems between Japan and the Soviet Union may have an impact on us.

The United States, as a responsible nation dedicated to furthering and developing the handling of international problems in accordance with international law, cannot well move beyond international law to impose our views on high-seas fishing unilaterally upon other countries. If we decide that it is in our interest to change international law, we can try to do so, but we should be sure that the changes that we have in mind have wide appeal and that we can defeat other proposals that might be adverse to our interests. In the absence of international law to resolve our fishery problems we must continue to rely on patient negotiations—making use of logic and such leverages and trading points as we can muster.

As I look back over the past 10 to 15 years, it seems to me that we have not done too badly on most issues. As for the future, I am an optimist. To be in the fish business one must be.

Calendar of International Conferences¹

In Recess as of October 1, 1966

Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament (re- Geneva Mar. 14, 1962-
 cessed August 25, 1966).

Scheduled October Through December 1966

OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee Paris Oct. 3-6
 ILO Tripartite Subcommittee on Seafarers' Welfare Oslo Oct. 3-7
 ECE Conference of European Statisticians Geneva Oct. 3-7
 IMCO Working Group on Intact Stability London Oct. 3-7
 FAO International Rice Commission: 11th Session New Delhi Oct. 3-8
 ECAFE Working Party on Economic Development and Plan- Bangkok Oct. 3-10
 ning.
 International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 54th Copenhagen Oct. 3-12
 Statutory Meeting.
 ILO Petroleum Committee: 7th Session Geneva Oct. 3-14
 FAO Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council: 12th Session Honolulu Oct. 3-17
 National Conference on Pollution of Our Environment Montreal Oct. 3-Nov. 3
 WMO Regional Association IV (North and Central America): Asheville, N. C. Oct. 4-13
 4th Session.
 UNCTAD Committee on Commodities: 2d Session Geneva Oct. 4-21
 ICAO Communication and Operations Division Montreal Oct. 4-Nov. 7
 OECD Textiles Committee Paris Oct. 5-6
 FAO Regional Conference for Europe Seville Oct. 5-11
 ECOSOC U.N. Development Program Pledging Conference New York Oct. 6
 NATO Industrial Planning Committee Paris Oct. 6-7
 FAO Conference on Animal Production and Health: 4th Session Ceylon Oct. 7-16
 ECE Preparatory Group of Governmental Experts for the 5th Geneva Oct. 10-12
 Meeting of the Senior Economic Advisers.
 ECE Group of Rapporteurs on the Packaging of Dangerous Geneva Oct. 10-14
 Goods.
 ECE Timber Committee Geneva Oct. 10-14
 Preliminary Meeting of Legal Experts to Examine the Draft Rome Oct. 10-14
 Convention of the Contract for International Carriage of
 Passengers and Luggage by Road.

¹ This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on Sept. 16, lists international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period October-December 1966. The list does not include numerous nongovernmental conferences and meetings. Persons interested in these are referred to the *World List of Future International Meetings*, compiled by the Library of Congress and available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.

Following is a key to the abbreviations: ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin America; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHC, Pan American Highway Congresses; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; SPC, South Pacific Commission; U.N., United Nations; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; UPU, Universal Postal Union; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

Calendar of International Conferences—Continued

Scheduled October Through December 1966—Continued

IMCO Working Group on the Stability of Fishing Vessels	London	Oct. 10-14
GATT Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration	Geneva	Oct. 10-14
ECAFE Seminar on Planning for Urban and Regional Development.	Nagoya	Oct. 10-20
ECOSOC Statistical Commission: 14th Session	Geneva	Oct. 10-21
ECA Subregional Conference on Economic Cooperation in West Africa.	Niamey	Oct. 10-22
NATO Atlantic Policy Advisory Group	Copenhagen	Oct. 11-14
OECD Trade Committee: Working Party on Government Procurement.	Paris	Oct. 13-14
NATO Science Committee	Lisbon	Oct. 13-14
IMCO Subcommittee on Radio Communications	London	Oct. 17-21
PAHO Executive Committee: 55th Session	Washington	Oct. 17-21
NATO Latin American Regional Experts	Paris	Oct. 17-20
ECA Committee on Industry and Natural Resources	Addis Ababa	Oct. 17-22
ECE Committee on the Development of Trade	Geneva	Oct. 17-25
ECOSOC Advisory Committee on Application of Science and Technology to Development: 6th Session.	Rome	Oct. 17-28
FAO Council: 47th Session	Rome	Oct. 17-28
South Pacific Commission: 29th Session	Nouméa	Oct. 17-28
2d Conference on the Policing of the Seas (resumed session)	London	Oct. 17-29
ILO Conference of Labor Statisticians: 11th Session	Geneva	Oct. 18-28
OECD Committee on Scientific and Technical Personnel	Paris	Oct. 19-21
UNESCO Executive Board: 74th Session	Paris	Oct. 21-24
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee on Safety Navigation	London	Oct. 24-28
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Braking Problems	Geneva	Oct. 24-28
U.N. Interregional Seminar on Development Policies and Planning in Relation to Urbanization.	Pittsburgh	Oct. 24-Nov. 2
NATO African Regional Experts	Paris	Oct. 24-28
IA-ECOSOC Telecommunications Commission: 2d Meeting	Washington	Oct. 25-Nov. 2
UNESCO General Conference: 14th Session	Paris	Oct. 25-Nov. 30
OECD Agriculture Committee: Ministerial Meeting	Paris	Oct. 27-28
Red Cross Inter-American Seminar on Youth and Sanitary Education.	Quito	Oct. 27-Nov. 4
ECAFE Seminar on the Development of Manmade Fibers Industries.	Tokyo	Oct. 28-Nov. 7
PAHC Permanent Executive Committee: 11th Meeting	Mexico City	Oct. 30-Nov. 4
FAO Cocoa Study Group: Committee on Statistics	Geneva	Oct. 31-Nov. 4
ILO Meeting on Discrimination in Employment	Geneva	Oct. 31-Nov. 4
IMCO Subcommittee on Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea	London	Oct. 31-Nov. 4
UNHCR Executive Committee: 16th Session	Geneva	Oct. 31-Nov. 8
FAO/U.N. World Food Program: 10th Session of Intergovernmental Committee.	Rome	Oct. 31-Nov. 9
ILO Governing Body: 167th Session	Geneva	Oct. 31-Nov. 18
UNCTAD U.N. Sugar Conference: 2d Session	Geneva	October
ECOSOC Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations	New York	October
ECLA Trade Committee: 5th Meeting	Santiago	October
Inter-American Indian Institute: Governing Board	Mexico City	October
SPC Meeting of Government Experts to Amend the Canberra Agreement.	Canberra	October
UNCTAD Committee on Manufactures: 2d Session	Geneva	Nov. 1-18
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payment Restrictions	Geneva	Nov. 1-18
NATO Middle East Regional Experts	Paris	Nov. 2-14
ICEM Budget and Finance Committee: 14th Session	Geneva	Nov. 3-4
NATO Civil Defense Committee	Paris	Nov. 3-4
OECD Committee for Research Cooperation	Paris	Nov. 3-4
Antarctic Treaty: Fourth Consultation Under Article 9	Santiago	Nov. 3-17
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: Annual Meeting.	Vancouver	Nov. 7-11
ECE Working Party on Custom Questions Affecting Transport	Geneva	Nov. 7-9
NATO Civil Communications Planning Committee	Paris	Nov. 7-9
ICEM Executive Committee: 28th Session	Geneva	Nov. 7-11
ECE <i>Ad Hoc</i> Meeting of Experts for the Study of Economic Aspects of Water Pollution Control Problems.	Geneva	Nov. 7-11

IMCO Subcommittee on Bulk Cargoes	London	Nov. 7-11
FAO Conference on Agricultural Extension in Asia and the Far East.	Tokyo	Nov. 7-12
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 10th Session . . .	Munich	Nov. 7-18
WMO Regional Association III: 4th Session	Quito	Nov. 7-19
NATO Eastern Europe and Soviet Zone of Germany Regional Experts.	Paris	Nov. 8-11
NATO Far East Regional Experts	Paris	Nov. 8-11
FAO Consultative Subcommittee on the Economic Aspects of Rice: 10th Session.	Bangkok	Nov. 9-18
FAO Regional Conference for Africa: 4th Session	Abidjan	Nov. 9-19
OECD Economic Policy Committee	Paris	Nov. 14-15
ECE Steel Committee: <i>Ad Hoc</i> Group of Rapporteurs on World Market for Iron Ore.	Geneva	Nov. 14-15
NATO Soviet Union Regional Experts	Paris	Nov. 14-17
IMCO Subcommittee on Subdivision and Stability: 5th Session .	London	Nov. 14-18
ECE Inland Transport Committee: Subcommittee on Road Transport.	Geneva	Nov. 14-25
Consultative Committee on Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): 18th Ministerial Meeting.	Karachi	Nov. 14-Dec. 1
Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission: Special Meeting . .	London	Nov. 15
OECD International Conference on Methods of Adjustment of Workers to Technical Change at the Plant Level.	Amsterdam	Nov. 15-18
OECD Working Party III: Economic Policy Committee	Paris	Nov. 16-17
ECE Steel Committee: <i>Ad Hoc</i> Group of Rapporteurs on World Trade in Steel.	Geneva	Nov. 16-17
OECD Science Policy Committee	Paris	Nov. 16-18
International Rubber Study Group: 18th Assembly	Lagos	Nov. 21-26
UNCTAD Committee on Invisibles and Financing Related to Trade.	Geneva	Nov. 21-Dec. 2
ILO Inland Transport Committee	Geneva	Nov. 21-Dec. 3
ICAO North Atlantic Systems Planning Group: 2d Meeting . .	Paris	Nov. 21-Dec. 3
ICAO Airworthiness Committee	Montreal	Nov. 22-Dec. 15
ICAO Caribbean Regional Air Navigational Meeting	Mexico	Nov. 22-Dec. 18
NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee	Paris	Nov. 24-25
OECD Ministerial Meeting	Paris	Nov. 25-26
IMCO Assembly: Extraordinary Session	London	Nov. 28-Dec. 3
ECE Electric Power Committee	Geneva	Nov. 28-Dec. 1
IMCO Subcommittee on Lifesaving Appliances	London	Nov. 28-Dec. 2
ILO Asian Advisory Committee	Manila	Nov. 28-Dec. 7
OECD Energy Committee	Paris	Nov. 29-30
ECE Gas Committee	Geneva	Nov. 29-Dec. 2
UNCTAD <i>Ad Hoc</i> Working Party on International Organization of Commodity Trade: 3d Session	Geneva	November
ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee	Geneva	November
IMCO Assembly: Special Session	London	November
UPU Management Council of the Consultative Committee on Postal Studies.	Sydney	November
UNESCO Executive Board: 75th Session	Paris	Dec. 1-2
NATO Committee for European Air Space Coordination	Paris	Dec. 1-2
NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (permanent session).	Paris	Dec. 1-2
IMCO Council	London	Dec. 2-3
International Wood Study Group: 9th Session	London	Dec. 5-9
UNCTAD Committee on Shipping: 2d Session	Geneva	Dec. 5-16
FAO Regional Conference for Latin America: 9th Session . .	Uruguay	Dec. 5-16
International Wheat Council: 47th Session	London	Dec. 7-13
ECE Coal Trade Subcommittee	Geneva	Dec. 8-9
ECE Agriculture Committee: Plenary Session	Geneva	Dec. 12-16
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on the Transport of Dangerous Goods.	Geneva	Dec. 12-16
IMCO Subcommittee on Fire Protection	London	Dec. 12-16
ECAFE Inland Transport and Communications Committee: 15th Session.	Bangkok	Dec. 13-21
NATO Food and Agricultural Planning Committee	Paris	Dec. 19-20
U.N. <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Tungsten	Geneva	December
NATO Ministerial Council: 38th Meeting	Brussels	December
Inter-American Chiefs of State	undetermined	December

U.S. Urges Early Action on Space Treaty

*Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

Mr. Chairman, I want to express the pleasure of the United States delegation that we have today resumed our deliberations on a treaty governing the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. Over the course of the 5 weeks since the recess of our talks in Geneva, we have reflected carefully on the work achieved during the first part of the Legal Subcommittee's fourth session. That work is substantial. As you know, the Subcommittee recorded agreement on eight substantive treaty articles covering 13 principal issues.

We should now press forward. I want to confirm here what I said in my concluding statement on August 3 in Geneva:² "With good will, hard work, and the serious approach that has marked the Subcommittee's efforts, I am convinced that we can reach full agreement."

We are here today in a conciliatory spirit—a spirit of give-and-take. My delegation will demonstrate its willingness to seek and to achieve a reasonable compromise on the few unresolved issues which remain before us. We are ready to consider the constructive suggestions already made by various members of the Subcommittee for the resolution of these issues, and we are sure that further helpful suggestions will be forthcoming. We hope our willingness to find a mutually acceptable text will be matched by a like spirit on the part of other members of the Subcommittee, for in this way agreement will be possible.

The United States considers it important for the Legal Subcommittee to report a fully agreed treaty text to our parent Outer Space Committee and thence to the General As-

sembly without delay. The General Assembly will then be in a position to take early action by opening the treaty for signature. In this way the Legal Subcommittee could make a great contribution to the opening days and mood of the General Assembly at its 21st session. Indeed, we would thus have taken a major step forward during these September days toward the realization of that primary purpose of the United Nations which, as the charter puts it, is "To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends."

Mr. Chairman, I have intentionally spoken with great brevity in order to facilitate the substantive discussion of unresolved issues. It is our hope that without precluding full discussion we can conclude this very afternoon this preliminary phase of our work—if it is the will of the Subcommittee and if all who wish to speak have an opportunity to express their views. My delegation therefore proposes that the Subcommittee meet tomorrow morning as a working group in order that we make the most rapid possible progress—and the best use of such very limited time as is available to all of us. We hope there will be a general disposition to move forward in this expeditious manner.

In conclusion, I want to stress the urgency of the need for a space treaty. The day is not far off when man will land on the moon. Let us strive to make that historic landing take place in the context of a mutually beneficial and universally accepted regime of law.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N. Y.

General Assembly

Manifestations of Racial Prejudice and National and Religious Intolerance. Report of the Secretary-General. A/6347, August 8, 1966. 34 pp. Reports of the International Law Commission. Text

¹ Made before the Legal Subcommittee of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on Sept. 12 (U.S./U.N. press release 4909).

² For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 29, 1966, p. 321.

of the draft articles on the law of treaties. Note by the Secretary-General. A/6348. August 9, 1966. 30 pp.

Draft Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. Note by the Secretary-General. A/6349. August 9, 1966. 11 pp.

Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Letter dated August 1 from the representative of the United Kingdom concerning the question of Aden and the Secretary-General's reply dated August 5. A 6374. August 10, 1966. 2 pp.

Question of South-West Africa. Note verbale dated August 2 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kenya. A/6387. August 16, 1966. 7 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. and Spain Amend Cotton Textiles Agreement

Press release 207 dated September 14

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

A revision of the 1963 bilateral agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles between the Governments of the United States and Spain¹ was announced on September 14.

The revision is embodied in an exchange of notes which took place at Washington on that day between Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs Anthony M. Solomon and the Marquis de Merry del Val, Ambassador of Spain.

The revision provides that because of special circumstances 1 million pounds of yarn may be exported from Spain to the United States during the period July 1-December 31, 1966, without being charged against the limitations of the agreement.

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE

SEPTEMBER 14, 1966.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the agreement between our two Governments concerning trade in cotton textiles

effected by an exchange of notes dated July 16, 1963, as amended.

In view of the special circumstances discussed by the representatives of our two Governments, I propose that, on a one-time basis, cotton yarn in categories 1 through 4 in the total amount of one million pounds may be exported from Spain to the United States during the period beginning July 1, 1966, and extending through December 31, 1966, without being charged against the limitations specified in the agreement, as amended.

If this proposal is acceptable to the Government of Spain, this note and your Excellency's note of acceptance² on behalf of the Government of Spain shall constitute an amendment to the agreement between our two Governments concerning trade in cotton textiles.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

For the Secretary of State:

ANTHONY M. SOLOMON

U.S. and Singapore Reach Cotton Textiles Understanding

Press release 194 dated August 30

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Letters were exchanged in Singapore on August 30 between the Singapore Government and the American Embassy on behalf of the United States Government which provide for controls over the export of cotton textiles from Singapore to the United States. The Singapore Government has agreed that exports of cotton textiles from Singapore to the United States will be restrained in accordance with a Singapore Cotton Textile Industry Restraint Schedule.

Under these letters the understanding

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5427.

² Not printed here.

shall remain in force for 3 years retroactively from April 1, 1966, through March 31, 1969.

The schedule establishes an overall limit for the first agreement year of 30 million square yards. Within this aggregate limit two group limits are provided; the first covers all apparel categories at 20 million square yards, and the second covers all other categories at 10 million square yards. Specific ceilings are provided for 11 apparel categories within the apparel group ceiling and for 8 fabric and made-up categories within the "all others" group. Provisions on growth, swing, consultation, spacing, and system of categories and conversion factors are also included. The schedule authorizes additional shipments of 5 million square yards during the first year of the agreement in various fabric categories and provides that additional shipments of 3.5 million square yards may be possible during the second year of the agreement and additional shipments of 1.925 million square yards may be possible during the third year.

AGREEMENT AND SCHEDULE

Letter From Government of Singapore

MINISTRY OF FINANCE
Singapore, I.
30th August, 1966.

DEAR MR. DEXTER: I refer to recent discussions held in Singapore between representatives of our two Governments concerning exports of cotton textiles from Singapore to the United States, and wish to inform you that in accordance with the agreement reached during the discussions, the Singapore Cotton Textile Industry will voluntarily restrain its exports to the United States, in accordance with the Singapore Cotton Textile Industry Restraint Schedule attached to this letter.

In view of this action by the Singapore industry, I propose the following arrangement, to be effective as of 1st April, 1966, concerning this trade:

(1) The Government of the United States of America agrees not to invoke procedures under Article 6(c) and 3 of the long-term arrangements regarding international trade in cotton textiles to limit cotton textile exports from Singapore to the United States during the term of this arrangement.

(2) The Government of the Republic of Singapore undertakes that the exports of cotton textiles from

Singapore to the United States will be restrained in accordance with the attached voluntary restraint schedule.

(3) The Government of the United States shall promptly supply the Government of the Republic of Singapore with data on monthly imports of cotton textiles from Singapore. The Government of the Republic of Singapore shall promptly supply the Government of the United States with data on monthly exports of cotton textiles to the United States. Each Government agrees to supply promptly any other available statistical data requested by the other Government.

(4) The Government of the Republic of Singapore and the Government of the United States agree to consult on any questions concerning trade in cotton textiles between our two countries, including levels of exports in categories not given specific limits in the attached schedule and in made-up goods or apparel made from a particular fabric.

(5) If the Government of the Republic of Singapore considers that as a result of the restraints specified in the attached schedule, Singapore is being placed in an inequitable position vis-a-vis a third country, the Government of the Republic of Singapore may request consultations with the Government of the United States with a view to taking appropriate remedial action such as consent of the Government of the United States to reasonable modification of this arrangement, including attached schedule.

(6) This arrangement shall continue in force through 31st March, 1969, except that either Government may terminate this arrangement effective at the end of March in any year by written notice to the other Government to be given at least 90 days prior to such termination date. Either Government may at any time propose revisions in this arrangement, including the attached schedule.

If this proposal is acceptable to the Government of the United States, I would appreciate your letter of acceptance¹ on behalf of your Government.

NGIAM TONG DOW
Deputy Secretary,
(Economic Development).

Mr. JOHN B. DEXTER,
Charge d'Affaires ad interim,
Embassy of the United States of America,
Singapore.

Singapore Cotton Textile Industry Restraint Schedule

The Singapore Cotton Textile Industry will restrain its exports of cotton textiles to the United States as follows:

1. During the period April 1, 1966, to March 31, 1969, exports of cotton textiles from Singapore to

¹ Not printed here.

the United States will be limited to aggregate, group and specific limits at the levels specified below.

2. For the first limitation year, constituting the 12-month period beginning April 1, 1966, the aggregate limit shall be 30,000,000 square yards.

3. Within this aggregate limit the following group limits shall apply for the first limitation year:

	<i>In Square Yards Equivalent</i>
Group I Apparel Categories (Categories 39-63)	20,000,000
Group II All other categories	10,000,000

4. Within the aggregate limit and the applicable group limits, the following specific limits shall apply for the first limitation year.

<i>Category</i>	<i>Quantity</i>	<i>Unit</i>	<i>In Square Yards Equivalent</i>
Apparel Categories (Group I)			
43	85,000	Doz.	614,890
44	20,000	"	736,000
45	60,000	"	1,331,160
46	40,000	"	978,280
47	45,000	"	998,370
50	130,000	"	2,313,610
51	60,000	"	1,067,820
52	65,000	"	944,450
54	50,000	"	1,250,000
55	27,000	"	1,377,000
60	149,000	"	7,742,040
All Other Categories (Group II)			
9/10	1,000,000	Sq Yds.	1,000,000
18/19	1,000,000	"	1,000,000
26 (duck only)	1,500,000	"	1,500,000
31 (shop towels only)	13,850,000	Pieces	4,819,800
34/35	160,000	"	992,000

5. (a) Within the aggregate limit either group limit may be exceeded by five percent.

(b) Within the applicable group limit (as it may be adjusted under this paragraph) specific limits may be exceeded by five percent.

6. (a) If it appears that cotton textile exports from Singapore to the United States in any category for which no specific limit is applicable, including Category 26 other than duck and Category 31 other than shop towels, are likely to exceed the consultation level specified below for any limitation year, the industry shall notify the Government of the Republic of Singapore. Until the industry has been informed that the Government of the Republic of Singapore and the United States Government have consulted on the effect of such shipments on conditions of the United States domestic market in the category in question and have concluded such consultations on a mutually satisfactory basis, these exports shall be limited to the consultation level. For

the first limitation year, the consultation level shall be 350,000 square yards equivalent.

(b) In the event that the United States Government requests consultations with the Government of the Republic of Singapore concerning undue concentration in exports from Singapore to the United States in made-up goods or apparel made from a particular fabric, these exports will be limited until the two Governments reach a mutually satisfactory solution. The limit shall be on the basis of the 12-month period beginning on the date the United States Government requests consultations under this paragraph and shall be 105 percent of the exports of such products from Singapore to the United States during the most recent 12-month period preceding the request for consultation and for which statistics were available to the two Governments on the date of the request. Any exports limited pursuant to this paragraph shall also be counted against all other applicable limits specified in this schedule.

7. In the second and succeeding 12-month periods that any limitation is applicable under this schedule, the level of exports permitted under that limitation shall be increased by five percent over the corresponding level for the preceding 12-month period. The corresponding level for the preceding 12-month period shall not include any adjustments under paragraph 5 or any excess shipments permitted under paragraph 8.

8. In view of the special circumstances surrounding the initiation of these restraints, the aggregate limit and the group limit on "All Other Categories" (including any adjustments of the group limit under paragraph 5) may be exceeded on a one-time basis:

a. During the first limitation year by not more than 5 million square yards. Any such excess shipments within this additional 5 million square yards may also exceed the limitations under paragraphs 4 and 6(a) (as they may be adjusted under paragraph 5) and shall be distributed among the following categories so as not to exceed the amounts shown.

<i>Category</i>	<i>Amount</i>
9/10	1,000,000 sq. yds.
18/19	500,000 sq. yds.
20/21	2,000,000 sq. yds.
22/23	2,000,000 sq. yds.
26 (duck only)	500,000 sq. yds.
26 (other than duck)	2,000,000 sq. yds.

b. During the second limitation year by 3.5 million square yards, if the Government of Singapore so requests within the first 30 days of such limitation year, and unless the Government of the United States of America advises the Government of Singapore within 30 days of the receipt of the request that there has been a significant downturn in the United States cotton textile industry. Any such excess shipment within this additional 3.5 mil-

lion square yards may also exceed the limitations under paragraphs 4 and 6(a) (as they may be adjusted under paragraphs 5 and 7) and shall be distributed among the following categories so as not to exceed the amounts shown:

Category	Amount
9/10	700,000 sq. yds.
18/19	350,000 sq. yds.
20/21	1,400,000 sq. yds.
22/23	1,400,000 sq. yds.
26 (duck only)	350,000 sq. yds.
26 (other than duck)	1,400,000 sq. yds.

c. During the third limitation year by 1.925 million square yards if the Government of Singapore so requests within the first 30 days of such limitation year, and unless the Government of the United States of America advises the Government of Singapore within 30 days of the receipt of the request that there has been a significant downturn in the United States cotton textile industry. Any such excess shipment within this additional 1.925 million square yards may also exceed the limitations under paragraphs 4 and 6(a) (as they may be adjusted under paragraphs 5 and 7) and shall be distributed among the following categories so as not to exceed the amounts shown:

Category	Amount
9/10	385,000 sq. yds.
18/19	192,500 sq. yds.
20/21	770,000 sq. yds.
22/23	770,000 sq. yds.
26 (duck only)	192,500 sq. yds.
26 (other than duck)	770,000 sq. yds.

9. Cotton textile exports from Singapore to the United States within each category shall be spaced as evenly as practicable throughout the limitation year, taking into consideration normal seasonal factors.

10. In implementing this schedule the system of categories and the rates of conversion into square yard equivalents listed in the annex hereto shall apply.

ANNEX

COTTON TEXTILE CATEGORIES AND CONVERSION FACTORS

Category	Description	Unit	Conversion Factor (Square Yards)
1	Yarn, carded, singles	Lb.	4.6
2	Yarn, carded, plied	Lb.	4.6
3	Yarn, combed, singles	Lb.	4.6
4	Yarn, combed, plied	Lb.	4.6
5	Gingham, carded	Syd.	1.0
6	Gingham, combed	Syd.	1.0
7	Velveteen	Syd.	1.0
8	Corduroy	Syd.	1.0
9	Sheeting, carded	Syd.	1.0

Category	Description	Unit	Conversion Factor (Square Yards)
10	Sheeting, combed	Syd.	1.0
11	Lawn, carded	Syd.	1.0
12	Lawn, combed	Syd.	1.0
13	Voile, carded	Syd.	1.0
14	Voile, combed	Syd.	1.0
15	Poplin and broadcloth, carded	Syd.	1.0
16	Poplin and broadcloth, combed	Syd.	1.0
17	Typewriter ribbon cloth	Syd.	1.0
18	Print cloth, shirting type, 80 x 80 type, carded	Syd.	1.0
19	Print cloth, shirting type, other than 80 x 80 type, carded	Syd.	1.0
20	Shirting, Jacquard or dobby, carded	Syd.	1.0
21	Shirting, Jacquard or dobby, combed	Syd.	1.0
22	Twill and sateen, carded	Syd.	1.0
23	Twill and sateen, combed	Syd.	1.0
24	Woven fabric, n.e.s., yarn dyed, carded	Syd.	1.0
25	Woven fabric, n.e.s., yarn dyed, combed	Syd.	1.0
26	Woven fabric, other, carded	Syd.	1.0
27	Woven fabric, other, combed	Syd.	1.0
28	Pillowcases, carded	No.	1.084
29	Pillowcases, combed	No.	1.084
30	Dish towels	No.	.348
31	Other towels	No.	.348
32	Handkerchiefs, whether or not in the piece	Doz.	1.66
33	Table damask and manufactures	Lb.	3.17
34	Sheets, carded	No.	6.2
35	Sheets, combed	No.	6.2
36	Bedspreads and quilts	No.	6.9
37	Braided and woven elastics	Lb.	4.6
38	Fishing nets and fish netting	Lb.	4.6
39	Gloves and mittens	Doz.	3.527
40	Hose and half hose	Prs.	4.6
41	T-shirts, all white, knit, men's and boys'	Doz.	7.234
42	T-shirts, other, knit	Doz.	7.234
43	Shirts, knit, other than T-shirts and sweatshirts	Doz.	7.234
44	Sweaters and cardigans	Doz.	36.8
45	Shirts, dress, not knit, men's and boys'	Doz.	22.186
46	Shirts, sport, not knit, men's and boys'	Doz.	24.457
47	Shirts, work, not knit, men's and boys'	Doz.	22.186
48	Raincoats, ¾ length or longer, not knit	Doz.	50.0

Category	Description	Unit	Conversion Factor (Square Yards)
49	Other coats, not knit	Doz.	32.5
50	Trousers, slacks and shorts (outer), not knit, men's and boys'	Doz.	17.797
51	Trousers, slacks and shorts (outer), not knit, women's, girls' and infants'	Doz.	17.797
52	Blouses, not knit	Doz.	14.53
53	Dresses (including uniforms), not knit	Doz.	45.3
54	Playsuits, washsuits, sunsuits, creepers, rompers, etc., not knit, n.e.s.	Doz.	25.0
55	Dressing gowns, including bathrobes, beach robes, lounge robes, housecoats and dusters, not knit	Doz.	51.0
56	Undershirts, knit, men's and boys'	Doz.	9.2
57	Briefs and undershorts, men's and boys'	Doz.	11.25
58	Drawers, shorts and briefs, knit, n.e.s.	Doz.	5.0
59	All other underwear, not knit	Doz.	16.0
60	Pajamas and other nightwear	Doz.	51.96
61	Brassieres and other body-supporting garments	Doz.	4.75
62	Wearing apparel, knit, n.e.s.	Lb.	4.6
63	Wearing apparel, not knit, n.e.s.	Lb.	4.6
64	All other cotton textiles	Lb.	4.6

Apparel items exported in sets shall be recorded under separate categories of the component items.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations;
Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on diplomatic relations concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes.
Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964.¹
Ratifications deposited: Luxembourg, August 17, 1966.

Finance

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965.²
Ratifications deposited: Dahomey, September 6, 1966; Jamaica, September 9, 1966; Malagasy

Republic, September 6, 1966; Upper Volta, August 29, 1966.
Articles of agreement establishing the Asian Development Bank, with annexes. Done at Manila December 4, 1965.
Acceptance deposited: United States (with a declaration), August 16, 1966.
Ratifications deposited: India (with a declaration), July 20, 1966; Philippines (with a declaration), July 5, 1966.
Entered into force: August 22, 1966.

Labor

Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the International Labor Organization. Dated at Montreal October 9, 1946. Entered into force April 20, 1948. TIAS 1868.
Admission to membership: Nepal, August 30, 1966.

Law of the Sea

Convention on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force September 10, 1964. TIAS 5639.
Accession deposited: Mexico (with a reservation), August 2, 1966.
Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force September 30, 1962. TIAS 5200.
Accession deposited: Mexico (with a reservation), August 2, 1966.
Convention on fishing and conservation of the living resources of the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force March 20, 1966. TIAS 5969.
Accession deposited: Mexico, August 2, 1966.
Convention on the continental shelf. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force June 10, 1964. TIAS 5578.
Accession deposited: Mexico, August 2, 1966.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044). Adopted at London September 15, 1964.²
Acceptance received: Cambodia, August 18, 1966.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1948. Done at London June 10, 1948. Entered into force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495.
Denunciation received: Argentina, September 5, 1966.

BILATERAL

Hong Kong

Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Hong Kong August 26, 1966. Entered into force August 26, 1966.

Inter-American Development Bank

Protocol to the social progress trust fund agreement of June 19, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4763, 5522). Signed at Washington September 7, 1966. Entered into force September 7, 1966.

Japan

Agreement relating to the reciprocal issuance of non-immigrant visas. Effected by exchange of notes

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

at Tokyo August 9 and 23, 1966. Entered into force September 22, 1966.

Interim agreement relating to the renegotiation of schedule XX (United States) to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva September 6, 1966. Entered into force September 6, 1966.

Mexico

Agreement relating to the loan to Mexico of Colorado River water. Effected by exchange of notes at México August 24, 1966. Entered into force August 24, 1966.

Singapore

Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Singapore August 30, 1966. Entered into force August 30, 1966; effective April 1, 1966.

Spain

Agreement amending the agreement of July 16, 1963, as amended (TIAS 5427, 5598, 5680, 5756), relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington September 14, 1966. Entered into force September 14, 1966.

contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and, in some cases, a selected bibliography. Those listed below are available at 5¢ each, unless otherwise indicated.

Basutoland. Pub. 8091. 4 pp.

Burundi. Pub. 8084. 8 pp.

Canada. Pub. 7769. 12 pp. 10¢.

Communist China. Pub. 7751. 8 pp.

Ghana. Pub. 8089. 8 pp.

Ivory Coast. Pub. 8119. 8 pp.

Lebanon. Pub. 7816. 4 pp.

Mauritius. Pub. 8023. 8 pp.

Morocco. Pub. 7954. 8 pp.

Nigeria. Pub. 7933. 4 pp.

Paraguay. Pub. 8098. 4 pp.

South Viet-Nam. Pub. 7933. 8 pp.

Southern Rhodesia. Pub. 8104. 4 pp.

United Kingdom. Pub. 8099. 8 pp.

Yugoslavia. Pub. 7773. 8 pp.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Greece, amending the agreement of July 17, 1964. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington May 23, 1966. Entered into force May 23, 1966. Effective September 1, 1965. TIAS 6009. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Bolivia—Signed at La Paz April 2, 1966. Entered into force April 22, 1966. With exchange of notes. TIAS 6013. 16 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Indonesia—Signed at Djakarta April 18, 1966. Entered into force April 18, 1966. With exchange of notes. TIAS 6016. 8 pp. 10¢.

Sampling of Radioactivity of Upper Atmosphere by Means of Balloons. Agreement with Australia extending the agreement of May 9, 1961, as extended. Exchange of notes. Dated at Canberra May 9, 1966. Entered into force May 9, 1966. TIAS 6017. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Greece, amending the agreement of November 17, 1964, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Athens January 13, 1966. Entered into force January 13, 1966. TIAS 6018. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Israel—Signed at Washington June 6, 1966. Entered into force June 6, 1966. With exchange of notes. TIAS 6023. 6 pp. 5¢.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each leaflet

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LV, NO. 1423 PUBLICATION 8140 OCTOBER 3, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of

the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-

intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. PRICE: 52 issues, domestic \$10, foreign \$15; single copy 30 cents.

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Africa	
The Coming of Age of the U.N. (Goldberg) . . .	492
Unfinished Business of the U.N. and the World (Sisco)	487
Asia. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of September 16	478
Atomic Energy. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of September 16	478
Burma. U.S. and Burma Reaffirm Bonds of Friendship and Cooperation (Johnson, Ne Win)	483
Canada	
International Issues of Pacific Fisheries (Herrington)	500
U.S.-Canadian Friendship Symbolized by New Park (Johnson)	499
China. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of September 16	478
Disarmament	
The Coming of Age of the U.N. (Goldberg) . . .	492
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of September 16	478
Economic Affairs	
International Issues of Pacific Fisheries (Herrington)	500
Unfinished Business of the U.N. and the World (Sisco)	487
U.S. and Singapore Reach Cotton Textiles Understanding	509
U.S. and Spain Amend Cotton Textiles Agreement	509
Foreign Aid. President Johnson Pays Tribute to Peace Corps Volunteers	496
Germany. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of September 16	478
Human Rights. The Coming of Age of the U.N. (Goldberg)	492
International Organizations and Conferences. Calendar of International Conferences	505
Japan. International Issues of Pacific Fisheries (Herrington)	500
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of September 16	478
Presidential Documents	
President Johnson Pays Tribute to Peace Corps Volunteers	496
U.S. and Burma Reaffirm Bonds of Friendship and Cooperation	483
U.S.-Canadian Friendship Symbolized by New Park	499
Publications. Recent Releases	514
Science. U.S. Urges Early Action on Space Treaty (Goldberg)	508
Singapore. U.S. and Singapore Reach Cotton Textiles Understanding	509
Spain. U.S. and Spain Amend Cotton Textiles Agreement	509
Treaty Information	
Current Actions	513

International Issues of Pacific Fisheries (Herrington)	500
U.S. and Singapore Reach Cotton Textiles Understanding	509
U.S. and Spain Amend Cotton Textiles Agreement	509
U.S.S.R.	
International Issues of Pacific Fisheries (Herrington)	500
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of September 16	478
United Nations	
The Coming of Age of the U.N. (Goldberg) . . .	492
Current U.N. Documents	508
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of September 16	478
Unfinished Business of the U.N. and the World (Sisco)	487
U.S. Urges Early Action on Space Treaty (Goldberg)	508
Viet-Nam	
The Coming of Age of the U.N. (Goldberg) . . .	492
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of September 16	478
Unfinished Business of the U.N. and the World (Sisco)	487
U.S. and Burma Reaffirm Bonds of Friendship and Cooperation (Johnson, Ne Win)	483

Name Index

Goldberg, Arthur J	492, 508
Herrington, William C	500
Johnson, President	483, 496, 499
Ne Win	483
Rusk, Secretary	478
Sisco, Joseph J	487

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: September 12-18

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to September 12 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 194 of August 30 and 203 of September 8.

No.	Date	Subject
*206	9/13	Amendment to program for visit of President Marcos of the Philippines.
207	9/14	Amendment to U.S.-Spanish bilateral cotton textile agreement.
†208	9/16	Amendment of U.S.-Philippine military bases agreement.
†209	9/16	Text of amendment of U.S.-Philippine agreement.
†210	9/16	Entry into force of U.S.-Canadian automotive products agreement.
211	9/16	Rusk: news conference of September 16.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Private Boycotts VS the National Interest

A frank look at a political and economic problem which has been and continues to be a serious concern to the United States Government is the subject of this 19-page pamphlet. The problem involves periodic attempts by individuals and groups, relatively small in number, to use or threaten to use economic reprisals against American businesses which trade with Eastern European countries. The pamphlet explains U.S. policy toward trade with Eastern Europe and points out that Americans who interfere with sales by local merchants—or by multimillion-dollar corporations—handling Eastern European goods are “obstructing a foreign policy that has been developed by four administrations since World War II.”

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THE
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BULLETIN

Vol. LV, No. 1424



October 10, 1966

INITIATIVE FOR PEACE

Statement by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg 518

PRESIDENT MARCOS OF THE PHILIPPINES VISITS THE UNITED STATES 526

THE OTHER WAR IN VIETNAM—A PROGRESS REPORT
(FIRST OF TWO PARTS)

by Robert W. Komer, Special Assistant to the President 549

Initiative for Peace

*Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

As the General Assembly convenes in this 21st year of the United Nations, we of the United States of America are aware, as indeed every delegation must be, of the great responsibilities which all of us share who work in this world organization.

No one, I am sure, feels these responsibilities more, or more keenly, than the Secretary-General, U Thant. In the past 5 years he has filled his office with distinction and effectiveness. And indeed, this is the most difficult office in the world. We know how much selfless dedication and energy have been exacted from him on behalf of the world community. We can well understand how the burdens of his office led him to his decision not to offer himself for a second term as Secretary-General.

But the United Nations needs him. It needs him as a person. It needs him as a Secretary-General who conceives his office in the full spirit of the charter as an important organ of the United Nations, endowed with the authority to act with initiative and effectiveness. The members, in all their diversity and even discord, are united in their confidence in him. His departure at this crucial time in world affairs, and in the life of the United Nations, would be a serious

loss both to the organization itself and to the cause of peace among nations. We reiterate our earnest hope that he will heed the unanimous wishes of the membership and permit his tenure of office to be extended. His affirmative decision on this question would give all of us new impetus to deal with the many great problems on our agenda.

The peoples of the world expect the United Nations to resolve these problems. With all their troubles and aspirations, they put great faith in our organization. They look to us not for pious words but for solid results: agreements reached, wars ended or prevented, treaties written, cooperative programs launched—results that will bring humanity a few steps, but giant steps, closer to the purposes of the charter which are our common commitment.

Realizing this, the United States has considered what it could say in this general debate that would improve the prospects for such fruitful results in the present session. We have concluded that, rather than attempting to review the many questions on the agenda to which we attach importance, we could make a more useful contribution by concentrating on the serious dangers to peace now existing in Asia, particularly the war in Viet-Nam, and by treating that subject in a constructive and positive way.

The conflict in Viet-Nam is first of all an

¹Made in plenary session of the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 22 (U.S. delegation press release 4917).

Asian issue, whose tragedy and suffering fall most heavily on the peoples directly involved. But its repercussions are worldwide. It diverts much of the energies of many nations, including my own, from urgent and constructive endeavors. It is, as the Secretary-General said in his statement of September 1, "a source of grave concern and is bound to be a source of even greater anxiety, not only to the parties directly involved and to the major powers but also to other members of the Organization." My Government remains determined to exercise every restraint to limit the war and to exert every effort to bring the conflict to the earliest possible end.

The Viet-Nam Conflict

The essential facts of the Viet-Nam conflict can be stated briefly: Viet-Nam today remains divided along the demarcation line agreed upon in Geneva in 1954. To the north and south of that line are North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam. Provisional though they may be, pending a decision on the peaceful reunification of Viet-Nam by the process of self-determination, they are nonetheless political realities in the international community.

The Geneva accord which established the demarcation line is so thorough in its prohibition of the use of force that it forbids military interference of any sort by one side in the affairs of the other; it even forbids civilians to cross the demilitarized zone. In 1962 at the Geneva conference held that year, military infiltration through Laos was also forbidden. Yet, despite those provisions, South Viet-Nam is under an attack, already several years old, by forces directed and supplied from the North and reinforced by regular units, currently some 17 identified regiments, of the North Vietnamese Army. The manifest purpose of this attack is to force upon the people of South Viet-Nam a system which they have not chosen by any peaceful process.

Let it be noted that this attack by North Viet-Nam contravenes not only the United Nations Charter but also the terms of General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX), adopted unanimously only last December and entitled "Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty." That resolution declares, among other things, that: "No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State." It further declares that: ". . . no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow . . . of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State." It would be hard to write a more precise description of what North Viet-Nam is doing, and has been doing for years, in South Viet-Nam.

Certainly the prohibition of the use of force and subversion, both by this resolution and by the charter itself, must apply with full vigor to international demarcation lines that have been established by solemn international agreements. This is true not only in Viet-Nam but also in all divided states, where the recourse to force between the divided parts can have far-reaching consequences. Furthermore, solemn international agreements, specifically the Geneva accord, explicitly prohibit recourse to force as a means of reunifying Viet-Nam.

Our Affirmative Aims in Viet-Nam

It is because of the attempt to upset by violence the situation in Viet-Nam, and its far-reaching implications elsewhere, that the United States and other countries have responded to appeals from South Viet-Nam for military assistance.

Our aims in giving this assistance are strictly limited.

We are not engaged in a "holy war" against communism.

We do not seek to establish an American empire or a sphere of influence in Asia.

We seek no permanent military bases, no permanent establishment of troops, no permanent alliances, no permanent American presence of any kind in South Viet-Nam.

We do not seek to impose a policy of alinement on South Viet-Nam.

We do not seek to overthrow the Government of North Viet-Nam.

We do not seek to do any injury to mainland China nor to threaten any of its legitimate interests.

We do not ask of North Viet-Nam an unconditional surrender or indeed the surrender of anything that belongs to it.

Nor do we seek to exclude any segment of the South Vietnamese people from peaceful participation in their country's future.

Let me state affirmatively and succinctly what our aims are.

We want a political solution, not a military solution, to this conflict. By the same token, we reject the idea that North Viet-Nam has the right to impose a military solution.

We seek to assure for the people of South Viet-Nam the same right of self-determination—to decide its own political destiny, free of force—that the United Nations Charter affirms for all.

And we believe that reunification of Viet-Nam should be decided upon through a free choice by the peoples of both the North and the South without outside interference, the results of which choice we are fully prepared to support.

These, then, are our affirmative aims. We are well aware of the stated position of Hanoi on these issues. But no differences can be resolved without contact, discussion, or negotiations. For our part, we have long been—and remain today—ready to negotiate without prior conditions. We are prepared to discuss Hanoi's four points, together with any points which other parties may wish to raise. We are ready to negotiate a settlement based on a strict observance of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements, which observance

was called for in the communique of the recent meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries in Bucharest. We will support a reconvening of the Geneva conference, or an Asian conference, or any other generally acceptable forum.

U.S. Proposals for Peace in Southeast Asia

At the same time we have also been soberly considering whether the lack of agreement on peace aims has been the sole barrier to the beginning of negotiations. We are aware that some perceive other obstacles, and I wish to make here today three proposals with respect to them.

First, it is said that one obstacle is the United States bombing of North Viet-Nam. Let it be recalled that there was no bombing of North Viet-Nam for 5 years, during which there was steadily increasing infiltration from North Viet-Nam in violation of the Geneva accords, during which there were no United States combat forces in Viet-Nam, and during which strenuous efforts were made to achieve a peaceful settlement. Let it be further recalled that twice before we have suspended our bombing, once for 37 days, without any reciprocal act of deescalation from the other side and without any sign from them of a willingness to negotiate.

Nonetheless, let me say that in this matter the United States is willing once again to take the first step. We are prepared to order a cessation of all bombing of North Viet-Nam the moment we are assured, privately or otherwise, that this step will be answered promptly by a corresponding and appropriate deescalation on the other side.

We therefore urge before this august assembly that the government in Hanoi be asked the following question, to which we would be prepared to receive either a private or a public response: Would it, in the interest of peace, and in response to a prior cessation by the United States of the bombing in North Viet-Nam, take corresponding and timely steps to reduce or bring to an end its own military activities against South Viet-Nam?

Another obstacle is said to be North Viet-Nam's conviction or fear that the United States intends to establish a permanent military presence in Viet-Nam. There is no basis for such a fear. The United States stands ready to withdraw its forces as others withdraw theirs so that peace can be restored in South Viet-Nam and favors international machinery—either of the United Nations or other machinery—to insure effective supervision of the withdrawal.

We therefore urge that Hanoi be asked the following question also: Would North Viet-Nam be willing to agree to a time schedule for supervised phased withdrawal from South Viet-Nam of all external forces—those of North Viet-Nam as well as those from the United States and other countries aiding South Viet-Nam?

A further obstacle is said to be disagreement over the place of the Viet Cong in the negotiations. Some argue that, regardless of different views on who controls the Viet Cong, it is a combatant force and, as such, should take part in the negotiations.

Our view on this matter was stated some time ago by President Johnson, who made clear that, as far as we are concerned, this question would not be “an insurmountable problem.”² We therefore invite the authorities in Hanoi to consider whether this obstacle to negotiations may not be more imaginary than real.

We offer these proposals today in the interests of peace in Southeast Asia. There may be other proposals. We have not been and we are not now inflexible in our position. But we do believe that whatever approach finally succeeds, it will not be one which simply decries what is happening in Viet-Nam and appeals to one side to stop while encouraging the other. Such an approach can only further delay the peace which we all desire and fervently hope for.

The only workable formula for a settlement will be one which is just to the basic interests of all who are involved.

² At a news conference on July 28, 1965.

In this spirit we welcome discussion of this question either in the Security Council, where the United States itself has raised the matter,³ or here in the General Assembly, and we are fully prepared to take part in any such discussion. We earnestly solicit the further initiative of any organ, including the Secretary-General or any member of the United Nations whose influence can help in this cause. Every member has a responsibility to exercise its power and influence for peace; and the greater its power and influence, the greater is this responsibility.

The Problem of Communist China

Now I turn to another problem, related in part to the first: the problem of how to foster a constructive relationship between the mainland of China, with its 700 million people, and the outside world. The misdirection of so much of the energies of this vast, industrious, and gifted people into xenophobic displays, such as the extraordinary, difficult to understand, and alarming activities of the Red Guards, and the official policy and doctrine of promoting revolution and subversion throughout the world—these are among the most disturbing phenomena of our age. Surely, among the essentials of peace in Asia are “reconciliation between nations that now call themselves enemies” and, specifically, “a peaceful mainland China.”⁴

Let me say to this Assembly categorically that it is not the policy of the United States to isolate Communist China from the world. On the contrary, we have sought to limit the areas of hostility and to pave the way for the restoration of our historically friendly relations with the great people of China.

Our efforts to this end have taken many forms. Since 1955, United States representatives have held 131 bilateral diplomatic meetings in Geneva, and later in Warsaw, with emissaries from Peking.

³ For background, see BULLETIN of Feb. 14, 1966, p. 229.

⁴ For an address made by President Johnson on July 12, see *ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1966, p. 158.

We have sought without success to open numerous unofficial channels of communication with mainland China.

We have made it crystal clear that we do not intend to attack, invade, or attempt to overthrow the existing regime in Peking, and we have expressed our hope to see representatives of Peking join us and others in meaningful negotiations on disarmament, a nuclear test ban, and a ban on the further spread of nuclear weapons.

But the international community, if it is faithful to the charter and to our resolutions, cannot countenance Peking's doctrine and policy of intervening by violence and subversion in other nations, whether under the guise of so-called "wars of national liberation" against independent countries or under any other guise. Such intervention can find no place in the United Nations Charter nor in the resolutions of the General Assembly. Yet dozens of nations represented in this hall have had direct experience of these illegal activities.

Issue of Peking's Admission to U.N.

It is in the light of these facts, and of our ardent desire for a better atmosphere, that the United States has carefully considered the issues arising from the absence of representatives of Peking from the United Nations.

Two facts bear on this issue and on the attitude of my country toward any attempted solution.

First, the Republic of China on Taiwan is a founding member of the United Nations and its rights are clear. The United States will vigorously oppose any effort to exclude the representatives of the Republic of China from the United Nations in order to put representatives of Communist China in their place.

The second fact is that Communist China, unlike anyone else in the history of this organization, has put forward special and extraordinary terms for consenting to enter the United Nations. In addition to the expul-

sion of the Republic of China, there are also demands to transform and pervert this organization from its charter purposes—some of them put forward as recently as yesterday.

What can be the cause of this attitude? We cannot be sure, but we do know that it comes from a leadership whose stated program is to transform the world by violence. It comes from a leadership which openly proclaims that it is opposed to any discussion of a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam. It would almost seem that these leaders wish to isolate their country from a world—and from a United Nations—that they cannot transform or control. Indeed, they have brought their country to a degree of isolation that is unique in the world today, an isolation not only from the United States and its allies but from most of the nonaligned world and even from most of the Communist nations. Many, not only the United States, have sought improved relations and have been rebuffed.

At this moment in history, therefore, the basic question about the relation between Communist China and the United Nations is a question to which only the leaders in Peking can give the answer. And I put the question: Will they refrain from putting forward clearly unacceptable terms; and are they prepared to assume the obligations of the United Nations Charter, in particular the basic charter obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state?

The world—and my Government—will listen most attentively for a helpful response to these questions. We hope it will come soon—the sooner the better. Like many other members here, the United States has the friendliest historic feelings toward the great Chinese people. We look forward to the occasion when they will once again enrich, rather than endanger, the fabric of the world community and accept the spirit of the charter, which enjoins all people to "practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors."

Tasks of Economic Development

Mr. President, I have dwelt on these great and thorny issues of Asia because they are of more—far more—than regional importance. Progress toward their solution would visibly brighten the atmosphere of international relations all over the world. It would enable the United Nations to turn a new corner, to apply itself with renewed energy to the great tasks of reconciliation and peaceful construction which lie before us in every part of the globe.

Surely, peaceful construction is needed—above all in the less developed areas. It is needed in Southeast Asia, today a region of conflict but also a region of vast underdeveloped resources, where my country is prepared to make a most substantial contribution to the development of the whole region, including North Viet-Nam. It is needed in the Western Hemisphere, where, under the bold ideals of the Alliance for Progress, the states of Latin America are already carrying out a far-reaching, peaceful process of economic and social development.

Indeed, in no area are the tasks of economic development more important than on the continent of Africa, represented in this hall by the delegates of 37 nations. Last May, in commemorating the anniversary of the Organization of African Unity, the President suggested ways in which the United States, as a friend of Africa, might help with some of that continent's major economic problems.⁵ Our efforts in this field are now entering a new stage as we begin to carry out the recommendations of a special committee appointed to review United States participation in African development programs, both bilateral and multilateral.

But the economic side of this peace cannot stand alone. The time is past when either peace or material progress could be founded on the domination of one people, or one race or one group, by another. Yet attempts to do just that still continue in southern Africa

⁵ *Ibid.*, June 13, 1966, p. 914.

today. As a result, the danger to peace in that area is real and substantial.

My Government holds strong views on these problems. We are not, and never will be, content with a minority government in Southern Rhodesia. The objective we support for that country remains as it was stated last May:⁶ “to open the full power and responsibility of nationhood to all the people of Rhodesia—not just 6 percent of them.”

Nor can we ever be content with such a situation as that in South West Africa, where one race holds another in intolerable subjection under the false name of *apartheid*.

The decision of the International Court, in refusing to touch the merits of the question of South West Africa, was most disappointing.⁷ But the application of law to this question does not hang on that decision alone. South Africa's conduct remains subject to obligations reaffirmed by earlier advisory opinions of the Court, whose authority is undiminished. Under these opinions, South Africa cannot alter the international status of the territory without the consent of the United Nations and South Africa remains bound to accept United Nations supervision, submit annual reports to the General Assembly, and “promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants.”

This is no time for South Africa to take refuge in a technical finding of the International Court—which did not deal with the substantive merits of the case. The time is overdue—the time is long overdue—for South Africa to accept its obligations to the international community in regard to South West Africa. Continued violation by South Africa of its plain obligations to the international community would necessarily require all nations, including my own, to take such an attitude into account in their relationships with South Africa.

Many other questions of significance will

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ For a Department statement of July 27, see *ibid.*, Aug. 15, 1966, p. 231.

engage our attention during this session of the General Assembly. Foremost among them are questions of disarmament and arms control, of which the most urgent are the completion of a treaty to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and the extension of the limited test ban treaty. Remaining differences on these issues can and must be resolved on a basis of mutual compromise.

Need for Rule of Law in Outer Space

Finally, I wish to speak of one further matter of great concern both to the United Nations and to my country, and that is the draft treaty to govern activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies.

Major progress has been made in the negotiation of this important treaty, but several issues remain. One of these concerns the question of reporting by space powers on their activities on celestial bodies. A second issue concerns access by space powers to one another's installations on celestial bodies. On both of these points the United States made at the most recent meeting of the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on Outer Space—and reaffirmed in the parent committee—significant compromise proposals in the interest of early agreement.

Unfortunately, the U.S.S.R. has not responded constructively to these proposals. Instead, it has insisted on still another matter: a provision requiring states which grant tracking facilities to one country to make the same facilities available to all others, without reciprocity and without regard to the wishes of the granting state. The obligation proposed by the U.S.S.R., as was apparent in the Space Committee, was unacceptable to many countries participating in our negotiations and was supported indeed only by a very small number of Eastern European states.

Tracking facilities, our discussions demonstrated, are a matter for bilateral negotiation

and agreement. The United States has held such discussions and reached such agreements with a number of countries on a basis of mutual commitment and common advantage. France and the European Space Research Organization have also established widespread tracking networks on a similar basis. It is, of course, open to the U.S.S.R. and any other space power, without objection from my Government, to proceed in exactly the same way.

I should like to state today my Government's interest in bilateral cooperation in the tracking of space vehicles on the basis of mutual benefits, and I should like now to make an offer to help resolve this dispute. If the Soviet Union desires to provide for tracking coverage from United States territory, we, on our part, are prepared to discuss with Soviet representatives the technical and other requirements involved with a view to reaching some mutually beneficial agreement; and our scientists and technical representatives can meet without delay to explore the possibilities to this end.

For, indeed, the outer space treaty is too important and too urgent to be delayed. This treaty offers us the opportunity to establish, in the unlimited realm of space beyond this planet, a rule of peace and law—before the arms race has been extended into that realm. It is all the more urgent because of man's recent strides toward landing on the moon.

By far the greater part of the work on the treaty is now behind us. We have agreed on important provisions, including major obligations in the area of arms control. We should proceed to settle the remaining subsidiary issues in a spirit of conciliation and understanding so that this General Assembly may give its approval to a completed treaty before the Assembly adjourns.

Mr. President, I conclude by expressing our earnest hope that the words of the United States today on all these issues may contribute to concrete steps toward peace and a better world.

We know the difficulties, but we are not discouraged. In the 21 turbulent years since the charter went into effect, we of the United Nations have faced conflicts at least as great and as difficult as any that confront us today. The failure of this organization has been prophesied many times. But all these prophecies have been disproved. Even the most formidable issues have not killed our organization—and none will. Indeed, it has grown great and respected by facing the hardest issues and dealing forthrightly with them.

There is no magic in the United Nations save what we, its members, bring to it. And that magic is a simple thing: our irreducible awareness of our common humanity and our consequent will to peace. Without that awareness and that will, these great buildings would be an empty shell. With them, we have here the greatest instrument ever devised by man for the reconciliation of conflicts and the building of the better future for which all mankind yearns.

The United Nations will live. We, its members, must and will make it live and

flourish. Whatever the troubles we face, we must and will make its purposes of peace more and more come true.

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to 21st U.N. General Assembly

The Senate on September 16 confirmed the following to be representatives and alternate representatives of the United States to the 21st session of the General Assembly of the United Nations:

Representatives

Arthur J. Goldberg
Frank Church
Clifford P. Case
James M. Nabrit, Jr.
William C. Foster

Alternate Representatives

James Roosevelt
Mrs. Eugenie Anderson
Mrs. Patricia Roberts Harris
George L. Killion
Harding F. Bancroft

President Marcos of the Philippines Visits the United States

President Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Philippines made a state visit to the United States September 12-27. He met with President Johnson and other Government officials at Washington September 14-16 and addressed a joint session of the Congress September 15. Following are exchanges of greetings and toasts between President Johnson and President Marcos on September 14 and a joint communique released on September 15, together with the text of President Marcos' address to the Congress.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS, SEPTEMBER 14

White House press release dated September 14

President Johnson

Mr. President and Mrs. Marcos: We welcome you.

You come to this house and to this Nation as the captain of a great country and you bring more than your credentials as a Chief of State. For your people and mine have shared suffering and victory. So we are not only friends; we are brothers.

You have also brought rain—and that endears you to us greatly.

More than anyone here today, Mr. President, you know the price of freedom. You were wounded five times in freedom's cause; you survived the Bataan Death March and for 2 years led a force of guerrillas with great and legendary courage. You wear two Silver Stars. And you carry the Distinguished Service Cross—one of the highest awards a grateful United States can give its heroes.

Our people take pride in the independence and progress of the Philippines. Your nation of islands is an exhibit for history's claim

that the future belongs to those who champion freedom and labor unselfishly for it.

I think it is particularly fitting this morning to observe that the new billion-dollar Asian Development Bank will soon have its headquarters in Manila. Your nation symbolizes the promise of this new venture. From the ruin of war you have built an economy which gives your people great hope, and you are an example to all nations that economic and social progress can be achieved without abandoning individual freedom.

We know that what your nation has, it has earned.

What you yearn for, you work for.

And what you work for—you are ready to defend.

For that, Mr. President, we are grateful.

Last Sunday, on your 49th birthday, 2,000 Philippine troops began their journey to Viet-Nam. In the field they will take their place beside Australians, Koreans, New Zealanders, Americans, and South Vietnamese.

I think I can understand your own feelings about this. As Commander in Chief, you and I know that it is never easy to commit men to battle. But we know that if a leader is to pass along to the next generation the treasure of liberty, he must do what must be done.

During the next 2 days we will talk of a day when the Pacific will be truly what its name implies: a place of peace. We will look to the time when nations who live by the side of that great ocean need no longer fear their neighbors; to a time when plenty, not poverty, is every man's reward for his labor.

Two decades ago the Filipino and the American were joined in cause and blood. Today we are joined in our hopes for a peaceful and prosperous world.

You yourself, Mr. President, have set as a goal for your nation "the attainment of a higher level of life for our people." That goal is our goal, too.

So this morning it gives me great pride and pleasure, Mr. President, to see you and Mrs. Marcos here in our house, the first house of this land. I want you to know that the welcome comes from all the people of this land, who respect the work and sacrifice of your great nation.

Thank you for being here.

President Marcos

President and Mrs. Johnson: Mrs. Marcos and I wish to extend our gratitude to you for your gracious welcome.

We have come to your great country many times, but this is the first occasion on which I can extend to the American people, through you, a message of good will and friendship, of comradeship and amity, from the Filipino people, whose destiny and fate you once decided in a historic moment 20 years ago, when on July 4, 1946, you dismantled the American colonial machinery in my country, declared it free, and thus set into motion one of the greatest glories of our age, the extension of the frontiers of freedom and the emergence of sovereign nations all over the world.

If the historians' verdict be true that our age will be remembered not so much for military or scientific achievements but for the ideal and the principle of the acceptance of international responsibility for the entire human family, then America, under your leadership, Mr. President, can claim a major share of this pioneering work in implementing this radical principle that the rich nations must help the poor nations, not only because they are interdependent in an irreversibly one world but because it is right.

I have come in the hope that in my own modest way I shall be able to strengthen the ties that bind us and deepen the relationship that has existed between our two peoples.

For we have shared the community of the spirit, a commonness of ideals conceived in

peace, strengthened in war. For over seven decades your nation and mine have walked the path of democracy. We have followed you. And we do not regret it.

For we are happy today to be known as an independent country seeking to identify the ancient springs of our national identity, participating in all that is Asia and hoping to help mold its ultimate destiny, but remembering that in this country lies the fountainhead of most of our liberties and that in this kindly land came the generous impulse that allowed the birth of a new Republic in the Pacific.

This new Republic, I represent. It has only 32 million people, and so perhaps the question should be asked: What can a small nation that was once a colony of the United States say to the President of the strongest nation ever known in the world?

I can only say, Mr. President, that we have come humbly and in all modesty to offer the fearless resolution of the spirit of the Filipino. For you have strength of body, and we can only tell you that on many occasions we have survived on fortitude alone.

What can we offer to this partnership with a great nation? You are perplexed by many problems that come from Asia and Africa. We come to offer you the intimate knowledge that we have acquired of Asia, from whence we come.

We come to offer you a heart and mind dedicated to the same objective: peace with justice.

This is all that we can offer you. But we offer it with a full heart. Accept, therefore, our gratitude, again, Mr. President, for your benevolence and your enlightened colonial policy as far back as 1902.

For the image of America that you have created in the disenchanted eyes of the Asian countries at the beginning of this century, we thank you as a nation on which we can depend for the salvation of mankind.

For in your strong hands lies the awesome responsibility that you discharge as the first and foremost nation that is a nuclear power.

We thank you for utilizing your powers

with restraint and wisdom. We have watched the leadership of President Johnson and we can only say, as the Orientals say: Leadership is the other side of the coin of loneliness, and he who is a leader must always act alone—and acting alone, accept everything alone.

We have seen you accept everything. The compulsion of the timorous you have discarded; the importunings of friends you have rejected. But staying close to the image that you knew of America and your vision of what is America, you have insured the security of my part of the world.

And in insuring the security of my part of the world, you have given to them a vision, too, perhaps of prosperity. Because in addition to the fact that you have become the guardian of the hopes of Asia, you have assured them that your ultimate motive is peace.

Your plan for the Asian Development Bank,¹ which soon shall be established; the Mekong Lower Basin Project,² to which goes many of the taxes of the American people; the Honolulu Declaration,³ which in ringing terms calls upon the whole world for a social revolution without violation of human rights; and your own move within your country—all this Asia watches and can only say: God grant that this leader continue in health that he may attain the final noble objectives that he envisions and we all dream about.

Thank you, again.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS

White House press release dated September 14

President Johnson

Mr. President, Mrs. Marcos, ladies and gentlemen, and Mr. Valenti: I have a confession to make tonight, Mr. President. I invited you here because I wanted to get to know you and to talk over with you many problems of interest to our two countries.

But there is also another reason for the invitation. It has been, until tonight, classified as top secret, known only to a handful of the highest American officials. It has been known to the Vice President, to the Secre-

tary of State, to Senator [Edmund S.] Muskie, and to a former member of my staff, Jack Valenti.

Mr. President, each of them, you may recall, has visited your country. Each of them met Mrs. Marcos. And each of them came back with a report that, as I remember, was something like this: The Philippines are on the march. The Philippines have a great future. The Philippines have a great leader—and he has a beautiful wife.

And then they went on to say, each of them: We believe, Mr. President, that you should invite President Marcos to the United States. And each of them always added a postscript: Be sure to include Mrs. Marcos.

We are very fortunate, Mr. President, in the choice of our wives. There has been a lot of talk in my country recently about elections. When someone asked me my reaction to this talk, I pointed out that actually, after all, I am a very fortunate man. So far, the Republicans haven't nominated Lady Bird. You and I, Mr. President, may win elections, but our wives win hearts.

We have much more in common, however, than just these wonderful helpmates.

Both of us served in the Pacific during the war.

Both of us later served in the Congress—and both of us later had our difficulties with the Congress. That may have sounded like a past tense. Both of us have had, and are having, difficulties with the Congress.

Both of us became the Senate leader of our parties—and both of us sometimes wish we were still there.

I hope you have an opportunity, Mr. President, to gain an appreciation of American politics while you visit us for the next few days. Let me assure you now that we are never as mad as we actually sound.

¹ For text of President Johnson's remarks upon signing the Asian Development Bank Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-369) on Mar. 16, see BULLETIN of Apr. 4, 1966, p. 521.

² For text of President Johnson's message to Congress on the Southeast Asia aid program on June 1, 1965, see *ibid.*, June 28, 1965, p. 1054.

³ For background and text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

You are fortunate to be here before an election. You will probably understand very quickly what one of our philosophers once said about politics in our country. He said, "The Republicans have their splits after an election, and the Democrats have their splits just before an election."

I am sure you never have any problems like that in the Philippines.

You are a most welcome guest in this house, Mr. President and Mrs. Marcos. To us, you are the symbol of an undaunted spirit in Asia that is enlarging liberty and enhancing the lives of human beings.

Our talks this afternoon were delightful. They were productive; they were good for both of our countries. We looked honestly and thoroughly at the problems that face our peoples and the world.

We both, I think, understand that if free nations that are small are to be the architects and guardians of their own destiny, they must be willing—and able—to discourage intruders.

As friends of your country, we are quite proud of the progress that you are making toward a free Pacific and toward a dynamic Asia.

As old comrades in arms, we have made plans to join in a new alliance. This time, the alliance is to fight the enemy which is hunger, the enemy which is disease, the enemy which is ignorance.

Already our work is under way. The new billion-dollar Asian Development Bank, which has its headquarters in Manila, offers the nations of Asia a cooperative pool of resources for the giant tasks ahead.

The dramatic work of the International Rice Research Institute, which is also located in your country, is proving that our capacity for discovery is really unbounded.

And these are but two of the specific steps of cooperation that we are taking together as willing partners in the future of the Pacific.

I hope, Mr. President, that you will be able to amend your itinerary, in the light of our discussions this afternoon, to visit other parts of this great land of ours.

We hope that you can visit some of our space installations. I think that our conversations this afternoon in that regard were quite fruitful. I look forward to the day when the Philippines and the United States can explore the stars together.

I look forward to the day when we can establish economic planning institutes in which we can work together in the field of oceanography and to the day when we can spend some time together attempting to determine what brings about the typhoons that cost the people of Asia \$500 million a year.

Our thoughts were of the future. Our thoughts were of tomorrow. Our thoughts of what we could, what we should, and what we must do to meet these problems. But our thoughts were always together, as brothers in arms.

Mr. President, we recognize you as a man of courage and as a man of faith. Tonight we have assembled from all parts of this nation our leading and most respected citizens. They have come here to honor you and your lady, Mr. President.

They have come to salute a hero in war who was on the Bataan Death March, who was wounded five times, who wears two Silver Stars and the Distinguished Service Cross—and who is a new voice of Asia and a leader for peace in the world.

So I should like to ask those of you, my friends, who have come here to meet with me tonight, to join in a toast to the President of the Republic of the Philippines.

President Marcos

President and Mrs. Johnson, Members of the Cabinet and Congress of the United States, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen: When I spoke this morning in response to the welcome of President Johnson, I spoke of the President as a man known to Asia as the man who has guaranteed security for that part of the world.

Now there is a new dimension. There is compassion and at the same time mixed with a sense of humor which strikes me as overwhelming under the circumstances.

As I was passing through Honolulu, Governor [John A.] Burns told me this story. "The ladies of this country," he said, "actually follow the men. Although they make the decisions as to where the children should go to school, where the family should reside, where the marketing should be done, how the family budget should be maintained, the men make the big decisions like whether NATO should continue in Europe or not, or whether there should be a counterinsurgency center in Manila."

I answered Governor Burns that "In the Philippines we have simplified all of this. We surrendered to the women a long, long time ago. We set them up on a pedestal so high they can't intervene in manly affairs."

I say this, because I understand that the occasion of our visit here has somehow resolved a continuing rivalry between the ladies and the men of the fourth estate. I am happy to know, however, that it has been resolved to the satisfaction of everybody and that the day after tomorrow I will be able to meet with all of the members of the fourth estate peaceably gathered, like the United Nations in fragments.

We have the saying in our country that a man who does not look back to his origins can never reach his destination.

This is true of nations, and this is true of peoples. As I look back at the origins of our people, I see a country, my country—7,770 islands, as of the last count—whose shores have been washed by the tidal ebb and flow of empire.

I see a people with its neighbors who, according to the latest diggings of Dr. Fox in Palawan Island, were established in these islands in 3000 B.C.

But I also see an association between the Philippines and the United States that dates back more than half a century, an association that resulted in a partnership conceived in peace, tested in war, and now meeting the challenges of this trying age with resolution and determination.

We have separated, and freedom was granted us in 1946. You have grown up into

the most powerful democracy ever known to man.

While the Philippines has become an experiment in democracy in our part of the world, it is my feeling that as I look back and see all the trials and tribulations that we have gone through, I am certain that such a partnership will outlast all the difficulties of the long and tedious road that we must travel together.

As I look back, I see the United States establishing the conditions for freedom and emancipation not only of the nation but also of the individual.

But now I see, too, the compassion of America. What is the image of America to the Asian? The image of America to the Asian is, first, that of freedom, of liberty. But, as I said, there is a new dimension and there is compassion.

All over the world one hears of the agitation of all the nations as the issue of a third world war or peace hangs in perilous balance. This issue of freedom is disputed not only in the battlefields but in the hearts and minds of men.

And I am, therefore, most thankful that in our conversations, Mr. President, this afternoon, you permitted your vision of the image that should be America to contaminate my mind.

I look up into the heavens and hope that this modest and small country, the Philippines, may participate in the great and joyful dreams of utilizing the secrets of space for peaceful means, that the talents of the United States may help develop a poor and undernourished country.

Underdevelopment is a term perhaps hazy to the many. To some it may mean just another television set or automobile. But to us who plan for the underdeveloped countries, a slight mistake means pain, bitterness, despair, hunger, and even death.

And, thus, your graceful offer that the minds and talents and genius that is American can be offered for the planning of the development of the small and poor countries is, indeed, something that inspires me and, I

know, as I shall transmit this message to all the Asian leaders and the Asian peoples, will inspire them.

For, Mr. President, they realize and they will realize that in this kindly land that is America there was, indeed, not only freedom but humanity and a sensitiveness to the needs of all mankind.

I would also like to note the fact that in this country I have learned as I watched the tolerance by a great leader of dissent. I have watched you explain to the less perceptive without irritation. And certainly we are happy that this is so.

For we look to this leader who can make decisions without impatience with difficult allies, notwithstanding the increasing fatigue from unending responsibility and in spite of what is apparently divided counsel.

Mr. President, I carry back to my country a clearer image of America as I carry back to my people, also, a clearer message that comes from you. It is not only a message of resolution, it is not only a message of strength, it is also a message of humaneness.

It is a message of your belonging to the great majority that is mankind. It is a message of your broad perspective and vision.

As I bear this message back to Asia, I know that Asia will understand and listen. And to the challenge that you have raised, Asia will respond.

I look forward, therefore, to the day when all of Asia, notwithstanding its diversity, shall stand up in partnership with a great country, the United States of America, and, under the leadership of a man like you, rise up to the dreams of our nobler selves and attain this vision that has all but been erased by these terrible problems that confront us today.

Mr. President, it is hard to concentrate on questions of state in such happy, congenial, and lovely company. So, may I now ask each and every one of you to stand up and join me in a toast to the President and Mrs. Johnson.

May they achieve all their dreams and may they lead the American people to the fulfill-

ment of the noble objectives that they have set for their country and for their people.

The President and Mrs. Johnson.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE, SEPTEMBER 15

White House press release dated September 15

1. At the invitation of President Johnson, President Marcos made a state visit to Washington September 14 to 16, 1966. This afforded an opportunity for the two Presidents to engage in the friendly and fraternal talks which have become traditional between the two countries.

2. President Johnson and President Marcos had a frank and cordial exchange of views on international developments of common significance as well as the cooperative arrangements which give substance to Philippine-American relations.

3. President Marcos set forth his vision of the Philippine future. He described the many frontiers that mankind faces—in space and in the ocean depths, on the farm and in the laboratory, in economic development and in expanding the capabilities of the young. He expressed his determination to move his country forward across these frontiers, with the exertion of Philippine energy and initiative and with the cooperation of friendly nations, especially the United States.

4. Scientific Cooperation. Both Presidents recognize the need of promoting cooperation in areas of science and technology and the mutual exchange of information and scientific knowledge for peaceful purposes. Such cooperation will furnish incentives to public and private resource initiative of both countries in enhancing and cultivating scientific and technological endeavors as a fundamental basis of a mutually beneficial relationship on science and technology.

5. Specifically, the two Presidents discussed recent developments in space technology. President Marcos expressed his desire to encourage greater training of Philippine scientists and engineers in the peaceful applications of such technology, and President Johnson undertook to offer appropriate fellowships for this purpose in U.S. institutions.

The considerable economic loss suffered annually in the Far East from typhoons was discussed by the two Presidents, who agreed that the regional initiatives undertaken by ECAFE [Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East] and WMO [World Meteorological Organization] to improve technical capabilities for typhoon damage control deserved full support. President Johnson offered the services of a United States meteorological team to develop a joint program of typhoon damage control in the Philippine area in

concert with regional planning, and President Marcos agreed to the desirability of such a program.

Finally, the two Presidents noted the cooperative programs already started between the Philippine National Science Development Board and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, and agreed that these programs should be expanded so that private and public research efforts can be applied to the advance of knowledge about growing food on the land and in the sea in the tropics. The two Presidents noted the expanded efforts now under way by the U.S. Government in the field of oceanography, in which it was agreed that the Philippines would participate fully.

6. Economic Development. One of the principal matters dealt with was the vigorous approach of the new Philippine Government to the problem of economic development. President Marcos re-emphasized his four-year development program to raise the living standards of the Philippine people, along lines already made public and discussed over many months. President Johnson was particularly encouraged to note the emphasis which President Marcos placed on improving the lot of the rural people through increased agriculture productivity, better income and meaningful land reform.

7. To support President Marcos' program of economic development and progress, the United States assistance program will be substantially increased during the coming year. This expanded effort will give priority to President Marcos' rural development and rice productivity program, including loans for irrigation projects and grants for other aspects of this program.

The two Presidents agreed to begin immediate negotiations for sales of agricultural commodities under a liberal credit arrangement over the next year, the proceeds of such sales to be used to support projects or programs to be agreed upon in such fields as irrigation, drainage and flood control, land reform, feeder roads, agricultural credit and Farmer's Cooperatives. The United States government will also provide support for programs and projects to be agreed upon in agricultural research, training and productivity, and pest and disease control, cadastral survey and land classification.

Extensive discussions are now in progress on these programs and projects. In addition, a new self-help program is being launched pursuant to the Food for Peace program under which food will be provided as a grant to allow payment of wages in kind to rural workers engaged in local improvement projects, and a grant of feedgrains will be made to stimulate the establishment and growth of livestock cooperatives.

U.S. assistance will also include a stepped-up malaria eradication campaign and planning for

rural electrification, air traffic control and an integrated telecommunications network. The United States is prepared to extend credit to finance engineering feasibility studies to help develop other new projects for external financing.

8. Further Economic Matters. The two Presidents noted that their representatives are continuing to identify, on an urgent basis, additional ways in which the United States can be helpful in assisting President Marcos' initiatives in agricultural, industrial, and other fields. Both Presidents recognized that the size of the task to be done requires the active participation of all interested governments and international institutions. It was also recognized that the success of the renewed Philippine efforts depends to a great extent on raising the level of internal savings, both public and private.

9. The two Presidents recognized that orderly economic development required the full organization and utilization of available management talent. President Marcos described the measures he had taken to systematize economic development planning and indicated he would welcome additional United States technical assistance in this field. President Johnson agreed to make available a technical advisory team composed of both governmental and private experts for this purpose.

10. Recognizing that external assistance mobilized through the major international lending institutions would speed economic development in the Philippines, the two Presidents agreed on the desirability of closer consultations among all countries and international agencies having an interest in helping the Philippines. President Johnson assured President Marcos of full American support for a Philippine initiative along these lines, and of active American cooperation in such an effort. Pending completion of multilateral arrangements, the U.S. will provide assistance to the Philippines under a bilateral program.

11. As regards means for ensuring the fruitful participation of foreign private investors in Philippine development, the two Presidents emphasized the importance to the Philippines of a favorable investment climate to attract and hold foreign private capital. As a further means of stimulating new private capital flows to the Philippines, the Presidents were pleased to announce that an exchange of notes⁴ had taken place providing for an augmentation of the coverage provided under the current Investment Guaranty Agreement⁵ between the two countries.

12. Future Economic Relations. The two Presidents agreed that an expansion of trade between the Philippines and the United States would also contribute to the development and stability of both

⁴ Not printed here.

⁵ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2517.

countries. They agreed that there should be an early beginning of intergovernmental discussions on the concepts underlying a new instrument to replace the Laurel-Langley Trade Agreement⁶ after its scheduled expiration in 1974. Intergovernmental discussions should be conducted through a joint preparatory committee to be set up before June 30, 1967. Both Presidents recognized the necessity of providing an adequate framework after 1974 for a fair and equitable treatment of new and existing investments, as well as for the expansion of trade opportunities between the two countries. The two Presidents agreed that the extension of Parity Rights under Article 6 of the Agreement would not be sought.

13. Offshore Procurement. The two Presidents agreed that the Philippines should participate on a full and equitable basis in supplying U. S. offshore procurement needs in Vietnam.

14. Mutual Security. Both Presidents recognized the strategic role which the Philippines plays in the network of allied defenses and agreed to strengthen their mutual defense capabilities. Both Presidents recognized that such defense construction projects as are presently under way and may be required in the future contribute to this end. President Marcos informed President Johnson of recent indications of resurgence of subversive activities, especially in Central Luzon. President Johnson pledged the continued assistance of the United States in the concerted drive of the Marcos Administration to improve the well-being of the people and strengthen its capabilities for internal defense.

15. The two Presidents reviewed the current requirements of the Philippine armed forces for external assistance. In accordance with President Marcos' program to expand the Army's civic action capability, President Johnson was pleased to inform him that the United States would within this fiscal year provide equipment for five engineer construction battalions to be engaged in civic action projects contributing to internal security, and would consider furnishing equipment for five more such battalions in the next fiscal year. President Johnson also informed President Marcos that delivery of a Destroyer Escort for the Philippine Navy was anticipated next year. The two Presidents agreed to keep the U.S. Military Assistance Program under continuing review in order to ensure that the materiel and training supplied to the Philippine armed forces were kept appropriate to the changing requirements and missions of these forces.

16. The two Presidents pledged themselves to strengthen the unity of the two countries in meeting any threat to their security. In this regard, they noted the continuing importance of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Philippines and the United

States⁷ in maintaining the security of both countries. President Johnson reiterated to President Marcos the policy of the United States regarding mutual defense as stated by him and by past U.S. Administrations to the Philippine Government since 1954.

17. The two Presidents noted that in the forthcoming Rusk-Ramos Agreement, the U.S. accepts President Marcos' proposal to reduce the term of the military bases agreement from 99 to 25 years.⁸ The two Presidents reaffirmed that the bases are necessary for both countries for their mutual defense, and were gratified with the progress being made in the negotiation and resolution of various issues related to the Bases Agreement in the spirit of harmony, friendship and mutual accommodation. They agreed that the base negotiations should be continued with a view to earliest possible resolution of remaining issues in the spirit of good will and cooperation which has characterized these negotiations to date.

18. The two Presidents noted the benefits to be gained if countries can share and profit from their common experiences in meeting Communist infiltration and subversion in all its forms in Southeast Asia. In this connection, the accomplishments of SEATO and of individual countries were discussed as well as means by which the Philippines and the United States might make an added contribution to this significant work. The two Presidents concluded that the usefulness of a center in the Philippines which might serve as a focal point for this work should be explored and proper actions pursued.

19. Veterans. The two Presidents noted that as a result of the recommendations of the Joint Commission which they appointed earlier this year, legislation to provide increased benefits to Philippine veterans, their widows, orphans and other dependents has been introduced in the U.S. Congress. President Johnson assured President Marcos of his full support of these measures and expressed his strong hope that they would be enacted in the near future.

20. President Marcos put the case of the Philippine veterans. President Johnson explained the problems and limitations from the standpoint of the United States. The two Presidents agreed that their representatives would discuss the means of restoring wartime pay to those recognized Philippine guerrillas who did not previously receive it and of compensating certain members of the Philippine Army for erroneous deductions of advanced salary from their wartime pay.

21. The two Presidents also agreed to adopt procedures which would minimize the adverse impact which additional payments to Philippine veterans might have on the U.S. balance of payments.

⁶ TIAS 3348; for background and text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 19, 1955, p. 463.

⁷ TIAS 2529; for text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 27, 1951, p. 335.

⁸ See p. 547.

22. Special Fund for Education. The two Presidents agreed to put to effective and creative use the Special Fund for Education available from and pursuant to the U.S. War Damage Appropriations for the Philippines. They directed the joint panels established last spring to accelerate discussions already under way on project proposals, and concurred in the rapid implementation of projects as they are mutually agreed.

23. Developments in Asia. President Marcos discussed his efforts in concert with other Asian countries to bring about an all Asian political forum to which can be referred any crisis in Asia like the Vietnam conflict for settlement by conciliation or other peaceful means. President Marcos also stressed his country's recognition of Malaysia and Singapore and the acknowledgment by Asian countries of the Philippine role in helping pave the way toward solution of the Indonesian and Malaysian question. President Johnson reiterated his support for an Asian conference to settle the Vietnam war and reaffirmed to President Marcos that so far as the United States is concerned it is prepared for unconditional discussions or negotiations in any appropriate forum in an effort to bring peace to Southeast Asia. President Johnson reaffirmed that the basic U.S. purpose in Asia is to support the national aspirations of Asian peoples; the United States is ready to continue helping other nations which seek its assistance in improving the welfare of their peoples and in strengthening themselves against aggression.

24. The two Presidents conducted a frank and searching review of the problems of international security in the Pacific area in general and in Southeast Asia in particular. They were in complete agreement that the principal threat to peace and security in the region was the Communist war of aggression and subversion being waged against the government and people of South Vietnam. President Johnson expressed his deep admiration as well as that of the American people for the action recently taken by the Philippines to send a civic action group of 2,000 men to assist the Vietnamese in resisting aggression and rebuilding their country.

25. The two Presidents reviewed events of the past few years which demonstrated the substantial progress being made in Asia toward regional cooperation. President Marcos noted, in particular, the recent meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Asia and the Pacific in Seoul, and the meeting of the Foreign Ministers from the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia in Bangkok within the framework of the Association of Southeast Asia. The two Presidents noted that the establishment of the Asian Development Bank, with its headquarters in Manila, was a specific example of which imaginative statesmanship by Asian countries working together could ac-

complish. President Johnson welcomed the evidence of expanding cooperation in Asia and reiterated the willingness of the United States to assist and support cooperative programs for the economic and social developments of the region.

26. Mutual Objectives. Both Presidents agreed that the close personal relationship established between them during the visit will further strengthen the deep friendship and partnership which bind their two countries. President Marcos expressed his profound appreciation for the warm welcome and hospitality shown him and his party by President Johnson and the American people. The two Presidents recalled with pride the historic association of their two peoples who, once more, are standing side by side in the defense of liberty. They affirmed that their partnership reflects their long-standing and common dedication to the promotion of human rights and freedom.

ADDRESS TO CONGRESS, SEPTEMBER 15⁹

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, distinguished Members of Congress, ladies and gentlemen: I must first thank the distinguished Speaker of the House of Representatives for his generous introduction.

When your distinguished diplomat by instinct and by necessity, Vice President Humphrey, extended to me the invitation of your great leader President Johnson to visit the United States in his now well-storied and effective trips to Asia, I did not expect the distinct honor of addressing a joint session of the U.S. Congress.

For there is no more noble forum than the U.S. Congress. It is the Foro Romano, the Roman Forum of the modern world. For, indeed, in our century, you are more than the voices of the American people or of American civilization. The voices that speak here speak to every man of the world. And it is here, since the 18th century, that the issues of modern times have been expressed and debated. Your decisions impinge upon the lives of the lowly and powerful alike.

Conscious of these circumstances, I come as an Asian, and I come with a message from

⁹ Reprinted from the *Congressional Record* of Sept. 15, p. 21818.

Asia and especially my country, the Philippines.

For, in culmination of a novel experiment in government, the United States dismantled its colonial machinery in my country some 20 years ago on July 4, 1946. It is as the elected representative of an Asian nation of 32 million people whose independence and destiny in the modern world have been the subject of debate in this Hall, that I stand before you today.

I come before you as the bearer of these messages.

The First Message: Fraternal Affection

The first is a message of fraternal affection from the Filipino people.

America occupies a special place in Philippine hearts. So do the American people. And we Filipinos, for our part, are proud to be counted among America's friends and allies.

I have journeyed 10,000 miles across the Pacific and continental America. I have come from Asia, from what some may describe as another world. But I feel at home in your midst.

For here in America I breathe a native air, the air of freedom that has become as much the breath of life for our young Republic as it has been for yours for nearly 200 years.

And in this inner citadel of American democracy, in this Congress of the United States, where the vital pulse of freedom beats strong and true, my own heart is at ease.

At ease and full. For any citizen of the free world, to stand here is to remember how a great Nation was formed in liberty tempered by law. How the greatest of democracies flourished in freedom and became, in two global wars, the salvation of the world. And now, at the summit of its power, it is called upon to lead in translating into reality the most cherished of humanity's hopes: peace with justice, in a world rebuilt upon a moral order that insures survival and growth even under the shadow of manmade total destruction.

For a Filipino like myself, to stand here

is also to remember that in this kindly land lies one of the fountainheads of his own country's liberties, that from here emanated the generous impulse that made possible a new birth of freedom in the Pacific, that in a very real sense the Philippines is a sister Republic of the United States.

That new birth of freedom in our island nation was but the first of many. The independence of the Philippines initiated the dismantling of colonialism in Asia, a historic process that was to extend to Africa and eventually become worldwide. To America belongs the pioneer's honor for bringing about one of the glories of our age: the vast extension of the frontiers of freedom through the emergence of so many new sovereign states.

Filipinos believe that he who does not look back to his origins will not reach his goal. This belief applies to nations as well as men. When I say that we Filipinos have a special regard for America, I look back to a Philippine-American association of more than half a century, during which a friendship was formed strong enough to endure the trials of war and, I hope, rich enough in living values to meet the varied and stern challenges of peace.

I look back and it was precisely this spirit of prevailing freedom in the United States, the ripeness of emancipation in your society, that made the Philippine revolutionary leaders in 1898 come into consultation and some terms of partnership with Admiral Dewey, even before a single American had landed on our shores.

The facts are in history: the agreement between President Aguinaldo and Admiral George Dewey; the consensus of opinion between the Filipinos fighting an ancient monarchy and a colonial regime and the Americans regarding the procedure of our finally realizing freedom.

It matters not now to many what the true agreement was between American representatives and Filipino revolutionaries in Hong Kong—as to whether you promised inde-

pendence, denied it, and claimed the Philippines as a purchase for \$20 million, thus starting the bloody war between your country and mine of 1898 to 1902.

For you redeemed all of these with such an enlightened colonial policy that the Filipino committed himself to destruction in the frontlines of the lost battles of Bataan and Corregidor as well as the underground under American higher commanders. The frontiers of these historic places were manned by Filipino troops and Filipino officers.

It matters not except to us that after the Second World War the Filipino soldier felt disowned by you when you approved the law which provided that service of the soldiers of the Philippine Commonwealth inducted to the U.S. Army shall not be considered service in the U.S. Army for purposes of benefits and rights granted by law.

For the American leaders again listening in a spirit of fairness have openly declared an injustice had been committed and you have sought and are still seeking to right this wrong.

So the Filipino soldier again died in the battlefields of Korea beside his American comrades for the same cause, while the Republic of the Philippines was fighting its own war of survival against the Huks, the armed elements of communism in my country who had staged their own violent national liberation movement.

And today we send our sons to South Viet-Nam on an errand of mercy although we face the retaliation of armed communism in our own land in the midst of a financial crisis.

What matters was that you had willingly abided by the true image of America, at once providing in the Philippines a condition of the spirit of freedom; founding throughout the country a universal educational system; replacing the feudal dispensation of the once regnant Spanish regime with civil institutions; helping the Commonwealth government in its efforts to implement social and

economic reforms; and, finally, introducing into our much-Europeanized culture the technology, awareness, ideas, and expertise of the vigorous civilization of the new world.

And, as an Asian, may I say that this is precisely what has endeared the civilization of America to Asia. As Tagore had declared, at the turn of the 19th century, it is the modern spirit of liberalism that makes the West relevant to us.

The Second Message: A Vote of Thanks

The second message from the Philippines is a vote of thanks to America.

History recalls that twice in this century America's power, wielded with courage and heroism by the American people, has provided the margin of strength needed to bring world wars to a victorious end. Twice after victory, America shunned the prospect of world domination and turned instead to the tasks of peace.

The Filipino people are thankful that the greatest military power in the world today is also the power most completely committed to the cause of world peace based on law and justice.

A distinguished historian has predicted that future generations will regard as the noblest achievement of our time not military or scientific conquests but the acceptance of international responsibility for the welfare of the entire human family. If this should indeed be the verdict of history, America would be entitled to claim a major share of the credit. For America has pioneered in giving reality to the revolutionary concept that rich nations should help those less fortunate than themselves, not only because it is necessary to do so in today's interdependent world but because it is right.

We in the Philippines are also thankful America has discharged the awesome responsibility of being the first and foremost atomic power in the world with restraint and wisdom. Humanity's safety and its chances for survival rest in the hands of America and we thank God that those strong

hands are firmly harnessed to the uses of peace and the heart that moves them entirely worthy of its solemn trust.

The Third Message: The Burden of Leadership

My third message is of greater urgency from the Philippines as well as from all of Asia.

As an Asian friend who has read the Asian mind and heart, allow me to speak in candor.

We note some hesitancy, some frustration and doubts, in America today.

After you lost the mainland of China to communism, after the battles of Korea and the debacle of Dien Bien Phu, you have doubted your own strength, your own competence, and questioned your own wisdom. Even after the commitment of your sons in Viet-Nam, still the question is asked: "Where are we headed for?" The mothers ask, "Why must our sons die in some unknown land?"

We condole with you because we, too, have lost our sons in battle. We, too, have known the horrors of war. God grant that America will never know what we have known at first hand—Manila was the most ravaged city in the Far East after World War II, and, in the distinguished company of bombed-out shattered cities, was next only to Warsaw.

God grant that America will never see what we saw—an occupation army in full control of city and countryside.

And we know what guerrilla warfare means; we are intimate with its cruel connotations. And we know what it is to die in jungle fastnesses as well as in street corners and alleys—as your young men once knew death in Berlin and Paris, as they are experiencing now in the mud and mire of South Viet-Nam.

The Philippines is the only country, perhaps, which has overcome a national Communist rebellion with its own indigenous troops—without the aid of alien soldiery. And even today in the Philippines communism again has resurged as a reaction to our increased aid to the Republic of Viet-Nam.

You who have lost your sons in an unknown land—why such death? you ask. When will these sacrifices end, and what does the future hold for all of us?

These are your questions. Gone for our moment of history is Grotius and his vision of world order. Only you can answer these questions. I can only offer you my thoughts.

The Wall of Fear

You have built around you a wall of fear—the wall of fear of Asia and all things Asian. It is the wall of fear of Asian communism. It is the wall of the unknown, the distant, the unplumbed risks, and the imagined terrors.

For a time Asia cringed in anxiety as there were suggestions that you forfeit your leadership in the Pacific because of fear.

America, the time has not yet come for you to lay down the heavy burden of leadership. Out of the bounty of your human and material resources, this great country has already given more generously to the common fund of human welfare than any other single nation in history. In the lifetime of this generation alone, America has contributed more to the security and well-being of the free world than could ever be repaid by its beneficiaries.

For America by the inscrutable judgment of destiny has become the trustee of civilization for all humanity. And America cannot escape this role.

The summons to America is worldwide, but the area of greatest urgency is my own region, Asia. In Asia today, the issue of world war or world peace hangs in perilous balance. In Asia the future of freedom is being disputed in battlefields as well as in the minds and hearts of men—in the hamlets, the marketplaces. Last year we were losing the military war. Today the tide has turned. The military initiative has transferred to Viet-Nam and her allies. But we are not winning the war for the mind and heart of Asia. We are in danger of losing it.

In Asia the ultimate questions are being

asked concerning man's capacity, in this atomic age, to survive his own suicidal instincts, fashion workable modes of coexistence, and eventually build that better world to which his nobler self aspires.

The Three Challenges

Asia today challenges America and the rest of the world in three vital fields: security from aggression; economic cooperation; and the definition of the moral and political basis upon which a new, more creative, more stable partnership could be built.

The war in Viet-Nam agitates the whole world and has brought into sharp focus the problems of Asian security. We stand with America in maintaining that aggression, whether perpetrated openly or by proxy, must be deterred and defeated; that all nations, Asian or not, are entitled to freedom from fear of subversion or overt attack; that they should have the period of peace they need to attend unmolested to their urgent tasks of economic and social development.

"Looming Menace" of Communist China

But peace or victory in Viet-Nam is only part of the answer to the question of Asian security. After Viet-Nam resurgent China poses the bigger problem. Very soon Communist China's growing military power may match its intransigence and its expansionist ambitions. This is the looming menace to Asian and world security today.

If the problem were simply a power equation, it could be solved tomorrow. But at the heart of the matter lies an agonizing dilemma.

To the free Asian nations rightly belongs the primary responsibility for their own security and well-being. This is an inevitable and a welcome consequence of independence. It is a privilege as well as a duty. However, China's power, blatantly militant and still unrestrained by firm commitments to international law, is developing during the dangerous interim period when the other Asian states, whether jointly or alone, cannot organize adequate defensive strength and be-

fore the United Nations has perfected its capacity to maintain international peace and order. The resulting security gap invites intervention, subversion, and foreign-inspired "wars of liberation." This dangerous security gap which is the present period can only be filled by America, however much Asian nations may abhor or at best regard with distrust such non-Asian power. It is only American military power that is acceptable in Asia and great enough to deter Communist China's aggressive tendencies.

Lin Piao's Pattern for Conquest

As an Asian who has made it his lifework to study and know the Asian mind and heart as reflected in the different countries, allow me to remind you that the old hard-core leaders around Mao Tse-tung are firmly and securely in power. The mantle of authority upon the demise of Mao Tse-tung will fall upon the shoulders of Marshal Lin Piao, the prophet of Mao Tse-tung still supported by Chou En-lai. This is a hard political reality. During the lifetime of these leaders at the least, it is believed by many that there is no probability of the moderation or mellowing of Chinese Communist policies. It is felt that Mao Tse-tung's version of protracted war, the war of national liberation, shall be utilized as an instrument of ideological expansion by means of an interminable wave of guerrilla action sustained by ruthless terror.

We are not against negotiations with Red China nor do we espouse a cutting of communications with them. On the contrary, we will support every effort to keep the channels of communication open and hope that negotiation can bring about a suspension of hostilities—but the military initiative just recently recovered should not be forfeited.

Marshal Lin Piao's pattern of world conquest is summed up in his terse simplification that in the world Asia, Africa, and Latin America are the rural areas while Western Europe and North America are the cities: that when the rural areas are conquered, the cities will fall, as was their experience in the Chinese mainland.

Asia may fall but America is the ultimate target. It is, therefore, to your national interest that the plan be aborted.

Hopes for Peace in Viet-Nam

For the past several months, several Asian states, the Philippines among them, have been working quietly and unobtrusively to bring about the first prerequisite to peace in Viet-Nam and that is to establish lines of communications between North and South Viet-Nam. The suspension of hostilities in South Viet-Nam can be attained only by the selfless obsession for anonymity by the negotiators that is required in delicate and sensitive negotiations of this nature.

To bring about peace in Viet-Nam will involve long, tedious, confidential, and secret negotiations. Patience and fortitude and just the right touch of sophistication and civility in the conduct of these negotiations will succeed. Publicity should come only after peace has been negotiated.

From my point of view it will not matter who will claim the credit for having brought about the successful negotiation. What matters now is that this violent, ruthless, and wasteful war must be brought to the conference table.

The effectivity and success of the quiet type of diplomacy that I propose and advocate has been demonstrated in the dismantling of the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia in which the Philippines had a modest share.

Even in this modern world, for the success of conciliation the most important factor to regard in Asian diplomacy is that no nation or leader or diplomat loses face in the negotiations. Losing face is still an unpardonable offense to an Asian.

An Asian Political Forum

Perhaps in this juncture it is now timely to speak frankly of the possibility of an aggroupation of Asian states constituting the ECAFE under the United Nations into a political forum which can de-fuse or even settle any crisis that may arise in the region.

Such an aggroupation of necessity accepts again the reality of the diversity of ideology among Asian nations. But an aggroupation of like-minded states would of necessity be suspect and be unable to bring about communication between conflicting countries with different ideologies and political beliefs. The establishment of the Asian Development Bank, I hope, will bring the different nations together close enough and condition them to cooperation so that they can hammer out such an arrangement.

The crux of the problem for America is to bring American power to bear in Asia on terms acceptable to Asian nationalism. It is a difficult but not an impossible task. Communist China's attacks on Korea, Tibet, and India had alerted neighboring countries to a developing pattern of expansionist design. The unsuccessful Communist-inspired coup d'état in Indonesia last year projected this design into the forefront of Asian consciousness. The result was a greatly heightened realization that Communist China, soon to become a nuclear power, is everybody's security problem, requiring for its solution the cooperation of everyone.

This new factor in the Asian solution is just beginning to be discerned and has not yet fully developed and cannot be appreciated outside Asia. It is among the most significant and heartening developments in the region in that one of its meaningful aspects is the possible growing desire for regional cooperation not only in the economic and social fields but possibly also in the political and security matters.

Another is the enhanced awareness that for the present and the years immediately ahead, Communist China's neighbors cannot expect, singly or together, to "balance" China's crucial margin of nuclear power without the assistance of non-Asian countries like America. There is in consequence a new disposition to regard America's deterrent power in Asia as a necessity for the duration of time required by the Asian nations to develop their own system of regional security supported by what they hope would

have become a greatly strengthened United Nations.

It is a mood both realistic and hopeful. Regarded with understanding and consideration, it could offer a wider basis for Asian cooperation than America has been able to achieve in the past. Three conditions are indispensable to the realization of that broader association. It must be based not on the narrow ideological alignments of the cold war but on the inescapable reality of Asian diversity. It must work with the tide of Asian nationalism instead of running counter to it. And it must be constructive in spirit and purpose, looking beyond victory in Viet-Nam to the creation of a milieu of justice and a rule of law under which all Asian nations could achieve their maximum potential for peaceful growth.

The experience of Viet-Nam suggests that it is not too soon to explore the creative possibilities of this new approach. To function in Asia without full Asian support is to build on shifting sand. The greater the power projected from outside into Asia, the more compelling the need that it should operate in harmony with Asian aspirations, toward goals compatible with Asian independence and dignity.

The Challenges to America and Asia

America's deepening appreciation of this need for a genuine basis of understanding and common purpose with Asia coincides with the growing desire in the region for security from aggression of all kinds, open or disguised, Asian or non-Asian. The challenge to America is to extend to Asia the defensive shield of American power in forms consonant with Asian freedom and self-respect. The challenge to Asia is to discard the dry meatless bone of mysticism and fatalism for the lifegiving substance of aspiration and endeavor; to leave the past behind, recognize today's need for energetic self-reliance and dignified maturity; to make common cause against aggression and meet America halfway in a joint undertaking to make the future secure for all.

After the United States recognized the independence of the Philippines in 1946, the American Government reluctantly yet realistically accepted the triumph of Communist power in the Chinese mainland as an accomplished fact. Still later, the Allied occupation of Japan, which was essentially an American operation, was formally terminated. All these developments added up to a recognizable policy of American disengagement from the affairs of Asia.

In Europe the trend was exactly the opposite. To the challenge of Soviet power following the end of the Second World War, the United States and its European allies countered with NATO. In rapid succession the Soviet attempt to drive the Western Allies from West Berlin was deflected by the Berlin airlift and the Communist threat against Greece and Turkey was nullified by the Truman doctrine. America made it abundantly clear that it was not prepared to see Western Europe overrun by Soviet power.

Thus, American policy in the period after the war conformed more or less to the Europe-first doctrine that had dominated Allied strategy during the war. The Filipino people, who were the main sacrificial victims of that wartime strategy, were deeply concerned that a similar strategic concept would govern the postwar policy of the United States. In 1949, from this same rostrum, President Elpidio Quirino, the second President of the Republic of the Philippines, called upon the United States to respond to the Communist menace in Asia with a Pacific equivalent of NATO. His appeal fell on deaf ears, however, and the following year he was compelled to convoke in Baguio City, on his own responsibility and without American support, the first Conference of Southeast Asia.

Within months after the holding of the Baguio conference, the Communists struck in Korea. President Truman, who had firmly challenged Communist ambitions in Europe while acquiescing to a policy of disengagement from Asia, suddenly realized that Com-

munist power was reaching out boldly toward Asia. Under the banner of the United Nations, the United States and 15 other states, including the Philippines, joined forces to repel the Communist invasion of South Korea.

Out of the bitter experience of the war in Korea, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization—SEATO—was born. This happened in Manila in 1954, 4 years after President Quirino had first advocated the establishment of an anti-Communist alliance to serve as the Asian equivalent of NATO. At the same time, the United States entered into mutual defense alliances with the Philippines, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. All these things were done under the then much-scorned but now surprisingly topical Dulles doctrine of “brinkmanship” and “massive retaliation.”

The salient elements of American policy emerge from this brief recital of recent events. The first is that, following the end of the Second World War, there was a deliberate attempt to orient American policy away from Asia and the Pacific toward Europe and the Atlantic. The second is that American policy in Asia has been essentially passive in character, developed and pursued mainly in response to Communist initiatives in subversion, aggression, and conquest. In short, the United States has been a reluctant participant in the affairs of Asia.

That reluctance did not spring from a new spirit of isolationism among the American people: It sprang rather from the feeling that prevailed among the makers of American foreign policy at the time that while the United States could undertake a virtually unlimited commitment to defend Europe, it could only accept a limited commitment to defend Asia. This was duly reflected in the differing obligations accepted by the United States under NATO and SEATO. American awareness of closer racial and cultural affinities with Europe probably justified this attitude in a situation where American power was, in any case, inadequate to police the world as a whole.

Today, we face the fact of massive Amer-

ican involvement in Viet-Nam—in a struggle which can neither be explained on the basis of recognized affinities nor justified by the example of the previous United Nations action in Korea.

American Involvement in Viet-Nam

History, however, may provide both explanation and justification. One elementary fact of American history is that the United States was a Pacific power long before it became an Atlantic power. President Washington's injunctions against “entangling alliances” and President Monroe's promulgation of the doctrine that bears his name insured America's virtual isolation from European affairs. This isolation lasted a long time, and America did not become an Atlantic power until after the First World War.

By contrast, the United States became a Pacific power just before the Civil War, when Commodore Perry opened feudal Japan to the modern world. This was followed at the turn of the last century by the acquisition of the Philippines, Hawaii, and Alaska, and by American support of the open door policy in China. American rule over the Philippines, the war in the Pacific, and the American occupation of Japan confirmed and strengthened the status of the United States as a Pacific power.

The American presence in Viet-Nam makes sense only when viewed in the historical context of the development of the United States as a Pacific power.

To recall this chapter of American history is not, of course, necessarily to justify the motives that brought the United States to Asia. The truth is that the American Republic, having isolated itself from the affairs of Europe and having had no share in the spoliation of Africa, was obliged to turn to Asia, across the Pacific, as the object of its belated imperialist attentions.

Today, having relinquished control of the Philippines and terminated the occupation of Japan, the United States can truthfully disavow any surviving imperialist ambitions in

Asia. The presence of American bases and American troops in South Korea, Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines could be justified as aiming solely to deter or repel any encroachments of Communist power in these areas.

This point should be made indubitably clear in the case of the American presence in Viet-Nam. Americans and their Government should never tire repeating that the United States is in Viet-Nam for the purpose of assisting that nation in defending its independence and territorial integrity. They should give every assurance that they are not in Viet-Nam, or anywhere else in Asia, for the purpose of political hegemony or economic gain. This, President Johnson has repeatedly done.

Such avowals of American purpose would correspond to the deepest aspirations of the non-Communist Asian nations themselves. Their common hope and desire is to be given an opportunity to consolidate their independence, to translate it in terms of a better life for their citizens, to determine and shape the destiny of their country without outside interference of any kind. To achieve these goals, these non-Communist nations realize that they need the umbrella of American power to shield them from Communist infiltration, subversion, and aggression. Without attempting to establish new or enlarged military alliances, it should be possible for the United States to provide this protection for all those nations that desire and ask for it.

America's Record in Foreign Affairs

Does America have a "negative" record in foreign affairs? The record shows that the East-West confrontation in Europe has been stabilized and that Communist influence is in retreat in Asia and Africa. As late as 2 years ago, nonalignment or Communist-leaning neutralism was the prevailing policy among Asian states. Today, Ceylon, India, and Indonesia have virtually abandoned their old familiar stance of neutralism and become firmly anti-Communist. Pakistan appears to be desisting from its open flirtation with Communist China, while the Communist par-

ties of North Korea and Japan have declared their independence of Peking.

I personally know for a fact that the American presence in Viet-Nam provided—though quite unintentionally—encouragement and support to those who successfully resisted the attempted Communist takeover in Indonesia. It is certain that the U.S. 7th Fleet in the China Sea, as well as American airpower in the area, rendered inoperative the so-called "Peking-Djakarta axis," which the Indonesian Communist Party might otherwise have invoked in the extremity of its disastrous debacle in Java.

In effect, and almost without realizing it, we are even now already reaping valuable dividends from the American presence in Viet-Nam. Those benefits are certain to multiply as the non-Communist neighbors of China understand that their security is guaranteed by the umbrella of American power. The assurance that has been given by President Johnson that this protection will not suddenly be withdrawn tomorrow, thus leaving them to the mercy of Chinese communism, is an indispensable factor in maintaining the stability of southeast Asia.

The so-called "domino theory," which many experts tend to discount, may be an oversimplification. But it is certainly correct to argue that a country like Thailand, for example, is hardly likely to depend for its security on an American army that has been defeated or has withdrawn under fire from Viet-Nam. Thailand would have to adjust to Chinese hegemony in Asia and its attitude would be shared in varying degrees by Laos, Malaysia, India, Pakistan, Japan, and the Philippines.

Our object must be to hold the line in Viet-Nam and, at least, to roll back Communist power behind the 17th parallel. This being achieved, we shall have provided a necessary basis for joint action among the Southeast Asia nations themselves in order to insure their collective security.

When this has been done, American military power could withdraw to existing bases in the outlying islands and archipelagos: Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philip-

piners. Together with the U.S. 7th Fleet, this line of defense off the Asian mainland could be rendered completely impregnable, while offering needed support to any mainland nation that may be threatened by Communist power.

Communist China and Its Neighbors

With this *cordon sanitaire* effectively established around the eastern and southern flanks of Communist China, the latter might then realize that it could more usefully harness its energies to the enormous task of satisfying the needs and improving the livelihood of its 700 million people. Or it could turn around and begin looking over and across the 5,000-mile front which it shares with the Soviet Union. But that would be another story.

There was reason to say in mitigation of Communist China's avowed policy of universal revolution, that is, of abetting and assisting "people's wars" abroad, that while the rulers of Peking are violent in their speeches, they are remarkably nonviolent in their actions. In recent weeks, however, many of the statements of the Chinese Communist leaders, as well as some of the actions which they have tolerated or encouraged, appear to verge dangerously on the irrational. Prudence dictates that we should beware lest the fanaticism behind their words translates itself into fanatical action and lest their irrationality in domestic matters merely foreshadows irrationality in foreign affairs.

No Asian country or government desires the destruction of Communist China. We who are its neighbors realize that we must coexist with China and the Chinese people. We need to adjust to the overwhelming fact that it exists in our very midst. But, equally, Communist China must accept the obligation to coexist peacefully with its neighbors. This means that it must abandon and forswear its policy of exporting violence and fomenting disorder amongst its neighbors.

Until we receive assurances to this end, the policy of the military containment of China must continue.

It was Winston Churchill who said, as

he rallied the battle-weary people of Britain during the last war, that the true measure of a nation's greatness is what it can do when it is tired. On the basis of this criterion, the United States may not, because of divided counsel at home, because of increasing fatigue from endless responsibility, or because of impatience with difficult allies, lay down the heavy burden of power and, in effect, resign as the leader nation of the free world.

It is not easy for someone not an American to say these things to Americans at a most trying moment in their history. It would behoove an outsider to keep discreet silence on questions that have so deeply divided Americans. Having served in the U.S. Armed Forces during World War II and as a guerilla officer during the Japanese occupation, I cannot be indifferent to the grief of thousands of Americans and Vietnamese whose brothers, sons, and husbands are fighting and dying in Viet-Nam.

Though I have spoken of our stake in Viet-Nam in terms of a battle of ideologies and a contest for power, I do not forget that the values involved in that struggle are profoundly human. Because the stakes are high, even decisive, involving the very future of freedom in Asia and, ultimately, in the world as a whole, including this country, we should like to see the hand of America remain steady and sure on the wheel of power and responsibility. We should like to be reassured that this great country, its people and Government, shall never act upon the agonizing issues of our time in disgust or anger, or from a feeling of tiredness or a sense of panic, but in the knowledge that they are confronted with responsibilities that must be met, tasks that must be accomplished, and battles that must be waged with all the courage and wisdom at their command.

The Parallel in the Economic Field

A parallel situation obtains in the economic field. Here, too, the primary responsibility rests with the Asian countries themselves. Economic and social development on a scale commensurate with the

aroused expectations of their own people is a task deserving of their greatest effort and utmost dedication. Maximum self-help should be their watchword dictated as much by self-respect as by sheer necessity. But here, too, even heroic national exertions may yet leave between success and failure, between poverty and prosperity, a vital margin—the economic gap which only assistance from outside can fill at this stage. And as in the field of security, foreign aid, though needed and desired, must be extended without the harsh demands that remind Asia of its past enslavement and with some sophistication if not idealism, in ways compatible with Asian nationalism.

The links of economics with the problem of peace are less obvious but no less real. Poverty is not only a fertile seedbed for Communist dictatorship and other extreme solutions; it is also the open gate to foreign-inspired subversion and the open road to “wars of national liberation.” When it afflicts a region as vast and as populous as Asia, it becomes a major threat to world peace.

One-half of mankind living in abject want or at bare subsistence levels constitutes an enormous drag on world prosperity. Itself already a “sea of troubles,” impoverished Asia also has the more dreadful potential of triggering another world war, offering as it does an almost irresistible temptation for foreign intervention. And in the growing economic bipolarization of the world into rich nations becoming richer and poor nations becoming poorer—one of the most serious long-term threats to international security—Asia, with its population explosion, its unsatisfied wants, and its deeply rooted grievances against the past, would be a major factor for all of humanity.

Much is already being done through existing organizations, within as well as outside the United Nations, to meet Asia’s need for economic aid. More is required to fill that vital margin between failure and success which even the most devoted application of self-help cannot bridge. Increased capital investments and more effective technical as-

sistance are essential. But more important in the long run is the enhancement of the feeling of partnership between the nations giving aid and the nations receiving it.

The Moral Basis of Economic Assistance

Precisely because there is no shortcut to economic development, the human factor should be kept constantly in view. The moral basis of economic assistance should never be forgotten in the preoccupation with its material superstructure. A sense of joint involvement in one of the great enterprises of this century is needed to sustain both the rich and the poor nations during the long, difficult journey toward the goal of a better life for all envisaged by the United Nations Charter.

The moral aspect of economic cooperation is of particular relevance to Asia. The nations of Asia give high priority to economic progress. But their deepest hunger is not of the body; it is hunger of the spirit: the desire, after centuries of colonial bondage, for the fullest attainable measure of human equality and human dignity.

This is the reason why the American Declaration of Independence still transmits a living message to the peoples of Asia, why they hold Lincoln the emancipator in such high regard, and why they have been so deeply moved by Roosevelt’s proclamation of the four freedoms, Kennedy’s ringing summons to a global alliance for the upliftment of the human condition throughout the world; and that is why President Johnson is called the liberator of Asia with his solemn promise of military security and his challenge to a social revolution.

They misjudge Asia who believe that the material factor will be decisive for Asia’s future. And they malign Asia who imagine that Asian nations are craven opportunists intimidated by brute strength and ever ready to join the winning side. America’s Philippine experience belies both beliefs. And if an Asian leader were to be asked to choose between indignity and hunger, he would unhesi-

tatingly choose hunger. And his people would go hungry with him.

For Asia is an ancient civilization; and its culture is essentially shaped by philosophy and religion and its actions moved by its ethical precepts. And when we react to the West, it is its materialism, its scientific power, that we confront, and the signs of enervation of its spirit. We discover a prosperous society advanced in its technology and living by the fundamentals of power and the machine and by its material excesses.

Human Values in a Materialistic Culture

But even here we perceive the fact of conflict arising from the inability of peoples to accommodate the yearnings of purely human values to be projected in this materialistic culture. And indeed in our world we witness not merely total war but also the acceptance of the totalization of doom. Beneath the overt unresolved conflicts of nations is the reality of human conflict—man against his culture because it has not been able to accommodate entirely his values, and even man against himself.

The human condition is a dialectic, and man himself has forfeited the inner harmony of his own nature.

Between the conceptions and actions of our civilization is a great divide of discordant facts. We have a politics, for instance, openly declared on democratic principles, but we witness the reality of inequality in our times; the fact of the subversion of the self-determination of nations; the disintegration of international law itself because of the inability of nations and powers in the international community to live by the postulates of the rule of law. The system of Grotius and the efforts of internationalists to enlist reason and an ordered postulate of justice in the settlement of disputes have found no concrete actuality.

And yet, it cannot be denied that in our century the evidence of material advancement and the prosperity of peoples is more true than at any other period of human history. The conclusion, therefore, is undeni-

able: that man cannot be sustained by the actuality of materialism; that he does not live by bread alone; and that it is only when wealth identifies itself with the spirit that it justifies itself.

American leadership has never been solely military; more accurately, it has consistently been spiritual.

Your Marshall Plan to a devastated Europe; your corps of peace volunteers to Africa and Asia; your concern with the democratic rehabilitation of Japan, an enemy country; even your economic aid to developing societies and your readiness to come to the defense of nations beleaguered in their just fight for sovereign rights—this is not America, the military imperialist, but the same America which saw in the conditions of the Philippines, my country, the prospect for a democratic experiment in Asia, the dismantling of the colonial machinery that was to end the enslavement of many peoples of the world.

In Viet-Nam are the savagery and ferocity, the treachery and bloodiness of war. Yet, there America has identified itself with individual fulfillment, with freedom, with nobility of the soul, with social justice.

For all the iron and steel you have piled on solid ground, Viet-Nam remains a vision and spirit which posterity, given the perspective of time, will be able to judge in its true light.

There is, therefore, the relevance of a reassertion of American leadership—a leadership based on the concepts of this new society as it was defined by your Founding Fathers and reiterated in the American Declaration of Independence, a leadership that is bold and vigorous in its liberalism, cutting across the distances between peoples which were created by misunderstanding, ignorance, and differences of human conditions—and just as your Founding Fathers had ventured out to the open seas so much feared for their imaginary terrors and false depths of risks, let America once more break through the wall of fear of Asia which has kept peoples apart and nations divided.

This is the America which the old world had enshrined in its liberalism; the new society which immediately found acceptance from the disenchanting nations of Europe and Asia at the turn of the 19th century—the image of the new world that had bewitched Dutch sailors' eyes and the migrating vision of those who took flight from the tyranny of monarchies—the green light of the 20th century that has heretofore been a beacon of the lost ideals of our times.

This is what has ennobled the image of America.

How Can America Reach the Heart of Asia?

To those who ask how America can reach the heart of Asia, I say: Let America speak from the depths of its own heart, with the voice of Jefferson, with the compassion of Lincoln, with the vision of Roosevelt, with Kennedy's clarion call to a crusade in behalf of the weak, the oppressed and defenseless; for a world of hope, lawful order, and growing freedom; let America speak through President Johnson's challenge for the social revolution that would transform human society without violence to human rights.

America, speak to Asia in the words of President Johnson when he said:¹⁰

By peace in Asia I do not mean simply the absence of armed hostilities. For where men hunger and hate, there can be no peace.

I do not mean that peace of conquest. For humiliation can be the seedbed of war.

And I do not mean simply the peace of the conference table. For peace is not written merely in the words of treaties, but in the day-by-day works of builders.

The peace we seek in Asia is a peace of conciliation between Communist states and their non-Communist neighbors; between rich nations and poor; between small nations and large; between men whose skins are brown and black and yellow and white; between Hindus and Moslems and Buddhists and Christians.

It is a peace that can only be sustained through the durable bonds of peace: through international trade; through the free flow of people and ideas;

¹⁰ For text of President Johnson's radio-TV address of July 12, see BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1966, p. 158.

through full participation by all nations in an international community under law; and through a common dedication to the great tasks of human progress and economic development.

Is such a peace possible?

With all my heart, I believe it is. We are not there yet. We have a long way to journey.

Addressed in these accents, Asia will listen. Confronted with this challenge, Asia will respond.

The Last Message

My last message to you is hard for me to articulate.

Let me bare my heart to you. I have come not as an enemy. I have contributed my modest share in the payment of the price for the liberties and ideals which we all cherish.

It is precisely because of this that I have been hounded by the loud persistent criticisms that I am much too pro-American in my policies. Perhaps I am—emotionally so. For I was one of the many who gambled everything—life, dreams, and honor—on a faith and the vision of America, when all was lost as the Stars and Stripes for the first time in history was trodden to the ground in Asia. I have faith in your objectives in Asia and am deeply convinced that democracy such as ours in the Philippines can thrive in an ocean of neutrals and Communists but only if you keep true to and abide by the image of fairness that is America.

And the truth is all of Asia watches how America will treat her most loyal and steadfast ally. The whole world watches if America will mete out justice to the Filipino veterans. There are rumblings among my people. Far too many of them, including some of our intellectual leaders, have long ago lost faith in your sense of fairness. Without necessarily heeding the importunings of our Communist enemies, they are harsh critics and have given up hope of American justice. They claim American policy desires only the permanence or predominance of American power in Asia regardless of what happens to the individual Asian and that you could not care less who lost his head to the tyrant

provided that tyrant was your tyrant. They cry "American help is self-help; America is a friend in need—her need."

And it is paradoxical that after the Second World War we have had to endure American ridicule for our claims to equal rights under the veterans laws of this country. We were unprepared for the rebuffs that we received but even less prepared for the hostility in the attitudes of some of your executive officials who have had to deal with us. Our former common enemy, Japan, had been patient and understanding. From you, our allies, we expected nothing less. But we did not get it.

Sometimes I have stood alone or with a few loyal comrades as of old, beleaguered by a sea of opposition as I reaffirmed loyalty to the American image.

So, upon the kind invitation of your great President, I have come to you with leave of my people. When I sought their counsel, they told me: "Go, young man of many dreams and many scars, go to your friends. Go but once and no more." I can hear them say still: "Go with our misgivings for we know only too well the Americans' disdain for state visitors who go to their land with promises of loyalty to their ideals and global objectives but with their palms and hands stretched out for aid. Do not beg for alms or aid for we do not solicit charity.

"But tell them loyalty is not for sale. There is no price tag for faith except justice.

"Go and tell them this. If, after they have heard you, they remain unmoved, then with sorrow and grief tell them we are prepared to close this unfortunate chapter of Philippine-American history. With dignity, the Philippines shall stand alone as we have done in the past, fighting off the terrors of our enemies. If we are overwhelmed, then Asia is lost to communism but we would have had our share of conflict. And if we fall, we shall have fallen with pride and shall have died with honor."

But the critics were more cruel. And even the veterans scoff at our own scars in battle. One of these scars I received in trying to

save an American comrade. "Where is he now?" they ask. "He is dead like many of our dreams."

Yes, my American comrade died in my arms. We were surrounded and we had to break out. He fell and, as he tried to crawl to safety, I returned to him, to fall at his side—Filipino and American blood commingling in Philippine soil.

As I cradled him in my arms to a fox-hole, he died with the words: "Tell them back home, you who will live, my only regret in dying is that America has failed us."

I, the Filipino, assured the American, as if this would assuage his dying, "No, America does not forget and will not fail us."

Many years are past. Time should have muted the tone of confidence and the tyranny of circumstance should have eroded the memory, but still today I say to you as I have said to my people: "America does not forget. America will not fail us."

U.S. and Philippines Amend Military Bases Agreement

JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 208 dated September 16

Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Narciso Ramos signed and exchanged diplomatic notes today [September 16] dealing with United States bases in the Philippines and on which understandings had been reached in 1959. The United States agreed to amend the Philippine-U.S. Military Bases Agreement of 1947¹ by reducing the term of Agreement from the original period of 99 years to a period of 25 years from the exchange of notes. It also confirmed the understanding reached in 1959 concerning consultation,² and reaffirmed its policy on mutual defense.

¹Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1775.

²Not printed here.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES

Press release 209 dated September 16

Text of U.S. Note

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, September 16, 1966

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the Military Bases Agreement of 1947 between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America and the Memorandum of Agreement of Foreign Secretary [Felixberto M.] Serrano and Ambassador [Charles E.] Bohlen of October 12, 1959. In this regard, I have the honor on behalf of my government to reaffirm the policy of the United States regarding mutual defense expressed in the 1959 Memorandum.

I have the honor, further, to propose that agreements reached between Ambassador Bohlen and Secretary Serrano in that Memorandum regarding consultation be confirmed, and that Article XXIX of the Military Bases Agreement be amended by substituting for the present provisions of Article XXIX the following:

Article XXIX—*Term of Agreement.* Unless terminated earlier by mutual agreement of the two governments, this Agreement and agreed revisions thereof shall remain in force for a period of 25 years from September 16, 1966 after which, unless extended for a longer period by mutual agreement, it shall become subject to termination upon one year's notice by either government.

If the foregoing proposal is acceptable to your government, I have the honor to propose that Your Excellency's reply indicating

such acceptance shall constitute an agreement between our two governments on this proposal, which will enter into force on the date of Your Excellency's reply.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

DEAN RUSK

His Excellency
NARCISO RAMOS,
*Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
c/o Embassy of the Philippines,
Washington, D.C.*

Text of Philippine Note

WASHINGTON, D.C., *September 16, 1966*

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to Your Excellency's Note dated September 16, 1966, which reads as follows:

[Text of the U.S. note.]

I have the honor, further, to inform Your Excellency that the proposal of the United States Government is acceptable to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and that my Government agrees that Your Excellency's Note above quoted and this Note shall constitute an agreement between our two governments on the foregoing proposal effective September 16, 1966.

Please accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

NARCISO RAMOS
Secretary of Foreign Affairs

His Excellency
DEAN RUSK
*Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.*

The Other War in Vietnam—A Progress Report

On September 13 President Johnson received a report entitled "The Other War in Vietnam—A Progress Report," prepared by Robert W. Komer, Special Assistant to the President. Mr. Komer's letter of transmittal and the 44-page report were made public by the White House on September 14.

Following is the text of Mr. Komer's letter, together with the introductory section and the first two chapters of the report.¹

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington, 13 September 1966

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I submit to you herewith the first comprehensive report on the "other war" in Vietnam. I believe that it demonstrates both real progress and growing momentum in the joint Vietnamese/US effort to move that country forward, even in the midst of war. At the same time as it resists aggression, South Vietnam is increasingly coming to grips with the need to modernize its society, bolster its civil economy, develop its representative institutions, and provide a better life for its people. The US is providing substantial help, technical advice, support and material aid. But this is primarily an effort of the Vietnamese themselves.

A.

This report is mainly a review of accomplishments. It is designed to show how the

¹The second part of this report covering chapter III, "Revolutionary Development: Functional Programs and Institution-Building"; chapter IV, "The Free World Joins In—32 Nations Help the Vietnamese"; and an annex, "Honolulu—Seven Months of Progress" will appear in the BULLETIN of Oct. 17.

GVN and US are moving forward on a broad front in an effort to win the "other war." It does not by any means contend that this war is won. Indeed, I would not overstate the progress to date. There are still many shortcomings in our own non-military programs and in those of the GVN. Much more remains to be accomplished. But the cumulative evidence of what is being done is impressive, especially in the light of the tragic problems confronting this embattled Republic of Vietnam.

Aside from all the difficulties which face any new developing country, the Vietnamese people are seeking to build a modern nation against a background of terror, harassment and aggression mounted by a determined enemy—from both within and without. This enemy seeks to throttle Vietnam's economy by systematic disruption of its transport, communications, and commerce. His use of terror and harassment has as its target not just military forces but the soldiers of Vietnam's "other war"—the school teachers and health workers, the village chiefs and agricultural workers, the literate and those who would lead Vietnam toward social justice and modernization. In the last seven months 3015 of these "other war soldiers" have been murdered or kidnaped by the VC. Here is a little known but tragic drama of the war in Vietnam. That steady progress can be made under such conditions is a tribute to the Vietnamese people.

B.

Seven months ago at Honolulu² you renewed our pledge of common commitment with the Government of Vietnam to defense

² For background, see BULLETIN of Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

against aggression, to the work of social revolution, to the goal of free self-government, to the attack on hunger, ignorance, and disease, and to the unending quest for peace. You stressed that the war on human misery and want is as fundamental to the successful resolution of the Vietnam conflict as are our military operations to ward off aggression.

Shortly after Honolulu, you gave a new management to our role in this "other war" by appointing Deputy Ambassador William Porter to direct the American efforts in the field under the guidance of Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. Then, five months ago you designated me as your Special Assistant to supervise and direct these civil side operations from the Washington end. In the last five months, my deputy Ambassador William Leonhart and I have made four trips to Vietnam. Recently we have received from Ambassadors Lodge and Porter a series of detailed progress reports on how we and our Vietnamese allies are faring in the "other war." They and the US Mission in Vietnam have played a central role in the accomplishments cited in this report to you—it is really theirs.

The months since Honolulu have seen a quickening pace of our joint efforts—not just in the well-publicized field of military operations but also in the less dramatic and often overlooked "other war." US civilian agencies—especially AID, USIA, and experts from other departments—are making exceptional efforts parallel to those of our military forces. The latter as well are contributing greatly to the non-military effort, through civic action programs, medical aid, logistic support, and in a host of other ways.

C.

The report that follows lists both the problems we and the GVN confront and some of our accomplishments to date—including the progress made toward achieving the goals set at Honolulu. The statistical record is impressive. But statistics tell only a fraction of the story. The highlights are that the Republic of Vietnam, assisted by the United

States and 32 other free nations, has committed itself to:

—*A Revolutionary Development program for constructive change in the countryside.* Both governments are mounting a growing effort to protect the countryside, revive its economic health, and provide it with modern services. Our efforts will not end when Communist aggression ceases, but will remain as the foundation of a modern nation.

—*A campaign to preserve economic stability.* In the midst of war, the GVN has courageously sought to bring its economic house in order—devaluing its currency, overhauling its fiscal system, and employing budgetary restraint.

—*New stress on Health, Education, and Welfare.* The US has put increasing emphasis on helping to meet the health and educational needs of Vietnam's people, and on caring for the impoverished refugees who are tragic victims of the war. These programs of AID, with help from our military services and private US sources, are among the largest and most impressive in Vietnam.

—*Expansion of the already successful amnesty program.* In the last eight months, over 12,000 people have voluntarily left the jungles and swamps and returned to the Government, which in turn has given them amnesty and a chance for a new life. The number so returning in 1966 is already higher than in all of 1965.

—*Major steps towards representative government.* This month, in unprecedented war-time conditions—and against VC efforts to terrorize and intimidate a free people from voting—the Vietnamese elected 117 members of an Assembly which will draft a democratic constitution for the Republic of Vietnam.

D.

The coming year will no doubt present additional trials. As the American people increasingly recognize this "other war" is a difficult and complex conflict, for the enemy has eaten his way into the fabric of Vietnamese society. But—as pledged at Honolulu—"the leaders of both of the governments

are determined that we are going to move forward and we are going to make progress.”

We expect in the coming year to focus our efforts on helping the GVN stabilize its economy—increase the pace of Revolutionary Development to recover and reconstruct the countryside—open more roads, railroads, and waterways—and strengthen representative institutions. Many of the specific measures we hope to undertake are outlined in the report.

Mr. President, all Americans can be proud of what many of their countrymen are doing—and our tax dollars are supporting—not only to resist aggression in Vietnam but to wage this constructive “other war.” It is in our highest tradition. It is *for* and *with* the people of Vietnam. It offers them the crucial assurance that their future will be better than their past. The road ahead may be a long one. We will no doubt encounter setbacks. But I believe that we can and will do better yet, toward helping our Vietnamese allies build a free and modern Vietnam.

Respectfully,

R. W. KOMER

TEXT OF REPORT

Major Fields of Accomplishment

The reports which follow describe the multi-faceted US programs which support South Vietnam's growing effort to win the “other war.” They cite both progress and problems. Where possible, they include forecasts of what we and the GVN hope to accomplish over the coming year. In other cases, GVN and US agencies are now formulating plans and budgets for the next Vietnamese fiscal year—beginning on 1 January 1967.

Even these detailed reports hit only highlights of US civil side programs. Many other facets have not been covered in detail. For example, a Joint US Public Affairs Office—a joint informational effort under a single manager—integrates the public information and exchange programs of State, USIA, AID and Defense in Vietnam and provides across-

the-board support for all Revolutionary Development activities. Operations include a diversified range of psychological and informational functions such as media support—press, publications, radio and TV; technical assistance to the GVN's Vietnam Information Service; five US and seven binational cultural centers; student and teacher exchanges.

Many other US activities supporting the GVN could not be fully treated, e.g., the labor field, legal reforms, the logistic support needed for a massive wartime aid program, military civic action, and other contributions of the military establishment. But they are by no means unimportant. In particular, our forces in Vietnam have given an impressive helping hand to the civil side—the non-military effort could not have accomplished nearly so much without it.

A word is also needed on the extensive technical assistance and advice which the US has given the GVN over the past year. Aside from the growing number of US technicians on duty in Vietnam, 36 separate civilian advisory or survey teams were sent between August 1965 and August 1966. Some were high level groups such as those led by Secretaries Freeman and Gardner and former AID Administrator Bell at the President's request. Others were teams of technical experts. Many of these teams were led by or included volunteer non-governmental experts. Eight were in the agricultural field, seven in that of health and medicine.

I. Buttressing Vietnam's Economy

For the past few years, the bulk of US non-military aid to Vietnam has been designed to help feed the people, keep the civil economy functioning, and forestall runaway inflation. It has served as an essential complement to our military effort to help Vietnam defeat aggression. In FY 1966, as the accelerating tempo of military operations and the buildup of Free World forces posed new threats to economic stability, the US similarly stepped up its economic aid and other measures to cope with these threats.

War has cut harshly into the Vietnamese economy. A prime target of the VC has been to disrupt transport, communications, and commerce. Roads have been mined, waterways blocked. Bridges, railroads and power lines have been destroyed by VC saboteurs. Young villagers have been forced off the land and into the VC ranks. Officials and farm leaders have been killed or driven from rural areas. To meet this attack, the GVN has had to mobilize an extraordinary proportion of the nation's manpower for police or military duties. By 1966, over two-thirds of Vietnam's able-bodied young men of 20-30 years of age were prevented by the exigencies of war from filling their normal productive role. All this has interrupted the flow of food and export crops to the cities from Vietnam's basically agricultural economy.

Hence, an increasing share of maintaining Vietnam's economy has been shouldered by the US through AID's Commercial Import Program and Food for Peace. Neither is a new program. Since 1954, the US has provided aid goods for sale or direct distribution in Vietnam. The piasters received help finance the strained Vietnamese budget, while the goods themselves offset inflationary pressures and prevent losses in living standards that would otherwise result from shortfalls in domestic production.

Accomplishments to Date:

—During FY 1966, the dollar funding of goods through AID's Commercial Import Program increased to \$398 million, more than double the \$150 million of FY 1965. Imports financed by the GVN out of its own foreign exchange earnings increased almost proportionately and are expected to exceed an annual rate of \$200 million in calendar 1966—as the GVN undertook at Honolulu.

—The import program is being revised and modified to assure maximum anti-inflationary impact and protect against the misuse of US funds. While mistakes and cases of corruption involving commodities under the commercial import program inevitably occur, what we learn from errors often tends to outweigh the actual cost of the error itself. The Vietnamese and American governments are working continuously to improve the program. Several reforms were instituted in FY 1966:

New licensing procedures for importers were designed to insure that the great bulk of imports are supplied through competitive bidding by suppliers. This economizes dollar costs and prevents collusion between importers and suppliers to circumvent GVN exchange controls.

Certain goods required in large quantity now are being procured through bulk purchases by the U.S. General Services Administration. This will mean lower unit costs and greater efficiency in transport scheduling and port handling.

Increased competition among importers was stimulated by making import licenses available to all legitimate Vietnamese firms satisfying certain minimal requirements. This holds down prices and produces an import flow responsive to the needs of the Vietnamese populace.

Importers must now also maintain larger deposits with their banks as well as full bank guarantees, subject to forfeit if irregularities are discovered.

Arrival checks, to insure that quality and quantity are in accord with sums paid, are being carried out in ever increasing numbers with direct participation by US technicians.

—Authorized imports under the *Food for Peace* program rose to about \$138 million in FY 1966, as compared with \$58 million in FY 1965. These were sold on the market, distributed as assistance in kind, or made available through voluntary agencies as part of their help to the needy.

—Despite a poor harvest and increased military activity in rice producing areas, heavier VC exactions of rice from the peasantry, and VC disruption of normal rice trading, US-financed imports (mostly under Food for Peace) have provided the people of Vietnam enough of their staple food—rice.

Effort in the Coming Year:

—Because of the central role in economic stabilization played by imports, priority will be given to increasing the rate at which necessary commodities can move through the ports, whether destined for the commercial economy or war-related programs. GVN and US financing for commercial imports may have to be increased to assure adequate supplies for stabilization and development.

—Loopholes which permit abuses of import privileges or limit competition will be closed wherever possible. In these cases, as with all the 1966 reforms, discovering unanticipated weaknesses in the newly instituted measures and making them effective in practice will require a substantial further effort. The principles underlying the reforms are sound. They will yield major returns if—but only if—they are made to work.

—Issuance of import licenses by the GVN will be speeded up through new processing procedures and US technical assistance.

—The GVN and US Mission are consulting on how to increase the supply of rice from domestic production. More agricultural specialists will take to the field to help Vietnamese farmers improve their cultivating techniques. Fertilizer and pesticides will be supplied. The farmer's opportunity to sell his output will be increased by facilitating farm-to-market transport through the provision of additional barges and improving security along principal transport routes. It may be possible to encourage the rice market to operate more freely by providing appropriate incentives to producers and merchants. The extension of security in the countryside and the protection of normal commercial activities will free increasing numbers of peasants from VC exactions, permitting them to sell their rice at a profit in GVN-controlled areas. This will also reduce the supply of rice available to the VC to support their military operations.

CHECKING RAMPANT INFLATION

As in all countries at war, Vietnam's economy has come under inflationary pressure.

This pressure multiplied with the expanded GVN war effort and the extensive US military buildup over the last 18 months. Vietnamese military and police forces increased by almost 100,000, US and Free World troop strength rose from some 25,000 to over 300,000, and unprecedented construction of military bases and logistical facilities got under way.

These measures—vital to the war effort—demanded resources at a rate which could not be met out of domestic output and normal government revenues. As a result, more money was pumped into the Vietnamese economy than could be readily absorbed. During FY 1966 alone, money in circulation increased nearly 80 percent. Prices rose sharply. In 12 months, the cost of living for working-class families in Saigon rose by over 70 percent. While the flow of real goods and services has increased in Vietnam despite price rises, the pattern has been distorted. For several important groups, such as the military, police and civil servants, money income lagged behind prices.

Spiraling prices and excessive spendable funds also mean waste and economic disruption. They stimulate hoarding of scarce goods. They foster ill-conceived expenditures by businesses and government, diverting scarce skilled manpower and capital to second-priority uses. They permit undertakings that cannot be completed, tying up resources in unfinished projects.

So the GVN and US decided at Honolulu on a massive effort to control inflation before it could undermine the economic fabric of South Vietnam. A broad economic stabilization program aimed at controlling the inequities and economic dislocation produced by monetary imbalance and inflation was given new teeth and purpose during 1966.

Even before Honolulu, *the US and GVN sharply increased the flow of imports*. As already noted, the sale of US aid goods served to reduce GVN budget deficits and to take piasters out of circulation. Piasters collected in this way accounted for over 60 percent of total GVN budgetary revenues

and paid for many US outlays in Vietnam.

Dollar purchases of piasters for other direct US expenditures provided foreign exchange to the GVN, with which it financed additional imports. Sales of goods from these two sources accounted for about 80 percent of total piaster absorption in FY 1966, and required over \$500 million in foreign exchange.

While imports remain the principal tool for checking inflation, there are limits on how much can and should be done through imports alone. The capacity of Vietnam's ports is limited. The financial burden to be borne by the United States must be kept within reason. Imported goods can fill only part of domestic Vietnamese demands. Excessive reliance on imports also tends to undermine Vietnam's ability to become economically independent in the future. For these reasons, the GVN and the US also took steps toward the more effective management of the economy by fiscal and monetary measures:

Accomplishments to Date:

—US military pay in Vietnam is now issued in military scrip instead of US currency to cut down the volume of dollars traded on the black market. Piasters purchased with scrip are channeled to the National Bank of Vietnam. Almost \$70 million flowed to the GVN from this source during FY 1966, at a rate increasing monthly with the US buildup. The GVN in turn agreed to finance \$200 million worth of imports during calendar 1966, relieving the demands on the US-financed Commercial Import Program.

—In March 1966 *the GVN increased taxes* on restaurants, bars, cabarets, beer and other items, and launched a program of more vigorous collection of taxes already on the books.

—The most decisive single measure to control inflation was the courageous devaluation undertaken by the GVN on 18 June 1966, on the advice of the International Monetary Fund. For each dollar of imports, nearly twice the previous number of piasters are now withdrawn from circulation. The new exchange rates mean that all Vietnamese

commodity imports and purchases of foreign exchange, with certain specified exceptions, now take place at 118 piasters to the dollar. As a surgical operation, the devaluation appears to have had marked success. The initial result was to raise prices of imported goods, but by early August import price indices had generally stabilized, total money in circulation decreased slightly, and blackmarket rates for dollars and gold sharply declined.

—As a major step toward controlling the inflationary impact of US piaster spending in Vietnam, the Department of Defense decided to place a ceiling on all its FY 1967 piaster expenditures at the level reached by the end of FY 1966. These include troop expenditures, contractor outlays, and other construction costs.

Effort in the Coming Year: The GVN and US are determined to check inflation via a multi-faceted program designed to preserve the beneficial effects of devaluation.

—The US and GVN must continue to finance an adequate rate of imports, further improve the port and internal distribution system, prevent critical commodity shortages, and undertake further fiscal and economic measures to limit demand.

—The GVN intends to hold down total budgetary expenditures in 1967. The civil and military pay raise granted at the time of devaluation, together with the increasing momentum of social and economic programs, will undoubtedly force the 1967 GVN budget above its 1966 level, but it will still be an austere one.

—GVN tax collections must be further increased. At GVN invitation, a team of technical experts from the US Internal Revenue Service is being sent to Saigon to assist in further increasing tax revenues. US-assisted efforts to tighten customs inspections and collections will be continued. Tax and customs receipts are expected to be significantly above FY 1966 levels.

—Control over the rate of piaster expenditure generated by US military programs must be maintained. Given the continuing US troop buildup, this will require offsetting

measures to absorb more troop expenditures within official (non-piaster) facilities or outside Vietnam and to limit in-country procurement of materials and wage payments.

—Wage restraint must be exercised in all sectors of the economy.

BREAKING THE PORT BOTTLENECK

The buildup of US/Free World forces beginning in 1965, coupled with increased non-military aid, created dangerous bottlenecks in the ports of South Vietnam. Only Saigon port could be considered a modern facility. Yet it was run-down and already overcrowded—and designed to handle only 150,000 tons a month. Other ports were small—some limited to shallow draft coastal ships and junks; they could not relieve the burden on Saigon port. As a result warehouses in Saigon became clogged, materials piled up on the docks, and ships backed up awaiting discharge even in other Pacific ports.

Breaking the port bottleneck became a key to successful GVN/US economic stabilization efforts as well as the military campaign. Urgent measures were taken to clear supplies of all types through the ports, particularly Saigon.

Accomplishments to Date: The immediate port crisis has been overcome and port capacity is rising, though not yet rapidly enough to clear up the backlog.

—The amount of cargo put through Saigon port monthly has more than doubled since last August. Military cargo handled increased from about 60,000 metric tons in August 1965 to over 170,000 metric tons in August 1966. Civilian cargo increased from about 130,000 metric tons to more than 210,000 metric tons over the same period.

—The Vietnamese Army took over management of the port, with General Lan appointed Port Director, responsible directly to the Prime Minister.

—In June 1966, the GVN and US signed an agreement making the US military responsible for receipt, discharge, and delivery to first destination holding areas of govern-

ment-to-government AID cargo as well as military cargo. MACV and AID are advising General Lan on operations involving the entire port area. The US Army 4th Terminal Command is operating US sections of the port and assisting the Vietnamese in their sections. Port management has greatly improved.

—By agreement with the GVN, seven high-tonnage commodities (e.g., fertilizer, cement, and galvanized iron sheet) will be procured in bulk by General Services Administration and shipped through the military transport system.

—The Defense Department has agreed to schedule a substantial part of AID cargo from the US, such as the bulk commodities noted above, via the military transport priority system. Thus the worldwide computerized management system of the DOD for regulating movement of supplies will be used to smooth out arrival of cargo at Vietnamese ports. Military and civilian cargo will hereafter use a common priorities system.

—Commercial cargo, including that financed by the US, is being better regulated. For example, to reduce congestion, the GVN has decreed that all cargo must be removed from port warehouses within 30 days or be auctioned by the government.

—Physical facilities at Saigon port have been greatly improved:

(1) 14 additional deep draft buoy sites have been prepared, a floating dock for roll-on-roll-off unloading has been put into operation, and a 90-acre depot complex at Thu Duc has been constructed.

(2) Roads and open storage areas have been repaired or constructed. More efficient traffic patterns have been laid out.

(3) More barge discharge and transit facilities were opened.

(4) 5,840 tons of sheet steel piling have been provided for constructing LST and barge landing sites in Saigon and Qui Nhon.

(5) Obstructions to navigation in the Saigon River have been removed.

(6) Five heavy-duty hydraulic dredges for use in port construction have been sent to Vietnam.

—Cargo handling and terminal operating equipment has been increased in Saigon and at other ports:

(1) AID has procured or contracted for 552 trucks, 156 lighters, 13 tugs and 213 pieces of handling equipment to facilitate port operations. More will be procured.

(2) 32 new barges have been procured; 14 are in SVN and the remainder will be delivered soon.

(3) Steel plate for constructing 47 new barges in SVN and rehabilitating 40 existing barges has recently arrived.

(4) 10 coastal vessels and an 800-ton per month junk fleet have been chartered to help move cargo from Saigon to other ports.

—Through improvements made, deep draft ships can now discharge directly onto piers at Da Nang, Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay.

—12 US Navy pontoon wharfs and 10 Bailey bridges have been procured to provide additional pier facilities at Da Nang, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, and Quang Ngai.

—A steel truss bridge is being constructed to provide two-way traffic into the Da Nang port area.

—As a result of these measures, the capacity of ports other than Saigon has been increased from about 125,000 metric tons in August 1965 to more than 400,000 metric tons—over a threefold increase.

Effort in the Coming Year: Since requirements are still rising in both the military and civil sectors, port capacity may have to double again next year to keep up with demand. Many remaining obstacles to efficient port operation will have to be removed. For example, lack of sufficient deep draft berths requires that most cargo be handled twice; the rate of discharge of civilian cargo is low partly because the civilian port of Saigon operates only 12 hours a day; and unloading slows down in bad weather because much cargo is discharged from anchorage using lighters or barges. Major efforts are under way to cope with all these problems.

—Plans call for increasing the capacity of the Saigon port system to at least 650,000 metric tons per month by the end of 1967.

This growth is necessary to cope with the expected surge in cargo arriving in SVN.

—Completion of the major Newport project and the Fish Market section of the Saigon port will release deep draft berths now used for military cargo.

—Additional barge berths and discharge sites will be constructed.

—A fresh water storage facility for ships in port will be finished.

—676,000 square feet of new warehouse space will be erected at Thu Duc, close to Saigon.

—Port management will be further improved; enforcement of customs and port clearance regulations will be tightened. Lights for night operations are being installed at commercial docks.

—First destination warehouse facilities will be expanded to expedite port clearance.

—Integration of AID and military cargo under the military sea transport system will be completed.

—Documentation practices will be improved to assure more rapid handling of cargo documents, letters of credit, and customs receipts.

—The feasibility of using high-speed unloading of bulk commodities such as cement, grain and fertilizer will be explored.

BUILDING AN INDUSTRIAL BASE

Although dependent primarily on agriculture, South Vietnam has developed an industrial plant that now contributes one-fourth of its gross national product. Its industries now supply the major part of internal needs for textiles, plastics, and home utensils. US aid, plus that from other countries, has helped to construct or expand some 800 industrial plants employing over 75,000 workers. Further development is handicapped as yet by shortages of long term capital, skilled labor, materials, and transport congestion. Because of insecurity, as well as nearness to markets, there has also been heavy concentration of industry around Saigon.

Accomplishments to Date:

—In FY 1966 private Vietnamese firms were licensed to import \$16.8 million of in-

dustrial machinery under the Commercial Import Program. This measure of investor confidence included \$2 million in machinery for an auto tire plant, \$700,000 for two steel pipe plants, \$515,000 for a cement products plant and \$562,000 for the plastics industry. Other US-made machinery was imported for plants producing chemicals, pharmaceuticals, glass and ceramics, and automotive batteries.

—Altogether, AID assisted in the establishment of 15 new industrial ventures and the expansion of 70 existing facilities in FY 1966.

—The GVN has encouraged industrial development through favorable legislation, tax incentives, designation of industrial parks, and establishment of an Industrial Development Center to stimulate and finance new facilities. A 400 million piaster loan from the GVN revitalized the IDC in 1966.

—Twenty-one American firms have invested a total of \$5 million in Vietnam, in partnership with local firms. 100 non-US firms act as agents for US companies in Vietnam. Two American banks are opening branches.

—To relieve shortage of electric power, aggravated by the Viet Cong sabotage of power lines from the large Da Nhim hydroelectric facility built by the Japanese, work was finished early in 1966 on a 33 megawatt steam generating plant, 12.5 megawatt gas turbine generating plant and a 4.5 megawatt diesel electric plant financed with US loans at Thu Duc near Saigon.

—Ninety-one smaller power units totalling 5,160 kilowatts were installed in district capitals and larger towns in FY 1966.

Effort in the Coming Year: Additional industrial investments can be expected in such fields as fertilizer, animal feed, paper, building materials, and small engines:

—Paper production capacity will be expanded from 18,000 tons per year to 35,000 tons in 1967.

—Construction has begun on a plant to produce concrete blocks and prestressed forms and poles, for completion in late 1967.

—CIP-funded industrial projects in FY 1967 are expected to approximate \$12 mil-

lion. One major project under consideration is a pipe plant.

—USAID plans to establish a *joint loan fund* with the IDC to assist in alleviating the current tight money situation for investment funds.

—A *Bureau of Standards* will be developed to test and improve the quality of manufactured goods.

—An additional 42 megawatts of electrical generating capacity will be placed in operation in Saigon during FY 1967, and design work begun on a 125 megawatt steam generating plant at Thu Duc. Installed capacity of 140 megawatts to meet Saigon's expanding needs is planned for June 1967. 5800 kilowatts of capacity will be installed outside of Saigon under an urban-provincial program in addition to the rural electrification through cooperatives and under the Revolutionary Development program.

—The US Marines are assisting the GVN in clearing the An Hoa-Nong Son industrial area a few miles southwest of Da Nang. Within the next year, further progress on this industrial development may be feasible.

—Further work on surveys, initial plans, and the start of construction is projected for Cam Ranh Bay, which offers attractive postwar possibilities for Vietnamese industry.

—Overall postwar planning for social, agricultural, economic and industrial development of Vietnam will get under way.

II. Revolutionary Development: The "Other War" in the Countryside

The Viet Cong have been able to sink their roots deep into the fabric of rural Vietnam. Insecurity, poverty, low health standards, lack of opportunity, social injustice, and land inequities have enabled the VC to exploit a rural feeling of alienation from the government.

The Revolutionary Development program must change all that—or else ultimately be judged a failure like its predecessors. As it has evolved, it focusses on gradually securing the countryside, eliminating terror and intimidation, and producing radical and constructive change in the lives of the people.

Its aim is to dry up the source of VC local support and build a strong and progressive society from the hamlet up. It is what Ambassador Lodge has called "the heart of the matter."

The first prerequisite of Revolutionary Development is adequate local security and elimination of the remaining VC threat, after main enemy military forces have been driven from an area. This has been primarily the function of the Regional and Popular Forces, support by the RD Cadre and civil police. Behind this shield, measures can be taken to reinstitute government processes and services, restore productive life among the inhabitants of an area, and develop national spirit and good government.

At Honolulu, the Vietnamese and US Governments pledged full support to an intensified program of revolutionary development (then termed rural construction). They sought new emphasis on the effort to build democracy in the rural areas—an effort as important as the military battle itself. They emphasized the necessity of combining military and civilian plans so that the RD effort would not be made in a vacuum surrounded by Viet Cong.

For many reasons, the Revolutionary Development program has been relatively slow in gathering speed. The task of winning the "village war" is complex and takes time, as shown by the limited achievements of predecessor programs aimed at similar objectives. Among the reasons for the difficulties this program has encountered:

—It is a dagger pointed at the Viet Cong's heart; thus the enemy is making every effort to thwart it.

—Adequate training of officials and cadre is essential; this has started, but takes time.

—In many areas, the farmers have seen too many ill-thought-out programs abandoned in mid-stream; they are watching and waiting before committing themselves to this one.

—The great buildup in main force enemy units in the last year made it essential that the US and the GVN concentrate troops in the highlands and other danger spots in an

effort—now clearly successful—to "spoil" the planned VC/North Vietnamese "monsoon offensive."

Nonetheless, there has been over the last several months a modest gain in secure hamlets and population. While "secure" in Vietnam is necessarily a relative term, our best estimate is that about 50 percent of the population was in reasonably secure areas at the end of 1965. By 31 August 1966 it is estimated that secure population had increased to almost 8,300,000, or over 55 percent of the total population. To take another standard of measurement, it is estimated that as of 1 July 1965 only 3199 hamlets were "secure"; by 30 June 1966 this figure had risen to an estimated 4054. This does not mean that the balance are under Viet Cong control. Much of the countryside is controlled by neither side or is in the process of being recovered by the allied forces. Our best current estimate is that some 24 percent of the population is still under VC domination. The remaining 21 percent is caught in the middle.

The key point is that the groundwork for an accelerated RD effort is being effectively laid, and better results are in prospect. As the ARVN regular army and US/Free World military forces achieve continued success in driving back the North Vietnamese and VC main force units, an increasing proportion of regular units of the RVNAF can help provide the indispensable security base for RD. The GVN's Revolutionary Development program is also gaining momentum. Several facets of this program in the countryside are discussed below, and others in the section which follows.

THE NEW REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT MINISTRY AND ITS CADRE

Forerunners of the Revolutionary Development program, regardless of their conceptual soundness, failed primarily because the VC/NVA destroyed the GVN ability to provide essential local security. However, management deficiencies also contributed. Inter-ministerial committees were created, found cumbersome and difficult, and abandoned. Councils chaired by the Prime Minister, and

composed of top civilian and military leaders, were unable to cope on a daily basis with the breadth and complexity of the problems involved.

In August 1965 a Ministry of Rural Construction was formed to administer the program now called Revolutionary Development. A dynamic new Minister, Major General Nguyen Duc Thang, took over shortly after its formation. On 12 July 1966 he was elevated to Commissioner General for Revolutionary Development and given supervision over ministries for Public Works, Agriculture, and Administration (formerly Interior). An integrated management system at the national level is within sight.

One essential building block in this program is government teams—called in Vietnam Revolutionary Development Cadres—working directly with the rural population. The RD Ministry is training them at two centers which the US assists in supporting. This program grew out of the Political Action Teams begun in a few provinces in late 1964. One of the training centers, located at Pleiku, trains only Montagnards; this is a major step forward in the effort to bring these tribal people forward into the 20th century. The second center, at Vung Tau, trains ethnic Vietnamese for work in all provinces.

The RD Ministry, operating through the province chiefs, has also allocated major sums for local self-help projects—to assist the rural population to help itself. Revolutionary Development Councils, tying together the many aspects of RD, have been created at region, division, province, and district levels. The RD Minister has twice visited all of the provinces to explain the RD concept and eliminate bottlenecks. Working relationships between the field and Saigon have been enhanced.

Accomplishments to Date:

—Secure population in the four National Priority Areas has increased by about 230,000 since the beginning of 1966.

—For the first time in years, provincial RD budgets were approved and authorization was given to expend funds at the begin-

ning of calendar 1966—the fiscal year for the GVN.

—1252 self-help projects were completed during the first half of 1966, compared to 521 during the same period in 1965. The people themselves contributed almost 6 million piasters and over 235,000 man-hours of labor to these projects. In July alone, 449 more self-help projects were completed.

—One month's statistics—for July 1966—show the accelerating RD pace:

- 966 more hamlet school classrooms completed;
- 3651 Vietnamese families resettled (30,736 for the year);
- 655 Montagnard families resettled (3,995 for the year);
- 184 kilometers of roads completed;
- 9 irrigation dams, 13 breakwaters and 8 dikes finished;
- 39.7 kilometers of irrigation canals dug;
- 5341 farmers given agricultural extension training;
- 1637 pigs, 3393 chickens and 4100 ducks distributed as part of the animal husbandry program;
- 84,161 kilograms of seed distributed.

—*The number of RD Cadre trained is growing rapidly*, and the quality of training has been improved by a 13-week training course; Cadre class I of 4518 students completed training in May at the Vung Tau center. These cadre in 76 teams of 59 men each have returned to their home provinces and are engaged in RD activities. Total cadre strength has reached 28,539, consisting of 24,766 RD Cadre operating in all provinces and 3773 Montagnard cadre in the Highlands.

—US/Free World military forces have made a major contribution to Revolutionary Development via *civic action* projects. In July alone a sampling of civic action reveals:

- 24 bridges built or repaired;
- 16 medical dispensaries erected;
- 5 market places built;
- 33 kilometers of road constructed or repaired;
- 47 school classrooms built;

308,397 medical treatments given;
3406 surgical operations performed;
8855 immunizations given;
10,134 sewing kits distributed;
4,914,054 piasters contributed.

Effort in the Coming Year: Successful military operations by GVN/Free World forces—now numbering one million—are creating conditions more favorable to Revolutionary Development. The VC, however, will do everything within their power to defeat the RD effort, which poses the greatest long-term threat to their existence. Hence to the extent possible military operations will be designed to provide security in and around areas of importance, population centers, vital installations, and critical roads, railroads and waterways. Military success permits Revolutionary Development to proceed. The focus during the coming year will be on overcoming the many problems and deficiencies which still plague the RD effort in the countryside, and on increasing the tempo of operations:

—Two more cadre classes will graduate from Vung Tau in 1966. The second class, in training now, will provide 38 more 59-man teams, and 158 units of 19 men to reinforce existing 40-man teams already working in the field.

—Management deficiencies at all levels of the complex RD effort will be tackled. At the national level, better coordination among the many ministries involved is essential; at the local level, district government needs to be strengthened to respond to demands stimulated by RD Cadre operations.

