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April 3, 1967

THE DEFENSE OF VIET-NAM: KEY TO THE FUTURE OF FREE ASIA

Address by President Johnson 534

COTTON IN THE WORLD TRADE ARENA

by Assistant Secretary Solomon 555

THE LATIN AMERICAN SUMMIT MEETING

President Johnson's Message to Congress 540

The Defense of Viet-Nam: Key to the Future of Free Asia

*Address by President Johnson*¹

It is always a very special privilege and pleasure for me to visit Tennessee.

For a Texan it is like homecoming, because much of the courage and hard work that went into the building of the Southwest came from the hills and the fields of Tennessee. It strengthened the sinews of thousands of men—at the Alamo, at San Jacinto, and at the homes of our pioneer people.

This morning I visited the Hermitage, the historic home of Andrew Jackson. Two centuries have passed since that most American of all Americans was born. The world has changed a great deal since his day. But the qualities which sustain men and nations in positions of leadership have not changed.

In our time, as in Andrew Jackson's, freedom has its price.

In our time, as in his, history conspires to test the American will.

In our time, as in Jackson's time, courage and vision, and the willingness to sacrifice, will sustain the cause of freedom.

This generation of Americans is making its imprint on history. It is making it in the fierce hills and the sweltering jungles of Viet-Nam. I think most of our citizens—after a very penetrating debate which is our democratic heritage—have reached a common understanding on the meaning and on the objectives of that struggle.

¹ Made before a joint session of the Tennessee State Legislature at Nashville, Tenn., on Mar. 15 (White House press release).

Before I discuss the specific questions that remain at issue, I should like to review the points of widespread agreement.

It was 2 years ago that we were forced to choose, forced to make a decision between major commitments in defense of South Viet-Nam or retreat—the evacuation of more than 25,000 of our troops, the collapse of the Republic of Viet-Nam in the face of subversion and external assault.

Andrew Jackson would never have been surprised at the choice we made.

We chose a course in keeping with American tradition, in keeping with the foreign policy of at least three administrations, with the expressed will of the Congress of the United States, with our solemn obligations under the Southeast Asian treaty, and with the interest of 16 million South Vietnamese who had no wish to live under Communist domination.

As our commitment in Viet-Nam required more men and more equipment, some voices were raised in opposition. The administration was urged to disengage, to find an excuse to abandon the effort.

These cries came despite growing evidence that the defense of Viet-Nam held the key to the political and economic future of free Asia. The stakes of the struggle grew correspondingly.

It became clear that if we were prepared to stay the course in Viet-Nam, we could help to lay the cornerstone for a diverse and independent Asia, full of promise and resolute in the cause of peaceful eco-

conomic development for her long-suffering peoples.

But if we faltered, the forces of chaos would scent victory and decades of strife and aggression would stretch endlessly before us.

The choice was clear. We would stay the course. We shall stay the course.

I think most Americans support this fundamental decision. Most of us remember the fearful cost of ignoring aggression. Most of us have cast aside the illusion that we can live in an affluent fortress while the world slides into chaos.

Basic Objectives in Viet-Nam

I think we have all reached broad agreement on our basic objectives in Viet-Nam.

First, an honorable peace that will leave the people of South Viet-Nam free to fashion their own political and economic institutions without fear of terror or intimidation from the North.

Second, a Southeast Asia in which all countries—including a peaceful North Viet-Nam—apply their scarce resources to the real problems of their people: combating hunger, ignorance, and diseases.

I have said many, many times that nothing would give us greater pleasure than to invest our own resources in the constructive works of peace rather than in the futile destruction of war.

Third, a concrete demonstration that aggression across international frontiers or demarcation lines is no longer an acceptable means of political change.

There is, I think, a general agreement among Americans on the things that we do not want in Viet-Nam.

We do not want permanent bases. We will begin with the withdrawal of our troops on a reasonable schedule whenever reciprocal concessions are forthcoming from our adversary.

We do not seek to impose our political beliefs upon South Viet-Nam. Our Republic rests upon a brisk commerce in ideas. We will be happy to see free competition in the

intellectual marketplace whenever North Viet-Nam is willing to shift the conflict from the battlefield to the ballot box.

So, these are the broad principles on which most Americans agree.

On a less general level, however, the events and frustrations of these past few difficult weeks have inspired a number of questions about our Viet-Nam policy in the minds and hearts of a good many of our citizens. Today, here in this historic chamber, I want to deal with some of those questions that figure most prominently in the press and in some of the letters which reach a President's desk.

Many Americans are confused by the barrage of information about military engagements. They long for the capsule summary which has kept tabs on our previous wars, a line on the map that divides friend from foe.

The Military Situation

Precisely what, they ask, is our military situation, and what are the prospects of victory?

The first answer is that Viet-Nam is aggression in a new guise, as far removed from trench warfare as the rifle from the longbow. This is a war of infiltration, of subversion, of ambush. Pitched battles are very rare, and even more rarely are they decisive.

Today, more than 1 million men from the Republic of Viet-Nam and its six allies are engaged in the order of battle.

Despite continuing increases in North Viet-Nam infiltration, this strengthening of Allied forces in 1966, under the brilliant leadership of General [William C.] Westmoreland, was instrumental in reversing the whole course of this war.

—We estimate that 55,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were killed in 1966, compared with 35,000 the previous year. More were wounded, and more than 20,000 defected.

—By contrast, 9,500 South Vietnamese,

more than 5,000 Americans, and 600 from other Allied forces were killed in action.

—The Vietnamese Army achieved a 1966 average of two weapons captured from the Viet Cong to every one lost, a dramatic turnaround from the previous 2 years.

—Allied forces have made several successful sweeps through territories that were formerly considered Viet Cong sanctuaries only a short time ago. These operations not only cost the enemy large numbers of men and weapons but are very damaging to his morale.

What does all of this mean? Will the North Vietnamese change their tactics? Will there be less infiltration of main units? Will there be more of guerrilla warfare?

The actual truth is we just don't know.

What we do know is that General Westmoreland's strategy is producing results, that our military situation has substantially improved, that our military success has permitted the groundwork to be laid for a pacification program which is the longrun key to an independent South Viet-Nam.

Bombing of Military Targets in the North

Since February 1965 our military operations have included selective bombing of military targets in North Viet-Nam. Our purposes are three.

—To back our fighting men by denying the enemy a sanctuary;

—To exact a penalty against North Viet-Nam for her flagrant violations of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962;

—To limit the flow, or to substantially increase the cost, of infiltration of men and materiel from North Viet-Nam.

All of our intelligence confirms that we have been successful.

Yet, some of our people object strongly to this aspect of our policy. Must we bomb? many people ask. Does it do any military good? Is it consistent with America's limited objectives? Is it an inhuman act that is aimed at civilians?

On the question of military utility, I can

only report the firm belief of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, General Westmoreland and our commanders in the field, and all the sources of information and advice available to the Commander in Chief: and that is that the bombing is causing serious disruption and is bringing about added burdens to the North Vietnamese infiltration effort.

We know, for example, that half a million people are kept busy just repairing damage to bridges, roads, railroads, and other strategic facilities, and in air and coastal defense and repair of powerplants.

I also want to say categorically that it is not the position of the American Government that the bombing will be decisive in getting Hanoi to abandon aggression. It has, however, created very serious problems for them. The best indication of how substantial is the fact that they are working so hard every day with all their friends throughout the world to try to get us to stop.

The bombing is entirely consistent with America's limited objectives in South Viet-Nam. The strength of Communist main-force units in the South is clearly based on their infiltration from the North. I think it is simply unfair to our American soldiers, sailors, and marines and our Vietnamese allies to ask them to face increased enemy personnel and firepower without making an effort to try to reduce that infiltration.

Now, as to bombing civilians, I would simply say that we are making an effort that is unprecedented in the history of warfare to be sure that we do not. It is our policy to bomb military targets only.

We have never deliberately bombed cities nor attacked any target with the purpose of inflicting civilian casualties.

We hasten to add, however, that we recognize, and we regret, that some people, even after warning, are living and working in the vicinity of military targets and they have suffered.

We are also, too, aware that men and

machines are not infallible and that some mistakes do occur.

But our record on this account is, in my opinion, highly defensible.

Look for a moment at the record of the other side.

Any civilian casualties that result from our operations are inadvertent, in stark contrast to the calculated Viet Cong policy of systematic terror.

Tens of thousands of innocent Vietnamese civilians have been killed, tortured, and kidnaped by the Viet Cong. There is no doubt about the deliberate nature of the Viet Cong program. One need only note the frequency with which Viet Cong victims are village leaders, teachers, health workers, and others who are trying to carry out constructive programs for their people.

Yet, the deeds of the Viet Cong go largely unnoted in the public debate. It is this moral double bookkeeping which makes us get sometimes very weary of our critics.

But there is another question that we should answer: Why don't we stop bombing to make it easier to begin negotiations?

The answer is a simple one:

—We stopped for 5 days and 20 hours in May 1965. Representatives of Hanoi simply returned our message in a plain envelope.

—We stopped bombing for 36 days and 15 hours in December 1965 and January 1966. Hanoi only replied: "A political settlement of the Viet-Nam problem can be envisaged only when the United States Government has accepted the four-point stand of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, has proved this by actual deeds, has stopped unconditionally and for good its air raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam."

—Only last month we stopped bombing for 5 days and 18 hours, after many prior weeks in which we had communicated to them several possible routes to peace, any one of which America was prepared to take. Their response, as you know, delivered to His Holiness the Pope, was this: The

United States "must put an end to their aggression in Viet-Nam, end unconditionally and definitively the bombing and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, withdraw from South Viet-Nam all American and satellite troops, recognize the South Vietnamese National Front for Liberation, and let the Vietnamese people settle themselves their own affairs."

That is where we stand today.

They have three times rejected a bombing pause as a means to open the way to ending the war and go together to the negotiating table.

South Viet-Nam's Economic Progress

The tragedy of South Viet-Nam is not limited to casualty lists.

There is much tragedy in the story of a nation at war for nearly a generation. It is the story of economic stagnation. It is the story of a generation of young men, the flower of the labor force, pressed into military service by one side or the other.

No one denies that the survival of South Viet-Nam is heavily dependent upon early economic progress.

My most recent and my most hopeful report of progress in this area came from an old friend of Tennessee, of the Tennessee Valley Authority, David Lilienthal, who recently went as my representative to Viet-Nam to begin to work with the Vietnamese people on economic planning for that area.²

He reported—and with some surprise, I might add—that he discovered an extraordinary air of confidence among the farmers and the village leaders and the trade unionists and the industrialists. He concluded that their economic behavior suggests, and I quote him, "that they think they know how all of this is going to come out."

Mr. Lilienthal also said that the South Vietnamese were among the hardest work-

² For remarks made by Mr. Lilienthal at a news conference at the White House on Feb. 27, see BULLETIN of Mar. 20, 1967, p. 467.

ing people that he had seen in developing countries around the world, that "to have been through 20 years of war and still have this amount of 'zip' almost insures their long-term economic development."

Mr. Lilienthal will be going with me to Guam Saturday night to talk with our new leaders about the plans he will try to institute there.

Our AID programs are supporting the drive toward this sound economy.

But none of these economic accomplishments will be decisive by itself. And no economic achievement can substitute for a strong and free political structure.

We cannot build such a structure—because only the Vietnamese can do that.

And I think they are building it. As I am talking to you here, a freely elected constituent assembly in Saigon is now wrestling with the last details of a new constitution, one which will bring the Republic of Viet-Nam to full membership among the democratic nations of the world. We expect that constitution to be completed this month.

In the midst of war they have been building for peace and justice. That is a remarkable accomplishment in the annals of mankind.

Changes in U.S. Mission Staff

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, who has served us with such great distinction, is coming to the end of his second distinguished tour of duty in Saigon.

To replace him, I am drafting as our Ambassador to the Government of Viet-Nam Mr. Ellsworth Bunker—able and devoted, full of wisdom and experience acquired on five continents over many years.

As his deputy, I am nominating and recalling from Pakistan Mr. Eugene Locke, our young and very vigorous Ambassador to Pakistan.

To drive forward with a sense of urgency the work in pacification in Viet-Nam, I am sending the President's Special Assistant, Mr. Robert Komer.

To strengthen General Westmoreland in the intense operations that he will be con-

ducting in the months ahead, I am assigning to him additional topflight military personnel, the best that this country has been able to produce.

So you can be confident that in the months ahead we shall have at work in Saigon the ablest, the wisest, the most tenacious, and the most experienced team that the United States of America can mount.

In view of these decisions and in view of the meetings that will take place this weekend, I thought it wise to invite the leaders of South Viet-Nam to join us in Guam for a part of our discussions, if it were convenient for them. I am gratified to be informed that they have accepted our invitation.

I should also like for you to know that the representatives of all the countries that are contributing troops in Viet-Nam will be coming to Washington for April 20 and 21 meetings for a general appraisal of the situation that exists.

U.S. Position on Peace Negotiations

This brings me to my final point: the peaceful and just world that we all seek.

We have just lived through another flurry of rumors of "peace feelers."

Our years of dealing with this problem have taught us that peace will not come easily. The problem is a very simple one: It takes two to negotiate at a peace table, and Hanoi has just simply refused to consider coming to a peace table.

I don't believe that our own position on peace negotiations can be stated any more clearly than I have stated it many times in the past—or than the distinguished Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, or Ambassador Goldberg [U.S. Representative to the United Nations Arthur J. Goldberg], or any number of other officials have stated it in every forum that we could find.

I do want to repeat to you this afternoon—and through you to the people of America—the essentials now, lest there be any doubts.

—United States representatives are

ready at any time for discussions of the Viet-Nam problem or any related matter with any government or governments, if there is any reason to believe that these discussions will in any way seriously advance the cause of peace.

—We are prepared to go more than half-way and to use any avenue possible to encourage such discussions. And we have done that at every opportunity.

We believe that the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 could serve as the central elements of a peaceful settlement. These accords provide, in essence, that both South and North Viet-Nam should be free from external interference, while at the same time they would be free independently to determine their positions on the question of reunification.

We also stand ready to advance toward a reduction of hostilities, without prior agreement. The road to peace could go from deeds to discussions, or it could start with discussions and go to deeds. We are ready to take either route. We are ready to move on both of them.

But reciprocity must be the fundamental principle of any reduction in hostilities. The United States cannot and will not reduce its activities unless and until there is some reduction on the other side. To follow any other rule would be to violate the trust that we undertake when we ask a man to risk his life for his country.

We will negotiate a reduction of the bombing whenever the Government of North Viet-Nam is ready, and there are almost innumerable avenues of communication by which the Government of North Viet-Nam can make their readiness known.

To this date and this hour, there has been no sign of that readiness. Yet, we

must—and we will—keep on trying.

As I speak to you today, Secretary Rusk and our representatives throughout the world are on a constant alert. Hundreds and hundreds of quiet diplomatic conversations, free from the glare of front-page headlines, or of klieg lights, are being held and they will be held on the possibilities of bringing peace to Viet-Nam.

Governor Averell Harriman, with 25 years of experience of troubleshooting on the most difficult international problems that America has ever had, is carrying out my instructions that every possible lead, however slight it may first appear, from any source, public or private, shall be followed up.

Let me conclude by saying this: I so much wish that it were within my power to assure that all those in Hanoi could hear one simple message: America is committed to the defense of South Viet-Nam until an honorable peace can be negotiated.

If this one communication gets through and its rational implications are drawn, we should be at the table tomorrow. It would be none too soon for us. Then hundreds of thousands of Americans—as brave as any who ever took the field for their country—could come back home.

And the man who could lead them back is the man that you trained and sent from here, our own beloved, brilliant General “Westy” Westmoreland. As these heroes came back to their homes, millions of Vietnamese could begin to make a decent life for themselves and their families without fear of terrorism, without fear of war, or without fear of Communist enslavement.

That is what we are working and fighting for. We must not—we shall not—and we will not—fail.

The Latin American Summit Meeting

*Message From President Johnson to the Congress*¹

To the Congress of the United States:

In less than a month, the leaders of the American states will meet in Punta del Este in Uruguay.

It will be the first such meeting in a decade, and the second ever held, of the heads of the free nations of our hemispheric system.

This meeting represents another link in the bond of partnership which joins us with more than 230 million neighbors to the south.

The gathering is far more than a symbol of flourishing friendship. Its purpose is a review of the progress we have made together in a great adventure which unites the destinies of all of us. Beyond that it will include a common commitment to the historic and humane next steps we plan to take together.

I look to this meeting with enthusiasm. The peaceful and progressive revolution which is transforming Latin America is one of the great inspirational movements of our time. Our participation in that revolution is a worthy enterprise blending our deepest national traditions with our most responsible concepts of hemispheric solidarity.

The Measure of Progress

The cooperative spirit between the rest of the Americas and the United States has been building for decades.

The establishment of the Inter-American Development Bank in 1959, and the Act of Bogotá in 1960, under the leadership of

President Eisenhower, helped turn that spirit to substance. In those historic compacts the American governments pledged their joint efforts to the development of programs to improve the lives of all the people of Latin America. They provided the impetus for an action taken in 1961 on which the history of the hemisphere has since turned. That action—the Alliance for Progress, which moved dramatically forward under President Kennedy—fused old dreams and fired new hopes. With its commitment of mutual assistance and self-help programs, it attacked evils as old as the condition of man—hunger, ignorance, and disease.

That Alliance is now 6 years old.

What can we say of it?

We can say that there is a clear record of progress. Per capita growth rates for Latin America show that more countries have broken the economic stagnation of earlier years. Reform and modernization are advancing as a new wave of managers and technicians apply their skills. There have been steady gains in private, national and foreign investments. Inflation is easing. The struggle for social justice is proceeding.

These are all true. But the statements of progress are more meaningful, and they more realistically reflect the spirit of the Alliance, when they relate to the people for whose lives the Alliance itself was created. Since the Alliance began, and with the funds that we have contributed—

¹H. Doc. 84, 90th Cong., 1st sess. (White House press release dated Mar. 13).

Men, women, and children are alive today who would otherwise have died.

—100 million people are being protected from malaria. In 10 countries, deaths caused by malaria dropped from 10,810 to 2,280 in three years' time. Smallpox cases declined almost as sharply.

—1,200 health centers, including hospitals and mobile medical units, are in operation or soon will be.

For tens of thousands of families, the most fundamental conditions of life are improving.

—350,000 housing units have been, or are now being, built.

—2,000 rural wells and 1,170 portable water supply systems have been built to benefit some 20 million persons.

Children are going to school now who would not have gone before.

—Primary school enrollments have increased by 23 percent; secondary school enrollments by 50 percent; university enrollments by 39 percent.

—28,000 classrooms have been built.

—160,000 teachers have been trained or given additional training.

—More than 14 million textbooks have been distributed.

—13 million schoolchildren and 3 million preschoolers participate in school lunch programs.

Men whose fathers for generations have worked land owned by others now work it as their own.

—16 countries have legislation dealing directly with land reform.

—With U.S. assistance, 1.1 million acres have been irrigated and 106,000 acres reclaimed.

—More than 700,000 agricultural loans have benefited 3.5 million people.

—15,000 miles of road have been built or improved, many of them farm-to-market access roads.

All of these are heartening facts. But they are only the beginning of the story,

and only part of it. Statistics can only suggest the deep human meaning of hope alive now where once none lived. Statistics cannot report the wonder of a child born into a world which will give him a chance to break through the tyranny of indifference which doomed generations before him to lives of bleakness and want and misery.

Nor can they reveal the revolution which has come about in the minds of tens of millions of people when they saw that their own efforts, combined with those of their governments and their friends abroad, could change their lives for the better.

Perhaps most important of all, statistics cannot adequately reflect the emergence of a vigorous, competent and confident new generation of Latin American leaders. These men are determined to see realized in their own time a strong, modern Latin America, loyal to its own traditions and history. They are men who know that rhetoric and resolutions are no substitute for sustained hard work.

And statistics can never tell us what might have been. They cannot record the shots which might have rung out in the avenidas and plazas of a dozen Latin American cities, but did not—or the howls of angry crowds which might have formed, but did not. The full success of the Alliance for Progress must be sought not only in what has been accomplished but in what has been avoided as well.

Ferment gripped the hemisphere when the Alliance was born. In places throughout the world, terror with its bloodshed sought to redress ancient evils. And in some of these places—in Cuba and half a world away in Southeast Asia—even greater evil followed the thrust of violence. Through their own efforts under the Alliance for Progress, the Latin Americans have transformed the hemisphere into a region of determination and hope.

The United States' participation in the Alliance was a bold affirmation of its belief that the true revolution which better men's lives can be effected peacefully. The Alliance's 6-year record of accomplishments

is history's clear testament to the validity of that belief.

It is also a testament to the validity of the underlying principle of self-help. Our support has been vitally important to the successes so far achieved. But the commitments and dedication of the Latin American nations themselves to these tasks has been the keystone of that success.

The Task Before Us

The record of progress only illuminates the work which still must be done if life for the people of this hemisphere is truly to improve—not just for today, but for the changing years ahead.

Last August, in a statement on the fifth anniversary of the Alliance for Progress, I described the challenge in these terms:²

If present trends continue, the population of this hemisphere will be almost 1 billion by the year 2000. Two-thirds—some 625 million—will live in Latin America. Whatever may be done through programs to reduce the rate of population growth, Latin America faces a vast challenge.

Farm production, for instance, should increase by 6 percent every year, and that will be double the present rate.

At least 140 million new jobs will need to be created.

Over a million new homes should be built each year.

More than 175,000 new doctors need to be trained to meet the very minimum requirements.

Hundreds of thousands of new classrooms should be constructed.

And annual per capita growth rates should increase to the range of 4 to 6 percent.

These requirements, added to the demands of the present, mean that new sights must be set, that new directions and renewed drive must be found if we are to meet the challenge, if we are to move forward.

It is with these sober problems confronting us that the leaders of the American states will meet at Punta del Este.

Pillars of Progress

Our governments have been hard at work for months preparing for this meeting.

Our concern has centered on the question of how we can speed the development process in Latin America. We know that growth and trade are interacting forces.

We know that they depend on the free movement of products, people and capital. We know they depend on people who are healthy and educated. We know that these conditions contain the seeds of prosperity for all of us.

Further, based on our joint experience so far under the Alliance, we know that the future progress of the hemisphere must rest on four strong pillars:

1. Elimination of Barriers to Trade

Civilization in most of Latin America followed along the coastal rim of the continent. Today the centers of population are concentrated here. Vast inner frontiers lie remote and untouched, separated from each other by great rivers, mountains, forests and deserts. Simon Bolivar saw these natural barriers as major obstacles to trade and communication and to his dream of a single great Latin American republic.

Because of them, Latin American countries for a century and a half tended to look outward for their markets to Europe and the United States.

Now they are looking inward as well. They see the same barriers, but they see them as less formidable. They are confident that with modern technology they can be overcome. Now with projects set in motion by the Alliance for Progress, men are beginning to carve roads along the slopes of the Andes, push bridges across the rushing rivers, connect power grids, extend pipelines and link the overland national markets.

The barriers of nature symbolize obstructions every bit as restrictive as the artificial trade barriers that men erect. The work to remove them both must proceed together.

Latin American leaders have seen the very real threat of industrial stagnation in the high tariff barriers they have erected against their commerce with each other. They see economic integration as indispensable to their future industrial growth.

The Central American countries, stimulated by Alliance programs, have already achieved spectacular increases in trade and

² For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 5, 1966, p. 330.

investment. The larger grouping of South American states and Mexico, however, has approached economic unity at a slower pace.

Now both groups together must systematically move toward a Latin American Common Market. When this is carried into effect, it will bring the most profound change in hemispheric relations since independence. The countries of Latin America have given clear and sure indication that they intend to join together to advance toward this goal.

2. Improvement of Education

The burden of illiteracy, which the masses of people in Latin America have borne for centuries, is beginning to lift. In other times, the pace might have been satisfactory. It cannot be considered so today.

The countries of Latin America hope and aim to be economically strong. Such nations will require trained people in an abundance far greater than their classrooms and laboratories provide. The scientists, the teachers, the skilled laborers, the administrators and the planners on whom tomorrow depends must be trained before tomorrow arrives. Children must go to school in ever-increasing numbers. Adults who have never written their names must be raised to the level of literacy. University facilities must be expanded and scientific, technical and vocational training must be provided of different kinds and in different fields.

All of this means more schools and an expansion of educational opportunities to reach more and more people with every passing month.

3. Agriculture

Half the people of Latin America live in rural areas.

Most of that rural life is still shackled by poverty and neglect. Agricultural productivity is still restricted by outdated methods and outmoded policies. Comprehensive programs and reforms must be accelerated to bring modern farming techniques to the campo.

We and our neighbors to the south en-

vision a dynamic Latin American agriculture which will help raise the standards of rural life.

We envision a sufficient increase in the production of food to provide for their growing populations—and to help meet world needs as well.

We envision a modernization of farming policies and techniques which will lead to a healthy competitive climate for food production.

4. Health

Finally, we will strive harder than ever before to improve the health of all the people.

The battle against diseases that kill and cripple will be intensified.

Programs to make safe water supply and essential sanitation services available to all will be accelerated.

Nutrition levels for poor children and their parents will be advanced.

These are the problems we face together, and the promises we envision together, as we prepare for Punta del Este.

The problems are real. But the promises are also real. They are not empty visions. They are all within our reach. They will not be accomplished quickly or easily. But they are objectives worthy of the support of all our people.

Increased Assistance

In keeping with the spirit of our commitment under the Alliance for Progress and after a careful review of the objectives which our Latin American neighbors have set for themselves, I believe that we should pledge increased financial assistance in the years ahead.

The fundamental principle which has guided us in the past—demonstrated need and self-help—will continue to shape our actions in the future.

I recommend that Congress approve a commitment to increase our aid by up to \$1.5 billion or about \$300 million per year over the next 5 years.

It must not be at the expense of our

efforts in other parts of this troubled world.

This amount will be in addition to the \$1 billion we have been annually investing in the future of Latin American democracy, since the Alliance for Progress began 6 years ago. The total value of our economic assistance, even after the proposed increases, will still be only a fraction of the resources the Latin American nations are themselves investing.

The \$1.5 billion increase I propose must be considered an approximate figure. Its precise determination will depend on steps which the Latin American nations themselves must take. But even so, we can project in a general way what will be necessary:

1. Agriculture, Education, and Health

Approximately \$900 million of this increase should be used over the next 5 years to train teachers and build new laboratories and classrooms; to increase food production and combat the malnutrition which stunts the promise of young children; to fight disease and cure the ill.

\$100 million of this amount has been included in the fiscal 1968 budget totals. I will request that it be added to the new obligational authority of \$543 million already recommended for the Alliance for Progress.

For the next four fiscal years, the additional annual amount of some \$200 million is within the \$750 million authorization for the Alliance for Progress approved by Congress last year.

2. A Latin American Common Market

Approximately one-quarter to one-half billion dollars over a 3 to 5 year period, beginning about 1970, may be required to assist Latin America to move toward a common market.

Progress in this direction will require a period of transition. To help with this adjustment, assistance can be used to retrain workers, ease balance of payments problems, and stimulate intra-Latin American trade.

The members of the Alliance for Prog-

ress, including the United States, should be prepared to finance this assistance on an equitable matching basis.

I will ask Congress to authorize these funds only when the first essential steps toward a common market are taken.

3. Multi-National Projects—Communications, Roads, and River Systems

Approximately \$150 million over a 3-year period should provide additional funds to the Inter-American Bank's Fund for Special Operations. These increased contributions can help finance pre-investment studies and a portion of the cost of new multi-national projects:

—Roads to link the nations and people of Latin America.

—Modern communication networks to speed communications.

—Bridges to carry the fruits of commerce over river barriers; dams to stem the ravages of flood.

—Hydroelectric plants to provide a plentiful source of power for growth and prosperity.

We will request congressional authorization to provide this amount together with our regular \$250 million annual contribution for each of the next 3 years to the Inter-American Bank's Fund for Special Operations.

We expect our partners in the Bank to increase their contributions on a proportional basis.

Conclusion

For the nations participating, Punta del Este will be a returning. It was there, 6 years ago in that city by the sea, that the American nations framed the charter of the Alliance which unites the hopes of this hemisphere.

We will be bringing with us the accumulated wisdom shaped by the experience gained in the years that have intervened.

We have learned much. Our sister countries know, and know well, that the burden of the task is theirs, the decisions are

theirs, the initiative to build these new societies must be theirs. They know that the only road to progress is the road of self-help.

They know that our role can only be that of support, with our investment only a small portion of what they themselves contribute to their future.

This knowledge strengthens their own resolve, and their own commitment.

The people of the United States have learned, over the 6 years since that first conference at Punta del Este, that the investment to which we pledged our support there is a good and honorable one.

It is an investment made in the spirit of our world view, so well described by a great American jurist, Learned Hand:

Right knows no boundaries, and justice no frontiers; the brotherhood of man is not a domestic institution.

That view of the world provides us with the knowledge that service is mutually rewarding. We have learned in the span of a generation that when we help others in a truly meaningful way, we serve our own vital interests as well.

I could go to the summit meeting with the President's executive authority and reach understandings with our Latin American neighbors on behalf of this country. I believe it is much more in our democratic tradition if the Executive and the Congress work together as partners in this matter.

I am, therefore, going to you in the Congress not after a commitment has been made, but before making any commitment. I seek your guidance and your counsel. I

have already met with some 40 of your leaders.

I am asking the entire Congress and the American people to consider thoroughly my recommendations. I will look to their judgment and support as I prepare for our Nation's return to Punta del Este.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE, *March 13, 1967.*

President Hails Senate Action on U.S.-Soviet Consular Pact

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release dated March 16

In giving its advice and consent to the ratification of the consular convention¹ today [March 16], the Senate acted in the best tradition of American government. The impressive vote for ratification was the product not only of strong bipartisan leadership but also of responsible action by the membership.

The convention will provide important measures to protect Americans traveling in the Soviet Union. Last year more than 18,000 of our citizens visited the U.S.S.R. These measures will become applicable as soon as the treaty enters into force.

I hope the Soviet Government will now move promptly to ratify the convention and that arrangements will be made for its early entry into force.

¹ S. Ex. D, 88th Cong., 2d sess.; for text, see BULLETIN of June 22, 1964, p. 979.

"March 12th is . . . a proud anniversary. Years from now men will still mark this date, and the man whose Doctrine gave it meaning."

20th Anniversary of the Truman Doctrine

Following are texts of a letter from President Johnson to former President Truman and his messages to King Constantine of Greece and President Cevdet Sunay of Turkey on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Truman Doctrine.

LETTER TO FORMER PRESIDENT TRUMAN

White House press release dated March 11

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On this day—as on so many others—those who love freedom will once again honor your name.

Twenty years ago you went before the Congress and summoned the American people to a great endeavor: that of helping free peoples to "maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes."¹

With that message you served two great functions of the Presidency—those of the teacher and the leader. You related the struggle of the Greek people against armed terrorism to the national security of the United States. You recognized that totalitarian regimes, imposed upon free peoples by direct or indirect aggression, "undermine the foundations of international peace." And you called upon the Congress and the American people to help resist that aggression.

Today America is again engaged in helping to turn back armed terrorism. As in your day, there are those who believe that effort is too costly. As on other occasions during the

¹ For a message delivered by President Truman before a joint session of the Congress on Mar. 12, 1947, see BULLETIN Supplement of May 4, 1947, p. 829.

past twenty years, there are those who counsel us that the stakes are not high enough, nor the danger near enough, to warrant our involvement.

But our people have learned that freedom is not divisible; that order in the world is vital to our national interest; and that the highest costs are paid not by those who meet their responsibilities, but by those who ignore them.

You helped to teach those lessons, Mr. President. Just as importantly, you had the courage and the determination to put them into practice: in Greece and Turkey, in Berlin, in Korea, and in other parts of the world where today men are free and prospering because of what you did.

March 12th is thus a proud anniversary. Years from now men will still mark this date, and the man whose Doctrine gave it meaning.

With best wishes for your health and happiness.

Devotedly,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

The Honorable HARRY S. TRUMAN
Independence, Missouri

MESSAGE TO KING CONSTANTINE

White House press release dated March 11

Twenty years ago today, President Harry S. Truman asked the American people to help the Greek nation preserve its freedom. Before a joint session of the Congress, he declared:

I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

The message and the program he conveyed on that historic occasion became known as the Truman Doctrine.

In commemoration of that decisive hour, in thanksgiving for his courage and vision, and in celebration of the friendship that endures between our peoples, I extend to you and the citizens of Greece my warm greetings and best wishes. In this I am joined by every American who rejoices that Greece is today free and prospering.

President Truman recognized that the security of the United States was intimately related to that of Greece. He warned our people—who, like yours, had just emerged from a savage conflict with another terrorist aggression—that

We shall not realize our objectives unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.

The American people responded to his call for assistance to a people struggling to be free—and their decision has affected, not only the security of your great nation, but the security of the world for two decades.

I am aware of the sacrifices made by the Greek people in the past 20 years. I am proud of the fact that throughout that period, the United States and Greece have worked together in close partnership toward common goals. I revere the Greek spirit, that for thousands of years has inspired the world, and that has taught men to cherish freedom above all else in life.

Today we mark a moment in man's long quest for freedom. I salute you and your people on this proud anniversary, and I look forward to a future of continued friendship and cooperation between our nations.

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT SUNAY

White House press release dated March 11

On the twentieth anniversary of the Truman Doctrine, I extend to you and to the Turkish people my good wishes. Then as now, the American people admire the vitality and the passion for freedom of the Turkish people. Then as now, the United States is proud of its association with the forward-looking Turkish nation.

Turkey has been a sturdy ally in NATO and CENTO. Its men played an unforgettable part with the United Nations forces which assured that aggression would not succeed in Korea.

With its security assured by its own courage and efforts, united with those of its allies, Turkey has moved forward remarkably in economic and social development. The vision of a modern Turkey, not only loyal to its own traditions and ambitions, but also a creative part of the world of contemporary science, technology, and industry, has been brought measurably closer to reality.

The visit you will soon be making to the United States affords an opportunity to give added meaning to that association. It will also serve as a symbol of the importance of the partnership of our two great republics. Mrs. Johnson and I are looking forward to welcoming you and Mrs. Sunay.

U.S. and Korea Pledge Continued Friendship and Cooperation

Prime Minister Il Kwon Chung of Korea visited the United States March 12-17. He met with President Johnson and other U.S. officials at Washington March 14-15. Following are an exchange of greetings between President Johnson and Prime Minister Chung, their exchange of toasts at a White House luncheon, and a joint statement issued at the close of their talks on March 14.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS

White House press release dated March 14

President Johnson

It is now almost 17 years since that June day when the invader struck at South Korea. For a few, time has erased the meaning of that day and all that followed. But for most Americans, it remains as clear as it was to President Harry Truman when he said:

In my generation, this was not the first occasion when the strong had attacked the weak. I recalled some earlier instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria. I remembered how each time that the democracies failed to act it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead. . . . I felt certain that . . . if the Communists were permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free world, no small nation would have the courage to resist threats and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors. If this was allowed to go unchallenged it would mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought on the second world war. It was also clear to me that the foundations and the principles of the United Nations were at stake unless this unprovoked attack on Korea could be stopped.

Mr. Prime Minister, the attack was stopped—and we have had 15 years to see the results.

The Korean people, whom you so proudly represent here today, have strengthened and

developed the independence that was once so dearly bought. They have moved forward, slowly at first and with some uncertainty, to meet problems that seemed to defy all solution.

I remember how depressed and discouraged all of us were at the future of Korea in the darkest days of the war, and I remember the prognostications and the prophecies of the cynics of that hour.

But would that we all look at South Korea today.

There is freedom of speech and a free press. There are free elections—and I understand you are about to have another soon.

Economically, Korea has made amazing progress.

A leading Western financial publication recently picked Korea as the developing country with “the best all-around national performance in 1966 in the world of economics and finance.”

Your rate of economic growth is close to 12 percent.

You are approaching self-sufficiency in food.

You set \$250 million as your export goal last year—and you reached and surpassed that goal.

The world knows what Koreans are doing with their freedom and their independence.

I don't mean to imply that you have solved all your economic and social problems, because we all know that you have not. Nor have we. No one really has. But the Korean economy has “taken off”—as one of my advisers is frequently fond of saying.

Korea's freedom is a consequence, above all, of Korean fortitude and courage. But the Korean people recognize that it is the result, too, of the heroism and sacrifice of their

friends. They know that freedom brings responsibilities as well as rights.

So they have begun to turn their attention from purely national needs and goals to the broader problems of Asia and the world. Korean initiative in launching the Asian and Pacific Council has been recognized and admired by all.

And today Koreans are fighting in the defense of another brave people. Once again we work side by side together—we fight together—against aggression. Once again we shall prove that it can be turned back by the courageous determination of free men.

In peace, as in war, we have joined our efforts—in the Asian Development Bank, in cooperative efforts to improve food production, in transportation, and in education and health measures throughout Asia.

Mr. Prime Minister, our peoples are linked by the strongest bonds of friendship. They were forged in the savagery and sorrow of war. They have been tested now in the challenges of peace.

The value of this friendship is beyond words. It is one of those benefits that come to men and nations all too rarely.

Mrs. Johnson and I extend our very warmest welcome to you and to all the distinguished members of your party.

I eagerly look forward to our exchange of views today and tomorrow.

I hope this visit to our country will be one of your most pleasant, one of your most interesting, and one of the most memorable journeys among us. We are delighted to have you. Thank you for having come.

Prime Minister Chung

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: It is with great pleasure and a sense of privilege that I receive the warm welcome extended to me and my party today.

First of all, I have the honor of conveying best regards from the President and Mrs. Park to you and Mrs. Johnson and to all the people of the United States of America.

Also, I am most happy to visit once again this Capital City of the United States, for which I have a profound feeling of friendli-

ness. I have no adequate words to express the pleasure I feel as I see you once again, having come by that firm bridge of good faith and friendship which was strengthened by the exchange of visits by our heads of state.

Mr. President, under your great and inspiring leadership, the freedom-loving spirit of the Founding Fathers of the United States and the glorious history of the American struggle for the preservation of freedom shine bright in all parts of the world.

Today, a new chapter in the history of the United States is being written on the unswerving efforts of the American people, who are determined to crush, with faith and courage, violence and aggression and to establish world peace in the true sense through perseverance and tolerance.

I am most happy to say that the entire people of the Republic of Korea have a deep respect and are grateful for the great contributions being made by the American people.

Mr. President, the Republic of Korea and the United States of America are the allies bound together for the common cause. Our traditional ties of friendship have been strengthened further over the last few years.

Today, the spirit of cooperation between our two countries is evident not only in the battlefield but in all our mutual endeavors, which are aimed at the establishment of a new world of prosperity in peace and freedom.

I pledge here that as a trusted ally of the United States the Republic of Korea will share all the adversities we may encounter in our joint endeavor.

Mr. President, as you have witnessed in person, my country is advancing under the leadership of President Park to a better, brighter tomorrow. The "Land of Morning Calm" is today full of vigor, vitality, and promise of a modern, self-sustaining future.

The assistance and cooperation rendered by the people of the United States since the end of World War II have borne full fruit in a land that was once plagued with despair and devastation.

It is with the utmost pleasure that I convey to the people of the United States the warmest gratitude of the people of the Republic of Korea.

We are today marching ahead with constancy and hope toward a bright future, ever thankful to the American people for helping them make this progress possible.

Mr. President, I am looking forward with joy in my heart to meeting with you and other leaders of your Government during my visit. We will discuss in all sincerity and frankness those problems of mutual interest which confront us today, with a view to strengthening the existing ties of friendship between our two countries.

Once again, I wish to express my gratitude to you, Mr. President, for this warm welcome extended to me and my party. Thank you.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS

White House press release dated March 14

President Johnson

This morning I had the privilege of welcoming you, Mr. Prime Minister, to the United States of America.

Now it is a very great pleasure to welcome you to my home.

Around us here today you will see many people who know your country well. And each of them is a friend of Korea.

Although I was in your country only a very short time, the visit last fall was one of the most memorable and the most heart-warming that I have ever known.

Mrs. Johnson and I shall never forget—and everyone with us will remember—the warmth, the spontaneity, the hospitality of the Korean people. I can still hear the rustling of countless small flags—Korean and American—that welcomed us in Seoul. I can still see those schoolboy posters all along your streets and the open friendliness in the faces of those who held them.

We knew, of course, that your country was called the Land of the Morning Calm. And

we found it to be so—in the early morning when the mists are rising off the rivers.

But it is not long before the air is filled with the sounds of men building and planting and producing, of little children reciting their lessons in the school, of the whole countryside coming awake and work being done.

I was struck by the evidence of economic growth and vigor that I saw everywhere we looked. Koreans were working to make a better society—to insure that all of the people shared in the fruits of their economic growth.

So both of us would like to cultivate our gardens in peace. We would like to make them bloom as they have never bloomed before—to create and to enjoy the blessings of prosperity, to enlarge the possibilities of a dignified and meaningful life.

But in our world even the most remote nations are often barred from cultivating their gardens in peace.

It is a world where peace and freedom and justice are constantly in jeopardy.

It is a world where men, if they will not stand up, may be forced to kneel.

Neither Koreans nor Americans kneel gracefully before conquerors or before aggressors.

It is a world where responsibilities are heavy for those who are willing to shoulder the burden of responsibility.

We carried that burden together in the defense of South Korea. We carry it together as we meet here today, in the defense of South Viet-Nam. We shall continue to carry it until ambitious men recognize that aggression and terror are futile and outdated weapons in relations between peoples and nations.

We shall continue together because, as President Harry Truman said more than 15 years ago:¹

All free nations are exposed and all are in peril. Their only security lies in banding together. No one

¹ For President Truman's state of the Union message on Jan. 8, 1951, see BULLETIN of Jan. 22, 1951, p. 123.

nation can find protection in a selfish search for a safe haven from the storm.

In going to the assistance of others—as our Korean friends know so well—America does not seek to dominate or control. We do not seek national grandeur or special privilege.

What we seek—in cooperation with like-minded nations like Korea—is the basis for a lasting peace, a peace with justice, not the peace of the grave but the peace of life, where men are free and able to shape their own future.

Today, together, we fight. But even as we do, we work together in a multitude of ways to improve the quality of the life of our own people and of others in the world.

And when real peace comes, as it will come, I know we shall continue to work—together and with others—to better the world we have inherited and helped to preserve.

Mr. Prime Minister, we are delighted that you are with us today.

In the spirit of our deep friendship and admiration for a very brave people, I ask all of those who have come here today to join me in a toast: To His Excellency, the President of the Republic of Korea—and to the continued prosperity and freedom of the Korean people.

Prime Minister Chung

Mr. President, Mr. Vice President, ladies and gentlemen: I wish to extend my heartfelt gratitude to you for your warm address and for this wonderful luncheon for me and my party.

After 4 years, I am indeed happy to visit this country once again.

I was moved by the marvelous aerial view of this great city, which has become more beautiful and splendid than I remembered. Here again as I find myself in this amicable and congenial company of old friends, I am at a loss for adequate words to express my deep emotion.

Mr. President, as I stand here, I have a vivid memory of the cheers of millions of

people on the streets of Seoul who, with flags in their hands, welcomed you to Korea last autumn.

I am sure that you personally felt then the admiration and appreciation of the Korean people. As a great leader, you have the mission of protecting freedom. You are armed with unflinching courage and a strong belief in justice. These are qualities we Koreans know are needed at this critical time in history.

Mr. President and distinguished guests, as President Park has stated before, we have been trying very hard to be a nation which stands by its friends and repays its obligations. We know well that real gratitude is more properly expressed by deeds rather than by words.

I am very proud to declare that the sacrifices and efforts made by American people in Korea have not been wasted.

Mr. President, you stated in Seoul² that self-esteem gives to a people confidence, a strong confidence, without which a people can accomplish little and with which they can surmount any obstacles.

Today, we are full of this confidence; my people are overcoming all difficulties and marching toward a hopeful tomorrow.

During the past several years, under the inspiring leadership of President Park, we Korean people have achieved political stability and economic progress.

According to 1966 statistics of our economic growth, the per capita income reached \$123; the total amount of exports, \$250 million; and the foreign reserves, close to \$230 million.

I know well that these figures are not so big as to surprise any one of you. Nevertheless, these figures are really encouraging to us, because comparing them with those of 5 years ago, you will discover that some of them have almost doubled and still others have increased almost 10 times.

Mr. President and distinguished guests, the Korean people, who in the past were

² For President Johnson's toast at a state dinner at Seoul on Oct. 31, 1966, see *ibid.*, Nov. 21, 1966, p. 771.

negative and resistant, have now become one of the free nations in the world, pursuing a course of affirmation and positive contribution. In other words, today we ask ourselves what we can do as an ally of the United States and what we can do as a free nation in Asia. At the same time we ask what we can contribute to the freedom and peace of all mankind.

We are growing today. We sent our troops to the Republic of Viet-Nam, normalized our relations with Japan, and hosted the ministerial meeting for Asian and Pacific cooperation.

We participated in the Manila Summit Conference and took part in the establishment of the Asian Development Bank. These are some of the tangible results recently achieved through the strength and confidence of the people of Korea.

Mr. President, today the Asian countries, including Korea, are facing, as President Franklin Roosevelt pointed out in his statement of four freedoms, the tasks of achieving freedom from fear and freedom from want.

We have learned that freedom in the 20th century can only be obtained through cooperation among peoples.

Your address delivered at Johns Hopkins University³ is a most important and historical declaration, clarifying the goals of the United States in Asia.

Particularly, your grand designs for everlasting peace and promotion of the well-being of the suffering peoples in Asia and firm attitude against injustice and fear have brought to the Asian people new hope and new courage, inspiring them with a sense of purpose.

Today, the Korean people admire you as a defender of freedom and peace and as an architect of the happiness of mankind.

Also, on this occasion I wish to express my profound respect and appreciation to the American people. Their contributions since the Second World War helped bring freedom to Korea and other nations in Asia.

Mr. President, we Korean people have developed into a trusted nation of the free Asia. We share our joys and sorrows with the American people, who have always been with us, not only in the darkness of despair but also in the bright morning of hope.

Finally, I express once again my heartfelt gratitude to you and my sincere hope for your continued friendship and assistance.

Distinguished gentlemen, may I ask you to join me in a toast to the magnificent contribution of President Johnson to mankind, to the health of President and Mrs. Johnson, and to the everlasting prosperity and happiness of the American people.

JOINT STATEMENT

White House press release dated March 14

Prime Minister Il Kwon Chung of the Republic of Korea arrived in Washington on March 14 at the invitation of President Johnson. The President and the Prime Minister met on March 14 and exchanged views on matters of mutual concern to the two governments. Also present were Minister of National Defense Sung Eun Kim, Minister of Commerce and Industry Chung Hun Park, Secretary General to the President Hu Rak Lee, Ambassador Hyun Chul Kim, Under Secretary of State Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, Special Assistant to the President Walt W. Rostow, and Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Samuel D. Berger. The Prime Minister brought with him a personal message to President Johnson from President Park Chung Hee.

President Johnson extended his congratulations to President Park on the remarkable progress achieved by the Korean people in recent years and the encouraging prospects for continued progress in various fields of national life in Korea.

President Johnson expressed the continuing admiration of the American people for the courage and prowess of the Korean forces on the field of battle in Viet-Nam and for their effective endeavors to promote the welfare of the Vietnamese populace. President Johnson indicated the importance he attaches to the combat capabilities of these forces and the steps being taken to strengthen these capabilities further with improved equipment. The Prime Minister stated his impressions of the current situation in Viet-Nam gained during his recent visit there. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that efforts to bring about a just and lasting peace must be constantly pursued but reaffirmed the determination of their two governments to continue vigorously the military struggle in Viet-Nam until

³ *Ibid.*, Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

the North Vietnamese are willing to enter into meaningful negotiations for peace. They affirmed that their two governments would continue to act in closest consultation on both these matters. Recalling that the United States Government has pledged to give special support to the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam on peaceful development, including the latter government's revolutionary development programs, and that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has requested the Korean Government to render assistance for the same programs, President Johnson and Prime Minister Chung agreed that their two governments will, in close consultation and coordination among themselves and with the Government of Viet-Nam, jointly render cooperation and assistance to the successful implementation of the peaceful development activities including the Government of Viet-Nam's revolutionary development program.

The President and the Prime Minister reviewed the recent series of incidents on land and sea in and near the Demilitarized Zone in Korea in which both ROK and U.S. units have suffered casualties from unprovoked attacks by North Korean forces. They agreed on the need for maintaining constant vigilance against the threat of renewed aggression against the Republic of Korea. They further agreed that in view of this continuing threat modernization of the Korean armed forces should be continued as rapidly as legislative and budgetary limitations will permit. President Johnson reaffirmed the readiness and determination of the United States to render prompt and effective assistance to defeat an armed attack against the Republic of Korea, in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. President Johnson assured Prime Minister Chung that the United States would continue to support the Korean armed forces at levels adequate to ensure Korea's security.

Prime Minister Chung reviewed his government's economic objective, as set forth in its Second Five Year Economic Development Plan. President Johnson expressed the admiration of the American people for the striking progress made by the Korean Government and people during recent years in increasing gross national product, industrial output, agricultural production, exports, and domestic revenues. President Johnson reaffirmed to Prime Minister Chung his previous assurances that the United States would continue to support the economic growth of the Republic of Korea, and in particular, to assist in the achievement of the goals of the second Five Year Plan. Further development loans will constitute one form of such support. He noted also that a consultative group of friendly governments, including the United States, and international lending institutions has been formed to coordinate the provisions of development funds to the Republic of Korea.

Prime Minister Chung expressed gratification over

the imminent visit of the private trade and investment mission to Korea under the leadership of Mr. George W. Ball. He assured President Johnson that the trade mission would be warmly welcomed in Korea, in keeping with the desire of both governments to expand trade between the two nations and to promote American private investment in Korea. President Johnson reaffirmed the United States Government interest in furthering the growth of trade between the Republic of Korea and the United States and stressed the importance of periodic meetings between appropriate United States officials and their Korean counterparts. It was agreed that the Minister of Commerce and Industry and the Secretary of Commerce meet annually for this purpose. He also assured the Prime Minister that the United States would cooperate with the Republic of Korea to bring promptly to the attention of American private business interests the opportunities and possibilities for investment in Korea, both through commercial loans and joint business ventures.

President Johnson and Prime Minister Chung reaffirmed the conviction of their two governments that existing regional organizations and institutions in the Pacific area should be strengthened and developed, with the ultimate objective of creating a new Pacific Community, open to all nations prepared to live at peace and to cooperate and work for the welfare of the people of Asia and the Pacific, as agreed by Presidents Johnson and Park in their joint statement in Seoul in November, 1966.⁴ President Johnson and Prime Minister Chung recalled the goals of freedom as declared by the seven heads of state at Manila last October⁵ and Prime Minister Chung reaffirmed the determination of the government of the Republic of Korea to continue its efforts towards accelerating the growth of a Pacific Community. President Johnson expressed appreciation for the initiative and important contributions made by the Republic of Korea in the evolution of the Pacific Community. He stressed the importance of solidarity and mutual support among the countries in the region and expressed the readiness of the United States Government to play its part in developing the Pacific Community.

President Johnson and Prime Minister Chung reaffirmed the strong ties of friendship and mutual interest between the Republic of Korea and the United States and pledged themselves anew to the maintenance and strengthening of those ties and to continued cooperation between their two governments in the economic, political, and military fields.

On behalf of the members of his party and the Korean people, Prime Minister Chung expressed his deepest appreciation to President Johnson for the warm reception and for the hospitality extended to him by President Johnson and the United States.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Nov. 21, 1966, p. 777.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1966, p. 730.

U.S. Investment and Trade Mission Visits Korea

President Johnson announced on March 10 (White House press release) that 27 U.S. business and financial leaders will visit Korea March 18–24 to stimulate American private investment and to promote increased U.S.–Korean trade.

This mission is the result of an agreement between President Johnson and President Chung Hee Park in Seoul last November for an exchange between the two nations to discuss these aims.¹ The two Presidents noted that the stability and progress of the Korean economy should make these objectives possible.

At White House request, George W. Ball, former Under Secretary of State, organized and will lead this U.S. private investment and trade mission to Korea.² Members will be traveling at their own expense.

Before their departure the group will assemble in Washington on March 16 for briefings by State Department Agency for International Development, Commerce Department, and Export-Import Bank officials.

This mission leaves Washington on March 17 and will spend 7 days in Korea as guests of the Korean Government.³

Foreign Minister of Guinea Visits the United States

The Foreign Minister of Guinea, Louis-Lansana Beavogui, arrived at New York on March 6 for a visit to the United States of approximately 10 days. (For an announcement of the visit, see Department of State press release 45 dated March 6.) He was

¹ For text of a joint statement dated Nov. 2, see BULLETIN of Nov. 21, 1966, p. 777.

² For a White House announcement, see *ibid.*, Jan. 9, 1967, p. 69.

³ For names of the members of the mission, see White House press release dated Mar. 10.

accompanied by Mr. Mohammed Kassoury Bangoura, Director General of Technical Cooperation and Economic Matters, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

During the course of his visit, Foreign Minister Beavogui spent several days in Washington, where he conferred with the Secretary of State and other U.S. officials. He also visited Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

St. Lawrence Seaway Tolls To Remain at Present Levels

Department Announcement

Press release 56 dated March 13

The Department of State announced on March 13 agreement with Canada that there will be no increase in tolls on the St. Lawrence Seaway for at least four years.

The United States Government considers that in view of the rapid growth of traffic on the Seaway a toll increase is not necessary. Traffic on the Seaway reached record levels in 1966 and tonnage carried on the waterway exceeded for the first time the tonnage forecast.

The Seaway toll structure may be reviewed after four years at the request of either government.

United States and Canadian representatives also have agreed on an adjustment in the division of toll revenues under which Canada's share will be increased from 71 to 73 percent for the next four years. The United States–Canadian agreement of March 9, 1959,¹ on St. Lawrence Seaway tolls provided for adjustment of shares for the two countries in accordance with their relative costs, and the present adjustment reflects costs incurred in recent years.

¹ For an exchange of notes dated Mar. 9, 1959, and text of a memorandum of agreement, see BULLETIN of Mar. 30, 1959, p. 440.

Cotton in the World Trade Arena

by Anthony M. Solomon
*Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs*¹

I am honored to have this opportunity to participate in your 52d annual convention. As Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, I am delighted to pay testimony to the fact that your association has been closely and helpfully involved over the years in international commercial affairs. The cotton trade has a long and proud tradition in the trading history of our country. Your familiarity with both the problems and potentialities of international trade reflects this experience and heritage. And it is therefore no accident that from your ranks have arisen men who have been leaders in this field.

The Department of State's credentials also go back a long way. Our people have not plowed cottonfields in the ordinary course of their work, but they have met payrolls, so to speak, in other important ways.

Our first Ministers to Europe after we won independence, John Adams in Great Britain and Thomas Jefferson in France, put more time and effort into expanding our trade than on any other single activity. They worked to get better markets for what were then examples of our technologically advanced products—whale oil and whale-oil candles. More generally, they negotiated hard to remove discrimination against all our products in foreign markets and to reduce trade barriers on a reciprocal basis. We were a have-not nation then, and we knew

that we had to export agricultural products to buy the machinery and equipment we needed from abroad.

The men who followed Adams and Jefferson in representing our country abroad have continued to work in the same vineyard. They sought to improve opportunities to sell our products, ranging from cotton to computers, and to widen areas of reciprocal trade. At home our position has been much the same. It is a source of pride for me today to recall that one of my most distinguished predecessors and a leading architect of our present trade policy, Will Clayton, came to his public work from a background in cotton.

In the first days of our history this policy stemmed from the premise that we could most effectively realize our potentialities as a nation as part of the world economy rather than in economic isolation. This fundamental proposition is the more valid today when by our very size and power we have far-reaching and inescapable responsibilities for defending peace and strengthening freedom throughout the world.

My purpose today is to talk about international trade problems and cotton policy. What are our international trade objectives, and are they, or should they be, different for cotton? I propose first to comment briefly on the status of our efforts in the trade field; second, to examine the cotton trade in the context of this trade policy; and third, to explore with you the current status and future prospects of cotton as we see them now.

We have done much in the two decades

¹ Address made before the Southern Cotton Association at Memphis, Tenn., on Mar. 10 (press release 53 dated Mar. 9).

since World War II to dismantle the network of barriers that throttled trade in the suspicious world of the thirties. As a result, the volume of world trade has grown faster than at any time in this century. Trade has become a positive and dynamic factor in the rapid recovery and expansion of the free-world economy.

We seek to continue this move toward a free and open world trading system based on the principle of nondiscrimination and a minimum of restrictions on the flow of goods, capital, and services across national boundaries. Such a system promotes the growth of all. It encourages specialization, the development and exchange of technology, and growing productivity. It provides the competitive environment essential for a new generation of ideas, technology, and trade patterns. These results serve the interests of all trading nations; they clearly are in the commercial, economic, and even strategic interest of the United States.

One of the important lessons we learned from the disastrous experience of the interwar period is that attempts by nations to solve their problems at the expense of others are self-defeating. In the end, everybody loses. Conversely, experience has also shown that the wider the area and the more numerous the commodities moving on a freely traded basis, the more all can benefit.

These are the premises underlying our actions in the trade field—and they are all familiar to you. To lose sight of them for short-term or narrow considerations would penalize the most efficient segments of U.S. agriculture and industry and, in the end, the overall national interest. Fortunately, the competitive character of the U.S. economic environment, and the receptiveness of our producers to change, support a generally outward-looking posture on international trade.

In the day-to-day dealings with foreign countries on specific trade issues and in negotiations in GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], the U.N., or other international organizations, many considerations must go into the determination of what constitutes the national interest. One factor

weighing heavily in this determination is the welfare of domestic producers and traders—their production capabilities, costs, employment, and income. It is for this reason that we have frequent and thorough discussions of specific trade issues with representatives of U.S. industry, labor, and trade.

Budgetary and balance-of-payments considerations are also involved. The constraints of our balance-of-payments position in recent years have made it essential that we assess carefully the foreign exchange consequences of actions affecting our exports. And the relation of budgetary considerations to the fight against inflation is self-evident.

Foreign policy considerations are a third general factor. Expanding trade on multilateral principles requires that we adhere to the rules of the game. In addition, consideration must be given to the problems of developing countries if they are to play their role in reciprocal trade and make satisfactory economic progress. For these reasons, work on specific trade issues requires consultations with representatives of the governments of foreign producers of our export commodities.

Kennedy Round Negotiations

In 1962 the Congress authorized us in the Trade Expansion Act to speed up the process of reducing tariff and nontariff barriers to trade. The Kennedy Round negotiations, which are the vehicle for this effort, will shortly reach a climax. The next few weeks will tell how well we will succeed.

On industrial items, substantial and mutually beneficial offers have been put on the table by all participants. Difficult issues remain in key sectors. Their resolution will require some give-and-take, but above all it will require that all participants recognize once again that their individual self-interest in fact lies in an environment that insures the continued and rapid expansion of world trade.

We recognized from the first that the Kennedy Round agricultural negotiations would be difficult. Agricultural support systems are complicated, varied—and every-

where. Agricultural protective devices are also legion. Nevertheless, the entire Western trading world agreed in Geneva on the goal of liberalizing agricultural trade.

I am sure you appreciate the nature of the negotiating difficulties. Societies such as our own have deep roots in, and complex commitments to, their agricultural sectors. Over time these have resulted in government regulations and techniques of agricultural support going well beyond tariffs. The techniques are very difficult to change in a short time. They are closely related to arrangements which effectively control the price as well as the volume of imports. As we have learned in Geneva and in other agricultural discussions, understanding the nature and consequences of each of these systems is in itself a major enterprise.

We understand the social and political pressures and needs which have brought these arrangements to their present state of development. We have accepted for many years the need of our own farmers for governmental assistance in production and marketing. We recognize that for some time to come governments will continue to give special assistance to agriculture. We seek, however, in the Kennedy Round, to reach agreement on restricting the application of these systems so as to assure an expansion in world agricultural trade. To do this, governments must be willing to subject policies that historically were considered to be of purely domestic concern to international discussion, coordination, and agreement.

Problems of Cotton in World Trade

Unlike the problems of many sectors of our agricultural economy, the problems of cotton in world trade do not arise from difficulties of access to markets, to which I have been alluding. They arise primarily from the capacity of world cotton producers to place on world markets ever-increasing quantities of cotton in the face of severe competition from manmade fibers and a relatively slow growth in the consumption of cotton products. But governments have contributed to the difficulties and may do so again.

U.S. cotton programs in the past have not been as effective as they should have been in dealing with a situation of chronic oversupply. Support policies have concentrated on prices and thus have tended to foster uneconomic production patterns, delay readjustments, and discourage consumption. In an effort to offset the effects of these policies on our exports we resorted to export subsidies. To offset the effect on consumption we made payments to processors.

More recently, of course, our policies took a more positive turn. We replaced the system of support prices by a more rational and effective program which permits market prices to find their competitive levels. Our present farm supports, which take the form of direct payments to producers, are proving to be more effective in adjusting production to requirements.

We have one problem other cotton producers do not share because we are willing, as a Government, to hold stocks of cotton. We do so as part of our policy to assist cotton farmers. As you know, many countries grow and export cotton. With the single exception of the United States, these are developing countries. Cotton is the number-one export of 9 of such countries and ranks among the three most important exports of 17 countries. These countries in recent years have increased their share in world cotton production, consumption, and exports. They do not have the economic strength and resources, however, to hold cotton from one year to the next but market their annual production each year.

As a result of our price-support programs operating in concert with our willingness to take supplies off the market, we have become, to a certain degree, the residual supplier of the world commercial market.

It is in this context that I propose to review the developments in the cotton situation since our 1965 legislation went into effect and to hazard some speculations about the future.

At the start of the current marketing year last summer, the situation was discouraging. Stocks in the United States were at a record

high, stocks in foreign exporting countries were the highest in a decade, but stocks in importing countries were in the third year of decline. Foreign production had been growing steadily, creating a further imbalance in supply. Prices of upland cotton continued to weaken, but world trade in cotton was stagnant. In contrast, manmade fiber production and sales set new records.

Here in the United States production was stable at a level well above disappearance, despite the many years of acreage control. By the end of the last crop year, U.S. stocks were almost 17 million bales, equivalent to over a year's production; and 88 percent of the carryover was in CCC [Commodity Credit Corporation] inventory. Exports last year were sharply off from prior levels, less than 3 million bales. Anticipation of the new program aggravated the situation that developed by July 31, 1966. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the prior U.S. program had failed to solve some of the basic problems of U.S. cotton marketing and had made others worse.

Cotton Situation Improving

The 1965 legislation² was designed to deal with this situation. Its aims were: to move cotton into trade for domestic consumption and export; reduce use of the CCC price-support loan program; reduce domestic production; gradually liquidate CCC stocks with minimum adverse effects for current production of our growers; reduce CCC's role in merchandising cotton; and make and keep U.S. cotton competitive with cotton from other exporting countries.

The situation has improved greatly in less than a year. Some aspects are radically changed. Our own production declined sharply, partly as a consequence of bad weather but chiefly in response to the acreage limitations and payments provided by the new law. Production was well below disappearance. Domestic consumption has risen,

² P.L. 89-321.

and exports have been encouraging. In the first 7 months of this marketing year, exports surpassed those in the entire 1965-66 marketing year. The carryover will show a sharp decline. CCC is now practically out of the merchandising of the better qualities of cotton and prices for these types are being determined in the marketplace. Price differentials for less desirable qualities of cotton have widened, again in response to market demand. As a result of these developments, many of our cotton farmers have better incomes, the CCC has lower costs, and the taxpayer benefits.

The world cotton situation has also improved. Foreign production is down, foreign acreage declined last year by over 1 million acres, consumption is up, and trade is higher. The progress made this year suggests that a balance between cotton supply and demand is attainable.

The increase in exports is gratifying. Further improvement in the level of U.S. exports is desirable and possible if we produce what the world needs. Secretary [of Agriculture Orville L.] Freeman expressed the hope a year ago that the U.S. would export at least 17 million bales in the first 3 years of the program. Our record this year encourages hope that this expectation will materialize.

But the progress made in this first year under the 1965 legislation and the improved world situation should not obscure the fact that U.S. cotton still faces some difficult problems. Our experience this year indicates that there is room in the world market for additional quantities of U.S. cotton. But our own production must be responsive to the market. There is doubt in the market that our supplies of better qualities will be sufficient to meet domestic and foreign demand. At the same time, the U.S. Government continues to purchase and store large amounts of poorer qualities, for which the demand is limited.

The shift in demand to longer staple lengths is a worldwide phenomenon. It is particularly challenging to U.S. producers at

this time. The problem can be solved through intelligent cooperation of government, producers, and shippers and through further adjustments in our cotton program. Loan rate discounts and differentials that reflect the new market situation can be an important means of moving toward a better balance of qualities. Further adjustments will have to be made in our cotton support programs to give more elbowroom to those of our producers who can produce high-quality cotton at low cost. The increased demand for certain alternative crops, such as soybeans and feedgrains, should facilitate these adjustments.

Need for Responsible Price Policy

There are some who see price cutting as the panacea to our cotton problems. My own view is that attempts to dump our production and stocks on the world market would not solve our cotton problems and would be contrary to our overall trade objectives. They could only result in a serious disruption of world markets which would be disadvantageous to us all. I wish to make clear the facts and analysis that underlie this conclusion.

Cotton's prospects have been carefully examined in a Department of Agriculture report entitled "Analysis of Factors Affecting U.S. Cotton Exports." The Department of Agriculture estimates that a 1-cent reduction in world cotton prices would increase free-world consumption of cotton by about 135,000 bales above the trend and reduce the average annual growth in foreign free-world production by about 100,000 bales. This is a very rough estimate. It makes no allowance for future changes in the relative prices of the fibers that compete with cotton, nor can it tell us how cotton growers in less developed countries will behave at different price levels than those that have recently been experienced. It points up, however, that price cuts cannot be expected to increase U.S. cotton exports by large amounts. Our present evidence suggests that even a cut in price of

as much as 4 cents from present levels would not increase the volume of exports sufficiently to make up for the reduction in price. On the other hand, such a price reduction would increase the budgetary cost of our cotton program.

A major reason for the small response to price cuts is the limited ability of cotton growers in developing countries to shift to other crops. Farmers in these countries do not have the skills, training, or capital to respond quickly to changes in the market; they cannot easily apply new techniques to their land and explore new market opportunities. Such adjustments take far longer than they do in the United States and require a combination of price incentives, technical help, and capital assistance. For these reasons, cotton producers in foreign countries would be forced to meet cuts in our prices. For the same reasons, their production may well continue to grow in the future, although at a lower rate.

We must also consider the consequences for other countries of an unrestricted cotton price cutting policy in the United States. Such price cuts would seriously reduce the foreign exchange income of Latin American and other producing countries and require them to cut back their development effort under the Alliance for Progress and other programs which we strongly support. Furthermore, we would be charged with seeking to drive other producers from the market, not through the forces of competition but on the basis of government action.

It is essential that cotton producing countries that are presently unable to grow enough food to meet their own needs should examine whether they are making the best use of their agricultural resources. Those countries receiving food assistance from us have been asked to review governmental measures which provide undue incentives for the production of commercial crops in oversupply, such as cotton or coffee. We hope that uneconomic production of cotton will be

reduced or eliminated as governments give higher priority to food production.

Taking all these considerations into account, our goal should be a price policy which takes account of the realities of the market. Cotton has become a cheaper product relative to the general price level. This price trend is a reflection of improved technology in the production of cotton and the increasing competitiveness of manmade fibers.

No government should try to reverse these price trends. But it is not in our interest on the other hand that cotton—our cotton or that of other producing countries—be sold more cheaply than it need be to retain its markets. A price war would not be to our benefit or that of any other exporters.

International Exchanges of Views

A responsible price policy must be complemented by continuing efforts to improve the quality competitiveness of cotton. As I said earlier, much remains to be done to increase the production of high-quality cotton. More can be done to improve consumer acceptance of cotton and its use. The United States is pleased to be one of eight major cotton exporting countries that have adhered to the International Institute for Cotton and its promotion program.

Rational price policies, improvement of quality, promotion programs, are thus all necessary ingredients of a policy aiming at a more healthy balance of supply and demand. But all of these efforts could come to naught in the absence of responsible production policies. The United States has taken a major step forward under its new legislation. But this is not a problem for the United States alone. Other major cotton producing countries must adjust their production to market prospects. If the world cotton economy is to move steadily toward a healthy equilibrium, all major cotton producing countries should be prepared to submit their cotton policies to international scrutiny and to take any necessary corrective action.

This is a good time to begin. We moved closer to a worldwide cotton equilibrium this year because production went down both in the United States and abroad. A continued increase of 1 million bales a year in world consumption should make it possible to achieve a further reduction in U.S. stocks and further progress toward balance between world consumption and available supplies. But this balance can only be maintained if all major producing countries pursue responsible production policies.

The International Cotton Advisory Committee has been a useful forum for the examination of policies of member countries. This work should be intensified and extended to production plans. The Committee should consider more fully the consequences of measures its members expect to take and whether these actions are consistent with the market prospects. The Committee could also examine whether members who desire international advice and assistance can be helped to shift resources to other types of agricultural production.

This exchange of views could significantly contribute toward avoiding the excessive increases in world production that might cause a renewed buildup of surpluses and thereby confront all of us with more painful and costly alternatives. If, as a consequence, production and demand grow in rough parallel, we can avoid the instability of price and the frequent and unpredictable changes of policy which have imposed such severe burdens on cotton growers, traders, and governments of cotton growing countries.

In sum, our objective in cotton, as in other commodities, is to promote increased consumption, trade, and income. We believe we can achieve this objective through increasing reliance on market forces. It is essential, however, that government actions—both in the United States and abroad—insure that the movement toward balance in the world cotton economy is not reversed. I am confident that by moving in this direction we can meet our domestic needs in ways that are consistent with our responsibilities abroad.

United States Joins Dedication of Jidda Desalting Plant Site

by Stewart L. Udall
Secretary of the Interior¹

Let me commence by again thanking the Minister of Agriculture [Hassan Mishari] for the honor extended to me and my Government through his Government's invitation to visit Saudi Arabia and attend the dedication of the Jidda desalination plant. I am most happy to be present at this event, which is of great importance both for Saudi Arabia and the United States.

The decision to build this plant, which 2 years from now will begin to supply 5 million gallons daily of sweet water to the city of Jidda, represents the culmination of a long series of efforts in both your country and mine. For centuries man has dreamed of converting the limitless supplies of sea water to meet the needs of a thirsty world, but until recent years the possibility of achieving this goal without exorbitant costs seemed beyond reach. Only in recent years has the development of new technology brought the goal within our grasp.

In order to exploit new possibilities, the United States Congress in 1952 created the Office of Saline Water in the Department of Interior, which is under my supervision. Experimental plants have since been constructed both in the United States and abroad, each designed to lower the cost of providing sweet water through desalting.

These developmental efforts, however, are not confined to the United States. Many countries have been involved in the development of improved desalting technology. Our good friends in the United Kingdom have been leaders in the field. Every nation should place its talents in the drive to provide sweet water to the world's parched areas.

¹ Remarks made at Jidda, Saudi Arabia, on Feb. 5 on the occasion of the dedication of the site for the desalination plant for the city of Jidda.

In October 1965 the United States sponsored the First International Symposium on Water Desalination, in which Saudi Arabia joined over 60 other nations.² President Johnson announced the United States' intention to join "a massive cooperative international effort to find solutions for man's water problems."³ Conversations between Saudi Arabia and the United States at the time of the International Symposium led to an agreement through which the United States Department of Interior has since cooperated directly with the Saudi Arabian Government in planning the present plant now being designed and soon to be erected.

Many persons deserve commendation for the efforts which have brought this project to the verge of realization. The Jidda desalination plant is a reflection of the wise leadership of His Majesty King Faisal in his progressive program to bring peace and prosperity to the Saudi people.

From personal participation in negotiations, I am familiar with the great importance Minister Mishari has attached to this project and the unfailing attention which Prince Mohamed, as Director of the Saudi Saline Water Conversion Office, has given every step of the arrangements. Aside from the technical personnel of OSW, credit also goes to private consultants such as Jackson and Moreland and the engineers, Burns and Roe, now designing the project. The manufacture of equipment and actual construction of the plant is open to international bidding. This is truly a cooperative effort.

In the long and glorious history of Saudi Arabia, the dedication of Jidda desalination plant project is sure to be remembered as a milestone of progress. Fresh water and electric power to be produced here will satisfy the needs of Jidda's growing population for personal consumption and sanitation and

² For an address by Secretary Udall at the opening session of the symposium, see BULLETIN of Nov. 1, 1965, p. 716.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 720.

permit nourishing the area's gardens and livestock. The plant will also permit new industries, contributing to the region's prosperity. It is also important not only to this major city but as well to the nation of Saudi Arabia as a whole, for we trust the successful completion and operation of this plant will lead the way to similar and perhaps even larger plants elsewhere in this rapidly developing country.

This plant has another significance which cannot be overlooked. The people of all the world's arid countries are watching us today. If this project is successful, and I have no doubt that it will be, it will represent a major technical accomplishment to be studied and adapted time and again until in the course of technological progress the day arrives when mankind need no longer worry about the terrible problems of thirst.

For the present, however, the age-old problem of satisfying man's thirst and nourishing his flocks and fields remains with us. Concern is felt not only in desert countries. Even nations such as my own, once thought to have unlimited water resources, have come to realize that nature's abundance has limits. In the United States we find ourselves waging constant war against the shortage of water in all parts of the country. The struggle is being pursued on many fronts. In addition to the millions of dollars which have been spent to develop economical means to purify sea water—research which has culminated in the design of this plant—other expenditures amounting to billions of dollars have been invested in dam building, irrigation, flood control, and water purification.

Other nations increasingly are giving their attention to the proper management of their precious water resources. Your country wisely has concerned itself not only with the possibilities of desalination, as represented by the dedication of this site today, but also is engaged in dam building, irrigation and drainage projects, and exploration of underground water resources.

My brief visit to Saudi Arabia will allow me to inspect the new water supply system

of your capital, Riyadh, and development projects at al-Hasa and Qatif Oases. I regret time will not permit my visiting other interesting areas of your country which bear many significant resemblances to my own State of Arizona, located in the arid southwest of the United States where water has always been in short supply.

Thus men of many nations have come to realize that meeting future needs requires the reexamination of every facet of water exploration and utilization, and in this effort the cooperation of all nations is required. The success of the International Symposium on Water Desalination which I referred to earlier has led President Johnson to call an International Conference on Water for Peace to be held in Washington in May 1967. This will permit the meeting of experts to exchange information and views on the world's water problems and seek practical solutions to these problems and simultaneous consultations among government officials responsible for conservation and development on means of implementing solutions. The conference will provide a forum for discussing water resources development, international cooperation to solve water problems, and possible establishment of a continuing worldwide Water for Peace program.

I am particularly pleased that Saudi Arabia has already accepted our invitation to attend the conference and has promised to send a large delegation, headed by Minister Mishari and Prince Mohamed. We sincerely hope that through this conference Saudi Arabia will share with the world the knowledge it has gained through the many water conservation and development programs already initiated here and will simultaneously learn through the experience of others.

Before I left Washington to come to Jidda, President Johnson requested that I convey his warm regards and sincere congratulations to his friend King Faisal and all the people of Saudi Arabia. May I again add my own congratulations and sincere hopes for the success of this venture and those to follow and my compliments on the high degree

of progress which the Saudi people have already attained under the leadership of His Majesty. My Government looks forward to continued cooperation with the Saudi Arabian Government in achievement of peaceful progress.

Asian Development Bank Immunities Defined

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

White House press release dated March 7

The President on March 7 issued an Executive order designating the Asian Development Bank as a public international organization entitled to the benefits of the International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945.

Under that act, public international organizations in which the United States participates and which have been designated by the President through appropriate Executive order are entitled to certain privileges, exemptions, and immunities, such as immunity from suit and judicial process, immunity from search and confiscation of property, and exemption from certain internal revenue, property, and other taxes.

Notwithstanding this designation, the Asian Development Bank will be subject to legal action in cases authorized by the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank.

The order also (1) delegates to the Secretary of the Treasury, acting in consultation with the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies, authority to instruct representatives of the United States to the Asian Development Bank, and (2) delegates to that Council authority otherwise to coordinate United States policies relating to the Bank. The responsibilities of the Secretary and the Council with respect to the Bank are the same as those previously assigned to them in regard to other international financial

institutions. These assignments of authority do not derogate from the foreign policy responsibilities of the Secretary of State.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 11334¹

ENJOYMENT OF CERTAIN PRIVILEGES, EXEMPTIONS, AND IMMUNITIES BY THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK AND COORDINATION OF UNITED STATES POLICIES WITH REGARD TO THE BANK

By virtue of the authority vested in me by Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1965 (30 F.R. 9353), by section 4 of the Asian Development Bank Act, approved March 16, 1966 (Public Law 89-369), and by section 1 of the International Organizations Immunities Act (59 Stat. 669; 22 U.S.C. 288), and as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. (a) The Asian Development Bank, an organization in which the United States participates under the authority of the Asian Development Bank Act, is hereby designated as a public international organization entitled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions, and immunities conferred by the International Organizations Immunities Act.

(b) The foregoing designation shall not be (1) deemed to abridge in any respect privileges, exemptions, and immunities which that organization may have acquired or may acquire by treaty or congressional action, or (2) construed to affect in any way the applicability of the provisions of Article 50 of the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank as adopted by the Congress in the Asian Development Bank Act.


SEC. 2. Executive Order No. 11269 of February 14, 1966, is amended as follows:

(1) By adding at the end of section 2 the following new subsection:

“(c) The Council shall perform with respect to the Asian Development Bank, the same functions as those delegated to it by subsections (a) and (b) of this section with respect to other international financial institutions.”

(2) By adding at the end of section 3 thereof the following new subsection:

“(d) The Secretary of the Treasury shall perform, with respect to the Asian Development Bank, the same functions as those delegated to him by subsections (a) and (b) of this section with respect to other international financial institutions.”



THE WHITE HOUSE, March 7, 1967.

¹ 32 Fed. Reg. 3933.

Department Issues Public Notices on Travel to Restricted Areas

On March 14, the Department spokesman announced that notices concerning the continuation of area travel restrictions for Cuba and the Communist-controlled areas of Viet-Nam, Korea, and China were being published in the Federal Register. In making the announcement, he noted that: "There will no longer be restriction on travel to Albania."

Following are texts of an amendment to the Code of Federal Regulations on passports and four public notices which were published in the Federal Register on March 16.

Amendment to Code of Federal Regulations¹

TITLE 22—FOREIGN RELATIONS
Chapter I—Department of State
PART 51—PASSPORTS

Passports Invalid for Travel to Restricted Areas

Part 51, Chapter I, Title 22, Code of Federal Regulations, section 51.72 (as corrected at 31 F.R. 13654, Oct. 22, 1966, and as amended at 31 F.R. 16143, Dec. 16, 1966) is amended to read as follows:

§ 51.72 Passports invalid for travel to restricted areas.