—Manpower resources for RD, especially for local security forces and RD Cadre, are deficient in quality and in some areas in quantity. A manpower coordinator has been added to the US Mission staff to work out recommended priorities.

—More attention will be given to securing critical roads, railroads, and waterways. Obstacles such as poor or closed roads, inadequate transportation, port congestion, etc., impede the flow of materials needed for local RD activities. Use of airlift is being in-

creased to overcome obstacles temporarily. Construction capabilities are being expanded to repair roads and waterways.

—Efforts to arouse the interest of the Vietnamese peasant in RD are being stepped up through information programs, visits by government leaders, and instructional workshops for provincial and district officials.

—Tentative 1967 goals for RD are now being developed. At present they call for a substantial increase in the number of secured hamlets; addition of 1–2 million people to those in secured areas; a major increase in the number of RD Cadre teams; greater emphasis upon education, health, people's self defense, self-help, rural electrification, RD Cadre and agriculture. Programs will be oriented toward quality rather than quantity. High impact projects designed to reach the maximum number of people will be stressed.

REOPENING THE LIFELINES OF THE COUNTRYSIDE

Basic to the VC strategy has been interdiction of roads and waterways. The VC have sought to cut or control transport routes, prevent surface military movement, disrupt the village market economy and supply of cities, exploit remaining civilian traffic by setting up tax collection roadblocks, and isolate the people. This effort at strangulation includes canals and waterways in the strategic delta region, where civilians could hardly travel except at the sufferance of the VC. It is extended to the strategically important Saigon ship canal where ocean-going vessels were vulnerable to VC guerrillas operating in the mangrove swamps along the shore.

Friendly control of roads and waterways had to be improved—for military security units to have a secure base and logistic support system; for revolutionary development to proceed in its efforts to win the people; for government influence to grow in the countryside. This has become a prime indicator of progress in pacification.

Accomplishments to Date: The campaign to open roads and waterways is a US and ARVN military effort, but its contribution to

the civil side merits mention. By 1 January 1966, it was estimated that, as a result of military actions over the preceding six months, 30 percent of the major roads in Vietnam were relatively secure. A new system for classifying relative security was then instituted:

Red: Closed, either by VC/NVA military control of the area or by extensive physical interdiction. Requires major military operation or engineer effort to open.

Amber: Marginal. Used by RVN, US/FW forces employing thorough security measures. Used by civilians subject to VC taxation. Frequent incidents occur.

Green: Controlled by RVN-US/FW forces. Minimum security measures required. Isolated incidents may occur.

A major effort was launched in 1966 to clear more roads. A series of special operations known as ROAD RUNNER and BUSHMASTER has been targeted on improving and extending road security; COUNTY FAIR-type operations also contribute.

—In ROAD RUNNER, multiple routes are used simultaneously to make it difficult for the VC to concentrate for an ambush.

—BUSHMASTER makes use of friendly ambushes to upset VC ambushes along communication routes.

—COUNTY FAIR is designed to smash the local VC administrative structure and tax collection organizations and the guerrillas that give them muscle. It contributes to overall area control—the best way to make travel along roads and waterways safe.

The following results have been achieved; they show a trend rather than a precise measure of progress:

	<i>Green</i>	<i>Amber</i>	<i>Red</i>
8 February 1966	32%	41%	27%
30 June 1966 (Most recent report)	36	26	38
31 August 1966 (Estimate)	40		60

Additionally, 34 percent of SVN's 1200 miles of railroad are now open, i.e., in approximately the green condition described for roads.

To secure the waterways, a further series of measures has been taken. For the Saigon

ship canal, US amphibious operations such as JACKSTAY and LEXINGTON I and II, naval gunfire and air attacks, as well as numerous RVN operations in the mangrove swamps along the Saigon ship canal, have been undertaken.

Armed helicopters and light observation aircraft are routinely kept airborne over ships as they transit narrows along the Long Tau and Soi Rap Rivers (i.e., the Saigon ship canal).

Twelve US Navy minesweepers have been introduced to supplement the Vietnamese Navy minesweeping operations of the river approaches to Saigon and the Nha Be POL depot. As a result, the enemy's capacity to seriously disrupt ship traffic into the Saigon port has been significantly reduced.

For other waterways Operation GAME WARDEN, using 71 newly introduced patrol boats, covers the river approaches to Saigon and the Mekong and the Bassac waterways to deny their use by the VC and suppress VC tax collection. Many VC tax collection stations have been destroyed; VC traffic now moves much less freely than it did a year ago.

Naval, police and customs agencies have been organized to deal with river control in a more integrated manner. GVN police now serve aboard US naval ships conducting river patrols.

Road and waterway security can never be absolute so long as even a minor guerrilla threat exists. A single man with a rifle or a command-detonated land or water mine can render a route insecure. A green security condition requires the continuous presence of friendly forces as patrols and in static guard posts at critical points such as bridges. Other military operations must keep large enemy units entirely out of the area.

Effort in the Coming Year: It is hoped that by the end of 1966 roads in the green security category can be increased to around 50 percent. Waterways, especially the Saigon ship canal, will be made safer for friendly traffic and VC/NVA use of the critical Mekong River and Bassac River complex will be denied to a large extent.

Operation GAME WARDEN will be stepped

up by increasing the number of US ships involved to 120 from 71.

By the end of 1967 it is tentatively estimated that many additional roads can be largely secured (i.e., in green or amber condition), such as Route 1 from Saigon north to the Demilitarized Zone, Route 15 from Saigon east to Vung Tau, Route 4 from Saigon south to Ca Mau, Route 19 from Qui Nhon west to Pleiku, and Route 11 from Da Lat to the seacoast.

RESTORING LAW AND ORDER

In normal circumstances the principal function of civil police is to maintain law and order, protect lives and property, detect and suppress illegal activities, and perform various regulatory functions ranging from traffic control to border patrol. On top of all these functions, the National Police of Vietnam support the national effort to overcome the Viet Cong. While the armed forces seek out and destroy the enemy military forces, the police gather intelligence on VC clandestine operations and movements, maintain public order in urban and rural areas freed of overt VC influence by military forces, and seek to prevent the movement of men and material into VC hands.

Beginning in 1964, revitalization of the police has received high priority, with support from AID. By 1966 the police were carrying an important share of the counter-insurgency effort. Significant improvements have been made in the police organization within the last year. More and more the police are spreading out from the cities and are combatting the VC in the rural areas.

Police activities consist of various major programs: including *Regular police* help to provide security and order in hamlets, villages and cities and participate in the Resources Control Program in order to regulate illegal movement of people and supplies; *Police Field Forces* are targeted against marauding bands of VC propagandists, tax collectors, kidnapers and killers; and *Police Special Branch* carries out an intelligence and operational role against the VC apparatus.

Accomplishments to Date:

—Total police strength has grown from 42,000 a year ago to 56,000. Over 2900 policemen and policewomen are presently receiving training. Until recently draft age men were ineligible for the police; opening of the 21–29 year age bracket will increase the flow of recruits.

—The tactical *Police Field Force*, consisting of small, highly mobile, lightly armed units capable of controlling low levels of armed banditry, now numbers 3000 trained and equipped men. Twenty-three companies have been organized, fifteen are operational and the remainder are undergoing training. Captured documents and prisoner interrogation reveal that the VC in the provinces close to Saigon consider the Police Field Forces a grave threat and have made them a priority target.

—A countrywide *police communications net* of 3400 radios now links regional directorates to province and district police offices. During the last year 347 radios were added to the resources control net, and 304 issued to the police field forces. The regular police sponsored village/hamlet network now has 10,000 two-way radios.

—*Police mobile patrols* in Saigon increased 30 percent in FY 1966. Boat patrols of waterways in and around Saigon were inaugurated.

—Police Special Branch has been strengthened. Prisoner Interrogation Centers now exist in 31 provinces; hamlet informant nets have been greatly expanded. Good intelligence pays off. One hamlet informant provided information leading to the arrest of 27 Viet Cong agents.

—Police actions against the VC infrastructure were more effective than in any previous period in recent years. During the first half of 1966, police arrested 6960 known or suspected VC, killed 288, and wounded 52.

—Since 1964, police have carried on an increasingly intense program of *resource control* using checkpoints, identity cards and family census measures to prevent movement of men and materials to the VC. The system

now consists of 6800 trained personnel operating 813 checkpoints. This program is as yet far from being fully effective, but the frequency of VC attacks against checkpoints and personnel tends to confirm intelligence reports that it is hurting the VC.

—Approximately 3000 police man *static, mobile and marine checkpoints* in the Saigon area and the seven surrounding provinces. 1966 has seen an extension of the resources control system to the Delta; police are operating 311 checkpoints in the upper and lower Mekong area and aboard patrol boats in the network of Delta rivers and canals.

—A major development during 1966 has been increasing cooperation between the military and police in resources control. National Police are assigned to each of the 71 US Navy vessels involved in Operation GAME WARDEN patrols of the major Delta waterways.

—Resource control achievements for the first five months of 1966 include: *Persons apprehended*—7035 known or suspected VC; 27,398 draft evaders; 4146 military deserters; 28,290 illegal residents. *Commodities seized* include 2.7 million kilograms of food, and substantial volumes of medicine, firearms and ammunition, and other equipment.

—7,500,000 persons have been registered and issued ID cards since the program began in 1958. Identification cards are an integral part of the population control program designed to reduce the support the VC/NVA can obtain from the local populace. The present ID card method for identifying such elements as Viet Cong, military deserters, draft evaders, criminal fugitives, and illegal residents was introduced in 1960.

—ID card checks during 1 June 1965–30 June 1966 contributed to the detecting of 13,456 known or suspected VC, arrest of 5771 deserters, apprehension of 50,309 draft evaders, and identification of 58,988 illegal residents. Even without an adequate central records facility for cross-checking personal data with intelligence, police and military agencies, some 87 VC and 676 military de-

serters have been detected using only ID card information.

—120 American public safety advisors are now advising the Vietnamese Police in various fields. Commodity assistance has been furnished the police by the US and other Free World countries in the form of communications equipment, vehicles, boats, laboratory and training equipment, and weapons and ammunition.

—*The National Police Academy* at Thu Duc, with American help, is almost completed. *A Field Forces Training Center* at Trai Mat is under construction and already being partly used. 700 police have received training abroad in the US and other countries.

Effort in the Coming Year: The police, a growing force that only within the last two years has received priority attention, have many deficiencies. Management needs strengthening; leadership is thin, and frequent shifts further weaken efficiency. The police must compete with the armed forces for qualified personnel. Training facilities limit the rate at which the police can expand. Police field forces represent a new concept which all province chiefs do not fully understand. But the GVN, with US help, is seeking to improve police capabilities. 1967 plans include:

—Expanding police strength at least to the 72,000 which was originally the 1966 goal. Expanding PFF toward a goal of 8500 by January 1, 1967.

—Putting 60 PFF companies into the field, at least one company in every province by mid-1967.

—Adding 2500 radios to the existing 10,000 unit village/hamlet network.

—Increasing the police training capacity.

—Stepping up Police Special Branch activities against VC infrastructure.

—Registering and issuing new ID cards to 2.5 million people. Applicants will be fingerprinted and photographed, and will include 15-to-18-year-olds to hamper VC use of youth for liaison agents and couriers.

—Building and training staff for the Na-

tional Record Identity Center to classify, cross-reference, and search 10,000 sets of fingerprints each day.

**GIVING GUERRILLAS A SECOND CHANCE:
THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM**

Since 1963 the GVN has offered the Viet Cong guerrillas a general amnesty program known as *Chieu Hoi* (Open Arms). In no area of the government's efforts have the results been so impressive in demonstrating the increasing disillusionment and disaffection in the Viet Cong ranks.

Accomplishments to Date:

—From the program's beginning in early 1963 to the end of August 1966, over 40,000 Viet Cong have voluntarily left the jungles and swamps, surrendered, and undergone the process of reintegration into Vietnamese society—which is the heart of the program.

—In the last 12 months, steady, and in some respects spectacular, improvement in the program's effectiveness has been achieved. From 1 August 1965 to 1 August 1966 some 17,445 Viet Cong returned to the government, compared with 21,315 during the preceding thirty months of the program.

—In a special campaign conducted over the Vietnamese New Year 3462 returnees came in, carrying 709 weapons plus miscellaneous material and documents.

—The total for 1966 alone is 12,106 as of August 26—more than the 11,124 that returned to the government during all of 1965. The rate of guerrillas seeking amnesty is now 50 a day.

—Of the 1966 total, about 8000 were members of the military arm of the VC and over 3800 were civilians attached to the VC.

—The GVN, with US aid, has built *Chieu Hoi* reception centers in every province and is now in the process of improving or expanding the older ones. During the period immediately following their arrival at the centers, the former Viet Cong are given courses which include political indoctrination and practical skills and are assisted in beginning a new life, sometimes in the hamlets and sometimes as laborers and semi-skilled workers.

—Special field personnel have been sent to the provinces to seek out the Viet Cong through every channel of communication available and to convince them that if they remain in the jungles and swamps they have no future, but if they return to the government they can help build a new and free Vietnam.

—JUSPAO has helped the GVN mount a major informational support program, utilizing printed materials (leaflets, posters, banners and pamphlets), airborne and ground loudspeaker broadcasts, and special radio and TV programs. In the last week of August, more than 45 million leaflets were dropped over VC and North Vietnam areas.

—The Viet Cong have shown intense sensitivity to these efforts urging the Viet Cong and NVA infiltrators to rally to the government. Current Viet Cong instructions to their troops are to drown out loudspeakers by beating on pots and pans and to collect and burn leaflets before reading.

Effort in the Coming Year: The importance of the *Chieu Hoi* program cannot be overestimated. Hence it is planned to:

—Increase substantially the amount of funds available.

—Provide maximum needed material assistance, particularly in the supply of roofing, cement, and other material for new housing for the returnees, in transportation and distribution of PL 480 rice to returnees in the centers, in expanded vocational training, and in the resettlement of returnee families.

—Double the capacity of the national reception center to 1000 and complete the construction of 14 more provincial and district centers.

—Expand the program of special armed propaganda teams of former Viet Cong, used to recruit additional VC returnees.

—Continue the campaign of leaflets, millions a week.

The 1967 aim is to double once again the number of VC returning to the GVN.

CARING FOR WAR VICTIMS AND REFUGEES

One result of the increased tempo of military operations since 1964 has been a massive

movement of peasant families seeking refuge in more secure territory under GVN control. More than a million have migrated since the fall of 1964. This steady influx swamped existing facilities for emergency care and faced the GVN with a task of vast dimensions.

To meet these crying human needs, the GVN launched a major emergency program. AID, the US military, US voluntary agencies, and other Free World countries have joined in assisting the GVN to cope with this humanitarian task. Its components include temporary housing, supplies of clothing and household goods for those forced to abandon their belongings, a temporary subsistence allowance for emergency feeding, medical and health care, primary schooling for children, vocational training in new skills, resettlement, and reintegration into the Vietnamese economy.

In the past six months the GVN response has been increasingly effective—particularly since the appointment in February 1966 of a Special Commissioner for Refugees, Dr. Nguyen Phuc Que. His Special Commissariat provides a focal point for refugee programs which were previously diffused among the Ministry of Social Welfare, the Ministry of Rural Construction, and other agencies.

Accomplishments to Date:

—In the last 12 months, *temporary shelter has been provided to over 460,000 refugees.*

—In the same period *almost 280,000 refugees have been resettled*, either in new locations or by return to their native villages. Incoming refugees exceeded those resettled, so the total in temporary encampments rose during the year from 320,000 to over 500,000.

—For calendar 1966 the GVN has budgeted over 1.1 billion piasters (approximately \$10 million) for refugee relief payments, housing, resettlement grants, schools, and vocational training, and other program costs.

—In FY 1966 the US programmed \$22.5 million for Vietnam refugee relief, including \$10.4 million in AID funds, \$7.9 million in Food for Peace commodities, and \$4.1 million from other related programs (health, agriculture, education, logistics, etc.).

—The Special Commissioner for Refugees has asked Province Chiefs to review their needs for the construction of temporary refugee housing and has established minimum standards for refugee camps (one dispensary, two wells, and twenty latrines for every 100 refugee families and one classroom for every 100 refugee children). The GVN has increased refugee relief payments from 7 to 10 piasters per person per day, or 5 piasters and 400 grams of rice per person per day.

—In Quang Tri, one temporary refugee center is 80 percent completed and two others are programmed. In Quang Ngai, 500 housing units are planned, and materials have been delivered for 300 of these. In Tay Ninh Province, 150 units have been completed in addition to 13 other units under self-help projects, and an additional 100 units are under construction. In three districts in Binh Dinh Province, a total of 200 housing units are under construction; 300 have been completed.

—*104 temporary classrooms for refugee children* had been completed as of 30 June 1966, and 60 more were under construction, out of 269 planned for 1966. In many provinces permanent structures are being built or expanded under the new hamlet school program to serve both refugee and non-refugee children.

—*Short-term vocational training programs for refugees* have been started at five polytechnic schools operated by the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Labor has undertaken short courses in masonry and construction trades.

—*Several pilot inter-provincial resettlement projects are under way.* In mid-May, nearly 1000 refugees were resettled from Phu Yen Province to the Cam Ranh Bay area. Food and temporary housing were furnished. Work is available in the area, and refugees will build their own permanent housing with materials furnished by the US and GVN. Each family will be provided with 600 square meters of land for house and garden. Another resettlement project in Dong Lac on Cam Ranh Bay will accommodate an initial group of 300 refugee families. This project is co-sponsored by the GVN, the US, the Vietnam-

ese Confederation of Trade Unions, and the US International Union of Electrical Workers. The Assistant to the President of the IUE participated in groundbreaking ceremonies for this project, and presented the CVT with the initial \$15,000 of the IUE contribution.

Effort in the Coming Year: The goal for 1967 is to expand refugee relief and raise the standards of care and rehabilitation to the target levels established in 1966.

—Because so many refugee facilities have been hastily erected to meet sudden inflows, additional construction will be undertaken to provide health and educational facilities and improve housing standards.

—Additional refugee staff will be recruited and trained, and the rate of resettlement accelerated.

—US and GVN plan 50 vocational training/community centers near refugee camps with large populations. Vocational training will be given in simple skills, home improvement and child care, agricultural practices, blacksmithing. The centers will also offer sewing, health, sanitation, and literacy classes for the rank and file of the refugee camp population.

—New ground must be broken in finding employment opportunities for refugees. While many may return to agriculture, continuation of the war will make this impossible for the time being for others. Further vocational training will help. Handicraft and cottage industry cooperatives will be organized.

—*Free World contributions to refugee relief will increase.* The Federal Republic of Germany's new refugee aid programs, totaling approximately 25 million Deutsche marks, will include assignment of 25 experts to assist in the construction of refugee centers, erection of a refugee village near Saigon to accommodate about 300 families, and establishment of a social welfare training center. The Federal Republic has also entered into an agreement with the Knights of Malta, under which the latter will provide a multi-purpose team or teams for refugee camps.

—*New Zealand plans to increase—from 8 men to 14—the strength of the surgical team which has been serving refugees in the Qui Nhon area, provide two or three mobile teams to work in refugee camps in the area, and furnish four or five vocational training instructors.*

—US voluntary agencies will assume an even larger humanitarian role (see next section).

THE PUBLIC JOINS IN—THROUGH US VOLUNTARY AGENCIES

In Vietnam today, the American people are once again expressing their concern for the suffering of their fellow man. They have responded to the plight of the Vietnamese people by contributing to and through US voluntary agencies food, shelter, clothing, medical assistance—and hope—for millions of men, women and children in South Vietnam. These voluntary agencies serve as essential and valued partners to the GVN.

Accomplishments to Date:

—At present 29 US voluntary agencies, with over 400 American staff members, are directly engaged in relief and rehabilitation programs in Vietnam. Of these 29 agencies, 18 are directly involved in refugee relief activities.

—*More than \$6 million* in funds has been donated by the American people (plus an additional \$13 million worth of clothing, medical supplies, school equipment and other material) to the voluntary agencies for emergency relief.

—In the past year, US voluntary agencies have distributed over 83 million pounds of Food for Peace commodities to feed one and one-half million needy Vietnamese. Essential to their activities is a partnership with the US Government, which defrays the cost of the ocean transportation of the supplies distributed by the voluntary agencies.

—In refugee relief programs, the number of voluntary agencies has increased from seven to eighteen in the past year and their staffs have increased from 50 to more than 150. Vietnam Christian Service (a joint program of Church World Service, the Men-

nonite Central Committee and Lutheran World Relief), for example, is quadrupling its staff of doctors, nurses, social and community workers in Vietnam this year.

—A seven-man team of experts, jointly supported by the American Red Cross and AID, has arrived to operate model refugee camps for the training of Vietnamese Red Cross personnel. This program will be supported in large measure by contributions by the American people to the Red Cross.

—Countless other Americans have sent donations through APO shipments to individual servicemen and units stationed in Vietnam, and through the Navy's "Operation Handclasp."

Effort in the Coming Year:

—Continue and increase support to the relief activities of the voluntary agencies, particularly for the half-million refugees in camps.

—Expand the Food for Peace program to assist three million people—the food and the funds from the sale of food to assist in relocation, self-help and civic action, refugee relief, school lunch, and maternal and child feedings.

U.S. Rejects South African Charge of Interference

Press release 215 dated September 21

Following is the text of an aide memoire which was handed to Ambassador H. L. T. Taswell of South Africa on September 21 by Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Joseph Palmer II in the latter's office in reply to the aide memoire from the South African Government delivered to Acting Secretary George W. Ball by Ambassador Taswell on August 17.¹

The Government of the United States refers to the aide-memoire of the Government of South Africa, which was handed to the Acting Secretary of State by the Ambassador on August 17, 1966.

¹ Not printed.

That communication in turn referred to an aide-memoire that was conveyed to the South African Government by the American Embassy at Pretoria on July 15. The United States aide-memoire of July 15 contained the following statements concerning the views of the United States Government on the South West Africa case then pending before the International Court of Justice:

South Africa, like the United States and other United Nations Members, has the obligation under Article 94 of the United Nations Charter to comply with decisions of the International Court of Justice in cases to which it is a party. Without prejudging the nature of the decision the Government of the United States assumes that all parties to the case, including the South African Government, will respect the rule of law and comply with the terms of the Judgment.

The United States Government would be glad to receive the South African Government's appreciation of the situation.

The Government of South Africa should understand that the Government of the United States will feel obligated to support the decision of the International Court of Justice. It is clear that this will be the view of an overwhelming majority of United Nations members.

The South African aide-memoire of August 17 asserts that these statements constituted "interference by bringing unwarranted pressure to bear" on the Government of South Africa. The Government of the United States cannot accept this characterization of a communication intended merely to make clear, without prejudging the outcome of pending litigation, that the United States would support that outcome whatever it might be.

A considerable part of the South African aide-memoire of August 17 is devoted to an exposition of views on the merits of the South West Africa case which South Africa had advanced in its presentations to the International Court of Justice. Beyond that, the South African aide-memoire seeks to represent the Court's Judgment of July 1966 as lending support to the position taken by South Africa on some of the substantive issues in the case. In the view of the United States, any such analysis of the Court's Judgment is untenable. The July 18 Judgment decided only one question: whether

Ethiopia and Liberia had a legal right or interest entitling them to a determination of claims they had put before the Court concerning the administration of the mandate for South West Africa. All the Court decided was that Ethiopia and Liberia did not have such a legal right or interest. The Court therefore did not decide the merits of their claims.

The Judgment of July 18, therefore, in no way diminished the legal authority of advisory opinions given by the Court in 1950, 1955 and 1956 at the request of the United Nations General Assembly. These advisory opinions established that the mandate for South West Africa continues in effect, that South Africa cannot alter the status of the territory of South West Africa without the consent of the United Nations, and that South Africa continues to be bound under the mandate to accept United Nations supervision, to submit annual reports and to forward petitions to the United Nations General Assembly, as well as to "promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants."

These opinions remain the basic and authoritative statements of the International Court of Justice on important substantive legal questions, including the existence and scope of South Africa's obligations and the rights of the inhabitants of South West Africa.

The South African aide-memoire of August 17 requested

that in view of the stand taken by the United States Government before the verdict that it will support the Judgment of the Court, it will now abide by the decision, and that having regard also to the further implications outlined above, it will instruct its representatives at the United Nations to oppose any renewal of the vendetta against South Africa.

The United States Government does indeed accept as final and binding on the parties, in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Statute of the Court, the Judgment of July 18 on the issue of the legal right or interest of the applicant states, Ethiopia and Liberia, to secure a determination of their claims. In keeping with its posi-

tion of upholding the rule of law, the United States Government continues to accept also the authority of the advisory opinions rendered earlier by the Court on questions relating to South West Africa. In accordance with those opinions, the United States considers that the mandate for South West Africa continues in force, that South Africa is bound by its legal obligations as mandatory power, and that the United Nations General Assembly has supervisory powers concerning the administration of the mandate.

In further consideration of the question of South West Africa at the United Nations, the Government of the United States will be guided by its concern for the well-being of the inhabitants of the territory and for the rule of law.

W. True Davis, Jr., Confirmed as IDB Executive Director

The Senate on September 16 confirmed the nomination of W. True Davis, Jr., to be Executive Director of the Inter-American Development Bank for a term of 3 years and until his successor has been appointed.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 2d Session

- U.S. Observance of International Human Rights Year, 1968. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 17083 (and similar measures). August 11-17, 1966. 50 pp. [Committee print.]
- Atlantic-Pacific Canal Study. Message from the President transmitting the second annual report of the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission. H. Doc. 466. August 15, 1966. 52 pp.
- Amending the Act of June 30, 1954, as Amended, Providing for the Continuance of Civil Government for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Report to accompany S. 3504. S. Rept. 1524. August 25, 1966. 25 pp.
- Continued Suspension of Duty on Certain Isle. Report to accompany H.R. 12461. S. Rept. 1540. August 30, 1966. 2 pp.

Report on Audit of Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, Calendar Year 1965. Letter from the Comptroller General of the United States transmitting a report of examination of financial statements of Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, Calendar Year 1965, Department of Commerce. H. Doc. 487. August 31, 1966. 13 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1966. Conference report. H. Rept. 1927. August 31, 1966. 30 pp.

Use of Foreign Currencies. Report to accompany S. 801. H. Rept. 1954. September 1, 1966. 2 pp.

Adjusting the Status of Cuban Refugees to that of Lawful Permanent Residents of the United States. Report to accompany H.R. 15183. H. Rept. 1978. September 1, 1966. 11 pp.

Claims Against Communist China. Report to accompany S. 3675. S. Rept. 1586. September 1, 1966. 9 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Cotton

Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the International Cotton Institute (TIAS 5964). Adopted by the General Assembly of the International Cotton Institute at Washington September 7, 1966. Entered into force September 7, 1966.

Finance

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965.

Ratifications deposited: Netherlands, September 14, 1966; Pakistan, September 15, 1966.

Enters into force: October 14, 1966.

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.

Signature and acceptance: Guyana, September 26, 1966.

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.

Signature and acceptance: Guyana, September 26, 1966.

Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954 (TIAS 4900). Done at London April 11, 1962. Enters into force May 18, 1967 (except amendment to article XIV).

Acceptance deposited: United States, September 20, 1966.

Entry into force: Amendment to article XIV, June 28, 1967.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.

Acceptances deposited: Chile, September 7, 1966; Trinidad and Tobago, September 6, 1966.

International regulations for preventing collisions at sea. Approved by the International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, London, May 17–June 17, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965. TIAS 5813.

Acceptance deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, September 6, 1966.

Satellite Communications System—Arbitration

Supplementary agreement on arbitration. Done at Washington June 4, 1965.¹

Signature: Director-General, Telecommunications Department of Malaysia, September 17, 1966.

Telecommunications

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 1959), with annexes and additional protocol. Done at Geneva November 8, 1963. Entered into force January 1, 1965. TIAS 5603.

Notification of approval: Pakistan (with reservations), July 8, 1966.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement concerning automotive products. Signed at Johnson City, Texas, January 16, 1965. Entered into force provisionally January 16, 1965.

Entered into force definitively: September 16, 1966.

Israel

Amendment to the agreement of July 12, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3311, 4407, 4507, 5079, 5723, 5909), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington August 23, 1966.

Entered into force: September 22, 1966.

Korea

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in Korea. Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul September 14, 1966. Entered into force September 14, 1966.

Sweden

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 28, 1966.

Entered into force: September 15, 1966.

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy, as amended. Signed at Washington January 18, 1956. Entered into force January 18, 1956. TIAS 3477, 3775, 4035, 5143.

Terminated: September 15, 1966, superseded by the agreement of July 28, 1966.

United Kingdom

Supplementary protocol amending the convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, signed at Washington on the 16th April, 1945, as modified by supplementary protocols (TIAS 1546, 3165, 4124). Done at London March 17, 1966.

Proclaimed by the President: September 15, 1966.

¹ Not in force.

Confirmations

The Senate on September 16 confirmed the following nominations:

Reynold E. Carlson to be Ambassador to Colombia. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated August 4.)

Glenn W. Ferguson to be Ambassador to the Republic of Kenya.

Robinson McIlvaine to be Ambassador to the Republic of Guinea. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated August 29.)

John M. McSweeney to be Minister to Bulgaria. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 218 dated September 23.)

J. Robert Schaetzel to be the representative of the United States to the European Communities, with the rank and status of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 214 dated September 21.)

The Senate on September 20 confirmed the nomination of Robert R. Bowie to be counselor of the Department of State. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 224 dated September 27.)

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: September 19-25

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to September 19 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 208 and 209 of September 16.

No.	Date	Subject
†212	9/20	Ball: House Foreign Affairs Committee.
*213	9/20	Visit of President Senghor of the Senegal.
*214	9/21	Schaetzel sworn in as U.S. Representative to the European Communities (biographic details).
215	9/21	U.S. aide memoire to South Africa.
†216	9/21	Rusk: "The Outlook for Freedom" (excerpts).
†217	9/22	Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs transferred.
*218	9/23	McSweeney sworn in as Minister to Bulgaria (biographic details).
*219	9/22	Visit of Chancellor Erhard of the Federal Republic of Germany.
†220	9/23	International Joint Commission, United States and Canada, studies on air pollution.
*221	9/23	Cyr sworn in as Ambassador to Rwanda (biographic details).

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LV, NO. 1424 PUBLICATION 8143 OCTOBER 10, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of

the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-

intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. PRICE: 52 issues, domestic \$10, foreign \$15; single copy 30 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the Department of State Bulletin as the source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

Africa. U.S. Rejects South African Charge of Interference (U.S. aide memoire) 567

American Republics. W. True Davis, Jr., Confirmed as IDB Executive Director 568

Asia. President Marcos of the Philippines Visits the United States (Johnson, Marcos) 526

Bulgaria. McSweeney confirmed as Minister 570

China

Initiative for Peace (Goldberg) 518

President Marcos of the Philippines Visits the United States (Johnson, Marcos) 526

Colombia. Carlson confirmed as Ambassador 570

Congress

Confirmations (Bowie, Carlson, Ferguson, McIlvaine, McSweeney, Schaetzel) 570

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy 568

President Marcos of the Philippines Visits the United States (Johnson, Marcos) 526

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to 21st U.N. General Assembly 525

W. True Davis, Jr., Confirmed as IDB Executive Director 568

Department and Foreign Service. Confirmations (Bowie, Carlson, Ferguson, McIlvaine, McSweeney, Schaetzel) 570

Economic Affairs

The Other War in Vietnam—A Progress Report (Komer) 549

W. True Davis, Jr., Confirmed as IDB Executive Director 568

Europe. Schaetzel confirmed as U.S. representative to European Communities 570

Guinea. McIlvaine confirmed as Ambassador 570

Human Rights. U.S. Rejects South African Charge of Interference (U.S. aide memoire) 567

International Organizations and Conferences. W. True Davis, Jr., Confirmed as IDB Executive Director 568

Kenya. Ferguson confirmed as Ambassador 570

Military Affairs. U.S. and Philippines Amend Military Bases Agreement (texts of notes) 547

Philippines

President Marcos of the Philippines Visits the United States (Johnson, Marcos) 526

U.S. and Philippines Amend Military Bases Agreement (texts of notes) 547

Presidential Documents. President Marcos of the Philippines Visits the United States 526

Science. Initiative for Peace (Goldberg) 518

South Africa

Initiative for Peace (Goldberg) 518

U.S. Rejects South African Charge of Interference (U.S. aide memoire) 567

South West Africa

Initiative for Peace (Goldberg) 518

U.S. Rejects South African Charge of Interference (U.S. aide memoire) 567

Treaty Information

Current Actions 569

U.S. and Philippines Amend Military Bases Agreement (texts of notes) 547

United Nations

Initiative for Peace (Goldberg) 518

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to 21st U.N. General Assembly 525

Viet-Nam

Initiative for Peace (Goldberg) 518

The Other War in Vietnam—A Progress Report (Komer) 549

President Marcos of the Philippines Visits the United States (Johnson, Marcos) 526

Name Index

Anderson, Mrs. Eugenie 525

Bancroft, Harding F 525

Bowie, Robert R 570

Carlson, Reynold E 570

Case, Clifford P 525

Church, Frank 525

Davis, W. True, Jr 568

Ferguson, Glenn W 570

Foster, William C 525

Goldberg, Arthur J 518, 525

Harris, Mrs. Patricia Roberts 525

Johnson, President 526

Killion, George L 525

Komer, Robert W 549

Marcos, Ferdinand E 526

McIlvaine, Robinson 570

McSweeney, John M 570

Nabrit, James M., Jr 525

Ramos, Narciso 547

Roosevelt, James 525

Rusk, Secretary 547

Schaetzel, J. Robert 570

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

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This 29-minute, 16mm, black-and-white motion picture is the first of a series of Foreign Policy Briefing Films on U.S. relations with the major geographic areas of the world. It is based on informal conversations with four policy-level officers of the Department who help shape our relations with the nations of Western Europe. Most of their remarks are illustrated by documentary footage; there are narrated historical and animated sequences as well.

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**THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE**

BULLETIN

Vol. LV, No. 1425



October 17, 1966

AN INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON

Special Interview for Tenth Anniversary Issue of America Illustrated 574

UNITED STATES AND GERMANY REAFFIRM COMMUNITY OF INTEREST

*Visit of Chancellor Ludwig Erhard
of the Federal Republic of Germany 578*

THE OUTLOOK FOR FREEDOM

Address by Secretary Rusk 586

THE OTHER WAR IN VIETNAM—A PROGRESS REPORT

(SECOND OF TWO PARTS)

by Robert W. Komer, Special Assistant to the President 591

For index see inside back cover

In this special interview, which appears in the 10th anniversary issue (September 1966) of America Illustrated, President Johnson discusses U.S.—Soviet relations over the past decade. America Illustrated is a Russian-language magazine published by the United States Information Agency for sale in the Soviet Union. This English text was supplied by USIA.

An Interview With President Johnson

Q. Mr. President, 10 years have elapsed since the United States and the Soviet Union began to exchange America magazine and Soviet Life in an effort to achieve better understanding between our countries. I wonder, sir, if you would comment on the state of relations between the two countries over the past decade?

A. That's a question frequently asked, and one which is always difficult to answer. It is easy to be a hopeful optimist—and just as easy to be a fearful pessimist. What is important in these complicated times is to be a realist. Time and again, in many parts of the world, we and the Soviet Union find ourselves on the opposite sides of a question. But, over the years, we've gained a lot of experience in working out many of our differences. And we've taken a few very important constructive steps together. I have in mind the nuclear test ban treaty, which forbids testing of these destructive weapons in the atmosphere or under the ocean and thus eliminates the dangerous hazard of fallout. I also think of the history of the cultural exchange program which broadened the opportunities for our best scientists, teachers, and artists to share their creativity with one another. These are positive, concrete steps. They help create a more favorable atmosphere for further steps, and further normalization of relations between countries. My prayerful hope is

that they will endure and expand, despite differences of view we may have.

Q. What do you consider to be some of the future possibilities for additional constructive steps?

A. I think we must work toward progress in the field of disarmament and in greater cooperative efforts between our two countries in space exploration, medical research, and communications. This administration strongly supports these efforts. And then, too, there are what you might call the basics. You know, in Texas, when we go to buy a farm, we don't put too much importance on the manmade disappointments—like a rundown barn or a badly fenced pasture. A good farmer goes out to the fields and sees what's growing. He stoops down and tastes a little bit of the soil. He looks at the stock and the streams and the spring. If these are ample or can be made so by the sweat of his brow, the farmer knows the place holds a future. I grew up on that land. Some of it was mighty poor and rocky—but some of it was good. I learned not to be afraid of disappointments—of the weeds and rocks—but to value the good soil and the hard, constructive work.

I think there's considerable good soil for U.S.—Soviet relations to grow and prosper with the right cultivation and care. We have more in common than we sometimes realize. I have considerable faith in the

people of the Soviet Union. We are both large countries. We both possess an incredible variety of natural resources. Our people are energetic, generous, and talented. We Americans really came to know and to admire the Russian people in World War II. And, I hope, they share some of the same feeling for us. So, I would say that our people are more naturally friends than enemies. I would like to see us exchange goods and ideas and technology—all of the means to achieving common progress and prosperity.

Decade of Economic Progress

Q. Mr. President, this decade has been one of economic progress for both the United States and the Soviet Union. Does this progress directly affect the issues of war and peace?

A. This decade of progress has undermined the goals of those who have preached that the ideological differences between America and the Soviet Union must inevitably lead to war. We see now that we can both prosper in spite of the differences. The two nations have never gone to war with one another. The fact is that no two nations have more to lose in war than the United States or the Soviet Union.

The past 10 years are a good example of what I mean. Just think how much we've achieved here in America: We've reached out into space, we've begun a new era of progress for our Negro citizens, our poor, our elderly, our students. We've realized so many of the dreams of the New Deal of the 1930's and 40's. We were prompted to act then because of a great depression. Today, we are acting at a time when our economy is at the highest point in history. But we want to have all our people share in our bounties. And we want to inject excellence into all aspects of our national life—on our farms, in our cities, in our classrooms, in the arts, in our factories. This is the Great Society.

But we are not the only ones building on our dreams. Think of what the Soviet people have accomplished after experiencing a most

destructive war in which they lost 20 million people. They have not only rebuilt their country, but they also have achieved splendid technological and scientific accomplishments. Neither country would like to see all these advances go up in smoke.

“World Law Can Bring World Order”

Q. Do you think then, sir, that we have reached a point in our relations with the Soviets where both sides accept the proposition that nuclear war is impossible?

A. There is no question but that the American people and the Russian people are absolutely opposed to war. I wish I could say that nuclear war is impossible. The United States, as I said before, will never start any war, nuclear or otherwise. But this world of ours is filled with dangers. We can never know what may suddenly erupt to bring new tensions and threats to the peace.

Under President Kennedy's leadership we proposed the most comprehensive plan yet advanced for general disarmament in stages so that no nation would be at a disadvantage at any stage. Pending action on this broad plan, we have proposed a treaty to curb proliferation of nuclear weapons and to reduce stockpiles. We hope that current disarmament talks will produce progress toward such a treaty. This Government has devoted considerable time and effort to this problem. In fact, we began negotiating right after the war. At that time we were the only nation in the world with the atomic bomb, but our reason then was no less compelling than it is today: The world simply cannot be free of danger as long as any nation possesses a nuclear arsenal. But general disarmament will not, in my view, become a universal fact until we can develop a compelling substitute for armed might in international relations. Once we had a terrible, bloody war between the States here in America. Since that time, we have established a rule of law that regulates our national life and shapes the relations between the National Government and the

State and local governments. I think that the United Nations, through principles enunciated in its founding charter, points the way toward a truly ordered structure of world law. World law can bring world order. But it also must reflect the desires of men and nations. When law ignores this cardinal principle, law itself is ignored. I think we may be evolving a world consensus on which law can stand. For example, in the time since I became President, the United States has participated in more international conferences—about 650, I believe—than during the first 150 years of our history. And so I believe we must pursue avenues of cooperative effort and agreement with the Soviet Union wherever they are to be found. We've got to get into the habit of peaceful cooperation. The test ban treaty was a significant step. There have been others since 1963. We have agreed not to put bombs in orbit, we are working together on a number of other important ventures—in desalination, weather information, exchanges of scientists, artists, and yes, magazines.

Q. What about the ideological barriers, Mr. President? Do you think we can really find social and political accord with the Soviet Union as long as we are in such diverse ideological camps?

A. I think both sides must realize that neither is going to convert the other. The United States has no interest in remaking the Soviet Union in our image. And I don't see any evidence that America will go Communist. I think that the real interests of nations transcend the ideological differences. For instance, some of the nations with which we work closely have moved toward planned economies. But this makes no difference to us—or to them. We work together out of mutual trust and respect and because we share many of the same ideals and aspirations.

We Americans believe that our democracy and our system of a mixed economy with a wide scope for free enterprise works best for us. But we support and respect the rights of all peoples freely to choose their

own system. We oppose the practice of imposing one's system on others. If everyone would abide by the principle of self-determination and reject aggression and subversion, the world would be a happier place.

Government by Consent of the Governed

Q. Mr. President, as a practitioner of what has been called "consensus politics," I wonder if you would comment on the differences between achieving a popular consensus for your domestic programs and for matters dealing with foreign policy?

A. We are a democracy, and Americans have the basic right to disagree with any policy of their Government—foreign or domestic. As we well know, Americans are not bashful about using this right. Now, there are a few important points I'd like to make about achieving a so-called consensus. First, I am a firm believer in the principle of national unity. I believe that our people have more reason to work together than apart to build a country we can be proud of. We may divide along many sectional, regional, political and special interest lines on the best way of approaching some of our problems—but I do think the vast majority agrees on what our problems are and the need for doing something about them. The challenge then is for the President to assert his leadership, to take a position on these issues by formulating legislative programs on which the Congress can act. The Congress, of course, can reject the President's programs—and it often does. But a President must do what he thinks is right. He must think in terms of the national interest and the Nation's security—even if this means stirring up some segments of public opinion, no matter how vociferous. I confess that on the home front it is easier for the public to understand what an administration is trying to do. They see that some of our schools are overcrowded, that we must do something to help our Negro citizens, that we are rapidly outgrowing our cities, and they are responsive to programs that seek remedies. But when the President

takes an extremely serious step in foreign matters, then it is really a more difficult proposition for people to grasp. Certainly, there are dissenters—those who disagree. But the great majority of the American people strongly support their Government. You know, the concept of consensus politics is just one expression in day-to-day political terms of the fundamental proposition of American government—government by consent of the governed. Either a President has achieved a popular mandate in office, or after his 4 years were up the people achieved a consensus of their own and voted him into retirement. So, in either case, the principle of government by consent of the governed has always been upheld.

Peace the "Bedrock of All Our Hopes"

Q. Mr. President, what are your hopes for the next 10 years?

A. You know, I've been in public life now for 35 years. And it's a sad commentary on the human condition when we realize that not once in any of those years has the world been wholly at peace. We've seen a lot of social and scientific advancement in the past 10 years. My hope for the next 10, like any sane man's hope, is that this will be matched in building a peaceful world. Then we will have something really to be proud of. Peace, after all, is the bedrock of all our hopes. Without peace, all of our work and progress come to naught. Think of all the important and beneficial work that the United States and the Soviet Union could undertake with the vast sums now being spent on the instruments of war. Why, it staggers the imagination. We could use that wealth to help the two-thirds of the world that is afflicted with poverty, hunger, illiteracy, and disease. These have-not nations want their place in the sun, their chance for a better life. And as I have often said, the wall between the rich and poor is made of glass, through which all can see. Men everywhere want the opportunity to grow, to become what they are capable of becoming. And this has a special meaning for me.

Fifty years ago I stood as a boy in the Texas hill country and wondered whether there would ever be any opportunity beyond those hills. We who have attained our dreams must respond to the dreams of others—the revolution of rising expectations. I hope we can work toward a world of greater interdependence among nations—where countries will increasingly cooperate in economic, social, and cultural undertakings.

The United States and the Soviet Union still have an agenda of unresolved differences, some of them quite serious. I believe we can settle these disputes, honorably and peacefully. We in the United States are determined to try. What has changed in recent years is not the size of our problems, but the means for solving them. The United States and the Soviet Union now possess—for the first time in history—the technology and productive capacity for extending mankind's benefits to all men. The alternative, of course, is that the world can fall victim to its fears and antagonisms and plunge humanity into the nuclear abyss. I happen to prefer the positive way.

Q. Do you see any indication that we can achieve this "positive way"?

A. Oh, yes, I do. I think that cultural exchange between our two countries is extremely important. We must get to know each other better. The political realities are such that we too often dwell on one another's mistakes and weaknesses. Let's admit that every nation has its infirmities. We all make mistakes, and injustice is not the product of any one geographic area. That's why I value this magazine exchange: *America Illustrated* and *Soviet Life* show what both countries are doing in constructive social and cultural ways. Here, both nations put their best foot forward, show their best products, their finest accomplishments, their creative ability. This is a most positive step toward better understanding. And understanding is essential to the quest for peace.

As I said earlier: If you take an objective look at our two countries—not just at the

issues which divide us—you see the two most powerful nations on earth with every reason to want peace and no rational reason to want war. I am an optimist about mankind. I believe men, with enough effort, can get what they want. And so I believe that the good soil will prevail over the rocks and weeds. The responsibility for the future rests in large part on the United States and the Soviet Union. We differ on many things. The Soviet leaders are often convinced of the rightness of their actions when we think they are wrong. And they sometimes think we are wrong when we feel strongly that our cause is just. As great powers, our two nations will undoubtedly have commitments

that will conflict. But there is one commitment I hope we both share: the commitment to a warless world. However you define it, this is mankind's age of greatest promise. We must move toward it—not toward war. We must find ways toward disarmament and an international rule of law strong enough to take the place of arms.

As President of the United States, as a citizen of this troubled planet, as the father of two daughters who want to bring children into a peaceful world, I say we not only want peace—we in America are willing to expend every effort to achieve this goal. And, really, as responsible citizens living in the nuclear age, we can do no less.

United States and Germany Reaffirm Community of Interest

Chancellor Ludwig Erhard of the Federal Republic of Germany visited the United States September 24–27. He met with President Johnson and other high officials on September 26 and 27, and visited the John F. Kennedy Space Center at Cape Kennedy, Fla., with President Johnson on September 27. Following are an exchange of toasts between President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard at a dinner at the White House on September 26 and President Johnson's remarks at Cape Kennedy, together with the text of a joint communique issued on September 27.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, SEPTEMBER 26

White House press release dated September 26

President Johnson

Mr. Chancellor, Mrs. Erhard, ladies and gentlemen: When Swift was informed that Handel was at his door, he said, "Ahh, a German and a genius. Admit him."

We greet you tonight, Mr. Chancellor, with equal vigor and enthusiasm—not only be-

cause you are a German and a genius but because you have also brought with you for the first time your devoted companion and helpmate, Mrs. Erhard, whom we are delighted to welcome this evening.

It was a native of your country who said that "He only earns his freedom and existence who daily conquers them anew."

We in this country believe that. We believe that the game is won or lost every day. We believe that the pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness is never, never ended. We believe that it is as new as the rising sun and as urgent to all of us as the next breath of fresh air.

Because the people of your country are unafraid of each day's test, they have shown the world now for more than 20 years what courage and fortitude can mean in the life of a nation that is determined to build anew.

You have given the world not only an example of resolution—you have given us the gifts of culture and science and spirit which have enhanced the lives of so many.

Your contribution to the Metropolitan

Opera is something that I can never forget, Mr. Chancellor—because Lady Bird won't let me.

In Viet-Nam tonight are your doctors and your teachers who have come there from Germany, and your medicine and your economic assistance—all devoted to spelling hope to aid a struggling, freedom-seeking people.

You seem to understand how deep is our concern for South Viet-Nam and how earnestly our thoughts these days are turned in that direction.

But you also know that America's efforts in Southeast Asia can and will never diminish our concern for the security of Europe and the Atlantic, because, Mr. Chancellor, more than one ocean commands our interest.

Mr. Chancellor, no one need doubt the American commitment to Europe's future. We keep our commitments in Viet-Nam and we keep them every place that we have them.

We stand with our allies in NATO, firmly dedicated to a common defense, because we believe in firmness and in unity lie the best hopes of peace in the world.

That is why the security of West Berlin, that island of courage, that city of commitment, is so very important to all Americans. I recall vividly how the spirit of its people inspired me during my most delightful visit there in 1961¹ at a very critical moment in our national life.

So we share your determination that the people of all Germany shall be peacefully united in freedom with all of their fellow citizens—and we do believe that it will truly come to pass.

I also share your hope, Mr. Chancellor, expressed to me earlier today, that I can come to Europe again. Your invitation to come to Germany next spring would give me a good opportunity for another meeting with our friends and allies. I want to assure you, sir, that I will try my very best to accept your invitation, if my other responsibilities will permit.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 4, 1961, p. 391.

I have welcomed you on many occasions, Mr. Chancellor, as a statesman of the modern world, but always most of all as our friend.

Tonight I welcome you again as a great leader, as a champion of progress for your people, as hope for mankind, and as one of our close and trusted friends in the world.

Ladies and gentlemen, I should like to ask you to join me in a toast to the President of the Federal Republic of Germany and to the whole German people, whose security and whose freedom are our very own.

Chancellor Erhard

Mr. President, Mrs. Johnson, ladies and gentlemen: I would like, Mr. President, to thank you from the bottom of my heart for the warm welcome that you have extended to me and, very particularly, to Mrs. Erhard, to my colleagues, and to the members of my delegation.

I have felt today how closely and how long we belong to each other. If I say long, I am thinking in terms of my activities in German political life which reach back to the time of the breakdown.

I am thinking about, too, the happy experiences which became alive again today when I met so many people with whom, from the very beginning, I cooperated in rebuilding our country. I won't be able to name them all, but I would like to name a few of them on behalf of all: General Lucius Clay, Mr. [John J.] McCloy, General [Maxwell] Taylor—as I say, I can't name them all.

But I have again felt something of the good will and openmindedness with which the American people met us in the darkest hour of our nation. And that, Mr. President, will remain unforgettable.

This is a lasting bond and this, in fact, has brought about the community of ideals which we share in common. In the beginning we thought that we were about to be reeducated. But soon we felt that there was much more behind it, that there was the honest will of a friend who was extending his saving hand to those who were in bitter need.

In the meantime, we have experienced, as you have said, Mr. President, that freedom

needs to be conquered daily anew. And, to use your words, these ideals require of us courage and firmness.

When I think of your worries which occupy you in the first line, then I can say, Mr. President, that I believe that of all of the peoples of the world there is none that has as much understanding and feels as much sympathy for the pain and at the same time the hope which the American people experience when standing up for the freedom you fight for, a just peace, and for the restoration of law and order, and that we share your hope that you be successful in restoring calm and order in that part of the world.

We do what we can do to help you in the humanitarian field. You can also be sure that the German people as a whole feel and know that there is moral relationship between the worries you are occupied with and that move you and the worries that move the German people. I have only to quote in that context the name of Berlin.

And we cannot be sure of our freedom without making efforts daily to preserve that freedom. And in Germany there are problems still, the solution of which requires your assistance. And let me say that in trying to solve these problems we trust in you.

We have to solve the European problems, but we consider these problems imbricated into an Atlantic world and we know that what is about to form in Europe is indissolubly linked with what the Atlantic alliance stands for, with our joint effort to stand up in defense of the ideals of freedom, peace, and security.

And for us the United States of America is the country in which we place the greatest trust, with whom we feel the most intimate solidarity. We are aware that freedom, peace, security, are not words which should only be used when there is no problem and no tension, should be used only because you are sure to get applause when you use them—that they must not become the small change, that they must not become slogans, but that they must be comprehended in their total

value, in what they mean as commitment for man, for peoples, for nations.

And if during these days, Mr. President, we struggle in the joint search for fruitful solutions, we know that friendship does not only have to prove its value when there is sunshine everywhere and when there is not the slightest difference in interests—we feel that these ideals must stand their test even when both our countries have, each of them, their worries. And that we must try not only to understand ours but that we must at the same time show the greatest understanding for the partner, the ally, the friend.

And I think that this was underlying all our talks. It was also underlying our internal discussions on our side, that we were trying on our side to have the maximum understanding for the American position.

And we are equally sure, Mr. President, that the same was true for the American side, that you, too, were appreciating, trying to understand, our reasons.

We don't have to use big words, and I don't think there is any reason for us to give up. The problems of our world can be solved. They can be solved all the more easily the closer we stand together. What we defend cannot be had for nothing. And we are prepared to pay the price that goes with it.

When I say "price" I don't mean that in the material sense—I mean it in terms of the willingness of peoples to assume the sacrifices that must be assumed in order to settle problems.

I was very pleased, Mr. President, that you have opened this hope, and I do believe that it is—and I do hope that it is—more than only hope: the expectation that soon we shall be able to welcome you in Germany. And then, of course, Mr. President, we expect to welcome you and Mrs. Johnson. And I am sure that the reception you will have in Germany, not only from the Government but from the people, will be a welcome with open arms. Because the German people understand that you are a symbol of this world and that we share a common fate.

Some people may think that this is a historical accident. I think it is important. I think that there is a common spirit animating us and this common spirit must not be lost because otherwise cruelty and force would prevail in the world.

We must be vigilant. We must be strong. But we must also trust in the moral force which will guarantee freedom, peace, and the order of law.

I would like to toast looking forward to having our next meeting, Mr. President, take place in Germany and then you will find that this is visible confirmation of the friendship between our two nations, a friendship which is lasting.

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, CAPE KENNEDY, FLA., SEPTEMBER 27

White House press release dated September 27

Chancellor Erhard, Dr. Webb [James E. Webb, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration], distinguished officials of the Republic of West Germany, ladies and gentlemen: I want to thank you for taking time this afternoon away from what I know is always a very tight schedule to welcome our distinguished friends.

I am pleased that our distinguished visitor, Chancellor Erhard, could also find time on his busy schedule to let me show him what you are doing here at Cape Kennedy. I wanted him to see it, not merely because of the pride we take in what you are achieving here but also because of the promise which this great spaceport holds for the future of all mankind.

The story of man's advancement, throughout history, has been the story of his victories over the forces of nature. In that continuing story, our own generation has been given the opportunity to write the grandest chapter of them all. Much of that chapter has already been written in this place where we now meet this afternoon.

As we look at this vast scientific complex,

it is hard to believe, Mr. Chancellor, that only 5 years ago no American had yet orbited the earth. Today 17 American astronauts have flown in orbit. Five of them have flown twice.

Only 5 years ago the heaviest satellite that we could put in orbit, as you saw a few minutes ago, weighed only some 3,000 pounds. The Saturn V, which will make its first flight next year, can place 250,000 pounds into earth orbit, as you have just been told.

Five years ago the moon was far beyond our reach. Today we have thousands of detailed photographs of our planet's orbiting satellite.

I could go on, Mr. Chancellor, listing the achievements of the remarkable national space team and the new adventures which lie just ahead. I can also tell you that we are on our schedule in our plan and our determination to put men on the moon before 1970.

But there is more—much more—involved in our work than the adventure and the challenge of space.

The adventures of men like [Charles] Conrad and [Richard F.] Gordon, whom you met this afternoon and who came here with us, not only widen their own horizons, but they open up vast new possibilities for our men of science throughout the world.

That is really why I invited you, Mr. Chancellor, to come along with me to have a personal look at these fantastic craft that are taking us into the future and to which men of German ancestry have contributed so much and of whom we are so proud. That is why I am discussing with the Chancellor, as well as other leaders, my hope that our scientists can join in joint endeavors to reap the full benefits of this adventure.

Later in the day we will make an announcement about expected exchanges among the excellent young people of both nations which I think will be of interest to the German people and to the American people.

In particular, I have authorized Mr. Jim Webb to discuss whether solar physicists from Europe may wish to be associated with the American solar physicists who are pre-

paring telescopes to fly on an Apollo flight in order to study the sun at the height of the solar cycle.

This is an avenue of international cooperation which we intend to vigorously pursue in every way that we can.

It has been said that the real and legitimate goal of science is the endowment of human life with new inventions and riches. That is the real goal of our own space effort in America. You are helping to endow all of human life in all lands with new inventions and with new riches.

And to each employee here who has contributed his part, I, as your President, say thank you. We appreciate you and we admire you. The presence of our distinguished visitor serves to remind us of the very special nature of achievements in space. Their benefits must flow not just to a single nation, but they must flow to all nations and to all peoples everywhere.

Let me give you briefly a few examples. Our weather satellites have already started a revolution in weather forecasting—which already has been a boon to farmers and fishermen the world over.

Other satellites are improving navigation, bringing information and education to literally hundreds of millions by relaying radio and television programs across the continents and across the seas of the world.

At the same time that we are meeting the demands for long space flights by our astronauts, we are developing techniques that will help us solve the problems of air and water pollution here on earth. We are very proud of the studies that we have made of your country and the information that you have given us in this field, Mr. Chancellor.

We have launched six research satellites that are designed by scientists in other countries. Eight more are planned.

We are working with scientists in 14 other countries in the launching of sounding rockets.

We are cooperating with 17 other nations which provide tracking, data acquisition, and command services for our satellites.

We would like so much to see many more multilateral prospects organized and managed by the countries of Europe, acting together. I would like to say this afternoon that the United States is prepared, if requested, to join with them in space efforts of mutual benefit by providing launch vehicles or in whatever other ways you leaders may feel that we can be of help.

This cooperation is among acknowledged friends. But we go beyond that. We seek—and we shall continue to seek—cooperation in space with the Soviet Union. We have an agreement to exchange certain kinds of space data. We have shared information on variations in the earth's magnetic field. We will soon publish jointly American and Soviet material on space biology and medicine.

We have agreed to certain principles governing the use of space.

But these agreements in principle—expressed in resolutions at the United Nations—fall short of the full, binding force of treaty law.

I earnestly hope that the Soviet Union—whose space achievements have been very great—will feel as we feel in America: that the rapid evolution of space technology makes early conclusion of a treaty between us governing the use of space a most urgent matter.

So it is a matter of the highest common interest—for the future peace of the world and the security of all men may very well be at stake as a result of our efforts.

And so, as we explore the vastness of space and as we dream of new horizons, we work, too, for the manmade controls that will keep these efforts at the service of man and at the service of peace.

There is so much ahead of us for all of us to do.

Each nation has its own problems—food for its hungry, medicine for its sick, care for its elderly, education for its young.

Each nation has its own dreams, and we have exchanged dreams in these last 2 pleasant days that I have spent with the Chancellor. We have dreams of peace, of security, of

independence, of progress, of the advancement of our youth and friendship among all the peoples of the world.

And together, men of all nations face the challenge not just of our world but of the vast universe whose stars shine down on us all and whose mysteries we slowly will penetrate together.

So let us go about the business of mankind. Let us abandon the use of force.

And let us meet together—in peace—the common challenges that confront all men.

The time we have is short.

The earth moves on.

And the heavens wait.

Before we leave, I want each man and woman who is in any way associated with this endeavor to know how much your country appreciates your effort and your achievement.

As we meet here our men patrol and guard freedom throughout the world. Some of our men are dying at this very hour in the rice paddies of Viet-Nam. We honor, respect, and are grateful for their contribution to our freedom.

I particularly want to acknowledge the great efforts that Dr. [Kurt H.] Debus, who came to us from Germany, and Dr. Wernher von Braun, who has been so intimately identified with our space program, also a former citizen of Germany, have made to our space effort.

I am called upon, on occasions, to distribute Medals of Honor to our gallant men who have protected our security and who have advanced the cause of peace. Today I don't have any Medals of Honor to distribute, but I would like in thanking each of you to point out that I know of none who are more deserving of our recognition than Dr. Debus and Dr. von Braun.

I want to add to that list two great American public servants, too—Secretary Robert McNamara, who is associated in this effort and who is one of our most brilliant and competent leaders today, and our own most able, imaginative Director, Dr. James Webb.

I have said many times I would like to have

Dr. Webb in the Cabinet and I would have if he didn't have a more important assignment.

Thank you very much.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE, SEPTEMBER 27

White House press release dated September 27

President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard completed today the fifth of a series of meetings which began in 1963. The two leaders attach exceptional importance to these consultations, which afford an opportunity for intimate and thorough discussion of matters of mutual concern. They were accompanied by Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of the Treasury Fowler and Secretary of Defense McNamara on the American side and Federal Ministers Dr. Schroeder [Gerhard Schroeder, Minister of Foreign Affairs], von Hassel [Kai-Uwe von Hassel, Minister of Defense], and Dr. Westrick [Ludger Westrick, Minister for the Federal Chancery] on the German side.

In two days of wide-ranging talks the President and the Chancellor reviewed problems in the relations between the two countries, as well as questions of world peace and security. The exchange of views, as in former meetings, took place in an open and cordial atmosphere and resulted in basic agreement on all important points. The President and the Chancellor found that the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America continue to share a deep community of interest in all major problems affecting international security.

The situation of the Atlantic Alliance and the state of East-West relations, including the problem of a divided Germany and Berlin, were among the main topics discussed. Questions of long-term Atlantic defense planning, which include the burden on the American balance of payments resulting from the stationing of United States forces in Europe were also discussed in that context. Other subjects reviewed were disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, European unity within an Atlantic partnership, the Viet Nam conflict, foreign aid, space and other scientific cooperation, the Kennedy Round and international liquidity.

German Reunification

President Johnson reaffirmed the objective of the reunification of Germany as one of the most significant goals of American foreign policy. Chancellor Erhard stressed the human suffering which results from the continuing artificial division of Germany, and the President and the Chancellor agreed that a solution of the German problem on the basis of self-determination was essential in the interest of humanity as well as of lasting peace in Europe. They em-

phasized the right and duty of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, as the only freely elected Government of the German people, to speak and to stand for their interests until the German nation has been made whole. They agreed that the freedom of Berlin must be preserved and that the problem of Berlin can be resolved only within the framework of the peaceful reunification of Germany.

Western Unity and East-West Relations

The President and the Chancellor addressed two main needs of our day: Western unity and improved East-West relations.

The President and the Chancellor underlined once more the great importance of European unification founded on common action and common institutions. A united Europe is a basic element of Western strength and freedom and a bulwark against the spirit of national rivalry which has produced so many disasters in the past. They emphasized that Europe and North America are parts of a common Atlantic world and have a common fate. It therefore continues to be a vital interest of their foreign policies to multiply and deepen the ties between North America and a uniting Europe. In this connection the President and the Chancellor discussed the problem of the technological gap between the United States and Europe and noted the excellent initiatives of the Italian Government in this regard. The President indicated that the United States stands ready to respond to any proposals by our European allies in this area of advanced technology.

In East-West relations they believe that we should continue to respond to the widespread yearning to heal the division of Europe and of Germany without which no lasting peace can be achieved, looking steadily for ways to overcome the rigidities of the past.

They believe that closer ties between all European nations, the United States and the Soviet Union will serve this purpose. So will new moves to remove ancient fears.

They agreed to explore with their allies every useful step that could be taken to these ends.

The Chancellor discussed with the President the possibilities for further development of the ideas expressed in the German Peace Note of March 25, 1966.² The President welcomed this constructive German initiative.

The President and the Chancellor are convinced that Western unity will contribute to East-West understanding—that Western European integration and Atlantic solidarity can open the way for wider cooperation in promoting the security and well-being of Europe as a whole.

² For texts of German note of Mar. 25 and U.S. note of Apr. 2, see BULLETIN of Apr. 25, 1966, p. 654.

Atlantic Security

President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard discussed fully the problems of Atlantic security. They agreed that tension in Europe is less acute. Yet a basic threat to security persists and the Atlantic Alliance continues to be the vital condition of peace and freedom. They reaffirmed the determination of the two governments to maintain the strength of the Alliance and its integrated defense and to adjust it to the requirements it will face in the coming years. They agreed that a searching reappraisal should be undertaken of the threat to security and, taking into account changes in military technology and mobility, of the forces required to maintain adequate deterrence and defense. This review should also address the question of equitable sharing of the defense and other comparable burdens, and the impact of troop deployment and force levels on the balance of payments of the United States and United Kingdom, and take into account the effect on the German economic and budgetary situation of measures designed to ameliorate balance of payments problems.

The President and Chancellor agreed that it would be desirable to have conversations in which the United Kingdom would be invited to participate along with the Federal Republic and the United States, to examine these questions, in the consideration of which all the NATO allies will wish to participate.

The President and Chancellor worked on the problems which have arisen under the existing offset arrangements between the Federal Republic and the United States. The Chancellor assured the President that the Federal Republic would make every effort fully to meet the current offset agreement insofar as financial arrangements affecting the balance of payments are involved. The Chancellor explained to the President that the Federal Republic would not in the future be able fully to offset the foreign exchange costs associated with the stationing of U.S. forces in Germany by the purchasing of military equipment. It was agreed that that question would be one of the problems to be considered in the tripartite conversations.

NATO Nuclear Issues

The President and the Chancellor emphasized their great interest in an early termination of the armaments race and in progress in the field of general and controlled disarmament.

They agreed that the proliferation of nuclear weapons into the national control of non-nuclear states must be checked, and expressed the view that nuclear arrangements consistent with this objective should be made within the Alliance to provide the non-nuclear Allies with an appropriate share in nuclear defense. They noted with satisfaction the decision of the Nuclear Planning Working Group in

Rome to recommend a permanent nuclear planning committee in the Alliance. They hope other members of the Alliance will support this recommendation, which would broaden and deepen the areas of nuclear consultation and would bring the Allies more intimately into planning for nuclear defense.

Viet Nam

President Johnson informed Chancellor Erhard of the current situation in Viet Nam. Chancellor Erhard reiterated his view that the assistance given by the United States to Viet Nam's resistance against aggression is important to the entire free world. Chancellor Erhard stated that in his view the efforts and sacrifices made by the United States in Viet Nam provide assurance of the seriousness with which the United States regards its international commitments. The Chancellor expressed his deep regret that the President's repeated peace offers have so far not been accepted. President Johnson expressed to Chancellor Erhard great appreciation for this support and for the tangible assistance in the economic and humanitarian fields which the Federal Republic has given to Viet Nam.

Space and Science Cooperation

The President and the Chancellor discussed possibilities for increased cooperation in technology and science and in particular in the field of space research. The Chancellor expressed his satisfaction that effective steps towards increased cooperation in space research have been initiated since his last meeting with the President in December 1965.³ The President and the Chancellor welcomed the decision to expand the present cooperative satellite program reached as a result of the recent discussions in Bonn between NASA Administrator Webb and Minister of Science [Gerhard] Stoltenberg.

The President and the Chancellor agreed that scientific cooperation should be pressed forward for the mutual benefit of both countries and the advancement of human knowledge, preserving opportunities for additional nations to participate and contribute.

Natural Resources and Environmental Control Cooperation

The President and the Chancellor expressed great satisfaction over progress which has been made on the program of German-American cooperation in the field of natural resources and environmental control which was agreed on during the Chancellor's visit last December. They reviewed with satisfaction the visit of Secretary of the Interior Udall to Germany in March of this year with a mission to look into

what we could learn from each other. American and German program directors and expert teams have been appointed who are exchanging experiences and making detailed plans, especially in the fields of air and water pollution and urban renewal.

Kennedy Round

The President and the Chancellor discussed the Kennedy Round. They agreed that the European Communities and the United States are now facing the decisive and most difficult phase of these trade negotiations. Both governments will give a very high priority to their successful conclusion in order to achieve the common goal of encouraging increased world trade by a substantial reduction in trade barriers.

International Monetary Negotiations

The President and the Chancellor also discussed the international monetary negotiations. They expressed satisfaction with the decisions of the Ministers and the Governors of the Group of 10 at the Hague, and with the plan for joint meetings between the International Monetary Fund Executive Directors and the deputies of the Group of 10. They agreed that the successful conclusion of these negotiations is of the highest political importance.

The President proposed to the Chancellor that there be established secure means of direct telephonic communication between Washington and Bonn to permit easy and rapid consultation on issues of concern to the two Governments. The Chancellor agreed that such an arrangement would be useful and should be set up as soon as feasible.

The two leaders agreed to increase the flow between their countries of the young people who are devoted to excellence in special fields. A competitive scholarship program will be explored to provide a creative exchange of talented youth who can make serious scientific, cultural or artistic contributions to the society of the host country.

The President and the Chancellor were happy to have had this opportunity to discuss together their common problems, as well as to renew their close personal friendship. They reaffirmed the friendship and trust which has developed between the people and governments of the United States and Germany. They expressed gratification at the results achieved by this meeting which should go far toward building even closer relations between themselves and with their partners, as well as toward improving future relations with the Eastern neighbors and other parts of the world.

The Chancellor extended an invitation to the President to visit the Federal Republic next spring; the President said that he would be most pleased to do so if his responsibilities permitted.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Jan. 10, 1966, p. 46.

The Outlook for Freedom

*Address by Secretary Rusk*¹

It is a high privilege to take part in this golden anniversary celebration. The range of topics and of speakers at your convocation suggests the breadth, and the height, of the vision of the leaders of the American business community. It indicates that your most important product is statesmanship.

You are concerned with the preservation and continual improvement of the most productive economic system the world has ever known. Its health and success are primary concerns of the Government of the United States.

The central objective of our foreign policy is, in the familiar words of the preamble to our Constitution, to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."

We can no longer find national security through policies and defenses limited to the North American Continent or the Western Hemisphere or the North Atlantic basin. In this age of instant communication and intercontinental missiles with thermonuclear warheads, distance does not spell safety and no part of this small planet is remote.

Our security depends upon a generally peaceful world. And a generally peaceful world cannot be achieved merely by wishing for it and talking about it and carrying placards calling for peace. It has to be organized and maintained by hard work, determination, and, at times, sacrifice by those

who want a peace that is safe for free institutions.

The kind of world we seek is sketched out in the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter.

We are deeply committed to the principles of free choice: to self-determination, to the right of every nation to choose and change its own institutions. Unlike the Communists, we do not try to impose our system on others. We don't even ask other nations to copy either our political or our economic institutions. But we have, nevertheless, some basic convictions about these matters, convictions rooted in experience.

We believe in government with the "consent of the governed," in Jefferson's phrase. We believe that democracy, with its capacity for great variety of forms and institutions, is the type of government most consistent with the dignity of the individual and the rights of man.

And we believe in economic institutions based on private enterprise. We regard private initiative as the engine of economic progress. In earlier days the engine was not well harnessed to our society as a whole and periodically it broke down. But immense progress has been achieved in improving the capitalist system to make it serve better and more steadily the needs of man. To this end, both government and enlightened leaders of business have made essential contributions.

The modern capitalism of the Western World has knocked the bottom out of Marxist-Leninist economic doctrine.

¹ Made before the National Industrial Conference Board at New York, N.Y., on Sept. 21 (press release 216). Mr. Rusk also made some extemporaneous remarks.

We must, and will, continue to improve our economic and social system. But already it provides, on the average, the highest level of living for our people as a whole that the human race has yet known.

Foreign Policy and the U.S. Economy

We in the State Department are deeply and constantly aware of the vital stake our foreign policy has in the success of the American economy. Our economic strength is the backbone of our international position. Without a strong economy, we could not sustain the efforts which are necessary to preserve the security and to build the strength of the free world—our necessary Military Establishment, our relatively modest foreign aid programs, our overseas information program, our diplomacy. And, beyond that, the ability of the American system to provide an ever better living for all our people is a very important asset in the contest between freedom and regimentation.

Promotion of the economic growth of the United States is one of the oldest objectives of our foreign policy. The central preoccupation of our first ministers to Europe after we won independence—John Adams and Thomas Jefferson—was our commerce. In fact, they set in motion our first national export promotion drive.

Among the constant objectives of our foreign policy are: access to goods from abroad which our economy needs and enlargement of foreign markets for American products. In line with those objectives—and with the paramount purpose of preserving our national security and way of life—the United States in recent decades has pursued several closely related policies:

The lowering of trade barriers;

Strengthening of the international financial system;

Aid to the economically advanced countries of the free world in recovering from the destruction and disruptive effects of war;

And aid to the developing nations in modernizing their economic, social, and political institutions.

These have been bipartisan policies—or, as the late Arthur H. Vandenberg preferred to say, “unpartisan.”

We in the Department of State recognize that we have special responsibilities for furthering the successful international operations of American business.

You are all aware of the keen commercial competition we face from other industrialized nations. Even with an overall increase in our exports, there has been a gradual reduction in our share of foreign markets. Our trade surplus diminished somewhat this past year because of increased imports. We must do more to expand our exports.

Working With the Business Community

In the Department of State we have been moving ahead with a number of new or intensified activities of particular interest to American business.

1. For several years I have emphasized to all our ambassadors overseas the importance of maintaining friendly and helpful relations with the American business community abroad. I have urged on all of them the importance of working with American business to expand our exports.

2. We have established an open door for businessmen with overseas activities. More and more businessmen are coming into the Department with their problems. We are delighted by this.

3. We have established the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Commercial Affairs and Business Activities to give leadership to this program.

4. We have enlarged and revitalized the Department's Advisory Committee on International Business Problems; and at two very useful meetings in the last several months that committee has given us its views.

5. We have broadened our consultations with many business organizations and trade associations.

6. We have also enlarged our consultation program through the Business Council for International Understanding, under which our ambassadors and other senior officers

meet with senior representatives of American business firms with overseas interests before they go on to their posts. More than 100 such consultations have taken place in the past year.

7. Cooperative efforts have also been undertaken with the Department of Commerce to upgrade the economic and commercial function abroad and to see that the total resources of our missions are used to forward the commercial and economic interests of the United States.

These are illustrative of our recent efforts to work more effectively with groups such as yours. They are in keeping with the paramount objectives of our foreign economic policy: to rebuild and expand the international economic order; to cultivate an international environment that encourages and expands the interchange of goods, capital, technology, and ideas. These efforts have accomplished important results.

Advances in the Free World

Trade among free-world countries has doubled in a decade. Last year, free-world exports totaled \$165 billion. Capital is moving across international boundaries in increasing volume, thereby contributing to a more effective use of the world's resources and special skills and to higher world income.

The countries of free Europe and Japan, long since recovered from the war, have advanced to new levels of productivity and well-being.

We have an immense and vital interest in the North Atlantic community, with its combined gross national product of more than a trillion dollars. We have a vital interest in the new, democratic Japan.

In the Western Hemisphere that great cooperative enterprise in social reform and economic development, the Alliance for Progress, is meeting its overall goals. However, some countries are lagging, and the overall goals may need to be lifted. Politically, the main trend has been toward moderation and democracy.

In the Dominican Republic we joined other members of the Organization of American States to assure the Dominican people a free election, thus averting a takeover by either the extreme right or the extreme left, both of which had been condemned by the OAS.

The Developing Countries

In free Asia, the Middle East, and Africa economic progress has been uneven. But some countries have made solid and relatively rapid advances. As a rule, they are those which have provided a favorable environment for private enterprise. In the developing areas there is a growing trend away from doctrinaire leadership.

But not all the indices are favorable. Overall, the gap between the developing countries and the advanced countries is widening. And the world stands at the threshold of a food-population crisis, which cannot be overcome by exports from the countries which produce more food than they need for themselves but requires immense efforts on the part of the developing nations.

At President Johnson's direction, our AID programs are putting increased emphasis on agriculture, as well as on health and education, the basic building blocks of development.

We have a great stake in the success of the populous democracies of the Asian subcontinent. We hope that India and Pakistan will move toward settlement of the disputes between them, so that both countries can concentrate more on internal development and make the best use of the assistance they are receiving from other free-world nations.

We have a vast stake in the security and progress of the free nations of East Asia and the western Pacific. The protective shield we are helping to provide for those countries is already yielding important results. From Australia on the south to Korea and Japan on the north, the free nations of that area are moving forward with renewed confidence. Indonesia, potentially a very rich country, has turned away from adventurism and is

coming to grips with its economic and social problems.

We have been much encouraged by new regional initiatives and institutions in that part of the world. Among them are:

The Asian Development Bank, which will open its doors next month.

The Southeast Asian Development Conference under the leadership of Japan.

ASPAC [Asian and Pacific Council], the group of Asian and Pacific nations brought together on the initiative of the Republic of Korea.

The renewed activities of the Association of Southeast Asia—Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

Those who say that what we are doing in South Viet-Nam lacks understanding and support in the western Pacific and East Asia are poorly informed. Those who predicted that it would cost us the friendship of other Asian nations were wrong. The new sense of confidence in that part of the world is mainly due to the conviction that the United States has the means and the will to meet its commitments and that aggression will not be allowed to succeed.

“Building Bridges” Through Trade

Side by side with our endeavors to deter or to repel aggression and to increase the strength and well-being of the free world, we pursue a third policy. That is to search persistently for areas of common interest and agreement with our adversaries.

In President Johnson’s phrase, we are trying to “build bridges” of human contact and trade and understanding with the nations of Eastern Europe.

And we earnestly seek agreements or understandings with the Soviet Union to blunt disputes and to reduce the danger of a great war. We hope for international agreements on the peaceful uses of space and on nonproliferation of atomic weapons. And we hope the time will come when, by permitting effective inspection on their own soil, the Soviets will make possible progress in reducing armaments. We do what we can to in-

crease contacts with the Soviet people.

We believe that our national interest—and the cause of peace—would be served by increased trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In February of last year President Johnson appointed a special committee on that subject composed of American business, labor, and academic leaders under the chairmanship of Mr. J. Irwin Miller, chairman of the board of the Cummins Engine Company. The recommendations of that committee led to the proposed East-West Trade Relations Act, submitted to Congress in May of this year.² This act would give the President authority to extend most-favored-nation tariff treatment to individual Communist countries when this is determined to be in the national interest. The authority could be exercised only in a commercial agreement with a particular country in return for equivalent benefits to the United States.

It is in our interest to encourage the Communist countries to devote primary attention to the well-being of their own people and to realize that peaceful relations with the nations of the free world serve that end. We believe that that policy is sound, even when we are required to resist aggression in Viet-Nam. We think we should do all we can to make it clear to Communist leaders that they have a constructive alternative to support of costly and futile attempts to gain advantages through the use of force.

Trade Relationships With Eastern Europe

Most of the European Communist nations have been seeking increased trade and other contacts with the West, including the United States. And more trade with these countries could be profitable in itself. As their national economies turn more and more toward consumer desires, they will become more attractive markets for our exports.

Between 1956 and 1965 our exports to Poland increased from less than \$4 million to more than \$35 million, and our imports from

² For texts of the proposed legislation and the special committee’s report, see BULLETIN of May 30, 1966, pp. 843 and 845.

Poland from \$27 million to almost \$66 million. In the first quarter of 1966 our trade with Poland was running at an annual rate of \$60 million of exports and \$80 million of imports. This is the kind of moderate but useful increase in trading relationships that we want to encourage for other countries of Eastern Europe.

In the case of Romania our trade was nominal for many years—usually less than a million dollars for either exports or imports. But with recent improvement in our bilateral relations, our exports to Romania rose to more than \$6 million in 1965 and were close to \$6 million in the first 3 months of 1966 alone. This increase not only benefits our own economy but carries with it the prospect of closer and more normal relationships with the people of Romania. Because Romania is still subject to discriminatory tariff treatment, its exports to us have not shown a comparable increase. They have grown only to \$1.8 million in 1965 and a little more than half a million dollars in the first quarter of 1966.

Since Yugoslavia embarked upon an independent course of policy in 1948, we have treated it accordingly. About 65 percent of Yugoslavia's trade is now with non-Communist countries.

I am convinced that, as President Johnson has said: "The intimate engagement of peaceful trade, over a period of time, can influence

Eastern European societies to develop along paths that are favorable to world peace."³

We also look forward to the time when it will be possible to have more normal relationships with the Asian lands which are now under Communist rule.

Despite dangers and crises and setbacks, the free world continues to grow in strength. The gap in gross national product between the advanced nations of the free world and the Communist states has widened. The combined GNP of the European members of NATO is approximately equal to that of the entire Communist world, and our GNP is substantially larger. Internal pressures for better living conditions and more personal freedom are spurring evolutionary changes in the Soviet Union and most of the smaller Communist states of Europe.

I think that it is accurate to say that, overall, progress has been made in building the foundations of peace. When Hanoi and Peking realize, as they must, that aggression will not be permitted to succeed and their militant doctrines have been discredited, I believe the world will have a good chance of organizing a peace that is safe for free societies and in which all peoples can make a better life for themselves and their posterity. Such a peace is our constant goal.

³ For text of President Johnson's remarks on signing the proclamation commemorating Poland's national millennium, see *ibid.*, May 23, 1966, p. 794.

The Other War in Vietnam—A Progress Report—Continued

Following is the text of the final portion of the 44-page report transmitted to President Johnson on September 13 by Robert W. Komer, Special Assistant to the President.¹

III. Revolutionary Development: Functional Programs and Institution-Building

Aside from those programs already discussed are the ongoing efforts to strengthen key elements of the Vietnamese economic and social fabric—agriculture, education, public health and medicine, government infrastructure. These programs have a major impact on the countryside. They are an integral part of Revolutionary Development.

IMPROVING THE LOT OF THE FARMERS

Vietnam's predominantly rural population—85 percent of the total—has borne the brunt of the war. Farmers have had to leave their ancestral lands to escape Viet Cong terror and fighting. The Viet Cong have seized crops for their own use or for tax levies. VC interference and declining production have drastically reduced shipments to the cities and towns. But the GVN, with US help, has mounted a growing effort to help revive Vietnam's agriculture; despite wartime disruption, progress is being achieved. Major credit is due to the 1000-man staff of the GVN Agricultural Extension Service and to the US agricultural ad-

¹Mr. Komer's letter of transmittal and the first portion of the report, which included chapter I, "Buttressing Vietnam's Economy"; and chapter II, "Revolutionary Development: The 'Other War' in the Countryside," appeared in the BULLETIN of Oct. 10, 1966, p. 549.

visors who work with them and Vietnamese farmers in all 43 of Vietnam's provinces.

Accomplishments to Date:

—With US help, the Ministry of Agriculture has conducted an extensive *educational program*, including distribution in 1965 of 3.1 million educational leaflets. It is planned to distribute some 4.7 million more this year.

—During 1965, 375 three-day *agricultural training courses* were held for 5000 farmers and local officials. Over 5000 half-day and one-day training meetings were held for about 150,000 farmers.

—Young farmers' "4-T Clubs," patterned after the American 4-H Clubs, have risen from 1200 in 1965 to 2200 this year, and have over 80,000 members. Membership should surpass 100,000 during the coming year.

—*Fertilizer use is being expanded.* In 1962 only 100,000 metric tons of chemical fertilizer were used. By 1965 some 700,000 farmers used approximately 276,000 metric tons of fertilizer on 1,976,000 acres, and received about 1.5 billion piasters in additional income. Major efforts are being made to improve fertilizer distribution. Over 10,000 demonstrations of how to use fertilizer are planned for 1967, twice as many as in 1965.

—*Fifty-nine District Farmers' Associations* with 244,000 members, and 250 *farmers and fishermen cooperatives* have been organized. In 1965 approximately 66,000 metric tons of fertilizer and 50,000 metric tons of corn were sold to 155,000 farmers through cooperatives and farmers associations.

—*Vietnamese research stations have*

tested and distributed new varieties of seed. 300 tons of improved corn seed, 40 tons of soybean seed, 150 tons of peanut seed, 250 million sweet potato cuttings, and eight million seed pieces of superior sugar cane were distributed to farmers in 1965.

—Farmers have become enthusiastic about *new crops and techniques.* The success of soybean plantings has prompted Mekong Delta farmers to request help in planting 50,000 acres in the next growing season.

—Vietnamese and American specialists have trained and worked closely with farmers to *prevent losses from insects, disease, and rats.* 1,400,000 acres were treated for insects and disease in FY 1966, and 20 tons of poison were used to kill about 10 million rats. Losses from these causes, estimated at 30 percent in 1961, have fallen to 16 percent this year.

—*Construction and repair of irrigation canals* has continued despite the war. In 1965 some 24 miles of new irrigation canals were completed, 15 miles rehabilitated, and 42 dams built or restored. 70,000 acres were irrigated in 1965 and 78,000 additional acres are expected to be irrigated in 1966.

—*Success in improving hog quality and output is especially notable.* Hog production grew from 1.7 million in 1963 to 3 million in 1965, and the average weight from 130 to 220 lbs. Part of this is due to a "Hog Corn" program whereby a farmer is given three small pigs, eight bags of cement for building a pig sty, and a supply of US-grown surplus corn. One pig is marketed after it is grown and the money returned to cover the cost; the other two pigs are kept for breeding. Over 18,000 fine quality Yorkshire and Berkshire pigs were distributed in 1965, and 26,000 will be distributed in 1966.

—*Fishing—a major source of cash and protein—has greatly expanded.* The Vietnamese Inland Fisheries Service teaches farmers how to build and use fish ponds, which with fertilization and supplemental feeding using low quality grain can produce ten times the amount of fish of a natural pond. 27 million fingerlings have been dis-

tributed for stocking. Present hatchery capacity is over three million fingerlings.

—Offshore fish catch has expanded from 165,000 metric tons in FY 1959 to around 400,000 metric tons in FY 1966. This growth has been due to better techniques, new wharfs, nylon nets and motors—some 12,000 of 57,000 fishing boats are now motorized, largely through AID programs.

—*Much has been done to improve the lives of people in rural communities.* In 1965 Vietnamese and US home economists conducted home improvement programs with 23,600 families, distributing 1000 sewing machines. Home Improvement Clubs, for Vietnamese rural women, increased from 1000 in 1965 to 1200 in 1966, and membership rose from 25,000 to 30,000.

—*A rural electrification program* through three selected cooperatives will begin this fall to bring electricity to 144,000 people in the countryside.

—*Rural water supply has been greatly improved.* AID, supplying rigs and technicians, has worked closely with the GVN Directorate of Water Supply. 80 wells and 60 potable water distribution systems were installed in rural villages and district towns in FY 1966. An estimated 3.3 million people have benefited since the program began.

—*On land reform,* the GVN is proceeding with distribution of 1.2 million acres of expropriated and government-owned land, much to be given to refugees. A pilot program involving 14,000 acres is being planned in An Giang Province using aerial photography for a thorough cadastral survey to permit the issuance of titles. The land will be divided into individual farm units, but developed as a controlled irrigation area with continuous cropping.

Effort in the Coming Year: The US aid budget for assisting agriculture in Vietnam will probably be doubled. Plans for assistance include:

—Doubling the seed multiplication program.

—Provision of 2000 marine engines.

—Construction of five cold storage plants for deep sea fishing.

—Training more agricultural and fisheries cooperative leaders.

—Training 1218 extension workers.

—Distributing 4.7 million educational leaflets.

—Increasing the number of American advisors in the provinces.

—Distributing 40,000 purebred chicks and 15,000 purebred hogs.

—Carrying out a joint GVN/US program for providing agricultural credit funds.

—Reorganization of the National Agricultural Credit Office.

—Technical advice to the GVN on problems of the pricing and transport of rice and on plans for comprehensive land reform.

—Providing an additional 500,000 to 600,000 people with clean water in FY 1967 by drilling wells in the areas northwest of Saigon and in the Delta, where salt water pollutes hand-dug wells.

CREATING A DEMOCRATIC EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

Education is one of Vietnam's most vital needs. Traditionally there have been few schools in the Vietnamese countryside, and schools in the cities have been filled to more than capacity. The young seek better educational opportunities; vocational and technical skills are in urgent demand. New educational methods and far more in materials, facilities, and numbers of teachers are needed. The Honolulu Conference and Secretary Gardner's subsequent mission to Vietnam in March declared that priority should be given to elementary education in the country hamlets, to vocational and technical education, and to secondary education.

Accomplishments to Date:

—6400 hamlet school classrooms have been built so far. This program has been enthusiastically supported by the Vietnamese people, and accordingly has been one of the targets of VC destruction and killings. 1364 classrooms were built in 1965. In 1966 some

"The Other War in Vietnam—A Progress Report" is available in pamphlet form on request from the Information Staff, Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C., 20523.

1600 have been completed in the first six months, out of 2300 planned. These were largely self-help projects, in which the GVN and the US contributed cement and lumber, and rural families provided the labor. These hamlet schools will provide 540,000 children with an elementary education; about one third of all elementary pupils enrolled in Vietnam.

—The number of *hamlet school teachers* has reached 7200, with 3400 trained so far this year.

—*Teacher training programs are being rapidly expanded.* The Ministry of Education has selected ten schools for pilot programs and opened a new demonstration secondary school with 280 students at the Faculty of Pedagogy of the University of Saigon. 1095 elementary school and 461 secondary school teachers have been graduated this year. Ohio University and Southern Illinois University advisors are working with Vietnamese educational officials to improve teacher training.

—*English language teaching has been greatly increased.* International Voluntary Service courses have 12,600 full-time and 1400 part-time students enrolled. The number studying English at Binational Centers expanded fourfold last year. Civic action teams of US forces have taught English to 30,000 Vietnamese.

—*The US has launched a large-scale textbook program.* Thus far in 1966 some 2.2 million textbooks have been distributed to elementary school children, bringing the total so far distributed to seven million. Also distributed last year were 2300 elementary teacher kits, making a total of 5250 out of 10,000 programmed. Training in the use of the new textbooks was given to 18,750 teachers.

—*Vocational training is expanding.* Enrollment in polytechnic schools in 1965 reached 2384, a 16 percent increase over 1964. There were 403 graduates, 60 percent more than the year before. Twenty rural training schools are being built; seven were completed this year, and six others are more than half built. Each will have a capacity of 500 students. With double shifts and full staff, 20–25,000 students can be enrolled. Additionally, many Vietnamese are learning new on-the-job skills with civilian firms or in the army.

—*Agricultural training is being improved.* The College of Agriculture graduated 265 in 1965 and 320 in FY 1966, and secondary agricultural schools 290 in FY 1966 against 220 the year before. Enrollment in secondary agricultural schools rose from 920 in FY 1965 to 1280 in FY 1966. 300 agricultural cadre are being given special training under the Revolutionary Development program.

—A special team of US advisors is being assembled to assist education *at the University level.* University enrollment increased 12.6 percent in 1966 over 1965. The new University of Can Tho will open on October 15 with four faculties: Science, Law, Letters and Pedagogy, and an Advanced School of Agriculture.

Effort in the Coming Year:

—*3000 more classrooms* will be built and *4000 additional teachers trained* under the hamlet school program for a total of 11,400 by the end of 1967. The total of hamlet school classrooms and “self help” classrooms should reach 9000 by the end of 1966, and well over 12,000 by the end of 1967.

—*Enrollment in polytechnic schools* will increase to 3000 in 1967 and 4000 in 1968. Additional training will be provided for a thousand refugees and a thousand veterans.

—*Teacher education enrollment* will be increased 15 percent at elementary and secondary school levels, 50 percent in normal schools, and 10 percent at university level during FY 1967.

—Construction of the remaining *13 rural*

trade schools will be completed. Vocational agricultural instruction will be intensified in An Giang and six other provinces. Rural trade schools will be serving 10,000 sixth and seventh grade students by the end of 1968.

—*Seven million more elementary textbooks will be distributed,* bringing the total to 14 million. Work will begin on producing eight million secondary level texts. Every secondary school student will have his own set of English language texts in 1967.

—The number of Fulbright-Hays lecturers and teachers will be increased from six to twenty this academic year.

—Six more mobile science educational units and two new in-service teacher educational centers are programmed.

—US advisors will work with the Ministry of Education on improving program content and in helping to provide an educational plant adequate for a developing state. A special effort to expand secondary school facilities will be made to the maximum extent security permits.

—For Montagnard areas, where children have lacked access to education, specialists are being recruited to develop means to write Montagnard dialects. A first run of 50,000 textbooks for the Montagnards will be produced during the coming year. Training in agricultural techniques will be emphasized.

—A five-year program to provide utility vehicles to transport school personnel and educational materials will be begun.

MEDICAL CARE IN THE MIDST OF THE WAR: A SUCCESS STORY

Acute problems of disease, sickness, and sanitation generally overburden the feeble resources of newly developing societies. In Vietnam these have been harshly accentuated by war. 700 of the 1000 civilian doctors have been drafted. The Viet Cong have destroyed many village health centers. The movement of a million refugees since 1964 has increased the danger of communicable disease. But the US and other free world countries have moved rapidly to meet the urgent need. More Vietnamese now have better access to medical care than ever before

in their lives. The record of achievement is perhaps the most impressive of all civil aid programs in Vietnam, and the program calls for further rapid expansion.

Accomplishments to Date:

—42 Free World medical teams of 5–21 members are now working in Vietnam, including 21 teams of American military medical personnel working at civilian hospitals.

—Joining the Americans have been volunteer Cuban refugee doctors and medical personnel from Australia, China, Iran, Italy, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Philippines, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland.

—153 American doctors from 38 states under "Project Vietnam" have already voluntarily served two-month tours at Vietnamese provincial hospitals.

—By the end of June our medical teams were treating an average of 39,700 patients a month. At the present rate, US and other Free World doctors will treat more than two million needy Vietnamese patients in FY 1967, and will be equipped to treat far more if necessary.

—Under military civic action programs, medical personnel of our regular military units administered some 2.2 million treatments of various nature to the civil populace in the first half of this year.

—*Malaria eradication* was an early success. Between 1958 and 1961, the incidence of malaria infection was reduced from 7.2 percent to 1.5 percent. Some 85 percent of Vietnamese subject to malaria are protected and in this last year 405,000 houses were sprayed under the anti-malaria program. The goal is total eradication when security conditions permit restoration of a nationwide campaign.

—To prevent the spread of communicable diseases, special attention is given to refugees as they come to the refugee centers. Some 50,000 immunizations against cholera and 70,000 against plague were given refugees and others in areas where outbreaks of disease threatened in the first half of 1966, adding to a total of some 12 million immuni-

zations so far given with AID-donated medicine.

—A special program for 90,000 Saigon elementary school children was completed in February.

—Using vaccine donated by Canada, another special program will shortly begin for the *immunization of school children against polio*.

—The assistance of the National Tuberculosis Association is being sought in a program against TB.

—In the increasingly crowded cities we are assisting the Vietnamese Government to improve sanitary conditions, and providing garbage trucks in the collection of refuse.

—After visiting Vietnam in March, Secretary Gardner suggested emphasis on improving the transport and distribution of medical supplies. Construction has since begun on four regional medical depots and the expansion of the Saigon central depot. With US military help, the logistics system for the movement of medical supplies to Vietnam has been improved.

—*Major emphasis has been placed on medical education*. The American Medical Association, drawing on US medical school faculties under AID contract, is working with the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Saigon to revise curricula and educational techniques.

—The Vietnamese and US Governments jointly financed the construction of a basic sciences complex at the University which was completed in March 1966.

—In this last year 32 Vietnamese trained in medicine in the United States, and 2100 students (not including nurses) attended medical facilities in Vietnam supported by the US.

—Since there are now only about 2500 nurses and 3000 practical nurses and midwives in Vietnam, the US has supported the construction and staffing of six new nursing schools, four of which are now open. When all are completed, Vietnam will have eight such schools, the number of student nurses will be doubled, and over 800 will be graduated annually.

—The US has assisted in the renovation and construction of ten key provincial hospitals. Construction has been troubled by rising costs and competing demands for materials, but two of the hospitals are now near completion. Further expansion of existing hospitals is to start shortly.

—The US has donated 28 surgical suites to hospitals throughout the country. Prefab techniques are being investigated for the improvement of 14 more provincial hospitals.

—Our military units through their civic action programs renovated or constructed 29 local dispensaries in the first half of 1966 besides treating hundreds of thousands of patients.

—The German hospital ship "Helgoland" has arrived, and equipment for ten 200-bed portable emergency hospitals has been donated by Canada.

Effort in the Coming Year:

—The AID budget for medical help to Vietnamese civilians rose from about \$5 million in FY 1965 to \$25 million in FY 1966; it will rise to more than \$50 million in FY 1967.

—Emphasis will continue on improving basic medical education and facilities to prepare for Vietnam's future peacetime needs. The US plans to work with the GVN on improving regional public health laboratories, rehabilitation facilities (including those for the blind) and the operations of the Ministry of Health.

—By 1970 Vietnam will be capable of producing annually 200 fully-trained physicians and 50 dentists a year.

—A survey will be conducted on where new medical facilities should be built, using permanent type hospital construction on a standard architectural plan.

—Fifty inter-village maternity/dispensaries are planned by the end of 1967.

—US civil and military agencies are cooperating on methods to improve the flow of medical supplies both to and within Vietnam, and to help the GVN maintain the proper balance of medical resources between civilian and military needs.

For ten years the VC has marked the structure of government in Vietnam as its special target; systematically murdered, maimed, or kidnaped government officials; and made public service vulnerable and hazardous. Their aim has been to destroy government at the lower levels, or leave behind a wasted structure of intimidated and ineffective officials, especially in rural areas. Cities have been besieged by refugees, and beset by problems of rapid urbanization, political instability and growing insecurity. 1964–1965 saw rapid deterioration. These trends have not yet been finally reversed, but much progress has been made, especially in the last six months.

Accomplishments to Date:

—A major effort has begun to restore some authority and autonomy to the vital and traditional *village/hamlet level of government*. Salaries for village and hamlet officials are being increased and a coordinated program to rebuild this weakest link between the people and the government is under way.

—The RD Cadre performs an essential role in helping local officials to rebuild village and hamlet administration.

—*The National Institute of Administration*, Vietnam's only school for administrators, is being reorganized. New programs are designed to train more young officials for work outside of Saigon. Each year there are graduating classes totalling 170, who are assigned to rural districts as Deputy District Chiefs for administration or jobs of equal responsibility. In addition NIA graduates 70 senior clerks yearly for positions in the GVN.

—*Training centers for local officials* have been built and staffed in most of the 43 provinces. Last year 14,000 local government employees participated in training programs.

—*Technical services* are being decentralized to the provinces and districts and provide services more readily to the rural population.

—The May 30, 1965 *local elections* were a significant, if generally unpublicized, step towards developing a responsible and crea-

tive relationship between central, provincial, and village government.

—A major administrative conference was held in Saigon in October 1965, with province chiefs, mayors, and councilmen attending, representing all provinces.

—Viet Cong terrorism against local officials is being slowly reduced. 991 local officials were killed or kidnaped in the first half of 1965; 512 in the second half of 1965; and 420 in the first half of 1966.

—Finally, the *September 11 elections* for a Constituent Assembly to draft a new Constitution will reinforce the democratic process and provide new foundations for the reconstruction of government at all levels.

Effort in the Coming Year: The GVN, with US help, plans to give special emphasis to strengthening government institutions and improving public services, particularly at the provincial, village and hamlet levels, which are critical to revolutionary development.

—Training of government administrators will be expanded; 5000 more local officials are to be trained during the remainder of 1966.

—Student capacity of the National Institute of Administration is being increased by 39 percent with part time courses for 700 trainees, and the addition of business administration courses with AID help.

—We will continue to urge steps to improve the legal system, with emphasis on social justice.

HELPING VIETNAMESE YOUTH

Youth in Vietnam represent the key to truly "revolutionary" development. The young have been suspicious of government—a government which has relied traditionally on the wisdom of the elders. They have tended to stand aside. Meanwhile, the VC labor to capture the spirit and energy of youth for purposes of insurgency. So new horizons of hope and opportunity must be opened to the youth of Vietnam. They need to be educated so that they can successfully reach for these new horizons. They must be motivated to serve their country in war, just as they must be prepared to serve it in peace.

Accomplishments to Date:

—The GVN has improved its aid to and contact with *youth groups*, and is encouraging the participation of young people in local government. Democratic student government athletic programs, and civic action programs are being sponsored by the "New School Movement" in the secondary schools. Thirty out of 187 secondary schools have adopted this program, and the GVN is encouraging its expansion.

—Young civilians and soldiers joined in a highly successful project of self-government and self-improvement in one of Saigon's worst slums, District 8. Premier Ky has directed expansion of this experiment to other Saigon slum areas.

—Youth are aiding their countrymen through *civic action programs*. Some 12,000 secondary school students under the direction of young teachers and youth leaders worked this summer in Saigon and 33 provinces on reconstruction and repair projects in hamlets and urban slums. Other youth organizations such as the Boy Scouts, Girl Guides, Buddhist and Catholic student groups, the National Voluntary Service, and the Voluntary Youth Association are working on a variety of socio-economic development projects.

—Under the Ministry of Youth, the *Province Youth and Sports Service* is developing civic responsibility through voluntary civic action and social welfare projects—aiding competitive sports programs and assisting the police through the 41,000 man Combat Youth Force. There are 7500 youth cadre at the province, district, village and hamlet levels.

—Greater emphasis is being placed on recruiting capable young people as *RD Cadre*. Young men and women are ideally suited to the rigorous life of revolutionary development cadre. They have the ability to motivate others.

—Thirty-one provinces have *4-T Club programs* similar to our 4-II Clubs. Membership of young people from farm families has risen from 46,000 in 1965 to 81,000 this year.

—*Vocational training* for students is expanding. Many others are learning on-the-

job skills working on construction projects.

Effort in the Coming Year: Programs are under way to:

—Increase broad programs of educational assistance to youth.

—Strengthen the Ministry of Youth and increase aid to the Province Youth and Sports Service.

—Encourage youth to participate in government. Many will be given important responsibilities in guiding the people and improving conditions in Saigon slum areas.

—Increase vocational training opportunities.

—Send more young people to rural areas during school vacations.

—Sponsor and help more competitive sports events. Our military units will increasingly help.

—Improve the effectiveness and morale of the Combat Youth Force.

—Work with the religious youth organizations to improve their leadership and resources for greater work in social welfare.

IV. The Free World Joins In— 32 Nations Help the Vietnamese

Many other Free World countries have come to the aid of Vietnam. There were nine helping this embattled nation in 1963. As of today, 32 nations have participated. They have sent more than 700 teachers, technicians and medical personnel. In the first six months of 1966, their grant assistance for civil programs amounted to more than \$15 million. Over 600 Vietnamese are studying abroad at the invitation of foreign governments.

Nations which have given non-military aid to Vietnam include:

Argentina	France	Italy	Norway
Australia	Germany	Japan	Pakistan
Belgium	Great Britain	Korea	Philippines
Brazil	Greece	Laos	Spain
Canada	Guatemala	Luxembourg	Switzerland
China	Iran	Malaysia	Thailand
Denmark	Ireland	Netherlands	Turkey
Ecuador	Israel	New Zealand	Venezuela

Their large and varied assistance, either

contributed directly or in some cases through the Red Cross, includes: surgical teams, civil engineers, dairy experts, textbooks, hand tools, blankets from Australia; agricultural and electric power advisors, mathematics textbooks and electrical power substations from the Republic of China; \$55 million of reparations plus radios, ambulances, and medicine from Japan; police training in Malaysia; medicine from Greece, Turkey, Israel, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Ecuador, Brazil; relief goods from India and Pakistan; petroleum and medical specialists from Iran; a wide range of teachers, experts and other assistance from France, Germany, Canada, and the United Kingdom; and much else.

In the last few months, major new contributions have included the donation by the Federal Republic of Germany of \$4.4 million for refugee relief, social centers and buses for the city of Saigon. Germany has also supplied the fully equipped hospital ship "Helgoland" which arrived in Saigon in August. This ship carries eight doctors, 30 other medical personnel, 145 beds, medical supplies and an ambulance. Canada is giving polio vaccine and equipment for ten emergency portable hospitals and Japan a ward and surgery section to the Cho Ray Hospital in Cholon. New medical teams are being sent by Japan, Denmark, Spain and the United Kingdom. Venezuela is giving 500 tons of rice.

Military units from the Republic of Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines are participating actively in civic action programs in the communities near which they are stationed.

The United Nations and its specialized agencies are also making significant contributions to the social and economic development of Vietnam. Under the UN Development Program 23 technical assistance programs are under way in such varied fields as tuberculosis control, postal services, soil survey, and physical therapy. UNICEF and WHO have large programs in the field of health. IAEA, ILO and UNESCO are also

conducting programs in Vietnam. ECAFE is also pressing ahead with projects of benefit to all the nations in the Mekong Basin, and has undertaken surveys for irrigation, hydroelectric facilities, and bridge construction projects in Vietnam.

Postscript

To end at the beginning, I would repeat that this progress report focusses mainly on accomplishments to date. Its purpose is to show what the GVN, with US help, is doing in key non-military fields—under quite difficult wartime circumstances. It is written in full recognition that few of the problems the GVN and US confront have yet been solved, that all too many shortcomings still exist, and that much more remains to be done. Nonetheless what *has* been achieved to date is more than impressive enough to demonstrate both real progress and growing momentum in the joint Vietnamese US effort to move Vietnam forward, even in the midst of war. That is the message of this report.

ANNEX

Honolulu—Seven Months of Progress

Another way to show the accelerating tempo of our “other war” might be to relate its progress to date to those joint pledges made during your meeting with the top Vietnamese leaders at Honolulu 6–8 February 1966. Only seven months have passed since this meeting, perhaps too short a time to show real progress. But these months have not been wasted. The impetus already given to Revolutionary Development, the electoral process, economic stability, and a better life for the Vietnamese people might best be demonstrated by reviewing the status of 10 major pledges made in the Joint Communique and Declaration of Honolulu of 8 February 1966.² To this end, the following Annex

² For texts, see BULLETIN of Feb. 28, 1966, p. 304.

recapitulates highlights in my main report.

GOAL. The GVN “pledged again:

—To formulate a democratic constitution for discussion and modification.

—To seek its ratification by secret ballot.

—To create, on the basis of elections rooted in that constitution, an elected government.”

STATUS. The first step in this direction preceded Honolulu—the elections for provincial and city councils of 30 May 1965.

—The second step takes place 11 September, when the Vietnamese people will elect 117 men and women to draft a constitution for Vietnam.

—The GVN has already announced a third step—elections next year for whatever governmental institutions are called for in the new constitution.

GOAL. “The President and the Chief of State and Prime Minister have agreed that their two Governments will take further concrete steps to combat inflation in Vietnam.”

STATUS. Measures taken during 1966:

—The Vietnamese piaster was devalued by 50 percent.

—Port congestion was reduced and the volume of imports doubled.

—Import procedures were reformed to increase competition and restrain prices.

—Customs duties and domestic taxes were increased.

—By late summer the cost of living index ceased to rise, money in circulation declined slightly, confidence in the piaster—and thus in the country’s future—strengthened, and black market exchange rates fell sharply.

GOAL. “Continued emphasis by both Vietnamese and Allied forces on the effort to build democracy in the rural areas—an effort as important as the military battle itself.”

STATUS. This effort, called Revolutionary Development, continues at an accelerating pace:

—During the first six months of 1966, 531 hamlets containing around 580,000 people, were brought into the program. 195 of these

hamlets, with 408,000 people, had previously been under VC control.

—The largest direct budget for these efforts in Vietnam's history has been committed: 1.7 billion piasters so far in calendar year 1966. Other ministerial programs in direct support also reached record levels.

—RD Cadre teams, 24,766 men and women, are now operating in all provinces, with a separate Montagnard Program of 3773 cadre in the Highlands.

—9338 cadre have received RD training at Vung Tau.

—Training facilities and staffs have been expanded to train and graduate 5000 to 6000 new cadre every 15 weeks.

GOAL. The GVN invited those fighting with the Viet Cong to leave their jungle hideouts, and "come safely to join us through the Open Arms Program."

STATUS. Since that call around 11,000 VC have returned to the government, accepted its protection and sought its benefits, under the Open Arms Program.

GOAL. "Continued emphasis on the design of rural construction work to meet the people's needs for larger output, more efficient production, improved credit, handicrafts and light industry, and rural electrification."

STATUS. Major steps are being taken in rural areas:

—Under the provincial electric program, power has been furnished to 135 localities as of 1 July 1966.

—Rural Electric Cooperatives will bring electricity to 141,000 people in three selected locations, with service to begin in the first area in September. 30 additional rural areas will be served with electricity in 1966 under the RD electricity program.

—80 additional wells and 60 potable water systems have been provided in this last year in villages and district towns.

—Much of the \$398 million obligated for US aid imports in FY 1966 was for fertilizer, machinery, iron and steel, and petroleum

products to strengthen agriculture and industry in the provinces.

—The GVN, with US help, is improving the mechanisms for providing credit, both to the farmer and the small businessman.

—Special attention is being given to help refugees learn the production of handicrafts and other skills of use to Vietnamese society.

GOAL. "In agriculture it was agreed that special effort would be made to move agricultural know-how—particularly new species of highly productive rice and corn and vegetable seed—from the experimental station to the farmer in the fields."

STATUS. Agricultural programs are being greatly strengthened:

—About 1200 tons of improved rice, corn, soybean, vegetable and other seeds, plus tens of thousands of improved coconut and sugarcane cuttings have been distributed to farmers in the first half of 1966.

—Over 40 varieties of new seeds are being released through agricultural research stations for seed multiplication.

—The major part of 1.4 million educational leaflets scheduled this year have been distributed to farmers.

—Most of 26,000 pigs to be given to the farmers in 1966 have been distributed. There are now three million of improved varieties of Yorkshire and Berkshire pigs; average weight has grown from 130 to 220 pounds.

GOAL. "Steps for more rapid land reform were carefully reviewed."

STATUS. A pilot program for distributing 14,000 acres in An Giang is proceeding, with 80 percent of aerial mapping for the cadastral survey now completed.

—GVN is proceeding with distribution of 1.2 million acres of expropriated and government-owned land to new owners, including refugees.

GOAL. "Both Governments agreed to make increased efforts in the training of health personnel, in providing teams for medical care,

and creating a stronger medical logistics system."

STATUS. American and other Free World medical teams in Vietnam increased to a total of 42 teams with 5 to 21 members per team. They were treating an average of 39,700 patients a month at the end of June. They included 21 teams of American military medical personnel working at civilian hospitals throughout Vietnam.

—Altogether 495 American medical and paramedical personnel are serving the needy civilian populace in Vietnam compared to 193 at the beginning of the year.

—Four of six new nursing schools have been opened, two during the last year. When all are completed the number of student nurses will be doubled and over 800 graduated annually.

—The medical faculty of the University of Saigon was strengthened by a contract with the American Medical Association and the completion of a new basic sciences complex.

—AID and the Department of Defense worked out a common medical supply system.

—Expansion of the Saigon medical depot and construction of eight regional medical depots has begun.

GOAL. Both Governments "agreed to strengthen their cooperation in building elementary schools, in training teachers, in reinforcing vocational and technical education, and in supplying textbooks."

STATUS. Construction was completed on 2309 elementary classrooms in the hamlet schools program in FY 1966, making a total of 6377.

—3200 teachers have been specially trained for elementary schools in the hamlets this year, and an additional 1095 elementary school teachers were graduated from normal schools.

—461 secondary school teachers completed training at the Faculty of Pedagogy at Saigon.

—20 rural vocational training schools are being built; seven have been completed so far

this year and six others are more than half built. Each school will have a capacity of about 500 students. With double shifts and full staff, 20-25,000 can be enrolled.

—300 agricultural cadre are being given special training under the RD program.

—30 percent increase in polytechnic education is planned for this coming school year.

—2.2 million textbooks have been distributed to elementary school children, bringing the total almost to the half-way point in the distribution of 14 million textbooks under the scheduled program.

GOAL. "It was agreed that the refugees who have of their own free will come over from the enemy side must be adequately cared for and prepared to resume a useful role in society. . . . It was agreed that a special effort will be made to provide good schools for refugee children."

STATUS. GVN has established a Special Commissariat for Refugees, funded with more than one billion piasters for 1966.

—USAID/Saigon now has 49 staff positions (35 in the field) and a budget of over \$20 million for refugee-related programs, including Food for Peace commodities.

—18 voluntary agencies (with staff of over 150) are currently engaged in refugee relief.

—306 temporary centers to receive refugees have been established, with in-country material and logistic support to respond to sudden influxes.

—The GVN has provided 104 classrooms for refugee children, with 60 more under construction and funds allocated for an additional 137.

—By mid-1966, over one million refugees had been given temporary assistance, of whom 360,000 had been resettled and over 140,000 returned to their native villages.

—A program of vocational training and cottage industry is under way for these people.

—The most pressing problem in refugee work now is integrating them into their new communities.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1966 Signed by President Johnson

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release dated September 19

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1966 [Public Law 89-583] which I signed today [September 19] provides the authority to carry forward our efforts to help other nations help themselves. These efforts are the foundation of our foreign policy in the emerging nations. Nothing we do at home or abroad is more important.

Programs authorized by this act will:

—attack the causes of poverty through special efforts in agriculture, health, and education;

—be concentrated in countries that are doing the most to help themselves;

—permit us to play our part in the exciting new regional arrangements emerging in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The Congress has wisely carried forward the principle of multiyear authorization for development lending and the Alliance for Progress. All of us know that the development of nations is not accomplished in a single year. It is the product of years of hard, patient, and imaginative work—primarily by the developing countries themselves.

We and our partners must approach the problem of development in a pioneering spirit. We have learned much about nation-building in the past two decades. But we have also learned to expect many trials and many errors before success is assured. We have learned that our most important asset is a willingness to invent, to experiment, to try new approaches.

This attitude will be the hallmark of our efforts to carry out this act. We will search for new ways to promote regional cooperation through programs which combine the resources of several nations for the common welfare of all. In this sort of creativity lie the seeds of tomorrow's world community.

These programs are necessities, not lux-

uries. The act which I sign today will keep them strong and vital.

I am, however, concerned over a number of new restrictions on the administration of this program that have been added to this bill. Some of them are much less objectionable than earlier versions considered by the Congress, but, taken together, they still unduly and unnecessarily limit the management of our foreign aid program.

The Congress has a clear duty in connection with authorization of the program. I have an equally clear duty in its execution. Although I am approving this bill with these new restrictions in it, I strongly urge the Congress next year to recognize the need for greater flexibility in the administration of a complex program that must be responsive to the rapidly changing circumstances of our world. Undue restrictions on the form and timing of our actions can significantly diminish the benefits we seek from the program.

Columbus Day, 1966

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

White House press release dated September 22

Proclaiming Columbus Day is much more to me than another ceremonial function.

This event gives me a chance, along with all of my fellow countrymen, to reflect on the beginnings of this nation—and on the men who began it.

It reminds us that every citizen in this land is the descendant of men who once were foreigners—who were strangers from afar. This is what our great President Franklin Roosevelt was thinking about one day in April when he addressed the Daughters of the American Revolution by saluting them as "My fellow immigrants."

Today we think of Christopher Columbus—a son of Italy—as the first immigrant: the first in that long procession of strangers who, over the centuries, have come to enrich our

lives, our statesmanship, and our culture here in America.

Today we think of Columbus Day as a time for honoring not only that great explorer but all those Italians whose gifts have been freely given to make this nation great.

Their names form a long list of excellency in every field of endeavor: Enrico Fermi, Frank Capra, A. P. Giannini, Fiorello LaGuardia, Max Ascoli, Joe DiMaggio, and John Pastore.

I would like to call the name of each of you, because you mean that much to me and you have made great contributions.

Steve Martini, who cuts my hair here at the White House and has cut the hair of Presidents for several years, is one of my most influential counselors, believe it or not. He is also one of my most recognized comforters in moments of distress and depression.

I just cannot resist adding Jack Valenti and Joe Califano. In the period that I have been here, no two men have given their country greater or more rewarding service.

In the past year, I am very proud that by all of us working together we have made it much easier for people of such ability to come here to the United States.

You may remember it was on October 3, last year, standing beside the Statue of Liberty, that I signed a new immigration bill that we had been trying to pass for years and we had finally, successfully gotten it through both Houses.¹ That measure ended, I think, once and for all, the discrimination which, for nearly 40 years, handicapped those who wanted to call our land their home.

Under the old system, even Christopher Columbus would have found it difficult to come to this country—simply because Christopher Columbus was born in Italy.

Under the old system, a person born in England was 12 times more welcome to America than a person born in Italy, and far more acceptable, Mike [Mike N. Manatos,

¹ For text of President Johnson's remarks at Liberty Island, N.Y., see BULLETIN of Oct. 25, 1965, p. 661.

Administrative Assistant to the President], than a Greek, Portuguese, or a Pole.

Under that old system, countries like Italy had very small immigration quotas. They had long lists of persons who were waiting to emigrate to the United States. At the same time preferred nations were failing to even fill the very large quotas that were assigned to them.

The Immigration Act of 1965 has not "opened the floodgates" to immigration as its opponents claimed that it would. In fiscal 1966, the State Department granted 309,000 visas—only 9,000 more than the year before. The increase is almost invisible when you consider that the internal growth of the United States was over 3 million.

The Immigration Act of 1965 does assign quotas on a basis of equality. It does not ask: "Where were you born?" But rather it does ask: "What skills can you perform?"

The act has been in force only since December 1 of last year, but its effects are evident:

Italy was granted 9,987 immigration visas in fiscal year 1965. In 1966, under the new law, Italy received 24,967.

Portugal was granted 1,798 visas in 1965; 9,017 in 1966.

Greece: 1,900 visas in 1965; 8,900 in 1966.

The Philippines: 2,489 in 1965; 5,204 in 1966.

The list goes on through all the countries with citizens desiring to relocate here in America.

So in its short life, this Immigration Act of 1965 has brought happiness to many homes, has reunited families that have been kept apart very cruelly for a good many years.

It has brought us capable people that wish to put their skills at the service of the United States.

It has earned us the friendship of nations which had resented this unfair treatment under the unjust quota system.

It has demonstrated the desire of the people in the United States to end discrimination and to end it in every corner of our national life.

For years, America has been a beacon of change and progress to men who wanted to escape old lands, old ways, and old injustices. That is what brought our fathers here; it still brings people here.

To men across the world, we have been the land whose revolution did not end; we have been the land whose eyes are always forward.

Today, all around the world, we hear the cry for change. And the cry for change is rising. It is rising in our own country. We are listening—and we are acting. We welcome it—for we hear in that sound the echo of 1776.

This is what I believe and this is what I remind you of—this echo of 1776—as I meet with you here in the Cabinet Room today to sign this proclamation.

When Columbus Day comes in 1966—or a century from now—our American Revolution is still going on and is still going to be going on, because we are still going to be changing. We are still going to be reforming. We are still going to be improving. We are still going to be building. Men from Italy and men from a hundred other lands are going to be doing this job for this land. And any man who has courage and a will to work and who has a love for liberty is free to join our ranks—as a “fellow immigrant.”

PROCLAMATION 3748¹

There is something of Christopher Columbus in every American. Secure and prosperous as the nation is, it nevertheless retains something of the adventurous spirit which inspired the great mariner to explore the mystery of unknown seas.

We no longer brave the sea in frail wooden ships. We no longer face the hostility of superstitious men convinced the world is flat. Yet not all our frontiers are conquered. The American adventure is not over.

New shores of promise await those who, like Co-

¹ 31 *Fed. Reg.* 12673.

lumbus, push on undaunted by the failures of the past or fear of the uncharted future.

Columbus's vision and daring, and that of the courageous men who followed him, brought European civilization to the New World. His conquest of the Atlantic—the “outer space” of the fifteenth century—is as meaningful to Americans of the space age as it was to our forefathers who pushed across the vast expanses of this continent.

Thus we honor Columbus not only as a voyager but also as a symbol of the long tradition of Italian enlightenment. From Galileo to Enrico Fermi, Italians have been in the vanguard of those dedicated to expanding man's knowledge of his universe.

Millions of Americans are bound to Italy by ties of blood, and all Americans are the spiritual heirs of the Italian genius which has enriched the quality of our national life.

As we honor the first Italian-American, we honor all the others who came after.


In recognition of our debt to Columbus, the Congress of the United States, by a joint resolution approved April 30, 1934, requested the President to proclaim October 12 of each year as Columbus Day for the observance of the anniversary of the discovery of America:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate Wednesday, October 12, 1966 as Columbus Day; and I invite the people of this Nation to observe that day in schools, churches, and other suitable places with appropriate ceremonies in honor of this great explorer.

I also direct that the flag of the United States be displayed on all public buildings on the appointed day in memory of Christopher Columbus.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twenty-second day of September in the year of our [SEAL] Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and ninety-first.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
September 22, 1966.

By the President:
GEORGE W. BALL,
Acting Secretary of State.

International Cooperation in Space

*Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

I am delighted at the opportunity to address this Committee on the work which its membership has so ably performed over the past year. This Committee, led by its distinguished chairman, Ambassador [Kurt] Waldheim, has a remarkable history of achievement over the past several years. Its proceedings have been marked by a high degree of cooperation, and a willingness to compromise. There have been some exceptions to this spirit and it is my fervent hope, Mr. Chairman, that these exceptions will remain few, isolated, and without permanent effect on the future course of this Committee's work.

There are four major areas to which the Committee has devoted its efforts over the past year: to scientific and technical aspects of outer space activity; to general international cooperation in space; to the organization of a space conference; and to the drafting of a treaty governing the activity of states in outer space and on the moon and other celestial bodies.

Our scientific and technical subcommittee has put before us a report which bears importantly, and in great detail, on international cooperation in space. I need not go into a detailed discussion of that report. I would like to say, however, that the United States warmly supports the subcommittee's recom-

mendations and hopes that this Committee will adopt all of them. One of the most important and forward-looking actions that we will accomplish in so doing is the creation of an outer space committee working group to consider the "need, feasibility, and implementation of a navigation-services satellite system." Such a working group might, I would hope, set the pattern for a major international space activity of the future.

Mr. Chairman, to promote international cooperation is a major obligation of all members of this Committee, and I cannot think of a more appropriate time for each member to report on its stewardship. Allow me a few brief comments on American cooperative programs.

U.S. Cooperative Programs

The past year brought particularly noteworthy developments in the practical applications of cooperative space activity. Transatlantic television broadcasts became routine by means of Early Bird. In the field of satellite meteorology, two operational satellites based on TIROS technology flew successfully, as well as Nimbus II, an advanced satellite equipped with special sensors to map nighttime cloud cover and cloudtop temperature.

These meteorological satellites illustrate the practical benefits that come as we learn to operate in space. The meteorological satellites now in operation provide widely disseminated weather information on a global

¹ Made before the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on Sept. 19 (U.S./U.N. press release 4914).

basis. I need not elaborate on the importance of this information to shipping, agriculture, and industry.

Both the second operational meteorological satellite and Nimbus II carry the Automatic Picture Transmission System (APT), which permits local reception of daylight cloud cover on simple and inexpensive ground equipment. There are almost 50 APT stations in 29 countries outside the United States. Stations are successfully operating in such countries as Argentina, Chile, Hungary, India, Israel, Kenya, Malaysia, Pakistan, Poland, and Qatar.

A number of these stations, I might add, have been built locally, using locally available materials, on the basis of do-it-yourself instruction manuals we have disseminated. The benefits of space meteorology, we believe, will increasingly be measured in terms of lives both saved and enriched. We reaffirm the invitation extended at the outset of the APT program to all countries to participate in it.

We are proud, as well, of our information program. Everyone knows of our successes—and our failures. Currently, approximately 5,000 foreign visitors a year come to see our space program in action, and some 18,000 have done so during the last 8 years. We publish fully and openly the results of our investigations. On July 13, only 5 weeks after Surveyor soft-landed on the surface of the moon, a package summarizing all the data available was on the way to scientific and space officials throughout the world. A smaller distribution was made within a few days of the landing. The same procedures are being followed with the Lunar Orbiter photographs.

Another measure of openness and cooperation in a nation's space program is the opportunities it provides for the scientists and engineers of other countries to work and study at its universities and research centers. Education and training opportunities have properly been a matter of great interest to this Committee and its scientific and technical subcommittee.

The opportunities available in the United

States are indicated by the fact that during the current year, 76 resident research associates from 21 countries are working at NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration] centers; 53 NASA international fellows from 13 countries are studying at American universities; and 36 technical trainees from 4 countries are in the United States for training in various NASA cooperative projects. We again invite others to take advantage of these opportunities.

We are proud to recall that late last year NASA successfully launched a French satellite to measure very-low-frequency radio emissions and a second Canadian satellite, the first of four in a new series to conduct ionospheric studies. Other joint satellite projects are moving toward launchings in 1966 and 1967. These include the platform launching of the second Italian San Marco satellite, and NASA launchings of the third United Kingdom satellite, the first and second ESRO [European Satellite Research Organization] satellites, and the third Canadian satellite.

The second subject to be considered by this subcommittee, Mr. Chairman, concerns the efforts of a working group already in existence. It has presented this Committee with important recommendations for an international conference on the practical applications of international space cooperation. The United States would heartily welcome a conference of this nature, and we hope that the Committee will be able to tie up the remaining loose ends and make a formal positive recommendation to the General Assembly.

Outer Space Treaty

The third subject with which this Committee must deal is represented by the work of its legal subcommittee. It involves the drafting of a treaty setting forth the standards states will be required to follow in outer space and on celestial bodies.

Much has been said about the importance of such a treaty. It has been pointed out that we have, here and now, the opportunity to establish a regime of law in outer space before national interests develop and freeze

positions. It has been said that this problem is immediate and current in light of the rapid advances being made to land a man on the moon. It has also been noted that important advances can be made in arms control through the medium of this treaty.

All this is true, all accurate. What I consider of most basic importance, however, is that this treaty offers states an opportunity to lift themselves out and above current issues and interests and build a framework—if only skeletal in form—for the future pattern of mankind's activity. This framework would have as its primary structural elements the rule of law, the essential importance of international cooperation, the central role of the concept of openness, and the practicability of including arms control measures as integral elements of evolving state relationships.

In Geneva, the legal subcommittee completed 4 weeks of deliberation with agreement on 8 substantive treaty articles covering 13 separate points. Many of these points are broadly applicable and are of immediate interest to every member of the United Nations. The most significant of these are the arms control measures. It is truly of historic significance that we were able to record agreement on a provision requiring states to refrain from placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit around the earth or on celestial bodies. To this was added a provision that would prohibit bases, fortifications, military maneuvers, or the testing of any kinds of weapons on the moon or other celestial bodies.

The other articles of agreement have been described and brilliantly analyzed by members of the subcommittee during the course of negotiations. They proclaim:

—that the exploration and use of outer space and celestial bodies should be for the benefit of all mankind;

—that there should be freedom of exploration;

—that there should be free access to all areas and installations on celestial bodies;

—that there should be no claim of sovereignty;

—that there should be freedom of scientific exploration and international cooperation to that end;

—that activities in outer space are subject to international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

Further, there are succinct and necessary provisions governing the assistance and return of astronauts, ownership of space objects, liability for damage, avoidance of harmful contamination, and jurisdiction over nationals.

Review of Outstanding Issues

At the close of the Geneva negotiations, my delegation was open and sincere in the expression of its desire to review its position and find a means of accommodating outstanding differences.² We made no secret of our desire to conclude a treaty; we attached great importance to such an act, and we said so. Our approach was succinctly expressed by President Johnson at Arco, Idaho, on August 26 when he said: "I am confident that with good will the remaining issues could be quickly resolved."³

We were gratified, therefore, when the Soviet Union proposed that the legal subcommittee meet again on September 12, and we came prepared to do business. On those issues outstanding which we considered to be of substantive importance, my delegation tabled proposals which went far to meet the reservations expressed by the Soviet Union.

In Geneva the Soviet Union said that it could not accept a compulsory reporting obligation nor one which required it to report exclusively to the Secretary-General. We hesitated in meeting these objections, because we very much had in mind the interest of the nonspace powers and those with more modest space programs in full disclosure and publication of information. We wanted to be consistent with the provisions already agreed

² For a statement made by Ambassador Goldberg at Geneva on Aug. 3, see BULLETIN of Aug. 29, 1966, p. 321.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 19, 1966, p. 410.

upon which declared outer space to be the province of all mankind and provided for international cooperation. To meet all of these considerations, we tabled a modified proposal on September 13, whereby parties would take note of the desirability of the fullest exchange of information, although they would be bound to submit reports only to the "extent feasible and practicable." Further, our modified proposal provides the option of reporting either to the Secretary-General or directly to the parties to the treaty.

The second outstanding issue which we considered to be of substance concerned access to installations and vehicles on celestial bodies. In Geneva the Soviet Union accepted the principle of free and open access. They advanced considerations of courtesy and safety as requiring certain modifications in our proposal. Accordingly, on September 13 we submitted a modified draft which provides for advance notice and appropriate consultations in order to assure safety and to avoid interference with normal operations. We have in mind the establishment of close and cooperative arrangements between representatives on the moon when a visit is proposed comparable to the effective and satisfactory procedures prevailing in Antarctica. Our proposal does not in any respect contemplate a veto; indeed, no one has suggested that a veto, under whatever guise, would be desirable.

I firmly believe, Mr. Chairman, that my delegation, following the Geneva meeting, took to heart the injunction to review and reconsider outstanding issues. Our proposals show that we did our homework.

Soviet Proposal Unacceptable

We were, therefore, most surprised and deeply disappointed at the position of the Soviet Union. They did not modify in any substantial manner their proposal on the right of a space power to demand tracking facilities, despite the clear sentiment of the membership of this subcommittee in opposi-

tion to it. Indeed, the Soviet Union now appears to require the inclusion of this provision as a condition for agreement to a treaty, and insists that this provision is a test of the sincerity of members of the subcommittee.

Mr. Chairman, I will not go into a detailed technical analysis of the Soviet proposal. I spoke on this question in our subcommittee meeting on September 16.⁴ Others have tellingly analyzed the deficiencies of the Soviet proposal, its unequal nature, and its inconsistencies. I merely wish to stress here my conviction that the Soviet proposal is unacceptable because it would be inconsistent with the broad principles of international cooperation and mutuality which are already agreed upon. The Soviet proposal would discourage rather than promote cooperation; it would deter and not promote wide adherence to the outer space treaty.

In a treaty which contains important arms control measures, we should do everything possible to encourage all U.N. members to accede.

I would not wish to conclude this brief review of the work of the legal subcommittee without paying tribute to its distinguished chairman, Professor [Manfred] Lachs, who has been unflinching in his efforts to stimulate all members to do their best to reach agreement. His wise and impartial guidance deserves our tribute.

In summarizing the work of the Outer Space Committee in all its parts, Mr. Chairman, I find that this has been a very active year for international cooperation in space and, in the final analysis, a good year. But a great deal is left to be accomplished. We have a space conference to organize. We have a potentially great treaty to finish drafting. To accomplish these tasks, and particularly the latter, we must practice, as well as preach, cooperation. If we promptly finish what we have started, 1966 will be a historic year.

⁴ For text, see U.S./U.N. press release 4911.

U.S. Replies to Statements on Viet-Nam Proposals

Following are statements made in the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative Arthur J. Goldberg in right of reply following statements made by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko on September 23 and by French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville on September 28.

Statement of September 23

U.S. delegation press release 4918

Mr. President [Abdul Rahman Pazhwak], yesterday my delegation sought to deal with the Viet-Nam situation in the spirit of the Secretary-General's letter to the members of September 1 and in the spirit that you, Mr. President, wisely invoked in your noteworthy address on assuming the office of President of the General Assembly last Tuesday.

My Government yesterday made serious and genuine offers to break out of the tragic impasse in Viet-Nam.¹ We have offered to take the first step in reducing the intensity and extent of the military conflict.

We have offered to begin, together with North Viet-Nam, the process of phased withdrawal of external forces from South Viet-Nam under effective international supervision.

We have offered to enter into immediate contact, private or public, to explore these possibilities, Hanoi's four points, and any other points which any party to the conflict may raise.

If the sincerity of these offers is to be tested or questioned, it should be tested not by verbal attacks nor by veiled warnings, but by exploring our willingness to take action—deeds—to match our words.

For the responsibility for the next step falls not on Hanoi alone but also on every power that can help toward a solution. As my

¹ For text of Ambassador Goldberg's statement of Sept. 22, see BULLETIN of Oct. 3, 1966, p. 518.

delegation pointed out yesterday, the greater a nation's power, the greater is its responsibility for peace.

We of the United States will persevere in our efforts for peace in Viet-Nam. We still await a considered reply to our affirmative proposals, and we continue in the hope that all members of this organization will join in this great endeavor.

What counts, Mr. President, is not prowess in the art of invective but prowess in the art of peacemaking.

Statement of September 28

U.S. delegation press release 4921

In briefly replying to the elegant address of the distinguished French Minister of Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Maurice Couve de Murville, I should like at the outset to acknowledge with pleasure and gratitude the expression of personal friendship on the part of the French delegation, an expression which I fully reciprocate both with respect to the distinguished Foreign Minister and the French delegation headed by my friend and colleague, Ambassador [Roger] Seydoux, and also for the French Government, its leaders, and its people.

In reply, I have three very simple observations to make.

First, I reaffirm what I said to the General Assembly last Thursday: We are not inflexible in our position. We recognize that there are—and we are prepared to consider—other proposals and views for a settlement in Southeast Asia. We welcome the several expressions which have been made on this Assembly floor—and there is no doubt that there will be many others considering the importance of the question—and we welcome in particular those made by the distinguished Foreign Minister of France, a country which we always remember is our oldest friend and ally. We remain convinced, however, that whatever approach will bring success, it will not be one which simply appeals to one side to stop, while addressing no similar appeal to the other side.

Second, the offers made by my Government to break out of the tragic impasse in Viet-Nam are evenhanded, genuine, and sincere, and should be tested by exploring our willingness to take action to match our words.

And third, I would conclude by expressing the hope that all members of the United Nations, and particularly those members with interests in the area, historical or otherwise, will accord to the offers we have advanced and the fair proposals we have made no less consideration and scrutiny than, according to accounts published by reputable news agencies, they seem to be receiving from the parties most directly concerned.

Agenda of Twenty-first Session of the U.N. General Assembly¹

U.N. doc. A/6440

1. Opening of the session by the Chairman of the delegation of Italy.
2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation.
3. Credentials of representatives to the twenty-first session of the General Assembly:
 - (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee;
 - (b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
4. Election of the President.
5. Constitution of the Main Committees and election of officers.
6. Election of Vice-Presidents.
7. Notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations.
8. Adoption of the agenda.
9. General debate.
10. Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization.
11. Report of the Security Council.
12. Report of the Economic and Social Council.
13. Report of the Trusteeship Council.
14. Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
15. Election of five non-permanent members of the Security Council.
16. Election of nine members of the Economic and Social Council.
17. Election of five members of the International Court of Justice.
18. Appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
19. Election of the members of the International Law Commission.
20. Admission of new Members to the United Nations.
21. United Nations Emergency Force:
 - (a) Report on the Force;
 - (b) Cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force.
22. Co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity: report of the Secretary-General.
23. Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
24. Report of the Committee for the International Co-operation Year.
25. Installation of mechanical means of voting: report of the Secretary-General.
26. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.
27. Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.
28. Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.
29. Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.
30. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space: report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
31. The Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.
32. Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
33. Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations.
34. The policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa: report of the Special Committee on the Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa.
35. Effects of atomic radiation: report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation.
36. Peaceful settlement of disputes.

¹ Adopted by the General Assembly on Sept. 24.

37. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: report of the Trade and Development Board.
38. Establishment of a United Nations capital development fund: report of the Committee on a United Nations Capital Development Fund.
39. United Nations Development Decade: report of the Secretary-General.
40. Accelerated flow of capital and technical assistance to the developing countries: report of the Secretary-General.
41. Activities in the field of industrial development:
 - (a) Report of the Committee for Industrial Development;
 - (b) Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the United Nations Organization for Industrial Development;
 - (c) Confirmation of the appointment of the Executive Director of the United Nations Organization for Industrial Development.
42. Inflation and economic development: report of the Secretary-General.
43. Decentralization of the economic and social activities of the United Nations.
44. Conversion to peaceful needs of the resources released by disarmament: report of the Secretary-General.
45. Permanent sovereignty over national resources.
46. Population growth and economic development.
47. World campaign for universal literacy.
48. United Nations Institute for Training and Research: report of the Executive Director of the Institute.
49. Operational activities for development:
 - (a) Activities of the United Nations Development Programme;
 - (b) Activities undertaken by the Secretary-General.
50. Programme of studies on multilateral food aid: report of the Secretary-General.
51. Review and reappraisal of the role and functions of the Economic and Social Council: report of the Secretary-General.
52. General review of the programmes and activities in the economic, social, technical co-operation and related fields of the United Nations, the specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations Children's Fund and all other institutions and agencies related to the United Nations system.
53. International Tourist Year.
54. World social situation.
55. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
56. Draft Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women.
57. Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination:
 - (a) Measures to implement the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;
 - (b) Status of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: report of the Secretary-General.
58. Manifestations of racial prejudice and national and religious intolerance.
59. Elimination of all forms of religious intolerance:
 - (a) Draft Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance;
 - (b) Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance.
60. Freedom of information:
 - (a) Draft Convention on Freedom of Information;
 - (b) Draft Declaration on Freedom of Information.
61. Creation of the post of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
62. Draft International Covenants on Human Rights.
63. International Year for Human Rights:
 - (a) Programme of measures and activities to be undertaken in connexion with the International Year for Human Rights;
 - (b) Report of the Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on Human Rights.
64. Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations:
 - (a) Report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
65. Question of South Africa: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
66. Special educational and training programmes for South West Africa: report of the Secretary-General.
67. Question of Territories under Portuguese administration: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
68. Special training programme for Territories under Portuguese administration: report of the Secretary-General.
69. Question of Fiji: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting

- of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
70. Question of Oman:
 - (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
 71. Offers by Member States of study and training facilities for inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing Territories: report of the Secretary-General.
 72. Financial reports and accounts for the financial year ended 31 December 1965 and reports of the Board of Auditors:
 - (a) United Nations;
 - (b) United Nations Children's Fund;
 - (c) United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
 - (d) Voluntary funds administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
 73. Supplementary estimates for the financial year 1966.
 74. Budget estimates for the financial year 1967.
 75. Pattern of conferences: report of the Secretary-General.
 76. Appointments to fill vacancies in the membership of subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly:
 - (a) Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions;
 - (b) Committee on Contributions;
 - (c) Board of Auditors;
 - (d) United Nations Administrative Tribunal;
 - (e) United Nations Staff Pension Committee.
 77. Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations: report of the Committee on Contributions.
 78. Audit reports relating to expenditure by specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency:
 - (a) Earmarkings and contingency authorizations from the Special Account of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance;
 - (b) Allocations and allotments from the Special Fund.
 79. Administrative and budgetary co-ordination of the United Nations with the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency: report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.
 80. Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee of Experts to Examine the Finances of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies.
 81. Personnel questions:
 - (a) Composition of the Secretariat: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Other personnel questions.
 82. Report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board.
 83. United Nations International School: report of the Secretary-General.
 84. Reports of the International Law Commission on the second part of its seventeenth session and on its eighteenth session.
 85. Draft Declaration on the Right of Asylum.
 86. Technical assistance to promote the teaching, study, dissemination and wider appreciation of international law: report of the Secretary-General.
 87. Consideration of principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations:
 - (a) Report of the 1966 Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General on methods of fact-finding.
 88. Progressive development of the law of international trade.
 89. Conclusion of an international treaty on principles governing the activities of States in the exploration and use of outer space, the moon and other celestial bodies.
 90. Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations.
 91. Treaty governing the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies.
 92. Strict observance of the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations, and of the right of peoples to self-determination.
 93. Withdrawal of all United States and other foreign forces occupying South Korea under the flag of the United Nations and dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.
 94. Development of natural resources.
 95. Question of the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including policies of racial discrimination and segregation and of *apartheid*, in all countries, with particular reference to colonial and other dependent countries and territories.
 96. Status of the implementation of the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty.
 97. Renunciation by States of actions hampering the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
 98. Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

U.S. Policy on Atlantic Union

Statement by Acting Secretary Ball¹

This committee is examining proposals—in the form of resolutions—designed to encourage a federal union of the North Atlantic countries.

Certainly the Department of State favors the development of increased cooperation among these nations. We look forward to seeing this cooperation—over time—assume an increasingly political form. We welcome increased discussion among private citizens who seek to promote Atlantic cooperation.

But I cannot in all candor, Mr. Chairman, endorse these resolutions since they do not, in our view, accord with the political realities of this mid-20th century. It is our experience that the pursuit of unrealistic goals distracts from, rather than assists, the achievement of the useful and the possible. We do not believe a United States Government initiative on Atlantic union would serve our interests and those of our European friends at this time.

The natural forces that tend to bind together the peoples of the North Atlantic are clear for all to see. We share a common history and a common civilization. We are legatees of the great civilization of the Greeks, the political institutions of Rome, and the unifying moral force of Christianity.

We are in a real sense children of the same history and the same spirit, as the men who founded our country well knew. The first of the great anticolonial struggles—our own War of Independence—was sparked by explosive ideas that originated in Europe.

¹ Made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Sept. 20 (press release 212). (Mr. Ball's resignation from the Department of State was effective Sept. 28.)

Beyond our common heritage there is a second element that has tended to unite the Atlantic world. The nations of Western Europe and North America have, to a unique extent, been beneficiaries of the Industrial Revolution of the 19th century and the great scientific revolution of the 20th. As a result, the Atlantic nations occupy a position of unparalleled power. They share a set of unique world responsibilities that derive partly from that power and partly from the great ideas of human freedom that first flourished in the West.

Together, we Atlantic nations produce some two-thirds of the world's industrial output, while having only one-sixth of the world's population. We use advanced technology and a highly skilled labor force to feed many other parts of the world. We share an enormous reservoir of capital and trained manpower.

Present Impediments to Atlantic Union

A recitation of these facts poses the central question this committee is considering today. Given the common heritage of the West, how can the Atlantic nations best translate their shared national interests into common policies? How can they most effectively work together to contribute to the needs of the modern world?

In principle, there are two major ways of going about combining the energies and resources of the peoples of the Atlantic area.

One way would be, as the pending resolutions suggest, to move toward some form of Atlantic federalism immediately. The second way would be to encourage the nations of Western Europe to move toward unity, while we at the same time worked at perfecting transatlantic institutions to make possible an effective partnership between North America and a uniting Europe.

Of these two approaches, the realities of politics and power clearly favor the second.

There are, it seems to me, two reasons why it is unrealistic to expect great progress toward Atlantic union at the present time.

The first derives from the great disparity

in size and resources between America, on one side of the ocean, and the individual nation-states of Europe on the other.

The second results from geography. The United States faces not only on the Atlantic but also on the Pacific Ocean, while Europe does not—and the United States also has special responsibilities within the Western Hemisphere.

The fact of disparity in size is, it seems to me, the central and inescapable impediment to serious movement toward Atlantic union at the present time. During the last 20 years we have seen a massive transformation of the power balance of the world. The nations of Western Europe, which only a quarter of a century ago controlled a great part of the population of the earth through vast colonial systems, have been reduced to their metropolitan dimensions. At the same time, with the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union, each organized on a continent-wide basis, there has been a redefinition of the scale of size essential to the role of a world power.

The individual nation-states of Europe, therefore, find themselves suddenly lacking both well-defined territorial interests around the world and the vast resources which today are prerequisite for a generalized world role.

As a result, the European nations have quite naturally tended to turn their attention inward toward a concentration on their own affairs. To be sure, they have cooperated with the United States in developing an Atlantic defense system. But in economic and political matters they have been concerned primarily with their own European affairs—with building institutions looking toward economic integration and taking tentative steps toward political unity within Europe.

Quite frankly, I find little evidence of any strong interest among Europeans for any immediate move toward greater political unity with the United States. We Atlantic nations are of different size and the Europeans are

sensitive to this disparity. They fear the overwhelming weight of United States power and influence in our common councils. They fear the superior resources of United States industry in their economic life. They are concerned that, in their relations with the United States, they may tend to lose their own identities and to become simply passive ancillaries to American policy.

These are the hard facts, as I see them. Anyone who has attempted to perfect techniques and arrangements for effective consultation with European governments cannot help but be sensitive to these realities.

Europeans Not Yet Politically Organized

Along with the feeling of European peoples that they have not yet organized themselves on a basis that enables them to work closely with the United States without danger of being overwhelmed is the fear that Atlantic union under existing circumstances would force them to pursue American policies not immediately relevant to their own interests.

This feeling is particularly apparent with regard to our policies in the Far East. Here our differences derive in considerable part from a differing sense of our responsibilities. They flow to some extent from the fact that the United States is a Pacific power and the European nations are not.

I do not mean to suggest by these comments that there cannot, and should not be, a progressive drawing together between the peoples of the United States and those of Western Europe. Indeed, consistent with their efforts to build a unified Europe, most Europeans continue to favor cooperation across the Atlantic. I think that the difference between the Department of State and the proponents of the pending resolution is a difference in sequence and timing and in the assessment of political realities.

We believe that so long as Europe remains merely a continent of medium- and small-sized states there are definite limits to the degree of political unity we can achieve

across the ocean. We believe, however, that if Europeans get on with the pressing business of constructing political unity in Europe, a coalescence in the relations of Europe and the United States can take place at a much more rapid pace.

European Unity a Prime U.S. Objective

Today, our prime objective in Western Europe should be to encourage unity. Western Europe lies between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is still the center of power, and it is no accident that the two great wars of modern history have sprung from Europe.

Over the past three centuries the world has already paid too dearly for the rivalry among European nation-states. It is essential that that rivalry be ended if we are to have any assurance of peace in the world.

Fortunately, within the last 20 years, men of great vision have led Europe by peaceful means to a degree of united action unprecedented in its history. They are now completing the steps that are creating a vast mass market embracing six countries. Sooner or later this economic community will almost certainly be joined by Great Britain and perhaps by other European states.

In the political sector they have unfortunately made less progress. Nonetheless the internal logic of the situation creates a very strong pressure toward unity. Europeans have come to recognize that they can play a significant role in the world and make the contribution which their resources and talents justify only by organizing their political affairs on a scale of size commensurate with the requirements of the modern age.

Building of Atlantic Partnership

It is with these considerations in mind that the United States throughout all post-war administrations has worked toward a constructive partnership of equals with a uniting Europe. We wish to build unity on

a sound basis, and experience has taught that nothing can be more useless—and in fact diversionary—than creating a formalistic set of institutions without organic vitality or political validity.

It is imperative, therefore, that Europe get on with its own special task of unity if we are finally to deal on a basis of true equality across the Atlantic. For equality between Europe and the United States is not something that we Americans can grant by an act of grace or create by unilateral fiat. Equality springs from political facts. Americans can act through a single set of institutions and thus can apply the full resources of our continent to a single purpose. Europeans as yet cannot do this. And until they are organized to speak with one voice and act with one will, there can be no real equality.

Efforts to build the basis of Atlantic partnership cannot, of course, await the full achievement of a united Europe—and they need not. There is much that we can and should do. For some years in NATO and the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] we Atlantic nations have been seeking to perfect instruments for common action for defense, and common policies in our economic relationships. These are necessary tasks but they are a far cry from the achievement of a federal Atlantic union. They are undertaken within the four walls of the possible. They take us, in Churchill's phrase, "from the tossing sea of Cause and Theory to the firm ground of Result and Fact."

As the process of integration in Europe proceeds it is not possible to prejudge what more thorough forms of transatlantic collaboration may develop. I do not rule out the possibility that one day—when Americans and Europeans can address each other as true equals—both may choose some more binding form of Atlantic association. But to press such association at the present time on an unwilling and unequal Europe could well postpone the future dawn of a more perfect unity.

U.S. and Canada Exchange Notes on Automotive Products Agreement

Press release 210 dated September 16

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Pursuant to article VI of the United States-Canadian Agreement concerning Automotive Products,¹ the Government of the United States and the Government of Canada have brought the agreement into definitive effect by giving formal notice that appropriate action in their respective legislatures has been completed. This was done through an exchange of notes at Ottawa on September 16 between U.S. Ambassador W. W. Butterworth and Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES

Text of Canadian Note

SEPTEMBER 16, 1966.

EXCELLENCY: With reference to Article VI of the Agreement Concerning Automotive Products between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America, I have the honour to inform you that on June 30, 1966 the Canadian Parliament completed its consideration of and gave its approval to the Agreement.

Since appropriate action on the Agreement by the Government of the United States was completed with enactment of the Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965 on October 21, 1965, and issuance of a Procla-

¹ For background and text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 8, 1965, p. 191.

² For statements by President Johnson and text of the proclamation, see *ibid.*, Nov. 15, 1965, p. 793.

mation by the President on the same date² to remove United States duties on automotive products covered by the Agreement, I propose that this Note and your reply constitute notice, in accordance with Article VI, that appropriate action in our respective legislatures has now been completed and that the Agreement Concerning Automotive Products as of this date.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

PAUL MARTIN
*Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

Text of U.S. Note

SEPTEMBER 16, 1966.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your Note of today's date which reads as follows:

[Text of the Canadian note.]

I wish to inform you that my government agrees that your Note and this reply constitute notice, in accordance with Article VI of the Agreement Concerning Automotive Products between the Government of the United States and the Government of Canada, that appropriate action in our respective legislatures has now been completed and that the Agreement has definitively entered into force as of this date.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

W. W. BUTTERWORTH

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international transportation by air and additional protocol. Done at Warsaw October 12, 1929. Entered into force February 13, 1933; for the United States October 29, 1934. 49 Stat. 3000. *Adherence deposited*: Nepal, February 12, 1966.

Protocol to amend the convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international carriage

by air signed at Warsaw October 12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000). Done at The Hague September 28, 1955. Entered into force August 1, 1963.¹

Adherence deposited: Nepal, February 12, 1966.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.

Signature and acceptance: Guyana, September 26, 1966.

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.

Signature and acceptance: Guyana, September 26, 1966.

Load Line

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London April 5, 1966. Open for signature April 5 until July 5, 1966.²

*Signatures:*³ Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Liberia, Malagasy Republic, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (with a statement), United Arab Republic (with a reservation), United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Acceptances deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, August 24, 1966; Tunisia, August 23, 1966.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044). Adopted at London September 15, 1964.²

Acceptances received: Kuwait, September 2, 1966; Malta, September 5, 1966.

Racial Discrimination

Convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly December 21, 1965.²

Signature: United States (with a statement), September 28, 1966.

Safety at Sea

International regulations for preventing collisions at sea. Approved by the International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, London, May 17–June 17, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965.

Acceptance deposited: Cyprus, August 11, 1966.

Trade

Protocol for accession of Switzerland to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 1, 1966. Entered into force August 1, 1966. TIAS 6065.

Acceptances: Canada, September 2, 1966; Israel, August 18, 1966; South Africa, August 17, 1966; Turkey, August 18, 1966.

Protocol for accession of Yugoslavia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva July 20, 1966. Entered into force August 25, 1966.

Acceptances: Austria, July 25, 1966;⁴ Canada, September 2, 1966; Finland, August 30, 1966; Indonesia, August 29, 1966; Israel, August 25,

1966; Turkey, August 18, 1966; Yugoslavia, July 26, 1966.

BILATERAL

Chad

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in Chad. Effected by exchange of notes at Fort Lamy August 31, 1966. Entered into force August 31, 1966.

China

Amendment to the agreement of July 18, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3307, 4176, 4514, 5105, 5623), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington August 25, 1966.

Entered into force: September 28, 1966.

Indonesia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1731–1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Washington September 30, 1966. Entered into force September 30, 1966.

Norway

Agreement amending Annex C of the mutual defense assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 2016). Effected by exchange of notes at Oslo August 29 and September 6, 1966. Entered into force September 6, 1966.

Somali Republic

Agreement extending the agreement of January 28 and February 4, 1961, as extended (TIAS 4915, 5332, 5508, 5738, 5814), concerning the succession of Somali Republic to the technical cooperation agreement of June 28, 1954, as amended (TIAS 3150, 4392), between the United States and Italy. Effected by exchange of notes at Mogadiscio July 28 and August 2, 1966. Entered into force August 2, 1966.

Agreement extending the agreement of January 28 and February 4, 1961, as extended (TIAS 4915, 5332, 5508, 5738, 5814), concerning the succession of Somali Republic to the technical cooperation agreement of June 28, 1954, as amended (TIAS 3150, 4392), between the United States and Italy. Effected by exchange of notes at Mogadiscio August 15 and 29, 1966. Entered into force August 29, 1966.

Togo

Treaty of amity and economic relations. Signed at Lomé February 8, 1966.²

Ratification advised by the Senate: September 28, 1966.

Tunisia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of July 30, 1966 (TIAS 6067). Effected by exchange of notes at Tunis September 19, 1966. Entered into force September 19, 1966.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

³ All signatures subject to acceptance except those of Panama and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

⁴ Subject to ratification.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on September 30 confirmed the nomination of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to be Under Secretary of State. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated September 21.)

Designations

Mrs. Katie Louchheim as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, effective October 1. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 229 dated October 1.)

George S. Springsteen as Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, effective October 1. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release dated September 28.)

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

The Essentials for Peace in Asia. Text of President Johnson's address to the American Alumni

Council on nationwide radio-TV, on July 12, 1966. Pub. 8113. Far Eastern Series 148. 12 pp. 15¢.

Major Publications of the Department of State—An Annotated Bibliography (Revised). Books, pamphlets, and periodicals selected for their lasting value to persons interested in the development of U.S. foreign policy and international relations. Included are a few items published by Congress or other government agencies. Pub. 7843. General Foreign Policy Series 200. 17 pp. Limited distribution.

Sample Questions from the Written Examination for Foreign Service Officer (Revised). To help candidates gain some idea of the nature of the test questions, sample materials are analyzed in detail. Pub. 7640. Department and Foreign Service Series 123. 88 pp. Limited distribution.

You and Your Passport (Revised). Application requirements, vaccinations, care of your passport, visas, and getting along abroad—all are highlighted in this folder. Pub. 7728. Department and Foreign Service Series 127. 12 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Democratic Republic of the Congo—Signed at Léopoldville July 19, 1965. Entered into force July 19, 1965. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5935. 14 pp. 10¢.

Air Transport Services. Agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, amending the agreement of February 11, 1946, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington May 27, 1966. Entered into force May 27, 1966. TIAS 6019. 16 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Paraguay—Signed at Asunción April 27, 1966. Entered into force April 27, 1966. With exchange of notes. TIAS 6020. 13 pp. 10¢.

Air Transport Services. Agreement with Denmark, amending the agreement of December 16, 1944. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington June 7, 1966. Entered into force June 7, 1966. With related notes. TIAS 6021. 7 pp. 10¢.

Tracking Stations. Agreement with Malagasy Republic, amending the agreement of October 7, 1963. Exchange of notes—Dated at Tananarive April 27 and May 2, 1966. Entered into force May 2, 1966. TIAS 6024. 3 pp. 5¢.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LV, NO. 1425 PUBLICATION 8144 OCTOBER 17, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of

the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Asia. The Outlook for Freedom (Rusk) . . . 586

Canada. U.S. and Canada Exchange Notes on Automotive Products Agreement (texts) . 616

Communism. The Outlook for Freedom (Rusk) 586

Congress

Confirmations (Katzenbach) 618

U.S. Policy on Atlantic Union (Ball) . . . 613

Department and Foreign Service

Confirmations (Katzenbach) 618

Designations (Louchheim, Springsteen) . . 618

Economic Affairs

The Other War in Vietnam—A Progress Report—*Continued* (Komer) 591

The Outlook for Freedom (Rusk) 586

U.S. and Canada Exchange Notes on Automotive Products Agreement (texts) 616

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Mrs. Louchheim designated Deputy Assistant Secretary 618

Europe

The Outlook for Freedom (Rusk) 586

Springsteen designated Deputy Assistant Secretary 618

U.S. Policy on Atlantic Union (Ball) 613

Foreign Aid. Foreign Assistance Act of 1966 Signed by President Johnson (statement) . 602

Germany. United States and Germany Reaffirm Community of Interest (Erhard, Johnson, communique) 578

Immigration and Naturalization. Columbus Day, 1966 (Johnson, proclamation) . . . 602

Italy. Columbus Day, 1966 (Johnson, proclamation) 602

Publications. Recent Releases 618

Presidential Documents

Columbus Day, 1966 602

Foreign Assistance Act of 1966 Signed by President Johnson 602

An Interview With President Johnson 574

United States and Germany Reaffirm Community of Interest 578

Science

International Cooperation in Space (Goldberg) 605

United States and Germany Reaffirm Community of Interest (Erhard, Johnson, communique) 578

Treaty Information

Current Actions 616

U.S. and Canada Exchange Notes on Automotive Products Agreement (texts) 616

U.S.S.R. An Interview With President Johnson 574

United Nations

Agenda of Twenty-first Session of the U.N. General Assembly 610

International Cooperation in Space (Goldberg) 605

U.S. Replies to Statements on Viet-Nam Proposals (Goldberg) 609

Viet-Nam

The Other War in Vietnam—A Progress Report—*Continued* (Komer) 591

U.S. Replies to Statements on Viet-Nam Proposals (Goldberg) 609

Name Index

Ball, George W 613

Erhard, Ludwig 578

Goldberg, Arthur J 605, 609

Johnson, President 574, 578, 602

Katzenbach, Nicholas deB 618

Komer, Robert W 591

Louchheim, Mrs. Katie 618

Rusk, Secretary 586

Springsteen, George S 618

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Sept. 26–Oct. 2

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to September 26 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 210 of September 16, 212 of September 20, and 216 of September 21.