Upon determination by the Secretary that a country or area is:

- (a) A country with which the United States is at war, or
- (b) A country or area where armed hostilities are in progress, or
- (c) A country or area to which travel must be restricted in the national interest because such travel would seriously impair the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs.

U.S. passports shall cease to be valid for travel to, in or through such country or area unless specifically validated therefor. Any determination made under this section shall be published in the FEDERAL REGISTER along with a statement of the circumstances requiring the restriction. Unless limited to a shorter period, any such restriction shall expire at the end of 1 year from the date of publication of such notice in the FEDERAL REGISTER, unless extended or sooner revoked by the Secretary by public notice.

Effective date. This amendment shall become effective on March 16, 1967.

The provisions of section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act (60 Stat. 238; 5 U.S.C. 1003) relative to notice of proposed rulemaking are inapplicable to

¹ 32 Fed. Reg. 4122.

this order because the regulation contained herein involves foreign affairs functions of the United States.

(Secs. 1, 4, 44 Stat. 887, 63 Stat. 111, as amended; 22 U.S.C. 211a, 5 U.S.C. 151c)

For the Secretary of State.

IDAR RIMESTAD,
Deputy Under Secretary
for Administration.

MARCH 14, 1967.

Public Notice 256¹

U.S. CITIZENS
Restriction on Travel to, in, or Through
Mainland China

Pursuant to the authority of Executive Order 11295 and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72(c), travel to, in, or through Mainland China is restricted as unrestricted travel to, in, or through Mainland China would seriously impair the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs. In view of the present unsettled conditions within Mainland China and the risks and dangers which might ensue from the inadvertent involvement of American citizens in domestic disturbances, the currently applicable restrictions on travel of American citizens to the Chinese mainland are therefore extended.

Hereafter U.S. passports shall not be valid for travel to, in, or through Mainland China unless specifically endorsed for such travel under the authority of the Secretary of State.

This public notice shall expire at the end of 1 year from the date of publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER unless extended or sooner revoked by public notice.

Dated: March 14, 1967.

For the Secretary of State.

IDAR RIMESTAD,
Deputy Under Secretary
for Administration.

Public Notice 257²

U.S. CITIZENS
Restriction on Travel to, in, or Through Cuba

Pursuant to the authority of Executive Order 11295 and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72(c), travel to, in, or through Cuba is restricted. In view of the declared hostility of the Cuban government to the United States and other democratic governments of the Western Hemisphere and the avowed policy of that government to promote terrorism and subversion in Latin America, unrestricted travel to, in, or through Cuba would seriously impair the conduct

² 32 Fed. Reg. 4140.

of U.S. foreign affairs. It would be incompatible with the resolutions adopted at the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of American States, of which the United States is a member. At this meeting, held in Washington from July 21-26, 1964, it was resolved that the governments of the American states not maintain diplomatic, consular, trade, or shipping relations with Cuba under its present government. Among other things, this policy of isolating Cuba was intended to minimize the capability of the Castro government to carry out its openly proclaimed programs of subversive activities in the Hemisphere.

Hereafter U.S. passports shall not be valid for travel to, in, or through Cuba unless specifically endorsed for such travel under the authority of the Secretary of State.

This public notice shall expire at the end of 1 year from the date of publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER unless extended or sooner revoked by public notice.

Public notice 179, 26 F.R. 492, promulgated January 16, 1961, is hereby canceled.

Dated: March 14, 1967.

For the Secretary of State.

IDAR RIMESTAD,
*Deputy Under Secretary
for Administration.*

Public Notice 258²

U.S. CITIZENS

Restriction on Travel to, in, or Through
North Korea

Pursuant to the authority of Executive Order 11295 and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72(c), travel to, in, or through North Korea is restricted as unrestricted travel to, in, or through North Korea would seriously impair the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs. In view of the dangerous tensions in the Far East, the expressed and virulent hostility of the North Korean regime toward the United States, the continued recurrence of incidents along the military demarcation line, and the special position of the Government of the Republic of Korea which is recognized by resolution of the United Nations General Assembly as the only lawful government in Korea, the Department of State believes that wholly unrestricted travel by American citizens to North Korea would seriously impair the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs.

Hereafter U.S. passports shall not be valid for travel to, in, or through North Korea unless specifically endorsed for such travel under the authority of the Secretary of State.

This public notice shall expire at the end of 1 year from the date of publication in the FEDERAL

REGISTER unless extended or sooner revoked by public notice.

Dated: March 14, 1967.

For the Secretary of State.

IDAR RIMESTAD,
*Deputy Under Secretary
for Administration.*

Public Notice 259²

U.S. CITIZENS

Restriction on Travel to, in, or Through
North Viet-Nam

Pursuant to the authority of Executive Order 11295 and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72(b), travel to, in, or through North Viet-Nam is restricted as this is "a country or area where armed hostilities are in progress".

Hereafter U.S. passports shall not be valid for travel to, in, or through North Viet-Nam unless specifically endorsed for such travel under the authority of the Secretary of State.

This public notice shall expire at the end of 1 year from the date of publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER unless extended or sooner revoked by public notice.

Dated: March 14, 1967.

For the Secretary of State.

IDAR RIMESTAD,
*Deputy Under Secretary
for Administration.*

Foreign Policy Conference Held at Philadelphia

The Department of State announced on March 18 (press release 59 dated March 17) that Sol M. Linowitz, U.S. Representative to the Council of the Organization of American States, would be the principal speaker in a tri-State foreign policy conference at Philadelphia, Pa., on March 30. The conference, jointly sponsored by the Department of State and the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, had the cooperation of more than 25 other State and community organizations in the area. It was attended by several hundred civic and community leaders and news media representatives from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, and the city of Baltimore.

Other State Department officers scheduled to participate were: Zbigniew K. Brzezinski,

² 32 Fed. Reg. 4140.

Member, Policy Planning Council; David H. Popper, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs; Philander P. Claxton, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Population Matters; John Holdridge, Deputy Director, Office of Research

and Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific; and Frederick W. Flott, Foreign Service officer (formerly Special Assistant to Ambassador Lodge in Saigon). Mrs. Charlotte Moton Hubbard, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, was the conference moderator.

THE CONGRESS

U.S. Participation in the U.N. During 1965

*Following is the text of a message from President Johnson transmitting to the Congress the 20th annual report on U.S. participation in the United Nations.*¹

To the Congress of the United States:

I am submitting herewith the twentieth annual report on United States participation in the United Nations, covering calendar year 1965.

That year gave new evidence of our country's vigorous commitment to the world organization, and to the cause of peace which it serves. All of the American efforts recorded here—whether political, economic, social, legal or administrative—were designed solely to further that commitment.

The whole world shared our grief when Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson died in London on July 14, 1965. The respect and affection in which he was held, and the world's gratitude for his contributions to the United Nations, found expression in messages from officials and leaders around the globe, and in the rare tribute of a memorial meeting in the General Assembly hall at the United Nations.

One measure of a nation's regard for the

¹ *U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1965* (H. Doc. 458, 89th Cong., 2d sess.); Department of State publication 8137, for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402 (\$2.00).

United Nations is the quality of representatives it sends to the Organization. Accordingly, I asked Arthur J. Goldberg to leave the Supreme Court of the United States and to succeed Ambassador Stevenson as our Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

Ambassador Goldberg's first important task was to help end the paralysis suffered by the General Assembly in 1964 as a result of the U.N. constitutional crisis. It had become clear that the membership as a whole was not prepared to apply the penalty provided by Article 19 of the Charter—loss of vote in the Assembly for those more than two years in arrears—to those members who had refused to contribute their assessed shares of certain peacekeeping operations. On August 16, Ambassador Goldberg announced that the United States would not seek to frustrate the evident desire of many members that the General Assembly should proceed normally. At the same time, he made it clear that the United States reserved the same option to make exceptions to collective financing assessments in the future.

The consensus reached by the General Assembly included agreement that the Organization's financial difficulties should be solved through voluntary contributions, particularly from those delinquent in their payments. A few nations contributed, but those furthest in arrears did not. The financial condition of the United Nations thus remained precarious.

During 1965, the Security Council made

a major contribution to international peace by halting the hostilities between India and Pakistan arising from the Kashmir dispute. In thus arresting a full-scale war on the sub-continent, the Organization prevented untold tragedy in Asia—and proved anew its value as an instrument for peace.

United Nations peace forces and truce supervisors continued to stand guard throughout 1965 in Cyprus, in Kashmir, in Korea, and along the troubled borders of Israel. The Security Council also dispatched United Nations representatives and observers to the Dominican Republic during the disorders there; but the primacy of the Organization of American States in dealing successfully with this regional problem, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, remained unimpaired.

During the year, concrete steps toward disarmament were again strongly urged from all quarters, although progress proved disappointingly slow; the serious problems of race relations and colonialism in Southern Africa were also a cause of increasing debate and concern; and the United Nations and its members were repeatedly urged by the United States to join in the search for peace in Viet-Nam.

In my speech in San Francisco on June 25, 1965²—the Twentieth Anniversary of the United Nations—I called upon its members to use all their influence, individually and collectively, to bring to the negotiating table those who seemed determined to continue the conflict. Ambassador Goldberg addressed similar appeals to United Nations members. Indeed, in his first official communication as U.S. Representative, a letter to the Security Council President on July 30, 1965,³ Ambassador Goldberg recalled the legitimate interest of the Security Council in the peace of Southeast Asia and asserted that “The United States stands ready, as it has in the past, to collaborate unconditionally with members of the Security Council in the search for an acceptable formula to restore

peace and security to that area of the world.”

Unfortunately, these initiatives produced no affirmative response from those supporting the aggression against South Viet-Nam. Two suspensions of the bombing of North Viet-Nam during the year were no more successful in opening the path to honorable negotiations. The tragic conflict continues unabated in Viet-Nam. But we are continuing our efforts untiringly to seek a peaceful settlement of this issue through the United Nations and all other channels. This was the key issue dealt with in Ambassador Goldberg’s statement to the twenty-first General Assembly in the general debate in September 1966.⁴

The year 1965 marked the mid-point of the United Nations Development Decade. It was a year of sober assessment. Despite substantial progress in some areas, it was clear that in most of the more than one hundred countries with per capita incomes of less than \$200, economic growth had been largely swallowed up by the mounting tide of population growth. Multilateral programs of aid, trade, and investment, although substantial in absolute terms, are not sufficient—even when combined with all the other large programs, public and private—to narrow the “development gap.”

This discouraging assessment stimulated new efforts to cope with development problems:

—The newly created U.N. Conference on Trade and Development began its search for new trade patterns and practices which would benefit the developing countries.

—The establishment of a new U.N. Organization for Industrial Development was approved by the General Assembly.

—The U.N. Development Program was established by merger of the U.N. Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund. The United States had worked long and hard for the integration of these two major U.N. operational programs in order to permit better planning and more effective use of resources.

² For text, see BULLETIN of July 19, 1965, p. 98.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 16, 1965, p. 278.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 10, 1966, p. 518.

—Foundations were laid for the new Asian Development Bank with a capitalization of \$1 billion, including a \$200 million subscription by the United States. It promises to be one of the most effective agencies for the financing of economic and social development in Asia.

—A new African Development Bank, designed to play a similar role in Africa, opened for business.

Through these and other instrumentalities, our delegations in U.N. agencies have given leadership and positive support to major goals in the struggle for a better life: more food production; assistance in voluntary family planning; the training of skilled manpower; development of transport and communications; fuller utilization of natural resources; and increased application of science and technology.

The year 1965 had been designated International Cooperation Year (ICY) by the U.N. General Assembly, and U.N. members were urged to commemorate it in appropriate ways. The culmination of the American celebration was a White House Conference attended by more than 5,000 distinguished Americans—leaders in their communities, in business and industry, in educational and labor organizations, in the arts and sciences, and in the professions.⁵ The Conference discussed reports on international cooperation in agriculture, atomic energy, disarmament, health, the welfare of women and youth, and many other fields. Many of its recommendations have already been put into effect. Others are being thoroughly evaluated by a special White House Committee which will shortly submit its report to me.

Public support for the United Nations continued at a high level as the Organization approached its twenty-first anniversary. Most thoughtful people know that the

⁵ Two special issues of the BULLETIN were devoted exclusively to International Cooperation Year: for articles by chairmen of the ICY Cabinet committees, see *ibid.*, Sept. 6, 1965; for articles by senior government consultants to the citizens' committees, see *ibid.*, Nov. 22, 1965.

United Nations is a far from perfect organization, in a far from perfect world. Yet they also recognize that it and its specialized agencies are the best system yet devised for sovereign nations to work together with equality and self-respect.

Our investment in the United Nations, and its various agencies and special programs, supplements other activities undertaken to preserve, protect, or promote a wide range of national interests. Above all, our commitment to the United Nations is an expression of faith which has illumined the entire history of our country: a faith that the creative powers of democracy and human reason can overcome the evils of tyranny and violence.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE, *March 9, 1967.*

1966 International Negotiations for Arms Control and Disarmament

Following is President Johnson's letter of February 17 transmitting to the Congress the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's sixth annual report, covering the period January 1–December 31, 1966,¹ together with the portion of the report entitled "International Negotiations."

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

To the Congress of the United States:

I am transmitting herewith the Sixth Annual Report of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I do so with considerable satisfaction, since this year has seen significant progress in this Nation's 20-year effort to bring under control the armaments which are the product of man's 20th-century ingenuity.

In 1966 a significant link was added to the still slender chain of arms control agree-

¹ H. Doc. 58, 90th Cong., 1st sess. Single copies of the report are available upon request from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C., 20451.

ments—a treaty banning weapons of mass destruction in outer space and on celestial bodies.² Its significance will grow as our mastery of space grows, and our children will remark the wisdom of this agreement to a greater degree than the present state of our own knowledge quite permits today.

The past year has also brought us close to another agreement, one of even greater immediacy—a treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons here on earth. Our hopes are high that this long effort will soon be crowned with success.

The United States has been trying to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons since 1946. At that time Bernard Baruch, speaking for the United States at the United Nations, said “If we fail we have damned every man to be the slave of fear.” It is true that we failed then, but we did not become the “slaves of fear”; instead we persisted. In the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961, Congress decreed that the search for ways to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war should become a matter of first emphasis for the United States Government. The establishment of an independent Agency to work out ways to bring the arms race under control was the act of a rational people who refused to submit to the fearful implications of the nuclear age.

Several things are evident from a reading of this report. The first is that we are succeeding, after a few short years, in developing an integrated and highly expert attack on the problem of arms control and disarmament. Our security has two faces—strength and restraint; arms and arms control. We have come to the point where our thinking about weapons is paralleled by our thinking about how to control them. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency plays a central role in this development.

The second is that despite the magnitude and complexity of armament imposed on the world by the cold war, the problem can be made to yield to imagination and determina-

tion, so that now we might legitimately begin to count up the score: we have cut down the danger of “accidental war” with the hot line, curtailed the injection of radioactive waste into the atmosphere with the limited test ban treaty, and joined in strengthening the system of safeguards designed by the International Atomic Energy Agency to close one of the doors to nuclear weapons.

The United States has anticipated the future by putting all of Antarctica, and more recently outer space, off limits to weapons of mass destruction. Nonarmament is easier than disarmament, and in these terms alone, the value of these latter treaties cannot be overestimated. In addition, however, we should not overlook the significance of this approach to the problems in arms control we face right now. A treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons will have this same preventive element—without it we face the prospect of a world in which more than a dozen nations will possess nuclear weapons. If our hopes for success in a treaty are realized, the chances for still further agreements will be greatly enhanced. These next steps will also be more difficult, because they must involve the weapons we might otherwise add to our arsenals, or even those now on hand.

This brings me to my last observation, which is that this report reveals the sobering reality of the immensity of the task we have undertaken. Read in the context of recent developments in the Soviet Union—the buildup of their strategic forces and the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system around Moscow—we are reminded that our hard-won accomplishments can be swept away overnight by still another costly and futile escalation of the arms race.

It is my belief that the United States and the Soviet Union have reached a watershed in the dispiriting history of our arms competition. Decisions may be made on both sides which will trigger another upward spiral. The paradox is that this should be happening at a time when there is abundant evidence that our mutual antagonism is be-

² For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 26, 1966, p. 953.

ginning to ease. I am determined to use all the resources at my command to encourage the reduction in tension that is in our mutual interest, and to avoid a further, mutually-defeating buildup. The work of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency will continue to be of invaluable assistance in this urgent task.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE, February 17, 1967.

EXCERPT FROM ANNUAL REPORT

INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS

We are in the midst of a great transition, a transition from narrow nationalism to international partnership; from the harsh spirit of the cold war to the hopeful spirit of common humanity on a troubled and threatened planet. . . . We are shaping a new future of enlarged partnership in nuclear affairs, in economic and technical cooperation, in trade negotiations, in political consultation and in working together with the governments and peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.³

In 1966, the United States sent its emissaries to almost every capital of the world in an effort to find ways to bring an end to the war in Vietnam. In parallel to that effort, American disarmament negotiators intensified their activities—in Geneva, New York, Washington, Moscow, London, and Paris—at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC),⁴ at the 21st session of the United Nations General Assembly, in consultation with our allies and in bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union.

The ENDC reconvened on January 27, 1966, and

³ For text of President Johnson's state of the Union message on Jan. 10, see *ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1967, p. 158.

⁴ The Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament will enter its sixth year on February 21, 1967. The Committee, which meets at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, was established under a joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement and welcomed by the General Assembly. While it is not a United Nations body, it reports to the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission and is serviced by the U.N. Secretariat. Membership is made up of five NATO nations (United States, Canada, Italy, United Kingdom, and France; the last has never taken her seat at the conference table), five from the Warsaw Pact (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, and U.S.S.R.), and eight non-aligned nations (Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and United Arab Republic). [Footnote in original.]

received a message from President Johnson,⁵ who pledged the United States to "continue to pursue every avenue for stable peace." That effort, he said, "has no more important set of goals than those of disarmament, which are the business of this conference."

As the year went on, hopes for success on two major arms control agreements brightened perceptibly. It was clear that at least one of them—a treaty governing activities in outer space and on celestial bodies—would be achieved. The other—a⁶ treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons—was moving closer to accord.

Non-Proliferation

The negotiations at Geneva were dominated by the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. As the conference convened, the U.S. draft treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now possessing them (presented in the previous ENDC session, on August 17, 1965) lay on the table.⁵ The Soviet Union had submitted its draft to the United Nations General Assembly on September 24, 1965. This document was subsequently presented to the ENDC on January 27, 1966.

The first principle of a non-proliferation treaty, enunciated in the U.N. resolution adopted overwhelmingly in November of 1965, is that it should contain no "loopholes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form."⁷ Early in the 1966 session of the ENDC, ACDA Director William C. Foster restated the President's pledge:⁸

We are prepared to work with other countries to assure that no non-nuclear country acquires its own nuclear weapons, achieves the power itself to fire nuclear weapons, or receives assistance in manufacturing or testing nuclear weapons. We are prepared to agree that these things should not be done directly or indirectly, through third countries or groups of countries, or through units of the armed forces or military personnel under any military alliance.

In an attempt to show a spirit of flexibility and to make its treaty language more precise, the United States, on March 22, 1966, tabled amendments to Articles I, II, and IV of the U.S. draft treaty.⁹

⁵ For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 21, 1966, p. 263.

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1965, p. 474.

⁷ For U.S. statements and text of the resolution, see *ibid.*, Nov. 29, 1965, p. 873.

⁸ For text of President Johnson's message to the 1966 session of the ENDC, see *ibid.*, Feb. 21, 1966, p. 263.

⁹ For texts of a U.S. statement and the amendments, see *ibid.*, Apr. 25, 1966, p. 675.

The amendments were intended to clarify and emphasize the Western view that collective defense arrangements would not violate the principle of non-proliferation. The determined intention of the United States not to relinquish its veto over the use of U.S. weapons was stressed repeatedly in the conference debate. As Mr. Foster put it—

... no one—I repeat, no one—will be able to fire United States weapons unless the United States decides that they are to be fired. This is the situation which now obtains, and we have no intention whatsoever of changing it.

In March, the Soviet Union transferred its long-time chief delegate to the ENDC, Semyon K. Tsarapkin, to the post of Ambassador to Germany. He was replaced by Alexei A. Roshchin, who in the following months mounted a concentrated, closely-reasoned attack on the U.S. draft treaty. The Soviet views were presented in a manner relatively free of polemic, except for the now familiar vituperation of the Federal Republic of Germany. Their central target was those provisions of the treaty which they claimed would permit West German "access" to or control over nuclear weapons through participation in NATO defense arrangements. They dismissed as irrelevant U.S. insistence that Soviet fears about nuclear weapons in the Western alliance were groundless because of firm U.S. retention of its veto over the use of such weapons. The U.S. treaty, contended Ambassador Roshchin, would lead to proliferation so long as it allowed for access through co-ownership or co-possession of nuclear weapons by NATO countries through such schemes as the proposed multilateral force. The U.S. approach to the treaty, he argued, did not really bar dissemination; it only retained a veto on the use of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon states. The U.S. response was a vigorous defense of its treaty draft, and a serious attempt at persuasion; the debate provided, in consequence, an illuminating clarification and exposition of the position of the two sides rarely matched in the conference's open debate.

The debate made clear that resolution of U.S.-Soviet differences would involve a long and arduous negotiation. In the hope of some tangible, short-term progress, Western representatives urged the conference to begin work on the less difficult aspects of the treaty drafts. The Italian delegation suggested the adoption of a partially agreed text, and the Canadians submitted a working paper setting forth the two drafts article by article in parallel columns. The Soviets, however, resisted this approach, and insisted on sticking to the central point at issue. The United States, during the remainder of the session, proceeded on its own to raise other substantive questions; one of them was the safeguards provision, another the necessity for making sure a non-proliferation treaty did not contain a loophole permitting nuclear explosions under

the guise of peaceful experiments.

The ENDC adjourned on August 25, without any agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, there was an atmosphere of hope and expectation among the delegates, engendered in part by the depth and seriousness with which the major elements in the draft treaties had been considered. President Johnson's announced intention to renew his search for an "acceptable compromise" in "language which we can both live with,"¹⁰ signalled a new phase in the negotiation. Privately, the U.S. and Soviet Co-Chairmen were beginning intensive talks in Geneva.

These talks were resumed during the period of the disarmament debate in the 21st United Nations General Assembly, which convened in New York on September 20. On September 23, Soviet Foreign Minister [Andrei A.] Gromyko, in a speech before the General Assembly, proposed as an additional item for the U.N. agenda the "renunciation of actions hampering a non-proliferation agreement." The Soviet Union, in commenting on the resolution, implied that plans for NATO nuclear defenses might "hinder" agreement on a treaty. The United States announced that while it could not support such an argument, it would support the resolution and, in fact, co-sponsored it.

The resolution was subsequently adopted by the U.N. General Assembly by a vote of 110 to 1 (Albania) with Cuba abstaining.¹¹ The affirmative vote included France, and marks the first time in recent years that France has voted as favoring efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.

Formal debate on non-proliferation was completed in the First Committee on November 10, with the adoption of a resolution, proposed by the eight non-aligned members of the ENDC, which remanded the question to the ENDC. The United States supported this resolution on the grounds that the Geneva conference was the proper forum for the negotiation.

Informal discussions, however, continued throughout the remainder of the year. Following talks in New York and Washington between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko in early October, Mr. Foster and Soviet Ambassador to the ENDC A. A. Roshchin continued bilateral talks in New York. The Soviets abandoned their earlier resistance to considering other than the central point of disagreement, and in consequence considerable "underbrush" has been cleared away by the talks. At the year's end, there still remained important points to be resolved, but the outlook was more encouraging than at any time since the two draft treaties were presented.

¹⁰ At a White House news conference on July 5, 1966.

¹¹ For text of A/RES/2149 (XXI) adopted Nov. 4, 1966, see BULLETIN of Dec. 12, 1966, p. 902.

International Safeguards

A key element in U.S. efforts to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons is the establishment of safeguards against the diversion of peaceful nuclear resources to military purposes. Nuclear reactors which produce electrical power are now in operation or under construction in 51 countries. These reactors produce a complicating byproduct—plutonium, a fissionable material which can be chemically separated and used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

Although most countries have openly expressed a reluctance to undertake the economic, military, and political consequences of acquiring nuclear weapons, pressure to do so can arise from suspicions that neighbor or rival states might clandestinely produce them. If such suspicions can be dispelled, an important incentive for nuclear proliferation will be removed. A system of international safeguards, such as that developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), provides the most effective assurance that peaceful nuclear programs are truly peaceful. To underline its own conviction that this is so, the United States is transferring its bilateral agreements to the jurisdiction of the international agency. In addition, we have recommended that all non-nuclear-weapon states accept IAEA safeguards or an equivalent system on their nuclear activities, so as to assure their neighbors that they are not secretly developing nuclear weapons, and to receive like assurance in return.

The United States—even though a nuclear power—has voluntarily placed several of its reactors under IAEA safeguards in order to show its strong support for the system and to prove that the inspection procedures are not burdensome or intrusive. The United Kingdom has followed the U.S. example.

In order to offset an apparent imbalance, which some of the non-nuclear-weapon states have felt to be unjust, the United States proposed (on July 28 at the ENDC)¹² that *all* states undertake not to export any source or fissionable material or specialized equipment to any other state for peaceful purposes except under IAEA or equivalent international safeguards. Thus, in the transfer of fissionable materials and equipment between states, the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon states receive like treatment in the control of international traffic in nuclear materials.

The question of international safeguards was discussed further at the United Nations 21st General Assembly. In a statement to the First Committee on November 9,¹³ Mr. Foster commended the several proposals, made during the annual General Conference of the IAEA held in Vienna in October, to widen the coverage of IAEA safeguards, including

¹² *Ibid.*, Aug. 22, 1966, p. 281.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1966, p. 930.

that made by Norway that a state not producing nuclear weapons invite the IAEA to safeguard its entire nuclear program. In welcoming this proposal, Mr. Foster pointed out that it would “go a long way toward reducing the grave threat of nuclear proliferation.” He also called attention—as worthy of serious consideration—to the offer made by Poland and Czechoslovakia at the IAEA Conference to place their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards provided the Federal Republic of Germany did the same. Czechoslovakia is completing its first power reactor; Poland, which operates three research reactors, does not plan to build a power reactor until sometime in the 1970’s. Mr. Foster pointed out that while the Federal Republic of Germany (which has 28 research reactors and 12 power reactors in operation, under construction or planned) already has placed its activities under European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) safeguards, the West Germans were themselves “giving the proposal serious consideration, as evidenced by the statement issued on 26 October by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.”

On November 22, the Director-General of the IAEA, Mr. Sigvard Eklund, addressed the U.N. General Assembly. He traced the phenomenal growth of nuclear energy as a source of electrical power and forecast the remarkable ways in which developing countries can use nuclear science to help solve such serious problems as the growing gap between the world’s population and its food and water supplies. But he also warned that the growth and spread of nuclear power represented a potential threat if measures were not taken to insure that its use is limited to peaceful activities. He reported on the progress made since the IAEA safeguards system was first adopted in 1961—progress in expanded application and in acceptance by additional countries. He cited as particularly encouraging the proposal made by Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Security Guarantees to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States

The question of assurance of another kind was also introduced in both the ENDC and U.N. discussions: that of some form of guarantee for the security of non-nuclear-weapon states who commit themselves not to acquire nuclear weapons. In his message to the opening of the Geneva conference on January 27 President Johnson reaffirmed his pledge that “nations that do not seek the nuclear path can be sure that they will have our strong support against threats of nuclear blackmail.” This pledge has been reaffirmed on many occasions, most recently by President Johnson when the Chinese Communists exploded their fourth nuclear test during his 1966 Asian journey. Soviet Premier [Aleksei N.] Kosygin offered to include a clause in the U.S.S.R.’s original draft treaty “prohibiting the use of nuclear

weapons against non-nuclear Powers parties to the treaty, which have no nuclear weapons on their territory." No amendment was offered by the Soviet delegate, however, during the 1966 sessions of the Geneva conference. Western delegations, particularly the Canadian, questioned how the concept of effective nuclear guarantees could be incorporated in a non-proliferation treaty. The non-aligned members of the ENDC found both President Johnson's statement and the Kosygin proposal attractive and suggested that the question be explored further.

The 21st U.N. General Assembly remanded the question of non-proliferation to the ENDC in a resolution drafted by the eight non-aligned members of the Committee.¹⁴ This resolution (adopted by a vote of 97 to 2, with 3 abstentions) contained an operative paragraph dealing with security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon states which do not possess nuclear weapons (i.e., the Kosygin proposal) and any other proposals for solving this problem. Although voting for the resolution itself, the United States abstained from voting on this operative paragraph on the grounds that it cited a specific non-use formula for ENDC consideration while failing to give similar treatment to other suggestions which had been made for dealing with the problem of assistance to a non-nuclear victim of nuclear threats or aggression.

Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes

At Geneva, on August 9, ACDA Deputy Director Adrian S. Fisher raised a question about the draft treaties to which little attention had been previously directed.¹⁵ He pointed out that a non-proliferation treaty would not be completely effective if it permitted the development of nuclear-explosive devices for any purpose, however innocently intended for peaceful use they might be. The "inescapable technological fact," he pointed out, is that a nuclear-explosive device intended for peaceful purposes can be used as a weapon or can be easily adapted for military use; the technology of making nuclear-explosive devices for peaceful purposes is essentially the same as that for making nuclear weapons.

As a means of resolving the dilemma posed by a prohibition on peaceful explosions by non-nuclear states, the United States suggested that "if and when peaceful applications of nuclear explosives that are permissible under test ban treaty limitations prove technically and economically feasible, nuclear-weapon states should make available to other states nuclear explosive services for peaceful applications." A nuclear-weapon state would provide the desired nuclear detonation under appropriate international observation, with the nuclear device re-

maining in the custody and under the control of the country performing the service. Such a service, Mr. Fisher suggested, could be provided at a cost to the recipient state far below that at which they could develop and produce such devices for themselves. Canada, rich in nuclear knowledge and natural resources requiring development, nevertheless promptly disclaimed "any intention to develop its own capacity to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions."

The Canadian delegate supported the U.S. proposal, saying:

In our view, the development by a non-nuclear-weapon State of the capacity to conduct a nuclear explosion even though it is designed for peaceful purposes would, in effect, constitute proliferation, and proliferation is a development to which the Canadian Government has repeatedly declared its opposition.

In addition to the proliferation aspect, he pointed out the tremendous cost in terms of resources and manpower which would be involved in developing a nuclear device to carry out an explosion for peaceful purposes.

Balanced Obligations

Throughout the discussions in both the ENDC and the U.N. General Assembly, delegates representing non-nuclear-weapon states expressed their conviction that "a non-proliferation treaty should be coupled with, or followed by, tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce, and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery." This concept was formally presented by the non-aligned eight in a memorandum to the ENDC during the 1965 session and was reiterated in their memorandum of August 19, 1966.

With respect to the treaty itself, both the United States and the Soviet Union take the position that it should be a simple undertaking on the part of nuclear-weapon states not to transfer nuclear weapons to states not now possessing them, and a corresponding commitment on the part of non-nuclear-weapon states not to acquire them. The feeling on both sides appeared to be that the prospects for agreement should not be jeopardized by the complications of additional arms control measures.

The United States has long recognized, however, that other measures must be diligently pursued to control and reduce the dangers of the nuclear arms race. It views a non-proliferation treaty as the logical next step. Once agreement is reached, the way will be paved for further agreements. The United States believes that in addition to calling on non-nuclear-weapon states to give up the option of acquiring nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon states should take positive action to curb their own nuclear arsenals. It has tabled a number of proposals

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 936.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1966, p. 351.

to this end—the extension of the test ban treaty, a cutoff in fissionable materials production, a “freeze” on the numbers of offensive and defensive missiles.

Extension of the Limited Test Ban

The U.S. proposal to extend the limited test ban, (which prohibits nuclear testing in the atmosphere, under water, or in outer space)¹⁶ to underground tests is important to the control of proliferation. The primary obstacle to reaching agreement has been the inability to agree with the Soviet Union about what constitutes adequate verification.

In the arms control context, the term “verification” refers to the process by which a nation assures itself that its security is not being jeopardized as a result of another nation’s violations of an agreement. Without adequate verification, mutual suspicions will tend to grow to the point where failure of the agreement is likely. The Soviet Union remains adamant in its refusal to permit inspection on its territory.

The science of seismology has advanced to the point where larger seismic events—those which register 4.75 or above on the Richter magnitude scale—can usually be identified by instruments outside the country as either earthquakes or man-made explosions. Despite recent technological improvements, however, difficulty still arises with the smaller seismic events, most of which can be detected but not identified with a sufficiently high degree of confidence.

The idea of extending the limited test ban treaty to cover underground tests above a certain “threshold” was first advanced by the Brazilian delegate, in 1963, who suggested a seismic magnitude of 4.75, and has been favorably regarded by other ENDC members since. At the 1965 session of the ENDC, the United Arab Republic renewed its previous proposals for a 4.75 threshold, a moratorium on all other tests, and scientific and technical discussions on problems of detection and identification. The United States rejected this idea on the grounds that it would constitute, in effect, an uninspected test ban. Variations on the “threshold” concept were discussed by ENDC members during the 1966 session.

Two conferences held outside the ENDC provided topics for discussion of a test ban. At a conference of non-nuclear powers in Sweden it was agreed to set up a “nuclear detection club” for the exchange of seismic information. At a meeting in Scarborough, Canada,¹⁷ a proposal was made for a suspension, for a trial period, of all nuclear tests. The suspension would be policed by a system of “verification by challenge.” Under this procedure, a country suspecting another country of conducting a test would ask the latter to supply information on the suspicious event. If the challenged country did not

provide a satisfactory explanation, and did not permit inspection, the challenging country could withdraw from the undertaking not to test.

The desire to find a way out of the verification impasse was felt very strongly by the non-aligned members of the ENDC, and this desire was shared wholeheartedly by the United States. The various ideas and suggestions put forth for a solution are appealing, and the United States has given the most careful consideration to them. U.S. negotiators have pointed out, however, that these various approaches leave many problems unsolved.

The United States has spent large sums in research in an effort to improve techniques for seismic detection and identification. Improvements in capabilities have been achieved, but there still remains a level at which the United States believes militarily significant nuclear tests can be carried out underground without being identified as such by national means alone; it has therefore continued to insist that some on-site inspection is necessary to police a comprehensive test ban.

The technical facts as set forth by the United States have been generally accepted. But it has been argued that they lead directly to a political question; namely, how much risk can be tolerated in relying on instruments alone to determine if nuclear-weapons tests are taking place. It is the U.S. position that banning underground tests without adequate verification is not consistent with U.S. security interests; that in addition the occurrence of unresolved suspicious events will generate mistrust and new tensions. The “challenge” idea, attractive in many ways, raises just such questions. In a statement to the ENDC on April 4, Mr. Fisher predicted that frustrations would result from the refusal of a challenged country to furnish satisfactory information. In any case, the Soviet representative flatly rejected this idea on the last day of the ENDC session. “The proposal to control the banning of such tests on the basis of ‘verification by challenge or invitation,’” he said, “is quite unacceptable to the Soviet Union. . . .”

Cutoff of Fissionable Materials Production

Another U.S. proposal directed towards curbing the arms race calls for a verified cutoff of fissionable materials production for use in weapons, and a transfer of agreed quantities of fissionable materials to peaceful purposes. To make this measure

¹⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234.

¹⁷ Sponsored by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, The Institute for Strategic Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the American Assembly of Columbia University—June 23–26, 1966. [Footnote in original.]

even more attractive, the United States has also proposed that the materials for transfer be obtained by the verified destruction of several thousand nuclear weapons.

On August 11, Mr. Fisher presented to the ENDC a method for monitoring a shutdown reactor—an important feature of an agreement on a verified halt of the production of fissionable material for weapons use.

The U.S. Government had sought to develop an effective inspection method which would be as unintrusive as possible. It utilizes a "passive" device—one which has no moving parts or electronics which might be subject to malfunction, which makes no permanent attachments to impair the future use of the facility, and which can remain undisturbed in place on a shutdown plant until removed for an inspection. The neutrons generated in the core of an operating reactor can be detected and measured by means of a material which captures neutrons. The monitoring device consists of wires containing natural cobalt. The wires are placed in a tube, which is then rolled flat. They thus take on a unique configuration inside this "safing tape," and this "fingerprint" is X-rayed before the tape goes into the reactor. The tape is then sealed by an ingeniously devised plastic cap into which pieces of metal shavings have been mixed at random. Photographs are made of this second "fingerprint." The reactor cannot then be operated in violation of an agreement without activating the telltale cobalt inside; the outside seal cannot be disturbed without altering the fingerprint. Inspections need not occur with annoying frequency, and can be scheduled in advance.

On November 16, 1966, this method for policing the "cutoff" measure was demonstrated on a shutdown reactor at the Atomic Energy Commission's Hanford Plant, near Richland, Washington. U.N. General Assembly delegates and advisors from 51 countries and several international organizations witnessed the demonstration as guests of the U.S. Government.

Freeze on Offensive and Defensive Missiles

In his seven-point message to the ENDC on January 27, President Johnson renewed his proposal for a freeze on the numbers and characteristics of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs). He stated that if progress were made on the freeze, the United States would then be prepared to explore the possibility of significant reductions in the number of these delivery vehicles. The "freeze" was first proposed in 1964. The U.S. Representative reminded the ENDC that had this proposal been accepted and implemented then, the subsequent substantial increases in SNDV inventories of the United States and the Soviet Union would not have taken place.¹⁸

In Geneva on August 16, U.S. Delegate Fisher outlined the U.S. rationale for inclusion of anti-ballistic missiles in a freeze proposal.

He noted that the strategic stability which exists today depends on the knowledge that each side has the ability to inflict unacceptable damage and casualties on the other in retaliation for an initial attack. If a freeze were put into effect on offensive forces alone, this strategic balance could be upset by the deployment of an improved defensive system by one of the adversaries. Such a shift in the military balance would force the other side to undertake counteractions, such as the parallel deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system, increased offensive deployment, or the introduction of new or improved weapons capable of penetrating or bypassing ballistic-missile defenses. The resulting arms race would be self-defeating. Higher and higher destructive potentials would be reached, and, despite the presence of defensive systems costing billions of dollars or rubles, casualties would still reach fantastically high levels if nuclear war should occur. Secretary of State Rusk underlined the U.S. concern in his press conference December 21.¹⁹ "We would regret very much," he said, "the lifting of the arms race to an entirely new plateau of major expenditures . . . with perhaps no perceptible result in the total strategic situation."

Nuclear-Free Zones

The United States is strongly in favor of the establishment of nuclear-free zones where the initiative for such zones originates within the area concerned; where the zone includes all states in the area whose participation is deemed important; where the creation of a zone would not disturb necessary security arrangements; and where provisions are included for following up on alleged violations in order to give reasonable assurance of compliance with the zone.

Under these criteria, the United States is precluded from accepting the proposal to make Central Europe a nuclear-free zone, but for such areas as Africa and Latin America, the idea has met with the full support of the United States. The most notable example of a successful agreement to insure that a geographical area will be free of nuclear weapons (and other weapons as well) is the 1959 Antarctica Treaty.

An active attempt to make Latin America a nuclear-free zone has been going on since 1962, when Brazil first introduced the idea to the 17th

¹⁸ For a U.S. statement of Aug. 2, 1966, see BULLETIN of Aug. 29, 1966, p. 317.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Jan. 9, 1967, p. 43.

U.N. General Assembly. The following year five Latin American Presidents joined in proposing a Latin American nuclear-free zone, and with the blessing of the 18th U.N. General Assembly, a Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America was established. The Commission, after a series of working meetings, has drawn up a draft treaty and is scheduled to meet again January 31, 1967.²⁰ Although differences remain in the positions of some of the members of the Commission with respect to the provisions of the treaty, a compromise is thought to be possible. In any case, the United States regards the initiative of the Latin American countries as an outstanding example of regional activity to limit and control armaments, and has formally conveyed its full support to the Commission.

Controlling Conventional Weapons

Although the discussions at the ENDC and the U.N. General Assembly centered mainly on halting and turning back the nuclear arms race, attention was also given to the problem of controlling conventional armaments. The seventh point of the President's message of January 27 to the ENDC presented an approach for progress in this area, in suggesting that countries, on a regional basis, explore ways to limit competition among themselves for costly weapons often sought for reasons of illusory prestige. He stated that if "arrangements can be worked out and assurance can be given that they will be observed, the United States stands ready to respect them."

Elaborating on this matter in a statement to the ENDC on April 19, ACDA Director Foster suggested six principles as possible guidelines for the control of conventional arms: that the affected countries not acquire military equipment which they agree to regulate; that the initiative come from within the region concerned; that any arrangement include all states in that region whose participation is deemed important by the other participants; that potential suppliers respect the restrictions agreed to; that arrangements contribute to the security of the states concerned and to the maintenance of a stable military balance; and, lastly, that provision be made for satisfying all interested parties that the arrangement is being respected.

There are many difficulties involved, but the United States has offered full cooperation in implementing regional arms control arrangements. Regional agreements to control armaments will enhance security by reducing tensions, permitting constructive utilization of economic resources, and contributing to the ultimate achievement of general disarmament.

ACDA has worked in close coordination with the

²⁰ For background, see *ibid.*, Mar. 13, 1967, p. 436.

Department of State in seeking ways to bring diplomatic influence to bear on the policies of foreign nations with respect to the acquisition of "prestige" armaments. Discussions are continuing among U.S. officials and Latin American members of the Organization of American States. This question will probably be one of the major items to be included on the agenda of the summit meeting of Latin American Presidents which is scheduled to take place in the spring of 1967. It is hoped that the heads of the states represented at the conference will declare their intention not to acquire certain types of sophisticated military equipment.

General and Complete Disarmament

In 1962, at the opening of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, both the United States and the Soviet Union tabled plans for general and complete disarmament. These plans have in common, as agreed in advance by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., a plan for a three-stage process of disarmament, to be carried out under effective controls. There the similarity begins to break down. The U.S. plan calls for balanced reductions, across the board by percentages, for all armaments and forces; the Soviet plan advocates immediate elimination, in the first stage of the disarmament process, of all nuclear delivery vehicles, with the exception of a "nuclear umbrella," to be retained by the U.S. and the Soviet Union until the end of the third stage.

The Soviet "nuclear umbrella," as first proposed by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in 1962, was vaguely described as a "strictly limited" quantity of intercontinental missiles, antiballistic missiles and anti-aircraft missiles, to be kept until the end of the second stage on the territories of the two countries. In September 1963 this was amended to "the end of the third stage." The Soviet draft does not provide for adequate verification; it provides only for inspection of the missiles at announced launching pads.

In the first year of the conference, an agenda was set up for discussion of stage I, and the Committee has worked on this ever since. The agenda includes discussion of nuclear delivery vehicles, conventional arms, nuclear disarmament, military bases, armed force levels, military expenditures, outer space measures, peacekeeping machinery, measures to reduce the risk of war, transition from first to second stages, and establishment of an International Disarmament Organization.

During the 1966 session, the United States suggested to the Committee that the principal reason for failure to make progress on the stage I agenda item covering nuclear delivery vehicles lay in the Soviet refusal to permit the establishment of a working group, or even to elaborate on their "nuclear umbrella" proposal until ENDC accepted the concept "in principle."

U.N. Resolution on Chemical and Biological Warfare

On December 5, 1966, the U.N. General Assembly adopted, with the support of the United States, a resolution which calls on all nations to observe the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. The United States, although not a party to the Geneva Protocol, has always observed the principles and objectives which the Protocol sought to achieve, and joined 90 other countries in voting for this resolution.

U.S. policy with regard to the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in the conduct of warfare was clearly recorded before the vote. "We have repeatedly endeavored to find adequate means to attain those objectives (of the Protocol)," said the U.S. Representative. "We have never used biological weapons of any kind, bacteriological or otherwise." He pointed out that the Protocol does not apply to all gases: "It would be unreasonable to contend that any rule of international law prohibits the use in combat against an enemy, for humanitarian purposes, of agents that Governments around the world commonly use to control riots by their own people. Similarly, the Protocol does not apply to herbicides, which involve the same chemicals and have the same effects as those used domestically in the United States, the Soviet Union and many other countries to control weeds and other unwanted vegetation."

Treaty on Outer Space and Celestial Bodies

On December 8, 1966, President Johnson confirmed that agreement had been reached on the Outer Space Treaty, characterizing it as "the most important arms control development since the limited test ban treaty of 1963."²¹

The treaty forbids the placing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space or on celestial bodies and places additional restrictions on military activities on the moon and other celestial bodies. In order to allow verification of these restrictions, open access to all areas on celestial bodies is guaranteed. The treaty also contains a number of general principles designed to establish a legal regime in outer space.

²¹ For President Johnson's statement of Dec. 9, 1966, see *ibid.*, Dec. 26, 1966, p. 952.

The treaty had its genesis in the U.N. resolution banning bombs in orbit which was passed unanimously in October 1963, the Declaration of Legal Principles for Outer Space Exploration passed in December 1963, and the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, which reserves the Antarctic for exclusively peaceful activity.

Negotiations on the treaty were conducted in the Legal Subcommittee of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. These negotiations started in Geneva on July 12, 1966, and were completed in New York at the United Nations. On December 19 the U.N. General Assembly adopted by acclamation Resolution 2222, endorsing this historic agreement.²²

The substance of the arms control provisions is in article IV. This article restricts military activities in two ways:

First, it contains an undertaking not to place in orbit around the earth, install on the moon or any other celestial body, or otherwise station in outer space nuclear or any other weapons of mass destruction.

Second, it limits the use of the moon and other celestial bodies exclusively to peaceful purposes, and expressly prohibits their use for establishing military bases, installations or fortification; testing weapons of any kind; or conducting military maneuvers.

Among the other more important principles established by the treaty are:

There shall be freedom of exploration and use of outer space and celestial bodies for all States on a basis of equality.

Claims of sovereignty and national appropriation are barred.

There shall be unconditional obligation to help and to return astronauts promptly and safely if they land elsewhere than planned, and to exchange information relating to astronaut safety.

The treaty will be signed for the United States at the White House on January 27, 1967, in the name of the President by the Secretary of State and the United States Ambassador to the United Nations.

²² For U.S. statements and text of the resolution, see *ibid.*, Jan. 9, 1967, p. 78.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences¹

Scheduled April Through June 1967

Inter-American Children's Institute: 47th Meeting of the Directing Council.	Managua	Apr. 3-6
IMCO Working Group on Stability of Fishing Vessels: 5th Session.	London	Apr. 3-7
FAO Ad Hoc Conference on the Control of Olive Pests: 7th Session.	Turkey	Apr. 3-7
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law: Special Committee of Experts.	Rome	Apr. 3-8
U.N. Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression . .	New York	Apr. 3-10
ECOSOC Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on Human Rights.	New York	Apr. 3-10
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 23d Plenary Session.	Tokyo	Apr. 3-17
World Meteorological Organization: 5th Congress	Geneva	Apr. 3-28
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission: Annual Meeting	San José	Apr. 4-7
UNCTAD Committee on Invisibles and Financing Related to Trade: 2d Session.	New York	Apr. 4-19
ICAO All-Weather Operations Panel: 3d Meeting	Montreal	Apr. 4-21
OECD Working Party on Short-Term Forecasts	Paris	Apr. 5-6
OECD Economic Policy Committee	Paris	Apr. 5-6
OECD Trade Committee: Working Party on UNCTAD Commodities.	Paris	Apr. 6-7
U.N. Working Group of Committee on Tungsten	New York	Apr. 6-12
NATO Industrial Planning Committee	Paris	Apr. 7 (1 day)
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: 6th Annual Meeting of Board of Directors and 12th Meeting of Technical Advisory Council.	Rio de Janeiro	Apr. 9-16
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission: Intergovernmental Meeting.	San José	Apr. 10-12
FAO/ECE Codex Alimentarius Group on Standardization of Fruit Juices.	Geneva	Apr. 10-14
IMCO Subcommittee on Navigation: 2d Session	London	Apr. 10-14
FAO Working Party on Fishery Statistics in North Atlantic Area: 5th Session.	Aberdeen	Apr. 10-15

¹This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on March 15, 1967, lists international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period April-June 1967. The list does not include numerous nongovernmental conferences and meetings. Persons interested in these are referred to the *World List of Future International Meetings*, compiled by the Library of Congress and available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.

Following is a key to the abbreviations: ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, United States Treaty; BIRPI, International Bureaus for the Protection of Intellectual Property; CCIR, International Radio Consultative Committee; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; UPU, Universal Postal Union; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

U.N. Industrial Development Organization Board	New York	Apr. 10-28
Economic Commission for Europe: 22d Plenary Session	Geneva	Apr. 11-29
OECD Maritime Transport Committee	Paris	Apr. 12 (1 day)
Meeting of American Chiefs of State	Punta del Este	Apr. 12-14
FAO/U.N. Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Program: 11th Session.	Rome	Apr. 12-21
OECD Special Committee for Iron and Steel	Paris	Apr. 13 (1 day)
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: Standing Committee.	New York	Apr. 13-14
ITU/CCIR Study Group XIII	Geneva	Apr. 17-28
ICAO North Atlantic Systems Planning Group: 3d Meeting	Paris	Apr. 17-29
International Coffee Organization: High-Level Working Group.	London	Apr. 17-29
NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping	London	Apr. 18-20
9th International Hydrographic Conference	Monte Carlo	Apr. 18-May 3
OECD Committee on Scientific and Technical Personnel	Paris	Apr. 19-21
SEATO Council: 12th Session	Washington	Apr. 19-21
U.N. General Assembly: 5th Special Session	New York	Apr. 21-
ANZUS Council: 16th Session	Washington	Apr. 21-22
Board of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank: 8th Meeting.	Washington	Apr. 24-28
FAO Committee on Fisheries: 2d Session	Rome	Apr. 24-29
ECAFE Expert Group for Technical Study of Draft Convention on Road Traffic and Road Signs and Signals.	Bangkok	Apr. 24-May 3
UNESCO Executive Board: 76th Session	Paris	Apr. 24-May 12
CENTO Council at Ministerial Level: 15th Session	London	Apr. 25-26
PAHO Executive Committee: 56th Meeting	Washington	Apr. 26-May 5
WHO Governing Council: 3d Session of International Agency for Research on Cancer.	Lyons	Apr. 27-28
OECD Special Committee for Oil	Paris	Apr. 27-28
20th International Film Festival	Cannes	Apr. 27-May 12
U.N. Committee on Friendly Relations	Geneva	April
ILO Technical Meeting of Experts on Organization and Planning of Vocational Training.	Geneva	April
11th Meeting of Consultation of American Ministers of Foreign Affairs: 3d Session.	Montevideo	April
FAO Study Group on Grains: 11th Session	Rome	April
OECD Agriculture Committee	Paris	April
NATO Atlantic Policy Advisory Group	Paris	April
ECOSOC Advisory Committee on Application of Science and Technology to Development: 7th Session.	New York	May 1-5
ECOSOC Committee for Program and Coordination	New York	May 1-5
WMO Executive Committee: 19th Session	Geneva	May 1-5
International Coffee Council	London	May 1-12
Economic Commission for Latin America: 12th Session	Caracas	May 2-13
Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission: Special Committee on Enforcement.	Paris	May 5-6
ICEM Budget and Finance Committee: 15th Session	Geneva	May 6-8
FAO Near East Plant Protection Commission: 2d Session	Tripoli	May 6-13
ITU Administrative Council: 22d Session	Geneva	May 6-27
World Health Organization: 20th Assembly	Geneva	May 8-27
Economic and Social Council: 42d Session	New York	May 8-June 2
U.N. International Law Commission: 19th Session	Geneva	May 8-July 14
ICEM Executive Committee: 29th Session	Geneva	May 9-12
OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee	Paris	May 9-12
Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission: 5th Annual Meeting	Paris	May 9-12
UNCTAD Permanent Subcommittee on Commodities: 1st Session (resumed).	Geneva	May 9-12
International Rubber Study Group: 81st Meeting	The Hague	May 9-12
UNCTAD Committee on Commodities: 2d Session	Geneva	May 9-26
OECD Trade Committee: Working Party on Government Procurement.	Paris	May 10-12
NATO Food and Agricultural Planning Committee	Paris	May 11-12
IMCO Subcommittee on Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea: 11th Session.	London	May 15-19
ICEM Council: 27th Session	Geneva	May 15-19
UPU Executive Council	Bern	May 16-26
12th Diplomatic Conference on International Maritime Law	Brussels	May 16-27
IMCO Subcommittee on Subdivision and Stability Problems: 6th Session.	London	May 22-26

Calendar of International Conferences—Continued

Scheduled April Through June 1967—Continued

UNHCR Executive Committee: 17th Session	Geneva	May 22-30
ECE Committee on Housing, Building and Planning	Geneva	May 23-26
OECD Fiscal Committee	Paris	May 23-26
International Conference on Water for Peace	Washington	May 23-31
NATO Civil Defense Committee	Paris	May 25-26
ILO Governing Body: 169th Session	Geneva	May 26 and June 3
WHO Executive Board: 40th Session	Geneva	May 29-30
IMCO Working Group on Fire Test Procedures	London	May 29-June 2
Hague Conference on Private International Law: Special Commission on Divorce.	The Hague	May 29-June 9
OECD Economic Policy Committee	Paris	May 31-June 1
NATO Civil Communications Planning Committee	Paris	May 31-June 2
U.N. Committee of 24 on Independence to Colonial Countries	New York	May
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 34th Session	New York	May
ECAFE Asian Highway Coordinating Committee: 3d Session	Kabul	May
FAO/WHO Committee of Experts on the Code of Principles for Milk and Milk Products.	Rome	May
UNESCO Coordinating Council for International Hydrological Decade: 3d Session.	Paris	May
International Cotton Advisory Committee: 26th Plenary Meeting.	Netherlands	May
Inter-American Committee for Cultural Action	Mexico	May or June
OECD Pulp and Paper Committee	Paris	June 1-2
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party III	Paris	June 2 (1 day)
International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 17th Meeting.	Boston	June 5-10
IMCO Subcommittee on Radio Communications: 3d Session	London	June 5-12
ECOSOC Committee for Program and Coordination	New York	June 5-16
ECOSOC Committee for Industrial Development: 7th Session	New York	June 5-23
European Civil Aviation Conference: 6th Meeting	Strasbourg	June 6-7
U.N. Development Program Governing Council: 4th Session	Geneva	June 6-23
International Labor Organization: 51st Conference	Geneva	June 7-29
NATO Civil Aviation Planning Committee	Paris	June 8-9
FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission: Committee on Food Hygiene.	Washington	June 12-16
UNICEF Committee on Administrative Budget: Program Committee and Executive Board.	New York	June 12-22
FAO Council: 48th Session	Rome	June 12-23
FAO World Scientific Conference on Biology and Culture of Shrimps and Prawns.	Mexico City	June 12-24
BIRPI Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property and the Berne Copyright Convention.	Stockholm	June 12-July 15
IMCO Council: 18th Session	London	June 19-21
ECE Conference of European Statisticians	Geneva	June 19-23
FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission: Committee on Processed Fruits and Vegetables.	Washington	June 19-23
NATO Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport.	Paris	June 20-22
Berlin International Film Festival	Berlin	June 23-July 4
International Whaling Commission: 19th Meeting	London	June 27-July 1
Inter-American Economic and Social Council: 5th Annual Meetings at the Ministerial and Expert Level.	Viña del Mar	June 30-July 13
IAEA Board of Governors	Vienna	June
FAO Study Group on Rice: Steering Committee	Rome	June
International Cotton Institute: 2d General Assembly	Antwerp	June
OECD Group on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees	Paris	June
NATO Ministerial Council	Luxembourg	June
FAO Codex Alimentarius Commission: 9th Meeting of Executive Committee.	Rome	June
Inter-American Conference of Ministers of Labor: 2d Meeting of the Permanent Technical Advisory Committee on Labor Affairs.	Viña del Mar	June
FAO Working Party on Pest Resistance to Pesticides	Rome	June
NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee: Plenary Session.	Paris	June

United States and Brazil Sign Income Tax Convention

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 57 dated March 14

U.S. Ambassador John W. Tuthill, Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Juracy Magalhães, and Brazilian Minister of Finance Octavio Gouvea de Bulhoes signed an income tax convention between the two countries at Rio de Janeiro on March 13. The convention follows in broad outline the pattern of tax conventions already in effect between the United States and other foreign countries.

The convention describes general rules of taxation and specifies the manner of relief from double taxation and the rules determining the source of income. It also sets forth maximum withholding rates applicable with respect to certain types of income and special rules covering personal income of aliens. In addition, the convention contains an article providing that the United States shall allow a tax credit for investment in Brazil under certain circumstances. Further details on the convention are provided in a press release issued by the U.S. Treasury Department.

The convention, which will be transmitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, will have effect for taxable years beginning on or after the first day of January of the year following the exchange of instruments of ratification.

TREASURY ANNOUNCEMENT

The Treasury Department announced on March 14 that the income tax convention between the United States and Brazil includes the following provisions:

Allowance of a 7 percent investment tax credit for investment in machinery and equipment in Brazil by U.S. firms. The credit is modeled after the investment tax credit applicable under the United States Internal Revenue Code.

The investment tax credit would be allowed under the same conditions as those applicable to the domestic investment tax credit. Consequently, this aspect of the treaty would apply only when the domestic credit is operative in the United States.

The treaty limits Brazilian withholding tax to 20 percent on dividends flowing to the United States from direct investment in Brazil.

The Brazilian withholding tax on interest paid to financial institutions in the United States and on royalties paid to U.S. licensors is limited to 15 percent.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962. Entered into force December 27, 1963. TIAS 5505.
Accession deposited: Honduras, January 20, 1967.

Maritime Matters

Inter-American convention on facilitation of international waterborne transportation, with annex. Signed at Mar del Plata June 7, 1963.¹
Ratified by the President: March 9, 1967.
Convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965. Entered into force March 5, 1967.²
Ratified by the President: March 9, 1967.

Organization of American States

Charter of the Organization of American States. Signed at Bogotá April 30, 1948. Entered into force December 13, 1951. TIAS 2361.
Signature: Trinidad and Tobago, March 13, 1967.

Safety at Sea

International regulations for preventing collisions at sea. Approved by the International Conference

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

on Safety of Life at Sea, London May 17-June 17, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965. TIAS 5813.

Acceptance deposited: Australia, January 13, 1967.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention, with annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. Entered into force January 1, 1967.²

Accession deposited: Maldivé Islands, February 28, 1967.

BILATERAL

Belgium

Agreement amending Annex B of the mutual defense assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 2010). Effected by exchange of notes at Brussels February 2 and 22, 1967. Entered into force February 22, 1967.

Ghana

Agreement supplementing the agreement of September 30, 1958 (TIAS 4121), relating to investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at Accra March 3, 1967. Entered into force March 3, 1967.

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities

² Not in force for the United States.

under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with annex. Signed at Accra March 3, 1967. Entered into force March 3, 1967.

Korea

Agreement regarding the status of the Korean Service Corps, with agreed understandings. Signed at Seoul February 23, 1967.

Entered into force: March 10, 1967.

Lesotho

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Signed at Maseru February 24, 1967. Enters into force on the date of notification from the Government of Lesotho that agreement has been approved in conformity with constitutional procedures.

Netherlands

Additional agreement to the agreement of May 17, 1949 (TIAS 1946), for financing certain educational and cultural programs. Effected by exchange of notes at The Hague June 22, 1966. *Entry into force:* February 28, 1967; effective January 1, 1965.

United Kingdom

Agreement amending the agreement of May 10, 1965 (TIAS 5806), for financing certain programs of educational and cultural exchange. Effected by exchange of notes at London February 16, 1967. Entered into force February 16, 1967.

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the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Albania. Department Issues Public Notices on Travel to Restricted Areas (*Federal Register* entries) 564

Asia. Asian Development Bank Immunities Defined (Executive order) 563

Brazil. United States and Brazil Sign Income Tax Convention 581

Canada. St. Lawrence Seaway Tolls To Remain at Present Levels 554

Congress

The Latin American Summit Meeting (President's message to Congress) 540

1966 International Negotiations for Arms Control and Disarmament (President's letter of transmittal and excerpt from ACDA's sixth annual report to Congress) 568

President Hails Senate Action on U.S.-Soviet Consular Pact (Johnson) 545

U.S. Participation in the U.N. During 1965 (Johnson) 566

Cuba. Department Issues Public Notices on Travel to Restricted Areas (*Federal Register* entries) 564

Department and Foreign Service. The Defense of Viet-Nam: Key to the Future of Free Asia (Johnson) 534

Disarmament. 1966 International Negotiations for Arms Control and Disarmament (President's letter of transmittal and excerpt from ACDA's sixth annual report to Congress) 568

Economic Affairs

Asian Development Bank Immunities Defined (Executive order) 563

Cotton in the World Trade Arena (Solomon) 555

The Defense of Viet-Nam: Key to the Future of Free Asia (Johnson) 534

St. Lawrence Seaway Tolls To Remain at Present Levels 554

United States and Brazil Sign Income Tax Convention 581

U.S. Investment and Trade Mission Visits Korea 554

United States Joins Dedication of Jidda Desalting Plant Site (Udall) 561

Foreign Aid

The Latin American Summit Meeting (President's message to Congress) 540

20th Anniversary of the Truman Doctrine (Johnson) 546

Greece. 20th Anniversary of the Truman Doctrine (Johnson) 546

Guinea. Foreign Minister of Guinea Visits the United States 554

International Organizations and Conferences

Asian Development Bank Immunities Defined (Executive order) 563

Calendar of International Conferences 578

Korea

Department Issues Public Notices on Travel to Restricted Areas (*Federal Register* entries) 564

U.S. and Korea Pledge Continued Friendship and Cooperation (Chung, Johnson) 548

U.S. Investment and Trade Mission Visits Korea 554

Latin America. The Latin American Summit Meeting (President's message to Congress) 540

Military Affairs. The Defense of Viet-Nam: Key to the Future of Free Asia (Johnson) 534

Passports. Department Issues Public Notices on Travel to Restricted Areas (*Federal Register* entries) 564

Presidential Documents

Asian Development Bank Immunities Defined 563

The Defense of Viet-Nam: Key to the Future of Free Asia 534

The Latin American Summit Meeting 540

1966 International Negotiations for Arms Control and Disarmament 568

President Hails Senate Action on U.S.-Soviet Consular Pact 545

20th Anniversary of the Truman Doctrine 546

U.S. and Korea Pledge Continued Friendship and Cooperation 548

U.S. Participation in the U.N. During 1965 566

Public Affairs. Foreign Policy Conference Held at Philadelphia 565

Saudi Arabia. United States Joins Dedication of Jidda Desalting Plant Site (Udall) 561

Trade. Cotton in the World Trade Arena (Solomon) 555

Treaty Information

Current Actions 581

President Hails Senate Action on U.S.-Soviet Consular Pact (Johnson) 545

St. Lawrence Seaway Tolls To Remain at Present Levels 554

United States and Brazil Sign Income Tax Convention 581

U.S. Participation in the U.N. During 1965 (Johnson) 566

Turkey. 20th Anniversary of the Truman Doctrine (Johnson) 546

U.S.S.R. President Hails Senate Action on U.S.-Soviet Consular Pact (Johnson) 545

United Nations. U.S. Participation in the U.N. During 1965 (Johnson) 566

Viet-Nam

The Defense of Viet Nam: Key to the Future of Free Asia (Johnson) 534

Department Issues Public Notices on Travel to Restricted Areas (*Federal Register* entries) 564

Name Index

Chung, Il Kwon 548

Johnson, President 534, 540, 545, 546, 548, 563, 566, 568

Solomon, Anthony M 555

Udall, Stewart L 561

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: March 13-19

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to March 13 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 45 of March 6 and 53 of March 9.

No.	Date	Subject
56	3/13	St. Lawrence Seaway tolls.
57	3/14	Income taxconvention with Brazil (rewrite).
†58	3/16	Cotton textile agreement with Poland.
59	3/17	Regional foreign policy conference, Philadelphia, Pa. (rewrite).

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE
DEPARTMENT
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BULLETIN

Vol. LVI, No. 1450



April 10, 1967

U.S. AND VIETNAMESE LEADERS CONFER AT GUAM 586

SECRETARY RUSK AND AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG URGE SENATE
APPROVAL OF OUTER SPACE TREATY

Statements Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 600

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S PROPOSAL FOR NEGOTIATION
ON VIET-NAM REJECTED BY HO CHI MINH

Department Statement and Texts of Letters 595

U.S. and Vietnamese Leaders Confer at Guam

BACKGROUND

President Johnson left Washington on March 19 for Guam, where on March 20-21 he conferred with top Vietnamese and U.S. officials on the situation in South Viet-Nam. Nguyen Van Thieu, Chairman of the National Leadership Committee of the Republic of Viet-Nam, and South Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky, who attended the conference at the President's invitation, brought with them a copy of the new Vietnamese Constitution adopted by the Constituent Assembly. The leaders of the two Governments exchanged views on military, political, and economic developments in South Viet-Nam. A joint communique was issued at the close of the meeting on March 21.

Included in the U.S. delegation were Secretary of State Dean Rusk; Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara; Director of the Agency for International Development William S. Gaud; Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman; Ambassador at Large Ellsworth Bunker, Ambassador-designate to Viet-Nam; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler; Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Richard M. Helms; Ambassador to Viet-Nam Henry Cabot Lodge; Ambassador to Pakistan Eugene M. Locke, Deputy-Ambassador-designate to Viet-Nam; Special Assistant to the President Robert W. Komer; Special Assistant to the President W. W. Rostow; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs John T. McNaughton; Consultant to the President on Viet-Nam,

Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor; the U.S. commander in Viet-Nam, Gen. William C. Westmoreland; the commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, Adm. U. S. Grant Sharp; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Leonard C. Unger, Coordinator of the Interagency Viet-Nam Task Force; and David E. Lilienthal, president of the Development and Research Corp., New York, N.Y.

ARRIVAL CEREMONIES, GUAM INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, MARCH 20

Arrival of President Johnson

White House press release (Guam) dated March 20

REMARKS BY GOV. MANUEL F. L. GUERRERO

Mr. President, your staff members, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen: For Guam today is a moment of history. This is an historic occasion, another milestone in the annals of the history of Guam.

Mr. President, we are very proud and deeply honored that you have selected the Territory of Guam as the site for this important conference.

Mr. President, we want you to know that the people of Guam are 100 percent behind your Viet-Nam policy.

Mr. President, we want you to know that we are loyal and patriotic citizens. We cherish and endear your leadership. We want you to live long, for you have worked hard for peace.

We welcome you to Guam, and we hope that during your sojourn your stay will be pleasant. Thank you.

RESPONSE BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

We have come to Guam to confer with our military commanders, our diplomatic representatives, and with those who are helping to wage the peaceful campaign against poverty and want in Viet-Nam.

We have come to meet once again the leaders of South Viet-Nam, whose people continue to bear the great burdens of a war that they did not invite but which was thrust upon them by Communist terror.

We will discuss the progress and the future course of our military effort. We will review our diplomatic initiatives. We will try to estimate the chances of bringing peace to Viet-Nam through an honorable settlement.

Our new team of representatives in Saigon—Ambassador Bunker, Ambassador Locke, Mr. Komer—will be here with us, as will the great patriot whom Mr. Bunker will succeed, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge.

We chose Guam as the site of our meeting for its convenience to those who are conducting the military and peaceful development campaign in Viet-Nam. But beyond that consideration, there is a historical significance to this island that stirs the memories of those who remember the dark hours of World War II and which strengthens our determination to persevere in Viet-Nam today.

Guam knows a war in a way that no other part of America knows it. It was the only inhabited part of our nation to be occupied by hostile forces during the Second World War.

That war, and all of its anguish, changed forever the world as we had known it. It taught us lessons that we shall never forget—most important, that the peace of all the world is threatened when aggressors are encouraged to feed on any part of it.

America, which lost Guam and then freed it again with blood that now stains this ground, has not forgotten that lesson. American boys in Viet-Nam are once again carrying the American commitment to resist ag-

gression and to make possible the sacred work of peace among men.

We are grateful to you—all of you—for coming out here to welcome us. Pray that our work here will bear fruit, for we labor for you, for your fellow Americans, for the people of Viet-Nam, and for all of those who love peace and freedom throughout the world.

I should like to address a very special word to my Guamanian friends.

I am proud of the distinction which this trip gives me of being the first American President to come here while in office. I am very proud of Guam. All America is proud of the progress that it has made toward self-government in the short time since civil administration came to this island in 1950.

We are proud of the strides that you have taken under a very fine public servant, Governor Guerrero. His first term of office is now ending.

It gives me real pleasure to tell you that just before we landed I signed a nomination to go to the United States Senate giving my recommendation that the Honorable Manuel Guerrero be appointed to a second term as the Governor of Guam.

I hope that Governor Guerrero will be the last Governor to be appointed by a President. If the Congress acts favorably on legislation that I have proposed, he will be. That legislation will give the American citizens of Guam, along with your fellow citizens in other parts of the United States, the right to elect your own Governor.

Then all of you who are already contributing so much to the efforts of your country and the effort that your country is making in Viet-Nam will at long last have one of the great rights of the American democracy. I look forward to the day when I may sign that bill that is now pending into the law of our lands.

Thank you, my friends, for this warm welcome. I know that I shall enjoy spending the next few days with you.

Arrival of Vietnamese Leaders

White House press release (Guam) dated March 20

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

Chairman Thieu, Prime Minister Ky, most distinguished officials from the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States of America, ladies and gentlemen: Once again I am very pleased to welcome two brave Vietnamese leaders to American soil.

We met in Hawaii a little over a year ago.¹ Then, our talks were of plans and hopes. Today, we meet in a time of progress. It is our common task to extend that progress in the days ahead.

Ever since our conference last fall in Manila,² your country has traveled far on the road to democracy. Your Assembly has hammered out a new Constitution. I am informed that I will see a copy of that Constitution during our meeting here.

It is the foundation stone of a freely and popularly elected government. You are the leaders of 16 million courageous and dedicated people who are determined to forge a free nation from the fires of war.

Your people look to a Viet-Nam that is unencumbered by a foreign presence on its soil, unhindered by acts of terror and aggression, free to determine its own destiny.

I hope that this conference will be of value to both of us in charting the course for the future of the struggle for freedom in Viet-Nam.

I am also delighted and particularly anxious for you to get to know Ambassador Bunker, who will shortly succeed Ambassador Lodge in Saigon. I know that you will find him an able and understanding Ambassador, as you will his associate, Mr. Locke. I know you will find him a worthy successor to a very brave and distinguished patriot.

Last week I reassured my own people that America is committed to the defense of South

Viet-Nam until an honorable peace can be negotiated.³

I renew that pledge to you today.

Thank you very much.

RESPONSE BY CHAIRMAN THIEU

Mr. President, thank you very much for your kind words of welcome. I am happy to set foot again on American soil in the midst of the Pacific and have this opportunity to meet again with you, Mr. President, and the distinguished members of your Government.

As we pointed out last year following our meeting in Honolulu, we must maintain close contact. There is no adequate substitute for exchanging ideas than face to face across a table.

At that Manila Conference last October we had again agreed upon the principle of close consultation for review of what we have done and for candid and thorough discussions of the various problems confronting us in the defense of freedom in Viet-Nam.

I am grateful that you have found it possible to cross the major part of the Pacific Ocean for this meeting to be had, an important juncture in our effort in Viet-Nam to stem off the Communist aggression from the North and to give substance and solid foundations to democracy in the Republic of Viet-Nam.

Thanks to your help, we are now throwing a line against Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese people will long remember that at this crucial moment of their history, their freedom is preserved, thanks to the solidarity of millions of people around this Pacific Ocean.

Vietnamese soldiers are especially proud to fight side by side with valiant soldiers of the United States of America in this great struggle to defend freedom and to secure a long-lasting peace in this part of this world.

The Republic of Viet-Nam will do her best

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

² For background, see *ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1966, p. 730.

³ For President Johnson's address before the Tennessee State Legislature on Mar. 15, see *ibid.*, Apr. 3, 1967, p. 534.

so that all the brave soldiers who have made the supreme sacrifices in the defense of freedom will not have given their lives in vain.

Viet-Nam is the crucial test case on which will hinge not only the fate of Southeast Asia but also of many other areas in the world, where newly independent nations are groping for a path toward the future.

Together we will win this war, not only against the Communist aggression but also against the immemorial enemies of mankind—hunger, disease, and ignorance—to launch a society in which everyone will find a rightful place in establishing a meaningful democracy under the sign of progress and social justice.

In the spirit of the Manila Conference, the Republic of Viet-Nam spares no effort to explore all possible avenues which may lead us to a just and honorable peace.

When such a peace is restored, a general reconciliation among all Vietnamese will be possible, to put an end to the sufferings and ravages of the war and open a new era in which all Vietnamese of good will can participate in the building of a free and peaceful nation.

With these hopes, I look forward to fruitful discussions at this meeting.

Thank you very much.

STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

Opening Statement at Conference, March 20

White House press release (Guam) dated March 20

I shall make my opening remarks very short. We are old friends and comrades in arms. We do not need to elaborate on preliminaries before getting down to work.

Our two Governments have developed methods of regular consultation that have served us well in the critical days in which we've been associated. I am confident this will continue.

Today I am introducing to you our new Ambassador, Ellsworth Bunker, and his deputy, Eugene Locke. He has served our country—and the cause of freedom—on three

continents. It is typical of him that he is ready to serve in this struggle as well. His distinguished talents give us full confidence for the future.

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge has represented the United States in Saigon with great dedication and ability. One measure of our appreciation for his splendid service is the caliber of the man we have chosen as his successor.

We meet at an auspicious time. The task of drafting a Constitution for South Viet-Nam, I am informed, has been completed. The drafters were elected by people in every section of the country—except where they were prevented from voting by pressures of the Viet Cong. I know you regret, as I do, that the Viet Cong succeeded in preventing anyone from voting. We believe that a system which stands in the way of democratic process in this fashion cannot survive very long among the people—even when it uses terror and assassination to achieve its ends.

Now your great task is to conduct a national election for a new government. The success of that election is as important as any of the military operations we shall conduct in the months ahead.

There are many signs that we are at a favorable turning point. Your fighting men, aided by your allies, now hold the initiative and are striking heavy blows against the strongholds and refuges of the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese masters. And in the villages the medicine of the revolutionary development program is already beginning to take effect. The Viet Cong are turning sharply against that program's administration. I think that is very solid tribute to its effectiveness.

There are many other things I could cite that give us encouragement. But Viet-Nam is still a land of war and suffering, where the danger of inflation and epidemics and political conflict lie just beneath the surface. So let us turn today to see again what we can do to make our joint efforts even more effective.

**Statement on New Vietnamese Constitution,
March 20⁴**

I am deeply pleased to hear from Prime Minister Ky that the Directorate has agreed to the new Constitution just adopted by the Constituent Assembly of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

The Constitution marks the most important step in Viet-Nam's progress toward representative government. It is the fruit of 6 months of labor by delegates whose very elections demonstrated the ability of the people of South Viet-Nam to move forward toward democracy in the midst of war and despite the savage opposition of the Viet Cong.

Many of the provisions of the Constitution were actively debated during 6 months of consideration by the Assembly. But when agreement was finally reached, the Constitution was approved by the unanimous vote of the Assembly.

Like the U. S. Constitution, the Vietnamese Constitution has been written by the democratically chosen representatives of the people. And like the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia two centuries ago, the Assembly in Saigon included many men in their late twenties or early thirties.

The Constitution secures freedom of speech and freedom of religion. It guarantees civil rights and due process of law and provides for free political expression by the press, political parties, and trade unions, as well as by individuals.

It establishes an executive branch and endows it with wide powers, but subjects it, at the same time, to strong measures of control by the Legislature. The Legislature will enjoy wide authority, perhaps wider than that of the U. S. Congress.

Three times in less than 2 years South Viet-Nam has moved closer toward establishing a government fully responsive to the people. The first of these steps was the provincial elections held in May 1965; the sec-

⁴ Read to news correspondents by Secretary Rusk at a news conference on Mar. 20 (White House press release (Guam)).

ond step was the election, last September 11, of the members of the Constituent Assembly; now a democratic Constitution has been adopted.

There will be other steps on the road to more representative government in Viet-Nam during the coming months. A new round of village and hamlet elections will begin in April, when over 900 village councils will be elected. In May and June nearly 5,000 hamlet chiefs will be chosen. Then, the election of a President and the Senate, provided for in the new Constitution, is planned for late summer. Finally, the election of the House of Representatives will come within a month after the election of a President.

All those who have thoughtfully studied the modern history of Viet-Nam know that military power alone cannot secure the peace and insure the progress of that nation, nor of any other. Free political institutions are indispensable to the success of South Viet-Nam's long struggle against terror, and those who support her in that struggle rejoice in the success of this past week.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, MARCH 20⁵

President Johnson

White House press release (Guam) dated March 20

In 1873, when Viet-Nam was disputing the right of France to extend control over the whole country, a scholar named Bui Vien was sent by the Emperor to enlist the help of the United States. He was received by President Grant.

On his way home he was informed of President Grant's decision that, because of unforeseen circumstances, the United States would be unable to assist Viet-Nam.

He stopped in Japan to see an old friend, the American Consul in Yokohama. As people did in those days in Asia, the two men exchanged poems. Here is what Bui Vien wrote:

⁵ At a dinner for U.S. and Vietnamese officials.

We pour out wine into glasses at Yokohama in the ninth month—in autumn.

Turning my head towards the clouds of Vietnam, I am anxious about my country.

Sea and land—memory and emotion—remind me of my former journey.

Enjoying myself with you, I regret all the more that we must part.

Spiritual companion, in what year will we be together in the same sampan?

Today we know the answer. We are together. And we know our destination. We established it years ago, and affirmed it at Honolulu and Manila. The brave sons of both our nations reaffirm it anew with every day that passes.

The trip is not yet over. The waters ahead may be rough. But together, with courage and unflagging devotion to the duty we share, we will make it.

Gentlemen, to the free peoples of Viet-Nam and the United States, who love their liberty and fight to preserve it.

Chairman Thieu

White House press release (Guam) dated March 20

Mr. President, gentlemen: I would like to thank you most sincerely for making this gathering not only an opportunity for the leaders of both Governments to exchange views on common problems but also a family affair in which protocol yields to informality and cordiality.

I am deeply touched by your evocation of the historical diplomatic mission. In the last century, Vietnamese Ambassador Bui Vien went on a good-will mission to the United States, a great country from across the Pacific Ocean, in what was for us, may I say, the Far East.

What I would like to add in recalling the history of Vietnamese-American friendship is that, almost a century and a half ago, an American Ambassador of good will, named John White, also came to Viet-Nam. He was a well-respected citizen of Boston, a businessman and traveler. History did not record his poems, but he wrote memoirs about his influences in our exotic land.

Today we have had the privilege and the

great pleasure to have in Ambassador Lodge a much more illustrious Ambassador from Boston. We are sad to see him leaving, but the years he spent in Viet-Nam will long be remembered.