No.	Date	Subject
*222	9/26	Program for visit of President Senghor of Senegal.
†223	9/27	Gordon: UPI editors and publishers.
*224	9/27	Bowie sworn in as Counselor of the Department (biographic details).
†225	9/27	U.S.—Indonesia discussions.
†226	9/29	Ball: annual meeting of the IBRD Board of Governors.
*227	9/30	Carlson sworn in as Ambassador to Colombia (biographic details).
*228	9/30	Hayes sworn in as Ambassador to Switzerland (biographic details).
*229	10/1	Mrs. Louchheim designated Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs (biographic details).

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Private Boycotts VS the National Interest

A frank look at a political and economic problem which has been and continues to be of serious concern to the United States Government is the subject of this 19-page pamphlet. The problem involves periodic attempts by individuals and groups, relatively small in number, to use or threaten to use economic reprisals against American businesses which trade with Eastern European countries. The pamphlet explains U.S. policy toward trade with Eastern Europe and points out that Americans who interfere with sales by local merchants—or by multimillion-dollar corporations—handling Eastern European goods are “obstructing a foreign policy that has been developed by four administrations since World War II.”

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THE
DEPARTMENT
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BULLETIN

Vol. LV, No. 1426



October 24, 1966

TOWARD A MORE RATIONAL WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER

Statements by Henry H. Fowler and George W. Ball 626

FREE ASIA

by U. Alexis Johnson 638

PANORAMA OF CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE IN LATIN AMERICA

by Assistant Secretary Gordon 644

MAKING EUROPE WHOLE: AN UNFINISHED TASK

Address by President Johnson 622

"Americans and all Europeans share a connection which transcends political differences. We are a single civilization; we share a common destiny; our future is a common challenge."

Making Europe Whole: An Unfinished Task

*Address by President Johnson*¹

I remember some years ago Franklin Roosevelt addressed the Daughters of the American Revolution. His opening words were not "My Friends," but "Fellow Immigrants."

And he was right. Most of our fathers came from Europe—East or West, North or South. They settled in London, Kentucky; Paris, Idaho; and Rome, New York. Chicago, with Warsaw, is one of the great Polish cities of the world. And New York is the second capital of half the nations of Europe. That is the story of our country.

Americans and all Europeans share a connection which transcends political differences. We are a single civilization; we share a common destiny; our future is a common challenge.

Today two anniversaries especially remind us of the interdependence of Europe and America.

—On September 30, seventeen years ago, the Berlin airlift ended.

—On October 7, three years ago, the nuclear test ban treaty was ratified.

There is a healthy balance here. It is no accident. It reflects the balance the Atlantic allies have tried to maintain between strength and conciliation, between firmness

and flexibility, between resolution and hope.

The Berlin airlift was an act of measured firmness. Without that firmness, the Marshall Plan and the recovery of Western Europe would have been impossible.

That hopeful and progressive achievement, the European Economic Community, could never have been born.

The winds of change which are blowing in Eastern Europe would not be felt today.

All these are the fruits of our determination.

The test ban treaty is the fruit of our hope. With more than 100 other signers we have committed ourselves to advance from deterrence through terror toward a more cooperative international order. We must go forward to banish all nuclear weapons—and war itself.

A just peace remains our goal. But we know that the world is changing. Our policy must reflect the reality of today—not yesterday. In every part of the world, new forces are at the gates: new countries, new aspirations; new men. In this spirit, let us look ahead to the tasks that confront the Atlantic nations.

Europe has been at peace since 1945. But it is a restless peace—shadowed by the threat of violence.

Europe is partitioned. An unnatural line runs through the heart of a great and proud nation. History warns us that until this harsh

¹ Made before the National Conference of Editorial Writers at New York, N.Y., Oct. 7 (White House press release; advance text).

division has been resolved, peace in Europe will not be secure.

We must turn to one of the great unfinished tasks of our generation: making Europe whole.

Our purpose is not to overturn other governments, but to help the people of Europe to achieve:

—a continent in which the peoples of Eastern and Western Europe work together for the common good;

—a continent in which alliances do not confront each other in bitter hostility, but provide a framework in which West and East can act together to assure the security of all.

In a restored Europe, Germany can and will be united.

This remains a vital purpose of American policy. It can only be accomplished through a growing reconciliation. There is no short-cut.

We must move ahead on three fronts:

—First, to modernize NATO and strengthen other Atlantic institutions.

—Second, to further the integration of the Western European community.

—Third, to quicken progress in East-West relations.

Let me speak to each in turn.

Vitality of the Atlantic Alliance

I. Our first concern is to keep NATO strong and abreast of the times.

The Atlantic alliance has proved its vitality. Together, we have faced the threats to peace which have confronted us—and we shall meet those which may confront us in the future.

Let no one doubt the American commitment. We shall not unlearn the lesson of the thirties, when isolation and withdrawal were our share in the common disaster.

We are committed, and will remain firm.

But the Atlantic alliance is a living organism. It must adapt to changing conditions.

Much is already being done to modernize its structures:

—We are streamlining NATO command arrangements;

—We are moving to establish a permanent nuclear planning committee;

—We are increasing the speed and certainty of supply across the Atlantic.

However, we must do more.

The alliance must become a forum for increasingly close consultations. These should cover the full range of joint concerns—from East-West relations to crisis management.

The Atlantic alliance is the central instrument of the Atlantic community. But it is not the only one. Through other institutions the nations of the Atlantic are hard at work on constructive enterprise.

In the Kennedy Round, we are negotiating with the other Free World nations to reduce tariffs everywhere. Our goal is to free the trade of the world from arbitrary and artificial constraints.

We are also engaged on the problem of international monetary reform.

We are exploring how best to develop science and technology as a common resource. Recently the Italian Government has suggested an approach to narrowing the gap in technology between the United States and Western Europe. That proposal deserves careful study. The United States is ready to cooperate with the European nations on all aspects of this problem.

Last, and perhaps most important, we are working together to accelerate the growth of the developing nations. It is our common business to help the millions in these nations improve their standards of life. The rich nations cannot live as an island of plenty in a sea of poverty.

Thus, while the institutions of the Atlantic community are growing, so are the tasks which face us.

Pursuit of Further Unity in the West

II. Second among our tasks is the vigorous pursuit of further unity in the West.

To pursue that unity is neither to postpone nor neglect the search for peace. There are good reasons for this:

—A united Western Europe can be our equal partner in helping to build a peaceful and just world order;

—A united Western Europe can move more confidently in peaceful initiatives toward the East;

—Unity can provide a framework within which a unified Germany could be a full partner without arousing ancient fears.

We look forward to the expansion and further strengthening of the European community. The obstacles are great. But perseverance has already reaped larger rewards than any of us dared hope 20 years ago.

The outlines of the new Europe are clearly discernible. It is a stronger, increasingly united but open Europe—with Great Britain a part of it—and with close ties to America.

Improving the East-West Environment

III. One great goal of a united West is to heal the wound in Europe which now cuts East from West and brother from brother.

That division must be healed peacefully. It must be healed with the consent of Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union. This will happen only as East and West succeed in building a surer foundation of mutual trust.

Nothing is more important for peace. We must improve the East-West environment in order to achieve the unification of Germany in the context of a larger peaceful and prosperous Europe.

Our task is to achieve a reconciliation with the East—a shift from the narrow concept of coexistence to the broader vision of peaceful engagement.

Americans are prepared to do their part. Under the last four Presidents, our policy toward the Soviet Union has been the same. Where necessary, we shall defend freedom; where possible, we shall work with the East to build a lasting peace.

We do not intend to let our differences on Viet-Nam or elsewhere prevent us from exploring all opportunities. We want the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe to know that we and our allies shall go step by

step with them as far as they are willing to advance.

Let us—both Americans and Europeans—intensify our efforts.

We seek healthy economic and cultural relations with the Communist states.

—I am asking for early congressional action on the U.S.—Soviet consular agreement.²

—We intend to press for legislative authority to negotiate trade agreements which could extend most-favored-nation tariff treatment to European Communist states.³

And I am today announcing these new steps:

—We will reduce export controls on East-West trade with respect to hundreds of non-strategic items.

—I have today signed a determination that will allow the Export-Import Bank to guarantee commercial credits to four additional Eastern European countries—Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. This is good business. And it will help us build bridges to Eastern Europe.

—The Secretary of State is reviewing the possibility of easing the burden of Polish debts to the United States through expenditures of our Polish currency holdings which would be mutually beneficial to both countries.

—The Export-Import Bank is prepared to finance American exports for the Soviet-Italian Fiat auto plant.

—We are negotiating a civil air agreement with the Soviet Union. This will facilitate tourism in both directions.

—This summer the American Government took additional steps to liberalize travel to Communist countries in Europe and Asia.⁴ We intend to liberalize these rules still further.

—In these past weeks the Soviet Union and the United States have begun to exchange

² For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 30, 1965, p. 375.

³ For background and text of the proposed East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966, see *ibid.*, May 30, 1966, p. 838.

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, Aug. 15, 1966, p. 234.

cloud photographs taken from weather satellites.

In these and many other ways, ties with the East will be strengthened—by the United States and by other Atlantic nations.

Agreement on a broad policy to this end should be sought in existing Atlantic organs.

The principles which should govern East-West relations are now being discussed in the North Atlantic Council.

The OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] can also play an important part in trade and contacts with the East. The Western nations can there explore ways of inviting the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries to cooperate in tasks of common interest and common benefit.

Hand in hand with these steps to increase East-West ties must go measures to remove territorial and border disputes as a source of friction in Europe. The Atlantic nations oppose the use of force to change existing frontiers.

Ending the Bitter Legacy of World War II

The maintenance of old enmities is not in anyone's interest. Our aim is a true European reconciliation. We must make this clear to the East.

Further, it is our policy to avoid the spread of national nuclear programs—in Europe and elsewhere. That is why we shall persevere in efforts to reach an agreement banning the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We seek a stable military situation in Europe—one in which tensions can be lowered.

To this end, the United States will continue

to play its part in effective Western deterrence. To weaken that deterrence might create temptations and endanger peace.

The Atlantic allies will continue together to study what strength NATO needs, in light of changing technology and the current threat.

Reduction of Soviet forces in Central Europe would, of course, affect the extent of the threat.

If changing circumstances should lead to a gradual and balanced revision in force levels on both sides, the revision could—together with the other steps that I have mentioned—help gradually to shape a new political environment.

The building of true peace and reconciliation in Europe will be a long process.

The bonds between the United States and its Atlantic partners provide the strength on which the world's security depends. Our interdependence is complete.

Our goal, in Europe and elsewhere, is a just and secure peace. It can most surely be achieved by common action. To this end, I pledge America's best efforts:

—to achieve a new thrust for the alliance;

—to support movement toward Western European unity;

—and to bring about a far-reaching improvement in relations between East and West.

Our object is to end the bitter legacy of World War II.

Success will bring the day closer when we have fully secured the peace in Europe, and in the world.

Toward a More Rational World Economic Order

The Boards of Governors of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and its affiliates, the International Finance Corporation and the International Development Association, held their annual meetings at Washington, D.C., September 26-30. Following is the text of a statement by Secretary of the Treasury Henry H. Fowler before the Board of Governors of the IMF on September 28, together with a statement for the press by Secretary Fowler issued the next day and a statement by Under Secretary of State George W. Ball before the Boards of Governors of the IBRD, IFC, and IDA on September 29.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY FOWLER

I give you my country's heartiest welcome as we meet together again to consider the vital work of the International Monetary Fund. We are honored by your presence.

In their 1966 annual report, the Executive Directors report on the strengthening of the Fund in the past year. The Fund's resources have now been raised to over \$20 billion as the result of global and selective increases in quotas. During the past year a decision was made to renew the General Arrangements to Borrow. These arrangements have again been utilized for the special purposes for which they were designed and have helped the Fund meet record drawing requirements by its members.

The United States fully supports the recent decision of the Executive Directors to improve the Fund's special compensatory financing facility, under which drawings may be made to meet shortfalls in export earnings.

But our focus at these annual meetings must be on meeting future challenges rather than past accomplishments.

When I spoke to you upon this same occasion last year,¹ I closed with a plea that we lift our eyes from our daily tasks long enough to catch sight of the broad outlines of what we who are associated in the International Monetary Fund are seeking to create: a world monetary structure strong enough, flexible enough, and with growth potentials adequate to the building of a greater society of nations.

This vision of a greater society of nations places three principal requirements upon us in the year ahead.

First, it calls for acceptance of a wider, deeper, more generally shared effort in the field of international economic development—to fill the crucial finance gap—the difference between the capital available to all of us and the capacity of the developing countries to use increasing amounts of capital effectively and productively—so eloquently expressed by President Woods [George D. Woods, President of the IBRD] in his notable address earlier in this meeting.

In his February 1 message to Congress on foreign aid, President Johnson, anticipating this call, clearly stated the position of the United States, saying:²

I propose that the United States—in ways consistent with its balance-of-payments policy—increase its contributions to multilateral lending institutions, particularly the International Development Association. These increases will be conditional upon appropriate rises in contributions from other members. We are prepared immediately to support negotiations leading to agreements of this nature for

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 18, 1965, p. 614.

² For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 320.

submission to the Congress. We urge other advanced nations to join in supporting this work.

I have already made proposals to this end in a speech at Granada, Spain, earlier this year and my colleague, Under Secretary Ball, will develop this topic in his address.

Second, the vision of a greater society of nations calls for the successful negotiation in the year ahead of a specific contingency plan for improved and expanded international monetary arrangements: arrangements with more depth, more span, and more flexibility; arrangements that would build into our international monetary system a means to provide world liquidity consonant with the world's ability to use reserves constructively. I shall expand on this point later.

Third, the vision of a greater society of nations summons us to tasks of national and international cooperation and development so far-reaching that they require the full and efficient use of our human talent and our material resources. We are facing a period in the world's history when the numerous and pressing demands for both national effort and international economic cooperation will reach new heights.

The United States regards the year ahead as a hinge for opening the door to a better future, as the strong nations, the old and the emerging, seize their joint opportunities to deal constructively with their joint problems without being haunted by the past or confounded by the present. I commend for your consideration the sense of urgency and analysis so well expressed in a report issued within the month by the Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of the United States. This report is entitled "Twenty Years After: An Appeal for the Renewal of International Economic Cooperation on a Grand Scale."

Without passing upon the particular procedures proposed in that report, there can be no question concerning the rightness of the emphasis and urgency expressed in the following words:

The world is in trouble—deep trouble—in at least five different areas of economic negotiation and policy: trade; aid to less developed countries; maintain-

ing a balance in international payments; international monetary reform; and maintenance of stable price levels in economies marked by full employment and rapid economic growth.

We in the United States are proud of our initiatives and national contribution in the last 20 years in these areas. We believe their spirit, their motivation, and their scale serve to give a measure of what must exemplify the role not just of the United States but of other nations individually as they regain and achieve strength and stature and of our family of free nations all together, if international economic and financial cooperation is to assume ever greater dimensions that are required for the last half of this century.

We call upon nations—those that are now strong and those that are rapidly emerging—to join us in a renewed effort that will make the year ahead a notable beginning.

Let us consider some of the specific ways in which we may move toward a better world economy.

Strengthening the Adjustment Process

I call your attention to the report of Working Party Three of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and to the discussion in the report of the Deputies of the Group of Ten countries of the need for improvement in our adjustment process and to the concern of the International Monetary Fund with the effective operation of the adjustment mechanism.

Each of these reports recognizes that the adjustment process needs to be improved and that the responsibility for adjustment should fall upon both deficit and surplus countries.

Deficit countries must make full efforts to balance their payments positions through appropriate policy mixes, depending primarily upon fiscal and monetary policy to achieve sustainable equilibrium. Surplus countries must employ their surpluses or hold them in forms that are consonant with the international interest, taking measures which will permit the adjustment policies adopted by deficit countries to work.

It is neither the course of national eco-

conomic wisdom nor of international cooperation for surplus countries to use their capital markets as instruments for the accumulation of gold and other reserves beyond their needs. Rather they should liberalize them—to facilitate capital export and for the finance of increased development assistance through the international institutions such as the World Bank and its sister banks.

Should this not be done by the surplus countries and should they not also liberalize trade restrictions, the deficit countries, after making appropriate use of policies to achieve equilibrium, may be forced, in the event such policies are not fully effective, either to adopt overly severe domestic measures or to apply unduly restrictive trade, capital, and assistance policies. These are not only difficult choices—they hurt the world economy.

Let us apply these principles of adjustment to the problem of development finance. However excellent our development assistance intentions, our ability to realize them will be lessened if due attention is not paid to the need to finance assistance in ways that are consistent with balance-of-payments positions.

In considering the extension of resources by the industrialized countries to the developing countries, there is a tendency to think of the donors as surplus countries and the recipients as deficit countries. This is not always the case. Among the capital-exporting countries there are countries with balance-of-payments deficits and countries with balance-of-payments surpluses. Further, these positions change from time to time.

It should remain clear that the amount of assistance extended by donor countries should be determined by their capacities to give assistance. However, in seeking to increase these amounts to meet the growing needs of the developing countries, the balance-of-payments positions of particular donor countries must be taken into account.

The most desirable way to reconcile these objectives would be for donor countries with balance-of-payments surpluses to reduce or eliminate any requirements that the financing which they provide be linked to procure-

ment in their markets. In extreme cases, surplus countries might even require that their financing be used for procurement in other countries. Surplus countries might also take steps to enlarge greatly the access of international lending institutions to their domestic capital markets.

Deficit donor countries have to safeguard their balance-of-payments positions while continuing to extend amounts of assistance commensurate with the broad criteria of aid-giving. It should be possible for us to devise imaginative methods to achieve this dual objective of increased aid and protection of balance of payments, and to this end we would welcome discussion among donor countries and with the international financial institutions.

Rationalizing Capital Outflows

The recommendations of a task force of the U.S. Government that I was privileged to head in 1963 included the following:³

The (United States) should, through appropriate international bodies, particularly the OECD, advocate the step-by-step relaxation of monetary, legal, institutional, and administrative restrictions on capital movements, together with other actions designed to increase the breadth and efficiency of Free World capital markets.

Unfortunately, so little progress has thus far been made in this area that the United States is forced to ask American banks and corporations to restrict their foreign investment.

We still find among the most highly developed countries of the world a widespread desire to run current account surpluses although these same countries are not prepared to supply capital net to the world on the scale that is required to finance these export surpluses. Many of the problems we face arise from this simple fact.

We expect that the OECD will issue shortly a blueprint for progress in improving capital markets abroad. We are also confident that, once the way is pointed, the OECD will establish procedures to assist in the translation of plans into action. We can

³ For background, see *ibid.*, May 18, 1964, p. 804.

look forward to a meaningful improvement in foreign capital markets that in turn will reduce the need for restraining measures on our part to guard against overdependence upon U.S. capital.

Coordinating National With International Policy

It is the responsibility of every nation so to conduct its internal affairs as to avoid weakening the international economic fabric upon which, in the end, we depend for our maximum individual and collective growth. The United States is keenly aware that it is particularly incumbent upon a reserve-currency country to keep its economy in good balance so that its currency should be a dependable store of value in the reserves of other nations.

As you know, a year ago I was able to report a very satisfying trend of improvement in the balance-of-payments accounts of the United States. But this year we have not been able to make a further improvement. To a very large extent the cause of our continued deficit is extraordinary and temporary: Our heavy involvement in the defense of freedom in Viet-Nam has directly increased our foreign exchange costs for military expenditures in the Far East by nearly \$1 billion. This does not take account of the indirect consequences reflected in the rapid rate of increase in imports, which has diminished the trade surplus.

In the past year sharp increases in demand, to a considerable extent also attributable to our involvement in Viet-Nam, have brought under attack the fine degree of balance among various elements of our economy that was maintained in the United States through most of the nearly 6 years of rapid economic growth we have enjoyed.

Consequently, earlier this month President Johnson announced a program intended to contribute to restoring that balance in the United States economy. With this program the United States Government took a further step in a step-by-step use of fiscal and monetary weapons during the past year to deal with inflationary excesses in our economy as and where they have appeared.

Working Party Three cited the need for the more active use of fiscal policy as a countercyclical weapon. In his message to the Congress of September 8, President Johnson pointed out that when caution signs became visible early in 1966, the United States administration and the Congress acted promptly through a series of five fiscal measures taking \$10 billion of excess purchasing power out of the economy during this calendar year.

The President also pointed out that responsible fiscal policy demanded tight control of Federal expenditures and that this has been exercised through a budget that on a national income basis, the best measure of economic impact, was designed to show an overall surplus of about \$1 billion and that in the first half of 1966 actually ran at an annual rate of \$3 billion surplus. Speaking on September 8, the President could say that since January 1 the Government has taken in more than it spent.

The President has placed before the Congress further fiscal recommendations: suspension for 16 months of special tax incentives to business plant and equipment investment. And he has undertaken a further wide range of actions to reduce Federal outlays, including a promise to cut actual spending far below what has been authorized by the Congress where authorizations exceed the fiscal 1967 budget.

The Working Party Three recommendations called also for further improvement in the implementation of general monetary policy. In the United States monetary policy has been used actively during the past year to dampen excess spending by restricting the availability of credit in the face of a strong surge in demands for credit. In the process, interest rates have risen to heights unprecedented for 40 years. All the instruments of general monetary policy—open market operations, reserve requirement changes, and discount policy—have been used during the past year, and most recently there have been innovations in their use.

We have also been making selective use of both fiscal and monetary weapons as the ad-

justment process report likewise recommended. When the danger of excess demand first appeared early this year, we took both monetary and fiscal actions designed to restrain general demand. Now that excess activity has become centered in the area of business investment, the President has asked the Congress to enact selective restraints in that area by suspending special tax incentives to investment. Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve has adapted its discount administration so as to intensify the pressure on banks to dampen loans to finance business investment spending. And because excessive competition for savings among financial institutions was having disproportionate effects on some sectors of the economy, we developed and won congressional approval for additional authority by the regulatory agencies over interest rates permissible for different types of deposits.

We expect this wide-ranging, varied, and flexible mix of measures to exert effective control upon demand in the United States such as the Fund report for this year suggests would be desirable. We also expect it to succeed, because of the careful selection and the variety of instruments used, without bringing about a harmful deflation.

At the same time, President Johnson recently declared to Congress:

Decisions made elsewhere will influence our defense needs in Viet-Nam. Because we cannot control or predict these outcomes, we cannot blueprint our fiscal measures in the months ahead. But should additional fiscal measures be required to preserve price stability and maintain sound fiscal policies, I will recommend them.

Improving the World System of Financial and Economic Cooperation

One of the critically important areas in which we can and should be moving currently toward a more rational world economy lies in improvements that can be made in the world system of financial cooperation.

At the center of this system lies the International Monetary Fund and the truly remarkable network of institutions and arrangements that has been developed to work with or alongside the Fund in the task of in-

ternational economic problem solving.

One of these is the General Arrangements to Borrow. Another is the cooperative network of reciprocal swap facilities developed by the United States and a number of other countries that has recently been enlarged to a total of \$4.5 billion.

There is less certainty that we have made progress in the field of the composition of reserves. Rising gold ratios at a time when supplies of new monetary gold are limited weaken rather than reinforce the system.

The improvements to date in the international monetary system that serves the nations gathered here have been on the whole defensive.

What is needed now is a positive advance: a widening of the financial channels running between our nations, deepening of them so that they can carry greater loads, and extension of them so that they reach more directly into all our lands.

For several years and in several international forums we have been intensely occupied with world trading arrangements in recognition of the necessity of expanding the volume and improving the flow of world commerce and particularly of increasing the participation of the developing countries in this commerce. In the Kennedy Round of the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] trade negotiations, we have now entered the crucial phase of activity.

Another aspect of the future will be a different payments situation from the one that has prevailed in the past two decades, when the world's reserves have grown chiefly due to United States payments deficits.

It is these deficits, chiefly, that have provided successively to a number of countries the reserves which have given them the courage to liberalize their trade restrictions and have thus in a sense floated the great increase in world trade that has taken place in recent years. There is a realization that the world cannot look to continued U.S. payments deficits to supply reserves in the future on the scale that they have in the past without unacceptable risks to the stability of the international monetary system. So we are mov-

ing toward equilibrium in our payments as fast as the unusual and temporary foreign exchange costs of the war in Viet-Nam will permit.

Such large reductions in reserves as have occurred have affected the reserve currency countries and those countries that had unusually high reserves at the end of World War II. That is, where reserves were too concentrated at that time, they have been redistributed. But that process, having taken place, cannot be expected to continue under normal conditions; and further dispersion at the expense of the reserve currencies does not strengthen the monetary system as a whole.

We must also keep in mind the fact that changes are taking place that are greatly increasing demand for goods and services. For example, the world population is expanding at a startling rate. The world's ability to produce and transport is rising exponentially due to leaping growth in our technological and scientific capabilities.

Many more people wanting many more goods and services and increasingly able to earn them will require a very substantial rise in the world's needs for reserves. While we must not make the mistake of confusing money, the lubricant, with incomes, which provide the fuel for the whole economic machine, it is equally unwise not to give proper care to an adequate supply and use of lubricant.

We must not let it be said that we were the generation of finance ministers who insisted that new mountains of the world's products could be carried to untold new millions of the world's people waiting and eager for them on an economic machine which we refused to lubricate adequately.

On July 10, 1965, I announced that the United States stood ready to attend and participate in an international monetary conference that would consider what steps we might jointly take to secure substantial improvements in international monetary arrangements.⁴

⁴ For text of Secretary Fowler's address at Hot Springs, Va., see *ibid.*, Aug. 2, 1965, p. 209.

Progress in the direction of better monetary arrangements, including assurance of adequate reserves in the future, is our decided purpose. With each passing month our determination to move in that direction has increased. The report of the Deputies of the Group of Ten submitted this summer, the action of the Ministers and Governors at The Hague on July 28, the address of Managing Director [Pierre-Paul] Schweitzer of the Fund, and the expressions of Governors at this meeting confirm our conviction that the time for decisive action is here.

We stand now at the threshold of the second stage of our negotiations aimed at improving international monetary arrangements. This stage follows upon agreement on basic points of contingency planning for reserve creation by the Ministers and Governors of the Group of Ten.

A fundamental basis of the discussions among the Group of Ten countries was that all countries have a legitimate interest in the adequacy of international reserves. As a consequence, it was agreed that second-stage discussions should include joint meetings with the Executive Directors of the Fund. It was also agreed that deliberately created reserve assets, as and when needed, should be distributed to all members of the Fund on the basis of IMF quotas or of similar objective criteria. Reserves distributed in this manner would be created on the basis of a collective judgment of the reserve needs of the world as a whole and would not be either geared or directed to the financing of balance-of-payments deficits of individual countries.

I believe these are sound recommendations. I hope and trust that a specific plan for deliberate reserve creation will emerge from this second stage to become the subject of action by the Fund Governors no later than the next annual meeting.

The Burdens of Supporting Freedom

The United States has raised a shield against aggression in Southeast Asia, as earlier in Europe and the Middle East. We fight there together with our Vietnamese friends, whose homes and lives and country

are threatened, and with the help of our allies from Australia, South Korea, and the Philippines.

The homes, the lives, and the national integrity of every free man—of every free nation—in the entire world lie in the shelter of that shield.

In closing, I want to refer back to the U.S. balance-of-payments position and in this way pull together the threads of my speech.

Last year our payments deficit was \$1.3 billion on a liquidity basis. This year so far it is running at about that same rate, despite a rapid step-up of activity in Southeast Asia. We have done well in the face of very adverse circumstances.

If we have not made further progress in our balance-of-payments position this year, the chief reason is the foreign exchange costs of the shield of freedom that I have just been discussing.

The United States has, at present, a net international payments deficit on military account of \$2.6 billion—this is not the budgetary cost but the foreign exchange drain.

We have a net deficit on foreign aid account, after tying, of about three-quarters of a billion dollars.

The total of these two items taken together is about two and a half times our overall deficit.

As I have already said, we have used fiscal and monetary policy to keep our domestic economy in an attitude of sustainable growth. We are prepared to do more—as and when needed. The President has made this very clear. We already have adopted some restraints on capital and tightened our assistance policies to minimize the balance-of-payments cost of this assistance.

My point is a simple one.

We want, and intend, to attain balance; we do not intend in the future to meet the world reserve needs by an American deficit. The costs of Viet-Nam have made the task more difficult, to be sure.

The question is, therefore, not “whether” but “how” to attain both our interim and longer term objectives.

Under present circumstances there are three broad possibilities.

We can apply general and selective measures that shrink the net flow of dollars to the rest of the world without any conscious geographical selection; that is, wherever these measures happen to impinge. This course, we suspect, is likely to mean that in the first instance a number of developing countries and deficit countries would feel the first impact in a shrinkage of their dollar receipts or their ability to command real resources, or both. Only at a later stage would the needed adjustment of the persistent surplus countries take place, as a result of the effect of this shrinkage in the purchasing power of the intermediate countries on the hard core of the world's imbalances in these surplus countries.

The second course would be to tailor our measures to the maximum extent possible to concentrate the adjustment on surplus countries. Measures that affect capital outflow could in large degree be so directed. Indeed, our voluntary restraints on capital represented a first, albeit cautious, step in this direction, as did the interest equalization tax. But as economic as this course would seem to be, it is not without problems, as you well know.

Finally, there is the possibility that the burden of adjustment might be shared in a more positive way with the surplus countries. By this I mean that the surplus countries would follow more active, instead of passive, policies in their pursuit of equilibrium. I say this although quite aware that such a course is not without difficulty for the major surplus countries. But I say this nevertheless because it is clear to me that this course is the most efficient, if not the only, means of taking into full account all aspects of the relationship of the pursuit of equilibrium to the total objectives of a rational world economic order.

The answer to this question as to how the objectives are to be attained is not one for the United States alone to answer. How it will be answered depends on the composite result of our own efforts and the policies of other countries, particularly the countries in

persistent surplus. Measures taken by the deficit countries might have to be quite drastic if surplus countries follow, whether by design or otherwise, policies that tend to preserve these surpluses.

Here, as elsewhere, it is our hope that we can continue to seek solutions through close and rational cooperation, both in the interim period and in the longer run. We seek a world in which nations work and consult together, understand each other's capacities for action, and allow their policies to fit together. A combined forward thrust is the desideratum—indeed it is a necessity—if our combined resources and efforts are to meet the impressive demands of the years and decade ahead.

STATEMENT FOR THE PRESS BY SECRETARY FOWLER, SEPTEMBER 29

I am gratified that the Governors of the International Monetary Fund have supported proposals for broadening and intensifying negotiations on the deliberate creation of international reserves.

Practically all the Governors who addressed the meeting endorsed the creation of a contingency plan to make this possible, with outright opposition from only two countries—France and Chad.

I am also pleased that IMF Managing Director Schweitzer recommended a series of joint meetings of the Executive Directors of the International Monetary Fund and the Deputies of the Group of Ten to develop solutions of this problem.

This second stage of negotiations would include representation of the full membership of the International Monetary Fund. Support for it came both from countries outside the Group of Ten and the members of the Group of Ten who reaffirmed on Sunday their recommendations made earlier, in July at The Hague.

In my remarks at this annual meeting I stressed the need for a greater sense of urgency and determination in pushing negotiations to a successful conclusion and I

expressed the hope of completing the development of a specific contingency plan for deliberate reserve creation in time for the next annual meeting.

I repeat the commendation I made in that speech of the emphasis and the sense of urgency expressed in a recent report of the Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments of the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress concerning negotiations and enhanced international cooperation in the field of aid, trade, international monetary reform, and the better working of the adjustment process in the international balance of payments.

During this IMF meeting, in a series of informal conferences which I held with the Fund Governors from Africa-Asia, Latin America, and other non-Group of Ten countries, I have discovered very wide support for strengthening and improving international monetary arrangements.

With reference to suggestions by President Woods of the World Bank and many Governors that development assistance should be increased, I would emphasize the readiness of the United States to participate in an expansion of the resources of the International Development Association on a basis that takes account of the balance-of-payments situations of the principal donor countries. I call upon donor countries enjoying balance-of-payments surpluses to devote these surpluses in greater measure to development financing, as an important aspect of strengthening the international monetary system as a whole.

STATEMENT BY UNDER SECRETARY BALL ⁵

Press release 226 dated September 29

Last Monday in this hall, the President of the World Bank made a forceful but disturbing speech. He pointed out that development, instead of proceeding at the faster pace at which it was capable, was "threatened by a serious loss of momentum."

⁵ Mr. Ball's resignation from the Department of State was effective September 30.

Assistance from public sources as a proportion of the income of the industrialized countries had, he noted, continued to decline for the fifth successive year.

This was a warning we should all take to heart. During the past few years not all trends have been favorable. While some of the developing nations have made great and heartening progress, others have lagged. Overall, the rate of economic growth is relatively high—but not high enough to meet the vast needs of the developing countries or to fulfill the objectives to which we are all committed. A kind of pause approaching a malaise has set in. Yet our economic and technological capacity to promote development has never been as high.

One can argue, on the basis of historical experience, that we are not doing too badly when national output among the rich and poor countries alike is growing at an average rate of between 4 and 5 percent a year. Sustained growth—let alone growth of this magnitude—is a relatively recent phenomenon. It was not until the time of Louis XIV that some West European countries succeeded in breaking through the limitations of a static productivity. And it was not until the industrial revolution in the 1800's that nations began to achieve consistent increases in their per capita income.

Even in highly industrialized countries, the growth rate during the hundred years before the Second World War averaged no more than 3 percent a year. It was half that in per capita terms after taking into account the population increase. At this relatively low level, moreover, economic growth was an uncertain and, to some extent, a haphazard process.

But this is no longer very relevant, for a qualitative change has taken place over the past two decades. Today virtually every country is committed to economic growth as a major goal of national policy, and the resources of science, of government, and of research are put to its service. For many countries, and especially those newly emerged into statehood, economic growth

has become the critical measure of national worth and performance.

This systematic approach to economic development has been one element contributing to the higher increases in national output that we see today. Another has been an awakened sense of responsibility on the part of the industrialized nations. Yet we seem now to have reached a new plateau that is not high enough. We must prepare for more extensive efforts in the years ahead.

During these proceedings and in past meetings of the Bank the main impediments to development have been quite thoroughly canvassed. There is a shortage of resources in a real sense and not merely in theoretical terms. More investment capital, both external and internal, could be put to effective use in the developing countries. Accumulated external debt and rising external service charges are holding back many developing countries. Trade policy and development prospects are closely interrelated and progress must be made on both fronts. Demography is a brooding omnipresence over the whole development process; we must get on with initiatives to reduce population growth and we must put heavier emphasis on food and agricultural development.

All these points are valid and central to the problem, and if I do not dwell on them it is because they have already received substantial notice in our discussions.

Technology and Development

Today I shall touch briefly on a less familiar issue: the relation between technology and development. The significance of this relation is well enough known but its practical consequences are largely uncharted territory. Yet the possibilities for economic growth are almost unlimited if we have the wit, the reason, and the resolution to put the new science to its service. For in every scientific field—in pure mathematics, physics, in biology—progress is moving at a geometric ratio.

Most important perhaps for economic development is the progress in computers. The

revolution in the design and use of these new instruments is only in its infancy. Yet its effects may prove as profound as those of the industrial revolution.

The industrial revolution extended the reach of the human hand. The computer extends the reach of the human brain. It can store vast quantities of information for ready retrieval. It can organize that information, correlate it, and generalize from it. It can absorb data as events occur, monitor those events, and control them. It can govern chemical plants, program the precise motions that a cutting instrument must follow to produce complex machine tools. It operates with fantastic speed.

The computer can hold within its grasp the model of an entire economy, and it can follow through the implications of proposed policy changes. It is a powerful tool for science, for government, for business, and for research in every field. Moreover, it interacts with man. It stretches human reason and intuition much as microscopes and telescopes extend human vision. New concepts are born because nothing is too complicated to think about.

Computer Training and Services

The implications of this revolution are clear. The rate of scientific and technological advance is accelerating; the rate of economic growth could accelerate with it. Mastery of the computer will greatly enhance the pace, the prospects, and the scope of technological change.

What can we then do to bring the developing countries more rapidly into the technological revolution that is already at hand?

It is neither necessary nor desirable that developing countries should become technological facsimiles of the advanced countries. But it is both necessary and desirable for them to begin now to train men and women to understand, to operate, and to adapt the powerful and revolutionary tools of our new era. For these new tools have many uses relevant to development. They can be used in planning transportation systems, in re-

ducing cost and increasing output, in weather and crop forecasting, in medical diagnosis, in education—indeed, in every facet of what we may call the programming of economic development.

Far more is at stake than training, or research, or better technical services, important and worthwhile as each of these objectives are. We must make it possible for the developing countries to become partners themselves in the interaction of ideas and innovations. This process knows no national boundaries, and the membership in the club should be made as wide as possible. The participation of the developing countries will vitally affect their ability to manage their own economic destiny and to maintain their economic freedom. Their partnership may become increasingly essential to the development of a politically healthy community of nations.

I hope that the Bank, which has never been afraid of new ideas, can give special attention to this problem. It may be possible to organize computer centers on a regional basis to provide both training and service. Such computer centers could be linked to existing regional institutes of research and technology. Alternatively, they might become the core around which regional research institutes and other regional economic activities could develop. If the Bank should develop a program in this field, the United States Government would be prepared to cooperate through its own aid program in support of this effort.

Meeting New and Emerging Needs

We turn naturally to the Bank with proposals of this kind since innovation is central to the Bank's business. The Bank has had two decades of experience in development during which it has acquired valuable skills and insights. It has worked in every area of development. It has pioneered in many. It has created two affiliates, established an economic development institute, sent missions throughout the developing world, brought donor countries and assist-

ance programs into consortia, consultative groups, and coordinating groups, helped to organize regional banks; and it is currently inaugurating the Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes.

The Bank has taken those initiatives to meet new and emerging needs. And my Government is prepared more and more to coordinate its own programs with those developed by the Bank. About 85 percent of United States development lending to Asia and Africa now moves under programs coordinated by the Bank through consortia and consultative groups.

We look to the Bank to flash danger signals and bring the critical issues into sharp focus. As we learn more about the development process we will need the Bank's guidance and prodding to shift development priorities and to use new methods and new approaches.

We look to the Bank, for example, to provide leadership in the field of agriculture and rural development. It is essential to make up for past years of neglect by placing special emphasis on agriculture if we are to avert famine in the developing world. And there is growing evidence that greater investment in the rural sector—unorthodox as some of these investments may be—can make most effective use of idle resources, provide an area of rational import saving, and in general increase the overall rate of growth.

We look to the Bank to encourage the developing countries to establish regional and subregional organizations that can lead over time to more extensive soundly based economic integration. They need the economies of scale, the benefits of specialization, and the spur of competition that larger markets make possible. The tentative efforts being made in this direction on every continent need the encouragement and support of the regional banks and the World Bank group. Here again we should not be afraid of unorthodox methods if they are based on sound economic principles.

We look to the Bank to help the developing countries expand their export receipts and diversify their economies so as to free

themselves from excessive dependence on commodities in chronic oversupply. The Bank's participation is essential to the coffee diversification studies now under way. Its help will be equally critical to encourage the new diversification and development features now being built into the International Coffee Agreement. This also is pioneer territory of great potential significance to the overall development effort.

Aid Transfers and Liquidity

The Bank has accumulated unique skills in the development field; but, as President Woods has pointed out, it must have access to the financial resources necessary to use them. The Bank staff and management have the talent and the imagination to do the job but the donor countries must provide the necessary financial resources. They must widen their capital markets to accommodate the Bank's regular bond issues and they must contribute resources for the IDA.

Last July the President of the Bank sent each of the Part I countries a memorandum outlining his proposal for the replenishment of IDA at a new and significantly higher level than in the first replenishment. These resources are needed for many reasons: the heavy burden of debt service in the developing countries, the pressure of population growth, the uncertainties in the growth of their export earnings, the leveling off of bilateral aid, and the hardening of aid terms as interest rates rise.

Nor can there be any doubt regarding the effective use of this development capital. The same exacting standards of self-help and performance that have for 20 years governed Bank loans are applicable equally to IDA loans.

The industrial countries, by virtue of the size and vigorous growth of their economies, have the capacity for a positive response to this need. What is required is the will.

Yet I must say one word at this point concerning the balance of payments of donor countries and its effect on aid transfer arrangements. Certainly it would be unwise to add to the mounting debt burden of bor-

rowing countries; but it could be equally unwise to increase the balance-of-payments drain on donor nations in external deficit.

Such nations can be expected to transfer real resources—the industrial materials, the capital equipment and the services that the developing countries need—and they can be expected to effect an increased part of this transfer through the World Bank group. But no nation when it is confronted with a serious balance-of-payments deficit can afford to see the funds it transfers work their way through the international monetary circuit and end up in a gold drain, an increase in its payments deficit—and ultimately pressure to adopt restrictive domestic policies.

Surely aid transfers should not be so managed as to result in contraction of world liquidity and world output. The contrary should be the case. It should be possible—and indeed it is essential—to devise satisfactory arrangements that will permit donors in balance-of-payments deficit to make their proper contributions to IDA without further unbalancing their external accounts.

This point is critical to the position of my country. The United States is prepared to increase its contribution to IDA substantially provided that other Part I members agree to carry an appropriate share of the burden of replenishment. But we must be assured of suitable arrangements to deal with the transfer problem. We look to the Bank to take the lead in shaping proposals to this end.

Pioneering Work in Development

We celebrate this year two decades of work by the Bank. They have been decades of steady accumulation of skill and experience. They have been experimental decades marked by great changes in development priorities and by solidly based pioneering work.

At the close of its first 10 years, almost half the Bank's portfolio consisted of outstanding loans to industrial countries. This year the portfolio testifies to the Bank's almost exclusive and proper concern with the developing countries. And it vindicates the wisdom of the process, for it shows the extent to which the Bank's one-time borrowers have become its full-fledged lenders.

During the first decade, the Bank's funds went almost entirely to infrastructure investments—power, railroads, and port facilities. Now the use of these funds is more diversified and includes investments in agriculture, education, and technology.

The Bank family has reached the point where it is able to invest over \$1 billion a year, more than three times the level of a decade ago. It is a thoroughly professional operation that accords with 20th-century concepts of human dignity and human betterment.

Over the next decade we will depend more and more on the Bank's expert knowledge, its ideas, and its capital. The Bank has demonstrated that it has the competence to respond to these needs. It is for all of us to make sure that it has the resources to do so.

Free Asia

by *U. Alexis Johnson*
*Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs*¹

It is a pleasure to be here today to talk to you about free Asia, the problems that we face, and the progress that is being made there. For behind the glare of headlines from Viet-Nam an increasing number of constructive developments elsewhere in free Asia are taking shape. I thus want today to take a broad look with you at the Asian picture, to discuss our basic interest there, and outline some of the constructive developments that are taking place.

It may seem trite to say that our basic interest in Asia is served, as it is elsewhere in the world, by a community of independent states freely cooperating together and with us for common purposes. However, I do not consider this often repeated phrase just rhetoric, but rather the very foundation and strength of our policy.

I have often told foreign audiences that we recognize that each country's foreign policy, including our own, is in the last analysis determined by its own estimate of its own self-interest. This is as it should be, for it is out of overlapping self-interests, that is, common interests, that sound self-respecting relations between states are built. They are not built on the shifting sands of sentiment and emotion. Especially they are not built on the concept of gratuitous aid or assistance, with their implications of inferiority and superiority.

Thus, in dealing with foreign groups and

officials I prefer to talk in terms of "cooperation" for common purposes with each of us contributing within our capabilities and means. This is a self-respecting relationship for both parties. It does not require self-debasing expressions of "gratitude" on their part, but rather enables them to take pride in a relationship of equality. Also, I feel this concept happens to have the value of being true. I wish that we could talk more in these terms even among ourselves, for it would save much controversy and confusion of thought about what we tend to call our aid programs.

As far as the Far East is concerned, there are increasing indications of a realization that, when we say we are seeking a community of truly independent states, we really mean it. To my mind this is the fundamental strength of our position as opposed to that of Peking. The developing nations increasingly realize that their aims of nationalism and independence are not compatible with communism. This is not because all Communists are at heart evil men, but because the very nature of the system requires central direction and control.

On the other hand, we can live in a world of competing nationalisms much more easily than can Peking or even Moscow. While competing nationalisms have presented and will continue to present their problems to us, our basic national interest can be well served if other countries are not serving the interests of those who have the will and ability to do us harm. I feel that it is a notable and encouraging fact that, of the more than 50 free

¹ Address made before the Far East-America Council of Commerce and Industry, Inc., at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 4 (press release 231).

countries that have become independent since the end of the Second World War, thus far not a single one has chosen communism for itself. Some have at times seemed to have hovered on the brink but, as in the most recent cases of Indonesia and Ghana, they draw back from taking the irreversible plunge. Thus, I feel that we can have confidence that the kind of a world that we say we want and are seeking is more compatible with the fundamental aspirations of most of mankind than is the world of Peking.

However, the word "community" is of equal importance with the word "independent" in the phrase "community of independent nations." This means a recognition of wider common interests and a cooperating together to achieve those interests rather than the anarchy of egocentric nationalisms. It is to be expected that the vigorous nationalistic assertion of independence will come first, as it did with our own country, and only following that will there be the growth of a sense of community.

Related to all of this is of course the problem of internal political and economic development; that is, the establishment and growth of some form of institutional framework and public attitude that will provide a government structure that in a reasonable degree has what our forefathers called the "consent of the governed" and which will organize the economy in a reasonably effective fashion.

Progress of Free Countries of Asia

Viewed against the foregoing tests, how are things going in the Far East?

While there have been and will continue to be many problems, to which I will refer later, I feel that we are entitled to take a considerable degree of confidence from what has thus far been accomplished out there. As the TV advertisement says, "We must have been doing something right."

First, how are the free countries of Asia doing in establishing their political and economic structure? The picture of course has its dark areas and its bright areas, but I know of no free area that I would call black. Let us

first briefly note some of the bright areas.

I suppose most of us would list Japan as the brightest of all. Its phenomenal postwar record is of course primarily due to the genius of the Japanese people themselves, but I feel that we Americans are entitled to take some credit for helping them lay the base during the occupation period and, equally important, for the peace settlement which was properly called "a treaty of reconciliation." This, I feel, was one of our acts of truly great statesmanship in the postwar period.

Somewhat less noted, but to my mind almost equally encouraging, has been what could now be called a "takeoff" of South Korea, both in the economic and political spheres. Out of the political turmoil which understandably followed the ouster of President [Syngman] Rhee, Korea has now emerged into a period of increasing political maturity and stability. Preparations are under way for new elections to be held a year from now. It now appears that the election will be strongly and responsibly contested. Ten years ago one could scarcely have imagined such a development in that country.

On the economic side, Korea has emerged from a period of economic stagnation and despair following the Korean War to achieve a GNP growth rate of 9 percent each year since 1963. As another example, its exports have increased over 10 times in 7 years, going from only \$15 million in 1958 to \$180 million in 1965. As Ambassador [Winthrop G.] Brown was saying to me the other day, perhaps equally important is the whole change in atmosphere that has taken place in the past few years. An attitude of pessimism and importuning for help has been replaced by an attitude of pride and "come see what we are doing."

Moving south, the economic record in Taiwan has also been notable. In the last 10 years its per capita income has increased almost 50 percent, and in the last 5 years its exports have approximately tripled. Our economic assistance program was entirely terminated at the end of the last fiscal year.

On the political side in Taiwan, the Chinese from the mainland and the Taiwanese

have been gradually finding an accommodation and are reaching a more meaningful relationship with one another, with the Taiwanese assuming an increasing role in the administration of the island.

The Philippines is one of only two or three former colonial countries stretching from Taiwan to Morocco which can boast of having changed its government by means of peaceful elections, and certainly the only one to have done so three times. I feel we are entitled to take some pride that in this former colony of ours pro-Americanism is apparently still generally considered to be a political asset.

Thailand, along with Japan, enjoys the great advantage of never having been colonized and having a respected monarchical institution that provides a focus of loyalty for the nation. Its record since 1958 demonstrates that the lack of a constitutional structure and the domination of a government by men in uniform is less important than the attitudes and achievements of the governing group. What some would term a military government in Thailand has been able to avoid repression and achieve a remarkably high degree of "consent of the governed" while pursuing progressive economic policies. Thailand has also produced Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, who has emerged as a leader of truly all-Asian dimensions.

I will not at this stage take time to discuss Burma, Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Laos, except to say that there are those who have since 1954 been saying that "we are losing Laos," but, for the moment putting aside the role of the Ho Chi Minh trail in the Vietnamese war, the internal situation in Laos itself is no worse and is in some ways better than it was 12 years ago.

I have left Indonesia and Viet-Nam to the last. The reversal of the Communist tide in the great country of Indonesia, with its 100 million population, has been an event that will probably rank along with the Vietnamese war as perhaps the most historic turning point of Asia in this decade. It has been accompanied by a great loss of life and bloodshed, and difficult political and economic

problems remain. The upheaval appears to have been essentially a recognition by Indonesian nationalism of the fact that Communist domination was not compatible with true independence.

Now, happily, Indonesia is looking to a resumption of life in the international community with its new links to U.N. agencies, its membership in the U.N. itself, and its close collaboration with the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development]. Indonesia and its creditors recently decided in Tokyo that the U.S.S.R. should be invited to participate in future reexaminations of Indonesia's debt problems and problems facing Indonesia in bringing about its economic stabilization and development. Neither we nor Indonesia are pressing for one or another specific orientation in Indonesia's foreign policy. Dedication to peace and world order is sufficient basis for developing friendly and constructive ties between the United States and Indonesia—and between Indonesia and other peace-loving countries.

The elections last month in Viet-Nam mark a most encouraging point in the political development of that war-torn country. It took real courage and confidence to try to carry out elections in that country during the midst of a savage war. The results confounded the pessimists and surprised even the optimists. For more than 5 million persons to register to vote out of a possible total voting population throughout the entire country of probably around 7½ million, and for more than 80 percent of those who registered to have voted in the face of Viet Cong threats and armed efforts to sabotage the elections, should once and for all set to rest whatever doubts there may have been with regard to the attitudes of the overwhelming majority of the Vietnamese people toward the Viet Cong and the so-called National Liberation Front.

I now turn to the question of "communities" of Asian nations. Our policy has consistently been to favor such communities and we have recognized that, to have any viability, the thrust must come from within the countries themselves. Engaged in their own

internal problems, wracked by their historical animosities, separated by their deep religious, racial, and cultural differences, and with competitive economies heavily tied to Western countries, it is not surprising that regional consciousness has been slow to develop. However, there has been a series of notable developments occurring—particularly during the past year—that are worth noting and which mark important first steps.

The first and most important was the settlement between Korea and Japan under which those two countries have now moved from sterile contention to productive cooperation in both the economic and the political fields.

Another fundamental development was the agreement on the founding of the Asian Development Bank. This Bank, of which the majority of the capital is subscribed by Far East countries themselves, is important not only in and of itself, but it can form the nucleus around which can be grouped a wide range of economic development projects of interest and benefit to various groupings of Asian states. It will be located in Manila, and the leading candidate for its first president is a distinguished Japanese economist.

Another encouraging development has been the reactivation of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), again bringing together Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines, with the expectation that Indonesia may also participate. With "confrontation" ended, promising possibilities open up for joint ventures, liberalization of trade, and that relief from anxiety that is a precondition for constructive community building.

This spring there was in Tokyo a meeting on economic development in which cabinet ministers from all Far Eastern states except Burma participated and during the course of which Japan pledged to increase its foreign assistance from $\frac{1}{2}$ percent to 1 percent of its gross national product.

In mid-June the Foreign Ministers from nine Far Eastern states met in Seoul under the name of "The Asian and Pacific Conference." They established machinery for the continuation of their objective of strengthen-

ing solidarity and cooperation among themselves, for what they term safeguarding their national independence and integrity and developing their national economies.

Except for the capital subscription of non-regional members of the Asian Bank, all these developments have been solely by and for the free Asian countries themselves. Thus, I feel that we can take some encouragement from these early steps to establish a true "community" of free Asian countries. We have nothing to fear from such a development, which can only encourage and hasten the day when the area can shape its own future with less direct military and economic support from the United States. In all of this, one of the most encouraging factors is the degree to which Japan is assuming, and the other countries are accepting, its increasing leadership.

It is also remarkable that, during these years of political and military strife in Southeast Asia, the four countries of South Viet-Nam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand have continued to meet and cooperate together in the work of the Mekong River Coordinating Committee.

The direct contributions by the SEATO members—Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines—together with the contributions of Korea, to the defense of South Viet-Nam are also major recognition of the community of interest of these Far Eastern countries. Incidentally, on the basis of population, the Korean force contribution to South Viet-Nam will soon be even greater proportionately than our own.

The Overwhelming Fact of Communist China

On the other side of the coin, and a large factor in the Far East, is the overwhelming fact of Communist China. I would like to note a few elements in the situation.

First, on the economic side, the disastrous failure of the "great leap forward" and China's slow recovery from its excesses, as compared with the creditable performances of the economies of most of the free Asian countries, have, I believe, long since dispelled

in the area the notion that Peking holds any special key to rapid economic development. Our best and most objective judgment is that, although there have been great improvements in distribution and the development of a limited capability to produce modern machinery and military goods, Communist China is one of the very few countries in the world in which there has been no increase in per capita gross national product during the last 10 years.

Politically, Peking is faced with uncertainty as to how to proceed in the face of a major series of setbacks internationally over the last few years. It stands in growing isolation even within the international Communist movement. Its own population, including major elements of the Chinese Communist Party itself, is exhibiting increasing skepticism as to the validity and effectiveness of its ideological prescriptions for China's ills. The tumultuous activities of the young Red Guards in mainland China—who appear to have dedicated themselves at the behest of some of Peking's leaders to the destruction of not only all foreign influences but of the survivals of Chinese culture and traditions—have shocked most of the world, as well as much of China's own population.

All these indications appear to be symbolic of fundamental changes in process within Communist China whose outcome it is still far too early to predict. These changes could ultimately result in a mere reaffirmation of Peking's past policies. But they might also lead to basic shifts in Peking's positions—either in the direction of moderation or of even greater militancy.

This is above all a period in which we in the United States must watch developments in Communist China with great care, maintaining the maximum flexibility in our policies and reactions, and being prepared to move to respond appropriately to signs of change in Peking's policies—either for the better or the worse. Nothing would be more welcomed by the American Government and people than an opportunity to renew the bonds of friendship with the people of mainland China. It has been China's policies and

leaders who have consistently rejected such a reconciliation on grounds of doctrine and policy.

The United States has no intention of abandoning its friends and allies. But neither will it flag in its efforts to join with any country which is prepared to work with good will and sincerity toward the goal of peace, stability, prosperity, and security for all the nations of Asia. In the long term, this goal cannot be realized without the cooperation of mainland China. We would hope that the great Chinese people will ultimately recognize that this is also in their true interest.

It is my own conviction that the outcome in Viet-Nam cannot but have a major and perhaps decisive influence on this question. The outcome in Viet-Nam will materially affect whether there will be a Communist China convinced of the correctness of its doctrine of violence, surrounded by neighbors convinced of the invincibility of Chinese expansionism, or a China looking more inward toward its own problems, and accepting a doctrine of "live and let live." In this sense I feel that Viet-Nam could well be regarded not just in the negative sense of demonstrating an ability to resist aggression, but rather in a positive sense of an opportunity to influence all of the Far East, including Communist China itself.

Japan's Constructive Role

Another development that I would call to your attention is the increasing emergence of Japan into a role of constructive leadership and responsibility in Asia. Japan's growing contribution to the goals of free Asia, its technical and managerial talents, its political skill and influence as an Asian nation, and its great economic resources can make a real difference in the speed and success with which Asia moves toward conditions of peace and prosperity.

Japan's new role in world affairs, with particular focus on Asia, is still not clearly formed. The Japanese people are now in the process of considering, in effect, the nature and direction of their national policies in coming generations. They and their leaders

are discussing the direction of their economic policies, the magnitude of their commitment to less-developed Asian nations, the future security role that they will wish to develop for Japan, and other questions of fundamental national policy.

These questions are for the Japanese people to consider, as they are doing, and to reach their own conclusions about the road ahead for Japan. Our role in this progressive debate in Japan is simply that of a friendly and sympathetic partner hoping our policies will continue to complement each other for our mutual goals. In our relationship with Japan we of course seek to maintain the extraordinarily high level of trade, our close and constant consultation with the Japanese Government on common problems, and our cooperation on the international stage in the pursuit of the basic goals we both seek. We are very serious about this partnership concept, and I myself would hope that, as Japan moves out in world affairs, we would be able to work toward a relationship with Japan in the Pacific comparable to our relationship with the United Kingdom in the Atlantic.

I will say only a word on Taiwan and its relationship to our policy on Communist China. To those who say that we should change our policy in this respect or that respect with regard to Communist China or that we should do this or that with respect to Communist China in the United Nations, I reply that you cannot ignore the question of Taiwan, or say that it should just be put aside. This is not because we say so but because Peking says so. We are bound to the Government of the Republic of China by treaty obligations. These are defensive. Persons advocating a change in policy must say what they would do with respect to Taiwan. They either have to say that they accept Peking's position that this is an "internal problem" which Peking is entitled to settle in any way it desires—including the use of force, without any outside interference—

or that they do not accept Peking's position. As Dean Rusk often puts it, our experience is that when you say you are not willing entirely to accept the Chinese Communist position, "Peking hangs up the telephone."

While Indonesia has freed itself from the threat of Communist control, the process of national construction is going to be long and hard. The natural wealth of Indonesia exceeds that of any other free country of Asia, and the potentials are very large. An encouraging factor is that the emerging leadership there seems to recognize the problems and the necessity of tackling them. Another encouraging aspect is the degree to which Japan has been taking leadership in assisting Indonesia in tackling these problems.

I am convinced that none of these problem areas, including that of Viet-Nam, is insoluble. As far as Viet-Nam is concerned, I am convinced that when Hanoi is persuaded that our patience and determination are no less than theirs a peaceful resolution can be brought about. The major part of our job is to convince Hanoi of this fact. Our attitudes and actions here in the United States are at least as important in this regard as what our men are doing on the battlefield in Viet-Nam.

I am also convinced that, while we have in the past and undoubtedly will in the future make tactical mistakes, the broad lines of our policy are fundamentally sound, and we can have confidence that we are running with the tide of history, a tide favoring a community of free and independent states in Asia. This does not mean that there are not going to continue to be difficulties that will call for sacrifice on our part, for difficulties and sacrifice are always associated with any great human endeavor. However, it does mean that these sacrifices are not in vain. It does mean that we should continue to have confidence in those principles that have made us great, and faith in those standards that have contributed to what we may have of goodness.

Panorama of Challenge and Response in Latin America

by Lincoln Gordon

*Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*¹

I speak to you as colleagues, not because I have any professional connection with the world of journalism but because you gentlemen of the fourth estate are more than ever involved in the shaping of foreign policy and international relationships.

To some degree, this has always been true. Thackeray wrote of the press more than a hundred years ago:

There she is—the great engine—she never sleeps. She has her ambassadors in every quarter of the world—her courtiers upon every road. Her officers march along with armies, and her envoys walk into statesmen's cabinets. They are ubiquitous.

And as James Reston points out in his article in July's *Foreign Affairs*:

The eighteenth-century American pamphleteers not only helped write the Constitution but thought—with considerable justification—that they created the union. They believed that government power was potentially if not inevitably wicked and had to be watched, especially when applied in secret and abroad, and they wrote the rules so that the press would be among the watchers.

We in the Department of State are accustomed to many watchers: the President and his aides in the White House; the Congress, its committees, and their professional staffs; the General Accounting Office; and—not least among them—the working press, the would-be Secretaries of State otherwise known as columnists, and the editors and

publishers so broadly represented here today. We are also watched by the chancelleries of more than a hundred nations and by a foreign press corps whose outlook often differs from that of their American colleagues.

This fishbowl environment sometimes has its drawbacks. All of us have suffered our share of haphazard and distorted reporting, of premature leaks, and even of occasional malice. Nonetheless, as we contrast our lot with regimes which censor and control their press, we cherish our blessings.

In the field of inter-American affairs, my own principal complaint concerning the press has been too little reporting rather than too much, and too narrow a view of the dramatic and newsworthy. Fortunately, there are signs of improvement on both these fronts. I hope that this meeting, the first of its kind to take place in Latin America, signifies an accelerated improvement. Surely there could be no more appropriate a location than Mexico, which, in addition to its natural beauties and justly renowned culture, is a living proof of Latin America's capacity for modernization without detriment to historic national values.

To some extent, tension between the press and the official makers of foreign policy is built into their differing responsibilities and time perspectives. Diplomats and foreign-policy planners must think in terms of months, years, and even generations; a newsman with a deadline must get his story turned in in a matter of minutes.

¹ Made before the annual meeting of UPI editors and publishers at Mexico City on Sept. 28 (press release 223 dated Sept. 27).

We also have our stack of daily cables from the field and must fight a constant battle to avoid exclusive concentration on the day-to-day "criselets," reserving a due share of our time and energies for the larger actions which really matter in the long run. But we are trained to make the effort to observe longrun processes of change and to search for levers which may influence them constructively. For the press to do likewise requires a conscious exercise of willpower, a conscious resistance to the easy temptation to let today's apparent but momentary and superficial drama drown out the story of where a nation and a continent has come from and where it is going.

So my plea to you is to press on with that conscious effort to redefine the dramatic and the newsworthy in Latin America. Even in the 10 years that I have been actively concerned with Western Hemisphere matters, there has been a marked move in that direction. As Ambassador to Brazil, I received dozens of visiting American journalists, editors, and publishers, many of them seeing Latin America for the first time. Most of them were excited by their discovery of a new world—the tremendous potential, the immense problems, the throbbing changes, the opportunities, the vital cultures.

It remains true that far more news from the United States is printed in Latin America than Latin American news is printed in the United States. It is still true that bad news travels faster and farther than good news; consequently the North American public more often gets exposed to dramatic headlines of disasters and *golpes* than of quiet achievements in Latin America.

Nevertheless, reporting from Latin America is becoming not only more intensified but also more analytical. Writers for the news agencies and big dailies and the TV crews seem to be getting more of the "why" into their stories. While I may not always agree with their interpretations, this kind of interpretative reporting is immensely important for the entire hemisphere. I have no doubt

that the present trend in this direction will continue as editors and publishers such as yourselves recognize the need—and the growing desire of their readers—for more understanding of this neighboring continent immersed in truly dramatic and revolutionary change.

The Thrust Toward Modernization

In a phrase, here is a continent which during the last century, after the exciting period of winning its independence from Spain and Portugal, fell behind the mainstream of Western modern evolution but is now coming actively to grips with its destiny. Today it is unlocking the opportunities which its superb endowment of human talent and natural resources make available to it. The key is institutional modernization.

It is an immensely difficult process. It confronts not only the inertia of manifold vested interests but the burdens of a population growth rate higher than any other world region, rural isolation and agricultural backwardness, quantitative and qualitative educational inadequacies on a massive scale, and the fractionalization of national economies into areas too small for truly modern development.

Yet, it is not a hopeless process. With any reasonable time perspective it can be seen in motion. Casual visitors to this beautiful and dynamic capital of Mexico or to a Brazilian city such as São Paulo sense it instinctively, as do visitors to the new frontiers of the Eastern Andes, Mato Grosso, or lower Bolivia. Those who knew Latin America a generation ago fully appreciate how rapidly the thrust toward modernization is taking hold.

Accelerating the Pace

But the pace is too slow and it must be accelerated. It needs vigorous effort in each nation; it needs intensive cooperation among the Latin American nations; and it needs sustained support from outside Latin America, notably from the United States. That is the *raison d'être* of the Alliance for Progress,

whose fifth anniversary we celebrated last month. And that is why the Alliance for Progress is in reality, and not merely as a slogan, the cornerstone of the Johnson administration's policy in inter-American relations.

The Charter of Punta del Este was a revolutionary innovation in the historic process of building a true community of free peoples in our hemisphere. From the earliest days of national independence, this has been one of the most cherished aspirations of farsighted statesmen in Latin and North America alike. Like all great political movements, it has suffered periods of frustration and setbacks. But as we review the sweep of the decades, we can say with some pride that we have not built badly.

For over three-quarters of a century, the Pan American Union has fostered the cultural, educational, and technical interchanges that are the basis for mutual knowledge and understanding. For almost two decades, the Treaty of Rio and the Charter of Bogotá have provided a framework of cooperation in political and security matters—to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes, to strengthen representative democracy, and to guard against aggression of any type from any source.

Although the roots of economic cooperation in the Americas also run far back, it was only at Punta del Este that a sustained effort for economic and social progress took its rightful place as a major purpose of our inter-American endeavors.

At Rio de Janeiro last November, our foreign ministers agreed to incorporate the basic principles of the Alliance for Progress as permanent features of the OAS [Organization of American States] Charter—a decision soon to be consummated in terms already agreed among our governments.² And within a few months, it is expected that all the Presidents of OAS nations will meet to

² For background and texts of the first two resolutions of the Final Act adopted on Nov. 30, 1965, see BULLETIN of Dec. 20, 1965, p. 985.

explore new ways to give added impulse to the Alliance.

Convergence of Our Interests

I have occasionally heard it argued by Latin Americans that the inter-American system should be conceived as a sort of bargain in which Latin American support for United States strategic and security interests is balanced against American support for Latin economic interests. This strikes me as a singularly erroneous view.

When German and Italian agents were seeking before and during World War II to subvert Latin regimes to the purposes of fascism, the security of Latin America was engaged no less than our own. When only 6 years ago the agents of Trujillo sought to assassinate a Venezuelan President and more recently the agents of Fidel Castro sought to capture Caracas in a lightning coup d'etat, the security of Latin America was even more directly engaged than our own. The Havana Tricontinent Conference last January, the guerrilla activities in half a dozen countries, and contemporary speeches of Castro make clear that the danger of externally supported subversion continues and requires continuing vigilance.

Nor should the value of OAS action in resolving peacefully a whole series of potentially inflammable Latin American border disputes be underestimated as a contribution to Latin American security. In short, the security aspects of the system must be recognized as a convergent interest of all its members.

This is equally the case with the newer measures for cooperation in economic and social progress. We in the United States Government believe—and we have had the consistent support of the Congress and public opinion in this belief—that accelerated economic and social progress in Latin America is also decidedly in the interest of the American people and of the United States as a nation. This, and not some imagined bargain of high strategy, is why Latin America can

expect our continued interest and support.

This is not to suggest any Pollyanna-like notion of universal *identity* of interest—that what is good for Latin America is always good for the United States and vice versa. Of course we have differences, and often substantial ones. So do the Latin nations among one another, as history eloquently testifies. It is only to suggest that there is an even larger area of convergence, resulting from history, geography, economics, and above all a shared set of basic values—of what gives life dignity and meaning and how essential to those values is not only material well-being but also freedom and respect for the individual.

It is clear that material progress is not synonymous with materialism, that modernization is not incompatible with spiritual values. Rather, the Alliance stands for what the great Mexican thinker José Vasconcelos once called—speaking of the relations between Latin and North American cultures—the “concurrence of the two great life-creating forces” of the hemisphere. It represents the “means” he sought by which these “two cultures, instead of expending and wasting themselves in conflict, should unite and collaborate for progress.”

Higher Targets for the Alliance

When President Johnson reviewed the first 5 years of the Alliance on August 17,³ he took encouragement from the record, especially in the last 2 years when overall growth rates have exceeded the minimum target of 2½ percent per capita set forth at Punta del Este. More important even than these statistics of growth and their physical counterparts in schools, roads, powerplants, water systems, and factories is the change in attitudes—the growing conviction that progress can be and will be achieved under free institutions and the growing understanding of how to do it.

The President called for a raising of the

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1966, p. 331.

targets—from 2½ to 4 or even 6 percent per capita annually. Such rates have been achieved in other developing countries in the recent past. There is no fundamental reason why they cannot be achieved in Latin America. Indeed they must be, if the rapidly growing urban labor force is to secure useful and productive employment, the standards of agricultural production are to be raised, and a real attack is to be made on the deficiencies in education, health, and housing.

That is the challenge the forthcoming summit meeting of American Presidents will face. It is not for me today to anticipate the results of that meeting. Each of the participants will have his own views on priorities. The task of joint preparation by governments and the appropriate international institutions is just getting under way.

President Johnson has made clear, however, his belief that three topics stand out as of the highest urgency: greatly accelerated progress toward Latin American economic integration; an intensified drive for the modernization of agriculture and rural living conditions; and a massive effort in education with special emphasis on developmental needs for skilled manpower.

If new efforts in these fields can be mounted in addition to—and not in replacement for—the progress in infrastructure, industrialization, the strengthening of private enterprise, the control of inflation, and the expansion of trade already well started under the Alliance for Progress, there is a good chance that higher targets of economic and social progress can in fact be realized.

The Returns on Investment in Education

You may suppose that my own emphasis on education merely reflects the bias of a former university professor with occasional nostalgia for the ivy-covered halls. I can assure you that there is much more to it. The fact is that no nation in modern times has achieved adequate rates of economic growth without a major expansion and reform of its educational system. The opening of oppor-

tunity to talent also has profound political and social effects in creating a basis for meaningful popular participation in public life, in expanding the middle class, and in encouraging social mobility.

But even in the most narrow and severe economic terms, investment in education has been proven to yield higher returns than most forms of conventional investment. This is especially true today, when the more advanced nations are going through a second or even third phase of the industrial revolution and when modern agriculture itself is becoming a highly capitalized and highly technical industry.

If Latin America is to achieve the ambitious growth-rate targets suggested earlier, one essential element will be to get on board this latter-day industrial revolution without going slowly and painfully through all the intermediate stages. This is already happening here and there in particular areas or industries. But it can become general only with a large supply of skilled manpower able to make it so: engineers, scientists, medical doctors, middle-grade technicians, economists, administrators, all in numbers far beyond anything on hand or in prospect with the educational systems as they now are.

This task is primarily one for national effort in each of the Latin countries, but it can be supplemented from the outside in various ways. One of the most promising is the concept of multinational postgraduate institutes of science and technology briefly mentioned in President Johnson's speech of August 17. If established on a sound basis with the support of governments and the professional groups concerned in each country and if properly backed by qualified institutions in the United States, they could make a major contribution to Latin development through their own programs of training and research, through their effect in raising the standards of national undergraduate institutions, and—not least—through reversing the brain drain of highly talented young Latin Americans to the United States and Europe.

Major developments in economic relations, such as those I have touched upon here, in-

evitably have their political consequences. I believe there is a favorable political trend. Since December 1963, over half the Latin American countries have held free democratic elections and installed in office the elected candidates. Three other countries will hold elections in the next few weeks. Certainly representative democracy is not yet universal practice in the hemisphere, and where it is at work—as in the United States itself—there remains ample room for further improvement. But the trend toward establishment of more permanent and more stable democratic institutions is on the whole encouraging.

Even in the Dominican Republic, still suffering the maleficent effects of three decades of dictatorship, the people have another promising chance for democratic growth following the orderly free election of June this year.

Unfortunately, Cuba still wears the chains of Communist dictatorship imposed by Fidel Castro in repudiation of the promises he had made to the Cuban people. Five years ago there was widespread fear that the Castro example might take hold elsewhere in Latin America. But today throughout the hemisphere people are looking at Castro's Cuba more with pity than with admiration. It appears that Latin Americans have decided they can make their own revolutionary changes, in peace with freedom—and without empty promises of ultimate paradise or compulsions of instant *paredón*.

Surely in this panorama of challenge and response, of new civilization being built on the foundations of ancient cultures, there is ample material both dramatic and newsworthy. How it can best be communicated to the American people, all of you know much better than I; but that it should and must be communicated I have no doubt.

It was said a few years ago that "It is one minute to midnight in Latin America."

Perhaps now it is well after midnight and the dawn of a new day, a new era, is almost here. But this new day will be a working day, and we will want to be up and at it long before sunrise.

President Senghor of Senegal Visits the United States

President Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal visited the United States September 28—October 6. Following are an exchange of greetings between President Johnson and President Senghor at a welcoming ceremony at the White House on September 28 and the exchange of toasts between the two leaders at an informal dinner at the White House that evening.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS

White House press release dated September 28

President Johnson

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: For me this is a very special occasion this morning—a time to repay hospitality long overdue.

I deeply regret, Mr. President, that we could not offer you better weather, but what we have lost in the weather we will try to make up in the warmth and friendship of our people.

Five years ago I visited Senegal to attend your inauguration as first President and to celebrate the first anniversary of your country's independence. It was a trip I shall never forget.

I remember the excitement of your people as they began their journey toward nationhood. I remember the enthusiasm they expressed toward the poet-statesman who serves as their great leader.

I did not remain only in your great capital of Dakar. I explored your country, just as I hope you will be able to explore ours.

I remember the many faces of your wonderful people. We traveled the countryside to the small village area of Kayar and I met the village chief there, a man whose tremendous strength and dignity spoke through our separations of language.

Mr. President, I believe that we understand each other. I came away from your country with profound respect for you and your deep commitment to your people and to your country. We are delighted that you are giving us

this chance to know you better, to meet our people, and to show you our nation.

In your official capacity, Mr. President, we welcome you as the head of a very friendly and vigorous African nation. Of course, we know the hardships you have endured. We admire the progress that you have made and we share with you a partnership in this noble venture of free men.

We can have no illusions about the difficulty of the road ahead. To wage a peaceful war against hunger, disease, and illiteracy will take all the strength and imagination that all of us can muster. The United States of America, Mr. President, intends to be a good friend and to be your strong ally in this effort that we will make together.

Mr. President, your presence among us today is a most happy event—not only for all of those who are present here this morning, but to those eyes in the nation which will follow your visit, recognizing an old friend who has come to share with us his warmth, his humor, and his very wise counsel.

I should like you to know that you are among friends. We bid you a most cordial welcome. We trust that your visit to our country will be a pleasant one and that you will enjoy your stay among us.

President Senghor

Mr. President, I am very sensitive to your welcome. I am very happy and very honored to be your guest today here in Washington, because, first, you were our guest, the guest of the Senegalese people in 1961 on the occasion of our first independence day.

I am honored to be your guest, secondly, because you are at the head of the United States of America, the most powerful nation in the world.

Indeed, I admire your material power, but I much more admire your spiritual power, the power of your democracy, of your creativity.

Since you were elected, we are very aware of your policy and we know that you have made much for all Americans—for white and for Negro—on the road to the Great Society.

Long live the United States of America.
Long live the friendship between the U.S.A.
and Senegal.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS

White House press release dated September 28

President Johnson

Mr. President, most distinguished guests: I once heard about a man who, while strolling through a cemetery, saw a tombstone bearing this inscription: "Here lies a Lawyer—and an Honest Man." Naturally, he was surprised to learn that the grave held only one man—not two.

Well, I am more surprised today than he was.

Here among us in the White House sits the architect of a nation's constitution; an educator; a statesman; an historian—and a poet. And he is only one man—not five!

If I were to compare you, Mr. President, with some figure from our history, I would have to call the names of Thomas Jefferson and Walt Whitman—and perhaps many others.

So from now on, when I am taken to task about my relations with intellectuals, I hope my learned critics will be convinced by this reply: "But what about President Senghor?"

Mr. President, our two nations are different in many ways.

America's independence is old—and yours is new.

But today I am thinking of the things that we have in common.

Your nation and mine are embarked on historic efforts to achieve social justice and economic progress for all of the citizens of our lands.

Your nation, like mine, knows that its future depends on the hope which education brings.

You and I—who both began as teachers—deeply share that conviction.

And we agree about the growing importance to the world of Africa's young nations.

In the United States, we admire the role

that you and your people are playing in building the future of your continent. That is why we have welcomed the opportunity to work with you in building secondary and technical schools; and that is why we are proud to send Peace Corps volunteers to teach and learn in Senegal and throughout Africa.

I was so pleased to hear you make the observations you did this morning about the effectiveness of our Peace Corps.

We have seen the growing willingness among African nations to work together for progress. I believe the trend is clear: Africa's people are setting their course toward cooperation.

It is fitting that Leopold Senghor, who is a symbol of this cooperative spirit, is both a political leader as well as a leader of thought.

Of him, a biographer has written: "If this were not a topsy-turvy world, it would be governed by poets—for they are the most lucid of men . . . Their glance is clear and ever new. They see and foresee."

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask you to join me in a toast to the people of Senegal and to their great leader, Leopold Senghor.

President Senghor

Mr. President, I would like, first of all, to express our thanks for the very cordial welcome afforded my delegation and myself.

We have, indeed, been deeply moved by it and particularly by the kind words you have just said.

They confirm in our eyes the friendship that unites our two peoples and which dates from before our independence.

Our gratitude is also coupled with the pleasure and honor we feel in being your guests today.

We have pleasure, indeed, to meet again as President the politician who represented his country at the celebration of the first anniversary of our independence and who, if I am not mistaken, has so far visited only Senegal in Africa.

And it is an honor for us to be the guests of the President of the United States of America, because this country, which is as

vast as a continent and is the most powerful in the world, has as its leader Lyndon B. Johnson, a man of action but also a man of heart.

If I speak of the greatness of the United States of America, it is of a greatness in the size of its soul; of a spiritual and cultural greatness. As everybody knows, you are the largest producer of food, of energy, and of many other things. That is to say that you are the biggest agricultural and industrial power.

I do not need to mention your military potentiality. In a word, you are in the field of material forces the most powerful state in the world. This has been said very often and is only too well known all around the world.

The formidable power, as a matter of fact, inspires only my admiration insofar as these productive forces are created by the American spirit. I prefer to speak of your spiritual forces, which do more to stimulate my admiration and our admiration in Senegal.

This, indeed, is the spirit of your message on the state of the Union on January 4, 1965,¹ in which you said:

And so tonight, now, in 1965, we begin a new quest for union. We seek the unity of man with the world that he has built—with the knowledge that can save or destroy him—with the cities which can stimulate or stifle him—with the wealth and machines which can enrich or menace his spirit.

There, indeed, lies your desire to save the soul and spirit which, since your independence, since the end of the colonial regime 201 years ago, has been the major endeavor of the American Nation.

This imposes some reflection. The American spirit is, therefore, a spirit of research in freedom, of a free investigation in order to understand the world. But the American spirit is also a spirit of innovation in order to transform, together with the environment, the conditions of man and from there man himself.

That is what you call, with such a suggestive word, creativity.

Mr. President, you have often been pre-

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 25, 1965, p. 94.

sented abroad as the typical American. I consider it the highest praise that could be made of you, since the typical American is one who expresses the American spirit.

Your friend, the famous journalist, Alistair Cooke, tells us that you are not a stereotype. That American spirit which you embody, in the dynamic sense of the word mixing the faith and exhaustive energy of the pioneers, has first-rate intellectual power.

I believe, however, that in spite of this fact, you rate heart with brain. In any case, I only want to stress this generosity which leads you in your steady struggle for equal rights for all American citizens. This you have felt deeply and you have proclaimed very strongly in your speech on March 15, 1965, that democracy is not only liberty and equality. It is, above all, fraternity based on human dignity.

Thus, in assuring progressively, as you have done, civil rights for all, you, Mr. President, who have deep roots in the south, are reviving the old American spirit.

At the same time, you also express our contemporary spirit. For justice for all means today—with the fantastic means at the disposal of the United States—prosperity for all, the Great Society.

As you proclaimed in your speech of March 15:

The time of justice has now come. I tell you that I believe sincerely that no force can hold it back. It is right in the eyes of man and God that it should come. And when it does, I think that day will brighten the lives of every American.

Yes, Mr. President, in this I do believe: The dawn that comes up announces the rising sun, the great day of enlightenment and joy that is coming.

Many a tear and much blood may still have to be shed before that day comes, a day which will be the glory of America.

We are not discouraged. We never have lost our hope in America, because there is the Federal Government and because there are men of heart and conscience like you, President Lyndon B. Johnson.

In stating again our gratitude for the warm welcome afforded us, I want to stress

the pleasure we feel in discovering, together with our similar ideals, the convergence of our endeavors which we have undertaken in order to assure to every citizen, to every man, his human dignity.

Your Excellencies, gentlemen, I invite you to toast the health of His Excellency, Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States of America, to the health of Mrs. Johnson, to whom I present the homage of my gratitude for the valuable help she brought to the First World Festival of Negro Arts, and to the greatness and happiness of the American people.

Indonesian Foreign Minister Meets With Secretary Rusk

Joint Statement

Press release 225 dated September 27

The Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. Dean Rusk, and the Presidium Minister for Political Affairs and Foreign Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, Mr. Adam Malik, met today [September 27] to discuss a wide range of topics of mutual interest. They reviewed U.S.-Indonesian relations, the current Indonesian economic situation, Indonesia's position in the world community of nations, and the problem of achieving political stability and economic growth throughout the Far East, including Viet-Nam.

They discussed the improvement in relations between their governments during recent months, and expressed the determination of the two governments to expand areas of agreement and cooperation between Indonesia and the United States.

In discussions of economic matters, the Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State noted Indonesia's recent moves to resume normal relations with agencies of the United Nations, other international organizations and Indonesia's creditors, and recognized the necessity of a multilateral approach to a solu-

tion of Indonesian problems of debt relief and foreign assistance.

At the same time, the Government of the United States in recognition of Indonesia's need for immediate emergency assistance has in past months supplied rice and cotton, and is prepared to furnish additional quantities of these commodities as well as spare parts. Training of Indonesian personnel in the United States will also be resumed. The Indonesian Foreign Minister expressed the appreciation of the Indonesian people for help which was given earlier this year and for the willingness of the United States to provide additional emergency assistance.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 2d Session

- The Crisis in NATO. Report of the Subcommittee on Europe of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on hearings held March 17-June 13, 1966. H. Rept. 2051. September 21, 1966. 13 pp.
- International Labor Organization's Recommendation on Employment. Letter from Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of State, transmitting text of ILO recommendation concerning employment policy. H. Doc. 489. September 7, 1966. 20 pp.
- Repealing the "Cooly Trade" Laws. Report to accompany H.R. 825. H. Doc. 2039. September 12, 1966. 4 pp.
- Tariff Treatment of Articles Assembled Abroad of Products of the United States. Report to accompany H.R. 11216. S. Rept. 1600. September 13, 1966. 12 pp.
- Philippine Hospitalization and Medical Care. Report to accompany H.R. 16330. S. Rept. 1603. September 14, 1966. 9 pp.
- War Orphans' Training for Children of Certain Philippine Veterans. Report to accompany H.R. 16367. S. Rept. 1604. September 14, 1966. 6 pp.
- Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1967. Report to accompany H.R. 17788. H. Rept. 2045, September 16, 1966. 38 pp.
- Baltic States. Report to accompany H. Con. Res. 416. S. Rept. 1606. September 19, 1966. 1 p.
- Foreign Service Buildings Act Amendments. Report to accompany H.R. 14019. S. Rept. 1607. September 19, 1966. 12 pp.
- Establishing a Contiguous Fisheries Zone Beyond the Territorial Sea of the United States. Report to accompany H.R. 9531. H. Rept. 2086. September 26, 1966. 16 pp.
- Access Highway to the Northwest Angle of Minnesota. Report to accompany S. 2138. S. Rept. 1655. September 26, 1966. 8 pp.

U.S. Signs Convention on Racial Discrimination

*Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

I am pleased to sign, on behalf of the United States Government, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. For this historic instrument reflects the aspirations of the vast majority of my fellow citizens. In recent years the United States has taken steps in landmark legislation and judicial decisions to insure the enjoyment of civil and political rights for all our people. We have combated and we shall continue to combat the economic and social ills resulting from long years of racial discrimination. With this effort, we associate ourselves with all who are struggling to eliminate discrimination. And in our aim we find ourselves united with nearly all members of the United Nations.

In signing this convention today, I would like to point out that under the constitutional processes of my Government treaties such as this convention can enter into force in the United States only after they are ratified by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. I would also like to observe that the convention accords with the objectives of the United States as they are expressed in our Constitution and law. To make this clear, I have requested the United Nations to circulate the following statement with the notification of signature by the United States:

The Constitution of the United States contains provisions for the protection of individual rights, such as the right of free speech, and nothing in the Convention shall be deemed to require or to authorize legislation or other action by the United States of America incompatible with the provisions of the Constitution of the United States of America.

¹ Made at New York, N.Y., on Sept. 28 (U.S./U.N. press release 4920).

The United States participated actively in the drafting of the convention and I am signing it today because it accords with our domestic and international objectives.

Bold and courageous action is indeed required if mankind is to eradicate the ancient evil of discrimination. Only thus will the United Nations truly succeed in building an international community based on respect for law and justice, a community that recognizes human rights at the core of all its endeavors.

When that recognition is universal not only in principle but in practice—when each nation combats discrimination not only in its words at the United Nations but with its deeds at home—then the search for a new and harmonious world order will have taken an immense stride toward fulfillment.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Customs convention on the temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Trinidad and Tobago, April 11, 1966.

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Trinidad and Tobago, April 11, 1966.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Accession deposited: Venezuela, June 30, 1966.

Protocol 1 to the universal copyright convention concerning the application of that convention to the works of stateless persons and refugees. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Accession deposited: Venezuela, June 30, 1966.

Protocol 2 to the universal copyright convention concerning the application of that convention to the works of certain international organizations. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Accession deposited: Venezuela, June 30, 1966.

Protocol 3 to the universal copyright convention concerning the effective date of instruments of ratification or acceptance of or accession to that convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force August 19, 1954; as to the United States December 6, 1954. TIAS 3324.

Accession deposited: Venezuela, June 30, 1966.

Cultural Relations

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21, 1952.¹

Notification that it considers itself bound: Trinidad and Tobago, April 11, 1966.

Finance

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force October 14, 1966.

Signatures: Afghanistan, September 30, 1966; Senegal, September 26, 1966; Trinidad and Tobago, October 5, 1966.

Proclaimed by the President: September 30, 1966.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs, as amended. Done at Geneva July 13, 1931. 48 Stat. 1543; TIAS 1671, 1859.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Trinidad and Tobago, April 11, 1966.

Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954 (TIAS 4900). Done at London April 11, 1962. Enters into force May 18, 1967, except for the amendment to article XIV which enters into force June 28, 1967.

Proclaimed by the President: October 7, 1966.

Publications

Agreement relating to the repression of the circulation of obscene publications, signed at Paris May 4, 1910, as amended by the protocol signed at Lake Success May 4, 1949. Entered into force September 11, 1911, and May 4, 1949. 37 Stat. 1511; TIAS 2164.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Trinidad and Tobago, April 11, 1966.

Slavery

Convention to suppress the slave trade and slavery, as amended (TIAS 3532). Signed at Geneva September 25, 1926. Entered into force March 9, 1927; for the United States March 21, 1929. 46 Stat. 2183.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Trinidad and Tobago, April 11, 1966.

Trade

Long-term arrangements regarding international trade in cotton textiles. Done at Geneva February 9, 1962. Entered into force October 1, 1962. TIAS 5240.

Acceptance deposited: Greece, August 18, 1966.

White Slave Traffic

Agreement for the repression of the trade in white women, as amended by the protocol of May 4, 1949 (TIAS 2332). Signed at Paris May 18, 1904. Entered into force July 18, 1905; for the United States June 6, 1908. 35 Stat. 1979.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Trinidad and Tobago, April 11, 1966.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement relating to the phase out of certain radar stations established under the agreement of August 1, 1951 (TIAS 3049) relating to the continental radar defense system in Canada. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington September 30, 1966. Entered into force September 30, 1966.

Nicaragua

Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio operators of either country to operate their stations in the other country. Effected by exchange of notes at Managua September 3 and 20, 1966. Entered into force September 20, 1966.

Uruguay

Agreement relating to radio communications between radio amateurs on behalf of third parties. Effected by exchange of notes at Montevideo September 12, 1961.

Entered into force: September 26, 1966.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LV, NO. 1426 PUBLICATION 8148 OCTOBER 24, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of

the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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American Republics. Panorama of Challenge and Response in Latin America (Gordon) . . . 644

Asia. Free Asia (U. Alexis Johnson) . . . 638

China. Free Asia (U. Alexis Johnson) . . . 638

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy . . . 652

Economic Affairs

Making Europe Whole: An Unfinished Task (Johnson) . . . 622

Panorama of Challenge and Response in Latin America (Gordon) . . . 644

Toward a More Rational World Economic Order (Ball, Fowler) . . . 626

Europe. Making Europe Whole: An Unfinished Task (Johnson) . . . 622

Foreign Aid. Toward a More Rational World Economic Order (Ball, Fowler) . . . 626

Human Rights. U.S. Signs Convention on Racial Discrimination (Goldberg) . . . 653

Indonesia

Free Asia (U. Alexis Johnson) . . . 638

Indonesian Foreign Minister Meets With Secretary Rusk . . . 652

Japan. Free Asia (U. Alexis Johnson) . . . 638

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Making Europe Whole: An Unfinished Task (Johnson) . . . 622

Presidential Documents

Making Europe Whole: An Unfinished Task . . . 622

President Senghor of Senegal Visits the United States . . . 649

Senegal. President Senghor of Senegal Visits the United States (Johnson, Senghor) . . . 649

Treaty Information

Current Actions . . . 653

U.S. Signs Convention on Racial Discrimination (Goldberg) . . . 653

United Nations. U.S. Signs Convention on Racial Discrimination (Goldberg) . . . 653

Viet-Nam.

Free Asia (U. Alexis Johnson) . . . 638

Toward a More Rational World Economic Order (Ball, Fowler) . . . 626

Name Index

Ball, George W . . . 626

Fowler, Henry H . . . 626

Goldberg, Arthur J . . . 653

Gordon, Lincoln . . . 644

Johnson, President . . . 622, 649

Johnson, U. Alexis . . . 638

Senghor, Leopold S . . . 649

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: October 3-9

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to October 3 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 223 and 225 of September 27 and 226 of September 29.

No.	Date	Subject
†230	10/3	Regional Foreign Policy Conference, New Orleans, La., Nov. 12 (rewrite).
231	10/4	U. Alexis Johnson: "Free Asia."
*232	10/4	Ferguson sworn in as Ambassador to Kenya (biographic details).
†233	10/3	U.S.-U.S.S.R. technical talks on Civil Air Transport Agreement.
*234	10/4	Bundy: Chamber of Commerce, Harrisburg, Pa. (excerpts).
*235	10/5	McIlvaine sworn in as Ambassador to Guinea (biographic details).
*236	10/7	Batson designated Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs (biographic details).
†237	10/7	U.S.-Japan Committee on Scientific Cooperation.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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**THE
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BULLETIN

Vol. LV, No. 1427



October 31, 1966

REQUIREMENTS FOR ORGANIZING THE PEACE

Address by Secretary Rusk 658

THE KENNEDY ROUND: THE FINAL PHASE

by W. Michael Blumenthal 671

UNITED STATES URGES CONCRETE U.N. ACTION ON SOUTH WEST AFRICA

Statement by Ambassador Goldberg in the Security Council 690

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S TRIP TO ASIA

Excerpts From President Johnson's Predeparture News Conferences 664

Requirements for Organizing the Peace

*Address by Secretary Rusk*¹

This great dinner revives many personal memories of a connection with the Army which began when I was 12 years old—with ROTC training in Boys High School in Atlanta.

It is a signal privilege to speak on this historic occasion honoring two men whose joint achievements deserve the everlasting gratitude of all who cherish freedom. One was a great soldier who was also a great civilian. The other is a great civilian who was also a sturdy soldier and a great Commander in Chief. Both exemplified the simple, basic virtues of duty, courage, and love of country.

Both made available to those who worked for them much practical wisdom. I beg leave to recall again some of General Marshall's advice to members of his staff:

"Don't ask me a question without bringing me your proposed answer."

"Don't wait for me to tell you what you ought to be doing—you tell me what I ought to be doing."

"Gentlemen, let's not talk about this matter too much in military terms; to do so might make it a military problem."

It was also my good fortune to see President Truman at work. I remember the little sign on his desk: "The buck stops here." No statement could have been more

accurate. He made the decisions and none of us ever had the slightest doubt about their meaning.

Both President Truman and General Marshall were builders of peace. Both knew that the United States could no longer find security apart from the rest of the world or through defenses and policies confined to the Western Hemisphere or to the North Atlantic basin.

President Truman made the organization of the United Nations his first order of business—side by side with finishing the wars in Europe and the Pacific. Within an hour of taking his oath of office, he announced his decision to go ahead with the charter conference at San Francisco.

A few months later, General Marshall, in a final biennial report as Chief of Staff of the Army, noted an epochal change in the problem of our national security due to new weapons developed near the end of the great war just concluded. He wrote:

... The technique of war has brought the United States, its homes and factories, into the front line of world conflict. They escaped destructive bombardment in the Second World War. They would not in a third.

... We are now concerned with the peace of the entire world.

That was after intercontinental planes and the atomic bomb. Since then the validity of his conclusion has been underwritten by intercontinental and submarine-borne missiles and thermonuclear warheads.

Both President Truman and General

¹ Made before the George C. Marshall Memorial Dinner of the Association of the United States Army at Washington, D.C., on Oct. 12 (press release 241).

Marshall knew that peace cannot be had merely by wishing for it or making lofty pronouncements or adopting hortatory resolutions. Both knew that peace, an enduring peace in which free societies can survive and flourish, requires infinite patience and perseverance—and that there can be no peace unless it is defended against those who are ready to use force to impose their will.

The guidelines to peace laid down by President Truman and General Marshall have served us—and the world—well. They are still sound. Tonight I shall review briefly where we, and others of like purpose, stand in the effort to organize peace.

Our goal is high—and it should be. General [Omar N.] Bradley said some years ago that we should set our course by the distant stars and not by the lights of each passing ship. Our goal is a peaceful world in which all men live under governments and institutions of their own choice and work together to further their common welfare.

No Shortcut to Peaceful World

But we know that that goal cannot be achieved overnight. In the Department of State we receive some beautifully tooled designs for a perfect world—designs that have not the slightest chance of enough acceptance to become realities in the measurable future.

There is no shortcut to peace.

Look at the political boundaries on this shrunken globe: the human family divided into more than 100 sovereignties which vary enormously in size, power, and technical advancement, in internal institutions, in degree of awareness of the rest of the world, in national or ideological purposes, and in attitudes toward the use of force to achieve their aims.

And, if you will, imagine all the different kinds of relations among nations spread along a line with total cooperation at one end and total conflict at the other. Near the end marked "cooperation" we find such

technical matters as standards of weights and measures and delivering the mail across international frontiers.

Near the halfway point along the line are multitudes of problems in which national interests clash but which usually are negotiable. Most of these are economic and many are extremely complex.

As we approach the other end of the line we begin to find issues in which nations feel threats to their deepest interests—issues of territory, of violations of sovereignty of the claims of ethnic or religious minorities. In our lifetime such issues have been made even more dangerous to the peace of the world by the ambitions of new imperialists under one ideological banner or another. Hitler used such issues as the German minority in Czechoslovakia and the status of Danzig as entering wedges for conquest. During the postwar period Communist aggressors have often sought to inflame and capitalize on local disputes.

Since the Second World War there have been, by one count, 379 instances of armed conflict, external or internal. And there have been at least 150 disputes or situations which so disturbed world order as to engage the concern of the international community.

Organizing the peace has meant containing these situations so that they would not explode into big wars. This has been done in various ways.

Many disputes were settled or contained through quiet diplomatic intercourse between the parties, sometimes with the help of third parties.

Some have been handled by regional organizations. The peace machinery of the Western Hemisphere has been brought into play in 28 cases, ranging from border disputes, through threats of aggression and subversion, to charges of violations of human rights. In the Dominican Republic we supported the Organization of American States in assuring the Dominican people the right to choose their own government, thus averting a takeover by either the extreme right or the extreme left, both of

which had been condemned by the Republics of the Western Hemisphere.

In the last few years the fledgling Organization of African Unity has been effective in four or five disputes, notably in bringing about a cease-fire on the Algerian-Moroccan border in 1964.

Since the International Court of Justice was set up under the U.N. Charter, it has decided 35 contentious cases and rendered 13 advisory opinions. Not many in either category involved high temperature problems, but a few, such as the Corfu channel, did and others had a feverish potential.

In some 70 cases, the United Nations has become involved, either as principal peacemaker or in a complementary role. U.N. action has taken many forms: airing an issue, spotlighting unacceptable activity, providing good offices and mediation, and, in 11 instances, introducing a peacekeeping force to supervise a cease-fire, restore order, and hold the line for the processes of peaceful settlement.

Peacemaking Involves Variety of Machinery

Thus, making and keeping the peace has involved a wide variety of machinery. Much of it has meant reducing the heat from a boil to a simmer. We have learned to live with uneasy truces on the theory that the first step to a solution is to stop shooting. Yet we are aware that not all disputes fade with time and that, both realistically and as a matter of justice, peacekeeping needs to be complemented with attention to underlying issues.

Some people think the United Nations should handle all international disputes. But the authors of the charter thought otherwise. Article 33 of chapter VI on *Pacific Settlement of Disputes* says that the parties "shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."

Some think the United States has become involved in too many disputes. We have an

interest in the peaceful settlement of quarrels which waste resources and energies that are needed for economic development and which may flare into wars. But we don't go around looking for business as peacemakers and peacekeepers. We have no aspiration to be the gendarmes of the universe. We are very pleased when other agencies or nations succeed in averting war or winning a cease-fire or settling a quarrel. For example, we were pleased and encouraged by the Soviet initiative in bringing India and Pakistan together at Tashkent.

Out of the scores of disputes in the last two decades, we have become directly involved in only a dozen or so.

Aggression Must Be Deterred or Repelled

In organizing a reliable peace, the first essential is to eliminate aggression—preferably by deterring it but, if it occurs, by repelling it. That was the lesson seared in the minds of those who drafted the Charter of the United Nations while the fires of the most destructive war in history still raged.

The paramount obligation of all members of the United Nations is to take effective collective action to prevent and remove threats to the peace and to suppress acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace. Unhappily, some members have refused to live up to that pledge.

President Truman and General Marshall—and his successor as Secretary of State, Dean Acheson—knew that if peace was to be secured, aggression had to be deterred or repelled. And when they saw that the machinery of the United Nations was not adequate, they reinforced it with other measures: aid to Greece and Turkey, the Rio pact, the North Atlantic alliance, the defense of the Republic of Korea, defensive alliances in the Pacific, military aid to many nations whose independence was threatened.

When the aggression against the Republic of Korea was unleashed, a Soviet boycott of the Security Council enabled the United Nations to act. President Truman saw instantly what had to be done and did it. As Assistant

Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs at that time, I was never in doubt about his resolve.

Under President Truman we signed defensive alliances with 37 nations—20 under the Rio pact, 13 under the North Atlantic pact, and 4 in the Western Pacific: Australia and New Zealand through the ANZUS pact and the Philippines and Japan through bilateral treaties.

Also, we had close associates who became treaty allies early in the Eisenhower administration: the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of China on Taiwan.

Security of Southeast Asia

And early in 1950, after extended consultations with his principal foreign policy and military advisers, President Truman determined that we had an important national security interest in keeping Southeast Asia, including Viet-Nam, within the free world. That finding was repeatedly reviewed—by him, and then by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson—always with the same conclusion.

I have heard it said or implied that President Kennedy did not regard the security of Southeast Asia generally, and of South Viet-Nam in particular, as important to the free world and the United States. If he ever had such views—or even any doubts about the importance of our stake in that area—he never revealed them to his Secretary of State.

In his news conference of September 12, 1963, President Kennedy summed up our objective in Viet-Nam in these words:

... we want the war to be won, the Communists to be contained, and the Americans to go home. . . . But we are not there to see a war lost, and we will follow the policy which I have indicated today of advancing those causes and issues which help win the war.

The great decisions of President Truman in both Europe and Asia remind us that the community of nations must have the courage to resist aggression no matter what form it takes.

Once again we are hearing, from dissenters at home and abroad, arguments and slogans with which President Truman and all who served him came to be familiar:

"Don't be alarmed by the other fellow's bellicose talk—he's just suffering from an inferiority complex; treat him kindly, and he'll be good."

"It's a long way off; nothing to worry about."

"You're unreasonable; you're asking for unconditional surrender"—when you're not asking the aggressor to give up anything except his aggression.

"You must compromise"—that is, give the aggressor at least half of what he demands. Is there any surer way to encourage further aggression?

"It's not an aggression; it's just a civil war."

And now again we are told that an aggression is just a "civil war."

There is an indigenous element in the war in South Viet-Nam, but relatively it is even smaller than was the indigenous element in the case of Greece. We consider it well within the capacity of the South Vietnamese to handle. We and others are there because of aggression from the North—an aggression which the other side has repeatedly escalated and now includes many regiments of the regular army of North Viet-Nam. And we shall leave when these invaders and arms from the North go home.

Of course there are differences between Greece and Viet-Nam—and differences between Hitler and the militant Communist imperialists. But superficial differences should not be allowed to obscure the heart of the matter, which is aggression.

And, let me emphasize, we had better not forget the ghastly mistakes which led to the Second World War. For, there won't be any opportunity to apply any lessons after a third world war. We had better remember what we know and see to it that a third world war does not occur.

At the same time, we must take care not to use more force than is necessary. Now, as in previous conflicts and crises during the last

two decades, there are those who want to go all out—apply maximum power and get it over with. That would be a perilous course, which conceivably could escalate into the thermonuclear exchange which no rational man could want. Prudence dictates that we use enough force to achieve the essential purpose of deterring or repelling aggression. That has been the practice of all four of our postwar Presidents. That is the road which offers the best hope of reaching a reliable peace.

For we can never forget that our objective is a secure peace. We want nothing else from anybody, anywhere in the world.

Peaceful Settlement in Viet-Nam

President Johnson has made clear, again and again, our desire for a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam. To that end we have made every conceivable suggestion compatible with the right of the South Vietnamese to live under governments and institutions of their own choice.

We do not regard as final public and negative reactions from the other side to our latest proposals. We hope for a more considered reply, whether through public or private channels. If there is uncertainty about the meaning of our proposals, the way to clear it up is through discussion—and we are quite ready to engage in such discussion. We are animated by the conviction that a common interest exists on which peace can be built in Southeast Asia and that sincere discussion will reveal where that common interest lies. This being so, it seems all the more tragic that the suffering and destruction of war should be further prolonged.

We will not turn our backs on the fate of Southeast Asia. But neither can we—nor would we wish to—impose our will on this area.

It follows that peace in Southeast Asia must be an *organized* peace—one which enlists the cooperation of many nations.

The organization of peace requires that, even while helping to repel aggression, we search incessantly for points of common interest and agreement with our adversaries.

Above all, we have sought, and seek, agreements and arrangements that reduce the danger of a great war. And high among these are agreements and arrangements to control and reduce armaments.

Here again, President Truman set the pace. Among many illustrations, I cite only one: the comprehensive plan to assure that the atom would be used only for peaceful purposes by making all production of atomic energy throughout the world the exclusive monopoly of an international agency under the United Nations. When the United States proposed that, we alone had the atomic bomb. After long study and discussion, most of the nations of the world approved the essentials of our proposal. The Communist states blocked it. Had that plan been adopted, the race in superweapons would have been averted and *Homo sapiens* would have been spared the threat of atomic obliteration.

All of President Truman's successors have continued the quest for agreements and understandings with our adversaries. And last Friday President Johnson set forth a comprehensive program for working toward a "far-reaching improvement in relations between the East and the West."²

The organization of peace required that we help to restore the strength of the economically advanced nations of Europe, that we encourage them toward integration, and that we try to work in close cooperation with them. Those efforts began under President Truman.

The organization of peace required that we try to make friends of our former enemies, that we encourage them to find a place in the free world as democratic, self-respecting, independent nations. It was under President Truman that the United States embarked on the reconciliations which have so vastly strengthened the cause of freedom and peace. We are proud to have as partners the flourishing democracies which have risen from the ashes of that great struggle.

² For President Johnson's address at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 7, see BULLETIN of Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.

The organization of peace requires that the economically advanced nations assist the less advanced to modernize themselves. Over the long range there can be no security in a world in which a few nations are rich and many are poor.

That was the profound truth set forth in the justly famous Point 4 of President Truman's inaugural.

Progress in the Developing Countries

Progress in the developing countries has been uneven. And we cannot afford to shut our eyes to the fact that the world is on the threshold of a food-population crisis.

But many of the developing countries in Asia and Africa have made encouraging progress. In the Western Hemisphere, the great cooperative enterprise, the Alliance for Progress, is meeting its overall goals and is gaining momentum. And most of the free nations of the Western Pacific are making remarkable progress: not only Japan and Australia but Thailand, Malaysia, and the Republic of China on Taiwan. The Republic of the Philippines has new, dynamic leadership. And, after many discouragements, the Republic of Korea is surging ahead. It is a powerful factor in the security of the Western Pacific not only on the northern rampart but on the southern rampart as well. It has not forgotten that when it was the victim of aggression others came to its aid. The Republic of Korea's contribution of fighting men in Viet-Nam—and first-class soldiers they are—is comparable to ours in ratio to population.

Indonesia has turned a critical corner.

The free nations of the Western Pacific have been taking new initiatives in regional cooperation of many sorts. They are infused with a new confidence. And, as the leaders of many of the countries of that area have said publicly, that confidence springs from the knowledge that aggression will not be allowed to succeed. Those who say that our firm stand in Viet-Nam is not appreciated by

governments and peoples in that part of the world are, to say the least, badly informed.

The organization of peace requires us to get on with the workaday affairs of men that need international cooperation. Those unsung activities comprise 80 percent or more of the business of the Department of State. We are active in more than 50 international agencies and take part annually in more than 600 multilateral international conferences. Most of that work goes unnoticed in the general press, but it is concerned with problems and arrangements that run from the control of disease to civil aviation, telecommunications, and the peaceful uses of the atom.

We are parties to more than 4,000 treaties and international agreements. Gradually there is growing what has aptly been called the "common law of mankind."

So we continue to move ahead with organizing the peace. And I have no doubt that the people of this great Republic—as President Truman used to say, "the greatest Republic on which the sun ever shone"—will continue to do whatever may be necessary to defend and organize peace.

Beneath the crises, the strength of the free world is growing, both absolutely and in relation to the Communist states. In the competition in production, the Communist states are falling further and further behind. Even more important, communism is losing the competition in ideas. For it is in the nature of man to want a part in deciding his own affairs and to enjoy certain rights as an individual—those "Blessings of Liberty" which we have long cherished and are determined to "secure to ourselves and our Posterity."

As President Truman said:³

"... the basic proposition of the worth and dignity of man is not a sentimental aspiration or a vain hope or a piece of rhetoric. It is the strongest, most creative force now present in this world."

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1945, p. 208.

President Johnson Discusses Forthcoming Asian Trip

Following are portions of opening statements made by President Johnson at his news conferences at the White House on October 6 and 13 dealing with his trip to Asia.

STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 6

White House press release dated October 6

As you know, the United States has agreed to attend the conference in Manila October 24-25. This will bring together the countries that are most directly helping the South Vietnamese to resist aggression and to build their nation.

The Philippines, Korea, and Thailand extended the invitation, which has been accepted by South Viet-Nam, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.

The details of the meeting—including the agenda—are now being worked out in consultation among all participants. President [Ferdinand E.] Marcos of the Philippines has already indicated the scope of the conference, and we expect:

—to review the military progress being made in the field;

—to hear the South Vietnamese plans for further evolution toward representative government, accelerated security of the countryside; and a strengthened economy while curbing inflation;

—to examine how the other nations present can best support those efforts; and

—to explore the prospects for peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese conflict, in the light of all proposals.

Much of this effort is consistent with the work at Honolulu in February which I considered highly successful.¹ At that meeting the Government of Viet-Nam reinforced its determination:

—to move toward a democratic constitution and an elected government;

—to take concrete steps to combat inflation;

—to invite Viet Cong to join them through the Open Arms program;

—and to multiply efforts in health, education, and agriculture, especially in the countryside.

Each of these steps has produced results since February, and we are hopeful they will receive increased support in Manila. Once aggression has been defeated, a common dedication will also be necessary for the rehabilitation and development of Viet-Nam.

STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 13

The mission to the Manila Conference and the trip to the six Asian countries is now shaping up. While there will be, as you know, some changes and additions to our itinerary, as there always are in schedules of this kind, much of it is available now. The Press Secretary will make the itinerary available to you at the door if you so desire it.

We think this is going to be a very exciting, challenging, and demanding trip. Mrs. Johnson and I are looking forward with a great deal of pleasure to returning the visits

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

to these seven countries of their leaders who have visited us in the last several months.

We realize that we shall be seeing an emerging Asia. The trip has many facets. Primarily, as you know, it is a mission to the Manila Conference. This is timely for many reasons, which I will not elaborate now, but will discuss later.

We shall visit six nations. I am anxious to see firsthand the proud achievements of those countries, which their leaders have told me about as they visited the White House in recent months.

For me, the trip to Australia, especially, and New Zealand, has an added dimension. It is somewhat a sentimental journey to places that are vivid in my memories from World War II days. Twenty-four years ago I was there as a very low-ranking set of eyes and ears for another President, Franklin D. Roosevelt. During the period that I spent there, brief as it was, I came to know and to love those people and to appreciate their courage and their pioneer spirit. So I look forward very much to seeing them again.

During the trip, I shall be meeting with government leaders and other officials. But I am very eager to see as many of the people of those countries as possible, and as much of their countryside and their cities as possible.

In Asia, over the last year, I have felt that there is an encouraging mood of new confidence in that part of the world. And I think also in this country there is a new interest in that part of the world, because our people are awakening to the fact that a very large majority of the people of the world live in that area of the world.

There we find the life expectancy is short. The per capita income is low. There is great opportunity to really work with our fellow human beings to give them better living and a better way of life and better opportunities that we have had here.

Regional enterprise is developing there. They take great pride in the new Asian Development Bank that I first suggested at Baltimore a few months ago.² The people of

² For text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

President Johnson left Washington on October 17 to attend the Manila Conference and to visit New Zealand, Australia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Korea, as well as the Philippines. His speeches and statements during the trip will be published in subsequent issues of the Bulletin.

Asia are thinking and, I think, working not only to hasten their own national development, but to find ways to work with other nations. I want to see for myself as much of their achievement as is possible for me to see in the limited time that we have allotted.

Too, I think this is a good time for the Manila Conference. You will recall that when we were in Honolulu last February, we agreed to meet again in 6 months or so to take stock and to look at the results that flowed from that meeting.

Much has happened in those 6 months. I will not try to take your time to relate it all today, but I think it is significant to point out that the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong monsoon offensive, that gave us concern, failed.

The Government of Viet-Nam made good its commitment to take action on the inflationary front, to devalue, to make arrangements where we could improve the efficiency of the port, the supplies we were sending there and, very important, made good its commitment to hold a free election for members of the Constituent Assembly.

There was great doubt in this country and other places in the world of the extent of the participation that would take place in that election by the peoples themselves. The terrorists did everything they could to keep the election from being held and to inculcate fear in the people so they would not go and vote.

Although we have an election coming up, a congressional election where we normally, off-years, vote less than 40 percent of our eligible people, only 50 percent in a personality presidential election, nevertheless these people, under fire, in the face of hand grenades and threats and terrorism, voted more than 80 percent.

That was a blow that caused the aggressor to suffer great loss of face throughout the world, because 80 percent of the people eligible to vote went to the polling places notwithstanding this terror, and demonstrated to the entire world their desire to have the privilege of self-determination.

The foundations have been laid and progress begun in the field for the Vietnamese "revolutionary development." And, as you know, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Secretary of Agriculture have done a great deal of work before Honolulu and following it, in the field of education, health, agriculture, and the bringing of security to the countryside.

The defections from the enemy forces so far this year far exceed the defections last year. That was a matter that we gave special attention to at Honolulu.

Meanwhile, on the world scene, our position on a peaceful settlement is now, I think, much better understood than in the past.

In recent weeks I have talked to most of the leaders from that part of the world. And I find from them that they realize that it is not the United States of America who refuses to come to the conference table.

That, in fact, there are only two governments in the world that now appear opposed to ending the war and achieving the peace. I would hope that those who make very special pleas for peace would direct their efforts to those two governments because they have no problem so far as the United States Government is concerned.

Therefore, I was very happy to respond to the pleas that had been made by President Marcos and earlier by President Park [Chung Hee Park, President of the Republic of Korea] and by the representatives of Thailand to agree to come and meet with them.

I am not unaware that some of you have found fault with my acceptance of that engagement at this time of the year. I would much prefer to have gone after my Congress had gone home—November 15, and so suggested.

But they have an election also in Australia on November 26, and one in New Zealand late in November. And it happens in those countries the Prime Minister is a candidate this year and running himself. They felt that I could more appropriately be away, I am sure, at least the leadership did, when I wasn't a candidate when we were having an election than they could when they were both candidates.

So we didn't feel we should wait until next year. We couldn't have it in November because of these elections. I have been criticized some for accepting. I only wonder what would have been said about me if I had said no, I refuse to come and talk to our allies about our problems or our program.

On our travel plans, we will have arrival and departure times for each city available to you soon. Mrs. Johnson and I are looking forward eagerly to the trip. We shall be leaving Washington from Dulles Airport at 9 a.m. Monday morning. We will fly nonstop to Honolulu, Hawaii. We are going to have a very busy schedule there. That is one of my favorite States in the Union and I contributed something to bringing it into the Union.

We shall participate in a ceremony and have a stay there overnight. We are going to be up at sunrise Tuesday. We will stop for an afternoon visit in the Fiji Islands where I spent several miserable days in a hospital in World War II, in a New Zealand military hospital, incidentally.³

Then we will go to New Zealand that afternoon. That will be a long day's journey. We will be crossing a lot of the Pacific and the international date line and the time change will mean that we will virtually lose Wednesday. I am very glad it is not Sunday so some of you won't have to miss church.

We will be in New Zealand on Wednesday and Thursday, next week, and then we will go on to Australia and very happily enjoy our visit there, I hope, from Thursday afternoon through Sunday.

³ The White House press office later explained that the President was actually referring to American Samoa.

We shall provide times and places for you when you leave this afternoon. To show you, we will visit Canberra, Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane, and Townsville before leaving Sunday, October 23, for Manila.

I will be at the Manila Conference, as you know. It is planned for Monday and Tuesday. I will be there until Wednesday. We shall leave the Philippines on early Thursday morning en route to Thailand. We will have 2 days in Thailand, 2 in Malaysia, plus 2 in

Korea. We will return to Washington via Alaska—another favorite State of mine I have not had a chance to visit since it came into the Union. I was there during the war period for a brief time.

We want and we hope now to be back home at 9 p.m. on Wednesday, November 2nd. I would not want to be held definitely to those hours, but that is our hope, and our plan, for your information and your planning.

President Johnson Confers With the Prime Minister of Laos

Following are statements made by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma of Laos and President Johnson at a news conference held during their informal discussions at New York, N.Y., on October 13.

PRIME MINISTER SOUVANNA PHOUMA

I am deeply honored to have been received today by President Johnson. This is our first meeting since President Johnson became President. I had had the honor to meet with him when he was here on the occasion of the state visit of His Majesty the King of Laos to the United States.

Reviewing our conversation, we have exchanged a number of viewpoints on the situation in Southeast Asia. Our conversation has been extremely cordial and I am very happy to note that President Johnson is very fully informed about what goes on in Indochina and what goes on in my own country.

Together we have tried to find possibilities to bring peace back to that part of the world. I believe personally that the settlement of the present problem cannot be

brought about by force of arms and that we must come as soon as possible to a conference, international in character, along the lines of the Geneva conference of 1954, perhaps with a much broader membership.

We have also discussed the recent tragedy we have sustained in Laos with the floods of the Mekong River and the great devastation it has brought to the country.

I am happy to hear that the Government of the United States is ready to assist us in recovering from the damage of the destruction.

I should now like to leave it to the President to give you any additional first-hand information.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON

My part of the discussion consisted of expressing regret that I did not get to see the Premier last year when we had a tentative arrangement to meet, because of my illness. I had to forgo that pleasure.

Second, I asked him for a rather full report on the flood damage as a result of the Mekong disasters. He went into some detail

of the loss of life—something in excess of 100—and the loss of values of the crops—something in excess of \$5 million. It was the worst flood disaster in 40 years in that country. I asked for his views on how he thought we could achieve peace in Southeast Asia and he is in the process of giving me his views at some length in the light of what is taking place there.

He has discussed the general picture in Indochina—that whole part of the world. I emphasized to the Premier the desire for the people of the United States to have a positive, affirmative policy. We do not seek to conquer anyone. We are not bent on conquest. We do not want to dominate any people. We have no desire for any American presence in that area any longer than is necessary to resist aggression. We have no desire to maintain any bases. We have stated and restated and restated our desire to transfer the activity from the battlefield to the conference table.

I reviewed generally our objectives and our hopes for the Manila Conference and asked for his views on any suggestion he might have that he would wish me to consider. I pointed out to him that it must be obvious to the aggressors that they cannot succeed. And it must be equally obvious that we have no desire and no intention to impose our will upon their people or to change their form of government or even their way of life; but that Ho Chi Minh and the people of Hanoi have absolute, complete, and full responsibility for carrying on the war every day that it is carried on; that we were willing to stop yesterday and go to the peace table.

I further pointed out that we hope that all the nations of the world will realize this and all of this country realize it.

I told him that those who desire peace in the world do not need to exercise any influence on us to get us to have unconditional discussion. So if they can divert their talents and energies to the aggressors and Mr. Ho Chi Minh—if they have any influence with him, maybe they can contribute to advancing the cause to which all of the American

people have so fully dedicated themselves.

The fact that we love peace and hate war doesn't mean for a moment that we are going to break our commitments or retreat in the face of aggression. We think the world must know that aggression will not succeed in Indochina, in that area of the world, and that it is not our desire or our intent to impose our political views on any people.

It is in the interest of every American family that aggression not succeed, that the United States' word be kept, that our commitments be fulfilled, and that the people of the world not misinterpret the raucous and rasping voices in various quarters as indicating (a) either we want to dominate the area or (b) that we will get tired.

As in the Dominican Republic, we are not going to let might make right and let the aggressor impose his will on liberty-loving people. But as soon as the people have a right to self-determination and they make that determination under a supervised election or honest, proper procedures, we will act promptly in accordance with our statements. I have assured the Premier we have no desire to expand the conflict in Viet-Nam. We hope to work positively with all nations toward stability in Southeast Asia.

I summarized briefly my hopes in the seven-nation conference coming up. I pointed out to the Premier that I welcomed his visit and this opportunity to talk with him. In the last several weeks I have been busily engaged with reviewing with all of the leaders in that area: President [Chung Hee] Park of Korea, representatives of Malaysia, representatives of Burma, Ne Win [Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the Union of Burma], President Marcos [Ferdinand E. Marcos, President of the Philippines], Prime Minister Holt [Harold E. Holt, Prime Minister of Australia], Prime Minister Holyoake [Keith Holyoake, Prime Minister of New Zealand]. I discussed these problems at some length with the Prime Minister of India and with the President of Pakistan. Most of these people have come to Washington, and most of them have come in the very recent days. I

have a general view of their attitude and their hopes and there is no substantial disagreement among us.

So far as the desire for peace is concerned, we believe that the peoples involved should be allowed to determine for themselves the type of government they should have.

I think we discussed some other technical, detailed problems about aid from other countries and about other matters affecting the internal affairs of this government. But that is about the complete summary.

President Johnson Meets With Thai Cabinet Ministers

White House Announcement

White House press release dated October 7

The President met today [October 7] with two distinguished statesmen from Thailand, Minister of National Development Pote Sarasin and Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman. The discussion centered on the economic development programs of Thailand.

Minister Pote Sarasin reviewed Thailand's rapid economic progress. Some 60 percent of the Thai budget is devoted to economic development.

The President made clear that the United States would continue to join with other interested countries in assisting the economic development of Thailand and noted that the soundness and effectiveness of Thai programs had resulted during the last 5 years in substantial participation by the World Bank and other nations. The President further indicated that the United States would continue to supply equipment and training to assist actions already undertaken by Thailand to stamp out insurgency instigated by outside forces.

The President repeated to the Thai Ministers that the United States continued to adhere fully to its commitments to Thailand

¹ For text of a communique dated Mar. 4, 1962, see BULLETIN of Mar. 26, 1962, p. 498.

under the Southeast Asia Treaty of 1954, ratified by the Senate, and reaffirmed that this treaty represented an individual obligation of the United States in accordance with its terms and as stated in the communique between Foreign Minister Thanat and Secretary Rusk in 1962.¹ The President made clear that these commitments had the full support of the American people, who recognized the firm Thai resolve to defend their own independence and freedom, and the major contribution Thailand was making to the security of the area.

Eugene Black on 10-Nation Trip To Discuss Asian Development

White House Announcement

White House press release dated October 18

At the request of President Johnson, Mr. Eugene R. Black is leaving October 26 on a visit to Asia, during which he will attend the inaugural meeting of the Asian Development Bank in Tokyo. He returns to Asia in his capacity as the President's special adviser on regional economic development.

The trip is part of the continuing consultation between Asians and ourselves. It was planned in advance of the invitation by Philippine President [Ferdinand E.] Marcos for the Chiefs of State conference in Manila, but it relates closely to those aspects of the Manila conference which focus on broad questions of long-range development and betterment throughout Asia. Mr. Black represents the President's keen interest in concrete proposals which can advance Asian living standards.

During his visit to more than 10 nations Mr. Black will discuss with Asian leaders and heads of international and regional organizations those policies and programs they consider most promising for rapid economic development and regional cooperation.

As the President's eyes and ears he will seek new and more effective ways for the

United States to support Asian initiatives and efforts to promote their common welfare.

Dr. Henry T. Heald, former President of the Ford Foundation, and Mr. Austin J. Tobin, Executive Director, the Port of New York Authority, will accompany Mr. Black and advise him on questions of education and transportation. Experts on Asian regional economic development from U.S. Government agencies will also accompany Mr. Black.

On his return he will report his findings to the President and to congressional leaders.

Letters of Credence

Argentina

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Argentine Republic, Alvaro Carlos Alsogaray, presented his credentials to President Johnson on October 3. For text of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated October 3.

Dominican Republic

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Dominican Republic, Héctor García Godoy, presented his credentials to President Johnson on October 3. For text of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated October 3.

Upper Volta

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Upper Volta, Paul Rouamba, presented his credentials to President Johnson on October 3. For text of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated October 3.

U.S., U.K., Germany Begin Talks on Central Europe Defense

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release dated October 11

I have appointed Mr. John J. McCloy as the United States Representative to the trilateral conversations to be held by the United States, the Federal German Republic, and the United Kingdom which were envisaged in the joint communique made by the President and Chancellor [Ludwig] Erhard on September 27.¹ It is understood that the other Representatives will be Dr. Karl Carstens for the German Federal Republic and Mr. George Thomson for the United Kingdom.

The three governments have invited Mr. Manlio Brosio, the Secretary General, to discuss with the group at its first meeting the ways in which its work could reinforce and assist NATO force planning already underway.

The purpose of these conversations is to undertake a searching reappraisal of the threat to security and—taking into account changes in military technology and mobility—of the forces required to maintain adequate deterrence and defense in Central Europe. The reappraisal will also deal with:

—equitable sharing of defense and other comparable burdens;

—the impact of troop deployments and force levels on the balance of payments of the United States and United Kingdom;

—the effect on the German economic and budgetary situation of measures designed to ameliorate balance of payments problems.

The first trilateral meeting will be held in Bonn, Germany, on October 20, 1966.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 17, 1966, p. 583.

The Kennedy Round: The Final Phase

by *W. Michael Blumenthal*

*Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations*¹

Since May 1963, when the ministers of participating countries first established the principles and procedures for the Kennedy Round, these negotiations have played a central role in the commercial policy field. Again and again, the governments of the principal world trading nations have underlined the dominant place which they accord to these GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] talks. The Dutch Government, indeed, has been one of those which has most consistently stressed this point. Queen Juliana, in her recent speech, stated that the government will "continue to strive for the success of the negotiations in the Kennedy Round. The EEC [European Economic Community] can make an important contribution to the expansion of world trade, which will in turn benefit the developing countries."

Other countries of the EEC have given equally firm support, and no meeting of the EFTA [European Free Trade Association] ministers has passed without urgent emphasis being given to these negotiations. In my own country, President Johnson has committed the full support of the U.S. Government to a successful conclusion of the Kennedy Round. Only last week in a message to Congress he reiterated the determination of the United States "to exert every effort" to lower trade barriers in the current round of negotiations in Geneva.²

¹ Address made before the annual meeting of the American Chamber of Commerce at Rotterdam, Netherlands, on Sept. 28.

² See p. 675.

This preoccupation with the Kennedy Round is not surprising. In the first place, it is a vastly more ambitious undertaking than any previous negotiation. Secondly, it comes at a time when there is much flux in commercial policy matters. For example, the final implementation of the Community's commercial policy and the present efforts of industrial countries to meet the demands of the developing countries for expanded export opportunity will certainly be closely related to the outcome of these negotiations. Third, there is a realization that success—or failure—in the Kennedy Round may have repercussions far beyond purely commercial or trade issues: on intra-European cooperation, Atlantic solidarity, relations between the developed and the developing countries, and perhaps even on the future of the EEC itself.

We have now reached the decisive point in the Kennedy Round—the point of no return. The big decisions will be taken in the next few months. And the stakes—for progress if we succeed or for retrogression if we fail—are high.

It is appropriate that we should be discussing the Kennedy Round here in Rotterdam, the world's largest port. The invigorating spirit of international trade is a tradition to the people of Rotterdam, as it is for the Netherlands as a whole. It is fitting that the motto of the city of Rotterdam should be "Stronger through struggle." The Netherlands also provides a good example of what the Kennedy Round can offer in the way of new export opportunity. Exports account for

roughly 30 percent of the gross national product. Last year, EFTA countries bought \$1.2 billion of Dutch products; the United States \$244 million. The EFTA countries and the United States together bought \$270 million of machinery, \$150 million of chemicals, \$75 million of textile yarn and fabrics, \$70 million of iron and steel products, and \$75 million of canned meats alone.

I dwell on the exports at stake in this negotiation because I suspect that here in the Netherlands, as in most other countries, including the United States, export interests are at times obscured by exaggerated fears about new import competition. There is a tendency for businessmen to be notoriously pessimistic when it comes to trade matters. It is not uncommon to hear producers on one side of the ocean forecasting imminent doom if tariffs are cut to import competition, while exporters of the same product on the other side of the ocean express no particular interest in seeing tariffs reduced. Exporters often hesitate to stand up and be counted when issues reach the critical phase, while protectionist groups do not, in most countries, seem to have the same inhibitions.

The point is that if only domestic producers concerned about imports are heard as to what can *not* be given, the interest of the exporter, dependent on reciprocity of trade benefits, is lost by default. Is it not in the interest of Dutch producers to see substantial tariff reductions abroad for such products as steel sheets, radios, or electric generators? What action on the part of the Community is needed to obtain these benefits? These are the kind of questions before us at Geneva in coming months. The answers need to be heard and require careful watching by businessmen in all countries.

Importance of Agricultural Discussions

The most important issue now being discussed in Geneva is agriculture. For certain participants, agricultural exports are a vital part of the total trade structure. Roughly a quarter of U.S. exports consist of agricultural products. The Netherlands, too, has substantial farm exports to the markets of

other major Kennedy Round participants: meat and dairy products, vegetables, cocoa, and indirectly such commodities as beer and cigars. To take account of these basic export sectors, it was agreed that the Kennedy Round would include agriculture as a necessary and integral part of the negotiations.

Nevertheless, agricultural discussions have lagged far behind the other areas of negotiation in the Kennedy Round. Partly this was because of the complexity of analyzing agricultural trade and the relevant factors of trade restriction by various countries. Partly this was because the EEC delayed making its Kennedy Round offers until its internal policy was substantially agreed upon. Partly it was because decisions pertaining to agricultural products are difficult and there is a tendency to postpone difficult decisions.

It was only 2 months ago that agricultural offers were tabled by the Community—at which time other major participants completed their existing offers. We are now engaged in the first stage of intensive multilateral and bilateral talks about these offers. It is not, therefore, appropriate for me to discuss here the details or substance of these talks. But one thing is certain: They are of vital importance; and the willingness and ability of all the major participants, including the EEC, to marshal the political will and the economic foresightedness to work out viable agreements may well determine whether the Kennedy Round can succeed.

How does the United States approach these negotiations in agriculture? We can only look at each offer from the viewpoint of our exporter back home—or with the same yardstick some of you, as exporters, undoubtedly use. How much duty and levies were paid before the Kennedy Round when exporting to the Community or some other export market? How much *less* will have to be paid after the Kennedy Round? If an exporter previously paid 20 percent duty at the border, and after the Kennedy Round he pays only 10 percent, this is something of value, and the United States is willing to reciprocate with offers of equal value. But if,

on the other hand, one levy at the border is reduced from 20 percent to 10 percent while a new form of tariff levy of 15 percent is added, the net result is that an exporter, instead of paying 20 percent as before, now would be paying 25 percent. This kind of "offer," obviously, is of no help to the exporter—he is worse off than when he started. Needless to say, such an "offer" would be unacceptable when drawing up the balance sheet in Geneva.

We recognize that in certain cases it may not be sufficient to deal only with protection at the border. We are attempting, for example, to negotiate a more comprehensive arrangement for trade in cereals. Whatever the scope of such arrangements, however, for an exporting country like the United States the yardstick of increased export opportunity must still remain the basic criterion in judging the value of proposed offers.

Concrete Reductions in Trade Barriers

This pragmatism of evaluating offers strictly from the viewpoint of the potential trade benefits should not seem strange to you. For businessmen, whether here in the Netherlands or in the United States or elsewhere, tend to look at their problems in this way. They measure what they gain and judge from that the value they can afford to give in return.

It is important to emphasize this point because Kennedy Round agricultural talks have for some time been encumbered by controversy over approach, theory, philosophy of agricultural protection, and other matters which are not directly related to an exporter's trading opportunities. This is not to deny that there are a number of fundamental issues relating to countries' policies of agricultural support and protection which should be dealt with. Some of these have been with us for a long time—but they are simply not the kind of issue that can be effectively handled within the scope and timing of the Kennedy Round. We must be more modest and attempt only what is practical and possible.

This is not to say, however, that offers

must remain modest. The United States has made a substantial offer and is prepared to indicate clearly for each agricultural commodity what particular benefits will be derived from it. We will likewise make calculations on the value of specific and definite offers by others. Where an internal policy or practice threatens to nullify a concession offered on border protection or where it imperils our trade with third markets, we will, of course, seek a commitment limiting the effects of that policy. Where our trading partners, on the other hand, wish to see our offers changed or improved for similar reasons and if there is a real trade interest for which these partners are willing to provide us with compensatory benefits, we will also be prepared to consider these requests.

This is the way we hope to negotiate the agricultural part of the Kennedy Round. Our results will not be judged by the lofty words in the preamble to an agreement but by the specific and concrete reductions in trade barriers that give new opportunity in export markets.

Tariff Cuts and Trade Benefits

While agriculture is the single most important issue on which we must concentrate at present, it is by no means the only one. In the industrial sector, there is the fundamental objective of an across-the-board tariff cut. Offers now on the table are in fact based on a 50 percent reduction in all tariffs with only a strictly "bare minimum" of exceptions for reasons of overriding national interest. The terms "bare minimum" and "overriding national interest" are of course elusive and it is futile even to try and define them. In the words of the distinguished Dutch philosopher Erasmus, "All definitions are dangerous." But the principle involved is nevertheless evident. Exceptions to the linear cut by each participant must be kept to those few cases where the inability to make the normal tariff reduction can be clearly justified.

The present status of offers, however, does not provide a comparable overall balance of trade benefits. The EFTA countries, for example, who enter the negotiations with

a significant trade deficit vis-a-vis their major trading partners, have put forward generally more attractive Kennedy Round offers than they are presently being offered in return. It will be a major task this fall for each participant to make those necessary improvements in its offers so as to achieve an overall balance at the highest possible level of tariff cuts. The alternative could be an unfortunate reduction of existing offers—a process which might easily accelerate in chain reaction fashion down to a least-common-denominator of trade benefits. I hope the less than satisfactory results of some past negotiations have taught us the danger of such a course.

Once again, I would urge that exporters keep a sharp eye on their particular interests in the Kennedy Round. Dutch exports to the United States, from organic chemicals to transistors and tulip bulbs, are all included in the Kennedy Round. But the outcome for each individual product depends on the ability to achieve an equitable balance for the negotiation as a whole. The particular interest at this point is identical with the general interest.

Nontariff Barriers

Another important aspect of the industrial negotiations I would like to mention is the field of nontariff barriers. It was agreed at the outset that a serious attempt would be made in the Kennedy Round to deal with some of these trade problems. We have begun work exploring ways to improve the regulations against international dumping. Some exporting countries have put special emphasis on the inconveniences of the American selling price system of customs valuation for certain chemical products. The United States has pointed to barriers against its exports of coal, the discriminatory impact of road taxes in several countries on American-built cars, and to other nontariff restrictions on its export sales.

The outcome of our talks in this difficult area will depend on the willingness of each participant to make contributions of real significance. No country is in a position to

act alone if an equal effort is not forthcoming on the part of others. An understanding of this basic fact is fundamental to any progress we hope to achieve in the nontariff-barrier field.

The Will To Lower Tariff Walls

We have now reached the final phase of the Kennedy Round. We are in fact already far behind schedule. The growing tariff discrimination between the EEC and EFTA, which it was hoped the Kennedy Round would mitigate, looms larger with each succeeding step of internal reductions.

The impatient challenge of the developing countries remains unanswered, and the second UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development] conference, scheduled to take place in the summer of next year, will pass critical judgment on the ability of the industrial countries to act together in the Kennedy Round to stimulate and encourage exports of developing countries. Finally, the 5-year authority granted by the U.S. Congress to the President in the path-breaking Trade Expansion Act expires next June 30.³ It would prove discouraging testimony of the will to carry out the objectives unanimously agreed to over 3 years ago if we returned emptyhanded. Worse, it could set in motion a backlash of protectionist sentiment, with perhaps a new wave of trade-restricting demands.

Decisions taken between now and early next spring will spell the measure of our achievement in the Kennedy Round. At this point we are hopeful that the necessary decisions will be taken to make this joint undertaking a genuine success. The United States, certainly, will not be found lacking. And the determination of other participants should in their own self-interest be equally forthcoming.

When I consider what is at stake in these coming months, I am reminded of the words of the American poet Robert Frost:

³ For a summary of the Trade Expansion Act, see *ibid.*, Oct. 29, 1962, p. 656.

Before I built a wall I'd ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offense.

Unfortunately, tariff walls were often erected without sufficient regard as to what was being walled in or walled out. But this remains the question today when we make our major effort to lower these walls which separate national economies and inhibit commerce between them. And it is our responsibility in coming months to find the means, the will, and the political courage to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion.

President Reports to Congress on Trade Agreements Program

Letter of Transmittal

To the Congress of the United States:

This is the tenth annual report on the Trade Agreements Program, as required by section 402(a) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. It covers calendar year 1965.

World trade in 1965 surpassed all previous levels, enriching the lives of peoples around the globe. Record levels of United States foreign trade contributed greatly to this advance, and the American people shared fully in its benefits.

However, the successes of 1965 also served to dramatize the vast unrealized potential of the world market and the importance of moving forward with the Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations, the great multilateral endeavor to generate more rapid growth in trade. Recently, the pace of these talks has intensified. The major participants have shown renewed determination to conclude an agreement. The United States will continue to exert every effort to assure that these negotiations yield extensive reductions in restraints on trade in all classes of goods, including agricultural products.

The steady growth and freer flow of world trade are essential to full prosperity at home, economic growth and stability in the industrialized countries, and progress in the de-

veloping world. We shall do everything in our power to build in future years on the substantial progress in these directions achieved in 1965.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE, *September 20, 1966.*

President Hails OECD Progress

Following is the text of a message from President Johnson to Thorvald Kristensen, Secretary General, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, marking the fifth anniversary of the OECD, September 30.

SEPTEMBER 28, 1966

DEAR MR. SECRETARY-GENERAL: The fifth anniversary of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development is a proud day for all mankind. It reminds us of the great strides all member nations have made in building their own economies and strengthening the bonds of international cooperation which are so vital to lasting prosperity.

But this day should also remind us of the challenge of the future. Most of the world's peoples still live in the shadow of hunger and disease. Many still face a future dark with deprivation and shorn of hope. The spectre of violence born of want is still to be banished from the earth. Until we have eliminated these ancient adversaries, none of our accomplishments will be secure.

We have learned much in the past five years. Most important, perhaps, we have learned the power of unity, of a common approach to common problems. This will be our strength in the future as it has been in the past. I know that the OECD will play its part in shaping the cooperative efforts necessary to meet our responsibilities to the hundreds of millions whose destinies hang in the balance. You may be assured of our strong and continuing support.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

East-West Trade Policy in a Balanced Strategy for Peace

by Joseph A. Greenwald¹

In his European policy speech last Friday, President Johnson described our task of reconciliation with the East as "a shift from the narrow concept of coexistence to the broader vision of peaceful engagement."² The subject I will be speaking about today—expanded East-West trade—is one of the main tools we can use in working toward the objective set by the President.

Our East-West trade policy is part of our balanced strategy for peace. On the one hand, we will continue to defend freedom in Southeast Asia and to demonstrate that Communist aggression does not pay.

But at the same time we must be prepared to take advantage of all opportunities to widen the areas of peaceful association with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

The underlying concept of flexibility and differentiation in our policy toward the Communist world calls for a special effort to achieve public understanding and support. It requires a greater degree of sophistication than some other aspects of United States foreign policy. This applies particularly to the field of trade. Since decisions to buy and sell are in the hands of individuals under our private enterprise system, a policy of expanding East-West trade can be effective

only if businessmen, as well as consumers, understand and accept it.

The obvious question is: Why should we trade with any of the Communist nations when they are supporting the forces shooting at Americans, South Vietnamese, Australians, and others? President Johnson answered on Friday. Speaking of the need to work with the East to build a lasting peace, he said: "We do not intend to let our differences on Viet-Nam or elsewhere prevent us from exploring all opportunities."

Another answer to this question lies in the nature of the Communist world as we see it today. What we once knew as the Sino-Soviet bloc is no longer the monolith of Stalin's time. We know that today there are deep and bitter differences among these countries. It is no longer axiomatic that Moscow's word will be followed blindly by all of the faithful followers throughout the world. On the contrary, we find daily evidence that each of the Communist countries increasingly pursues its own national interests. It is to our advantage in this situation to deal with these countries in accordance with our own national interest—and not in accordance with an outdated concept of a Sino-Soviet bloc of a decade ago.

Finally, we do not ignore the commercial benefits from expanding trade.

Thus, as a part of our continuous search for areas of agreement with the East, as a part of the effort to balance resistance to aggression in South Viet-Nam with a peace-serving move in another part of the world, and as part of our general program of trade expansion, Secretary of State Rusk, acting

¹ Made at Syracuse, N.Y., on Oct. 11 before a tricity world trade meeting sponsored by the Foreign Trade Club of Syracuse (press release 240). Mr. Greenwald is Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Trade Policy and Economic Defense.

² For text of President Johnson's address at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 7, see BULLETIN of Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.

on the President's instructions, submitted the East-West Trade Relations Act to the Congress on May 11 of this year.³ He asked the Congress to provide the President with the authority necessary to negotiate commercial agreements with the Soviet Union and other nations of Eastern Europe to widen our trade in peaceful goods, when such agreements will serve the interests of the United States. The President last Friday affirmed that the administration intends to press for passage of the proposed legislation.

Both Republican and Democratic administrations have favored expanding trade with Eastern Europe. In 1958, for example, President Eisenhower made it clear that "the United States favors the expansion of peaceful trade with the Soviet Union" and spoke of the importance of trade as a means of strengthening the possibilities for independent actions by the countries of Eastern Europe.⁴

The United States is not alone in seeking to improve relations with the Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe. Last June, after the meeting of the foreign ministers of the North Atlantic alliance in Brussels, Secretary Rusk reported that all the members of NATO have observed signs of evolution in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union—evolution toward national autonomy, less harsh internal discipline, and the restoration of more normal relations between the peoples of Eastern Europe and those of the West.

Most of the responsible statesmen of the North Atlantic community recognized, the Secretary said, that the facts of the world situation require that NATO remain strong and alert. At the same time, he said, "they agree that every effort must be made to improve East-West relations and to solve or blunt East-West disputes . . ."⁵

Before President Johnson decided to seek East-West trade legislation, he had the matter studied intensively by a group of American business, labor, and academic leaders. The committee was chaired by J. Irwin Miller, chairman of the board of the Cummins

Engine Company. In its report in 1965, the Miller committee concluded that the United States, having protected itself by a secure and adequate defense, can prudently seek practical means of reducing areas of conflict with the Soviet Union.⁶ The committee advocated the use of trade in peaceful and non-strategic items as a policy instrument.

The committee said:

Trade cannot settle the major outstanding issues between ourselves and the Communists, nor can it, by itself, accomplish a basic change in the Communist system. Over time, however, trade negotiations and trade relations can provide us with useful opportunities to influence attitudes in these countries in directions favorable to our national interest.

Provisions of the Proposed Legislation

The proposed East-West Trade Relations Act is based on the recommendations of the Miller committee. It would give the President positive tools to accompany existing laws which use the negative power of trade denial—the Export Control Act, the Battle Act, the restrictive provisions of other laws—to prevent trade from strengthening the Communist regimes militarily. These existing laws deny to the Communist regimes items of strategic and military value and they will continue in effect. What we propose in the East-West Trade Relations Act is to reduce the barriers to trade in nonstrategic goods.

The main provisions of the proposed legislation would authorize the President to extend most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treatment to certain individual Communist countries instead of the very high rates of the 1930 Smoot-Hawley tariff. In other words, the President could apply the same tariff duties to individual Communist countries that are now applicable to all other

³ For background and text of the proposed legislation, see *ibid.*, May 30, 1966, p. 838.

⁴ For text of President Eisenhower's letter of July 14, 1958, to Premier Khrushchev, see *ibid.*, Aug. 4, 1958, p. 200.

⁵ For Secretary Rusk's address at Denver, Colo., on June 14, see *ibid.*, July 11, 1966, p. 44.

⁶ For text of the committee's report, see *ibid.*, May 30, 1966, p. 845.

countries. The authority could be exercised only in a commercial agreement with a particular country in which such MFN treatment would be granted in return for equivalent benefits to the United States.

We would seek through these commercial agreements to find ways to make it easier to carry on East-West business transactions.

Problems of interest to American businessmen could be dealt with under the consultation procedures or in the periodic negotiations to be provided for in agreements under the proposed act.

Any agreement would be limited to 3 years but could be renewed for periods not to exceed 3 years each. Any agreement could be suspended or terminated at any time on reasonable notice. MFN treatment would apply only while an agreement was in effect. The President would be directed to suspend or terminate MFN treatment whenever he determined that the other party was no longer fulfilling its obligations under the agreement or that the suspension or termination was in the national interest.

The act would apply only with regard to European Communist countries. It would not apply to Cuba, Communist China, North Korea, and North Viet-Nam, and the Soviet Zone of Germany. Existing laws and regulations will assure that no benefits of the act will be made available to these areas. Poland and Yugoslavia now receive most-favored-nation treatment under the Trade Expansion Act, and they could continue to do so.

Prospects for Trade With Eastern Europe

But even with passage of the requested legislation and conclusion of commercial agreements with a number of countries, what are the actual prospects for more trade between the United States and Eastern Europe?

In recent years, United States trade with those countries has grown relatively little compared with the growth of total U.S. trade and compared with the growth of trade between other industrial countries and Eastern Europe. Last year U.S. exports to Eastern

Europe and the Soviet Union totaled \$139 million, and U.S. imports from those countries were valued at \$137 million. In 1964 U.S. exports to those countries totaled \$340 million, but that was a year of unusually large shipments of wheat and other grains. In contrast, total free world exports to these Communist countries (excluding Yugoslavia) in 1965 reached \$6 billion, and free-world imports from them totaled approximately the same amount. The Netherlands and Sweden each did more business with the Communist countries of Eastern Europe last year than the United States did.

For a number of reasons, we would not expect a sudden huge expansion of United States trade with Eastern Europe to result from East-West trade legislation and conclusion of commercial agreements. This trade historically has not been large. The availability of Eastern European goods that will find a market in the United States is a real constraint on a sizable growth in trade. Although there need not be a strict bilateral balance in their trade with the United States, the Eastern European countries will have to sell in the United States to earn some of the foreign exchange with which to pay for American products.

Another constraint, despite the Soviet theme that trade should not be affected by "differences in economic and social systems," is the fact that we do have different trading systems and it will take time before marketing techniques both ways are understood and mastered. One difficulty is the limited contact between U.S. businessmen and plant managers in Communist countries. Another is the lack of clear-cut protection for U.S. industrial property rights. There is also difficulty in identifying and providing information on products and technology which might be of interest to U.S. firms.

But we should not consider that this is a permanent state of affairs. In almost all the countries of Eastern Europe an active search is under way for means to overcome the inefficiencies and lack of incentives in the economy which are depressing growth rates and retarding improvement in standards of liv-

ing. Plans for overcoming these obstacles are being advanced in almost every country of the area. The plans usually call for rationalization of investments, introduction of new incentive systems based on profits, an increase in the autonomy of enterprises, and an increase in trade with the West. The tremendous economic success of the United States and Western Europe since World War II is exerting an irresistible pull on the economists and planners of the East, just as Western standards of living sharpen the dissatisfaction of Eastern European consumers with the results of their own systems.

The experience of Yugoslavia has been closely studied by the other Eastern European countries. Immediately after the break with the Cominform in 1948 Yugoslavia dismantled its central apparatus for planning and controlling the economy, giving its individual enterprises substantial autonomy in their own management. The remaining structure of central governmental controls over investment, foreign currency transactions, etc., was intended to be temporary and, with some hesitations, has been steadily reduced. An economic reform introduced in July of 1965 was intended, over a period of adjustment, to open the Yugoslav economy to competition from outside producers, to force Yugoslav enterprises to prove their viability in competition on the world market, and to integrate Yugoslavia more closely with the free world economic system. The transformation of the Yugoslav economy is well symbolized by their acceptance last August as a full contracting party to the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]—an international trade instrument designed primarily to govern trade relations among countries with market economies.

It is reasonable to expect a moderate and gradual growth in U.S.—Eastern European trade. It is increasingly evident that the Eastern Europeans, including the Soviets, are intent on acquiring more advanced equipment and technology. Moreover, as their national economies turn more and more to consumer needs and desires, they will become more attractive markets. One impressive ex-

ample is the recent agreement of the Fiat Company of Italy to build an \$800 million factory in the Soviet Union to make compact cars for the Russians. In connection with this, inquiries have been made of U.S. companies which may lead to substantial sales of U.S. automotive equipment and services to Fiat for the Soviet plant. President Johnson in his October 7 speech announced that the Export-Import Bank is prepared to finance American exports for this plant. Other Western European countries are building or expect to build factories in Eastern Europe to produce a wide range of goods.

Two additional steps to facilitate expansion of U.S.—Eastern European trade were announced by the President on October 7. One was his signing of a determination that will allow the Export-Import Bank to guarantee commercial credits to Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. This already was possible for Yugoslavia and Romania. The other was a decision, details of which the Commerce Department will shortly announce, to reduce export controls on East-West trade with respect to approximately 400 nonstrategic items.

These recent actions by the President and passage of the proposed East-West trade legislation should result in a higher level of trade. While the total still would be a very small percentage of U.S. world trade, it would be important to individual industries and businesses, to farmers, and to many firms providing the services to facilitate exports and imports.

Trade Can Convey Ideas

But would increased two-way peaceful trade between the United States and Eastern European countries really have significant effect on the general policies and attitudes of these countries?

We should not expect miracles from trade, but greater exchanges of goods and increased contacts of persons involved in trade could help to bridge the gaps between us and the nations of Eastern Europe. Trade can convey ideas. Through trade and the contacts which it requires, we can communicate to

others some additional elements of our national personality and philosophy and our hopes for peace. The articles of trade can transmit specifically and perhaps more convincingly than the most powerful radio station some idea of our marvelous productivity—the rich variety and efficiency and consumer orientation of our output. Perhaps we can also transmit, through trade, the idea of our own system's basic reliance on a framework of economic incentives and rewards.

As with all trade relations, it must be a two-way street. If we believe that expanded East-West trade is an essential part of our balanced strategy for dealing with Communist countries, if we want to sell more of our farm and factory output to the Eastern Europeans, if we want them to invest some of their scarce economic resources in producing peaceful specialties for our consumers, then we will have to buy from them. In the case of Communist countries, we all have a special problem of consumer education.

There is a small but active minority which apparently believes it is unpatriotic to buy from or sell to any Communist country. Some individuals and small groups, such as self-appointed "Committees to Warn of the Arrival of Communist Merchandise on the Local Scene," have tried through boycotts, threats of economic reprisals, and other methods to block legal trade in goods from Communist countries. The targets of their intimidation have ranged from small shops to supermarket chains and multimillion-dollar corporations. The goods that aroused their wrath have varied from Christmas tree ornaments and hams from Poland, and vases and ashtrays from Czechoslovakia, to baskets and tobacco from Yugoslavia. Similarly, pressure has occasionally been brought on companies not to sell to Communist countries.

Are these Americans advancing the interests of the United States? The Government of the United States does not believe so. We think they are harming the United States national interest by obstructing a foreign policy that has been developed by four administrations since World War II. We think they are still living in the late 1940's and the early 1950's—not the middle of the 1960's. We think they are out of step.

In the past, we have been able to act with sufficient flexibility to meet changing situations and exploit new opportunities. Now the situation has changed and opportunities are arising, but in our view we do not have enough authority to act flexibly in our own interest.

As we see it, it now makes good sense for this nation with its enormous economic strength and its economic involvement in every part of the non-Communist world, to use trade as an effective tool to advance our relations with the countries of Eastern Europe.

Senator Magnuson has said of the proposed East-West Trade Relations Act that "few bills can ever hope to rival this one in its potential for contributing to the peace and stability of the world in what is left of the 20th century." He urged that we look at the Communist world as it exists in actuality today, not as it took shape in our fears of 10 or 20 or 30 years ago.

Today there is no longer a monolithic Soviet bloc—nor is there a Sino-Soviet bloc. Growing appreciation of the significance of this fact should increase popular acceptance of the general proposition that an expansion of peaceful trade with the nations of Eastern Europe would serve the purposes of peace and, thus, the national interest of the United States.

U.S.—Japan Scientific Committee Holds Sixth Annual Meeting

The U.S.—Japan Committee on Scientific Cooperation held its sixth annual meeting at Washington, D.C., October 10–13. Following are a Department of State announcement of the meeting, messages from President Johnson and Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, and opening remarks by Secretary Rusk, together with the text of the joint communique issued at the close of the meeting.

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT, OCTOBER 7

Press release 237 dated October 7

The sixth meeting of the U.S.—Japan Committee on Scientific Cooperation will be held at the Department of State on October 10–13, 1966. Distinguished scientists of the two countries are members of this Committee, which was established in 1961 as one of three high-level U.S.—Japan consultative bodies.

In the course of its annual meetings, held alternately in Washington and Tokyo, the Science Committee has recommended cooperative activities to promote exchanges of scholars, scientific information and materials, and education in the sciences, and to encourage joint research projects in earth sciences of the Pacific area, biological and medical sciences, hurricanes and typhoons, and pesticides.¹

At the coming meeting, the Committee will review the progress in these fields during the past year, hear special presentations by American and Japanese scientists on aspects of their work, and consider possible addi-

tional fields for cooperative research. It will also consider a report on the overall cooperative science program that has been carried out with the support of the two Governments since the Committee was established 5 years ago.

The United States delegation, headed by Dr. Harry C. Kelly, dean of the faculty, North Carolina State University, includes: Dr. H. Stanley Bennett, director, The Laboratories for Cell Biology, University of Chicago; Dr. Detlev W. Bronk, president, The Rockefeller Institute; Dr. Caryl P. Haskins, president, Carnegie Institution; Dr. Gordon J. F. MacDonald, member, President's Science Advisory Committee; Gerard Piel, publisher, Scientific American; Dr. Edward M. Purcell, professor of physics, Harvard University; Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, dean of science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Dr. Kankuro Kaneshige, professor emeritus, Tokyo University, is chairman of the Japanese delegation. Other members are: Dr. Shiro Akabori, president, Osaka University; Dr. Seiji Kaya, professor emeritus, Tokyo University; Dr. Masao Kotani, professor, Osaka University; Dr. Toshio Kurokawa, director, Cancer Institute Hospital, Japanese Foundation for Cancer Research; Dr. Takashi Mukaibo, professor, Tokyo University; Kiyoshi Okano, councilor, Higher Education and Science Bureau, Ministry of Education; Masao Sawaki, counselor, Embassy of Japan; Dr. Yusuke Sumiki, professor emeritus, Tokyo University; Hiroshi Yashiki, director, Promotion Bureau, Science and Technology Agency.

¹ For text of joint communique issued at the close of the fourth annual meeting, see BULLETIN of July 13, 1964, p. 61.

President Johnson

On the occasion of this sixth meeting, and after a half-decade of close working relationships, it is clear that the United States and Japan have established, through their Committee on Scientific Cooperation, a new path for cooperation between nations. This has been a truly joint program—in effort, in funds, and in scientific dedication. The research under the Committee has been proposed and carried out by individuals acting on behalf of their professional interest and public conscience.

Science and technology are vital ingredients in the continued growth of all nations, developed and developing, and in the search for a better life for all men. This Committee has advanced that cause. I believe that there is no practical limit to what free men, acting together with initiative, resolution, and responsibility, can accomplish. I ask the Joint Committee to accept my congratulations for a successful program, and I join with you in your high hopes for the future.

Prime Minister Sato

I send my greetings and best wishes to all the participants in the sixth meeting of the U.S.—Japan Committee on Scientific Cooperation.

As you all know, this Committee was set up 5 years ago by the late President Kennedy and Prime Minister [Hayato] Ikeda, and together with the Committees on Trade and Economic Affairs and Culture and Education, is one of the main focal points for U.S.—Japan collaboration and cooperation.

It is highly gratifying to note the progress that has been made by the dedicated scientists of both countries in this area of joint effort during the past 5 years.

On behalf of the Government and the people of Japan, I wish to extend our wholehearted support and encouragement to the work of this most important Committee, and

² Read to the opening session of the Committee.

to express the hope that this work will continue to promote the cause of peace and welfare for all mankind.

**REMARKS BY SECRETARY RUSK,
OCTOBER 10**

It is a very special pleasure for me to greet the sixth meeting of the United States—Japan Committee on Scientific Cooperation and to welcome our friends from Japan. I am also pleased that today is the day on which—indeed just 30 minutes ago—we inducted into office our new Ambassador to Japan, Mr. Alexis Johnson. As many of you know, my close associations with the scientific community in Japan as well as in the United States go back many years, and they have intensified my interest as Secretary of State in the work of this joint Committee. Your Committee has done its full share to justify the confidence in the value of closer working relationships between our two countries, expressed by the late Prime Minister Ikeda and the late President Kennedy in June 1961, reaffirmed by Prime Minister Ikeda and President Johnson in November 1963, and reiterated by Prime Minister Sato and President Johnson last year.³

It has been my privilege to serve as Chairman of the American delegation to all five meetings of the U.S.—Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs. These have helped both Governments to understand better and to deal effectively with many mutual problems both between our two countries and in relations with others. The most recent meeting of that Committee was in July of this year in the historic city of Kyoto.⁴ I came away from it and from my talks in Tokyo with Prime Minister Sato with a feeling that we had achieved the genuine partnership on the basis of equality that has been our goal. The rise of the new Japan as a great democratic nation has been very gratifying to the American people. We have admired your remarkable economic vitality

³ For background, see BULLETIN of July 10, 1961, p. 57, and Feb. 1, 1965, p. 133.

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1966, p. 177.

and we have been pleased to see Japan undertake a widening range of constructive activities in the affairs of free Asia and of the free world as a whole.

During the last few years I have witnessed with keen satisfaction the growth of cultural contacts and scientific cooperation between Japan and the United States. Under the aegis of your Committee scientific cooperation has developed from an idea through experimental arrangements to maturity. The importance of the U.S.—Japan program for scientific cooperation is today beyond question in both nations. The many joint projects, under eight panels, attest to the vitality of your undertaking; and they extend beyond scientific curiosity, important as that is, to concern for the general welfare, as is indicated by your consideration of joint studies of means of predicting earthquakes and tropical storms.

I understand that during this meeting you will review a report on your Committee's activities over the past 5 years. I do not wish to preempt your own evaluation of your progress, but I am confident that your record will stand as a guide to effective bilateral scientific cooperation.

This time of review and evaluation is also an appropriate time to look ahead to further challenges and opportunities. Science and technology are an essential part of man's restless search of himself and his world. As this search continues to gather momentum—and it will—we must look to the inclusion of the next generation of scientists as contributors to expanding investigative endeavors and we must continue to be on the alert for additional promising areas for joint scientific efforts. And we must, above all, approach the future with a confidence which is justified by 5 years of growing achievement.

In science and technology, as in other fields, we are proud to have such a strong and talented partner as Japan. And we believe that our partnership can be increasingly useful not only to both of our countries but in building a peaceful world and furthering the well-being of all mankind. Indeed, one of the special responsibilities which the United

States and Japan bear, and perhaps bear together, is to assist a good many nations and a good many people to enter the scientific world in a sense in which they have not yet been able to enter it.

For the truth is that in the field of science we are dealing with a genuine international community. There is no such thing as American science or Japanese science. The building blocks of knowledge are put in place by thoughtful and inquiring men whose minds reach out beyond their own national borders, both to take and to receive. There is no branch of knowledge which does not reflect this comradeship of mind and spirit.

And so, Mr. Chairman, Dr. Kelly, Dr. Kaneshige, in your labors together in this Committee you are spinning a few more of the infinity of threads which bind peace together. Thank you, sir.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE, OCTOBER 13

The Sixth Meeting of the United States—Japan Committee on Scientific Cooperation was held at the Department of State, Washington, D.C., October 10–13, 1966. Dr. Harry C. Kelly, Head of the United States Delegation, and Dr. Kankuro Kaneshige, Head of the Japanese Delegation, served as Co-Chairmen.

At the outset of this meeting, marking the fifth anniversary of the establishment of the cooperative program, the Committee was welcomed by Secretary Rusk and Ambassador [Ryuji] Takeuchi and received messages of commendation and encouragement from President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato.

The Committee reviewed and approved a report, which is to be published later this year in English and in Japanese, detailing its overall activities in the past five years. The Committee noted that these cooperative efforts have produced significant and valuable scientific results, that the number of participating scientists from Japan and the United States has increased steadily, and that scientists from other countries also have participated in some of the program activities. All of these cooperative endeavors also exemplify the meaningful contribution which scientific cooperation can make to the promotion of international friendship and understanding.

The Committee expressed satisfaction upon receiving reports of progress from panels in each of the following eight areas of cooperation:

- (1) Exchange of Scholars
- (2) Exchange of Scientific Information and Materials

- (3) Earth Sciences of the Pacific Area
- (4) Biological Sciences
- (5) Medical Sciences
- (6) Education in the Sciences
- (7) Hurricane and Typhoon Research
- (8) Research on Pesticides

Some of the important findings of work accomplished under the program were presented by participating scientists at a symposium held on October 12 at the National Academy of Sciences.

In addition to the joint research projects already underway, the Committee agreed to explore, by means of joint survey seminars or coordinated inquiries by specialists of both countries, the possibilities of designating the following as new fields of cooperation: (1) solid state physics, (2) mathematical economics, (3) urban engineering, (4) cell biology, and (5) studies of ancient contacts between Japan and Peru. The Co-Chairmen were asked to determine at a later date which of the above subjects should be recommended to their respective governments as new fields for cooperation.

The next meeting of the Committee will be held in Tokyo in June or July, 1967.

Philippine Veterans Benefits Signed Into Law

Following is a statement by President Johnson upon signing H.R. 16330 and H.R. 16367 on September 30, together with his statement at a ceremony on October 11 marking the signing of H.R. 16557.

STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 30

I have today signed H.R. 16330 and H.R. 16367, two bills dealing with Philippine veterans benefits.

When President Marcos of the Philippines visited Washington several weeks ago, I had the honor and pleasure of a frank and friendly exchange of views with him on national and international developments.¹

Out of these talks came a greater understanding of several issues, including the matter of benefits to Philippine veterans of World War II. I stated my strong hope that

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 10, 1966, p. 526.

legislation dealing with this subject would be enacted quickly by Congress.

Congress responded promptly and generously and the two bills I sign today are another milestone in the continuing saga of U.S.-Philippine cooperation and friendship.

H.R. 16367 will extend the benefits of the War Orphans Educational Assistance program to the children of those Commonwealth Army and "New" Philippine Scouts veterans who died or were permanently and totally disabled while serving with the Armed Forces of the United States. These Philippine children will be entitled to receive payments to pursue their education for up to 36 months.

The future of a nation is determined by the capabilities of its youth. I believe this bill will assist the Philippines in building a bright and promising future.

H.R. 16330 extends and enlarges the present U.S. program of hospital and medical care for Philippine veterans. The present program will be extended to June 1973. Out-patient care will be provided for "New" Philippine Scouts as well as Commonwealth Army veterans who have service-connected disabilities. Veterans with non-service-connected disabilities will now be able to get hospital care if they are unable to pay for treatment.

This bill also provides funds for one of the finest medical facilities in the Far East, the Veterans Memorial Hospital near Manila. That Hospital, operated by the Government of the Philippines, was built and equipped by the United States for the benefit of Philippine veterans.

I am especially pleased with the provision of this bill which provides funds for the education and training of medical personnel and for medical research at the Memorial Hospital. This is in keeping with America's commitment to join with the Philippines in an alliance to fight disease and to improve the health standards of the people.

These two bills are the direct result of the deliberations of the Joint United States-Republic of the Philippines Commission for the Study of Philippine Veterans Problems. I

would like to express my gratitude to all the members of that Commission, especially General George Decker, the Chairman of the U.S. participants, and Congressman Olin E. Teague, the Vice-Chairman, who presided so ably over the proceedings during the illness of General Decker.

STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 11

White House press release dated October 11

Chairman Teague, Administrator Driver [William J. Driver, Administrator, Veterans Administration], Members of Congress, ladies and gentlemen:

When President Marcos of the Philippines visited us a short time ago, he talked to me about a number of inequities and injustices which the passage of time had brought to our Filipino allies. I urged the Congress to correct these unintentional inequities as promptly as they could.

The Congress responded wholeheartedly. So today we have come here to sign the last of three measures enacted by the Congress since President Marcos' visit to deal with these inequities.

The first act expands educational benefits for children of diseased and disabled war veterans; the second provides greater hospital and medical benefits for Filipino veterans.

But this act, I think, is by far the most far-reaching.

This measure deals specifically with two matters of importance to Filipino veterans. It will enable us to refund to them wartime insurance premiums, which they need not have paid but which were collected in error during those hectic and confusing days of the Second World War. It will also restore to them the full amount of benefits that were originally intended in 1946.

Due to changes over the years in the relative value of the Philippine peso and the U.S. dollar, their actual benefits have been greatly reduced. This measure allows us to restore the cash value of their benefits to what was intended by the original legislation.

This bill, like the two which came before it, is the direct result of the very fine work done by the Joint United States–Republic of the Philippines Commission on the Study of Philippine Veterans Problems.

I would like to publicly express my personal appreciation to all the fine members of that Commission, especially to General George Decker, the Chairman of the U.S. participants, and my old friend Congressman Olin E. Teague, Vice Chairman, for their leadership and dedicated efforts.

I also want to mention three distinguished lawmakers who were instrumental in making this legislation a reality: Senator Mike Mansfield, Senator Jennings Randolph, and our own beloved House Majority Leader Carl Albert, who cannot be with us this morning because he is indisposed at the Bethesda Hospital.

The relationship between the United States and our friends in the Philippines is both warm and historic. Twenty-five years ago we shared together the shock of violent aggression. Together, we persevered through the long night of war until we emerged—together—into the hard-won sunlight of victory and peace. We are very pleased to find ourselves united again today in our determination to secure a true and a lasting peace among all of our fellow nations of the Pacific.

Our mutual search for peace among our neighbors must always rest to a very large degree upon the trust and confidence we have in one another. I am especially pleased to sign this measure today because, in addition to its tangible benefits to many thousands of deserving and patriotic Filipino veterans, I believe that it forges still another link in the strong chain of friendship which unites our two Republics:

I am looking forward, along with Mrs. Johnson, with a great deal of pleasure to visiting in the Philippines in the next few days. We will apply all of the talent, energy, and efforts that we have in an attempt to bring together the united spirit that is necessary if we are to have peace in the world.

To all of you Members of Congress, from both parties, who have participated in pass-

ing this very just and long overdue legislation, I say the American people not only thank you but the Filipino people thank you. We are grateful for another job well done.

U.S., Mexico To Join in Solving Rio Grande Salinity Problem

Following is a statement made by President Johnson on September 19 upon signing the act (Public Law 89-584) authorizing conclusion of an agreement with Mexico for joint measures for solution of the lower Rio Grande salinity problem, together with the text of a telegram he sent on that day to President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz of Mexico.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

White House press release dated September 19

I proudly sign legislation authorizing a joint project with our sister Republic of Mexico for the solution of the salinity problem in the lower Rio Grande.

This is another example of how good neighbors solve common problems. Within the past few years, our two countries have already resolved the Chamizal border dispute at El Paso and have taken measures to resolve the salinity problem on the Colorado River.

Now we will undertake a new joint effort on the salinity problem of the lower Rio Grande.

Today the saline waters of the lower Rio Grande prevent attaining the potential abundance of over 1 million acres of fertile land on both sides of the border. We cannot afford this needless waste. We need not.

The peoples of the United States and Mexico have united in a joint venture to develop the border together. The International Boundary and Water Commission, made up of representatives from the two countries, was created to resolve common problems and to help develop fully the bountiful resources on both sides of the border. This organization has proposed a canal to convey practically all

the saline waters from a Mexican irrigation district—now reaching the lower Rio Grande—directly to the Gulf of Mexico. That proposal is embodied in the legislation I am about to sign.

Once this project is completed, the brackish waters will no longer damage seedlings, citrus fruits, and vegetables. That water will be conveyed directly to the sea. The Rio Grande will again become free from harmful concentration of salts so damaging to agriculture on both sides of the border.

In this spirit of cooperative endeavor both countries will share equally in the cost of the international project. Each will contribute \$690,000. Also, local people in the United States benefiting most directly from this project will share equally with their Government in paying for it. They have already raised and deposited in the Treasury nearly 90 percent of their share. I commend these fine people for their initiative, cooperation, and confidence.

I also commend the many Members of Congress who have made this project a reality. I especially commend my friends from Texas, Senator [Ralph W.] Yarborough and Congressman [Eligio] de la Garza, who so effectively sponsored it.

I am informing my very good friend President Diaz Ordaz of Mexico of the favorable action by the Congress. We jointly announced last December the recommendation of the International Boundary and Water Commission for the solution of this problem.¹ Today we can both rejoice that the solution will soon become a reality.

TEXT OF TELEGRAM

White House press release dated September 19

His Excellency

GUSTAVO DIAZ ORDAZ

President of the United Mexican States

Once again I have the pleasure to inform you of the enactment and approval of legislation of great interest to both our countries.

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 24, 1966, p. 118.

You will recall you joined with me last December in announcing the recommendations of the International Boundary and Water Commission for a solution of the salinity problem on the lower Rio Grande. The United States Congress has quickly approved these recommendations by passing legislation to authorize the proposed international project.

I believe that the Commission is to be congratulated on having arrived at so equitable and satisfactory a solution. This project, now to be undertaken jointly by our two Governments, is still another notable achievement in our cooperative efforts to resolve common border problems.

Mrs. Johnson and I send our warmest regards to you and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Ambassador Bunker To Review Israel Desalination Proposals

Following is a portion of the opening statement made by President Johnson at his news conference at the White House on October 13.

I have asked, now on another subject, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, as one of his assignments in the new post as Ambassador at Large, to begin to review proposals which have been made for a desalting electric power project in Israel.

In making this review, Ambassador Bunker will give careful study to the proposals in relation to all aspects of Israel's water problem.

Ambassador Bunker, as you know, has had a very long and distinguished record in the service of our country. He has most recently done some outstanding work in the Dominican Republic as our representative to the Council of the Organization of American States. And except for his work there I

shudder to think of the situation that would confront us now.

I am especially pleased that Ambassador Bunker has agreed as one of his new duties to work on this complex subject of desalting, which holds so much hope for the future of mankind, and which I am determined to have a substantial breakthrough on during my term of office if that is at all possible.

From the beginning, the United States and Israel have viewed these explorations of world-wide cooperation with great pleasure. We want to do what we can to solve the problem of scarcity of water. Some of you may recall that I said in my speech to the friends of the Weizmann Institute in New York that the knowledge and experience obtained from all of our programs in this field will, of course, be made available to all other countries.¹

I have repeatedly said that the United States is equally ready to cooperate with other countries in solving water problems.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has participated in the U.S.-Israeli studies.

U.S. Marks Anniversary of Arms Control Act

*Statement by President Johnson*²

Five years ago Monday [September 26], the Congress passed and the President approved the United States Arms Control Act, because the people of this Nation felt that the most urgent goal of national policy was to build a peaceful world environment.

When the United States was the only nation possessing atomic weapons, we urged others to join us in placing all atomic facilities under international control. Now five nations possess nuclear weapons.

We are still seeking and urging the effec-

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 24, 1964, p. 285.

² Made public Sept. 24.

tive international control of atomic facilities and weapons.

The highest priority goal of national policy continues to be: *to lift from mankind the threat of nuclear war.*

This means we must continue to seek and gain agreements that would bring the nuclear arms race under control and prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons.

In observing this fifth anniversary of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, I, as President of the United States, pledge this Government to continue the search for peace, on every front, whatever the obstacles we may confront—however long the road may be.

U.S. and Canada Request IJC Study on Air Pollution

Press release 220 dated September 23

The Department of State announced on September 23 that it had that day transmitted the following letter to the International Joint Commission, United States and Canada, requesting a report on air pollution in the Detroit-Windsor and Port Huron-Sarnia areas. An identical letter was transmitted to the International Joint Commission by the Government of Canada.

SEPTEMBER 23, 1966

THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION,
UNITED STATES AND CANADA,
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.,
and Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.

SIRS: As a result of expanding industrial and other activities along the international boundary of the United States and Canada, the Governments of both countries have been increasingly aware of the problem of air pollution affecting citizens and property interests on either side of the boundary. In particular, Governments have received representations that citizens and property in the vicinities of Detroit-Windsor and Port

Huron-Sarnia are being subjected to detrimental quantities of air pollutants crossing the boundary.

The problem of air pollution in the vicinity of the cities of Windsor and Detroit was the subject of a Joint Reference to the Commission dated January 12, 1949. The Commission was requested to report whether the air over, or in the vicinity of, Detroit and Windsor was being polluted by smoke, soot, fly ash or other impurities in quantities detrimental to the public health, safety or general welfare of citizens or property on either side of the boundary. In the event of an affirmative answer, the Commission was asked to indicate the extent to which vessels plying the waters of the Detroit River were contributing to this pollution and what other major factors were responsible and to what extent.

The Commission, in its final report to Governments of May 1960, replied in the affirmative to the first question and listed various industrial, domestic and transportation activities on land as being largely responsible. In accordance with the terms of the said Reference, however, the Commission did not formulate any recommendations with regard to these major factors, its recommendations being limited to vessels plying the Detroit River.

In view of the seriousness of the problem of air pollution in the vicinity of Port Huron-Sarnia and Detroit-Windsor, both Governments have agreed to refer this matter to the International Joint Commission, pursuant to Article IX of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. The Commission is therefore requested to inquire into and report to the two Governments upon the following questions:

(1) Is the air over and in the vicinity of Port Huron-Sarnia and Detroit-Windsor being polluted on either side of the international boundary by quantities of air contaminants that are detrimental to the public health, safety or general welfare of citizens or property on the other side of the international boundary?

(2) If the foregoing question or any part thereof is answered in the affirmative, what sources are contributing to this pollution and to what extent?

(3) (a) If the Commission should find that any sources on either side of the boundary in the vicinity of Port Huron-Sarnia and Detroit-Windsor contribute to air pollution on the other side of the boundary to an extent detrimental to the public health, safety or general welfare of citizens or property, what preventive or remedial measures would be most practical from economic, sanitary and other points of view?

(3) (b) The Commission should give an indication of the probable total cost of implementing the measures recommended.

In the light of the findings contained in the Commission's report of May 1960, the Commission, in conducting its investigations under this Reference is requested to give initial attention to the Detroit-Windsor area and, to submit its report and recommendations on this problem to the two governments as soon as possible.

The Commission is also requested to take note of air pollution problems in boundary areas other than those referred to in Question 1 which may come to its attention from any source. If at any time the Commission considers it appropriate to do so, the Commission is invited to draw such problems to the attention of both Governments.

For the purpose of assisting the Commission in making the investigations and recommendations provided for in this Reference, the two Governments, upon request, will make available to the Commission the services of engineers and other specially qualified personnel of their respective Governments, and such information and technical data as may have been acquired by such Governments or as may be acquired by them during the course of investigation.

Sincerely,

For the Secretary of State:

JOHN M. LEDDY

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Talks Resuming on Moscow-New York Air Services

Department Announcement

Press release 233 dated October 8

The Soviet Union and the United States have agreed that technical talks between the designated carriers should be resumed looking toward signature of the Civil Air Transport Agreement between the two Governments which was initialed in 1961. Assuming that these and other technical questions are resolved, it is contemplated that air services between Moscow and New York might begin as soon as the late spring of 1967.

Foreign Policy Conference To Be Held at New Orleans

The Department of State announced on October 3 (press release 230) that a foreign policy conference will be held at New Orleans, La., on November 12, sponsored by the Foreign Relations Association of New Orleans, International House, and Tulane University and supported by a broad cross section of community organizations.

Invitations will be extended to business and community leaders, representatives of national nongovernmental organizations and members of the press, radio, and television from Mississippi, Louisiana, and eastern Texas. The purpose of the meeting is to bring together citizen leaders and media representatives with government officials responsible for formulating and carrying out foreign policy.

Officials now scheduled to participate in the conference include Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs; Richard Reuter, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Food-for-Peace Program); Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Member, Policy Planning Council; and Harold Kaplan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs.

United States Urges Concrete U.N. Action on South West Africa

*Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

We of the United States delegation have listened with close attention to this debate on the future of South West Africa. The extraordinary importance attached to this issue was dramatically demonstrated by the General Assembly when it decided to begin the debate without delay and to hold it in plenary session. We share the general view of the importance of the issue, and we believe this may prove to have been one of the truly decisive debates of the United Nations if, as we earnestly hope, it results in effective action.

I should like to pay tribute to you, Mr. President, and to the participants in this debate, for the seriousness with which this very difficult question has been treated. My delegation has great respect for the views expressed, both in the statements made and in the 54-power draft resolution.

We are encouraged to find that, as regards the status of South West Africa, virtually all of the membership, with very few exceptions, is in agreement. This near-unanimity finds strong support in the legal framework clearly defined by the three advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, which remain an authoritative statement of the law on this matter.

It may be useful at this stage of our debate

¹ Made in plenary session of the U.N. General Assembly on Oct. 12 (U.S. delegation press release 4929).

to sum up at this point the essential elements of this broad agreement, which we believe exists in this Assembly.

First, the people of South West Africa, like all peoples, have the right to determine their own future.

Second, South West Africa is a territory having an international status and will remain so until its people exercise this right of self-determination.

Third, South Africa's right to administer the territory arose solely from the mandate.

Fourth, as the mandatory power, South Africa incurred certain obligations toward the people of the territory—including the promotion of their material and moral well-being and their social progress. It has not fulfilled these obligations. Indeed, it has even gone so far as to impose on the territory the abhorrent system of racial segregation known as *apartheid*.

Fifth, as the mandatory power, South Africa incurred certain obligations to the international community, for which the General Assembly has supervisory responsibilities. Among these are obligations to report annually on its administration of the territory and to transmit petitions from the inhabitants. South Africa has repeatedly refused to carry out these obligations. We are thus confronted with a continuing material breach of obligations incumbent upon the mandatory power.

Sixth, South Africa itself has disavowed

the mandate, asserting that it ceased to exist upon the dissolution of the League of Nations.

Seventh, by virtue of the breach of its obligations and its disavowal of the mandate, South Africa forfeits all right to continue to administer the Territory of South West Africa. Indeed, it is because of South Africa's own actions that it can no longer assert its right under the mandate; and apart from the mandate, South Africa has no right to administer the territory.

Eighth, in these circumstances the United Nations must be prepared to discharge its responsibilities with respect to South West Africa.

On these eight points, Mr. President, we believe all but a very few members are in essential agreement. We agree on the nature of the problem. We agree on the objective. It is highly important that our near-unanimity on these fundamentals should be made manifest.

This is all the more true when we come to decide on the best means of implementing our common aim. To be effective in this most important issue, we need more than world opinion voiced by words in a resolution. We need world cooperation manifested by concrete action.

And with this in mind, the United States is prepared to work with all delegations committed to our common goal.

In our view, the General Assembly should begin by expressing explicitly the decision with respect to the status of South West Africa in a form acceptable to virtually all the membership. Having done this, it should create a practical instrumentality to give effect to its decision.

In considering what form this instrumentality should take, we are very much helped by the eminently sensible suggestion made by a number of representatives during this debate; namely, the establishment of a United Nations commission for South West Africa. The United States would be glad to serve on an appropriately representative body if that is the desire of the General Assembly.

This commission, it seems to us, should have very explicit and strong terms of reference. It should be asked to recommend means by which, in accordance with a prescribed timetable, an administration for South West Africa can be set up which will enable the people of the territory to exercise their right of self-determination. The commission should report as soon as practicable and in any event not later than a specific and early date to be agreed upon, a date consistent both with the urgency of the matter and with the need for effective discharge of its important responsibility. All principal organs of the United Nations should be asked to take appropriate action with respect to the commission's report, and the cooperation of all members in its work should be requested.

This, let me emphasize, Mr. President, is an action proposal. It contemplates steps which can be immediately and practically implemented and which lie within the capacity of this organization. It is designed to provide the community of nations promptly with a considered blueprint for united and peaceful action for the benefit of the people of South West Africa.

It is extremely important, Mr. President, that the action which the General Assembly takes on this transcendantly important issue should be both intrinsically sound and widely supported. This is necessary in the first place for the sake of the people of South West Africa, who have a right to expect from us not only words but also concrete, helpful, and meaningful actions. And it is equally necessary for the sake of the United Nations itself—for the authority and prestige of this world body.

These are the views of the United States on this important subject. We do not suggest that we have spoken the last word on this matter. We are flexible in our approach. But we are also firm in our determination that the United Nations, with all the unanimity and effectiveness we can muster, shall proceed to bring practical relief to the people of South West Africa in their time of need.

Department Supports Commercial Treaty With Togo

*Statement by William C. Trimble*¹

I am appearing before the committee in support of the treaty of amity and economic relations with the Togolese Republic (S. Ex. E).² It belongs in the series of commercial treaties that the Department of State has been negotiating since 1946, and constitutes the 23d unit in that series. The United States commercial treaty network, including those treaties negotiated under the current program, together with the older treaties of the type, extends to the Far East, the Middle East, Africa, and South America and includes nearly every country in Western Europe. We continue to pursue a policy of extending the body of commercial treaties to the fullest extent possible.

The treaty with Togo is another agreement coming within the terms of congressional policy as expressed in section 413 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, which provides that the President "shall accelerate a program of negotiating treaties for commerce and trade . . . which shall include provisions to facilitate the flow of private investment to nations participating in programs under this act." The treaty does encourage private investment from one country to the other, which in this instance would probably mean U.S. investment in Togo, with Togo enjoying the inflow of foreign capital.

This is the first formal treaty to be concluded between Togo and the United States,

¹ Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Sept. 22. Mr. Trimble is Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. For text of the committee's report, see S. Ex. 8, 89th Congress, 2d session.

² For an announcement of the signing of the treaty on Feb. 18, see BULLETIN of Mar. 7, 1966, p. 367.

although several less formal agreements are already in effect, covering the Peace Corps, economic assistance, and the investment guaranty program. We already have excellent official relations with Togo, which shares U.S. views on a number of important issues. The 60-odd Peace Corps volunteers now in Togo, as well as their predecessors, have developed close personal associations with the Togolese people. The Togolese Government has worked with our AID officials in establishing a center for training heavy road equipment operators and mechanics that serves nine French-speaking African states. Encouraged in part by Togo's "open door" trade policy, one of our important corporations has a major interest in a mining enterprise that, after just a few years of operation, contributes about one-third of Togo's export earnings.

Now we are giving formal expression to our initial fruitful contacts and making possible a legal framework that will encourage still greater contacts with this friendly African state, a former trust territory that attained full independence in April 1960.

The treaty has a double importance for relations between our two countries. From our viewpoint, it serves as a charter of rights for Americans in Togo and as a code of fair treatment for American businessmen. For Togo, it evidences a friendly desire to engage in legal and commercial activities on an equal footing with the United States without prejudicing the close relationships inherited from past associations with the former administering power.

I wish to point to another aspect of the treaty. It is the first treaty within the commercial treaty structure of the United States to be entered into with a recently independent African state. As such, it represents not only an important milestone in our friendly relations with Togo but in addition a hopeful precedent for extension of our commercial treaty system to other African countries which have only recently achieved independence and are now developing their national commercial relations with the rest of the world.

The new treaty contains 15 articles. It is the short, simplified version of the standard treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation, such as are now in force with the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan. The simplified version is in force with Ethiopia, Iran, and Viet-Nam and has, of course, been before the committee each time. The more significant features are summarized in the report of the Secretary of State that accompanies it.³ Its provisions are based upon existing precedents and introduce no new commitments that raise problems as to their effects upon domestic law.

The treaty was approved by the National Assembly of Togo on July 2 of this year, and the instrument of ratification was signed by President [Nicolas] Grunitzky on August 25.

That completes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.⁴

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on October 12 confirmed the following nominations:

Ellsworth Bunker to be Ambassador at Large. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated October 6.)

Francis J. Galbraith to be Ambassador to the Republic of Singapore. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated September 19.)

Foy D. Kohler to be a Deputy Under Secretary of State. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated September 21.)

Sol M. Linowitz to be the representative of the United States on the Council of the Organization of American States, with the rank of Ambassador. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated October 6.)

William R. Rivkin to be Ambassador to the Republic of Senegal, and to serve concurrently as Ambassador to The Gambia.

Eugene Victor Rostow to be Under Secretary of

³ For text, see S. Ex. E, 89th Congress, 2d session.

⁴ The Senate on Sept. 28 adopted a resolution providing for ratification of the treaty.

State for Political Affairs. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 244 dated October 14.)

Llewellyn E. Thompson to be Ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated September 21.)

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Finance

Articles of agreement establishing the Asian Development Bank, with annexes. Done at Manila December 4, 1965. Entered into force August 22, 1966.

Ratifications deposited: Afghanistan, August 22, 1966; Belgium, August 16, 1966; Canada, August 22, 1966; ¹ Denmark, August 16, 1966; ² Finland, August 22, 1966; Germany, Federal Republic of, August 30, 1966; Japan, August 16, 1966; ¹ Korea, August 16, 1966; ¹ Laos, August 30, 1966; Malaysia, August 16, 1966; ¹ Netherlands, August 29, 1966; Thailand, August 16, 1966.

Health

Amendment to Article 7 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 20, 1965.³

Acceptance deposited: Ethiopia, September 19, 1966.

Law of the Sea

Convention on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force September 10, 1964. TIAS 5639.

Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force September 30, 1962. TIAS 5200.

Convention on fishing and conservation of the living resources of the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force March 20, 1966. TIAS 5969.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Trinidad and Tobago, April 11, 1966.

Load Line

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London April 5, 1966. Open for signature April 5 until July 5, 1966.³

Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 13, 1966.

Satellite Communications System

Supplementary agreement on arbitration. Done at Washington June 4, 1965.³

¹ With a declaration.

² With a statement.

³ Not in force.

Signature: Ministry of Communications of Venezuela, October 11, 1966.

Slavery

Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade and institutions and practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva September 7, 1956. Entered into force April 30, 1957.⁴

Notification that it considers itself bound: Trinidad and Tobago, April 11, 1966.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965.³

Ratifications deposited: Canada, August 31, 1966; Central African Republic, August 15, 1966.

War

Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners of war;⁵

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea;

Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian persons in time of war.⁵

Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1950; for the United States February 2, 1956. TIAS 3362, 3363, and 3365, respectively.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Central African Republic, July 23, 1966.

Adherence deposited: Korea, August 16, 1966.

Whaling

Amendment to paragraphs 6 (4), 7 (a), and 8 (a) to the schedule to the international whaling convention of December 2, 1946 (TIAS 1849). Adopted at London July 1, 1966 at the Eighteenth Meeting of the International Whaling Commission. Entered into force: October 5, 1966.

BILATERAL

Korea

Agreement for the exchange of official publications.

³ Not in force.

⁴ Not in force for the United States.

⁵ Republic of Korea adhered with reservations.

Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul April 18 and September 24, 1966. Entered into force September 24, 1966.

Tunisia

Agreement relating to the establishment and operation of a Mediterranean Marine Sorting Center. Effected by exchange of notes at Tunis September 26, 1966. Entered into force September 26, 1966.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: October 10-17

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to October 10 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 220 of September 23, 230 and 233 of October 3, and 237 of October 7.

No.	Date	Subject
*238	10/10	U. Alexis Johnson sworn in as Ambassador to Japan (biographic details).
†239	10/11	Ratification of Gut Dam Agreement with Canada.
240	10/11	Greenwald: Foreign Trade Club, Syracuse, N. Y.
241	10/12	Rusk: Association of the United States Army, Washington, D.C.
†242	10/14	U.S.-Chile air service consultations.
†243	10/14	15th anniversary of Organization of Central American States.
*244	10/14	Rostow sworn in as Under Secretary for Political Affairs (biographic details).

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LV, NO. 1427 PUBLICATION 8153 OCTOBER 31, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of

the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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**THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE**

BULLETIN

Vol. LV, No. 1428



November 7, 1966

THE UNITED STATES AND POLAND: STRENGTHENING TRADITIONAL BONDS
Address by President Johnson 712

COLUMBUS AS A SPANIARD
by Ambassador Angier Biddle Duke 717

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S TRIP TO ASIA
*Statements and Remarks Made by the President
in Hawaii, New Zealand, and Australia 698*

For index see inside back cover

President Johnson Begins His Tour of Asia

The President left Washington on October 17 to visit six countries in the Pacific and Asian area and to attend the conference held at Manila October 24-25. En route to Manila, President Johnson stopped overnight at Honolulu, Hawaii, and then visited New Zealand and Australia. Following is a statement made by the President upon his departure from Washington, together with texts of statements and remarks he made on various occasions during this portion of his 17-day trip.

DEPARTURE STATEMENT, DULLES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, OCTOBER 17

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated October 24

I leave you this morning to undertake a hopeful mission.

I go to visit six nations which, working with others, are beginning to shape a new regional life in Asia and the Pacific. I have followed with admiration the energetic progress made in Asia by Asians. I have been happy to receive at the White House recently the leaders of those countries. Now I am availing myself of this opportunity to repay their visits and to see their people and to visit in their great countries.

I go to learn of their progress and problems, their hopes and their concerns for their children and for their future.

At Manila we shall consider the problem of Viet-Nam.

A small Asian nation is under attack, defending itself with extraordinary courage

and endurance. I go to confer with its leaders and with the leaders of those other nations that have committed their young men to defeat aggression and to help those 15 million people shape their own destiny.

We shall review the state of military operations; but we shall mainly devote our attention to the civil, constructive side of the problem of Viet-Nam.

We shall together seek ways of bringing about an honorable peace at the earliest possible moment.

I know that I can wave no wand. I do not expect anything magical to happen or any miracles to develop.

But as I undertake this mission on behalf of our entire nation at a most critical time in our history, I am inspired and strengthened by the presence of the leaders of the Congress here this morning, the members of the Cabinet, and by the unity of the American people. I ask for your prayers. I shall do my best to advance the cause of peace and of human progress.

Thank all of you very much.

ARRIVAL STATEMENT, HONOLULU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, HAWAII, OCTOBER 17

White House press release (Honolulu, Hawaii) dated October 17

It is always a very great pleasure for me to come to Hawaii for any purpose. It is especially good to come here on the first part of a trip whose purpose is peace and whose destination is a conference of seven free nations of Asia and the Pacific.

Six months ago we met here in Honolulu with the leaders of South Viet-Nam.¹

You have every reason to be very proud of your contribution to the constructive steps that brought about that conference and that have come out of that conference.

We resolved here then to hasten the coming of representative government in South Viet-Nam.

Since the Honolulu conference, more than 80 percent of the registered voters of South Viet-Nam have elected an assembly to draft a constitution.

We resolved here in Honolulu to combat the ruinous inflation that was eating the heart out of South Viet-Nam's economy. Since then, the Government of Viet-Nam has taken very brave measures to control runaway prices.

Working with them, we have increased the flow of essential goods coming through the ports for all the people of Viet-Nam.

We resolved here in Honolulu to carry the blessings of education to the remotest area of South Viet-Nam.

Since then, 3,200 new teachers have already been trained for their rural schools, and more than 2 million additional textbooks have already been distributed.

We also resolved here in Honolulu to invite those that were fighting with the Communists to leave their jungle hideouts and join the efforts to build a nation through peaceful and democratic means.

Since then, more than 10,000 Viet Cong have responded to that call—a far larger number than for the equal period last year.

Some of the learned commentators and distinguished speculators who practice instant judgment concluded that nothing really happened at Honolulu. They were not only premature, but they were dead wrong.

I believe that you will have the satisfaction of knowing that history will record the Honolulu conference as a vital and a productive stepping stone toward a free and independent Viet-Nam.

Texts of the other statements, remarks, and addresses made by President Johnson in Hawaii, American Samoa, and Australia which have not yet been received will be included in future issues of the Bulletin. The Bulletin also will publish material resulting from the Manila conference, as well as items relating to President Johnson's visits in the Philippines, South Viet-Nam, Thailand, Malaysia, Korea, and Alaska after the conference.

Now we have come here today on our way to another conference. We do not expect to pull any rabbits out of any hats at Manila, notwithstanding any speculations you may hear or see.

There are no surprises to spring on anyone, for we know that the most important weapon in Viet-Nam is patience among our people and unity behind our program.

Manila will help us in our planning, it is true; it will give us a firm grasp of the realities that we face in resisting aggression, the problems we face in seeking peace and in rebuilding Viet-Nam.

From our talks, we do expect to enlarge the area of understanding which already exists between those nations directly assisting South Viet-Nam, and that, in itself, we think, will be worth the effort.

Some have predicted that this and that will happen in Manila. They have said—and I don't want to recount the accuracy of speculation—that we may develop some new strategy of war or come forth with some spectacular form for peace.

Neither prediction will prove out.

Our military strategy is already quite clear. I have been briefed by General [William C.] Westmoreland just in the last few weeks. It is to resist aggression with the maximum force that is necessary and the minimum risk that is possible.

As for the other prediction, let me remind you that the leaders who will sit down together in Manila have already signed a petition for peace.

Not one of the men who will be there enjoys asking the sons of his people or his nation to risk their lives in war. But the question of peace is not one that we can

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

answer alone. The men who can—who can make peace—the Communists in Hanoi, who are using force against South Viet-Nam, are not coming to Manila. They are the ones who, if they would reason with us, could help produce a formula for peace.

We intend to explore every possibility and every proposal that has been advanced for a solution to the Viet-Nam conflict and the rehabilitation of that country.

We will be ready for the day when the Communists will want to join us at the table, from which they will be missing at Manila.

I will also be visiting five other nations in the next 17 days. Since I have been President, I have had visitors come to Washington from more than 100 countries, and now I am going to have a chance to repay at least six of their visits.

I intend to go into those countries, not to tell them what they should do but to tell them how proud our people are to be their friends.

I intend to tell them that our foreign policy is simply the outreach of our domestic policy. What we seek for the people of the United States—good jobs, enough to eat, a chance to learn, the opportunity to be all that they can—is what we also hope and seek for other people.

Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are not only our hope for America; they are what we hope for all the world.

I also intend to tell the people of Asia how very, very proud we are of our new State of Hawaii. For this State is a model for what the world should be, a place where different cultures and different races, different colors and different religions, come together to make one united people.

I am proud to have had a part in making Hawaii the 50th State in the Union. I am proud to have offered the bill that created the East-West Center, which I am now going to visit.

Hawaii can be proud, too—proud of your Governor John Burns, who, as a delegate, helped to bring all of this about, and proud of all the other patriotic men and women that you have sent to serve you so ably and patriotically in the Congress.

When it is all finally said, it adds up to this: I am so happy to be back here with you. I am happy to take with me to Asia the message of all of Hawaii, the message of a free and proud and a prosperous people that are living here and are cooperating with their neighbors.

It is that kind of an Asia that we believe will serve the peace of the world, and that is so much what all of us want to do.

Thank you very much.

THE VISIT TO NEW ZEALAND

Arrival Statement, Ohakea Airport, October 19

White House press release (Wellington, New Zealand) dated October 19

This is my second visit to New Zealand, and they recognized both times that I was a rancher from a drought-stricken part of Texas.

Six days ago I paid a running political visit to Staten Island, a borough of New York City. That is almost 10,000 miles from where we are today—which is almost as far from any place as anyone can get.

And yet our closeness is greater than our distance.

Staten Island in New York City was named by Dutch colonizers at a time when New York City was still known as Nieuw Amsterdam. And New Zealand, 324 years ago, was also called Staten Land by the explorer Tasman, who first sighted the peaks of your green land.

Apparently Captain Tasman's sponsor, the Netherlands East Indies Company, felt that Staten Land wasn't quite grand enough a name. So it came to be that your nation, with 223 mountains thrusting 7,500 feet or higher, was then called Nieuw Zealand, named after a Dutch province that is flatter than a fried herring.

The Dutch experience in both New Zealand and in New York gave way to English settlers. Ever since we have been cultural, if not terrestrial, neighbors. We have shared a common human philosophy that men can grow to their own limits. We have noted that those human limits are quite vast.

When I first came to New Zealand, it was

about a quarter of a century ago, and my country and your country were then allied in a major war at a grim moment in history.

As I came across Auckland Bay in a sputtering PB2Y2, I saw your beautiful land and I wished to myself that I might be able to return at a more tranquil moment.

Tranquillity, as I have since learned, is not an easy commodity to come by. Our times today cannot be called tranquil times. Yet, should we compare our common condition this afternoon with our common condition in 1942, I can only conclude that we—and the world—have seen great progress.

We are allied in a grim, if smaller, conflict now. At the deepest roots of that conflict is the threat—the threat to what we hold dearest in the United States and New Zealand: the ability of people to grow in freedom.

New Zealanders have done that. Your accomplishments are great. Yours is one nation to which less developed Asian-Pacific peoples look for inspiration and guidance.

My nation is anxious to work with you in providing that help.

Our task for the future in New Zealand, in the United States—yes, all over the world—is a difficult but inspiring one. That is to allow people, and allow nations, to grow to their own vast limits in freedom.

I want to thank you for coming here in this rainy weather, exposing yourselves to the weather, to give us this neighborly welcome.

I have told Mrs. Johnson many, many times of the delightful experience that I had here and the hospitality that your people extended to me.

I remember the first thing I did after I landed in Auckland Bay was to go and buy myself a raincoat.

I went back before I left the United States and got one that I had worn several years ago—it is a little short now—as I knew I would need it in New Zealand.

If you will be good enough, I hope that you will wish me on my return to have the same kind of rainy reception at my home ranch in Texas as I am getting here today.

Mrs. Johnson has come with me and she will get to see you, to know you, to see your boys and girls, your families. She will be able in the years to come to share with me the beauty and, most of all, the kindness and the integrity of the great people that make up New Zealand.

We are so delighted to be in your country today.

Arrival Statement, Wellington International Airport, October 19

White House press release (Wellington, New Zealand) dated October 19

I am deeply indebted to Her Majesty for her generous words on this occasion.²

I have enjoyed a great deal observing the pride of your young manhood as I reviewed the guard.

After 4,650 miles of flying over water—with one stop on the island of Samoa—we feel as if we have finally found the Promised Land.

I suspect our impressions are very much like those of the men and women who came out here a century ago from Britain and discovered the green fields and the hillsides where cattle and sheep could be raised in abundance and a decent life provided for their children.

That is one of the many experiences I think that we have in common. For many other men and women—among them, the brothers and sisters and cousins of those who came to New Zealand—sought the same dream and came to America and found it. Some of them this afternoon are watching their sheep graze on the green countryside in my home State. And, like those New Zealanders, the new Americans gave themselves totally to the task of molding the land to their needs. There was much work to be done at home and little time or inclination to take part in the world's affairs.

But this century has changed all of that. It has changed it for both of us. Again and again we have been cast into the storm of international strife.

Both of us have been drawn into world

² Governor General Sir Bernard Ferguson greeted President Johnson on behalf of Queen Elizabeth.

wars against our desires. Both of us have come to acknowledge our responsibilities for building world peace.

On the battlefronts of Europe, the Near East, Asia, and the Pacific, Americans and New Zealanders have fought side by side and have died side by side in order to preserve liberty and human freedom for other human beings.

Around the conference tables of the United Nations, New Zealanders and Americans have labored to devise a more rational system for settling the conflicts between nations.

So the 6,000 miles that separate us really shrink into insignificance. What is important is that your nation and ours, though young in the chronology of historical time, have come of age in much the same way—have drawn much the same conclusions from the chaotic experience of this century—and now look to the future together with much the same hopes and many of the same apprehensions.

I thought of those common hopes on the way here from Samoa this afternoon. For that little island—the Samoan people, 22,000 of them, have begun to build a progressive and an enlightened society. We have been trying to encourage them and assist them, as you have in the Pacific islands in which you have historic ties. In Wellington and in Washington we have united and we have understood that affluent nations have responsibilities toward those whose development is only beginning. I hope that we can share our experiences on these islands. I want to assure you that we are ready to adopt as our own any programs that you have put into successful effect in these islands. We are very eager to make available to you a full account of the Samoan experience of ours.

I should not like to close without a personal recollection—one that makes the tie between our nations all the more real for me. As I said at the airport I first came to, when I came to New Zealand one foggy day back in 1942, almost a quarter of a

century ago, I was riding a flying boat. It came down onto Auckland Bay. We couldn't see the bay, and we didn't know whether we were going to land on the water or on the land in our flying boat.

I thus became one of thousands of Americans who received your hospitality and received your care during a very young part of my life and a very dangerous period. You people of New Zealand took our American boys into your homes and you cared for the sick and the wounded among us, you gave us—when we needed it most—a home away from home.

I must say, frankly, I have been wanting to come back here ever since, and here I am.

Not long afterward, I fell quite ill with a fever I had contracted in New Guinea. I was hospitalized at Suva, in the Fiji Islands. I take it that I must have been in a bad way—though being delirious with a fever of 105 and not remembering what happened, I was not really a good judge of my condition.

But New Zealand doctors and nurses cared for me with great skill, with the help of an American doctor who later came in. They pulled me through what was a very rough and very lonely time—and since then I have thought of New Zealand always with the warmest gratitude.

You may, in the history books, have to assume your share of responsibility for what later happened in Washington, because it was your care and compassion that made it really possible for me to ever get back to Washington.

Competent, strong, and compassionate New Zealanders symbolized for me the characteristics of this nation. My opinion has only been deepened and confirmed by the years that have followed.

I am so glad to be back here on your soil again. Mrs. Johnson and I look forward to seeing something of your beautiful country and to meeting as many of your great people as our time permits. I would so much like to see some of your countryside, particularly some of your great sheep.

I want to tell you in closing that we bring

with us, to all the people of New Zealand from all of the people of the United States, the proud affection and the great respect of our people for your people.

To those of you who have stood here on this breezy afternoon in the chill and the rain a little earlier, I say: Thank you so very, very much for your cordiality.

Remarks at a State Dinner at the Governor General's Residence, Wellington, October 19

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated October 24

I have been thinking this evening of my country's history and how the protocol of this occasion might have been very different if it had not been for a rather strong-minded generation of my countrymen—back almost 200 years ago. We would have our own Governor General today. I have not worked out all the might-have-beens—all that might have happened in the past two centuries, if a Governor General had been sitting in Washington alongside the American President or Prime Minister, as it might have been. Certainly, a great deal more tea might have been consumed in America, and a great deal less ice. The World Series might have been a cricket match, and we would certainly have had to learn to drive—intentionally—on the left side of the road. But a great deal would be the same. The Beatles would dominate all our teenagers no less than they do today. Coca-Cola and Hollywood would be as omnipresent as ever. We could call consumer credit by the name you give it here, hire-purchase, but I suspect people would find it equally attractive and equally burdensome.

So you see, Your Excellency, history has a way of coming out the same, no matter what the political arrangements. And for that I think we political men may be grateful. I know that I am grateful tonight to be in a land where men choose to be free and try to be just. That is the real kinship we have with you, and it will endure long after the Beatles are grandparents and Hollywood has passed from the scene. And at the end of a long journey over the Pacific, it is good to be among kinsmen and friends.

Address at the Parliamentary Luncheon, Wellington, October 20

White House press release (Wellington, New Zealand) dated October 20

First of all, I apologize for being late. I attribute that to the graciousness of the good people of Wellington.

Mrs. Johnson and I are quite honored to be in New Zealand. We have had a delicious luncheon, very well served, for which I feel further in the debt of the ladies and the management.

Physically, we have not entirely adjusted to the Southern Hemisphere after our long flight, but you may be sure that our hearts are already in residence.

We came by jet from Hawaii and Samoa, riding the smooth jet stream at more than 500 miles an hour for almost 10 hours. It was quite a change from my last arrival in New Zealand—in the spring of 1942, when both nations faced very grim problems together and when your men joined our men shoulder to shoulder to try to protect the liberty and the freedom of not only New Zealand but the people of America as well.

That was back in 1942. I came here in a PB2Y2 flying boat. We sputtered through the fog and finally, with the help of the good Lord, landed in Auckland Bay. We weren't sure that we weren't on a sheep ranch somewhere because the weather was zero zero. But it has improved, Mr. Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition. I assume that the election has nothing to do with it.

Since the Prime Minister brought up the ugly subject about what a noise people made when you talk in terms of millions of dollars, I guess they do make some noise in a nation of 2 or 3 million. But if you are talking in terms of taxes, in terms of billions of dollars, before 200 million Americans, you don't know what noise is.

I thought it was rather significant that both of our distinguished, eloquent speakers spent a good portion of their time on our disagreements—I don't know whether they were anticipating or just wanted to kind of clear the atmosphere for their constituents. But as

far as I am concerned, I am unaware of any disagreements, although I think they are a good thing. I think they provide strong people. I think they develop enduring friendships. I wonder what the Leader of the Opposition and the Prime Minister would think if we all saw everything alike—if we would all want the same wife. So differences are good for us.

Back to that old flying boat that I arrived here in. It was, by today's standards, very primitive. Dangerous as those days were back in 1942 for New Zealanders and Americans, your welcome was as warm then as it was today—although not as numerous. But it was outgoing, and it was generous to the men who wore the American uniform.

To me it was perhaps more needed for a lonely lieutenant commander in 1942 than it is for a President in 1966. But ever since that date 25 years ago, I promised myself that I would come and bring my lady to New Zealand. I assure you that neither of us were disappointed from the time we landed on your soil yesterday.

Our two nations are separated by 6,000 miles of blue Pacific Ocean. But we are united by historical interests and commitments that we think are far more important in the shaping of our national destinies than the miles that divide us.

First among them is a tradition of representative democracy. It is right that I should be speaking today before Parliamentarians whose heritage derives, as does ours in the American Congress, from the British House of Commons. As a parliamentarian or legislator for more than 24 years, 12 in the House and 12 in the Senate—3 as majority leader—I know that I feel at home in your presence.

It is not only the democratic tradition that unites us. Both of us, Americans and New Zealanders, believe that we have much work to do beyond our shores. It may once have been possible for democracy to flourish in one country, isolated from the misery and oppression that befell other men. But neither reason nor conscience permits such a narrow view of our responsibilities today.

This basic truth came home to both of our nations—and to you, I think, sooner than to us—in the course of two World Wars.

I never go to bed at night but that I thank the dear Lord for Winston Churchill, whose eloquence finally awakened the sleeping giant in America—almost too late, but in time.

New Zealanders twice left these beautiful islands to fight, not just for themselves but to fight for the freedom and liberty of all men. Brave beyond measure, they fell at Gallipoli, in the skies over Britain, in Greece, at El Alamein, at Mount Cassino, and in the jungles of the Pacific. I was in a ward hospital with many of them stretched out on the beds on the side of me in 1942. Beneath the "lemon squeezer" and berets that were their hallmarks, their strong, confident, and brave faces gave heart to their allies—to all of us—and finally brought victory for freedom on many battlefields. I knew many of them in those years. I revered them for all their character, their integrity, and their courage.

Today, on behalf of a people with whom shoulder to shoulder they fought, suffered, and died, I have come here to salute their towering memory.

And again, in 1950, when an invading army crossed into the Republic of Korea, both our nations answered the aggressors' challenge promptly. Ours was a unity of nations who longed to live in peace but who understood—from the bitter lessons of two wars—what the consequences of appeasement would be.

Every man wants peace. That is something that all of you should take cognizance of now. You can't separate men by those who want peace and those who don't want peace. Every man wants peace. Every man hates to kill. Every man wants to live. No man wants to die.

We were determined, then, in the words of the United Nations Charter, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." Together, with the Army of the Republic of Korea and other brave allies, we finally turned back the invaders, and we

made it possible for the people of the Republic of Korea to work out their destiny in freedom. Today 44,600 of them from that little nation are proud allies in another struggle to permit men to be free in another little nation, South Viet-Nam.

You were a valiant part of that war effort, and yours has been a clear and decent voice always in the councils of peace. New Zealand has contributed to the United Nations—both in diplomatic efforts and in programs of assistance to humanity—to a degree, I think, that has excited the admiration of all of her associates. As you were ready to stand against military aggression, so you were prepared to help build a world society in which free nations would be able to provide security and hope for their people.

From long experience you knew that fighting an invading soldier in uniform or fighting an armed terrorist is only one part of the war in Asia—and only one part of your responsibility. For hundreds of millions of Asians, the most common terrorism is not that of guns or grenades. It is that of hunger, disease, of poverty, and of illiteracy. These are as capable of crushing the hopes of man as any ruthless enemy with his mortar or his bombs or his guns. Much of this war in Asia still remains to be fought. And we are calling now for volunteers for it, too.

You have played an honorable part in helping your neighbors, especially in the Pacific islands, fight the war against want. And we in the United States have joined you—as the distinguished Prime Minister has made, I hope, appropriate reference—as allies in this struggle against the ancient enemies of mankind: ignorance, illiteracy, disease, and poverty. We have worked to help the people of Asia delay, yes, and, I think, finally halt, the march of hunger and disease.

But if we in the developed nations were to try to accomplish this alone, with only our resources, we—and Asia—would surely fail.

Fortunately we are not alone. Asia is blessed with men and women whose determination is as strong as their countries' needs. Throughout this vast area of the globe, the

planners and the builders are today at work. The key to Asian peace in coming generations is in Asians' hands.

For it is Asia's initiative that will found the institutions of progress.

It is Asia's example that will inspire its people to build on the bedrock of social justice.

It is Asia's dream that will determine the future for three of every five human beings on earth.

I know that your nation and my nation will respond to that dream willingly and generously.

Yet all of our efforts—all the planning, all the devotion, all the resources free nations are able to commit to Asia—can be demoralized and destroyed if the terrorist and the aggressor ever succeed in dominating the people.

It is difficult to grow crops, to irrigate fields, to operate schools, to care for the old, to educate the young, to levy taxes, and provide for the people's needs when you are operating in an atmosphere and a climate of terror.

I looked at some figures yesterday. In one small area we had built 65 schools, only to have 55 of those 65 destroyed by the terrorists. The terrorist knows that if he can break down this fabric of community life, then he is well on his way to conquest. Where that conquest stops no one knows. "On what meat does this Caesar feed and when will he halt?"

He tried in Malaya. After great sacrifices by the Malayan people, after great commitments of lives and resources by Britain, Australia, New Zealand, other members of the Commonwealth, and their allies, the terrorist outlaw has been defeated and ambitious invaders have been deterred.

He is trying it again today in Viet-Nam.

It is tragic that this war, the war of terror and bloodshed, must be fought before Asia can be fully free to wage the other war—against hunger and disease and the ancient enemies of man. It is tragic that every foot of ground on which rice might be planted,

every village in which a school might be built, and every hillside on which a hospital might rise to help the people of Viet-Nam must be secured and protected against terror.

Yet it must. For free men, for responsible men, for men of conscience, there just is no acceptable alternative but to resist aggression.

As the struggle continues, we are working with our allies to try to build the foundation of a new Viet-Nam. We are seeking to bring an end to this vicious war by asking men to come to the conference table.

We had a wonderful welcome. We had a lot of friendly signs and banners. We had some pickets carrying some signs saying, "We Want Peace." I did not consider them unfriendly. We want peace, too. I was somewhat startled that they should spend their talents, their time, their pickets, and their cardboard on the President of the United States, because he has gone to more than 100 capitals with a very simple, plain statement that any picket can understand that said, "We will meet you any place you designate in 24 hours, with whomever you choose, to remove this disturbance from the battlefields to the conference room."

I saw many appeals made to the man to whom no appeal is necessary. But I didn't see Mr. Ho Chi Minh's name on one placard, and I wonder why.

So with those men who join me genuinely and earnestly in wanting to stop the killing, stop the bloodshed, and bring peace to all humanity, if they can deliver the adversary, I will volunteer to present myself without due notice.

As the struggle continues, we are working with our allies today, every week, to build foundations, to bring to an end this vicious war.

Our goal is not to destroy North Viet-Nam. Our objective is not the objective of Roosevelt and Churchill and the other leaders—"unconditional surrender." Our goal is not to compel North Viet-Nam to surrender anything which is hers, not even to bring

her government down or to change her system.

Our goal is simply to halt the shooting, to stop the war that she is waging and supporting against her little neighbor. When we succeed—and we shall succeed—I pledge you that we shall begin a nobler war against man's ancient enemies of hunger, ignorance, and disease—everywhere in Southeast Asia, including North Viet-Nam if its government so desires.

We say today to the leaders of North Viet-Nam: A new Asia is emerging. Your people should be part of it—proud, independent, peaceful—the beneficiaries of a social and scientific revolution that is regenerating the life of man.

What can be gained by continuing a war, we say to North Viet-Nam, that you cannot win? What can be lost by joining with your brothers in Southeast Asia in a different kind of war—a war for human dignity, a war for health, a war for enlightenment of the mind, a war for your children and generations of children to come? America pledges today, from this historic platform, that she will serve in that war against these ancient enemies in Southeast Asia for its duration.

This, we believe, is an inescapable responsibility of a Pacific neighbor, as we know ourselves to be, as you in New Zealand have already shown on many fronts that you are.

Our New Zealand friends, there is much that we two nations can prove to the world.

We can prove to the world that it is possible to maintain close ties of affection with Europe without being cut off from Asia, blind to Asia's needs, or ignorant to her great culture.

We can prove that geographic separation does not require spiritual isolation—either from the opportunities or the problems of other men.

We can prove that wealth and prosperity need not build a wall around their fortunate possessors—but can build avenues of service to mankind.

Lastly, New Zealand and America can

prove to the world that nations which have never felt the invader's heel on their soil can and will respond to those brothers who fight to make their own destiny.

These are the true and worthy lessons for mankind. I rejoice that we have you as a partner in our efforts to give them life.

I came here—10,000 miles—a quarter of a century ago to join with your men to protect the liberty of this area of the world. I am coming back this week to join with your Prime Minister and your leaders to try to search, to find a course and chart a way so that we can again protect liberty and freedom—not by driving the dictator from our soil, because he has not reached there yet.

Men often wonder how the course of history might have changed if we had met Hitler before he started through Poland. All men want peace. Some have different ways. Some have different methods. Some think that you can do it one way, and some the other.

I am willing to accept any reasonable proposition, and consider it, that any ally or adversary may make. All I want to do is not only be the possessor of freedom and liberty, but I want to be the protector of it not just for myself but for mankind.

We are firmly committed to a partnership that has been tested in war. It has been deepened and expanded in peace and it has been strengthened, I hope, by SEATO and the ANZUS agreements. We in the United States are here to pledge you that we shall meet our responsibilities even though the immediate danger is 10,000 miles from our boundaries. We will meet our responsibilities today, and in the decades ahead, with all the more confidence because the proud citizens of New Zealand happen to be America's friends.

Mr. Prime Minister, on behalf of 200 million who have come to ask nothing and to give nothing except our friendship and our loyalty, we tell you we are very proud that New Zealand is our friend—and we are prouder still that we are hers.

THE VISIT TO AUSTRALIA

Arrival Statement, RAAF Fairbairn Airport, Canberra, October 20

White House press release (Canberra, Australia) dated October 20

The Vice President told me about how the good people of this land took him into their hearts when he recently visited you. My mouth has been watering ever since because I wanted to be where he was. Now, tonight, I feel that I have returned to my second home. When I first came here a quarter of a century ago, I thought that I had not left home at all, so much did your plains, your hills, and your bush country, your cattlemen, your cattle, and your sheep remind me of my native land of Texas.

I soon learned that the real similarities between us were far deeper and far more meaningful than those landscapes and livestock. The real equation was human. Here in Australia was the same openness, the same virility, the same self-confidence, the same generosity of spirit that I had treasured in my own country.

I am honored beyond measure tonight, upon my arrival, to see the cream and flower of your young manhood who have rendered such gallant and distinguished service in Viet-Nam come here to meet me. Because as I look upon that uniform with that hat turned to the side, it represents to me the highest degree of patriotism, the greatest amount of courage, and the kind of a neighbor that America always wants to have.

Mr. Prime Minister, I don't know what you are claiming credit for these days, but if you and the Leader of the Opposition will join, I want to thank both of you for that beautiful Texas sunset and for that wonderful American rainbow that I saw as I came in.

When I came here a quarter of a century ago, the people of Australia were engaged in a struggle to preserve freedom, a struggle to protect their homes, a struggle to advance the cause of peace for all men.

The Japanese were just 35 miles across the Owen-Stanley Range, and they were coming in your direction. Then, as tonight, Aus-

tralian sons were fighting side by side with ours. Their gallantry then in Egypt, in Italy, in the South Pacific, inspired us to believe that our cause of right would one day prevail. Their gallantry tonight in Viet-Nam is one reason for the faith that we all have that aggression there will not succeed.

I came to Australia in 1942 on a mission of war. Now, more than 24 years later, I return tonight on a mission of hope. I cannot say that miracles will occur at Manila. I carry no magic wand. The hard work of securing the peace is never done by miracles.

I cannot say that the hunger and injustice of the past will be ended by a declaration of seven nations in Manila. Years must pass, years of dedication and patient effort, before men can make the kind of just society of which they dream.

Yet there is new hope, a new vision, in this vast area of the world. Nations are joining together not only to resist aggression and to prove that might does not make right but to make a decent life possible for all of their people. Their visions of freedom—freedom from foreign domination, freedom from tyranny, from the despair that rides with hunger, disease, and ignorance. It is the only vision that is really worthy of man's destiny.

We shall be guided by that vision as we meet and chart our course at Manila.

I am very grateful that once again the Australian and American people have put their hands and their shoulders side by side to the same task. I am grateful for the understanding that your distinguished Prime Minister and other Australian leaders have shown for America's role in the Pacific. I feel tonight—as I did in 1942—the confidence that comes from the steadfast support of a united people in Australia. You must know that we reciprocate that support in the fullest possible measure.

Together, as we have always been, I know that we shall succeed. Now I look forward to meeting with your great people once again.

I am particularly glad that Mrs. Johnson is with me. In 1942 she remained in Washington—when I put on the uniform—to run

my congressional office in the House of Representatives. I have been told on very high authority that it never ran with greater efficiency before or since. Several people have even suggested that we might try the same arrangement now—that it might prove equally beneficial to my constituents in America and to our allies in the world.

But Mrs. Johnson insisted on finding out for herself whether all that I have been talking about for 24 years is really true in Australia. So, Mr. Prime Minister, and to those loyal guests who came here in this chilly atmosphere, we are happy and excited to be with you. I have never looked forward to any two days in my life with more pleasurable anticipation. As I come to this new area of the world, this Pacific area that is now in a goldfish bowl, in the spotlight, where people who look to the future are looking across the Pacific, I know that my faith and my confidence in the leadership that Australia is going to give to the world of tomorrow is going to be rewarded.

Thank you and good night.

Remarks at a Reception at Government House, Melbourne, October 21

White House press release (Canberra, Australia) dated October 21

I have so much in my heart that I would like to tell you that I don't trust myself. I need not convey to you the admiration and affection that I have for the Australian people, born in the grim days of World War II and increased and strengthened each passing year for a quarter of a century.

Our two countries have so much in common. Our two peoples are so much alike that I feel—except for your reception here in Melbourne today—as though I have never left home. But you gave me something in the reception here that they could never give me at home. Texans have the biggest of nearly everything—except receptions.

I appreciate very much the Prime Minister's generous reference and kind attentions to my wife. I am heartily in agreement with everything he said about her. I would like to add one thing that he didn't

say, and I know that all of you who are here on the ground agree with me—we both out-married ourselves.

Our nations are, geographically, a world apart. But our roots and our goals, our faith in the future, are one and the same.

Australia, like America, is a nation of newcomers. We have both thrown open our borders to new talent, to enterprise, to ambition. We have applied the dynamics of a free economy and a progressive social policy to the building of a better life for human beings.

The results in Australia are quite plain. Your living standards are among the highest to be found anywhere in the world. Your riches are widely shared and divided among your people.

In America we still fight a war against poverty. Here, poverty and slums are almost unknown.

In America we call ourselves, with great pride, a nation of homeowners. But the percentage of Australians who own their own homes is much higher than ours and makes the blush of shame come to my cheeks.

In America we congratulate ourselves on approaching full employment. But Australia has had full employment since 3 years before I came here in 1942—at least 28 years.

My country still has much to learn from Australia, and about Australians, but we have learned this much:

—We know your agricultural technology deserves its wide acclaim. By progressive soil enrichment and pest control you are achieving remarkable productivity, and you really serve as a model for the rest of the world.

—We know that your achievements on the land have been matched in your thriving factories. While your exports are still primarily agricultural, more Australians work in industry than in agriculture.

—We know that the future of your industrial development is bright beyond compare. You are looking forward to doubling your mineral exports in 5 years.

I think if I don't get Ed Clark [Edward Clark, U.S. Ambassador to Australia] out of

here, you may double them in 3 years. Every time I try to increase our own production and I send for the head man, I'm told he is visiting Ambassador Clark in Australia.

So you are looking forward to doubling your mineral exports in 5 years, and you will triple them in 10 years.

—We know that what you are doing to fulfill Australia's promise requires a great deal of private initiative, wise public policy, a rapid growth of domestic saving, and continued attraction of capital from abroad.

I am proud that more and more Americans are joining Australians in a creative economic partnership that is building the even better Australia of tomorrow.

You are in a goldfish bowl. You are the envy of many nations of the world. You have just begun to move. You have just begun to grow.

This common task challenges us both. The future of your nation offers unlimited opportunity. Vast Australia is still largely untapped, its enormous wealth waiting to be converted to enrich the lives of its people—the only just use that can ever be made of the resources of the area.

This is the challenge that my country knows well, a challenge that we, like you, are still trying to meet. It is a challenge that we today are ready and eager to join you in meeting.

Let us dedicate ourselves tonight not only to building a better Australia but in building with you a better world.

As we meet here in such a spirit of happiness, there are so many things to be thankful for.

We love peace. We hate war. No one wants to die. Everybody wants to live. We are doing everything that we know to have peace in the world. But it is not a one-way street. You can't make a contract by yourself.

You can't go to a conference and sign a treaty that is unilateral if you are the only one present. Unless and until those ambitious, selfish men recognize and realize this, we must constantly bear this in mind: that aggression doesn't pay, that might doesn't

make right, that power cannot go unchecked in the 20th century.

Until they realize that they cannot win, all this talk about peace will be unilateral. When they do recognize that they can't win, that there is nothing to be gained by destroying their own sons and their own land—and a good many of ours—when they do recognize that, then they may be willing, in terms of the prophet Isaiah, to “come and let us reason together.”

America knows its responsibility. It goes where it has responsibility. We have answered many roll calls across many oceans.

I am reminded of the time when I went to a neighbor's house to ask a lady if her little boy could go home and spend the weekend with me. He had a brother who was a rather fat little boy. He weighed about 200 and he was about 14 years old. We called him “Bones.” He was very properly nicknamed “Bones.”

When I insisted to the mother that she let my friend go home with me, he talked about his little brother. Finally the mother said no, he couldn't. He thought that was unjust. He looked up to his mother and said, “Mama, why can't I go home and spend the night with Lyndon?” He said, “Bones has done been two wheres, and I haven't been anywheres.”

Well, we have been “two wheres” several times. In the places we have been the Australians have been by our side. So I have spent 2 very delightful days, a part of yesterday, last evening, and today, with your honored and distinguished Prime Minister. I have been President 3 years. During that 3 years' time I have received Prime Minister Menzies in the Capital in Washington. I have received Prime Minister Holt in the Capital three times. We have exchanged viewpoints and we continue to give each our very best judgments.

But we need the counsel of each other in these critical times. We need each of you to think about your future and what kind of a world you want to live in. You can't have that kind of a world just by wishing for it. America didn't come into existence

just because somebody wished it would. It came into existence because men, good and true, faithful, loyal, and fearless, were willing to stand up and fight for freedom and fight for liberty and put that at the highest priority.

As the aggressor marched in the Low Countries in the late 1930's, and ultimately wound up in World War II, there are aggressors prowling tonight, on the march again.

Their aggression shall not succeed. But I would remind you it is much closer to Melbourne than it is to San Francisco. It is time for you to stop, look, and listen and decide how much your liberty and your freedom mean to you and what you are willing to pay for it.

If you want to sit back in a rocking chair with a fan and say, “Let the rest of the world go by,” you won't have that liberty and that freedom long. Because when a dictator or an aggressor recognizes that you don't cherish it, that you are not willing to fight and die for it, that you are a pushover, then you are the number-one objective.

So tonight the American boys, almost half a million of them, have left their families and their homes. They have taken our treasure to the extent of about \$2 billion a month to go to the rice paddies of Viet-Nam. They help that little nation of 13 or 14 million try to have the right of self-determination without having a form of government they do not want imposed upon them.

Tonight those brave Aussie lads are there by their side, not halfway, not a third of the way, but all the way, to the last drop of their blood, because they are never going to tuck their tails and run—they are never going to surrender.

They are going to stay there until this aggression is checked before it blooms into world war III.

We wish it were not so, but wishing it were not so doesn't make it so. We wish we could transfer it from the battlefield this moment to the conference table, but we can't do it by ourselves. And until we can convince these people that we have the resolu-

tion and we have the determination, we have the will, and we have the support of our own people, they are not going to come to their senses.

But so far as my country is concerned, don't be misled, as the Kaiser was or as Hitler was, by a few irrelevant speeches. We don't fight with bayonets or swords. We don't even throw Molotov cocktails at each other in America. They may chew off an ear and they may knock out a tooth, they may take your necktie or your pocketbooks, but when they call the roll on the Defense appropriations bill to support our men at the front, it will be carried 87 to nothing in the Senate.

So don't misjudge our speeches in the Senate. And I would warn all would-be oppressors who think they can march and get away with it, they must not misjudge them, either.

Finally, I would say this: In 3 years in office I have seen your previous Prime Minister and your present Prime Minister three times. And I have just asked your indulgence once.

But I have wanted to come back to Australia since I left here 25 years ago, and here I am. And I am happy, and I am enjoying it. I liked it then, and I like it better now. I must admit I am traveling in a little different manner and in a little different company. That does make it nice.

But your Prime Minister said on the steps of the White House—as if he were speaking to the American boys, with more than 100 of them dying every week—that while Australia did not equal our population or our resources, there is no nation in the world that exceeded the Australians in cour-

age, patriotism, and loyalty. When they took their stance by your side, you didn't get a crick in your neck looking around to see if they were coming. I found that out 25 years ago in New Guinea.

They may be ahead of you, but they will never be behind you, and they will always be by the side of you.

So the Prime Minister made the observation that they would be with us all the way. He didn't need to say that. I knew that. The boys that had served with them knew that. But some of the newcomers that were fresh may not have known it.

But he said, "L.B.J., our men are in Vietnam and we are there and we are with you all the way to check this aggression before it lops over and moves on down."

We are going to Manila to try to find the formula for peace, to try to review our military operation, to try to bring that country closer to representative government, to try to exchange views with the leaders of seven countries who love liberty and who love freedom.

We don't expect any magic wonders; we don't expect any miracles. But we do think that each nation who has men committed to die—their leaders ought to get around the table and get the best thinking of the best men those nations can send.

So I want to thank you for your great welcome, for your delightful 2 days. I have benefited tremendously from meeting with your Cabinet and with your leaders. I would be too sentimental if I told you just exactly how I feel about the Australian people, but I think most of you had rather just judge that for yourselves and let me quit talking.

Thank you.

The United States and Poland: Strengthening Traditional Bonds

*Address by President Johnson*¹

Mrs. Johnson and my daughter Lynda and I are delighted that we could have this opportunity on the last day that we are in this country to come here and visit with you good people in the State of Pennsylvania.

This is a proud day for all Americans of Polish descent.

For what we are dedicating this afternoon is more than a beautiful structure of stone and glass.

It is a symbol of 1,000 years of Polish civilization and Polish Christianity. And to me it is also a symbol of millions of men and women who have come to our shores as immigrants in search of a better way of life in America.

They were poor, most of them, and had to take what they could get. Life was hard at its best.

Many of them were illiterate, and the language barriers seemed almost impossible for most of them to surmount.

They were no strangers, of course, to discrimination. Their names were hard to pronounce, they spoke with a strange accent, and they did not come from the "right" part of Europe.

But they did have faith, and having that, they overcame every barrier that confronted them. And looking back now we, all of us, realize how very much they contributed to the richness and to the diversity of the United States of America.

They brought their culture—and that has enriched us. But they brought more. They brought brawn to our industrial might. They brought scholarship to our universities. They brought music to our concert halls. And they brought art to decorate our walls.

And most of all, they brought a love of freedom and a respect for human dignity that is unsurpassed by any in America.

I expect that it is a little known fact of history, but it was a group of Polish-Americans who conducted America's first recorded labor strike. And they did it for the right to vote.

The first Polish immigrants landed at Jamestown, Virginia, in 1608. They followed the usual practice of paying for their passage by working for the company after their arrival. But in the process they discovered that the company authorities had disenfranchised them because they were "foreigners." And so, in 1619, they simply stopped working. And in a very short time thereafter they won their rights as free citizens.

This is the spirit of Polish-Americans.

You just really don't know how glad I am that you won that first strike.

This is not an isolated example. The freedom that we have enjoyed for nearly 200 years was bought not only with American blood, but it was bought—our freedom—with Polish blood as well. Casimir Pulaski once pledged himself before the high altar of a church to defend faith and freedom to the last drop of his blood. And he redeemed that pledge at Savannah so that a young nation could choose its own destiny.

¹ Made at the dedication of the National Shrine of Our Lady of Czestochowa at Doylestown, Pa., Oct. 16 (White House press release).

This is the spirit of Polish-Americans.

Another great man was Thaddeus Kosciusko. Like Pulaski, he came here to help us win our freedom. When the war ended, a grateful Congress gave him American citizenship, a pension with landed estates in Ohio, and the rank of brigadier general.

But he was much more than a professional soldier. He was a great and outstanding humanitarian. And before he returned to Europe in 1798, he drew up his will that placed him at the forefront of the movement to abolish slavery and discrimination.

This was almost 60-odd years before the Emancipation Proclamation.

Here is what he wrote in his will:

I, Thaddeus Kosciusko, hereby authorize my friend Thomas Jefferson to employ the whole of my property in the United States in purchasing Negroes from among his own or any other and giving them liberty in my name. . . .

This, too, is the spirit of Polish-Americans.

We need that spirit in America today—perhaps more than we have ever needed it before. We need the spirit that says that another man's dignity is more precious than life itself.

We need the spirit that says a man's skin shall not be a bar to his opportunities—any more than a man's name or a man's religion or a man's nationality.

And finally, we need the spirit that says, as Pulaski said nearly two centuries ago, "Wherever on the globe men are fighting for freedom, it is as if it were our own affair."

For today, when we pray here on this peaceful Sabbath day, this Sunday afternoon, in this beautiful green valley, there are millions of our fellow citizens who are fighting for freedom—millions in this country and hundreds of thousands across the water.

Millions of our fellow citizens here are fighting for freedom:

Freedom from want.

Freedom from ignorance.

Freedom from fear.

And most of all, freedom from discrimination.

And I hope that each of you will understand that their struggle is your affair, too. So let us make it our cause as well.

As we dedicate this magnificent shrine here this afternoon, let us not be ashamed to say that we are generous or that we care about human beings. When we reach out to help those who are less fortunate than ourselves, let us remember the words of Christ: "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me."

The Battle for Freedom in Asia

Now as we are striving to expand the horizons of 20 million Americans, we have not forgotten the urgent pleas of millions of others throughout the world. They, too, are our brothers—all of them, in all directions. "Love thy neighbor as thyself."

In the morning, we will leave to visit six countries in Asia. We will go to an area of the world where more than half of the people live. We will go to an area of the world where in some parts of it the life expectancy is only 35 years of age, where the per capita income per year is \$65.

They are fighting their battle for freedom:

Freedom to determine who shall govern them.

Freedom from want.

Freedom from hunger.

Freedom from disease.

Freedom from ignorance.

They are now carrying on their battle against all the ancient enemies of mankind. They need your blessings, they need your prayers, and they need your help.

And I am going to carry all of them with me on your behalf.

We must not forget your friends and your relatives in Poland. We have not forgotten the traditional bonds that have united our peoples since our earliest days as a nation.

We intend to strengthen those bonds. As I said at the Virginia Military Institute in an address in 1964,² we intend to build bridges

² For text, see BULLETIN of June 15, 1964, p. 922.

to Poland—bridges of friendship, bridges of trade, and bridges of aid. And following through, last year it was my privilege to appoint one of the outstanding living Polish-Americans as our Ambassador to Poland to help start building those bridges: John A. Gronouski. He is writing a great record for himself and for his nation.

Widening Our Ties With Poland

We have not been idle here at home.

Our postwar contribution to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in Poland has now exceeded \$360 million.

Many Poles have had a better diet, thanks to what you in America have done for them through America's Food for Peace program.

We have donated \$37 million in food through CARE and other private organizations. Through these organizations, we have been able to provide hot meals to hundreds of thousands of children in schools and summer camps and to the sick and aged in hospitals and institutions.

Last December a great children's hospital, a gift from the American people, was dedicated in Krakow.

Last week in New York I announced further steps that the American Government plans to take.³

We will press for legislative authority to negotiate trade agreements which could extend most-favored-nation tariff treatment to Eastern European states, including Poland.⁴

We are instituting a program to strive for closer cultural relations with Poland.

We have reduced export controls on East-West trade in the last few days with respect to hundreds of nonstrategic items that they would like to have from America.

On behalf of your Government, we have extended to Poland an invitation to cooperate with America in our satellite program.

We have taken steps to allow the Export-Import Bank to guarantee commercial cred-

its to four additional Eastern European countries—including Poland.

We are now carefully looking at ways in which we may use some portion of our Polish currency balance for the benefit of both countries—ways which will symbolize America's continuing friendship for Poland.

We are trying to determine ways and means to liberalize our rules on travel in our two countries in order to promote much better understanding and increased exchanges between our people.

And, finally, I am quite hopeful that I will be able to arrange to send to Poland a mission of leading American businessmen and others to explore ways to widen and to enrich the ties between Poland and the United States of America.

New Era of Friendship

My fellow Americans, we are living in times of ferment and unrest—both at home and abroad. But I genuinely believe—I truly know—that there is more in America that unites us than there is to divide us. I believe that our generation now has the opportunity to establish a new era of friendship and cooperation with the peoples of the world. I believe we have the power to eradicate ancient injustices and to ease traditional tensions.

When I leave tomorrow, I shall say that my purpose will be not to accomplish any miracles but to tell the people of the countries that I visit that the best way to judge America's foreign policy is to look at our domestic policy.

Our domestic policy here at home is to find jobs for our men at good wages, education for our children, a roof over their heads, and a church where they can worship according to the dictates of their own conscience, adequate food for their bodies, and health for their families. Because with food, income, education, health, and with a strong defense that will protect our liberty, if we can do that here at home, we can set an example that all the people of the world will want to emulate.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, May 30, 1966, p. 838.

We would like to see all of the 3 billion people have the blessings, advantages, freedom, and prosperity that we have here in America in Pennsylvania this afternoon.

And while we cannot wave any wand and we do not expect to achieve any miracles, we do expect to tell them what interests our people, what we want, and what we would also want for them. We want to assure them that we do not look at self alone. We "love thy neighbor as thyself."

Yes, our ultimate task is reconciliation—to bring us all to perceive, at home and abroad, regardless of our faith or where we worship, regardless of our sex or our religion, regardless of our color, whether it is white or brown or black or green, to bring to all of us at home and abroad, that men are children of God and brothers.

Yes, we are living in an exciting age. Much is at stake. The fabric of our whole society is at stake. The future of all civilization is at stake. But remembering the words "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," I have great hopes for the future. And I believe you do, too.

The Most Urgent Work of Our Times

On October 3 President Johnson was presented with the first copy of "This America," a collection of excerpts from his speeches and messages published by Random House. Following is the text of the epilog which was contributed by the President for the book and was released by the White House on that day.

I have spoken and written of her problems and her promise. I believe that our destiny as a nation depends upon how well we fulfill the pledges to ourselves: the pledge of freedom, of equality, of a more decent life for all.

What we accomplish around the world will be shaped in large part by what we are and what we become at home. Neither high ideals nor great wealth nor military might will

profit us much if we are powerless to solve the problems of our own land.

But we would be shortsighted to confine our vision to this nation's shorelines. The blessings we count at home cannot be cultivated in isolation from the worldwide yearnings of men. An America rich and strong beyond description, yet living in a hostile and despairing world, would be neither safe nor free.

Today the citizens of many nations walk in the shadow of misery. Half the world's adults have never been to school. More than half the world's people are hungry or malnourished. In the developing nations, thousands die daily of cholera, smallpox, malaria and yellow fever—diseases that can be controlled or prevented. Across the world, millions of questioning eyes are turned upon us. What answers can we give?

We mean to show that our dream of a great society does not stop at the water's edge, that it is not just an American dream. All are welcome to share in it and all are invited to contribute to it. The most urgent work of our times—the most urgent work of all time—is to give that dream reality.

The course we follow today traces directly over the two decades since the Second World War. We emerged from that conflict with the sure knowledge that our fate was bound up with the fate of all. Men could no longer content themselves in pursuing narrowly national goals. Men must join in the common pursuit of freedom and fulfillment.

In that pursuit, we have helped Western Europe rebuild, aided Greece and Turkey, come to the defense of Berlin, resisted aggression in Korea and South Viet-Nam. In that pursuit, we have helped new nations toward independence, extended the brotherly hand of the Peace Corps, and carried forward the largest program of economic assistance in the history of mankind.

Today, we follow five continuing principles in our policy:

The first principle is to employ our power purposefully, although always with great restraint. In a world where violence remains the prime policy of some, we as surely shape

the future when we withdraw as when we stand firm before the aggressor. We can best measure the success of this principle by a simple proposition: Not a single country where we have helped mount a major effort to resist aggression today has a government servile to outside interests.

The second principle is to control, to reduce, and ultimately to eliminate the modern engines of destruction. We must not despair or grow cynical at man's efforts to become master of his own fearsome devices. We must push on to harness atomic power as a force for creation rather than destruction.

The third principle is to support those associations of nations which reflect the opportunities and necessities of the modern world. By strengthening the common defense, by stimulating commerce, by confirming old ties and setting new hopes, these associations serve the cause of orderly progress.

A fourth important principle is to encourage the right of each people to govern themselves and shape their own institutions. Today the urge toward independence is perhaps the strongest force in our world. A peaceful world order will be possible only when each country walks the way it has chosen for itself.

A final, enduring strand of our policy as a nation is to help improve the life of man. From the Marshall Plan to now that policy has rested upon the claims of compassion and common sense—and on the certain knowledge that only people with rising faith in the future will build secure and peaceful lands. Not only compassion, but our vital self-interest compels us to play a leading role in a worldwide campaign against hunger, disease, and ignorance.

Half a century ago, William James declared that mankind must seek a "moral equivalent of war." Today the search continues, more urgent than ever before in history. Ours is the great opportunity to challenge all nations, friend and foe alike, to join this battle. We can generate growing light in our universe, or we can allow the darkness to gather. To spread the light, to enlarge man's inner and outer liberty, to promote the

peace and well-being of our people and all people—these are the ambitions of my years in office.

They are the enduring purpose, I believe, of this America.

Progress of Central American Regional Integration Hailed

Following is a statement by Lincoln Gordon, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, marking the 15th anniversary of the Organization of Central American States on October 14.

Press release 243 dated October 14

Today is the fifteenth anniversary of the formation of the Organization of Central American States (ODECA). This anniversary should serve as an occasion to note the consistent and remarkable progress which the five Central American nations have made as partners in their effort to achieve regional integration.

We salute our Central American neighbors for their foresight and determination which, 15 years ago, prompted the formation of ODECA and which, more recently, has brought forth many other examples of economic, social, and cultural cooperation. The rapid pace of progress over the last 5 years, during which the Central American Common Market has emerged as a major factor in regional development, has been particularly notable.

In 1965 ODECA was accorded greatly expanded responsibilities for regional development activities in the areas of health, labor, education, and population studies. This reorganization of ODECA gives evidence of Central America's intention to press the integration movement into social as well as economic fields.

It has been Central American initiative that has led to these successes. A striking example has thus been provided of the merging of separate national interests to the end of facilitating joint regional development.

Columbus as a Spaniard

by Angier Biddle Duke
Ambassador to Spain¹

It is right, when St. Louis adds to its many attractions a permanent Spanish pavilion, to say a word about Spanish threads woven brightly through our American and Atlantic heritage.

In just a few days we celebrate the 474th anniversary of the landing on our shores of Christopher Columbus. Last year Columbus Day was no simple, perfunctory, routine reprise of oft-repeated ceremonies. The Yale University library had just unveiled a Vinland map, ascribed *circa* 1440 A.D. This map showed an island whose location and coast strongly suggested Newfoundland's northern tip. It reminded the news-reading world of Viking voyages centuries earlier than the great wave of Spanish explorations. The implication—against which there were furious Spanish and Italian reactions—was that the depedestalization of Columbus had been long overdue.

The reaction in Spain was instantaneous, strong, and sustained. Virtually all the Madrid press gave the Vinland story front page and headline treatment and bitter editorial coverage. One leading morning paper described Yale's publication of the map as a "methodical and incredibly belligerent effort, long and carefully prepared, aimed at destroying as far as possible the Spanish glory of the discovery of the New World by a seafarer by the name of Christopher Columbus." In an October 12 headline

the same newspaper also used the expression "cultural necrophagia" to describe the Yale library action, thus reviving an extremely unpleasant word which means the "feeding on dead bodies." The Washington correspondent of the same paper described the Yale University publication as an example of the lack of sympathy that "the great occasions in our history inspire in the Anglo-Saxon world," and said that Yale was "trying in the face of documented and uncontestable historical facts to affirm the superiority of northern Europe over the Mediterranean south." If you regard this reaction as extreme, you may be unconsciously retreating to a stereotype which maligns the whole Latin heritage. The Vinland map should be welcomed but put in the proper perspective.

As the current United States Chief of Mission in Spain, in a line begun by John Jay, I am of course most interested in historical matters, particularly with an issue so basic and important. Therefore, in spare moments and with the help of scholarly friends, I have looked into what is and what is not mythical about Columbus and have given some thought as to his true place in history.

One result of my research is a total confidence that Christopher Columbus needs no help from me, nor from anybody else, to defend the greatness of his achievements. You and I, here today only a few hours' flight from his points of departures and arrivals, are his beneficiaries. It may be useful, in a modest way, to tell you a bit about

¹ Address made at Washington University, St. Louis, Mo., on Oct. 6.

what I have been learning about him and his enormous influence. Columbus had a central role, to be sure, in authentically Spanish contributions that transformed the future of mankind.

Any notion that new information is required to justify his preeminence as the discoverer of the New World is downright silly. But let us be hospitable. Why should we not take into our ken not only the Vinland map but all traces of courageous explorers?

Possible Pre-Columbian Travelers

To perpetuate his status as the discoverer, it is entirely unnecessary to claim that in 1492 Columbus was the only nonnative who ever set foot in the Americas. There is copious evidence and argument that there could have been a long series of pre-Columbian travelers to this hemisphere. C. M. Boland, in 1961, mentions at least nine:

Stone-age nomads crossing the Bering Strait from Asia to Alaska, whose descendants became American Indians and Eskimos;

Phoenicians, who might have reached New Hampshire—and/or Venezuela—after successive Punic Wars, a few hundred years B.C.;

Romans, or Roman subjects, who could have fashioned iron, bronze objects, and stone inscriptions in various parts of North America around 64 A.D.;

A Chinese, who may have toured Mayan lands in Central America around the year 500;

St. Brendan the Bold, reportedly wandering from Ireland to Newfoundland, Bermuda, and Florida about 50 years later;

Other Irish monks, settling in what is now, ironically, New England back in the 10th century;

An entire cascade of Viking excursions; Welshmen, who Boland thinks went up the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers to the Louisville region around 1171;

Two Venetians and a Scotch prince, to Nova Scotia around 1395.

Also cited are Dr. Gordon Erholm's presentations of striking parallels of Asian with

Middle American art forms. This anthropologist feels that similar fishhooks, war clubs, blowguns, musical pipes, nose flutes, looms, barkcloth, parasols, toys, and design patterns must have come from contacts across the Pacific between the second and seventh centuries. During my own Central American tour of duty in El Salvador in 1952, I was repeatedly impressed by the striking similarity of Mayan and Asian artifacts. You may have heard, too, how certain Chinese and Japanese glazed ceramics may somehow have been transmitted to the ancient Incas of Peru.

The Vinland map is one of many shards. Libraries are full of them, and of course they are interesting curiosities. More than a few early maps were "guesstimated" creative works. Others had what amounted to the best "facts" that could be approximated.

Columbus in the Cast of Titans

Let us welcome all these profuse suggestions. They show how widely diverse free inquiry can yield intriguing ideas without weakening the central and the supreme truth. It was Columbus who revealed the New World to the Old.

It is not necessary to belabor the Vinland map business. We need not go as far as does G. R. Crone, map curator of the Royal Geographic Society in London, who deduces that the Vinland map is a version of an existing world map of the Venetian Bianco, that it is "probably post-Columbian" in origin, and that "the man who produced it was a copyist, not a cartographer."

Montaigne, who had been hearing many tall stories of exotic lands, said dryly: "We had great need of topographers to make us particular narrations of the places they have been in."

Columbus filled that need. He certainly anticipated the hardheaded dictum of Alfred Korzybski, the well-known author of "Science and Sanity," who kept saying that the map is not the territory.

Samuel Eliot Morison credits Christopher Columbus with "the most spectacular and most far-reaching geographical discovery

in recorded human history," If one were to put Columbus in a category, it should be with those whose work—in whatever realm—is at the highest transcendent rung of their occupational ladders, those whose work was inspiring in the magnitude of their revelations. Ralph Waldo Emerson felt this in his lines about wisdom in the volume titled *Society and Solitude*. I quote:

Raphael paints wisdom; Handel sings it; Phidias carves it; Shakespeare writes it; Wren builds it; Columbus sails it; Washington arms it; Watt mechanizes it.

While you might prefer in 1966 to select a cast of titans different from those Emerson chose in 1870, Columbus belongs with those who have left the deepest creases upon the collective memory of man.

Columbus Felt at Home in Spain

Essayists have tried to show that Columbus was Castilian, Catalan, Corsican, Majorcan, Portuguese, French, German, English, Greek, Jewish, and Armenian. Thomas Glick, a Harvard scholar recently in Spain, points out that Columbus' contemporaries usually referred to him as Genoese—sometimes as Ligurian, referring to that northern region of what is now Italy. That country, as a unit, did not then exist, even though her cities were centers of Renaissance learning, art, and trade.

There is not much doubt but that Columbus' family had been established in the Genoa area for three generations, and this heritage today is a source of great pride to Italians everywhere. That his family had been originally Spanish Jews who subsequently became converts is a reasonable assumption, difficult to prove conclusively but one cogently maintained by many sound scholars. It is a certainty, however, that this Mediterranean man felt very much at home in what came to be his mother country—Spain. There he has ever been regarded as Hispanized as that other Mediterranean giant of Spanish culture, El Greco.

Today, as then, the accident of birth is not necessarily a bar to leadership in the country of one's choice. The fact that Eamon de

Valera was born in Brooklyn of Spanish heritage proved no impediment to his being elected twice as President of Ireland. In a similar sense, the Scottish Andrew Carnegie has been historically accepted as American as readily as the American-born T. S. Eliot is today thought of as an Englishman, and American history from the Revolutionary War on is full of examples of outstanding achievements of persons born elsewhere who climbed to fame and made their mark in our country.

Columbus told what he saw in Castilian language, as a man who had been Genoese by birth but was Spanish by choice, by residence, diction, culture, and possibly by ancestry. The flowers and trees he saw in Haiti, the mountains, plains, and valleys, the fish, the songbirds, and the climate all recalled to him what had become his homeland. His Haitian observations on December 7, 1492, made no less than seven specific comparisons with Spain. "The air was like April in Castile," he wrote in his journal for December 13, "the nightingales and other little birds were singing as in that month in Spain, so that it was the greatest delight in the world."

Spain, where Columbus settled after his years in Portugal, was becoming the most powerful nation on the Continent.

In 1479, when Ferdinand became King of Aragon, he ruled Catalonia, Valencia, and the Balearics; Isabella's Castile had absorbed Andalusia and León. Militant and expansive, with their conquest of Granada in 1492 they ruled more of the peninsula than had been united for centuries. With an Iberian population guessed at 6 million, Spain was then an expanding frontier society. At the edge of the strange and unknown—Africa and the ocean—its condition pressed them to explore, to keep moving ahead, and conquer. The 700-year struggle with the Arabs had built up a pressure that was not released merely by the capture of Granada. A society in a perpetual state of mobilization and onward movement could not relax, stopping limp in its tracks.

It might well appear providential that in

the very year that the united armies of Spain had pushed the last of its ancient overlords back into Africa, the fully aroused energies of this conquering people found leadership at the water's edge in the person of him who was to become the Admiral of the Ocean Sea.

That is why we have 200 million Spanish-speaking people in our hemisphere today, why most of our Western States have Spanish names, and why Spanish is even today a spoken language of the Philippines.

J. H. Plumb of Cambridge University declared that in 1492 the American dream was born. He reflects how, despite Columbus' idea that he had been probing near Cipangu—Japan, no less—the imagination of humanists and intellectuals was fired by the admiral's accounts of what they wanted to believe was an entirely new world. His readers across Europe dreamed of natural man, denizens of a green, golden world that had escaped the fall of Adam from the garden, a world that had never known original sin.

On more practical levels, the Spanish Government moved with considerable foresight. It kept a very firm hold on what became a fast proliferating New Spain. From experience colonizing the Canary Islands in the early 1490's, it soon developed what for the 16th century was a complex and sophisticated set of governing institutions which indeed were to last for centuries.

Civilization Builders Followed Columbus

The point to be made here is that institution building in the new lands began immediately in the wake of the voyages and discoveries.

Although distances from Spain to its empire caused delays even on minor matters, once a decision was taken it was usually obeyed with only minimal misinterpretation and evasions. The crown had continuing, absolute authority. The Irish, Viking, and Welsh wanderers had no such imperial resources behind them. Their travels were isolated adventures, their settlements perishable, their effect on history marginal. They did not break paths for a whole tide of new explorers, evangelists, soldiers, and colonizers

coming after them, as did Christopher Columbus and the Renaissance Spain he served.

Needless to say, Columbus' voyages did not yield instant results. On four voyages he found most of the Caribbean islands, among them Haiti, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Trinidad, and what is now the Venezuelan mainland. As ensuing explorations continued, the Atlantic carried greater riches of its Indies trade than Asia had ever sold the smaller Mediterranean world. And there arose a maritime rivalry—spurred with all the urgency of the much later Oklahoma land rush—among Spain, Portugal, France, England, and the Dutch as others sailed in Columbus' wake.

The cry "Westward Ho" resounded across Europe. Missionaries, conquistadors, administrators, and new waves of civilization builders followed after Columbus to the New World, as they did not do in the paths of his random, if no less courageous, precursors. Just as he was the pragmatist who actually did what others theorized might be possible, the discoverer stirred minds which in time discovered other, no less revolutionary, worlds.

Columbus' conviction that the world was round was not exceptional. Isaac Asimov, the science history writer, says that the earth's rotundity was well accepted by scholars of that day but there was dispute about the distance west from Europe to Asia. The real mark of the Renaissance scientist, that which set Columbus apart from his medieval sources, was that he relied not on books but insisted on empirical proofs. "Although men have talked or have written about these lands," he wrote after his discovery, "all was conjecture, without getting a look at it."

It was not merely coeval accident that Copernicus was 19 in 1492, a Polish student at Bologna. His later astronomical observations at Frauenburg would remap our solar system.

From all evidence, Columbus was as devout in theology as his Catholic monarchs. But his works inspired Rabelais, Machiavelli, Montaigne, Lope de Vega, El Greco, and

others whose insights changed men's views of the world, as did his Renaissance contemporaries Michelangelo and Leonardo.

The greatest literature abounds with fanciful images of the world he opened up. In the Elizabethan pageant of Tamburlaine the Great, Christopher Marlowe has Callapine—son of the Turkish Emperor Bajazeth, and a prisoner in Egypt—try to bribe his keeper:

Choose what thou wilt, all are at thy command:
A thousand galleys, manned with Christian slaves,
I freely give thee, which shall cut the Straits,
And bring armadas from the coast of Spain,
Fraughted with gold of rich America. . . .

That was in 1588, not quite a century after the discovery. Salvador de Madariaga, who makes out a diligent case for Columbus' having been an assimilated convert from a Jewish family of Spanish origins, places him in history this way:

The new world that was to be discovered was not merely the American continent, but that world that the discovery of the American continent was to bring forth in the minds of men. Someone was needed to open the way, to lead . . . that lost world had to be found and someone had to find it: but this was to be the greatest day in human history. . . .

In that Columbian tradition others pursued and discovered yet other new worlds. Miguel Serveto and Harvey discovered the circulating blood systems, Newton the laws of motion, Galileo saw with his eyes that the moon has mountains, the sun spots, Jupiter moons, and the Milky Way clouds of stars.

In that same tradition it is not at all strange that Spain is playing an important role in the exploration of outer space today. In fact, last month the first photographs of the earth taken from the moon were received at Robledo de Chavela—our joint facilities near Madrid.

Morison, who resailed the classic four voyages in a chartered yawl and with the 1939 Harvard Columbus expedition, has documented how skilled a navigator Columbus really was. He also explains the tale—that may well be apocryphal—how at a triumphant dinner on his first return to Spain one guest said someone else would have done the same thing soon. Schoolchildren around the world are told that Columbus asked all

present to make a hard-boiled egg stand on end. Nobody could, but when it came to Columbus he beat one end flat and it stood. Columbus, the man of action, showed the way. After something is done it looks easy.

Centuries later, John F. Kennedy was to make a somewhat similar point. At the start of the Cuban missile crisis, when only a few people in the White House knew of the imminent drastic confrontation with the Kremlin, J.F.K. was scheduled to give a short routine talk on foreign affairs to a group of newsmen and broadcasting people. Richard Rovere, looking back on Kennedy's speech after the crisis was peacefully settled, wrote in the *New Yorker* that the President expressed "an uncharacteristic sentiment in a characteristic way." He had cited a poem by Domingo Ortega, the bullfighter, which he had read in a Robert Graves translation:

Bullfight critics ranked in rows
Crowd the enormous plaza full,
But there is only one who *knows*
And he's the man who fights the bull.

We, the heirs of the Spanish Renaissance and its preeminent discoverer, the Admiral of the Ocean Sea, are today at the edge of new oceans in space. We are at new gulfs in the relations between nations, finding new voyages between them. At no time has there been better prospect for new attempts to brave the perilous unknown, nor with as great returns for the benefit of mankind.

Department Announces Plans for Advisory Panels

Department Announcement

Press release 246 dated October 18

The Department of State announced on October 18 plans for the creation of several panels of civilian specialists from outside government to serve as advisers to the Department on a broad range of foreign policy matters.

Panels ranging in size from 10 to approximately 20 members each will be constituted to work with and offer advice to the

Bureaus of Far Eastern Affairs, African Affairs, European Affairs, Near East and South Asian Affairs, International Organization Affairs, and the Department's Policy Planning Council. Each of these panels will be considered open ended, and from time to time new members will be added. The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs already has well-established panels of outside advisers with whom it consults.

Members of the new panels will be drawn in large measure from the academic community, with representatives to be invited also from private foundations and research institutions, together with individuals representing a number of professions. The panel of advisers for the Bureau of International Organization Affairs has been completed. When the necessary administrative work has been completed the composition of the other panels will be announced.

President Johnson and Secretary Rusk appreciate and value the advice and suggestions which have come from private American citizens interested in the conduct of our foreign relations. The President and the Secretary welcome the opportunity which the creation of these teams will present for the organization and application of new ideas designed to enhance the formulation and conduct of U.S. foreign policies.

The members of the advisory panel to the Bureau of International Organization Affairs are:

Harding F. Bancroft, executive vice president, The New York Times, New York, N.Y.; Andrew W. Cordier, dean, School of International Affairs, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.; Richard N. Gardner, professor of law, Columbia University, New York, N.Y. (formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs); Ernest A. Gross, partner, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt and Mosle, New York, N.Y.; Arthur Larson, director, World Rule of Law Center, Duke University, Durham, N.C.; Marshall D. Shulman, professor of international politics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Mass.; Francis O. Wilcox, dean, The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C. (formerly Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs); Joseph E. Johnson, president, Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, New York, N.Y.; Vernon McKay, professor of African studies, The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C.; Francis T. P. Plimpton, partner, Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyons and Gates, New York, N.Y. (formerly Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations); Kenneth W. Thompson, vice president, The Rockefeller Foundation, New York, N.Y.; Charles W. Yost, senior fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, N.Y. (formerly Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations).

U.S. and Chile Conclude Air Service Consultations

Department Announcement

Press release 242 dated October 14

Delegations representing the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Chile met in Santiago, Chile, between June 26 and August 12, 1966, to consider matters of mutual interest with respect to international air services between the two countries. The consultation was conducted pursuant to the Air Transport Services Agreement which has governed such services since entering into force on December 30, 1948.¹

In accordance with the procedure agreed at the conclusion of consultations, the United States Embassy at Santiago and the Ministry for Foreign Relations of Chile on October 14 exchanged diplomatic notes² confirming each Government's acceptance of the results of the talks. These include an understanding that, under the terms of the existing agreement, either Government may require airlines designated by the other Government to submit schedules for information purposes only, but neither Government will delay or deny their entry into effect. Procedures for *a posteriori* bilateral reviews of services were clarified.

During the consultation, the delegations also undertook a review of services being provided by the designated airlines, Panagra

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1905.

² Not printed here.

and LAN. As a basis for possible future reviews, the aeronautical authorities of both countries are arranging for a periodic exchange of statistics which will facilitate a continuous study of traffic development over the agreed routes.

Both Governments consider that the consultative provision embodied in the Air Transport Services Agreement provides a ready and useful mechanism for bilateral discussion of any questions which arise with respect to services provided by designated airlines of either party under the agreement.

Department Announces Revised Passport Regulations

Press release 248 dated October 20

The Department of State on October 20 published revised regulations dealing with nationality, passports, and travel controls.

The new regulations, which became effective that day on publication in the Federal Register,¹ also define the procedures of the Department in revoking and denying passports, in designating areas of restricted travel, in specially validating passports for restricted areas, and in witnessing and certifying marriages of Americans abroad.

This first general revision of passport regulations in 28 years does not bring about major changes or innovations. The revision constitutes rather a modernization and simplification of prescribed procedures to make them better suit the needs of the increased volume and speed of travel today.

When the main body of the former regulations was promulgated, air travel was in its infancy and the volume of passport issuance was approximately one-tenth of today's level of 1.5 million passports annually.

The new regulations were issued under authority delegated to the Secretary of State by Executive Order 11295 of August 5, 1966.²

¹ 31 *Fed. Reg.* 13537.

² 31 *Fed. Reg.* 10603.

U.S. Chess Team Excepted From Ban on Travel to Cuba

*Department Announcement*¹

The Department of State today [October 20] validated the passports of eight members of the U.S. Chess Federation and eight members of the Puerto Rican Chess Federation for travel to Cuba to participate in the International Chess Federation's Olympiad, central committee, and general assembly meetings beginning in Cuba on October 22 and lasting until November 20.

The International Chess Federation has more than 3 million playing members, and nearly 70 national chess federations are affiliated with it.

This exception to the general ban on travel to Cuba was granted in order to permit U.S. representation in the International Chess Olympiad.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 2d Session

Beirut Agreement Implementation Legislation. Report to accompany H.J. Res. 688. S. Rept. 1626. September 20, 1966. 10 pp.

U.S. Observance of International Human Rights Year, 1968. Report to accompany H.R. 17083. H. Rept. 2050. September 21, 1966. 7 pp.

The Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act of 1966. Report to accompany S. 2463. H. Rept. 2052. September 21, 1966. 5 pp.

Three German Paintings. Report to accompany S. 3353. S. Rept. 1635. September 22, 1966. 13 pp.

Three Vested German Paintings. Report to accompany H.R. 12543. H. Rept. 2066. September 22, 1966. 7 pp.

Chamizal Boundary Highway. Report to accompany S. 2630. S. Rept. 1657. September 27, 1966. 8 pp.

National Service Life Insurance-Philippine Peso Payments. Report to accompany H.R. 16557. S. Rept. 1658. September 27, 1966. 11 pp.

Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1967. Report to accompany H.R. 17788. S. Rept. 1663. September 28, 1966. 23 pp.

Amending Section 301(a)(7) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Report to accompany S. 2892. H. Rept. 2150. September 28, 1966. 5 pp.

Fur Seal Act of 1966. Report to accompany S. 2102. H. Rept. 2154. September 29, 1966. 33 pp.

¹ Read to news correspondents on Oct. 20 by the Department spokesman.

U.S. and Canada Ratify Gut Dam Agreement

Department Announcement

Press release 239 dated October 11

Secretary of State Dean Rusk and His Excellency A. E. Ritchie, Canadian Ambassador to the United States of America, on October 11 in Washington exchanged instruments of ratification, thereby bringing into force the agreement of March 25, 1965, between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada concerning the establishment of an international arbitral tribunal to dispose of United States claims relating to Gut Dam.¹

In line with the provisions contained in the agreement, the Governments of the United States and Canada have today jointly appointed Dr. Lambertus Erades, vice president of the Rotterdam District Court, the Netherlands, to preside over the three-member tribunal as chairman. Professor Alwyn Freeman of Johns Hopkins University has been appointed by the United States Government as its national member, and the Government of Canada has appointed the Honorable Daniel Roach, a recently retired judge of the Court of Appeals of Ontario, as the Canadian national member.

The tribunal will consider claims against the Government of Canada for damage to property on the southern shore of Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence River. The United States maintains that property damage resulted from the construction and maintenance by the Government of Canada of a dam in the international section of the St. Lawrence River known as "Gut Dam."

The Government of Canada constructed

¹ For Department statement of Mar. 25, 1965, and text of the agreement, see BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 643.

Gut Dam as a navigational aid at the beginning of the century pursuant to arrangements entered into with the United States Government. Gut Dam itself was removed in 1953 as part of the St. Lawrence Seaway construction program.

Over the years, the Governments of the United States and Canada have held negotiations with a view toward a fair resolution of these claims. The bringing into force of this agreement today represents the successful result of these negotiations. Under the terms of this agreement the claims will be heard and disposed of on their merits and any award made by the tribunal will be final and binding on both governments.

The headquarters of the tribunal is being established in Ottawa, but it is anticipated that the tribunal will also hold meetings in Washington, D.C. The first meeting of the tribunal will take place early in the new year.

The tribunal staff will be headed by two joint secretaries appointed by the Governments of the United States and Canada. Mr. Arnold E. Ogren has been appointed United States joint secretary and Mr. Charles V. Cole has been appointed Canadian joint secretary. The representative of the Government of the United States before the tribunal is Mr. Ernest L. Kerley, Assistant Legal Adviser, Department of State, Washington, D.C., and the representative of the Government of Canada before the tribunal is Mr. H. Courtney Kingstone, Deputy Head of Legal Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Agreement for the application of safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the bilateral agreement between the United States and Australia of June 22, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3830, 4687), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Vienna September 26, 1966. Entered into force September 26, 1966.
Signatures: Australia, International Atomic Energy Agency, United States.

Cultural Relations

Agreement for facilitating the international circulation of visual and auditory materials of an educational, scientific and cultural character, and protocol. Done at Lake Success July 15, 1949. Entered into force August 12, 1954; enters into force for the United States January 12, 1967.

Ratified by the President: September 30, 1966.

Acceptance deposited: United States, October 14, 1966.

Proclaimed by the President: October 14, 1966.

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21, 1952.¹

Ratified by the President: October 14, 1966.

Racial Discrimination

Convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly December 21, 1965.²

Signature: Chile, October 3, 1966.

Ratification deposited: Pakistan, September 21, 1966.

Accession deposited: Ecuador, September 22, 1966.

BILATERAL

Afghanistan

Agreement extending the technical cooperation program agreement of June 30, 1953, as extended (TIAS 2856, 4670, 4979, 5243, 5477, 5714, 5807, 5901, 5993). Effected by exchange of notes at Kabul July 16, October 5 and 8, 1966. Entered into force October 8, 1966, effective from June 30, 1966.

Canada

Agreement concerning the establishment of an international arbitral tribunal to dispose of United States claims relating to Gut Dam. Signed at Ottawa March 25, 1965.

Ratified by Canada: September 13, 1966.

Ratifications exchanged: October 11, 1966.

Entered into force: October 11, 1966.

Proclaimed by the President: October 12, 1966.

Agreement relating to the establishment of a cooperative meteorological rocket project. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa September 29 and October 6, 1966. Entered into force October 6, 1966.

India

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of September 30, 1964, as amended (TIAS 5669, 5729, 5793, 5846, 5875, 5895, 5913, 5965, 6032). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington October 14, 1966. Entered into force October 14, 1966.

Philippines

Amendment to the agreement of July 27, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3316, 4515, 5677), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 27, 1966.

Entered into force: October 21, 1966.

Somali Republic

Agreement extending the agreement of January 28 and February 4, 1961, as extended (TIAS 4915,

5332, 5508, 5738, 5814), concerning the succession of Somali Republic to the technical cooperation agreement of June 28, 1954, as amended (TIAS 3150, 4392, 4919), between the United States and Italy. Effected by exchange of notes at Mogadiscio September 27 and 29, 1966. Entered into force September 29, 1966.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Department Transfers Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs

Press release 217 dated September 22

Effective September 19 the Department transferred the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs to the direct control of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Refugee and Migration Affairs. Previously it was part of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs.

The transfer follows the appointment of Ambassador James Wine on September 6 to the newly created post of Special Assistant to the Secretary for Refugee and Migration Affairs.

Both moves represent further steps to strengthen and unify Government-wide programs in coordination with privately backed efforts in this field.

The Special Assistant, with rank equivalent to that of an Assistant Secretary, acts on behalf of the Secretary of State in all refugee and migration matters within the Department of State, on the interagency level, and with the private sector.

The Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs is responsible for developing, coordinating, and, in consultation with the concerned bureaus and offices of the Department, determining Departmental policies in matters of refugees, displaced persons, and migrants. Its director is Elmer M. Falk, and the deputy director is Clement J. Sobotka. The Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs was originally placed in the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs on April 1, 1956, by administrative action of the Secretary of State.

George L. Warren, a leading authority in the field who for many years has served as Adviser on Refugee and Migration Affairs in the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, will join the staff of Ambassador Wine.

Designations

Douglas N. Batson as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, effective October 9. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 236 dated October 7.)

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

The UN . . . action agency for peace and progress (Revised). Leaflet describing the purpose, structure, and objectives of the United Nations. Pub. 7733. International Organization and Conference Series 55. 12 pp. 10¢.

Department of State Public Information Materials. Brief bibliography, topically arranged, of pamphlets and periodicals now available. The Department's Film and Audio-Tape libraries are listed separately; also Background Notes. Pub. 8088. General Foreign Policy Series 213. 17 pp. Limited distribution.

Private Boycotts VS the National Interest. Explains how the "bridge of trade" with Eastern European countries can be a positive program against communism—by expanding our contacts in that area—and ultimately aids our foreign policy. Pub. 8117. Commercial Policy Series 203. 20 pp. 15¢.

"The United States and Western Europe"—Discussion Guide. Discussion questions for classroom use prior to viewing this film, which analyzes postwar U.S. policy toward Western Europe. Includes a list of suggested readings. Pub. 8123. 7 pp. Limited distribution.

"In Search of Peace"—Discussion Guide. Gives discussion questions, definitions, and suggested readings to accompany the film, which sets forth the long-range goals of U.S. foreign policy. Pub. 8124. 8 pp. Limited distribution.

Treaties—Continued Application to Tanzania of Certain Treaties Concluded Between the United States and the United Kingdom. Agreement with Tanzania. Exchange of notes—Dated at Dar es Salaam November 30 and December 6, 1965. Entered into force December 6, 1965. Effective December 9, 1963. TIAS 5946. 3 pp. 5¢.

Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with France. Exchange of notes—Dated at Paris May 5, 1966. Entered into force July 1, 1966. With related notes—Signed at Paris June 29 and July 6, 1966. TIAS 6022. 8 pp. 10¢.

Air Transport Services. Agreement with Norway, amending the agreement of October 6, 1945, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington June 7, 1966. Entered into force June 7, 1966. With related notes. TIAS 6025. 7 pp. 10¢.

Air Transport Services. Agreement with Sweden, amending the agreement of December 16, 1944, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington June 7, 1966. Entered into force June 7, 1966. With related notes. TIAS 6026. 7 pp. 10¢.

Atomic Energy. Application of Safeguards by the IAEA to the United States-Israel Cooperation Agreement. Agreement with Israel, and the International Atomic Energy Agency—Signed at Vienna June 18, 1965. Entered into force June 15, 1966. TIAS 6027. 10 pp. 10¢.

Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with Israel. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington June 15, 1966. Entered into force June 15, 1966. TIAS 6028. 3 pp. 5¢.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Colombia, amending the agreement of June 9, 1965. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington June 24, 1966. Entered into force June 24, 1966. With related notes. TIAS 6029. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with the Ivory Coast, amending the agreement of April 5, 1965. Exchange of notes—Signed at Abidjan June 1, 1966. Entered into force June 1, 1966. TIAS 6030. 3 pp. 5¢.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LV, NO. 1428 PUBLICATION 8158 NOVEMBER 7, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of

the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-

intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. PRICE: 52 issues, domestic \$10, foreign \$15; single copy 30 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the Department of State Bulletin as the source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

American Principles. The Most Urgent Work of Our Times (Johnson) 715

American Republics. Progress of Central American Regional Integration Hailed (Gordon) 716

Asia

President Johnson Begins His Tour of Asia 698

The United States and Poland: Strengthening Traditional Bonds (Johnson) 712

Australia. President Johnson Begins His Tour of Asia 698

Aviation. U.S. and Chile Conclude Air Service Consultations 722

Canada. U.S. and Canada Ratify Gut Dam Agreement 724

Chile. U.S. and Chile Conclude Air Service Consultations 722

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy 723

Cuba. U.S. Chess Team Excepted From Ban on Travel to Cuba 723

Department and Foreign Service

Department Announces Plans for Advisory Panels 721

Department Transfers Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs 725

Designations (Batson) 725

Economic Affairs

President Johnson Begins His Tour of Asia 698

Progress of Central American Regional Integration Hailed (Gordon) 716

U.S. and Canada Ratify Gut Dam Agreement 724

The United States and Poland: Strengthening Traditional Bonds (Johnson) 712

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Batson designated Deputy Assistant Secretary 725

Human Rights. The United States and Poland: Strengthening Traditional Bonds (Johnson) 712

International Organizations and Conferences. Department Announces Plans for Advisory Panels 721

Italy. Columbus as a Spaniard (Duke) 717

New Zealand. President Johnson Begins His Tour of Asia 698

Passports

Department Announces Revised Passport Regulations 723

U.S. Chess Team Excepted From Ban on Travel to Cuba 723

Poland. The United States and Poland: Strengthening Traditional Bonds (Johnson) 712

Presidential Documents

The Most Urgent Work of Our Times 715

President Johnson Begins His Tour of Asia 698

The United States and Poland: Strengthening Traditional Bonds 712

Publications. Recent Releases 726

Refugees. Department Transfers Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs 725

Spain. Columbus as a Spaniard (Duke) 717

Treaty Information

Current Actions 724

U.S. and Canada Ratify Gut Dam Agreement 724

Viet-Nam. President Johnson Begins His Tour of Asia 698

Name Index

Batson, Douglas N 725

Duke, Angier Biddle 717

Gordon, Lincoln 716

Johnson, President 698, 712, 715

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: October 17-23

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to October 17 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 217 of September 22, 239 of October 11, and 242 and 243 of October 14.

No.	Date	Subject
*245	10/18	Miss Laise sworn in as Ambassador to Nepal (biographic details).
246	10/18	Advisory panel plans announced.
†247	10/18	MacArthur: American and Common Market Club of Brussels.
248	10/20	New regulations on nationality, passports, and travel controls.
*249	10/20	Gordon: Pan American Society of California, San Francisco (summary).

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE
DEPARTMENT
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STATE
BULLETIN

Vol. LV, No. 1429



November 14, 1966

THE FREE WORLD'S STAKE IN VIET-NAM

by Assistant Secretary MacArthur 745

THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT CHAPTER IN MAN'S PILGRIMAGE TOWARD PEACE

by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg 739

REFUGEE PROBLEMS TODAY

by James Wine 751

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S TRIP TO ASIA

*Manila Conference Documents; President Johnson's Remarks
at Cam Ranh Bay, Viet-Nam, and Report to the Nation 730*

Seven Nations Declare Unity at Manila Conference; President Johnson Visits American Troops at Cam Ranh Bay

President Johnson arrived in the Philippines on October 23 to attend the seven-nation conference held at Manila October 24-25. On October 26 the President made a surprise visit to the port installation at Cam Ranh Bay in the Republic of Viet-Nam to talk with U.S. service personnel. After his return to Manila, the President recorded a report to the Nation on his trip to Viet-Nam and the Manila conference. Following are texts of the three documents issued at the close of the Manila conference, President Johnson's remarks at Cam Ranh Bay, and his report to the Nation.

MANILA CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS ¹

Goals of Freedom

We, the seven nations gathered in Manila, declare our unity, our resolve, and our purpose in seeking together the goals of freedom in Vietnam and in the Asian and Pacific areas. They are:

1. To be free from aggression.
2. To conquer hunger, illiteracy, and disease.
3. To build a region of security, order, and progress.

¹ Issued at Manila at the close of the conference on Oct. 25. Texts of the documents also were made available at Washington by the White House and by the Department of State (press release 252 dated Oct. 25).

4. To seek reconciliation and peace throughout Asia and the Pacific.

Manila Summit Conference—Joint Communiqué

Introduction

1. In response to an invitation from the President of the Republic of the Philippines, after consultations with the President of the Republic of Korea and the Prime Ministers of Thailand and the Republic of Vietnam, the leaders of seven nations in the Asian and Pacific region held a summit conference in Manila on October 24 and 25, 1966 to consider the conflict in South Vietnam and to review their wider purposes in Asia and the Pacific. The participants were Prime Minister Harold Holt of Australia, President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea, Prime Minister Keith Holyoake of New Zealand, President Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Philippines, Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn of Thailand, President Lyndon B. Johnson of the United States of America, and Chairman Nguyen Van Thieu and Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky of the Republic of Vietnam.

Basic Policy

2. The nations represented at this conference are united in their determination that the freedom of South Vietnam be secured, in their resolve for peace, and in their deep concern for the future of Asia and the Pacific.

Some of us are now close to the actual danger, while others have learned to know its significance through bitter past experience. This conference symbolizes our common purposes and high hopes.

3. We are united in our determination that the South Vietnamese people shall not be conquered by aggressive force and shall enjoy the inherent right to choose their own way of life and their own form of government. We shall continue our military and all other efforts, as firmly and as long as may be necessary, in close consultation among ourselves until the aggression is ended.

4. At the same time our united purpose is peace—peace in South Vietnam and in the rest of Asia and the Pacific. Our common commitment is to the defense of the South Vietnamese people. Our sole demand on the leaders of North Vietnam is that they abandon their aggression. We are prepared to pursue any avenue which could lead to a secure and just peace, whether through discussion and negotiation or through reciprocal actions by both sides to reduce the violence.

5. We are united in looking to a peaceful and prosperous future for all of Asia and the Pacific. We have therefore set forth in a separate declaration a statement of the principles that guide our common actions in this wider sphere.

6. Actions taken in pursuance of the policies herein stated shall be in accordance with our respective constitutional processes.

Progress and Programs in South Vietnam

THE MILITARY EFFORT

7. The Government of Vietnam described the significant military progress being made against aggression. It noted with particular gratitude the substantial contribution being made by free world forces.

8. Nonetheless, the leaders noted that the movement of forces from North Vietnam continues at a high rate and that firm military action and free world support continue to be required to meet the threat. The necessity for such military action and support must depend for its size and duration on the

Texts of other items relating to President Johnson's visit in the Philippines, as well as to his subsequent visits in Thailand, Malaysia, and Korea, will be published in future issues of the Bulletin as they become available.

intensity and duration of the Communist aggression itself.

9. In their discussion, the leaders reviewed the problem of prisoners of war. The participants observed that Hanoi has consistently refused to cooperate with the International Committee of the Red Cross in the application of the Geneva Conventions, and called on Hanoi to do so. They reaffirmed their determination to comply fully with the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and welcomed the resolution adopted by the Executive Committee of the League of Red Cross Societies on October 8, 1966, calling for compliance with the Geneva Conventions in the Vietnam conflict, full support for the International Committee of the Red Cross, and immediate action to repatriate seriously sick and wounded prisoners of war. They agreed to work toward the fulfillment of this resolution, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, and indicated their willingness to meet under the auspices of the ICRC or in any appropriate forum to discuss the immediate exchange of prisoners.

PACIFICATION AND REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

10. The participating governments concentrated particular attention on the accelerating efforts of the Government of Vietnam to forge a social revolution of hope and progress. Even as the conflict continues, the effort goes forward to overcome the tyranny of poverty, disease, illiteracy and social injustice.

11. The Vietnamese leaders stated their intent to train and assign a substantial share of the armed forces to clear-and-hold actions in order to provide a shield behind which a new society can be built.

12. In the field of Revolutionary Develop-

ment, measures along the lines developed in the past year and a half will be expanded and intensified. The training of Revolutionary Development cadres will be improved. More electricity and good water will be provided. More and better schools will be built and staffed. Refugees will be taught new skills. Health and medical facilities will be expanded.

13. The Vietnamese Government declared that it is working out a series of measures to modernize agriculture and to assure the cultivator the fruits of his labor. Land reform and tenure provisions will be granted top priority. Agricultural credit will be expanded. Crops will be improved and diversified.

14. The Vietnamese leaders emphasized that underlying these measures to build confidence and cooperation among the people there must be popular conviction that honesty, efficiency and social justice form solid cornerstones of the Vietnamese Government's programs.

15. This is a program each of the conferring governments has reason to applaud recognizing that it opens a brighter hope for the people of Vietnam. Each pledged its continuing assistance according to its means, whether in funds or skilled technicians or equipment. They noted also the help in non-military fields being given by other countries and expressed the hope that this help will be substantially increased.

ECONOMIC STABILITY AND PROGRESS

16. The Conference was told of the success of the Government of Vietnam in controlling the inflation which, if unchecked, could undercut all efforts to bring a more fulfilling life to the Vietnamese people. However, the Vietnamese leaders reaffirmed that only by constant effort could inflation be kept under control. They described their intention to enforce a vigorous stabilization program, to control spending, increase revenues, and seek to promote savings in order to hold the 1967 inflationary gap to the minimum practicable level. They also plan to take further measures to insure maximum utilization of the Port of Saigon, so that imports urgently

needed to fuel the military effort and buttress the civil economy can flow rapidly into Vietnam.

17. Looking to the long-term future of their richly endowed country, the Vietnamese representatives described their views and plans for the building of an expanded post-war economy.

18. Military installations where appropriate will be converted to this purpose, and plans for this will be included.

19. The conferring nations reaffirmed their continuing support for Vietnamese efforts to achieve economic stability and progress. Thailand specifically noted its readiness to extend substantial new credit assistance for the purchase of rice and the other nations present reported a number of plans for the supply of food or other actions related to the economic situation. At the same time the participants agreed to appeal to other nations and to international organizations committed to the full and free development of every nation, for further assistance to the Republic of Vietnam.

POLITICAL EVOLUTION

20. The representative of Vietnam noted that, even as the Conference met, steps were being taken to establish a new constitutional system for the Republic of Vietnam through the work of the Constituent Assembly, chosen by so large a proportion of the electorate last month.

21. The Vietnamese representatives stated their expectation that work on the Constitution would go forward rapidly and could be completed before the deadline of March 1967. The Constitution will then be promulgated and elections will be held within six months to select a representative government.

22. The Vietnamese Government believes that the democratic process must be strengthened at the local as well as the national level. The Government of Vietnam announced that to this end it will begin holding village and hamlet elections at the beginning of 1967.

23. The Government of Vietnam announced that it is preparing a program of

national reconciliation. It declared its determination to open all doors to those Vietnamese who have been misled or coerced into casting their lot with the Viet Cong. The Government seeks to bring them back to participate as free men in national life under amnesty and other measures. Former enemies are asked only to lay down their weapons and bring their skills to the service of the South Vietnamese people.

24. The other participating nations welcomed the stated expectation of the Vietnamese representatives that work on the Constitution will proceed on schedule, and concurred in the conviction of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam that building representative, constitutional government and opening the way for national reconciliation are indispensable to the future of a free Vietnam.

The Search for Peace

25. The participants devoted a major share of their deliberations to peace objectives and the search for a peaceful settlement in South Vietnam. They reviewed in detail the many efforts for peace that have been undertaken, by themselves and other nations, and the actions of the United Nations and of His Holiness the Pope. It was clearly understood that the settlement of the war in Vietnam depends on the readiness and willingness of the parties concerned to explore and work out together a just and reasonable solution. They noted that Hanoi still showed no sign of taking any step toward peace, either by action or by entering into discussions or negotiations. Nevertheless, the participants agreed that the search for peace must continue.

26. The Government of the Republic of Vietnam declared that the Vietnamese people, having suffered the ravages of war for more than two decades, were second to none in their desire for peace. It welcomes any initiative that will lead to an end to hostilities, preserves the independence of South Vietnam and protects the right to choose their own way of life.

27. So that their aspirations and position would be clear to their allies at Manila and

friends everywhere, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam solemnly stated its views as to the essential elements of peace in Vietnam as follows:

(1) *Cessation of Aggression.* At issue in Vietnam is a struggle for the preservation of values which people everywhere have cherished since the dawn of history; the independence of peoples and the freedom of individuals. The people of South Vietnam ask only that the aggression that threatens their independence and the externally supported terror that threatens their freedom be halted. No self-respecting people can ask for less. No peace-loving nation should ask for more.

(2) *Preservation of the Territorial Integrity of South Vietnam.* The people of South Vietnam are defending their own territory against those seeking to obtain by force and terror what they have been unable to accomplish by peaceful means. While sympathizing with the plight of their brothers in the North and while disdaining the regime in the North, the South Vietnamese people have no desire to threaten or harm the people of the North or invade their country.

(3) *Reunification of Vietnam.* The Government and people of South Vietnam deplore the partition of Vietnam into North and South. But this partition brought about by the Geneva Agreements of 1954, however unfortunate and regrettable, will be respected until, by the free choice of all Vietnamese, reunification is achieved.

(4) *Resolution of Internal Problems.* The people of South Vietnam seek to resolve their own internal differences and to this end are prepared to engage in a program of national reconciliation. When the aggression has stopped, the people of South Vietnam will move more rapidly toward reconciliation of all elements in the society and will move forward, through the democratic process, toward human dignity, prosperity and lasting peace.

(5) *Removal of Allied Military Forces.* The people of South Vietnam will ask their allies to remove their forces and evacuate

their installations as the military and subversive forces of North Vietnam are withdrawn, infiltration ceases, and the level of violence thus subsides.

(6) *Effective Guarantees.* The people of South Vietnam, mindful of their experience since 1954, insist that any negotiations leading to the end of hostilities incorporate effective international guarantees. They are open-minded as to how such guarantees can be applied and made effective.

28. The other participating governments reviewed and endorsed these as essential elements of peace and agreed they would act on this basis in close consultation among themselves in regard to settlement of the conflict.

29. In particular, they declared that Allied forces are in the Republic of Vietnam because that country is the object of aggression and its government requested support in the resistance of its people to aggression. They shall be withdrawn, after close consultation, as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides. Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled.

CONTINUING CONSULTATION AMONG THE PARTICIPATING NATIONS

30. All the participants agreed that the value of a meeting among the seven nations had been abundantly demonstrated by the candid and thorough discussions held. It was further agreed that, in addition to the close consultation already maintained through diplomatic channels, there should be regular meetings among their Ambassadors in Saigon in association with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. Meetings of their Foreign Ministers and Heads of Government will also be held as required.

31. At the close of the meeting, all the visiting participants expressed their deep gratitude to President Marcos and to the Government of the Republic of the Philip-

ines for offering Manila as the conference site, and expressed their appreciation for the highly efficient arrangements.

Declaration of Peace and Progress in Asia and the Pacific

We, the leaders of the seven nations gathered in Manila:

Desiring peace and progress in the Asian-Pacific region;

Having faith in the purposes and principles of the United Nations which call for the suppression of acts of aggression and respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;

Determined that aggression should not be rewarded;

Respecting the right of all peoples to choose and maintain their own forms of government;

Seeking a peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam; and

Being greatly encouraged by the growing regional understanding and regional cooperation among the free nations of Asia and the Pacific

Hereby proclaim this declaration of principles on which we base our hopes for future peace and progress in the Asian and Pacific region:

I. Aggression must not succeed.

The peace and security of Asia and the Pacific and, indeed, of the entire world, are indivisible. The nations of the Asian and Pacific region shall enjoy their independence and sovereignty free from aggression, outside interference, or the domination of any nation. Accepting the hard-won lessons of history that successful aggression anywhere endangers the peace, we are determined to fulfill our several commitments under the United Nations Charter and various mutual security treaties so that aggression in the region of Asia and the Pacific shall not succeed.

II. We must break the bonds of poverty, illiteracy and disease.

In the region of Asia and the Pacific, where there is a rich heritage of the intrinsic worth and dignity of every man, we recognize the responsibility of every nation to join in an expanding offensive against poverty, illiteracy and disease. For these bind men to lives of hopelessness and despair; these are the roots of violence and war. It is when men know that progress is possible and is being achieved, when they are convinced that their children will lead better, fuller, richer lives, that men lift up their heads in hope and pride. Only thus can there be lasting national stability and international order.

III. *We must strengthen economic, social and cultural cooperation within the Asian and Pacific region.*

Together with our other partners of Asia and the Pacific, we will develop the institutions and practice of regional cooperation. Through sustained effort we aim to build in this vast area, where almost two-thirds of humanity live, a region of security and order and progress, realizing its common destiny in the light of its own traditions and aspirations. The peoples of this region have the right as well as the primary responsibility to deal with their own problems and to shape their own future in terms of their own wisdom and experience. Economic and cultural cooperation for regional development should be open to all countries in the region, irrespective of creed or ideology, which genuinely follow a policy of peace and harmony among all nations. Nations outside the region will be welcomed as partners working for the common benefit and their cooperation will be sought in forms consonant with the independence and dignity of the Asian and Pacific nations.

A peaceful and progressive Asia, in which nations are able to work together for the common good, will be a major factor in establishing peace and prosperity throughout the world and improving the prospects of international cooperation and a better life for all mankind.

IV. *We must seek reconciliation and peace throughout Asia.*

We do not threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of our neighbors, whatever their ideological alignment. We ask only that this be reciprocated. The quarrels and ambitions of ideology and the painful frictions arising from national fears and grievances should belong to the past. Aggression rooted in them must not succeed. We shall play our full part in creating an environment in which reconciliation becomes possible, for in the modern world men and nations have no choice but to learn to live together as brothers.

**PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S REMARKS
AT CAM RANH BAY, OCTOBER 26**

White House press release (Manila, the Philippines) dated October 26

I came here today for one good reason: simply because I could not come to this part of the world and not come to see you.

I came here today for one good purpose: to tell you, and through you, tell every soldier, sailor, airman, and marine in Viet-Nam how proud we are of what you are doing and how proud we are of the way you are doing it.

I came here today with only one regret: that I would not be able to personally thank every man in Viet-Nam for what he is doing. I wish—I wish very much—that I could visit every battalion, every squadron, every ship.

You know what you are fighting against: a vicious and illegal aggression across this little nation's frontier.

You know what you are fighting for: to give the Vietnamese people a chance to build the kind of nation that they want, free from terror, free from intimidation, free from fear.

I do not have to tell you that this is a tough battle. But from the first day you have shown that you were up to the job.

General [William C.] Westmoreland told me as we were reviewing the troops that no armed forces anywhere, at any time, com-

manded by any commander in chief, were up to the group that we have in Viet-Nam now.

I cannot decorate each of you, but I cannot visualize a better decoration for any of you to have than to know that this great soldier thinks that you are the best prepared, that you are the most skilled, that you know what you are doing, and you know why you are doing it—and you are doing it.

No American army in all of our long history has ever been so compassionate.

Make no mistake about it: The American people that you represent are proud of you.

There are some who may disagree with what we are doing here, but that is not the way most of us feel and act when freedom and the Nation's security are in danger.

We in America depend on you, on the young and on the brave, to stop aggression before it sweeps forward. For then it must be stopped by larger sacrifice and by heavier cost.

We depend upon you. We know that a nation that stops producing brave men soon ceases to be a nation.

I give you my pledge: We shall never let you down, nor your fighting comrades, nor the 15 million people of South Viet-Nam, nor the hundreds of millions of Asians who are counting on us to show here—here in Viet-Nam—that aggression doesn't pay and that aggression can't succeed.

You stand today in a long line of brave men—the kind of men that our nation has produced when they were needed—the kind of men who fought at Valley Forge and Vicksburg, in the Argonne and at Iwo Jima, on the Pusan perimeter and at the 38th parallel.

Such men today are in Viet-Nam. You are in Viet-Nam, and at your side are the men of five other allied nations. They also know what is at stake and are willing to fight and die for it.

That is what the conference we have just completed at Manila demonstrated.

Above all, there are our Vietnamese friends. These are people who have been fighting, suffering, and dying, some of them for more years than most of you have lived.

With our help and with the help of the other allies, they will succeed in giving their people the right to shape their own destiny.

One day when they know peace, the whole world will acknowledge that what you have done here was worth the price.

Then this wonderful harbor, built here by you, will become a source of strength to the economic life of Viet-Nam, Asia, and this part of the world.

We are working, each of us in our own way, to bring that day even closer.

One of your number has been working longer than most, and harder than most, to speed that day along. In recognizing him today, we honor all the men, in all the services, in all this great command.

It gives me a great pleasure to award to your gallant commander, General Westmoreland, the Distinguished Service Medal for his courage, for his leadership, for his determination, and for his great ability as a soldier and as a patriot.

American fighting men, I salute you. You have the respect, you have the support, you have the prayers of a grateful President and of a grateful nation.

I hope, through each of you, to take this message to all of you: We believe in you. We know you are going to get the job done. And soon, when peace can come to the world, we will receive you back in your homeland with open arms, with great pride, and with great thanks.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S REPORT TO THE NATION, OCTOBER 27²

My fellow Americans: I am speaking to you this morning from Manila only a few hours after my trip to Viet-Nam.

I went there to visit our men at our base on Cam Ranh Bay. Many of them only recently had come from the battlefield. Some were in field dress, carrying their packs and rifles.

² Telephoned from Manila to Washington, where it was taped and made available to radio and TV networks by the Office of the White House Press Secretary on Oct. 27 (White House press release).

All of them were inspiring. You knew that courage was no stranger to these men. And as I decorated five of them for extraordinary bravery in battle, I realized over again how very much we owe these men. How many times we have called on young men like these to serve their country, and not once—not once—have they failed us.

Those men have pledged their lives.

I pledged—in return, and on your behalf, for I was there as your representative—I pledged that we will not fail them.

The struggle in Viet-Nam becomes very real when you stand among men who have tasted its agony and experienced its horror. No Commander in Chief could meet face to face with these soldiers without asking himself: What is it they are doing here? What does it mean—the sacrifice and valor of the very young and the very best?

As I passed among their ranks, I thought of all the battlefields in this century where Americans that we love have fought: Belleau Wood and the Argonne, the Solomons and Bastogne, the Pusan perimeter and the 38th parallel in Korea.

They fought—and tens of thousands of them died—for the same cause that brought the men I saw at Cam Ranh Bay to a place called South Viet-Nam.

They are there to keep aggression from succeeding.

They are there to stop one nation from taking over another nation by force.

They are there to help people who do not want to have an ideology pushed down their throats and imposed upon them.

They are there because somewhere, and at some place, the free nations of the world must say again to the militant disciples of Asian communism: This far and no further.

The time is now, and the place is Viet-Nam.

And the men I saw this week at Cam Ranh Bay know—as their buddies throughout Viet-Nam know—that they are in the front line of a contest that is as far-reaching and as vital as any we have ever waged.

We are not alone there. Five other nations of the Pacific and Asian regions have joined

with the United States to help the Republic of South Viet-Nam turn back the terrorist and defeat the aggressor. Other nations are helping us to provide food and medicine and other resources for a people who have already suffered too long and too much.

Seven of the allied nations met here in Manila this week to take stock of where we are and where we want to go. As I talked with the leaders of South Viet-Nam and the Republic of Korea, of the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand, I was struck by how the fortunes of freedom have brought together these nations of such diverse backgrounds.

We have different histories. Our economies have reached different stages of development. We speak different languages. We worship at different altars. The color of our skin is not the same.

But what emerged from Manila was not a testament to those differences. It was a witness of our unity. What brought us to Manila is this fact: We all have a stake in peace and freedom and order in Asia and the Pacific.

We know that we can have peace, that order is possible, and that freedom can be assured only if we unite and work together. We know that in division is weakness—and in weakness, danger.

And so we came here to Manila to meet. That was to me the most encouraging development of all—that we could meet, as friends, as partners, as equals.

We declared here in Manila these goals of freedom for Viet-Nam and for all of Asia and the Pacific:

First, to be free from aggression.

Second, to conquer hunger, illiteracy, and disease.

Third, to build a region of security, order, and progress.

Fourth, to seek reconciliation and peace throughout the area.

Seven nations at Manila committed themselves to these goals. For us, they are not mere rhetoric to be stored in the dustbins of diplomatic history. We will seek all of them, and we hope we will achieve all of them. We

made no new treaties; we entered into no new agreements.

No, this was not rhetoric at all. These goals are what led us to send our men to Viet-Nam to begin with. And when I looked into their faces at Cam Ranh Bay yesterday, I knew that what we had done in Manila was for real. What we did—if we keep faith with ourselves—will make it impossible for those men and their allies to sacrifice in vain. For there can be no sense in fighting and suffering if our purpose is unclear and if we are unsure of what we hope to achieve.

At Manila, we spelled it out for all the world to see. Let me repeat it—again and again.

We seek:

—To be free of aggression.

—To conquer hunger, illiteracy, and disease.

—To build a region of security, order, and progress.

—To seek reconciliation and peace throughout the area.

To those goals we have committed the lives of our men and the wealth of our nations.

But we did more at Manila.

We saw much progress toward attaining these goals in Viet-Nam.

We received an eloquent and encouraging report from General [William C.] Westmoreland.

We saw that our military shield is now strong enough to prevent the aggressor from succeeding.

We saw that the South Viet-Nam Government, assisted by our nation and others, is improving the lives of its people. There is a long way yet to go, but we are determined to get on with it.

We saw that democracy is gaining in Viet-Nam. The constitution should be adopted before its deadline of next March. Elections are then scheduled to follow within 6 months to form a representative government.

We saw that the South Vietnamese will try to include in their national life various views and various groups. The Government will of-

fer them amnesty if they will lay down their weapons. It will allow them to move to the North, if they desire it, or to give their skills and energies to building the South.

So we committed ourselves once again to the Geneva Convention. We urged that the seriously sick and wounded prisoners of war be returned to their homes. We offered to discuss the immediate exchange of prisoners.

Most urgently, we asked ourselves: What are the real chances for peace?

The people of Viet-Nam—many of whom have known a lifetime of strife and terror, of hunger and injustice—long for an end to the fighting that does not require their submission to terror.

Each of the nations meeting at Manila has now expressed its willingness to seek an honorable peace. None of our nations has insisted on the unconditional surrender of the forces opposing us or on terms which those forces could reasonably find dishonorable.

We agreed at Manila that our own forces will be withdrawn from South Viet-Nam as the forces sent down from the North are also withdrawn and as violence disappears. And we made it clear that this could be accomplished from our side in not more than 6 months after the conditions we set out were met—and perhaps even sooner.

This was, I think, a very important step forward. Our intentions are in writing now for all the world to see. Those who have doubted them can continue to doubt only to hide their unwillingness to seek peace. For we mean what we say: When the aggression from the North has ceased, we do not want and we do not intend to remain in South Viet-Nam.

Her people want to get on with the job of building a new South Viet-Nam free from the interference of any foreign nation. And that, too, is our goal.

Until then we must continue to resist the aggression that threatens South Viet-Nam. We do so not only because that aggression must fail. We do so because we believe that the Communists will unbolt the door to peace only when they are convinced their military campaign cannot succeed.

We want to end this war today—we want to end it this hour. But as it was said at the conference in Manila, we have followed every hint, we have made every gesture; now, with the specific spelling out of our position on withdrawal of forces, the ball is in the other court.

In Viet-Nam yesterday I thought of the great potential for peace at Cam Ranh Bay. It is a magnificent harbor that we are helping to build there. How wonderful it will be when ships docking there carry the commerce of peace instead of the implements of war.

Yet so long as men try to take by violence what is not theirs by right, they must be re-

sisted—and Cam Ranh Bay must continue to supply the men I saw today with the weapons they need to resist it.

I thank God for the courage of these men. I thank God for the unity of the free nations which are standing up to terror. And I pray to God that our adversary may soon decide that he cannot succeed in what he is attempting and that he will then renounce the use of force in Viet-Nam. Then—and only then—we get on full time with the job we are anxious to do.

In all of this I ask for the understanding, the support, and the prayers of our countrymen.

The United Nations: A Great Chapter in Man's Pilgrimage Toward Peace

by Arthur J. Goldberg

*U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

I greatly appreciate this opportunity to join in marking United Nations Week under the distinguished sponsorship here present, that of Southern Methodist University, the Dallas United Nations Association, and the city of Dallas itself. I appreciate also the warm welcome which you have given me and the interest in world affairs which you as leaders in your community have shown by organizing this observance.

In the United Nations it is my duty to speak for all the American people from coast to coast, in all the diversity that makes up this dynamic, pluralistic, free society. I know well that it is the greatness of our country—

not only in its material strength but in its commitment to freedom—that accounts for the influence that the United States wields in the United Nations.

When I took up my duties at the U.N. a little over a year ago, I went with no expectation that universal peace was readily achievable, but rather with the conviction that every step toward peace is of priceless importance, whether it be a war ended, an agreement negotiated, a new friend made, or an old enemy won over. Peace is made up of millions of such achievements—a few of them big, most of them small, but all of them precious to our country's safety and well-being.

Let me mention just three of the major achievements for peace in the U.N. during this past year.

¹ Address made at Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Tex., on Oct. 25 (U.S./U.N. press release 4950).

—The U.N. did stop a war, a very dangerous one, which erupted in the disputed territory of Kashmir between our two friends India and Pakistan.

—U.N. blue helmets continued to stand guard over a fragile peace in the Middle East and also in Cyprus, preventing new outbreaks of major violence in those areas.

—In a U.N. committee we have achieved agreement with the Soviet Union and other nations on about 90 percent of a new treaty to develop peaceful cooperation and prohibit the arms race in the unlimited realm of outer space.² I am very hopeful of completing this important treaty in 1966.

Let me add in candor that the U.N. still faces—indeed the world community faces—many stubborn problems.

U.S. Proposals for Peace in Viet-Nam

First and foremost, we have still not found the path to an acceptable peace in Viet-Nam. But we are not discouraged. We have had a good response, both here at home and abroad, to the United States proposals for peace in Viet-Nam which I presented last month in the U.N.³

That statement made clear to all the world our strictly limited aims in Viet-Nam: to achieve a political and not a military solution to the conflict; to assure for all the people of South Viet-Nam the right of self-determination, the right to decide their political destiny free of force; and to assure that the reunification of Viet-Nam will be decided upon through a free choice by the peoples of both North and South, without outside interference—the results of which choice the United States would fully support.

Having stated these aims, I went on to make clear that the United States is prepared to sit down and negotiate without any prior conditions; to discuss not only our points but also the four points put forward by Hanoi, as well as points which others might raise; to negotiate a settlement based on a

strict observance of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962; to negotiate in a reconvened Geneva conference or an Asian conference or any other generally acceptable forum. I stressed that we are not inflexible in our approach. And, in order to get over what others regard as obstacles to negotiation, I made these further points:

First, that the United States is willing to take the first step toward deescalation of the war by ordering a prior end to all bombing of North Viet-Nam the moment we are assured that there would be a response toward peace from North Viet-Nam.

Second, that the United States has no desire to maintain a permanent military presence in Viet-Nam and is prepared to agree to a time schedule for supervised phased withdrawal of all external forces from South Viet-Nam—those of North Viet-Nam, as well as those of the United States and other countries aiding South Viet-Nam.

Third, that the question whether the Viet Cong, being a combatant force, should have a place in the negotiations is, as far as we are concerned, not an insurmountable problem.

Here at home, the response to these proposals has been quite favorable. A nationwide Gallup survey reported only yesterday that they are supported by nearly three-quarters of the American people.

The response from other countries has also been encouraging. Many speakers in the U.N. debate have supported our proposals, far more than have supported the rigid position of Hanoi. Moreover, we have received some signals, though they are not very strong at the moment, that countries which have hitherto supported the Hanoi regime may now be prepared to join in the search for an honorable, peaceful solution that would be acceptable to all sides.

In my U.N. statement I pointed out that every member of the United Nations has a responsibility to exercise its power and influence for peace and that the greater that power and influence, the greater is the responsibility. We of the United States are fully prepared to take our own advice in this

² For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 17, 1966, p. 605.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 10, 1966, p. 518.

respect; we recognize our responsibility as a great power, and we are ready to take the extra step which will help to achieve an honorable settlement. It is to be hoped that the faint signals we have received from other countries will become stronger and that these countries, too, will play the affirmative part which is indispensable to a peaceful solution.

The Problem of Communist China

Another great problem for the United Nations, and indeed for the world community, is the problem of Communist China, with its antiforeign attitudes and its official policy of promoting "wars of national liberation" in other countries. As I reminded the Assembly last month, the United States desires not to isolate mainland China from the world but, on the contrary, to do whatever we can to rebuild the traditionally friendly relations that have existed between the United States and the people of China in the past.

But I also pointed out that the U.N. cannot, consistent with its charter, countenance Peking's doctrine and policy of promoting violent revolution and subversion all over the world. Nor is a majority in the U.N. likely to consent to the demands of Peking that the Republic of China on Taiwan be excluded and the U.N. itself transformed in order to pave the way for Peking's admission to the world organization.

The fact is, as I stated then, that Communist China is indeed isolated in the world today—not by any act or wish of ours but by its own hostile and violent policies. The true question, therefore, about the relation of Communist China to the U.N. is one which only Peking can answer, and it is this: Will they refrain from putting forward clearly unacceptable terms, and are they prepared to assume the obligations of the United Nations Charter—in particular the basic obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against other states?

The United States and, indeed, the world, will listen most attentively for a helpful response to this important question. I will not attempt to predict when that response will come, but we hope it will come soon—the

sooner the better. We look forward to the occasion when the great Chinese people, with all their gifts and their energy, will once again enrich rather than endanger the fabric of the world community.

Danger From Spread of Nuclear Weapons

Still another great problem is the danger to peace flowing from the increasing number of countries possessing nuclear weapons. The United States has long been seeking a reliable agreement to prevent the further spread of these terrible weapons to still further countries.

Now, after years of seemingly fruitless negotiation, there seems to be real hope for such a treaty. President Johnson said recently:⁴ "We have hopes that we can find some language that will protect the national interests of both countries and permit us to enter into the thing that I think we need most to do: that is, a nonproliferation agreement." And the Soviet Foreign Minister [Andrei A. Gromyko], after a call on President Johnson at the White House, stated that his country, as well as ours, was "striving to reach agreement on this question."

A number of difficult points of disagreement remain, but our Government is ready and determined to resolve them. The achievement of this treaty is an urgent necessity for peace and stability, especially among the lesser powers of the world.

But this treaty would also be highly welcome for another reason: namely, as a sign that the Soviet Union may be beginning to move toward more sensible and less belligerent policies. When we reflect that, during the Stalin period, the major threat to the security and freedom of the American people came from Moscow, any shift in Soviet policies in the direction of cooperation in the U.N. and the world community can only be welcomed and encouraged.

Finally, the U.N. as an institution has problems of its own. At the top of the list right now is the problem of assuring the con-

⁴ At his news conference on Oct. 13, in reply to a question concerning relations with the Soviet Union.

tinuance in office of our able Secretary-General, U Thant of Burma. For 5 years he has filled the most impossible job in the world with real distinction. Understandably, he has expressed a wish to leave his office at the end of this year. But the United Nations needs him. The members, who are seldom unanimous on other things, are unanimous in their confidence in him and their wish to see him stay on. We are hoping very much for an affirmative decision on his part during the present session of the Assembly.

U.N. Strengths and Weaknesses

Such are some of the tough and stubborn problems that come to us at the United Nations. It has been much the same all through the history of the U.N., whose 21st birthday we are observing this week. The most jagged, broken edges of the world's political conflicts come there to be mended. We must not lose patience because the mending process is so difficult.

In the early years the U.N. had to contend with the worst of the cold war, with trouble in Iran, Greece, Berlin, Indonesia, Palestine, Kashmir, Cyprus, Suez, the Congo, and, worst of all, Korea. In all of those clashes the U.N. played some part, and in a few cases a decisive part, in defeating aggression, warding off a head-on collision, or ending hostilities.

Some people predicted that one or another of these issues would cause the breakup and the death of the United Nations. But this did not happen. The U.N. conquered some of these issues; it did less well with others. But none of them conquered the U.N. It has lived and flourished through all of its troubles. That is a most significant fact of history, from which we draw hope and reassurance for the future.

Indeed, I think it is not too much to hope that, through painful trial and error, the nations of the world may gradually be moving toward an age of cooperation, or at the very least of mutual toleration and respect, which may become known to history as the Age of the United Nations.

This is no prophecy of a golden age of

perfect peace. The United Nations is, and I expect will long remain, essentially an association of sovereign powers. It has no magic of its own to impose peace on unruly nations. Its power is no greater than what its sovereign members are willing to put at its service, which quite often is not enough to fulfill the charter's aims. The failures commonly attributed to the U.N. are thus, in reality, the failures of sovereign members, and these are not going to be cured overnight.

We of the United States are not meekly resigned to these weaknesses in the U.N. We are striving to make the United Nations a more effective force for peace: to assure its capacity to put peace forces in the field when trouble breaks out, to assure its financial soundness, to make it more effective in its promotion of human rights and economic development. And we are by no means alone in these efforts.

Give-and-Take of Free Negotiation

But I do not expect the strengthening of the United Nations to be achieved, for instance, by transforming it into a world government. The conditions for such a gigantic step do not exist. Rather, I expect the improvement to come as member nations learn to use their own sovereignty more wisely. For the sovereignty of even the most powerful nation, unless it is wisely used, cannot assure its people the peace and happiness and progress to which they aspire.

We are accustomed to thinking of a nation as exercising its sovereignty when it says no to some other nation, or when it builds a wall of defense against an enemy. And this much is true. But surely we also exercise our sovereignty when, in our own interest, we say yes to another nation, when we work with other nations to develop mutually beneficial trade, when we cooperate in science and the arts, when we remove walls of misunderstanding and build bridges of friendship. These things, too, are acts of sovereignty. And this is what the United States and many other countries have been endeavoring to do at the United Nations for the past 21 years.

The members of the U.N. pursue these

ends not by issuing decrees or commands, which no nation has the power to do, but rather by a means very congenial to the American temperament: the give-and-take of free debate and free negotiation. In a successful negotiation no party gains all it wanted, but every party gains something.

Yet there still seems to be a lingering fear of this negotiating process, based on a caricature in which the negotiator, if he is an American representative, is portrayed as in some way "giving away our vital interests." As one who is engaged in this process every day, I want to state categorically that there is no truth to this picture. In the negotiations in which I have been engaged in the United Nations, for instance, I have no intention whatever of in any way sacrificing the vital interests of the United States.

But this does not mean that my time and energies are being concentrated solely on narrow and selfish interests peculiar to our country alone. Fortunately, no such emphasis is necessary, for the most vital interests of the United States are those which the great majority of countries also see as their vital interests; namely, a stable and peaceful world in which nations cooperate for the common good.

Thus our country can always be guided by the rule laid down by President Kennedy when he said: "Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate."⁵

Indeed, history teaches us that every great public agreement has required negotiation and compromise. Our own Constitution would never have been adopted without the "great compromise" between the large and small States. Many delegates on both sides were so reluctant to take this necessary step that Benjamin Franklin, the oldest and perhaps wisest man among them, exclaimed in exasperation: "Declarations of a fixed opinion, and of determined resolution never to change it, neither enlighten nor convince us." He argued for compromise in the name of "the common good," and his argument made

possible a form of government for our free nation.

I make no secret of the fact that this same spirit of compromise governs the affairs of the United Nations. The U.N. is, in the words of its charter, "a center for harmonizing the actions of nations." The give-and-take of compromise is part of the basic commitment of every member.

Keeping Faith With U.S. Principles

If there are any among us who still view this commitment as in some way an offense to our national pride, I wish any such person would come and visit us in our United States Mission to the United Nations and go with us to the U.N. Headquarters to watch their representatives at work. They would not have to stay very long to discover that our country plays a very considerable and responsible role of leadership and influence in the community of nations, a role which, whatever its difficulty, has some moments of important achievement for American interests, a role in which every American, I think, has a right to feel patriotic pride.

I think most Americans understand that the true internationalist is in no way untrue to his own country. Rather he is a nationalist with common sense, a patriot with vision, a lover of his own flag who yet has the imagination to know that his nation is part of an indivisible humanity. The same patriotism which we have tested and proved in war is tested and proved also in the search for peace, a peace in which free nations can dwell in safety.

My whole life has convinced me that human nature is everywhere the same. The ingredients of peace in the wide world are not essentially different from the ingredients of peace in the average city or town in America. They are respect for the rule of law, toleration of differences—whether of religion or race or opinion or culture, and the insight to perceive, beneath these differences, our common humanity and our manifold common interests. The United Nations Charter expresses the same thought when it calls on all peoples "to practice tolerance and live to-

⁵ For text of President Kennedy's inaugural address, see *ibid.*, Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.

gether in peace with one another as good neighbors.”

We Americans are at our best when we live by these principles. For the genius of our nation is not exclusive; it is inclusive. Our Declaration of Independence proclaims that all men—not just Americans—“are created equal.” Not only our national self-respect but our very future as a leading power in the world depends on our keeping faith with that high principle both at home and abroad.

To do this is often difficult. But Americans, through history—and none more than Texans—have been no strangers to difficulty. We look back now, for instance, on the opening of the American West as a simple matter, an adventure which we can sit back and enjoy at the movies or on television. But it was not simple for those who achieved it. The new territory into which they moved was dangerous and often deadly, and it required extraordinary courage.

The new “territory” which we seek to open up in the international sphere is different, but it is just as demanding. It is a frontier within the human mind—the minds of people all over the world, not excluding Americans. It is a realm of new understanding, new awareness of our common human nature and human destiny, and of the necessity for living together in peace on this little globe. To conquer that frontier, which today is still beset with the dangers of mutual fear and ignorance, requires no less intelligence, no less courage, and no less devotion than that shown by Americans of the pioneer past.

But I believe contemporary Americans—

and other nations, too—will display these qualities and that, as a result, the United Nations will prove to be one of the great chapters in man’s long pilgrimage toward peace and a better world.

U.S. Comments on Communist Chinese Nuclear Test

*Department Statement*¹

As the Atomic Energy Commission stated last night, a nuclear explosion has occurred in the general area of the Chinese nuclear test site in Lop Nor.

Preliminary estimates of the yield are that it was in the low to low-intermediate range, similar to the first Chinese test.²

We have been aware of the Chinese efforts to develop missiles as well as nuclear weapons.

A test of the type reported by Peking falls within the time period we had foreseen.

We see no reason to alter our estimate of when they might have an operational capability.

Since Communist China has refused to sign the limited nuclear test ban treaty, it can be expected that there will be further tests of this kind. It is unfortunate that they should continue to pollute the atmosphere in defiance of world opinion.

¹ Read to news correspondents on Oct. 28 by the Department spokesman.

² For a statement made by President Johnson on Oct. 16, 1964, see BULLETIN of Nov. 2, 1964, p. 612.

“... all free peoples, including those of Europe, have a vital interest in the outcome of the struggle in Viet-Nam. For what is at stake is the very defense of freedom in the world today.”

The Free World's Stake in Viet-Nam

by Douglas MacArthur II

Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations¹

I am happy indeed to be with you in Brussels today. In the first place, I have a very special feeling for Brussels and Belgium. For not only have I twice served in this hospitable and diversified country, but also—and this must be off the record—in this fair city dwells a most exciting and enchanting girl to whom I have lost my heart—my granddaughter.

But these personal attachments to Belgium are not the only reason why it is such a pleasure and privilege to address this particular group. I say this because Brussels has become the capital of the new Europe—a uniting Europe—of which the Common Market represents the very core, the cement that is gradually binding Europe together.

Americans have a deep and abiding interest in what happens in Europe. For twice within the span of one generation—at the cost of hundreds of thousands of young American casualties and hundreds of billions of dollars of our national treasure—we became involved in two great World Wars that had their origins in the disunity and rivalries of a Europe of national states.

And so while the manner in which Europe organizes itself for the future is, in the first instance, Europe's own concern, Americans,

remembering two World Wars of European origin, feel that they, too, have a legitimate interest in the course Europe decides to follow.

The concept developed in Europe by Europeans of substituting unity, based on equality and achieved by common consent, for rivalry among nation-states is perhaps the greatest and most constructive idea to emerge in the 20th century. It is based on an unassailable logic. For Europe, and indeed the world, has undergone changes in the past two decades more profound than changes that in the past occurred over centuries. And this changed world requires new concepts.

The great colonial systems of the world, organized and administered by Europe, under which one-third of the world's population lived only 20 years ago, are largely dismantled—to be replaced by more than 60 new states.

And in this postwar period the consequences of an age of technology have brought into a position of dominance those states organized on a continentwide basis, commanding vast resources of men and material. This has transformed the structure of world politics.

In a world where colonialism no longer represents an acceptable relationship among peoples, the proud states of Western Europe, which a quarter of a century ago occupied the center of the stage, now find themselves

¹ Address made before the American and Common Market Club of Brussels at Brussels, Belgium, on Oct. 19 (press release 247 dated October 18).

as only medium powers with a limited capacity to influence world events.