We know that with Ambassador Bunker another page of cordial and constructive friendship will be opened.

In this spirit may I ask you, Mr. President and gentlemen, to join me in a toast to the everlasting friendship and solidarity between our two nations, for freedom, peace, and progress.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE, MARCH 21

White House press release (Guam) dated March 21

The President of the United States and the Chief of State and the Prime Minister of Viet-Nam completed their discussions in Guam. These talks have demonstrated again their joint determination with their allies, to defend freedom in South Viet-Nam and at the same time to continue the earnest search for an honorable peace.

President Johnson took this occasion to present to Chairman Thieu, Prime Minister Ky and their party the new leadership of the U.S. Mission in Saigon. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker will take up from Ambassador Lodge the maintenance and strengthening of close relations with the Government of Viet-Nam. He will be working with that Government in its struggle to preserve the nation's freedom, in its steady progress toward economic and social development, and in the new political chapter now opening of constitutional and representative government under elected leaders. President Johnson introduced Ambassador Eugene Locke, who will take Ambassador Porter's place as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Mission, and he also explained that his Special Assistant, Mr. Robert Komer, would be in Saigon giving his attention to Pacification/RD matters.

Meeting with their advisors, President Johnson and Chairman Thieu and Prime Minister Ky reviewed the encouraging progress on the various programs of the Vietnam-

ese Government which had been discussed at Honolulu early in 1966 and were outlined in the Communique of the Seven Allied Nations meeting in Manila last October.

Discussion covered the military front, where the initiative lies increasingly with the allied forces and where the leaders of North Viet-Nam must recognize the futility of their effort to seize control of South Viet-Nam by force.

The meeting also reviewed those programs of the Vietnamese Government to which the United States is providing assistance. They found that, a solid foundation having been laid, the pacification and revolutionary development program was now beginning to show encouraging results, despite Viet Cong efforts to disrupt it by terror and intimidation. They noted the successful maintenance of financial stability while recognizing the need for continued vigilance on this front. They heard from Dr. Vu Quoc Thuc and Mr. David Lilienthal of the long-range economic planning now getting underway. Plans for continued efforts in the fields of national reconciliation and reform of land policies and tenure provisions were described by the Vietnamese leaders.

They also outlined the provisions of the Constitution drafted by the Constituent Assembly elected last September 11 and agreed by the Assembly and approved by the Directorate in the last few days. This instrument provides for the principal organs of a representative government and assures to the people civil and economic rights and social justice. The Constitution offers full civil rights to those who respect its provisions and the world looks forward to the day when the Viet Cong will take advantage of this offer, abandon the course of terror and violence and join in making a free, modern society in South Viet-Nam.

It was also announced that elections for a president will be held under the Constitution within 4 to 5 months and the elections for a legislature shortly thereafter. Meanwhile a major forward step will be made toward the restoration of democratic local

government when village hamlet elections take place, starting in April.

The numerous and varied efforts made in recent months to bring about a peaceful settlement were reviewed by the heads of both delegations. Thus far, they noted regretfully, North Viet-Nam has failed to respond to all such efforts. However, Chairman Thieu, Prime Minister Ky and President Johnson reaffirmed their undertakings at Manila and Honolulu and pledged themselves anew to the diligent pursuit of peace. Continuing consultations about the search for peace will be maintained among the nations whose forces are now fighting against aggression in South Viet-Nam.

The Vietnamese and American leaders also took note of the forthcoming meetings in Washington of SEATO on April 18-20 and of the Foreign Ministers of nations having troops in Viet-Nam on April 20-21. The latter will bring together again the Governments which met at Manila last October and provide an opportunity for them to review progress and programs in Viet-Nam and consult on future courses of action.

The Vietnamese leaders are leaving Guam for Saigon this morning and President Johnson is expected to depart at the end of the day.

RETURN TO WASHINGTON

Statement by President Johnson, Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, March 21

White House press release dated March 21

Before I returned to Washington, I wanted to come here to see some of the men and their families who are carrying the burdens of this war, as I did last fall when I went to Cam Ranh Bay.⁶

In some respects our engagement in Viet-Nam is familiar to America.

In World War II and in Korea, as in Viet-Nam, there was a conflict of ideology

⁶ For background, see *ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1966, p. 735.

between ourselves and our adversaries. But the struggle is not limited to one of ideology.

Force had to be met with force. Americans had to shoulder rifles, man tanks and warships, and take bombers into the air, all at great risk to their lives and at a great distance from their homelands.

The ideological debates continued over the wisdom of involvement or noninvolvement:

The "America Firsters" had their say, but the aggressor could not be stopped by argument.

People who desired to live in freedom could not be protected by debating points.

The defense of freedom required then, as it requires now, the willingness of brave men to face danger, to risk death, and to live with their fears for months and years on end.

Today we are here to decorate 12 men, all of whom risked their lives many times in the air over Viet-Nam. As their Commander in Chief and the representative of the people whom they have so gallantly served, I salute them with all my heart.

There are some respects, as professional soldiers know, in which this war is different from the others that we have waged. There are no sharply defined battle lines. The random terror of the subversive, not the mythical power of a conventional army in the field, is the enemy's main weapon.

Political and social forces are at work which complicate the struggle and which make it necessary to do far more than wage a traditional military campaign.

We met these past 2 days here with leaders, Vietnamese and Americans, to discuss some of the elements of this different kind of war in Viet-Nam.

We have brought the new team of American representatives to Viet-Nam: Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, who has served his country with great distinction in the Dominican crisis, in India, in Italy, and many other posts of the highest responsibility; Ambassador Eugene Locke, who now represents us in Pakistan; and Robert Komer, who until now has been in the

White House as my counselor on the civil side of the Vietnamese war.

We wanted these distinguished Americans to meet the leaders of Viet-Nam with whom they will be working in the months ahead.

We came here to discuss seven of our major concerns in Viet-Nam today:

First, the military progress of the war, both in the South and in the North.

Second, the political progress that is being made in South Viet-Nam. Prime Minister Ky gave me a copy of the new Constitution which the freely elected Constituent Assembly had just adopted in South Viet-Nam and which the Directory had just approved. This is the third and the most significant step that South Viet-Nam has taken toward granting its people the fundamental rights of democracy.

Third, we discussed in some detail the morale, the health, the training, the food, the clothing, and the equipment of our superb young fighting men. I questioned General Westmoreland closely on all of these matters, and his response was deeply gratifying to me.

Fourth, the national reconciliation program in Viet-Nam.

Fifth, the land reform program, which is moving steadily forward.

Sixth, the extent of civilian casualties and what is being done to help those who are injured or who are wounded by the war.

Seventh, the possibilities of bringing an end to this conflict at as early a date as possible by an honorable settlement.

We did not adopt any spectacular, new programs at this meeting. We said in advance that that was not our plan. The nature of this war is not amenable to spectacular programs or to easy solutions. It requires courage, perseverance, and dedication—exactly the qualities that men such as you are providing today.

So to all of the men of this command, and their families who so loyally stand by them in this hour of trial, let me say as we leave Guam that all America honors you and is grateful to you.

We feel refreshed by the conviction that on several fronts—military, political, and social—we and our allies are making substantial progress. When the inevitability of that progress finally gets through and becomes clear to Hanoi, we shall then arrive at what Churchill would have called “the beginning of the end.”

I leave you today with pride—great pride—in what you are doing and great confidence for the country that you serve.

I do not want to let this occasion go by without presenting to you some of the great public servants who lead this nation in this critical period.

I want to introduce your Secretary of State—Dean Rusk.

Next I want to introduce your Secretary of Defense—Robert McNamara.

Ambassador Bunker and Ambassador Lodge.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler; Admiral Sharp; General Maxwell Taylor; General Westmoreland; and your distinguished Governor of Guam.

Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen.

Statement by President Johnson, Andrews Air Force Base, Washington, March 21

White House press release dated March 21

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen.

As I said upon my departure from Guam, we discussed seven of our major concerns at at our meeting there.

First, the military progress of the war, both in the South and in the North.

Second, the political progress that is being made now in South Viet-Nam. Prime Minister Ky gave me a copy of the new Constitution which the freely elected Constituent Assembly has adopted and which the Direc-

tory has just approved. This is the third and most significant step that South Viet-Nam has taken toward granting its people the fundamental rights of democracy.

Third, we discussed the morale, the health, the training, the food, the clothing, and equipment of our superb young fighting men. I questioned General Westmoreland very closely on these matters. His response was extremely gratifying to me.

Fourth, the national reconciliation program in Viet-Nam.

Fifth, the land reform program, which is moving steadily forward. Premier Ky told me that he had distributed 27,000 titles just recently.

Sixth, the extent of civilian casualties and what is being done to help those who are injured or who are wounded by the war.

Seventh, the possibilities of bringing an end to this conflict by an honorable settlement.

We did not adopt any specific or spectacular new programs at this meeting. The nature of this war is not amenable to spectacular programs or easy solutions. It requires courage, perseverance, and dedication.

During my flight home I learned that Hanoi had made public an exchange of letters between me and Ho Chi Minh.⁷ His reply to me of mid-February and his earlier public reply to His Holiness the Pope were regrettable rebuffs to a genuine effort to move toward peace. This has been the consistent attitude of Hanoi to many efforts by us, by other governments, by groups of governments, and by leading personalities throughout the world. Nevertheless, we shall persevere in our efforts to find an honorable peace. Until that is achieved, of course, we shall continue to do our duty in Viet-Nam.

⁷ See p. 595.

President Johnson's Proposal for Negotiation on Viet-Nam Rejected by Ho Chi Minh

On March 21 the Department of State made public the text of a letter from President Johnson to Ho Chi Minh, President of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, after the text of that letter and President Ho's reply had been broadcast in English by Radio Hanoi earlier that day. The letters were exchanged in February through officials of the American and North Vietnamese Embassies in Moscow. President Johnson's letter was delivered there on February 8, and the reply on February 15.

Following is a Department statement of March 21, together with the texts of the two letters.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT ¹

President Johnson did write to President Ho Chi Minh a letter delivered to the North Vietnamese in Moscow on February 8.

This personal letter from President Johnson reaffirmed earlier proposals made on four occasions by the United States Government to Hanoi through representatives in Moscow, commencing in early January. These proposals called attention to the upcoming Tet cease-fire and urged direct talks aimed at resolving this Viet-Nam conflict. Other than a diatribe against the United States, delivered on January 27, no response at all was received to these proposals prior to that of February 15 by President Ho Chi Minh.

¹ Read to news correspondents on Mar. 21 by the Department spokesman.

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS

President Johnson's Letter

His Excellency

HO CHI MINH

President

Democratic Republic of Vietnam

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am writing to you in the hope that the conflict in Vietnam can be brought to an end. That conflict has already taken a heavy toll—in lives lost, in wounds inflicted, in property destroyed, and in simple human misery. If we fail to find a just and peaceful solution, history will judge us harshly.

Therefore, I believe that we both have a heavy obligation to seek earnestly the path to peace. It is in response to that obligation that I am writing directly to you.

We have tried over the past several years, in a variety of ways and through a number of channels, to convey to you and your colleagues our desire to achieve a peaceful settlement. For whatever reasons, these efforts have not achieved any results.

It may be that our thoughts and yours, our attitudes and yours, have been distorted or misinterpreted as they passed through these various channels. Certainly that is always a danger in indirect communication.

There is one good way to overcome this problem and to move forward in the search for a peaceful settlement. That is for us to arrange for direct talks between trusted representatives in a secure setting and away from the glare of publicity. Such talks should

not be used as a propaganda exercise but should be a serious effort to find a workable and mutually acceptable solution.

In the past two weeks, I have noted public statements by representatives of your government suggesting that you would be prepared to enter into direct bilateral talks with representatives of the U.S. Government, provided that we ceased "unconditionally" and permanently our bombing operations against your country and all military actions against it. In the last day, serious and responsible parties have assured us indirectly that this is in fact your proposal.

Let me frankly state that I see two great difficulties with this proposal. In view of your public position, such action on our part would inevitably produce worldwide speculation that discussions were under way and would impair the privacy and secrecy of those discussions. Secondly, there would inevitably be grave concern on our part whether your government would make use of such action by us to improve its military position.

With these problems in mind, I am prepared to move even further towards an ending of hostilities than your Government has proposed in either public statements or through private diplomatic channels. I am prepared to order a cessation of bombing against your country and the stopping of further augmentation of U.S. forces in South Viet-Nam as soon as I am assured that infiltration into South Viet-Nam by land and by sea has stopped. These acts of restraint on both sides would, I believe, make it possible for us to conduct serious and private discussions leading toward an early peace.

I make this proposal to you now with a specific sense of urgency arising from the imminent New Year holidays in Viet-Nam. If you are able to accept this proposal I see no reason why it could not take effect at the end of the New Year, or Tet, holidays. The proposal I have made would be greatly strengthened if your military authorities and those of the Government of South Viet-Nam could promptly negotiate an extension of the Tet truce.

As to the site of the bilateral discussions

I propose, there are several possibilities. We could, for example, have our representatives meet in Moscow where contacts have already occurred. They could meet in some other country such as Burma. You may have other arrangements or sites in mind, and I would try to meet your suggestions.

The important thing is to end a conflict that has brought burdens to both our peoples, and above all to the people of South Viet-Nam. If you have any thoughts about the actions I propose, it would be most important that I receive them as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

President Ho Chi Minh's Reply

Translation

His Excellency

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

President of the United States

Excellency, on February 10, 1967, I received your message. Here is my response.

Viet-Nam is situated thousands of miles from the United States. The Vietnamese people have never done any harm to the United States. But, contrary to the commitments made by its representative at the Geneva Conference of 1954, the United States Government has constantly intervened in Viet-Nam, it has launched and intensified the war of aggression in South Viet-Nam for the purpose of prolonging the division of Viet-Nam and of transforming South Viet-Nam into an American neo-colony and an American military base. For more than two years now, the American Government, with its military aviation and its navy, has been waging war against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, an independent and sovereign country.

The United States Government has committed war crimes, crimes against peace and against humanity. In South Viet-Nam a half-million American soldiers and soldiers from the satellite countries have resorted to the most inhumane arms and the most barbarous methods of warfare, such as napalm, chemicals, and poison gases in order to massacre our fellow countrymen, destroy the crops,

and wipe out the villages. In North Viet-Nam thousands of American planes have rained down hundreds of thousands of tons of bombs, destroying cities, villages, mills, roads, bridges, dikes, dams and even churches, pagodas, hospitals, and schools. In your message you appear to deplore the suffering and the destruction in Viet-Nam. Permit me to ask you: Who perpetrated these monstrous crimes? It was the American soldiers and the soldiers of the satellite countries. The United States Government is entirely responsible for the extremely grave situation in Viet-Nam.

The American war of aggression against the Vietnamese people constitutes a challenge to the countries of the socialist camp, a threat to the peoples' independent movement, and a grave danger to peace in Asia and in the world.

The Vietnamese people deeply love independence, liberty, and peace. But in the face of the American aggression they have risen up as one man, without fearing the sacrifices and the privations. They are determined to continue their resistance until they have won real independence and liberty and true peace. Our just cause enjoys the approval and the powerful support of peoples throughout the world and of large segments of the American people.

The United States Government provoked the war of aggression in Viet-Nam. It must cease that aggression, it is the only road leading to the re-establishment of peace. The United States Government must halt definitively and unconditionally the bombings and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, withdraw from South Viet-Nam all American troops and all troops from the satellite countries, recognize the National Front of the Liberation of South Viet-Nam, and let the Vietnamese people settle their problems themselves. Such is the basic content of the four-point position of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, such is the statement of the essential principles and essential arrangements of the Geneva agreements of 1954 on Viet-Nam. It is the basis for a correct political solution of the Vietnamese problem. In your message

you suggested direct talks between the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States. If the United States Government really wants talks, it must first halt unconditionally the bombings and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. It is only after the unconditional halting of the American bombings and of all other American acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam that the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States could begin talks and discuss questions affecting the two parties.

The Vietnamese people will never give way to force, it will never accept conversation under the clear threat of bombs.

Our cause is absolutely just. It is desirable that the Government of the United States act in conformity to reason.

Sincerely,

HO CHI MINH

Thailand Grants U.S. Permission To Use U Tapao Airbase

*Statement by Secretary Rusk*¹

I invite your attention to an announcement made in Bangkok this morning [March 22] regarding the Thai Government's agreement to permit the U.S. Air Force to use the Thai airbase at U Tapao.

In this connection, the President has asked me to express his deep appreciation, and that of the American people, for the very great contribution which Thailand is making to the common cause in Southeast Asia. No country has been stronger in its support for the concept of collective security, and no country has been quicker to recognize that collective security carries obligations as well as benefits.

Thailand was among the first to send troops to repel aggression in Korea. Thailand has provided air and naval units to assist in the defense of its neighbor, the Republic of

¹ Read to news correspondents by the Department spokesman on Mar. 22 (press release 73).

Viet-Nam, and the Thai Government recently announced its decision to send, in addition, a ground combat unit to Viet-Nam. It is worth noting that when the Thai Government called for a thousand volunteers for this unit, more than 30,000 Thai young men responded.

Another great contribution which Thailand has made to the Allied war effort in Viet-Nam is the use of Thai military installations and facilities by United States military forces. The military installations and facilities are made available by Thailand as a member of SEATO and are critically important to us as we carry out our part of the war effort. U.S. Air Force planes flying from Thai bases at Takhli, Udorn, Korat, Ubon, and Nakorn Phanom are of immeasurable importance in meeting the aggression against South Viet-Nam. The completion of the air base at U Tapao and the Thai Government's decision to permit its use by B-52's will greatly increase the effectiveness of our air operations.

When the President was in Bangkok last October he acknowledged that the Thai contribution to the common defense involved risks for Thailand. At that time the President said,²

Let me assure you in this regard that Thailand can count on the United States to meet its obligations under the SEATO treaty. The commitment of the United States under the SEATO treaty is not of a particular political party or administration in my country, but of America as a nation. And I repeat to you: America keeps its commitments.

Thailand has made other great contributions to security and stability in the area. Its determination to defeat through its own efforts the attempts by Peking and Hanoi to create insurgency in Thailand is wholly admirable. Despite this costly and difficult effort, the Thai have achieved remarkable internal economic growth and development. And they have been a leader in the movement to create institutions of regional cooperation

² For President Johnson's toast at a state dinner at Bangkok on Oct. 28, 1966, see BULLETIN of Nov. 21, 1966, p. 767.

which manifest the new spirit of hope that is growing in Asia today.

Thailand, which is known the world over for its devotion to its national independence, can take special pride in its contribution to fostering this new spirit of hope.

By its action today, Thailand has shown once again that it knows, as does the United States, that it is by standing together as allies that we preserve our own independence and freedom.

Pacific Islands Trust Territory

White House Announcements

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S MEETING WITH COMMISSIONER NORWOOD

White House press release (Guam) dated March 21

The President met on March 21 with High Commissioner William Norwood and other officials of the government of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Commissioner Norwood and his associates came to Guam at the President's invitation to brief him on conditions and prospects in the territory, which is administered by the United States under the supervision of the United Nations. The territory consists of more than 2,000 islands in the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall groupings.

The discussion centered on economic and social progress. Commissioner Norwood gave the President a detailed account of recent advances in such critical fields as health and education. He also discussed the important role in these efforts being played by the Peace Corps, which has nearly 500 volunteers now at work in the territory.

The President also congratulated Mr. Norwood and his colleagues on the quickening pace of political development reflected in the formation of the Congress of Micronesia and in the increasing numbers of Micronesians who are assuming responsible positions in the government.

The President expressed the full support of the American people for these encouraging developments. He urged Commissioner Norwood to press forward with the government's consideration of an economic development plan for the territory. He cited as evidence of U.S. support the recent Senate passage of the administration-proposed bill lifting the ceiling on financial support to the territory. He expressed confidence that the House would also act favorably.

In thanking Commissioner Norwood for his presentation, the President said:

"Although I very much regret that time won't permit a personal visit to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, I believe that Commissioner Norwood's impressive analysis has given me a vivid sense of the progressive spirit now at work in Micronesia. Under his inspired leadership, I am confident that the people of the trust territory can look forward to new victories in the never-ending battle against poverty, ignorance, and disease.

"Mr. Norwood has the support of every American in this noble cause."

ALLOCATION OF DISASTER FUNDS

White House press release (Guam) dated March 21

The President on March 21 declared a major disaster for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands because of damages caused by Typhoon Sally. He made available Federal funds in the amount of \$750,000 for disaster assistance in the affected areas.

Koror and Babelthuap are two small islands in the Palau District of the trust territory, located approximately 250 miles southwest of Guam. These islands suffered severe damage when typhoon winds roared through the island on March 2.

Emergency mass care services are being furnished by the trust territory government assisted by the military and the American National Red Cross. The Department of Agriculture has provided large quantities of surplus foods to feed disaster victims.

The President's major disaster declaration

and allocation of funds will permit Federal assistance for the recovery and rehabilitation of the devastated areas. These funds will be used for the repair or replacement of public facilities damaged or destroyed in the disaster.

This program of assistance authorized under the Federal Disaster Act (Public Law 81-875) is administered by the Office of Emergency Planning. The OEP Region 7 office in Santa Rosa, Calif., is coordinating Federal disaster relief activities in the trust territory.

U.S. Mission Chiefs in Europe Meet at Bonn

The Department of State announced on March 24 (press release 65) that a 4-day conference of chiefs of American diplomatic missions in Europe would be held at Bonn, Germany, from March 28 to 31. The meeting brought together American ambassadors from 30 diplomatic posts in the European area.¹

Vice President Humphrey attended a part of the conference sessions on March 29-30.

Under Secretary Katzenbach left Washington March 29 to chair the last day of the conference. The earlier sessions were chaired by John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs.

The meeting is one of a series of regional meetings called periodically in different parts of the world by the Department of State to permit American ambassadors abroad to discuss questions of mutual interest and exchange views with senior Washington officials. The last such conference of all American ambassadors in Europe was held at Bonn in 1963. A meeting of U.S. ambassadors to NATO countries took place at The Hague in 1965.

¹For a list of the chiefs of American missions in Europe, see Department press release 65 dated Mar. 24.

Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Goldberg Urge Senate Approval of Outer Space Treaty

Following are statements made by Secretary Rusk and Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on March 7.¹

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK

Press release 46 dated March 7

It gives me great pleasure to be here today to discuss with you the recently signed Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.²

I am delighted to be associated today with my Cabinet colleague, our distinguished Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg. Ambassador Goldberg handled our side of the negotiation of this treaty with great skill and dedication and is eminently qualified to go over its contents with you in detail. Since my remarks are in the nature of an introduction of Ambassador Goldberg, I shall make them brief.

In my view, the interests and security of the United States would be advanced by its ratification. Perhaps of greatest significance is the fact that there is a treaty at all. Negotiations were proposed only last May, when President Johnson urged that steps be taken to negotiate a treaty on celestial bodies.³ On the proposal of the Soviet Union, negotiations were expanded to draw on previous United Nations resolutions and to include all of outer space as well as celestial

bodies within the scope of the treaty. We welcomed that proposal as forthcoming and responsive to the problems that confront mankind.

The negotiations proceeded in a businesslike fashion, with a minimum of polemics, and were successfully concluded in a remarkably short time, considering the treaty's comprehensive nature. The conclusion of this treaty, we feel, augurs well for the possibility of finding areas of common interest and agreement with the Soviet Union on other significant issues—especially in those fields in which there are genuine common interests affecting all mankind.

The Antarctic Treaty⁴ and the limited test ban treaty⁵ are examples of a congruence of common interests among the United States, the Soviet Union, and many other countries. The Outer Space Treaty is the most recent example of a successful identification of common interests and their expression in a mutually acceptable legal instrument.

It is our earnest desire and our basic policy to continue to explore with the Soviet Union and others additional ways of reducing the danger of conflict and of promoting stability and security in the world. Progress in achieving this aim may not be rapid, and it is not

¹ The complete hearings will be published by the committee.

² S. Ex. D, 90th Cong., 1st sess.; for text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 26, 1966, p. 953.

³ For a statement by President Johnson on May 7, 1966, see *ibid.*, June 6, 1966, p. 900.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1959, p. 914.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

inevitable. But it is possible, and it is more urgent than many think. A task of prime importance at this time is the conclusion of a treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. We are working hard on that treaty. Similarly, we should like to make progress on an agreement to limit the prospective race in offensive and defensive missiles and are pleased that the Soviet Union has indicated its willingness to participate in serious discussions.

The Outer Space Treaty now before this committee emerged from the processes of the United Nations and its General Assembly. The treaty is a positive result of the political process which the General Assembly has developed over the course of years. It indicates the manner in which standards of behavior and, indeed, rules of international law can result from the deliberations of the General Assembly.

The antecedents of the Outer Space Treaty are, I believe, generally familiar to you. They are the Antarctic Treaty of 1959; the United Nations Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1963;⁶ and the resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1963 that calls upon states not to station weapons of mass destruction in space—whether in orbit around the earth, on celestial bodies, or otherwise.⁷

This treaty represents a synthesis of the experience of nations since the beginning of the space age. There has been, for almost 8 years, an earnest effort to articulate and define the general standards of behavior that should govern states in the use of outer space and celestial bodies. The standards developed in the Outer Space Treaty represent a balance of rights and obligations between nations conducting space activities and those who do not. The treaty contains provisions of immediate applicability and others that will assume greater importance as the activities of states develop in outer space. Finally,

the treaty provides for arms control measures that will promote our security today and will be of increasing importance in years to come.

Establishing a balance between rights and obligations was of particular concern to the treaty negotiators. It was recognized that while only a limited number of states might enter outer space, such activities could affect the well-being of all on this planet and in the earth's environment. Further, it was recognized that when man extends his activities beyond this earth, he ought to do so as more than just the representative of a single nation-state. Thus the treaty speaks of astronauts as "envoys of mankind" and considers the exploration and use of space and celestial bodies to be for the benefit of all mankind. Knowledge derived from space will be made available to scientists of all nations. The importance of avoiding harmful contamination of the earth as well as of celestial bodies is dealt with in the treaty. The provisions on liability, interference with other countries' space activities, and assistance to and return of astronauts are part of the balance of rights and obligations which are characteristic of any successful negotiating effort.

The treaty is balanced, as well, between principles having immediate application and others whose usefulness will be in future years. Among the principles of immediate importance are the provisions on liability, the obligation unconditionally to assist and to return astronauts, and the obligation to report any findings that bear on the safety of astronauts. These can be of direct importance in the carrying forward of our space program. Among the broad principles that will grow in significance are those applying international law and the United Nations Charter to the activities of states in outer space, insuring freedom of exploration, and barring national appropriation of outer space and celestial bodies.

Finally, the treaty's arms control provisions are of immediate and particular importance to our national security. Parties to the treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 30, 1963, p. 1012.

⁷ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 11, 1963, p. 754.

weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. Parties to the treaty undertake as well to use the moon and other celestial bodies exclusively for peaceful purposes. They undertake not to establish military bases, installations, or fortifications, and to abstain from testing any types of weapons or conducting military maneuvers on celestial bodies. There is, of course, no prohibition on the use of military personnel and equipment for peaceful purposes.

Concomitant with these arms control measures, the treaty contains provisions which, together with our own developing national capabilities, will permit adequate verification that the treaty is being observed. Article I permits free access to all areas of celestial bodies. Article XII provides that all stations, installations, equipment, and space vehicles on the moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other parties to the treaty. In addition, outer space and celestial bodies are declared free for exploration and use by all states, and the treaty provides that outer space is not subject to national appropriation. Under the treaty, space vehicles of the United States will be free to go anywhere in outer space, on the moon or other celestial bodies. The problems of military security related to this treaty have been examined with great care. The conclusion of the executive branch, including those with special responsibility for military and defense matters, is that the treaty will contribute to this country's security.

To conclude, Mr. Chairman, the attempt to develop law and a peaceful world order constitutes a necessary element in United States policy. These are essential goals of the United Nations as well. The Outer Space Treaty establishes the basis for a legal regime to govern the activities of states in outer space.

The treaty is not complete in all possible details. It does not deal with all problems that may develop. But it is responsive to those

problems that can be described and forecast today.

This treaty demonstrates that man's skill at making law can keep pace with his technological prowess. The treaty succeeds in substantial measure in establishing the necessary standards for reducing the dangers of military conflict in outer space and for encouraging its peaceful exploration.

I venture to hope that this treaty may serve as an impressive model for cooperation among the nations—a cooperation that is essential if the world is going to escape destruction by conflict and if it is going to make headway in conquering disease and poverty, in relating population rationally to means of decent livelihood, and in offering all men proper scope for their talents and energies.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG

U.S./U.N. press release 23 dated March 7

I welcome this opportunity to give testimony to the Committee on Foreign Relations on the Outer Space Treaty. In this statement I shall first briefly sum up the most important provisions of the treaty, then indicate what seem to me its main points of significance to our national interest and security, and finally, discuss in somewhat more detail the history of our negotiations.

I. Major Provisions

In sum, the treaty's most important provisions can be stated as follows:

1. In the area of *arms control*, it forbids the orbiting or stationing in outer space or on celestial bodies of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. It specifies that the moon and other celestial bodies are to be used only for peaceful purposes and forbids certain military activities on celestial bodies. Further, it guarantees access, without veto, by each party to the installations and vehicles of other parties on celestial bodies. It insures, as well, freedom of movement anywhere in outer space and on celestial bodies.

2. The treaty declares outer space to be the "province of all mankind" and *forbids claims of sovereignty* to outer space or the moon or

any other celestial body. It explicitly extends the rule of international law, including the charter, into the newly entered realm of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies.

3. The treaty furthers *peaceful cooperation* in a number of ways. It assures freedom of scientific investigation in outer space and commits the parties to promote international cooperation to this end. It guarantees freedom of access to all parts of celestial bodies. It requires the fullest practicable reporting by all states on the nature, conduct, locations, and results of their space activities. It calls for avoidance of space activities that would contaminate celestial bodies or do harm to the earth's environment. It forbids harmful interference with another's space activities and calls for appropriate consultation. And it declares as a general principle that the exploration and use of outer space "shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries."

4. Finally, the treaty affords important protections to *astronauts*. They are to be regarded as envoys of all mankind. In outer space, astronauts of different nations are required to assist one another. If an astronaut makes an emergency landing on foreign territory, he must be given all possible assistance and must be returned home safely and promptly. And any hazard to astronauts that is discovered in outer space must be made known immediately by the party making the discovery.

That is not intended to be a complete list of the treaty's provisions, but I believe it covers those that are most significant.

II. Advantages to the United States

The Outer Space Treaty contributes substantially not only to the fabric of common interests and peace in the community of nations but also, and particularly, to the national interest and security of the United States. Many of its provisions, indeed, have been objectives of our diplomacy since the earliest years of the space age. Some are of immediate and concrete value; others are very broad principles whose ultimate value

may not be fully realized for many years, until mankind has greatly multiplied its present activity in the new realm of outer space.

The advantages to the United States are, as I see them, of four kinds:

1. *Arms control*. President Johnson has called this treaty "the most important arms control development since the limited test ban treaty of 1963."⁸ Unlike the nuclear tests which were outlawed by the 1963 treaty, the military measures in outer space which this treaty will outlaw are measures that have never been taken. But nobody can say with confidence that they might not be taken; and this treaty forbids such measures. Surely it is much better and infinitely easier to close the door to the arms race before it enters a new dimension than to attempt to root it out once it has become established.

Moreover, beyond its intrinsic value as an arms control measure, this treaty raises hopes for further steps along this road. In writing the arms control provisions of the Outer Space Treaty we drew inspiration and guidance from the corresponding provisions of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, as well as from the limited test ban treaty. Thus this is, in a very real sense, the third in a historic succession of treaties limiting the arms race. It is our hope that this success will, in turn, help to smooth the way for the next major step which we now urgently seek to take in agreement with the Soviet Union and any other powers concerned; namely, the treaty against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Each of these steps will give the United States—and the community of nations—more security at less cost.

2. *International order*. The entire Outer Space Treaty will help to strengthen international order and promote habits of peaceful cooperation—not only in the new realm of outer space itself but in the many space-related activities here on earth.

The treaty promotes these ends, first, by seeking to remove both the means and the causes of conflict in outer space. The arms control provisions operate in this sense. So

⁸ For a statement by President Johnson on Dec. 8, 1966, see *ibid.*, Dec. 26, 1966, p. 952.

do those provisions which extend international law into the realm of outer space and forbid claims of sovereignty in that realm. By thus seeking to minimize the hazards of human conflict in outer space, we hope to free our astronauts to concentrate on the natural hazards and challenges of this new environment—and to work together in overcoming them.

The treaty also contains provisions to promote international cooperation in the conquest of space for common benefit. Although we are still in an early stage of growth in space science and technology, we already know that in such major fields as communications, weather forecasting, and navigation no nation can reap the full benefits of space technology except by joining in international cooperative ventures. In this sense the Outer Space Treaty is in the same line of historical development as the many treaties and agreements which govern the day-to-day essentials of modern life—which assure that international mail is delivered, that ships do not collide in the night, that epidemic diseases do not cross frontiers, and so on. All these instruments have a double value. Not only do they bring their various practical benefits; they also, when taken together, make up the very strong fabric of community life among the nations—binding nations together by their practical common interests and constituting a powerful, though little-noticed, discouragement to war and incentive to peace.

3. *United States-Soviet relations.* All these considerations have a special importance in their bearing on our evolving relations with the Soviet Union. It is significant that the country which has for many years been our major adversary and a major source of danger to our security has also emerged as the only other nation with a space program comparable in size and scope to our own. Moreover, this has happened at a time when some of the sharp edges of Soviet hostility against the non-Communist world have begun to wear down, enabling them perhaps to see their own true interests in a somewhat different light and to discuss with non-Communist

nation nations, including ourselves, new areas of common interests.

This treaty, following on the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and the limited test ban treaty of 1963, is one further step in translating some of these common interests into concrete and enduring agreements. We should not exaggerate the impact on history of any one of these treaties in isolation; but it would be hard indeed to overstate the general tendency to which they all contribute—that of a growth of peace and tolerance and openness among the Soviet Union, the other nations associated with it in Eastern Europe, and the non-Communist nations. I believe that this long-term trend will be advanced by this treaty.

4. *Interests of nonlaunching powers.* Finally, I believe this treaty is helpful to the interests of the United States in that it also serves and protects the interests of the non-launching powers. While we have cooperative programs of space research with a large number of countries, many nations have little or no space program of their own; yet their cooperation in the conquest of space is important in a number of ways, and it was essential to a meaningful treaty that it make equitable provision for the protection of their interests rather than concentrate too narrowly on the particular concerns of the major space powers. Moreover, all countries, whether space powers or not, have a great stake in peace and in measures of arms control to enhance the security of all.

In this connection we were fortunate in having as our negotiating framework the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. This body was created by the General Assembly in 1961, at the joint initiative of the United States and the U.S.S.R., to deal with both the legal and the scientific and technical implications of this new activity. Understandably, the major negotiating issues, which I shall discuss in a moment, arose between the leading space powers. But the delegates of other powers also took an active part in the writing of the treaty.

As a result, these other powers can have

confidence that the obligations which they assume under the treaty, such as the return of astronauts or space vehicles landing on their soil, are fully balanced by provisions protecting their rights and providing them with concrete benefits. Among the most important of these are the hope expressed that space will be explored and used "for the benefit and in the interests of all countries" and the explicit assurance of the right of all states, without discrimination and on a basis of equality, to explore freely and use outer space and celestial bodies. These areas thus cannot become the exclusive preserve of the big powers or the first arrivals.

Numerous other provisions of the treaty, such as those on liability and contamination, protect the interests of the smaller powers. As a matter of principle as well as of pragmatism, I believe it is very much in the interest of the United States that the non-launching powers, whose cooperation and friendship are of great importance to us, should have such protections and assurances.

III. Development of the Treaty

Let me now give the committee some highlights of the history of this treaty, both within the United States Government and in the negotiating phase.

As far as the United States Government is concerned, this treaty is the result, over the years, of a broadly based consensus and of wide consultation and collaboration. This has been true as between political parties, as between the Executive and the Congress, and as between the executive departments.

The bipartisan origins of the treaty, as well as the early congressional interest in it, are attested to by the fact that the earliest initiatives toward international agreement in this area were taken by President Eisenhower and by the then majority leader of the Senate, Lyndon B. Johnson—who was also at that time the chairman of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Ever since that time the successive steps toward this treaty have been taken on a bipartisan basis and in the closest consultation between the Executive and the concerned

committees of Congress. This was true during the negotiation in Geneva last July and August, when two of our congressional advisers, Chairman George Miller of the Committee on Science and Astronautics and Representative James Fulton, came to Geneva. The advice and counsel provided by Members of the Senate in Washington and New York at various stages of the negotiations were likewise deeply appreciated.

As for the executive branch, the nature of the subject made necessary the close collaboration of a number of executive departments and agencies. This collaboration was evidenced by the composition of my negotiating delegation which included representatives of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, NASA, the AEC, ACDA, and the Department of State. From my standpoint as a negotiator this collaboration has been most successful, and I cannot speak too highly of the participation and advice we received from all parts of the Government during the negotiating phase.

I am not going to go into the whole history of the work on this treaty within the Government, which started almost with the beginning of the space age. A recent stimulus for these preparations was the developing pace of United States and Soviet activities directed toward the landing of astronauts on the moon. In October of 1965 the State Department circulated the text of a proposed treaty to other executive agencies including the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Aeronautics and Space Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the National Aeronautics and Space Council. Subsequent interdepartmental consultations proceeded into the early months of 1966 and resulted in a number of changes in the proposed text.

On May 7, 1966, President Johnson made an announcement drawing attention to the need for a treaty laying down rules and procedures for the exploration of celestial bodies and calling for early international discussions to this end. He pointed out that the United States wanted to do what it could to see that

serious political conflicts did not arise as a result of space activities and to insure that astronauts would be able freely to conduct scientific investigations of the moon.

The President's announcement proposed six elements of such a treaty: (1) freedom of exploration, (2) prohibition of claims of sovereignty, (3) freedom of scientific investigation and international cooperation, (4) studies to avoid harmful contamination, (5) mutual assistance among astronauts in case of need, and (6) a ban on the stationing of weapons of mass destruction, weapons tests, and military maneuvers on celestial bodies.

Mr. Chairman, each and every one of these six elements is included in the treaty now before the committee.

On May 9 I informed the Chairman of the United Nations Outer Space Committee, Ambassador Kurt Waldheim of Austria, of the President's statement and requested an early session of the 28-member Legal Subcommittee to prepare a treaty for submission to the General Assembly in the fall.⁹ On May 11 I gave the permanent representative of the Soviet Union at the United Nations an outline of our points for inclusion in the proposed treaty. We also consulted widely with other members of the Legal Subcommittee.

The first response from the U.S.S.R. came on May 30 in the form of a letter from Foreign Minister [Andrei A.] Gromyko to Secretary-General U Thant. This letter asked that the matter of a celestial bodies treaty be taken up by the General Assembly in the fall. It was very encouraging to us; because not only did we and the Soviets apparently have in mind the same subject for a treaty—namely, activities on celestial bodies—but in addition the principles that they proposed for inclusion in the treaty were extremely close to ours. I therefore wrote to Ambassador Waldheim on June 16¹⁰ proposing that the Outer Space Legal Subcommittee be convened on July 12 so as to begin work without delay. This proposal was quickly agreed to.

⁹ For text of Ambassador Goldberg's letter of May 9, 1966, see *ibid.*, June 6, 1966, p. 900.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, July 11, 1966, p. 60.