If the European nations are to play a role commensurate with their resources and abilities, they must restructure their political arrangements to meet the challenge and the requirements of this changed world.

While the bold concept of a restructured Europe based on unity rather than independent national states is European in its origin, the United States has given encouragement to it ever since the end of the war. At the same time we have sought to build with Western Europe a partnership arrangement so our joint efforts to meet the great common tasks of the industrialized nations of the West could be coordinated.

We recognized from the beginning that unity in Europe and an effective Atlantic partnership are closely related and that until Europe moved toward greater unity there would be limitations on that partnership. For so long as there remained the great disparity in size and resources between the United States and the nations of Europe acting individually, there would be an awkwardness in any Atlantic arrangement.

This awkwardness stems from fact, not from procedures. It cannot be avoided by improved consultations. It derives from the fact that Americans acting through a single set of institutions can apply the full resources of a continent to a single purpose. This Europeans cannot thus far do.

European unity and Atlantic partnership have relevance not only for the stability of the West but for the achievement of a secure settlement between East and West. A permanent and constructive East-West settlement will not be achieved by fragmenting Europe nor by loosening the institutional bonds that tie the West—the Atlantic community—together. Unity of the Western Powers is an essential basis for a constructive and enduring East-West settlement.

And so we applaud the efforts of the Common Market and the other European institutions aimed at achieving greater European unity.

But I did not come here to talk only about Europe. I came also to speak about an area halfway around the world from Europe. I refer to the struggle going on in Southeast Asia.

I am told that some in Europe are prone to think that the cruel war in Viet-Nam is purely an American responsibility in which Europe has little stake. If this be true, it seems to me that they are not looking at what is happening in Southeast Asia in the perspective of their own history and their own enlightened self-interest. And so I would like to say just a few words about it.

The Basic Question in Viet-Nam

In the first place, Viet-Nam is a very complex country. Historically, the whole of Viet-Nam consisted of three kingdoms: Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin China. Each of these had its own culture, was jealous of its prerogatives, and was in competition with the others. The result is that today there are longstanding rivalries even within South Viet-Nam stemming from these historic divisions of the country, and these make the task of a central government very difficult.

There are also ethnic differences. In addition to people of Vietnamese stock, there are about half a million of Cambodian origin; three-quarters of a million *Montagnards*; a million people of Chinese descent; and lesser numbers of other ethnic origins.

Regional and ethnic diversities are only part of the picture. There are also religious differences. The majority of the inhabitants are Buddhists, but they are divided into different groups. There is also a vocal and active Catholic minority, a Confucianist minority, and certain other religious sects such as the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao, which recently exercised full temporal as well as religious power, having their own armies and controlling the government in the areas of their influence.

And finally, for almost 100 years prior to World War II, Viet-Nam was under colonial rule with no real tradition or experience in democracy as we in the Western World would

understand it. So even without armed aggression from the North, any South Vietnamese central government would have had its work cut out to reconcile these differences.

However, despite its difficulties, South Viet-Nam made substantial progress from the time of the Geneva accords in 1954 until 1960. In that period a million Vietnamese who voted for freedom with their feet when they left Communist North Viet-Nam to go south in 1954 were resettled, and 650,000 acres of land were distributed to 150,000 families in a substantial effort at land reform. Enrollment in elementary schools was doubled. While agricultural production was falling 10 percent in the Communist North, it increased 20 percent in the South.

Then, in 1960, when the Communist regime in Hanoi saw that the South was not going to crumble from its own internal contradictions, Hanoi established the National Liberation Front and started the infiltration of tens of thousands of armed men and weapons.

By 1961 the naked character of this aggression from the North had become clear. Accordingly, the South Vietnamese Government asked the International Control Commission consisting of India (chairman), Canada, and Poland to investigate and report on this aggression. After a lengthy and painstaking inquiry the Legal Committee of the ICC on June 2, 1962, issued a majority report signed by India and Canada, which stated:

. . . the Committee has come to the conclusion that in specific instances there is evidence to show that armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions and other supplies have been sent from the Zone in the North to the Zone in the South with the object of supporting, organizing and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, directed against the Armed Forces and Administration of the Zone in the South. These acts are in violation of Articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam.

While Viet-Nam, as I have pointed out, presents a very complex picture, the basic question that the Viet-Nam struggle poses for Americans, Europeans, and indeed all

free peoples is a very simple one. That question is: "Can and will aggression be made profitable in the world today?"

It seems to me that people of my generation—particularly Europeans—should have a very special interest in the answer to that question. For they lived through a decade—the 1930's—when aggression was indeed made profitable with tragic results for the world and particularly for Europe.

Lessons of the Thirties

In the early 1930's we first saw the Japanese militarist aggression against China—the so-called Manchurian incident—and there was no response on the part of democratic nations.

Then, in the mid-1930's, we saw the Fascist aggressor Mussolini attack and enslave defenseless Ethiopia. And again there was no reaction from the Western democracies.

Then those of us who lived in Europe at that time heard the tramp of Nazi jackboots as Hitler tore up the treaty governing the Rhineland and marched into that area to prepare it as a springboard for further aggression. And still there was no response.

And when there was no reaction, the savage rape of Austria followed.

And then when the Nazi aggressors saw that the enslavement of Austria was accepted by the Western World, half of Czechoslovakia was brutally torn away and absorbed. And there still being no reaction, the remainder of Czechoslovakia was devoured shortly thereafter.

And finally, on the morning of September 1, 1939, came Hitler's assault on Poland that triggered World War II and led to tens of millions of deaths and massive destruction, misery, and suffering for mankind.

Virtually all historians who write about the decade of the 1930's agree that when Hitler attacked Poland he did so convinced that the Western democracies would not react. How could he have been so convinced when they had commitments as solemn as treaty language could make them to come to Poland's defense? The answer is that the

Western democracies' commitments lacked one essential ingredient—credibility. The commitments were not credible because earlier commitments had not been honored.

And so from history, particularly the decade of the 1930's, it seems to me we should have learned certain hard lessons:

First, that the integrity and credibility of a commitment is essential if miscalculation is to be avoided, for it can mean the difference between peace and global war. Today the United States has 40-odd security commitments throughout the world, including those it made to the European nations of NATO at their request. I for one believe that the credibility and integrity of America's commitments—including those we have given to South Viet-Nam as well as to Europe—are one of the principal pillars of peace in the world today. For if our commitment to one country is no longer credible, some will be tempted to take this as an invitation to aggression in other areas where we are also committed.

Second, we have learned from the 1930's the tragic lesson that successful aggression feeds on itself and begets further aggression. For if aggression is permitted to occur unchecked, it snowballs and soon there is a world in flames and another world war becomes inevitable.

Third, we also have learned that as the area of freedom shrinks, the security of every remaining free nation is correspondingly reduced.

And finally, history should have taught us the irrevocable lesson that the sooner aggression is resisted, the more favorable the chances of containing it and the lower the price of its containment in terms of young lives and national treasure.

The struggle going on in Viet-Nam today is not, of course, an isolated war but part of a vast and continuing struggle in which the United States and certain other free nations have been engaged for the past two decades since the end of World War II.

On one side are engaged those nations that are trying to create a decent world order

based on the principles of the United Nations Charter—that is, a world of independent nations, each free to choose its own institutions but cooperating with one another to prevent aggression, maintain peace, and create a better world for all peoples.

On the other side is that small number of nations that believe the principal business is to get on with the task of world revolution, through which they hope to impose their political system on the rest of the world.

Free-World Resistance to Aggression

Let me remind you that Viet-Nam is not the first time since the end of World War II that we have had to face up to Communist efforts to impose their system on other free nations by force or subversion. The first occasion was in 1946 when Soviet military forces occupied a substantial part of Iran and endeavored to take over the control of the country as they had done in Eastern Europe. We and certain other nations stood by Iran, and it was saved.

The next year, 1947, the Communists endeavored to take over Greece through infiltration of armed guerrilla fighters and weapons across the frontiers of Communist Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. This was the prototype of the very kind of aggression they are now conducting in Viet-Nam. Once again the United States stood firm and, under the Truman Doctrine, sent substantial assistance, including General [James A.] Van Fleet with over a thousand officers and men to aid the Greeks. And Greece was saved.

In 1948, when the Communists blockaded West Berlin in an effort to take it over, we and certain others again stood firm, and Berlin and West Germany were saved.

In 1950 the United States and other members of the U.N. went to South Korea's defense when it was subjected to savage Communist aggression, and South Korea was saved.

In the early 1950's we gave encouragement and assistance to the Philippines in its effort to prevent the Communist Huk insurrection, supported and encouraged from without,

from taking over the country. And the Philippines were saved.

In the mid-1950's we also stood firm when Taiwan was threatened by Chinese Communist aggression. And Taiwan remains free.

And for almost 10 years, the gallant Malaysians and British successfully resisted the Communist subversive efforts to take over Malaya.

What sort of a world would we—would Europe—live in today if Communist aggression had not been resisted during the past two decades?

Would Iran and the rest of the Middle East, with its oil and resources on which Europe is so heavily dependent, still be free?

Would Greece and Turkey have survived? Or would the Mediterranean be a Communist lake?

Would South Korea be independent?

Would Taiwan have remained in the ranks of free nations?

Would the Philippines and Malaysia today be under governments of their own choosing?

Would Southeast Asia still be free?

Communist Militancy

I ask these questions in connection with Viet-Nam because the leaders in Hanoi and Peking make no effort to mask their intentions. The Communist radio announced months ago the creation of a liberation front for both Thailand and Malaysia. And General [Vo Nguyen] Giap, commander of the North Vietnamese Communist armies, states publicly,

South Vietnam is the model of the national liberation movement of our time. . . . If the special warfare that the United States imperialists are testing in South Vietnam is overcome, then it can be defeated everywhere in the world.

Let me repeat—"everywhere in the world."

The leaders in Peking are even more militant. They publicly proclaim at frequent intervals that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," and that "the seizure of power by force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and highest form of revolution."

Today the world has been given fair warn-

ing of Hanoi's and Peking's intentions just as Hitler gave us fair warning in *Mein Kampf* before World War II. I believe that we will ignore that warning at our peril.

We did to our sorrow ignore Hitler's warning in the 1930's. We also disregarded a voice that spoke to us after the aggressors were appeased at Munich. That voice, speaking at Munich, said:

Do not suppose that this is the end. This is only the beginning of the reckoning. This is only the first sip, the first foretaste of a bitter cup which will be proffered to us year by year unless, by a supreme recovery of moral health and martial vigor, we arise again and take our stand for freedom as in the olden time.

Eventually of course we and other free peoples listened to Winston Churchill. We listened almost too late, but not quite, and we prevailed.

But at what a terrible cost!

Today we are again faced with the choice of opposing aggression or appeasing it and letting it proceed unchecked. If we do not honor our commitment to the Republic of South Viet-Nam, if we withdraw, if we thus show that we are not prepared to stand by our commitment to Viet-Nam, will aggressors believe that our commitments anywhere else can be depended on? And if they reach that conclusion—that our commitments are not dependable—may we not again see a tragic miscalculation leading to a world in flames?

Before concluding, let me say a word about another aspect of Viet-Nam.

The shooting war dominates the headlines, yet nobody pretends that South Viet-Nam can be held, let alone won, by military means alone. And so, in the background, another war goes on. The weapons used in this war are more mundane. It is a war concerned with schools, with fertilizer, with water pumps and other things aimed at economic and social progress.

This is a war engaged in by the South Vietnamese Government with the support of the United States and certain other nations to modernize and improve, to boost living standards of the peasantry, to show them

that their government and friends care about them. The task is a monumental one and yet progress is being made despite the difficulties of carrying out such a program during hostilities.

U.S. Objectives in Viet-Nam

And finally, a few words about our objectives in Viet-Nam.

We do not seek a single square meter of Communist territory.

We do not seek to subvert or overthrow the Communist regimes in Hanoi or Peking. We want no military bases or other special positions or rights in South Viet-Nam. We do not wish or expect to keep our troops there after peace is assured.

We support free elections in South Viet-Nam to give the South Vietnamese people a government of their own choice.

We regard unification of Viet-Nam as a matter for the Vietnamese themselves to determine through their own free decision.

We believe that South Viet-Nam and other countries of Southeast Asia can be non-aligned or neutral if that be their decision.

We are prepared to order a cessation of all bombing of North Viet-Nam the moment we are assured, privately or otherwise, that this step will be answered promptly by a corresponding and appropriate deescalation on the other side.

The United States also stands ready to withdraw its forces as others withdraw theirs so that peace can be restored in South Viet-Nam, and favors international machinery—either of the United Nations or other machinery—to insure effective supervision of the withdrawal.

We would welcome unconditional discussions and talks looking to move the Viet-Nam problem from the battlefield to the conference table.

Why then are we in Viet-Nam? The only reason we are there is to honor our commitment, to help a small nation that has been subjected to brutal aggression maintain its

independence so that it can live under a system of its own choosing, and to prove that aggression will not pay off as it did in the 1930's with such tragic results.

It seems to me that all free peoples, including those of Europe, have a vital interest in the outcome of the struggle in Viet-Nam. For what is at stake is the very defense of freedom in the world today.

And at the same time, I can assure you that the United States will continue to make clear in every corner of the world that we seek peace and are prepared to discuss without conditions an honorable settlement that asks nothing for the United States but seeks only continued freedom and independence for the people of South Viet-Nam.

Three months ago President Johnson defined our aims in Asia when he said that "The peace we seek in Asia is a peace of conciliation between Communist states and their non-Communist neighbors. . . ." ²

The President reiterated this theme 12 days ago in an important address to all Europeans.³ "One great goal of a united West," he said, "is to heal the wound in Europe which now cuts East from West. . . . That division must be healed peacefully." And, he added, "with the consent of Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union."

Let me underscore this point. We do not intend to let our differences on Viet-Nam prevent us from exploring opportunities for the political reconciliation of Europe. The goal of my Government is a reunited Europe deciding its own destiny. In President Johnson's phrase, "The maintenance of old enmities is not in anyone's interest."

And so, in both Southeast Asia and in Europe, we seek a peace of reconciliation so that all peoples regardless of their political systems can live and work together to create a better world.

² For text of an address by President Johnson on July 12, see BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1966, p. 158.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.

Refugee Problems Today

by James Wine

*Special Assistant for Refugee Affairs to the Secretary of State*¹

President Kennedy once said, “. . . man holds in his mortal hands the power to abolish all forms of human poverty and all forms of human life.”²

In my judgment the refugee epitomizes “all forms of human poverty.” His world is a microcosm where one finds concentrated in a small area all the enemies of man—political oppression, social disorder, disease, malnutrition, war—and these are the very forces which create refugees. I believe that to labor in his behalf and to attack these conditions which produce the refugee is at once to increase the world's capacity for peace.

Discussions of refugees and their problems frequently seem to touch on either the maudlin or the cynical. I hope to avoid both extremes, for my purpose is not to move you to tears nor is it to cloy you with unmeaningful statistics. My purpose is:

1. First, to emphasize the widespread refugee problem that exists today;
2. To remind that it must concern us, most importantly for humanitarian reasons, but joined with far-reaching political and economic reasons;
3. And, finally, to indicate how the problem is being approached and how it must be resolved in the future.

The tragedy of our day is the 11 million refugees in the world. The focus has shifted

¹ Address made before the Overseas Press Club at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 24 (press release 251).

² For President Kennedy's inaugural address, see BULLETIN of Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.

from Europe to the less developed countries of Asia and Africa. The problem has increased in terms of numbers of refugees and numbers of countries affected—it is now worldwide in its scope.

Since the advent of the Castro government in 1959, some 350,000 Cubans have escaped to free countries. In the Far East over 2 million refugees are in Hong Kong and Macao as a result of persecution and related economic hardship since the Chinese Communist takeover. The exodus continues at the rate of about 10,000 a year.

In South Viet-Nam more than 800,000 have fled from outlying areas toward district and provincial capitals because of Viet Cong terror and destructive floods caused by typhoons, as well as out of sheer war weariness; and in Laos 300,000 refugees exist because of hostilities between the Pathet Lao and Government forces.

Following the suppression of the Tibetan revolt against the Chinese Communists in 1959, the Dalai Lama and thousands of other Tibetans fled to India and Nepal. Subsequent migrations have brought the total Tibetan refugee population to 45,000 in India and 15,000 in Nepal.

During 1963 and 1964 renewed outbreaks of religious-communal violence in India and Pakistan caused the flight or eviction of 1 million Hindus from Pakistan into India and 500,000 Moslems from India into Pakistan.

Africa, too, has her share of refugee problems. There is an increasing number of refugee students seeking opportunities for higher

and secondary education reaching asylum countries from South Africa and elsewhere.

Rwanda: Since 1959, 160,000 people have left the country as a result of a revolt in which the majority Hutu group ended the political control of the minority Tutsi tribe.

Sudan: Approximately 130,000 refugees from southern Sudan are dispersed in six other African countries. Their departure was a byproduct of severe antagonism between the three southern provinces and the Government of the Sudan.

Portuguese territories: There are three groups of refugees who have fled from Portuguese territories before violence and oppression stemming from the struggle for self-determination: More than 260,000 from Angola are now in the Congo; 11,500 from Mozambique are now in Tanzania; and 55,000 refugees from Portuguese Guinea are now in Senegal.

Congo (Kinshasa): An estimated 57,500 Congolese are refugees in other countries as a result of the 1964-1965 rebellion.

Then there is one of the largest, thorniest, and longest existing refugee problems: the Palestine Arab refugees. During the course of the Arab-Israel war of 1948, approximately 700,000 Arabs fled from the area of Palestine that is now Israel into adjacent Arab countries. This problem has remained acute and stalemated since that time as a result of the Arab-Israeli political deadlock. While "stalemated," the problem has certainly not remained static, for there are now 1,300,000 refugees. The problem increases each year as more than 40,000 children are born annually to these refugees; almost 500,000 of the total are under 15 years old.

The figure of 11 million is indeed startling and demonstrates a world caught up in strife.

This represents but one aspect of the problem in terms of numbers and location. Since there have always been refugees and there probably always will be, why should we get aroused about them today? Although our moral position toward the problem has not changed, our relationship to the problem has changed, and we of the free world have

failed to do enough effectively. Once, perhaps, our humanitarian instincts were sufficient. Although they are still undeniably the most important basis for concern, they are no longer the only one, for there are serious questions not entirely answerable in humanitarian terms.

Social, Political, and Economic Concerns

Two of these questions are: What are the social, economic, and political consequences of neglecting refugees? And, positively, what are the social, economic, and political consequences of aiding refugees? Let me say here that, when I speak of economic and political consequences, this is not to imply narrow national interest. For we must transcend such a circumscribed point of view. We must look to the whole of society. Neither am I describing a spectrum where humanitarian concerns are at one end and political and economic concerns at the far opposite end. The two are closely interrelated and cannot be divorced one from the other. There is, I think, a humanitarian concern of, at least, a majority of men on this earth for the condition of their fellow man, and the condition of man must also be expressed in social, political, and economic terms.

What are the "costs" of neglecting refugees? Secretary Rusk has summarized them this way:³

Unresolved refugee problems are a cause of international controversy, a symbol of human want and loss of personal dignity, an actual or potential threat to the peace, and frequently an impediment to the growth of overall stability, especially in developing countries.

The dilemma in most of the developing countries is that these young nations can ill afford the cost of aiding refugees and they can ill afford the cost of neglecting refugees. Here is a hypothetical example.

A small developing country becomes an asylum country for 300,000 refugees when

³ For Secretary Rusk's statement before the Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on July 14, see *ibid.*, Aug. 15, 1966, p. 235.

violent political conflict suddenly breaks out in a neighboring state. She would be able to absorb these refugees into her economy if she had funds available for their relocation. No funds exist in her budget, and no help is forthcoming.

The first few days, or perhaps even weeks, the population in the area where the refugees have settled provides shelter and food for them. As the situation continues and grows with an increasing influx of refugees, they become an economic burden on the local community which becomes an economic burden on the national government of asylum. There is insufficient food and shelter—there is no program for peaceful resettlement. Civil strife in the form of riots breaks out. With the deteriorating situation in the asylum country, some of the refugees decide to form a liberation party and use this asylum country as a training center and base for guerrilla activities in their own country. The asylum center is accused by her neighbor of aiding and abetting the enemy, and the situation has become the basis for an international conflict.

But there is another side of the coin. The refugee can have a beneficial impact on his new world. Quite candidly, there will always be some part of any given number for whom care will have to be provided—the ill, the illiterate, the recalcitrant. The fact that some care must be forthcoming cannot be ignored. This is pure humanitarian effort.

Refugees a Potential National Asset

However, it can be successfully argued that refugees also have a great potential for becoming a national asset. Many, too numerous and well known to mention, emerged from refugee status to make significant gifts of talent in science, the arts, and business.

Then there are the many unknowns who created no great works of art or scientific theories but simply wove themselves into the national fabric. They are the ones laboring in our great industrial centers, toiling on our farms, manning the many small businesses, and otherwise adding a productive ingredient

into the economy. By peaceable and profitable assimilation, great advantages have been delivered over to their adopted society in social, political, and economic terms.

There is a third positive factor—the enrichment of one culture by another, which helps to make us mutually aware of and to appreciate different customs, thoughts, and attitudes and thus perhaps to come closer to the realization of individual human worth.

Thus out of the refugee's problem, grievous though it is, some good can come, and we in the United States should know this best of all.

Certainly refugees have greatly added to the flavor of American life. One could even say that some—for instance, Charley and Pete Gogolak—have given it an extra kick.

We as an immigrant nation have seen that refugees can produce—can increase the stability and productivity of individual societies, thus contributing to an important prerequisite for world peace.

Creative Challenge of Refugee Problems

Now to the solution of refugee problems. Because each refugee problem is in a measure different from many other refugee problems, few generalizations are possible. It is a creative challenge. The United States has responded to that challenge, both unilaterally and as a member of the United Nations.

Today, of course, is the 21st anniversary of the United Nations, and it has chosen to focus on refugees—to highlight its interest and involvement.

For example, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is doing important work in Africa today by coordinating direct relief to those in desperate need. He is performing a responsible educational role assisting in the resettlement of refugees and showing the host country that assimilation of the "stateless" can become a valued contribution of their adopted land. In the Middle East the UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency] feeds, clothes, and educates thousands. One way to underline the intensity of United Nations concern

for refugees is to simply state that since 1945 the United Nations has devoted over \$2 billion to refugee assistance.

The United States leadership in assisting refugees since World War II began in 1945 with the role of our occupation authorities in Germany, Austria, Italy, and Korea. We began by providing major resources and caring for millions of fugitives from their Communist-controlled homelands. Since then, United States leadership has been exerted in three principal ways: (1) through a series of special immigration acts and administrative measures which have enabled 1.2 million refugees to find new homes in the United States, most of them as citizens; (2) through direct United States programs in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and the United States, involving expenditures of over \$1.2 billion; and (3) through United States participation in United Nations and other intergovernmental programs for refugees, involving United States contributions of some \$850 million. Moreover, the United States did lead—in terms of initiative and diplomatic effort—in the establishment of nearly all of these multilateral programs.

But let me emphatically underscore that these accomplishments were achieved only in partnership with the many voluntary agencies, who perform with a high sense of dedication and whose income is made possible through the generosity of individual Americans to the extent of millions annually.

The United States Government's machinery for managing official refugee policies and programs has evolved over the years as needs and demands evolved. Today there are 11 major departments and agencies carrying out refugee programs, with additional agencies making contributions from time to time.

I personally find satisfaction in this multi-agency involvement, for I feel that the essentially moral character of refugee policies and actions deserves and justifies widespread attention from any government with both money and personnel resources.

Yet, we must plan for the future, and it is

eminently sensible to bring all our separate efforts into clearer focus so there can be a harmony of means to achieve our goals.

With this thought in mind, we have recently inaugurated a contingency planning group to look ahead constantly and to plan ahead, governmentwide, for refugee contingencies. In this group, we will continually survey the world, trying to anticipate refugee situations. Some we might even eliminate by timely corrective action. Others, we can try to limit. We will work on the full scope of each refugee situation. This means that while some of us may be concentrating on emergency care and maintenance measures in a crisis situation, others may be looking forward to the impact of the refugees on the ultimate asylum country.

Organizing U. S. Capability

Thus we will have to make greater efforts to organize the United States' capability to meet emergency refugee crises and to build into our foreign policy and into our international development and assistance programs a greater awareness of what it will cost us if we choose to neglect refugee problems. We also must sharpen our awareness of the positive social, economic, and political gain to be derived from recognizing the refugee problem as an obligation and an opportunity.

We shall work actively to enlarge the interest and involvement of all nations of the free world. This is essential in my view, as stated earlier, because this issue plainly stated is peace in our world, and to fail in the resolution of these problems is to preclude the achievement of freedom for mankind.

We have tried to do three things this afternoon:

We have reminded ourselves that the refugee problem did not end with the close of European displaced person camps—that it is as real and urgent today as it has ever been. If you would like to see for yourself, come with me to Kennedy Airport at 10 tonight, where we will welcome a flight from Vienna bearing 150 refugees from Eastern Europe.

Secondly, we have reviewed some of the reasons why we should be concerned. We have seen that there are no complicated explanations for our being deeply interested and involved in these matters—they directly affect our lives and our future well-being.

Lastly, I have observed that the resolution of these problems is complex. Although we as a government and a member of the family of nations have responded, it has not been sufficient. Immigration to the United States alone is not the answer; care and feeding alone is not the answer; resettlement alone is not the answer. We need to reach out for fuller understanding and to discover new and imaginative solutions. Our attention should be boldly and prudently directed to the forces and conditions which create the refugee, to the provision for immediate human needs and, most importantly, we must work to develop new opportunities for the refugee to help himself in his new life wherever he is. It's not too late to seek a newer world.

U.S., Colombia Exchange Notes on Sea-Level Canal Study

Joint Announcement

Press release 253 of October 25

The Government of the Republic of Colombia and the Government of the United States of America today [October 25] exchanged notes providing for an investigation and study of the feasibility and desirability of constructing a sea-level canal in the region of the Atrato, Truando, and Curiche Rivers in Northwest Colombia. The announcement was made by His Excellency Germán Zea Hernández, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Honorable Reynold E. Carlson, United States Ambassador to the Republic of Colombia. Site surveys, mapping and other investigations and studies are scheduled to begin in the near future.

The canal route in Colombia is one of four locations being considered by the Atlantic-

Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission of the United States of America. The other routes are located in the Panama Canal Zone, in the Darien region of Eastern Panama, and along the border between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. The Commission will recommend the most suitable site for a sea-level canal, the best method for its construction, and estimate its cost.

Technicians and engineers from Colombia and the United States will cooperate in the investigation and study. The route of the investigation and study generally follows the Atrato and Truando River valleys, crosses the continental divide, and then follows the Curiche River valley to Humboldt Bay. It is about 160 kilometers long and crosses the continental divide at an elevation of about 290 meters above sea level.

Engineer Harry G. Woodbury, Engineering Agent of the Canal Study Commission, said that more than a hundred people living along the route will be employed to assist in the investigation and study. Trails and crude roads will be cleared as needed. The engineers will study the area topography and geology. A network of stream and rain measuring stations will be installed in the river valleys along the route. These will collect data needed to develop a plan to control floods and sediment deposits which could interfere with the construction, operation and maintenance of a sea-level canal.

A medical team will study hazards to human health and safety along the study route and will develop a preventive medicine plan for the area. Weather stations will be built to make extensive observations including wind currents, cloud frequency and rainfall.

Data collected along the route will not only be used to study the feasibility of a sea-level canal but will be made available to Colombian and United States agencies. Valuable information about the natural resources of Northwest Colombia will become available to Colombian agencies to assist them in planning future development of the region.

Tin Council and U.S. Officials Discuss Tin Sales Program

The Department of State announced on October 28 (press release 256) that a delegation from the International Tin Council met with representatives of the U.S. Government in Washington on October 25-27, 1966. The delegation from the Council was headed by Harold W. Allen, chairman of the Council; it included representatives of the consuming- and producing-country members of the Council. Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Anthony M. Solomon was in the chair for the United States.

The object of the Council's delegation was to discuss certain difficulties which might result from disposals of surplus tin, particularly the problems which could arise if the General Services Administration were selling tin at the same time the Council, under the provisions of the Third International Tin Agreement, was buying tin. The Council also requested the United States to reaffirm previous assurances that surplus disposals would take into account the effects on the investment of capital in exploration and development of new tin supplies.

The delegation was informed that the United States agrees in principle to moderate its tin sales program if it should be inconsistent with the contingent operations authorized under the International Tin Agreement. Coordination between the International Tin Council and the U.S. Government for this purpose has been arranged.

The delegation was also informed that the U.S. Government reaffirmed that in formulating disposal programs it would take into account the effects on the investment of capital in exploration and development of new tin supplies and the need to foster the health and growth of the world's tin industry and was prepared to discuss the long-term pro-

gram of the orderly disposal of the remaining surpluses at some future time.

The General Services Administration sales program for the balance of the third tin year will be kept under continuing review, and the U.S. Government will consult with the Council on the program for the fourth year at the appropriate time.

U.S. Citizens Visiting Pakistan May Purchase U.S.-Owned Rupees

The Department of State (press release 254) and the Treasury Department announced on October 26 that United States citizens visiting or residing in Pakistan may purchase that country's currency, the Pakistani rupee, from the United States Embassy and consulates in Pakistan. Sales will be made at the official rate of exchange, and no conversion fees will be charged.

U.S.-owned foreign currencies are now being sold to American tourists, businessmen, and residents in seven countries. The others are Ceylon, Guinea, India, Israel, Tunisia, and the U.A.R. (Egypt).

Purchases of the currencies of these countries owned by the U.S. Government relieve strain on the U.S. balance of payments by reducing the flow of dollars from the United States to foreign hands. The United States Government, therefore, urges Americans to take advantage of these arrangements.

In Pakistan, Pakistani rupees owned by the U.S. Government may be purchased at the United States Embassy in Rawalpindi, the Embassy branch office in Karachi, and at the American consulates in Dacca, Lahore, and Peshawar in exchange for United States currency, personal checks drawn on a bank in the United States, or for United States travelers checks. Purchasers must present their passports for identification.

U.S. Commitment to Political Solution in Viet-Nam Reaffirmed

*Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

I have asked to speak in order to reply to the comments of several delegations on the discussion of Viet-Nam during the general debate.

The universal anxiety caused by the conflict in Viet-Nam is seen in the stress placed upon this subject by nearly all—by new and old members, by large and small powers, and by countries as far removed physically from Viet-Nam as Dahomey and Norway.

With few exceptions, the discussion about Viet-Nam has been constructive and devoid of the harsh words which appeal to emotion rather than reason. In this sense it is a tribute to the seriousness with which most members of the Assembly approach their tasks as peacemakers.

The discussion has been notable in another respect—the substantial sentiment expressed in favor of five points:

First, the vital necessity of a political rather than a military solution in Viet-Nam;

Second, and a logical corollary to the first, the need for early discussions in one form or another and for a reduction, leading to a cessation, of all the military operations now going on there;

Third, the need to assure the people of South Viet-Nam the same right of self-determination cherished by all peoples: the right to decide their own political destiny free of any external interference;

Fourth, a recognition that those countries rendering military assistance to South Viet-

Nam have no designs against the North and no intention to establish a permanent military presence in the South; and

Fifth, the need for some arrangement whereby the peoples of both the North and South will be permitted to make a free decision concerning the unification of Viet-Nam.

My Government subscribes to these points without reservation, for we see in them, as have many members of the Assembly, a way to a settlement which would respect the rights of South Viet-Nam and deprive North Viet-Nam of nothing to which it has a legitimate claim.

We have made our commitment to a political solution and therefore remain prepared to engage in immediate discussions—through private, informal channels or through more formal negotiations. Similarly, we have offered to take the first step toward deescalation; to order a prior end to all bombing of North Viet-Nam the moment there is an assurance that there would be a response toward peace from North Viet-Nam.

We are given much advice as to what we ought to do in this area. We have considered this advice, and, having considered it, we would like to know from Hanoi privately or publicly what would happen if we followed it. We have said repeatedly that we do not seek a permanent military presence in Viet-Nam and have offered to agree to a time schedule for supervised, phased withdrawal of all external forces—those of North Viet-Nam as well as those of the United States.

Other proposals have been made—both in and out of this Assembly. These we have welcomed, for, as I told this Assembly on September 22,² the position of my Government is flexible; we are prepared to discuss

¹ Made in plenary session on Oct. 18 (U.S. delegation press release 4940).

² BULLETIN of Oct. 10, 1966, p. 518.

any and all proposals looking toward a settlement which is honorable for all concerned.

Underlying the discussion of Viet-Nam in the general debate has been a recognition—one which we share—that the principles of the Geneva agreements, with suitable updating and strengthening, provide the bases for such a settlement. It is well to recall, therefore, what those principles are:

—a demarcation line between North and South Viet-Nam and the regrouping of all forces on the appropriate side of that line;

—a demilitarized zone on either side of that line from which all forces, supplies, and equipment were to be withdrawn;

—the obligation of the parties on either side of that line to insure that their territory was not used for hostile actions against the other and to prevent the crossing of that line by unauthorized civilian and military personnel;

—the political decision concerning the reunification of Viet-Nam was to be made—in freedom and peace and without interference from any source—by the peoples in the South and the North;

—and, finally, an obligation on the part of all to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of all the states on the Indochinese peninsula.

We, for our part, persevere in the belief that these principles do indeed continue to provide a basis for a peaceful and honorable settlement.

It is through some contact, some dialog, of course that we are most likely to proceed toward a settlement. While public statements of position could usefully lead to a dialog, they can neither be a substitute for it nor accepted as a final rejection of it. We want that dialog to begin and are, therefore, prepared to use any of the many private channels available at this very moment. Our commitment to a political solution remains undiminished, as does our willingness to take the first step which may be conducive to the necessary discussion or negotiations concerning the contents of a political solution.

I would conclude by stating simply that the offers we have made before this Assembly are genuine and they remain open. To those who doubt their sincerity, whether parties to the conflict or not, I would make the most direct reply I can think of: There is only one sure way to test the sincerity of a man or a country—challenge him to make good through deeds what he offers in words.

We are prepared to accept—and make good on—that challenge.

U.S. Supports U.N. Membership of Botswana and Lesotho

Statement by James M. Nabrit, Jr.¹

It is a double honor for the United States to welcome Botswana and Lesotho to the United Nations and a double pleasure to welcome their delegations to the Security Council today.

With a population of over 540,000 in an area of 220,000 square miles, Botswana has been progressively developing politically and economically into the 20th century. As a protectorate of the British Crown, its people achieved an increasingly greater share in their own government until granted full independence.

Lesotho, with a population of 930,000 and an area of nearly 12,000 square miles, has also made progressive steps in self-government leading to its present independence. Lesotho has been a British colony since its annexation in 1868 at the request of the Basuto people.

In recounting the political progress in Botswana and Lesotho we feel due credit should be paid to the Government of the United Kingdom, under whose aegis these advances in democratic self-government have been made.

¹ Made in the Security Council on Oct. 14 (U.S./U.N. press release 4933). Mr. Nabrit is Deputy U.S. Representative in the Security Council.

We know that both Botswana and Lesotho will contribute much to the work of this organization. We will welcome their participation in our efforts to achieve for the United Nations the goals of its charter, however difficult their attainment may be. The path toward world peace and the reconciliation of international differences has proved to be long and arduous. We in the United Nations therefore can offer to these new members only the prospect of hard work in the service of hopes and ideals that are still unrealized. We know that both Botswana and Lesotho will accept this challenge with the same admirable spirit of determination, wisdom, and moderation that they have demonstrated in the years leading to their recent independence.

My Government is especially pleased that Botswana and Lesotho share with the United States the strong conviction that governments to be effective and strong must be based on the consent of those they govern. My Government is well aware also of the many obstacles that Botswana and Lesotho have overcome in their praiseworthy drive to build nations where man's dignity and worth are not determined by race. This is indeed a victory in the worldwide struggle toward equal rights and opportunities for all. This achievement brings Botswana and Lesotho to our membership with substantial contributions already in hand.

The United States looks forward to increasing the friendly relations that already exist between us and these two new African nations. The contacts and experiences that we already have and have had with each have convinced us that they can and will make continuing meaningful contributions toward solving the problems that lie before us. My Government will gladly vote for the resolutions for their admission.²

² The Council on Oct. 14 unanimously recommended that Botswana and Lesotho be admitted to membership in the United Nations. On Oct. 17 the General Assembly admitted the two new nations by acclamation.

U.N. Urges Nations To Refrain From Interference in the Congo

Following is a statement by U.S. Representative Arthur J. Goldberg made in the Security Council on October 14, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council on that day.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG

U.S./U.N. press release 4935

Since the events which led to the United Nations Operation in the Congo, the United States has been vitally concerned with doing everything we can through the United Nations and unilaterally to help insure the security, independence, and well-being of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with whom we enjoy good relations. We were strong supporters of the United Nations efforts to help restore stability to the Congo and have by mutually agreeable bilateral arrangements assisted the Congo with the same purpose in mind. There is a clear and constant record of American concern for Congolese security manifested by concrete aid and assistance rather than the stale and irrelevant rhetoric which to date has been the sole and dubious contribution of the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, whose distinguished representatives have spoken in this debate.

We have listened with great concern to the reasoned presentation by the distinguished Foreign Minister of the Congo Democratic Republic, and we shared his concern about the situation in the Congo. We would have been prepared and are prepared to support unhesitatingly a call on all states not to interfere in the domestic affairs of any other state, including the Congo, and, indeed, we would have been further prepared to support a call upon all states not to allow territory under their control to be used as bases for operations for interference by mercenaries or otherwise in the domestic affairs of other states, including specifically the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Now, we have difficulty in supporting operative paragraph 1 as it now stands for reasons which have been adverted to by other delegations. It is asserted by the distinguished Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo that mercenaries are being stationed in Angola for employment in the Congo, and this is denied by the distinguished representative of Portugal, who offers on behalf of his Government to open the way for a factfinding mission so that the Council can determine the disputed fact.

In the presence of this conflict and in the absence of any Security Council action on the Portuguese proposal for a factfinding mission, which in our view this Council could take action to insure would have complete access to the facts, we have found it difficult to make an enunciation at this stage of our proceedings in the particular terms of paragraph 1.

We, too, recognize and compliment the distinguished representative of Mali and the cosponsors in their attempt to find a common ground so that all can be together, and we welcome very much the statement he just made which permits a separate vote so that in the final analysis, whatever our reservations may be about specific language, we can come to a common meeting in a resolution which expresses the view of this Council that all states ought to refrain from interfering in the domestic affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, indeed, that mercenaries ought not to be employed by any state to interfere in the domestic affairs of other states, including the Congo.¹

Mr. President, I shall not reply myself today to the irrelevant excursions made by members about the general problem of the Portuguese territories. We have made our position in this respect quite clear, and we are prepared when that subject comes up again to express our strong views in this area.

¹ On Oct. 14 the Security Council in a separate vote adopted operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution (S/7539) by a vote of 11 to 0, with 4 abstentions (U.S.).

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ²

The Security Council,

Having heard the statements of the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of the representative of Portugal,

Taking note of the statement of the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo that Angola under Portuguese administration is used as a base of operation for foreign mercenaries for interfering in the domestic affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Taking note further of the statement of the representative of Portugal that there are no mercenaries in Angola, nor camps, nor war material meant to disturb the peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Being deeply concerned over developments in the area,

Recalling the pertinent resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly,

1. *Urges* the Government of Portugal, in view of its own statement, not to allow foreign mercenaries to use Angola as a base of operation for interfering in the domestic affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

2. *Calls upon* all States to refrain or desist from intervening in the domestic affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow closely the implementation of the present resolution.

U.S. Delegation to 14th UNESCO General Conference Confirmed

The Senate on October 22 confirmed the following to be representatives and alternate representatives of the United States to the 14th session of the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization:

Representatives

Charles Frankel
William Benton
Thomas F. Malone
Nan Tucker McEvoy
Joseph R. Smiley

Alternate Representatives

Frederic R. Mann
Patrick E. Haggerty
Whitney M. Young, Jr.

² U.N. doc. S/RES/226 (1966) (S/7539); adopted unanimously on Oct. 14.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Note verbale dated August 22 from the Byelorussian S.S.R. mission regarding the application for U.N. membership of the German Democratic Republic. S/7474. August 24, 1966. 2 pp.

Report of the Trusteeship Council on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands covering the period July 1, 1965—July 26, 1966. S/7425. August 26, 1966. 70 pp.

Telegram dated September 19 from the Indonesian Ambassador to the United States informing the Secretary-General that his Government "has decided to resume full co-operation with the United Nations and to resume participation in its activities." S/7498. September 19, 1966. 1 p.

General Assembly

Question of South West Africa. Notes verbale from representatives of various countries regarding the July 18 Judgment: Pakistan, A/6388, August 17, 1966, 3 pp.; Poland, A/6402, September 1, 1966, 2 pp.; Turkey, A/6413, September 14, 1966, 2 pp.

Draft Declaration on the Right of Asylum. Note by the Secretary-General. A/6367. August 22, 1966. 13 pp.

The Korean Question. Letter dated August 26 from the Representative of the U.S.S.R. forwarding a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and a memorandum from that government. A/6370. August 29, 1966. 8 pp.

Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: Note by the Secretary-General on measures to implement the U.N. declaration, A/6403, September 2, 1966, 5 pp.; note by the Secretary-General on the status of the international convention, A/6405, September 7, 1966, 5 pp.

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Station. Report of the Advisory Panel. A/AC.105/L.30. September 1, 1966. 68 pp.

Information furnished by the United States concerning objects launched into orbit or beyond. Letters dated August 26; A/AC.105/INF.139-142, September 2, 1966.

Second Report of the Working Group of the Whole. A/AC.105/34. September 16, 1966. 6 pp.

Report of the Legal Sub-Committee on the Work of Its Fifth Session (July 12-August 4 and September 12-16). A/AC.105/35. September 16, 1966. 52 pp.

United Nations Emergency Force. Report of the Secretary-General. A/6406. September 7, 1966. 28 pp.

Co-Operation Between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. Report of the Secretary-General. A/6408. September 8, 1966. 3 pp.

Regional Development. Letter dated September 6 from the representative of Colombia, enclosing the text of the Declaration of Bogotá, which was signed on August 16 by the Presidents of Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela and by representatives of the Presidents of Ecuador and Peru. A/6410. September 8, 1966. 15 pp.

The Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the United Nations Human Rights Seminar on *Apartheid*. A/6412. September 13, 1966. 57 pp.

Report of the Committee on a United Nations Capital Development Fund. A/6418. September 19, 1966. 15 pp.

International Year for Human Rights. Note by the Secretary-General. A/6422. September 19, 1966. 9 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Supplementary Tax Convention Signed With Canada

Press release 250 dated October 25

On October 25 Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach and Canadian Ambassador A. E. Ritchie signed a supplementary convention between the United States and Canada further modifying and supplementing the income tax convention of March 4, 1942, as amended.¹

Paragraph 1 of article XI of the 1942 convention, as amended and presently in force, reads:

1. The rate of income tax imposed by one of the contracting States, in respect of income (other than earned income) derived from sources therein, upon individuals residing in, or corporations organized under the laws of, the other contracting State, and not having a permanent establishment in the former State, shall not exceed 15 percent for each taxable year.

The supplementary convention modifies paragraph 1, as quoted above, by providing that it shall not apply in respect of income derived from sources in one of the countries

¹ 56 Stat. 1399; Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2347, 3916.

and paid to a corporation organized under the laws of the other country if the latter corporation is not subject to income tax in the last-mentioned country because it is not resident there for purposes of its income tax.

The supplementary convention will be transmitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol bringing under international control drugs outside the scope of the convention of July 13, 1931, for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs, as amended by the protocol signed at Lake Success on December 11, 1946. Done at Paris November 19, 1948. TIAS 2308.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Trinidad and Tobago, April 11, 1966.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a global commercial communications satellite system. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force for the United States August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.

Accession deposited: Mexico, October 25, 1966. Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.

Signature: Department of Communications and Transportation of Mexico, October 25, 1966.

Supplementary agreement on arbitration. Done at Washington June 4, 1965.¹

Signature: Department of Communications and Transportation of Mexico, October 25, 1966.

Sugar

Protocol for the further prolongation of the international sugar agreement of 1958 (TIAS 4389). Open for signature at London November 1 through December 23, 1965. Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5933.

Ratifications deposited: Colombia, September 20, 1966; Ecuador, July 21, 1966; Ireland, June 23, 1966; Malagasy Republic, June 14, 1966; Mexico, August 16, 1966; Portugal, September 29, 1966.

Acceptance deposited: Indonesia, July 20, 1966.

BILATERAL

Canada

Supplementary convention further modifying and supplementing the convention and accompanying protocol of March 4, 1942, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion in the case of income taxes, as modified by supplementary conventions of June 12, 1950, and August 8, 1956 (56 Stat. 1399; TIAS 2347, 3916). Signed at Washington October 25, 1966. Enters into force on the date of the exchange of ratifications.

Congo (Kinshasa)

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Kinshasa October 3, 1966. Entered into force October 3, 1966.

Togo

Treaty of amity and economic relations. Signed at Lomé February 8, 1966.¹

Ratified by the President: October 6, 1966.

¹ Not in force.

Asia. Seven Nations Declare Unity at Manila Conference; President Johnson Visits American Troops at Cam Ranh Bay (Johnson, Manila conference documents) 730

Atomic Energy. U.S. Comments on Communist Chinese Nuclear Test 744

Botswana. U.S. Supports U.N. Membership of Botswana and Lesotho (Nabrit) 758

Canada. Supplementary Tax Convention Signed With Canada 761

China
The United Nations: A Great Chapter in Man's Pilgrimage Toward Peace (Goldberg) 739
U.S. Comments on Communist Chinese Nuclear Test 744

Colombia. U.S., Colombia Exchange Notes on Sea-Level Canal Study 755

Congo. U.N. Urges Nations To Refrain From Interference in the Congo (Goldberg, resolution) 759

Congress. U.S. Delegation to 14th UNESCO General Conference Confirmed 760

Disarmament. The United Nations: A Great Chapter in Man's Pilgrimage Toward Peace (Goldberg) 739

Economic Affairs
Seven Nations Declare Unity at Manila Conference; President Johnson Visits American Troops at Cam Ranh Bay (Johnson, Manila conference documents) 730
Supplementary Tax Convention Signed With Canada 761
Tin Council and U.S. Officials Discuss Tin Sales Program 756
U.S. Citizens Visiting Pakistan May Purchase U.S.-Owned Rupees 756
U.S., Colombia Exchange Notes on Sea-Level Canal Study 755

Europe. The Free World's Stake in Viet-Nam (MacArthur) 745

International Organizations and Conferences
Seven Nations Declare Unity at Manila Conference; President Johnson Visits American Troops at Cam Ranh Bay (Johnson, Manila conference documents) 730
Tin Council and U.S. Officials Discuss Tin Sales Program 756

Lesotho. U.S. Supports U.N. Membership of Botswana and Lesotho (Nabrit) 758

Pakistan. U.S. Citizens Visiting Pakistan May Purchase U.S.-Owned Rupees 756

Presidential Documents. Seven Nations Declare Unity at Manila Conference; President Johnson Visits American Troops at Cam Ranh Bay 730

Refugees. Refugee Problems Today (Wine) 751

Treaty Information
Current Actions 762
Supplementary Tax Convention Signed With Canada 761

U.S.S.R. The United Nations: A Great Chapter in Man's Pilgrimage Toward Peace (Goldberg) 739

United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 761
The United Nations: A Great Chapter in Man's Pilgrimage Toward Peace (Goldberg) 739
U.N. Urges Nations To Refrain From Interference in the Congo (Goldberg, resolution) 759
U.S. Commitment to Political Solution in Viet-Nam Reaffirmed (Goldberg) 757
U.S. Delegation to 14th UNESCO General Conference Confirmed 760
U.S. Supports U.N. Membership of Botswana and Lesotho (Nabrit) 758

Viet-Nam
The Free World's Stake in Viet-Nam (MacArthur) 745
Seven Nations Declare Unity at Manila Conference; President Johnson Visits American Troops at Cam Ranh Bay (Johnson, Manila conference documents) 730
The United Nations: A Great Chapter in Man's Pilgrimage Toward Peace (Goldberg) 739
U.S. Commitment to Political Solution in Viet-Nam Reaffirmed (Goldberg) 757

Name Index

Benton, William 760
Frankel, Charles 760
Goldberg, Arthur J 739, 757, 759
Haggerty, Patrick E 760
Johnson, President 730
MacArthur, Douglas, II 745
Malone, Thomas F 760
Mann, Frederic R 760
McEvoy, Nan Tucker 760
Nabrit, James M., Jr 758
Smiley, Joseph R 760
Wine, James 751
Young, Whitney M., Jr 760

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: October 24-30

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
250	10/25	Supplementary tax convention with Canada.
251	10/24	Wine: Overseas Press Club, New York, N.Y.
252	10/25	Statements of the Manila Conference.
253	10/25	Study of sea-level canal route in Colombia.
254	10/26	Local currency for sale to U.S. visitors in Pakistan.
†255	10/27	Katzenbach: American Foreign Service Association, Washington, D.C. (revised).
256	10/28	U.S.-International Tin Council talks.
†257	10/30	U.S. protests to Guinea on detention of U.S. Ambassador.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Initiative for Peace

In a statement before the United Nations General Assembly on September 22, Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg outlined U.S. aims in Viet-Nam and set forth proposals for peace in Southeast Asia. "We have not been and we are not now inflexible in our position," he said. "But we do believe that whatever approach finally succeeds, it will not be one which simply decries what is happening in Viet-Nam and appeals to one side to stop while encouraging the other."

Reprinted from the Department of State BULLETIN, this 8-page pamphlet contains the text of Ambassador Goldberg's statement.

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Vol. LV, No. 1430



November 21, 1966

UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION SIGN CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT

Texts of Agreement and Related Documents 791

GROWTH OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE: AN INDEX OF WORLD RESPONSIBILITY

*Excerpt From Remarks by Under Secretary Katzenbach
Before the American Foreign Service Association 781*

UNITED STATES TRADE POLICY AFTER THE KENNEDY ROUND:
HELPING THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES HELP THEMSELVES

by Assistant Secretary Solomon 784

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S TRIP TO ASIA

*Statements and Remarks Made by the President During His Visits
to Thailand and Korea 766*

The Visits to Thailand and Korea

President Johnson was in Thailand October 27-30, where he held talks with His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej and Thai Government officials. After a 2-day visit to Malaysia, the President arrived at Seoul, Korea, on October 31 for meetings with President Chung Hée Park and officials of the Government of the Republic of Korea. Following, in chronological order, are texts of addresses, remarks, and statements made by President Johnson during his visits in these two countries, together with the text of a joint statement issued by President Johnson and President Park at the close of the visit to Korea on November 2.

THE VISIT TO THAILAND

Arrival Statement, Municipal Pavilion, Bangkok, October 28

White House press release (Bangkok, Thailand) dated October 28

I spent yesterday as the guest of your Prime Minister [Thanom Kittikachorn] at his summer residence in Bang Saen. It was for me a very welcome day of rest after the Manila conference and after our visit to South Viet-Nam.¹ It gave me a chance to reflect quietly upon the meaning of the days that have passed since I left my own country.

I realized that the same waves that wash Bang Saen—and Bangkok—also touch Ma-

¹ For texts of the Manila conference documents, together with remarks made by President Johnson at Cam Ranh Bay, South Viet-Nam, on Oct. 26, see BULLETIN of Nov. 14, 1966, p. 730.

aysia, South Viet-Nam, the Philippines, and as the waves move out they wash against South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, and many thousands of miles away the same Pacific waves touch my own nation at Hawaii, Alaska, California, Oregon, and Washington.

These waves speak of the deepest meaning of my journey. For we have learned again that we are Pacific neighbors, with common interests, with a common destiny.

You have shown here in Thailand that prosperity and progress in Asia are attainable goals. You have shown by your leadership that regional efforts can gather momentum throughout Asia. Most important, you have shown that freedom and independence are the best environment for progress.

I believe that the Conference of Seven Nations succeeded at Manila, but that is a judgment that will best be made by history. For the Pacific waters also touch Hanoi and mainland China. One day, I believe, they will join the Pacific neighborhood—in peace and without the suspicions and hostility that make cooperation difficult today.

One day they will be good neighbors. We look forward to that day. For our passion is peace. We seek no eternal hostility. We seek no dominance. We are committed to the proposition that no nation shall dominate another nation in the Pacific.

I cannot tell you how happy I am this afternoon to be able to return again to Thailand. When I was here in 1961, I fell under the charm and the beauty of your land. More importantly, I came away with respect and

admiration for the people of Thailand, who gave us such a warm welcome when we were here. Mrs. Johnson and I left with the most pleasant memories of the people of Thailand. We have looked forward so eagerly to returning and spending these next few days in your land again.

We already feel, in the night that we have spent here, that we are at home. And it is no wonder—because, after all, the one thing that this trip symbolizes and establishes is that we are Pacific neighbors.

Thank you.

**Toast to the King of Thailand
at a State Dinner at Bangkok, October 28**

White House press release (Bangkok, Thailand) dated October 28

Our two peoples live in opposite sides of the world. We have different histories. We have different customs. Yet what we share in common far surpasses our differences.

The very name of your great nation means, in my own language, "Land of the Free." Those words are familiar to every American, for they are part of our national anthem. That anthem celebrates our homeland as "the land of the free and the home of the brave."

The people of Thailand also understand that those who wish to be free must be brave.

Your Majesty's ancestors made a long pilgrimage to a new land rather than accept subjugation. That is what my ancestors also did. Yours were centuries ahead of us. But when our time came we, too, chose the path of freedom.

The search for freedom led my own ancestors from their homeland in Europe, as it led yours from their ancestral home in China.

The Thais were more successful. Since your first migration, nearly 1,000 years ago, the people of Thailand have never been a colony of any foreign power. But we Americans are still less than 200 years away from colonial status.

Considering our history, I think it is understandable why my countrymen are puzzled when someone calls us a "colonialist" power.

The Bulletin will complete its publication of items relating to President Johnson's Asian trip as soon as texts become available. A future issue of the Bulletin will include texts of remarks made by the President during his visit to Malaysia October 30-31 and upon his return to the United States, as well as his addresses, statements, and remarks in Hawaii, American Samoa, Australia, and the Philippines which have not been previously published.

Considering your own history, I think it is understandable why the people of Thailand should be puzzled by those who suggest that you are being "used" or "dominated" by Americans; or, for that matter, anyone else.

The truth is that Thailand and the United States are going down the same road together. We did not start our journey together. But we met on the road which leads, ultimately, to peace and independence for all nations. We of America are proud to march beside you, who began that journey long before we did.

Tonight we stand as allies in a common cause. At this very moment, Thai forces are assisting the South Vietnamese in their struggle against armed aggression, alongside the forces of the United States of America.

At the same time, you are making available facilities in Thailand of great importance to the collective effort to defend against Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. Your contribution is of major proportions. We know the risks that we both run to meet the common dangers. But we know, also, that we act from a joint conviction of common interest.

Let me assure you in this regard that Thailand can count on the United States to meet its obligations under the SEATO treaty. The commitment of the United States under the SEATO treaty is not of a particular political party or administration in my country but is a commitment of the American people.

I repeat to you: America keeps its commitments.

I have spoken tonight of defense. But our common cause is a peaceful one. It is the right

of every people to determine its own destiny.

The road toward that goal has been long. There are rivers still to cross and mountains still to climb. Yet I believe that the hardest part of the journey is past.

I believe that in the lifetime of men now living, the human race will emerge into the sunlit uplands of peace and freedom.

While I am not a prophet, I would like to venture this prediction tonight: When that time finally comes, the people of many nations will bless the names of those who stood fast in the cause of freedom during the days of its greatest need and during its hour of darkness.

And among the first of those names will be Thailand—Land of the Free—and His Majesty the King of Thailand.

Ladies and gentlemen, will you join me in a toast to the King.

**Address at Chulalongkorn University,
Bangkok, October 29**

White House press release (Bangkok, Thailand) dated October 29

Twenty-five hundred years ago in Athens, in Palestine, in China, and in the western part of India, men probed deeply into the nature of their being, trying to make sense out of their lives.

The results of that search are still with us today all across the world. Since then, our similarities and our differences have been like separate rivers, flowing from a common lake of humanity.

The marvel and the challenge of our modern age are that we can see the rivers of man converging again. We have seen them converging at the United Nations in New York City, at a thousand universities and international conferences, and as millions of our citizens travel abroad to become acquainted with other cultures.

We live, then, at a spectacular moment in the ages of man.

The challenge to us is also spectacular.

We must first retain the beauty and the integrity of our separate streams.

Secondly, we must encourage the free adoption of the best of all the ways of life.

Our goal is an elementary one. It is this:

to give each man in the world a chance to seek the highest and the deepest of the human experience as he sees fit.

You are doing that today here in Thailand.

Forty-five years ago only 29 percent of your people were able to read and write. Today literacy is close to 75 percent.

Twelve years ago only 21,000 of your youth were pursuing university study. Today the number is gratifyingly well over 45,000. Almost 8,000 are studying here at this beautiful university. In addition, 3,000 Thai young people are studying at colleges and universities abroad. I am very proud that more than half that number are at schools in the United States of America. All but a handful of these will return to your own country—as should be the case, but is not always so, with students from other countries.

Your educational progress is exciting, and it is matched by material progress as well. A spreading network of roads is drawing remote farms into contact with your marketplaces here in your land. You have applied modern technology to agriculture, making Thailand the world's leading exporter of rice while achieving a remarkable diversification of your crops.

Your gross national product is growing at a rate of 7 percent a year, the highest in all of Southeast Asia.

But you have seen that, in this world, nationalism is not enough. You have seen that for men to reach the highest ground, then men must work together. Nineteen regional organizations now have headquarters in Bangkok—and their diligent and inspired work is already beginning to bear fruit.

When I was in Bangkok 5 years ago, I visited ECAFE [Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East] with U Nyun [Executive Director, ECAFE], who is with us today on this platform, and I heard of that organization's plans for Asian regional development projects. Five years ago almost all they had were plans. Today the Asian highway is 94 percent completed, and two dams, both here in Thailand, are already supplying water and power as the first part of

what was then the visionary Mekong development project.

Thailand is not yet rich, but she is carefully selecting from the rivers of man those modern techniques that will make her materially rich: education, economic development, and regionalism.

But the human spirit is not made wealthy only by dams or highways or more rice. A wealthy human spirit cannot flourish without rice, without good health, or without decent housing. That is not to say that a wealthy spirit automatically and necessarily follows material wealth. We have seen in my own country that the good life does not end with the possession of a new car, a new house, a new refrigerator, or a new washing machine.

It was our philosopher Ralph Waldo Emerson who said: "The true test of civilization is not the census, not the size of the cities, nor the crops, but the kind of man the country turns out."

That is the meaning of my legislative program in the United States: the creation of a Great Society where each American has the opportunity to pursue excellence—to be the best that is within him to be.

Accordingly, we in America are seeking broader educational opportunity. We are seeking better medical care. We are seeking cleaner cities and purer water and fresher air. We are seeking equality as a fact for all of our citizens. We are seeking to preserve our land in the state that it was given to us. And all of these things add up to what we call in America the Great Society.

But there is still more to excellence today in this world of many human rivers. A great society cannot really exist in one nation and not exist in another nation. Excellence can be achieved only by learning from the peoples of the entire world.

One year ago at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C., I proposed that my country, the United States of America, launch a concerted effort in international studies.² I learned just a few days ago, while I was already here in Asia, that our Congress had

² For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 4, 1965, p. 550.

acted on this proposal and passed a new law, the first step—the International Education Act. That will have to be implemented, as it will be, as we go along. Its purpose is to help Americans learn from other nations and, we hope, to help other nations learn from America. It will also establish a Center for Educational Cooperation in Washington, D.C.

I am so very proud that the American Congress has passed this act. I think it is fitting and appropriate to sign this program into law here today on this stage of this great university, in a land where international cooperation has now become a national byword.

With the approval of your president, I intend to sign this far-reaching, novel piece of legislation immediately following this talk this morning.

I think we have reason for pride also in the record of my country in providing economic assistance to other nations, beginning with the Marshall Plan and more recently with the nations of Asia.

Today, even as the conflict in Viet-Nam continues, and with all its major burdens, I hope and expect that we shall not only continue our present program but do still more as the right programs and initiatives are developed.

And I am very happy to see that our efforts are being joined increasingly by those of other nations that may be in a position to help. You know this well in Thailand. In the past 5 years the development assistance that you have received from other nations has exceeded that which my own nation has been called upon to supply. You have shown how effective the multilateral approach can be in a nation that is able to develop wise and effective programs of its own.

But I would go still one step further. My nation today is bearing a heavy load in the Vietnamese conflict, alongside your nation. The central tragedy of our times is the human and material waste that goes into war. Innocent men are killed and billions of dollars put to unproductive use.

It is my hope, and my firm expectation, that as soon as Hanoi accepts reality and the

war in Viet-Nam ends, it will be possible to devote substantially greater funds to the relief of all human need in the world—to the enrichment of life. In my own country we are awaiting the development of a great many worthwhile causes until we can reduce our military expenditures.

In that larger effort we believe that Southeast Asia will have its full share. We know that you believe as we do—that we would much prefer to take our material resources and put them in bread for babies than to put them in bullets and bombs.

I say this from the bottom of my heart, and I tell you that I long to see the day come when we can live at peace in the world with our neighbors.

Sometimes a nation must do what it would not choose to do. Sometimes men must die in order that freedom may live. That, this morning, is our greatest sorrow—that young men must spend their lives in battle who might instead be building a world of peace.

So I say here in your presence, with all the sincerity I can command, I say to the leaders in Hanoi:

Let us lay aside our arms and sit down together at the table of reason.

Let us renounce the works of death—and take up instead the tasks of the living.

Enough of this sorrow. Let us begin the work of healing, of teaching, of building, and of providing for the children of men. This is the purpose for which we were really made; this is what our age asks us to do.

Thank you very much.

THE VISIT TO KOREA

Arrival Statement, City Hall Plaza, Seoul, October 31

White House press release (Seoul, Korea) October 31

To an American, the free soil of Korea is hallowed ground.

Sixteen years ago an invading army from the North swept down upon your land. Long and tragic months followed, bringing grief to thousands upon thousands of good Korean families.

First alone and then under the United Nations, President Harry S. Truman committed my country to help Korea turn back the aggressor. But months passed before the tide of battle could be clearly reversed, and 3 years before an armistice was finally reached. And in the tide of war this city was fought over, not once but several times, and virtually destroyed.

Sixteen years have gone by. Your nation tonight is secure in freedom. It is bursting with vitality and growth and pride. Only you know how much toil, how much sacrifice, how many disheartening days there were before the new Korea emerged. You know how you had to build upon the rubble of a dreadful war: the industries, the shops, the schools, the hospitals, and the roads that a modern nation must have. You received help from your friends, but no one else could have done the job for you. Koreans built the new Korea, and Koreans are rightly proud tonight of what they have done.

I have come to Korea to tell you that Americans, who fought side by side with you in your darkest hours, rejoice in your success and take heart from your example.

I have come to meet the men and women who have made the new Korea possible.

I have come to express our gratitude for the brave and generous help that you are giving to our common ally in Viet-Nam, both on the battlefield and in the rebuilding of the countryside. This is an act of a nation that understands the nature of aggression and that knows what it means to have help in resisting an aggressor.

Mr. President, under your leadership Korea is playing an honorable and vital role in the Pacific community. There is a new spirit of cooperation in this part of the world, one that my country warmly welcomes and strongly supports. That new spirit of cooperation in this part of the world was expressed by the seven nations who met at Manila last week.

That historic meeting, which you first suggested and which you did so much to bring into being, affirmed the broad partnership

and the common purpose of free Pacific nations, a partnership that will endure long after the Communist aggression is ended in Viet-Nam. Our ultimate goals lie beyond the battlefield. They will be realized when the resources of mankind are devoted entirely to relieving hunger, to conquering disease, and to liberating man's spirit as well as his body.

So I stand on this hallowed soil of Korea tonight—for whose freedom thousands of my countrymen died alongside yours—confident that we shall redeem their sacrifice, confident that the cause of freedom will prevail in Asia.

Mr. President, I want to thank you and all the people of Korea for this magnificent welcome. The Communist masters in the world tonight can get no comfort from what they see in Malaysia—from which I have just come—from what they see here in Korea, and what they see in other parts of Asia.

I extend to you, Mr. President, and to all the people of Korea, America's hand of friendship and admiration. I look forward eagerly to the next few days that I shall spend here with you and your countrymen.

Mrs. Johnson and I, Secretary Rusk and our party, thank each of you for your hospitality this afternoon. We ask that all of you be careful and cautious and considerate that we don't hurt anyone in this huge crowd so that we can all go to our homes tonight and thank the good Lord for the freedom and the independence that is ours.

Now, Mr. President, with a salute to the two flags that fly above us, shoulder to shoulder, and to the freedom that they both represent, I say to one and all, good night and thank you very, very much.

**Toast to the President of Korea
at a State Dinner at Seoul, October 31**

White House press release (Seoul, Korea) dated October 31

Not very long ago, a friend of mine sat down with a Korean university professor to talk about the great changes that have taken place in this country during the past decade.

They spoke of the rate of economic growth in Korea, now one of the highest in the world; of your rural development programs, which are transforming your countryside;

of your vigorous democracy and your strong leaders, giving the best within them to building their country; and of Korea's very responsible role in the new Asia.

My friend searched for a way to sum up what these things meant to the people of Korea.

Your professor deliberated and then answered: "self-esteem." He meant that confidence, that affirmative spirit, without which a people can accomplish little and with which they can surmount any obstacles.

Together they recalled the time 16 years ago when a ruthless invader rolled through your streets, bringing terror and destruction to an innocent people. They recalled the long, hard fighting that drove him back into the North and that made this Republic free again. They remembered the years after the war when the task of reconstruction seemed too great for any people to accomplish. So much had to be rebuilt in this broken land; so much had to be changed; so much had to be created out of limited resources.

Korea's friends helped, of course—through economic aid and through strengthening the shield of security behind which this building could be done. Yet all the help in the world—all the aid and all the military security—could not have achieved the new Korea.

Koreans did that. Through many trials and errors, through many disappointments, the Korean people remade their land—and they made it a better land. On that achievement tonight rests their self-esteem and their confidence in the future.

Mr. President, we Americans are very proud that you have permitted us to play a part in that achievement. We are proud that we stood with you in the days when it was hard to see any light. We are proud that we remain with you in the morning of your success and your great promise.

Mr. President, I should like to take this occasion tonight to pay tribute to one of our own, a great lover and protector of freedom, who from the very first day until the very last hour has stood beside Korea in protecting her liberty and securing her inde-

pendence—our own beloved Secretary of State, Dean Rusk.

And if the people of Southeast Asia are permitted to live in liberty and freedom, I know of no American who will have contributed more to it than the distinguished Secretary of State.

Korea inspires us to feel that nations can meet the gravest challenges successfully if they can be secured from terror. And I can assure you tonight, Mr. President, that the United States of America will continue to play its part in providing that security. Here in Korea tonight our fighting men stand with your own along the demilitarized zone, and we shall come once more to your defense if aggression—God forbid—should occur here again.

What the Korean people are doing tonight in Viet-Nam is an even bolder testament of confidence.

You know that those who are free themselves have a very special responsibility for defending the freedom of their neighbors. Your Korean people know what it is to fight an invading Communist army on your own soil. You know how much depends on a nation's morale, and you know how morale depends on the determined help of others. The commitment the Korean people are making in Viet-Nam tonight flows from their own experience—and from profound understanding of their obligations to freedom.

Mr. President, centuries passed before our two people came to know each other. Suddenly, on the battlefield, we became allies. In the years that have followed we have become friends. Now tonight we are partners in a new Pacific community.

We know the mettle of the Korean people. We admire their bravery and their self-esteem. We are glad that history and the choice of both our peoples have made us allies and partners and friends. May that past be only prolog to richer years yet to come.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Secretary, most distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, I

should like to ask all of you to join me in a toast to the President and Mrs. Park and to the gallant people of this great Republic.

Remarks to U.S. Servicemen at Camp Stanley, Korea, November 1

White House press release (Seoul, Korea) dated November 1

I have come a long way to see you. When we get back home we will have traveled 30,000 miles. We will have talked to the statesmen and the soldiers of the Pacific-Asian area. If we can just learn to do our jobs as politicians as well as you do as soldiers, we will eliminate yours—there won't be any need for soldiers. But until we do, you are going to have to carry on.

We have made some progress since I left home. We sat down in Manila with the Foreign Ministers and Presidents from seven nations. We outlined a program for those seven nations.

They are the nations that are furnishing men that are defending freedom in Viet-Nam today.

The average fellow in the world doesn't ask for much. He wants an opportunity to have a job so he can earn enough food to satisfy the needs of his stomach and to cover his body. He wants a place where he can protect himself from the elements of the sun, the heat, and the cold, and have a roof over his head. He wants a chance for his kids to go to school and to learn to read and write, to get as much education as they can take.

If there is anything left over after that, he would like to have a little recreation for his family, a movie now and then, or to be able to load them all in the old jalopy and take them to see grandma on Sunday.

Then he would like to have a place where he can worship according to the dictates of his own conscience.

That is what you are all working at. That is why you are out here. You want to make it possible for people in this world to do those things. That is not asking much for those people, those people who produce the boys

who are willing to die all over the world.

But except for you, people couldn't do that. Except for you and your brothers who came here ahead of you years ago, Korea would now be under the master's heel and people would tell them how to worship, what they could learn, what they could read, and how they would live every hour of every day. They would have no choice.

We tried to avoid getting involved in all these things. Twice in my lifetime before Korea we thought we could sit it out, that it didn't make any difference what happened on the other side of the pond. But we found out we couldn't do that.

Everything that happens in this world affects us because pretty soon it gets on our doorstep. We thought we could sit out World War I, but we couldn't. The Kaiser misunderstood us and didn't think we would fight. He sank the *Lusitania* and we were involved.

We thought we could sit out World War II and said, "Let's let them take care of these problems themselves."

What happened? Hitler went through Poland.

We turned our head in the other direction as if we didn't see it. He picked up Eastern Europe.

The first thing we knew, practically everything that we held dear was gone.

Then they turned our fleet upside down in Pearl Harbor. We were at war with Japan and Germany before we knew what happened, and we had to get the job done.

Then the same type of dictatorship and totalitarianism that allows no choice from the top down, that tells you what to think, what to say, how to read it, write it, and speak it, started marching in this area of the world. We had to come to Korea to stop that march. We joined with our Korean-Pacific brothers and we stopped it.

The country I just came from, Malaysia, which, with our British brothers, loves freedom, they came in—Australia, New Zealand, and others—and they stopped the Communist envelopment there.

In Indonesia there are 100 million people that enjoy a measure of freedom today that they didn't enjoy yesterday. All these developments in Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, or Viet-Nam are possible only because of you.

Some people have said, "Why don't we let the old men go fight? It won't make much difference if they do get killed. Why do we snuff out all these young lives protecting this thing we call liberty and freedom?"

Well, I think that would be a pretty good idea if the old men could get the job done. But they can't do it. They are a little broader around the middle, and they can't break these rocks with their fists. They can't face these elements. They can't stand the pace you can. They can't insure this freedom and this liberty that we love, that we cherish, that we want to hand down to our children.

My great-great-grandfather died at the Alamo.

There was the battle of San Jacinto or Texas wouldn't have had its independence.

In all the years we have been represented in some way down through the years. You are preserving it for them today.

We hope this won't go on always. As I said in the beginning, until we learn to do our job, understand others, get along, be as efficient, be as competent as you, until the politicians get to understand people, we are going to have to protect liberty and freedom. We are going to have to make freedom and independence free from aggression. We are going to have to stand and say, "Might doesn't make right."

There are 3 billion people in the world, and we only have 200 million of them. We are outnumbered 15 to 1. If might did make right, they would sweep over the United States and take what we have. We have what they want.

We had better establish a rule we established in Europe when we went there that no dictator, just because he has power, because he has might, can snuff out freedom and liberty.

We have had to show it couldn't be done in Korea. We may have to show it can't be done

in other areas of the Pacific. We are showing right now it can't be done in Viet-Nam. 400,000 of our young men, the flower of our manhood, the very tops, are out there.

It is better to do it there than it is in Honolulu. We hope that we can establish the fact that men are equal in the world; might doesn't make right in the world.

We don't ask for much, but what we ask for we are going to get, we are going to keep, we are going to hold.

You weren't born into this world, the good Lord didn't bring you here, to liquidate the freedom and liberty that your grandfathers fought for with bows and arrows or old muskets. You have a heritage, a tradition to carry it on.

General [William C.] Westmoreland, who landed on some of these hills not far from here with his paratrooper boots on, told me the other day, "Mr. President, I think you ought to know this: You haven't been to the field, you haven't been to the rice paddies I have seen in Viet-Nam, but no Commander in Chief in the history of all glorious America ever commanded a more courageous and competent army or armed force than the Commander in Chief does today."

That is not a tribute to the Commander in Chief; that is a tribute to the men that he is commanding.

So I came here to tell you that you are protecting what we prize most—freedom for ourselves and freedom for all human beings. And you are doing a mighty good job of it.

Whatever you read about the demonstrators, whatever you hear about those that burn their draft cards, remember that there are always some in every crowd. But the bulk of the 200 million people in America and the bulk of the 3 billion people in the world thank God there are men like you.

Keep your chin in and your chest out and do your duty as you see it. You are doing it. We are proud of you. I came here today to tell you so.

I want you to tell the other 40,000 or 50,000 that can't be within sound of my voice today that I came, I saw, and I believed.

Your parents and your dependents may

not see some of you again, but they will always be mighty proud that you came this way, and so am I.

Remarks at the Tae-an Myun Agriculture Demonstration Area, November 1

White House press release (Tae-an Myun, South Korea) dated November 1

I have been deeply impressed by what I have seen and heard in Korea today. I had the noon hour with your brave Korean troops and had lunch with some of my fellow Americans. I was glad to see them so physically fit, so mentally alert, and so dedicated to the cause of freedom.

Your President took great pride in the sons of Korea, as I did in our American boys. Most of all, we were proud that both Koreans and Americans love freedom, are protecting freedom, and are ready to die for freedom.

I spent the night on a hill named Walker Hill in Seoul, named after our late great American General Walton Walker, who commanded the 8th Army and who gave his life for freedom.

It is regrettable that a man like Walton Walker had to give his life in order for men like your Governor Park [Governor Tae Won Park of Kyonggi Province] and others to have a ceremony like this today, where we name Johnson Hill.

But because of what the Walton Walkers and the hundreds of thousands of Koreans and Americans did together, we are privileged to meet this afternoon in peace on this hillside and look down on this fertile valley that we are transforming into one of the great production centers of this land.

I grew up in a farming area in my own country. I struggled to earn a living from the hard and hilly land. We were short of water, we were short of money, and there were many, many times when we were short of hope. But men and women made a miracle in that part of my country, and we Americans made a miracle all over the land when we turned the wilderness into homes, into productive farms, and into great cities.

In the hilly, hard land where I live, 30

years ago only 5 percent of the homes were electrified; today 95 percent of the homes are electrified. Today there is water, electricity, farm machinery, roads, and schools. And what is most important, there is the knowledge of how to keep on making a living in the rural areas.

I am so impressed and so thankful for that, because I see what happened in my own Johnson City, Blanco County, is happening here today in Tae-an Myun.

From the air I saw how you had turned the circular or oval plots into large productive squares and thus increased the production in excess of 35 percent.

What we did in my country in the 1930's, you are doing better in your country in the 1960's.

From this hilltop we can see great evidence of flood control, irrigation, erosion control, and reforestation of your hills. We look down the lines that carry your electric power, and we look down the roads that carry your produce to market. We see out yonder your bench terracing that has increased your farm yields and the patterns of paddy arranging that have been close to my heart.

I know, too, that the people here have built their own schools. They have a self-supporting community cooperative, with a tuition charge of 59 cents a month. I know your school is still short of equipment, but I know that I, too, was once a schoolteacher, and because of your school I hope your community will never be short of hope.

Because of what is happening here and what is happening in this area—and what is beginning to happen all over Asia—millions upon millions of people are going to have a new lease on hope.

My countrymen are proud that we are able to help you in your struggle for a better life. Most of all, we are proud of you for the kind of struggle that you are making.

You honor me by naming this hill for me in memory of this visit today. I accept this honor, not for myself but for the American people, who pledge that they will continue to help the best they can with the knowledge that you are working so hard yourself to de-

velop and advance the interests of this great Republic.

As I spent last night on Walker Hill, I hope some day to be able to spend the night on Johnson Hill, when we will live in plenty, in peace, and in prosperity.

Address Before the Korean National Assembly, Seoul, November 2

White House press release (Seoul, Korea) dated November 2

Sixteen years ago, an event occurred in Korea that changed the shape of Asia and the world.

On a June morning in 1950 we woke up to learn that a Communist army had smashed into the Republic of Korea without warning or provocation.

Many Americans at that time could not locate Korea on the map. We were concerned mainly with the Communist threat to Europe and the rebuilding of that Continent. Asia seemed remote and beyond the pale of our interest.

But President Truman acted quickly. American forces went to the aid of our Korean friends. The United Nations was called into emergency session, and a majority resolved to meet the aggression.

There were those who condemned us for trying to play "world policeman." We were told that there could be no successful outcome to a "dirty little war" in Asia.

Yet we stood firm behind the principle that the people of Korea—no less than the people of France or Italy—had a right to self-determination. We acted because the success of Communist aggression in Asia would have been as harmful to world peace and to our own national interest as the success of Communist aggression would be harmful in Europe.

And we acted because we knew that such aggression feeds on itself. We had watched one country after another fall in the 1930's to Nazi aggression in Europe and militarist imperialism in Asia. Force prevailed from Czechoslovakia to Poland, from Korea to the Java Sea. I have always believed that the Communist strategists of the fifties were encouraged by the indifference, the fear, and the

weakness that permitted the aggression of the thirties to move so far so fast.

But in Korea in 1950—as in Viet-Nam today—we acted to stop the aggression.

Side by side we fought with you to protect your right to be sovereign and independent. We had total casualties of 157,000—33,000 killed in combat, more than 20,000 killed in noncombat, or total dead of 53,625. While our total casualties were 157,530, the Korean people suffered civilian casualties of perhaps 2 million. Who will ever know how many children starved? How many refugees lie in unmarked graves along the roads South? There is hardly a Korean family which did not lose a loved one in the assault from the North.

This was the cost—the terrible cost—of protecting the Republic of Korea from Communist aggression. As I meet with President Park and see your countryside and your people, and then I look out into the faces of this Assembly, I know that these men did not die in vain.

For here is one of the truly dramatic stories of our time—a nation transformed within a generation.

I hope that a great historian will soon record the story of how an ancient nation has emerged from the shadows of its colonial past and from the tragedy of war to become one of the youngest and most vigorous constitutional democracies in the world.

I want him to tell how this nation—through no fault of its own—was divided, invaded, and almost destroyed.

I want him to record that when the fighting stopped Korea faced every conceivable difficulty: cities in ashes, millions of refugees, transportation in ruins, factories idle, inflation rampant, unemployment high.

I want him to tell of the men and women who guided this nation through those terrible years—of their greatness and their shortcomings, of their foresight and their errors.

I want him to describe the student uprising, the military revolt, and then the achievement of constitutional government in the fall of 1963. I want him to recall the sense of triumph and accomplishment—when the votes

were cast and counted and the people had made their choice of who would govern.

I want him to record how you have taken your stand with other nations that are helping South Viet-Nam to resist a new Communist tactic, one that combines external aggression with internal terror. I want him to record that your contribution, in terms of population, matches the United States of America.

Finally, I want him to record the astonishing economic and social progress you have made working together in unity here in Korea.

I have seen in Korea how real and how realistic are the four goals of freedom adopted at Manila.

You have fought—and you are fighting now—so that Asia can be free from aggression.

You are moving rapidly in Korea to conquer hunger, illiteracy, and disease.

You have shown leadership in helping to build institutions that promise this region security, order, and progress. Korea proposed, and was host to, the historic conference that created the Asian and Pacific Council. You became a charter member of the Asian Development Bank and helped to initiate the Manila conference.

You have sought reconciliation. The settlement with Japan will bring lasting benefits to both nations and strength to this part of the world. You aspire and are prepared to act—under the United Nations—to bring about the unity of the Korean nation. We support that aspiration and that position fully.

And you are now ready to play your part in bringing about an honorable peace in Viet-Nam.

It is right, therefore, that I should end my trip through Asia here in Korea, where the four goals of freedom adopted at Manila are on their way to achievement.

I have seen, listened, and learned much on this trip:

—from the proud island of Samoa, teaching its children by television, to the dignity and dynamism of Thailand;

—from the intention of New Zealand and Australia to enter helpfully into the life of Asia, to the vitality and determination of the Philippines;

—from the solid agreement we found among allies at the Manila conference;

—from the understanding of that conference that I found in Malaysia, to this thrilling climax in Seoul.

Today the world has turned its eyes to Asia and begun to understand the goals, the problems, and the energy of this region where almost two-thirds of humanity lives.

A new, young generation of Asian leaders is determined that there shall be security and order and progress in their region. These are men who are prepared to stake their lives on that proposition.

The new Asia will remain loyal to its own traditions and culture and values, even as it works constructively with the United States and other nations throughout the world.

I have seen palaces and universities, ordinary homes and village schools, new land developments and new strains of rice for Asia's millions. I have seen Cabinet members and schoolchildren, farm experts and village leaders, and our fighting men. I have seen millions of faces—friendly and well-wishing. And I have been deeply encouraged. I leave with a deep sense of confidence in the future of Asia and the Pacific.

The tasks of economic, social, and political development are hard and long. It will take time, persistence, and ingenuity to give permanence and stability to Asian regionalism.

Difficult days lie ahead of us in Viet-Nam until the Communists change their minds about fighting. We saw in Korea—as we saw in Europe and other parts of Asia—that they choose peace only when they know that military success is beyond their reach. We must, therefore, remain strong and resolute until that day when those who started the fighting are ready and willing to end it.

That day will come, for peace is right and inevitable, and the free people of Asia and the Pacific deeply yearn and long for it.

My Korean friends, I thank you from the bottom of my heart for the warmth of your welcome.

I thank you for your courage and for your friendship—and for the testimony you are giving to the promise of freedom in the world.

An effective Korean Government, engaged in a democratic dialog with a vigorous opposition, is transforming your country into a modern nation and into a democratic state.

A great and proud people is emerging onto the world scene from its historic isolation. Other nations have played a part in that achievement. But it is the intelligence, the energy, the hard work, and the genius of the Korean people that are creating a new future for your country.

We honor, respect, and salute you.

Thank you and goodbye. Mrs. Johnson and I wish that the good Lord will give his blessings to your people and your land.

Text of Joint Statement³

1. At the invitation of President Chung Hee Park of the Republic of Korea, President Lyndon B. Johnson of the United States arrived in Seoul on October 31, 1966, for a State Visit to the Republic of Korea. President Johnson met with President Park at the Blue House on November 1, 1966, for a discussion of the current international situation and to exchange views on problems of mutual concern to the two nations. After leaving the Blue House, the two Presidents continued their discussion in President Park's special train en route to visit the 26th Division of the Republic of Korea Army. Present for these talks were Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown, Special Assistant to the President Walt Rostow, Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy, Prime Minister II Kwon Chung, Deputy Prime Minister Key Young Chang, Foreign Minister Tong Won Lee, Minister of Na-

³ Issued by President Johnson and President Chung Hee Park of Korea on Nov. 2 at the conclusion of President Johnson's state visit to Korea (White House press release (Seoul, Korea) dated Nov. 2).

tional Defense Sung Eun Kim, Mr. Hu Rak Lee, and other high officials of both governments.

Basic Policy

2. President Park and President Johnson reaffirmed the strong ties of friendship traditionally existing between the Republic of Korea and the United States and their determination to continue the closest cooperation and consultation to secure a lasting peace in Asia and the Pacific under which freedom, justice and prosperity for all would prevail.

Asia and the Pacific

3. The two Presidents confirmed their satisfaction at the unity demonstrated at the seven-nation conference held in Manila October 24 and 25, 1966. They are resolved to devote all their efforts to the realization of the high but now achievable hopes expressed by the participating nations in the Joint Communiqué, the Goals of Freedom, and the Declaration on Peace and Progress in Asia and the Pacific. Existing regional organizations and institutions should be developed to the fullest, with the continuing initiatives and efforts of nations in the area, whether or not represented in Manila. The evolving partnership of a new Pacific Community should be open to all nations prepared to live at peace and to cooperate and work for the welfare of the people of Asia and the Pacific.

Viet-Nam

4. President Johnson expressed the admiration of the American people for Korea's major contribution to the struggle in Viet-Nam, and praised the Korean troops both for their valor on the field of battle and their effectiveness in peaceful and constructive endeavors to promote the welfare and improve the livelihood of the Vietnamese people.

The two Presidents stressed that the defeat of aggression in Viet-Nam is vital to the full achievement of the goals stated at Manila. They again agreed to continue their military

⁴ For background, see BULLETIN of June 14, 1965, p. 950.

and other efforts, as firmly and as long as may be necessary, and at the same time to be prepared to pursue any avenue that could lead to a secure and just peace. They specifically reaffirmed that they would continue to act in the closest consultation in both these areas.

Korean International Actions

5. The two Presidents reviewed the actions of the Republic of Korea in the international field under President Park's leadership since their last meeting in May 1965.⁴ They noted in particular that the normalization of relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan had contributed significantly to the achievement of an atmosphere of further unity and stability in this part of the world. President Johnson expressed the view that the despatch of troops to help defend the Republic of Viet-Nam, the convening of the ASPAC meeting in Seoul, and the initiative for the seven-nation conference in Manila, together with the significant role which the Republic of Korea played at the conference were outstanding achievements which had placed Korea in the forefront of the free nations of Asia and earned the respect and admiration of free men everywhere.

Defense of Korea

6. The two Presidents acknowledged the need to ensure that the forces of aggression do not again menace the peace and tranquility of the Republic of Korea. They agreed that the growing strength of the Communist force in the northern part of Korea and of the Chinese Communists remained a major threat to the security of the Republic of Korea and neighboring areas. President Johnson reaffirmed the readiness and determination of the United States to render prompt and effective assistance to defeat an armed attack against the Republic of Korea, in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. President Johnson assured President Park that the United States has no plan to reduce the present level of United States forces in Korea, and would continue to support Korean

armed forces at levels adequate to ensure Korea's security. They agreed that their two Governments would continue to consult closely to ensure that the Korean forces are strengthened and modernized within the limitations imposed by legislative and budgetary considerations.

Korean Economic Development

7. President Park reviewed for President Johnson the progress which Korea had made in recent years in its economic and social development and in achieving political stability, and expressed his appreciation for United States cooperation in this effort. He outlined the objectives of the Second Five Year Economic Development Plan, by which the Republic of Korea intends to accelerate this progress toward its goal of a self-sustaining economy and a better life for the Korean people.

8. President Johnson expressed his warm admiration for the significant achievements of the Korean Government and people in increasing agricultural production, industrial output, savings and domestic revenues over the past eighteen months. He assured President Park that the United States Government intends to continue to support the growth of the Korean economy and in particular the implementation of the Second Five Year Plan. The two Presidents, noting the availability of funds to the Republic of Korea from other friendly Governments and from international lending institutions such as the World Bank and the newly constituted Asian Development Bank, agreed that further Development Loans, Food for Peace, and technical help in specialized areas would be the major forms of United States assistance to the achievement of Korea's economic goals, as contemplated in their May, 1965, joint communique.

Trade and Exchanges in All Fields

9. The two Presidents agreed that the stability and progress of the Korean economy should make possible a substantial further expansion in trade between the two nations

and in American private investment in Korea. They agreed to an early exchange of missions to these ends. In the same spirit, they agreed that exchanges among cultural leaders and intellectual groups in both countries should be promoted to the fullest possible extent, both through private and public channels.

Scientific Development

10. Recalling their agreement of May, 1965, to cooperate in the establishment of a new institute to bring the benefits of applied science and technology to the Korean economy and people, the two Presidents noted with pleasure the strong progress that had been made toward the establishment of the Korean Institute of Science and Technology, which is destined to make a fundamental and significant contribution to the modernization of life and industry in the Republic of Korea.

Korean Unification

11. President Park expressed the heartfelt desire of all Koreans for the unification of their homeland, and reaffirmed that it remains the firm policy of his Government to seek reunification under the objectives and principles established by the United Nations and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.

President Johnson pledged his continued strong support for this policy. The two Presidents deplored the continuing refusal of the Communists to accept the competence and authority of the United Nations, which refusal is responsible for prolonging the artificial division of Korea.

Conclusion

12. On behalf of Mrs. Johnson, the members of his party and the American people, President Johnson expressed his deepest thanks to President Park and to all citizens of the Republic of Korea for the overwhelming warmth of their reception and for the many courtesies extended to him during his visit.

**Departure Statement, Kimpo Airport,
Seoul, November 2**

White House press release (Seoul, Korea) dated November 2

Mrs. Johnson and I leave for Alaska after 3 days in your wonderful land, meeting our friends, your people.

We came here following the Manila conference, where the leaders of seven nations pledged their countries and dedicated their energies and talents to resisting aggression, to fighting hunger, illiteracy, and disease, and conquering it, providing for order, progress, and security in the world, and finally for extending our hand out and keeping our guard up in an attempt to reason out the problems of the world instead of fighting them out.

We expressed our great desire at any time, any place, to transfer our difficulties from the battlefield to the conference room.

We, in America, love and cherish our liberty, our independence, and our freedom. We do not try to impose it upon other people, but we are determined to preserve it for ourselves and for our children.

We, at Manila, listened and learned, and we did not try to dictate or to dominate. We realized all too well that no great power should try to force freedom and liberty on people who do not seek it or cherish it or desire it or demand it. But it was evident from our discussions that all the leaders, speaking for their people, thought about freedom as we did.

I am returning to my country to tell my

people that those who are nearest the demilitarized zone, that those who are nearest the borders the aggressor has crossed, that those who are closest to the aggression itself fear it the most and are equally as determined to resist it as we are.

And if their resistance is as determined and dedicated as I believe it to be, they will find in America not only a partner but an ally who will stand shoulder to shoulder with them in protecting and preserving their right to determine, their right to freedom of choice, their right to liberty and freedom for themselves and for their children.

I believe the hundreds of thousands of Koreans who died here in this land in the fifties died to preserve freedom for Korea and its children. All Koreans realize how precious freedom is, not just in the fifties but in the sixties and in the seventies and in all of the years to come. So long as you are determined to protect your own land, your own people, and your own way of life from the aggressor's march, you will find your American friends ready to stand by you and to support you in that protection.

We have fallen in love with your country and with your people. We have great confidence in your future. Our stay here has been delightful.

Mr. President, you and Mrs. Park have gone far beyond your duty in providing for our comfort and for a wonderful welcome.

Thank you and goodbye.

Growth of the Foreign Service: An Index of World Responsibility

by Under Secretary Katzenbach (Excerpt)¹

I do not come here today to offer any profundities or pronouncements on policy. It would be presumptuous at this early date. What I would rather do is simply share with you some of my impressions of the last 3 weeks. The first and foremost of those is, quite honestly, the importance of the Foreign Service.

By importance, I mean a Service whose vitality is not eroded by undue caution and yet whose judgment is not impaired by exuberant recklessness. As with so much that is both important and difficult, such a goal can easily be no more than platitude. I would propose three particulars.

The first is that, rising above recent modish debates, we need in our Foreign Service neither careerists nor outsiders; what we need are professionals.

Second, we require experience, and yet we also require the ability to master experience and not become its victims.

Third, drawing both on professionalism and on freedom from a slavish obedience to experience, we must have a Service with the capacity to develop good long-range policies, not just short-range immediate reactions.

Let me illustrate what I mean by each of these points.

First, why do we need career professionals? Jefferson opened the Department in 1790 with a staff of five clerks, one custodian, and

a part-time translator of French, who I think is still here. Even 50 years ago our diplomacy represented a haphazard avocation. We had no real professional service then because we did not need one—we really had no foreign relations.

Through the 19th century Americans were busy carving a nation, and we were non-aligned neutrals until 1917. Our attitude was a bit like Trotsky's remark after the October revolution: "What? Are *we* going to have foreign affairs?"

Our involvement in the world came rapidly, and consequently a career service was created in 1924. The growth of the Department and the Service since then is really an index of our growing world responsibility.

In 1924 there were 633 Foreign Service officers and 4,000 employees in the Department of State. In 42 years we have increased sixfold. There are now 3,500 in the Foreign Service and 26,000 in the Department as a whole.

That is not simply the result of a bureaucratic Parkinson's disease—or law. Nor has it been simply a quantitative explosion, but also one of professional scope.

Harold Nicolson used to say the qualities of an ideal diplomat were "truth, accuracy, calm, patience, good temper, modesty and loyalty." Today even that noble catalog of skills is grossly insufficient.

It may be just as necessary to have a fluency in Burmese, or to recognize that a ferry system across an African river would be more economical than building a bridge,

¹Remarks made before the American Foreign Service Association at Washington, D.C., on Oct. 27 (press release 255, revised).

or to recognize that a restrictive trade policy in Europe is wrong and to try to change it.

On my trip to Viet-Nam 2 weeks ago I saw a Foreign Service of young and vigorous officers applying these new qualities to exceptionally difficult local tasks:

—The economic skills needed successfully to head off a dangerous inflation;

—The sociological insight to understand and act on the apathy of villagers;

—The consummate political skills needed to face such things as the Buddhist crisis of last March;

—The language skills—and more than language skills—needed to communicate with a remote society.

We need the most creative and articulate men and women we can produce in our society—to grapple with the most difficult issues that face our society. The issues of war and peace are the most difficult issues that have really ever faced any society. We should be attracting to the Service, we *must* attract into the Service, the best of a postwar generation of young Americans. And we should encourage our outstanding young officers not only by promoting them but also by giving them jobs that test their capacities.

Yet a good Service is something more than a collection of special skills. It should be an adventure that is larger than self—represented by esprit, by loyalty, and by professionalism.

This association can and does play a significant role in fostering these qualities. You should be a forthright advocate for your membership. Looking inward, you should be the conscience of the Foreign Service. As teacher and innovator, you can nurture valued traditions and stimulate new fermentations.

As President Johnson said 8 years ago, when he was still in the Senate, "If diplomacy fails, our future will rest upon other shoulders and no one can contemplate the results with a feeling of ease."

That observation is fully as true now as it was then.

Experience a Tool and Not a Master

My second point is that we need experience—but we also need the ability to avoid being mastered by it.

What is wrong with relying on past experience? Obviously, nothing, unless old experience leads us to apply false analogies to the future. When excessive reliance on the past obscures the unique requirements of what is really a new situation, we increase the agonies of decision—and the possibilities of failure.

If the United States had acted out of habit rather than reflection, we would never have achieved the limited test ban treaty or succeeded in a number of other initiatives that, if gaged by past experience, were doomed to failure from the start.

My experience in the Department of Justice demonstrated the danger of holding too fast to the lessons of experience and believing too certainly that they were right.

In the field of immigration, for example, off-and-on efforts to abolish the iniquitous national-origins quota system went on for 40 years, all to die virtually stillborn. Past experience and just about everybody I talked to said that it just didn't make any sense to try again. Because of the remarkable imagination and patience of a number of people in the Department of Justice, however, the immigration reform law was enacted. It took us 3½ years to do it, but it got enacted.

Similarly, President Kennedy and President Johnson set out to secure the Civil Rights Act of 1964, despite continued awareness of the filibuster sword.

To the lasting credit of the Congress and the public, that effort, as you know, succeeded. And there really wasn't anybody who said it could succeed. (Although I suppose in the light of a more recent legislative battle, I ought to observe that this victory did not establish an *absolute* precedent for progress.)

New situations do not always, or even often, organize themselves into the neat categories of past experience. If this were not true, then foreign policy would be a mindless

process and we could all be replaced by computers in striped pants.

I do not propose to pack up all my papers and hand over my new elevator key to a behavioral scientist or a computer technician, because I believe we can conquer excessive and assertive reliance on experience.

The proof of a true professional, no matter how experienced, is that he never loses a seed of skepticism, a grain of suspicion, and a germ of doubt.

There are, in short, times when the virtue of experience is simply to demonstrate the irrelevance of that experience. And I believe that in that way one makes experience a tool and not a master. Now—as always—is the time to probe for new policies.

Need for Long-Range Policies

That leads to my third point—that we need good long-range policies above and beyond short-range improvisation.

We are all involved in the day-to-day business of the Department. We are prepared to monitor and manage crises around the clock. But shouldn't all of us—desk officers, country directors, assistant secretaries—continuously be taking a harder look at what our policies in every country and every region should be 5 and 10 years from now?

Every officer of the Department should have a broad concern and involvement in the Nation's problems. And let me add a personal thought here. Foreign Service officers are greatly skilled observers of politics. I see many cables every day. They are remarkably sophisticated reports about political developments in foreign countries. Can I urge each and every one of you to consider that you have got political problems here at home, and

you should be as shrewd and sophisticated observers and as concerned about politics here in the United States, about what public opinion is, and about what the Congress of the United States is doing, as you are about foreign countries and the politics of foreign countries.

Each of us has ideas on how to meet these problems. Day-to-day operations are time-consuming, but our professional mandate extends beyond these changing daily needs.

Change faces us more every day. We might well amend the ancient epigram of Heraclitus that "There is nothing permanent except change," to say that there is nothing permanent except the acceleration of change.

But this is not a fact that should breed despair or occasion surrender or send us cowering to some distant post hoping that retirement will come before the lightning. Change should, rather, provoke our best efforts. For professionalism, reflective experience, and wise planning do not exist for their own sake, any more than the Foreign Service or the Department of State exist for their own sake.

These are high goals for us to aspire to—world law, world disarmament, world peace—they are all possible goals.

"Our problems," President Kennedy said in perhaps his greatest speech,² "are man-made; therefore they can be solved by man. And man can be as big as he wants. No problem of human destiny is beyond human beings. Man's reason and spirit have often solved the seemingly unsolvable, and we believe they can do it again."

² For text of President Kennedy's address at American University, Washington, D.C., on June 10, 1963, see BULLETIN of July 1, 1963, p. 2.

United States Trade Policy After the Kennedy Round: Helping the Developing Countries Help Themselves

by *Anthony M. Solomon*
*Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs*¹

I welcome and appreciate this opportunity to discuss international trade with participants in this 53d National Foreign Trade Convention. The Department of State has long enjoyed a close and cordial working relationship with the National Foreign Trade Council. We wish to keep it that way. We look to you for ideas and support as we consider trade policies and programs to meet the nation's needs after conclusion of the Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations next year.

We remain hopeful for a successful outcome to those negotiations now in the home-stretch in Geneva. Through them we seek to achieve major reductions in the tariff and other barriers to our exports in our principal markets, mainly Europe, Canada, and Japan.

We are also interested in expanding peaceful trade with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. My good friend Sandy Trowbridge of the Commerce Department [Alexander B. Trowbridge, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic and International Business] is here with us this afternoon to discuss this subject with you.

We have very important interests as a nation in expanding the trade of the developing countries. This is a matter of political as well as commercial importance to us. My purpose today is to outline the dimensions of the problem and to explore with you some of the

questions that have a special relevance to trade.

Our overall objective is to help these nations help themselves. Finding ways to expand their trade is one way to do this. At stake is the well-being of more than 1½ billion persons in free-world countries. One-third of our total imports comes from these countries. And despite their low incomes, they provided a market in 1965 for \$8.5 billion of our exports.

Let me spend a few minutes reviewing the economic position of the developing countries and the trade problems facing them. These countries have low standards of living and weak industrial structures. They depend heavily on exports of unprocessed foods and raw materials; in most cases one or two products account for the bulk of their export earnings.

These nations are determined to achieve rapid economic growth. They are not, and should not be, content with average annual per capita incomes such as \$81 in India, \$49 in Ethiopia, and \$200 in Paraguay. This aspiration for rapid development has received international endorsement through the United Nations' designation of the 1960's as the Development Decade and the establishment of a growth target of 5 percent annually. It is an objective that the United States strongly supports and is consistent with the policy to which we have been committed for two decades.

¹Made before the 53d National Foreign Trade Convention at New York, N.Y., on Nov. 2 (press release 260 dated Nov. 1).

The results of the first half of the Development Decade have been uneven and in overall terms disappointing. Only 17 developing countries reached or surpassed the 5 percent target. On the other hand, per capita income in the developing countries as a whole increased by barely \$10 in these 5 years. Trade is a key factor determining these development prospects.

Pressures on the Developing Countries

Economic development requires the importation of growing volumes of capital equipment and other goods which in general can be purchased only from developed countries. To achieve a 5 percent growth rate these nations will need to increase their imports by more than 5 percent a year.

These countries are under pressure now because rapidly rising population levels have increased their need for food imports. To fill these food needs, the United States is urging an all-out effort to increase agricultural production in the developing countries and, as an interim measure, an expansion in food aid from developed countries. For some time to come, nonetheless, a growing food import bill may be a drain on the scarce foreign exchange of developing countries.

Foreign aid has been of immense help to these countries in financing imports needed for development. Another source is the flow of private investment. We have frequently stressed to the developing countries the technological and financial benefits private foreign investment can bring and the importance of providing conditions that will encourage and expand such investment.

But the great bulk of the resources necessary to finance import requirements of the developing countries now comes and must continue to come from their trade earnings. These earnings have not been expanding at a satisfactory rate, primarily because of the difficulties of trade in basic products. These countries depend heavily on the trade in primary products and, generally speaking, these products have been an uncertain and inadequate source of export earnings.

Demand for many primary products is slow growing, and prices over much of the past decade were generally unfavorable. The problem is further exacerbated by the tendency toward frequent and sharp short-term fluctuations in commodity prices. Another adverse factor is the extent to which the production of industrial countries—and I refer here to both synthetic substitutes and protected domestic agriculture—has made inroads into markets that might otherwise be available to developing countries.

Export earnings of the developing countries grew by less than 3 percent in the period 1955–60. The rate for the first half of this decade is better, approximately 6 percent, due both to improved commodity prices and stronger demand resulting from full employment in the industrial countries. There is no basis for confidence, however, that these gains can necessarily be sustained.

The developing countries urgently seek the cooperation of the United States and other industrial countries in making their primary-product export earnings a more dependable and dynamic source of foreign exchange. The United States accepts the necessity for such cooperation. We cannot disregard the impact of difficulties in world markets for coffee, cocoa, rubber, tin—to name a few important cases—on the economic and political stability of the countries of Latin America, Africa, and Asia. We must take account of the extent to which adverse trade trends can offset the benefits of foreign aid programs.

We should also be mindful of the benefits to U.S. export trade which accrue from larger and more stable export earnings by developing countries. There is much truth to the developing countries' claim that self-interest alone should motivate us. What they earn from exports to the developed world by and large goes straight back to the advanced countries like our own to finance imports of capital goods, equipment, and other essentials for economic development. Over the long term, economic development is also the basis for expanded commercial trade. For example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture

has observed that for every 10 percent increase in incomes in developing countries we can expect a 16 percent increase in commercial demand for U.S. agricultural products.

Action to Deal With Commodity Problems

There is no single answer to the problems of commodity trade. A variety of measures are required.

First is the reduction of tariff and other obstacles to trade in and consumption of these primary products. This will enlarge the potential market.

A second line of approach is to provide compensatory financing facilities to deal with short-term problems. The International Monetary Fund has established arrangements to provide prompt balance-of-payments assistance to developing countries experiencing severe shortfalls in their earnings due to factors beyond their control. The United States strongly supports such measures.

In addition, it also is essential to examine the possibilities of intergovernmental action to deal with individual commodity problems.

For some commodities international agreements regulating production, trade, and prices may be both feasible and desirable. Our experience thus far suggests that the possibilities for such action are limited in number but of considerable potential in importance. For others, more modest and flexible forms of intergovernmental action, such as commodity study groups, may be the best or only course. In any event, we must be prepared to examine and develop new techniques in this field, both to deal with short-term problems and to get at the underlying causes of difficulty.

There are two current examples which illustrate the possibilities of a comprehensive and constructive approach to a commodity problem through an international agreement.

One is the world grains arrangement in the early stages of negotiation in the context of the Kennedy Round to provide a package solution for the interrelated problems of access to markets, world prices, supply/demand imbalances, and food aid.

The second is the International Coffee Agreement,² which has not only served to avert a disastrous collapse of coffee prices but is now serving as the framework for a joint effort to cut back production, reduce producers' stocks, and achieve a long-term equilibrium between world supply and demand. The agreement also contains provisions aimed at expanding consumption, but in the case of coffee the only sure way to equilibrium is to move resources out of production. To facilitate this, a major part of the work under the agreement in the period immediately ahead will be concerned with the creation of a diversification fund and the promotion, in cooperation with the financial agencies, of country diversification programs tailored to the needs of the countries concerned.

The coffee case is in a sense unique, but it does illustrate the possibilities that exist and innovations that can be devised to move toward market equilibrium without going through all of the financially disruptive and politically dangerous adjustments that the use of market forces alone would require. The United States will continue to work with other governments in this regard, exploring any reasonable proposal and, we hope, contributing a measure of leadership in clarifying what is and is not feasible and economically sound.

Industrial Exports From Developing Countries

It would be unrealistic to count on overcoming the developing countries' trade problems through action on commodities alone. For this and other reasons, the developing countries have also focused their attention on possibilities for increasing exports of processed goods. On an overall basis, exports of manufactured and semimanufactured products from the developing countries have been growing at a good rate but from a very low base and remain well below the levels needed. This raises the question of what can be done to achieve a further substantial increase in

² Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5505.

industrial exports of developing countries.

Most important, of course, is that the developing countries themselves follow economic policies conducive to the establishment of efficient industries which can compete effectively in world markets. Control of inflation, reasonable exchange rates, avoidance of excessive import-substitution policies, and measures to encourage investment are all important.

Regional integration among the developing countries can also be a major factor in promoting their trade and economic growth. In many—indeed, virtually all—developing countries, internal markets are too small to support efficient modern industrial plants. It is not geographic size or the size of the population but effective purchasing power that determines the size of a market. In the developing countries per capita income is appallingly low. Regional cooperation can create larger markets so that the enterprises of the developing countries can benefit from the economies of scale and intraindustry specialization on which growth and efficiency depend.

Encouraging progress toward regional integration is being made in a number of areas. The Central American Common Market is perhaps the most promising one. We support these arrangements and would like to see the process accelerated in areas where it is lagging and instituted in areas where no such action has been taken.

The industrialized countries must see to it that their own economic policies encourage rather than frustrate legitimate development aspirations of the poor nations. One important step is to maintain high levels of domestic economic activity. But they must also provide improved access to their markets. The current Kennedy Round negotiations provide an opportunity to lower trade barriers among industrialized countries and to extend the benefits to developing countries without full reciprocity on their part. Our own offers in the Kennedy Round cover a very substantial portion of items of trade interest to the developing countries. If others matched us, the results could be of significant

benefit to the poor nations in opening up new markets.

Access alone, while vital, is not enough, however. These countries need advice and assistance in marketing techniques, market research, quality control—the whole range of practical steps that traders in the advanced countries know so well.

The Issue of Trade or Tariff Preferences

The developing countries will naturally welcome whatever reductions of trade barriers emerge from the Kennedy Round. They also appreciate the fact that efforts are being made both bilaterally and multilaterally to transfer marketing know-how to them. But they have raised a more fundamental question which has been attracting increasing attention recently and which will have to be faced up to in the post-Kennedy Round period; namely, the issue of trade or tariff preferences. The developing countries are asking for preferential rather than equal access for their exports of processed and manufactured goods to the markets of the industrialized countries.

Like most trade policy matters, preferences involve a host of technical and policy issues. But the basic dilemma can be put quite simply: Does equal treatment for all make sense when the competitive strength of infant industries in the poor countries is so obviously no match for long-established mature industries in the developed countries?

There is nothing very new or startling about trade preferences. We have had preferential trade ties with the Philippines for decades. The extensive network of British Commonwealth preferences dates from 1931. The French and a few other European nations have had similar arrangements with African areas for many years.

What is new is that the developing countries themselves have recently become dissatisfied with this uneven situation, and with good reason. Neighboring countries of the developing world who frequently produce the same kinds of products face discrimination in developed-country markets when one receives a preference and the other does not

simply because of the historical fact of colonial relationships. The system pits the poor against the poor and has neocolonial overtones. It is made to order for creating friction and tensions among the very countries who most of all need to cooperate with each other economically for their mutual prosperity.

And one area of the world—Latin America—has historically had no trade preferences in any market; instead, it has had to cope with discrimination against its exports nearly everywhere.

Moreover, developed countries, including the United States, frequently face discrimination because many of these preferential arrangements are reciprocal.

While the present systems are becoming increasingly discredited—virtually no one is prepared to espouse them as affirmatively desirable—this does not mean that they can easily be gotten rid of. "A bird in the hand" is a reasonably accurate explanation for this seeming paradox. Therefore, what is to replace the benefits a preference beneficiary now receives in certain developed-country markets?

Difficulties of Generalized Preferences

The answer being voiced with increasing vigor by the developing countries is that the network of existing preferences which are selective as to product and countries should be replaced by a general system of trade preferences for processed and manufactured goods by all industrialized countries for the benefit of all developing countries and without reciprocal preferences.

At first sight, there appear to be some obvious merits in this approach. It would have political advantages. The developing countries have been pleading for a special boost for their exports for several years, and rich countries who oppose their plea appear to be politically insensitive. It would also be politically advantageous to eliminate friction among the developing countries themselves arising from discriminatory advantages enjoyed by some at the expense of others.

Economically, the case is perhaps less

clear. Some developing countries would no doubt benefit and be able to increase their exports. It seems likely that this would be the case for the relative handful of more advanced developing countries in Asia and Latin America. Such a system would also probably make it easier to eliminate existing reciprocal preferences.

On closer scrutiny, however, the host of difficulties I referred to earlier comes to light:

—Who decides what countries are developing countries for purposes of such a system?

—How can we be sure that vested interests in preserving margins of preference will not interfere with further reductions of tariffs among industrialized countries?

—Is there not a risk that the institution of a new system of trade preferences might occasion a decrease in foreign aid?

—What kinds of safeguards would be needed to guard against sudden adverse impact on firms and workers in developed countries?

—How can we be sure that a preferential scheme will not depress rather than improve export opportunities simply because of the complexity of administration?

Many other questions of this kind have been posed. The search for answers is underway in a number of multilateral forums. These talks will go on and will probably reach some kind of climax at the second United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1967.

The United States, as most of you probably know, stands pretty much alone on this issue of preferences. Most of our friends in other industrialized countries are either convinced that the poor countries do have a case in their appeal for generalized preferences or, if not convinced, are at least prepared to give them the benefit of the doubt.

We for our part have questioned whether the advantages would outweigh the disadvantages. We have made it clear that a shift in so fundamental a principle of American commercial policy as nondiscrimination now embodied in the Trade Expansion Act is not

one we would undertake lightly and without the most searching examination of the pros and cons.

We will have to face still other complex issues in the trade policy field in the post-Kennedy Round period. The future of our trade relations with our friends in Western Europe will be greatly affected by developments in the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Area. My talk today would be unduly prolonged if I were to discuss the various possibilities of association with or increased membership in the EEC.

It seems clear in any case that we will need to negotiate further mutual reductions of trade barriers on both sides of the Atlantic in the years ahead if we are not prepared to face the prospect of a permanent trade wall between ourselves and most of the continent of Europe while the Europeans enjoy the competitive advantage of no barriers among themselves. This is not something that will be solved easily or quickly after the Kennedy Round. I mention this here today because we should not think the Kennedy Round is the end of the line. As in the area of our trade relations with the developing countries and with the countries of Eastern Europe, we face major challenges in our trade relations with our industrialized trading partners in the years ahead.

Our task now is to devise a strategy to guide us in all three of these vital areas. The thoughts and views of the members of the National Foreign Trade Council on this important subject would be most helpful to us.

Foreign Policy Conference To Be Held for News Media

The Department of State announced on November 4 (press release 266) that it will hold a National Foreign Policy Conference for Editors and Broadcasters in Washington December 1 and 2.

The Secretary of State has extended invitations to editors and commentators of the daily and periodical press and the broadcast-

ing industry in the 50 States and Puerto Rico.

Secretary Rusk and other high Government officials will address plenary sessions of the conference.

There will be opportunity for discussions in depth with senior officials of the Department of State, AID, and USIA in concurrent roundtables on the morning of December 2. Subjects to be covered in these sessions are Africa, Europe, world trade, issues in foreign aid, the Alliance for Progress—the Next Stage, USIA media programs abroad, and the training of a Foreign Service officer. The latter session will be conducted at the Foreign Service Institute by Director George V. Allen and members of his staff and will include a tour of the Institute and demonstration of language-training techniques.

U.S. Protests House Arrest of Americans in Guinea

Press release 267 dated October 30

Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach on October 30 strongly protested to the Government of Guinea over an official report from the American Embassy in Conakry which stated that the U.S. Ambassador to Guinea, Robinson McIlvaine, and at least one local Pan American Airways official were being held under house arrest.

Secretary Katzenbach made the U.S. protest to the Guinean Chargé d'Affaires in Washington, Abdoulaye Bobody Barry, who was called to Mr. Katzenbach's office at noon that day.

The report from our Embassy in Guinea stated that Ambassador McIlvaine was being detained at the Embassy residence because of an incident in Accra, Ghana, on October 29, when it is reported that the Guinean Foreign Minister, Louis-Lansana Beavogui, and a delegation of Guinean officials en route to the OAU conference in Addis Ababa were removed by Ghanaian officials from a Pan American flight and taken into custody by the Government of Ghana.

Secretary Katzenbach made it clear to the Guinean Chargé that neither the U.S. Government nor Pan American Airways had any responsibility whatsoever for the incident in Accra. He called for the immediate release of Ambassador McIlvaine and the Pan American personnel.

The Guinean Chargé, Mr. Barry, stated he would convey the U.S. protest urgently to his Government.

Earlier in the day Ambassador McIlvaine also conveyed an official protest over the affair to the Guinean Foreign Office.

U.S. Informs OAU of Position on Ghana-Guinea Dispute

Press release 261 dated November 2

The U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia, Edward M. Korry, delivered the following note to Diallo Telli, Administrative Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity, at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on November 2.

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Administrative Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity and has the honor to inform him that it has learned that the representative of the Republic of Guinea to the Organization of African Unity in a press conference at Addis Ababa has circulated the text of a communique of the Government of the Republic of Guinea issued at Conakry on October 30. The communique attempted to place responsibility on the Government of the United States for the detention at Accra by the Government of Ghana of the Foreign Minister of Guinea and other members of the Guinean delegation en route to the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of African Unity convening at Addis Ababa on October 31, 1966. It also stated that the Government of Guinea would take all appropriate reciprocal measures against the United States Government unless it assured the transportation of the Guinean delegation to Addis Ababa before the con-

vening of the Council of Ministers of the OAU. Since that time the Government of Guinea has taken a series of unjustifiable measures against the American Ambassador and Diplomatic Mission in Conakry.

The United States Government has noted that the Heads of Delegations to the Council of Foreign Ministers of the OAU agreed on October 31 to send a Mission composed of representatives of Congo (Kinshasa), Kenya and Sierra Leone to Accra and Conakry to assist in resolving the dispute that has arisen between Ghana and Guinea.

Under instructions the United States Embassy requests that there be brought to the attention of the members of the Organization of African Unity and to the members of the aforementioned Mission certain facts relating to this matter and a statement of applicable international law.

Pan American Airways is a United States corporation engaged in international air transport. It is a private enterprise and not an agency of the United States Government. In conducting the business of transportation by air, Pan American is subject to and operates under the rules of international law applicable to air transport.

It is a fundamental principle of the law of nations that a State is sovereign within its own territory and that, with the exception of diplomatic immunity and matters covered by special treaty arrangements, it has full jurisdiction over persons and property within that territory. Furthermore, Article 1 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention to which Ghana, Guinea and the United States are all parties) emphasizes this principle as applied to international air transport by providing expressly that it governs in the airspace over a nation's territory. The Article reads: "The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory."

The Pan American aircraft flying to Accra came within the jurisdiction of Ghana as soon as it entered Ghanaian airspace. Consequently, when it landed for its regularly scheduled stop at Accra, the aircraft and all

those on board were subject to the jurisdiction of Ghana. Neither the United States Government nor Pan American had any power or right under international law to resist the assertion by Ghanaian authorities of jurisdiction at Accra Airport with respect to all passengers on the aircraft.

The United States Government had no part in and has no responsibility for the events that took place at the Accra Airport. It regards this as a dispute between two sovereign states, both members of the OAU.

The United States Government likewise wishes to make it clear that it does not condone in any sense the detention by the Government of Ghana of the Foreign Minister of Guinea and other Guinean officials, which it regards as contrary to accepted international practice.

The Embassy requests that copies of this communication be circulated to the delegations of all members of the OAU as well as to the members of the OAU Mission now proceeding to Accra and Conakry.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Soviet Union Sign Civil Air Transport Agreement

Following is a statement made on November 4 by Llewellyn E. Thompson, Acting Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, upon signing the U.S.-U.S.S.R. civil air transport agreement, together with a Department announcement and texts of the agreement and related documents.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR THOMPSON

Press release 265 dated November 4

This is for the United States a welcome occasion. It was just 20 years ago that the United States signed the first of its modern civil air transport agreements. Since that time, through a series of other agreements, the countries of the world have evolved an air transport network serving essentially the entire globe. So far, one of the principal omissions in this network has been direct air service between the Soviet Union and the United States by airlines of these two coun-

tries. The agreement we have just signed corrects this omission by making possible direct air service between Moscow and New York.

The inauguration of service requires additional agreement on technical matters between the appropriate agencies of the two Governments. It also requires a mutually acceptable commercial agreement between the airlines involved. We feel confident that these matters can be worked out satisfactorily over the coming months and that by the next tourist season we will see Soviet and American airplanes serving our two countries.

We believe that it is good and desirable to facilitate the travel of citizens of the United States to the Soviet Union and of citizens of the Soviet Union to the United States. As a matter of fact, the exchange of visitors to the other country is one area in which we would be delighted to be overtaken and sur-

passed by the Soviet Union. We warmly welcome greater contacts among the citizens of our two countries.

We feel quite sure that direct air communication between the two countries, as contemplated in this agreement, is a desirable and necessary step toward better mutual understandings.

Thus we have good reasons to be pleased today with the signing of this air transport agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union.

May I add that, as the next U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, I have a personal interest in the improvement in communications which direct air service will make possible and therefore personally welcome this step.

Press release 264 dated November 4

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The United States and the Soviet Union on November 4 signed a civil air transport agreement providing for reciprocal air services between New York and Moscow by Pan American World Airways and the Soviet airline, Aeroflot.

The agreement was signed on behalf of the United States by Llewellyn E. Thompson, Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and for the Soviet Union by E. F. Loginov, Minister of Civil Aviation of the U.S.S.R.

The signing ceremonies at the Department of State were attended by Charles S. Murphy, Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, Charles O. Cary, Assistant Administrator for International Aviation Affairs of the Federal Aviation Agency, and Alan S. Boyd, Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation, and Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R.

The agreement comprises these separate documents: The main civil air transport agreement; an agreement supplementary to the main agreement containing provisions to insure safe and effective operation of the airline services; and an exchange of diplomatic notes containing certain understandings of

terms and concepts used in the other agreements.

AGREEMENT AND RELATED DOCUMENTS

Text of Agreement

CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring to conclude an Agreement for the purpose of establishing air transport services, have appointed their plenipotentiaries, who have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Each Contracting Party grants the other Contracting Party the rights enumerated in this Agreement and the Annex hereto for the purpose of establishing and operating the air services (hereinafter called "agreed services") envisaged herein. The Annex to this Agreement shall be deemed an integral part of this Agreement, and all references to the Agreement shall refer also to the Annex.

Article 2

1. The flight routes of aircraft on the agreed services and the points for crossing national boundaries shall be established by each Contracting Party within its territory.

2. All technical and commercial questions not covered by this Agreement concerning the flights of aircraft and the transportation of passengers, baggage, cargo, and mail on the agreed services, as well as all such questions concerning commercial cooperation, in particular the establishment of schedules, frequency of flights, capacity (as set forth in Article 3 of this Agreement), fares and rates, servicing of aircraft on the ground, and methods of financial accounting, shall be resolved by agreement between the designated airlines.

3. The agreement between the designated airlines and amendments thereto shall be subject to approval by the appropriate authorities of the Contracting Parties. After the airline agreement has thus been approved and all other requirements with respect to the operation of the agreed services have been complied with, the Contracting Parties shall by an exchange of notes specify a date on which the agreed services may commence.

Article 3

1. The capacity to be provided by each designated airline on the agreed services shall be related pri-

marily to the requirements of the traffic having its initial origin or ultimate destination in the territory of the Contracting Party whose nationality the airline possesses. Such origin and destination is determined by the ticket or air waybill. Traffic which transits the territory of a Contracting Party, with or without stopover, shall not be considered to have its origin or destination in that territory.

2. The designated airline of each Contracting Party shall submit periodically to the other Contracting Party traffic statistics as shall be specified in the airline agreement.

3. There shall be fair and equal opportunity for the designated airline of each Contracting Party to operate and promote the agreed services, and the airline agreement shall contain appropriate provisions to implement this principle.

Article 4

All fares and rates to be charged pursuant to the airline agreement for traffic which moves over the agreed services for all or part of its transportation by air shall be established at reasonable levels, due regard being paid to all relevant factors, such as costs of operation, reasonable profit, and the rates charged by any other carriers, as well as the characteristics of each service. Such fares and rates shall be filed with the appropriate authorities of the Contracting Parties.

Article 5

Each Contracting Party reserves the right to withhold, suspend, or revoke permission to operate the agreed services from the designated airline of the other Contracting Party in the event that it is not satisfied that substantial ownership and effective control of such airline are vested in nationals or agencies of the other Contracting Party. Such action may also be taken by either Contracting Party in case of the failure of the airline of the other Contracting Party to comply with the laws and regulations of the first Contracting Party referred to in Article 9 of this Agreement, or in case of failure of the airline or the other Contracting Party to perform its obligations under this Agreement or under the Supplementary Agreement referred to in Article 6 of this Agreement or to fulfill the conditions under which the rights are granted in accordance with this Agreement on the basis of reciprocity. Such action shall normally be taken only after prompt consultation between the appropriate authorities of the Contracting Parties, except in case of a failure to comply with laws and regulations referred to in Article 9, Paragraphs 1 and 2.

Article 6

The Contracting Parties shall take all necessary measures to ensure safe and effective operation of the agreed services. To this end, they shall con-

clude a Supplementary Agreement relating to such measures.

Article 7

1. Fees and other charges for the use by the Soviet airline of each airport, including its structure, technical and other facilities and services, as well as any charges for the use of airways and communications facilities and services, and charges for fuels and lubricants, in the territory of the United States of America shall be made at established levels.

2. Fees and other charges for the use by the United States airline of each airport, including its structure, technical and other facilities and services, as well as any charges for the use of airways and communications facilities and services, and charges for fuels and lubricants, in the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall not be higher than the fees and other charges which are levied upon the Soviet airline for similar facilities and services within the territory of the United States of America.

Article 8

1. Aviation fuel, lubricants, spare parts (assembled or unassembled) and other materials and equipment, delivered to or taken on board in the territory of one Contracting Party exclusively for the operational needs of the designated airline of the other Contracting Party, shall be exempt on a basis of reciprocity from customs duties, taxes, inspection fees and other national duties and charges.

2. Aircraft being operated on the agreed services, as well as spare parts (assembled or unassembled), provisions and other materials and equipment which are retained on board the aircraft of the designated airline of one Contracting Party, shall be exempt on the basis of reciprocity within the territory of the other Contracting Party from customs duties, taxes, inspection fees, and other national duties and charges, even in the event that these materials are used by such aircraft during flight over such territory, except in those cases where they are disposed of in the territory of the other Contracting Party.

3. Each Contracting Party shall ensure the provision at a reasonable price or facilitate the importation into its territory of an adequate quantity of aviation fuel of required grade, quality, and specifications for the airline of the other Contracting Party in accordance with the request of such airline.

Article 9

1. The laws and regulations of one Contracting Party governing the entry into and exit from its territory of civil aircraft in international flight

in accordance with the present Agreement or the operation and navigation of such aircraft while within the limits of its territory shall apply to the aircraft of the designated airline of the other Contracting Party.

2. The laws and regulations of one Contracting Party governing the arrival and sojourn in and departure from its territory of aircraft crews, passengers, baggage, cargo and mail carried on board aircraft, in particular regulations governing landing permits, passports, customs and immigration, currency, and quarantine formalities, shall apply to the crews, passengers, baggage, cargo and mail of the aircraft of the designated airline of the other Contracting Party during their arrival and sojourn in and departure from the territory of the first Contracting Party.

3. Visas for air crews and cabin crews of aircraft operating the agreed services shall be granted in advance, with a validity of at least six months, to a number of up to forty complete aircraft crews for each airline. These visas shall be valid for any number of flights into and out of the territory of the other Contracting Party during the period of their validity.

4. Crews employed on the agreed services may stay temporarily in New York or Moscow provided that they leave on the aircraft on which they arrived or on the next regularly scheduled flight of their airline, unless prevented by illness or crew rest requirements.

5. Each Contracting Party shall supply to the other copies of the relevant laws and regulations referred to in this Article.

Article 10

1. All aircraft of the designated airline of one Contracting Party during flights over the territory of the other Contracting Party must have the identification marks of their state established for international flights, and also the following documents:

Certificate of registration;

Certificate of airworthiness;

License for radio equipment;

Appropriate certificates for each member of the crews;

When carrying passengers, a list of passengers indicating the points of their embarkation and debarkation, unless transmitted by other means; and

When carrying cargo, documents describing the cargo.

2. All of the aforementioned documents issued or rendered valid by one Contracting Party shall be recognized as valid by the other Contracting Party, provided that the requirements under which the certificates or licenses were issued or rendered valid are not less stringent than mutually agreed standards generally accepted in international civil air transportation of passengers, cargo and mail.

Article 11

1. In case of a forced landing, accident or other incident involving an aircraft of the designated airline of one Contracting Party within the territory of the other Contracting Party, the Contracting Party in whose territory the incident took place shall without delay and by the quickest means notify the other Contracting Party thereof, and of the available particulars and circumstances of the occurrence, take necessary measures for the investigation of the causes of the incident, and also undertake immediate steps to give such assistance as may be necessary to the crew and passengers, provide for the safety of the aircraft and the mail, baggage, and cargo of such aircraft in the condition in which they are after the incident, and provide for their rapid onward transportation.

2. (1) The Contracting Party whose registry the aircraft possesses shall have the right to appoint its observers, who shall be present and participate in the investigation of the incident.

(2) The preparation of the report, findings, and the determination of probable cause of such incident will be accomplished by the appropriate authorities of the Contracting Party in whose territory the incident occurred.

3. The Contracting Party conducting the investigation of the incident is required to:

(1) upon the request of the other Contracting Party, leave the aircraft and its contents undisturbed (so far as is reasonably practicable) pending their inspection by representatives of the appropriate authorities of such Contracting Party and of the airline whose aircraft is involved;

(2) grant immediate access to the aircraft to accredited representative of the other Contracting Party and to representatives of the airline whose aircraft is involved;

(3) ensure the protection of evidence;

(4) conduct an inquiry into the incident and furnish the other Contracting Party with a report of the facts, conditions, and circumstances thereof;

(5) on request of the other Contracting Party, release to any person or persons designated by it the aircraft, its contents or any part thereof, as soon as these are no longer necessary for the inquiry, and facilitate removal thereof to the territory of the other Contracting Party.

4. The crew of the aircraft involved in the incident and the representatives of the airline whose aircraft is involved shall comply with all accident investigation laws and regulations applicable within the territory where the incident took place.

5. Prior to commencement of the agreed services each Contracting Party shall establish air search and rescue procedures, activities and centers within its territory so as to promote efficient organization of search and rescue operations in connection with

flights conducted under this Agreement, including arrangements for mutual participation in such operations with the consent of the Contracting Party in whose territory the search and rescue activities are to be conducted. Information on search and rescue procedures will be exchanged on a current basis.

Article 12

To facilitate the conduct of the operation of the agreed services including the servicing of aircraft, each Contracting Party shall grant the airline of the other Contracting Party operating such services the right to have a representation with up to a total of eight employees stationed at the terminal point of the agreed routes within the territory of the first Contracting Party. Additionally, each Contracting Party grants the right of entry into its territory for short periods not exceeding thirty days to those personnel required by the airline of the other Contracting Party for the normal conduct of its activities.

Article 13

1. Flights of the airlines of both Contracting Parties on the agreed routes shall be suspended upon thirty days' notice given by one Contracting Party to the other if it finds that its designated airline is prevented from operating flights on the agreed services because of circumstances beyond the control of the first Contracting Party. Such flights may be suspended immediately by either Contracting Party if extraordinary circumstances arise which are beyond the control of the appropriate authorities of that Contracting Party.

2. Services so suspended can thereafter be reinstated through an exchange of notes between the Contracting Parties and shall be carried on in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, the Supplementary Agreement, and the airline agreement.

Article 14

1. All financial accounting and payments between the designated airlines of the Contracting Parties pursuant to the airline agreement shall be carried out, as agreed upon by the designated airlines, in United States dollars, or in rubles if such payments in rubles become legal under the currency regulations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, through the transfer of sums due to the designated airline of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to its account in the Bank for Foreign Trade in Moscow and of sums due to the designated United States airline to its account in a bank of its choice in the United States of America. Particular payments may be made in third country currencies by agreement between the designated airlines.

2. The above-mentioned sums shall be transferred freely and such transfers shall be exempt from any taxation or any other restrictions.

3. Passengers intending to undertake a trip, regardless of their citizenship, shall be free to choose the airline or airlines. They shall be free, when paying for the air service, to pay for it in the currency of that country where the payment takes place if the tariffs of the carrier provide for payment in such currency.

4. The rate of conversion between the rubles and the United States dollars for all purposes pursuant to this Agreement including pricing of and payment for commodities and services and settlement of outstanding balances between the two designated airlines shall be the rate of exchange on the date of settlement of outstanding balances which is applied on that date for sales of transportation over both carriers and which is legal in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and not unlawful in the United States of America. If there should be a change in the rate of exchange applied for such sales of transportation, the designated airlines will make a special settlement at the old rate as of the date of such change.

5. The rates of exchange which shall be applicable to sales made in currencies of third countries of transportation performed by the designated airlines pursuant to this Agreement shall be provided for in the airline agreement.

6. The provisions of this Article shall be applicable to cargo as well as passenger transportation.

Article 15

1. Except as otherwise agreed upon by the designated airlines in the airline agreement with respect to their liability to each other, in the event the designated airline of one Contracting Party or its employees acting within the scope of their employment shall cause damage to persons or property, that airline shall accept financial responsibility for such damage in accordance with, and within the limits set by, the applicable national laws of the Contracting Party in whose territory the damage was caused or its international obligations under a multilateral convention.

2. The designated airline of each Contracting Party will authorize its representatives within the territory of the other Contracting Party to accept documents related to the activity of such airline including service of notice and other legal process.

Article 16

Either Contracting Party may at any time request consultations between the appropriate authorities of both Contracting Parties for the discussion, interpretation, application or amendment of this Agreement. Such consultation shall begin within sixty days after the receipt of the request by the Department of State of the United States of America or by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, respectively. In the event that agreement is reached concerning the amendment of

this Agreement, these amendments shall come into force upon confirmation by an exchange of diplomatic notes.

Article 17

This Agreement shall come into force on the date on which it is signed and shall remain in force until six months after the receipt by one Contracting Party from the other Contracting Party of a notice of its intention to denounce this Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present agreement.

DONE in duplicate, each in the English and Russian languages, both equally authentic, at Washington this fourth day of November, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-six.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

E. F. LOGINOV

ANNEX

1. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics entrusts the Ministry of Civil Aviation of the U.S.S.R. with responsibility for the operation of the agreed services on the routes specified in Table I of this Annex, which in turn designates for this purpose the Transport Authority of the International Airlines of Civil Aviation (Aeroflot).

2. The Government of the United States of America designates Pan American World Airways, Inc., to operate the agreed services on the routes specified in Table II of this Annex.

3. The designated airline of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall have in the territory of the United States of America at the terminal point of the agreed route the right to land for technical and commercial purposes as well as to use alternate airports and flight facilities for these purposes. Such airline shall have within the territory of the United States of America the right:

(1) To discharge passengers, baggage, cargo and mail coming from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or points beyond the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in third countries and destined for the United States of America or points beyond the United States of America in third countries; and

(2) To pick up passengers, baggage, cargo, and mail coming from the United States of America or points beyond the United States of America in third countries and destined for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or points beyond the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in third countries.

4. The designated airline of the United States of America shall have in the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the terminal point of the agreed route the right to land for technical and commercial purposes as well as to use alternate airports and flight facilities for these purposes. Such airline shall have within the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the right:

(1) To discharge passengers, baggage, cargo and mail coming from the United States of America or points beyond the United States of America in third countries and destined for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or points beyond the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in third countries; and

(2) To pick up passengers, baggage, cargo and mail coming from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or points beyond the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in third countries and destined for the United States of America or points beyond the United States of America in third countries.

AGREED SERVICES

Table I

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Moscow–New York and return, nonstop in both directions, except for agreed technical stops.

Table II

For the United States of America:
New York–Moscow and return, nonstop in both directions, except for agreed technical stops.

Text of Supplementary Agreement

AGREEMENT SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, having on this date signed a Civil Air Transport Agreement and desiring to conclude, in accordance with Article 6 thereof, a Supplementary Agreement providing for measures to ensure safe and effective operation of the agreed services, have agreed as follows:

Article I

The following provisions shall be applied by the appropriate authorities of the Contracting Parties in the operation of the agreed services:

1. The appropriate authorities of the Contracting Parties shall take all necessary measures to ensure safe and effective operation of the agreed services. For this purpose each of them shall provide within

its territory for the use of the designated airline of the other Contracting Party appropriate airports (regular and alternate), routes, radio communications and navigational aids, airport lighting aids, instrument landing aids, airport safety facilities, including fire and crash equipment, search and rescue facilities, meteorological and air traffic control services, Notices to Airmen (NOTAMS), and other services necessary to operate the agreed services.

2. Air routes and assigned airports:

(A) (1) Aircraft of the designated airline of the United States shall conduct flight operations into Moscow and return along any of the following air routes, considering one to be regular and the other alternate:

- (a) Ventspils - Moscow (regular route)
- (b) Alitus - Moscow (alternate route)

(2) Flights in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be on designated airways/routes and within control areas, as directed by air traffic control.

(3) Regular and alternate airports are assigned as follows:

- (a) Regular - Sheremetyevo International Airport
- (b) Alternates:

- (i) Vnukovo¹
- (ii) Ryazan - Dyagilevo
- (iii) In the Riga area, or in another suitable location mutually agreed by the appropriate authorities of the Contracting Parties.

(B) (1) Aircraft of the designated airline of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall conduct flights into New York and return along any of the following air routes, considering one to be regular and the other alternate:

- (a) Nantucket, Massachusetts - New York (regular route)
- (b) Boston, Massachusetts - New York (alternate route)

(2) Flights in the United States will be on designated airways/routes and within control areas, as directed by air traffic control.

(3) Regular and alternate airports are assigned as follows:

- (a) Regular - John F. Kennedy International Airport
- (b) Alternates:
 - (i) Philadelphia International Airport²
 - (ii) Boston - Logan International Airport

¹ May be used as the regular airport during the time Sheremetyevo is closed. [Footnote in original.]

² May be used as the regular airport during the time John F. Kennedy International is closed. [Footnote in original.]

(iii) In the New York area, or in another suitable location mutually agreed by the appropriate authorities of the Contracting Parties.

(C) Any changes in the selection of the regular or alternate air routes referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B) above shall be agreed between the designated airlines. Flights, as a general rule, shall be carried out on the regular route. Use of the alternate air route, however, shall be permitted on any particular flight, subject to clearances by air traffic control authorities for air traffic purposes.

(D) The alternate airports mentioned in subparagraphs (A) (3) (b) (iii) and (B) (3) (b) (iii) above will be mutually agreed by the appropriate authorities of the Contracting Parties prior to the commencement of service.

3. The information and assistance provided in accordance with the terms of the Civil Air Transport Agreement and of this Supplementary Agreement shall be sufficient to meet the reasonable requirements of the designated airline of the other Contracting Party.

4. The information to be provided by the appropriate authorities of each Contracting Party shall include detailed particulars of the regular and alternate airports assigned for operating the agreed services, the flight routes within its territory, radio and other available navigational aids, and other facilities and procedures of the air traffic control services. Such information shall conform to mutually agreed standards generally accepted in international civil air transportation.

5. (A) The appropriate authorities of the Contracting Parties shall provide a continuous service of information in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article, so that such information will be operational for the day in question and that any changes will be transmitted immediately.

(B) Notice of changes shall be given by means of NOTAM service transmitted either by teleprinter or by other established rapid aeronautical communication facilities, with subsequent written confirmation when necessary, or in writing only, provided that the addressee receives sufficient advance notice. NOTAMS transmitted by teleprinter shall be transmitted in a NOTAM code which is in accordance with mutually agreed standards generally accepted in international civil air transportation. Written NOTAMS shall be supplied in English or in English and Russian.

(C) The exchange of information by NOTAMS shall commence as soon as possible and, in any case, at least two months before the starting date of regular flights on the agreed services.

6. (A) The crews of aircraft operated on the agreed services by the designated airlines shall be fully acquainted with the flight rules and procedures

of the air traffic control services which are used by the appropriate authorities of the other Contracting Party, and shall comply with these rules and procedures.

(B) All flight operations conducted on the agreed services, while over the high seas, shall comply with the applicable rules, regulations, instructions, and procedures of the country or countries providing air traffic control services in the airspace over the high seas in which the aircraft is operating.

7. The appropriate authorities of each Contracting Party shall provide the designated airline of the other Party with current information on the conditions prevailing along the air route. Such information shall include data on the conditions at airports and aids to navigation necessary for the execution of the flight.

8. (A) All flight operations shall be conducted on an instrument flight rule flight plan. Before each flight, the commander of the aircraft shall submit a flight plan to the air traffic control authorities in the country from which the flight is starting. Prior to departure, an air traffic control clearance shall be issued for each flight. Additionally, air traffic clearance is specifically required for: (1) takeoff, (2) approach, and (3) landing.

(B) Compliance with air traffic control instructions and clearance shall be mandatory as originally received and as may be subsequently amended, whether or not amendments are at the request of the commander of the aircraft. However, the commander of the aircraft shall have the authority to deviate therefrom in case of an emergency requiring immediate action to safeguard the aircraft and the passengers, but only to the extent necessary therefore, and provided that he shall advise the appropriate air traffic control authorities as soon as possible of the action taken.

(C) Routings to alternate airports shall be in accordance with air traffic control clearances and instructions.

9. The commander of the aircraft shall ensure the maintenance of a continuous watch on the air traffic control radio frequencies, as designated by the appropriate air traffic control authority, and shall ensure immediate transmission of replies on those frequencies.

10. Communications between the aircraft and the air traffic control authorities shall be carried out by radio telephone in English, preferably by using two-way radio circuits directly connecting the aircraft to the air traffic control authorities.

11. (A) The appropriate authorities of each Contracting Party shall ensure that the aircraft used on the agreed services by the designated airlines are equipped with appropriate radio transmitters, receivers, and beacon transponders, as well as with navigation and approach aid equipment, which meet

mutually agreed standards generally accepted in international civil air transportation.

(B) Navigation and approach aid equipment of the aircraft shall be adapted to at least one of the navigation and approach aid systems employed within the territory of the other Contracting Party.

(C) All such communication, navigation, and approach aid equipment shall be in normal operating order at the beginning of each flight. Such equipment shall be so arranged, in accordance with provisions mutually agreed upon between the appropriate authorities of the Contracting Parties, that the failure of a component will not preclude receiving the communications and navigation aid signals necessary for safety of flight.

(D) The navigation aid system referred to in subparagraph (A) above shall mean, in the case of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, NDB and, in the case of the United States, VOR/DME. The approach aid systems referred to in that subparagraph shall be, in the case of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, NDB, SP, and, at airports Sheremetyevo and Vnukovo, the additional system ILS and, in the case of the United States, ILS. Both the navigation aid systems and the approach aid systems shall comply with mutually agreed standards generally accepted in international civil air transportation.

12. (A) All aircraft operations conducted in the agreed service shall comply:

(1) While within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with the applicable rules, regulations, and procedures of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and

(2) While within the United States, with the applicable rules, regulations, and procedures of the United States.

(B) In addition, the appropriate authorities of each Contracting Party may require aircraft of its airline to comply with its regulations while operating within the territory of the other Contracting Party to the extent that these regulations are not in conflict with the regulations of the appropriate authorities of that other Contracting Party.

13. (A) The aircraft to be used on the agreed services by the designated airline of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall meet the airworthiness and performance requirements specified by the United States. For purposes of this paragraph, these requirements shall be the applicable airworthiness and performance standards, recommended practices, and technical annexes established by the International Civil Aviation Organization.

(B) The aircraft to be used on the agreed services by the designated airline of the United States shall meet the airworthiness and performance requirements specified by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. These requirements shall not be more

stringent than those specified by the United States.

(C) The provisions of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph shall not be considered as precluding such particular deviations from the specified requirements as may be agreed between the appropriate authorities of the Contracting Parties.

14. The standards, recommended practices, technical annexes, and codes established by the International Civil Aviation Organization (and where appropriate by the World Meteorological Organization) shall be applied in principle to the matters covered in paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the Civil Air Transport Agreement and in the Supplementary Agreement.

15. For the purpose of exchanging information essential for executing the flights on the agreed services, including the transmission of NOTAMS, as well as for air traffic control liaison purposes, the appropriate authorities of each Contracting Party shall establish two-way communication between New York and Moscow. This circuit may also be used for operational, commercial, meteorological, and administrative telegrams within and between the designated airlines with a view to ensuring the regular and normal operation of the agreed services. Transmission on the said two-way circuit shall be effected either in full or using a code mutually agreed between the appropriate authorities of the Contracting Parties.

16. (A) The appropriate authorities of each Contracting Party shall supply or make available, meteorological information required for servicing flights over the agreed routes, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 12 of the Technical Regulations of the World Meteorological Organization and in accordance with such additional arrangements as have been or may be mutually agreed between the Main Administration of Hydrometeorological Service of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Environmental Science Services Administration (formerly Weather Bureau) of the United States.

(B) In order to facilitate exchange of experience and to familiarize meteorological personnel with the typical weather conditions along the route, the appropriate authorities of each Contracting Party may arrange transportation for its meteorological personnel on aircraft of its designated airline. In connection with these arrangements, the appropriate authorities of each Contracting Party shall provide for consultation in its own meteorological centers between its meteorological personnel and those of the other Contracting Party who have arrived for the exchange of experience and familiarization.

17. (A) The designated airlines shall have the right to make such technical flights as may be agreed upon between the appropriate authorities of the Contracting Parties. Such flights shall be made prior to the beginning of regular flights.

(B) Later, the designated airlines shall have the right to make additional technical flights over the agreed routes when instituting an additional route or a new type of aircraft.

(C) Furthermore, the designated airlines shall have the right to make test flights in areas established by the appropriate authorities of each Contracting Party whenever necessary after technical servicing, repair, and refitting of aircraft.

(D) The carrying of paying passengers on such flights shall be forbidden.

18. A designated airline of one Contracting Party shall, at the request of the appropriate authorities of the other Contracting Party, adopt all measures necessary to reduce noise of aircraft to an acceptable level. In this connection, the necessary requirements shall not be more rigid than those required of civil aircraft of other countries making similar international flights within the boundaries of the territory of the Contracting Party making such requests.

19. (A) For the purpose of assuring compliance with safety requirements, inspectors of the appropriate authorities of each Contracting Party shall be granted access to:

(1) Its aircraft while on the ground or in flight within the territory of the other Party,

(2) Airports and airport, telecommunication, navigation, meteorological, and aircraft maintenance facilities used by its designated airline within the territory of the other Party, and

(3) Aircraft of the other Party on the ground or in flight while such aircraft are within its territory.

(B) The frequency of such inspections in (2) and (3) of subparagraph (A) above shall be mutually agreed between the appropriate authorities of the Contracting Parties.

20. The appropriate authorities of each Contracting Party undertake to adopt measures to ensure that appropriate disciplinary or administrative action is taken against any member of the crew of its aircraft for violation of any of its obligations which relate to the flight of aircraft and, upon request, shall forward complete information on any such disciplinary or administrative action to the appropriate authorities of the other Contracting Party.

21. No arms, explosives or munitions, except for signal pistols or pyrotechnic flares normally used for emergency purposes, shall be carried on board aircraft used in the agreed services.

Article II

The technical stops provided for in Tables I and II of the Annex to the Civil Air Transport Agreement shall be Stockholm, Oslo, Shannon, and Gander. Technical stops may be made at other locations with the mutual consent of the Contracting Parties.

Article III

1. The appropriate authorities of the Contracting Parties shall make such arrangements as are necessary to implement Article I of this Supplementary Agreement.

2. The appropriate authorities of either Contracting Party may at any time request consultations for the discussion, interpretation or amendment of Article I of this Supplementary Agreement. Such consultations shall begin within sixty days after the receipt of the request therefore by the appropriate authorities of the other Contracting Party.

3. Amendments of Article I of this Supplementary Agreement which are consistent with the Civil Air Transport Agreement shall be brought into force by agreement between the appropriate authorities of the Contracting Parties.

Article IV

The "appropriate authorities", as used in this Supplementary Agreement, shall mean, in the case of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Ministry of Civil Aviation of the USSR or such authority as shall be specified by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and, in the case of the United States, the Federal Aviation Agency or such agency or Department as shall be specified by the Government of the United States.

Article V

The present Supplementary Agreement shall come into force simultaneously with the Civil Air Transport Agreement and shall remain in force for the same period of time as that Agreement remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present Supplementary Agreement.

DONE in duplicate, each in the English and Russian languages, both equally authentic, at Washington this fourth day of November, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-six.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

E. F. LOGINOV

Exchange of Notes

UNITED STATES NOTE

NOVEMBER 4, 1966

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the Civil Air Transport Agreement and a Supplementary Agreement thereto concluded today between our two Governments and to set forth the following

understandings of my Government with regard to certain terms and concepts used therein:

1. The term "civil" as used in these Agreements means that the provisions thereof refer solely to aircraft used on the agreed services and the Agreements do not apply to state aircraft used for non-commercial flights such as for military, customs, police or diplomatic purposes.

2. The words "damage to persons" appearing in Article 15 of the Civil Air Transport Agreement include injury or death.

3. Nothing contained in the Agreements requires either Government to make available to the other, by sale or otherwise, any equipment of any kind.

4. Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of the Civil Air Transport Agreement should not be understood to prevent in the territory of one Contracting Party the customs free transfer of aircraft equipment and spare parts between a designated airline of the other Contracting Party and any airline of a third country when such equipment or spare parts are necessary in the maintenance of the aircraft of the airline to which the equipment or parts are to be transferred for the purpose of permitting the safe continuation of its flight, provided that the transfer between the airlines involved is permitted by the appropriate authorities of the Contracting Party in whose territory the transfer is to take place.

I would appreciate receiving your confirmation that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shares the foregoing understandings.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON

His Excellency

E. F. LOGINOV,

Minister of Civil Aviation

of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

SOVIET NOTE OF REPLY

NOVEMBER 4, 1966

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to your note of today's date concerning the Civil Air Transport Agreement and a Supplementary Agreement thereto, which reads as follows:

(Text of United States note)

I have the honor to confirm herewith that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shares the understandings of certain terms and concepts set forth in your note.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

E. F. LOGINOV

His Excellency

LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON,

*Acting Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs,
Department of State.*

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Cultural Relations

Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Concluded at London November 16, 1945. Entered into force November 4, 1946. TIAS 1580.

Resumption of participation: Indonesia, July 30, 1966.

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force for the United States November 2, 1966.

Ratification deposited: United States, November 2, 1966.

Load Line

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London April 5, 1966. Open for signature April 5 to July 5, 1966.¹

Ratified by the President: November 4, 1966.

Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

Resumption of participation: Indonesia, September 29, 1966.

Convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965. Open for signature April 9 to October 9, 1965.¹

Acceptances deposited: Dominican Republic, July 11, 1966; Norway, September 8, 1966; Yugoslavia, July 18, 1966.

United Nations

Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. Signed at San Francisco June 26, 1945. Entered into force October 24, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031.

Admissions to membership: Botswana, October 17, 1966; Guyana, September 21, 1966; Lesotho, October 17, 1966.

Resumption of participation: Indonesia, September 28, 1966.

BILATERAL

Brazil

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs, as amended. Signed at Rio de Janeiro November 5, 1957. Entered into force November 5, 1957. TIAS 3949, 4636, 5412.

Terminated: October 19, 1966, superseded by the agreement of October 5 and 19, 1966.

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Rio de Janeiro October 5 and 19, 1966. Entered into force October 19, 1966.

Ecuador

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of June 25, 1965 (TIAS 5835). Effected by exchange of notes at Quito October 24, 1966. Entered into force October 24, 1966.

¹ Not in force.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Civil air transport agreement, with exchange of notes. Signed at Washington November 4, 1966. Entered into force November 4, 1966.

Agreement supplementary to the civil air transport agreement. Signed at Washington November 4, 1966. Entered into force November 4, 1966.

United Kingdom

Agreement relating to indemnities on ammunition shipments in the United Kingdom or in British ships traveling to or from the United Kingdom. Effected by exchange of notes at London October 27, 1966. Entered into force October 27, 1966.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on October 22 confirmed the nomination of Robert G. Neumann to be Ambassador to Afghanistan.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Yugoslavia—Signed at Belgrade April 11, 1966. Entered into force April 11, 1966. With exchange of notes. TIAS 6031. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with India, amending the agreement of September 30, 1964, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at New Delhi May 27, 1966. Entered into force May 27, 1966. With related notes. TIAS 6032. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Indonesia, amending the agreement of April 18, 1966. Exchange of notes—Signed at Djakarta June 6, 1966. Entered into force June 6, 1966. TIAS 6033. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Use of Title I Funds for School and Hospital Construction Program. Agree-

ment with Burma—Signed at Rangoon June 1, 1966. Entered into force June 1, 1966. TIAS 6034. 4 pp. 5¢.

Leased Bases in Newfoundland—Ferry Service. Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington June 6 and 10, 1966. Entered into force June 10, 1966. TIAS 6035. 14 pp. 10¢.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreements with Poland. Exchange of letters—Signed at Washington June 24, 1965. Entered into force June 24, 1965. And signed at Washington May 18 and 20, 1966. Entered into force May 20, 1966. TIAS 6036. 4 pp. 5¢.

Sewage Disposal System. Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes—Dated at Ottawa January 13, April 22, and June 9, 1966. Entered into force June 9, 1966. TIAS 6037. 3 pp. 5¢.

Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with India. Exchange of notes—Signed at New Delhi May 16 and 25, 1966. Entered into force May 25, 1966. TIAS 6038. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Israel—Signed at Washington June 6, 1966. Entered into force June 6, 1966. With exchange of notes. TIAS 6039. 10 pp. 10¢.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agreement with Turkey, amending the agreement of June 10, 1955, as amended—Signed at Washington May 11, 1966. Entered into force July 5, 1966. Effective from June 9, 1966. With exchange of notes. TIAS 6040. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Sierra Leone, amending the agreement of January 29, 1965, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Freetown June 2, 1966. Entered into force June 2, 1966. TIAS 6041. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, amending the agreement of July 19, 1965. Exchange of notes—Signed at Léopoldville April 22 and 25, 1966. Entered into force April 25, 1966. TIAS 6042. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Iceland, amending the agreement of December 30, 1964, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Reykjavik June 13, 1966. Entered into force June 13, 1966. TIAS 6043. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Indonesia—Signed at Washington June 28, 1966. Entered into force June 28, 1966. With exchange of notes. TIAS 6044. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Morocco. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rabat December 29, 1964. Entered into force December 29, 1964. With related notes. TIAS 6045. 15 pp. 10¢.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Power Applications. Agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland—Signed at Washington June 2, 1966. Entered into force July 15, 1966. TIAS 6046. 6 pp. 5¢.

Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement with Belgium, amending Annex B to the agreement of January 27, 1950. Exchange of notes—Signed at Brussels April 5 and May 26, 1966. Entered into force May 26, 1966. TIAS 6047. 3 pp. 5¢.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Israel, amending the agreement of November 5 and 22, 1963. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington June 30, 1966. Entered into force June 30, 1966. TIAS 6048. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Morocco. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rabat April 23, 1965. Entered into force April 23, 1965. With related notes and amending agreements. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rabat October 8, 1965. Entered into force October 8, 1965. And exchange of notes—Signed at Rabat April 21, 1966. Entered into force April 21, 1966. TIAS 6049. 21 pp. 15¢.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, amending the agreement of June 15, 1955, as amended—Signed at Washington June 2, 1966. Entered into force July 15, 1966. TIAS 6050. 2 pp. 5¢.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LV, NO. 1430 PUBLICATION 8162 NOVEMBER 21, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of

the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-

intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. PRICE: 52 issues, domestic \$10, foreign \$15; single copy 30 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).

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Afghanistan. Neumann confirmed as Ambassador 801

Africa. U.S. Informs OAU of Position on Ghana-Guinea Dispute (text of U.S. note) 790

Asia. The Visits to Thailand and Korea (Johnson) 766

Aviation
United States and Soviet Union Sign Civil Air Transport Agreement (Thompson, agreement and notes) 791

U.S. Informs OAU of Position on Ghana-Guinea Dispute (text of U.S. note) 790

Congress. Confirmations (Neumann) 801

Department and Foreign Service
Confirmations (Neumann) 801

Growth of the Foreign Service: An Index of World Responsibility (Katzenbach) 781

Diplomacy. Growth of the Foreign Service: An Index of World Responsibility (Katzenbach) 781

Economic Affairs
United States Trade Policy After the Kennedy Round: Helping the Developing Countries Help Themselves (Solomon) 784

The Visits to Thailand and Korea (Johnson) 766

Ghana
U.S. Informs OAU of Position on Ghana-Guinea Dispute (text of U.S. note) 790

U.S. Protests House Arrest of Americans in Guinea 789

Guinea
U.S. Informs OAU of Position on Ghana-Guinea Dispute (text of U.S. note) 790

U.S. Protests House Arrest of Americans in Guinea 789

International Organizations and Conferences.
U.S. Informs OAU of Position on Ghana-Guinea Dispute (text of U.S. note) 790

Korea. The Visits to Thailand and Korea (Johnson) 766

Presidential Documents. The Visits to Thailand and Korea 766

Public Affairs. Foreign Policy Conference To Be Held for News Media 789

Publications. Recent Releases 801

Thailand. The Visits to Thailand and Korea (Johnson) 766

Treaty Information
Current Actions 801

United States and Soviet Union Sign Civil Air Transport Agreement (Thompson, agreement and notes) 791

U.S.S.R. United States and Soviet Union Sign Civil Air Transport Agreement (Thompson, agreement and notes) 791

Viet-Nam. The Visits to Thailand and Korea (Johnson) 766

Name Index

Johnson, President 766

Katzenbach, Nicholas deB 781

Neumann, Robert G 801

Solomon, Anthony M 784

Thompson, Llewellyn E 791

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Oct. 31–Nov. 6

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to October 31 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 255 (revised) of October 27 and 257 of October 30.

No.	Date	Subject
*258	10/31	Rivkin sworn in as Ambassador to Senegal and The Gambia (biographic details).
*259	11/1	Galbraith sworn in as Ambassador to Singapore (biographic details).
260	11/1	Solomon: National Foreign Trade Convention, New York, N.Y.
261	11/2	Note to OAU concerning measures taken by Guinea.
*262	11/3	Passport field agency to be opened at Philadelphia, Pa.
†263	11/4	Foreign policy conference for educators, St. Paul, Minn. (rewrite).
264	11/4	U.S.–Soviet civil air transport agreement.
265	11/4	Statement by Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson at signing of U.S.–Soviet civil air transport agreement.
266	11/4	National foreign policy conference for editors and broadcasters (rewrite).

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

Initiative for Peace

In a statement before the United Nations General Assembly on September 22, Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg outlined U.S. aims in Viet-Nam and set forth proposals for peace in Southeast Asia. "We have not been and we are not now inflexible in our position," he said. "But we do believe that whatever approach finally succeeds, it will not be one which simply decries what is happening in Viet-Nam and appeals to one side to stop while encouraging the other."

Reprinted from the Department of State BULLETIN, this 8-page pamphlet contains the text of Ambassador Goldberg's statement.

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**THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE**

BULLETIN

Vol. LV, No. 1431



November 28, 1966

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S TRIP TO ASIA

*President Johnson Returns to the United States
After 17-Day Trip to the Asian-Pacific Area 806*

Additional Documentation 812

Chronological List of Published Documentation 835

President Johnson Returns to the United States After 17-Day Trip to the Asian-Pacific Area

On November 1 President Johnson returned to the United States after his 17-day journey to Asia and the Pacific. En route to Washington, D.C., from Seoul, Korea—the last visit on his Asian tour—the President stopped overnight at Anchorage, Alaska, and on the evening of November 2 returned to Dulles International Airport near Washington, where he had begun his 31,500-mile journey on October 17. Following are texts of President Johnson's remarks at Anchorage on November 1 and 2 and at Dulles Airport on November 2.

ARRIVAL STATEMENT, ELMENDORF AIR FORCE BASE, ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, NOVEMBER 1

White House press release (Anchorage, Alaska) dated November 1

The last time I came to Alaska was just after the Japanese had paid us a visit at Dutch Harbor.

The last 17 days we have spent trying to create an Asia and a Pacific that could live in peace together, where the gateway to this great area where two-thirds of the people of the world live would no longer be in danger.

You people who live here on this great frontier gave Senator [Warren G.] Magnuson and me a hearty welcome—I won't say a warm one—when we were here in July 1942. You don't know how pleased I was when your good Governor [William A. Egan] and your fine congressional delegation in-

vited me to come back here and spend the night with you on my way home.

I am very proud of Alaska. Your heart is as big as the State itself. And your future is as bright as your bonfires.

Along with our distinguished and beloved Secretary of State, I have had a wonderful journey. It has been throughout Asia and the Pacific. We have conferred with the leaders of nine peoples in nine separate locations. We found several things that I won't dwell on at length, but I think you want a firsthand report.

We found people who are determined to be free. We found people who are determined to have a better life for their children and for their families. We found people who are dedicated and determined to stand on their own feet.

The United States of America has taken its stand in Asia and the Pacific. We are fighting tonight in Viet-Nam to make that stand come true. And we are going to be successful. You can put that in your pipe and smoke it: That stand is going to come true.

The road to Asia and to the Pacific runs through our newest State. Here in Alaska, Washington, Oregon, and California, you are the gateway to this vast, new Asia that is emerging, where almost two out of every three people in the entire world live. They want to be our friends. They want to be our partners.

And they, like we, want to be free, inde-

pendent, and have the right to self-determination.

Alaska's future lies between the mainland to the east and Asia to the west—and you are a good bridge. I know that you will represent us all very well.

Thank you for coming out. Thank you for sending to Washington such earnest, conscientious men who represent you in the United States Senate in the form of Senator [E.L.] Bartlett and Senator [Ernest] Gruening, and Congressman Ralph Rivers in the House.

It gave me great pleasure to work with them and with you during the great difficulties brought on by the earthquake. Now we have all the difficulties behind us. Now we look forward to the great developments in this State in order that you and your children can be a more vital and progressive part of this Union and that we can live in peace and prosperity together.

Thank you very much.

CIVIC MEETING, ANCHORAGE, NOVEMBER 2

Opening Remarks (Excerpt)

White House press release (Anchorage, Alaska) dated November 2

I am on American soil again for the first time in 17 days. And I am telling you it is a mighty good feeling.

We have flown 28,000 miles since the 17th of October, and we have another 3,500 miles to go today and another speech coming up this evening. We have touched the perimeter of the Pacific at all its points:

- at Hawaii in the east;
- at New Zealand and Australia in the south;
- at Malaysia in the west;
- and now at Alaska in the north.

We have seen the beaches of Samoa, the pastures of New Zealand, the ranches of Australia—so much like the American West; we have been to the rice paddies of Viet-Nam, the Philippines, Thailand, the hills of Korea, the forests of Malaysia—and now we have seen the snow and the mountains of Alaska.

We have been cooled by ocean breezes, warmed by the tropical sun, and now we feel what you probably call up here just the nip of autumn.

We have talked of war and peace with the leaders of the world—of hunger and of hope. We met with the leaders of many nations that are directly helping us to resist Communist aggression and bring peace to Viet-Nam. We met with the American boys at Cam Ranh Bay,¹ who are led so ably by General [William C.] Westmoreland. I want the mother of every American man there to know what General Westmoreland told me personally face to face—that no Commander in Chief in the history of the American nation had a better equipped, a more competent, or a more devoted armed forces than you have now.

We saw great cities and small villages. We saw leaders and diplomats from many countries, soldiers in many uniforms, and, most important, millions of just ordinary men and women who trust America and who really think that they can believe our word and they can count on us as friends.

And now we are coming to the end of our journey. We are winding our way back to Washington.

It has been the most rewarding, the most thrilling, and the most encouraging journey of my entire life. I believe it may also have been the most important and the most historic.

When I left Washington,² I said that I expected no miracles to emerge from the Manila conference. Each of the nations invited to Manila had long since committed itself to seeking an early and an honorable end to the war. None of them had demanded the unconditional surrender of the North—as President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill did in World War II. None of them had laid down any impossible condi-

¹ For President Johnson's remarks at Cam Ranh Bay in South Viet-Nam on Oct. 26, see BULLETIN of Nov. 14, 1966, p. 735.

² For President Johnson's remarks at Dulles Airport on Oct. 17, see *ibid.*, Nov. 7, 1966, p. 698.

tions for a peaceful settlement. We had repeated again and again and again that we would be glad to go any place, talk to anyone any time without any preconditions. Yet all we have ever heard from the other side is that they renew their voice of hostility.

Until that voice changes—until the Communists realize that they are not going to win this war and they cannot win this war—we think there will be no miracle in Viet-Nam.

Yet if a miracle did not occur at the Manila conference, a meeting of mind and spirit did take place—and that may yet have had the greatest significance for all the nations of Asia and the Pacific.

For there the leaders of seven very different and very productive nations talked for days with a candor, with an understanding, and with a common sense of purpose. We spoke of the Pacific community of tomorrow. We acknowledged that we are neighbors and that we are partners, that each of us has a stake—a very important one—in the peaceful and democratic development of this great part of the world.

That partnership will endure just as long as the leaders who met at Manila want it to and who work and try to make it. And I think it will endure long after those of us who met there have passed from the scene. It is permanent, I think, because it is built on a foundation of historic necessity.

We spoke of our resolve to seek four goals of freedom in Asia and the Pacific: freedom to resist aggression so we won't be swallowed up—not let the big one eat the little one; to conquer hunger, illiteracy, and disease, the ancient enemies of mankind; to build a region of security, order, and progress; and to seek reconciliation and peace throughout Asia and the Pacific.³

I saw men and nations fulfilling these goals throughout our long journey.

You all know that Communist aggressors tried to impose their will for many years

³ For texts of the documents issued at the close of the Manila conference, see *ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1966, p. 730.

now throughout the Pacific and Asia.

They tried to impose the Communist will in the Philippines—and they failed.

They tried to impose their will on Malaya—and they failed.

They tried to impose their will on the great little Republic of Korea—and they failed.

And now, openly and without provocation, the Communists are trying to impose their will on the people of South Viet-Nam. Once again you can be sure of this: The Communists are going to fail in Viet-Nam.

In each of the countries that Mrs. Johnson and I visited we found men and women who are working to build a society of free people. They are on the high road to success.

In Viet-Nam we are fighting at this very moment for the goals of freedom that we adopted at Manila. Those goals are what the struggle there in South Viet-Nam is really all about—whether these people have the right to self-determination, whether they can select the leaders of their own choice, or whether they can have them imposed by someone else. They are the North Star, really, of our common policy. The Communists would deny those goals that we enumerated in Manila. We would fulfill them.

I am glad that I have ended my Pacific journey here in this wonderful State of Alaska. I passed through Hawaii on the way out, and we had a wonderful reception there, a very warm one, full of hospitality, and we treasured every moment that we spent in Hawaii.

Now we are allowed to come here and stay all night with you in Alaska on our way back. That fact speaks of the future of this part of the country, because you really are the bridge of this new partnership that I am talking about. You are on the rim of a new era. As the Pacific prospers and grows, Alaska—and Portland and Seattle and San Francisco and Los Angeles and Honolulu and all of these great Pacific areas—are going to grow and prosper and have peace, too.

Remarks on Signing Fish Protein Concentrate Act (Excerpt)

White House press release (Anchorage, Alaska) dated November 2

I am today signing a bill⁴ which marks another advance in this nation's commitment to eliminate poverty, famine, and disease throughout the world. This measure will make it possible to apply the results of research from the laboratory to the economic large-scale production of a wholesome, nutritious protein concentrate.

Protein deficiency is a problem even in our own country here in America. But even more important, it is the greatest cause of childhood disease and illness throughout the world—and particularly in the less developed countries.

The fish protein concentrate to be developed in this program will be used to fortify foods of many kinds without changing their taste or their texture. It is easy to transport, because 85 percent of the world's population—almost 3 billion people—live less than 500 miles from the sea. It can be made available without the need for special storage or refrigeration, and its use throughout the world will not require any change in food custom or habits.

The boundless fishery resources of the seas are as extensive as the seas themselves. Marine biologists tell us that the oceans could support an annual catch of 400 to 500 million pounds of fish, and that is a very important source of animal protein.

Nevertheless, despite the world's increased fishery efforts, 85 percent of this great potential supply goes unused every year. This fish protein concentrate program offers us an opportunity to utilize our fishery resources, to provide the world with a protein source of great value at a very low cost, to help our commercial fishing industry to prosper. This is a challenge, and it is an important beginning.

Thanks to the efforts of Senator Bartlett, Senator Gruening, and Congressman Rivers,

⁴As enacted, the bill (S. 2720) is Public Law 89-701.

it is now possible to take this important step in meeting one of the pressing problems of mankind.

ARRIVAL STATEMENT, DULLES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, NOVEMBER 2

White House press release dated November 2

We are glad to be back home. Thirty-one thousand five hundred miles seems a long way. Seventeen days is a long time. But I know and I do believe that every day and every hour and every mile was worth it.

I am returning home with three strong impressions. Before I give them to you, and before the rain comes on, I want to say how grateful Mrs. Johnson and I, Secretary Rusk, and the other members of our party are to all of you good people who would come out in this inclement weather to make us feel at home when we arrive here in Washington.

I must say that in all the 17 days and in all the nine lands that we visited, we had perfect weather until we landed in the United States. When we got up to Alaska last night a little after midnight, we found that it was below freezing, it was raining a drizzle, and now we come here this evening and we have a little rain offering, too. But that shows you what happens to us in America in election year.

Most farmers and ranchers, though, I think will be glad to have this rain; so I don't want to join the complainers.

My impressions that I would like to leave with you are these:

First, the great vitality of the new Asia where we have been. Everywhere factories, schools, homes, and village centers are going up. A new, a strong-minded, and a dedicated generation is reaching out for progress in government, in industry, and agriculture.

Behind these men are coming the next generation, the schoolchildren. They came out in unbelievable numbers to greet us, to wave our flag, and to applaud ours as it passed. Their faces glowed with life, with

warmth, and with friendship. They glowed with intelligence and with eagerness.

I put aside once and for all, I think, the old idea of faceless Asian masses. What I saw were hundreds of thousands of unique individuals, starting life well, clearly on the road to very proud and very responsible citizenship.

There is still massive poverty to overcome because, I know you realize, in this area most of the people live off of between \$10 and \$20 a month. But there is a spreading and growing confidence that comes when men see before their eyes that progress is possible and is obtainable by their own efforts.

My second impression that I came away with is the impression of unity, the solid unity that we achieved at the Manila conference—the seven nations that met there.

If you can think of all the things that might have gone wrong, and some predicted would go wrong, you can take great pride in the unity that was expressed.

The seven nations there agreed to four goals:

—To be free from aggression; to try to resist an aggressor.

—To try to conquer hunger, illiteracy, and disease.

—To build a region of security and progress and order.

—To seek reconciliation and peace throughout Asia and the Pacific.

The chiefs of state and heads of government personally forged these goals in a private all-day session together where just the heads of state were present. They are now, tonight, the policy and the purpose of all of these seven nations.

These nations contain almost 300 million people. So what Manila showed was this: that those who are nearest the danger, those who are closest to the aggression in Viet-Nam, recognize it most clearly for what it really is—a campaign to destroy and to conquer a small country.

Each of us at the Manila conference rejected the voice of the appeaser and the heel

of the aggressor. Our allies know that the constructive goals that they have set for their people and their regions are sure to be frustrated unless aggression is defeated.

We agreed that our goal is an honorable peace just as soon as it can be obtained. We would like it tomorrow, next week, or this very hour. Beyond that, we look hopefully to the day when our adversaries will join with us in a war—in a different kind of war, though—against hunger, illiteracy, and disease and in rebuilding a region of security, order, and progress throughout Asia and the Pacific.

I also had a very deeply inspiring personal experience, if you will indulge me. I saw our men in Viet-Nam, fresh from battle. Many of them had come from the foxholes that morning. Many of them had come from their ships at sea.

I also visited with our men in Korea who are standing watch at the 38th parallel to deter a second invasion.⁵

I want every American who reads what I say or who hears my report to know that they can be very proud of these men.

As we reviewed the ranks together, riding the jeep down the line, General Westmoreland leaned over to me and whispered in my ear. He said, "Mr. President, no Commander in Chief has ever commanded a finer fighting force than you see represented here at this airport."

That is a great tribute to Bob McNamara [Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara] and to the military men who have trained these fellows and who guide them every day. It is also a great tribute to the parents of this country who brought up these men and who gave them their training.

So because of duty, those men tonight are in Viet-Nam and in Korea. Because of duty, six of them died yesterday morning from Communist gunfire on the almost forgotten front of the 38th parallel in Korea. They died because there are men in this world who still believe that might makes right.

⁵ For President Johnson's remarks at Camp Stanley in South Korea, see *ibid.*, Nov. 21, 1966, p. 772.

They use force. They won't let other people live in peace.

We have lived with this fact too long to forget it this soon. For two decades, from Eastern Europe to South Viet-Nam, the Communists have used force to impose their will on others. Only when other nations stood up to them and let them know they couldn't get by with it did they finally back down.

The men I saw in Viet-Nam are there tonight because we believe, we genuinely and sincerely believe, that aggression just must not succeed there or again. We are not alone in that belief. All the seven nations with us believe that, too. The leaders who met with us in Manila know that they have a very important stake in keeping the peace in their own backyards. If communism spreads and local Communists backed by major powers have an opportunity to take sides, then they will take over. They know that it is their duty to try to help the United States keep these fires from spreading, and that effort will be increased.

We are doing our part. I want to renew tonight the pledge that I made in Viet-Nam at Cam Ranh Bay.

We shall never let these men down, nor their fighting comrades, nor the 15 million people in South Viet-Nam, nor the hundreds of millions in this area where we have treaty commitments. That we consider the solemn promise of all the people of the United States of America.

The world of Asia and the Pacific is moving through a critical transition—from chaos to security, from poverty to progress, from the anarchy of narrow nationalism to regional cooperation, from endless hostility, we hope, to a stable peace.

It has been my hope and my prayer since I left home 17 days ago that this journey and the meeting at Manila would help move things a little bit faster in the right direction.

History will decide. No new treaties were made. No new commitments were offered. All action taken or to be taken will follow our constitutional processes, but I think I can tell you tonight that I return much

more confident and much more hopeful than when I left.

The job is certainly not done. The war in Viet-Nam is not over. Great obstacles must be overcome before progress is built into the life of Asia and the Pacific and before the region organizes itself on a cooperative basis.

But everywhere we went, I met strong men who have put their shoulder to the wheel and their hands to the task. I saw leaders who know that in this era the ultimate success of political power lies with the people. In some nations the people have a greater voice in their own affairs than they do in others, but everywhere the drumbeat of equality can be heard. The leaders of modern Asia are getting in step with it rather fast.

They have our support. They have the encouragement of the United States Government.

Since I left Washington, I have seen millions of faces—by one estimate yesterday, more than five million people. Almost all of them, from Samoa to Korea, were friendly to the United States of America. They are united with us in the decision to resist force. They are united with us in our attempt to build a better world. And they are united with us in seeking, earnestly seeking, peace in the world.

Their leaders, along with your leaders, are willing to go anywhere, meet with any government at any time, and enter into any honorable agreement that will settle our differences at the conference table instead of on the battlefield.

But in the meantime, these people in the danger area are counting on our dedication to freedom and not our doubt. They are betting their very lives on our determination.

So I have come back here tonight to say this: Those of us who met at Manila, and those men whom we saw at the fighting front, know that the road ahead may be a long and a difficult one. We know that each of us will make some mistakes, and we have no doubt but what they will be observed and pointed out from time to time.

But if our countrymen will stand with us, if we will try to travel this difficult road

together, I think we will come out well at the end, as America always has.

You know history. Where there is a deep division in a land, there is danger, danger to all the land. Where there is unity in the land, there is strength. I want to leave you tonight with a prayer that was offered at the Sunday service up in Townsville, Australia—northern Australia—as we left there to go to the Manila conference:

O God, Who has bound us together in the bundle

of life, give us grace to understand how our lives depend upon the courage, the industry, the honesty and the integrity of our fellowmen, that we may be mindful of their needs and grateful for their faithfulness, and faithful in our responsibilities to them.

So it was in that spirit that we have for 17 days tried our best to represent the best interests of all of our people and of this great country of ours. To each of you who endured this inclement weather to say "Glad to see you back," Lady Bird and I thank you from the bottom of our grateful hearts.

Additional Documentation on President Johnson's Trip to Asia

Following, in chronological order, are texts of President Johnson's addresses and remarks at various points on his itinerary which have not been previously published in the Bulletin.

VISITS EN ROUTE TO ASIA

Address at East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, October 17

White House press release (Honolulu, Hawaii) dated October 17

It is a source of deep personal satisfaction for me to be back here with you in Hawaii again today.

Seven years ago, inspired by your present Governor and your former Delegate, John Burns, I called for the first appropriation for this East-West Center, where two great cultures might share with one another their perspective of man's destiny.

Five years ago I came here to dedicate this great center. I have followed it very closely since, even to the point of keeping in touch with a former boss of mine who is now associated with the East-West Center, your deputy chancellor, Mr. Sam Gilstrap. I hope he is more lenient on the faculty

members and the students than he was on me 25 years ago.

We know that no opportunities before us today are more crucial or more hopeful than those for expanded ventures in international education.

That is why the Congress, upon my recommendation, has just passed the International Education Act of 1966¹ to strengthen American universities as centers of international learning. During this Pacific journey, on friendly Asian soil, I plan, as President of the United States, to sign this act.²

In addition, I am directing Secretary [of Health, Education, and Welfare] John Gardner to begin work immediately to establish a new Center for Educational Cooperation. It will advance the aims of the International Education Act and will serve as a focal point in Washington for leadership in education on a global scale.

I have also asked Secretary Gardner to begin immediately to plan this year for a

¹ For President Johnson's message to Congress of Feb. 2, see BULLETIN of Feb. 28, 1966, p. 328.

² For an address by President Johnson at Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand, see *ibid.*, Nov. 21, 1966, p. 768.

World Conference on Education to be held in the year 1967. This gathering of world educators and specialists will take a fresh look at the world's new educational needs. I hope it will help the nations to establish new priorities and new proposals for world-wide cooperative efforts in educating our children.

Dr. James Perkins, the distinguished president of Cornell University, has agreed to work with Secretary Gardner on this most laudable undertaking. He will organize and direct a planning conference early this winter to prepare the agenda and the schedule for the larger meeting to come later. I have asked him to invite a number of the world's leading educators to join him in these preparations.

In our continuing efforts to broaden our intellectual horizons and to expand our educational frontiers, this still-young center of research and study has already begun to play a leading role.

Symbolically, you stand as a bridge—a bridge between the two mainlands on either side of this wide ocean that surrounds all of these islands. You remind us that our people and the people of Asia have much to give to each other as well as much to learn from each other.

It was not always so.

In centuries past, men of the West went to Asia for many reasons. Some made the long ocean trek in search of wealth. Others went as the agents of governments that wanted colonial possessions. Still others went to teach, to treat the sick, to spread the gospel, to aid the farmer, to help build factories, to advise officials, to translate Western works of literature and technology.

Much that was good and constructive and abiding came from all of these undertakings. But it is a fact that we must understand and recognize that these movements from West to East were also very disturbing and revolutionary in their effect.

The West entered the Industrial Revolution earlier than the East. By this accident of history, the West commanded the tools of modern science and technology much sooner than the East.

Through colonialism and by other means the West intruded its then superior power into the East. And, of course, there was a reaction. That reaction has taken many forms, some peaceful and others violent. It should not surprise us, therefore, that scars—sometimes deep scars—have remained in men's minds and in their hearts.

Looking back over the years there are many searching questions that we can ask.

How well have we really learned the lessons of our experience in Asia?

How well have we understood the complex causes of conflict in the Pacific's time of troubles?

How well have we understood the feelings and aspirations of Asia's peoples during the century of turbulence?

How well have we understood the impact of West upon East—of Western arms, industry, and ideas upon venerable Asian cultures?

How well have we understood the course of revolution in Asia?

How well have we understood the shocks, as well as the benefits, that modernization can bring to developing societies?

How well have we understood the shifting tides of nationalism in all its forms?

In almost three decades of elective office I have had to answer these questions for myself. For two decades I answered them as one who conceived America's destiny almost entirely in relation to Europe.

My forebears came from Britain, Ireland, and Germany. People in my section of the country regarded Asia as totally alien in spirit as well as nationality. East and West meant to us that Texas was west of where Sam Gilstrap lived—Oklahoma.

We therefore looked away from the Pacific, away from its hopes as well as away from its great crises. Even the wars that many of us fought here were often with leftovers of preparedness, and they did not heal our blindness. I remember we felt we would get some planes out here after they had all they needed in Europe in the early forties.

One consequence of that blindness was

that Hawaii was denied its rightful part in our union of States for many, many years.

Frankly, for two decades I opposed its admission as a State, until at last the undeniable evidence of history, as well as the irresistible persuasiveness of Jack Burns, removed the scales from my eyes. Then I began to work and fight for Hawaiian statehood. I hold that to be one of the proudest achievements of my 25 years in the Congress.

There are still those who cannot understand the Pacific's role in America's future. But their voices, shrill though they may be, are becoming few and tired, and small. Most of us who were blind two decades ago can now begin to see.

Only by answering these questions with candor can we build solid foundations for our future relations with Asia. Only then can we really understand the depth of the desire in Asia for independence, for modernization, and for dignity. American policy toward Asia today must be the policy of an open mind.

I am convinced that we have now reached a turning point in Asia's history, in Asia's relationship with the United States of America, in Asia's relations with all the rest of the world in which we live.

I think it has become clear that what we want to see in Asia is what the vast majority of Asians themselves want to see.

I do not pretend to speak for Asia. I cannot. But I do urge my countrymen: Let us listen when the Asians speak for themselves.

In the last few months I have had many, many talks with leaders from practically all of the countries of Asia. They and others of their countrymen have come to speak and have spoken privately and freely of their hopes of tomorrow.

What do they want? They have told me.

First, they want to be secure from outside attack and aggression. They want to end the threat of internal subversion with all the terrorism and murder that is associated with it.

They want their people to be able to live in peace.

They want to raise the living standards of their people.

They want their children to get an education.

They want to be able to see a doctor and to have medicine when they are ill.

They want, above all, to have a voice, a voice in their own destiny—self-determination—a voice in the choice of those who will lead them, whether in the village, the province, or in the nation's capital.

They want freedom—freedom and justice—and a fair prospect that their dreams can some day, some time, come true.

They wish to make modern societies—but societies true to their own traditions, their own culture, and their own ambitions.

And that is also a good definition, I think, of what the United States wants to see in Asia. That is as good a definition as any that I can offer.

What are the prospects of their achieving this goal?

I travel to the Far East this autumn at a time of great trial and conflict for the people of the Pacific basin. I come to meet with the leaders of nations which share with us a common determination: that the people of South Viet-Nam shall be permitted to shape their own destiny, free from aggression from without and free from terror from within.

On our agenda are the hard questions of war in all of its aspects—of force and of sacrifice; of diplomacy and negotiation; of rehabilitation and reconstruction.

But I can tell you this: I go to Asia with confidence and with hope. Behind the terrible costs of combat and hostility I believe that a new Asia is gradually coming into its own.

The process is slow, but the signs are unmistakable. One after another, the nations of Asia are casting off the spent slogans of earlier narrow nationalism. One after another, the nations of Asia are grasping the realities of an interdependent Asia.

What are these realities?

—That the security of every nation is threatened by an attack on any nation.

—That national stability and strength can only come through self-help, rigorous planning, hard work, and sacrifice.

—That political power held by the few and the rich within a nation is power that will not long survive.

—That lasting national prosperity can only come through full cooperation with one's neighbors, the rich and the poor, the large and the small alike.

—That no single nation can or should be permitted to dominate the Pacific region.

—That disputes settled by other than peaceful means are disputes that will remain unsettled.

—Most important of all, that Asia's destiny lies in the hands of Asians themselves.

Throughout Asia today these realities are grasped, I believe, as never before.

A new spirit seems to me to be clearly at work: a self-confidence that permits cooperation; a skepticism that rejects illusory shortcuts; a deepening consciousness of Asia's proud past and an understanding and hope for Asia's great future. Yes, important things are happening in Asia, and they are happening with Asian leadership and with Asian initiative.

That is, of course, only a beginning. Great problems and greater challenges lie further ahead.

There remain in Asia, for instance, voices of extremism and apostles of militancy. Such voices and such rhetoric are out of tune with the new currents in Asia. They are increasingly irrelevant. They are increasingly isolated.

For Asia's leaders and Asia's peoples are looking, I think, beyond narrow nationalism. They are looking beyond ideology.

They see on the one hand the age-old afflictions of poverty, ignorance, and disease. They see on the other hand the possibility of abundance, knowledge, and health. And they see the absolute necessity of matching Asia's needs with Asia's resources and those of other regions.

Nothing has really given us more encouragement in our part of the world—and, I think, throughout Asia—than the creation of the Asian Development Bank, with its new headquarters in Manila—a billion-dollar regional bank to serve this great area of the world.

We think sooner or later this new perception will spread as well to the closed societies of Communist Asia. Sooner or later the pragmatic and compassionate spirit of the Chinese people will prevail over outmoded dogmatism.

We in America look to that day with hope and with confidence.

For our part, we shall do what we can to hasten its coming. We shall keep alive the hope for a freer flow of ideas and people between mainland China and the United States, as I have said so recently on so many other occasions. For only through such exchange can isolation be ended and suspicion give way to trust.

We do not believe in eternal enmity. All hatred among nations must ultimately end in reconciliation. We hopefully look to the day when the policies of mainland China will offer and will permit such a reconciliation.

But we are not prepared to pay for peace the price of freedom. We shall never surrender American freedom or sacrifice the freedom of America's allies in Asia.

America can help. We must help. We are now helping. But we see our role as helping, and not imposing our will on Asia.

We can give advice and technical assistance. We can cooperate in all kinds of activities—from the far reaches of space to the ocean depths.

Asia will provide its own leadership. Some of it is being built and trained right here in your atmosphere. We do not need to instruct them or direct them. They will take their initiatives, they will make their decisions, and they will time their own actions.

But we must and we shall cooperate with that leadership.

Then our role is that of a neighbor among equals—a partner in the great adventure of

bringing peace, order, and progress to a part of the world where much more than half of the entire human race lives.

As long as danger threatens, our strength shall back our commitments in Asia. Yet we seek no special status or privileges, no primacy, no territory, no base rights in perpetuity. We recognize that our strength, our size, and our great wealth may impose a very special obligation upon us in the transition to the new Asia. But we also recognize that the cooperative tasks of assistance and defense will be assumed more and more by others, and we hope by collective regional groupings as the nations of Asia develop and build their own strength and their own abundance.

I will go to confer with the leaders of six nations—six nations who have also committed their sons to the proposition that aggression shall not succeed and the people of South Viet-Nam shall have the right to shape their own future by their own self-determination and to shape it in peace.

I will go to see, to listen, and to learn—and to act with our partners to bring an honorable peace to Southeast Asia at the first day it is possible.

I want to caution all of my countrymen that we are taking with us no magical wands and no instant solutions. I hope your speculations will be cautious and informed. We know all too well that this is a long road of many miles, but we will walk it, shoulder to shoulder with free Asia.

But I felt it right to share with you this afternoon, here in this very special place to me, the lessons of the past and the hopes for the future in our relations with Asia.

I intend to ask the leaders that I see to visit America—especially to come to this part of America, here in beautiful Hawaii, and to see for themselves a model, a model of how men and women of different races and different cultures can come and live and work together, to respect each other in freedom and in hope.

I shall say to my colleagues that I come not to admonish or to direct but to inform and that our foreign policy is as our domestic policy.

We want food for the hungry.

We want income, jobs, and wages for our workers.

We want education for our children.

We want medicare, health, research, and nursing homes to take care of our needy.

We want a strong and adequate defense in order that we may be secure until that day finally comes when our guns are unloaded and war is no more.

Finally, we will go to hear a brief report on our sons who are rendering such gallant service and such an excellent account of themselves in attempting to help this little nation of South Viet-Nam keep itself from being gobbled up, in an attempt to resist aggression and provide deterrence with the minimum damage and the minimum danger.

I know with me, on this great visit that I am returning to the heads of other states, I will carry your hopes and your prayers. I hope some day next year, the following year, or in the years to come—God only knows when—we can meet again here in peaceful Hawaii, when wars will be banished from the face of the earth, when prosperity will be known to every American family, and that the other families of the world will begin to raise their own standards of living. Then we can once again enjoy the blessings of which we have dreamed all these years.

Thank you so much.

Arrival Statement, Tafuna International Airport, Pago Pago, American Samoa, October 18

White House press release (Pago Pago, American Samoa) dated October 18

I am very proud that I could be here with you today.

I can assure you that the people of the United States share my pride in what American Samoa has done to prove that destiny is really what we make it.

This island, with a population of only 22,000, has become the symbol of what many large nations may achieve for their people.

It has become a showplace for progress and a proving ground of methods to improve the lives of our fellow human beings.

And, along the way, American Samoa has taken the term "self-help" out of the bureaucrats' dictionary and made it a living language for their people.

You have doubled the per-acre yield of your crops.

You have sharply reduced the diseases that once plagued your island. And this month you will begin construction of the American Samoan Tropical Medical Center, which will provide the finest hospital care in this part of the world.

You have almost eliminated childhood malnutrition.

You have recognized that education is the tidal force of our century, driving all else ahead of it.

I am told that the pilot program of education which you have started may point the way to learning breakthroughs throughout the Pacific islands and Southeast Asia. Samoan children are learning twice as fast as they once did, and retaining what they learn. Surely from among them one day will come scientists and writers to give their talents to Samoa, to America, and to the world.

One requirement for good and universal education is an inexpensive and readily available means of teaching children.

Unhappily, the world has only a fraction of the teachers that it needs. Samoa has met this problem through educational television—which was pioneered here by your outstanding Governor, Rex Lee, and the very able Director of the United States Information Agency, Mr. Leonard Marks.

Before Mr. Marks came out here recently to help inaugurate this educational television system, he came to me at the White House and talked to me about this great benefit at some length. Upon his return, he insisted that he come over, and he spent an entire evening reviewing what your hopes and achievements would be. Everyone now wants to study the job that you have done—UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization], the World Bank, New Guinea, New Zealand, India, and other countries around the world.

It is truly a remarkable experiment.

This technique—which you are helping now to improve—has the power to spread the light of knowledge like wildfire, to spread it all across the wide areas of our earth.

I want to commend you on the stride that you have taken. We are most grateful for the voluntary action of the Samoan Legislature in voting to pay Federal income taxes. You are the only American Territory voluntarily to take on this responsibility.

Your taxes are growing with your economy. You paid about \$200,000 in 1963, and yet you paid over a million dollars in 1965. At this rate, you may eliminate the deficit in the United States budget this year.

An American editor, who used to have nothing to say about what we were doing in Samoa, recently wrote, "Somewhere on earth there may be a more spectacular example of revolutionary change in an area and its people, but in years of roving the world's far corners, I have not seen it."

All praise to you for that. No, not quite all praise. Some of it must go to a man that you know better than you do any other American—your own very able Governor, Rex Lee.

This year it was my pleasure to give him the President's award for distinguished Federal civilian service—an award that is granted to only five individuals each year.

I have no appropriate awards to confer upon the people of Samoa for their progress. But there must be great satisfaction and honor enough in contemplating what you have done in 3 years, where you are today, and where the works of progress will lead your children in generations to come.

I hope that America may soon accomplish in her other Pacific island responsibilities the same achievements of Samoa. Indeed, I think we must. For no other corner of the world can be left untidy and ignored today. Where once the sailing clippers called rarely in a year, now the jet airliners touch down several times a week. The time is fast coming when there will be no such thing as "a far corner of the earth."

So I think this is the way that God intended. I cannot believe He wanted man to go

isolated ever from his neighbor. He did not seek that distance or race or religion or creed ever separate us from one another. At the table of need, we all find our place, and the greatest need of all today, I think, is for human fellowship and a sense of what each of us can do for the rest of us.

This is my first visit to American Samoa. I have not been among you but just a moment. But I think I know what you want most for yourselves and what you want most for your children—really what the vast majority of the world's people want, too.

They want to be independent and stand on their self-respect. They want to keep their dignity and to be proud of themselves and their heritage. They insist on equality. They reject being camp followers and stooges for the brokers of international politics.

At home, it is pride and the sense of being your own man. In Asia, it is called "face." It is what makes all of us members of the same race. It is what makes us know that in the emerging Asia—and throughout the entire world—there is really no place for second-class citizens.

Up until our time, it was possible for an island like this to exist in isolation and despair. And it was possible for a large and powerful country like the United States to conceive of itself, also in isolation, as the center of all civilization—indeed, as the center of all human wisdom and glory.

But time and change have jostled our prejudice. They have shown us that the center of the world is anywhere that people are. And they have made imperative the spirit of American Samoa today.

For the road to the future runs to Asia, and it crosses here, here at the heart of the Pacific.

I want now to thank you from my heart, for what you are doing here is really a message of hope for millions of peoples elsewhere in the Pacific and in Asia. I shall remember your example vividly—and for that and for the privilege of coming and visiting with you today, I shall always be thankful to you.

THE VISIT TO AUSTRALIA

Address at Parliament House, Canberra, October 21

White House press release (Canberra, Australia) dated October 21

Mr. Prime Minister [Harold E. Holt], I would like to say to you and the Parliamentarians who honor us here today that this is a most unique occasion. But the truth of the business is, our Congress has me for lunch every day.

I have so many memories of Australia. There was a sign I remember over a tavern yonder in Melbourne which read: "U.S. Colonels Under 21 Will Not Be Served Unless Accompanied By Parents."

And there are other members of this great country that I recall so well. Like every other man who is separated from his homeland in time of war, I was in need of friends. Here in your Australia I was treated as if I were in the house of my own family. Australia became my second home.

As a Texan, I feel that this land of vast spaces, of farms, ranches, of sheep and cattle, of booming cities and of dynamic industrial growth, is my own.

As an American, I am struck by how much we have in common. I see that wherever I turn—from your lively democratic politics, to your devotion to education, to your interest in the exploration of space, to the robust expansion of your society, and to your intelligent interest in relations with other nations.

The foundations of the friendship between our two nations are deep and they are increasing.

In the 3 years as President that I shall finish on November 23d, former Prime Minister [Robert] Menzies visited me in Washington three times. Prime Minister Holt also came three times. Yes, we live at a time when foreign affairs go beyond their traditional scope. There are now strong new ties in the domestic life of our countries.

These new ties come from:

—Modern communications, which bring instantly to the homes of citizens of every

country the news of events from around the world;

—From modern weapons, which make the threat of war anywhere a life-and-death issue for every nation;

—From the way that we are all involved in historic changes which are reshaping the political life of the planet.

I am speaking of the change from the colonial era to an era when scores of new nations claim rights, claim recognition, and claim identity; the change from old to modern societies, which can bring to their peoples the advantages of modern science and modern technology, the change throughout the world from dependence upon large powers to partnership in the affairs of the planet; and change, still tentative but stubbornly tenacious, from a dangerous cold war to a more stable and peaceful world.

Since 1945 the United States has been found wherever freedom was under attack or wherever peace was threatened. The stage has shifted from time to time. The stakes have grown as man's capacity for destruction increased.

But America's role has not changed. With constancy, we have pursued the defense of freedom and we have prevented nuclear destruction. We have patiently labored to build a world order in which both peace and freedom can flourish.

My countrymen have lived so long with crises and danger that we accept, almost as if it were inevitable, the assumption of American concern, concern for the disorders that threaten the peace in all other parts of the world.

We accepted this responsibility, first, because at one time there was no other nation who could do it. For the last 20 years, only under the shadow of our strength could our good friends keep their freedom.

Second, we have learned, at very painful costs, that aggression and upheaval in any part of the world carry the seeds of destruction to free men in all parts of the world.

Finally, since the end of World War II, we have assumed this responsibility for a reason

that is often difficult for others to understand. We have accepted responsibility because we have believed it to be right that we should do so.

Of course, our policies are shaped with a proper regard for our security and our welfare. But much of the energy of our efforts has come because we believe it is right—we believe that it is right that the strong should help the weak defend their freedom. We believe that it is right that the wealthy should help the poor overcome their hunger; that nations, no matter how small or fragile or young, should be free from the coercion of others.

We have steadily resisted Communist efforts to bring about by force and intrigue a world dominated by a single ideology. Our convictions, our interests, our life as a nation demand that we oppose, with all the strength that we can muster, any effort to put this world in anyone's straitjacket.

On continent after continent, in dozens of countries, hundreds of millions of people struggle today to exist on incomes of scarcely more than a dollar a week. Many people have less to spend each day on their food and shelter, on their clothing and on their medicine, on all of their needs, than the average Australian spends for a package of cigarettes. They live in shacks hardly worth the name. They live without heat, water, sanitation—and promise.

Their children know no schools, few doctors, no hospitals. They can rarely expect to live to be 40 years of age. They mark those years with the weary and ancient cycle of both misery and monotony.

The per capita product of the developed countries today is in excess of \$2,000 per year. In the underdeveloped countries, many of which are in the area of which we speak, it is less than one-tenth of that. And the gap continues to widen.

These are no new conditions. Poverty, hunger, and disease are all as old as man himself. But in our time and in this age there has been a change. And there is more in the offing.

The change is not so much in the realities of life as in the expectations of the future. An association of the hopeful has emerged, and it will be heard.

The shrinking of distances and the spreading of knowledge has made us more aware of other human beings. And it has made them aware of what, too, is within their reach.

They know that the conditions their fathers accepted with resignation are no longer inevitable.

They know that depression and despair are not what their Creator ordained.

And because they know, they yearn. They yearn for their families to live decent lives. They yearn for jobs to give them survival and, beyond survival, to give them dignity. They yearn for their children to learn to read and to write. They yearn for their hungry to be fed and their sick to be healed. They yearn to arrive.

So we must deal today with these urgent drives: the drive for security; the drive for the defense of freedom, for the preservation of independence; the drive for satisfaction, for self-respect, and for equality of justice and opportunity.

I use "we" deliberately. In the early post-war years the indispensable strength was America's. Now other nations have also gathered strength, and it has now become possible to share the burdens of defense more evenly.

That is what is happening today in Viet-Nam, where the demands of security and the urge for satisfaction mingle in a single crucible.

There our men stand together—as they have stood before—to check aggression. And there they serve together—as they have served before—to help build and preserve and protect freedom. The raw conflict of one and the elusive attainments of the other make their duty more difficult—and make it more essential.

I would like for every Aussie who stands there in the rice paddies on this warm summer day to know that every American and L.B.J. is with Australia all the way.

I can speak for all Americans, more than

a quarter of a million of them who are there, when I say that they know that every Australian standing by their side, and back here at home, will stand with courage and will stand with honor.

I believe there is a light at the end of what has been a long and lonely tunnel. I say this not just because our men are proving successful on yonder battlefield. I believe it for this reason: There is a widening community of people who are beginning to feel responsible for what is happening in Viet-Nam.

Of all the signs, this is the brightest. For the unilateral use of power is out of date in an age where there can be no losers in peace and where there can be no victors in war. And the unilateral reach of compassion is limited.

What is required—and what we are seeing emerging in Viet-Nam and through out all of Asia—is a concert of effort on the part of diverse nations that know that they must work together.

This is the Asia to which I journey.

From multiple creeds and cultures, from many races and tongues, is coming an increased momentum of partnership.

This is an Asia that is ancient in its philosophies, its learning, and its cultures. Ancient, yes, but it is new in its leadership, new in its achievements, and, most important, new in its aspirations. For free Asia is in the hands of a generation of leaders unfettered in the past and unafraid in the future. They are men who would agree with Thomas Paine, the American patriot, who said in the time of our own country's Revolution, to which the Opposition Leader so eloquently referred, "If there must be trouble, let it be in my day, that my child may have peace."

Yes, I think these men are conscious that he serves his nation who understands his times. They know that a national spirit comes first, but they know, too, that nationalism is not enough. And they are challenged by the task of leading their people beyond the first steps of political independence. They are caught up in the work of winning their freedom now from the oppres-

sion of hunger, of illiteracy and disease and stifling poverty.

The role of these new leaders is that of the statesmen who follow the revolutionary and of the settler who comes after the pioneer.

There is in history a time for each. And to each posterity will owe an equal debt. They believe in the wisdom of the Chinese philosopher who more than 2,000 years ago had this to say:

Of a great leader, who talks little,
When his work is done, his aim fulfilled,
They will all say
"We did this ourselves!"

And so free Asia has. And the great story of the past year is their story. While the people of South Viet-Nam and their allies have now begun to turn the tide of battle against aggression, we have seen Japan and we have seen Korea establish normal relations, with the promise of closer cooperation.

We have seen, most recently, Indonesia pull back from economic collapse and from a most dangerous Communist threat.

We have seen nine Pacific nations, including Australia, come together on their own initiative to form the Asian and Pacific Council.

We have seen Asians gathering to map a regional future in economic development, in education, and in agriculture.

We have seen three nations of Southeast Asia—Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia—take the initiative in seeking and searching for peace in their own region.

We have seen 31 nations participating in the creation most recently of the Asian Development Bank, while the development of the Lower Mekong River Basin goes steadily forward in the face of conflict.

This sense of common destiny is growing all along the arc of free Asia. Initiatives have come from Tokyo, from Seoul, from Manila, from Bangkok, from Kuala Lumpur, from Singapore—as well as from here in Canberra.

We in the United States have long been the friends of those who have worked toward unity in Western Europe, toward economic integration in Latin America, and toward

stronger regional ties among the young nations of Africa.

We shall also be the friends and partners of those in Asia who want to and who are willing now to work together to fashion their own destiny. From you must come initiative and leadership. From us will come cooperation.

There of course will be growing pains of diversity, but from them will emerge mutual progress that does not ask of any of us the surrender of any of our most vital principles.

The challenge of the new Asia comes to Australia at a conspicuous time in your history. You have already shown that your commitment is a matter of policy and action—not rhetoric.

When your Prime Minister symbolically said in Washington, in speaking of the crisis that faces our men on a faraway battlefield at the moment, that he would go "all the way with L.B.J.," there wasn't a single American that felt that was new information.³

There is not a boy who wears the uniform yonder today who hasn't always known that when freedom is at stake, and when honorable men stand in battle shoulder to shoulder, Australians will go all the way, as Americans will go all the way—not a third of the way, not part of the way, not three-fourths of the way—all the way, until liberty and freedom have won.

Your nation and its leaders can take great pride in playing a leading role in the Colombo Plan. You have brought tens of thousands of Asian students here to your homes as I came once—and I shall never forget it—and to your universities. You have contributed beyond compare, most generously and patiently, to the planning of the future of the Mekong Valley.

You have been among the early leaders in creating the Asian Development Bank.

You have joined eight other nations who, on their own initiative, have formed the Asian and Pacific Council.

It is only right—right, as I said earlier in

³ For background, see *ibid.*, July 25, 1966, p. 130.

my remarks—that Australia become a strong partner in providing the new leadership in the new Asia.

Nature gave you new land and rich natural resources. Your vigorous people have made a good life for themselves and for their children. Your industry has expanded rapidly in the last two decades.

Your insight into Asia, your geographic position, the great integrity of all of your people, have brought you to the edge of the Pacific era—the era of infinite possibilities. Those of us in America who look west, and those in Asia who look east, will find here in Australia the ideal crossroads.

A quarter of a century ago, the end of colonialism was the dream that beckoned Asia onward. With foreign rule ended, it seemed that all the blessings of a better life would surely come, and come quickly.

I know, I think, something of how they must feel today. Long ago, as a young man in my native State of Texas, in the years of the great depression, I found my mission: to use the time allotted me and the full measure of all the energy I could muster, to help man make the most of life, to try to do the greatest good for the greatest number.

As a teacher, as a Congressman, as a Senator, as a Vice President, and now as President of my country, I have had the chance to follow that mission and to try to do those things of which I once, as a boy back in that hill ranch country, could only dream.

But my work is not done. I have come to Australia to warn you: Nor is yours. We cannot tire of sacrifice until peace comes to Viet-Nam. We cannot talk of satisfaction until all the people of Viet-Nam have a chance to share in the promise that is unfolding here in the Pacific and throughout Asia. I genuinely and I earnestly believe that that day is on the way and that day will soon come.

Then, and now, I pledge that we are ready and willing to serve as your partners in Asia—until what we *can* achieve in our time is what we *have* achieved in our time.

The man who, a quarter of a century ago,

sent me here to Australia—Franklin Delano Roosevelt—once prophesied that:

One day a generation may possess this land, blessed beyond anything we now know, blessed with those things—material and spiritual—that make man's life abundant. If that is the fashion of your dreaming, then I say: Hold fast to your dream. America needs it.

Well, this afternoon I would amend his vision somewhat. For Franklin Roosevelt did not belong to America; he belonged to the world, and so does his faith in what lies ahead.

I would say, therefore, to the people of the Pacific and to the people of Asia: If that is the fashion of your dreaming, then I say: Hold fast to your dream. The world needs it.

And the world needs Australia at this critical hour—all the way.

Arrival Statement, Sydney, October 22

White House press release (Sydney, Australia) dated October 22

There is an old song in the United States which says "There is no place like home." Well, I want to change that. There is no place like home, unless it is Australia.

You have treated us as if we belong here. I think we really do.

We will have to leave tomorrow, but our hearts will remain here, here with the people of Australia.

I want to tell you what a beautiful sight the Sydney Airport is from my plane: Your nice welcome sign, your large group of enthusiastic friends who have come here to extend their hospitality, the beautiful signs and flags.

I just want to say this: If Ambassador [Edward] Clark ever resigns as our Ambassador to Australia—and he is so happy here I don't think he ever will—I believe now that the first applicant for the job is going to be Lyndon Baines Johnson.

On behalf of Mrs. Johnson, myself, and my fellow countrymen, we thank you for your graciousness and for your generous attitude that brought you here to make us feel at home this morning.

**Remarks at Art Gallery of New South Wales,
Sydney, October 22 (Excerpts)**

White House press release (Sydney, Australia) dated
October 22

In America, during the past few years, I have heard Australia described as a very "American" place.

I can only assume that America is described here as a very "Australian" place.

I believe both are true—providing we are talking about the real meaning of our nations. I am not willing to accept the notion that America stands only for supermarkets and superhighways, just as I know that you will not accept the idea that Australia stands only for kangaroos and "Waltzing Matilda."

If America and Australia are alike, in what way are we alike?

Our lands are vast. Our people are drawn from many countries. Our histories are young. Our governments are free. Our people bubble with energy, occasionally to a fault. We have reached a level of plenty for most of our people that men could scarcely envision or ever dream of just a century ago.

But, for all of this, there is more that really binds us together. In a political campaign in Texas some years ago, I was asked about my allegiances. I replied in this way: "I am a free man first, an American second, a public servant third, and a Democrat fourth, in that order."

I think that ranking of priorities is something that we can all understand. I think that kind of ranking holds true in Australia as well. We are free men first, and our strength flows like a mighty river from that premise.

The hallmark of our societies is that we encourage every man to stretch as far as he can and to look any man straight in the eye.

I believe that trait, more than any other, has built America and built Australia and, indeed, has forever changed the human equation upon this planet.

So we have prospered. We already have most of the material trappings that so much of the developing world today strives for.

Our people for the most part are well clothed, well fed, well educated, and well

housed. Automobiles are a commonplace; washing machines far outnumber washing boards; private housing is spacious and available to ever-larger segments of the population of our two countries.

But if the American experience—and the Australian experience—is to have any real meaning on the canvas of history, it must show a good deal more than just mere quantity. "More" is not enough. We must now learn the social truths that can convert "more" into "better."

Human progress, we know, does not end with a two-car family, or central air conditioning, or even a long vacation.

We are concerned in my country with the quality and the human grandeur of our existence. I have set that proposition to the people of my land under a simple banner: the Great Society.

We are seeking better and much more extensive education. We are seeking better medical treatment for all of our people. We are seeking cleaner cities—purer water and purer air. We are seeking equality for all of our minority groups—and the land preserved in as near the state as possible as God gave it to us.

I have some help on that conservation and beautification program in person here today. Mrs. Johnson has been pointing out to me several good examples that we must emulate that we have observed here in your country.

These programs have a common root: to let men push on to the furthestmost boundaries of their being in an environment that is fit for the human species.

We know that a great society demands great individuals—that as Emerson said:

The true test of civilization is not the census, nor the size of the cities, nor the crops—but the kind of man the country turns out.

Increasingly, the thrust of Emerson's words will be at the heart of my program when I return home. I intend to pursue what I consider the ultimate moral goal that a politician can seek. It is this: the creation of the conditions that allow people to pursue excellence.

In the session of the Congress that is about to end we fought poverty and discrimination and slums and all the accumulated ailments of a society that grew boundlessly for almost two centuries and sometimes passed over its less fortunate members. That battle is not yet won, and we do not intend to falter in its execution.

But we now also intend to concentrate on the quest for quality. Needless to say, such a goal cannot be achieved just by legislative fiat. But if an enlightened program cannot automatically grant excellence, it can open the doors for those who seek to enter. That is what I seek, and that is what I have asked task forces made up of our great scholars throughout the land who are now at work in our Capital to seek—to seek an open-door policy for excellence.

I have had an old lesson reinforced in my mind during the past few days that I have been away from my country. A great society cannot end at the water's edge in New York or in Los Angeles—nor can it end at the water's edge in Sydney or in Perth. A truly great society can exist only in a great and unifying world that is dedicated to bringing out the best in people from all over the world.

I know that the magnanimous offer announced yesterday by your own University of Sydney—to bring 10 young American science students here in January—was made in that spirit. It will touch a most responsive chord in my country, and I must say to you that it has touched me deeply.

Our young people who will study at your Nuclear Research Foundation are symbols of our common quest to probe the deepest limits of our world and to stretch the human intellect as far as it seeks to go. That these young students will be designated Lyndon B. Johnson Scholars is an honor that, as a former schoolteacher—and sometimes I have some practice teaching to do these days—I cherish beyond expression and description.

For the liberation of the best in man lies at the heart of all we are trying to do in our own country—and all that we are really trying to help others do.

If we are to ever be worthy of the trust

and of the confidence of other peoples, we shall have to face up to our own lives and our own problems.

The war on poverty in America has more ultimate meaning, I think, throughout the world than a thousand supermarkets.

The protection of freedom where freedom is threatened has more ultimate meaning throughout the world than all the products or technology that we may ever export.

The great majority of our people have come to embrace and accept these values. I believe that you share them as well—and that satisfied this visiting American as deeply as the exuberant warmth of your hospitality. It is one more bond in a friendship that shall last as long, as the Prime Minister said, as our nations endure.

For as I read only this morning in the Sydney Morning World, my visit to Australia represents a growing awareness of the interdependence of all of us and a growing desire to strengthen it and make it increasingly fruitful, not simply for white Australians and Americans but for all people of every race, of every creed, of every nationality.

And that is exactly why I am here, and that is exactly how I feel and how I believe most Australians feel.

Arrival Statement, Brisbane International Airport, October 22

White House press release (Brisbane, Australia) dated October 22

First of all, Mrs. Johnson and I want to express our deep appreciation for the opportunity to come here and to meet with you and our deep regret that you have been delayed by our tardiness.

We have been meeting so many wonderful people in Australia whom we hadn't anticipated we would see that our schedule has had to be stretched a little from time to time.

Tonight we come to you near the close of the most wonderful visit that I have ever made to any land.

This has been a sentimental journey for me. My bond with Australia goes back 24 long and eventful years. It goes back to 1942, when General MacArthur established his

headquarters in Australia and planned the mighty campaign that would free the Pacific of aggression.

It goes back to those dark days when it was hard to see any light at the end of the tunnel—and the Japanese were on the other side of the Owen-Stanley Range coming in your direction, in our direction—until at last, through bravery, through determination, and through sacrifice of Australians, Americans, and others, some light appeared.

I am told that it was something like a million Americans who passed through Brisbane during World War II. So a great part of the enthusiasm my people feel for your wonderful land of Australia must have started with that original million right here. I hope and I trust, and I want to believe—and I do believe—that that feeling is mutual.

Comradeship in war unites men as few experiences can unite them. But that union is always purchased at a terrible price. Free men just must learn to find comradeship in peace as well as finding it in war. They must learn to find it in trade, in scholarship, in fighting disease, relieving hunger, and in exploring the earth and the heavens.

Americans and Australians are finding that peaceful comradeship today.

I have enjoyed my 2 days in Australia. I have appeared in cities and areas that contain considerably more than half the population of this entire country. Although I have appeared in 30 of the 50 states in America this year, I still haven't reached 50 percent of the population. So I have some homework to do when I get back from Manila.

Only this afternoon at Cooby Creek, not far from where I stand, a new space tracking station was dedicated. It is a joint effort of our space scientists, who are already working together at Carnarvon, Woomera, and Canberra.

These stations are very vital to the success of our lunar program—and vital to all that we are seeking to understand about the universe around us.

We could never have come so far, so fast, in this great adventure without the dedication and competence of Australian scientists

and Australian technicians, and without the cooperation of the modern 20th-century statesmen who guide the destinies of this land.

But we are not depending only on the cooperation of mature professionals to build a peaceful comradeship in science. Yesterday an announcement of very keen significance to me was made at the University of Sydney. It was revealed that 10 young students from my country will be invited to study, during January, at the Nuclear Research Foundation along with your own brightest boys and girls here in Australia. That they will be called the Lyndon B. Johnson Scholars is a great tribute to Australian generosity, but it is a source of deep gratitude to me.

Our two young nations are blessed with tremendous natural and human resources. We have so much to offer to those who need the skills and the technology that we already possess in abundance.

In agriculture, in satellite communications, in the control of rivers, in public health, in population planning, we already have a range of understanding and experience that can make the vital difference for millions of our fellow men.

We cannot—we must not—hold on selfishly to these skills and these technologies. We must not fear to share them with those who long for a better life. We shall find—as wise men have always known—that the lives of those who give of themselves are enriched far beyond the treasure and the talent that they share with others.

I know that yours is a giving nation. You gave tens of thousands of your best young men to the cause of freedom—your freedom and the world's freedom—in the Second World War. Thousands more stood shoulder to shoulder with us in Korea, and tonight they stand shoulder to shoulder in the rice paddies in Viet-Nam. You have given millions of dollars to aid your neighbors in the Pacific and in Asia.

I just cannot end without saying that you have given me—the representative of a people who admire you and who cherish the affection of all the citizenry of Australia—3

days that have filled my heart and strengthened my body and my spirit.

In the morning I will go to Manila. I will go there with your most distinguished Prime Minister. I will go refreshed by the encouragement that you have given me and with my faith renewed in our common task.

We will do the best we can to give the maximum protection to the men whom we must guide.

We long and look for the day when all men on this earth will enjoy prosperity and war will be no more.

We ask for your hopes, your confidence, and your prayers.

And we will give you all that is within us.

Thank you so much for coming out here and doing us this great honor. We shall never forget it.

Departure Statement, Garbutt Air Force Base, Townsville, October 23

White House press release (Townsville, Australia) dated October 23

It is right that my second visit to Australia should conclude in a place that holds such vivid memories for me from my first visit here in Townsville in 1942.

Things are much calmer and much more peaceful here in Townsville today at the Buchanan Hotel than they were when I was here 24 years ago.

A few weeks ago your distinguished Prime Minister visited me in Washington. I had, at that luncheon in his honor, a young man who had not seen his father. He is now a teacher at West Point. The night that I spent in Australia on June 8, 1942, I slept in a double bed with a Colonel Francis Stevens. We left here about midnight for the Three-Mile Field in Port Moresby, New Guinea. Colonel Stevens never came back and never saw his boy, but the Prime Minister came to America and did greet him.

And if Colonel Stevens could have followed us through Australia the last 3 days, could have seen the happiness on the faces of the people, could have seen them enjoying their freedom and preserving and protecting

it, Colonel Stevens would have felt that he did not die in vain.

I do not know how many Australian faces I have looked into or how many Australian hands I have shaken during the last 3½ days. The number does not really matter. What matters is what your faces and your hands have said to me—and what I hope that mine have said to Australia. The message is that the vast majority of the American and Australian people are together—all the way—on the battlefield and in the search for peace.

Obviously, that view is not held by everyone. There are those who feel very deeply and certainly those who feel very vocally that our common engagement in Viet-Nam is morally wrong. They have made their feelings known with equal vigor in my country and already in yours. Theirs is, I believe, the view of a minority. That does not make it mistaken; but it does require us to see it in a larger context.

Because we have put our trust in democracy, we are bound to preserve and to protect the minority's right to express its opinion and we cannot and we must never insist that it speak its opinion in a whisper that is pleasing to us. We are bound, too, to behave toward the minority with a tolerance, courtesy, a gentleness, with ordinary respect—an obligation that falls, I think, with equality on the minority, too.

But it is exactly because we are democracies and because our governments are responsible to the whole people that we cannot be turned aside from policies and commitments that the great majority of our public support and for which they have made profound sacrifices, as Colonel Stevens did in this town 24 years ago.

This is especially so where what is at stake is liberty and is freedom itself. We are in Viet-Nam now precisely because the great majority of our people believe in free choice for the people of the little country of Viet-Nam. We believe in that right of free choice, in self-determination. We believe in it so strongly that we are willing to go there and

fight for it and die for it until that right is achieved and until that right is preserved and protected.

Most of our people have learned the lesson of this century: that nations must not turn their backs on those whose freedom is imperiled by aggression. When they have done so—and the melancholy history of our times tells us that they have—it was not long before their own freedom faced the same mortal danger.

Thus, at home, we defend the right of the minority to dissent and the right of the majority to insist that it be heard as well. In Viet-Nam we defend the right of the minority to be heard—peacefully, at the ballot box. We defend the right of the majority to be free of persuasion by terror.

Now I leave this great people, this wonderful land, to go to Manila with your Prime Minister and other heads of state. We will meet with others who have committed their sons to the struggle to the end in Viet-Nam. We will, of course, review that progress. We will, of course, review the prospects for bringing it to an end. We will, of course, consider what may be done to heal the wounds of a long and a tragic war.

We know, of course, that there is so much good to be done with the resources that are now being wasted that we want very much to get ahead and transfer this conflict from the battlefield to the conference room.

I am conscious of the human tragedy and the lost opportunities every day—as the battle reports come to me every morning before I get out of bed.

Again and again and again I have said: We are ready to stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam; we are ready to produce a schedule for the withdrawal of our troops—whenever the other side tells us what it is prepared to do to move toward peace in Viet-Nam and to reciprocate the actions and the decisions that we take.

We must remember this: It takes only one side to make a war and to begin a war. It takes two sides to end a war, short of unconditional surrender. And we do not seek the

unconditional surrender of those who oppose us in Viet-Nam, nor to destroy or change any system of government, nor to deprive any people of what is rightfully theirs. When a decision is made by the other side to seek its goals through peaceful means—not through terror, not through violence—we shall be the first to meet at the conference table.

We prefer reason to force. But until that time comes, we shall not let our men go unprotected and undefended. We shall fight for freedom in Viet-Nam—knowing that as we do, we fight not just for freedom and liberty in Viet-Nam, but we fight for freedom and liberty in Australia, in New Zealand, in Hawaii, in the United States of America, and freedom and liberty wherever men cherish it.

We believe the day will come when our neighbors in Asia and the Pacific will enjoy the liberty and the freedom that is now a part of the heritage of the people of America and the people of Australia. And behind the shield of our determination, the free expressions of mankind may continue to be heard. That is reward enough for the effort we are making.

I have come here to retrace some of the tracks that I made a quarter of a century ago. This has been a sentimental journey. The last few hours I have had many sad memories. But never in my life have I gone among a people in any land where I have been received with such unfailing courtesy. Never have I seen a nation where its military leaders, where its diplomatic leaders, where its industrial leaders, where its political leaders are more in line with what I think is good for the whole world as I see here in this great land of Australia.

So to your Right Honorable Prime Minister and his gracious First Lady, Mrs. Holt, to the members of his Ministry and the Governors, the Premiers, the distinguished hosts that we have had as we have traveled across this land, to the leaders of the Opposition Party, to the boys and the girls, to one and all, Mrs. Johnson and I not only salute what we consider to be one of the great people in

this universe, but we leave this land with great regret. Yet we also leave it with the hope that we may come again.

THE VISIT TO THE PHILIPPINES

Address at the International Rice Research Institute, Los Baños, October 26

White House press release (Manila, the Philippines) dated October 26

We meet here in a new Asia.

In this Asia the old barriers of indifference and rivalry are slowly being overcome and a new spirit of cooperation is taking shape.

Today, while our Asian friends still need a helping hand, they want to match it with their own efforts aimed toward their own goals.

This Rice Institute here in Los Baños is a product of intelligent assistance. Two American foundations have given support. One of the moving forces behind the creation of the institute, I am proud to say, was that great former president of the Rockefeller Foundation, whose vision, whose genius did so much to help in this work—Dean Rusk. The institute's director today is a New Hampshire man who just addressed us, Dr. Robert Chandler. Yet the professional staff includes scientists of seven nationalities; two-thirds of them are Asian.

In its short 4 years of existence this institute has produced promising new strains of rice yields, which are now being planted in the soil of many countries. One strain developed here has been called the "miracle" rice.

I am glad to know that the institute is prepared to make these seeds available to all nations—to all nations, whatever their politics and ideology. The need for food transcends all the divisions man has created for himself.

At the Manila conference we were deeply concerned with the military struggle in Viet-Nam.⁴

⁴ For texts of the documents issued at the close of the Manila conference, see *ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1966, p. 730.

But we were equally concerned with the critical needs of the societies of Asia, whatever their ideology.

So man's greatest problem is the fearful race between food and population. If we lose that race, our hopes for the future will turn to ashes.

And the shocking truth is that as of now, as we speak here today, we are losing the war on hunger. There are nations of the world with declining standards of living, where population growth is already outrunning the supply of fundamental foodstocks.

At the same time the stocks of surplus-producing nations have rapidly declined.

There was in 1961 a grain surplus of 136 million tons. The figure for 1967 is down from 136 million to 50 million.

A rice surplus of over a million tons existed in 1956. It has now dropped to a mere 300,000 tons, or less than a third of what it was 10 years ago.

These are danger signals that we cannot ignore. For between now and 1980 we must prepare to feed 1 billion more people.

That may sound like a bloodless economic abstraction. But we must learn to hear what it says in human terms:

One billion more people means one billion babies. And four out of five of those babies will be born in countries that cannot today feed their people from their own resources. Somehow or other we must do something about this. Somehow or other we must overcome this. And somehow or other you are doing something about it right here. This is one of the most encouraging things I have seen.

And you at Los Baños are pointing the way that we will need pointed throughout all of Southeast Asia.

Drawing on your experiments, these new rice strains, the technical training you are giving in conjunction with the College of Agriculture at the University of the Philippines—which has your President so excited and who has described it to me fully today—will, I think, do more to escalate the war against hunger than anything that I know of

that is being done today. So I congratulate President [Ferdinand E.] Marcos.

I say that that is the only war that we really seek to escalate.

We believe we can win this war against hunger. Yet victory will not come easily.

These young people believe—and they are right, I think—there is nothing natural or God-given about poverty or hunger and disease.

Some of them react against an unjust state by professing empty ideologies. But some—and they are represented here at Los Baños—realize that only knowledge, skill, and hard work can provide fruitful avenues to a decent future.

In every country, but particularly Asia, Latin America, and Africa, there is a desperate need for skilled men and women who can release their brothers from the *barrios* of poverty.

For if the world's need for food is to be met, it will be by scientists and economists who will discover better seeds, who will find better methods of planting, who will give us better ways of distributing the harvest of the earth. It will not be by "miracles" but by the qualities of dedicated minds that we find working right here tonight in the new Los Baños rice strain.

If illiteracy and disease that we pledged ourselves only yesterday to conquer are conquered, it will be by armies of well-prepared teachers and doctors.

Pickets, pamphlets, angry shouting against the leaders and against the society—these are all quite understandable among young people. But if that is all there is, if there is no equally vigorous determination to prepare for the long, hard task of making a better life for one's people, then that picketing and that shouting will not be enough.

There is an anger that cannot tolerate hunger, disease, illiteracy, or injustice in the world. And it becomes a divine anger when it is translated into the practical work of healing and teaching.

I know and I have seen, I have touched the hands and looked in the eyes of the healers and the teachers here in Asia—in your uni-

versities, among those who are fortunate enough to have escaped a life of poverty, and in the *barrios* and in the villages as well.

Asia's great task is to liberate their energies for their children's sake. On her success our hopes for peace—and the conscience of all mankind—literally depend.

I want to thank Dr. Robert Chandler. I want to express my admiration to him and to all the members of the staff of this great institute.

I want to commend President and Mrs. Marcos for their interest in this kind of a development. Because if we are to win our war—and the only important war that really counts—if we are to win our war against poverty, against disease, against ignorance, against illiteracy, and against hungry stomachs, then we have to succeed in projects like this.

You are pointing the way for all of Asia to follow, and I hope they are looking. I hope they are listening. And I hope they are following.

Remarks at Corregidor, October 26

White House press release (Manila, the Philippines) dated October 26

On behalf of the American people, I accept this bell from the *Houston* with great gratitude and appreciation to you, President Marcos, not only for this thoughtful symbolic act of yours but for the great contributions that you made to preserving freedom in our land and yours.

I am grateful to you for these scrolls that you have presented to me. I shall place one as directed and retain one among my treasured possessions.

When I accepted President Marcos' invitation to visit the Republic of the Philippines, I did so with a very eager heart. Not only did I especially want to meet with your President and other leaders of free Asia whom he brought together here in consultation, but I also wanted to convey to the Philippine people the very deep sentiments of affection and respect that the American people entertain for them.

What American can forget the names

Bataan and Corregidor? We think of them as defeats. But in a more fundamental sense they were victories—because they symbolized the end of the age-old alinement in Asia of white Europeans against the indigenous population.

In those dark days American and Philippine soldiers fought—and they died—shoulder to shoulder against a common foe.

The Philippine people rejected the view that the United States was just another white colonial power. They gave their dedication and their blood in the cause of freedom.

Let me be quite candid this afternoon about this. We Americans—in the temporary flush of expansionism—did for a time flirt with the folly of colonial power.

Yet deep within the American character, as your great President Marcos so magnanimously stated in his address to our American Congress just 6 weeks ago,⁵ there is a rejection of hypocrisy. There is a compelling affirmation of the equality of justice.

We have never abandoned the revolutionary principles of our Declaration of Independence.

Brave Filipinos, like your great President Ferdinand Marcos, risked their lives in a thousand glorious enterprises for the common cause during World War II. They demonstrated not only their sense of comradeship but their recognition that the United States, whatever its aims in the past, shared their aspirations for a free, democratic, and proudly Philippine nationhood. They knew that the American people were not capable of moral double bookkeeping.

Since that time their faith has been vindicated. The Republic of the Philippines stands today as an example to the entire world of what a free nation can accomplish.

As President of the United States, I have been the guest of your Government at a momentous gathering of sovereign states who share certain values and certain dreams.

We are in Manila not to create any leagues or pacts but as a fellowship of Pacific powers

—in both the geographic and ethical senses of the word “pacific.”

Our immediate concern is the war in Viet-Nam, where we have all agreed—and reiterated it with great determination only yesterday—that a terrorist, Communist insurgency sponsored and buttressed by the Hanoi government shall not destroy the independence of Viet-Nam.

The Philippine people, who were racked by a similar armed assault on their sovereignty by the Huks, will recognize the full dimensions of these problems and the nature of the response that must be mounted. You, above all, need no advice on how insurgency should be mastered. You know, as we do, that while arms alone never carry the day, there is no possibility of success without strength.

Indeed, your contribution to the defense of South Viet-Nam has 2,000 of your Filipino citizens laboring at the arduous task of community development, of providing medical and social services to the brave and long-suffering Vietnamese people.

But beyond the struggle in Viet-Nam, you have a wider work to do for peace.

You have retained an Asian identity without rejecting Western values. You have accepted your past—and thus you will play a major role in future relations between our two great cultures. Self-confident, certain of your own destiny, you can speak with the clear voice of understanding to both our peoples.

It was 8 years ago that I authored the legislation that was designed to bring the East and the West better relations. We set up—across a long bridge, then, of 2,400 miles out into the Pacific—the East-West Institute at Honolulu in Hawaii.

This morning, with great pride, I saw the fruits of the great efforts of Dean Rusk, the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, the Philippine Government, and President and Mrs. Marcos in doing what we are doing to provide food for Asia. I look to the future with great hope to see those plans realized.

At Corregidor, the shrine of Philippine-American bravery and sacrifice, I wanted while I was here to pay tribute to the dead

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 10, 1966, p. 534.

and to the living, who are today carrying on their ideals and building the new freedom for which they gave their lives.

Yesterday we pledged ourselves to provide the essentials that are necessary to maintain a defense against aggression in this area of the world. Yesterday we rededicated and re-resolved to spend our efforts and our talent to fighting a war against hunger, poverty, disease, and ignorance—against the ancient enemies of mankind.

We pledged ourselves to find the root causes of war and to beat them. And under the great leadership of this young man who distinguished himself in war and is now leading in the march for peace, we shall succeed.

THE VISIT TO THAILAND

Toast at a Dinner in Honor of King Bhumibol Adulyadej at Bangkok, October 29

White House press release (Bangkok, Thailand) dated October 29; advance text

A distinguished visitor to my country once said:

. . . from the beginning of our relationship right up to the present time no conflict of any kind has arisen to disturb our cordial friendship and understanding. On the contrary there has been mutual good will and close cooperation between our two countries. . . . the time is ripe for an even closer cooperation. It will demonstrate to the world that we are one in purpose and conviction, and it can only lead to one thing—mutual benefit.

Those words were said about Thailand and the United States.

They were the words Your Majesty used when you addressed the joint session of our Congress in 1960.⁶

Since then, the relations between our two countries have followed the course set out by Your Majesty. Cooperation between our countries has grown. That cooperation has shown the world that our purposes are the same. And it is surely clear to all—except, possibly, to those who wish to misunderstand—that the result of Thai-American cooperation has been mutual benefit.

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, July 25, 1960, p. 144.

Most of us think of this cooperation as new. I read recently, for example, a report which said that the first offer of assistance between Thailand and the United States was in 1951.

Whoever wrote that report did not know his history very well.

In fact, the first offer of assistance between our countries was made in 1861. It was made by your great King Mongkut to our great President Abraham Lincoln.

We were then engaged in a great Civil War. Our people and our Government were sorely pressed. Your King wished to help. And he acted directly on that wish. He did not send a negotiating team. He did not ask his councilors to hold public hearings. He did not propose a joint working group to study the situation. He merely picked up his pen and wrote a letter to President Lincoln.

He had learned, he wrote, that the United States had no elephants. He pointed out the importance of elephants in economic life. And he suggested that they might play a useful role in America. He asked the President to consider the matter and to let him know if he wanted to try the experiment. If so, he would provide the elephants—and the United States could supply the transportation.

Consider the happy simplicity of this proposal:

—No suggestion that President Lincoln send some Americans to Thailand to learn how to handle elephants;

—No proposal to set up a school outside Washington where Thai technicians would instruct Americans on the care and maintenance of elephants;

—No long-term agreement proposed to insure a supply of spare parts or replacements.

Mr. Lincoln thought seriously about the proposal. Then he picked up his pen and wrote a letter to King Mongkut. He thanked the King, and he said he would happily accept the offer—save for that fact that the climate in our country was too cold for elephants to prosper.

Perhaps the President felt that the supply system of the American Army was not able

to absorb this new technology. He may have felt that he lacked the technicians necessary to use the weapon effectively.

I have sometimes wondered whether the President was right. That tragic war lasted for 4 years after he received your King's letter. Who can say what the effect would have been if in 1861 on a foggy morning in the rolling Virginia hills the army had advanced behind a screen of charging war elephants?

In any case, this incident from our common past makes one thing clear: The disposition of our two countries to help each other goes back well into the past. I am sure it will continue way into the future—and that it will always be mutually rewarding.

Your Majesty, President Lincoln closed his letter to your great-grandfather—more than 100 years ago—with these words:

. . . wishing for Your Majesty a long and happy life, and for the generous . . . people of Siam the highest possible prosperity, I commend both to the blessing of Almighty God.

On that occasion—as upon others—Mr. Lincoln spoke for all Americans—and for all time. I cannot improve upon his words. I can only reinforce his sentiments. For the friendship between our nations is a very great and a very special treasure.

Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen: I ask you to join me in a toast to His Majesty the King.

THE VISIT TO MALAYSIA

Arrival Statement, Kuala Lumpur, October 30

White House press release (Bangkok, Thailand) dated October 29 for release October 30; advance text

I am delighted to be here in Malaysia.

I feel that I know you, because Malaysia, like the United States, is a federation of states which were once colonies of Great Britain and because Malaysia is, like the United States, a nation of many diverse peoples, different religions, and different cultures. Here, as in America, you are working to reduce racial tensions so that all men may live in peace with one another.

Malaysia, like the United States, has been making great social and economic progress,

based on the concept of personal initiative. That concept—that a man should be free to make the best of his life as he sees fit—is one that my people cherish.

But though I feel that I know you, I am here to learn. I know that your nation is a model of what may be done by determined and far-sighted men in Southeast Asia and in other parts of the world. You valiantly subdued a Communist insurgency in your nation. And then, from the very same room where you once planned battle strategy, you planned the works of peace. You began building a free and prospering countryside that can relieve the poverty and the apathy upon which communism thrives.

Your achievement in this respect, I believe, has the greatest significance for our struggle in Viet-Nam today. You have shown that military action can stop Communist aggression and that, while the aggression is being stopped—and even more strongly when it is stopped—the peace, as well as the war, can be won.

Your example offers us hope for the future.

It is a pleasure to be here and to see it firsthand.

Remarks at a State Dinner at Kuala Lumpur, October 30

White House press release (Bangkok, Thailand) dated October 30; advance text

My Malaysian friends: I have traveled more than 15,000 miles since I left Washington 2 weeks ago and am near the end of my journey through Asia. Soon I must return to America.

Nowhere in my travels have I found greater expectations than here in Malaysia. For here the promises of a new nation are bright. Here the accomplishments of orderly and evolutionary development are real.

Fifteen years ago Kuala Lumpur was a city in conflict. You were absorbed in fighting terrorists. Your streets were filled with soldiers and your hospitals with the wounded.

Malaysia was traveling that difficult road along which one of your near-neighbors, South Viet-Nam, now toils with such sacrifice.

Yet here today we see what the future can

hold for that troubled country. We see a bright and thriving capital bursting with energy. We see an inspiring new mosque, symbolizing your trust in God. We see a beautiful new museum, showing your respect for a rich past. We see new buildings and new industries, marking your economic progress.

Three of the world's great peoples have come together in your nations. They are people who differ in many ways but who have the will to live together in peace and harmony and with a sense of nationhood.

I know of your accomplishments:

—how you have given rural development and education first priority in your federal budget;

—how you have made land available to the landless;

—how you have improved rural health services and rural education.

You have impressed the world with your determination to close the gap between the rich and poor of your own nation—especially by giving the impoverished countryside a chance to share in the promise of the nation. You knew the formula was complicated, requiring roads, schools, fair prices for the farmer, available credit, chemical fertilizers, the opportunity for farmers to own land—all of these things together. And you have set about providing them with imagination and skill.

Today, Malaysia is at peace. And equally important, your nation is reaching outward to its neighbors in a spirit of cooperation and mutual respect.

Six years ago Malaysia joined with Thailand and the Philippines in the Association of Southeast Asia to foster closer cultural and economic ties.

Some said then that the association was ahead of its time. But it is now clear that ASA was the first step in a larger movement toward common efforts to meet the problems and realize the promise of Southeast Asia. This movement is now sweeping through Asia.

Asia, like other parts of the world, has for

centuries been divided by local and narrow national rivalries. Differences and divisions were more important than common problems and aspirations.

Now all that is changing. As a Malaysian statesman said: "Every nation, every group within a nation, has a direct and vital role to play in the coming struggle for unity and plenty."

Malaysia is playing such a role today.

If ASA was a symbol of a new era, Malaysia itself is, in another sense, a symbol of hope.

You have demonstrated that an independent nation can rise from long years of bitter struggle against Communist terror to create economic prosperity and to lead in regional cooperation.

For a weary and war-torn land across the South China Sea, Malaysia stands as a symbol of what is possible—and what surely will come to pass.

Throughout Asia, men long to turn aside from fear and turmoil and bloodshed. They seek only the works of peace—a goal that sometimes seems too distant to be attainable.

While I have been in Asia the Communist Chinese have exploded another nuclear weapon, which they state was attached to a missile. We can only regard the pursuit of national nuclear power by too large a part of the underdeveloped world as a tragic fact. For bread is the need of millions who face starvation every day, and bombs are too often purchased at the price of bread.

The pursuit of a national nuclear capability not only makes international arms control, including a nuclear test ban and a non-proliferation treaty, vastly more difficult. It also invites danger to China itself. For the leaders of China must realize that any nuclear capability they can develop can—and will—be deterred. We have already declared that nations which do not seek national nuclear weapons can be sure that they will have our strong support, if they need it, against any threat of nuclear blackmail.

We hope that mainland China, like other developing nations, will concentrate its resources on economic development. In this

way a truly modern China can emerge on the mainland. For a peaceful China has nothing to fear from any of us. A peaceful China can expect friendship and cooperation. A reckless China can expect vigilance and strength.

All of Asia will gain when the day comes to pass that China is at peace with her neighbors and free from the fears and suspicion that keep her isolated from the world.

My friends, I shall forever cherish the reception you have given me as the representative of the American people.

The ties that link the Malaysian and American peoples can only become stronger as we pursue our common goals—as we build democracy and protect freedom; as we resist aggression and subversion; as we seek to end

world tensions; and as we strive to eliminate ignorance and illiteracy, disease and poverty.

As you move forward, know that you have the friendship of my people.

May I ask you to join with me in raising your glasses to the King [His Majesty Tuanku Ismail Nasiruddin Shah].

Note

The version of President Johnson's remarks at a state dinner at the Governor General's residence at Wellington, New Zealand, on October 19 which appeared in the BULLETIN of November 7, p. 703, was an advance text and was not actually delivered.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LV, NO. 1431 PUBLICATION 8165 NOVEMBER 28, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of

the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Chronological List of Material on President Johnson's Trip to Asia as Published in the Bulletin

Date (Local)	Statements and Addresses by the President and Other Documents	Bulletin References
October 17	Departure statement, Dulles International Airport, Chantilly, Va. <i>Visits En Route to Asia</i>	Nov. 7, p. 698
October 17	Arrival statement, Honolulu International Airport, Hawaii	Nov. 7, p. 698
October 17	Address, East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii	Nov. 28, p. 812
October 18	Arrival statement, Pago Pago, American Samoa <i>The Visit to New Zealand</i>	Nov. 28, p. 816
October 19	Arrival statement, Ohakea Airport	Nov. 7, p. 700
October 19	Arrival statement, Wellington International Airport	Nov. 7, p. 701
October 20	Address, Parliamentary luncheon, Wellington <i>The Visit to Australia</i>	Nov. 7, p. 703
October 20	Arrival statement, RAAF Fairbairn Airport, Canberra	Nov. 7, p. 707
October 21	Address, Parliament House, Canberra	Nov. 28, p. 818
October 21	Remarks at a reception at Government House, Melbourne	Nov. 7, p. 708
October 22	Arrival statement, Mascot Airport, Sydney	Nov. 28, p. 822
October 22	Remarks at the Art Gallery of New South Wales, Sydney	Nov. 28, p. 823
October 22	Arrival statement, Brisbane International Airport	Nov. 28, p. 824
October 23	Departure statement, Garbutt Air Force Base, Townsville <i>The Visit to the Philippines</i>	Nov. 28, p. 826
October 24-25	Manila Summit Conference: Texts of joint communique and other documents	Nov. 14, p. 730
October 26	Address, International Rice Research Institute, Los Baños	Nov. 28, p. 828
October 26	Remarks at Corregidor	Nov. 28, p. 829
October 26	Remarks to American servicemen, <i>Cam Ranh Bay, South Viet-Nam</i>	Nov. 14, p. 735
October 27	Report to the Nation (telephoned from Manila to Washington) <i>The Visit to Thailand</i>	Nov. 14, p. 736
October 28	Arrival statement, Municipal Pavilion, Bangkok	Nov. 21, p. 766
October 28	Toast to the King at a state dinner, Bangkok	Nov. 21, p. 767
October 29	Address, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok	Nov. 21, p. 768
October 29	Toast at a dinner in honor of the King, Bangkok <i>The Visit to Malaysia</i>	Nov. 28, p. 831
October 30	Arrival statement, Kuala Lumpur	Nov. 28, p. 832
October 30	Toast to the King at a state dinner, Kuala Lumpur <i>The Visit to Korea</i>	Nov. 28, p. 832
October 31	Arrival statement, City Hall Plaza, Seoul	Nov. 21, p. 770
October 31	Toast to the President of Korea at a state dinner, Seoul	Nov. 21, p. 771
November 1	Remarks to American servicemen, Camp Stanley	Nov. 21, p. 772
November 1	Remarks at Tae-an Myun Agriculture Demonstration Area	Nov. 21, p. 774
November 2	Address, Korean National Assembly, Seoul	Nov. 21, p. 775
November 2	Joint statement: President Johnson and President Park	Nov. 21, p. 777
November 2	Departure statement, Kimpo Airport, Seoul <i>Return to the United States</i>	Nov. 21, p. 780
November 1	Arrival statement, Elmendorf Air Force Base, Anchorage, Alaska	Nov. 28, p. 806
November 2	Remarks at a civic meeting, Anchorage	Nov. 28, p. 807
November 2	Arrival statement, Dulles International Airport, Chantilly, Va.	Nov. 28, p. 809

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Background Notes

The *Background Notes* series of pamphlets is a useful reference tool for teachers and students and an interesting and accurate source of background information for travelers and businessmen. Written by State Department "desk officers," *Background Notes* contain concise, authentic information about the political, economic, and social life of other nations. Averaging about 4,000 words, each *Note* includes an up-to-date map and a selected bibliography. The *Notes* are presented in an easy-to-read format suitable for filing in a looseleaf notebook.

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THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN

Vol. LV, No. 1432



December 5, 1966

THE FUTURE OF THE PACIFIC COMMUNITY

Address by Secretary Rusk 838

POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY

by Assistant Secretary Sisco 856

THE WORLD'S FOOD AND POPULATION PROBLEMS

by Richard W. Reuter 862

SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF NOVEMBER 18 844

For index see inside back cover

The Future of the Pacific Community

Address by Secretary Rusk¹

Tonight I should like to share with you some observations about the Pacific community of nations. The trip with the President from which I recently returned was my ninth to the Western Pacific as Secretary of State.

I have always found in that area great reservoirs of friendliness and good will toward the United States. This was, of course, vividly evident during President Johnson's recent tour. Every place he went he received the most enthusiastic welcome probably ever accorded a visitor from another land.

And I think his trip laid to rest the canard that what the United States is doing in Viet-Nam is not understood and supported in that part of the world. Those closest to the danger know that South Viet-Nam is the target of an aggression—and that that aggression must be repelled if there is to be a reasonable prospect of peace in East Asia and the Western Pacific.

Increasingly, those who understand the danger are willing to help in dealing with it. For various reasons, a few leaders are not so frank in public. But generally in that area it is realized that our firm stand in Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia is giving the nations of the region time to build and organize their

strength, resources, and development. I doubt that there is a non-Communist government in that part of the world that would not be deeply alarmed if it thought we and our allies would falter in our resolve to secure to the people of South Viet-Nam the right to make their own future under leaders and institutions of their own choice.

Another salient reality about East Asia and the Western Pacific is the economic and social progress of most of the non-Communist countries. Some of them face difficult problems. But nearly all are making genuine advances and look to the future with high confidence.

You note that I don't speak of the "Far East." Several years ago I began to try to get away from that designation. And recently in the State Department we finally managed the bureaucratic feat of changing the name of our Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs to Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Whatever we call it, the area we are talking about is to our west—and it is manifesting the kind of vitality and self-confidence and sense of boundless opportunity that Americans have traditionally associated with the "West" or the "Far West" or the "Great West."

This great area across the Pacific is immense by any measurement: area, population, natural resources, or what you will. Wellington is as far from Saigon as Vienna is and as far from Seoul as Moscow is from Washington. Canberra is as far from

¹ Made before the annual meeting of the Association of State Colleges and National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges at Washington, D.C., on Nov. 15 (press release 274).

Bangkok as Washington is from London. The population, outside mainland China, is roughly 350 million. And it contains peoples of rich cultures and high talents.

Wherever you go among the non-Communist nations of the Pacific you find hope and confidence. And in most you find impressive forward movement.

Economic Progress in Asian-Pacific Area

New Zealand has achieved a new high in per capita income. Australia is forging ahead. Its potential is vast—and will be even greater as it solves its water problem. Thailand has made very substantial economic progress. So has Malaysia. The Republic of the Philippines has new, dynamic leadership. The Republic of China on Taiwan has become a showplace of the Western Pacific and is providing technical assistance to approximately 25 countries.

Indonesia has pulled back from the abyss and is putting its affairs in order. It has the resources to become one of the prosperous nations of the world.

The Republic of Korea is making remarkable economic progress both industrially and in agricultural production. At the same time it continues to be a major contributor to the security of free Asia. Its troops stand shoulder to shoulder with ours not only on the northern rampart of freedom but on the southern front. In ratio to population, its contribution of troops to the defense of South Viet-Nam is comparable to ours.

Japan's spectacular economic development is widely known, although it may not be so generally realized that at present rates of growth Japan will soon be third in rank among the industrial nations of the world. It is particularly gratifying that Japan's rise to unprecedented heights of productivity and per capita income has been achieved by peaceful means under democratic institutions. We are proud to have this highly talented and industrious nation as a major partner in the free world.

The economic progress of the free nations

of the Western Pacific, including the Republic of China on Taiwan, stands in sharp contrast to mainland China—where there has been no increase in per capita income in the last 10 years.

Another momentous development is that the free nations of East Asia and the Western Pacific have begun to work together. Regional and subregional cooperation is proliferating on an impressive scale and holds great promise for the future.

ECAFE [Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East], a branch of the United Nations, with a strong executive secretary and a professional staff, has been the sponsor of a broad range of cooperative activities and organizations.

The new Asian Development Bank will hold its inaugural meeting this month. It should become an important instrument of economic development not only through the funds it makes available but, even more, through leadership in sound planning.

ASPAC, the Asian-Pacific Council of 10 nations formed in Seoul last spring, is not only a political forum but has underway working-group studies of various projects for cooperation in economic, social, and cultural fields.

The Association of Southeast Asia has been reactivated by its founders, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Its membership is open to others, and from it may evolve a larger grouping.

The Colombo Plan, a broad informal association, continues to provide a forum for joint examination of country development plans, problems, and policies.

In addition to those and other regional organizations, there have been some important *ad hoc* meetings, such as the ministerial conference on Southeast Asian development held this spring at the initiative of Japan; the Asian agricultural development conference, also Japanese-initiated, scheduled to meet next month; periodic meetings of the Southeast Asian education ministers.

Most of these organizations and meetings

are the result of initiatives by the free nations of the area. In most, the United States has not even participated.

Vital Contributions by the United States

The United States has made vital contributions to the independence and to the economic and social advance of the free nations of East Asia and the Western Pacific.

One has been to help provide a shield of security. This has been, and still is, indispensable. Our response when the Republic of Korea was invaded; the powerful, mobile, military forces we have maintained in the Pacific; our assistance to free nations in the area in building their military defenses and economic strength; the defensive alliances through which we gave warning to would-be aggressors and reassured their potential victims—these measures were indispensable in creating the secure environment that has enabled the free nations of the area to survive and advance.

Another vital contribution was a peace of genuine reconciliation with Japan.

A third has been our aid in economic and social development: capital; technical assistance in many fields; and, more broadly and fundamentally, aid in education.

In the epochal task of assisting the developing countries in that area—as in other areas—the American institutions of learning represented here tonight have played an enormous role.

I think first of the missionary teachers and doctors.

I think of the special undertakings of various American universities in association with local universities: in training teachers and administrators, in developing professional schools, in transferring the techniques of a wide range of professional and vocational skills. (Twenty-nine American colleges and universities have had AID contracts in East Asia.)

I think of the exchanges of professors; of the thousands of young Asians who have received part of their advanced education in

the United States; of thousands of others who have come here for shorter periods of special training; of the experts in agriculture and other practical skills we have sent to those countries; of the volunteers of the Peace Corps, of whom approximately half in that part of the world are engaged in educational activities; of our USIS libraries; of the educational materials, including millions of textbooks, we have provided; of the continuing work of the East-West Center in Hawaii.

Of course, we have not been alone in this effort. Great Britain, Australia, France, and many nations, including Japan, have contributed on a significant scale. The Republic of the Philippines is an increasingly important regional center for education and training. Thailand has made many contributions to regional educational programs, including support for SEATO educational and scientific programs and the new Asian Institute of Technology in Bangkok. Taiwan is exporting expert assistance, especially in agriculture.

While the President was in the Philippines on this trip, he visited an institution in which I have been interested since it was set up in 1960 by the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations in cooperation with the Government of the Philippines: the International Rice Research Institute at Los Baños.² Rice is the most important single food crop in the world, and the people of Asia eat more than nine-tenths of all the rice grown. But much of the research done on rice in Japan and the United States is not directly applicable to South and Southeast Asia.

The professional staff of the institute at Los Baños includes scientists of seven nationalities. And many young scientists from Asia go there for training; the institute had 64 research scholars during 1965.

In 6 years IRRI has laid the scientific

² For an address by President Johnson at Los Baños on Oct. 26, see BULLETIN of Nov. 28, 1966, p. 828.

basis for revolutionary improvements in rice production in South and Southeast Asia and other tropical rice-growing countries. One variety it has developed produces at least twice the yield the best farmers now obtain with the varieties available to them in such countries as India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

This one development won't solve the food/population problem, which is moving rapidly toward a stage of crisis for the human race. But it should help to relieve what Mahatma Gandhi once called "the eternal compulsory fast" of his and other people.

Education and Economic Growth

A recent study at Brookings sustains the not surprising presumption that economic growth is related to ratios of educational enrollment to total population. It indicated that gross national product per capita begins sustained growth when primary enrollments reach 8 to 10 percent of the total population; that subsequent economic growth seems to be associated with the expansion of secondary enrollment beyond 2 percent of the population; then, finally, with the growth of university level enrollments.

Some such relationship between educational and economic growth appears in the East Asia and Pacific area. Japan passed the 10 percent mark in primary enrollments before 1900, the 2 percent enrollment in secondary schools during the First World War; and its enrollment at the university level in ratio to total population is now the third highest in the world. Australia and New Zealand have educational records not unlike Japan's; and they rank among the world's leaders in per capita GNP.

Taiwan and the Republic of Korea have high rates of literacy and increasing enrollments in secondary schools and universities. And the expansion of education in the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong has followed or been accompanied by the economic growth that has been the hallmark of the last 10 years.

And despite war and terror—including the assassination of schoolteachers by the Viet Cong—South Viet-Nam has achieved the ratios of enrollment associated elsewhere with the beginning of sustained economic growth.

I would not wish to press this parallel too far—much depends upon the nature and quality of the education, especially at the secondary levels and higher. As we are all aware, some countries have more university graduates than can find useful employment while they are still short of men and women with essential professional and vocational skills.

In any event, in most of the free nations of East Asia and the Western Pacific the educational foundations have been laid for sustained economic, social, and political development.

Common Purposes Expressed at Manila

A few words about the recent Manila Conference:³ As you know, the participants were the chiefs of state or heads of government of the seven nations which are making military contributions to the defense of South Viet-Nam. It was the result of Asian initiatives. And President Johnson listened carefully to his associates from the six other countries.

Anyone who thinks that these countries are "clients" of the United States—that they would take orders from us or anybody else—is a victim of fantasy. These are proud, self-reliant peoples led by men who do not hesitate to assert their minds.

The Manila Conference was not essentially a conference on military strategy. It was about South Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia, yes, but also about the future of East Asia and the Western Pacific as a whole. It revealed agreement on a wide range of matters. All were set forth in the published state-

³ For text of documents issued at the close of the Manila Conference on Oct. 25, see *ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1966, p. 730.

ments—there were no secret agreements or understandings.

The seven participants summed up their fundamental common purposes in four Goals of Freedom:

1. To be free from aggression.
2. To conquer hunger, illiteracy, and disease.
3. To build a region of security, order, and progress.
4. To seek reconciliation and peace throughout Asia and the Pacific.

I have already discussed the second and third points. As to the first, freedom from aggression, I would make just a few comments.

The elimination of aggression is the first essential in organizing a stable peace. It is, in essence, the first obligation of every member of the United Nations under the charter which we and others of like mind wrote while the flames of the Second World War were still raging, while we were thinking hard about how that catastrophe came about and how "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

The prevention of aggression is the paramount purpose of the defensive alliances we have entered into with more than 40 other nations. It is the first purpose of our own powerful and varied Military Establishment.

I think it is generally—if not universally—realized that a thermonuclear aggression would not be a rational act. I think it is generally—if not universally—realized that open aggression by large-scale movement of conventional forces across frontiers involves prohibitive risks for the aggressor.

Aggression in South Viet-Nam

But indirect aggression by infiltration of men and arms across frontiers is still with us. It was tried in Greece, in Malaya, in the Philippines, and now in South Viet-Nam. The label "civil war" or "war of national liberation" does not make it any less an aggression. The purpose is to impose on

others an unwanted regime. It substitutes terror for persuasion, force for free choice. And especially if it succeeds, it contains the inherent threat of further aggression—and eventually a great war.

Those who speak of the struggle in South Viet-Nam as essentially a civil war are ignoring overwhelming evidence. There was no serious threat until 1959–60, when North Viet-Nam set in motion a systematic effort to seize control of South Viet-Nam by force.

Of course, there is an indigenous element, but the fact that the invaders from the North are Vietnamese does not make this just an internal affair. The aggression against the Republic of Korea was launched by North Koreans. Would Moscow, or anyone else, treat it as a purely internal affair if the Federal Republic of Germany were to send thousands of armed men, including some 20 full regiments of its regular army, into East Germany?

The militant Asian Communists have themselves proclaimed the attack on South Viet-Nam to be a critical test of this technique. And beyond South Viet-Nam and Laos they have openly designated Thailand as the next target.

Today, as 30 years ago, there are people who do not read, or tell us to ignore, the openly proclaimed expansionist designs of ambitious men. But experience warns us that this would be imprudent. It is quite true that those who would like to impose their will on others sometimes lack the means to do so. That is so today where the power of the United States stands as a barrier.

Of course, there are differences between Hitler and other aggressors of a generation ago and those which have disturbed or threatened the peace in more recent years. But those who dwell on the differences often becloud the heart of the matter, which is aggression.

Now, as a generation ago, some people are saying that if you let an aggressor take just one more bite, he will be satisfied. But one of the plainest lessons of our times is that one

aggression leads to another—by the initial aggressor and perhaps by others who decide there would be profit in emulating him.

Some assert that we have no national security interest in South Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia. But that is not the judgment of those who have borne the high responsibilities for the safety of the United States. Beginning with President Truman, four successive Presidents, after extended consultation with their principal advisers, have decided that we have a very important interest in the security of that area.

There is a further and more specific reason why we are assisting South Viet-Nam: Out of the strategic conclusions of four successive Presidents came commitments, including the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. The Senate approved it with only one negative vote.

Our commitments are the backbone of world peace. It is essential that neither our adversaries nor our friends ever doubt that we will do what we say we will do. Otherwise, the result is very likely to be a great catastrophe.

In his last public utterance President Kennedy reviewed what the United States had done to preserve freedom and peace since the

Second World War, and our defensive commitments, including our support of South Viet-Nam. He said: "We are still the keystone in the arch of freedom, and I think we will continue to do as we have done in the past, our duty. . . ."

The resolve of President Johnson and a great majority of the American people is, I believe, clear. And it is the resolve of the other governments which are contributing military forces to the defense of South Viet-Nam. This aggression will be repelled.

At the same time, we and our allies have persistently sought peace. Never in the history of warfare has there been greater effort—by one side—to move armed conflict to the conference table.

What are the Communists prepared to do if we should suspend bombing of the North? So far they have not indicated that they are willing to reciprocate in any way.

Eventually the aggressor must realize that he has nothing to gain from continuing this war. We and our allies have made it plain that we are not trying to change the government of North Viet-Nam—and that a North Viet-Nam that does not use force against its neighbors would be welcomed as a partner in economic development.

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of November 18

Press release 277 dated November 18

Secretary Rusk: Well, I am glad to see some of the veterans of the Asian trip getting back home—things coming back to normal.

I called on the President this morning and was delighted to find him in fine fettle and filled with the usual, which means extraordinary, energy that characterizes him. I went out to have a little roundup with him on things that have been happening in the last few days in the international field.

I would like to welcome a group of distinguished visitors here today, a group of European and Ecuadorean journalists who are with us on a visit to the United States, and a group of 10 graduate fellows who are at the Washington Journalism Center. Glad to have you here to see the grilling of the Secretary of State.

Ready for your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you assess the prospects for a Christmas truce in Viet-Nam?

A. Well, we, I think, ought to distinguish between what might happen at Christmas and the idea of a general pause of the sort that came during the Christmas and the New Year's season during January of this year.

We have not been able to get indications from the other side as to what would happen if the bombing were stopped. We have tried almost literally every week since last January to get an answer to that question. And so I would not want to hold out the expectation that a prolonged pause in the bombing might occur.

I think it would be for the South Vietnamese in the first instance, and to some extent depend on the Viet Cong, as to what might

happen during such special days as Christmas and the Tet period. But we will have to see what happens on that. I don't have any hard information on either one of those subjects at the present time.

North Viet-Nam Rejects Peace Talks

Q. Mr. Secretary, some people have the impression, as the American forces continue to build up over there and the pressure continues, that the emphasis of the United States and its allies, despite occasional concessions in the way of words of peace, is shifted more to military; that the affairs are in the hands of the military more than the diplomats and the ambassadors. I am sure that you would probably not agree with this, but I wonder if you would assess the relative balance in the situation?

A. Yes. If there is any weighting between those two, this is solely due to the fact that the other side has not been willing to undertake serious discussions or to come to a conference table or to engage in a conference or to start making peace here. This is not through lack of contact with the other side. And the men keep coming from the North.

Now, so long as these men keep coming from the North and these North Vietnamese regiments in South Viet-Nam continue to operate, then there is a military problem and that military problem has to be faced. It has to be faced at the level of the engagement of substantial units, such as has been going on in this Attleboro Operation, and it has to be faced at the level of pacification.

We would be glad to see this matter moved from the military to the diplomats at any moment, literally any moment. And we have

tried to emphasize—I think there can be no doubt at all about our view on this—we have emphasized over and over again that we are prepared for a political process which will bring this situation to a close.

Indeed, I suspect that the efforts that have been made in that direction are literally without precedent in history—where one side in a conflict of this sort has gone to such extraordinary efforts to probe the possibilities of a peaceful settlement, efforts which have been systematically and persistently rejected or refused by the other side.

So that if this appears to show more motion on the military side than on the diplomatic side at the moment, this is not because of inactivity on the diplomatic side but because the other side refuses to move through diplomacy and its men keep coming from the North, and those men have to be met.

Q. Well, sir, a related question. Are you aware of any specific plan whereby the authority of the United States Ambassador to Viet-Nam would be diminished, particularly in favor of the military?

A. No. I saw a rumor on that today. There is nothing in it.

Q. What about Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge coming home, sir?

A. Well, I suspect he will take some leave at some point. But I have no indication he is coming home in any other sense. He is entitled to leave, and he is due for some leave. But there is nothing in the mill on the other side.

U.N. Discussion on Chinese Representation

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been reports that the United States might be willing to consider in the United Nations a Canadian or an Italian proposal to have the Secretary-General study the problem of admission of two Chinas to the United Nations. Could you tell us whether there has been any movement in the United States' position on this?

A. Thus far there have been two resolutions tabled in the United Nations on the Chinese representation question. The one, a

resolution to declare that decisions on this matter are important questions which must be decided by a two-thirds vote; we think that resolution will pass by the necessary majority. The other, a resolution tabled by Cambodia, Albania, and certain others, that would expel the Republic of China and seat Peking in its place; we think that resolution will be defeated.

There has been discussion among delegations as to possible additional resolutions, and I understand that the Italian Minister [Attilio Piccioni, chairman of the Italian delegation to the U.N.] mentioned such a resolution in his statement to the General Assembly today. I have not seen the exact text of such a resolution. We know that there has been some interest in a study committee. We had a study committee in 1950 to look at this situation.

I would not wish to comment precisely on a resolution until I see the text. But I can confirm that that kind of discussion has been going on in the United Nations.

Visit to the Far East

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a disclosure by the President that you were going to the Far East on your way to the NATO meeting. There has been some discussion or suggestion that President Eisenhower visit there next spring. There have also been some suggestions that Ambassador Arthur Goldberg would be going out there in December. Can you say specifically, sir, the purpose of your visit and perhaps the general nature of these other visits?

A. Well, I can talk about mine a little bit. I would prefer not to talk about a visit which might be made by President Eisenhower. That would be up to him and the arrangements which might be worked out.

But I do plan to go to the NATO meeting by way of the Far East. In our Manila Conference it was quite clear that close consultation among governments involved in Viet-Nam was very much appreciated. It gives me a chance to stop in certain capitals—I am not prepared to announce which capitals

—on the way to NATO in order to review the situation that exists at that time since the Manila meeting and to keep in close touch with the governments who have such an important stake in what happens out there.

There is nothing particularly dramatic about it or unusual about it.

I expect among other places to visit Saigon on the way through, and that will give me a good chance to get a full briefing before I get to the NATO meeting, where I know our NATO allies will want to have the latest information about that situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has a Christmas truce formally been proposed to the United States, and if so, by whom?

A. No, not at this point.

U.S.—Eastern European Relations

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the last month or so the atmosphere has seemed to have been improved between the United States and the Soviet Union especially in the Communist world. I wonder if you could assess this, and has this atmosphere been, in your view, worsened any by this recent case of this American, [Vladimir] Kazan-Komarek, detained in Czechoslovakia?

A. On the last point, the case of Mr. Kazan-Komarek, we are pressing very hard for immediate consular access to this gentleman, who is an American citizen. We have been very much disturbed by the circumstances under which he was pulled off of an airplane that was making what was described as an emergency landing in Prague and for reasons that were not disclosed to us and without consular access.

He was a member of a travel bureau, accredited to Intourist. He had been invited to Moscow for a travel conference by the Soviet Union. He was returning on a Soviet plane that he had no reason to believe would be touching down in Prague. As a former Czech, obviously that is a matter in which he would have some interest.

We do not like the circumstances of this man's treatment. We are trying to get con-

sular access. We would hope that it would be speedily resolved.

This is one of those things which can have an influence on bilateral relations between ourselves and Czechoslovakia, and we would prefer to see the matter settled expeditiously and in accord with general practice in matters of this sort.

As far as the general relationship is concerned, we continue to get from Eastern Europe some severe criticisms and some very extreme language about a number of problems, particularly the problem of South Vietnam. Nevertheless, it has been President Johnson's desire that we do our best to try to find points of agreement on one or another point as they arise in discussion.

As you know, we have recently signed the civil air agreement with the Soviet Union.¹

President Johnson, last May, took an important initiative in proposing a treaty on outer space. That has been under consideration by the appropriate committee of the United Nations. We would hope that that could come to a conclusion very soon. That outer space treaty, somewhat on the analogy of the Antarctic Treaty, would be a step forward—although it would not settle all of our problems here on earth.

We also hope that we can make some serious progress on the subject of nonproliferation. We have had discussions with the members of the Geneva conference during the present discussions in New York before the United Nations General Assembly. We have had discussions with the Soviet Union, the cochairman of that conference. We think that there has been some underbrush cleared away. But I cannot tell you today that we see an agreement in sight.

In any event, if we see that there is a possibility that some real progress can be made, we will want to discuss this fully with our allies, particularly in NATO, and move on the basis of allied solidarity in concluding any such agreement.

We would like to see these developments.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 21, 1966, p. 791.

The President has put forward the East-West trade bill.²

Now, there have been many reasons why people in this country can be annoyed with people in Eastern Europe. They have been saying some very harsh things about us. But we have not retaliated in kind on such exchanges. We would like to get on with the quiet business of trying to improve situations where they can be improved and, where necessary, to do our duty, as we try to do in Viet-Nam.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do the circumstances of a plane being diverted to Prague have implications for a civil air agreement for travel between Moscow and New York?

A. Well, I don't believe that particular incident has an organic connection with the civil air agreement, or we would not link the two. We are, of course, interested in the circumstances in which that plane stopped off in Prague and what the Soviet Union can do about one of its invited guests who was taken off the plane during its stop in Prague. And we are in touch with the Soviet Union on that subject.

Communist Chinese Nuclear Test

Q. Mr. Secretary, since your last press conference, Communist China has announced the testing of a nuclear missile.³ Can you give us your judgment, sir, as to what you regard as the strategic and political impacts of this?

A. Well, I think that as soon as they exploded a nuclear device it was clear that very shortly they would be able to produce a weapon which could be dropped from an airplane, for example, and that raised the possibility that in a very short space of time they could have a weapon that would at least be capable of being dropped on one or another of their immediate neighbors.

We also have known that they have been

² For background and text of the proposed legislation, see *ibid.*, May 30, 1966, p. 838.

³ For a Department statement of Oct. 28, see *ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1966, p. 744.

engaged in missile experimentation and missile development, but it is not our impression that they have made important progress on that at the present time. I believe Chairman Seaborg [Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission] commented on that just in the last day or so. I think there is some time before the Chinese are in the intercontinental system.

But I would myself suppose that—or hope that—by that time the Chinese will be sufficiently sophisticated about these matters to know that the use of these weapons under any circumstances anywhere on their own initiative would be a reckless act which could cause the greatest problems for them, even though they might just possibly cause some problems for others.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Washington Post reported the other day that the United States has refused to make public the files of Mr. [Kurt Georg] Kiesinger which are contained in the Allied Documentation Center in Berlin. If this is a fact, why was it so?

A. Well, I'm not going to comment on questions which are very much involved in the internal political arrangements of our friends in Germany these days. The Allied files are not secret to the Allies. All of the Allies have access to those files.

Now, Mr. Kiesinger has made his statement in a letter to the Washington Post. I'm not going to get into that or get into the question of the Berlin deputies voting because these are very much involved in the internal situation in Germany.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Italian U.N. proposal talks about existing realities in Asia, and people have taken that to mean essentially the two-China idea. Could you help us understand what circumstances would have to be present for the United States to associate itself with this concept?

A. Well, I prefer not to speculate about the future. Those circumstances don't exist today. So let's wait and see whether the circumstances change.

The Problem of German Reunification

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the East-West problem, the Secretary General of NATO, [Manlio] Brosio, in a speech here today made the point that progress toward détente should be accompanied by progress toward solution of the German problem. A number of people in Europe, and I believe Chancellor [Ludwig] Erhard himself, commented or indicated they felt that the President's speech in New York on this subject had put détente ahead of German reunification. Is there a priority there in American policy?

A. No. As a matter of fact, as far as the President's speech in October⁴ is concerned, it reflected the views of President Johnson about bridgebuilding and about trying to settle questions, large or small, wherever there is an opportunity to improve our relations with Eastern Europe.

In a broader sense, what that means is that we are trying to agree with our allies in Europe, including the Federal Republic, who have been increasing their trade relationships and taking other steps to improve their relations with the countries of Eastern Europe.

Now, there cannot be repose, serenity, in Europe until the German question has been settled. And you will recall that in that October speech President Johnson mentioned the problem of reunification over and over again. Because so long as there is a German nation which is divided and German people who are not permitted to join each other and live together in a single country, then there is going to be restlessness and a lack of a genuine peace in Central Europe.

So although we have been—we and all of our NATO allies have been—taking certain steps to improve our relations with Eastern Europe, we look forward to the time when this German problem can be settled, and that would open up dramatic possibilities for a change in the world situation that could open the way for major steps in disarmament and other matters of the greatest im-

portance to all the peoples of all the countries concerned.

Q. Well, are you saying then that our policy remains what it has been since the end of the war, that reunification must come before a real détente?

A. No, I didn't say that. President Johnson has put forward the space treaty. He has been making strenuous efforts on the nuclear proliferation matter. He has put to the Congress an East-West trade treaty. He decided that we should go ahead and sign the civil air agreement. There has been some motion, some probing of the possibilities of improved relations. So that is not quite the same as saying that our policy is the same as it has been since the end of the war.

What I'm saying is, it is hard to see how there can be a permanent solution in Europe that would bring the European scene to a condition of stability and contentment without a solution to the problem of reunification.

Now, it may be that improved relations with Eastern Europe on the part of all of us, including the NATO countries in Europe, including the Federal Republic, could open up some possibilities for movement on that question of reunification which have not been possible to find during the period of hostile confrontation and what might be called the worst period of the cold war. We don't know. We don't know. But we are trying to find out.

Q. Sir?

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes?

Q. There has been a lot of discussion lately about the arms race in Latin America. First, do you feel that such a race is under way? And, secondly, do you consider that the purchases made so far are out of consonance with the Alliance concept?

A. I think to a degree that arms race is more on paper than on the ground. The countries of Latin America spend on the whole less on defense in relation to their gross national product than most countries in most places. That is, in terms of the world

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.

situation, they are among the lowest in the world.

As far as American aid is concerned, I think only about 7 percent of our aid to Latin America has been on the military side compared to economic and social aid.

Now, we do not take part in and we do not favor an arms race—as that word is generally interpreted. It is true that some of these countries are trying to modernize certain of their equipment. Some of it is World War II or previous, or prior to World War II in character. But the general trend has been not to build up large arms establishments there.

Now, we are not ourselves completely satisfied with the present situation. We have made that clear on more than one occasion. We would be glad to see some understanding among our friends in Latin America as to the level of arms and to the purpose to which those arms will be put. It may be that over time we could work toward better understandings in that field which would perhaps be related to closer coordination on a collective basis in case emergency military requirements arose. But these countries are not going pellmell into an arms race with each other. I think that issue has been considerably exaggerated.

India's Food Needs

Q. Mr. Secretary, sir, India has made a request for more wheat. I believe it was in the month of July or August. I was wondering, sir, at what stage is the consideration of this request? And, secondly, whether it has raised any political or foreign policy issues?

A. Well, we are giving very urgent consideration to India's food needs. I must say that we have been disappointed, as I know our friends in India have been, that the drought, which sorely beset them this past year, has been repeated in certain sections of India, with the prospect that this next year there will be a food problem. During October, the extent of this became evident, and I think that we and other governments,

as well as the Indian Government, must now give urgent attention to what steps are necessary to help meet this very tragic problem.

But I cannot give you a date on when particular decisions will be made. We have representatives in India looking at this matter most urgently, and I would hope that we could bring this to a conclusion before too long.

Q. Mr. Secretary—

A. On your particular question, as to whether political questions are involved; no, they are not. We all have problems in mobilizing our resources to meet emergency needs, and where the needs are on such a scale the problems are on an equal scale.

Q. Mr. Secretary, given the results of the elections last week, I was wondering if you could give us your estimate of how Hanoi may react that as an indication of resolve?

A. In general, I think the Communist world has read those elections as not affecting the situation in Viet-Nam significantly, and I think that's all to the good.

I can't suggest to you that Hanoi liked the elections. They wouldn't like them whatever the effect of the elections would have been. But I think there is a reasonable chance that the Communist world has not made the kind of miscalculation about these elections that might have occurred.

There was a question back here. [Indicating.] Yes.

Q. Sir, Senator John Tower of Texas said at a press conference yesterday that there is absolutely no guarantee by this country that the goods and services—wheat, for example—that we let the Soviet Union and the satellites have will not go into war munitions for North Viet-Nam. He said that wheat could be converted to industrial alcohol, and that could certainly give a diminution of war. What does the State Department think about that?

A. I would like to see his statement. I haven't had a chance to see it. Of course, that could be said of almost any kind of peaceful trade.

We would like to see this Viet-Nam matter ended quickly because there will be those who will find that it is an obstacle to improved relations with Eastern Europe on other questions. But I think the broader view is that we ought to keep trying, probing—and this is the President's view—probing for points of possible agreement, even though there are major issues in dispute—dangerous issues in dispute, such as Viet-Nam—because, particularly with the Soviet Union and the United States where so much sheer physical power is concentrated, it is very important that we try to remove unnecessary misunderstandings, that we try to insulate, if we can, those differences which cannot be resolved, and try to find a way to live together a little better on this planet.

Common Concerns on NATO Issues

Q. Mr. Secretary, NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio today also warned against overoptimism on the question of détente and against a troop reduction in Europe, as he has been here to prepare the NATO conference. Would you please comment on this?

A. Well, I think his statement today was a very frank exposition of some very important views on NATO.

On the matter of troops, let me repeat what I have said several times before the Stennis subcommittee; and that is that we feel that NATO itself, as a whole, should have a common view on the nature of the threat which might exist against the NATO countries; that they should have a common view as to what ought to be done, in prudence, to prepare themselves against that threat on the defense side; and that we should also have common views as to how those burdens are shared within the alliance.

Now, we ourselves would very much regret unilateral action taken by individual countries except in the framework of a total NATO position—which puts, as a number-one item in its concern, the safety of the NATO area, because that is what NATO is all about. Undoubtedly, we shall be discussing these matters in the mid-December meeting of NATO, as well as East-West re-

lations and some other things. But I think the Secretary General properly posed these problems in his speech today at the National Press Club.

U.S. Concern About Prague Plane Incident

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said the United States Government is talking with the Soviet Government at the present time about the Prague plane incident. Could you tell us what questions are of primary concern? For example, are you raising the question whether or not Soviet airliners, which might operate to the United States under the new agreement, would stick to the routes to which they are committed?

A. No, Mr. Hightower [John Hightower, Associated Press], we would have no problem about that, because the agreement itself makes that clear. And, if there were problems on that side, then suitable action could be taken very promptly.

What we are concerned about is that an American citizen was invited to Moscow by Intourist for a conference and he boarded a Soviet plane without any way of knowing that it would touch down in his country of origin, his country of birth, and that while that plane was in Prague, for an emergency reason, he was taken off that plane by Czech authorities. And, therefore, we feel that the consideration that was due him was not given him; that we are entitled to consular access; and that the Soviet Union, as well as the Czech Government, should take a real interest in this problem and help us to resolve it as quickly as possible.

Q. Mr. Secretary, with regard to troops in Asia and the withdrawal of troops in Asia, is the United States Government concerned over the reduction, and planned further reduction, of the level of British forces in the areas of Singapore and Malaysia and that area?

A. Well, we do not have from the British specific plans in that regard. We have had some indication that they would like to reduce their forces somewhat, following the end of confrontation between Malaysia and

Indonesia. We would hope very much that Great Britain would retain its commitments in that part of the world and would retain forces in the area that would make it possible for them to meet those commitments. But, on details, I am not in a position to comment, because we don't have the details in front of us.

Q. Mr. Secretary, at the outset, sir, you referred to the continuing problem of infiltration of North Vietnamese troops into the South. There have been recurring reports, Mr. Secretary, about a considerable increase in the level of Chinese labor and other forces

in North Viet-Nam. Can you provide any information on this point, sir?

A. Nothing, except that I have not seen evidence that there has been any significant recent increase. I have seen different figures, and I would prefer myself not to get into the numbers game.

I am reasonably confident that some of the figures that have been used are considerably exaggerated. But I have not seen indications that there has been any major change in that situation in the recent 2 or 3 months, for example.

Q. Thank you, sir.

Ambassador Goldberg Visits President Johnson To Report on U.N. Developments

Following is a statement made to newsmen at the LBJ Ranch by Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, after his meeting there on November 7 with President Johnson.

White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) dated November 7

My purpose in this visit has been to report to the President on our search for peace at the United Nations and on developments there which affect the prospects for peace. From the beginning of my assignment at the United Nations, which began about 16 months ago, I have acted on the principle that I am serving at the United Nations for just one reason—the hope of doing something to advance the cause of peace in the world. This concern for peace flows both from the United Nations Charter, by which our country is bound, and also, specifically, from the President's charge to me at the time of my appointment.

I have reported to the President on developments at the U.N. since the opening of the current session of the General Assembly

on September 20, about 7 weeks ago. Let me sum up briefly the main topics, and particularly those which occurred in his absence.

I. *U Thant's departure at this crucial time* in world affairs and in the life of the U.N. would be a serious loss both to the organization and to the cause of peace among nations. We reiterate our earnest hope that he will heed the unanimous wishes of the membership and permit his tenure of office to be extended for another full term.

II. *Viet-Nam.* Among other things, I reported on Viet-Nam. I told the President that, in my view, the consistent progression of our policy toward Viet-Nam—from Baltimore,¹ to our presentation to the Security Council in February,² to our general debate statement before the Assembly on

¹ For an address by President Johnson at Johns Hopkins University at Baltimore, Md., on Apr. 7, 1965, see BULLETIN of Apr. 25, 1965, p. 606.

² For background and texts of statements, see *ibid.*, Feb. 14, 1966, p. 229.

September 22,³ and most recently to the Manila Summit Conference—has had a favorable reception from a substantial and increasing segment of the international community.

I noted that many nations which spoke in the Assembly's general debate supported our proposals for a peaceful settlement—far more than have supported the rigid position of Hanoi—and that many have urged the other side to challenge us to make good in deeds what we have offered in words.

I also reported that our presentations at the United Nations have helped to elicit some signals—new, even though they are faint and indirect—that countries which have hitherto been no less rigid in their posture than Hanoi may now perceive the advantages of joining in the search for a peaceful settlement and protecting the legitimate interests of all sides, including Hanoi.

The President has directed me to pursue this search, to respond to any signal, no matter how faint, through any appropriate diplomatic channel and by personal visits if desirable so as to leave no avenue of peaceful settlement unexplored.

This encouraging development suggests that we have been right in persisting—from the Baltimore speech to the Manila Summit Conference—in certain policies, namely:

1. We have consistently sought a political rather than a military solution, and, as I stated to the Assembly, we have equally consistently rejected “the idea that North Viet-Nam has the right to impose a military solution.”

2. We have consistently stated our willingness to take the first step, to walk the extra mile in order to bring about either a reduction of hostilities or to achieve the dialog with the other side which is a prerequisite to a political solution. I recall, for instance, our offer of unconditional discussions in Baltimore; our repeated offer to discuss and consider any points or proposals which Hanoi or others might wish to propose; and our offer before the Assembly this fall to

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 10, 1966, p. 518.

order a cessation of all bombing of North Viet-Nam the moment there is an assurance that there would be a genuine response toward peace from North Viet-Nam.

3. We have consistently stated that we seek no permanent military presence in South Viet-Nam. This was in point 8 of the 14 points.⁴ It was in our letter to the Security Council in January⁵ that we would withdraw “as soon as South Viet-Nam is in a position to determine its own future without external interference. . . .” It was also in the Manila summit communique,⁶ which states that allied forces shall be withdrawn “. . . as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides” and, further, that: “Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled.”

4. We have consistently stated our willingness to negotiate a political settlement based on strict observance of the principles of the Geneva agreements and to support a reconvening of the Geneva conference, an Asian conference, or any other generally accepted forum; or, in the words of the Manila communique, “to pursue any avenue which could lead to a secure and just peace.”

5. We have consistently stated our desire to have a settlement with effective international supervision of its implementation and with effective international guarantees which leave no loopholes for evading commitments undertaken or for the future renewal of hostilities. These are, in the words of the Manila communique, “essential elements of peace.”

6. We have consistently given assurances that we do not seek to determine the political future of South Viet-Nam. As I stated before the Assembly in September, we do not seek to exclude any segment of the South Vietnamese people from peaceful participation in their country's future. This statement has its counterpart in the Manila summit communique, where the Government

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, Feb. 14, 1966, p. 225.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 229.

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1966, p. 730.

of South Viet-Nam "announced that it is preparing a program of national reconciliation . . . declared its determination to open all doors to those Vietnamese who have been misled or coerced into casting their lot with the Viet Cong," and stated it ". . . seeks to bring them back to participate as free men in national life. . . ."

7. Finally, we have consistently held to one basic and affirmative aim, which remains as stated to the Assembly in September: "to assure for the people of South Viet-Nam the same right of self-determination—to decide its own political destiny, free of force—that the United Nations Charter affirms for all."

I remain hopeful that, if we persist in these goals, it will not be too long before the other side will see in them the basis for a settlement which respects the rights of South Viet-Nam and deprives North Viet-Nam of nothing to which it has a legitimate claim. The President and the Secretary of State have urged me to go to Southeast Asia, including South Viet-Nam, in pursuance of these goals, and I shall do so as soon as I can consistent with my duties at the U.N.

III. *Chinese Representation.* One of the great problems for world peace is that posed by Communist China, with its strongly antiforeign attitudes, its self-isolation, and its official policy of promoting violence and subversion against independent countries under the label of so-called "wars of national liberation." As I reminded the General Assembly in my address in September, the United States has no desire to increase the isolation of mainland China from the rest of the world; on the contrary, we have sought, and still seek, to limit the areas of conflict and to open new channels of communication with the authorities in Peking. As the President has stated on numerous occasions and most recently in Kuala Lumpur, we look forward to the occasion when they will once again enrich, rather than endanger, the fabric of the world community.

But we cannot condone—and certainly the

United Nations under its charter cannot condone—Peking's policies of international violence. Specifically, we will not consent—and we do not think a majority in the U.N. will consent—to the demands of Peking that the Republic of China on Taiwan be excluded and the U.N. itself transformed in order to pave the way for Peking's admission. A proposal to do just that has been made every year in the U.N. for many years, and we expect this issue will come up once again quite shortly during the present session.

It is timely, therefore, to consider what the real issue is. We continue to believe, as I said in September, that the true question about the relations of Communist China to the U.N. is a question which only Peking can answer: Will they refrain from putting forward unacceptable terms; and are they prepared to assume the obligations of the United Nations Charter—in particular the basic obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against other states? The sooner Peking is ready to say yes to this question, the better it will be for the cause of peace.

IV. *Outer Space Treaty.* Last summer, on President Johnson's initiative, we began negotiations with the Soviet Union and other interested nations for a treaty to develop peaceful cooperation among nations in the unlimited realm of outer space and to prevent an extension of the arms race into that environment. Our negotiations proceeded rapidly. There were still some unresolved questions when the Assembly session began in September, but negotiations have continued and we are quite optimistic about the prospects for a complete treaty text, ready for submission to governments for ratification by the end of 1966. This would follow our cultural and air agreements with the Soviets.

This treaty will not only encourage scientific cooperation among the nations active in outer space; it will also include very important arms control provisions. One of these is the so-called no-bombs-in-orbit provision. Another is the agreement not to

use the moon or any other celestial body for military purposes. It is thus highly significant for peace, and we are very pleased about the progress made on it thus far.

V. *Nonproliferation Treaty.* We are also making progress on another major aspect of the arms control question; namely, the treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries—known as the nonproliferation treaty.

In addition to the five nuclear powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and Communist China—quite a number of additional countries have the potential capacity to make nuclear weapons. Such a development would create great danger and instability in the world. It is in the common interest of all countries, nuclear and nonnuclear alike, to prevent this from happening.

Recently there have been encouraging signs that the outlook for a nonproliferation treaty is improving. The Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. [Andrei A.] Gromyko, came to talk with President Johnson about it at the White House, and afterward he told the press that “both countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, are striving to reach agreement to facilitate conclusion of an international agreement on this question.” President Johnson, on October 13, also made a hopeful statement on this subject:⁷ “We have hopes that we can find some language that will protect the national interests of both countries and permit us to enter into the thing that I think we need most to do: that is, a nonproliferation agreement.”

These hopeful signs have been borne out in the debate on disarmament at the General Assembly, where both Ambassador [Nikolai T.] Fedorenko and I made statements emphasizing the hopeful outlook for a nonproliferation treaty, in spite of the substantial differences that still remain to be resolved. Last week the Assembly voted 110 to 1—only Albania voting no—for a resolution urging that this treaty be negotiated as a matter of urgency and that no state

do anything to put an obstacle in the way.

Thus there is a general desire to see such a treaty agreed to, and despite the remaining difficult issues we are hoping for substantial progress before this Assembly session ends in December. The President directed me this morning to pursue this with the utmost diligence, and I shall do so immediately upon my return to New York, where the First Committee (Political) is dealing with the subject.

VI. *African questions.* The U.N. has been greatly concerned recently with several political questions arising in southern Africa.

These questions are of great concern also to the United States. The peace we seek cannot be assured in the absence of justice. This specifically includes justice in the relations of people of different races and justice for those who aspire to exercise the right of self-determination.

Based on these principles, the position of the United States on these African questions is clear. We are unalterably against *apartheid* in South Africa and in South West Africa. We are for arrangements which will assure to the people of South West Africa the exercise of their right of self-determination. We are for majority rule in Rhodesia. And we shall continue to seek by all peaceful means to end the conditions which prevent the attainment of these goals.

This position flows very clearly from our own traditions, as expressed by the President in his recent comprehensive statement on Africa to the African ambassadors in Washington.⁸ We are a traditionally anti-colonial country; and we are also a country with a strong tradition of equal opportunity for every individual regardless of his origin. Neither morally nor as a matter of national self-interest can we afford to have a double standard, one standard at home and another abroad. So we shall persist in the United Nations to seek peaceful progress on these important questions of justice and fair play in Africa.

VII. *Economic and social progress.* Final-

⁷ At his news conference on Oct. 13.

⁸ For text, see BULLETIN of June 13, 1966, p. 914.

ly, we are dealing at the United Nations with a host of economic and social issues which have important implications for human progress. The enormous inequalities in economic status, in nutrition, in health, in education, between the world's poor people and those who are more fortunate—these inequalities are not good for the cause of peace. I expressed to the President our great pleasure at the points of the Manila Conference dealing with these subjects. The peace we seek is not a peace of the status quo, but one where progress is possible without violence; one where the just grievances of people are redressed peacefully instead of erupting into war.

At the U.N. we have many opportunities to develop multilateral programs with other countries to meet some of these problems. An important example is our recent proposal to strengthen the 3-year World Food Program by matching United States commodities against new cash and new commodity pledges of all other nations combined. The purpose of this program is, first of all, to help tide over some countries which face very severe food emergencies in the coming years. It also seeks to stimulate these countries to modernize their inefficient agriculture and grow more of their own food. That is the long-range solution. It is vitally important to peace that the food-deficit countries should greatly increase the efficiency and productivity of their agriculture.

Such, then, are some of the questions affecting world peace on which we have been working at the United Nations and on which I have reported to the President. I do not want to understate the difficulties. There is a great deal of diversity and discord in the world, and the United Nations must deal with most of the difficult and discordant issues that arise. The United States, which bears a very considerable responsibility at the U.N. and in the world generally, is inevitably involved in many of these difficult issues.

What is remarkable, therefore, at the U.N. is not that we encounter disagreement but that we find so much common ground

with the other members. In the past 10 or 11 years the membership of the United Nations has doubled. Sixty new members have entered, many of them with problems of extreme poverty and of recent colonial subjection which are very different from our problems. Yet on most of the key issues we have found common ground with these nations. Their basic aspirations are not essentially different from our own: a peaceful world in which all peoples have an equal chance. I think it is significant that the vital aims of the United States and those of the U.N. majority have never been so much in conflict as to oblige us to use the veto to protect this country's vital interests—whereas the U.S.S.R. has used the veto over 100 times, the latest being just last week on the Israel-Syria dispute. I trust that that will continue to be the case. Our greatest protection still lies in the fact that other countries are aware of, and share with us, our dedication to a peaceful and just world.

Finally, my last instruction from the President, which I welcome, is to continue to pursue any indication from any country at the United Nations of a step toward peace and to advance by any diplomatic fronts any possibility of bringing the Viet-Nam conflict to an honorable end.

Letters of Credence

Congo (Kinshasa)

The first Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cyrille Adoula, presented his credentials to President Johnson on November 4. For text of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated November 4.

Pakistan

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Agha Hilaly, presented his credentials to President Johnson on November 4. For text of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated November 4.

Power and Responsibility

by Joseph J. Sisco

*Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*¹

It is a delight to be in your wonderful city. New Orleans is synonymous with gracious living, with a broad outlook, and with a forward-looking spirit in our international relations.

The history of New Orleans prepared you for such a spirit. The Louisiana Purchase in 1803 was among the great acts of foresight in American history. President Jefferson—our first Secretary of State—sent Monroe and Livingston to purchase New Orleans for \$7.5 million, and they came back with the whole vast Louisiana Territory for \$12 million. What a bargain!

Even more important than the bargain was the boldness of Jefferson's act—his constitutional initiative in the face of his strong feelings about limiting federal power. It was a reach of imagination that saw the security and prosperity of America not just in terms of the generation of 1803 but in terms of generations of 1903 and 2003.

A similar breadth of vision and reach of inspiration must guide our foreign policy today, though I have no easy answers or quick solutions to offer you.

In Jefferson's day America was at the periphery of world power. Today we are the single most powerful nation on earth, and this power brings with it enormous responsibilities.

There are some who feel that we have been injudicious in the use of our power—that we have become involved in too many

international disputes in world trouble spots. The fact is we don't go around looking for business as peacemakers. We approach international crises with an initial bias toward nonintervention. But if what is at stake is direct or indirect aggression against a country to which we are committed as an ally, or in an area directly affecting our own security, we cannot choose the easy road and stand aside.

The possession of great power coupled with a sense of responsibility makes for restraint rather than recklessness. Where it is necessary to use our power for purposes of peacemaking, we would rather do it in conjunction with others than to move alone. If we are to make progress in the laborious search for a better world order, we shall have to find ways to generalize still more broadly among other nations, old and new, both the sense of responsibility and the willingness to participate in the use of power, where necessary, for legitimate purposes under the U.N. Charter.

If Jefferson were here today, he would be astonished not only at the change in world power relationships but even more at the technological revolution which has taken place since his time. We all know how greatly science has intertwined our destiny with that of every continent. We are literally living in each other's backyards.

Let me give you an example. Communications satellites, which already link us with Europe, will soon link us with Asia. Before long, with the completion of the system of

¹ Address made before a regional foreign policy conference at New Orleans, La., on Nov. 12.

satellites and ground stations, the communications revolution will encompass Africa.

Presently, if a person in Nigeria wants to telephone someone in the Ivory Coast, he has to go through a radio circuit via London and Paris. With communications satellites, any African nation with a ground station will be able to make direct phone connections much more easily not only with fellow Africans but with people all over the globe.

In short, man's interdependence has reached into every corner of his daily existence. These changes have transformed diplomacy—in particular the diplomacy of peacemaking—from the relatively simple thing it was a century or even a score of years ago.

Many Instruments of Foreign Policy

In dealing with the tough day-to-day decisions of peacemaking in the post-World War II world, we have learned three lessons:

First, we cannot rely on a one-instrument policy. There is no single, all-purpose system of security that meets all our needs. There are no panaceas, no cure-alls, no magic wands. Many types of international instruments are called into play to cope with a Cuba missile crisis, with the Kennedy Round of new rules for international trade, with brushfire wars in the Congo and Cyprus, with aggression in Viet-Nam, with the economic and social needs of Asia and Africa.

We have direct nation-to-nation relationships with some 120 different states. We share our responsibilities with allies. We are connected with more than 40 nations in regional arrangements and alliances such as NATO in Europe, the OAS and the Alliance for Progress in the Western Hemisphere, and SEATO in Asia.

We participate in 50 international agencies and programs and take part in over 600 international conferences a year. Their work ranges over almost the entire spectrum of man's economic and technical activities.

At the apex of this structure, we join with more than 120 nations in the U.N. and its associated bodies.

Choosing the right instrument or instru-

ments for a particular foreign policy requirement is important for its success. What is correct for one particular need may not prove effective for another.

Viet-Nam

Viet-Nam is a case in point. While U.N. machinery has already proved its worth in such diverse situations as Indonesia, Greece, Palestine, Kashmir, Korea, Suez, Lebanon, Laos, the Congo, West New Guinea, the Yemen, and Cyprus, it has not been able to deal effectively with Viet-Nam. It has not been able to take on either the peacekeeping or peacemaking job from the United States and its allies.

But that is not because we have not tried. We brought the issue before the Security Council,² but it got nowhere at all because of the threat of the Soviet veto and because of the attitude of some nations who are not members—North Viet-Nam and Red China.

Now, there are those who charge that our policy in Viet-Nam is an abandonment of charter principles and a confession of lack of faith in the U.N. This is simply a distorted notion of what the U.N. and the charter are all about. Our goal in Viet-Nam is that of the U.N. Charter, to safeguard the right of the peoples of Southeast Asia to settle their affairs peacefully and to select their form of government by principles of self-determination.

We are not trying to wipe out North Viet-Nam. We are not trying to change its government. We are not trying to establish permanent bases in South Viet-Nam. We are not trying to gain one inch of new territory.

And we are prepared to withdraw our forces from South Viet-Nam within 6 months of the time that the aggression, infiltration, and violence stop.

We could, of course, take the easy way out by abandoning our commitment and turning a blind eye to the aggression against South Viet-Nam. But this we cannot do without encouraging the forces of violence and aggression everywhere.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Feb. 14, 1966, p. 229.

We want a peaceful solution—there can be no doubt of President Johnson's resolve in this regard. And we will continue to use not one instrument but *all* instruments of policy to bring it about.

Roots of War

The second thing we have learned is not to rely on a one-sided approach, whether it be military, diplomatic, or economic.

Viet-Nam once again is a good illustration. Attention to problems of poverty and economic and social betterment are an integral part of security. That is why we have committed ourselves to a billion-dollar development program for Southeast Asia, why we back the Mekong Valley project and welcome the formation of the Asian Development Bank.

The seven nations meeting in Manila last month recognized the interaction of social, economic, and political forces. Their Declaration of Peace and Progress in Asia and the Pacific, signed by President Johnson and the leaders of six Pacific nations, said:³

In the region of Asia and the Pacific, where there is a rich heritage of the intrinsic worth and dignity of every man, we recognize the responsibility of every nation to join in an expanding offensive against poverty, illiteracy and disease. For these bind men to lives of hopelessness and despair; these are the roots of violence and war.

Atlantic and Pacific

The third and closely related lesson I want to mention is that we can no longer afford—if we ever could—a one-ocean policy. Peace will escape us if we follow a double standard on aggression—if we strive to deter it across the Atlantic while tolerating it across the Pacific.

As Hawaii and Alaska have come into the Union—as we have acquired new responsibilities in the Western Pacific—the frontiers of our interest have moved to the West as well.

At the same time, our attention to Viet-

Nam and the problems of the Pacific does not mean that we are turning away from Europe. Our allegiance to the fundamental concepts of the Atlantic alliance is as firm as ever. We know from the experience of two World Wars that our safety will continue to depend on a strong defense of Western Europe. We must continue to search for acceptable solutions to the problems of German reunification and of European security. Someday, I am convinced, we shall find such solutions, but only if we maintain our deterrent strength while we seek them.

Such solutions do not depend on us alone. It takes two sides to reach an agreement. Our own approach to basic international settlements is clear. It was well stated in the Manila declaration:

We do not threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of our neighbors, whatever their ideological alignment. We ask only that this be reciprocated. . . . We shall play our full part in creating an environment in which reconciliation becomes possible, for in the modern world men and nations have no choice but to learn to live together as brothers.

The responsible use of power in today's world requires a serious effort to reach out for agreement and reconciliation with differing political and social systems. For this reason we continue to explore areas of common interest with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European states even while the conflict in Viet-Nam goes on.

Practical agreements need not be based on agreement on political values. It was in this spirit that President Johnson announced last month the lifting of certain barriers to trade with Eastern European countries and held out the hope of a reduction in tensions and military forces throughout Europe.⁴ Agreement has recently been reached on starting regular Moscow-New York air flights.⁵ The recent Polish-Czech offer to accept controls over their atomic facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) if West Germany takes equivalent action could

⁴ For text of President Johnson's address at New York, N. Y., on Oct. 7, see *ibid.*, Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.

⁵ For background, see *ibid.*, Nov. 21, 1966, p. 791.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1966, p. 734.

also open the way to improved East-West relations in other fields.

Communist China

The same basic attitude guides our policy toward Communist China, despite Peking's continuing displays of extreme belligerence and xenophobia.

The United States has no hostile designs on mainland China, no desire to isolate it or to prevent useful contacts with the Chinese people. Our representatives have talked repeatedly with Chinese Communist diplomats in Geneva and Warsaw. We have relaxed barriers to travel by Americans to Communist China. We would also be prepared to deal with Communist China in certain forums where its interests are directly involved, such as a conference to resolve the Viet-Nam problem or discussions on disarmament.

The problem here lies with the other side. We see no sign that the Chinese Communists reciprocate our desire for additional contacts. On the contrary, everything that has happened in Communist China in recent years leads us to the conclusion that Peking's policies are today more aggressive, more disruptive, more ruthless, and more arrogant than at any time in the past. The Chinese Communists are not isolated by others; they isolate themselves.

For these reasons, therefore, we remain opposed to excluding representatives of the Republic of China on Taiwan from the United Nations in order to put Chinese Communist representatives in their place.

We do not see how the U.N. could accept the incredible terms the Chinese Communists have put forward as a condition for their entry into the U.N. What they want to do is to turn history upside down: to have the United Nations condemn the United States as an aggressor in Korea; to have the United Nations exclude the Republic of China; and to have the United Nations transform itself into an organization entirely different from the one that exists today.

We are entitled to ask whether the Chinese Communists would be prepared to assume the obligations of the United Nations Charter as they stand, especially those designed to protect the territorial integrity and the political independence of others, and whether the Chinese Communists will persist in putting forward unacceptable conditions for their entry. Until these questions are satisfactorily answered, how can we believe that Peking has any real desire to participate in the United Nations work? All this is regrettable, because in principle the U.N. organization should be all-embracing if it is to be most effective.

New African Countries

The issues of the African Continent have become another major area of controversy. We Americans know pitifully little about Africa. The fact that African issues have bubbled to the top of the U.N. agenda is symptomatic of the great changes that have come over the postwar world with the emergence of former colonies as independent nations.

There were 51 original signers of the United Nations Charter in 1945. Since then, 70 nations have been added, most of them newly independent countries of Africa and Asia, bringing the present total to 121. Seventy-five of the one hundred and twenty-one, some 60 percent, are Afro-Asian countries, and thirty-nine of the seventy-five are African.

These new nations feel understandably strongly about issues of colonial domination and race discrimination. Our own national history and traditions place us in natural sympathy with those seeking racial equality and self-determination. We share their abhorrence of *apartheid* and their opposition to societies in which one race is entrenched in a position superior to another. As President Johnson told the African ambassadors on the anniversary of the Organization of African Unity last May: ⁶

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, June 13, 1966, p. 914.

The United States has learned from lamentable personal experience that domination of one race by another leads to waste and injustice. Just as we are determined to remove the remnants of inequality from our own midst, we are also with you—heart and soul—as you try to do the same.

Our African policy is determined by more than an ideological sympathy with racial equality and majority rule, however. It is dictated by hard national interest. It is important to us to maintain the course of peaceful change and economic development in black Africa and to protect the independence of the new nations.

The new governments of the African Continent are inexperienced and vulnerable. Developments on the continent can go in two directions: toward irresponsibility and extremism on the one hand or toward greater responsibility and independent development on the other.

We intend to do what we can to see that the latter course prevails. The best means for doing so is to encourage, through the U.N. and in other ways, the creation of sound national societies in Africa based on a concept of racial and regional cooperation. Any other course would point Africa toward anarchy and strife; would prevent economic and social progress; and would open up opportunities for Communist interference and penetration.

Racial Oppression

The problem is not so much the ultimate objectives. These we share not only with the African and Asian countries but with virtually every member of the United Nations. The problem is rather one of implementation. How do we achieve these objectives over the stubborn resistance of recalcitrant authorities? How do we do so by working with the tools at the United Nations' command?

The U.N., let us remember, is not a super-state. It has scored great victories in damping down disputes with contending countries, but—the outstanding exception of Korea aside—it has not mobilized military force against an outlaw regime.

What is more, the crisis situations develop-

ing in southern Africa and now under consideration in the U.N. are unique in many ways. They are not the kinds of situations that were foreseen when the U.N. Charter was drafted.

The threats to the peace with which the U.N. at that time was expected to deal were acts of aggression. In Africa today the dangers are of a different character. They arise from racial oppression and from the overtones and remnants of colonial domination. There are no armies massed on or plunging across frontiers; no monster demonstrations of popular discontent; no signs of warfare or anarchy.

And yet the threat is undeniably there and must be dealt with in time before it engulfs us all. Pressures are building up inexorably in areas where race repression is sanctioned. If the U.N. stands passively by and these pressures are allowed to increase, race tensions could erupt into violence both inside and outside today's problem areas. It might then prove impossible to forestall such a downward drift into anarchy.

This is a problem no nation can handle alone. Either the U.N. grapples with it or no one does so. We are now approaching the stage where we must face squarely the question of how far the U.N. should go—and how far we, as its strongest member, should go—to bring about the fulfillment of U.N. objectives in southern Africa.

Already some significant steps have been taken. To support the British in their opposition to the illegally constituted Smith regime in Rhodesia, the U.N. has called for voluntary sanctions against Rhodesia.⁷ In a specific emergency last spring, the U.N. Security Council decided upon a blockade of crude-oil shipments by sea through the port of Beira in Portuguese Mozambique.⁸

While the voluntary sanctions have had some effect, they have not succeeded in bringing about the desired political change. We may soon have to decide whether the authority of the Security Council to impose

⁷ For background, see *ibid.*, Dec. 6, 1965, p. 908.

⁸ For background, see *ibid.*, May 2, 1966, p. 713.

mandatory economic embargoes should be invoked to put additional pressures on the present Rhodesian authorities.

South West Africa

Somewhat similar questions will soon arise with respect to South West Africa. Last month the U.N. General Assembly decided that South Africa had in effect forfeited its old League of Nations mandate to administer that territory, largely because South Africa established its *apartheid* policy there and refused to be accountable to the U.N. for its administration.⁹ The Assembly is now seeking means to induce the Government of South Africa to permit the establishment of an international administration designed to lead South West Africa toward self-determination.

This approach to a solution was accepted in the Assembly by the United States and 113 other members. Thus it had the support of almost the entire international community. The result is that we know what we want the U.N. to do, though we are not yet clear on how it can be done.

The Assembly wisely recognized that it was feeling its way in a new and difficult area. Its resolution provides that a committee should recommend *practical* means by which South West Africa should be administered for the desired ends. When that committee reports next spring, the time will have come for the U.N. to consider what more can be done to move toward a satisfactory outcome.

Obviously it will be exceedingly difficult to induce those in control of southern Africa to comply with U.N. resolutions pointed toward drastic political change. Some of the U.N.'s weapons, such as moral suasion and the power of world opinion, have already been employed to no avail. We shall, however, continue our efforts to bring reason to bear in order to bring about a peaceful and just solution.

The alternatives have their own dangers and are uncertain in their cost and effect. Voices will be heard calling for broad,

⁹ See page 870.

mandatory economic sanctions, for the necessary steps to make those sanctions effective, and—from those of more far-reaching views—for the use of force. What the U.N. must determine—and what the United States, as a principal member, must determine—is the degree of sacrifice we are willing to contemplate, individually and collectively, and how—of crucial importance—effective that sacrifice would be.

We are moving into new and largely uncharted waters. The questions which are raised are vital for the future of Africa, for the future of the U.N., and perhaps ultimately for the future of every nation which may some day stake its existence on the rule of law in the world.

Sharing Responsibilities

I leave you with one concluding thought.

Looking at the world from the vantage point of the United States—with our awesome responsibilities and the obligations of the greatest power in the world—we must be clear where our interests lie. They lie not in the direction of isolation and the withdrawal of our power, superficially attractive as this may be, but in widening the areas in which our responsibilities can be shared.

If we are to pursue our abiding national interest, we must take to heart what President Johnson said last summer:¹⁰

“The peace we seek . . . is a peace of conciliation between Communist states and their non-Communist neighbors, between rich nations and poor, between small nations and large, between men whose skins are brown and black and yellow and white, between Hindus and Moslems and Buddhists and Christians.

“It is a peace that can only be sustained through the durable bonds of peace: through international trade, through the free flow of people and ideas, through full participation by all nations in an international community under law, and through a common dedication to the great task of human progress and economic development.”

¹⁰ For text of President Johnson's radio-TV address on July 12, see *ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1966, p. 158.

The World's Food and Population Problems

by *Richard W. Reuter*

*Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Food for Peace Program)*¹

It is good to be the opening speaker at this conference (as it is always good to be in dynamic New Orleans). The overseas use of our food resources is a constant, positive, and important part of America's foreign policy. Secretary Rusk has commented that seldom a day goes by that some issue regarding food programming does not come to his attention. In many ways our discussion here may well serve as useful background for other foreign policy questions that will be considered during the day.

But it is also a particularly important subject for New Orleans. For this area well knows the importance of America's export program. And agricultural commodities are America's largest single dollar earner—last year nosing out even automobiles and automobile parts for first place in net exports.

The United States has become the world's largest agricultural exporting nation—\$6.68 billion in fiscal year 1966. Twenty percent of all the agricultural commerce moving in world trade was grown on American farms. Incidentally, we are also the world's third largest importer of agricultural products—\$4.45 billion last year. For the first extended period in our history we are earning significant balance-of-payments surpluses from agricultural products. This is important to America.

A recent report from the U.S. Department of Agriculture points out that more grain

for export moves out of Gulf ports than from any other area; more than from the Great Lakes, East Coast ports, and West Coast ports combined. Last year this meant slightly over 1 billion bushels flowed down the Mississippi or over your railroads and highways. In this whole great area from Brownsville to Mobile this means an important economic gain for local business and hundreds of thousands of jobs related to food export.

Agricultural exports, of course, also mean a great deal to the farmers of the State of Louisiana. Exports, at world market prices, in fiscal year 1966 used \$53.7 million worth of your rice, \$14.7 million of cotton, and \$11 million of soybeans, of the major Louisiana crops. As an example of what this means, one out of every two acres of riceland is growing crops for export; one out of every three acres of soybeans.

One hundred million dollars worth of Louisiana farm products was exported last year, three-fourths commercially and one-quarter under our Food for Peace program. The overseas use of food is important to this area and its economy.

I think the United States can well be proud of its agricultural record—and of its humanitarian concern for the food needs of others. From our surpluses we have shared \$14 billion worth of agricultural commodities over the 12 years since the passage of Public Law 480, the enabling legislation for our Food for Peace program. During this same period we have more than doubled our commercial exports. And we have fed the

¹ Address made before a regional foreign policy conference at New Orleans, La., on Nov. 12 (press release 272 dated Nov. 11).

American people better than any people in history have eaten, at only 18¢ out of every dollar of take-home pay.

What, then, is the reason for a talk on the world's food and population problems? What, then, is this food crisis about which there has been so much recent talk, and why does it concern the Department of State?

As we look at the world picture there is much, too, about which we can be satisfied. For the first time in history the world has gone for two decades—the period since the end of World War II—without widespread death from famine, even after natural disasters, thanks largely to America's ability and willingness to donate and sell concessionally food needed. But there is also a new awareness in the world of the importance of local increased agricultural productivity. At the request of less developed countries, the United States aid program alone has 1,100 agriculturists working full time in technical assistance programs overseas. There is probably an equal number working for agricultural development under the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Commonwealth countries' Colombo Plan, and other countries' bilateral programs. Freedom From Hunger is a campaign worldwide by U.N.-FAO; it is also a growing demand by peoples everywhere.

Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Greece, Turkey, Pakistan are examples of national progress in food production that include thrilling stories of achievement. There are a number of factors that make us optimistic that the gloomy English parson, Dr. Malthus, 200 years after his dire predictions of population exceeding food supply, may continue to be proven to have been wrong.

The Food/Population Race

But may I take a few minutes this morning to review the overall picture before we are lulled into a false security.

Despite all of our efforts and our very real success stories, during the sixties the world is losing ground in the food/population race. We are not yet out of trouble on food needs. In fact, the food/population problem may

well have more potential for catastrophe than any other. The less developed countries of the world, with 60 percent to 80 percent of their working force in agriculture, are slowly losing the ability to feed themselves.

The countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America traditionally were the suppliers of grains to the industrialized countries. As recently as the period just before World War II these areas exported 11 million tons of grain, primarily to industrialized Europe. Latin America was the largest food-exporting area. The ships are now sailing in the other direction. After the war, Asia, Africa, and Latin America were net importers of 4 million tons, and this year the less developed world will import from the industrialized countries over 30 million tons of grain.

The causes of the present difficult agricultural situation in Asia and the Far East can be traced back to the extremely low rate of increase in agricultural production during and immediately after the Second World War. In the 14 years from the period 1935-38 to the period 1949-53 food production in the region (excluding mainland China) increased only by 6 percent. Population, on the other hand, increased by 19 percent during the same period. Consequently the per capita agricultural production actually fell by 13 percent. Comparably, Latin America had an 11 percent per capita drop. The average for all developing regions was a 9 percent drop. At the same time there was an 11 percent increase in the developed regions (including Russia and Eastern Europe).

Latin America, thanks to some recent progress in Brazil, has improved its production now and is just about in balance, importing about as much as it exports. North America—the United States and Canada—has become the major export area. It is, in fact, the residual supplier to the world.

For 6 years the world has been consuming more grain than the world has been producing. In 1961 food consumption in the importing countries ran ahead of world production by 10 million tons. This year the drawdown was 18 million tons. As mentioned, North American surpluses, sold and shared gen-

erously, filled the gap and made this consumption above production possible.

However, the seemingly limitless surpluses in the United States are now gone, except for tobacco and cotton—both low in nutrition. Our ready reserve, surplus stocks, has been used. Our standby reserve is our unused capacity. We are now putting reserve acres back in production to help meet world food needs. These food needs increase, due to population and modest personal income gains, at the rate of about 4 percent a year. By the next crop year we have authorized for production about half of the cropland we retired under earlier programs.

Prior to World War II the spectacular decrease in the death rate of the economically advanced nations had not been shared by most of the population of the world. Most of the world's people had an expectation of life at birth no greater than that which Western Europeans experienced during the Middle Ages.

The situation has dramatically changed since the end of the war. A variety of factors, including the advent of the U.N. and its specialized agencies and the major aid programs in the public health field, has opened up to the mass of people throughout the world the attainment of the 20th-century death rates.

Since World War II, declines in mortality among the economically underdeveloped areas of the world have been more dramatic than those which were earlier experienced in the industrialized areas. For example, between 1940 and 1960 Mexico, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Ceylon, Malaya, and Singapore decreased their death rates by more than 50 percent. Other nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America had almost similar increases in life expectancy. Birth rates during this period, though they did not rise materially, did remain at a high level.

As a result, population growth rates in the less developed countries have frequently exceeded 3 percent a year, almost double that of the industrialized countries. At 3 percent a year, a population doubles in 24 years.

This, then, is a key factor in the demand side of our food/population equation.

In the next 15 years there will be an additional 1 billion people, five times the present U.S. population. Four-fifths of these new people will be in the food-short developing countries.

Reversing the Trend Toward a Food Deficit

If present trends continue, then the food deficit in the importing countries will grow to 42 million tons by 1975 and 88 million tons by 1985. Somewhere in less than 20 years we will have lost the ability to fill the world's food gap, regardless of all the efforts of North America and other food-exporting countries to increase production.

Continuing on the present course can but lead to disaster.

The answer must come from reversing the present trends. Population growth trend must be turned downward and food production increased. With few new lands available to agriculture in major food-deficit areas, the developing countries must raise their rate of production to become less dependent on imported foods.

Dr. [B. R.] Sen, Director General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, points out in the FAO report "The State of Food and Agriculture 1966," issued only last month, that:

... World food production failed to rise in 1965/66, but population increased by about 70 million persons. Because of widespread drought last year's food output was no larger than in 1964/65.

Those poor harvests came (Dr. Sen reminds us) not in the midst of plenty, but after several years of a neck-and-neck race between food and population.

Thus, (writes Dr. Sen) the world food situation is now more precarious than at any time since the period of acute shortage immediately after the Second World War. Because of the depletion of stocks, the world has become much more dependent on current production and hence on weather conditions. It is therefore with some anxiety that we await the outcome of the 1966 '67 harvests.

It is true that for the first time in history we have the ability to produce enough food for everyone to eat adequately. Yet it is esti-

mated that still 10,000 people a day, mostly children, die from the effects of malnutrition. The tragedy is that today in numerical terms there are more hungry people than ever before. There will be another 70 million people next year. Can we feed them too? Adequately? Because in this world of rising expectations people are no longer willing to just quietly die.

President Kennedy, speaking at the FAO World Food Congress in Washington in 1963,² then pointed out that the remarkable advances in agricultural scientific development gave us the know-how to eliminate hunger if we but have the will. The answer to whether the world in fact can feed itself in the years ahead hangs on the question of whether the world can be mobilized to do the job that is required. So far the evidence is mixed. There are evidences of real progress in many countries, but overall progress is tantalizingly slow. The world will not change easily—that we know.

President Johnson has called for new aid initiatives in the fields of food,³ health, and education.⁴

We now recognize that in the long run the job of providing enough food is essentially going to rest with the developing countries themselves. Increased yields will take huge foreign capital transfers for inputs, and technical assistance from government and private-sector specialists. But perhaps even more importantly, they will also require indigenous government policies that encourage production and give incentives to farmers; they will require economic changes to provide institutions for credit and marketing, and even elementary mass education to allow farm-level acceptance of new methods and materials. It will not be easy. This in many instances calls for a break with the traditional that many governments and many societies just may not be prepared to do in time.

Under Secretary of Agriculture John Schnitker, speaking in Kansas to the National Catholic Rural Life Conference, put it this way:

Today we are losing the race against want, not because we don't know how to produce food, but because too many elements deter us. Modernizing agriculture in the developing countries means altering the basic behavior patterns of nearly half the world's people. It is a slow and time-consuming operation.

And time is running out. The cost—in money and in social change—may well seem too great for the world. But the alternative could well be widespread starvation and instability.

This, then, is the challenge we face as we prepare to implement a new Public Law 480. The new program is designed to respond to that challenge.

President Johnson in asking Congress for new Food for Freedom legislation emphasized that agricultural production must be increased in the food-deficit countries themselves. We will tie strings on our food aid—the strings will be adequate evidence by developing countries that they have put priority on the agricultural sector and have faced up to the question of food needs and population growth. We expect to direct capital and technical assistance toward encouraging such greater emphasis on agricultural development; next year AID will be spending 25 percent of its development funds in the agricultural sector.

To help fill the food gap while these self-help measures are evolving, we will have to continue to use food-aid shipments, perhaps increased, but at least sharply pinpointed to needs. The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to consider food aid as a demand on production in setting acreage goals for U.S. farmers. The happenstance of surplus will no longer be the basis for U.S. food-aid programming. Commodity availability therefore may more effectively be geared to nutritional needs, allowing increased attention to the quality as well as quantity of the diet.