Meanwhile, on June 16, both we and the Soviet Union made public proposed treaty texts.¹¹ With regard to the scope of the drafts, both texts dealt with activities on celestial bodies. The Soviet text also included provisions on the regulation of activities in outer space generally. These were drawn from two major resolutions of the General Assembly: the "no bombs in orbit" resolution¹² and the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. Both these resolutions had been unanimously adopted by the Assembly in 1963 as a result of United States initiatives. The principles they contained are among the most important in the treaty.

It should be recalled, however, that the Outer Space Treaty embodies major provisions that were not in the 1963 resolutions. Of prime importance among these are the prohibition on use of celestial bodies for specified military activities, the guarantee of open and veto-free access by space powers to each other's installations on celestial bodies, and the provision for full reporting of space activities.

The treaty negotiations in the Legal Subcommittee opened at the European headquarters of the United Nations in Geneva on the agreed date, July 12. They ran until August 4 and, after a brief adjournment, resumed in New York from September 12 through September 16. Great progress had been made, but the treaty was still some distance from completion. During September, October, and November, the U.S. delegation held detailed private consultations with many members of the Legal Subcommittee, including, of course, the Soviet Union. As a result of these consultations, agreement on the treaty text was finally reached in early December.

In accordance with United Nations procedures, the completed space treaty then made its appearance in the Political Committee of the General Assembly in a resolution co-sponsored by 43 members of the United Nations, among them many members of the Outer Space Committee, including the United

¹¹ For text of the U.S. draft treaty, see *ibid.*, p. 61.

¹² *Ibid.*, Nov. 11, 1963, p. 754.

States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. The resolution commended the treaty, requested the depositary governments to open it for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date, and expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence.

The General Assembly adopted this resolution by acclamation on December 19.¹³ The treaty was then perfected in French, Spanish, and Chinese—with indispensable help from the United Nations Secretariat. On January 27 it was opened for signature simultaneously in Washington, London, and Moscow. At the ceremony in Washington¹⁴ 60 states signed the treaty, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. The total number of signatories at present is 75.

IV. Principal Issues in the Negotiations

With the committee's permission, I shall now discuss certain issues that arose during the negotiations, in which the Soviet view differed from our own and agreement was reached after experiencing some difficulty.

My purpose is not to lay undue stress on the difficulties we encountered, because the fact is that the negotiations as a whole went very smoothly and rapidly and were marked by a spirit of accommodation and a willingness on all sides to compromise without sacrificing fundamental principles. Moreover, the importance of a given provision cannot always be measured by the difficulty in reaching agreement on it. A number of the major provisions which I mentioned at the outset of this statement, and which are important to our interests, were agreed on with little or no difficulty.

However, I do believe that some account of the main issues on which there has been difficulty and of how they were resolved may be useful to the committee in forming its own judgment on the overall value of the treaty. These points related to (1) access to installations on celestial bodies, (2) limitations on specified military activities on celestial bodies, (3) requests by launching powers for

tracking facilities, (4) liability for damage resulting from space launchings, and (5) the unconditional obligation to return astronauts who land on foreign territory or on the high seas.

1. *Access to installations on celestial bodies.* The United States treaty draft of June 16 proposed that

All areas of celestial bodies including all stations, installations, equipment, and space vehicles on celestial bodies, shall be open at all times to representatives of other States conducting activities on celestial bodies.

We considered such a guarantee of openness to be fundamental to the treaty. Specifically, it was necessary in order to verify compliance with the prohibition against the placing of weapons of mass destruction on celestial bodies and the limitation on specified military activities there.

The first Soviet treaty proposal did not contain any provision on open access. After considerable discussion in Geneva, the U.S.S.R. accepted in principle our proposal that there should be open access and agreed that such access should apply to all areas of celestial bodies and to all stations, installations, equipment, and space vehicles placed on such bodies.

However, the U.S.S.R. raised two difficulties concerning this article. First, they insisted that there should be access only "on a basis of reciprocity." This phrase, in its usual meaning, was acceptable to us. Indeed, it is implied in every international agreement. But we had to be sure that the record would leave no doubt as to its meaning. After thorough discussion we reached agreement with the Soviet and other delegations on this point. I then made a statement in the Legal Subcommittee in Geneva on August 3 as to the meaning of the phrase.¹⁵ I reiterated this interpretation in my statement of December 17 to the Political Committee of the General Assembly,¹⁶ the text of which is attached to the President's message.¹⁷ This statement

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Aug. 29, 1966, p. 321.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Jan. 9, 1967, p. 78.

¹⁷ For President Johnson's message to the Senate on Feb. 7, see *ibid.*, Mar. 6, 1967, p. 386.

¹³ For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 9, 1967, p. 83.

¹⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1967, p. 266.

was an authoritative, on-the-record interpretation of the treaty. It was not challenged in the debate, and the resolution commending the treaty was thereupon adopted by acclamation.

In these clarifying statements I pointed out that the words "on a basis of reciprocity" in article XII do *not* import a veto. That is, they do *not* mean that State *A* may visit State *B*'s facilities or installations on a celestial body only if *B* asks to visit those of *A*. On the contrary, "on a basis of reciprocity" merely states what would be true in any event under international law. Any party to the treaty has the right to visit installations of another party on a celestial body—whether or not the other party chooses to exercise its reciprocal right. If, however, the prospective visitor has illegally, and in violation of the treaty, barred visits to its facilities by the state whose installations it wishes to inspect, the second state may deny a visit to the breaching party. This result is simply an application of the principle that when one party breaches a material obligation which is owed to another party, the latter is entitled to withhold performance of a commensurate obligation which it would otherwise have owed to the first party.

I might point out, in addition, that if any party were to deny access to its facilities and thus breach this basic provision of the treaty, other parties whose rights had thus been interfered with would be entitled to take action consistent with international law. Thus in the event of a material breach, a party would have the option of treating the entirety of its treaty obligations toward the breaching party as having come to an end, to be revived only upon remedial action by the defaulter.

The second difficulty raised by the U.S.S.R. in regard to the access provision was its proposal that celestial bodies installations should be open "subject to agreement between the parties with regard to the time of visit to such objects." I considered this proposal to be totally unacceptable. Such a provision could have been read as giving a party the right to withhold a visit indefinitely

and thus achieve a veto in fact. The Soviets insisted that this was not their intention; but since we were dealing with a key provision of the treaty, it was essential that we foreclose any doubt as to the right of visitation.

At this stage the Japanese and Italian delegates made a valuable point. They suggested that what the treaty needed was some guarantee that a visit would not jeopardize the safety of astronauts or normal functioning of the installations being visited. On reflection it seemed clear that the inspection provisions of the Antarctic Treaty, from which our access language was drawn, were not in all respects appropriate for the Outer Space Treaty. This was especially true in view of the far greater difficulties and hazards of lunar exploration in contrast to Antarctic exploration—the extreme importance of unimpaired oxygen supply, the need for careful conservation of life-supporting systems, and the difficulty of surface travel. We would not want to receive a visit from the Soviets or any other party if that visit would jeopardize the lives of our astronauts. We also bore in mind the practical fact that for the foreseeable future it would be immensely difficult to engage in forbidden activities on the moon without detection.

Article XII of the Outer Space Treaty thus embodies the practical solution that "reasonable advance notice of a projected visit" shall be given "in order that appropriate consultations may be held and that maximum precautions may be taken to assure safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the facility to be visited." There is no veto. I made this clear in a statement on the record on August 3 in the Legal Subcommittee in Geneva and on December 17 in the General Assembly's Political Committee in New York. Again, no country dissented.

Before leaving this matter of verification, let me make clear that the access provisions I have been discussing apply only to celestial bodies and are a safeguard against treaty violations in that context. The prohibition against placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit has no related provision dealing specifically with verification. The treaty

leaves it open to individual countries to employ their own national means of verification. I understand that in his testimony General Wheeler [Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff] will state why, from the viewpoint of our armed services, the prohibition on orbiting nuclear weapons is desirable. Accordingly, I do not propose to go into this matter. But speaking for the administration, after close consultation with the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and NASA, I want to stress that the executive branch is agreed that our national interest is served by this provision.

To this I might add that if we had no treaty prohibition against orbiting nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union would have no legal inhibition in this area of any kind whatever. Our situation could therefore only be worsened if the treaty failed to include this prohibition. It is our judgment that the existence of the prohibition will tend to limit the arms race, help make the problem of nuclear weapons more manageable, and thereby assist the growth of international security. It will help avoid a costly and dangerous new area of weapons deployment.

2. *Limitations on specified military activities on celestial bodies.* In developing our position as to permissible activities on celestial bodies, we drew heavily on the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. The prohibitions on specified types of military activities in that treaty have stood the test of time. Interestingly enough, the first Soviet proposal also reflected shared Antarctic experience.

The United States, following closely the Antarctic Treaty, proposed that the establishment of military fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, and the testing of weapons on celestial bodies be prohibited and that the treaty should also state the matter affirmatively by calling for celestial bodies to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Now, in offering these proposals we clearly and candidly recognized that military personnel and military equipment, as such, should not and could not be prohibited from celestial bodies. Most of our astronauts are members of the armed services. Our rocketry has been

developed in important measure with funds appropriated by the Congress as part of defense budgets. The United States treaty draft of June 16 therefore added a saving clause as follows:

The use of military personnel, facilities or equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose shall not be prohibited.

Here, too, we followed the pattern of the Antarctic Treaty.

This matter, which is dealt with in article IV, paragraph 2, of the Outer Space Treaty created two problems of considerable difficulty. Part of the problem appears to have been semantic.

First, the U.S.S.R. asserted that our proposal to ban "military fortifications" was inadequate and that we should agree as well to forbid "military bases and installations." Now, we had no problem in accepting a ban on "military bases." The Antarctic Treaty contains a ban on military bases, and no one has ever charged that, for example, the Navy-supported facilities on McMurdo Sound were a military base in violation of the Antarctic Treaty. But we were doubtful about accepting a ban on "military installations" because it seemed too sweeping. Any construction on the moon, if built or used by astronauts belonging to a military service, could conceivably be labeled a "military installation" even though its character and purpose were entirely peaceful. I pointed out to the Soviet delegation on a number of occasions that a lunar barracks built to house astronauts who might be drawn from the military services of their country might be said to be a "military installation"—or at least could be alleged to be such—regardless of the fact of its peaceful and research-supporting character. I made it clear that the United States could not accept a prohibition whose apparent scope might be so broad as to defy meaningful definition.

Our proposed saving clause raised much the same issue in a different form. At first the Soviets professed to see no need for such a clause. They took the position that the employment by them of Soviet military personnel for activities on celestial bodies would not

violate the treaty. We pointed out that unless there were such a saving clause as to astronauts having military rank, a party might later charge that employment of such astronauts was prohibited. Eventually, without too much difficulty, the U.S.S.R. came around to accepting the saving clause which now appears as the penultimate sentence of article IV and states that "The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited."

But it was only toward the very end of our negotiations that the Soviets agreed to a saving clause regarding military *equipment*. We were able to agree on such a clause, contained in the last sentence of article IV, stating that "The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited."

Agreement on this saving clause, in turn, made it possible for us to accept the inclusion of "military installations" among the prohibitions applying to celestial bodies. To return to the example of the barracks, such a facility would be in conformity with the treaty because it would be necessary for peaceful exploration.

3. *Tracking facilities.* A third difficulty in the negotiations involved earth-based tracking stations. This subject was raised by the U.S.S.R., but for some time it was not clear what they wanted. Their first treaty proposal, on June 16, read as follows: "The Parties to the Treaty undertake to accord equal conditions to States engaged in the exploration of outer space." When it became apparent that many members of the Legal Subcommittee did not understand what this language meant, the U.S.S.R. made a second proposal, on July 20, that "States Parties to the Treaty will accord other States Parties to the Treaty conducting activities relating to the exploration and use of outer space equal conditions for observing the flight of space objects launched by these States."

The Subcommittee took some time to consider this proposal. The Soviet delegate portrayed it as a limited obligation. He said

that it merely required that State *A*, if it had granted a tracking facility to State *B*, must also grant tracking facilities on request to State *C*. This explanation seemed to suggest that the Soviets might be seeking a "free ride" by applying the most-favored-nation principle to the granting of tracking facilities. Under their proposal, the countries with whom the United States has carefully negotiated bilateral space agreements over a period of years would have been obliged to let the Soviets construct installations on their soil. As you know, the United States has agreements for tracking facilities with a large number of countries including Argentina, Australia, Chile, Ecuador, Madagascar, Mexico, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

The representatives of a number of these countries made clear that they could not agree to such an obligation. They pointed out, as we also did, that arrangement for the establishment of a space tracking facility is a bilateral matter. Not only is it related to the desire of nations to cooperate with one another in space research, but there are also practical considerations which might impel a country to grant a facility to one space power while finding it undesirable to make a like grant to another space power. The Soviet proposal to place an absolute obligation upon host countries was therefore unacceptable.

Further discussions led to further revisions. Eventually, a solution to this problem was found in the provision which appears as article X of the treaty. This article provides that ". . . the States Parties to the Treaty shall consider on a basis of equality any requests by other States Parties to the Treaty to be afforded an opportunity to observe the flight of space objects launched by those States. The nature of such an opportunity for observation and the conditions under which it could be afforded shall be determined by agreement between the States concerned."

We consulted closely with a number of the countries who have granted tracking facilities to us before agreeing to this proposal. We also considered our own obligations in view of the fact that, as you know, the United States has entered into an agreement with

the European Space Research Organization authorizing it to construct a tracking facility at Fairbanks, Alaska.¹⁸ Our friends said that they could agree to the text of article X on the understanding that an authoritative statement would be made as to the scope and limitations of the obligations which that article imposes.

Accordingly, after extensive consultations with a number of members, including the Soviet Union, I decided to place upon the record an authoritative interpretation of what this obligation entails. On December 17, speaking to the General Assembly's Political Committee, I said:

It is quite clear from the text of the article, however, that there must be agreement between the parties concerned for the establishment of a tracking facility. The article as thus revised recognizes that the elements of mutual benefit and acceptability are natural and necessary parts of the decision whether to enter into an agreement concerning such a facility, and it appropriately incorporates the principle that each state which is asked to cooperate has the right to consider its legitimate interests in reaching its decision.

No objection was recorded to this statement and this put the matter to rest.

4. *Liability.* The 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles adopted by the General Assembly contains a provision on liability which is carried over into the space treaty without change. Article VII of the treaty codifies the international legal rule that a country which launches a space vehicle, or from whose territory an object is launched into outer space, is "internationally liable for damage to another State Party . . . or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies."

Article VII is indeed desirable. But a separate agreement on liability for damages caused by space vehicles is a necessity, and we hope to continue work in the Outer Space Legal Subcommittee toward that end. Such an agreement should lay down rules and procedures governing liability and the presenta-

tion of international claims. Work of this character has been undertaken in the Legal Subcommittee since 1962, but the issues are complex and redoubled efforts are required. A number of basic issues remain. These include how costs should be shared when damages are caused by a space project in which more than one country participates; how to measure the damage applicable to loss of life, bodily injury, and destruction of property; and agreement on a tribunal to adjudicate disputed claims.

The Legal Subcommittee has on its agenda a separate agreement on liability, and we will want to prepare our position for future deliberations on this subject. What is most satisfactory is that the Outer Space Treaty contains an optimum fundamental rule on this subject.

5. *Return of astronauts.* Finally, I would like to comment on the obligation, contained in article V of the space treaty, that when astronauts land on foreign territory or on the high seas "they shall be safely and promptly returned to the State of registry of their space vehicle." The 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles stated this rule in the same manner.

However, in the Outer Space Legal Subcommittee discussions of 1964 and 1965 concerning a detailed agreement on the return of astronauts and space vehicles, the U.S.S.R. had not proved as forthcoming. The Soviets had at various times appeared to insist on language that might be taken to limit the humanitarian obligation to return an astronaut. We thought it incompatible with the spirit of the treaty, which describes astronauts as "envoys of mankind," to suggest in any manner that detention could be envisaged or tolerated. We thus continued to insist that the duty to return must be absolute and unconditional. It is a particular source of satisfaction to us that agreement was reached on this basis.

On a related matter, we were also able to reach agreement on the unconditional obligation to report to other parties or the Secretary-General of the United Nations, "any phenomena they discover in outer space, in-

¹⁸ For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 26, 1966, p. 979.

cluding the moon and other celestial bodies, which could constitute a danger to the life or health of astronauts."

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, I commend to this committee the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. I believe it meets the essential test of any international agreement which the President submits to the Senate. It will further the national interest and the security of the United States and will encourage the cause of peace in the world. I earnestly hope the Senate will advise and consent to its ratification.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Poland Sign Cotton Textile Agreement

Press release 58 dated March 16

The Governments of the United States and Poland exchanged notes on March 15 effecting a comprehensive agreement covering U.S. imports of all categories of cotton textiles from Poland.¹ The 3-year agreement was signed for the United States by Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs Anthony M. Solomon and for Poland by Mr. Zdzislaw Szewczyk, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Polish People's Republic.

The United States entered into the agreement in accordance with its obligations under the Long-Term Arrangement for international trade in cotton textiles. This arrangement was negotiated in 1962 by importing and exporting countries under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Poland is not a participant in GATT

¹ For text of the U.S. note, see Department press release 58 dated Mar. 16.

or the Long-Term Arrangement, but has applied for admission to GATT.

The agreement will supersede current limitations on seven individual categories of cotton textile imports from Poland which the United States put into effect in 1966.

The effect of the agreement is to provide for orderly growth in Polish exports of cotton textiles to the United States while avoiding disruption in the U.S. domestic market.

The agreement sets an aggregate limit of 5 million square yards equivalent for the first agreement year, with a 5 percent increase permitted in the second and succeeding years of the agreement. The total is divided almost equally between apparel, 2.6 million square yards equivalent, and other categories, 2.4 million square yards equivalent. There are also nine individual category ceilings.

The Polish Government agreed to use its best efforts to space exports from Poland to the United States within each category evenly throughout the agreement year, taking into consideration normal seasonal factors.

The two Governments agreed to cooperate in providing statistical data to each other and to consult as necessary on problems that may arise in administration of the agreement.

In 1966 the United States imported from Poland 3.1 million square yards equivalent of cotton textiles valued at \$652,000.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Agreement for the application of safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the bilateral agreement between the United States and Brazil of July 8, 1965 (TIAS 6126), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Vienna March 10, 1967. Enters into force on the date which the Agency shall have received from the two Governments written notification that they have complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

Signatures: Brazil, International Atomic Energy Agency, United States.

Consular Relations

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on consular relations concerning the acquisition of nationality. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963.¹

Accession deposited: Madagascar, February 17, 1967.

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on consular relations concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963.¹

Accession deposited: Madagascar, February 17, 1967.

Finance

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.

Signature: Sudan, March 15, 1967.

Maritime Matters

Convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, with annex. Done at London, April 9, 1965. Entered into force March 5, 1967.¹

Acceptance deposited: United States, March 17, 1967.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

International convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. Done at Washington February 8, 1949. Entered into force July 3, 1950. TIAS 2089.

Adherence received: Romania, March 21, 1967.

Protocol to the international convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries signed under date of February 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089). Done at Washington June 25, 1956. Entered into force January 10, 1959. TIAS 4170.

Adherence received: Romania, March 21, 1967.

Declaration of understanding regarding the international convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089). Done at Washington April 24, 1961. Entered into force June 5, 1963. TIAS 5380.

Acceptance received: Romania, March 21, 1967.

Protocol to the international convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089) relating to harp and hood seals. Done at Washington July 15, 1963. Entered into force April 29, 1966. TIAS 6011.

Adherence received: Romania, March 21, 1967.

Protocol to the international convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089) relating to measures of control. Done at Washington November 29, 1965.²

Adherence received: Romania, March 21, 1967.

Protocol to the international convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089) relating to entry into force of proposals adopted by the Commission. Done at Washington November 29, 1965.²

Adherence received: Romania, March 21, 1967.

Postal Matters

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and convention with final protocol and regulations of execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881.

Ratifications deposited: Ghana, November 17, 1966; Spain, Spanish territories in Africa, November 9, 1966; Yugoslavia, November 15, 1966.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. Entered into force January 1, 1967.¹

Ratifications deposited: Australia, January 25, 1967; Ceylon, January 13, 1967; Finland, February 3, 1967; Lebanon, January 10, 1967; Nigeria, January 21, 1967.

Accession deposited: Guyana, March 8, 1967.

Trade

Declaration on the provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 18, 1960. Entered into force October 14, 1962. TIAS 5184.

Acceptance: Tunisia, February 15, 1967.

Declaration on the provisional accession of Iceland to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 5, 1964. Entered into force April 19, 1964; for the United States November 20, 1964. TIAS 5687.

Acceptance: Tunisia, February 15, 1967.

Procès-verbal extending the declaration on the provisional accession of Iceland to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (TIAS 5687). Done at Geneva December 14, 1965. Entered into force December 28, 1965; for the United States December 30, 1965. TIAS 5943.

Acceptance: Tunisia, February 15, 1967.

Protocol for the accession of Switzerland to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 1, 1966. Entered into force August 1, 1966. TIAS 6065.

Acceptance: Portugal, February 7, 1967.

Third procès-verbal extending the declaration on the provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (TIAS 5184). Done at Geneva November 17, 1966.

Acceptances: Argentina, January 9, 1967; Australia, January 11, 1967; Austria, December 30, 1966; ³ Belgium, January 27, 1967; ³ Canada, January 3, 1967; Denmark, December 22, 1966; Finland, December 30, 1966; Indonesia, December 28, 1966; Israel, January 3, 1967; Japan, December 28, 1966; Netherlands, December 22, 1966; ³ Nigeria, December 15, 1966; Norway, January 16, 1967; Sweden, January 27, 1967; Tunisia, February 15, 1967; Turkey, February 1, 1967; United Kingdom, February 13, 1967; United States, December 13, 1966.

Entered into force: January 9, 1967.

Second procès-verbal extending the declaration on the provisional accession of the United Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (TIAS 5309). Done at Geneva November 17, 1966.

Acceptances: Australia, January 11, 1967; Belgium, January 27, 1967; ³ Canada, January 3, 1967; Denmark, December 22, 1966; Finland, December 30, 1966; Greece, January 24, 1967; Indonesia, December 28, 1966; Japan, December 28, 1966; Netherlands, December 22, 1966; ³ Nigeria, December 15, 1966; Norway, January 16, 1967; Sweden, January 27, 1967; Switzerland, February 14, 1967; Turkey, February 1, 1967; United Arab Republic, January 18, 1967; United Kingdom, February 13, 1967; United States, December 13, 1966.

Entered into force: January 18, 1967.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

³ Subject to ratification.

BILATERAL

Brazil

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Rio de Janeiro March 13, 1967. Enters into force upon exchange of ratifications.

Lesotho

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Signed at Maseru February 24, 1967.
Entered into force: March 7, 1967.

Luxembourg

Agreement amending annex B of the mutual defense assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 2014). Effected by exchange of notes at Luxembourg March 1 and 14, 1967. Entered into force March 14, 1967.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Consular Convention. Signed at Moscow June 1, 1964.⁴
Senate advice and consent to ratification: March 16, 1967.

Viet-Nam

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with annex. Signed at Saigon March 13, 1967. Entered into force March 13, 1967.

⁴ Not in force.

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Asia. Thailand Grants U.S. Permission To Use U Tapao Airbase (Rusk) 597

Congress. Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Goldberg Urge Senate Approval of Outer Space Treaty 600

Department and Foreign Service

U.S. and Vietnamese Leaders Confer at Guam (Guerrero, Johnson, Thieu, joint communique) 586

U.S. Mission Chiefs in Europe Meet at Bonn 599

Economic Affairs

Pacific Islands Trust Territory (Johnson) 598

United States and Poland Sign Cotton Textile Agreement 612

U.S. and Vietnamese Leaders Confer at Guam (Guerrero, Johnson, Thieu, joint communique) 586

Europe. U.S. Mission Chiefs in Europe Meet at Bonn 599

Military Affairs

Thailand Grants U.S. Permission To Use U Tapao Airbase (Rusk) 597

U.S. and Vietnamese Leaders Confer at Guam (Guerrero, Johnson, Thieu, joint communique) 586

Non-Self-Governing Territories. Pacific Islands Trust Territory (Johnson) 598

Outer Space. Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Goldberg Urge Senate Approval of Outer Space Treaty 600

Poland. United States and Poland Sign Cotton Textile Agreement 612

Presidential Documents

Pacific Islands Trust Territory 598

President Johnson's Proposal for Negotiation on Viet-Nam Rejected by Ho Chi Minh 595

U.S. and Vietnamese Leaders Confer at Guam 586

Publications. Recent Releases 614

Science. Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Goldberg Urge Senate Approval of Outer Space Treaty 600

Thailand. Thailand Grants U.S. Permission To Use U Tapao Airbase (Rusk) 597

Treaty Information

Current Actions 612

Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Goldberg Urge Senate Approval of Outer Space Treaty 600

United States and Poland Sign Cotton Textile Agreement 612

U.S.S.R. Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Goldberg Urge Senate Approval of Outer Space Treaty 600

United Nations

Pacific Islands Trust Territory (Johnson) 598

Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Goldberg Urge Senate Approval of Outer Space Treaty 600

Viet-Nam

President Johnson's Proposal for Negotiation on Viet-Nam Rejected by Ho Chi Minh (Department statement and texts of letters) 595

Thailand Grants U.S. Permission To Use U Tapao Airbase (Rusk) 597

U.S. and Vietnamese Leaders Confer at Guam (Guerrero, Johnson, Thieu, joint communique) 586

Name Index

Goldberg, Arthur J 600

Guerrero, Manuel F. L 586

Ho Chi Minh 595

Johnson, President 586, 595, 598

Rusk, Secretary 597, 600

Thieu, Nguyen Van 586

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: March 20—26

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to March 20 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 46 of March 7 and 58 of March 22.

No.	Date	Subject
†60	3/20	U.S. inspection of Antarctic stations (rewrite).
†61	3/21	Convention on conduct of North Atlantic fisheries.
*62	3/23	Harriman: Franklin D. Roosevelt birthday memorial dinner, New York.
*63	3/24	Program for visit of Prime Minister of Afghanistan.
†64	3/24	U.S. and Portugal sign cotton textile agreement.
65	3/24	Chiefs of U.S. diplomatic missions in Europe to meet at Bonn (rewrite).
†66	3/25	Itinerary for Vice President Humphrey's trip to Europe March 26-April 9.
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THE
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BULLETIN

Vol. LVI, No. 1451



April 17, 1967

SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF MARCH 28 618

U.S. RECAPITULATES BASIC PRINCIPLES
FOR U.N. PEACEKEEPING FUNCTIONS
Statement by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg 636

UNITED STATES ACCEPTS U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSAL
FOR ENDING THE VIET-NAM CONFLICT

Texts of Secretary-General's Aide Memoire and U.S. Replies 624

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 28

Press release 70 dated March 28

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK

Earlier today, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, made public some proposals which he had offered to a number of governments involved in the problem in Viet-Nam on March 14.¹ The following day we gave the Secretary-General our interim reply, stating that we welcomed his initiative and, after consultation with the Government of Viet-Nam and other allies, we would give him a more considered reply.

On March 18 we delivered that reply to the Secretary-General, and you now have that in front of you.

In essence, the Secretary-General proposed that there be a general standstill truce in Viet-Nam, that there then be preliminary talks leading to a reconvening of the Geneva conference.

In our reply we stated that we accepted the outline of his proposals, that we would be glad to negotiate the standstill truce and take part in preliminary discussions leading to a reconvening of that conference.

We do not yet have in front of us the full text of whatever reply Hanoi may have delivered to the Secretary-General. Whether Hanoi will make that public, I do not now know. We do have a public statement from Hanoi which seems to indicate their attitude. That public statement of yesterday said that:

To call on both sides to cease fire and hold unconditional negotiations, while the United States is committing aggression against Viet-Nam and taking serious steps in its military escalation in both zones of Viet-Nam, is to make no distinction between the aggressor and the victim of aggression,

to depart from reality, and to demand that the Vietnamese people accept the conditions of the aggressors.

And then it adds:

And, by the way, it is necessary to underline once again the views of the Government of Hanoi, which has pointed out that the Viet-Nam problem has no concern with the United Nations and the United Nations has absolutely no right to interfere in any way in the Viet-Nam question.

The indications are, therefore, that Hanoi has once again taken a negative view toward an initiative taken by someone else to move this matter toward peace.

I might say that the recent publication of the exchange between President Johnson and Ho Chi Minh² and today's publication of the proposals of the Secretary-General, and the responses to it, illustrate the problem that we have had from the beginning in bringing the Viet-Nam problem to a peaceful conclusion.

Many governments, many groups of governments, many world personalities, have tried to take an initiative to move this conflict toward a peaceful settlement. There has invariably been a positive and a constructive response from the United States, and there has invariably been a negative and hostile and, at times, vituperative response from the authorities in Hanoi. When one looks back over the long record of initiatives taken by many personalities and governments and groups of governments, one sees the record of Hanoi's intransigence, with such phrases as "swindle" and "farce" and words of that sort.

Now, we do not ourselves believe that peace is not the business of the United Nations. We believe that no nation can say that

¹ See p. 624.

² BULLETIN of Apr. 10, 1966, p. 595.

a world organization representing 122 nations cannot properly take up the question of maintaining the peace. The charter provides for it, the obligations of the nations of the world are involved, and the issue of peace is at stake.

Nevertheless, we have never insisted that the United Nations is the sole mechanism for dealing with this question.

There is now pending before the Security Council a resolution offered by the United States calling for a peaceful settlement of this problem.³ That has been resisted in the United Nations because of the attitude of Hanoi and Peking toward the involvement of the United Nations. When the Soviet Ambassador said at the Security Council that "This is not the business of the U. N., it is a matter for the Geneva machinery," Ambassador Goldberg [U.S. Representative to the United Nations Arthur J. Goldberg] said, "All right. If that is your view, we will agree with that; then let us use the Geneva machinery."

But the Geneva machinery has been paralyzed by the attitude of Hanoi and Peking. For example, that machinery has not been available to respond favorably to Prince [Norodom] Sihanouk's request that the International Control Commission step up its activities to insure the neutrality and the territorial integrity of Cambodia. That machinery was not available to insure the demilitarization of the demilitarized zone between North and South Viet-Nam.

So we would say to the authorities in Hanoi that surely there must be some machinery somewhere which can open the possibilities of peace. If not the United Nations, then the Geneva machinery; if not the Geneva machinery, then the resources of quiet diplomacy.

I can tell you, now that the exchange between President Johnson and Ho Chi Minh has been made public, and U Thant's proposals and our reply have been made public, that there is nothing in the private record

which throws any different light on this situation than you now have in the public record. Despite all of the efforts made privately by many people in many places, the private record and the public record are now in agreement.

I do hope that the authorities in Hanoi would give serious thought to the present situation. If they have supposed that they would be able to obtain a military victory in the South, they must surely now put that hope aside. If they have had any hope that there would be a political collapse in South Viet-Nam, surely they must now know that all of the groups in South Viet-Nam, who have some differences among themselves, are resolved to bring into being a constitutional government in which those various groups can work together on a basis of the free choice of the South Vietnamese people with respect to their future and that one point on which they are generally agreed in South Viet-Nam is that they do not wish the program of Hanoi or the Liberation Front.

If Hanoi supposes that somehow international opinion will come to their rescue, surely they must know that when they rebuff the United Nations Organization, an organization of 122 members, this will not bring them support in other parts of the world. And surely they must understand that all small nations who are within the reach of some greater power have a stake in the ability of South Viet-Nam to determine its own future for itself. And surely Hanoi must not be under continuing misapprehension that somehow some divisions within the United States might cause us to change our attitude toward our commitments to South Viet-Nam. Because although there may be some differences among us, those differences are trivial compared to the differences between all of us, on the one side, and Hanoi on the other.

So we would hope that in some fashion, in some way, at some time, the authorities in Hanoi will make use of some machinery in which to be responsive to the many efforts which we and others have been making toward peace over the last several years.

³ For text of a U.S. draft resolution submitted to the U.N. Security Council on Jan. 31, 1966, see *ibid.*, Feb. 14, 1966, p. 231.

It is no good to brush aside the 17 non-aligned nations, and the British Commonwealth of Prime Ministers, and His Holiness the Pope, the Secretary-General, and the President of India, and all the others who have been trying to find some basis on which this matter could be moved toward a peaceful conclusion, and suppose that somehow opinion is supporting them in their efforts to seize South Viet-Nam by force.

So we would advise them to believe that, as far as we are concerned, we are not calling the search for a peaceful settlement to an end because of Ho Chi Minh's reply to President Johnson or because of the attitude which they seem to be taking toward U Thant's most recent proposals. We shall continue that effort by private and public means, and we would hope that we would get some response through some channel that would begin to bring this thing within the range of discussion and make it possible to move toward a peaceful settlement.

Now, I am ready for your questions.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have outlined all of the reasons why they surely must not believe these various elements. What is it then you think that makes them keep on fighting and refusing to negotiate in the face of what must be a loss of international support and these other adverse factors?

A. Well, it is very hard to say. I can't enter into the minds of the leaders in Hanoi on a matter of that sort. I would suppose, really, that they are under some misapprehension. They are making some misjudgments and miscalculations on some point, either the state of international opinion or the state of opinion within the United States. It's possible even that they still have some slender hopes of some military success in the South.

I just don't know what is in their minds. But what I am saying is that, so far as we understand their point of view, the principal

pillars of their hopes are eroding from under them and they should become interested in peace and at an early date and not at some long delayed future date.

Q. Mr. Secretary, your statement today in reply to U Thant has said that there would be an appropriate involvement for the Government of South Viet-Nam throughout the entire process of arranging a peace. Would you spell that out a little more, sir? Premier [Nguyen Cao] Ky has been indicating that we haven't called him in.

A. Well, obviously, any discussion with North Viet-Nam about peace in Viet-Nam must directly involve the Government of South Viet-Nam. Indeed, as you know, the Government of South Viet-Nam has on more than one occasion suggested direct talks between South Viet-Nam and North Viet-Nam. They have proposed, for example, that the two governments there get together on the question of possibly extending the Tet stand-down, the Tet cease-fire.

We would support that as a means for coming to grips with this problem. We would think that it would be a very good idea if Hanoi were to accept the proposals of South Viet-Nam for direct talks to move this toward a peaceful solution.

There are many opportunities available, you see.

There would be direct talks between Saigon and Hanoi. There would be talks between ourselves and Hanoi. There would be talks under the auspices of the two cochairmen of the Geneva conferences, or under the auspices of the three members of the International Control Commission. Or there could be intermediaries, such as the Secretary-General of the United Nations, or some other distinguished governmental or nongovernmental leader. Any of these methods are appropriate and useful, as far as we are concerned.

The problem is that no one has been able to find a procedure or a method which apparently is agreeable to Hanoi.

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes.

Q. If Hanoi persists for months and even years in its attitude, what will our response then be? What will our course be?

A. We shall meet our commitments in South Viet-Nam. We shall do our duty there.

Q. Mr. Secretary, at the end of the Korean war, as I recall, we entered into talks without a truce and the fighting continued for 2 years. Would you explain, would this formula to which you have responded today, could it be a lead to that same sort of thing, peace talks without any change in the fighting?

A. Well, let me remind you, Mr. Harsch [Joseph C. Harsch, NBC News], of our most elementary position on this matter of talks. We will talk this afternoon or tomorrow morning without any conditions of any sort on either side. We are prepared to talk while the shooting is going on. If the other side wishes to raise major conditions, as they have with their demand that there be an unconditional permanent cessation of the bombing, we are prepared to talk about conditions. We will discuss the conditions which must precede the initiation of formal negotiations.

Or if they do not wish to start at that end—that is, What do you do about the shooting?—we are prepared to start at the other end—What do you do about a final settlement of the problem?—and work back from that to the practical means by which you reach the final settlement. So we are prepared to talk without any conditions of any sort—or about conditions.

Now, let me say that we don't ourselves fully understand why there cannot be discreet talks even though the shooting is going on. Now, we are aware of the element of so-called face, but "face" is not a substitute for very serious practical problems that we face on the military side.

Now, I remind you that we discussed Berlin while the blockade was still in effect. We discussed Korea while the hostilities were still in effect. Indeed, we took more casualties in Korea after the negotiations started

than had occurred before the negotiations started. We talked about the Cuban missiles while the Cuban missile sites were being built by the hour in Cuba. So we are prepared to talk without any change in the military situation whatever.

But we are also prepared to talk about changes in the military situation. What we cannot do is to commit ourselves to a permanent and unconditional stoppage of the bombing without knowing what the practical results of that will be on the military side.

No one has been able to tell us, for example—just as one example—that if we stop the bombing, those three divisions or more of North Vietnamese troops that are now in and on both sides of the demilitarized zone will not advance to attack our Marines, who are 6 miles away.

Now, obviously, these are important practical questions. So we will talk at this moment, or we will talk about any other circumstances in which the other side might think that they might wish to talk. But what we cannot do is to stop half the war and let the other half of the war go on unimpeded.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you refer, when we referred in our reply to the Secretary-General to a general standstill truce, are we talking at that point of a cessation of the bombing and cessation of infiltration from the North?

A. I would suppose that a general standstill truce would involve an elimination of all military action of all sorts on both sides. Now, one reason why there has to be some discussion of that is that it is necessary for both sides to understand what in fact will happen, particularly in a guerrilla situation where the situation on the ground is somewhat complicated. And so there needs to be some discussion of that point if it is to be a protracted standstill.

But if that can be achieved, then we can move into the preliminary political discussions which might open the way for a reconvening of the Geneva conference or some other appropriate forum. But a military

standstill would involve the concept of stopping the military action on both sides, and that certainly would include stopping the bombing.

Q. Mr. Secretary, just how does this formula today differ from Mr. Thant's previous formula?

A. Well, I think that he would perhaps be the better one to comment on that. If there is a major difference, I think that this does place emphasis upon a mutual stop of the military action on both sides as an important first step.

As far as his earlier proposals were concerned, the three-point proposals, you recall that they envisage that we would stop the bombing as the first point; the second point, that there would be a mutual deescalation of the military action; and, third, there would be discussions among all those involved in the conflict.

We said, "Your point one, stopping the bombing, gives us no particular problem, but what do you have from the other side about point two?" Well, what he had from the other side about point two was a complete rejection—that there will be no mutual deescalation of military action.

And on point three, the question of discussions with all the parties involved in the fighting, the other side has consistently said in and out—from time to time, rather—that the Liberation Front must be accepted as the sole spokesman for the South Vietnamese people.

We find disturbing the refusal of Hanoi to engage in discussions with the Government in Saigon. We think that would be an appropriate way to begin such discussions and the possibilities of peace might be opened up if that channel were to become active. But thus far Hanoi has refused to exercise it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how would you distinguish between this proposal and the President's proposal to Ho Chi Minh?

A. Well, I think that perhaps the Secretary-General's proposal is somewhat broader in that it would presumably apply to a cease-

fire throughout all of Viet-Nam, South Viet-Nam as well as the disengagement militarily between North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam. So to that extent, it is somewhat broader. But, nevertheless, that is something which we are perfectly prepared to discuss with representatives from the other side or are perfectly prepared to have the Government of Saigon discuss with the representatives from Hanoi.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is your answer to those critics who say that the President's letter in effect raised the American price?

A. Well, I don't understand what they are talking about.

Q. Well, they say that in this letter the United States is demanding proof in advance that infiltration would have stopped.

A. We didn't talk about proof in advance. The words used were "assurances that infiltration had stopped."

Q. Well, it is your contention that the price was not raised, that you're on the status quo ante as far as that is concerned?

A. The principal point here is that Hanoi has increasingly emphasized during this past year its inflexible demand that a stop in the bombing be permanent and unconditional and that, in exchange for that, there would be no indication from Hanoi as to what comparable or corresponding military action they would take on their side.

Now, just recall, for example, during the 37-day pause at the beginning of last year, Ho Chi Minh sent a letter to the heads of Communist states, and in that letter he demanded that the United States must end unconditionally and for good all bombing raids and other acts, war acts, against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam—only in this way can a political solution of the Viet-Nam problem be envisaged.

Now, that insistence upon the stoppage of the bombing, which would be permanent and unconditional, has been a major increase in the public demands of Hanoi during this past year. And that makes it necessary for us to know what would happen if we committed ourselves to any such cessation.

The North Vietnamese representative in Paris on February 22d said that we must state in advance at the time of any cessation of bombing that it would be permanent and unconditional. Well, that means that we must know what the effects would be. Will the infiltration continue? Will those three divisions move against our Marines? Are they going to continue their half of the war? No one has been able to whisper to us that that would not be the result. No one—private citizens, governments, Hanoi's own representatives, governments friendly to Hanoi—no one has been able to whisper to us that there would be any change in the present military tactics and strategy of Hanoi with respect to seizing South Viet-Nam by force.

If any of you gentlemen have any information to the contrary, I would be glad to hear it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I ask you if the channels directly to Hanoi remain open after this exchange of letters, and, if so, are we putting these propositions that you have just stated directly to them?

A. As far as we are concerned, the channels remain open. They have been open all along. I have referred to the fact that nothing we have had privately throws any different light on what you now know publicly about the attitude of the two sides. But I shouldn't exaggerate the point that channels remain open. When you pick up the telephone and nobody answers on the other end, is that a channel or not? Or if you find yourself in a telephone conversation and the other end hangs up, I will leave it to you as to whether that is a channel. I can say at the moment that our channels are not very efficient, to say the least.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is the amount of reciprocity that we would require for stopping the bombing a negotiable commodity, or is there a decisive—must there be a complete stoppage in infiltration, or is it negotiable?

A. I don't want to give a categorical response to that because President Johnson in a recent press conference said that we would

be glad to hear of almost anything from the other side. But that doesn't mean that we can live on just nothing from the other side—just nothing.

I point out to you that during the Tet pause, at the end of which Ho Chi Minh gave his reply to the letter which President Johnson had sent to him at the beginning of the Tet pause, he had some other alternatives open to him. If there was a problem of time, he could have said, "Mr. President, time is rather short here. We need a little more time on this." He didn't say that. Or he could have said, "I don't particularly like your proposal, but here are my counterproposals." He didn't say that. In effect, he called for the capitulation of South Viet-Nam and capitulation of the American forces in South Viet-Nam and a permanent and unconditional stoppage of the bombing. That we can't take.

Yes, sir?

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you talk about the public and private record being the same, what exactly do you mean? Do you mean there is nothing outstanding now privately in the way of negotiation?

A. No. What I'm saying is there is nothing in the private record that reflects any different view on the part of the authorities in Hanoi than you now have on the public record.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you explain why you haven't published the text of four other letters that you recently sent to Hanoi?

A. Because we do not wish ourselves to establish the point that a private communication with us is impossible. If Hanoi wishes to make public a communication from us, as they did in connection with the exchange between President Johnson and Ho Chi Minh, that is a choice which they can make. But I think it could be very important in the future that Hanoi at least know that it is possible for them to communicate privately with us without its becoming public—to the extent that you gentlemen would let us get away with that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, point (b) of the United

States answer talks about preliminary talks. What's your understanding of who would take part in those talks—just Hanoi and Washington, or would it be Saigon or the NLF?

A. Well, we haven't formulated that in great detail because we need to know what the attitude of Hanoi would be and what the general situation would be. In our reply we did say that of course the Government of South Viet-Nam will have to be appropriately involved throughout this entire process and that the interests and views of our allies would also have to be taken fully into account. So we did not try to make that precise in detail because we would be interested in knowing what Hanoi's response to the

Secretary-General's initiative would be.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you referred to the fact that there was no contradiction between the public and private record as far as peace talks are concerned. I wonder if you would be prepared to comment now on reports concerning the possibility of negotiations in Warsaw?

A. If your question is Would I be willing to? the answer is "No." I think the attitude of Hanoi on these matters is fairly clear at the present time, but I do not want to point the finger to, or close the door on, any contacts that might occur anywhere in any capital as far as the future is concerned.

Q. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

United States Accepts U.N. Secretary-General's Proposal for Ending the Viet-Nam Conflict

At a news conference held at U.N. Headquarters on March 28 Secretary-General U Thant made public the text of his aide memoire dated March 14 addressed to the parties concerned in the conflict in Viet-Nam and indicated that it would also be appropriate for the parties to make their replies public.

Following is the text of the Secretary-General's aide memoire, together with texts of a U.S. interim reply of March 15 and the definitive U.S. reply of March 18 released by the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and the Department of State on March 28.

SECRETARY-GENERAL'S AIDE MEMOIRE OF MARCH 14

On many occasions in the past the Secretary-General of the United Nations has expressed his very great concern about the conflict in Viet-Nam. That concern is intensified by the growing fury of the war result-

ing in the increasing loss of lives, indescribable suffering and misery of the people, appalling devastation of the country, uprooting of society, astronomical sums spent on the war and last but not least, his deepening anxiety over the increasing threat to the peace of the world. For these reasons, in the past three years or so, he submitted ideas and proposals to the parties primarily involved in the war with a view to creating conditions congenial for negotiations which unhappily have not been accepted by the parties. The prospects for peace seem to be as distant today than ever before.

Nevertheless, the Secretary-General reasserts his conviction that a cessation of the bombing of North Viet-Nam continues to be a vital need, for moral and humanitarian reasons and also because it is the step which could lead the way to meaningful talks to end the war.

The situation being as it is today, the Sec-

retary-General has now in mind proposals envisaging three steps:

- (a) A general stand-still truce.
- (b) Preliminary talks.
- (c) Reconvening of the Geneva Conference.

In the view of the Secretary-General, a halt to all military activities by all sides is a practical necessity if useful negotiations are to be undertaken. Since the Secretary-General's three-point plan has not been accepted by the parties, he believes that a general stand-still truce by all parties to the conflict is now the only course which could lead to fruitful negotiations. It must be conceded that a truce without effective supervision is apt to be breached from time to time by one side or another, but an effective supervision of truce, at least for the moment, seems difficult to envisage as a practical possibility. If the parties directly involved in the conflict are genuinely motivated by considerations of peace and justice, it is only to be expected that earnest effort will be exerted to enforce the truce to the best of their ability. Should a public appeal by the Secretary-General in his personal capacity facilitate the observance of such a truce, he would gladly be prepared to do so. Appeals to that effect by a group of countries would also be worthy of consideration.

Once the appeal has been made and a general stand-still truce comes into effect, the parties directly involved in the conflict should take the next step of entering into preliminary talks. While these talks are in progress, it is clearly desirable that the general stand-still truce will continue to be observed. In the view of the Secretary-General, these talks can take any of the following forms:

- (1) Direct talks between the United States of America and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

- (2) Direct talks between the two Governments mentioned in one above, with the participation of the two Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference of 1954.

- (3) Direct talks between the two Governments mentioned in one with the participa-

tion of the members of the International Control Commission.

- (4) Direct talks between the two Governments mentioned in one with the participation of the two Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference of 1954 and of the members of the International Control Commission.

The Secretary-General believes that these preliminary talks should aim at reaching an agreement on the modalities for the reconvening of the Geneva Conference, with the sole purpose of returning to the essentials of that Agreement as repeatedly expressed by all parties to the conflict. These preliminary talks should seek to reach an agreement on the timing, place, agenda and participants in the subsequent formal meeting—the reconvening of the Geneva Conference. The Secretary-General deems it necessary to stress that the question of participants in the formal negotiations should not obstruct the way to a settlement. It is a question which could be solved only by agreeing that no fruitful discussions on ending the war in Viet-Nam could take place without involving all those who are actually fighting. Since the Government in Saigon as well as the National Front of Liberation of South Viet-Nam are actually engaged in military operations, it is the view of the Secretary-General that a future formal conference could not usefully discuss the effective termination of all military activities and the new political situation that would result in South Viet-Nam without the participation of representatives of the Government in Saigon and representatives of the National Front of Liberation of South Viet-Nam.

In transmitting these proposals to the parties directly concerned, the Secretary-General believes that he is acting within the limits of his good offices purely in his private capacity. He hopes that the divergent positions held by the parties both on the nature of the conflict and the ultimate political objectives will not prevent them from giving their very serious attention to these proposals. Indeed, he takes this opportunity to appeal to them to give their urgent consideration to his proposals.

U.S. AIDE MEMOIRE OF MARCH 15 ¹

U.S./U.N. press release 30 dated March 28

MARCH 15, 1967

The United States welcomes the proposal of the Secretary-General which contains constructive and positive elements toward bringing about a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict.

The United States is in the process of consulting the government of South Vietnam and its allies. We expect to provide the Secretary-General with a full and prompt reply.

U.S. AIDE MEMOIRE OF MARCH 18 ²

U.S./U.N. press release 31 dated March 28

MARCH 18, 1967

As the Secretary-General knows, the United States and other Governments have, over many months, approached Hanoi, both publicly and privately, with proposals to end the conflict in Vietnam. To date, all such efforts have been rebuffed. The Government of North Vietnam has refused to agree to discussions without preconditions or to take reciprocal actions leading toward a cessation of hostilities.

For this reason, the Government of the United States would be most interested in learning whether Hanoi is willing to enter into such discussions or to take reciprocal actions leading to peace in Vietnam. The United States has been, and remains willing to enter into discussions without preconditions with Hanoi at any time.

To this end, the United States accepts the three-step proposal in the Aide Memoire of the Secretary-General of 14 March 1967 envisaging:

¹ The text also was read to news correspondents at Washington by the Department of State spokesman on Mar. 28.

² The text also was released by the Department of State on Mar. 28 (press release 69).

- (a) A general stand-still truce;
- (b) Preliminary talks;
- (c) Reconvening of the Geneva Conference.

The United States believes it would be desirable and contributory to serious negotiations if an effective cessation of hostilities, as the first element in the three-point proposal, could be promptly negotiated.

It would, therefore, be essential that the details of such a general cessation of hostilities be discussed directly by both sides, or through the Secretary-General, the Geneva Conference Co-Chairmen or otherwise as may be agreed. The United States is prepared to enter into such discussions immediately and constructively.

The United States is also prepared to take the next steps in any of the forms suggested by the Secretary-General to enter into preliminary talks leading to agreement as to the modalities for reconvening of the Geneva Conference.

Of course, the Government of South Vietnam will have to be appropriately involved throughout this entire process. The interests and views of our allies would also have to be taken fully into account.

The United States again expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his untiring efforts to help bring about a peaceful settlement and an end to the conflict in Vietnam.

Letters of Credence

Afghanistan

The newly appointed Ambassador of Afghanistan, Abdullah Malikyar, presented his credentials to President Johnson on March 17. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated March 17.

Prime Minister of Afghanistan Visits the United States

Prime Minister Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwal of Afghanistan visited the United States March 25–April 9. In Washington, March 28–30, he met with President Johnson and other U.S. Government officials. Following are an exchange of greetings between President Johnson and Prime Minister Maiwandwal at an arrival ceremony on the south lawn of the White House on March 28, their exchange of toasts at a White House luncheon that afternoon, and a joint statement released later that day at the conclusion of their meeting.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS

White House press release dated March 28

President Johnson

Mr. Prime Minister, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen: I am very happy, on behalf of all Americans, to welcome you back to our country, Mr. Prime Minister, and to this Capital City that you know so well.

All of us will remember that you came here before as the Ambassador from your country. Today you return as Prime Minister. We are very proud that a good friend who lived among us has found time to pay us a cordial visit in the position of great trust and distinction which you now hold.

Mr. Prime Minister, Afghanistan is far from us in miles and hours as we meet this morning. But for us it is no longer a distant, far-off, remote place. Countless Americans have come to know your country and to know your people.

President Eisenhower was your guest. Their Majesties King Zahir and Queen

Homaira are warmly remembered by all of us for their visit here in 1963.¹

Ambassador [Abdul Rahman] Pazhwak is our good neighbor in New York, where he now serves as President of the United Nations General Assembly.

So we meet today as friends. We live on opposite sides of the globe, yet we have much in common:

—Your land, like ours, has a strong tradition of freedom and independence.

—Your people, like ours, cherish diversity while they seek unity in mutual respect and justice.

—You, like us, are experimenters in the art of government and social reform.

—And we share a common dedication to peace and to the ideal of a world community based on freedom.

Mr. Prime Minister, these are only a few of the ties which bind our nations and our peoples together. Historically, the relations between our countries have been close and cordial. Today they are warmer than ever before. It is a very great honor and privilege to have you with us to discuss an even more productive future.

We are so happy that you could come to our land.

Prime Minister Maiwandwal

Mr. President, I wish to thank Your Excellency most sincerely for your warm words of welcome and kind expressions of friendship toward Afghanistan.

¹ For text of a joint communique issued at Washington on Sept. 7, 1963, see BULLETIN of Oct. 7, 1963, p. 535.

First, I have the honor to convey the heartfelt greetings of my sovereign, King Mohammed Zahir, to you personally and, through you, to the Government and the people of the United States of America.

His Majesty recalls with the greatest of pleasure and satisfaction the cordial hospitality accorded to him and Her Majesty Queen Homaira during their memorable state visit to the United States in September 1963.

For my own part, I wish to thank you for inviting me to make this visit to the United States, which I remember so fondly from my two previous official assignments in this country.

It will afford me a welcome opportunity to meet and talk with you, Mr. President, as well as other officials and citizens of the United States, including many old friends.

Although a considerable geographic distance separates our two countries, our common belief and devotion to liberty and respect for the inherent dignity of man has bridged this distance.

I am confident that my visit will serve to strengthen and promote the friendly and cultural relations which so happily have prevailed between Afghanistan and the United States since the establishment of formal ties in 1943.

I find it an interesting and noteworthy coincidence that the day before yesterday, my first full day in the United States on this visit, marked the anniversary of the signing of the historic agreement in Paris 31 years ago establishing diplomatic and consular representation between our two countries for the first time.

It was during these years that Afghan students began coming to the United States for higher studies, and the flow has increased steadily through the years since then.

Also over the past 20 years many Americans have been coming to Afghanistan to assist our country in its economic development, along with specialists and technicians of other countries and the United Nations.

Afghanistan is engaged in an all-out effort to develop its economy while at the same time modernizing its political and social institutions.

Our people deeply appreciate the assistance which the friendly countries, including the United States, have contributed to these goals.

Afghanistan follows a policy of active nonalignment and is determined to exercise its free judgment in international affairs. It endeavors wherever possible to serve the cause of international peace and the rights of nations and peoples in the firm belief that only in peace can the progress of all nations, including Afghanistan, be assured and that international understanding is the best way of insuring human prosperity throughout the world.

My Government is strongly dedicated to working for reform in the economic, political, social, and cultural affairs in the country.

I am looking forward, Mr. President, to friendly exchanges of views with you and other members of your Government in the hope that they may contribute to the achievement of the peace and prosperity for which we and our peoples strive.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS

White House press release dated March 28

President Johnson

Mr. Prime Minister, Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen: Among the last state visitors that our beloved President John Kennedy received in this White House were Their Majesties King Zahir and Queen Homaira of Afghanistan. They won our hearts during that visit. They reminded us that, although their country and ours are half a world apart, we are neighbors in thought and we are kindred in spirit.

Today it is our good fortune to welcome the distinguished diplomat, the professor and the journalist, who heads the Government of Afghanistan.

You, sir, are no stranger here with us. You are, rather, an old and very honored friend of many in this room and of many more elsewhere in this city and in this nation.

There was a time, Mr. Prime Minister, when we knew little of your country, except that it was a land of adventure, a romantic land where cultures met, rich history was written, a place where spirited and sturdy men fought with pride to maintain and to keep their independence.

We know this still, but now we know a great deal more about your land.

We know today that you and your countrymen, under the leadership of His Majesty King Zahir, have set as your high goal Afghanistan's "experiment in democracy."

We know today what you are doing to develop your country. We know what you are doing to enrich the lives of all of your people.

Mr. Prime Minister, we here in America, all of us, are very proud to be associated with you in that effort.

If it would be useful to you, Mr. Prime Minister, if you think it would be helpful, we are prepared to send to your country a team of this nation's best agricultural experts, directed by Secretary [of Agriculture Orville L.] Freeman, who would be delighted to work with your specialists in the vital achievement of agricultural self-sufficiency that we both know is so very important to this and to future generations.

Mr. Prime Minister, you have come to visit with us just after the festival of the New Year in your country. That season, like the coming of spring for us, is a time of reaffirmation and rededication. It is a time when we can, together, rededicate ourselves to the great tasks that each of us, in our own way, in our own land, is trying so hard to do:

—to build a better framework of social justice for all of our people;

—to devote our energies and our resources to better lives for all of our people;

—to strengthen the strong roots of freedom and the spirit of independence that has

motivated us both throughout our histories; —and, most important of all, to make a contribution, individually and collectively, to a lasting peace among men throughout the world.

This morning as we were talking the Secretary-General of the United Nations made public the main lines of his new proposal for a general truce and cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam. He presented that proposal to our honored and most distinguished Ambassador, Arthur Goldberg—who is privileged to be with us here today—in New York first on March 14th.²

On March 15th, under Secretary Rusk's and Ambassador Goldberg's direction, we promptly replied, welcoming the proposal and noting that it contains "constructive and positive elements toward bringing a peaceful settlement of the Viet-Nam conflict."

We promptly told the Secretary-General that we would be consulting immediately with the Government of South Viet-Nam and with our other allies and that we would provide him with a full and very prompt reply. On March 15th we said that.

On March 18th Ambassador Goldberg delivered that reply. It was positive. It was definitive. It was affirmative.

The Government of Viet-Nam also responded constructively.

Yesterday we regretfully learned from Radio Hanoi that they were informing the world that they apparently were not prepared to accept the Secretary-General's proposal. As they stated through their radio, "The Viet-Nam problem has no concern with the United Nations, and the United Nations has absolutely no right to interfere in any way with the Viet-Nam question."

We respectfully disagree. War and peace are concerns of the United Nations. They are concerns of all people.

We welcome the efforts of not only the United Nations but any nation, large or small, if they have any suggestion or any contribution they are prepared to make.

² See p. 624.

I would hope that the Secretary-General was correct this morning when he said that none of the parties has categorically—categorically—turned his plan down.

We have seen over the past several years—and, yes, recently in the past several months—one effort after another to bring peace to Southeast Asia fail because Hanoi rejected it.

But, Mr. Prime Minister and honored guests, I want everyone who can hear my voice or see my words to know that this nation will continue to persist. Deep in our history is the memory of what President Abraham Lincoln said to his countrymen in the dark days of 1861:

Suppose you go to war, you cannot fight always; and when, after much loss on both sides, and no gain on either, you cease fighting, the identical old questions as to terms of intercourse are again upon you.

In Southeast Asia the terms for the relations among states were set in 1954 and 1962 by international accords. In the end they must be honored. In the end the people of South Viet-Nam must be given the chance to determine their destiny without external interference.

So all of our power, our intelligence, and our imagination will be devoted in the future, as in the past, to bringing that day nearer.

As we meet here in this spring, in this period of dedication, this spring of 1967, let us together pledge anew our dedication to the achievement of the objectives of social justice, devoting our energy and resources to better lives, to strengthening the roots of freedom and independence, and to making a contribution, individually and collectively, to peace among men.

Mr. Prime Minister, I have no doubt, after our extended visit today, that we are joined in these objectives and in this resolve.

Now I should like to ask our friends who have come here from other parts of the nation out of friendship and respect for the distinguished Prime Minister to join me in

a toast to His Majesty King Zahir and to the great nation of Afghanistan.

Prime Minister Maiwandwal

President Johnson, Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen: I wish to thank you again, Mr. President, as I had the occasion to do on my arrival earlier this morning, for your very kind words of welcome to me personally and your expressions of friendship for my country and the people of Afghanistan.

It is gratifying to know that the visit of Their Majesties the King and Queen of Afghanistan in 1963 is still so fondly remembered in this country. I can assure you that the friendly sentiments you have expressed are warmly reciprocated by them.

I am pleased to be here and to visit the United States again.

Mr. President, the experiment of Afghanistan in democracy, I am proud to confirm, is a noble endeavor and is in full swing under the wise and benevolent leadership and guidance of His Majesty our King.

When he visited the United States in autumn 1963, this experiment was merely a new seed planted in our ancient soil, but it has been carefully nurtured since then and now has grown into a sturdy young plant.

Its blossoms include a liberal new constitution which appeared in 1964, free nationwide parliamentary elections by universal suffrage and secret ballot in 1965, establishment of an independent parliament representative of their nation, and the adoption of a host of progressive new laws designed to reform and modernize our society and political institutions.

Our experiment, in short, has had a healthy start and is beginning to bear fruit.

But we have chosen to modernize not on merely one but on several fronts at once—economic as well as political and social—and in some of this we highly value the great assistance which friends like the United States of America have been giving us in developing our economy.

We appreciate your help in building our infrastructure, especially the construction of roads like the magnificent Kabul-Kandahar Highway, a gift of the American people dedicated only last August in a ceremony attended by Secretary Freeman—and the highway between Herat and the Iranian border, currently under construction.

Similar cooperation between our two countries is, to a considerable extent, helping to develop our educational systems, our agriculture, our water resources, and our transportation system.

All of this will pay repeated dividends for the future lives of our people.

May I assure you, Mr. President, that our prime aim and driving ambition is to reach self-sustained economic growth in as short a time as possible so as to free ourselves from the need for foreign assistance.

Still, we continue to need your help in many ways in order to accelerate our growth and reach our national goals in the shortest possible time.

Your kind offer of assistance by a special team of experts to advise us on ways and means of achieving agricultural self-sufficiency would indeed be useful, and we look forward to discussing this, as well as other aspects of cooperation, with the responsible officials of your Government.

Mr. President, Afghanistan is a real example of a country in which the sincere efforts of the people and friendly assistance of foreign countries have combined to create an area of peace and stability in an all too often turbulent and insecure world.

We firmly believe in the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, including the necessity of solving international problems by peaceful means.

In this spirit, we continue to pursue our efforts aimed at the peaceful settlement of the Pakhtunistan problem, which constitutes the major issue in our relationships with Pakistan.

As a living example of international cooperation in peace, our policy of active and positive nonalignment and of coexistence has

worked for the advantage of our country, our region, and, we hope, the world.

This is not a new policy for us, but rather one we have pursued throughout this century as a national struggle and a consequence of our geographic position and historical experience.

You have aptly referred, Mr. President, to the present season of the Afghan New Year, which falls also in the beginning of spring, as a time of rededication. In our case it marks this year the beginning of our third 5-year plan, through which we hope to make further substantial progress in improving the life of our people.

The Government and the nation of Afghanistan are grateful for the friendship, understanding, and interest manifested by the Government and people of the United States in our struggle for economic and social betterment.

Ladies and gentlemen, friends, I invite you to join me in a toast to the health and prosperity of the President of the United States and to the great American people.

JOINT STATEMENT

White House press release dated March 28

At the invitation of President Johnson, Prime Minister Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwal of Afghanistan visited Washington from March 28–30, 1967. The President and Prime Minister met on March 28 and exchanged views on matters of mutual interest.

President Johnson took particular pleasure in welcoming the Prime Minister back to Washington, recalling his long and distinguished role as Ambassador from Afghanistan to the United States. The President also recalled the state visit to the United States in September 1963 of Their Majesties King Mohammed Zahir Shah and Queen Homaira, a visit which added substantially to the long record of close friendship between the United States and Afghanistan. He asked the Prime Minister to convey to His Majesty the King the warm affection and ad-

miration of the American people for the Afghan people.

Prime Minister Maiwandwal described for the President Afghanistan's continuing efforts, under the leadership of His Majesty the King, to build and strengthen democratic institutions and to press economic and social progress. He outlined his government's intention, under the Third Five Year Plan, to intensify economic development efforts. The President assured the Prime Minister of the continuing desire of the United States to do its part in assisting Afghanistan's efforts for implementing the Third Five Year Plan. The Prime Minister expressed to the President the deep appreciation of the Afghan people for United States economic assistance.

In this connection the President noted with special satisfaction cooperative efforts of long duration by the United States and Afghanistan in many fields of education.

The Prime Minister reviewed Afghanistan's foreign policy of non-alignment and friendship and cooperation with all Nations. He described the problems existing among the countries of the region to which Afghanistan belongs and reiterated Afghanistan's view that these problems can be solved through peaceful means and in an atmosphere of understanding, confidence and realism.

The two leaders talked about current developments elsewhere in Asia, particularly the urgent need for peace and stability in Southeast Asia. They outlined their respective positions on the problem of Vietnam and agreed that a peaceful and just settlement is urgently needed. The President described for the Prime Minister the many and persisting efforts of the United States to achieve a cessation of hostilities in Vietnam consistent with the freedom and independence of the people of South Vietnam. The Prime Minister stated that implementation of the 1954 Geneva accords is a sound basis for the settlement of the Vietnamese problem.

The President was delighted to know of the intention of the University of California at Santa Barbara to bestow an honorary degree on the Prime Minister during his current visit.

Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 1967

A P R O C L A M A T I O N ¹

There is special meaning this year in the hemispheric tradition of Pan American Day.

On April twelfth, for the first time in a decade and the second time in history, the Presidents and Heads of Government of the American nations will meet to fortify the foundation of the house of the Americas.

Seventy-seven years ago we first joined our hearts and hands as brothers in a hopeful hemisphere. We pledged a common pledge—we dreamed a common dream. We have since translated that pledge into progress. And we have founded the Organization of American States as a firm framework for the fulfillment of that dream.

We have recently strengthened that Organization by amending its Charter to meet the challenge that our changing times demand.

We have extended our unique experiment in international living by welcoming into our membership the new nation of Trinidad and Tobago.

We have enhanced the meaning of that experiment by forging within it an Alliance for Progress in which our goals for the good life are matched only by our desire to achieve them. And the impressive accomplishments of these last six years trace that desire's growing satisfaction.

When the Alliance was formed in 1961, it was estimated that our Latin American neighbors could supply about 80% of the capital required. In fact, they have done better than this. By the end of this year, the gross investment in Latin America will have totaled over \$100 billion—and 95% of it will have been from domestic sources. This ability of our neighbors to save and invest in their own future is a most striking indication that Latin America can, with relatively modest external help, mobilize the resources needed for its own development—and thus strengthen the foundations of the house we share in this hemisphere.

The cooperative spirit of the Alliance is bringing new-found confidence and hope into this house.

—Per capita growth rates show that more and more countries are breaking the economic stagnation of earlier years.

—Men, women and children are alive today who would otherwise have died. In ten countries, deaths caused by malaria dropped from 10,810 to 2,280 in three years' time. Smallpox cases declined almost as sharply. And new health centers and hospitals are growing everywhere.

—Men whose fathers for generations toiled on land owned by others are now working it as their own. With U.S. assistance, 1.1 million acres have

¹ No. 3774; 32 *Fed. Reg.* 5539.

been irrigated and 106,000 acres reclaimed. 15,000 miles of road have been built or improved, many of them farm-to-market access roads.

—For tens of thousands of families, the most fundamental conditions of life are improving. 350,000 housing units have been, or are now being, constructed. New and modernized water supply systems have been built to benefit some 20 million people.

So as we assemble under the banner of the Alliance for Progress, we are cheered by success and encouraged in the task that lies ahead.

With the confidence born of achievement, we know that we can prepare a better world for the new generation of Americans who will come after us.

We look to the 60% of Latin America's 245 million people who are now under the age of 25, and we know that the task of meeting their aspirations is great. But we also know that we have forged the tools to do the task. And there is promise in what we see.

The sustaining arm of education is reaching out to more and more of this strategic 60% of Latin Americans.

—Since the Alliance was formed, school enrollments have increased at an average annual rate of over 6%. This rate represents more than twice the rate of increase in the total population.

—For each 1,000 inhabitants, there were 124 students enrolled in schools in 1960, 170 in 1965, and 174 in 1966.

—28,000 new classrooms have been built.

—160,000 teachers have been trained or given additional training.

—More than 14 million textbooks have been distributed.

—13 million school children and 3 million preschoolers participate in school lunch programs.

And more than this, what statistics cannot adequately relay is the emergence of a generation of vigorous, confident and responsible leaders throughout Latin America—leaders who are ready to help their countries help themselves. These leaders are beginning to include more and more women doers in their ranks. And since women comprise over half the population of Latin America, there is new potential in this leadership.

The successes scored by the Alliance have been aided by the United States—but they have been realized by the cooperative spirit that resides in the commitment and dedication of the Latin American nations themselves. Their unrelenting perseverance has been a keystone in the firm foundation of our house of hemispheric progress.

So as together we seek to strengthen—we seek a realistic goal.

As together we build to better—we build on solid ground.

Bound by geography, born of a common revolu-


tionary heritage, nurtured by common ideals, committed to the dignity of man, and sustained by the youth and vigor that have been our common strength, we will project our traditions into a promising future—and we will prevail.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim Friday, April 14, 1967, as Pan American Day, and the week beginning April 9 and ending April 15 as Pan American Week; and I call upon the Governors of the fifty States of the Union, the Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the officials of all other areas under the flag of the United States to issue similar proclamations.

Further, I call upon this Nation to rededicate itself to the fundamental goal of the inter-American system, embodied in the Charter of the Organization of American States and in the Charter of Punta del Este: social justice and economic progress within the framework of individual freedom and political liberty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this thirty-first day of March in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-seven, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and ninety-first.



By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

U.S. Observers Inspect Antarctic Stations

The Department of State announced on March 20 (press release 60) that a five-man U.S. observer team had completed an inspection of Antarctic stations operated by other parties to the Antarctic Treaty.¹ The U.S. observers reported that they were welcomed in a friendly and cooperative spirit at every facility visited, that access to all installations was made available freely, and that all activities observed in the Antarctic were in con-

¹ For a Department announcement regarding appointment of U.S. observers, see BULLETIN of Jan. 9, 1967, p. 71; for text of the treaty, see *ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1959, p. 914.

sonance with the spirit and specific provisions of the treaty.

The essence of the Antarctic Treaty is the dedication of the area for peaceful purposes. The treaty expressly prohibits in Antarctica any military measures, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the execution of military maneuvers, and the testing of any type of weapons. Freedom of scientific investigation, as well as international cooperation toward that end, is preserved. To insure observance of the treaty provisions, signatories have the right of inspection and aerial observation in all areas of Antarctica.

The following stations were inspected:

Station	Operated by	Date
Dumont d'Durville	France	Feb. 1
Wilkes	Australia	Feb. 8-9
Mawson	Australia	Feb. 14
Molodezhnaya	U.S.S.R.	Feb. 17
Showa	Japan	Feb. 19
SANAE	South Africa	Feb. 25
Signy	United Kingdom	Mar. 2
Orcadas	Argentina	Mar. 2

In addition, the Danish ship *Thala Dan*, under charter to the French and Australian expeditions, was inspected while unloading cargo at Wilkes station.

The observers made the journey on board the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker *Eastwind*, which departed Wellington, New Zealand, on January 25 and landed the observers at Punta Arenas, Chile, on March 6.

The U.S. observers who made the trip were: Frank G. Siscoe, Department of State; Merton Davies, Rand Corporation scientist; Col. Ernest F. Dukes, USAF; Karl Kenyon, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service; and Cyril Muromcew, Department of State.

The Antarctic Treaty was signed on December 1, 1959, and entered into force June 23, 1961. The 12 original signatories of the treaty are: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In addition, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Denmark have acceded to the treaty.

U.S., Canada Request IJC Study of American Falls at Niagara

Press release 80 dated March 31

The Department of State on March 31 sent the following letter to the International Joint Commission, United States and Canada, requesting the Commission to investigate and report upon measures necessary to preserve or enhance the beauty of the American Falls at Niagara. An identical letter was transmitted to the Commission by the Government of Canada.

MARCH 31, 1967

THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION
UNITED STATES AND CANADA
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
and Ottawa, Ontario, Canada

SIRS: The Governments of the U.S.A. and of Canada have agreed to request the International Joint Commission, pursuant to Article IX of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909,¹ to investigate and report upon measures necessary to preserve or enhance the beauty of the American Falls at Niagara. The Commission is specifically requested to investigate and recommend:

(1) what measures are feasible and desirable (a) to effect the removal of the talus which has collected at the base of the American Falls, and (b) to retard or prevent future erosion;

(2) other measures which may be desirable or necessary to preserve or enhance the beauty of the American Falls;

(3) the allocation, as between the United States and Canada, of the work and costs of construction.

At the same time, the Commission is asked to bear in mind the obligations of Canada and the United States contained in the Niagara Treaty of 1950² and the mutual interest of the two countries in refraining from

¹ 36 Stat. 2448.

² Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2130.

measures which might preserve or enhance one of the Falls to the detriment of the other.

For the purpose of assisting the Commission in its investigation and otherwise in the performance of its duties under this reference, the two governments will upon request make available to the Commission the services of engineers and other specially qualified personnel of their governmental agencies and such information and technical data as may have been acquired or as may be acquired by them during the course of the investigation.

The Commission is requested to submit its report to the two governments as soon as may be practicable.

Sincerely,

For the Secretary of State:
GEORGE S. SPRINGSTEEN
*Acting Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs*

Convention Adopted on Conduct of North Atlantic Fisheries

Press release 61 dated March 21

Representatives of 18 countries engaged in fishing operations in the North Atlantic, including the United States, Canada, and 16 European nations, on March 17 adopted and referred to governments for approval the text of a Convention on the Conduct of Fishing Operations in the North Atlantic. The convention was incorporated in a final act which has been signed by representatives of all countries participating in a Fisheries Policing Conference, which met at London four times starting in 1965.

The convention establishes an international code of conduct to be followed by fishing vessels and ancillary craft in the North Atlantic area. It is designed to increase safety at sea, particularly on the international fishing grounds, and to reduce the risk of damage to boats and fishing gear which can occur when vessels using different fishing methods operate close to one another.

The convention contains provisions on

marking of fishing vessels to insure their identification at sea and establishes uniform supplementary light signals for fishing vessels. It also establishes uniform methods of marking nets and other gear in the sea and a code of good conduct on the fishing grounds. The convention provides for a conciliation procedure to facilitate settlement of small claims arising out of gear damage involving fishermen of different nations and for an inspection system whereby authorized officers from any of the participating countries in certain circumstances will be able to board and inspect fishing vessels of other participating countries to investigate possible violations of the rules or cases of damage. While it will be possible for certain countries to opt out of the boarding provisions, other aspects of the inspection system, such as observation and reporting of violations to the authorities of the flag state of the fishing vessel, will apply uniformly to all fishing vessels.

The convention itself will be open for signature in London from June 1 to November 30, 1967. After signature it will be subject to ratification by the United States upon advice and consent of the Senate.

The countries represented at the Conference were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, and United States.

The Conference stemmed from the European Fisheries Conference of 1963-64, at which a resolution was passed that the United Kingdom should convene a technical conference of all countries participating in the Northeast Atlantic fisheries to prepare a draft convention embodying a modern code for the conduct of fishing operations and of related activities in the Northeast Atlantic. It was also resolved to invite representatives of the United States and Canada to attend, so that the extension of the provisions of any such convention to the Northwest Atlantic fisheries might be considered. The convention will cover the area off the coasts of Canada

and the United States as far south as Cape Hatteras, where fishing grounds are often occupied by vessels of many nations.

Representatives of the Departments of State and Interior and the U.S. Coast Guard met several times with representatives of fishermen along the Atlantic coast in preparation for negotiating the convention.

The U.S. delegation consisted of John T.

Gharrett, Regional Director of the U.S. Bureau of Commercial Fisheries in Gloucester, Mass., as chairman and Raymond T. Yingling of the Department of State as vice chairman. William L. Sullivan, Jr., of the Department of State was also a member of the delegation. Lt. Comdr. C. J. Blondin, U.S. Coast Guard, and John B. Skerry, Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, served as advisers.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U.S. Recapitulates Basic Principles for U.N. Peacekeeping Functions

*Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative to the United Nations¹*

Mr. Chairman [Francisco Cuevas Cancino, representative of Mexico]: I appreciate your courtesies in giving me this opportunity to make a statement on behalf of my delegation about the vitally important task of this committee. And again, since I am appearing at these resumed sessions for the first time, may I express my pleasure, Mr. Chairman, that you are again in the chair and supported by an able bureau and an efficient staff.

My main purpose is not to discuss in detail the various proposals which have been made here, on which the United States view has been ably set forth by my colleague, Ambassador Finger [Seymour M. Finger, senior adviser to the U.S. representative]. Rather I wish to emphasize at this critical stage in

the committee's proceedings the deep and continuing concern which my country feels for the future functioning of the United Nations in the peacekeeping field.

We of the United States desire to do our part in every possible way in the combined efforts and in the mutual accommodation which will be required if that essential function is to be maintained in its full vigor. The same concern, we know, is widely shared not only in this committee but among the entire membership of the United Nations.

It is now over 18 months since we weathered a grave constitutional crisis in the life of the organization and the General Assembly was enabled to resume its normal work. As all members know, the United States, as our contribution to the resolution of that crisis, without yielding its basic principles, reluctantly acquiesced in the unwillingness of

¹ Made in the U.N. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Working Group A, on Mar. 22 (U.S./U.N. press release 28/Corr. 1).

the majority to apply article 19 of the charter in that situation.²

But we have not changed our view about the capacity and the duty of the United Nations, in the future as in the past, to serve effectively as a keeper of peace among nations. On that issue, in our conception, the deepest interests of all members are alike—and there are many signs that the great majority, large and small, know this full well.

Regrettably, certain major practical issues important to peacekeeping—particularly the issue of financing, over which the crisis arose—were not resolved in 1965. They are still unresolved today. In particular, it therefore remains uncertain to what extent the United Nations can be looked to in the future—as in the past—to send peacekeeping forces into the field in order to maintain international peace and security. The creation and maintenance of such forces in time of need stand as one of the greatest achievements of the U.N. in its 21-year life. The uncertainty as to its future capacity in this regard is understandably a cause of anxiety to all nations and citizens throughout the world who have at heart the cause of world peace and security.

To keep this matter in perspective, it should be noted that, despite all these uncertainties, the activities of the U.N. organs which are responsible under the charter for the maintenance of international peace and security have continued without interruption. Vital peacekeeping operations continue in Cyprus, Kashmir, and the Middle East. This is a testimonial, despite the lack of resolution of the issue, to the pragmatic good sense of the members of the U.N. who have dealt with crises as they arose. It would be a sad day indeed for the U.N. and for world peace, and for all we would hope to work and seek for, if the recalcitrance of one member or a few members were to prevent the U.N. from continuing to take action to keep the peace. We

² For a statement by Ambassador Goldberg in the U.N. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations on Aug. 16, 1965, see BULLETIN of Sept. 13, 1965, p. 454.

are encouraged that this has not happened, and we persist in the confidence that it will not happen.

What concerns us here is how to assure the readiness of the U.N. to face future emergencies. Last December, in the General Assembly, it appeared that an important step was about to be taken in this direction by the adoption of the thoughtful Canadian resolution which received such a strong majority vote in the committee.³ And referring to the Canadian resolution, I cannot forbear from also acknowledging the deservedly admired contribution which has been made to our consideration of this subject by that conscience of the United Nations in the area of peacekeeping, the distinguished Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Ireland, Frank Aiken, who has with resolution and fortitude persisted in keeping it at the forefront of the U.N. agenda.

The Canadian measure contained important principles on financing, on the residual authority of the General Assembly to launch peacekeeping operations, and on advance planning by member states to contribute men and facilities to future U.N. peacekeeping operations. But at the last moment, as we all know, a final vote on this key resolution was deferred until the special session in April.