Perhaps in your questions and comments we can discuss further the new legislation

² For text, see BULLETIN of July 8, 1963, p. 58.

³ For President Johnson's message to Congress of Feb. 10, see *ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 336.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 328.

President Johnson has just signed into law. It provides a basis for continuing American leadership in a key aspect of "the other war"—the war against hunger and want and disease.

The future peace of the world may well be determined by the success with which we can mobilize the world to share in this effort. The world's food and population problems are very much a concern in developing the foreign policy of the United States. The way those problems are dealt with may well determine the kind of a world we shall have.

Food for Peace Act of 1966 Signed Into Law

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) dated November 12

On February 10 I proposed to the Congress a Food for Freedom program,¹ by which the United States might lead the world in a war against hunger. The act which I have signed today [November 11] prepares us for this historic task.²

Most of the developing world is now in crisis, one that is more serious than any ideological disagreement. Rapid population growth is putting relentless pressure on food supplies.

For 6 consecutive years world food consumption has exceeded production. A precarious balance has been maintained through our surplus stocks. Seventy million tons of surplus grain have been used since 1961.

But today the surpluses are gone. We have rationalized our domestic agriculture to eliminate unneeded surpluses.

During the past few months we have acted to expand wheat and feed-grain production. Half of our 60 million acre cropland reserve will be returned to production. But even the

¹ For text of President Johnson's message, see BULLETIN of Feb. 28, 1966, p. 336.

² As enacted, the bill (H.R. 14929) is Public Law 89-808.

food-producing capability of U.S. farmers—unmatched in history—cannot suffice indefinitely in a world that must feed a million new human beings each week.

The only long-term solution is self-help. Our new Food for Freedom program will provide American food and fiber to stimulate greater productivity in the developing countries. I am instructing the appropriate officials to make sales agreements only after carefully considering what practicable self-help measures are being taken by the recipient country to improve their own capacity to provide food for their people.

We must be certain that our Food for Freedom grants are consistent with our program to encourage the sound and rapid expansion of food production in the receiving countries. Food for Freedom grants will be made only where the country receiving the grant demonstrates its own willingness to help win its own war on hunger.

We must also be certain that Food for Freedom grants are made, whenever possible, on a multilateral basis with the other countries of the world who have the resources to join us in food-grant programs. We are all members of the family of man and as such we must band together if we are to be successful in the war on hunger.

This act will also permit us to deal with food problems beyond hunger in its starkest form.

Here at home, our farmers will continue a high level of production in the years immediately ahead to meet food needs. In the longer run, successful economic development abroad will build markets for U.S. products.

The sound population programs encouraged in this measure, freely and voluntarily undertaken, are vital to meeting the food crisis and to the broader efforts of the developing nations to attain higher standards of living for their people.

There are, however, other provisions which cause me concern. I am particularly troubled by the provision which, while giving some latitude for Presidential discretion, precludes food aid to countries that sell, furnish, or permit their ships or aircraft to

transport any equipment, materials, or commodities to either North Viet-Nam or Cuba.

The position of this administration is quite clear as to free-world trade and shipping to both North Viet-Nam and Cuba. We oppose it. We have conducted and will continue a very active effort against this trade. No free-world countries now furnish arms or strategic items to either area.

However, I believe we should have the flexibility to use food aid to further the full range of our important national objectives. Restrictions on its use deprive us of this flexibility. They inhibit us in meeting objectives to which four administrations have dedicated themselves.

Accordingly, I hope that the Congress in the next session will reconsider those provisions of this bill passed in the closing days of the session, which create major difficulties for our foreign policy.

In spite of these problems, the bill marks the beginning of one of the most important tasks of our time. I am proud to sign it.

Department Holds Conference for Educators at St. Paul

The Department of State announced on November 4 (press release 263) that the Minnesota World Affairs Center and the Academic Town Meeting Committee, in cooperation with the Department of State, would hold a foreign policy conference for educators in St. Paul, Minn., November 30.

Among officials expected to participate were George V. Allen, Director, Foreign Service Institute, Department of State; Harald W. Jacobson, director, Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Department of State; and Bascom H. Story, director, education and manpower planning service, Office of Technical Cooperation and Research, Agency for International Development.

Other participants include outstanding educators from Minnesota and representatives of organizations concerned with international affairs.

U.S., U.K., Germany Hold Second Round of Talks in Washington

*Trilateral Communique*¹

The second round of talks between the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany concerning questions of military capabilities, the defense burden and the foreign exchange problems resulting from the stationing of troops in Germany took place on November 9 and 10, 1966 in the United States Department of State.² The representative for the United States was Mr. John J. McCloy; for the United Kingdom, Minister George Thomson; and for the Federal Republic of Germany, State Secretary Karl Carstens. The Secretary General of NATO was represented at the talks by Mr. Arthur Hockaday of the NATO International Staff.

They engaged in a further exchange of views on the above topics and reviewed and discussed the reports submitted to them by the three groups of experts who met October 31 through November 4 in Bonn.

The three representatives again affirmed the importance attached by their Governments to NATO and their determination to maintain the strength, cohesion and vitality of the Alliance and its integrated system of defense. They noted with satisfaction the arrangements made by Secretary General [Manlio] Brosio and the NATO Defense Planning Committee for close links with NATO during the progress of the Trilateral Talks. They also expressed appreciation for the assistance that representatives of SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe] rendered the Working Groups meeting in Bonn.

The three representatives plan to meet again on November 25 for further discussions with a view to submitting a report on their activities to the December Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

¹ Issued at the close of the talks on Nov. 10 (press release 271).

² For an announcement of the trilateral talks, see BULLETIN of Oct. 31, 1966, p. 670.

Advisory Panel for East Asian and Pacific Bureau Named

The Department of State announced on November 10 (press release 270) the formation of a panel of advisers for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. This is the second panel of advisers announced by the Department in accordance with the general plan made public on October 18.¹

Edwin O. Reischauer of Harvard University, Ambassador to Japan from 1961 until August of this year, will be chairman of the panel. The initial membership comprises 18 other experts on various aspects of the area. Other advisers may be added as required. Eleven of the members of the panel are currently associated with universities; and there are representatives of journalism, medicine and science, research, and public service.

The panel will meet two or three times a year for sessions of about 2 days, and individual members may be in touch with the Department at any time on specific matters.

A separate panel on China is also being formed, and the names of the members will be announced later.

The members of the advisory panel for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs are:

- Edwin O. Reischauer, *chairman*, professor, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
- John M. Allison, director, overseas career program, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii
- Hugh Borton, president, Haverford College, Haverford, Pa.
- Claude A. Buss, professor of history, Stanford University, Palo Alto, Calif.
- Russell G. Davis, associate director, Center for Studies in Education and Development, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
- Russell H. Fifield, professor of political science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
- Caryl Haskins, president, Carnegie Institution of Washington, Washington, D. C.
- Alice Hsieh, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.

¹ For a Department announcement and names of members of the advisory panel for the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, see BULLETIN of Nov. 7, 1966, p. 721.

Walter H. Judd, former Member of Congress, Washington, D. C.

Lucien W. Pye, professor of political science, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.

Abraham M. Rosenthal, editor, *New York Times*, New York, N.Y.

Howard A. Rusk, president, World Rehabilitation Fund, New York, N.Y.

Robert A. Scalapino, chairman, Political Science Department, University of California, Berkeley, Calif.

Arch T. Steele, journalist and writer, Portal, Ariz.

George E. Taylor, director, Far Eastern and Russian Institute, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.

Frank N. Trager, professor of international affairs, New York University, New York, N.Y.

Robert E. Ward, professor of political science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.

Clifton Wharton, Jr., acting executive director, the Agricultural Development Council, Inc., New York, N.Y.

Kenneth T. Young, president, the Asia Society, New York, N.Y.

Water for Peace Conference To Be Held at Washington

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) dated November 8

Last year I announced that the United States would convene a great international conference to deal with the world's water problems.¹ Today I am signing into law a bill that authorizes the conference and funds to defray its cost.²

Next May in Washington, experts from many nations will gather to examine a common necessity: providing adequate, clean, and dependable water supplies for their people.

In the past many of man's efforts to solve his water problems failed because he did not possess the tools, the technology, or the understanding to do the job. That is no longer the case. The question now is whether

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 1, 1965, p. 720.

² As enacted, the bill (S.J. Res. 167) is Public Law 89-797.

the competence he possesses can be translated into action where it is needed.

I believe that question can be answered yes—if experts from throughout the world can meet and match skills with needs and if the nations join in a global effort to help one another.

The International Conference on Water for Peace will deal with some of the oldest water problems and some that have been aggravated by modern life. It will study relief from drought and protection from floods; the waterborne diseases that kill 5 million people every year; the pollution of rivers, lakes, and streams, a major problem for the developed and less developed nations alike.

I do not expect that simple answers to these problems will emerge from the conference. But I do believe that by sharing what we now know with each other, we shall take the necessary first step toward providing generations to come with the water they will need to exist.

Claims for Property Losses in the State of Goiás, Brazil

The Department of State announced on November 10 (press release 269) that the American Embassy at Brasilia has informed the Department that the State of Goiás contemplates the expropriation for public purposes of approximately 1,200,000 acres of land located around the towns of Trombas and Formoso in the municipalities of Formoso and Uruacu in accordance with Decree No. 87 of May 4, 1965.

The Department of State has been assured that American owners of expropriated land will have the option of receiving from the State of Goiás an equivalent amount of state-owned land in exchange for the expropriated land or a cash payment, provided such owners communicate with the expropriating authorities within 181 calendar days from November 10.

American nationals who desire to file claims or obtain further information about the matter should write with the least possible delay to:

Dr. Sebastião Emmanuel Bulduino,
Procurador Geral do Estado do Goiás,
Procuradoria Geral do Estado,
Goiânia, Goiás, Brasil.

The Department of State is informed that most of the affected lands are occupied by squatters and recorded in the names of persons residing in California, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 2d Session

- Twenty Years After: An Appeal for the Renewal of International Economic Cooperation on a Grand Scale. Report of the Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments of the Joint Economic Committee. September 1966. 4 pp. [Joint committee print.]
- U.S. Participation in HemisFair. Report to accompany H.R. 15098 relating to participation of the U.S. in the HemisFair 1968 Exposition in San Antonio, Texas. S. Rept. 1673. October 3, 1966. 19 pp.
- Adjusting the Status of Cuban Refugees to That of Lawful Permanent Residents of the United States, and for Other Purposes. Report to accompany S. 3712. October 4, 1966. S. Rept. 1675. 11 pp.
- Authorizing the Extension of Loans of Naval Vessels to Friendly Foreign Countries. Report to accompany H.R. 12822. H. Rept. 2186. October 5, 1966. 11 pp.
- Florence Agreement Implementation Legislation. Report to accompany H.R. 8664. S. Rept. 1678. October 5, 1966. 33 pp.
- World Newsprint Supply-Demand. Outlook through 1968. Report of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. H. Rept. 2196. October 6, 1966. 31 pp.
- Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1967. Conference Report to accompany H.R. 17788. H. Rept. 2203. October 6, 1966. 4 pp.
- Permitting Persons from Countries Friendly to the United States to Receive Instruction at Service Academies. Report to accompany S. 3887. S. Rept. 1690. October 6, 1966. 4 pp.

U.N. Assumes Responsibility for South West Africa

Following is a statement made by U.S. Representative James M. Nabrit, Jr., in the U.N. General Assembly on October 27, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Assembly on that day.

STATEMENT BY MR. NABRIT

U.S. delegation press release 4955, Corr. 1

The General Assembly has now acted upon the resolution with respect to South West Africa. We would have preferred that a wider consensus in wording and expression could have been achieved to assure that the resolution would have had even broader unanimity in the voting, particularly among all of the permanent members of the Security Council. We accept the result in good spirit and congratulate all who with patience and persistence contributed to this good result which reflects near unanimity on the part of this institution.

We have voted for this resolution in its amended form in the belief that the text does not in fact depart from the essential objectives we had in mind in the statement by Ambassador Goldberg on October 12.¹ We did so in the light of the many consultations in which we have been engaged and after careful consideration of the significant changes which have been made in the original text.

If members cooperate realistically and constructively in the implementation of this

resolution, we are hopeful it will contribute materially in preparing the way for the conclusions which a special session must then reach on how the material and moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants of South West Africa can henceforth be assured.

Our interpretation of this resolution and the basis on which we have supported it is that it is South Africa's rights that have come to an end, not the concept of international responsibility itself, and that this consequence has derived both from South Africa's failure to fulfill its obligations and from its disavowal of the mandate. The rights of the inhabitants as well as the rights and responsibilities of the United Nations as confirmed by the various advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice continue.

How the United Nations should discharge this responsibility, as it is called upon to do in paragraph 5 of the resolution, will be decided upon in light of the recommendations of the new *Ad Hoc* Committee for South West Africa established under paragraph 6. The task of that Committee is to recommend practical means by which South West Africa should be administered so as to enable the people of the territory to exercise the right of self-determination and to achieve independence. We hope that it will do its work seriously and realistically. It must, of course, be free to consider all means compatible with the charter and this resolution, and we would expect it to undertake appropriate consulta-

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 31, 1966, p. 690.

tion with all governments legitimately concerned with this grave matter.

I also wish to call attention to the importance of paragraph 7 of this resolution, for this paragraph calls upon South Africa to refrain from any action which might in any way tend to alter the present international status of the territory. It is necessary that this paragraph be observed strictly so as to avoid any prejudice to the international status of the territory or to future actions designed to discharge the responsibility of the United Nations. We are not unaware that the resolution also calls the attention of the Security Council to its terms and we are conscious of our responsibilities in the Council.

In voting for this resolution the United States has undertaken no commitment as to action which we would consider appropriate in the Security Council, should the Security Council later be seized of this question, since we do not wish to prejudice the report of the Committee and since it would of necessity depend upon the situation prevailing at that time.

In presenting the policy of the United States on October 12, Ambassador Goldberg emphasized that our proposals were designed to be immediately and practically implemented, to lie within the capacity of the organization, and to point toward united and peaceful action for the benefit of the people of South West Africa. We hope that the resolution which we have just adopted will be carried out in a way that meets these criteria and that it will lead toward a just and pacific settlement of this problem in the interests of the people of South West Africa themselves.

I conclude by repeating and reaffirming the statement made on behalf of my Government on October 12. We are firm in our determination that the United Nations, with all the unanimity and effectiveness that we can muster, should proceed to bring practical relief to the people of South West Africa in this their time of need.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION²

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of South West Africa to freedom and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960³ and earlier Assembly resolutions concerning the Mandated Territory of South West Africa,

Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 11 July 1950, which was accepted by the General Assembly in its resolution 449 A (V) of 13 December 1950, and the advisory opinions of 7 June 1955 and 1 June 1956 as well as the judgement of 21 December 1962, which have established the fact that South Africa continues to have obligations under the Mandate which was entrusted to it on 17 December 1920 and that the United Nations as the successor to the League of Nations has supervisory powers in respect of South West Africa,

Gravely concerned at the situation in the Mandated Territory, which has seriously deteriorated following the judgement of the International Court of Justice of 18 July 1966,⁴

Having studied the reports of the various committees which had been established to exercise the supervisory functions of the United Nations over the administration of the Mandated Territory of South West Africa,

Convinced that the administration of the Mandated Territory by South Africa has been conducted in a manner contrary to the Mandate, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Reaffirming its resolution 2074 (XX) of 17 December 1965, in particular paragraph 4 thereof which condemned the policies of apartheid and racial discrimination practised by the Government of South Africa in South West Africa as constituting a crime against humanity,

Emphasizing that the problem of South West Africa is an issue falling within the terms of resolution 1514 (XV),

Considering that all the efforts of the United Nations to induce the Government of South Africa to fulfil its obligations in respect of the administration of the Mandated Territory and to ensure the

² U.N. doc. A/Res/ 2145 (XXI); adopted by the Assembly on Oct. 27 by a vote of 114 (U.S.) to 2 (Portugal and South Africa), with 3 abstentions (France, Malawi, and U.K.).

³ For U.S. statements and text of the resolution, see BULLETIN of Jan. 2, 1961, p. 21.

⁴ For a Department statement of July 27, see *ibid.*, Aug. 15, 1966, p. 231.

well-being and security of the indigenous inhabitants have been of no avail,

Mindful of the obligations of the United Nations towards the people of South West Africa,

Noting with deep concern the explosive situation which exists in the southern region of Africa,

Affirming its right to take appropriate action in the matter, including the right to revert to itself the administration of the Mandated Territory,

1. *Reaffirms* that the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) are fully applicable to the people of the Mandated Territory of South West Africa and that, therefore, the people of South West Africa have the inalienable right to self-determination, freedom and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

2. *Reaffirms further* that South West Africa is a territory having international status and that it shall maintain this status until it achieves independence;

3. *Declares* that South Africa has failed to fulfil its obligations in respect of the administration of the Mandated Territory and to ensure the moral and material well-being and security of the indigenous inhabitants of South West Africa, and has, in fact, disavowed the Mandate;

4. *Decides* that the Mandate conferred upon His Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South Africa is therefore terminated, that South Africa has no other right to administer the Territory and that henceforth South West Africa comes under the direct responsibility of the United Nations;

5. *Resolves* that in these circumstances the United Nations must discharge those responsibilities with respect to South West Africa;

6. *Establishes* an *Ad Hoc* Committee for South West Africa—composed of fourteen Member States to be designated by the President of the General Assembly—to recommend practical means by which South West Africa should be administered, so as to enable the people of the Territory to exercise the right of self-determination and to achieve independence, and to report to the General Assembly at a special session as soon as possible and in any event not later than April 1967;

7. *Calls upon* the Government of South Africa forthwith to refrain and desist from any action, constitutional, administrative, political or otherwise, which will in any manner whatsoever alter or tend to alter the present international status of South West Africa;

8. *Calls the attention* of the Security Council to the present resolution;

9. *Requests* all States to extend their whole-

hearted co-operation and to render assistance in the implementation of the present resolution;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide all assistance necessary to implement the present resolution and to enable the *Ad Hoc* Committee for South West Africa to perform its duties.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Cultural Relations

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force for the United States November 2, 1966. *Proclaimed by the President*: November 3, 1966.

Finance

Articles of agreement establishing the Asian Development Bank, with annexes. Done at Manila December 4, 1965. Entered into force August 22, 1966. *Ratifications deposited*: Australia, September 19, 1966;¹ Austria, September 29, 1966; Cambodia, September 30, 1966; Ceylon, September 29, 1966;² China, September 22, 1966; Italy, September 30, 1966;² New Zealand, September 29, 1966;² Singapore, September 21, 1966; Sweden, September 29, 1966;³ United Kingdom, September 26, 1966;² Republic of Viet-Nam, September 22, 1966.

Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization, as amended. Done at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force for the United States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643.

Acceptance deposited: Guyana, September 27, 1966. Amendment to article 7 of the constitution of the World Health Organization, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Done at Geneva May 25, 1965.⁴ *Acceptance deposited*: Mali, October 18, 1966.

Labor

Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the International Labor Organization. Dated at Montreal October 9, 1946. Entered into force April 20, 1948. TIAS 1868. *Admission to membership*: Lesotho, October 31, 1966.

¹ With reservations and declarations.

² With a declaration.

³ With a statement.

⁴ Not in force.

Postal Matters

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and convention with final protocol and regulations of execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881).

Adherence deposited: Malawi, January 3, 1966.

Ratification deposited: United Kingdom, August 2, 1966.

Red Sea Lights

International agreement regarding the maintenance of certain lights in the Red Sea. Done at London February 20, 1962.

Acceptances deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, September 14, 1965; Italy, October 26, 1966; Norway, October 25, 1966.

Entry into force: October 28, 1966.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.

Acceptance deposited: Indonesia, October 26, 1966.

International regulations for preventing collisions at sea. Approved by the International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, London, May 17-June 17, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965. TIAS 5813.

Acceptance deposited: Gambia, November 1, 1966.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a global commercial communications satellite system. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.

Approval deposited: Netherlands, for the Kingdom in Europe, November 16, 1966.

Trade

Third procès-verbal extending the declaration of November 12, 1959, as extended (TIAS 4498, 4958, 5809), on the provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 14, 1965. Entered into force January 6, 1966. TIAS 6005.

Acceptance: Luxembourg, September 13, 1966.

Procès-verbal extending the declaration of March 5, 1964 (TIAS 5687), on the provisional accession of Iceland to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 14, 1965. Entered into force December 28, 1965; for the United States December 30, 1965. TIAS 5943.

Acceptance: Luxembourg, September 13, 1966.

Protocol for accession of Switzerland to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 1, 1966. Entered into force August 1, 1966. TIAS 6065.

Acceptances: Chad and India, October 14, 1966.

Wheat

Protocol for the further extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open for signature at Washington April 4 through 29, 1966. Entered into force July 16, 1966 for part I and parts III to VII; August 1, 1966 for part II.

Accession deposited: Dominican Republic, November 2, 1966.

Approval deposited: Nigeria, November 17, 1966.

BILATERAL

Austria

Amendment to the agreement of July 22, 1959 (TIAS 4402), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 11, 1965.

Entered into force: November 16, 1966.

Brazil

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 8, 1965.

Entered into force: November 9, 1966.

Colombia

Agreement relating to studies of the possibility of constructing an interoceanic sea-level canal through Colombian territory. Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá October 25, 1966. Entered into force October 25, 1966.

Indonesia

Amendment of the agreement of June 8, 1960 (TIAS 4557), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington January 12, 1966.

Entered into force: October 31, 1966.

Korea

Agreement under article IV of the mutual defense treaty regarding facilities and areas and the status of United States Armed Forces in Korea, with agreed minutes and exchange of notes. Signed at Seoul July 9, 1966.

Enters into force: February 9, 1967.

Malta

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Signed at Washington November 16, 1966. Enters into force on date of notification from Government of Malta that agreement has been approved in conformity with constitutional procedures.

Mauritania

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in Mauritania. Effected by exchange of notes at Nouakchott September 19 and October 17, 1966. Entered into force October 17, 1966.

Mexico

Agreement relating to creation of a joint commission to review operation of the Abraham Lincoln and Benito Juárez scholarship funds. Effected by exchange of notes at México September 30 and October 25, 1966. Entered into force October 25, 1966.

Morocco

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of August 12, 1966. Effected by an exchange of notes at Rabat October 25, 1966. Entered into force October 25, 1966.

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of April 23, 1965, as amended (TIAS 6049, 6122). Effected by exchange of notes at Rabat October 25, 1966. Entered into force October 25, 1966.

Pakistan

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of May 26, 1966, as amended (TIAS 6052, 6074). Effected by an exchange of notes at Rawalpindi October 25, 1966. Entered into force October 25, 1966.

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of May 26, 1966, as amended (TIAS 6052, 6074). Effected by an exchange of notes at Rawalpindi October 6, 1966. Entered into force October 6, 1966.

Paraguay

Agreement relating to the establishment of a peace corps program in Paraguay. Effected by exchange of notes at Asunción November 4, 1966. Entered into force November 4, 1966.

Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of March 21, 1966, as amended (TIAS 5968, 5981, 5995, 6062). Effected by an exchange of notes at Saigon November 3, 1966. Entered into force November 3, 1966.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Private Boycotts VS the National Interest. Explains how the "bridge of trade" with Eastern European countries can be a positive tool to encourage evolution toward greater national independence, peaceful cooperation, and open societies. Pub. 8117. Commercial Policy Series 203. 20 pp. 15¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Jordan, signed at Amman April 5, 1966. Entered into force April 5, 1966. With exchange of notes and amending agreement. Exchange of notes—Signed at Amman August 25, 1966. Entered into force August 25, 1966. TIAS 5985. 12 pp. 10¢.

Double Taxation—Taxes on Income. Convention with the Netherlands, modifying and supplementing the convention of April 29, 1948, as supplemented—Signed at Washington December 30, 1965. Entered into force July 8, 1966. With exchange of notes—Dated at Washington April 7 and 27, 1966. TIAS 6051. 29 pp. 15¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan—Signed at Karachi May 26, 1966. Entered into force May 26, 1966. With exchange of notes. TIAS 6052. 11 pp. 10¢.

Weather Stations—Cooperative Program on Guadeloupe Island. Agreement with France, amending and extending the agreement of March 23, 1956, as supplemented and extended. Exchange of notes—Dated at Paris January 12 and July 7, 1966. Entered into force July 7, 1966. Effective from June 30, 1965. TIAS 6053. 3 pp. 5¢.

Tracking Stations. Agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, extending the agreement of January 20, 1961. Exchange of notes—Signed at London January 17 and February 8, 1966. Entered into force January 17, 1966. TIAS 6054. 2 pp. 5¢.

Defense—Continuing Use of Land Adjacent to Leased Bases Area at Redcliff, Newfoundland. Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ottawa June 15, 1966. Entered into force June 15, 1966. TIAS 6055. 3 pp. 5¢.

Judicial Procedure. Agreement with Sierra Leone. Exchange of notes—Signed at Freetown March 31 and May 6, 1966. Entered into force May 6, 1966. TIAS 6056. 4 pp. 5¢.

Further Extension of International Wheat Agreement, 1962. Protocol with Other Governments open for signature at Washington April 4 to 29, inclusive, 1966. Entered into force July 16, 1966, with respect to Part I and Parts III to VII; and August 1, 1966, with respect to Part II. TIAS 6057. 43 pp. 20¢.

Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Arrangement with the Federal Republic of Germany. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bonn June 23 and 30, 1966. Entered into force June 30, 1966. TIAS 6068. 3 pp. 5¢.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LV, NO. 1432 PUBLICATION 8167 DECEMBER 5, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of

the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-

intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. PRICE: 52 issues, domestic \$10, foreign \$15; single copy 30 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the Department of State Bulletin as the source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

Africa
 Ambassador Goldberg Visits President Johnson To Report on U.N. Developments 851
 Power and Responsibility (Sisco) 856

Asia
 Advisory Panel for East Asian and Pacific Bureau Named 868
 The Future of the Pacific Community (Rusk) Secretary Rusk's News Conference of November 18 838
 844

Brazil. Claims for Property Losses in the State of Goiás, Brazil 869

China
 Ambassador Goldberg Visits President Johnson To Report on U.N. Developments 851
 Power and Responsibility (Sisco) 856
 Secretary Rusk's News Conference of November 18 844

Congo (Kinshasa). Letters of Credence (Adoula) 855

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy 869

Department and Foreign Service. Advisory Panel for East Asian and Pacific Bureau Named 868

Disarmament. Ambassador Goldberg Visits President Johnson To Report on U.N. Developments 851

Economic Affairs
 The Future of the Pacific Community (Rusk) 838
 The World's Food and Population Problems (Reuter) 862

Educational and Cultural Affairs. The Future of the Pacific Community (Rusk) 838

Europe
 Power and Responsibility (Sisco) 856
 Secretary Rusk's News Conference of November 18 844

Foreign Aid
 Food for Peace Act of 1966 Signed Into Law (Johnson) 866
 The World's Food and Population Problems (Reuter) 862

Germany
 Secretary Rusk's News Conference of November 18 844
 U.S., U.K., Germany Hold Second Round of Talks in Washington (communiqué) 867

Health. Water for Peace Conference To Be Held at Washington (Johnson) 868

India. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of November 18 844

North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 Secretary Rusk's News Conference of November 18 844
 U.S., U.K., Germany Hold Second Round of Talks in Washington (communiqué) 867

Pakistan. Letters of Credence (Hilaly) 855

Presidential Documents
 Food for Peace Act of 1966 Signed Into Law 866
 Water for Peace Conference To Be Held at Washington 868

Public Affairs. Department Holds Conference for Educators at St. Paul 867

Publications. Recent Releases 874

South Africa. U.N. Assumes Responsibility for South West Africa (Nabrit, text of resolution) 870

South West Africa
 Power and Responsibility (Sisco) 856
 U.N. Assumes Responsibility for South West Africa (Nabrit, text of resolution) 870

Treaty Information. Current Actions 872

U.S.S.R. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of November 18 844

United Kingdom. U.S., U.K., Germany Hold Second Round of Talks in Washington (communiqué) 867

United Nations
 Ambassador Goldberg Visits President Johnson To Report on U.N. Developments 851
 Power and Responsibility (Sisco) 856
 Secretary Rusk's News Conference of November 18 844
 U.N. Assumes Responsibility for South West Africa (Nabrit, text of resolution) 870

Viet-Nam
 Ambassador Goldberg Visits President Johnson To Report on U.N. Developments 851
 The Future of the Pacific Community (Rusk) Power and Responsibility (Sisco) 838
 856
 Secretary Rusk's News Conference of November 18 844

Name Index

Adoula, Cyrille 855
 Goldberg, Arthur J 851
 Hilaly, Agha 855
 Johnson, President 866, 868
 Nabrit, James M., Jr 870
 Reuter, Richard W 862
 Rusk, Secretary 838, 844
 Sisco, Joseph J 856

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: November 7-20

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Release issued prior to November 7 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 263 of November 4.

No.	Date	Subject
*267	11/9	Linowitz sworn in as U.S. representative on the OAS Council (biographic details).
*268	11/14	Neumann sworn in as Ambassador to Afghanistan (biographic details).
269	11/10	Claims for property losses in the State of Goiás, Brazil (re-write).
270	11/10	Advisory panel for Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
271	11/10	Communiqué, second round of U.S.-U.K.-German trilateral talks.
272	11/11	Reuter: "The World's Food and Population Problems."
†273	11/14	Rusk: University of Denver Convocation (excerpts).
274	11/15	Rusk: "The Future of the Asian Community."
*275	11/17	Annual awards ceremony.
*276	11/17	Rusk: annual awards ceremony.
277	11/18	Rusk: news conference of November 18.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Background Notes

The *Background Notes* series of pamphlets is a useful reference tool for teachers and students and an interesting and accurate source of background information for travelers and businessmen. Written by State Department "desk officers," *Background Notes* contain concise, authentic information about the political, economic, and social life of other nations. Averaging about 4,000 words, each *Note* includes an up-to-date map and a selected bibliography. The *Notes* are presented in an easy-to-read format suitable for filing in a looseleaf notebook.

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THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN

Vol. LV, No. 1433



December 12, 1966

NEW ASPECTS OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS

Address by Vice President Humphrey 878

THE UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO UNESCO

Statement by Assistant Secretary Frankel 883

UNITED STATES REVIEWS POSITION ON NONPROLIFERATION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Statements by Arthur J. Goldberg and William C. Foster 896

New Aspects of the Alliance for Progress

*Address by Vice President Humphrey*¹

It is a pleasure to honor Operation Amigo in the presence of so many *amigos* of long standing.

Tonight we meet in the same spirit of friendship that first inspired the creation of Operation Amigo and has carried it across two continents.

It is only natural that this friendship should flourish in our hemisphere. We share a common European inheritance which has left in the Americas—North and South—a widespread belief in constitutional government, in political democracy, in social justice, and in economic progress. We share, too, the Judeo-Christian belief in the dignity of the individual.

Out of this Western cultural and political inheritance have come lasting bonds which have held our peoples together, despite acknowledged differences between individual nations.

The spirit of Operation Amigo is that which inspired President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's good-neighbor policy. It is that of the Alliance for Progress, which President John Kennedy launched in 1961 and which President Johnson vigorously supports today.

In our own policy toward our neighbors we in the United States have come a long way since the days of Brigadier General Smedley

¹ Made at an Operation Amigo dinner at Washington, D.C., on Nov. 10. Operation Amigo is a program sponsored by the Miami (Fla.) Herald which provides local hospitality for Latin American students.

Butler, who in 1916 declared that the purpose of our policy was to make the area "safe for the boys of the National City Bank."

Our neighbors have come a long way since the days when a President of Chile could say "there are only two kinds of problems confronting society: those which get solved by themselves—and those which defy solution."

The purpose of United States policy today is summarized in the preamble to the Charter of Punta del Este:² ". . . to unite in a common effort to bring our people accelerated economic progress and broader social justice within the framework of personal dignity and political liberty."

Peoples of our hemisphere today approach the task of modernizing their societies free of the fatalism of earlier days.

They increasingly realize that the status quo is neither an inheritance to be enjoyed nor any longer a burden to be patiently borne.

They realize that a status quo which benefits the few at the expense of the many bears an intolerable human cost.

They know that deliberate, systematic political action can bring genuine improvement to the lives of ordinary and humble citizens.

All of us know today that rapid change in the socioeconomic structure is possible. We are determined to see the people of the Americas emerge from the shadows of social

² For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 462.

serfdom into the sunlight of human rights, out of the lethargy of neglect into participation in the political, social, and economic life of the community.

Possessed of this vision and determination, a new generation of leaders in our hemisphere has begun to tackle the problems posed by rapid population growth: rural isolation and agricultural backwardness, inadequate education in both quality and quantity, and the conversion of local economies into the larger regional markets required for economic growth.

Latin American nations have initiated tax and land reforms, built new schools and trained more teachers, embarked on national development plans, entered commodity stabilization agreements, and encouraged responsible private enterprise.

As the leaders of our hemisphere prepare to meet next year, it is already clear our sights must be raised if the original economic goals of the Alliance for Progress are to be reached.

President Johnson has called for the raising of targets for annual growth rates—from 2½ to 4 or 6 percent per capita annually.³ To accomplish this, special attention must be given to the fields of economic integration, agricultural and rural modernization, and education.

The Process of Economic Integration

It is now widely recognized that the progress we seek will be achieved only if the process of economic integration of the hemisphere is accelerated.

Just as the nations of postwar Europe united to form a European Economic Community, so the nations of Latin America naturally see their own destiny more and more in terms of an economically integrated market of continental proportions.

The development of regional markets—in

³ For an address by President Johnson at the Pan American Health Organization on Aug. 17, see *ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1966, p. 330.

a manner guaranteeing the efficiency which only competition and larger markets can bring—is now recognized as essential to the economic growth of many Latin American countries. The Central American Common Market has already shown what can be accomplished when a national outlook is replaced by a regional one.

We in the United States support effective economic integration because you yourselves regard it as essential.

We support it because the modern Latin America which can emerge from effective integration will be a more effective partner in all the great common world tasks which confront us.

We support it because, as our postwar experience demonstrates, our own most fruitful and mutually advantageous trade and financial relations are with industrialized and diversified areas.

And finally, we support it because economic integration is a fundamental part of the Alliance for Progress, to which we committed ourselves at Punta del Este.

The progress we seek will elude us so long as agriculture remains stagnant and rural Latin America remains isolated from the booming cities that have sprung up across the continent. Today, half the people in Latin America live in rural areas but receive only one-fourth of the total income.

Today, per capita food consumption is lower than a decade ago.

Through science and technology; heavy capital investment; investment in new fertilizer, machinery, and skills; development of marine food resources; and through widening of markets, Latin American agriculture can both feed a growing population and finance the modernization of rural America.

All this will require even greater attention to education, particularly to training in the skills required for a modern society.

In most Latin American countries schools and universities are too few, too small, and too poor to meet the need. Economic growth requires more trained talent, more engineers,

scientists, and agronomists, more electricians, carpenters, and machinists.

The democratization of society requires an end to illiteracy, an extension of educational opportunities beyond the favored few. The preservation and enrichment of our culture requires more poets, painters, and musicians.

The educational needs of the continent cannot be met through conventional means. Modern methods of radio and television and audiovisual techniques must be applied. New multinational centers for training and research must be established to train the specialists needed. Only with such centers can trained talent be retained in Latin America and the "brain drain" be halted.

Expanding educational opportunities also means enlarging the possibility for participation in public life, for enlarging the middle class, and increasing social mobility.

Danger of a Nuclear Arms Race

But this progress in the fields of integration, agriculture, and education will be threatened if the desire of some for modern military weapons cannot be checked.

We recognize that the economic and social aspirations of the people of Latin America cannot be achieved without security. We know that externally supported guerrilla movements exist in some Latin American countries. But surely these security problems do not require highly sophisticated weaponry.

For many years we have been told that military budgets in Latin America are "sacred cows." But with all being asked to contribute to the common effort, it is time that the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress consider whether precious resources are being utilized unnecessarily for military equipment.

But a further step is needed. The time has come for the nations of Latin America to consult with each other about the weapons they believe are truly necessary for their security.

We would hope that Latin American nations could agree that there are certain

large and sophisticated weapons they do not need and will not buy. This alone would be an important contribution to economic and social growth and political harmony.

So long as supersonic fleets are considered the best guarantee of security in any one nation, the security of all nations has no guarantee. Surely breaking the poverty barrier is more important to the peoples of the Americas than breaking the sound barrier.

If unnecessary expenditure on conventional weapons represents a threat to the solvency of many, the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the hemisphere would threaten the security of all.

The time is right for a regional arms agreement which would bar the nuclear arms race from our hemisphere.

Nuclear weapons would serve no useful purpose in preserving the security of Latin American nations but would only imperil the peace of the continent. They would further endanger the precarious economies of countries which already possess military forces too large for their security needs and too expensive to be maintained without outside assistance.

If the nations of Latin America support such an agreement—and such a proposal was initiated several years ago—they can be sure that the United States will enthusiastically respond.

Perfecting Political Democracy

As we face the next decade, we are more aware today than 5 years ago that the economic progress we seek, and the social justice we aspire to, can be securely achieved only where political institutions are strong and where political leadership is secure. Perfecting political democracy and strengthening constitutional government are an essential part of the Alliance for Progress.

Where political leadership has been strong, democratic institutions have survived. But there is no doubt that progress in preserving and extending democratic political institu-

tions has at best been uneven. There have been recent hopeful signs, such as the peaceful transfers of power in Venezuela, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic. In other countries military coups d'état, not free elections, have brought changes in the government.

Until ways are found to strengthen the political fabric of Latin societies, to perfect the institutions which are the substructure of a stable political system, we cannot be sure that military coups d'état represent only a temporary aberration and not a permanent trend.

By the political substructure, I mean those institutions such as political parties, labor unions, business organizations, *campesino* federations, cooperatives, and civic organizations that are the channel for much of our participation in political life.

The problem of perfecting political institutions applies to all the American nations—North and South. In responding to the pressures of rapid change, we are all experimenting with new forms of political organization, with new ways of strengthening established institutions.

For North Americans, it may be the problem of governing the urban megalopolis or of incorporating marginal groups into the society. For Central and South Americans, it may be building political parties, improving administration, or strengthening labor unions.

In view of this continued political turbulence our people and leaders should consider giving the same attention to political development that has been given in the past two decades to economic development.

Economic and social development can help significantly to provide the basis for civic advancement, but it will not guarantee it. The past and prospective inadequacy of economic and social progress argues strongly for more conscious action to develop political systems that can enable rapidly changing societies to contain and manage explosive tensions within them.

Maximum use should be made of collaboration between counterpart organizations: student groups working with student groups, businessmen with businessmen, intellectuals with intellectuals, labor groups with labor unions.

Participation, Progress, and Peace

Why this special concern with political development? Because it will be necessary if modernizing Latin American societies are to accommodate the demand of their people for participation and progress without sacrificing the requirement of domestic peace.

These three elements—participation, progress, and peace—often conflict with one another, and even in the best of circumstances their reconciliation is difficult.

Peace—or domestic order—can temporarily be achieved by military dictatorship.

Progress—the more abundant and equitable provision of goods and services to the citizens—can be achieved through technocracy.

But participation—full participation of the citizens—is possible only in a democracy.

The defects of military government are obvious. The allure of technocracy should not deceive. The difficulties of democracy should not repel. Only when economic modernization is matched by popular participation will modernization be a permanent achievement and not a passing phase.

The Alliance for Progress today is moving ahead in those countries where political leaders have been able to offer their people the prospect of participation, as well as peace and progress. In a number of countries—Chile, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico to name a few—the validity of the original assumption of the Alliance for Progress is being demonstrated: that economic progress and social justice are best achieved within a framework of constitutional democracy.

Progress is being achieved in the political dialog of the Americas. The Alliance for Progress is today the standard by which political leaders and governments are judged

—even in those countries which do not fully adhere to the standard. This is an important achievement. For it has been truly said that countries will not go where their leaders will not take them.

There are many who say that, after 5 years, the progress of the Alliance is unimpressive. The Alliance has done better than many had hoped—and not as well as we would prefer. There is no doubt that only a beginning has been made. The crippling poverty and staggering injustice of centuries will not be ended in 5 years, nor in a decade. But what is most important is that men of vision have offered reason for hope.

As our own experience with the New Deal taught us, what can be accomplished in a material sense in a very limited period of time will always fall short of expectations.

We should not be discouraged. Where there is evidence that progress is being made, this will sustain the confidence of the people that the unmet problems of society will be solved in the future.

Today there is hope.

Whether those hopes will finally be fulfilled will depend on the people and the leaders of Latin American nations. But it will also depend on us.

In meeting our responsibilities, let it not be said that we could not match the greatness of our resources with the grandness of our vision.

We look forward to the day when a strong Latin America can play a larger role in the Western World—in the Atlantic world—and can be a full partner of the United States and Europe.

It is only then that the nations of our hemisphere will realize the desire of Bolívar to see the Americas fashioned into the greatest region of the world—greatest “not so much by virtue of her area and her wealth, as by her freedom and her glory.”

Chamizal Highway To Symbolize U.S.—Mexican Friendship

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) dated November 8

The Chamizal Highway bill brings us one step further toward the goals we established concluding the treaty of 1963 with Mexico.¹

That historic agreement removed a 100-year-old source of contention between our two nations. The United States and Mexico transferred lands to one another and agreed to a new boundary and relocation of the Rio Grande at El Paso.

By the act I shall sign today,² a new highway is authorized parallel to the adjusted boundary and downstream along the Rio Grande. With the 40-acre Chamizal Memorial Park, it will symbolize the good faith that made the agreement possible.

The State of Texas or the city of El Paso will share with the United States in the costs of constructing the highway. This is right and proper, for both the State and the city have helped to create and sustain the human relationships that form the real tie between our peoples.

We have no closer nor any more meaningful bonds with any nation than we have with Mexico. Each of our peoples travels frequently and in great numbers to the other's country, and the culture of each has become part of the other. I believe that coming decades will find us growing even closer together—proud, independent, yet mutually enriching friends. Chamizal, long the subject of dispute between us, now becomes the emblem of that friendship.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 23, 1963, p. 480.

² As enacted, the bill (H.R. 11555) is Public Law 89-795.

The United States Commitment to UNESCO

Statement by Charles Frankel

*Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs*¹

Twenty years ago 28 nations, of which the United States was one, joined together to establish this organization. These nations now meet again in Paris for a General Conference, joined by other member states that outnumber them three to one.

Our mood, inevitably, is not the same as that in which our founding fathers met. They met in relief and in hope and in pursuit of an ideal. We meet, as human beings have always met once an ideal has begun to be implemented, with perhaps a fuller sense of the complexities of what was undertaken. But we meet, and I think we are right to meet, in a spirit of confidence.

For UNESCO exists. It exists because there is a hope abroad in the world that sustains it. It is the hope that if men will meet to find and define their common tasks, and if they will then get on with these tasks, there will emerge, gradually, a common etiquette, a common discourse, a common business that can hold mankind together.

Like all human institutions, UNESCO can sink into a kind of busy dream, mistaking plans for achievement and earnest activity for service to its ideal. It can confuse means and ends, occupying itself with administration and negotiation as though these were substitutes for a sense of purpose.

I do not say that this is what has happened to UNESCO. I say only that it is the supreme daily business of our organization to see that it does not happen, whatever our failures may be and whatever, indeed, our successes may be.

This is why I have noted with pleasure the wise concluding injunction of our Director-General [René Maheu] in his evaluation of UNESCO's activities and future prospects. He has spoken of the need to retain in UNESCO "a certain freshness and vivacity of mind and approach," and he has said: "I trust that our intricate machinery, our arduous toil, our very successes themselves will never dry up or deflect that limpid spring." The delegation of the United States associates itself with this statement.

Accordingly, Mr. President, I should like in these opening remarks to address myself to two subjects.

First of all, I wish to speak of new and separate initiatives that can be undertaken by individual nations, initiatives that can carry forward the ideals of UNESCO and that can give support to the multilateral effort UNESCO represents.

Secondly, I want to speak of the direct support to UNESCO which nations can and must give, and which my Government is historically committed to give.

Let me turn, first, to initiatives that can be undertaken by individual nations.

In discussing such initiatives, I should like to begin, with your permission, Mr. President, by describing initiatives that are being launched by my own country. The past year

¹ Made before the 14th General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Paris, France, on Oct. 27. Dr. Frankel was chairman of the U.S. delegation to the conference, which was held at Paris Oct. 25–Nov. 30; for names of other members of the delegation, see *BULLETIN* of Nov. 14, 1966, p. 760.

has been one in which my country has undertaken new programs in international education and has set about to prepare itself to engage more effectively in cooperative educational relations—binational and multinational—with other nations. These programs have been designed to serve our own educational interest and that of other nations. They embody, in our minds, and in words the Director-General himself has used to describe them, “the UNESCO idea.”

In describing these programs, I do not offer them as models that other nations must necessarily adopt for themselves. They are part of an American effort to improve what we ourselves are doing. But I hope that other nations will regard these steps as an invitation to explore the means and procedures by which they, too, in their own different ways, can contribute to an international adventure in mutual education.

Let me first describe the general principles behind these programs. I would begin by noting that in his message to Congress of February 2 describing his administration’s new international education program,² President Johnson singled out UNESCO for special mention as the kind of organization with which we wish to cooperate. He did not, of course, mean to indicate that UNESCO was the only such organization. But the fact that he specifically mentioned UNESCO indicates the position that UNESCO presently holds in the foreign policy of the United States.

Secondly, the President in that message indicated that educational and cultural cooperation with other nations should be recognized as lying at the heart of our foreign activities, just as education does in our domestic activities. The United States, we recognize, has a long-term, continuing commitment to educational cooperation with other countries and believes that such cooperation should be a central feature of our relations with them.

Nor do we commit ourselves to educational cooperation only because education is a major instrument for economic and technical development, important as this is. We commit

ourselves to educational cooperation because education is a major instrument of human fulfillment, because the education of men’s minds and spirits is properly our species’ ultimate concern. Indeed, we in the United States accept this commitment in order to help ourselves. Over the long run our own hopes for the peaceful resolution of international disagreements depend in large part on cooperative programs of education with other nations. And our own education depends on such programs. For all nations so far as education is concerned are developing nations. By participating in international educational development we believe that we shall develop our own educational system.

This is the third general guiding principle in the new programs we are envisaging. We are not envisaging a one-sided program in which we educate others. No nation has a mission to educate the world. We do not presume that our educational system, which has its triumphs but also its problems, is the answer to every other nation’s needs. What we envisage is a process of intellectual collaboration. We are talking about give-and-take.

Specific Features of the U.S. Program

Against this background I would turn to some of the specific features of the program that has now been set in motion in the United States.

To begin with fundamentals, the President last February asked the executive branch of our Government and the Congress to take steps to advance the free flow of ideas and people and of works of art, science, and imagination between our nation and others. In response, the executive branch has simplified visa procedures in order to facilitate attendance by foreign guests at international educational and scholarly meetings in the United States.³

Again, the President proposed that implementing legislation be written into our tariff codes to cover the Florence and Beirut agreements. These are UNESCO agreements which

² For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 328.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, May 30, 1966, p. 869.

the United States accepted in principle from the time of their negotiation. I am happy to tell you today, after these many years, that the necessary implementing legislation has been passed by our Congress.⁴

I feel an obligation, in this connection, to mention particularly one of my colleagues. Those of you who have been associated with UNESCO over the past several years know well the important role Ambassador William Benton has played in helping to negotiate the original agreements and in helping to secure the adherence of the United States to them. I cannot speak of these agreements without paying tribute here to his personal contribution.

These agreements, which eliminate tariff barriers to the free flow of educational material, are two major achievements of UNESCO. The United States, for its part, has now abolished tariff barriers to the importation of educational and scholarly materials, no matter what the country of origin and no matter whether the country is or is not a party to the Florence and Beirut agreements. As President Johnson said when he signed the legislation, and noted that he was doing so in UNESCO's 20th anniversary year, "The ideals for which that organization (UNESCO) stands are being given fresh vitality and renewed purpose."

We hope that other nations that have not done so will also soon subscribe to the Florence and Beirut agreements. These agreements are basic to the free flow of ideas.

The free flow of ideas, however, comprehends more than the elimination of legal barriers to such flow. It also has a practical side, a human side, and an intellectual side. More specifically, UNESCO, in the judgment of my delegation, should consider a 10-point program.

1. On the practical side, modern science and research are generating important ideas and discovering important facts each day. This enormous mass of important material has been accumulating more rapidly than we have been able to assimilate or transmit it.

⁴ See p. 894.

President Johnson Hails UNESCO's 20 Years of Achievement

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization celebrated its 20th anniversary on November 4. Following is the text of a message from President Johnson, which was delivered to the 14th session of the UNESCO General Conference at Paris.

OCTOBER 27, 1966

As you review twenty years of achievement and set your course for the future, I send warm greetings to the 14th UNESCO General Conference.

In a world where there is too much want and too much ignorance, you are helping build a better life for all men based on education and on progress in science and the arts.

In a world strained with mistrust and conflict, you are helping to build peace. Your work is founded on the conviction that peace must mean more than the absence of conflict: it must mean the presence of justice and wider opportunities for human fulfillment.

The American people support these goals.

What we achieve together can give reality to our common dream: a worldwide human fraternity, based on mutual understanding and respect—and living in peace.

The problem is, in effect, the other side of the problem of literacy. UNESCO has a vital stake in reducing both sides of the problem.

Computers and other information processing systems now provide us with a technology that can begin to deal with such matters. UNESCO's vital activities as a clearinghouse for information should incorporate as much as possible the recent developments in information processing, storage, and retrieval. My Government is pleased to see the steps UNESCO is taking to expand and improve its documentation operation. We endorse the organizational modifications in the secretariat, the plans for utilization of up-to-date technology, and the effort to strengthen regional information centers. The more effectively UNESCO performs its clearinghouse function, the better it serves the broad objective of increasing the free flow of information.

2. The flow of ideas has also its human side. It is not, after all, the name of an abstract concept. It is the name for an urgent human desire—a name for human curiosity, for human contact beyond the limiting boundaries of political frontiers. Indeed, it includes more than the flow of ideas, for the flow of ideas depends on the flow of human sympathy and trust. This is why, in our new program for international education in the United States, we seek, by working at all levels of education, to broaden the perspectives of Americans, and to educate ourselves not only in the skills and knowledge but the emotional and moral attitudes appropriate to living in this international century. This is an imposing task, but we believe that it is incumbent on any nation that subscribes to the UNESCO Charter.

3. Still on the human side, the free flow of ideas obviously entails people as well as books. President Johnson has recommended that there be established in our Department of Health, Education, and Welfare an American Education Placement Service. It would act as an international bureau, available to other governments, for recruiting American teachers who wish to work overseas.

The executive branch of my Government is now preparing plans for the early establishment of this service. My Government hopes that this service, in the words of the President, "will lead to the development of a World Teacher Exchange—in which all nations may join to bring their classrooms into closer relationship with one another."⁵

Under such an arrangement, multinational exchanges could be arranged under which individual countries could rotate teachers from one country to another. Here is a program, I believe, of special promise for UNESCO. If a workable system emerges, the United States Government is prepared to examine with sympathy the possibility of associating the work of its Education Placement Service with such a World Teacher Exchange.

4. We should also seek other ways and

means of facilitating exchanges of persons and personal experiences. For example, the United States Government, at the invitation of the President and with the advice of Congress, is undertaking a pilot program under which volunteers from other countries will serve in our country in our social service, community development, and educational experimental programs. Beginning next summer we hope to have a group of perhaps 100 more "Volunteers to America." If the idea works, we hope to expand it.

Promoting Intellectual Cooperation

5. To turn to intellectual issues, the process of intellectual and cultural cooperation, as we all know, is complex. The multiplicity of languages, and the multiplicity of mental habits and perspectives in the world which these languages reflect and reinforce, are obvious complicating factors. Differences in intellectual styles and pedagogical methods add to the difficulties. Political pressures and tensions make additional troubles.

It is the task of UNESCO to find forms of practical cooperation that will promote fruitful international conversation despite these differences. Indeed, the conversation for which UNESCO is the forum can be all the more fruitful because these differences exist. We would have little to learn from each other if we were all the same.

But the conversation must be one that tends to eliminate superstitions and to substitute, as a basis for discourse, the bedrock of well-attested fact. From this point of view, the role of the social sciences in the work of UNESCO is peculiarly significant. They can offer a chance for independent, objective, and cooperative inquiry into facts. They can help create a new spirit—not of monolithic intellectual unity but of disciplined and reasoned discourse among men. The program of UNESCO should pay increasing attention to the potentialities of this domain of human thought. We also welcome, in this connection, the emergence of a UNESCO program in the teaching of international law.

6. The question of the transferability of

⁵ BULLETIN of Feb. 28, 1966, p. 328.

educational credits and academic degrees urgently needs fresh examination. Obviously, there are genuine and difficult issues affecting the question of the equivalency of degrees from one country to another. Yet much of the concern that is expressed is gratuitous. In a world like ours, where trained talent is rare, where human ignorance and suffering are great, rules and standards should be our servants not our masters. They should operate to help us to find and utilize the human abilities that exist and not to discourage such abilities or to put them on the shelf.

UNESCO should not be a party, I would suggest, to any efforts aimed at supporting "academic protective tariffs." I speak as one who has spent most of his life in the academic world, and I think I know something about these "tariffs." I speak, indeed, to an audience filled with colleagues who are members of the same guild I am. I think you know something about these protective tariffs. They consist in rigid systems of qualification—or, more usually, disqualification—by which people are tested for jobs on the basis of achievements in a curriculum designed for another place at another time. Let UNESCO not become too deeply entangled in this kind of thicket. Instead, let UNESCO endorse a flexible position based upon the criterion of relevant performance—on what a man can do and on the relevance of what he can do to an objective appraisal of what tasks he will be called upon to perform in the position for which he is being considered.

New Initiatives in Education

7. Nor are these the only initiatives that can now be taken. Science, education, and culture are not the work of governments, but of nations. Much of a government's function is simply to activate and encourage nongovernment organizations. In this spirit the President has proposed and our Congress has recently passed the International Education Act of 1966.⁶

The act authorizes programs of grants for the long-term encouragement of American

secondary school, college, and university growth in international education. It proposes that grants will be given to educational institutions to support their own programs of development in international education and international cultural cooperation. The promise this new act holds for cooperation between American and foreign educational institutions is, I believe, evident. It promises a time when governments will stand behind such cooperation but will not be in the middle and, as sometimes happens, in the way.

8. If it is important to keep the home and the school in touch with each other in the education of the young, then it is surely important to give attention to the role of women in the planning of education.

9. If we are concerned about the application of science to the betterment of the human condition, no problem deserves more attention than the control of population growth.

10. We can and should look, too, at the promise and the peril of the mass media of communication in our time. All of us in UNESCO know that the desperate need for education that marks our age cannot be met by traditional methods alone. Yet we do not yet know enough, we have not yet pooled our separate experiences in different cultural contexts, with regard to the utility and desirability of radio or television as adjuncts to the teaching process.

Some beginnings, to be sure, have been made within our UNESCO family of member states. In educational television, for example, the United States has some 15 years of experience in a wide variety of educational situations. We have learned some things about the potential of this medium, but many basic questions remain unanswered, and we are not yet satisfied with the results. One exciting recent development is in Samoa, where instruction via television serves as the backbone of the entire educational system. The American experience in educational television has been summarized objectively in a

⁶ President Johnson signed the act at Chulalongkorn University at Bangkok, Thailand, on Oct. 29; for text of his address, see *ibid.*, Nov. 21, 1966, p. 769.

booklet just published by the Ford Foundation.

But American experience is only part of the total pool of experience represented by the member states of UNESCO. Japan and Italy are but two examples of other countries that are providing vigorous and creative leadership in educational television.

The case studies of the new media in Africa soon to be released by UNESCO's International Institute for Educational Planning will mark another step forward in bringing reliable information about the cost and value of the new media to the member states.

Over the last decade my Government has provided opportunities for people from other nations to study at first hand our experience in new educational methods and techniques. We will continue to make these opportunities available and hope that other countries with developing programs in educational television will give us Americans, as well as people from other countries, a similar opportunity.

Working With and Through UNESCO

Against this background of specific actions—and there are many others, of course, that could be listed, including actions contemplated or taken by many other member states, allow me, Mr. President, to suggest, briefly, ways in which member states can work with and through UNESCO.

First of all, we should ask about our relationship to UNESCO's program. The United States is happy to be able to support the program and budget proposed for consideration by this conference. We do so believing that UNESCO is an instrument that can and should be used to advance the purposes of international education and cultural cooperation. It is, of course, one instrument and not the only one. In different situations different instruments are appropriate. But UNESCO unquestionably has certain unique potentialities.

Broadly speaking, we in the United States believe that national progress—cultural, social, economic, or political—is best served by broadening the base of general education of the population as a whole. Different strate-

gies are needed, of course, to reach this goal in different countries, but it is in terms of this goal that we should choose the means. In many circumstances the best means can well be the multinational instrumentalities offered by UNESCO.

Beyond this, more member states may also wish to consider the so-called funds-in-trust arrangement with UNESCO—the arrangement under which a given country, which desires to conduct certain international educational, scientific, or cultural activities, turns to UNESCO on an *ad hoc* basis and asks UNESCO to carry on that activity in its name. The United States Government is prepared to consider projects of this sort.

In addition, member states can examine what UNESCO is doing in the various countries of the world and determine where supplementary action of their own can advance common purposes. This need not involve a formal arrangement, but it can in many cases elevate programs to the level at which they can really make a substantial and telling difference.

The Spirit of This Conference

I wish finally to speak about the spirit in which the United States delegation expects to approach its business at this conference. Last May, in a speech at Princeton University honoring the memory of Woodrow Wilson, President Johnson said:⁷

Peace must be built, step by painful, patient step. And the building will take the best work of the world's best men and women.

It will take men whose cause is not the cause of one nation but of all nations, men whose enemies are not other men but the historic foes of mankind.

The majority of the issues with which this conference is concerned are of an objective educational, scientific, or intellectual nature. Discussions of such issues can best be carried on if the individuals who take part in them make every effort to consider the facts dispassionately in the light of their professional experience, their best intelligence, and their

⁷ For an excerpt from President Johnson's address on May 11, see *ibid.*, May 30, 1966, p. 835.

conscience as members of a cooperative enterprise potentially involving all mankind.

In their work in this conference the members of our delegation will deal with some questions—for example those related to budgetary matters—where they must speak as representatives of a member state. There will be other questions, too, where the members must function as a group in order to register a single vote of the United States delegation. But the great majority of issues before us involve the exchange of ideas about crucial educational and cultural matters involving all mankind. These subjects are not necessarily in political fields, and they are not necessarily in fields where governments as such can be expected to have an established or official position.

Most of the members of the United States delegation are private citizens with specialized professional experience. In order to allow us all to take advantage of their specialized competence, they will, perhaps, broach ideas in an experimental and exploratory spirit, hoping in this way to contribute to the objective analysis of the issues we face. They will speak *ad referendum* to their Government, and without necessarily committing their Government or their delegation to a final position on these matters. We are convinced that such an honest confrontation of the issues by individuals can contribute greatly to the resolution of specific questions and to the growth of that spirit of cooperation without regard to frontiers which is the ideal of UNESCO and which should mark its day-to-day activities.

Mr. President, alongside the madness and hostility and distrust that mark our world today, there is, also, a universal urge for sanity and sympathy and forbearance. The zealots may make all the noise. But the mass of mankind, unless I am wrong, is of a more moderate temper. This generation of men and women, in all countries, large and small, rich and poor, has lived through too much.

At the center of every society there are men and women who have grown weary of recipes for the salvation of mankind. They have grown suspicious of doctrines that base

the hope for human improvement on the universal triumph of any political gospel. To me, UNESCO speaks for these people and to them. That is why it exists and why we can now take it as a fact that it will continue to exist. The diversity of the human condition, happily, will remain; and disagreements between men and between groups are also part of the human condition. But the spite, frenzy, and panic that now surround these disagreements can be reduced. The world can, finally, belong to moderate men—the greatly undervalued and greatly oppressed majority of the human race.

Mr. President, UNESCO gives us the opportunity to translate this hope into day-to-day practice.

Ambassador Harriman Discusses His Post-Manila Trip

Following are excerpts from a press conference held by President Johnson and Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman at the LBJ Ranch, Johnson City, Tex., on November 11.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON

Ambassador Harriman went with me to the Manila Conference. Following that conference, I asked him to visit some dozen countries in the Pacific area and then come back by Europe, to report to those countries—the heads of the governments—the developments at Manila, the success of that exchange; to ask them for their views; to urge them to make any suggestions or recommendations they have that they thought might lead to taking the differences from the battlefield to the conference table; asking them to give us any suggestions they might have for peace.

The Ambassador visited the Philippines, Ceylon, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Italy, France, Bonn, Britain, and Morocco.

He has come back and he has given me

in the last hour or so a rather full report on the individual conversations he had with the various heads of state in each country, except Paris, where he saw [Maurice] Couve de Murville, the Foreign Minister. In all others he saw the heads of state. He will give me a somewhat more detailed report in writing a little later. The Secretary of State, Ambassador Goldberg, and I will review it at the appropriate time.

. . . I am told you wanted to see Ambassador Harriman. I don't know what he will tell you, but I will be glad for him to tell you whatever he said to me and answer any questions, as I will be glad to do after he talks to you.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

As the President said, I went to 11 countries since Manila. As the President requested me to, I reported on the developments in Manila, Viet-Nam, and other aspects of the situation in the Far East and also discussed the matters which interested each country the most.

I found a very general appreciation of the value of the Manila Conference and new conceptions of the seven countries that sat down together. The President with six Asian countries sitting there as equals made a deep impression among the Asians.

Then the limited objectives were outlined—the willingness to come to a peaceful negotiation and the taking out of troops, with the mention of 6 months, though it was not clear when the period would begin.

It indicated definitely, and they all accepted, that the President intended to take out our troops—as did the other countries involved.

In fact, the seven countries spoke, which carried much more meaning, because it was a commitment among the seven. The position of the South Vietnamese Government has been strengthened materially, I found, by the September 11th elections and also by their agreement to carry forward this process of constitutional elections.

Each one of the countries wants to see

peace—a peaceful settlement. In almost every case, they recognize the need to stop aggression. There are different points of view on it, but I think it is fair to say that no country wants to see aggression succeed. They want to do everything they can. Some are able to do more than others.

In the Asian countries they were interested in the President speaking about the possibility of regional development and our assistance to Asian initiative after the end of hostilities.

In Europe they had been concerned that we were getting too interested in the Far East and would neglect our commitments to NATO.

I was able to reassure them—to the press particularly, and the television. The people are more concerned, I think, than the more thoughtful ministers. In almost every case I saw the heads of governments and the principal ministers involved.

Each country had some idea about the development of some initiative on their part. Most of them are quiet. Most of them thought that the less said about their negotiations or their discussions, the better. Each one is trying in their own way to do something, whether it be directly to Hanoi or whether it be through some other channel.

The most promising or the most immediate discussion will take place when the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. George Brown, goes to the Soviet Union on the 21st of November to talk to the Soviet leaders, among other things, about Viet-Nam.

The British have a special responsibility with the Soviet Union as cochairman of the Geneva conference. The meeting of those two Governments is a very important event. We are hopeful that something may come of it. It is impossible to predict, but at least the Soviet Union has considerable influence in Hanoi. I found that in almost every case the leaders of the governments felt that the spectacle of the confusion that exists in Peking now and in Red China was reducing China's influence and it gave a better opportunity for a quieter attitude.

As the President has said, and I found it

confirmed everywhere, that every country in the world, with the exception of Red China and Hanoi, wants to see peace. That consensus, the pressure of world opinion, I think, gives us a right to have some encouragement. Each of the individual countries, of course, has its problems, and they are naturally interested in talking about them. They are grateful for the position the United States is taking in almost every case and are appreciative of the assistance that is given them and grateful for the initiative that President Johnson on a number of occasions has taken.

Are there any questions any of you would like to ask?

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. Mr. Ambassador, did you discuss the possibility of a Christmas truce and the possibility of suspending American bombing in North Viet-Nam, as the Pope has suggested he might call for? What is the position on the Pope's call for a suspension of our bombing and a Christmas truce?

A. I left out the fact that I had an audience with the Pope. He has since announced, today, that he is going to ask, as he did last year, for a cease-fire which, of course, would stop the fighting, which, of course, would include the end of the bombing. He hoped it would be longer than the 48 hours which was all that occurred last year. He naturally hopes the bombing as well will stop.

The subject of bombing did come up. Some of the countries believed it would be desirable for the United States to suggest that we stop, and they indicate some constructive action would be taken by the other side. I had to point out to them that the President stopped for twice as long last year as anyone had suggested. The only answer from Hanoi had been to push further supplies, to repair roads, to take advantage of the pause, in order to reinforce their troops. I made it also quite plain to the heads of governments and publicly that it was not of value to peace to propose, as General de Gaulle did at Phnom Penh, that the United States take uni-

lateral action. I expressed the personal opinion that that put off the day of peace and added to Hanoi's intransigence, thinking that if they hung out, world opinion would force us to take action.

I believe that most of the countries thoroughly understand the President's position and would like to see Hanoi take some reciprocal steps, which, as the President indicated, could be done formally or informally, publicly or privately. Talking it out with the different governments and also with the public, I think has given a more balanced impression. But the subject of bombing constantly comes up. It is one in which there is propaganda coming from the Communist side, particularly from the Eastern European countries, that if the United States would only stop bombing, something would happen. It is quite clear that it is essential that Hanoi indicate what that is in advance.

Q. Shortly before the election the Republicans released a poll that they said showed our prestige in Europe was dropping considerably. Did you find that to be the case?

A. No, I did not find that our prestige in Europe had dropped at all. I found there was some concern with De Gaulle's action in dropping out of the Organization of the North Atlantic Treaty—that it would lead to a new situation.

They wanted to be quite sure that because of our involvement in Viet-Nam we had not lost the interest.

But as far as the United States prestige is concerned, there is no question about its prestige and the fact that President Johnson has taken such leadership in the development of a new sense of unity, not only in the defense but also in the development through NATO of better relations between East and West, which is having a deep impression.

Q. Mr. Ambassador, do you see or hear any new signals from Hanoi?

A. No new signals from Hanoi. It is encouraging, as I said, that the Soviet Union is ready to talk about it. They haven't indicated they are ready to do anything.

It is encouraging that all of the Eastern

European countries indicate that they are talking to Hanoi. There are thirdhand conversations which appear to indicate that Hanoi is willing to talk, provided we do certain things.

I am going to be quite frank in saying that there is no specific discussion going on at the present time.

Q. Sir, did you ask to see Mr. de Gaulle? Is there any significance in your not seeing him but all the others?

A. I saw the heads of governments in all other countries. But I went to Paris primarily to meet with the NATO Council, whom I talked to as a group—the 15 members—including our own. I did not ask to see General de Gaulle. But I saw Couve de Murville, who is the Foreign Minister. I paid him a courtesy call.

The Press: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON

I want to express my very deep appreciation for the excellent job Ambassador Harri-man has done. He is one of our most experienced and most astute diplomats. He always turns in a most credible performance. I have enjoyed his oral report, and I will look forward to reviewing his written position when it is developed.

Mr. Komer Reports on Progress in the "Other War" in Viet-Nam

Robert W. Komer, Special Assistant to the President, made the following statement to newsmen at the LBJ Ranch after his meeting with President Johnson on November 7.

White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) dated November 7

Having just returned Friday, I reported today to the President on my latest trip to Viet-Nam. He asked me to go down right after Manila to concert with the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam (GVN) on how

we could help it move forward on the very forthcoming program it announced at Manila.¹

This GVN program was one of the most encouraging pluses of the Manila Conference and deserves more attention than it has yet received. As noted in the final communique, the GVN announced its intent to:

A. Press forward with the transition to representative government by holding national elections within 6 months after the new constitution is promulgated.

B. Advance democracy at the grassroots level, too, by starting to hold village and hamlet elections early in 1967.

C. Prepare a program of national reconciliation which will open all doors to those Vietnamese who have been misled or coerced into casting their lot with the Viet Cong.

D. Retrain and reassign a "substantial share" of GVN armed forces to clear-and-hold operations, the first step in pacification of the countryside.

E. Expand and intensify the Revolutionary Development effort by improving cadre training, building and staffing more and better schools, providing more electricity and good water, and expanding health and medical facilities.

F. Give top priority to land reform and land tenure measures, modernize agriculture, expand credit facilities, improve and diversify crops.

G. Enforce a vigorous stabilization program to keep a lid on inflation by controlling spending and increasing revenues.

H. Take further steps to relieve congestion in the key port of Saigon.

I. Start planning now for an expanded postwar economy including conversion of military installations.

The President pledged at Manila our fullest support of these constructive efforts through a parallel stepping up of America's contributions to winning the "other war."

One of the most encouraging things I

¹ For text of the joint communique issued at the close of the Manila Summit Conference on Oct. 25, see BULLETIN of Nov. 14, 1966, p. 730.

found in Saigon is that the Ky government is moving ahead rapidly with concrete plans to step up Republic of Viet-Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) clear-and-hold operations throughout the country in order to provide the continuous local security needed for Revolutionary Development (RD) pacification efforts to proceed. Prime Minister [Nguyen Cao] Ky and Chairman [Nguyen Van] Thieu told me the GVN intends to allot the bulk of its regular forces to this mission. New instructions are being issued, new plans are being drawn up now for 1967, and several joint ARVN/U.S. mobile training teams have already been assembled in Saigon to receive the new doctrine and then provide on-the-job training to the ARVN troops in the field.

General [William C.] Westmoreland in turn plans to strengthen the U.S. advisory effort and support for Revolutionary Development, by such measures as assigning more senior officers to the advisory task and putting greater emphasis on road and canal clearing operations. In some cases U.S. units will participate with RVNAF in clear-and-hold operations, as is occurring right now in Long An Province with one battalion of the 25th Division. But this will normally be only a secondary mission for U.S. forces.

Next, the Ministry of Revolutionary Development plans a strengthened and revamped RD program, employing more 59-man teams and stressing land reform, self-help, and meeting peasant grievances. With all the above, most of us count on substantially greater progress in pacification during 1967 than proved possible this year.

On the economic side, I was also most encouraged by the prospects for keeping inflation under control in 1967. Prime Minister Ky and his top economic people described to me their intent to enforce a tough stabilization program to minimize inflationary pressures, keep a tight rein on the 1967 GVN budget, increase revenues through better tax collection, and plug loopholes. On the President's behalf, I in turn assured Prime Minister Ky of full U.S. economic support in buttressing Viet-Nam's civil economy and bringing in enough AID imports to supple-

ment the GVN's own import program and reduce inflationary pressures. I think we can keep inflation from getting out of control in 1967.

I told the President that the returnee rate is again moving up after a summer dropoff. In Saigon I discussed with the GVN their Manila-announced plans for a national reconciliation program to begin before February. Some 15,200 returnees have come over in 1966 to date (already 4,100 more than in all of 1965), and the GVN hopes to bring in over 45,000 in 1967. If this rate is achieved, it will almost certainly mean a significant drop in Viet Cong strength.

Lastly, I reported to the President that the process of political evolution in South Viet-Nam is going forward. The Constituent Assembly has buckled down to its task, and the Government is preparing plans for village and hamlet elections.

Turning to the U.S. role, I briefed the President on our latest plans for stepping up the "other war" in Viet-Nam, following on his pledges at Manila. We have laid the groundwork since Honolulu for a greatly increased effort in port and transport rehabilitation, modernization of agriculture, urban assistance in Saigon, and more emphasis on public health, education, and care of refugees. In the next 12 months we will provide:

—Upward of 500,000 tons of rice and other food grains.

—Electric power and clean drinkable water to over 500,000 more people in the countryside.

—Almost a doubling of public health outlays, including more hospitals, medical supplies, and medical education.

—3,000 new elementary and 400 secondary school classrooms, training of 4,000 new teachers, and 8 million more textbooks in addition to the 6 million already distributed.

—Expanded agricultural aid, improved seed, more fertilizer and insecticide.

—More than 1,500 U.S. civilian technical advisers, plus more than 1,000 third-country nationals.

Lastly, at the President's request I discussed with Prime Minister Ky how the United States could best assist in the post-war economic development studies he announced at Manila. We discussed various procedures and expect a GVN/U.S. announcement shortly.

I don't want to end up conveying false optimism. Progress is being made on the civil side, but much remains to be done. A new Viet-Nam is not built in a day—or a year.

U.S. Accepts Beirut Agreement; Implements Florence Agreement

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release dated October 14

A little over a year ago in my speech at the Smithsonian bicentennial celebration,¹ I pledged that we would embark on a new and noble adventure: the adventure of international education. One of the five central tasks of this adventure will be to increase the free flow of books and ideas, works of art, of science and imagination.

Today I am happy, with the full support of Congress, to announce that we are taking three major steps forward in fulfilling this task.

I am today signing a proclamation that announces our formal acceptance of the audiovisual agreement of Beirut.² This final step is now possible because last Saturday, October the 8th, I signed a joint resolution to Congress to bring our tariff laws into conformity with this treaty. Today I am issuing

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 4, 1965, p. 550.

² For text of the agreement, see S. Ex. V, 81st Cong., 2d sess.

³ For text of Executive Order 11311, see 31 *Fed. Reg.* 13413.

⁴ For text of the agreement, see BULLETIN of Sept. 21, 1959, p. 425.

⁵ For text of Executive Order 11312, see 31 *Fed. Reg.* 13415.

an Executive order that designates the United States Information Agency to carry out the Beirut agreement for this Government.³

The Beirut agreement removes import duties and every other barrier to the international movement of educational materials of the type called "audiovisual"—classroom motion pictures, slides, video tapes, recordings, and the like.

Our exports of these educational materials are growing at the present annual level of \$3,500,000. I feel confident that our acceptance of this Beirut agreement will soon bring a doubling in the number of nations—there are now 18—which are full partners to the agreement. I believe it will increase many times the volume of American educational tools flowing abroad.

I also signed today a bill to implement the agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific and Cultural Materials, commonly known as the Florence Agreement.⁴

Through this legislation, the United States now joins with 51 other countries in dropping tariff barriers that have limited the free access of nations to all the tools of learning, including books and scientific instruments, which other nations create.

The United States helped negotiate this agreement in 1950. I believe Ambassador [George V.] Allen negotiated this agreement almost 18 years ago. The Senate ratification followed in 1960.

We have been successful, finally, in obtaining action by the 89th Congress which will permit full U.S. participation in this multinational effort.

I have also signed an Executive order facilitating art exchanges with foreign countries.⁵ This is under authority given me by the 89th Congress. I am designating the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Smithsonian Institution, as the responsible person to allow art works to come into this country for exhibition.

I am particularly pleased that we take these steps in the year of UNESCO's 20th

anniversary. The ideals for which that organization stands are being given fresh vitality and renewed purpose. I hope they will command the support of all forward-looking, enlightened citizens without regard to partisanship.

We know that knowledge has no national boundaries, that the instruments of learning should be fully and freely accessible to all. We know that ideas, not armaments, will shape our lasting prospects for peace.

Florence Agreement To Govern Scientific Instrument Imports

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) dated November 10

I have today [November 10] signed H.R. 11216,¹ a bill which simplifies the requirements for qualifying imported articles for partial exemption from duty to the extent of the value of any U.S. components contained in the articles; denies duty-free entry of buttons transshipped to the United States from an insular possession; provides duty-free entry for certain teaching aids used in the Montessori method of education; provides duty-free entry for gifts from Canadian citizens to the International Peace Garden, Dunseith, N. Dak.; and provides duty-free entry for certain scientific instruments imported for the use of various universities in connection with their research work.

The amendments to H.R. 11216, contained in sections 4(a), (2), (3), and (4) and relating to mass spectrometers, were the subject of three separate bills on which the executive branch made its views known to the Congress. In this regard, the Department of Commerce objected to the enactment of these separate bills providing duty-free entry for these instruments. In making its recommendation regarding the duty-free entry of mass

¹ As enacted, the bill is Public Law 89-806.

spectrometers imported for the use of the University of Hawaii, the University of Nebraska, and Utah State University, the executive branch followed its usual procedure for determining whether a scientifically equivalent instrument was available from a domestic manufacturer. With regard to the three cases, the Department of Commerce determined, and so reported to the Senate, that instruments of equivalent scientific value to those imported by each of the three universities were available from domestic manufacturers of mass spectrometers. Apparently this information did not become known to the House Committee in sufficient time to affect its deliberations on the conference report.

On November 8, 1965, I noted that enactment of legislation implementing the Florence Agreement would obviate the necessity for special legislation providing duty-free entry of scientific instruments and apparatus for particular educational institutions.² Since that time the Congress has enacted H.R. 8664 (Public Law 89-651) to provide for United States implementation of the Florence Agreement. This law, which goes into effect next year,³ provides that scientific instruments should be accorded duty-free treatment only where there are no instruments of equivalent scientific value available from domestic sources. Those standards will govern the entry of all scientific instruments in the future and this administration will oppose any special legislation, such as that contained in sections 4(a), (2), (3), and (4) of this bill, which does not conform thereto. Accordingly, I do not regard approval of sections 4(a), (2), (3), and (4) of this bill as establishing a precedent for future Presidential approval of similar special legislation providing for duty-free entry of scientific instruments.

² BULLETIN, Dec. 6, 1965, p. 907.

³ For text of Proclamation 3754 regarding the effective date of the Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Materials Importation Act of 1966, see 31 *Fed. Reg.* 14381.

United States Reviews Position on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Following are statements by Arthur J. Goldberg and William C. Foster, U.S. Representatives to the U.N. General Assembly, made in Committee I (Political and Security), together with the text of a resolution adopted by the General Assembly on November 4.

STATEMENT BY MR. GOLDBERG, OCTOBER 20

U.S. delegation press release 4944

The debate on disarmament opens this year in circumstances which hold substantial hope for progress in this all-important cause. Not always in the past has this been the case. If we can bring these hopes to early fulfillment, we will justify many times over the persistence and faith that have been shown through difficult and frustrating times in the past.

Reserving the right to speak later in the debate on specific topics as they arise, I shall confine my statement today to general observations which, the United States delegation earnestly hopes, may contribute to the atmosphere and the prospects of progress.

The first two items on our agenda relate to what has come to be known as nonproliferation; in other words, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to states not now possessing them. That is as it should be, for certainly no question on the agenda of this Assembly warrants a higher priority.

This view, fortunately, is very widely shared. It was evident in Assembly Resolution 2028 (XX), adopted last year without a dissenting vote.¹ President Johnson ex-

pressed it in his message last January to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee,² in which he urged that agreement on a nonproliferation treaty be made a priority task of that body; and we were glad to find the same view expressed in the messages sent on that occasion by Chairman Kosygin [Alexsei N. Kosygin, Chairman, Council of Ministers] of the Soviet Union and Prime Minister [Harold] Wilson of the United Kingdom. And, in fact, discussion of the question dominated the session of the ENDC that ran, with a brief interruption, from January to August of this year.

We regret that during the Geneva discussions no final agreement was reached. But it would be a complete misreading of the record of that session to say that no progress was made toward a nonproliferation agreement. In fact, substantial progress was made in at least four areas:

1. Progress toward understanding that collective nuclear defense arrangements do not and need not lead to proliferation.
2. Progress in accepting the need for safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities.
3. Progress in understanding the special problem of peaceful nuclear explosions.
4. Progress in exploring ways to halt, and indeed to reverse, the buildup of nuclear weapons stockpiles and delivery systems.

In none of these areas did our progress reach the stage of agreed treaty language. But in all of them we achieved a better grasp of each other's ideas; and that itself is important as a necessary precondition to the

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 29, 1965, p. 884.

² *Ibid.*, Feb. 21, 1966, p. 263.

conclusion of an agreement. Let me now discuss these four points in order.

First, there is increased understanding of the problem that exists wherever, as in Europe, the nuclear deterrent remains essential to an alliance created for collective defense. The discussions showed a growing awareness that, while the nonnuclear members of such an alliance are entitled to have a voice in their collective nuclear defense as well as their conventional defense, this must not and need not, whatever form it takes, in any way involve or lead to proliferation. We believe that the ENDC discussions began to shed light on how this might be accomplished with a treaty acceptable to all sides.

A second area of progress was the increased acceptance of the need for international safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities. The eight nonaligned members of the Committee clearly, if implicitly, recognized that need in their memorandum on nonproliferation. They stated that "there should be workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty. The eight delegations consider that such provisions should guarantee compliance with the obligations of the treaty." We know of no more effective guarantee of compliance than acceptance of international safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities.

A third area of progress was recognition of the inescapable fact that the technology of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes is inseparable from that of nuclear weapons. This is not a question of a country's intention or motivation. No matter how sincerely a non-nuclear-weapon state may forswear all desire to produce nuclear weapons, it could not become capable of making a nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes without thereby becoming capable of exploding a nuclear weapon. That is why the United States indicated that the treaty must prohibit the dissemination to or manufacture by non-nuclear-weapon states of peaceful nuclear explosives, as well as nuclear weapons.

However, we believe the benefits of any such future technology—which, let me emphasize, is still in the future—could and

should be made available to nonnuclear powers without risk of spreading nuclear weapons. For this purpose, if and when peaceful nuclear explosions that are within test ban treaty limitations are technically and economically feasible, we believe nuclear states should make available to other states nuclear explosive services for such peaceful applications. Such services might consist of performing the desired detonation under appropriate international observation, the nuclear device remaining in the custody and control of the state performing the service. This would, of course, be far less expensive to nonnuclear states than developing and producing their own devices.

A fourth area in which progress was achieved was in the introduction by a number of delegations of additional concrete procedures and fresh ideas for achieving a series of agreements to halt the buildup and to begin the process of reducing existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. As the authors of these ideas know, the United States has long shared their concern over this related question, and I shall come to it later in my remarks.

Mr. Chairman, we are convinced that the progress achieved in these four areas at the last ENDC session has helped to create a new situation and a more hopeful prospect for concluding a nonproliferation treaty.

Need for Treaty Clear and Urgent

I am happy, therefore, to inform this committee that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to take advantage of this new and more promising situation. We are engaged in a continuing and joint search for mutually acceptable ways of overcoming our remaining differences. Our discussions at this stage must of necessity be exploratory. It will not be easy, since important differences remain. No one, therefore, can predict the duration or outcome of these discussions. But the businesslike manner in which they have begun is a good augury.

We are encouraged also by the statement made by Foreign Minister [Andrei A.]

Gromyko following his recent meetings with President Johnson and Secretary Rusk. He said then that "both countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, are striving to reach agreement to facilitate conclusion of an international agreement on this question." As President Johnson stated on October 13:³ "We have hopes that we can find some language that will protect the national interests of both countries and permit us to enter into the thing that I think we need most to do: that is, a nonproliferation agreement."

Let me assure this committee that, for our part, we of the United States intend to make every possible effort to achieve early agreement on this treaty. We consider the need for it to be clear and urgent. The United States is opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We do not and will not assist in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Indeed, our laws strictly forbid us to do so; our policy excludes any agreement which would result in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the effort to achieve a nonproliferation treaty we shall persist until we succeed. Indeed, we are ready to negotiate such a treaty here and now.

In these circumstances, Mr. Chairman, I am sure this committee will agree that this is a time for all of us to show patience and moderation in discussing this question. We are, of course, mindful of the fact that this treaty vitally concerns each and every government, whether it possesses nuclear weapons or not. As progress is achieved—as we strongly hope it will be—consultations will be held with other governments to seek their advice and counsel.

Indeed, our awareness of the universal interest in this subject was one of the reasons which led the United States to co-sponsor the draft resolution introduced by the Soviet delegation concerning the renunciation by states of actions hampering the conclusion of a nonproliferation agreement. This draft is in document A/C.1/L.368.

I wish to endorse emphatically the appeal which that draft contains for all states to

refrain from any actions which might hamper the conclusion of a nonproliferation agreement. Such an appeal is fully justified, for—I repeat—the achievement of this treaty is vital to the interests of each and every nation of the world, nuclear and non-nuclear alike.

Moreover, success will require the cooperation and self-restraint of every nation, nuclear and nonnuclear alike. All should refrain from any action that could jeopardize this great treaty project: from arrangements contrary to the spirit of the treaty, from raising extraneous political issues as obstacles, and from delaying tactics of any kind.

We must clear the tracks for the nonproliferation treaty. To this end we hope the draft resolution will receive the unanimous endorsement of this committee and of the General Assembly, and as quickly as possible.

Treaty a Concern of Every Government

Such an endorsement will remind the world of a fact too easily ignored; namely, that this treaty concerns every government in the world and that it is not a special concern of the nuclear-weapon states.

Indeed, we are aware that non-nuclear-weapon countries have their own concerns about this subject. Particularly, we are mindful, as I stated to the Assembly last year,⁴ that many such countries desire some form of assurance that their security against nuclear attack will not suffer if, by this treaty, they renounce the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons. We continue to give this problem careful study, and we remain ready to explore with all delegations what action might be undertaken by the General Assembly to meet this understandable concern.

At the discussions in Geneva and now in this committee, the guidelines for the kind of nonproliferation treaty we all seek remain those set forth in the excellent Resolution 2028 (XX) voted in this committee last year. We agree with the principles set forth in that resolution that a nonproliferation treaty must have no loopholes and that it must em-

³ At a White House news conference.

⁴ BULLETIN of Oct. 11, 1965, p. 578.

body an acceptable balance of mutual obligations and responsibilities as between the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon states.

There has been much emphasis on this concept of "balance." Before we focus on this concept in our discussion, I should like to refer to what I consider a rather disquieting tendency. That is the tendency to view a nonproliferation treaty as an attempt by the nuclear-weapon states to get something for nothing or to impose unequal obligations on others. It is suggested that for reasons of "balance" the nuclear-weapon states must give some tangible equivalent *quid pro quo* if the non-nuclear-weapon states are to forswear the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons. I am troubled by this because, with all due respect to those who hold these views, I believe that they are misreading the facts and misjudging the consequences of nuclear proliferation.

The acquisition of nuclear weapons by more and more sovereign states, far from helping to solve the particular political issues between them, would be more likely to sharpen those issues and add even more seriously to general world instability. It would create more tension, more mutual fear, mutual uncertainty, and danger. And, let me emphasize, this increased danger would be felt not primarily by the present nuclear-weapon states but by the states which today do not possess these weapons.

The truth is that, in the circumstances of today, no non-nuclear-weapon state can promote its long-range security by acquiring nuclear weapons. What will really promote the national security of every state, large or small, is the nonproliferation treaty.

Indeed, no non-nuclear-weapon state should feel that it is being asked to sign such a treaty as a favor to the nuclear-weapon powers. It should do so only as a step primarily designed to further its own security. It should do so in the awareness that a treaty in which nuclear-weapon states agree not to give and non-nuclear-weapon states agree not to receive or manufacture nuclear weapons reduces the possibility of nuclear war.

It should do so in the awareness that this treaty will do more for the security of all countries, nuclear and nonnuclear alike, than any conceivable program of armament.

Additional Nuclear Disarmament Measures

A nonproliferation treaty is, therefore, a basic step in the broader pattern of disarmament, which we all hope will lead to a more secure world. It is only one step. We have equal need of measures which would halt and turn back the arms race. However, let us not risk encumbering negotiations on a nonproliferation treaty by any attempt to link it to additional disarmament measures. If we try to do everything at once we may succeed in doing nothing.

Subject to this pragmatic caution, the United States emphatically endorses the wish expressed by the eight nonaligned members of the ENDC that a nonproliferation treaty should be "coupled with or followed by" tangible measures of nuclear disarmament. Indeed, several of the measures of nuclear disarmament endorsed in their memorandum are proposals which the United States has put forward. Several others have our support—not, let me say frankly, as a concession to the nonnuclear powers but because we believe they would strengthen the security of all countries while protecting our own vital interests.

We have accordingly proposed and continue to urge a verified cutoff—a complete halt—in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. Or, if this is not acceptable at the outset, we are prepared to consider a gradual shutdown of production facilities on a plant-by-plant basis.

We are also prepared to reduce our nuclear stockpiles. We have offered to transfer to peaceful uses under international safeguards 60,000 kilograms of enriched uranium if the Soviet Union would so transfer 40,000 kilograms from its own stockpiles. We have further proposed that these amounts of fissionable materials could be obtained through the demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet

Union. The number of weapons destroyed could run into the thousands. We believe, as do a number of non-nuclear-weapon countries, that this is matter ripe for agreement, and we continue to hope for a more positive response from the Soviet Union.

Similarly, the United States has proposed a verified freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles; that is, strategic bombers and missiles. We are heartened by the inclusion of this proposal in the joint nonaligned memorandum to which I referred earlier; and in the General Assembly last year I announced United States readiness, if progress were made on a freeze, to explore a reduction in the number of these vehicles. That offer was repeated in Geneva, and I repeat it again here today. Moreover, we have stressed that the freeze should also encompass anti-ballistic-missile systems. This proposal is a further indication of our desire to halt and turn back the nuclear arms race. But we cannot do it alone. We need the agreement of the other nuclear powers, and particularly the Soviet Union.

Comprehensive Test Ban

Another measure that remains high on our list of priorities is an agreement banning underground nuclear tests. A comprehensive and adequately verifiable test ban would make an important contribution to our non-proliferation objective. It would also be a step by the nuclear-weapon states toward halting and reversing the nuclear arms race.

The essential difficulty here is over means of verification. Such a ban can be effective only if each party has confident knowledge that the other parties are abiding by it. Advancing technology has been giving us better and better means for detecting earth tremors and determining which are natural and which are manmade. Despite these advances, there is still a gap between our concept and that of the Soviet Union concerning verification arrangements. In this situation we follow with special interest the efforts of a number of countries, on the initiative of Sweden, to develop international seismic

cooperation. We welcome this development and believe that it should be encouraged.

Mr. Chairman, general and complete disarmament remains our ultimate objective. We must continue our efforts to that end. But as we plan for a more rational world for tomorrow, the world of today thrusts its problems and its dangers upon us and we are not permitted to overlook them.

In this statement I have referred to three of these dangers and to the steps we believe must be taken promptly to meet them.

They are:

—Most urgently, to achieve a treaty forbidding the further spread of nuclear weapons.

—Second, to halt—and, indeed, reverse—the continuing buildup of stocks of nuclear weapons and the vehicles for their delivery.

—Third, to achieve a complete ban on the underground testing of nuclear weapons.

Equally important is a fourth step:

—To curb the races in so-called conventional armaments which are today an immediate threat to peace in certain regions of the world.

These steps, Mr. Chairman, are not steps away from but closer to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. Let us be frank and admit how far the world stands today from that great goal. To approach it at all, we must start with the world as it now is, with all its mistrust and danger and all its burden of weapons.

Indeed, matters will not get better unless we take bold and timely steps to prevent them from getting worse. If we want a world which will be generally and completely disarmed, let us begin by preventing the all-too-possible advent of a world in which some 10 or 20 states have mounting stockpiles of nuclear weapons, a world with strategic nuclear delivery vehicles bristling in frightening profusion, a world in which neighbors neglect peaceful development to compete in armaments, tension, and instability. Such a world would make unrealizable the goal of general and complete disarmament.

Let us accordingly continue to give prior-

ity, as all of us know we should, to those measures which will strengthen security in today's world. Thus we shall gain the confidence to build the better world of tomorrow.

STATEMENT BY MR. FOSTER, NOVEMBER 2

U.S. delegation press release 4960

Since we are approaching a vote on the resolution appearing in document A/C.1/L.368/Rev. 1, I shall be extremely brief. I shall reserve for a later intervention the additional comments which my delegation wishes to make concerning the substantive issues which have been dealt with by many speakers.

The United States delegation has already indicated its strong support for the appeal addressed in the resolution now before us that all states refrain from any actions which might hamper the conclusion of a nonproliferation agreement. This appeal is directed to all states, nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon states alike. As Ambassador Goldberg stated on October 20, we believe that "All should refrain from any action that could jeopardize this great treaty project: from arrangements contrary to the spirit of the treaty, from raising extraneous political issues as obstacles, and from delaying tactics of any kind."

It is clear that this is also the general view of this committee. Virtually every speaker has welcomed the hopeful prospect offered by the discussions which have been undertaken by the United States and the Soviet Union to seek a basis for overcoming our remaining differences. Most speakers have, accordingly, exercised restraint in referring to past differences and obstacles.

Unfortunately, however, several representatives were unable to resist the temptation to look backward. In so doing, they repeated charges against the policies of my Government, and against the Federal Republic of Germany which, though stale and unfounded, need to be corrected for the record.

Thus, the representatives of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, in particular, followed the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union in raising the specter of a rapidly growing civilian nuclear program in West Germany. They implied that this program may ultimately be diverted to military purposes.

Yet, as they know, the Federal Republic is the only country that has forsworn, by treaty, the production of nuclear weapons. They know that every peaceful nuclear installation in the Federal Republic is under effective international safeguards inspection by the European Atomic Energy Community, an obligation also undertaken by a solemn treaty. They also know that in its note of March 25, 1966,⁵ the Federal Republic stated that it intends to require IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards on its exports of nuclear equipment outside the EURATOM area.

It is strange, therefore, to hear the representatives of certain Eastern European countries making such charges when their own nuclear installations are as yet without any international safeguards.

It was all the more regrettable that such charges were made in the light of the statement issued in Bonn and New York on October 26 by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany with regard to the recent Polish-Czech proposal to place their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards provided the Federal Republic does likewise. That statement concluded as follows:

The proposals by Poland and Czechoslovakia are being considered very seriously by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany together with the other member states of the European Atomic Community.

In their statements several representatives also chose to repeat old charges about an alleged desire of the Federal Republic to exploit collective nuclear defense arrangements in NATO as a means of acquiring its own nuclear weapons. Mr. Chairman, I do not propose to emulate them by injecting

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 25, 1966, p. 654.

extraneous political issues into our present discussions. Let me say again, however, that the members of NATO—and this includes the Federal Republic—are convinced that while nonnuclear members of the alliance are entitled to a voice in their collective nuclear defense, as they are in their conventional defense, this need not and must not involve or lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I deplore the tendency of certain representatives to portray the policies of the Federal Republic as blocking the road to normalization and lasting security in Europe. Such misguided attempts to equate with revanchism the desire of the people of West Germany for peaceful reunification is particularly out of place in the United Nations, where so much of our attention is devoted to the goal of assuring the right of self-determination to other peoples. Surely it is those governments which persist in denying this right to the German people, and those who for outmoded ideological purposes seek to maintain old enmities, who stand in the way of harmony and lasting security for all in Europe.

The Federal Republic, which has established close ties in peace and friendship with its partners in Western Europe and North America, has also taken important initiatives to improve its relations with the states and peoples of Eastern Europe. This is part of an historic movement toward reconciliation and normalization which has begun to transform relations between East and West on that continent.

The conclusion of a nonproliferation agreement will give further impetus to that movement even as it strengthens the security of the rest of the world. Let us therefore concentrate our attention on the constructive steps needed to facilitate this agreement and not waste any more time on recriminations.⁶

TEXT OF RESOLUTION⁷

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965,

Convinced that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would endanger the security of all States and hamper the achievement of general and complete disarmament,

Considering that international negotiations are now under way with a view to the preparation of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and wishing to create an atmosphere conducive to the successful conclusion of those negotiations,

Urgently appeals to all States, pending the conclusion of such a treaty:

(a) To take all necessary steps to facilitate and achieve at the earliest possible time the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with the principles laid down in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX);

(b) To refrain from any actions conducive to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or which might hamper the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

⁶ The revised draft resolution (A/C.1/L.368/Rev. 1) was adopted by Committee I on Nov. 2 by a vote of 100 (U.S.) to 1 (Albania), with 1 abstention (Cuba).

⁷ U.N. doc. A/RES/2149 (XXI) (A/C.1/L.368/Rev. 1); adopted by the Assembly on Nov. 4 by a vote of 110 (U.S.) to 1 (Albania), with 1 abstention (Cuba).

Fourth Annual Review of the Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrangement

*Statement by George R. Jacobs*¹

The fourth year of the Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrangement² has been a record one for foreign suppliers of cotton textiles—yarn, fabrics, made-up goods, and apparel—to the U.S. market. The LTA is continuing to accomplish its stated aims. In the fourth LTA year, as in the past, it has permitted exports to the United States, particularly from developing countries, to expand substantially. It has also permitted the developing countries in their planning programs to predict with reasonable certainty the level of their cotton textile exports. At the same time, it has permitted our domestic industry to plan its future with a greater degree of confidence.

There have been three major developments in the fourth LTA year affecting my country's cotton textile trade and industry.

There was an exceptionally sharp increase

¹ Made before the Cotton Textiles Committee of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade at Geneva on Sept. 27. Mr. Jacobs is Director of the Office of International Commodities, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State; he was chairman of the U.S. delegation at the meeting of the Committee.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431. The governments participating in the Long-Term Arrangement are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Republic of China, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, India, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom (including Hong Kong), and United States.

in overall U.S. imports of cotton textiles. The bulk of these imports came from well-established LTA exporting countries, but a number of new exporting countries began selling significant quantities to the United States during the year.

Although our domestic industry has generally been operating at high levels during the fourth LTA year, in part to fill increased military requirements, and has continued its program of modernization of plant and equipment, many of the industry's long-range problems remain unsolved. Its rate of return on capital was still below national averages. Manmade-fiber textiles continued their serious inroads on cotton textile markets. Unemployment remains a problem in certain sectors of the industry. Labor and industry are concerned about the recent rate of increase in textile imports. My Government must take this concern into account in shaping its policies and specifically in its administration of the LTA.

Finally, the fourth LTA year has been characterized by considerable activity by my Government in negotiating new agreements under the LTA and in amending and liberalizing existing agreements. New agreements under article 4 were negotiated with Hong Kong,³ Pakistan, and Singapore;⁴ existing agreements with Japan,⁵ Colombia,⁶

³ *Ibid.*, Sept. 26, 1966, p. 467.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Oct. 3, 1966, p. 509.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1966, p. 180.

⁶ *Ibid.*, July 11, 1966, p. 58.

Portugal,⁷ Spain,⁸ the Republic of China,⁹ Israel,¹⁰ and Greece¹¹ were amended. Negotiations with several other supplier countries were underway.

U.S. Imports of Cotton Textiles

At last year's annual review, the U.S. statement¹² characterized the 19 percent increase in U.S. imports of cotton textiles in the third LTA year over the second LTA year as "sharp." We estimate a 36 percent increase in the volume of imports in the fourth LTA year. Imports will reach 1,700 million equivalent square yards. In the base year for the STA [Short-Term Arrangement], July 1960–June 1961, our imports totaled 813 million equivalent square yards. In the 5 years that the Geneva arrangements on cotton textile trade have been in effect, U.S. imports have more than doubled.

Imports in each major group showed impressive increases this year. Fabric imports grew by about 13 percent; made-ups, primarily household goods, by about 29 percent; and apparel by about 15 percent. The increase in U.S. imports of yarn was spectacular. The previous downward movement in yarn imports was reversed. A fivefold increase was recorded in this single year: from less than 70 million to more than 340 million square yards equivalent. The tendency on the part of suppliers to upgrade the value of their exports to the U.S. market continued. Apparel imports, which are particularly sensitive in our domestic market, showed the greatest absolute increase in value.

The bulk of U.S. imports in the fourth LTA year came from exporting countries participating in the LTA, and two-thirds of our imports came from developing countries. In the fourth LTA year, imports from the

developing countries will total about 1,125 million square yards equivalent compared with 716 million square yards equivalent in the third LTA year, an increase of almost 60 percent. U.S. imports from developing countries in the fourth LTA year were larger than total U.S. imports from all sources in any year prior to 1965. The developed countries, principally those of Western Europe, supplied about 9 percent of total U.S. imports. About 25 percent of our total imports came from Japan. These figures clearly indicate that the United States has carried out the obligation imposed by the LTA to provide the developing countries with "larger opportunities" for increasing trade and export earnings from cotton textiles.

There are two additional points I would like to make about U.S. imports in the fourth LTA year. First, a number of new-supplier countries, for the most part nonparticipants in the LTA, began to sell in the U.S. market. The United States believes it would be inequitable to allow new-supplier countries to continue a buildup of uncontrolled trade. Therefore, in the course of the fourth LTA year the United States resorted to article 3 of the LTA to prevent disruption of the U.S. market and to preserve a proper measure of equity for other supplier countries whose exports are under article 4 bilateral agreements. At present actions under article 3 involve four countries, only one of which is a participant in the LTA.

My second point about imports relates to a trend singled out for special mention last year. With an increase in imports of nearly 500 million square yards, the U.S. import/consumption ratio continued to rise, reaching during the fourth LTA year the level of about 9 percent. By way of contrast, in the third LTA year imports accounted for 7.4 percent of the total U.S. market and in the base year for the STA, 5.2 percent. Growth in the U.S. market has been largely taken up by imports, since our consumption of cotton textiles rose only slightly during this period. Furthermore, there was a concentration of imports in certain categories. The five lead-

⁷ *Ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1966, p. 356.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Oct. 3, 1966, p. 509.

⁹ *Ibid.*, May 23, 1966, p. 817.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1966, p. 189.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, June 20, 1966, p. 992.

¹² For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 24, 1966, p. 134.

ing cotton textile categories accounted for 40 percent of total imports.

A continuation of the present rate of growth in imports would create critical pressures on the U.S. domestic market. We hope that exporting countries will bear this in mind in their planning for future exports. An undue concentration of exports in a few categories can create particularly heavy pressures on the market, affecting most seriously both imported and domestically manufactured goods.

Developments in the U.S. Industry

During the fourth LTA year, the combination of civilian demand and military requirements in the United States made it possible for many plants to operate at high levels of activity. This should not obscure the fact that the U.S. industry continues to face serious problems:

1. It has always been subject to cyclical fluctuations. The industry states it has apparently passed its cyclical peak.

2. Its profits, although improved, are still well below national averages for manufacturing industries.

3. Its wage rates continue to lag behind other manufacturing industries.

4. Unemployment continues to be a problem in certain sectors of the textile industry, particularly the apparel sector.

5. Cotton's share of total fiber consumption has continued to decline.

Also, as you are no doubt aware, the industry has publicly expressed its serious concern about the effect that the rapid rise in imports of manmade-fiber textiles is having on it. These imports have more than doubled over the past 2 years and are now almost half the volume of cotton textile imports.

Policies and Actions Under LTA

In the fourth LTA year, the United States in implementing its policy in the cotton textile field conducted many negotiations with exporting countries. We have already re-

ferred to U.S. actions under article 3. In addition, the United States negotiated several new bilateral agreements under article 4 and liberalized many existing bilateral agreements. In August of this year new bilateral agreements with Hong Kong and Singapore were signed. The U.S.-Japanese bilateral agreement was liberalized and extended in January 1966. The U.S.-Republic of China bilateral agreement was liberalized in April of 1966; in May 1966 agreement was reached with Greece on liberalization; in June negotiations with Colombia and Israel resulted in liberalization of our agreements with those countries. In August and September the agreements with Portugal and Spain were similarly amended. Negotiations were completed with Pakistan in August and an exchange of notes constituting a new agreement will be completed in the near future.

I shall not attempt to detail further our actions under the LTA in the current year. I want to point out, however, that the United States has provided a substantial degree of liberalization for most of our cotton textile suppliers and that some of these measures of liberalization are already in effect. Others will come into effect when agreement is reached to extend the LTA. It is on this basis that the United States has reached understandings with many of its cotton textile suppliers. The U.S. view is that the LTA should be extended in its present form and that extension of the LTA will supply a basis on which trade in cotton textiles can continue to grow in an orderly fashion.

In summary, my Government thinks that its record during the fourth LTA year is most creditable and fully consistent with the goal stated in the preamble to the LTA:

... to provide growing opportunities for exports of these products, provided that the development of this trade proceeds in a reasonable and orderly manner so as to avoid disruptive effects in individual markets and on individual lines of production in both importing and exporting countries; ...

Achievement of this record by the United States has been possible largely because of the LTA.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Finance

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.

Ratification deposited: Niger, November 14, 1966.

Load Lines

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London April 5, 1966.¹

Acceptance deposited: United States, November 18, 1966.

Meteorology

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.

Accession deposited: Guyana, November 22, 1966.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea,

¹ Not in force.

1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.

Acceptance deposited: Gambia, November 1, 1966.

Satellite Communications System

Supplementary agreement on arbitration. Done at Washington June 4, 1965.

Signature: Thailand, November 21, 1966.

Entered into force: November 21, 1966.

War

Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners of war;

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea;

Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian persons in time of war.

Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1950; for the United States

February 2, 1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and 3365, respectively.

Adherence deposited: Cyprus, August 8, 1966.

BILATERAL

Philippines

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of September 28 and October 4, 1961 (TIAS 4865) relating to the loan of a floating dry dock to the Philippines. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila November 4, 1966. Entered into force November 4, 1966.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LV, NO. 1433 PUBLICATION 8171 DECEMBER 12, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officials of

the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-

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American Republics. New Aspects of the Alliance for Progress (Humphrey) 878

Asia. Ambassador Harriman Discusses His Post-Manila Trip (Harriman, Johnson) 889

Atomic Energy. United States Reviews Position on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Foster, Goldberg, text of resolution) 896

Disarmament. United States Reviews Position on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Foster, Goldberg, text of resolution) 896

Economic Affairs. Fourth Annual Review of the Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrangement (Jacobs) 903

Educational and Cultural Affairs

Florence Agreement To Govern Scientific Instrument Imports (Johnson) 895

President Johnson Hails UNESCO's 20 Years of Achievement 885

U.S. Accepts Beirut Agreement; Implements Florence Agreement (Johnson) 894

The United States Commitment to UNESCO (Frankel) 883

Foreign Aid. New Aspects of the Alliance for Progress (Humphrey) 878

International Organizations and Conferences

Fourth Annual Review of the Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrangement (Jacobs) 903

President Johnson Hails UNESCO's 20 Years of Achievement 885

The United States Commitment to UNESCO (Frankel) 883

Mexico. Chamizal Highway To Symbolize U.S.-Mexican Friendship (Johnson) 882

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Ambassador Harriman Discusses His Post-Manila Trip (Harriman, Johnson) 889

Presidential Documents

Ambassador Harriman Discusses His Post-Manila Trip 889

Chamizal Highway To Symbolize U.S.-Mexican Friendship 882

Florence Agreement To Govern Scientific Instrument Imports 895

President Johnson Hails UNESCO's 20 Years of Achievement 885

U.S. Accepts Beirut Agreement; Implements Florence Agreement 894

Treaty Information

Current Actions 906

Florence Agreement To Govern Scientific Instrument Imports (Johnson) 895

U.S. Accepts Beirut Agreement; Implements Florence Agreement (Johnson) 894

United Nations. United States Reviews Position on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Foster, Goldberg, text of resolution) 896

Viet-Nam

Ambassador Harriman Discusses His Post-Manila Trip (Harriman, Johnson) 889

Mr. Komer Reports on Progress in the "Other War" in Viet-Nam 892

Name Index

Foster, William C 896

Frankel, Charles 883

Goldberg, Arthur J 896

Harriman, W. Averell 889

Humphrey, Vice President 878

Jacobs, George R 903

Johnson, President 882, 885, 889, 894, 895

Komer, Robert W 892

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: November 21-27

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
†278	11/21	U.S.-Pakistan cotton textile agreement.
†279	11/23	Amendment of U.S.-Korean cotton textile agreement.
†280	11/25	Rostow: OECD ministerial council meeting.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

The Outlook for Freedom

“The modern capitalism of the Western World has knocked the bottom out of Marxist-Leninist economic doctrine,” Secretary Rusk asserts in this major address describing the “vital stake our foreign policy has in the success of the American economy.” Speaking to the National Industrial Conference Board at New York, N.Y., on September 21, the Secretary explains the principal factors affecting U.S. trade with the advanced and the developing countries and our efforts to “build bridges” through trade with the nations of Eastern Europe. This pamphlet is the text of the Secretary’s address.

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THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN

Vol. LV, No. 1484



December 19, 1966

THE UNIVERSITY CAMPUS AND FOREIGN POLICY

Address by Secretary Rusk 914

SECRETARY RUSK, SECRETARY McNAMARA, MR. McCLOY
MEET WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON

Excerpts From Press Briefing 919

MOVE TO CHANGE REPRESENTATION OF CHINA IN U.N.
AGAIN REJECTED BY GENERAL ASSEMBLY

*Statement by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg
and Texts of Resolutions 926*

THE UNITED STATES AND THE NEW ASIA

by W. W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President 910

The United States and the New Asia

by *W. W. Rostow*
*Special Assistant to the President*¹

Two weeks ago, the President returned from Asia and the Pacific. I thought I might share with you some reflections on that trip and on the Manila Conference which was its high point.² As the President said, it will be for history to judge the meaning and results of the journey. Two weeks is not quite the period historians require to achieve perspective; and an active—if minor—participant may not always be the most objective judge of events.

Nevertheless, it may be useful to take stock with you of the Manila Conference, the journey as a whole, and where we now stand in our relations to Asia.

First, Viet-Nam. At its core, the Manila Conference was concerned with Viet-Nam. The chiefs of state and heads of government who joined Chairman [Nguyen Van] Thieu and Prime Minister [Nguyen Cao] Ky in Manila had each made the most difficult decision a government can make; namely, to send their men to fight beyond their borders in the defense of another nation. The contributions in fighting men of the governments varied, but each had stood before its own people and said: The defeat of the aggression against South Viet-Nam is essential to our national security. Each had acted on that judgment by sending its men abroad.

¹ Address made before the Associated Press Managing Editors Association at San Diego, Calif., on Nov. 16.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Nov. 7, 1966, p. 698; Nov. 14, 1966, p. 730; Nov. 21, 1966, p. 766; and Nov. 28, 1966, p. 806.

What was accomplished at Manila? First, the conference dramatized before the world that those closest to the danger understand it best and have staked much on the proposition that this aggression must not succeed.

The Manila Conference also reflected clearly the progress made in Viet-Nam during 1966. In that time, the expected Communist monsoon offensive had been smashed before it could be successfully launched. Confidence in the military situation had increased.

While the military situation was reviewed at Manila, it was not a military conference. It focused on civil matters.

One basic fact at Manila was that the Government of South Viet-Nam had fulfilled a number of promises it had made at Honolulu earlier in the year:

—there had been a quite remarkable and successful election of a constituent assembly;

—the problem of inflation had been candidly faced, if not finally solved;

—progress had been made in opening the ports;

—the slow, hard work on revolutionary development had moved forward, despite the distance still to be traveled.

At Manila, the Government of Viet-Nam further committed itself:

—to continue the effort to overcome the tyranny of poverty, disease, illiteracy, and social injustice;

—to train and assign substantial numbers of the armed forces to local security opera-

tions in order to provide a shield behind which a new society can be built;

—to improve training of revolutionary development cadres; provide more electricity and good water; build and staff more and better schools; teach refugees new skills; expand health and medical facilities;

—to work out a series of measures to modernize agriculture and to assure the cultivator the fruits of his labors; give top priority to land reform; expand agricultural credit; improve and diversify crops;

—to maintain by constant effort the control of inflation;

—to begin planning an expanding postwar economy, including conversion of military installations;

—to hold a national election to select a representative government within 6 months after the constitution is completed (probably before the deadline of March 1967);

—to hold village and hamlet elections early in 1967;

—to prepare a program of national reconciliation and to open all doors to those Vietnamese who have been misled or coerced into casting their lot with the Viet Cong. The Government seeks to bring them back to participate as free men in national life under amnesty and other measures.

These new undertakings of the South Vietnamese were taken seriously because of creditable past performance. The South Vietnamese Government is, by its own commitment, a transitional government, to be replaced next year in a free national election; but it presented its program in concrete practical terms which earned the respect as well as the attention of the other governments represented.

And every man there understood how hard it is for a young country of 15 million, with something like 700,000 of its men under arms, to develop the administrative capacity to carry out such civil measures in the midst of a war.

Finally, at its own initiative—in conformity to [Vietnamese Minister of Foreign Affairs] Tran Van Do's formula of July 1965—the Government of Viet-Nam asked its allies

to accept the principle that their forces should be removed as the military and subversive forces of North Viet-Nam are withdrawn and peace becomes possible in the South—to which the allies replied with the now famous 6-months proposition.

Steps Toward Regional Cohesion in Asia

As I say, it was the common commitment to send men to Viet-Nam to fight against aggression that brought this group together. But those at the conference were also leaders of Asian and Pacific nations caught up in the much wider constructive process now going forward in the region.

As an historian and one who has had the privilege of being involved in public affairs on and off for 25 years, I know of few more remarkable developments than the new atmosphere of hope and determination to cooperate now sweeping Asia. The roots of that process can be found in the problems, aspirations, and politics of particular nations in the region; and there has been slow movement forward in this direction for some time. But the present phase of intense cooperative activity is closely linked on two historic actions: the decision taken by President Johnson early in 1965 to do whatever was necessary to defeat aggression in Viet-Nam and, second, the articulation of his vision for Asia in the Baltimore speech on April 7, 1965.³

As the seriousness of our commitment became clear, and as American forces proved themselves in battle, the governments and peoples of Asia and the Pacific began to feel new security and new confidence. They concluded that they had a future, and they began to respond.

There was: the rapid emergence of the Asian Development Bank; forward movement in the Mekong Committee; the Tokyo Ministerial Conference on Southeast Asian Development; the launching in Seoul of the Asian and Pacific Council; development of an important and practical regional program in Kuala Lumpur by Asian education ministers—all of this within the past year.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

In December there will be a meeting on agriculture.

Right now and in the weeks ahead Mr. Eugene Black will be meeting with his Asian colleagues as they map together next steps on this promising road.

The point is this: The Manila Conference took place at a time when the whole region was astir with efforts to shape its own future on a cooperative basis, unique in the long history of Asia. In different ways many Asian leaders have shared and articulated Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's judgment of our role in Viet-Nam. He said the United States was "buying time" for the nations of Asia, and "if we [in Asia] just sit down and believe people are going to buy time forever after for us, then we deserve to perish."

Clearly, the governments and peoples of Asia do not intend to perish. While the people of Viet-Nam, the United States, and other fighting allies are buying time by dealing with Hanoi's aggression, they are moving forward to find the regional cohesion which, over the long pull, will permit them to shape their own destiny together.

Goals of Freedom

That is the background for the declaration of the "Goals of Freedom" at the Manila Conference and the longer Declaration of Peace and Progress in Asia and the Pacific, from which it was derived.⁴

The Goals of Freedom are these:

1. To be free from aggression;
2. To conquer hunger, illiteracy, and disease;
3. To build a region of security, order, and progress;
4. To seek reconciliation and peace throughout Asia and the Pacific.

The leaders of the seven nations gathered in Manila, who formulated these goals, were conscious at all times of their absent friends. They did not set up any permanent machinery, beyond arrangements for consultation

⁴ For texts of the Manila Conference documents, see *ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1966, p. 730.

among their ambassadors in Saigon. They were anxious not to cut across the path of the wider regional efforts going forward. And it will be for other nations to decide whether they find these Goals of Freedom an acceptable statement of common purposes and objectives.

But it is worth noting this: They flowed naturally from the opening statements of all those present; they represented an honest consensus, to which all actively contributed.

And when, in the late afternoon of October 25, the chiefs of state and heads of government emerged from their meeting, they had, I believe, the right to feel they had spoken well for their own peoples and for the peoples throughout this area which contains two-thirds of the human race.

One could see these four goals even in the context of Prime Minister Ky's statement on Viet-Nam. His definition of his Government's objectives in Viet-Nam could be reduced to: a claim to "be free from aggression"; a determination "to conquer hunger, illiteracy, and disease"; the desire of Viet-Nam to become part of a "region of security, order, and progress"; and the intent of South Viet-Nam to seek reconciliation within itself, including a program to bring into the mainstream of society those who have hitherto worked with the Viet Cong.

There is a fair chance that, in the Goals of Freedom, the Manila Conference crystallized—at a critical transitional moment—where Asia intends to go.

"The Foundations Exist for a New Asia"

It is one thing to articulate a set of goals. But it is quite another to make them stick, to bring them about, to make them come to life. The vision of the future shared by those at Manila, like other grand visions, will take time to achieve. There will be frustrations and setbacks. The scale of the problems of hunger, illiteracy, and disease; the nationalist and other inhibitions to be overcome before institutions of security, order, and progress can be built; and the historic changes in attitude and policy required of the Communists

before reconciliation and peace can be achieved in the region—all these are enormous barriers.

It is, therefore, worth asking bluntly: Are there grounds for believing that these goals are more than rhetoric? Are these goals attainable? This is a matter of judgment now—and for the future to decide.

I can tell you that, as we concluded our travels—having been to New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Viet-Nam, Thailand, Malaysia, and Korea—we were all, in the President's words, more confident and hopeful than when we left. That confidence and hope arose from direct contact with governments, peoples, and projects which reflected great vitality and a gathering sense of purpose everywhere we went. Specifically:

—New Zealand and Australia have clearly decided that, without severing their old ties to Great Britain and the Commonwealth, their fate is substantially linked to that of the hundreds of millions of peoples of Asia.

—In the Philippines one can see clearly that the Government and people of that country are determined to develop and, while maintaining their old ties to the United States, to help lead the way in the building of a new cooperative Asia.

—In Thailand, Malaysia, and Korea one sees three remarkable success stories in Asian economic and social development. Their rates of growth are high and steady. And on the scene, statistics are reflected in impressive reality: from the magnificent architecture set against the sky on the hills of Kuala Lumpur to the rapidly diversifying industry in that rather miraculous place, South Korea; from the successful applications of modern science and intelligent organization in agriculture in all three countries to the extraordinary expansion of education at all levels.

Then there were the children. As the President said on his return:⁵

They came out in unbelievable numbers to greet us. . . . Their faces glowed with life, with warmth,

⁵ *Ibid.*, Nov. 28, 1966, p. 809.

. . . with intelligence and with eagerness. I put aside once and for all . . . the old idea of faceless Asian masses. What I saw were hundreds of thousands of unique individuals, starting life well, clearly on the road to very proud and very responsible citizenship.

We were told in Korea, for example, that the children are growing up 2 inches taller than their parents.

One could only conclude that we are dealing, in the new Asia, with leaders and peoples with strength and determination, with countries on the march. It is simply not true, as some have believed, that Asia is made up of passive nations, waiting to be taken over by Communist China or by anyone else. Nor are they seeking some new ideology.

They are proudly independent. They are loyal to their own traditions, their own ambitions. They are prepared to work with one another. They are beginning to solve some of their immense problems and to share with one another the lessons of their experience and of their victories.

Meanwhile, there is nothing in the dreary and pathological performance of mainland China—or of the other Communist regimes in Asia—that represents to them the wave of the future.

In short, the foundations exist for a new Asia, capable of moving toward the Manila Goals of Freedom.

As in all great affairs, these goals will not be achieved without sustained effort and dogged persistence. The new Asia they—and we—wish to see emerge is one in which the peoples of the region, working together, will take a larger hand in their own destiny than in the past; a region in which they lead and we help where and when such help is wanted and in the common interest. But right now the fate of that enterprise rests in a quite substantial way on us—the people of the United States.

At this moment they need our military help in seeing the war in Viet-Nam through to an honorable peace. All their hopes and plans and dreams depend, quite simply, on the failure of aggression in Viet-Nam. No one can follow the performance of our men fighting

in Viet-Nam without feeling profound confidence that they will do the job. No one could go with the President to Cam Ranh Bay and not be deeply moved by that encounter between the Commander in Chief and his men. The test is and will be here—among us at home—to understand the challenge, the stakes, the possibilities, and to persist—to persist—until an honorable peace is achieved.

The fact is this: In seeing it through in Viet-Nam, we are not merely honoring a solemn commitment made in the SEATO treaty: ⁶ “that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area . . . would endanger [our] own peace and safety . . . [and would

require action] to meet the common danger.” We are not merely proving, as we have had to prove in Greece, Berlin, Korea, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and at many other points in the past generation, that aggression shall not succeed.

Our commitment to see it through in Viet-Nam is also helping open the door to a new and hopeful chapter in the history of Asia. That, I believe, is the conviction of all of us who had the privilege of sharing in the Manila Conference and the President’s journey.

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

The University Campus and Foreign Policy

*Address by Secretary Rusk*¹

I am very pleased to have this opportunity to pay my respects to this fine university, and especially to its pioneering in the study of international relations, beginning 40 years ago. The work of Ben Cherrington and his colleagues and successors in your Social Science Foundation has not only benefited this community and State—and neighboring areas here on the top floor of the continent—it has been a national asset. And we in the Department of State feel a special proprietary interest in Dr. Cherrington, for he was the first chief of our Division of Cultural Relations, by appointment of Secretary of State [Cordell] Hull in 1938.

There are many facets to the relations between the university campus and our

foreign policy. I use the broader term “university campus” without derogation to the schools and departments specializing in international studies. The functions of the larger unit and the more specialized ones overlap. And it is not only the graduate students in international studies who need to know something about our foreign policy and the world around us.

The ordinary citizen needs awareness and understanding of other cultures, nations, and peoples. He also needs some understanding of the essential relationships between our people and other peoples; that is, some knowledge of the fundamentals of our foreign policy—its premises, its goals, its principal components, and its intimate connection with the welfare of our citizens.

Foreign relations, world affairs, international relations—call them what you will, they have ceased to be distant, peripheral, or

¹ Made before the University of Denver Convocation at Denver, Colo., on Nov. 14 (press release 273). Mr. Rusk also made some extemporaneous remarks.

separate from internal and personal affairs. The first concern of our foreign policy is the preservation of our national life—in the familiar words of the preamble of our Constitution, “to secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” This is not just rhetoric. In the atomic age, it is the deepest of realities. We can no longer find security in isolation from other parts of this small planet.

A paramount obligation of our diplomacy—as of the military forces and all the other instruments which support it—is, and must be, to preserve the safety of our society. Our foreign policy is as close to the citizen as the member of his family, or of his neighbor’s family, who is fighting in Viet-Nam or standing guard elsewhere on the ramparts of freedom. It is inseparable from his livelihood, his family, his hopes for his children.

Most citizens cannot be experts on all phases of our international relations. Even those who give full time to them must specialize to some degree or have the help of specialists. But the citizen needs to know enough to discharge intelligently his duties as a voter. And, above all, he needs the habits of thought that will enable him to make thoughtful judgments. There is no substitute for a basic liberal education.

These broad fundamental contributions of the university are not confined to its campus. There is the unending challenge of adult education, both for the citizen who has left the college campus and for the citizen who never reached it. We in the State Department have a lively interest in this in the field of international affairs and try to do our share of the job by keeping the news media fully informed and by providing printed material and speakers for many interested nongovernmental groups.

Among the other tasks of the university, and increasingly of the school of international studies, is the education of those who intend to make their careers in professions requiring knowledge of various aspects of international affairs. Our career diplomatic service has long ceased to be a preserve for the

graduates of a few Ivy League colleges. Every State and territory and nearly 500 universities and colleges are now represented in our Foreign Service. Every year we take 200 or so of the best young men and women produced by colleges and universities throughout our nation. In last year’s group of 190 new officers, 137 had attended graduate school and nearly half had graduate degrees.

International institutions need ever-increasing numbers of qualified personnel. And the needs of corporations and banks engaged in international business for suitably educated and trained persons are rising year by year.

The American universities of our time have a special historic role in helping the developing countries to train the administrators, the teachers, and the specialists in many fields whom they must have in order to move ahead into the modern world. We have done and are doing this through American colleges and universities overseas, by providing teachers and specialists to the developing countries, and by bringing men and women from those countries here for education and training.

International Education Act of 1966

As President Johnson said in his message to Congress on the International Education Act in February of this year:² “Education lies at the heart of every nation’s hopes and purposes. It must be at the heart of our international relations.”

The President was referring not only to assistance to the developing countries but to the broader role of our educational institutions in the great and growing international communities of knowledge. Science is international. Technology is international. And year by year the various peoples of the world are learning more about each other’s arts and literature.

Your Government helps to further these international contacts among scholars in many ways, including educational and cul-

² For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 28, 1966, p. 328.

tural exchange programs. It fosters international cooperative programs among scientists and technical experts in many fields, from oceanography to the exploration of space, from the desalting of water to the control of disease.

It is a definite policy of your Government to promote such cooperative efforts to deal with natural hazards and other common problems of man as man, not only with friendly nations but with our adversaries. We believe that man's struggle with nature is a common interest that provides a basis for cooperative efforts which will help to wear away barriers that now divide the human race. Contacts and exchanges have expanded between our scholars and those of the Soviet Union, as well as with the smaller Communist nations of Eastern Europe. And we have made it clear that we would be glad to see contacts restored between the scientists and scholars and medical experts of our country and those on the mainland of China.

In short, your Government adheres to two truths that President Johnson emphasized in his address at the bicentennial celebration of the birth of James Smithson, founder of the Smithsonian Institution:³ "learning respects no geographic boundaries" and "partnership between Government and private enterprise can serve the greater good of both."

In that address in September 1965 President Johnson proposed the development of a broad international education program. A committee appointed by him addressed itself to that challenge and made recommendations. In his special message to Congress in February the President set forth his program. And 2 weeks ago at Chulalongkorn University in Thailand he signed the International Education Act of 1966, which brings into law an important element in that program: the strengthening of education in world affairs in American institutions.

This act needs an appropriation—perhaps this will come initially by supplemental appropriation in January. I believe it can do

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 4, 1965, p. 550.

much to strengthen educational centers concerned with international affairs and thus increase the ability of our Government and people to conduct international relations intelligently and with steady focus on our national interest in building a reliable world peace. Grants under this act will be made by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

Government and the Universities

Some years ago, in what were simpler times—for me at least; I was a foundation executive—I sat on a committee of nine organized by the Ford Foundation at the request of Secretary of State [Christian A.] Herter. Our assignment was to study the role of the American universities in world affairs, and we made a report on that subject in 1960. Among other things, that report defined what the committee thought should be the relationship between the Government and the universities:

Government would provide the means to do the educational tasks, at home and abroad, that the universities cannot undertake unaided. The universities would rise to the educational responsibilities which world affairs place on them and on their sister institutions in other nations.

The report also said:

Where government draws on the universities, it has a traditional obligation . . . to respect their integrity in the pursuit of free inquiry. . . .

Those principles have guided this administration in its relations with the universities and will continue to guide it under the International Education Act. In short, after the Government has done its essential part, it should—and will—get out of the way and let the educators get on with their business.

I would emphasize also still another aspect of the relations of the academic community to our international relations and foreign policy. That is the creative function of the scholar in expanding knowledge; in exposing illusions, superstitions, and prejudices; in devising new approaches; in generating new ideas.

The colleges and universities provide the Government with information and analyses

on an enormous scale. The Office of External Research in the Department of State has information on more than 5,000 foreign affairs studies currently underway in American universities. It receives approximately 200 new academic papers each month.

We draw on the graduate schools of international studies and the wider university communities for information, ideas, and personnel. Over the years, our Policy Planning Council in the Department of State has taken some of its members and many of its consultants from the academic community. The various bureaus of the Department of State are expanding their panels of consultants in the universities and graduate schools of international studies.

I welcome thoughtful analyses and proposals from any source. I am delighted when somebody comes up with a new idea that can survive the initial test, which is careful examination. We are proffered many ideas and proposals, but not as many of them are as new as their authors sometimes suppose. Some are blueprints which have little, if any, relationship to practicability. And some are old ideas long since discarded by those carrying the burden of responsibility.

The Phenomenon of Aggression

There is a fundamental difference between an opinion—or a conclusion—and a decision. An opinion or a conclusion can be changed at the pleasure of the author without harm to anyone, including himself, unless he places a high value on consistency. The man who has the responsibility for making a decision has to live with the consequences. And when the decisions are those in the realm of foreign policy and national defense which must be made by the President, the Nation has to live—or perhaps perish—with the consequences.

I must confess that I am somewhat puzzled by those who put forward as “new” ideas notions which we and others paid dearly for embracing in times only recently past—for example: the notion that peace can be secured by appeasing aggression; that when an aggressor proclaims his intentions you

shouldn't pay any attention because he is just indulging in big talk; that all he needs is tender psychiatric help; that if you let him take just one more bite, he will be satisfied; that what happens in the Western Pacific is no concern of ours because it is a long way off. The young people of my generation heard all those things said about Manchuria, Ethiopia, the rape of Czechoslovakia. They were a “long way off”—no concern of ours.

I was in the Oxford Union on the night in 1933 when the union adopted the motion that its members would not fight for King and country. Six years later the brilliant philosopher who led the debate in favor of the motion said: “Sorry, boys, we weren't thinking of Hitler. Get out and fight.” He might have added, “Without the weapons and the training and the allies you would have had if I and people like me hadn't been so stupidly shortsighted”—and without the preventive measures that might have obviated the Second World War.

Some seem to have forgotten the clearest lesson of this century. And others try to explain it away by arguing that Hitler and his allies were unique phenomena—that there are no longer any dangerous aggressors.

I am fully aware of the differences between Hitler and Mussolini and the Japanese militarists, on the one hand, and the aggressors of more recent years. But the differences cannot obscure the common element: the phenomenon of aggression.

And our national interest in preventing or eliminating aggression is not confined to the Western Hemisphere or the North Atlantic community. Our national interest in security and peace is global. That does not mean that we must intervene in every quarrel. But it does mean that we have an interest in the rule of conduct among nations. And it does mean that we should exert our influence—and, if necessary, use our power—to try to prevent a great war and to build a reliable peace.

Our deep interests in the Western Pacific and East Asia are not new. We fought to repel aggression against the Republic of

Korea. And four successive Presidents of the United States, after extended consultation with their chief advisers, have concluded that the security of Southeast Asia, and of South Viet-Nam in particular, is very important to the security of the United States.

We have evinced our important national interest in the security of Southeast Asia generally, and South Viet-Nam in particular, through many actions and pledges, of which the most binding was the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, which the Senate approved with only one dissenting vote. And Secretary of State [John Foster] Dulles said specifically to the Foreign Relations Committee that that treaty applied to an armed attack by "the regime of Ho Chi Minh in North Viet-Nam."

Far-Reaching Issues in South Viet-Nam

But our interest in South Viet-Nam extends far beyond that nation and Southeast Asia. It involves the most far-reaching issues—not only for us but for the world as a whole.

Let me read from a considered statement:

. . . the interest and concern of the United States—whether in the Far East, in any other part of the Pacific area, in Europe, or anywhere else in the world—are not measured alone by . . . exceptional conditions peculiar to the particular area. . . .

The momentous question . . . is whether the doctrine of force shall become enthroned once more and bring in its wake, inexorably, international anarchy and a relapse into barbarism; or whether this and other peaceful nations, fervently attached to the principles which underlie international order, shall work unceasingly . . . to promote and preserve law, order, morality, and justice as the unshakable bases of civilized international relations.

We might, if we could reconcile ourselves to such an attitude, turn our backs on the whole problem and decline the responsibility and labor of contributing to its solution. But let us have no illusions as to what such a course of action would involve for us as a nation.

It would mean a break with our past, both internationally and domestically. It would mean a voluntary abandonment of some of the most important things that have made us a great nation. It would mean an abject retreat before those forces which we

have, throughout our whole national history, consistently opposed.

It would mean that our security would be menaced in proportion as other nations came to believe that, either through fear or through unwillingness, we did not intend to afford protection to our legitimate national interests abroad, but, on the contrary, intended to abandon them at the first sign of danger. . . .

All this we would be doing in pursuit of the notion that by so doing we would avoid war. But would these policies, while entailing such enormous sacrifices and rendering the Nation more and more decadent, really give us any such assurance?

Reason and experience definitely point to the contrary. . . .

These paragraphs I have just read are from one of my distinguished predecessors: Cordell Hull, on March 17, 1938.

Today we have to consider not only our national interests—the most vital of which is a peace that is safe for free institutions—but the commitments that we have made in our efforts to achieve such a peace. Besides our general commitments under the United Nations Charter, we have specific pledges to more than 40 allies. Were either our adversaries or our friends to believe that those pledges are worthless, the prospects for a reliable peace would vanish overnight. We must take particular care not to mislead those who would impose their will on others by force or threats.

We shall not have a chance to learn any lessons from a third world war. We must remember and apply the tragic lessons of the Second World War.

But we look beyond the turmoil and the crises of the present. Our objective is a peaceful and orderly world—the kind of world sketched out in the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter. That is the goal to which we committed ourselves as a nation and people when we helped to write and signed the United Nations Charter. It is a goal which is anchored in our basic interests and ideals. And, we believe, it expresses aspirations that are shared by men and women in every part of the earth.

Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. McCloy Meet With President Johnson

Secretary Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, and John J. McCloy, U.S. Representative to the trilateral talks with the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, met with President Johnson at the LBJ Ranch, Johnson City, Tex., on November 23. Following are excerpts from a press briefing held after the meeting.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON

At about 9:25 this morning Mr. McCloy, Secretary Rusk, Mr. McNamara, and Mr. [W. W.] Rostow arrived at the ranch and spent until almost 12 o'clock discussing the tripartite talks that Mr. McCloy had been representing our Government in, and reviewing the results of his conversations.¹

Subsequently, I conferred briefly with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara about matters relating to our other problems in other parts of the world, South Viet-Nam, our defense structure, our appropriation budget plans, and so forth.

There are really not any hard announcements to come out of these meetings. They will be continuing, as you know, until the first of the year. However, I thought, consistent with our general policy, where we can, that I would like to ask Secretary Rusk to make a brief statement, at the conclusion of which he will take any questions you may want to ask to clarify what he says, or any others you may want to present to him.

¹ For text of a trilateral communique issued on Nov. 10 at the close of the second round of talks between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany, see BULLETIN of Dec. 5, 1966, p. 867.

Then Secretary McNamara and Mr. McCloy will speak before you go to the Press Center and before we go to lunch.

SECRETARY RUSK

Thank you, sir.

We came down this morning to have a chance to go over a number of NATO questions with the President, but I must say on behalf of all four of us that we were delighted to be here on the occasion of these distinguished space awards.

The space program has joined us in cooperation with a great many countries all over the world, and the accomplishments of that program have stirred the imagination of peoples right around the globe.

We are very much interested in the outcome of the initiative taken by the President last May in proposing an important agreement on the peaceful uses of outer space.² We have been encouraged by the progress made thus far, and we would hope that that agreement, which would be of great importance, could be concluded in the very near future.

Mr. McCloy is going this weekend to Bonn to engage in another round of tripartite talks with his German and British colleagues. They will be making at least an interim report to the ministerial meeting of NATO, which will occur in the middle of December.

At that meeting annually the NATO foreign and defense ministers review the political and military situation of NATO in considerable detail. We expect these tripartite talks, as well as conversations in NATO, to

² *Ibid.*, June 6, 1966, p. 900.

continue into the first part of the coming year.

We have been encouraged by the solidarity of the Fourteen and by the prompt decisions they were able to take in response to the decisions announced by France earlier this year. We have no doubt at all that the Fourteen consider NATO of the utmost importance, as do we, as an organization that is vital to our mutual security on both sides of the Atlantic.

We also talked a bit about Viet-Nam. We continue to explore every possibility of a peaceful settlement of that situation. We, of course, are much interested in the present visit of Mr. George Brown, the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, in Moscow. This is not, strictly speaking, a meeting of the two cochairmen, but these two Foreign Ministers are, in fact, the cochairmen of the Geneva conference.

We would hope that the discussions between them might show some progress at some point. But I would not be able to indicate today that we see the prospect opening up in the immediate future for moving this matter from the battlefield to the conference table.

I mentioned one or two other matters in connection with the United Nations, but perhaps I can take your questions at this point.

Q. Mr. Rusk, the Canadian Foreign Minister [Paul Martin] this morning came out in favor of a policy of seating two Chinas in the United Nations. How do you view this?

Secretary Rusk: That is the Canadian view. Ambassador Goldberg stated our view to the General Assembly the other day.³ We feel that it is very important that the question of China be considered an important question by the General Assembly, requiring a two-thirds vote for a decision. We think that point will be sustained.

Secondly, we believe that the so-called Albanian resolution, which would expel the Republic of China on Formosa, would be

definitively defeated, and we think that that will occur.

There is a third proposal before the General Assembly for a study committee to look at this question in some depth between now and the next session. Ambassador Goldberg has indicated that we would support that. That study committee is not prejudicial to any results.

We think that this is a question that needs fair examination. I think it would not be appropriate for me to comment specifically on Mr. Martin's view, because we stated our view on the three resolutions that are now before the General Assembly.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on what basis do you express some hope for the Moscow-British talks?

Secretary Rusk: I said we were watching those discussions with some interest. We would hope that some prospect would come out of it that would move a step toward peace. We have hoped this about many initiatives taken by many groups of nations, many governments, many personalities, such as the Secretary-General and His Holiness the Pope. We continue to nourish that hope, although we continue to be disappointed thus far that Hanoi and Peking have not joined to open up the path to peaceful settlement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us anything of the results, if any, of these tripartite talks on NATO to date?

Secretary Rusk: You may recall when these questions or certain issues were being discussed before the Stennis subcommittee, I tried to emphasize the view, as expressed more than once by the President, that NATO as a whole should have a common view as to the nature of any possible threats that might be directed against NATO.

NATO, as a whole, should have a common view as to the preparedness which in prudence ought to be built in connection with such a threat, and NATO, as a whole, should join in providing the forces and to make the burdens equitable among all the members.

³ See p. 926.

These, broadly speaking, are within the range of discussions. No conclusions have been reached at this point. These questions will be discussed further at the ministerial meeting of NATO in Paris. This is part of the continuing business of NATO. I express my confidence in the readiness of NATO to do what is required under the Secretary General.

The press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY McNAMARA

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

As the President indicated, in addition to reviewing the status of the tripartite talks and our operations in Viet-Nam, we discussed this morning certain aspects of the defense program. This is the fourth in a series of discussions with the President on the defense program for fiscal 1968. We will have others before we complete the development of the fiscal 1968 defense budget.

We hope to have completed the studies by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other elements of the Department in 3 or 4 weeks, at which time we will present final recommendations to the President for his review.

This morning, in particular, we reviewed the manpower levels which will serve as the basis of planning for each of the several services—the Army, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps. In connection with that we discussed the draft outlook for the forthcoming year.

I will be very happy to try to answer your questions on this or related subjects.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the draft outlook for the coming year?

Secretary McNamara: I have reported previously, I believe, that we anticipated the draft calls for the next 4 months, which covers our immediate planning period, the months of December, January, February, and March, would be substantially below the level of the calls for the current 4-month period—August, September, October and

November. Initially we anticipated the reduction from the level of August, September, October, and November would be about 50 percent.

On that basis we requested of the Selective Service System the call of 27,600 men for the month of January. As has been our practice, we sent that requested call to the Selective Service Director early in November, about 60 days ahead of the call period. That was based on our then tentative plans for calendar 1967.

Based on the discussions we have had this morning and the studies that we have been able to complete with respect to fiscal 1968 since that early period in November, we believe we can further cut the draft call for the month of January. I will, upon my return, reduce it to about 16,000, a reduction of some 12,000 from the originally planned level announced early this month.

The outlook for the year, of course, is a little more difficult to predict this far in advance, and particularly to predict when we haven't yet completed all facets of the fiscal 1968 program, half of which lies in calendar 1967.

But I anticipate that the total manpower requirement for all services, those to be brought into the service through the draft as well as those who will volunteer, will be about one-third less than the manpower required in calendar 1966.

Q. What was that figure?

Secretary McNamara: I don't want to be that precise. I will simply tell you that I think the total number of men to be taken into the military services in calendar 1967, as best we can forecast at this time, will be about one-third less than in calendar 1966.

Q. What was calendar 1966?

Secretary McNamara: We haven't yet completed this year and I don't want to be at this time announcing total year figures for 1966. It will be on the order of 900,000 men.

Q. This year?

Secretary McNamara: Yes, for calendar 1966.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what makes this reduction in rate possible?

Secretary McNamara: As I told you before, looking ahead as best we can at this time to our requirements for operations in South Viet-Nam, we believe the requirement for additional men to be deployed to that area in calendar 1967 will be less than the number deployed there in calendar 1966.

We began this year with about 185,000 men in South Viet-Nam. We will add during the year about 200,000. We should end the year, therefore, with about 385,000. We don't anticipate it will be necessary, barring unforeseen contingencies, to add that many men to South Vietnamese forces in 1967. That is one of the factors that influences the level of the draft calls.

I want to emphasize that we intend to continue in calendar 1967 the current policy of rotating men out of the forces and bringing them home from South Viet-Nam at the end of a 12-month tour of duty, and our manpower planning for calendar 1967 will be based upon that. Despite having that as one of our objectives, as I say, I believe that we will be able to operate taking in about one-third fewer men in 1967 than in 1966.

Q. How many men will this put in Viet-Nam at the end of calendar 1967?

Secretary McNamara: It is much too early to give a final estimate on that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will the total force level of the Armed Forces be less in 1967 as a result of the fewer additions?

Secretary McNamara: No. The total strength in our active force at the end of calendar 1967 will be greater than at the end of calendar 1966. But the rate of increase will be less. We are reaching a leveling off point, in other words.

That is true not only of our manpower, but of our defense production as well. I think I told you before that as we look ahead we can

see the possibility of reducing somewhat the planned rates of production, and we have already, on two occasions, announced to our defense contractors reductions in the planned rates in the production of air ordnance.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us an advance look, so to speak, in general terms, of the 1968 budget?

Secretary McNamara: No. It is much too early, gentlemen, for that. It will be 3 or 4 weeks before we draw our recommendations together, and it will certainly be some time after that before the President has an opportunity to fully consider them.

Q. What about the supplemental?

Secretary McNamara: We will definitely have a supplemental. I think it has been very clear, based on the premise on which the fiscal 1967 budget was presented to Congress and explained to Congress, that a supplemental would be required.

You remember that at the time the fiscal 1967 budget was developed approximately a year ago, October 1965, we were in the midst of a very substantial buildup of our forces in South Viet-Nam. We put 100,000 men in South Viet-Nam in 120 days.

The budget was developed in the middle of that expansion. It was difficult to look to the end of the fiscal year, some 21 months thereafter, and predict with any certainty the level of any combat operations we should plan for before the end of that fiscal year.

It is much easier to do that now. The lead-times required to insure production of air munitions, aircraft, helicopters, ground munitions, to insure we have adequate supplies beyond 1967, requires that we place orders for those supplies in the first half of 1967. Therefore, we will have a supplement to provide for that.

Q. How big?

Secretary McNamara: Again, this is one of the subjects I will be reviewing with the President during the next 3 or 4 weeks.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the fact that you are

going to reduce draft calls next year, does this mean that you will be leveling off the forces in Viet-Nam at what you end up there with at the end of next year?

Secretary McNamara: No. As I mentioned earlier, the number of men in Viet-Nam will undoubtedly increase, but it will increase at a lesser rate than it has increased during calendar 1966. I don't want to try to predict when the total will level off, but I think we can, barring unforeseen emergencies, state with some certainty that the rate of increase will be less in the ensuing 12 months.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will we be able to meet our deadline for evacuating our troops from France by April 1st, and, too, do all of our statements on troop needs in Viet-Nam conform with General [William C.] Westmoreland's always saying we need more troops?

Secretary McNamara: The President, on many, many occasions, has said that we will supply our commanders in South Viet-Nam the forces they require. That is the principle upon which we have operated to date.

It is the principle upon which the fiscal 1968 program is being developed, and I am sure it is the principle on which we will operate in ensuing calendar years.

Q. Mr. Secretary, assuming that order of 900,000, it would be 270,000 less going into the Armed Forces this year than last year?

Secretary McNamara: It will be something on that order. I don't want to be too precise because we haven't finished this year and it is too early to predict the end of next year. It is on that order.

Q. On the supplemental, you are saying we will do the same thing as last year, that the supplemental will go up in January along with the budget?

Secretary McNamara: Yes, exactly.

Q. Has that been determined?

Secretary McNamara: The amount of the supplemental hasn't been determined, but I think it is very clear that a supplemental

will be required. As we get closer and closer to the end of the fiscal year and see it is becoming increasingly desirable that we plan for operations, and the support for such operations beyond that point, I think it is very apparent that a supplemental will be necessary.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON

Thank you, Secretary McNamara.

Ladies and gentlemen, our country is very fortunate and our people are very grateful that we have been able to enlist the services of one of America's most dedicated and competent citizens.

Mr. McCloy, throughout several decades, has served this land of ours with great distinction, and never has he undertaken a more responsible assignment than his present duty. We are glad to welcome him here today. We have enjoyed and profited from his review.

I would like Mr. McCloy to make a statement if he cares to. Then we would be glad for you to ask any questions.

MR. McCLOY

I don't think there is any statement in regard to the work I have been doing that would be appropriate or possible for me to make after the statement made by Mr. Rusk. Are there any questions you care to ask?

Q. Sir, could you tell us what position we will take at the next tripartite talks later on this week?

Mr. McCloy: As the Secretary indicated, they begin on Monday in Bonn. We will carry on the same sort of work we have been doing, on which I think we have been progressing—discussions of strategy, force levels, and the other incidents to the determination of what the role of NATO should be, considering the present situation; what changes have oc-

curred in the situation since NATO was organized.

It would be a little difficult to specify all the items now that we will discuss, but they will be in that general line. So far there has been no indication of how long this meeting is going to continue. We may have to adjourn it to another spot. The objective would be to make a report as soon as we were prepared to do it through the ministers—the meeting of the ministers scheduled for December 15th. As the Secretary indicated, that may not be a final determination or report. It may be only interim.

Q. Mr. McCloy, do you see so far movement toward a satisfactory settlement of the related questions of NATO force levels and the German offset payments?

Mr. McCloy: It perhaps is a little early to tell. You know the situation that exists in Bonn, with no new government in prospect. Some of the decisions which have to be made are very important decisions, very substantial decisions, and it is perhaps too much to expect that the interim government, or a government which is there pending the organization of a new government, would be in a position to give the answers to those.

But I believe we can make progress along certain principles, having to wait, probably, until the new government is in position, has its feet under the table, so to speak, when those decisions can be made.

Q. Is that the principal reason that is holding up an agreement now, sir—the German political crisis?

Mr. McCloy: No, I don't think so. There was a great deal of work that had to be done in the way of survey, exploration, and, indeed, it still has to be done before you really can come down to the hard facts of, let's say, what the offsets will be or could be. It is a great deal of preliminary work that has to be done.

*The press: Thank you, Mr. McCloy.
Thank you, Mr. President.*

New Law a First Step To Protect Great Seal of the United States

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) dated November 12

I have today [November 11] signed S. 2770. This law gives us for the first time in our history new and needed criminal sanctions against the unauthorized use and commercial exploitation of the Great Seal of the United States.¹

The Great Seal is the proud and enduring symbol of the dignity and honor of America. It is as old as the history of our Republic.

One of the earliest concerns of our Founding Fathers was to develop a seal. Work on the Great Seal began on July 4, 1776, the same day Congress agreed to the Declaration of Independence. It took almost 6 years to perfect that Seal. Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson were among those great Americans whose genius and inspiration brought forth the Great Seal as we know it today.

But for many years there has been a need for legislation governing the commercial reproduction and use of our Great Seal. Up to now we have had to use our powers of moral suasion to discourage uses of the Seal that were undignified or sought to convey the false impression that the Government was endorsing a particular book or activity.

Moral suasion has not always been sufficient. Now we have a new law to give the Great Seal of our country some of the protection it deserves. I regard this law as a first step. It has fallen considerably short of our expectations and our recommendations. It just does not go far enough.

—By specifically listing the prohibited uses of the Great Seal, it narrows greatly the scope of protection under the law. The bill, for example, may not control the use of

¹As enacted, the bill (S. 2770) is Public Law 89-807.

Great Seal designs on objectionable salable souvenirs.

—It fails to provide for injunctive relief when that approach in certain cases may be preferable to criminal proceedings.

—And nowhere does it protect the Presidential Seal against unauthorized use and commercial exploitation. The symbol of the highest office in the land must surely deserve the protection of law.

The Great Seal of the United States together with the Presidential Seal are part of the priceless heritage of a free people and a free country. Their worth and their dignity must be preserved.

I have asked the Secretary of State and the Acting Attorney General to review the new law and to prepare a far broader proposal for submission to Congress next year. I have asked them to develop a proposal that will give the full and fair protection of the law to the Great Seal of the United States and the Presidential and Vice Presidential Seals as well.

U.S. Expects Another Nuclear Test by Communist China Soon

*Department Statement*¹

We have reason to believe that another Chinese Communist nuclear test will take place in the near future at their usual test site in Lop Nor. This continuation of Chinese atmospheric testing reflects the determination of the Chinese Communists to move ahead in their nuclear weapons development program in defiance of world opinion as expressed by the more than 100 nations which have signed the test ban treaty of 1963.

¹ Read to news correspondents by the Department spokesman on Nov. 29.

U.S., Bulgaria, Hungary Raise Legations to Embassy Status

Bulgaria

Press release 282 dated November 28

On the basis of mutual agreement, the Governments of the United States of America and of the People's Republic of Bulgaria have decided to raise their diplomatic representation to the level of embassy.

Hungary

Press release 281 dated November 28

On the basis of mutual agreement, the Governments of the United States of America and the Hungarian People's Republic have decided to raise their diplomatic representation to the level of embassy.

Assistant Secretary Palmer Visits Six African Countries

The Department of State announced on November 29 (press release 284) that Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Joseph Palmer 2d would depart Washington December 1 to visit six African countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda.

While in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, December 8-12, he will meet with U.S. ambassadors and principal officers from posts in southern and eastern Africa. Similar regional conferences have been held in the past at periodic intervals.

Mr. Palmer's itinerary is as follows: Tananarive, Madagascar, December 3-6; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, December 7-12; Mogadiscio, Somalia, December 13-14; Entebbe and Kampala, Uganda, December 15-16; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, December 17-19; Nairobi, Kenya, December 19-22; return to Washington, December 23.

Move To Change Representation of China in U.N. Again Rejected by the General Assembly

Following is a statement made by U.S. Representative Arthur J. Goldberg in plenary session of the U.N. General Assembly on November 21 during the debate on the question of Chinese representation, together with the texts of a resolution which was adopted on November 29 and two draft resolutions which were rejected on that day.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG

U.S. delegation press release 4979

As the General Assembly turns to the question of the representation of China in the United Nations—one of the most difficult and important questions that confront this organization—three draft resolutions lie before us.

These, in the order of their introduction, and in the order in which they are to be considered under the established rules of the General Assembly, are as follows:

—First, a resolution submitted by Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Gabon, Italy, Japan, Madagascar, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand, and the United States (document A/L. 494) confirming that, under the charter, any proposal to change the representation of China is an important question requiring a two-thirds majority for adoption.

—Second, a resolution submitted by Albania, Algeria, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Pakistan, Romania, and Syria (document A/L. 496) which would expel the representatives

of the Republic of China and put representatives of Peking in their place.

—Third, a resolution submitted by Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Italy, and Trinidad and Tobago (document A/L. 500) proposing that a study and inquiry be made into the question of Chinese representation and a report made to the 22d General Assembly.

The United States believes that it can best contribute at this opening stage of the debate by stating simply, briefly, and forthrightly its position on these three proposals.

One, the United States is a cosponsor of the "important question" resolution. This resolution confirms that any proposal to change the representation of China in the United Nations, such as the Albanian resolution, is an important question. It is obviously of transcendent importance, and therefore under the Charter of the United Nations a two-thirds majority is required for its adoption. The basic issue here, I wish to emphasize, is not one of tactical advantage for one side or the other but of the fidelity of the United Nations to its constitution and its established procedures. We will vote for the important-question resolution and strongly urge its adoption.

Second, the United States will vote against the Albanian resolution, which would expel the Republic of China from the United Nations and put Peking in its place. This proposal is repugnant to the charter and to the interests of world peace. Moreover, it flies in the face of the aim of universality which its sponsors claim for it. We vigorously oppose

the Albanian resolution, and we urge that it be decisively rejected.

Third, the United States will vote for the study-committee resolution for a sober, deliberate, and constructive consideration of the problem of the representation of China in keeping with the principles and purposes of the charter.

I shall now set forth the considerations which have led us to these conclusions.

The Important-Question Resolution

First, the important-question resolution. The 14-power important-question resolution confirms what the charter provides and intends. Article 18 of the charter says: "Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting."

No one can seriously deny that a proposal to change the representation of China in the United Nations, such as the Albanian resolution, is important. Indeed, if there is any aspect of the matter on which both the proponents and the opponents of the Albanian resolution could hardly disagree, it is that the action proposed in the resolution holds important and far-reaching implications for the United Nations, vitally concerns the maintenance of international peace and security, and is directly connected with the rights and privileges of membership.

This commonsense interpretation of the charter and the consequent applicability of the two-thirds majority requirement to resolutions of the Albanian type have long been accepted by the General Assembly. In 1961, the first year it debated a substantive proposal to change China's representation, the Assembly so explicitly decided in Resolution 1668 (XVI).¹ The continued validity of this resolution was affirmed in 1965 in Resolution 2025 (XX).² The present 14-power important-question resolution simply affirms the continuing validity of the Assembly's prior decision on this vital point.

¹ For U.S. statements and text of resolution, see *BULLETIN* of Jan. 15, 1962, p. 108.

² For U.S. statements and text of resolution, see *ibid.*, Dec. 13, 1965, p. 940.

Mr. President, it is my Government's deep conviction, based upon long experience, that procedural rules such as this are not trivial things. Substantive rights largely depend upon observances of procedural rights. And it is in fidelity to the charter concept that all important questions require a two-thirds majority that we emphatically urge the adoption of the 14-power resolution.

Second, the Albanian resolution. I turn now to the second resolution before the Assembly, the Albanian resolution. The United States strongly opposes this resolution and urges its rejection.

I shall not dwell on the tendentious language of this resolution—language which is not at all in keeping with the spirit of tolerance and harmony which the charter enjoins upon all. It is its substance that concerns us.

U.S. Opposition to Albanian Resolution

The main thrust and intent of the Albanian resolution is to expel the Republic of China from the United Nations. In fact, the cosponsors this year have recast the language used in past years so as to insure that any member wishing to vote to admit mainland China must simultaneously, whether it wishes it or not, vote to expel the Republic of China.

This maneuver is put before us in the strange guise of universality. But the Albanian resolution runs in the opposite direction, away from universality and toward the expulsion of the Republic of China.

I say to every member categorically: Whatever your attitude may be on the admission of representatives of Peking, if you are unwilling to see the Republic of China expelled from membership in the United Nations—the first such expulsion in the history of this organization—you have no alternative but to vote against the Albanian resolution.

There is no conceivable justification for expelling the Republic of China. Whatever the sponsors of the Albanian resolution may contend, several facts are beyond dispute:

—The Republic of China is a founding member of the United Nations and its rights as a signatory are established by the charter.

—The role of the Republic of China in supporting United Nations activities, as this organization knows, has been outstanding. In its fidelity to the purposes and principles of the charter, it bears comparison with any member of the organization.

The contrast with Communist China is very sharp indeed. The record of the past is known to every member of this Assembly. Peking has vilified the United Nations, its activities, and its goals. It has even threatened to establish a rival organization. It has espoused a doctrine of force in international affairs and has, in the guise of "peoples' wars," interfered in the affairs of many independent countries represented in this Assembly, in violation of the principles of the charter and of resolutions of the General Assembly.

No Conciliatory Moves by Peking

Some have commented that Peking's words of insult and vilification about this organization have been somewhat muted in the past. If this portends a change in attitude toward the United Nations, it is to be welcomed.

But this claimed change can scarcely be reconciled with such phenomena as the attacks and insults which Peking has recently leveled at the person of our distinguished Secretary-General, a man admired by all in this Assembly and a man who is a symbol of the United Nations in the world.

The sober reality is that the immediate past has been characterized not by conciliatory moves in the interests of peace and security on the part of mainland China but by other and more ominous developments there running in the contrary direction. There are the xenophobic excesses of the Red Guards, whose implications none can entirely fathom but which make all of us uneasy. There is the further deterioration of relations between Communist China and

the rest of the Communist world. There is an ever-increasing tension in its relations with the Afro-Asian world. There is the increasingly bitter expression of enmity against my own country.

There is Peking's adamant refusal to take any step which might open the way to a political solution in Viet-Nam and the use of its influence to prevent such steps by anyone else. There is its rejection, as machinations of "imperialist stooges," of the measures toward that end which have been proposed by other sources—by one of the cochairmen of the Geneva conference, by the Secretary-General, by the British Commonwealth nations, and by 17 nonaligned countries, and, indeed, by others. And underlying all of this, there is an undeviating adherence to the doctrine and practice of fomenting "peoples' wars" against sovereign governments and interfering in their internal affairs.

For all these reasons we shall vote against the Albanian resolution and urge that it be decisively defeated.

I now turn to the study-committee resolution. In past years our consideration of this question would have ended at this point. This year, however, there is a new element in the debate: the study-committee proposal. My Government will vote in favor of this resolution.

Our discussions of this issue, I would recall, have always foundered on one rock: Peking's insistence that we repudiate solemn treaty commitments to the Republic of China and leave Peking a free hand to take over the people and territory of Taiwan.

We have refused and shall continue to refuse to repudiate our commitments to the Republic of China.

Similarly, we refuse to countenance any solution to the problem of Chinese representation which involves the expulsion of the Republic of China on Taiwan from the United Nations. As we understand the study-committee proposal, it does not in any way prejudice or undermine our commitments, nor indeed does it prejudge the results of the study to be made.

We hope this inquiry of the committee may help to obtain answers to questions which can only be answered by Peking:

Will they refrain from putting forward clearly unacceptable demands, and specifically the unacceptable demand that the Republic of China be expelled from this organization?

And will they assume the obligations of the U.N. Charter, in particular the basic obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state?

With these considerations in mind, we shall support the study-committee resolution.

TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS

Important-Question Resolution³

The General Assembly,

Recalling the recommendation contained in its resolution 396 (V) of 14 December 1950 that, whenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a Member State in the United Nations and this question becomes the subject of controversy in the United Nations, the question should be considered in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the circumstances of each case,

Recalling further its decision in resolution 1668 (XVI) of 15 December 1961, in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter, that any proposal to change the representation of China is an important question, which, in General Assembly resolution 2025 (XX) of 17 November 1965, was affirmed as remaining valid,

Affirms again that this decision remains valid.

Draft Resolution on Chinese Representation⁴

The General Assembly,

Recalling the principles of the Charter of the

³ U.N. doc. A/RES/2159 (XX) (A/L.494 and Add. 1); adopted on Nov. 29 by a vote of 66 (U.S.) to 48, with 7 abstentions.

⁴ U.N. doc. A/L.496; rejected on Nov. 29 by a vote of 46 to 57 (U.S.), with 17 abstentions.

United Nations and the universal role that the United Nations is called upon to play,

Considering that the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China is essential both for the protection of the Charter of the United Nations and for the cause that the United Nations must serve under the Charter,

Recognizing that the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations,

Decides to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it.

Draft Resolution on Establishment of a Study Committee⁵

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of the representation of China,

Believing that a solution of the question of Chinese representation, which accords with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the aim of universality, would further the purposes of the United Nations and strengthen its ability to maintain international peace and security,

Believing that the complexities of this question require the most searching consideration in order to pave the way to an appropriate solution, taking into account the existing situation and the political realities of the area,

1. *Decides* to establish a Committee of . . . Member States, to be appointed by the General Assembly, with the mandate of exploring and studying the situation in all its aspects in order to make the appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session for an equitable and practical solution to the question of the representation of China in the United Nations, in keeping with the principles and purposes of the Charter;

2. *Appeals* to all Governments concerned to give assistance to the Committee in its search for such a solution.

⁵ U.N. doc. A/L.500; rejected on Nov. 29 by a vote of 34 (U.S.) to 62, with 25 abstentions. Before this draft resolution was put to a vote, the Assembly adopted a Syrian resolution making the proposal to study the representation of China an important question, requiring a two-thirds vote for adoption.

U.N. Reaffirms Principles for Negotiating Nonproliferation Treaty; Calls for Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States

Following is a statement by William C. Foster, U.S. Representative to the U.N. General Assembly, made in Committee I (Political and Security) on November 9, together with the text of a two-part resolution adopted by the General Assembly on November 17.

STATEMENT BY MR. FOSTER

U.S. delegation press release 4969

In his statement before this committee on October 20 Ambassador Goldberg outlined the general thinking of the United States delegation on the question of nonproliferation.¹ Today I should like to speak in more detail on several aspects of the question that I believe are particularly relevant to our present discussion.

I wish in particular to deal, first, with peaceful nuclear explosions and, second, with international safeguards on peaceful nuclear facilities. Both of these questions have been referred to by a number of speakers and my remarks today are intended to underscore several important points.

I listened with interest and, I must say, with some concern to the view expressed on October 31 and November 7 by the distinguished representative of India [V. C. Trivedi] that a treaty provision prohibiting the development by non-nuclear-weapon states of nuclear explosive devices intended for peaceful purposes would be tantamount to attempting to stop the dissemination of scientific knowledge and technology concerning peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

He said that the denial of such information and technology would be particularly harmful to those non-nuclear-weapon countries which are making great efforts to develop their economies.

Let me reassure him that this was not and is not our intention. But because it was the United States that at Geneva first suggested that the nonproliferation treaty should also deal with the problem of nuclear explosives, I should like to comment in more detail on this question.

It is the preparation for and the explosion of a nuclear device equivalent to a bomb that would be prohibited in a nonproliferation treaty. Let us make no mistake about the real issue involved when we speak of peaceful nuclear explosions. To suggest that the nonproliferation treaty should not deal with the problem of nuclear explosives is tantamount to saying that we should agree to a treaty which contains a major loophole in contradiction to operative paragraph 2(a) of Resolution 2028 (XX).²

The explosive release of nuclear energy may indeed be put to beneficial peaceful work, if and when it becomes technically and economically feasible. But it is the work to which it is put and not the explosion itself which is "peaceful." The reason, as we and others have stated before, is that the science and technology behind a nuclear explosive device are inseparable from the science and technology of nuclear warheads or bombs.

Because it is inseparable, the proving of such science and technology by means of an

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 12, 1966, p. 896.

² For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 29, 1965, p. 884.

actual nuclear explosion conducted by a non-nuclear-weapon state would have to be regarded by other countries as having resulted in the acquisition by that state of the basic technology for producing nuclear weapons. It is as simple as that.

Controlled Fusion Research

The distinguished representative of India urged that we "not confuse the question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons with that of the future and distant development of controlled fusion techniques." With this we wholly agree. Fortunately, however, peaceful applications of energy derived from controlled and sustained nuclear reactions, that is, reactions stopping far short of explosions in the exact use of that term, have nothing to do with nuclear weapons. Development work relating to such controlled and sustained nuclear reactions would not, I repeat, would not, be affected by having the prohibitions of a nonproliferation treaty also encompass peaceful nuclear explosives.

As an engineer and one who has had the experience of operating an integrated peaceful nuclear-products industry, I must say I could not grasp Ambassador Trivedi's other point that somehow there would be no problem if the technology used were that of fusion instead of fission. In fact, the very same problem arises whether the nuclear explosion is achieved by uncontrolled nuclear fission or by uncontrolled thermonuclear fusion.

We desire that the same principle of freedom of scientific research which applies to nuclear reactors which operate by nuclear fission should apply to the development and application of any technology that may become practical for obtaining a sustained and controlled fusion reaction. The United States has been a major contributor to the dissemination of knowledge in this area as it has in other peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Many countries, including a number of advanced nuclear countries which do not produce and do not intend to produce nuclear weapons, have also published a wealth of information on controlled fusion reactions. We

fully agree that all countries having the capacity and a desire to carry out their own research into controlled fusion reaction should benefit from a wide dissemination of scientific knowledge in this area, and we have no reason to believe that this will not continue.

But we must not confuse the so-called "clean" thermonuclear explosives which may some day be available for peaceful engineering projects with research on controlled fusion reactors. Indeed, it is precisely because controlled fusion research is not related to nuclear weapons that the United States has made publicly available the results of its fusion research which, as the distinguished representative of India correctly states, is still in an exploratory phase.

These, then, are the considerations that led the United States to urge at Geneva that if and when peaceful nuclear explosions that are permissible under test ban treaty limitations prove technically and economically feasible, nuclear-weapon states should make available to other states nuclear explosive services for peaceful applications.³ This would consist of performing the desired nuclear detonation under appropriate international observation, with the nuclear device remaining in the custody and under the control of the state performing the service so as to insure that no proliferation of nuclear explosive devices or design information results.

The detailed workings of such a proposed service would, of course, have to be spelled out in detail at some appropriate stage, and arrangements agreed upon that would be satisfactory to all interested parties. We do not believe that our good faith can be questioned in the light of this suggestion by the United States of a way in which eventual peaceful benefits of nuclear explosives can be shared with non-nuclear-weapon states, and in a manner which, for the developing countries in particular, would place the least demand on their own financial resources.

A key element in our efforts to curb the

³ For text of a U.S. statement on Aug. 9, see *ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1966, p. 351.

proliferation of nuclear weapons is the establishment of safeguards against the diversion of peaceful nuclear activities to military purposes. I should like to review briefly today why the United States supports the international administration of such safeguards and their extension to cover all peaceful nuclear activities in the world.

Basic Purpose of Safeguards

Although most countries are reluctant to undertake the huge costs and grave risks involved in acquiring nuclear weapons, pressure to do so could arise from suspicions that neighbor or rival states may be clandestinely preparing to produce nuclear weapons. If such suspicions can be dispelled, an important incentive for nuclear proliferation will be removed. This, I believe, is the basic purpose of nuclear safeguards: they provide the most effective means by which a country can assure its neighbors that its nuclear program is truly peaceful and receive similar assurances in return. To be really meaningful in reassuring others, such safeguards should be applied to the entire nuclear program of a state.

The first nuclear safeguards consisted of bilateral arrangements in which a state exporting a nuclear reactor sent its own inspectors to determine that the reactor was being used only for its intended peaceful purpose. While such bilateral safeguards were a useful first step, it soon became apparent that safeguards administered by an international agency would be far preferable. Such an agency can establish uniform inspection procedures, particularly if it is of worldwide scope, so that safeguards standards do not become a matter of competitive bargaining in the marketplace. Even more important, a worldwide body can carry out safeguards procedures in which all states, friend and adversary alike, will have confidence.

For these reasons, the International Atomic Energy Agency has developed a safeguards system with the help and support of many countries. The United States has invited the IAEA to safeguard several of its

nuclear reactors and has also made a commercial nuclear-fuel reprocessing facility available to the IAEA for development of safeguards procedures and for training inspectors.

The need for effective international safeguards has been widely accepted throughout the world, as evidenced by the virtually unanimous acceptance in 1965 of an improved system of safeguards by all the members of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Some 40 countries, including the United States, have learned through firsthand experience that IAEA safeguards are effective, are not costly or burdensome, and do not interfere with the operation of nuclear facilities. The United States therefore believes that the time has come for each state to give serious consideration to the benefits it can gain by inviting the IAEA to establish safeguards over its entire peaceful nuclear program.

IAEA and EURATOM

During the annual general conference of the IAEA last month in Vienna, several important proposals were made for widening the coverage of IAEA safeguards. Dr. Gunnar Randers, the distinguished delegate of Norway to the general conference, suggested that states which do not produce nuclear weapons invite the IAEA to safeguard their entire nuclear programs. This suggestion was repeated here in the General Assembly on October 5 by Norway's distinguished Foreign Minister, Mr. [John] Lyng.

The United States heartily welcomes Norway's suggestion. We hope that many states will respond to it positively. A growing roster of states which voluntarily invite IAEA safeguards because it is in their own self-interest to do so can, I believe, go a long way toward reducing the grave threat of nuclear proliferation.

At the same IAEA conference last month, Poland and Czechoslovakia offered to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards provided that West Germany did likewise. We would have preferred to have heard this proposal made without any precondi-

tions, because all nuclear installations in the Federal Republic are already subject to effective international EURATOM [European Atomic Energy Community] safeguards which the United States considers equivalent to IAEA safeguards. The United States nevertheless considers the Polish and Czechoslovakian proposal worthy of serious consideration. I believe it is highly significant that states in Eastern Europe, as well as many states elsewhere, have indicated that they recognize the desirability of effective international safeguards on peaceful nuclear programs.

Because of the importance of effective worldwide safeguards in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and in keeping with its desire to promote the constructive evolution of relations between Eastern and Western Europe, the United States is giving careful study to the potentialities and significance of the Polish-Czech proposal. This is a decision to be taken in the first instance by the Federal Republic and other members of the European Community. We are confident that they are giving the proposal serious consideration, as evidenced by the statement issued on October 26 by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

We recognize that the ramifications of this proposal will require deliberate study by the states concerned both in Eastern and Western Europe. The United States favors efforts to improve cooperation between the IAEA and EURATOM as consistent with its policy of working toward the development of a single worldwide safeguards system whose effectiveness is assured by the participation of all states. Meanwhile, we view the EURATOM system as fulfilling a most important and useful role. We therefore hope that the present informal relations between EURATOM and the IAEA can be regularized. Such a development would usefully complement a constructive response to the Polish-Czech proposal and would go far toward creating an atmosphere of increased confidence and mutual trust.

Another noteworthy development has been

the approach to safeguards taken by the nations of Latin America in their proposals for a treaty for the denuclearization of Latin America. Under the proposals now being considered by them, IAEA safeguards would apply to the nuclear installations of states participating in the zone.

My Government is gratified to see that other states are giving serious and timely consideration to this matter. During the past few days we have heard a number of interesting statements in this committee stressing the importance of international safeguards. I was particularly struck by the statements of the representatives of Japan, the Netherlands, Italy, and Canada, all of whom urged that we continue to work for complete coverage of effective international safeguards, with the ensuing invaluable benefits of mutual reassurance for us all. That is why we have proposed that the nonproliferation treaty should contain the strongest possible safeguards provision acceptable to the international community.

The Question of Balanced Obligations

Mr. Chairman, we also listened with special interest yesterday to the statements of the distinguished representatives of the United Kingdom, Ceylon, and the Netherlands in response to remarks expressed here on the question of balanced obligations in a nonproliferation treaty. Their views coincide with those of the United States as set forth most recently by Ambassador Goldberg in his statement to this committee on October 20.

The United States supported Resolution 2028 (XX) and subscribes to its provisions, including operative paragraph 2(b). The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of obligations and responsibilities. But these should be practical and directly relevant to the primary objective of a nonproliferation treaty. As many others have already remarked, we simply cannot afford to delay the conclusion of a nonproliferation treaty while awaiting progress on other measures. And we should therefore not permit the well-known obstacles to rapid agreement on other meas-

ures—no matter how important these may be—to obstruct progress toward our priority objective, a nonproliferation treaty.

The eight nonaligned delegations of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament have recognized this fact when in their joint memorandum of August 19 they reaffirmed their conviction that a nonproliferation treaty “should be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.” They indicated that such steps “could be embodied in a treaty as part of its provisions or as declaration of intention.”

The joint memorandum goes on to list a number of suggestions for such tangible steps. Among these are a complete cutoff of fissionable materials production for weapon purposes and a freeze and possible reduction in the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, both of which were first proposed and continue to be pressed by the United States. We also continue to search for ways to make progress toward a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Concurrent progress on measures which the United States has proposed and which we are the first to defend would indeed meet the test of acceptable balance. More important, it would mark a major reversal in the nuclear arms race—an objective we share with everyone here. The United States welcomes the growing support given by numerous delegations to the measures we have proposed. We shall continue to explore every opportunity to facilitate agreement on these measures which, we fully agree, are directly related to our priority objective of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Chairman, in keeping with your admonition that we cooperate in expediting the committee’s work, I shall conclude by taking this occasion to refer to the two resolutions which have been tabled under this item.

The United States regards the resolution in document A/C.1/L.371 (revised) as constructive and deserving of widespread sup-

port. Yet in our view it has an important defect. I must take note of the difficulties that have been created by attempts to deal in specific terms with an aspect of the question of assurances. The results of these attempts, as embodied in the language which has just been substituted this morning for the original operative paragraph 3, are not satisfactory to the United States delegation.

Let me make clear that my remarks are addressed at this time to what is now the new operative paragraph 4. As for the new operative paragraph 3, dealing with a nonuse undertaking with regard to denuclearized zones, that is a question which will actually arise when a treaty establishing such a zone is concluded and when the nuclear powers are formally asked to respect the zone.

The United States greatly appreciates the efforts made by a number of delegations over the past few days to find a formulation for the new paragraph 4 which was acceptable to all. The language now before us is itself the result of a last attempt to find a compromise, and it has in fact come measurably close to bridging the gap. Unfortunately, it is still not satisfactory to my delegation.

Objection to Nonuse Formula

Our principal objection is that the attempt to recommend for consideration by the ENDC a specific nonuse formula which has been offered to deal with an aspect of the question of assurances seems to us premature, at the very least. This is a matter which will be the subject of early and delicate negotiations and we think it unwise to vote now on so specific a formulation when we have as yet devoted so little time to analyzing its implications.

Moreover, the United States has serious reservations about the particular formulation which is spelled out in paragraph 4. I shall not take the time now to state these reservations because they are the same as those set forth fully in the statements made by the distinguished representatives of Italy and Canada on November 7. We fully agree with their analysis of the probable impact

and implications of this nonuse formulation.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the United States believes that, if the committee wishes to recommend specific formulations for study by the ENDC, it should also refer in similar detail to other suggestions which have been advanced to deal seriously with the problem of providing or supporting assistance to a non-nuclear-weapon state that is the victim of nuclear aggression. This committee will recall that following President Johnson's statement of support for those who may be threatened by nuclear blackmail,⁴ the United States delegation has several times expressed its readiness to consider with all delegations in the General Assembly what appropriate action could be taken by the United Nations to deal with this problem. The language now before us in paragraph 4 does not, we think, adequately set out the possibilities which should be studied, whether here or in the ENDC.

For these reasons, the United States delegation will not be able to support operative paragraph 4, and we request a separate vote on this paragraph in order to have the opportunity to register more formally our position.

As for the amendment to this resolution submitted by the delegation of Cameroon in document A/C.1/L.373, I would recall that my delegation has in the past had occasion to express its opposition to similar proposals for sweeping prohibitions on the use of nuclear weapons. Such prohibitions outside the context of general and complete disarmament are unrealistic. They imply that it is the weapon used rather than aggression itself which must be prohibited pursuant to the United Nations Charter. My delegation will accordingly vote against this amendment.⁵

Finally, I should like to comment briefly on the draft resolution sponsored initially by the delegation of Pakistan.⁶ My delegation fully appreciates the considerations which underlie the proposal for a conference of non-nuclear powers. However, I feel I must associate myself with the views of those who believe this proposal to be inopportune and

probably impractical. Just now, when the prospects for concluding a nonproliferation treaty have improved so markedly, it would be unfortunate if a commitment were undertaken to convene a conference which could seriously delay the agreement we all seek.

It is difficult to see what purpose could be served by such a conference which could not better be served by existing forums and existing mechanisms for consultation. We entirely agree that every opportunity must be provided to enable all countries to express their views on the proposed treaty, here in the Assembly, later at Geneva, and, if need be, through additional meetings and procedures which come readily to mind for assuring the opportunity of full consultation. We therefore believe that this initiative might well be held in abeyance in the event our hopes for an early agreement should be disappointed.

I trust, however, that this will not be the case. The United States delegation believes that the time has come for a supreme effort to overcome remaining differences and to produce a draft agreement which will prove acceptable to all. The discussions in this committee have further illuminated the expectations and concerns of both nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon powers. For our part, we shall have these expectations and concerns very much in mind as we approach what we earnestly hope will be conclusive and successful negotiations on a nonproliferation treaty.⁷

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, Nov. 2, 1964, p. 610.

⁵ On Nov. 9 the representative of Cameroon agreed that, in the light of the revised draft resolution (A/C.1/L.371/Rev. 1), the Cameroon amendment (A/C.1/L.373) to the original draft resolution (A/C.1/L.371 and Corr. 1) no longer applied.

⁶ U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.372.

⁷ On Nov. 10 the two draft resolutions before the committee were voted upon as follows:

Operative para. 4 of the revised draft resolution (A/C.1/L.371/Rev. 1) was adopted by a vote of 98 to 0, with 4 abstentions (U.S.); and the draft resolution as a whole was then adopted by a vote of 103 (U.S.) to 1, with 2 abstentions.

Draft resolution A/C.1/L.372, as amended by document A/C.1/L.376, was adopted by a vote of 46 to 1, with 56 abstentions (U.S.).

TEXT OF RESOLUTION*

NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

A

The General Assembly,

Having discussed the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Noting that it has not yet been possible to reach agreement on an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Viewing with apprehension the possibility that such a situation may lead not only to an increase of nuclear arsenals and to a spread of nuclear weapons over the world but also to an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon Powers,

Believing that if such a situation persists it may lead to the aggravation of tensions between States and the risk of a nuclear war,

Believing further that the remaining differences between all concerned should be resolved quickly so as to prevent any further delay in the conclusion of an international treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Convinced, therefore, that it is imperative to make further efforts to bring to a conclusion a treaty which reflects the mandate given by the General Assembly in its resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965, and which is acceptable to all concerned and satisfactory to the international community,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolution 2028 (XX);

2. *Urges* all States to take all necessary steps conducive to the earliest conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;

3. *Calls* upon all nuclear-weapon Powers to refrain from the use, or the threat of use, of nuclear weapons against States which may conclude treaties of the nature defined in paragraph 2 (c) of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX);

4. *Requests* the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to consider urgently the proposal that the nuclear-weapon Powers should give an assurance that they will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States without nuclear weapons on their territories, and any other proposals that have been or may be made for the solution of this problem;

* U.N. doc. A/RES/2153 (XXI); on Nov. 17 the General Assembly adopted draft resolution A (A/C.1/L.371/Rev. 1) by a vote of 97 (U.S.) to 2, with 3 abstentions; draft resolution B (A/C.1/L.372, as amended), by a vote of 48 to 1, with 59 abstentions (U.S.).

5. *Calls upon* all States to adhere strictly to the principles laid down in its resolution 2028 (XX) for the negotiation of the above-mentioned treaty;

6. *Calls upon* the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to give high priority to the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with the mandate contained in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX);

7. *Transmits* the records of the First Committee relating to the discussion of the item called "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", together with all other relevant documents, to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament;

8. *Requests* the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to submit to the General Assembly at an early date a report on the results of its work on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

B

The General Assembly,

Recalling previous resolutions on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Considering that the further spread of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States,

Convinced that the emergence of additional nuclear-weapon Powers would provoke an uncontrollable arms race,

Reiterating that the prevention of further proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of the highest priority demanding the unceasing attention of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon Powers,

Believing that a conference of non-nuclear-weapon Powers would contribute to the conclusion of arrangements designed to safeguard the security of those States,

1. *Decides* to convene a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States to meet not later than July 1968 to consider the following and other related questions:

"(a) How can the security of the non-nuclear States best be assured?

"(b) How may non-nuclear Powers co-operate among themselves in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons?

"(c) How can nuclear devices be used for exclusively peaceful purposes?"

2. *Requests* the President of the General Assembly immediately to set up a preparatory committee, widely representative of the non-nuclear-weapon States, to make appropriate arrangements for convening the conference and to consider the question of association of nuclear States with the work of the conference and report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session.

U.S. To Serve on U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on South West Africa

Following is a statement by Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, issued by the United States Mission to the United Nations on November 21.

U.S./U.N. press release 4980

As the President of the General Assembly has announced, the United States is among the countries which will be serving on the United Nations *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa.¹

We have accepted his invitation to serve, despite our great regret that France and the United Kingdom have not found it possible to take part. We would have welcomed their participation in the resolution of this grave and important problem.

Our acceptance is based on our understanding that, as indicated in the General Assembly's resolution on South West Africa,² the Committee will proceed to its highly responsible task with all deliberate speed and concern, in full recognition of the many complex and difficult problems involved. I have already expressed my country's view that we must seek a peaceful solution consistent with the United Nations Charter and with the principle of self-determination, a principle to which the United States has been committed from the earliest days of its history.

In short, United States participation is based on the expectation that the Committee will explore all avenues to a peaceful solution to this problem and on our conviction that its recommendations, if they are to be acceptable and effective, must be realistic and practicable and within the capacity of the U.N. to achieve.

¹ Other states designated as members of the *Ad Hoc* Committee are: Canada, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Finland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, the U.S.S.R., and the United Arab Republic.

² For a U.S. statement of Oct. 27 and text of the resolution, see BULLETIN of Dec. 5, 1966, p. 870.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Pakistan Sign Cotton Textile Agreement

Press release 278 dated November 21

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The United States and Pakistan on November 21 signed at Rawalpindi a new 4-year bilateral cotton textile agreement covering the exports of Pakistan's cotton textiles to the United States for the period July 1, 1966-June 30, 1970. This agreement replaces the bilateral cotton textile agreement signed at Washington on February 26, 1965.¹ Commerce Secretary Vaqar Ahmad signed the new agreement on behalf of the Government of Pakistan, and Ambassador Eugene M. Locke signed on behalf of the United States Government.

The main features of the new agreement are:

1. The aggregate limit for the first year of the agreement is 55 million square yards. This limit as well as the other limits in the agreement will be increased by 5 percent for the second and subsequent years of the agreement.

2. The group limit applicable for the first agreement year for yarns and fabrics (group I, categories 1-27) is 48 million square yards and for apparel, made-up goods, and miscellaneous products (group II, categories 28-64) is 7 million square yards.

3. Specific ceilings for carded sheeting, poplin and broadcloth, carded twills and sateens, printcloth, barkcloth-type fabrics, duck, shop towels, and T-shirts are provided.

4. Other provisions on flexibility, undue concentration, spacing, exchange of statistics,

¹ For background and text of U.S. note, see BULLETIN of Mar. 15, 1965, p. 391.

categories and conversion factors, consultation, administrative arrangements, equity, termination, relationship to the Geneva Long-Term Arrangements, and control of imports are also included.

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE

No. 766

RAWALPINDI, November 21, 1966.

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the recent discussions held in Karachi between representatives of our two Governments concerning the cotton textile agreement between our two Governments effected by an exchange of notes at Washington on February 26, 1965. In accordance with these discussions, the Government of the United States of America understands that the agreement is replaced with the following new agreement:

1. The term of this agreement shall be from July 1, 1966 through June 30, 1970. During the term of this agreement, the Government of Pakistan shall limit annual exports of cotton textiles from Pakistan to the United States to aggregate, group and specific limits at the levels specified in the following paragraphs.

2. For the first agreement year, constituting the 12-month period beginning July 1, 1966, the aggregate limit shall be fifty-five million square yards equivalent.

3. Within this aggregate limit, the following group limits shall apply for the first agreement year:

<i>Groups</i>	<i>In Sq. Yds. Equivalent</i>
I. (categories 1-27)	48 million
II. (categories 28-64)	7 million

4. Within the aggregate limit and the applicable group limits, the following specific limits shall apply for the first agreement year:

<i>A. Group I</i>	<i>Million Square Yards</i>
Category 9 (sheeting, carded)	23.0
Category 15 (poplin and broadcloth, carded)	2.0
Print Cloth (categories 18, 19 and parts of category 26)*	10.0
Category 22 (twill and sateen, carded)	2.0
Barkcloth-type Fabrics (parts of category 26)*	3.0
Duck (parts of category 26)	6.0
Other ²	2.0

*Print cloth and barkcloth-type fabrics are further described in Annex A.

<i>B. Group II</i>	<i>Units</i>	<i>Sq. Yds. Equivalent (millions)</i>
Shop towels (part of category 31)	3.9 million	1.357
T Shirts (categories 41 and 42)	250,000 doz.	1.808
Other ²		3.835

5. Within the aggregate limit, the limit for Group I may be exceeded by not more than 10 percent and the limit of Group II may be exceeded by not more than 5 percent. Within the applicable group limit, as it may be adjusted under this provision, specific limits may be exceeded by not more than 5 percent.

6. In the second and succeeding 12-month periods for which any limitation is in force under this agreement, the level of exports permitted under such limitation shall be increased by 5 percent of the corresponding level for the preceding 12-month period, the latter level not to include any adjustments under paragraph 5.

7. In the event of undue concentration in exports from Pakistan to the United States of cotton textiles in any category not given a specific limit, the Government of the United States of America may request consultation with the Government of Pakistan to determine an appropriate course of action. Until a mutually satisfactory solution is reached, the Government of Pakistan shall limit exports in the category in question from Pakistan to the United States starting with the 12-month period beginning on the date of the request for consultation. This limit shall be 105 percent of the exports of such products from Pakistan to the United States during the most recent 12-month period preceding the request for consultation and for which statistics are available to our two governments.

8. The Government of Pakistan shall use its best efforts to space exports from Pakistan to the United States within each category evenly throughout the agreement year, taking into consideration normal seasonal factors.

9. The two governments recognize that the successful implementation of this agreement depends in large part upon mutual cooperation on statistical questions. The Government of the United States of America shall promptly supply the Government of Pakistan with data on monthly imports of cotton textiles from Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan shall promptly supply the Government of the United

² These "other" categories are not subject to specific limits. Hence, within the aggregate and the applicable group limits, as they may be adjusted under paragraph 5, the square yard equivalent of shortfalls in exports in categories with specific limits may be used in these "other" categories subject to the provisions of paragraph 7. [Footnote in original.]

States of America with data on monthly exports of cotton textiles to the United States. Each government agrees to supply promptly any other available relevant statistical data requested by the other government.

10. In the implementation of this agreement, the system of categories and the rates of conversion into square yard equivalents listed in Annex B hereto shall apply.

11. The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Pakistan agree to consult on any question arising in the implementation of the agreement.

12. Mutually satisfactory administrative arrangements or adjustments may be made to resolve minor problems arising in the implementation of this agreement including differences in points of procedure or operation.

13. If the Government of Pakistan considers that as a result of limitations specified in this agreement, Pakistan is being placed in an inequitable position vis-a-vis a third country, the Government of Pakistan may request consultation with the Government of the United States of America with the view to taking appropriate remedial action such as a reasonable modification of this agreement.

14. Either government may terminate this agreement effective at the end of an agreement year by written notice to the other government to be given at least 90 days prior to the end of such agreement year. Either government may at any time propose revisions in the terms of this agreement.

15. During the term of this agreement, the Government of the United States of America will not request restraint on the export of cotton textiles from Pakistan to the United States under the procedures of Article 3 of the Long-Term Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles done at Geneva on February 9, 1962. The applicability of the Long-Term Arrangements to trade in cotton textiles between Pakistan and the United States shall otherwise be unaffected by this agreement.

16. The Government of the United States of America may assist the Government of Pakistan in implementing the limitation provisions of this agreement by controlling the imports of cotton textiles covered by the agreement until agreement is reached that Pakistan will control these exports in accordance with the limitations of the agreement.

If these proposals are acceptable to your Government, this note and your note³ of acceptance on behalf of the Government of Pakistan shall constitute an agreement between our Governments.

³ Not printed here.

Accept, please, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

EUGENE M. LOCKE
United States Ambassador

The Honorable
VAQAR AHMAD,
*Secretary, Ministry of Commerce,
Government of Pakistan,
Rawalpindi.*

ANNEX A

I. Printcloth

Printcloth is a term applied to a plain woven fabric made of singles uncombed yarns. The fabric is not napped, not fancy and not figured. The difference in the yarns per inch of the warp and of the filling does not usually exceed 15. The average yarn number ranges between 27 and 44 per inch.

Printcloth falls under Category 18 "Printcloth, shirting type, 80 x 80 type, carded"; Category 19 "Printcloth, shirting type, other than 80 x 80 type, carded"; and under the T.S.U.S.A. numbers of Category 26 "Woven fabric, not elsewhere specified, other, carded" listed below:

T.S.U.S.A. Numbers

- | | | |
|------|------|---|
| 320. | xx34 | Printcloth other than printcloth type shirting, not combed, wholly of cotton, not fancy or figured, not bleached or colored. |
| 321. | xx34 | Printcloth other than printcloth type shirting, not combed, wholly of cotton, not fancy or figured, bleached but not colored. |
| 322. | xx34 | Printcloth other than printcloth type shirting, not combed, wholly of cotton, not fancy or figured, colored, whether or not bleached. |
| 326. | xx34 | Printcloth other than printcloth type shirting, not combed, chief value, but not wholly of cotton, containing silk or man-made or both, not fancy or figured, not bleached or colored. |
| 327. | xx34 | Printcloth other than printcloth type shirting, not combed, chief value, but not wholly of cotton, containing silk or man-made fibers, or both, not fancy or figured, bleached but not colored. |
| 328. | xx34 | Printcloth other than printcloth type shirting, not combed, chief value, but not wholly of cotton, containing silk or man-made fibers, or both, not fancy or figured, colored, whether or not bleached. |

II. Barkcloth

Barkcloth is a term applied to a fabric most commonly used in the drapery and upholstery fields. The fabric is often made with heavy filling yarns and fine warp yarns with 2 or 3 times as many warp threads as filling threads per inch, or with heavy warp and filling yarns with a fairly even number of warp and filling threads per inch. The weave is of an irregular design with long warp and filling floats resulting in a rough or barklike fabric surface. Barkcloth is most commonly woven with 6 harnesses but should it be advantageous to do so, could easily be produced with 8 or more harnesses.

Barkcloth-type fabrics are those fabrics classified as "Woven fabrics, not elsewhere specified, other, carded" and which fall under the numbers of the Tariff Schedule of the United States (T.S.U.S.A.) listed below. For administrative purposes, barkcloth-type fabrics shall be considered as including all fabrics falling under these numbers. Schedule 3 of the T.S.U.S.A., including revisions through supplement No. 4, which gives the complete definitions applicable to these numbers is attached. All yarn counts, represented by the fourth and fifth digits ("xx") of the following numbers and specifically described in Schedule 3 of the T.S.U.S.A., are included in the restraint action.

T.S.U.S.A. Numbers

320. xx88	320. xx92
321. xx88	321. xx92
322. xx88	322. xx92
323. xx88	323. xx92
324. xx88	324. xx92
325. xx88	325. xx92
326. xx88	326. xx92
327. xx88	327. xx92
328. xx88	328. xx92
329. xx88	329. xx92
330. xx88	330. xx92
331. xx88	331. xx92

Should the Government of Pakistan have further questions concerning the fabrics covered herein, the United States Government would be pleased to consult on this problem.

ANNEX B

LIST OF COTTON TEXTILE CATEGORIES AND CONVERSION FACTORS FOR FABRICS AND MADE UP GOODS

Category Number	Description	Unit	Conversion Factor to Syds.
1	Cotton yarn, carded, singles	Lb.	4.6
2	Cotton yarn, carded, plied	Lb.	4.6
3	Cotton yarn, combed, singles	Lb.	4.6
4	Cotton yarn, combed, plied	Lb.	4.6

5	Gingham, carded	Sq. Yds.	Not required
6	Gingham, combed	Sq. Yds.	Not required
7	Velveteen	Sq. Yds.	Not required
8	Corduroy	Sq. Yds.	Not required
9	Sheeting, carded	Sq. Yds.	Not required
10	Sheeting, combed	Sq. Yds.	Not required
11	Lawn, carded	Sq. Yds.	Not required
12	Lawn, combed	Sq. Yds.	Not required
13	Voile, carded	Sq. Yds.	Not required
14	Voile, combed	Sq. Yds.	Not required
15	Poplin and Broadcloth, carded	Sq. Yds.	Not required
16	Poplin and Broadcloth, combed	Sq. Yds.	Not required
17	Typewriter ribbon cloth	Sq. Yds.	Not required
18	Print cloth, shirting, type, 80x80 type, carded	Sq. Yds.	Not required
19	Print cloth, shirting, type, other than 80 x 80 type, carded	Sq. Yds.	Not required
20	Shirting, Jacquard or dobby, carded	Sq. Yds.	Not required
21	Shirting, Jacquard or dobby, combed	Sq. Yds.	Not required
22	Twill and sateen, carded	Sq. Yds.	Not required
23	Twill and sateen, combed	Sq. Yds.	Not required
24	Woven fabric, n.e.s., yarn dyed, carded	Sq. Yds.	Not required
25	Woven fabric, n.e.s., yarn dyed, combed	Sq. Yds.	Not required
26	Woven fabric, n.e.s., other, carded	Sq. Yds.	Not required
27	Woven fabric, n.e.s., other, combed	Sq. Yds.	Not required
28	Pillowcases, not ornamented, carded	Numbers	1.084
29	Pillowcases, not ornamented, combed	Numbers	1.084
30	Towels, dish	Numbers	.348
31	Towels, other	Numbers	.348
32	Handkerchiefs, whether or not in the piece	Dozen	1.66
33	Table damask and manufactures	Lb.	3.17
34	Sheets, carded	Numbers	6.2
35	Sheets, combed	Numbers	6.2

Category Number	Description	Unit	Conversion Factor to Syds.
36	Bedspreads and quilts	Numbers	6.9
37	Braided and woven elastic	Lb.	4.6
38	Fishing nets and fish netting	Lb.	4.6
39	Gloves and mittens	Dozen	3.527
40	Hose and half hose	Dozen pairs	4.6
41	T-shirts, all white, knit, men's and boys'	Dozen	7.234
42	T-shirts, other knit	Dozen	7.234
43	Shirts, knit, other than T-shirts and sweatshirts	Dozen	7.234
44	Sweaters and cardigans	Dozen	36.8
45	Shirts, dress, not knit, men's and boys'	Dozen	22.186
46	Shirts, sport, not knit, men's and boys'	Dozen	24.457
47	Shirts, work, not knit, men's and boys'	Dozen	22.186
48	Raincoats, $\frac{3}{4}$ length or longer, not knit	Dozen	50.0
49	Coats, other, not knit	Dozen	32.5
50	Trousers, slacks, and shorts (outer), not knit, men's and boys'	Dozen	17.797
51	Trousers, slacks and shorts (outer), not knit, women's, girls' and infants	Dozen	17.797
52	Blouses, not knit	Dozen	14.53
53	Dresses, (including uniforms) not knit	Dozen	45.3
54	Playsuits, sunsuits, washsuits, creepers, rompers, etc., not knit, n.e.s.	Dozen	25.0
55	Dressing gowns, including bathrobes and beachrobes, lounging gowns, housecoats and dusters, not knit	Dozen	51.0
56	Undershirts, knit, men's and boys'	Dozen	9.2
57	Briefs and undershorts, men's and boys'	Dozen	11.25
58	Drawers, shorts, and briefs, knit, n.e.s.	Dozen	5.0
59	All other underwear, not knit	Dozen	16.0
60	Pajamas and other nightwear	Dozen	51.96
61	Brassieres and other body supporting garments	Dozen	4.75
62	Wearing apparel, knit, n.e.s.	Units or lb.	4.6
63	Wearing apparel, not knit, n.e.s.	Units or lb.	4.6
64	All other cotton textiles	Units or lb.	4.6

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Finance

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.
Ratification deposited: Cyprus, November 25, 1966.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a global commercial communications satellite system. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1965. TIAS 5646.
Accession deposited: Philippines, November 30, 1966.

Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.
Signature: Philippines, November 30, 1966.

Telecommunications

International telecommunications convention, with annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965.¹
Ratification deposited: Guinea, October 3, 1966.

Trade

Third procès-verbal extending the declaration of November 12, 1959, as extended (TIAS 4498, 4958, 5809), on the provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 14, 1965. Entered into force January 6, 1966. TIAS 6005.
Ratification deposited: Austria, October 21, 1966.
Acceptance: Czechoslovakia, November 2, 1966.

Procès-verbal extending the declaration of November 13, 1962 (TIAS 5678), on the provisional accession of Yugoslavia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 14, 1965. Entered into force December 28, 1965; for the United States December 30, 1965. TIAS 6008.
Ratification deposited: Austria, October 21, 1966.

Protocol amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and development, and to amend annex I. Done at Geneva February 8, 1965. Entered into force June 27, 1966. TIAS 6139.
Ratification deposited: Austria, October 21, 1966.

Protocol for the accession of Switzerland to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 1, 1966. Entered into force August 1, 1966. TIAS 6065.
Ratification deposited: Austria, October 21, 1966.

Acceptances: Czechoslovakia, November 2, 1966; Japan, October 27, 1966; United Kingdom, November 4, 1966.

BILATERAL

India

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of September 30, 1964, as amended (TIAS 5669, 5729, 5793, 5846, 5875, 5895, 5913, 5965, 6032, 6113). Effected by an exchange of notes at New Delhi November 21, 1966. Entered into force November 21, 1966.

¹ Not in force.

Japan

Agreement amending the agreement of November 25, 1964 (TIAS 5688), regarding king crab fishery in the eastern Bering Sea. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington November 29, 1966. Entered into force November 29, 1966.

Panama

Agreement relating to the granting of reciprocal authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio operators of either country to operate their stations in the other country. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama November 16, 1966. Entered into force November 16, 1966.

PUBLICATIONS

German War Documents Volume Released by Department

The Department of State announced on December 7 (press release 285 dated November 30) the release of *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series C (1933-1937), The Third Reich: First Phase, Volume V, March 5-October 31, 1936*. Together with the 13 volumes of series D already issued, the present volume represents the 18th to be prepared and published by the cooperative project of the United States, Great Britain, and France for the publication of documents from the archives of the former Ger-

man Foreign Office. These archives, which now have been restored to the German Federal Republic, were captured at the end of World War II and were held in custody by the United States and British Governments for more than 10 years, during which documents were selected, microfilmed, and annotated for publication.

Volume V opens on March 5, 1936, and leads immediately to the diplomatic crisis precipitated by Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhineland on March 7. It terminates with the month of October, which witnessed the formation of the Rome-Berlin Axis and the signature of the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact.

The 639 documents selected for this volume are arranged in chronological order, but the analytical list presents them by topic, enabling the reader easily to follow any main subject.

In accordance with the practice in this project, the selection of documents has been made jointly by the British, French, and United States editors, who share responsibility for the selections made. Under a reciprocal arrangement some of the volumes are edited and printed by the British and some by the United States Government. This volume has been edited by the British editors and printed at Her Majesty's Stationery Office. The folded signatures for the American edition were shipped from England and bound at the U.S. Government Printing Office. The volume is being released simultaneously in Washington and London.

Copies of the volume (Department of State publication 8083) may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402, for \$4.75 each.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LV, NO. 1434 PUBLICATION 8176 DECEMBER 19, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of

the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-

intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. PRICE: 52 issues, domestic \$10, foreign \$15; single copy 30 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the Department of State Bulletin as the source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

Africa. Assistant Secretary Palmer Visits Six African Countries	925	United States and Pakistan Sign Cotton Textile Agreement	937
Asia		U.S.S.R. Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. McCloy Meet With President Johnson (excerpts from press briefing)	919
The United States and the New Asia (Rostow)	910	United Kingdom. Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. McCloy Meet With President Johnson (excerpts from press briefing)	919
The University Campus and Foreign Policy (Rusk)	914	United Nations	
Atomic Energy		Move To Change Representation of China in U.N. Again Rejected by the General Assembly (Goldberg, texts of resolutions)	926
U.N. Reaffirms Principles for Negotiating Non-proliferation Treaty; Calls for Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (Foster, text of resolution)	930	Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. McCloy Meet With President Johnson (excerpts from press briefing)	919
U.S. Expects Another Nuclear Test by Communist China Soon	925	U.N. Reaffirms Principles for Negotiating Non-proliferation Treaty; Calls for Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (Foster, text of resolution)	930
Bulgaria. U.S., Bulgaria, Hungary Raise Legations to Embassy Status	925	U.S. To Serve on U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on South West Africa (Goldberg)	937
China		Viet-Nam	
Move To Change Representation of China in U.N. Again Rejected by the General Assembly (Goldberg, texts of resolutions)	926	Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. McCloy Meet With President Johnson (excerpts from press briefing)	919
Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. McCloy Meet With President Johnson (excerpts from press briefing)	919	The United States and the New Asia (Rostow)	910
U.S. Expects Another Nuclear Test by Communist China Soon	925	The University Campus and Foreign Policy (Rusk)	914
Department and Foreign Service. U.S., Bulgaria, Hungary Raise Legations to Embassy Status	925		
Diplomacy. The University Campus and Foreign Policy (Rusk)	914	<i>Name Index</i>	
Disarmament. U.N. Reaffirms Principles for Negotiating Nonproliferation Treaty; Calls for Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (Foster, text of resolution)	930	Foster, William C	930
Economic Affairs		Goldberg, Arthur J	926, 937
The United States and the New Asia (Rostow)	910	Johnson, President	919, 924
United States and Pakistan Sign Cotton Textile Agreement	937	McCloy, John J	919
Educational and Cultural Affairs. The University Campus and Foreign Policy (Rusk)	914	McNamara, Robert S	919
Germany		Palmer, Joseph, 2d	925
German War Documents Volume Released by Department	942	Rostow, W. W	910
Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. McCloy Meet With President Johnson (excerpts from press briefing)	919	Rusk, Secretary	914, 919
Hungary. U.S., Bulgaria, Hungary Raise Legations to Embassy Status	925		
Military Affairs. Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. McCloy Meet With President Johnson (excerpts from press briefing)	919		
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. McCloy Meet With President Johnson (excerpts from press briefing)	919		
Pakistan. United States and Pakistan Sign Cotton Textile Agreement	937		
Presidential Documents			
New Law a First Step To Protect Great Seal of the United States	924		
Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. McCloy Meet With President Johnson	919		
Publications. German War Documents Volume Released by Department	942		
South West Africa. U.S. To Serve on U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on South West Africa (Goldberg)	937		
Treaty Information			
Current Actions	941		

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Nov. 28-Dec. 3

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to November 28 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 273 of November 14, and 278 of November 21.

No.	Date	Subject
281	11/28	U.S. and Hungary raise diplomatic representation to level of embassy.
282	11/28	U.S. and Bulgaria raise diplomatic representation to level of embassy.
*283	11/29	Kohler sworn in as Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs (biographic details).
284	11/29	Assistant Secretary Palmer to visit Africa (rewrite).
285	11/30	<i>Documents on German Foreign Policy</i> (rewrite).
†286	11/30	Statement on IMCO action to improve passenger-ship safety.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

The Promise of the New Asia

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This 72-page illustrated pamphlet contains the major statements and addresses made by President Johnson during his 17-day journey, October 17–November 2, to seven Asian and Pacific nations. The pamphlet also includes a statement by General William C. Westmoreland, the U.S. commander in Viet-Nam, made before the chiefs of state and heads of government of the seven allied nations at the Manila Summit Conference, as well as the texts of the three historic documents issued at the close of the Manila Conference: the Goals of Freedom, the Joint Communique, and the Declaration of Peace and Progress in Asia and the Pacific.

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THE
DEPARTMENT
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BULLETIN

Vol. LV, No. 1435



December 26, 1966

INTER-AMERICAN COOPERATION: THE ROAD AHEAD

by Assistant Secretary Gordon 946

IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON WORLD TRADE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

*Addresses by Vice President Humphrey
and Secretary of Commerce John T. Connor 956*

PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAILS U.N. ACCORD ON TREATY
GOVERNING EXPLORATION OF OUTER SPACE

Statement by President Johnson and Text of Treaty 952

Inter-American Cooperation: The Road Ahead

by *Lincoln Gordon*

*Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*¹

It has been stated—accurately, if repeatedly—that Latin America is in ferment, that the continent is undergoing vast and sweeping transformations. This sense of dramatic change and movement can be felt almost everywhere: in the halls of government, in the universities, in the business and financial centers, in the homes and working places of the people.

Nor can there be doubt of the need for fundamental change. It is a felt and increasingly articulated need voiced by millions of restive individual Latin Americans, impatient to find solutions to conditions they find intolerable. It is a need reflected in political party platforms and programs of government throughout the hemisphere. And it is a need given formal intergovernmental recognition in the Charter of Punta del Este, which set in motion the Alliance for Progress 5 years ago.

To understand this need requires a clear view of conditions as they are and also an understanding of the processes of change which are at work. It calls for both a snapshot and a motion picture.

The thoughtful North American visitor who observes more than the modern city centers of Latin America is often, and rightly, shocked by what he sees and learns. There are the shantytowns—not rundown central residential districts of the kind we unfortunately possess in such large measure but recent agglomerations of squatters' shacks,

fearfully overcrowded and receiving an apparently inexhaustible influx of impoverished migrants from the countryside.

Outside the cities the contrasts are even sharper. Although there are substantial areas of prosperous and quite productive agriculture and livestock raising, they are surrounded by thousands of square miles of isolated subsistence farms whose methods of production and marketing have scarcely changed in two centuries.

Although illiteracy is still shockingly high, there are not enough schools or teachers to accommodate the vast requirement for primary schooling, to say nothing of secondary and higher education. Especially in rural areas, health services are woefully inadequate or nonexistent. And in the explosively growing cities there is much open unemployment and even more semiemployment with little economic value and little return.

Confidence in Goals of the Alliance

If there is poverty, however, there is generally not apathy, resignation, or hopelessness. On the contrary, there is a growing conviction among leadership groups and the people generally that economic growth, broader opportunities, and a steady advance in living standards can be achieved through their concerted efforts and can be achieved without sacrifice to human rights, civil liberties, or democratic institutions.

Of course, there are extremist left-wing minorities dedicated to the violent seizure of power and eager to uproot the existing social

¹ Address made before the Pan American Society of the United States at New York, N.Y., on Dec. 1.

order even though they have little notion what to build upon its ruins. There are also vested interests who admit the need for change in principle but do what they can to make sure that no changes affect them.

But the increasingly dominant attitude holds that social and economic progress and reform can be achieved by peaceful means, institutions can be modernized, science and technology brought to bear, middle classes expanded, and industrial and agricultural workers given a fair share of the growing national product and full participation in national life. These are the goals embodied in the Alliance for Progress, and the consensus around them is growing because such developments are visibly taking place.

All over the hemisphere, new roads are bringing hitherto isolated areas into contact with the wider national communities. Spreading electric power systems are opening new opportunities for local industries and mechanization on the farms. Only in the last 5 years, water supply systems have been developed to serve almost 50 million people, thus attacking at its root the largest single cause of infant mortality.

Thousands of small farmers for the first time have access to credit for farm machinery, breeding stock, and technical advice to help increase their output. I have seen cases where a simple irrigation system has permitted two crops a year instead of one, while hybrid seeds have doubled the yield per acre—thus multiplying fourfold the previous production. New schools in rural areas where none before existed, and hundreds of other examples, could be added to this roster.

While known by different slogans in different countries, these are becoming increasingly the goals and methods through which Latin American leadership is transforming the southern part of this continent. For this reason, while the snapshot of Latin American conditions may well be disheartening, the motion picture of attitudes and processes and directions of change gives reason for real optimism and challenges our own best efforts, public and private, to help speed those efforts forward.

For several reasons, this has been a year of sober reappraisal of Latin America's development prospects and needs. In August we passed the fifth anniversary of the Charter of Punta del Este—the halfway point in the Alliance for Progress as originally conceived.

In late September, when the foreign ministers of the hemisphere met informally here in New York, they agreed unanimously that we should work toward an early inter-American meeting of Presidents to take the political decisions at the highest level required to give our national and cooperative efforts a new impetus. In recent days, a group of nine distinguished Latin American international civil servants has been working to develop specific proposals for consideration of governments and presentation to the projected presidential meeting.

Experience of the Last 5 Years

Broadly speaking, the experience of the last 5 years shows substantial overall economic growth, especially in 1964 and 1965, when on the average it passed the minimum target of 2½ percent per capita. This year that level may not be reached, mainly because bad weather reduced the agricultural output in several countries. Gross inflows of capital to Latin America from abroad have also increased, even though levels of private foreign investment are still disappointing.

Internally, much has been done to improve tax structures and tax administration, to fight inflation, and to strengthen institutions required for more productive private enterprise. A start has been made in many countries on agricultural reform and modernization. Savings and loan institutions have been established to mobilize funds for new housing. Everywhere there is a new drive for expansion in educational and public health services.

Externally, some headway has been made toward diversification of Latin America's exports, but foreign exchange earnings are still far from sufficient to support self-sustaining growth at an adequate rate. And, most important of all, it is clear that the growth targets themselves must be raised if

productive employment is to be found for the growing labor force, agricultural production raised so that Latin America can feed itself and secure new sources of export earnings, and the essential process of industrialization pushed forward.

Clearly the efforts must be reinforced both at the national level and in various aspects of international cooperation. At the national level, in addition to pushing forward with roads and power and communications and with institutional reforms to promote more rapid industrialization, the two major sectors of agriculture and education have been singled out for special attention. This is because continued lack of adequate progress in those fields threatens to undermine the entire development effort.

Economic Integration

On the international side, in addition to efforts to improve Latin America's trading opportunities, the key topic of concentrated attention is the economic integration of Latin America. This is because—in the considered judgment of the most thoughtful Latin American economists, joined in increasing measure by business and political leaders from all over the continent—rapid progress toward economic integration offers the best hope of a major breakthrough in the pace of economic development.

In the eyes of these Latin American leaders, economic integration could create conditions for a major advance in industrialization with high productivity and efficiency—raising domestic living standards, broadening job opportunities, and permitting export diversification on a basis which can compete in world markets for products enjoying a rapidly increasing world demand.

This will not be an easy process to bring about. It raises not only hopes but also a variety of fears within Latin America. There is, indeed, a certain analogy between those fears and some which accompanied the evolution of our own trade policy during the past three decades.

This audience will recall the high tariffs and restrictive trade policies which charac-

terized our own country during the 1920's and early 1930's. Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1934, successively amended and expanded on various occasions up through 1962, we have set the course of trade policy, in collaboration with most of the world's great trading nations, toward liberalization and trade expansion. At the beginning, American business was naturally fearful about the loss of protection, but the movement was set in motion notwithstanding.

The benefits to American business are now part of history, including current history. Our exports increased from about \$2 billion per year in the early 1930's to \$12.5 billion in 1948 and over \$27 billion last year, while total world trade has increased more than threefold since 1948.

The basic element making possible this vast expansion with all of its direct and indirect benefits, and notwithstanding an American wage level much higher than those of most of our competitors, has been the high productivity of American business based on domestic competition in a very large national market.

Industry in Latin America, by and large, is lacking precisely this type of advantage. Many of the national markets are small, with total populations of only a few million people, average per capita incomes of only \$300, and much of the rural population virtually outside the national market for industrial goods.

In these circumstances, much of today's industry in Latin America was developed to replace imports through production at low volume and high unit cost, often on a domestic monopoly basis protected by extraordinarily high tariffs, exchange controls, or outright import prohibition. Although there are many exceptional individual cases, most of these industries are not able to compete abroad, nor can they generate a domestic mass market contributing to higher living standards for their own people.

There can be little doubt, therefore, that a major incentive to more rapid Latin American industrial expansion and modernization would be the area's consolidation into a regional market, with its population of over

200 million today and a prospect of over 600 million by the end of the century. As industries grow within such a region, with reasonable protection from outside, they should develop rapidly the potential to compete fully in world markets.

In thinking about the possibilities and prospects of Latin American integration, it is important to avoid false analogies with the European Common Market. When Western Europe began the process of formal integration, it already possessed an advanced degree of industrialization, a high level of regional trade, and a dense network of transportation and communications. Latin America is a much larger area with much more diverse economic conditions. It also suffers from many physical obstacles to the regional flow of goods and services.

To attack this aspect of the problem, the Alliance for Progress is now giving special attention to the development of what we call multinational projects. They include continental road projects, interconnection of electric power systems, telecommunications, and joint investment in air transport and such basic industries as fertilizers, pulp and paper, iron and steel, and petrochemicals.

The Inter-American Development Bank is taking a strong lead in this field. Their first study of projects to be explored in detail points to potential hydroelectric development on the tributaries of the River Plate, the interconnection of the Central American power system, road development on the eastern slope of the Andes, a continental telecommunications grid, and other highway and river-basin development projects. For anyone who knows the scarcely untouched frontiers of Latin America, such projects offer breath-taking possibilities.

Elimination of Trade Restrictions

On the side of commercial policy, Latin America has made a good start toward integration during the last 5 years through the organization of the Central American Common Market and the Latin American Free Trade Association.

In Central America, intrazonal exports

have expanded from \$33 million in 1960 to \$140 million in 1965. Among these five countries, 92½ percent of all trade is now free of restrictions, and the proportion of their intraregional trade has grown from 7.2 to 18.7 percent.

In the larger Latin American Free Trade Association, which now includes Mexico and all of South America except Bolivia, progress has been slower toward the elimination of regional trade restrictions. There too, however, exports have shown a marked increase, from \$775 million in 1962 to \$1.4 billion in 1965, or from 6 to 11.3 percent of the total trade of the member nations. Some 9,000 tariff concessions have been negotiated during five annual conferences, and more are expected to come out of the conference now in session in Montevideo.

The goal which Latin American governments have stated as their ultimate objective is a single Latin American Common Market. How rapidly and through precisely what measures this goal can best be attained is, of course, for Latin America itself to determine.

The difficult questions which must be resolved include such matters as automatic reduction of intra-Latin American tariffs and nontariff barriers to trade, reasonable external tariff levels to promote competitiveness in the world as a whole, investment policies to promote more rapid industrial expansion and higher agricultural productivity, and the establishment of an improved institutional framework to guide the overall integration effort. These questions are actively under debate in capitals throughout the hemisphere.

Overall Gains to the United States

Where does the United States stand in relation to this movement? We have endorsed it strongly. We are already providing substantial support for the Central American Common Market through CABELI, the Central American Bank for Economic Integration. As President Johnson said on August 17,²

We are ready . . . to work in close cooperation toward an integrated Latin America. . . .

² For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 5, 1966, p. 330.

To my fellow Presidents, I pledge: Move boldly along this path and the United States will be at your side.

Why do we take this stand? Will not more rapid Latin American industrialization based on a protected regional market curtail some of our own export markets? As Latin America becomes more competitive in the world, will this not add a new competitor against us as well as others? The short answer is that we may suffer some specific losses but we firmly believe that the overall gains will greatly outweigh those losses.

We have learned within our own national market and during the last 30 years in the world at large that one region's prosperity is bound up with the prosperity of others, that trade is mutually profitable.

And growing prosperity for Latin America is not merely in our affirmative economic interest; it is even more in our affirmative political interest in the broadest sense of that term. Latin Americans place the same high value on peace and freedom in the world that we do. As they grow in numbers and economic strength, they will play a steadily greater role on the world stage, and we can expect it to be conducted constructively and responsibly in pursuit of a mutually beneficial world order.

Looking ahead a decade, Latin American trade expansion, fortified by economic integration, should permit the ending of bilateral aid on concessional terms.

Meanwhile, however, continued aid to support national and multinational development efforts is an essential requirement. As the Alliance for Progress has developed, such aid is being increasingly well used, guided by a special inter-American committee known as CIAP [Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress]. Each year there has been a major step forward in the domestic mobilization of resources, their direction into high-priority objectives, and in coordinated support from the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, other international institutions, and the agencies of our own Government. The pace must surely be accelerated, but the directions are sound.

Before concluding, I should like to touch on another aspect of Latin American resource use which has been prominently noted in the press in recent weeks. This is the concern that purchases of military equipment by Latin American countries may constitute some kind of "arms race," diverting resources from badly needed efforts for economic development and social progress.

It has been asked how U.S. military assistance activities can be reconciled with some of these recent reports, which portray the Latin nations as contending with each other for modern weapons in order to defend themselves against each other. The facts are quite different, and many of these reports have been exaggerated and distorted.

The proportion of gross national product expended in the defense budgets of the Latin American nations is among the lowest in the world, averaging about 1 $\frac{3}{4}$ percent. The lion's share of these modest defense expenditures goes for pay and allowances and maintenance, with less than 10 percent being used for new equipment for force improvement. The United States assistance programs have given overwhelming priority to economic and social development, with only about 7 percent of our aid consisting of military assistance and 93 percent economic.

Furthermore, this aid has been provided with a view to discouraging the acquisition of costly and sophisticated nonessential military equipment. In contrast to other areas of the world, there are no supersonic aircraft in Latin America. Latin American navies have acquired no ships larger than destroyers in the 1960's. Army equipment programs have been modest, directly related to internal security needs, with heavy emphasis on transportation and communications.

With respect to recent aircraft purchases for Latin American countries, U.S. Government spokesmen have already pointed out that this has been essentially a matter of replacing obsolete and virtually unusable equipment. The planes purchased have all been subsonic and roughly comparable in performance to aircraft already in service in

the area. They are intended not to expand air forces but to replace planes of the early post-war vintage which have become almost impossible to keep operational.

Lest I be considered a biased commentator, let me quote from a recent British study of arms to developing countries published by the Institute for Strategic Studies in London. On the question of Latin American air forces they say:

In the decade after World War II there were two transfusions of military aircraft into South America: a large one, when American World War II piston-type aircraft were made available as excess stocks, and a smaller one of British aircraft sold as new equipment. However, since that time these nations have shown a considerable reluctance by comparison with some other areas of the world to pay for the modernization of their air forces.

The various Latin American air forces began to discuss this problem with our military aid authorities 2 or 3 years ago, long before the sale to Argentina which many of the press reports have characterized as triggering an "arms race."

At a later point, the same British study discusses the peculiarities of each underdeveloped region in relation to arms and says:

It is impossible to equate the "arms race" in the Middle East with the "arms walk" in Sub-Saharan Africa.

In this line of phrasemaking, I would feel tempted to describe Latin America's rate of arms acquisition over recent years as an "arms crawl."

Internal Security and Civic Action

As experience has all too clearly shown in several countries of Central and South America, the threat of guerrilla insurgency and violence is not an imaginary one. It continues to be backed by Cuba and by extra-continental Communist powers. While efforts are being concentrated on positive measures for economic and social advance, the maintenance of internal security cannot be left neglected. Perhaps paradoxically, some of the most ruthless efforts to disrupt orderly progress through violent subversion have occurred precisely where democratic regimes

are most strenuously devoted to improving conditions for the masses of their people.

Moreover, in many countries the armed forces are, alongside their primary security mission, engaging in road construction in difficult terrain, assistance to community development projects, literacy and vocational training, and other civic action contributions to affirmative economic and social progress.

Several Latin American nations have also participated in international peacekeeping missions under the aegis of the United Nations or the Organization of American States, and in an uncertain world it would be rash to assume that they will not again be called on in the future.

Nor should it be assumed that a modest level of arms modernization has anything to do with the problem of military coups against democratic regimes. Where conditions of political stability, responsible government, and respect for constitutional authority do not exist, coups can take place with a handful of small arms. The problem of strengthening representative democracy in Latin America is indeed a serious one, and happily one on which much progress has been made in recent years. It should not be confused, however, with the problem of arms supplies.

I do not wish to suggest that there is no problem whatsoever of rivalry among Latin military establishments and a resulting latent danger of resource wastage on unnecessary military equipment with nothing to justify it except prestige. Certainly resources are too precious and too badly needed for developmental purposes for any such wastage to be afforded.

This is a problem which we believe can best be dealt with through friendly understandings among our Latin neighbors. This continent has in fact now enjoyed many years of freedom from border conflicts. Its governments are pledged to peaceful settlement of disputes under the charters of both the United Nations and the Organization of American States. They also have the protection of special mutual defense arrangements under the 1947 Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. As President Johnson made clear in

August, we are encouraging our friends in Latin America to work toward understandings which will avoid the outbreak of a real arms race in costly and unnecessary items of military equipment.

Clearly, ladies and gentlemen, inter-American cooperation has come a long way since the first Washington Conference of 1890 established the International Union of American Republics and the Commercial Bureau of the American Republics—with an annual budget of \$36,000. As I have tried to suggest to you, there is a long hard road ahead, but we are moving along that road and

we have every reason for confidence that it leads in the right direction.

Samuel Johnson once wrote that: "Self-confidence is the first requisite to great undertakings." To me the greatest achievement of the Alliance for Progress in its first 5 years has been the visible growth of self-confidence on the part of the forward-looking leadership of Latin America. With such leadership and with our own steadfast cooperation, we can all be confident in the growing well-being and solidarity which the future holds in store for the peoples of the Americas and the pan-American community of nations.

President Johnson Hails U.N. Accord on Treaty Governing Exploration of Outer Space

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON¹

I am glad to confirm on the basis of Ambassador Goldberg's [Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United Nations] report to me this morning that agreement has been reached at the United Nations among members of the Outer Space Committee, including the United States, on a draft text of a treaty governing the exploration of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies.

In accordance with U.N. procedures, it is expected that a resolution endorsing the treaty will be submitted formally early next week, with broad cosponsorship, along with the agreed text of the Outer Space Treaty. We look forward to early action by the Assembly on this matter.

Progress toward such a treaty commenced on May 7 of this year when I requested Ambassador Goldberg to initiate consultations for a treaty in the appropriate U.N. body.² After businesslike negotiations within the U.N. Outer Space Committee in Geneva and at the United Nations in New York,³ this im-

portant step toward peace has been achieved.

It is the most important arms control development since the limited test ban treaty of 1963.⁴ It puts in treaty form the "no bombs in orbit" resolution of the United Nations.⁵ It guarantees free access to all areas and installations on celestial bodies. This openness, taken with other provisions of the treaty, should prevent warlike preparations on the moon and other celestial bodies.

This treaty has historic significance for the new age of space exploration. I salute and

¹ Read by Acting Press Secretary George Christian at a news conference at Austin, Tex., on Dec. 8; the text also was released at the United States Mission to the United Nations at New York, N.Y., on Dec. 8 (U.S./U.N. press release 5011).

² For background, see BULLETIN of June 6, 1966, p. 900; for a letter from Ambassador Goldberg to the chairman of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on June 16 and text of the U.S. draft treaty, see *ibid.*, July 11, 1966, p. 60.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Aug. 15, 1966, p. 249; Aug. 29, 1966, p. 321; and Oct. 17, 1966, p. 605.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

⁵ For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1884 (XVIII), see *ibid.*, Nov. 11, 1963, p. 754.

commend all members of the United Nations who contributed to this significant agreement.

In the expectation that formal U.N. action will have been completed at an early date, I plan to present the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent at the next session of Congress, and I hope that the United States will be one of the first countries to ratify it.

TEXT OF TREATY

TREATY ON PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES IN THE EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE, INCLUDING THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man's entry into outer space,

Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Believing that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried on for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the degree of their economic or scientific development,

Desiring to contribute to broad international co-operation in the scientific as well as the legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Believing that such co-operation will contribute to the development of mutual understanding and to the strengthening of friendly relations between States and peoples,

Recalling resolution 1962 (XVIII), entitled "Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space", which was adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on 13 December 1963,

Recalling resolution 1884 (XVIII), calling upon States to refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction or from installing such weapons on celestial bodies, which was adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on 17 October 1963,

Taking account of United Nations General Assembly resolution 110 (II) of 3 November 1947, which condemned propaganda designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, and considering that the aforementioned resolution is applicable to outer space,

Convinced that a Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use

of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, will further the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE I

The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.

Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.

There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage international co-operation in such investigation.

ARTICLE II

Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.

ARTICLE III

States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding.

ARTICLE IV

States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.

The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.

ARTICLE V

States Parties to the Treaty shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer space and shall render to them all possible assistance in the event of

ident, distress, or emergency landing on the territory of another State Party or on the high seas. When astronauts make such a landing, they shall be safely and promptly returned to the State of registry of their space vehicle.

In carrying on activities in outer space and on celestial bodies, the astronauts of one State Party shall render all possible assistance to the astronauts of other States Parties.

States Parties to the Treaty shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the Treaty or the Secretary-General of the United Nations of any phenomena they discover in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, which could constitute a danger to the life or health of astronauts.

ARTICLE VI

States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty. The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the State concerned. When activities are carried on in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, by an international organization, responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall be borne both by the international organization and by the States Parties to the Treaty participating in such organization.

ARTICLE VII

Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an object into outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and each State Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies.

ARTICLE VIII

A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body. Ownership of objects launched into outer space, including objects landed or constructed on a celestial body, and of their component parts, is not affected by their presence in outer space or on a celestial body or by their return to the Earth. Such objects or component parts found beyond the limits of the State Party to the Treaty on whose registry they are carried shall be returned to that State, which shall, upon request, furnish identifying data prior to their return.

ARTICLE IX

In the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty. States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose. If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experiment. A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, may request consultation concerning the activity or experiment.

ARTICLE X

In order to promote international co-operation in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in conformity with the purposes of this Treaty, the States Parties to the Treaty shall consider on a basis of equality any requests by other States Parties to the Treaty to be afforded an opportunity to observe the flight of space objects launched by those States.

The nature of such an opportunity for observation and the conditions under which it could be afforded shall be determined by agreement between the States concerned.

ARTICLE XI

In order to promote international co-operation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, States Parties to the Treaty conducting activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, agree to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as the public and the international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of the nature, conduct, locations and results of such activities. On receiving the said information, the Secretary-General of the United Nations should be prepared to disseminate it immediately and effectively.

ARTICLE XII

All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other States Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity. Such representatives shall give reasonable advance notice of a projected visit, in order that appropriate consultations may be held and that maximum precautions may be taken to assure safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the facility to be visited.

ARTICLE XIII

The provisions of this Treaty shall apply to the activities of States Parties to the Treaty in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by a single State Party to the Treaty or jointly with other States, including cases where they are carried on within the framework of international inter-governmental organizations.

Any practical questions arising in connexion with activities carried on by international inter-governmental organizations in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be resolved by the States Parties to the Treaty either with the appropriate international organization or with one or more States members of that international organization, which are Parties to this Treaty.

ARTICLE XIV

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by five Govern-

ments including the Governments designated as Depositary Governments under this Treaty.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force and other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE XV

Any State Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party to the Treaty accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty and thereafter for each remaining State Party to the Treaty on the date of acceptance by it.

ARTICLE XVI

Any State Party to the Treaty may give notice of its withdrawal from the Treaty one year after its entry into force by written notification to the Depositary Governments. Such withdrawal shall take effect one year from the date of receipt of this notification.

ARTICLE XVII

This Treaty, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in _____, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the ____ day of _____ one thousand nine hundred and _____.

Impact of Technology on World Trade and Economic Development

The Department of Commerce sponsored an international symposium on technology and world trade which was held at the National Bureau of Standards, Gaithersburg, Md., November 16-17 and was attended by government officials and representatives of universities and business firms. Following is an address made by Secretary of Commerce John T. Connor at the opening session on November 16, together with an address made by Vice President Humphrey at a reception held at the Department of State that evening.

ADDRESS BY SECRETARY CONNOR

This symposium has three purposes: First, to look at the impact of technology upon international trade and investment; second, to outline a world environment which will encourage more widespread use of technology; and, third, to seek new ways for technology and trade to promote economic development. These objectives combine to create a very formidable challenge. Fortunately, you and your speakers are admirably qualified to come up with constructive answers.

Technology is older than world trade, and the two have been interacting with one another for thousands of years. So we are not faced with a recent development in the history of civilization. We are not faced with a unique phenomenon in the relations between states. What we are confronted with is a vast difference in the scale of world trade and a rapidly increasing development and introduction of new technology.

During the past 10 years total world trade has doubled in volume, and it now approaches

a yearly level of \$200 billion. During this same period, three new words which have become part of our everyday language—atomics, astronautics, and electronics—speak volumes on the depth and extent of technology in every facet of our lives.

The fundamental basis for the exchange of goods and services between countries is that one country has something that another country needs or wants, and vice versa. This something could be raw materials: bauxite, oil, rubber. It could be agricultural or manufactured products: coffee, furniture, clothing. It could also be products which flow from highly sophisticated technology: computers, supersonic transports, nuclear reactors, engineering services.

Looked at from this "differential need" point of view, it is clear that differing levels of technology in various fields among the nations of the world act as a stimulus to world trade. If all the nations in the world could develop and produce computers as cheaply and efficiently as the United States, for example, there would be very little international trade in computers. And this same statement could be applied to other products and other countries.

The point is that technology flows from one country to another in the channels of international trade. The technology is contained in the goods and services that countries exchange, more so than in engineering textbooks. Technology also flows between countries, of course, through a myriad of licensing arrangements.

Technology has done a great deal to expand world trade, and it has done this in many ways. For example, technology has been

applied to the instruments of world trade: steam power, internal combustion engines, nuclear propulsion, navigation, air transportation, refrigeration, communications systems.

Technology, through raising productivity and standards of living and lowering unit costs, also has helped create viable markets where none existed before. Autoworkers in some European countries, until recent times, used to travel to their jobs on bicycles. Now there is a mass market for private autos in Europe. On the other hand, there is no viable market today for refrigerators in some of the developing nations. To describe it differently, a need is not necessarily the same thing as a market.

Myths About Science and Technology

In this age of rapid material and social change, a mystic aura has developed around science and technology, two of the main forces for change and growth. We tend to regard scientists as a special type of people with unique insight and foresight. As a corollary to this, many myths have developed about the processes of science and technology. Mythmakers in the past have been celebrated in song and prose. Mythbreakers have often suffered a different fate. Nevertheless, I think we should face the facts as they are and not as they appear or as we would wish them to be.

For example, there is the widely held notion that large amounts of basic research and development in a given field will inevitably result in technological leadership in that field. There is no correlation, however, between Nobel Prize winners per capita and technological leadership. Japanese industry, to its credit, mastered the technology of transistor production with little investment in basic research in solid-state physics. The result was that Japan was able to enter many world markets successfully with a variety of electronic products.

When we view the difference in technology between nations, we cannot have a simple view but must consider it across the broad

spectrum of industrial activities. We must look at the situation country by country and industry by industry and even product by product.

The problems arising from differing levels of technology in various fields among the nations of the world must be looked at against the needs and goals of countries and the level of development of their economies. These goals, incidentally, include noneconomic objectives as well as the goal of economic growth and development. How significant is the difference in level of technology in computers between the United States and the developing nations? Perhaps it is not important at all at this particular time.

And speaking of economic goals, no nation should overlook the potential benefits of technological investment in the agricultural sector. In the United States, as highly industrialized as we are, the rise in productivity of the farm sector in recent years is more than twice as great as the rise in productivity for the rest of the economy. If this is true for us, then it is clearly an appropriate area for consideration by other countries. After all, agriculture involves machinery, transportation systems, management and planning skills, opportunities for exports, and many other desirable economic phenomena.

For some nations, at certain stages in their economic development, and in some industrial sectors, it might make more sense to buy the know-how rather than to undergo the costly and time-consuming process of developing it. Patent royalty and licensing arrangements, joint ventures, and local investments by other countries offer great opportunities for leapfrogging the costly basic research and development phase. Other possibilities include simply buying hardware and software. The decision on which way to go involves consideration of the nation's goals, its resources, and its particular stage of development at that time.

The United States is no exception. The flow of technology is a two-way street. America has acquired advanced technology from

other countries in many industrial fields. These include the floating glass process from England, cryogenics research in Holland, natural product chemistry, optics, oxygen steelmaking, and prestressed concrete from Europe.

The solution for the developing nations does not lie in a mass transfer of technology from the developed countries. Whether to develop steel mills and nuclear reactors or to improve water supply systems and ineffective waste disposal systems is a question each nation must face with respect to its needs. But take the case of a nation which will have to continue to depend, in the near future, upon carts hauled by animals for the nationwide transportation of materials. Surely this country would be ill advised to import diesel trucks for this purpose, which immediately require modern roads, fuel, spare parts, trained mechanics, and other elements.

“Technical Balance of Payments”

We hear a great deal these days about the technical balance of payments. The term is generally meant to include royalties, licensing fees, and any other payments for technical know-how. According to the myth, nations which run a deficit in their technical balance of payments are at a distinct and permanent disadvantage with respect to nations that have technical payments surpluses.

The hard facts disclose, however, that Japan, which has persistently run a deficit in its technical balance of payments, has had a rate of economic growth that would be welcomed by any country anywhere. Furthermore, it has attained a position as one of the leading trading nations in the world. The conclusion I draw from this is that whatever the cost to Japan of acquiring the foreign know-how, it was one of the best investments ever made by any country.

The real challenge facing us today is not how to mold one country in the image of another country. Nor is it how to make all countries technologically equal in some theoretically ideal world. Rather, the challenge is to remove obstacles to the movement of tech-

nology from one country to another. Technology should be available in an open market of knowledge so that each country may choose the technology most appropriate to its own self-set needs and goals.

If the countries of the world do not accept this thesis, then there is a danger that they might take well-intended actions designed to protect themselves but which would in reality serve no one's best interests. Such actions might reveal themselves in restrictive policies on investments from foreign countries. Or they might take the form of protectionist trade policies. In either case, the consequences would be undesirable from everyone's point of view. Trade and investment conducted in an equitable and reciprocal framework carry the hopes and aspirations of all nations for better living conditions throughout the world.

Speaking for my own country, the United States with all of its technological resources has no intention of trying to attain economic domination in any country or any part of the world. We understand and share the concern of other countries that advanced technology should be put to use in all countries for the achievement of economic growth and other national goals. It is true that short-term problems may arise from differing levels of technology in various fields among the nations of the world. We believe, however, that these problems are best solved in the private sector. The role of government should be to create those conditions which will encourage such solutions.

In areas of science and technology where the United States has a leading position, the policy of the United States is to share peaceful know-how and to cooperate in peaceful international endeavors. There are many examples of this type of cooperation: Antarctic studies, atomic energy, meteorology, telecommunications, space exploration, oceanography, and such extended endeavors as the International Geophysical Year and the International Cooperation Year.

Just last month, President Johnson stated, “We are exploring how best to develop sci-

ence and technology as a common resource.”¹ I don’t believe there could be a more open-handed or less restrictive point of view than that statement.

The primary problem, in many cases, is not technological lags or technological leads but obstacles to the application of existing technology that is readily available. These obstacles include attitudes; traditions; institutions; outmoded educational and training systems; organizational relationships; economic policies; political issues; flexibility on the part of government, management, and labor; the availability of capital; and so forth.

In this thicket of obfuscation, the problem is not alleviated by erecting barriers to the flow of technology and world trade. Our efforts should be aimed at removing barriers and obstacles. This principle is valid with respect to America and Europe. It is valid for the developed and the developing countries, and it is valid for countries with different economic and political systems.

Organizational and Management Techniques

It is an oversimplification to interpret the industrial revolution solely as a period of rapid technological change. There were enormous and far-reaching changes in the organization and management of the processes by which goods are produced. New concepts and new attitudes had to be broadly accepted by industrial managers, industrial workers, and the consumers and users of manufactured products.

The introduction of mass production techniques, for example, was essentially a management innovation, not a technological innovation. The technology was already known. The skills of the entrepreneur are as essential to the success of a modern nation as the knowledge of scientists and engineers. There are numerous examples of countries or industries or individual companies having equal access to the latest technology but where one country or one industry or one company out-

performs all the rest. In many cases the management concepts or the level of managerial competence make the difference.

In my view, the problem of infusing the latest organizational and management techniques is as challenging and difficult as the problem of transferring the latest technology. And it is just as important if the benefits of technology are to be fully realized.

The history of America in bringing 50 States to the present national level of development shows many similarities with the problems we all face and the approaches we are taking in the global effort to raise living standards throughout the world. Fortunately, our Constitution created a Union of States and precluded any attempts to raise trade barriers between one State and another within the United States. As a result, this early “common market” grew into a mass market with economies of scale which contributed immensely to our economic growth and technological development.

In spite of this favorable environment, however, we have not yet achieved a nationwide parity in standards of living or in the level of technological development. The Appalachian region of America stands in stark contrast to areas on the east and west coasts, both economically and technologically.

Through our system of agricultural colleges, research stations, and farm specialists scattered throughout the Nation, the dissemination of the latest agricultural technology has become a successful reality in this country.

We have not been so successful in the manufacturing and service sectors of the economy. Studies conducted by the Commerce Department show that there is a wide range of difference between the most efficient and the least efficient plants in any given industry. This pattern exists regardless of the size of the plant. And this condition is true whether it is a labor-intensive industry or a high-technology industry.

In some industries, the value added per employee in the most efficient plants is 500 percent above the amount for the least efficient plants. Think of the competitive ad-

¹ For an address by President Johnson at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 7, see BULLETIN of Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.

vantage this offers to the top firms. Or, on the other hand, think of the waste in human and material resources among the lowest firms. This efficiency gap includes many components: management skills, availability of capital, marketing know-how, participation in world trade, condition of plant and equipment, flexibility of labor and management, ability to utilize the latest technology, and many others.

Our economists estimate that if all companies in all industries followed the most advanced practices of the most efficient companies, the growth in national productivity would far exceed the growth rate of recent years. Practically speaking, this may be expecting too much, but it is clear there is a great potential for improvement.

Looking at the broader problems of technology and world trade from a global point of view, what needs to be done? Perhaps more to the point, what can be done?

First, there are some institutional goals we could work toward. These include such things as: greater participation by all countries in the development of international standards for industrial products; an accelerated and more broadly based movement toward some form of international patent cooperation; an unfettered flow of capital among nations, with due provision made for special circumstances and special cases; the reduction and elimination of barriers to trade on a fair and reciprocal basis; wider availability and movement of technology among nations.

Second, we need to change our approach to the fact that there are differing levels of technology in various fields among the nations of the world. Our thoughts and our actions should not be directed toward artificially compensating for these differences. Rather, we should try to assure that each nation has access to the particular technology most appropriate to its own goals as defined by that nation. In this way, trade and economic growth will both be enhanced.

Third, we need to learn more about the processes of technology, trade, and economic growth; how they interact; why a certain formula succeeds for one country and fails

for another. Toward this end, the United States is joining with the member nations of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] in a major study of the processes by which nations are able to develop and exploit science and technology for the attainment of economic and other national goals. The results of this study should be useful to all nations and applicable to all levels of development.

Can these objectives be realized? I don't know of any substantive reason why they cannot if we have the will to succeed and a willingness to cooperate. The United States stands ready to join with all other countries in efforts to disseminate and use the knowledge of mankind for the benefit of mankind.

ADDRESS BY VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY

Mr. Secretary, you have an imposing list of participants in this conference. By the time it is done, I am sure that just about every conceivable aspect of technology and trade, technology and competition, technology and investment, technology and growth, will have been examined and discussed.

I am also aware that the so-called "technological gap" between the United States and other nations, particularly our Western European friends, can hardly be escaped these days. Each day there seems to be a new proposal—and some of them have been good ones—toward closing that gap. If there is a technological gap, there is no gap in the information about it.

Therefore, rather than enter into any technical discussion this evening, I would simply like to leave behind a few general observations and ideas.

First, although some people deny it, I do not dispute the fact of a technological gap.

I know that all the statistics indicate that we in the United States have commanding leads over Western European nations in many fields—especially in computer technology and utilization. But we have advanced technology in large part simply because our industry, which exists in many cases on a far larger scale than European industry, has had

the need for it. Supply *does* follow demand.

I think by far the most promising proposals for closing the American-European technological gap have been those such as Prime Minister Wilson's [British Prime Minister Harold Wilson] on Monday for a European Technological Community. If Europe—which has already seen the benefits of a European Economic Community, a Coal and Steel Community, and an Atomic Energy Community—were to pool her technology in a similar way, I have no doubt that the gap would already be a long way toward being closed.

Of course, the very fact of entry into the European Communities by Britain and her EFTA [European Free Trade Association] partners—and eventually perhaps by others—would help create an even larger European market and larger industry able to finance and sustain advanced technology along with the necessary research and development.

And from the general need for such technology, I feel sure it would follow.

Needs of the Developing Countries

This leads me to my second observation; namely, that economic integration and the creation of larger, continental markets—all over the world—can be a powerful force for closing any technology gaps.

It seems obvious, but too often overlooked, that small and poor nations stand little chance for economic sustenance if they do not seek economic integration or at least close economic cooperation with their neighbors. This is beginning to happen in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, but not nearly rapidly enough.

I am pleased to see that "Technology and the Developing Countries" will be one of your subjects tomorrow.

Long after any North Atlantic technology gap is closed, it will be the business of the Atlantic nations to try to close the far more dangerous rich-poor nation gap. We in the rich nations must begin taking more active steps now to help the poorer nations build their economies, create broader markets, and develop their own technologies.

I do not mean that each developing nation and its economic partners will need the capacity to produce and market sophisticated computer systems.

I do mean that without trained manpower and the ability to enter the technological age, the developing nations will not only be unable to compete in world markets but the resulting political and social unrest in these nations will be a threat both to their own security and ours.

And this leads me to my third general observation: that we all ought to do a little more thinking about what technology is *for*.

If technology is used just to construct more impressive pieces of hardware without resulting human benefit, then it will be wasted.

I believe that today we have the technological capacity already at hand to rebuild the decaying central cores of large cities all over the world; to provide decent and reasonable housing on a wide scale; to lift primitive agriculture into the modern day; to compress the time scale for nations with catching up to do; to master our physical environment before it masters us; to end the coexistence of starvation and abundance on the same planet.

In my view, the real "technological gap" is between our technological capacity and our application of it to social needs.

These needs—such as education, public health, recreation, and transportation—exist in every part of the world. Meeting these group needs, however, is quite different from meeting individual needs such as for automobiles, clothing, or electrical appliances.

Modern Management Experience

Old ways of doing things simply won't do the job. We need new mechanisms, new ways and means, for bringing technology into the marketplace of public needs.

Here in our country the model may lie in the constructive partnership of government, industry, labor, and the university that has been so successful in our space program. The talent and resources of all these elements in American society brought to bear in an efficient and coordinated fashion have moved us forward in space far more rapidly than we

would have hoped even a few years ago.

We have seen, too, what government research and development contracts given to the university and to private corporations have produced in overcoming scientific and technological obstacles in a remarkably short time.

The same partnership concept, the same "systems approach," the same investment in research and development, applied to other public needs may prove to be the way in which our rich nation may finally be able to overcome economic and social problems which have been generations in the making.

I believe, too, that private industry, acting on its own, can be a powerful force in overcoming these problems.

In the United States a good deal of our technological capacity lies in private industry. In other countries this situation often differs.

I know from personal experience that American business today is demonstrating a social conscience. This has been shown again and again in such areas as equal employment opportunity, retraining of workers, and hiring the handicapped. Often as not, public service has also turned out to be profitable.

I think that American private industry—operating in a competitive environment which promotes efficiency—can profitably enter other areas of public need, providing educational services, slum rehabilitation, and such things as information systems.

Where these things may not be profitable, I believe we in Government should do what we can to be of help until they become so. (But I have the feeling many of these things can be profitable from the start.)

Today we are putting to use in Government many of the modern management techniques already used in American industry.

In formulating federal programs and in organizing ourselves, such as in the new Department of Housing and Urban Development, and of Transportation, we are increasingly concerned today with attacking our national problems with the highest degree of coordination and cost-effectiveness.

We have finally, for example, with creation

of the new Department, begun to consider transportation as the problem of how to move men and materials most effectively, rather than in terms of the particular problems of railways, airlines, and highways.

The new Demonstration Cities Act, passed in the last Congress, is our first legislation which attempts to pull together all programs for the city—programs for economic opportunity, for housing, for clean air and water, for social welfare, for highway construction, for neighborhood renewal, and so on—and bring them to bear together in the right mix in the right place at the right time to best improve the urban environment. Up until now these programs have too often been administered without regard to their relation to each other or to their order of priority.

And both the partnership concept and systems approach have been put to work in the war on poverty, part of which is managed under contract by private American corporations.

In California my friend Governor Pat [Edmund G.] Brown, working with aerospace companies, has made a promising beginning at the State level in applying these approaches to problems of transportation, garbage disposal, crime, and paperwork.

Benefits of Free Exchange of Technology

We are just beginning to utilize our technological capacity for human benefit here in the United States. We are learning.

But during the learning process we still, as the world's most technologically advanced society, have a responsibility to help create human benefits in other places by making our knowledge more widely shared.

Technology moves in the form of products and services that nations exchange. It moves through patent royalties and licensing arrangements. It also moves in textbooks.

I have noticed that while a breakthrough in science flashes quickly around the world, a breakthrough in technology may take years to find its way to a place of need. What we should seek, therefore, are rules and practices to help speed the flow of technology, not slow it down or stop it.

I know the argument that technology carefully gained should not be easily shared lest hard-earned competitive advantage be lost. The argument against sharing of technology, it seems to me, is not unlike the argument against liberalized trade. But in technology, as in trade, the benefits of openness and free exchange would seem to outweigh any loss of temporary protective advantage.

I should think that an international patent system, for instance, would go a long way toward safeguarding ownership of valuable technological processes without burying each nation under paper.

And it seems clear to me that the United States' own long-term economic interest dictates that our trading partners should develop strong technologically based competitive economies.

Halting the "Brain Drain"

Technology also moves in the minds of people who travel from one country to another.

Some travel to teach, and some travel to learn.

When students have been trained in another country and then remain there to fashion their careers, we are faced with one element of what is the now famous "brain drain." There are thousands of young scientists and engineers working in the United States who came here to learn but have stayed to earn.

If it is any comfort to those nations which have lost the services of their talented citizens, they should know that we have experienced a comparable situation in the United States. Some of our States and regions graduate more Ph.D.'s each year than they employ. There is a "brain drain" from our Midwest to our east and west coasts. We deplore this. But from a broad national point of view, we can at least take some comfort from the fact that the United States as a whole is richer for this new talent.

But there is no comfort at all for the developing country desperate for trained manpower when that manpower is swallowed up

here. These are precious human resources they cannot afford to lose.

How do we reverse this flow?

First of all, I take it for granted that good technically trained people do not turn away from their homelands for money alone or for better living conditions alone. Any good man wants to be where the problems are and where he has a fair chance of solving them. He also wants to utilize the most modern equipment and facilities.

There are some things we can do.

I believe a great part of the problem lies in the educational systems of the industrialized countries. Too often, we offer discipline-oriented, rather than problem-oriented, education and training.

Quite properly we emphasize the "ics"—physics, optics, nucleonics. I believe we must emphasize, too, the "tions"—education, transportation, nutrition, communication, irrigation—the things needed in developing countries—so that both our own citizens and those of developing nations can acquire the useful skills of nation-building.

I think, too, we can help draw these valuable people homeward by making available to their own nations equipment and facilities that they have become accustomed to here. Our Government agencies, our universities, and private industry are all topheavy with equipment which is perfectly satisfactory for skilled use but which has been superseded by the next-generation model.

As Chairman of the Aeronautics and Space Council, I have made it my particular business, for instance, to see that equipment which has served its purpose in our advanced research and application in space has been put to good use elsewhere.

We can help by working with the developing countries to insure that too high a percentage of their students do not come to the United States to acquire skills which have no relation to the priorities at home.

We can also, quite practically, do what we can to help establish institutions in their home countries which will give these young people the skills they need without leaving home in the first place.

And, then, there is the across-the-board need to help build the technologies of the have-not nations so that their talented people will have sufficient daily challenge. It is clear that unemployed or underemployed scientists, even if they do not leave their country, pose political and social problems.

New Initiatives Needed

In all we do to raise technological capabilities around the world and to use those capabilities for human benefit, I am convinced that we should not become bound by doctrine, dogma, or ideology.

In the United States there were any number of people who argued that there was no way to undertake a major effort in space except under complete Government auspices. Yet, as I have related, we have been successful with another approach.

I am equally sure that the approach we took would be a dismal failure in many other countries because of the varying strengths and relationships in their societies.

I think we need to find out what works and use it. I can think of a number of opportunities not tried or barely tried.

For the business executives here tonight: I believe private corporations should think about establishment with other corporations, regardless of their nationality, of joint training institutes in talent-short parts of the world.

I don't mean that you should establish your own private foreign aid programs (although I'd be in favor of that, too).

What I see are cooperative arrangements which meet the intellectual needs of the people being trained, which help meet the national goals of the country in which the institute is located and the legitimate financial objectives of the private or public enterprise company which sponsors it.

To those of you from universities: I would like to see schools established by you, on your own initiative, devoted to city-building, to agricultural development, to modern management. Why can't we export the essence of the Harvard or Stanford business schools?

I believe that American and European universities—increasingly breaking out of isolation from their own societies—should try to meet as well the human needs of the people living in the forgotten two-thirds of the world.

To those of you from private organizations and foundations: What opportunities do you see? Here in the United States we have a National Academy of Engineering. It took us a long time to get it, but now we have it.

I see no reason why the academy could not serve as a clearinghouse in helping to set up similar engineering institutions in other countries, working on public problems.

To those of us in government: I think each of us in our respective governments must seek new ways to use technology constructively.

The United States Government in this past year has embarked on new international programs using technology in the fields of health, of education, and of agriculture. We mean to expand those programs. We have taken steps to remove barriers to the flow of scientific and technical information and instruments to and from our country. We have increased our programs of international exchange.

But I have no doubt that we must do much more, as other governments must do much more.

I believe that we should be particularly receptive to proposals from other governments, from international organizations, from private companies or groups of companies, from any source in fact which wants to put technology to wider and better international use.

The least we can do is to reward initiative by others, and to remove unnecessary obstacles, when a good idea turns up. (And if the Americans in the audience have any doubt about where to submit their good ideas, I would refer them to Vice President Humphrey.)

Finally, may I make this observation: We can perceive today the general need for, and the genuine benefit from, the building of

technological strength in every country of the world. We can also begin to perceive the ways in which this can be done; a number of them have been discussed at this conference.

What remains to be done is for all of us to act on our knowledge. As Thomas Huxley once said: "The great end of life is not knowledge, but action."

It seems to me an abysmal waste of time, of resources, and of energy whenever men build barriers between themselves or when they miss the opportunity to improve mankind's general lot on earth.

Today we have the chance—through technology—to remove those barriers and to lift all our nations together by our action.

I think we should get on with it.

U.S. and U.K. Hold Talks on Southern Rhodesia

The Department of State on December 1 released the following joint United States-United Kingdom statement issued that day at the close of talks on Southern Rhodesia held at Washington November 30-December 1 by U.S. and British Government officials.

Sir Saville Garner, Permanent Under Secretary of State, Commonwealth Office, accompanied by other United Kingdom officials from London, the U.K. Mission to the United Nations, and the British Embassy, met with Joseph Palmer II, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, and Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, and other U.S. officials from Washington and the U.S. Mission to the U.N., to discuss the Rhodesian problem and related matters. Particular attention was paid to the United Nations aspects of the problem in the light of the Commonwealth Conference Communiqué of last September. These talks are part of the regular consultations between the two governments on Africa which have been held periodically over the past few years in London and Washington.

U.S. Welcomes IMCO Action on Passenger-Ship Safety

Press release 286 dated November 30

The Department of State today [November 30] welcomed the action taken in London by the Third Extraordinary Assembly of IMCO (Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization) to tighten drastically international standards for passenger ships.

The Assembly on November 30 approved amendments to the Safety of Life at Sea Convention of 1960.¹ The amendments will now be transmitted to the 64 member governments for acceptance. Ratification by two-thirds of these governments is required before the new higher standards will become effective.

Once ratified, the amendments will require older vessels, previously exempted from modern safety standards, to be substantially rebuilt or withdrawn from service. Newer vessels will need more limited upgrading to meet the revised standards.

The action taken by the IMCO Assembly complements legislation recently enacted by the Congress and signed by the President on November 6 establishing higher minimum standards of safety for passenger ships leaving United States ports.² The Assembly action reflects the results of an international cooperative effort initiated by the United States Government shortly after the *Yarmouth Castle* disaster.³ The *Yarmouth Castle* burned on November 13, 1965, with a loss of 90 lives, while en route to Nassau in the Bahamas on a cruise originating in Miami, Fla.

United States congressional interest in the action taken was highlighted by the presence at the Extraordinary Assembly meeting of the following Members of Congress, who attended in the capacity of con-

¹Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5813.

²Public Law 89-777.

³For background, see BULLETIN of May 16, 1966, p. 782, and June 13, 1966, p. 952.

essional observers to the Assembly: Representative Edward A. Garmatz, chairman, House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, and Representatives Paul G. Rogers and Frank M. Clark.

The United States delegation at the meeting included: William K. Miller, director, Office of Maritime Affairs, Department of State, *U.S. Representative*; Adm. Willard J. Smith, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, *Alternate Representative*; Lowell K. Bridwell, Deputy Under Secretary for Transportation, Department of Commerce; Adm. John Harlee, Chairman, Federal Maritime Commission; and Joseph I. Goldstein, president, Wilson Line.

Department Names Advisory Panel on China

Press release 287 dated December 7

The Department of State announced on December 7 the formation of a panel of advisers on China to work with the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. This is the third panel of advisers named by the Department under the general plan made public on October 18.¹ The panel of advisers on China is separate from the East Asian and Pacific panel, which was announced on November 10,² although there are three members of the earlier panel who are also members of the China panel.

Eight of the ten members of the advisory panel on China are distinguished scholars associated with major universities. Two members of the panel have had prominent careers in public service, including extensive experience in policy matters related to China. As is the case with other panels, additional members may be added from time to time.

The panel will meet two or three times a year for sessions of about 2 days. The initial

¹ For a Department announcement and names of members of the advisory panel for the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, see BULLETIN of Nov. 7, 1966, p. 721.

² *Ibid.*, Dec. 5, 1966, p. 868.

meeting of the group will take place early in 1967. Individual members may be consulted on specific matters.

The members of the China panel are:

- A. Doak Barnett, acting director, East Asian Institute, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
- Alexander Eckstein, professor of economics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
- John Fairbank, director, East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
- Julius C. Holmes, retired Ambassador, Washington, D.C.
- Ralph L. Powell, professor of Far Eastern studies, American University, Washington, D.C.
- Lucian W. Pye,³ professor of political science, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.
- Robert A. Scalapino,³ chairman, Political Science Department, University of California, Berkeley, Calif.
- Philip D. Sprouse, retired Ambassador, Orinda, Calif.
- George E. Taylor,³ director, Far Eastern and Russian Institute, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.
- Paul A. Varg, dean, College of Arts and Letters, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Mich.

Cuban Refugee Airlift Completes First Year of Operation

White House press release dated December 1

The Cuban refugee airlift, 1 year old December 1,¹ is operating smoothly and fulfilling President Johnson's objective of reuniting long-separated members of Cuban families. This was reported to the President by Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare John W. Gardner on the occasion of the airlift's first anniversary.

The U.S.-operated airlift from Cuba to Miami, Fla., began December 1, 1965. It has continued at the rate of two flights a day, 5 days a week, except when weather conditions or other problems caused temporary suspensions.

When President Johnson first called for the

³ Also a member of the East Asian and Pacific panel.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Nov. 29, 1965, p. 850, and May 2, 1966, p. 707.

airlift, in his address of October 3, 1965, at the Statue of Liberty, he said:²

Our first concern will be with those Cubans who have been separated from their children and their parents and their husbands and their wives that are now in this country.

Secretary Gardner reported these accomplishments during the first year of the airlift:

—Over 45,000 refugees have arrived on the airlift and have been reunited with their families throughout the United States.

—Most of the 8,600 children who had been sent here earlier by parents who were unable to leave Cuba have now been reunited with their parents in this country. Many had been separated for 4 or 5 years. Only 420 Cuban refugee children currently require care in foster homes and institutions.

—The new refugees have rapidly become self-supporting. The number dependent upon Federal financial assistance has remained close to the pre-airlift level. As in the past, only about 5 percent of resettled refugees require Federal assistance and usually only for short periods of time.

—The airlift has not resulted in an undue burden on the Miami area. Seventy-six percent of all newly arrived refugees have been resettled from Miami to other parts of the United States since last December 1.

“The continuing success of the refugee program is a tribute to the valor and resourcefulness of the Cubans themselves and to the hospitality and generosity of the thousands of American citizens who have helped the refugees build new lives in the United States,” Secretary Gardner said.

“The Cuban refugees have well earned the right to become permanent residents of the United States, and I am pleased that the new law which you signed November 2 makes it possible for refugees who so desire to establish permanent residency as a first step toward citizenship.”

Since the Cuban refugee program began earlier in 1961, 224,000 refugees have registered at the U.S. Cuban Refugee Center in Miami. Of these, 131,000 have been resettled

outside the Miami area in 2,100 communities in every State of the Union through the program administered by the Welfare Administration of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare working in cooperation with four national voluntary agencies: the National Catholic Welfare Conference; Church World Service of the National Council of Churches (Protestant); the United Hias Service (Jewish); and the International Rescue Committee (nonsectarian).

Permanent Resident Application Fees for Cuban Refugees Waived

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) dated November 10

On November 2 I signed into law legislation which authorizes adjustment of the status of Cuban refugees.¹ This means that refugees who have been in this country for 2 years or more can become permanent U.S. residents.

Today I directed the Attorney General, on humanitarian grounds, to waive the \$25 fee that the Immigration and Naturalization Service normally requires for an adjustment of status under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. Cuba requires that the refugees coming to this country turn over to the Cuban Government any worldly assets they own before leaving the country. Most Cuban refugees are able to accumulate very few resources in a 2-year period.

The ability of Cuban refugees to become permanent U.S. residents—without the imposition of any fees—makes individuals eligible for many benefits, such as the right to seek a license to practice his or her profession. This new law also places Cuban refugees in a position where they can initiate the process of becoming eligible for U.S. citizenship.

¹ As enacted, the bill (H.R. 15183) is Public Law 89-732.

² For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 25, 1965, p. 661.

It is estimated that there are currently 123,000 Cuban refugees who are eligible to apply for permanent resident status. More will become eligible at the rate of about 4,000 a month as long as the stream of refugees continues at its present rate.

U.S., Mexico Discuss Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs

White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) dated November 11

The President announced on November 11 that the international traffic in illicit narcotic and other dangerous drugs would be discussed by officials of Mexico and the United States at a meeting to be held at Washington on November 15-17.

The chairman of the U.S. delegation was David C. Acheson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury (for Enforcement). The other members of the U.S. delegation were:

Fred M. Vinson, Jr., Assistant Attorney General (Criminal Division), Department of Justice
Henry L. Giordano, Commissioner, Bureau of Narcotics, Department of the Treasury
John H. Finlator, director, Bureau of Drug Abuse Control, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Terrance G. Leonhardy, director, Office of Mexican Affairs, Department of State

The chairman of the Mexican delegation was Fausto Acosta Romo, First Assistant Attorney General of the Mexican Republic. The other members of the Mexican delegation were:

Ambassador Oscar Rabasa, Legal Adviser to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Mexican Representative on the Commission on Narcotic Drugs
Alberto Becerra Sierra, Minister-Counselor of the Mexican Embassy, Washington, D.C.
Salvador Celis Vega, Chief of the Narcotic Depart-

ment, Office of the Attorney General of the Republic of Mexico

Jaime Fernandez-MacGregor, Counselor of the Mexican Embassy, Washington, D.C.

The purpose of the meeting was (1) to exchange current information and examine present trends in the illicit traffic; (2) to review progress made in combating the traffic since a similar meeting was held in Mexico City in June 1965; and (3) to develop recommendations for further bilateral cooperation and joint action.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 2d Session

Site for Organization of American States and International Center. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Grounds of the House Committee on Public Works. July 28-August 1, 1966. 100 pp.

The Foreign Policy Aspects of the Kennedy Round. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. August 9-17, 1966. 74 pp.

The Atlantic Alliance. Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. Part 7 (Supplement). August 15, 1966. 9 pp.

Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces Treaty. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. August 26, 1966. 23 pp.

Atlantic Union. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. August 30-September 20, 1966. 194 pp.

New Approach to United States International Economic Policy. Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments of the Joint Economic Committee. September 9, 1966. 44 pp.

Tenth Annual Report of the President on the Trade Agreements Program. Message from the President transmitting the report. H. Doc. 499. September 20, 1966. 56 pp.

Duty-Free Entry of Triaxial Apparatus and Rheogoniometer for Northwestern University. Report to accompany H.R. 13035. October 12, 1966. 2 pp.

Duty-Free Entry of Mass Spectrometer and Rheogoniometer for Princeton University. Report to accompany H.R. 14388. H. Rept. 2243. October 12, 1966. 2 pp.

U.S.S.R. Vetoes Security Council Resolution on Israel Complaint

Following are statements made in the U.N. Security Council by Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, during debate on an Israel complaint against Syria, together with the text of a draft resolution which was vetoed by the Soviet Union on November 4.

STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 14

U.S./U.N. press release 4934

Before stating my Government's view on the incidents which are the subject of our agenda, I wish to make two general points.

First, we are not dealing here with what we all know, somewhat regretfully, to be the settled views of various parties on the underlying political questions in this area and in this matter. We are dealing rather with the imperative necessity to maintain peace and security in the area, which is, as all prior speakers have pointed out, the primary responsibility of the Security Council.

Secondly, to discharge this responsibility, the Council must act, as it has generally acted in the past in considering related questions, impartially and even-handedly for peace. I believe the record of many years will show that my own Government has sought to act whenever the fragile state of peace in the area was endangered or broken from either side.

One of the bitter lessons of history in this area and elsewhere is that violence breeds violence. It is the essential task of the Security Council to take those wise steps and measures which will contain violence and promote peace and security.

We are now immediately concerned with a series of acts of violence against Israel, in

which there have been a number of Israeli casualties, including loss of life. In our view, Israel has acted properly and wisely in seeking assistance through peaceful political means by bringing this matter promptly to the Security Council. This is where matters such as this one should be brought; this is where matters such as this one should be settled.

I speak of a series of incidents because there seems to be no doubt that there is a series of incidents which appear to be part of a pattern of action. Information available to the Council in many documents and by much evidence indicates that the chief instigator of many of these border incidents is the so-called El Fatah or El Asifah group. Now this is clear. The organization does not deny its involvement. On the contrary, it publicly proclaims its responsibility for many incidents in the past. In several cases, acts for which this group takes credit have resulted in the loss of human life. They pose a constant threat to the citizens of a member state.

Now the problem before us is a little more deeply rooted. The Syrian Government, as I understand the statement made by the Ambassador who represents it so ably here, is not ignorant of the movements of this organization. Indeed, it permits its official radio station in Damascus to broadcast the El Fatah communiques. And we have noted that the Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army was quoted on the Damascus radio only 2 days ago, October 12, saying that the operations of the El Fatah group were "legitimate actions which we should not restrict but should support and abet." This is the problem which is before us. Because at the same time and in a contradictory way, it would seem to me, the Syrian Government disclaims any responsibility for acts of terrorism.

For instance, on October 11 the Damascus radio broadcast a statement, which the Syrian Government thereafter confirmed in a note to the United States Embassy in Damascus, from which I quote:

We are not guards for Israel's safety. Also, we are not willing to hold back the revolution of the expelled and oppressed Palestinian people. Under no circumstances shall we do so.

It is this attitude and policy which presents the problem, because the Syrian Government is bound by solemn commitments, some of which include all of us, not to take action in support of such activities.

First, Syria is bound by article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the United Nations Charter, to which we all owe allegiance.

Second, Syria is bound by, and voted for, General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX),¹ which was adopted on December 21 last—again, if I remember correctly, unanimously—and which provides that: “. . . no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the régime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State.”

Third, and most specifically in this matter, Syria is bound by article III, paragraph 3, of the Israel-Syria General Armistice Agreement. These are very solemn commitments. We believe that commitments should be kept on both sides, by Syria and by Israel, and we believe that the activities which Syria has been condoning, in violation of these commitments, are very dangerous to peace in the area. Past cases before this Council show that such activities can lead to even more serious developments.

Now, we seek to promote good conditions of peace and stability in the area, between Syria and Israel and between all countries in the Middle East. We therefore urge the Government of Syria, in the interest of peace, to consider its attitude, to recognize its obligations under the charter and the General Armistice Agreement, and to take all necessary measures to insure that these obliga-

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 24, 1966, p. 128.

tions are put into practice—specifically, by insuring that its territory is not used as a base for terrorism or destruction, with or without the consent of the Syrian Government. We think that, in so urging, we are expressing the common voice of all peoples everywhere who believe in peace, who eschew violence, and who would live by the law of the charter. We also strongly hope that all those in the area who might become involved in these dangerous activities will continue to take every possible measure to deny the use of their territory to any terrorist organization whose activities are directed against the inhabitants of any member state of the United Nations.

Finally, we appeal to all parties, including Israel, to avoid any acts which might contribute to a further deterioration of the situation in the area.

STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 28

U.S./U.N. press release 4956

As stated on many other occasions before the Security Council, in dealing with various aspects of this matter, United States policy respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries in the Middle East, member states of the United Nations, as the United States is required to do under the charter. United States policy firmly supports maintenance of a peaceful situation in the Middle East and seeks to prevent and to bring to an end all acts of violence across existing frontiers, regardless of the direction in which they occur. In the unfortunate instances where violence does occur, the United States has consistently called for utilization of United Nations machinery on the spot and for recourse to the Security Council as the proper forum of prevention and redress.

Implicit in this policy is the concept that when resort is made to the United Nations machinery and to the Security Council, the United Nations must take strong and effective action to bring to an end the use of violence across these frontiers in any form. The Council should, in our view, express it-

self clearly and specifically on the matter before it in this and all comparable incidents. We thus, indeed, encourage reliance upon this institution and its agents for the maintenance of peace and thus turn the parties away from the continuation and extension of instability in the area, from the use of violence, and from the implicit danger of its intensification. This, Mr. President, has been a consistent policy of the United States year in and year out, determined in accordance with our constitutional processes by our people at large, through a democratically elected Congress and President and by no other means.

I trust that our determined intention to do everything we can in this Council to contribute to maintaining the peace in the Middle East is shared by all members of this Council and that they will also utilize their influence to this end. The United States, and other governments, in addition to their actions in the Security Council have made repeated representations to all concerned to this end and have likewise used their influence to counsel moderation and discourage the further use of violence. We would persevere in the hope that all permanent and nonpermanent members of the Security Council are doing so as well and that they will urge a peaceful course and the prevention of violence to all concerned. And, indeed, it is our view that the members of this Council should stand together for observance by all concerned without reservations, letting the chips fall where they may.

My Government, along with others, is deeply concerned at the continuing incidents of violence inside the frontier of Israel and at the casualties and loss of life which have resulted, which is the subject of the instant complaint, just as we have demonstrated our concern with violence and loss of life which have occurred in Arabic countries when that has been the subject of the complaint. The cumulative effect of these acts of violence represents a danger to peace in the Middle East.

And many of these incidents, the facts of which have been confirmed in investigations

made by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, we are now specifically advised have been caused by the terrorist organization called El Fatah. If there were any question of this, the statements issued by the organization itself are conclusive, for they indeed have said that they are responsible for these acts of violence. Communiqués issued by this organization claiming responsibility for the very incidents which concern us today have been broadcast.

The continuance of these planned incidents is dangerous to the peace and security of the Middle East, and a preambular paragraph of the resolution² before you consequently expresses justifiable concern at this danger.

As I pointed out in my previous statement to the Council, the presence on Syrian soil of the organization responsible for many of the recent incidents is an announced fact and also an established and unchallenged one. It is also apparent from the many broadcasts of communiqués of this organization and from statements of Syrian Government leaders that its illegal and dangerous activities cannot have been undertaken on so extensive a level without the knowledge of the Syrian Government. Its attention also was drawn to this organization and its activities by members of this Council during our meetings this summer. Members will, I believe, consequently agree with the fact that the draft should deplore these incidents in the first operative paragraph and that it should also remind the Government of Syria of its obligations in this connection.

The draft might well have drawn on the language of last year's widely supported General Assembly resolution on nonintervention, the implementation of which appears as an item on the agenda of this session of the Assembly. The relevant passage of that resolution states, and I quote, "... no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the régime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State."

² U.N. doc. S/7568.

While such a statement would have been appropriate in this resolution, the text presented rests upon an obligation which is more formal: the General Armistice Agreement. This obligation is expressed in the second operative paragraph, which reminds Syria to fulfill its obligations by taking all measures to prevent the use of its territory as a base of operation for acts constituting a violation of the Armistice Agreement. This is an essential point of this resolution, and it is highly important that it be acted upon.

The draft resolution also calls for strict adherence to the Syria-Israel General Armistice Agreement and urges full cooperation by the Governments of Syria and Israel with the Armistice Commission set up by it, as well as to cooperate with UNTSO by facilitating the work of its personnel in their observation and investigation tasks. Clearly, adherence to the agreement, which this Council has many times expressed is in force and effect, and cooperation with the UNTSO and the Mixed Armistice Commission is essential if the bodies are to be made more effective, both in preventing and in determining the origin of acts in violation of the agreement. Paragraph 6 of the draft urges the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of the resolution and to seek ways to assist in the effective fulfillment of the resolution's intent to prevent further violence in the area.

Another significant element in the resolution, suggested by others in the broad consultations which have taken place, is the fifth operative paragraph expressing the Council's intention "to consider further as soon as possible in the interest of the promotion of lasting peace in the Middle East what steps could be taken on the broader question of Arab-Israeli relations."

This, indeed, has been a very constructive contribution to the text of the resolution, for, indeed, as has been rightly observed, this is an important part of the work of our organization: the task of peaceful settlement. As the Secretary-General observed in his introduction to his annual report, too often we have been concerned in our resolu-

tions only with controlling the manifestations of a dispute and establishing, when necessary, bodies or forces charged with observing or keeping the peace. We need also to turn our attention to the sources of the problems, and the draft resolution accordingly includes this element. The United States is fully committed to assuring peaceful conditions in the Middle East and would welcome such an examination.

Mr. President, the concern of my Government, and the concern of other governments represented on this Council, is an objective one: It is that peace be preserved in the Middle East. That will require, first of all, the exercise of responsibility and restraint by all the governments in the area. Our responsibility here is to encourage such restraint, to encourage action to prevent violence which can engender answering violence. The draft resolution, with its emphasis on restraint, its concern for peace, and its recognition of the broader unresolved question which forces of violence are currently exploiting, is an important and appropriate expression of what needs to be said and said promptly and decisively by the Council.

I trust that this text of the resolution will receive widespread support in the Council.

STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 4

U.S./U.N. press release 4965

The United States regrets that the resolution³ sponsored by the six powers was not adopted. The United States voted for the resolution, which by its terms deplored the incidents which have been the subject of this debate, asked Syria to strengthen measures to prevent such incidents, and asked Israel to cooperate with the Mixed Armistice Commission.

It was the view of the United States that the adoption of such a resolution in the even-handed manner in which it was drafted by the six sponsors would contribute to peace and stability in the area.

Despite the Soviet veto, it is nevertheless

³ U.N. doc. S/7575/Rev. 1.

a matter of high import, not to be ignored, that the resolution received such widespread support by members on a broadly geographical basis.

I have already stated in this debate that the fundamental United States policy in the Middle East is to support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries and the maintenance of unbroken peace. And, indeed, I do not have to refer to history, well known to every member of the Council, to demonstrate that the United States has acted in this spirit. The United States has exerted and will continue to exert its influence to prevent and bring to an end all acts of violence across existing frontiers, regardless of the direction in which they occur. This is the stand my Government has taken for many years and we reaffirm it again now.

We believe, notwithstanding our inability to vote a resolution today, that under the charter it is the continuing responsibility of the members of the Security Council, and especially of the permanent members, to exercise comparable influences against violence across frontiers in the Middle East and to do so regardless of the direction in which the violence occurs. It is only such a policy that can contribute to stability rather than to instability in the area.

My delegation voted for the resolution presented by Argentina, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, and Uganda because we fully accept that its even-handed objective was to assure such peaceful conditions and to assure them irrespective of the source of the trouble. It was the conviction of the sponsors, which we respected, that this common objective could best be achieved in the language of their draft rather than the language of the draft presented by the United Kingdom and the United States, and in the spirit of compromise we supported the six-power draft.⁴

We commend the sponsors for their patient efforts to achieve a fair resolution of

⁴ On Nov. 4 Mr. Goldberg announced that the United States would not press the joint U.S.-U.K. joint draft resolution (S/7568) to a vote.

this debate, and we do not believe that, although it has been vetoed, they have been unsuccessful in their efforts. The language of the resolution and the vote taken, though, stand as a matter of record for all the world to see and for the parties to duly notice.

We urge that all members of the Council, indeed, all members of the United Nations, exercise their direct influence to assure the implementation of the essential features of the resolution which only seek peace and stability in the area.

In the previous debate I voiced the concern of my Government that the pattern of violence which has been taking place in Israel is a pattern whose cumulative effects can only result in great dangers to the peace and security. Then we voiced similar concern in the July debates which took place on the Syrian complaint.⁵

With respect to the incidents which were the subject of our present debate, I pointed out in my previous statement in this debate that it is a matter of record that the organization which takes credit for these incursions is centered on Syrian soil. We therefore fully concurred with the sense of the draft resolution that effective steps are necessary on the part of the Government of Syria to insure by all efforts within its power, in the words of the General Armistice Agreement, that no warlike act or act of hostility shall be conducted from territory controlled by one of the parties against the other party or against civilians in territory under control of that party.

Now, the draft resolution in an even-handed manner also made reference to the General Armistice Agreement and the obligations of the parties thereunder. The General Armistice Agreement provides, as we all know, in article 7 for implementing machinery, including a Mixed Armistice Commission with responsibility for supervising the execution of the agreement and with power to employ observers and to investigate complaints and claims with a view to an equitable and mutually satisfactory settlement.

⁵ For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 29, 1966, p. 313.

This machinery has the full support of the United States, and we fully concurred and do concur with the sense of the draft resolution that would have said that Israel should cooperate fully with it.

We also concur in the comment of the Secretary-General in his report, S/7572, that serious consideration should be given as to whether there might be some more fruitful approach to the goal of enabling ISMAC to function effectively, and the United States likewise endorsed and still endorses the call upon both Governments to facilitate the work of the UNTSO in the area, especially in light of the reports on the violations of the demilitarized zones and the defensive areas by the Secretary-General in documents S/7561/Rev.1, and S/7573.

The deep concern of the United States is that peace be preserved in the Middle East. We trust this is a common concern. The responsibility of all members of the United Nations, and particularly the members of the Security Council, is to encourage restraint and to urge governmental action to prevent violence.

The resolution is solely directed toward that aim. We trust that the concepts it contains and which have received the support of the great majority of the members of this Council will be fully understood in the area and that they will be acted upon. Only a policy of peace on both sides of the borders can be acceptable if the charter obligation of all United Nations members is to be observed.

TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION ⁶

The Security Council,

Having heard the statements of the representatives of Israel and Syria and taking note of the reports of the Secretary-General in documents S/7553 of 17 October, S/7561/Rev. 1 of 23 October, S/7572 of 1 November and S/7573 of 2 November 1966,

1. *Deplores* the incidents which have been the

⁶ U.N. doc. S/7575/Rev. 1; not adopted because of the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council. The vote on Nov. 4 was 10 to 4 (U.S.S.R.), with 1 abstention.

subject of this debate, as well as the loss of human life and casualties caused by them;

2. *Invites* the Government of Syria to strengthen its measures for preventing incidents that constitute a violation of the General Armistice Agreement;

3. *Invites* the Government of Israel to co-operate fully with the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission;

4. *Calls upon* the Governments of Syria and Israel to facilitate the work of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization personnel in their tasks of observation and investigation on both sides of the Armistice Demarcation Line;

5. *Urges* the Governments of Syria and Israel to refrain from any action that might increase the tension in the area;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as appropriate.

U.N. Security Council Censures Israel for Raid Against Jordan

Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, on November 16 during debate on a Jordan complaint against Israel, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council on November 25.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG

U.S./U.N. press release 4977

Immediately after learning of the incident now before the Council, on Sunday morning, I issued a statement on behalf of my Government expressing our strong disapproval of the large-scale Israeli military action on Jordanian territory on November 13.¹ As far as I am aware, the statement of my Government condemning this attack was the first and most prompt statement made by any Government represented on this Council, at least here in New York. The United States then condemned this raid and condemns it now, deeming it in clear violation of the solemn obligations undertaken by Israel in

¹ For text, see U.S./U.N. press release 4975 dated Nov. 13.

the General Armistice Agreements. And what makes it of course most deplorable is the tragic toll in human lives of this inexcusable action.

On October 14 I stated before the Council my Government's policy of seeking to promote conditions of peace and stability in the Middle East and our opposition to the use of force across Middle East boundaries regardless of the direction from which it came.² This was the purport of our statement on Sunday. This was our objective in the recently concluded Security Council action when Israel was the complainant. It continues to be our objective in the present consideration of this deplorable violation of the General Armistice Agreements.

I said in our last debate—I now repeat—that violence breeds violence, and indeed, it should be and must be the function of this Council to assure conditions of peace and stability in the area.

At the end of our last debate over Syrian responsibility for incursions into Israel, I stated,

Despite the Soviet veto, it is nevertheless a matter of high import, not to be ignored, that the resolution received such widespread support by members on a broadly geographical basis.

I urged the implementation of the essential features of the resolution in the interests of peace and stability in the area. That urging was addressed to all countries concerned, including the Government of Israel.

I made that statement on November 4. Nine days later, as the Secretary-General has told us in his report³ and as confirmed by reports of our ambassadors in the area, the Government of Israel carried out, with the support of tanks, armored vehicles, heavy weapons and aircraft, a raid into Jordan the nature of which and whose consequences in human lives and in destruction far surpass the cumulative total of the various acts of terrorism conducted against the frontiers of Israel. Although we do not have the full details which have been promised us by the Secretary-General, nevertheless, from

his report and from what we have been advised, the basic nature of this destructive raid is sufficiently known in outline.

Now we are dealing with the complaint of Jordan here before us. And on behalf of my Government, I wish to make it absolutely clear that this large-scale military action cannot be justified, explained away, or excused by the incidents which preceded it, in which the Government of Jordan has not been implicated. This is not a new attitude by my Government. My Government has expressed itself about retaliatory raids in the past. Deplorable as these preceding incidents were—and they were deplorable, as we said on Sunday—this deliberate, governmental decision must be judged as the conscious act of responsible leaders of a member state and therefore on an entirely different level from the earlier incidents, which we continue to deplore.

It was undertaken without proper utilization of United Nations machinery in the area, notably the Mixed Armistice Commission, which in this situation, unlike some others we have had to consider, is fully functioning between Israel and Jordan. It was also undertaken without any effort to use again, and again if necessary, the good offices of the Security Council, a failure made even more inexplicable by the fact that the Council had just completed extended discussion of an Israeli complaint against Syria for similar incidents, during which over two-thirds of the members had spoken out against such terroristic activities. I am aware that that resolution was vetoed. But, nevertheless, the forum of this Council is still available to members, as it is available today, and it is our view that it should always be resorted to and we feel it is the duty of member states to resort to the Council for its consideration of the matter.

Without detailing our position other than what I have already stated on all such past raids, I would recall my Government's and the Council's stand in 1953 on an incident which had some similarity to that being considered today. The Council at that time approved a resolution sponsored by my delega-

² See p. 969.

³ U.N. doc. S/7593 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1.

tion, together with the United Kingdom and France, which in its operative paragraphs reads: ⁴

Finds that the retaliatory action at Qibiya taken by armed forces of Israel on 14-15 October 1953 and all such actions constitute a violation of the cease-fire provisions of the Security Council resolution of 15 July 1948 and are inconsistent with the Parties' obligations under the General Armistice Agreement and the Charter;

Expresses the strongest censure of that action which can only prejudice the chances of that peaceful settlement which both Parties in accordance with the Charter are bound to seek, and calls upon Israel to take effective measures to prevent all such actions in the future.

We meant what we said then. We mean the same thing today.

Long before the resolution I have just cited, the United Nations position on military action, such as that taken by Israel in Jordan on November 13, was set forth in a Security Council resolution of July 15, 1948.⁵ That resolution cited the provisions of article 40 of the charter in ordering the governments and authorities concerned "to desist from further military action and . . . to issue cease-fire orders to their military and para-military forces. . . ."

These principles were subsequently expanded by the Council's resolution of August 19, 1948,⁶ which in paragraph 1(d) specifically provides as follows:

No party is permitted to violate the Truce on the ground that it is undertaking reprisals or retaliations against the other party.

I need scarcely remind the members of the Council that the parties themselves in article I of the General Armistice Agreement have agreed that "No aggressive actions by the armed forces of the parties shall be undertaken, planned or threatened against the people or the armed forces of the other."

The raid of November 13, we must necessarily conclude, is clearly contrary to the resolutions and the agreement I have cited,

⁴ For text of a resolution adopted by the Council on Nov. 24, 1953, see BULLETIN of Dec. 14, 1953, p. 840.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, July 25, 1948, p. 114.

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 29, 1948, p. 267.

and the Council must speak out firmly against such a policy, which can only lead to disaster in the area, just as we urged the Council to speak out on other policies which we also condemned.

Now, this policy of retaliation, in our view, is contrary also to the requirements both of the charter and of this Council that peaceful means be utilized to settle such problems. Extensive United Nations machinery has for many years been in existence in the area to deal with complaints between the parties of the General Armistice Agreements. And as I have pointed out, unlike other areas, such machinery has generally functioned well on the Israel-Jordan border. It should be utilized. It must be utilized by the parties concerned.

Now, my Government is confident that the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in good faith fully adheres to and respects its obligations under the General Armistice Agreement. Its record of cooperation with the United Nations peacekeeping machinery in the Middle East speaks for itself.

In addition, the Security Council was actively concerned with security problems in the area just before the raid we are now considering. And all these facts, in our view, makes the Israeli resort to force even more deplorable.

Having thus expressed our views against this and any such military raids in unequivocal terms, I wish again to say what I said at the outset and which we still believe, that violence breeds violence and that it must be opposed in the Middle East, regardless of the direction from which it comes. And this is our view of how this Council, if it is faithful to the charter, the General Armistice Agreements, must act on complaints that come before it. The Council, and in particular its permanent members, cannot contribute effectively to peace in the Middle East unless the entire context is taken into account and all parties to the General Armistice Agreements are required by this Council to adhere to their legal obligations to prevent violence across the frontiers.

The events of the past 4 months in the Middle East, during which the Council has had three series of meetings to consider breaches of the peace, speak for themselves as indicators of the degree of tension in the area, to which our distinguished colleague, Ambassador El-Farra [Muhammad H. El-Farra, representative of Jordan], and the distinguished representative of Israel have referred. Starting in midsummer, there occurred in Israel, with seemingly little warning, a number of tragic incidents along the demarcation line between Syria and Israel. And then this was followed by an airstrike July 14 by Israeli Air Force planes on a Syrian construction project.

In September and October there occurred a series of further terrorist incidents within the borders of Israel, for some of which certain organizations outside its borders claimed public credit and against which Syria did not commit itself to take effective action. The loss of life and damage caused by these incidents caused the Government of Israel to complain to the Council on October 12, as we all know. And we all know that our debate was not conclusive because of the veto, which we regretted and still regret.

Now, we know that violence in the area continues now in the most deplorable form, and we know that we have unfinished business before the Council of the first magnitude.

I would call attention again in this regard specifically to paragraph 1(b) of the resolution of August 19, 1948, which provides that:

Each party has the obligation to use all means at its disposal to prevent action violating the Truce by individuals or groups who are subject to its authority or who are in territory under its control.

The United States accordingly believes that the Council, as we said last time, should also speak out clearly against terrorist incidents, as it did at the time of the Qibiya raid, in the interests of equity and peace and security and fairness in order to deal with the total situation.

But we have before us a complaint of great magnitude, as I have said earlier in

my remarks, and we cannot condone the action which the Government of Israel took in this regard.

It is the urgent appeal of my delegation and my Government to all nations in the area to exercise restraint and to refrain from any acts or statements which might tend to exacerbate this highly dangerous situation. The incident, the grave and serious incident which we are now considering, must not be repeated. We call upon all governments concerned to strictly adhere to the General Armistice Agreements and in particular to articles I and III which provide that no aggressive actions by armed forces shall be undertaken, planned, or threatened and that no warlike act shall be conducted from the territory controlled by one of the parties against the other.

We also think it most appropriate for the Council to ask the Secretary-General and General Bull [Lt. Gen. Odd Bull, Chief of Staff, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization] to keep the situation in the area under close and constant review, reporting as appropriate to the Council.

In conclusion, a very valuable suggestion was made to us by Chief Adebo [S. O. Adebo, representative of Nigeria] in our last discussion of the problems which did not emerge in the final action that we were considering. Chief Adebo urged that in the exercise of our responsibilities here, we ought to consider what steps this Council can take to strengthen the fabric of peace, either through the machinery of prevention or the machinery of factfinding or conciliation, or whatever other ideas this Council might think appropriate to strengthen the fabric of peace in the area. We thought that was a good suggestion. We think it is a good suggestion now. But the plain fact of the matter is that it should be apparent to all members of the Council, as it is apparent to the world, that despite everything that the United Nations machinery has done—and I commend the machinery and the Secretary-General for a great contribution to the uneasy peace which has existed there—we cannot in good

conscience, faithful to our obligations under the charter, be satisfied with conditions which, if allowed to continue, would threaten surely the peace and security in the area and would result in greater sacrifice of human life and the involvement of an ever-widening circle of states. We think that now is the time for this Council to really make its great contribution toward stabilizing the situation in this important part of the world.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ⁷

The Security Council,

Having heard the statements of the representatives of Jordan and Israel concerning the grave Israel military action which took place in the southern Hebron area on 13 November 1966,

Having noted the information provided by the Secretary-General concerning this military action in his statement of 16 November and also in his report of 18 November (S/7593 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1),

Observing that this incident constituted a large-scale and carefully planned military action on the territory of Jordan by the armed forces of Israel,

Reaffirming the previous resolutions of the Security Council condemning past incidents of reprisal in breach of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan and of the United Nations Charter,

Recalling the repeated resolutions of the Security Council asking for the cessation of violent incidents across the demarcation line, and not overlooking past incidents of this nature,

Reaffirming the necessity for strict adherence to the General Armistice Agreement,

1. *Deplores* the loss of life and heavy damage to property resulting from the action of the Government of Israel on 13 November 1966;

2. *Censures* Israel for this large-scale military action in violation of the United Nations Charter and of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan;

3. *Emphasizes* to Israel that actions of military reprisal cannot be tolerated and that if they are repeated, the Security Council will have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against the repetition of such acts;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the situation under review and report to the Security Council as appropriate.

⁷ U.N. doc. S/RES/228 (1966); adopted by the Council on Nov. 25 by a vote of 14 to 0, with 1 abstention (New Zealand).

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European Space Station To Be Located in Alaska

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

White House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated November 28

The President has been informed that an agreement for the first foreign space station on U.S. territory was reached in Paris today [November 28] by an exchange of notes between Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen and the European Space Research Organization (ESRO).

The agreement provides for the establishment of an ESRO station near Fairbanks, Alaska, to receive telemetry from, and send commands to, ESRO scientific satellites.

This agreement is in conformance with the President's announced intention of cooperating with others in space, as he stated during a recent visit with Chancellor [Ludwig] Erhard of Germany to the Kennedy Space Center:¹

We would like so much to see many more multi-lateral projects organized and managed by the countries of Europe, acting together. I would like to say this afternoon that the United States is prepared, if requested, to join with them in space efforts of mutual benefits by providing launch vehicles or in whatever other ways you leaders may feel that we can be of help.

The United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is designated as the cooperating agency with ESRO for implementation of the agreement. Under a memorandum of understanding between NASA and ESRO of July 8, 1964,² NASA will launch the first two ESRO satellites, de-

¹ For text of President Johnson's remarks at Cape Kennedy, Fla., on Sept. 27, see BULLETIN of Oct. 17, 1966, p. 581.

² For background and text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 10, 1964, p. 203.

signed to study the ionosphere and solar radiation. The first launching is expected from the Western Test Range in California early in 1967.

The members of ESRO are Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. ESRO has scientific and technical establishments in several European countries and will build other telemetry stations outside Europe. The purpose of ESRO is to "provide for, and to promote, collaboration among European states in space research and technology exclusively for peaceful purposes."

The Fairbanks station, one of a network to be constructed by ESRO, is expected to require the presence of some 25 technical personnel.

Although use of the ESRO station to support NASA programs is not contemplated, mutual support would be technically feasible since ESRO stations will be compatible with NASA's Space Tracking and Data Acquisition Network.

ESRO will receive certain privileges and immunities customarily accorded to international organizations located in the United States.

It is expected that the station will be operational by the summer of 1967.

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE

PARIS, NOVEMBER 28, 1966.

M. PIERRE AUGER,
*Director General,
European Space Research Organization,
Paris, France.*

DEAR SIR: I have the honor to refer to discussions which have recently taken place between the Government of the United States of America and the European Space Research Organization concerning

the establishment and operation of a satellite telemetry/telecommand station near Fairbanks, Alaska, in connection with peaceful and scientific space activities to be undertaken by the Organization.

The Government of the United States (hereinafter referred to as the United States) desires to cooperate with the European Space Research Organization (hereinafter referred to as ESRO) in these activities as part of their mutual efforts to foster international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space, and agrees to the establishment by ESRO of an earth station on United States territory for space telemetering and telecommand purposes. In furtherance of this objective the United States will use its best efforts to facilitate the necessary local arrangements by ESRO in connection with its activities in Alaska. The United States proposes that this station be established and operated in accordance with the following principles and procedures:

Lease of Land

1. ESRO may acquire by lease an area of land and obtain appropriate easements for the establishment and operation of an earth station for space telemetering and telecommand purposes, to be located in the vicinity of the City of Fairbanks. The United States will seek to facilitate arrangements for the lease of the land and appropriate easements and will help resolve any problem which may arise in connection with the use of such land and such easements.

Construction of the Station

2. ESRO will arrange for the construction of the station which is the subject of this Agreement. The costs of constructing, installing, equipping and operating the station will be borne by ESRO, including the cost of constructing or improving roads and other means of access, except to the extent that contributions may be made by State or local authorities to serve public needs.

Cooperating Agency

3. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (hereinafter referred to as NASA) is designated by the United States as Cooperating Agency with ESRO on matters pertaining to the implementation of this Agreement.

Description of the Station

4. The ESRO station will consist of installations for:

Reception and recording of spacecraft telemetry

signals (e.g., telemetry receiving antennae with automatic tracking receivers, pointing gear and radome, telemetry receiving assembly, PCM decommutators and display equipment, coded time generator with decoders and display equipment, graphic and magnetic recorders);

Transmission of telecommand signals to spacecraft (e.g., transmission antenna and pointing gear, radome, telecommand coder and transmitter);

Telecommunications with ESRO Control Center (e.g., teleprinter and associated equipment, telephone link);

Processing of information, maintenance of equipment, scientific and technical measurements on the ground and other tasks ancillary to the above activity (e.g., measuring instruments, antenna command and control desk, calibration tower with antenna and associated equipment);

Accommodation of staff, equipment and stores; emergency power supply station, transformers, water supply and other services.

As program requirements develop, additional equipment may be added, or existing equipment changed, at the station, consistent with the terms of this Agreement. ESRO shall notify the United States in advance of any major addition to or change in station equipment.

Telecommunications

5. ESRO will select a contractor who will obtain, in accordance with applicable United States law, appropriate authorizations for the construction and operation of the radio transmission facilities, which authorizations will be granted by the United States subject to compliance by the contractor with applicable United States and international telecommunications regulations.

The United States will act with respect to this station, in all matters concerning the International Telecommunication Union in conformity with the International Telecommunication Convention.

The United States recognizes that an essential characteristic of the station is its need for freedom from harmful radio interference, including interference caused by air-ground communications, and recognizes the importance of measures to maintain this freedom insofar as practicable against the operation of radio interference-producing devices. The United States will take precautionary measures insofar as practicable to eliminate or minimize harmful interference to the extent such devices are subject to the control of or by the United States. In addition, ESRO will seek appropriate arrangements with the State of Alaska insofar as measures for the control of such interference fall within the jurisdiction of the State of Alaska.

The area to be protected from radio interference

is that area enclosed by the following points, as determined from U.S. Geological Survey Fairbanks D-1 and D-2, Alaska, 1:63, 360 Scale Topographic Maps:

Latitude	64° 55'4" N,	Longitude	147° 32'30" W,
"	64° 56'38" N	"	147° 32'30" W,
"	64° 56'38" N	"	147° 31'00" W,
"	64° 57'21" N	"	147° 31'00" W,
"	64° 57'21" N	"	147° 27'30" W,
"	64° 55'4" N	"	147° 27'30" W,

Status of ESRO

6. ESRO shall, to the extent consistent with the instrument creating it, possess the capacity in the United States to contract, to acquire and dispose of real and personal property, and to institute legal proceedings.

Privileges and Immunities

7. ESRO and its personnel shall be accorded the status, privileges, exemptions and immunities indicated in the following subparagraphs:

Customs Duties

A. The United States will, upon request, take the necessary measures to facilitate the admission into the United States of material, equipment, supplies, goods or other items imported by or for the account of ESRO in connection with the station and ESRO programs. Such shipments shall be accorded such exemption from customs duties and internal-revenue taxes imposed upon or by reason of importation, and such procedures in connection therewith, as are accorded under similar circumstances to foreign governments.

Title to Property

B. Title to all materials, equipment or other items of property used in connection with the station and ESRO programs will remain in ESRO. Material, equipment, supplies, goods or other property of ESRO may be removed from the United States at any time by ESRO free of taxes or duties.

Inviolability and Immunity From Search

C. The archives of ESRO shall be inviolable. The property and assets of ESRO shall, subject to police and health regulations, and applicable United States regulations with regard to radio station inspections, be immune from search, unless ESRO expressly waives such immunity, and from confiscation.

Judicial Immunity

D. ESRO, its property and assets, shall enjoy the same immunity from suit and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign governments, except

to the extent that ESRO may expressly waive its immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract.

Other Privileges of ESRO

E. ESRO shall be exempt from the following taxes levied by the United States: federal income tax; federal communications taxes on telephone, telegraph and teletype services in connection with the operation of the station; and federal tax on tickets for air transport of ESRO officers and employees which are purchased by ESRO or ESRO officers and employees in connection with official travel to and from the station.

Privileges of Personnel

F. The United States will facilitate the admission into the United States of such ESRO officers and employees and their families, as may be assigned to or visit the station. ESRO and its officers and employees shall have the same privileges and immunities as those accorded by the United States to officers and employees of foreign governments with respect to laws regulating entry into and departure from the United States, alien registration and fingerprinting, and registration of foreign agents. Officers and employees so assigned shall not exceed in number those necessary for the construction and effective operation of the station. ESRO will communicate their names to the United States in advance of entry.

Baggage and effects of ESRO officers and employees assigned to the station may be admitted, when imported in connection with the arrival of the owner, into the United States, and may be removed from the United States free of customs duties and internal-revenue taxes imposed upon or by reason of importation. Such effects having a significant value shall be sold or otherwise disposed of in the United States only under conditions approved by the United States. Such ESRO personnel shall be exempt from the payment of United States income tax and federal insurance contributions on wages and expenses paid by ESRO. The privileges and immunities set forth in this subparagraph shall not apply to citizens of the United States or foreign nationals admitted into the United States for permanent residence. However, officers and employees of ESRO, whatever their nationality, shall be immune from suit and legal process relating to acts performed by them in their official capacity and falling within their functions except insofar as such immunity may be waived by ESRO.

Automobile Insurance

8. ESRO will ensure that adequate automobile liability insurance is obtained for any of its personnel who operate automobiles in Alaska and will obtain

such insurance for any automobiles which ESRO may purchase, lease or borrow. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, ESRO will waive any immunity which it might otherwise claim with respect to any suit or legal process alleging liability covered by such insurance.

Availability of Data

9. ESRO shall, upon request of the United States and at its expense, provide any raw data received by ESRO at the station and any reduced data therefrom. The United States may make use of this data after a period consistent with existing ESRO practice. Any earlier use of this data by United States shall be subject to prior permission by ESRO. In any use of this data the United States will respect the ESRO rules relating to intellectual property rights.

Station Use

10. Apart from utilizing its station for its own satellites, ESRO may utilize its station for the support of satellites of one or more ESRO member states, and, with the prior consent of the United States for the support of other satellites.

Final Clauses

11. Supplementary arrangements between the United States and ESRO may be made from time to time as required for the carrying out of the purposes, principles and procedures of this Agreement.

This agreement may be revised by mutual consent at the request of either party.

The United States and ESRO recognize the desirability, in accordance with international practice, of arbitrating any difference which may arise under this Agreement.

This Agreement shall continue in effect until February 29, 1972, and can be extended for an additional term by prior written agreement.

If the foregoing principles and procedures are acceptable to the European Space Research Organization, I have the honor to propose that this note, together with your note to that effect,³ shall constitute an Agreement between the United States of America and the European Space Research Organization on this matter which shall enter into force on the date of your note in reply.

I wish to present the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

³ Not printed here.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 11318⁴

DESIGNATING THE EUROPEAN SPACE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION AS A PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION ENTITLED TO ENJOY CERTAIN PRIVILEGES, EXEMPTIONS, AND IMMUNITIES

By virtue of the authority vested in me by Sections 1 and 11 of the International Organizations Immunities Act (59 Stat. 669; 22 U.S.C. 288), as amended by Public Law 89-353 (80 Stat. 5), I hereby designate the European Space Research Organization (ESRO) as a public international organization entitled to enjoy those privileges, exemptions, and immunities provided for by the International Organizations Immunities Act which are described in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Agreement between the United States and the European Space Research Organization effected by an Exchange of Notes at Paris, dated November 28, 1966, a copy of which paragraphs are annexed hereto and made a part of this Order.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
December 5, 1966.

United States and Korea Amend Cotton Textile Agreement

Press release 279 dated November 23

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The United States and Korea amended on November 22, 1966, their bilateral cotton textile agreement signed in Washington on January 26, 1965.¹ The amendment was effected by an exchange of notes and letters signed by Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Anthony M. Solomon on behalf of the United States Government and by Chargé d'Affaires Kew Sung Lee on behalf of Korea.

⁴ 31 Fed. Reg. 15307.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 22, 1965, p. 275.

The amendments:

- a. Eliminate the specific ceiling for category 48 in the present agreement.
- b. Raise the consultation level for group I (nonapparel) to 500,000 square yards.
- c. Add a paragraph permitting administrative adjustments to resolve minor problems in carrying out the agreement.
- d. Provide that a total of 1.88 million square yards of cotton textiles shipped from Korea between January 1, 1966, and April 1, 1967, will not be charged against the limitations and ceilings in the agreement.

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE

NOVEMBER 22, 1966

SIR: I refer to recent discussions between representatives of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Korea concerning exports of cotton textiles from the Republic of Korea to the United States and to the agreement between our two Governments concerning such exports effected by an exchange of notes of January 26, 1965. I propose that the agreement be amended as of January 1, 1966, as follows:

1. In numbered paragraph 4 delete "category 48—10,000 dozen".
2. In numbered paragraph 5 change "350,000 square yards equivalent" in the second and last sentences to "the consultation level" and add the following new sentence at the end of the paragraph: "The consultation level for calendar year 1966 is 500,000 square yards equivalent in Group I and 367,500 square yards equivalent in Group II."
3. In numbered paragraph 7 delete "5" in the first sentence and change the second sentence to read: "For calendar year 1967, each of these levels and the levels established in paragraph 5 for 1966 shall be increased by a further five percent over the levels for calendar year 1966."

4. Add the following new paragraph numbered 14: "Mutually satisfactory administrative arrangements or adjustments may be made to resolve minor problems arising in the implementation of the agreement including differences in points of procedure or operation."

If these proposals are acceptable to the Government of the Republic of Korea, this note and your note of acceptance² on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Korea shall constitute an amendment to the agreement between our two Governments.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.

For the Secretary of State
ANTHONY M. SOLOMON

TEXT OF U.S. LETTER

NOVEMBER 22, 1966

DEAR MR. LEE: I refer to the agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles between our two countries, as amended today.

The Government of the United States agrees that the following amounts of cotton textiles in the categories indicated exported from Korea between January 1, 1966 and April 1, 1967 will not be charged against the limitations and ceilings in the agreement:

A. Category 22	91,920 square yards
Category 42	9,598 " "
Category 43	58,002 " "
Category 46	481 dozens (11,770 syds. equivalent)
Category 50	3,099 " (55,144 syds. ")
Category 51	5,464 " (97,247 syds. ")
Category 54	350 " (8,750 syds. ")
Category 60	4,925 " (256,877 syds. ")

B. An additional 1.3 million square yards (i) of which not more than 910,000 square yards equivalent may be in Group 1 and not more than 390,000 square yards may be in Group 2, and (ii) which shall be limited to exports in categories not given specific ceilings in the agreement and to the following amounts in other categories:

Category	
9	100,000 square yards
18/19	75,000 " "
22	100,000 " "
26 (duck)	343,000 " "
26 (other)	42,500 " "
54A (tablecloths & napkins)	15,750 lbs. (77,050 syds. equivalent)
49	2,250 doz. (75,125 syds. equivalent)
54	3,500 " (87,500 syds. equivalent)
60	4,000 " (207,840 syds. equivalent)

I will be grateful if you will confirm that the foregoing is acceptable to your Government.

Sincerely,

ANTHONY M. SOLOMON
Assistant Secretary
for Economic Affairs

² Not printed here.

King Crab Fishery Agreement With Japan Extended

Secretary Rusk and Ambassador of Japan Ryuji Takeuchi exchanged notes on November 29 extending for 2 years the November 1964 agreement¹ covering the Japanese king crab fishery in the eastern Bering Sea. The new agreement provides for a reduction in the catch for conservation purposes. Following is the text of the U.S. note.

NOVEMBER 29, 1966

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to Your Excellency's note of November 29, 1966, which reads as follows:

"I have the honor to refer to the Notes exchanged on November 25, 1964 concerning the king crab fishery in the eastern Bering Sea and to confirm, on behalf of my Government, the understandings reached between the representatives of the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America to continue to apply the provisions of the agreement embodied in the aforementioned Notes with the following modifications:

"1. The proviso in paragraph 3 (1) shall be changed to read 'provided that, in order to avoid possible over-fishing of the king crab resource in the eastern Bering Sea, the Government of Japan ensures that the annual commercial catch of king crabs by nationals and vessels of Japan for the years 1967 and 1968 shall be equivalent to 163,000 cases respectively (one case being equivalent to 48 half-pound cans).'

"2. Paragraph 3 (5) shall be changed to read 'The two Governments shall meet before December 31, 1968 to review the operation of these arrangements and the conditions of the king crab fishery of the eastern Bering Sea, and decide on future arrangements in the light of paragraphs 1 and 2, and the introductory part of this paragraph, and the United States President's assurance of May 20, 1964² that full consideration would be given to Japan's long established fishery.'

"I have further the honor to propose that this Note and Your Excellency's reply confirming the above understandings on behalf of your Government

¹ For background and text of a U.S. note of Nov. 25, 1964, see BULLETIN of Dec. 21, 1964, p. 892.

² For background, see *ibid.*, June 15, 1964, p. 936.

shall be regarded as constituting an agreement between the two Governments.

"I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration."

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the above understandings reached by representatives of our two Governments are acceptable to the Government of the United States of America and that Your Excellency's note and this reply are considered as an agreement between our two Governments.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

DEAN RUSK

His Excellency
RYUJI TAKEUCHI,
Ambassador of Japan.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Labor

Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the International Labor Organization. Dated at Montreal October 9, 1946. Entered into force April 20, 1948. TIAS 1868.

Admission to membership: Botswana, October 18, 1966.

Pacific Settlement of Disputes

Convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes. Done at The Hague October 18, 1907. Entered into force January 26, 1910. 36 Stat. 2199.

Adherence: Sudan, October 3, 1966.

Postal Matters

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and convention with final protocol and regulations of execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881.

Ratifications deposited: Czechoslovakia, May 20, 1966;¹ Congo (Brazzaville), September 7, 1966.

Red Sea Lights

International agreement regarding the maintenance of certain lights in the Red Sea. Done at London

¹ With a statement.

February 20, 1962. Entered into force October 28, 1966.

Proclaimed by the President: December 2, 1966.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965.²

Accession deposited: South Africa, including South West Africa, November 11, 1966.

Trade

Procès-verbal extending the declaration of March 5, 1964 (TIAS 5687), on the provisional accession of Iceland to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 14, 1965. Entered into force December 28, 1965; for the United States December 30, 1965. TIAS 5943.

Ratification deposited: Austria, October 21, 1966.
Acceptance: Czechoslovakia, November 2, 1966.

BILATERAL

Bolivia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of August 17, 1965 (TIAS 5871). Effected by an exchange of notes at La Paz November 30, 1966. Entered into force November 30, 1966.

Canada

Agreement relating to the winter maintenance of the Haines Road for the 1966-67 winter season. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa October 31 and November 17, 1966. Entered into force November 17, 1966.

Central African Republic

Agreement relating to the establishment of a peace corps program in the Central African Republic. Effected by exchange of notes at Bangui September 9 and November 24, 1966. Entered into force November 24, 1966.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Designations

Carl F. Salans as Deputy Legal Adviser, effective November 30. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release dated November 30.)

² Not in force.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and, in some cases, a selected bibliography. Those listed below are available at 5¢ each, unless otherwise indicated.

Afghanistan. Pub. 7795. 8 pp.

Guatemala. Pub. 7798. 4 pp.

Iran. Pub. 7760. 4 pp.

Mexico. Pub. 7865. 8 pp.

Philippines. Pub. 7750. 8 pp.

Switzerland. Pub. 8132. 8 pp.

Tanzania. Pub. 8097. 8 pp.

Venezuela. Pub. 7749. 8 pp.

Antarctica—Measures in Furtherance of Principles and Objectives of the Antarctic Treaty. Certain recommendations adopted at the Third Consultative Meeting under Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty, at Brussels, June 2-13, 1964. TIAS 6058. 13 pp. 10¢.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agreement with Switzerland—Signed at Washington December 30, 1965. Entered into force August 8, 1966. TIAS 6059. 24 pp. 15¢.

Telecommunication—Radio Broadcasting Facilities. Agreement with the Philippines, implementing the agreement of May 6, 1963, as implemented. Exchange of notes—Signed at Manila July 13, 1966. Entered into force July 13, 1966. TIAS 6060. 11 pp. 10¢.

Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with Kuwait—Signed at Kuwait July 19 and 24, 1966. Entered into force July 19, 1966. TIAS 6061. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Vietnam, amending the agreement of March 21, 1966, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Saigon July 22, 1966. Entered into force July 22, 1966. TIAS 6062. 3 pp. 5¢.

Movement of Cuban Refugees to the United States. Agreement with Cuba. Exchange of notes between the Embassy of Switzerland (representing the United States interests) and Cuba—Signed at Habana November 6, 1965. Entered into force November 6, 1965. With related notes. TIAS 6063. 19 pp. 15¢.

Maritime Matters—Deployment of USS *Shenandoah* to Malta. Agreement with Malta. Exchange of notes

—Signed at Valletta July 26 and August 3, 1966. Entered into force August 3, 1966. TIAS 6064. 5 pp. 5¢.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—Protocol for the Accession of Switzerland to the Agreement of October 30, 1947. Done at Geneva April 1, 1966. Entered into force with respect to the United States of America and Switzerland August 1, 1966. TIAS 6065. 20 pp. 15¢.

Air Transport Services. Agreement with Austria—Signed at Vienna June 23, 1966. Entered into force July 23, 1966. TIAS 6066. 19 pp. 15¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Tunisia—Signed at Tunis July 30, 1966. Entered into force July 30, 1966. With exchange of notes. TIAS 6067. 12 pp. 10¢.

Satellite-Balloon Meteorological Research (Project EOLE). Agreement with France. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington June 16 and 17, 1966. Entered into force June 17, 1966. With memorandum of understanding and exchange of letters between the French Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales and the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration—Signed at Paris and Washington May 27, 1966, and May 11 and 27, 1966. TIAS 6069. 12 pp. 10¢.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Portugal, amending the agreement of March 12, 1964. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington August 17, 1966. Entered into force August 17, 1966. TIAS 6070. 2 pp. 5¢.

Television System in Saudi Arabia. Agreement with Saudi Arabia extending the agreement of December 9, 1963, and January 6, 1964. Exchange of notes—Signed at Jidda June 27 and July 30, 1966. TIAS 6071. 3 pp. 5¢.

Loan of Additional Long Range Aid to Navigation (LORAN-A) Equipment. Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ottawa April 19 and July 28, 1966. Entered into force July 28, 1966. TIAS 6072. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan amending the agreement of May 26, 1966. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rawalpindi and Karachi August 10, 1966. Entered into force August 10, 1966. TIAS 6074. 3 pp. 5¢.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with India, supplementing the agreement of September 19, 1957, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at New Delhi February 2, 1966. Entered into force February 2, 1966. With related notes. TIAS 6075. 6 pp. 5¢.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LV, NO. 1435 PUBLICATION 8178 DECEMBER 26, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of

the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-

intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. PRICE: 52 issues, domestic \$10, foreign \$15; single copy 30 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the Department of State Bulletin as the source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

American Republics. Inter-American Cooperation: The Road Ahead (Gordon) 946

China. Department Names Advisory Panel on China 966

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy 968

Cuba
Cuban Refugee Airlift Completes First Year of Operation 966
Permanent-Resident Application Fees for Cuban Refugees Waived (Johnson) 967

Department and Foreign Service
Department Names Advisory Panel on China 966
Designations (Salans) 985

Economic Affairs
Impact of Technology on World Trade and Economic Development (Connor, Humphrey) 956
Inter-American Cooperation: The Road Ahead (Gordon) 946
King Crab Fishery Agreement With Japan Extended (text of U.S. note) 984
United States and Korea Amend Cotton Textile Agreement (texts of U.S. note and letter) 982
U.S. Welcomes IMCO Action on Passenger-Ship Safety 965

Europe. European Space Station To Be Located in Alaska (text of U.S. note and Executive order) 979

Immigration and Naturalization. Permanent-Resident Application Fees for Cuban Refugees Waived (Johnson) 967

International Organizations and Conferences. U.S. Welcomes IMCO Action on Passenger-Ship Safety 965

Israel
U.S.S.R. Vetoes Security Council Resolution on Israel Complaint (Goldberg, text of draft resolution) 969
U.N. Security Council Censures Israel for Raid Against Jordan (Goldberg, text of resolution) 974

Japan. King Crab Fishery Agreement With Japan Extended (text of U.S. note) 984

Jordan. U.N. Security Council Censures Israel for Raid Against Jordan (Goldberg, text of resolution) 974

Korea. United States and Korea Amend Cotton Textile Agreement (texts of U.S. note and letter) 982

Mexico. U.S., Mexico Discuss Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 968

Presidential Documents
Permanent-Resident Application Fees for Cuban Refugees Waived 967
President Johnson Hails U.N. Accord on Treaty Governing Exploration of Outer Space 952

Publications. Recent Releases 985

Refugees
Cuban Refugee Airlift Completes First Year of Operation 966
Permanent-Resident Application Fees for Cuban Refugees Waived (Johnson) 967

Science
European Space Station To Be Located in Alaska (text of U.S. note and Executive order) 979
Impact of Technology on World Trade and Economic Development (Connor, Humphrey) 956

President Johnson Hails U.N. Accord on Treaty Governing Exploration of Outer Space (Johnson, text of treaty) 952

Southern Rhodesia. U.S. and U.K. Hold Talks on Southern Rhodesia (joint statement) 965

Syria. U.S.S.R. Vetoes Security Council Resolution on Israel Complaint (Goldberg, text of draft resolution) 969

Treaty Information
Current Actions 984
European Space Station To Be Located in Alaska (text of U.S. note and Executive order) 979
King Crab Fishery Agreement With Japan Extended (text of U.S. note) 984
President Johnson Hails U.N. Accord on Treaty Governing Exploration of Outer Space (Johnson, text of treaty) 952
United States and Korea Amend Cotton Textile Agreement (texts of U.S. note and letter) 982
U.S. Welcomes IMCO Action on Passenger-Ship Safety 965
U.S.S.R. U.S.S.R. Vetoes Security Council Resolution on Israel Complaint (Goldberg, text of draft resolution) 969
United Kingdom. U.S. and U.K. Hold Talks on Southern Rhodesia (joint statement) 965

United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 978
President Johnson Hails U.N. Accord on Treaty Governing Exploration of Outer Space (Johnson, text of treaty) 952
U.S.S.R. Vetoes Security Council Resolution on Israel Complaint (Goldberg, text of draft resolution) 969
U.N. Security Council Censures Israel for Raid Against Jordan (Goldberg, text of resolution) 974

Name Index

Connor, John T. 956
Goldberg, Arthur J. 969, 974
Gordon, Lincoln 946
Humphrey, Vice President 956
Johnson, President 952, 967
Salans, Carl F. 985

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: December 5-11

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to December 5 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 279 of November 23 and 286 of November 30.

No.	Date	Subject
287	12/7	Advisory panel on China.
†288	12/9	Advisory panel for Policy Planning Council.
†289	12/9	Katzenbach: National Association of Manufacturers Congress of American Industry, New York, N.Y.
†290	12/10	Kohler: American Legion, Orlando, Fla.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

The Outlook for Freedom

"The modern capitalism of the Western World has knocked the bottom out of Marxist-Leninist economic doctrine," Secretary Rusk asserts in this major address describing the "vital stake our foreign policy has in the success of the American economy." Speaking to the National Industrial Conference Board at New York, N.Y., on September 21, the Secretary explains the principal factors affecting U.S. trade with the advanced and the developing countries and our efforts to "build bridges" through trade with the nations of Eastern Europe. This pamphlet is the text of the Secretary's address.

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