Mr. Chairman, time has passed since then. That session is now imminent. In this situation it may be useful for me to recapitulate four basic principles which my Government believes are among the minimum essentials of a solution. These are:

—First, the capacity of the United Nations to deploy peacekeeping forces promptly in an emergency must be preserved.

—Second, viable and equitable financial arrangements must be agreed upon, and faithfully implemented, to support this capacity.

—Third, the essential role of the Secretary-General as executive head of the organization

³ A/SPC/L. 130/Rev. 4, introduced by Canada and cosponsored by six other countries; for text, see U.N. doc. A/6603.

in peacekeeping operations, as in all other operations, must be respected.

—Fourth, no single country, however powerful, can or should be permitted to frustrate by the veto a peacekeeping operation of the United Nations properly initiated by an appropriate organ of the U.N.

Now let me comment briefly on each of these.

Preserving the U.N.'s Peacekeeping Capacity

First, the United Nations peacekeeping capacity:

As for the vital importance of the capacity of the United Nations to deploy peacekeeping forces, I need scarcely reemphasize what is so well known to all members. This capacity is essential to the organization's very first purpose, set forth in article 1 of the charter: "to maintain international peace and security." It is a factor in the security of every nation on the globe, including my own. When through neglect or obstruction we diminish that capacity, we diminish to that extent the security of every nation.

The U.N., of course, is valuable in many ways: as a point of diplomatic contact; as a forum of international debate; as a center of international cooperation for the betterment of human life in all of its aspects, economic, social, and with respect to human rights. But none of its values can be ranked higher than its services as a truly international peacekeeping organization. The "blue helmets" of the United Nations—whatever the imperfections of the operations—in the Middle East, the Congo, and in Cyprus, in Kashmir, and in other areas, have restored calm to these troubled areas, any one of which might otherwise have become a battleground, a confrontation of the great powers, with consequences catastrophic for the entire world. That the organization should lose its capacity to respond in this way to the similar emergencies which are sure to recur in this turbulent era is, as our Secretary-General remarked nearly a year ago, "inconceivable." And yet, as he went on to say with his characteristic directness, "that is the kind of risk which we are now running."

Regarding the means necessary to assure that this United Nations capacity remains unimpaired and particularly that members are prepared in advance to respond to a United Nations call for peacekeeping forces, we shall have more to say in the working group which deals with that subject.

Financial Arrangements

My second point relates to the vital need for reliable financial support of peacekeeping operations. It is this issue that first threatened to undermine the peacekeeping activity of the U.N.—and that threat still hangs over us today.

One sign of it is the fact that the most recently inaugurated peacekeeping operation, that on Cyprus, is being financed on a hand-to-mouth basis by some 20 countries responding to periodic appeals from the Secretary-General. That the world's ranking international official should be obliged to go begging every few months to carry out the will of the organization, expressed by repeated and unanimous resolutions of the Security Council, is neither dignified nor acceptable.

On the other hand, the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East has been provided for on a sounder and more equitable footing. It has been covered by apportionment among the members—although regrettably not all have yet paid. Perhaps the formula used for UNEF through some improved mechanism can be helpful in finding a model for the future.

One aspect of the financial problem is the question of *voluntary contributions*. I should like to deal with this with great frankness and candor with respect to the position of my Government.

At the time when a way was being sought to end the deadlock over article 19, many delegations came to the United States delegation and assured us that if we would not press for application of the article 19 voting penalty then the members who had refused to contribute to certain peacekeeping operations would make substantial voluntary contributions to reduce the deficit of the orga-

nization. In spite of these assurances, I am obliged to note that more than a year has passed and no voluntary contribution has yet been made by any of those countries that refused to contribute, particularly the major ones.

Now, some have suggested that the United States also should make a voluntary contribution. I need scarcely reiterate to this committee that my country took the initiative in breaking the deadlock over article 19. Now it is for others to take the initiative by doing their part in the interest of U.N. solvency.

I also need scarcely remind the committee that the United States, in addition to paying its assessed share in every case, had long since made large voluntary contributions both to the United Nations Emergency Force and to the Congo operation.

But I again repeat the assurance that I have given before: that once the promised substantial voluntary contributions have been made by those who we have been assured would make such contributions, the United States will not be found wanting—as indeed we have never been found wanting in support of the U.N.'s needs and requirements.

I next turn briefly to the more basic question of *future financial arrangements*.

The United States has in no way abated its support for the principle of collective financing for peacekeeping. We believe it should be applied in light of the realities and practicalities of the situation to the extent feasible, as it now is for certain peacekeeping operations contained in the regular budget.

This is one area in which this committee could take a constructive step by examining the various proposals for a model special scale for financing operations involving heavy expenditures. We are prepared to join in the search for a reliable and equitable formula and to consider various approaches that have been suggested.

For example, we will be glad to examine the concrete suggestion made by India; namely, that in cases where the Security Council authorizes a peacekeeping operation

involving heavy expenditures, the General Assembly may apportion the resulting expenses on a special scale, reducing the share of the low-income countries. We are fully prepared to discuss this proposal in a spirit of mutual accommodation—and with a view to making real progress toward meaningful agreement.

We have listened today with close attention to the cogent observations just made by our distinguished colleague, Ambassador [Akira] Matsui of Japan, on the Indian proposal. As is usual for him and his country, Ambassador Matsui has made a notable contribution to the discussion in the careful analysis which he has given us today.

We are also prepared to consider other financing formulas, including the Jamaican proposal and the formula embodied in the seven-power resolution adopted by the Special Political Committee last fall.

And we have listened today also with great interest to the suggestions of the distinguished representative of Ethiopia, our colleague, Ambassador [Lij Endalkatchew] Makonnen, toward a coordinated and balanced method for the initiation and financing of peacekeeping operations to be implemented on the basis of a gentlemen's agreement. We shall, of course, want to study these with care but I can assure Ambassador Makonnen here and now that the United States is prepared to consider his proposals with the closest attention as well as other proposals aimed toward the same goal.

Ambassador Makonnen stated his aim as, and I quote him, "making the Organization readily responsive to any contingency that might require United Nations actions without badly needed actions being slowed down or hindered altogether by the requirement of big-power unanimity." I am in complete agreement with his statement so cogently expressed.

We have also had an interesting proposal from the distinguished Minister Zorrilla [Luis G. Zorrilla, alternate representative] of Mexico concerning the financial aspects of peacekeeping, which also require and will receive our careful consideration and study.

In the same spirit we would be glad to discuss suggestions with regard to a finance committee to consider methods of financing peacekeeping, including the French proposal for a committee linked to the Security Council. We believe that any such committee ought to be created by the General Assembly, whose authority in this area is supported by the charter. Perhaps a compromise might be possible; namely, a committee composed of the members of the Security Council but reporting to the General Assembly. I mention this as an example of the flexibility which we are willing to manifest and which we believe can lead to progress.

Secretary-General's Executive Authority

My third point is that any United Nations peacekeeping operation, like any other complex operation, requires a single executive. That executive should be the Secretary-General—in the future as in the past.

In the peacekeeping area as in every other vital work of the organization, the Secretary-General simply cannot function as a glorified clerk. He must have the latitude to make the necessary day-to-day decisions. He must not be tied down by demands that administrative details be referred back to the Security Council or the General Assembly as the case may be. If the Secretary-General has to clear with them the assignment of every observer and the allocation of every jeep, the peacekeeping function of the U.N. will simply undergo a new form of paralysis—administrative rather than financial.

Of course, as in the past, the Secretary-General should operate within the scope of his authority and his mandate, and his rights and responsibilities and limitations under the charter. He should be responsive to the authorizing body. He should consult with the members on his conduct of peacekeeping operations. But consultation must not be distorted into a new form of veto.

I can only say, from my experience and that of my predecessors at the United Nations, the Secretary-General has discharged

his duty of consultation with complete fidelity and objectivity and in the interest of all members of the organization.

No Veto on Peacekeeping

Finally, the United States firmly adheres to the view that no one nation may frustrate the United Nations in its peacekeeping work.

Under the charter, the Security Council's responsibility is not described as "exclusive" but rather as "primary." The power of the General Assembly to make recommendations in this realm is made clear in the charter, notably in articles 10, 11, 12, and 14.

Various members, including France, have in the past suggested that the General Assembly retains a role in peacekeeping activities as distinct from enforcement actions. And it may be useful to emphasize this distinction, to which we fully subscribe. Only the Security Council has power under the charter to mount enforcement actions. Such actions involve coercion and in launching them the Security Council has the power to issue orders binding on member states. That power is properly subject to the veto.

The General Assembly has no binding power with respect to enforcement actions. It can only recommend. But the importance of this recommendatory power—which is possessed also by the Security Council—is attested to by the fact that virtually all the operations involving military forces in the history of the United Nations have been authorized by recommendation. One, the United Nations Emergency Force, was recommended by the General Assembly. All the others were recommended by the Security Council without invoking its enforcement power.

Believing as we do in these principles which we conceive to be entirely sound and compatible with the charter, we were much gratified last December when the Canadian resolution, containing a clear reaffirmation of the Assembly's role in this area, received such a strong majority vote in the Special

Political Committee of the General Assembly. And we earnestly hope this vote foreshadows further progress toward the general acceptance and reaffirmation of the Assembly's vital peacekeeping function.

I believe the issue of the General Assembly's authority in this area has never been more eloquently stated than in the statement which our late beloved colleague, Dr. Victor Andrés Belaunde of Peru, made in the debate on peacekeeping last December 14, on the last day of his life. I am convinced he spoke for an overwhelming part of the membership of the United Nations when he said:

We cannot resign ourselves to that absurd concept which, while recognizing the necessity for peace, holds that when the organ specifically charged with responsibility for peace becomes paralyzed, the General Assembly should also be paralyzed and immobilized, impotent in the face of war and catastrophe. We cannot accept this; we will never accept it.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, I repeat that the United States wishes a resolution of this problem. It wishes to respond flexibly to any initiative whose purpose is to assure the future of the United Nations as a keeper of the peace. Progress cannot be made by unrequited concessions from one side. But where a spirit of accommodation is apparent, my Government will respond.

The interests at stake in this matter transcend the interests of any nation or group of nations. All nations, great and small alike, irrespective of their size or location or ideology, irrespective of particular grievances, have a vital stake in a peaceful world order.

One who serves here, Mr. Chairman, I am sure you will agree with me, is tempted very often to wonder what future historians will write about the United Nations in its first quarter-century.

Perhaps they will record that its greatest period was a decade or so in which it created something the world had never seen before—international peacekeeping forces acting under the flag of, and in the name of, a world organization—but that after this brief flowering its members commenced to quarrel

and to reassert their ancient jealousies, their doubts, their fears, their timidities, and that these pioneering actions were abandoned.

Or perhaps they will write that the first flowering led to something better; that after a difficult crisis, the members realized how deep their common interest was; that they went on to put the U.N., the servant of that common interest, on a more solid footing—thus opening a new era in the history of man's ancient quest for peace.

But historians can only record history; it is we who have the responsibility and who must write it. In the name of our common humanity, let us write a new history which our posterity in every nation will not be ashamed to read.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica

The Antarctic Treaty. Signed at Washington December 1, 1959. Entered into force June 23, 1961. TIAS 4780.

Accession deposited: Netherlands, including Kingdom in Europe, Surinam, and Netherlands Antilles, March 30, 1967.

Finance

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.

Signature and ratification: Yugoslavia, March 21, 1967.

Genocide

Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Done at Paris December 9, 1948. Entered into force January 12, 1951.¹

Accession deposited: Mongolia (with reservations and declaration), January 5, 1967.

Maritime Matters

Inter-American convention on facilitation of international waterborne transportation, with annex. Done at Mar del Plata June 7, 1963.²

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

Ratification deposited: United States, March 20, 1967.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol to the international convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089) relating to measures of control. Done at Washington November 29, 1965.²

Ratification deposited: Spain, March 30, 1967.

Protocol to the international convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089) relating to entry into force of proposals adopted by the Commission. Done at Washington November 29, 1965.²

Ratification deposited: Spain, March 29, 1967.

Oil Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, with annexes. Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered into force for the United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900.

Acceptance deposited: Ivory Coast, March 17, 1967.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.

Acceptance deposited: Brazil, March 8, 1967.

Amendments to chapter II of the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted by the IMCO Assembly at London November 30, 1966.²

Senate advice and consent to ratification: March 21, 1967.

Ratified by the President: March 28, 1967.

Wheat

Protocol for the further extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open for signature at Washington April 4 through 29, 1966. Entered into force July 16, 1966, for part I and parts III to VII; August 1, 1966, for part II.

Acceptance deposited: Costa Rica, March 29, 1967.

BILATERAL

Congo (Kinshasa)

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities under title I of the Agricultural Trade Develop-

ment and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with annex. Signed at Kinshasa and Lubumbashi March 15, 1967. Entered into force March 15, 1967.

Israel

Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles, with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington January 27, 1967. Entered into force January 27, 1967.

Italy

Agreement relating to exportation of cotton velveteen fabrics from Italy to the United States. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington October 19, 1966. Entered into force October 19, 1966.

Japan

Agreement amending the agreement of September 12 and 19, 1966 (TIAS 6170), relating to the establishment of a geodetic satellite observation station at Kanoya. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo February 21 and March 14, 1967. Entered into force March 14, 1967.

Poland

Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington March 15, 1967. Entered into force March 15, 1967.

Tunisia

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with annexes. Signed at Tunis March 17, 1967. Entered into force March 17, 1967.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Consular convention. Signed at Moscow June 1, 1964.²

Ratified by the President: March 31, 1967.

United Arab Republic

Agreement relating to an educational and cultural exchange program. Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo January 5 and February 21, 1967. Entered into force February 21, 1967.

² Not in force.

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the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Afghanistan
 Letters of Credence (Malikyar) 626
 Prime Minister of Afghanistan Visits the United States (Johnson, Maiwandwal, joint statement) 627

Antarctica. U.S. Observers Inspect Antarctic Stations 633

Canada. U.S., Canada Request IJC Study of American Falls at Niagara 634

Economic Affairs
 Convention Adopted on Conduct of North Atlantic Fisheries 635
 U.S., Canada Request IJC Study of American Falls at Niagara 634

Foreign Aid
 Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 1967 (proclamation) 632
 Prime Minister of Afghanistan Visits the United States (Johnson, Maiwandwal, joint statement) 627

Latin America. Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 1967 (proclamation) 632

Presidential Documents
 Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 1967 632
 Prime Minister of Afghanistan Visits the United States 627

Treaty Information
 Convention Adopted on Conduct of North Atlantic Fisheries 635
 Current Actions 641

United Nations
 Prime Minister of Afghanistan Visits the United States (Johnson, Maiwandwal, joint statement) 627
 Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 28 618
 United States Accepts U.N. Secretary-General's Proposal for Ending the Viet-Nam Conflict (texts of Secretary-General's aide memoire and U.S. replies) 624
 U.S. Recapitulates Basic Principles for U.N. Peacekeeping Functions (Goldberg) 636

Viet-Nam
 Prime Minister of Afghanistan Visits the United States (Johnson, Maiwandwal, joint statement) 627
 Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 28 618
 United States Accepts U.N. Secretary-General's Proposal for Ending the Viet-Nam

Conflict (texts of Secretary-General's aide memoire and U.S. replies) 624

Name Index

Goldberg, Arthur J 636
 Johnson, President 627, 632
 Maiwandwal, Mohammed Hashim 627
 Malikyar, Abdullah 626
 Rusk, Secretary 618
 U Thant 624

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: March 27-April 2

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to March 27 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 60 of March 20 and 61 of March 21.

No.	Date	Subject
*67	3/27	Linowitz: Overseas Press Club, New York (excerpts).
*68	3/27	Amendments to itinerary for visit of Prime Minister of Afghanistan.
*69	3/28	U.S. reply to U.N. Secretary-General's aide memoire on Viet-Nam (U.S./U.N. press release printed here).
70	3/28	Rusk: news conference of March 28.
*71	3/29	Rusk: salute to Roy Wilkins at Freedom House dinner.
*72	3/29	Linowitz: Women's National Press Club, Washington, D.C. (excerpts).
*74	3/30	Linowitz: Regional Foreign Policy Conference, Philadelphia (excerpts).
†75	3/30	Panel of advisers for Bureau of African Affairs (rewrite).
*76	3/30	Meeting of U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Matters.
*77	3/30	Program for visit of President Sunay of Turkey.
*78	3/30	Rusk: interview on Northwestern University radio program.
†79	3/31	Palmer: "Africa and America."
80	3/31	Study requested of measures to preserve beauty of American Falls at Niagara.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE
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BULLETIN

Vol. LVI, No. 1452



April 24, 1967

AFRICA AND AMERICA

by Assistant Secretary Palmer 646

CENTO ECONOMIC COMMITTEE MEETS AT WASHINGTON

*Statement by AID Administrator William S. Gaud
and Text of Communique 668*

TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES REAFFIRM BONDS
OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION

*Exchanges of Remarks Between President Johnson
and President Sunay and Text of Joint Communique 652*

Africa and America

by Joseph Palmer 2d

*Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*¹

I am very pleased to talk to this Council which shares with us in government a deep interest in advancing relations between the United States and Africa.

I need not remind this group, with its knowledge and experience in African affairs, of Africa's far-reaching transition in the past decade: the creation of over 30 nations, the new impetus to the development of its human and material resources, and, above all, the response of its peoples to the opportunities and responsibilities of freedom. You are also aware of the inevitable gap between goals and achievements in a continent whose aspirations are high and whose overall level of productivity is still very low. Finally, you know that there are no pat answers to Africa's problems and, while they cannot be postponed until a mythical tomorrow, they cannot be solved overnight.

With these thoughts in mind, may I discuss briefly three areas of problems and opportunities in Africa today: the aspirations of individuals, the tasks of national governments, and the opportunities for regional cooperation.

The President, in his speech last May 26² to the African ambassadors from OAU [Organization of African Unity] countries, ex-

¹ Address made before the Council of the African-American Institute at New York, N.Y., on Mar. 31 (press release 79).

² BULLETIN of June 13, 1966, p. 914.

PLICITLY emphasized the importance of the aspiration for human dignity, racial equality, and political rights in the history and experience of both the United States and the peoples of Africa. At this time the question of individual rights is at the heart of the several issues which are found in the southern part of the continent. Without minimizing the importance of other problems, I would like to say a few words about Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa, since they are presently occupying a major portion of the attention of the United Nations.

The illegal declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia was an effort by a white minority of 220,000 to perpetuate its control over some 4 million Africans. By its action the Smith regime—not the British nor the Africans nor the U.N.—confronted the world with an issue of principle that the international community could not ignore.

The options open to the government of Southern Rhodesia in November 1965 were clear. It could continue to govern legally under the 1961 constitution, it could achieve legal independence on the basis of the principles advanced by the U.K. to safeguard the political and human rights of the majority as Rhodesia moved toward majority rule, or it could declare its independence illegally and seek to perpetuate minority rule. It chose the last option, and the international community responded, as it inevitably had to do, with virtually universal opposition.

The basic issue was, and still is, the question of unimpeded progress toward majority rule. What the British seek and what most of the world would find acceptable is a settlement that assures an orderly but reasonable transition to majority rule, with minority rights fully protected. Neither the British Commonwealth, the U.N., nor the United States demands immediate majority rule. Nor does anyone advocate depriving the minority of its legitimate rights. We believe that the white minority in Southern Rhodesia can make a valuable contribution to the development of an independent Rhodesia and that its rights should be protected so that it can play its full part in this great task in security and prosperity.

U.S. Actions on Southern Rhodesia

All of the action taken by the United States Government, acting in its own interest as a responsible member of the international community in response to the Smith regime's challenge, has been based on our recognition of the importance of the principle involved. Within the framework of President Johnson's statement that the United States "will not support policies abroad which are based on the rule of minorities or the discredited notion that men are unequal before the law,"³ we have repeatedly affirmed our opposition to the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) by (1) opposing the present illegal regime in Salisbury, (2) supporting the role of the United Kingdom as the constitutional sovereign authority in Southern Rhodesia, (3) voting for the selective mandatory sanctions approved by the U.N. Security Council last December 16,⁴ (4) adopting the necessary measures to give effect to the mandatory sanctions program supported by the international community, and (5) continuing in force other measures to implement the existing voluntary sanctions program.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ For a U.S. statement and text of the resolution, see *ibid.*, Jan. 9, 1967, p. 73.

We do not know precisely what effect the new mandatory sanctions program will have. We are sure the program will impress upon the white minority in Southern Rhodesia the seriousness of international opposition to UDI and will reinforce the previously implemented voluntary sanctions program. We hope that it will lead the Smith regime to reconsider its position and reach a reasonable settlement of the issues.

I would like to make it clear that the United States Government is cooperating with the international community in a peaceful and measured effort through economic sanctions to achieve an internationally accepted objective in a particular place under particular circumstances; also, that we are not committed to going beyond the present program, nor do we see any present need to do so. We believe that what is required of the international community at this stage is to make the existing program as effective as possible.

The Situation in South West Africa

The rights and aspirations of the individual are also central issues in current discussions at the United Nations over the future of the international Territory of South West Africa. The principle involved was fundamental to the mandate agreement of 1920, in which South Africa agreed to "promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants."

The International Court of Justice was asked to decide if South Africa had violated this obligation. In July 1966 the ICJ declined to adjudicate the substance of the charges on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked the requisite legal interest.⁵ However, the Court in three previous advisory opinions had said that South Africa cannot alter the status of the territory without the consent of the U.N. and that South Africa continues to be bound to accept U.N. supervision and to promote the inhabitants'

⁵ For a Department statement of July 27, 1966, see *ibid.*, Aug. 15, 1966, p. 231.

well-being and progress. The advisory opinions remain the basic and authoritative statements of the International Court of Justice on important questions, including the existence and scope of South Africa's obligations and the rights of the inhabitants of South West Africa.

After more than two decades of trying to get the South African Government to accept the principle of accountability to the U.N., the General Assembly in October 1966 decided that South Africa's mandate was terminated and that the territory should become "the direct responsibility" of the U.N.⁶ The *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa, which is composed of representatives of 14 countries, including ourselves, is exploring "practical means by which South West Africa should be administered, so as to enable the people of the Territory to exercise the right of self-determination and to achieve independence. . . ."

Three proposals have been made in the Committee, and these will be forwarded to the General Assembly for further consideration. The United States has joined with Italy and Canada in sponsoring a resolution to enable the U.N. to explore how it can discharge its responsibilities with respect to South West Africa. The people of South West Africa must be enabled to exercise their rights of self-determination, freedom, and independence in accordance with the U.N. Charter.

In order to accomplish this, we propose the establishment of a U.N. Council for South West Africa and the appointment of a special representative to help achieve this objective. The council and commissioner would ascertain what elements may be considered as representative of various people of the territory, establish all contacts deemed necessary, consult with various representative elements to establish with them as soon as possible a nucleus of self-government in South West Africa and determine the neces-

⁶ For a U.S. statement and text of the resolution, see *ibid.*, Dec. 5, 1966, p. 870.

sary conditions that will enable South West Africa to achieve self-determination and independence.

As a part of the above process, we believe that a serious effort should be made to explore with South Africa possible means of cooperation with the U.N. to fulfill the aspirations of the inhabitants of South West Africa. There are, of course, many differing views within the U.N. with respect to the merits of such a dialog, and the recent announcement by South Africa of its intention to create a separate Ovamboland in the northern part of the territory further complicates the problem.

At the same time we all are deeply aware of the value of dialog in keeping open doors to peaceful and mutually advantageous accommodation. Interesting developments have recently been taking place in South Africa's relationships with some independent African states. While it is perhaps too early to assess the full significance of these developments, they may nevertheless hold some hope for greater flexibility in general approaches to the problems of this area. In the midst of the divergent views which characterize efforts to solve the South West Africa problem, it therefore remains our hope that doors to peaceful accommodation can be kept open through a dialog among the parties concerned. Our representative on the *Ad Hoc* Committee has kept this very much in mind, and his efforts and those of others on the Committee have been consonant with this point of view.

Tasks of National Governments

The task of building governments which truly reflect the aspirations of the peoples of Africa is a critical problem throughout most of the continent. The President recognized this last May when he spoke of the never-ending effort of nations, new or old, to combine freedom with responsibility, liberty with order.

I don't think that any of us underestimate the difficulties this task entails. In Africa it is part of the change and experimentation

going on in many of its nations. We are well aware of the dangers in the breakdown of law and order, the problems arising from irregular seizures of power, and the handicaps which political instability poses for sound economic development. In mentioning briefly only two examples of the search for effective national government, I must necessarily pass over a number of other situations which also merit our sympathetic understanding.

The Congo has been involved in a painful search for a formula of government acceptable to all of the country's many elements. After almost 7 years, there is for the first time peace within its frontiers. Its leadership can now turn its full attention to realizing the country's potential as an African nation. No one expects that this task will be accomplished overnight, but there are many indications, both domestic and foreign, that the process of building sound relationships is under way. Within the country steps are being taken to reorganize and improve the administration and to reduce the budgetary deficit. At the same time export earnings increased from \$338 million in 1965 to \$434 million in 1966. Constructive developments at home have been accompanied by success on the part of President [Joseph] Mobutu in establishing close relations with fellow African leaders where their interests coincide, as witnessed by the recent meeting of heads of state in Kinshasa.

The great state of Nigeria, as we all know, is experiencing its time of troubles. This most populous country of Africa, in its second year of political crisis, has been subject to centrifugal forces in which regional, tribal, and personal pressures all have played their part. The period of instability is beginning to show a cumulative adverse effect on the economy of the country, with all regions of Nigeria being hurt both in their normal trade and in their development by the swirl of events and pressures. It would be a great tragedy to Africa and the world if this trend continued to the point where it threatened the great potential for national development which Nigeria possesses in such outstanding

degree and which has so engaged the energies of her statesmen. All of us remain hopeful that the wisdom and foresight which has characterized the Nigerian nation will preclude this.

Nigeria's development of its national cohesion and the form of its political association is, of course, for the Nigerians themselves to determine. In these critical times her many friends can offer moral support and sympathetic understanding from the knowledge gained through experience that the road to full national identity is a long and difficult one and that each country must travel it in its own manner.

We well remember that our own synthesis was achieved with long travail over 90 years following our independence. We wish for Nigeria and other nations facing similar difficulties a less arduous and more peaceful resolution of their problems in a form best suited to their circumstances and aspirations.

Opportunities for Regional Cooperation

In no sector of African life are the needs and opportunities more pressing than in the field of regional cooperation. We know the history of Africa's boundaries—a blend of diplomatic compromise and imperial conquest, with the result that they rarely relate to economic viability. We know the history of Africa's communications—initially with a metropole and fundamentally with the outside world and not with fellow African nations. We know that one of the effects of many small national markets—and 26 of Africa's nations have 5 million people or less—is to complicate growth because of limitations on the viability of investment projects.

In such situations appropriate international cooperative action could become a vital element in enhancing the prospects for economic development. Not a single major river in Africa lies wholly within one country. Not a single important crop is the sole product of one African nation. In these and practically every activity one can think of that seriously affects the economy of an African

country, there is an increment of effectiveness to be added by regional cooperation.

Africa, as the newest of the continents to achieve independence, has had little time to develop its own regional institutions. Nevertheless, the Economic Commission for Africa has not only pointed out paths of sound economic development to its members but has helped launch specific programs and institutions furthering the growth of the continent. The Organization of African Unity is seeking international political cooperation among its members which is so important to economic development. The African Development Bank, which opened its doors less than a year ago, already has 29 members and over \$40 million in paid-in capital. Negotiations are under way for additional members and for additional assistance, probably through a special fund to which non-African nations may contribute. Our own support for this new institution is reflected in the promise of President Johnson in his foreign aid message to "seek an appropriate means of responding to the recent request of the African Development Bank for U.S. participation in a special fund. . . ."⁷

These three institutions are only part of the growing pattern of regional cooperative efforts in Africa. Under the U.N. Development Program, a number of river basin arrangements are being developed. The rinderpest program under the aegis of the OAU Scientific Technical and Research Commission ranges over a score of African countries. The World Health Organization, in cooperation with African health organizations, AID, and others, is campaigning against smallpox and measles in 19 West African nations. OCAM [Organisation Communautaire Africaine et Malagache], UDEAC [Union Douaniere et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale], and the Conseil de l'Entente have been formed by various French-speaking countries for their mutual benefit.

In responding to the needs and opportunities of regional cooperation, the U.S. Gov-

ernment has followed two very broad courses of action. First, arising out of the review of our policies called for by the President in his speech to the OAU ambassadors last year, we suggested that the World Bank assume a greater role and involvement in African economic development. We believed that, using its prestige and experience, the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] might explore with African regional organizations establishment of an international standing committee to assess the evolving needs of the continent, set priorities, and integrate projects into more precisely defined development programs.

After preliminary soundings among members and other international and regional organizations, the Bank recently met with the ECA, the ADB, and the U.N. Development Program to begin to work out plans for cooperative African economic development. Concentrating initially in the fields of power, transport, and telecommunications, this effort, in our opinion, is an auspicious beginning.

Our second principal effort involves our own assistance programs. In the past 9 months we have reviewed our policies in the light of both the followup of the President's speech and the aid legislation last autumn. As a result, we are putting special emphasis upon such fields of development as transportation, telecommunications, agriculture, education, and health, and we shall be devoting an increasing percentage of our available resources for Africa to assisting regional institutions and groupings and in financing regional projects.

No one expects that these two approaches will work miracles by themselves. The sheer size of Africa's problems of economic and social growth precludes easy answers. Moreover, as African leaders have often stated—and as the President said in his foreign aid message to Congress—self-help is the essential ingredient of economic and social growth. However, we do believe that cooperation among regional and international

⁷ *Ibid.*, Mar. 6, 1967, p. 378.

organizations, donor nations, and the African countries themselves can give a new dimension to this effort. The task before all of us is to transform our convictions into effective practice.

The Secretary of State and the Administrator of AID will shortly begin the presentation of the aid program to Congress. In the course of these hearings and of subsequent discussion the Congress and the American public will have the opportunity to examine the whole gamut of American overseas assistance. In this connection I hope very much that we can focus on the needs and opportunities for regional cooperation. For along with the achievement of individual rights and the forging of national governments, the search for cooperation in economic development with and among African countries is worthy of the best efforts of the peoples of both of our two continents.

Advisory Panel Named for African Affairs Bureau

The Department of State announced on March 30 (press release 75) the appointment of a panel of 12 new advisers for the Bureau of African Affairs and their participation in the Bureau's established Advisory Council on African Affairs.

This is the latest panel of advisers to be announced by the Department in accordance with the general plan made public on October 18, 1966.¹ On that date the advisory panel for the Bureau of International Organization

Affairs was announced, followed by others on subsequent dates.

The Advisory Council on African Affairs was established in June 1962 and since then has met periodically with officials of the Bureau of African Affairs. Its present membership is drawn from the business, philanthropic, religious, academic, and other communities.² The newly appointed advisers and the present members of the council may, from time to time, be called upon individually or as members of small working groups for advice on matters within their fields of specialization.

The 12 newly appointed advisers are:

William Attwood, Cowles Communications, Inc., New York, N.Y.

Leland Barrows, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa.

Philip Bell, Haverford College, Haverford, Pa.

Mercer Cook, Howard University, Washington, D.C.

Frederick H. Harbison, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.

Ulric St. C. Haynes, Management Resources Corp., New York, N.Y.

Francis Keppel, General Learning Corp., New York, N.Y.

James Loeb, the Saranac News, Saranac Lake, N.Y.
Wilfred Owen, the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.

Alan Pifer, Carnegie Corp., New York, N.Y.

Joseph C. Satterthwaite, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, D.C.

Carroll L. Wilson, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.

¹ For announcements of other advisory panels, see BULLETIN of Nov. 7, 1966, p. 721; Dec. 5, 1966, p. 868; Dec. 26, 1966, p. 966; Jan. 2, 1967, p. 16; and Jan. 9, 1967, p. 72.

² For a list of the members of the council, see Department press release 75 dated Mar. 30.

Turkey and the United States Reaffirm Bonds of Friendship and Cooperation

President Cevdet Sunay of the Republic of Turkey made a state visit to the United States April 2-13. He arrived in Washington, D.C., on April 3 for a 3-day visit during which he met with President Johnson and other U.S. Government officials. Following are texts of an exchange of greetings between President Johnson and President Sunay at an arrival ceremony on April 3, their exchange of toasts at a state dinner at the White House that evening, and a joint communique released on April 4 at the conclusion of their meetings.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS

White House press release dated April 3

President Johnson

Mr. President, Mrs. Sunay, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen: Mrs. Johnson and I are especially happy to see you, Mr. President. Your presence in America will give us a chance to return some of the warmth and friendliness we received from the people of Turkey on our visit to your country almost 5 years ago. Your people won our hearts, as they had already earned the respect and the admiration of all the American people.

Our century has been greatly enriched by the goals and achievements of the Turkish nation. More than four decades ago the emergence of modern Turkey, under the guiding genius of Kemal Ataturk, was one of the great revolutions of our age. It remains an inspiration to all who have since won their

independence or who still seek to unshackle the fetters of the past.

You have proved, by your example, that free men can create strong and independent institutions. Inscribed as a reminder to all who enter the halls of your Parliament are the words: "Sovereignty belongs to the people."

Your citizens have demonstrated repeatedly their commitment to constitutional government. Your vigorous parliamentary democracy is a tribute to that dedication. You have jealously guarded your freedom of conscience and protected your independence.

Free men are also natural allies.

Turkey has been one of the most active members of the United Nations. It has served on the Security Council as well as on other United Nations bodies. A member of the Council of Europe and of the United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission, Turkey was one of the first countries to answer the United Nations' call for troops for Korea. In 1952 Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, officially committing its strength to the cause of preserving peace.

Between Turkey and the United States there is a bond, a special sense of fellowship which can be known only to those who belong to the strong fraternity of free men.

It is in this spirit that we meet here today, Mr. President. I am looking forward to exploring with you the great issues of the day and the paths we might together follow to bring greater harmony among all of the nations of the world. I am looking forward to learning more about the impressive and ex-

citing progress being made in Turkey toward a more abundant and creative life for your people.

There is a vigor and momentum in Turkey today which your friends in America have long and enthusiastically applauded.

We know that the future belongs not merely to the strong but to those who will labor hardest at the constructive works of peace. And, as so often in this century, Mr. President, we see Turkey leading the way.

Mr. President, we are delighted to have you and your gracious lady with us.

President Sunay

Mr. President, Mrs. Johnson, ladies and gentlemen: I am very grateful for this most cordial and warm welcome.

As I come to Washington to pay a state visit to the United States upon your kind invitation, my memory goes back to 1962, when we had the pleasure and the privilege of greeting you and Mrs. Johnson in Turkey. We were all, at that time, very much impressed by your powerful personality, your statesmanship, your dedication to the cause of peace and human progress.

As the President of the United States you have devoted all your boundless energy to the ideals which are dear to you.

My visit coincides with a very happy anniversary. That anniversary is the anniversary of the Truman Doctrine, under which the United States undertook for the first time a commitment toward the free world. The implementation of this doctrine opened the way for a lasting solidarity and partnership between Turkey and the United States.

We have so much in common with you. We share the same love of freedom and the same dedication to democracy. We are equally attached to the objective of a just peace and to the building of a community of free and equal nations. Our nations have proved throughout history how much they are determined to safeguard their liberties and how much they can meet with courage and determination any challenge.

The cooperation we inaugurated 20 years ago is as strong as ever. This association has been sealed and reinforced by our ties of alliance within NATO, which we both consider as an indispensable element of equilibrium, security, and peace. We value deeply this partnership, and we are equally convinced of the need to work relentlessly to strengthen peace and promote mutual understanding and confidence among the nations of the world.

Mr. President, I am looking forward to meeting and discussing with you the matters of mutual interest, and I also rejoice at the prospect of meeting other good friends of Turkey in the United States.

It is my fervent hope and expectation that our personal contacts will serve to strengthen further the ties of friendship which bind our two countries and to promote a greater understanding between our peoples. Thank you.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS

White House press release dated April 3

President Johnson

Mr. President, Mrs. Sunay, distinguished guests: This house is honored tonight by a distinguished visitor from a very famous land. A bridge between two continents, Turkey had become a melting pot of races long before the first explorers ever reached our shores. Great empires, which have left their stamp on history, have risen and fallen in this land. Its people have contributed profoundly to the arts of civilization.

But nothing in Turkey's ancient past surpasses its modern achievements.

When this century was still young, from the ashes of an empire a great new Turkish nation was formed. The remarkable energy, vision, and wisdom of a great leader, Kemal Ataturk, set his people on the path of 20th-century accomplishment.

A great philosopher once said that the creator of a commonwealth must toil in one

century for the benefits that his descendants will reap in the next.

Turkey has proved that we need not always wait so long. The Turkish people today are already enjoying many of the fruits of their own efforts.

They have joined the mainstream of economic progress. They are shaping events rather than being shaped by them. Their borders are secure, their democratic institutions are strong.

But, Mr. President, as the American philosopher Ralph Waldo Emerson once said, "The true test of civilization is not the census, nor the size of the cities, nor the crops, but the kind of man that the country turns out."

Mr. President, our countries are different in many ways. But I think we can both be proud that they turn out men that have much in common.

Americans and Turks alike are devoted to social justice, to the preservation of freedom, to democracy.

Our people alike seek personal participation in the affairs of their government.

Americans and Turks alike desire greater educational opportunities for their children, for we realize that the future belongs not to us but to them.

Americans and Turks alike are seekers after a world that is free of war and strife and a world where each of us, to the limits of his capacity, can pursue excellence.

Mr. President, your life has been spent in dedicated service to your countrymen, first as a soldier, now as President of the Republic, always as a faithful servant of your people. There is no higher dedication.

On this occasion tonight I cannot help but reminisce.

This is the anniversary of the Truman Doctrine. Twenty years ago, when President Truman called upon the American people to rally in defense of the freedom of Greece and Turkey, there was a great deal of criticism in this land about that decision.

Mr. Truman was accused of arrogance, of wanting to play "world policeman." In the

words of one commentator, who is still with us, the Truman Doctrine was a disastrous entanglement in an anti-Communist crusade which could only lead to a much wider war.

Some of us refused to believe this. Indeed, one of the proud moments of my life was on May 7, 1947, when I rose in the House to support President Truman and his supposedly "disastrous" policy of containment.

In voting for aid to Greece and Turkey, I said on that day:

I do so with the hope that Russia has peaceful intentions; that she desires to live at peace with other nations; that she will cooperate in the restoration of a war-torn world; but, if it be otherwise, then I am certain as I stand here that the passage of this measure is the only course that this country can in decency take, and the only course which may avoid war.

Tonight, as we meet here in the White House, Greece and Turkey—and Korea—are taken for granted as dynamic, freedom-loving nations. And I hazard the guess that in 20 years the Republic of Viet-Nam will similarly be taken for granted.

These things have been accomplished because the United States of America and its allies throughout the world have stood firm before the tide of aggression—and the tide has receded. And among those who unflinchingly confronted the risks and obligations, there has been—and, I think, always will be, Mr. President—a very special bond of fellowship.

We have a unique tie. For two decades our peoples have shared a vigil beside the gates of freedom—not for ourselves but for the entire fellowship of free men, the weak as well as the strong, the timid and the meek as well as the brave. The graves of brave Americans and brave Turks in the hills of Korea tonight are an eternal testament to our comradeship.

We honor this great common tradition tonight as we honor you. May it grow and prosper in the years ahead, as new generations, inspired by common ideals, make freedom, justice, and progress their common cause as it has been ours.

Ladies and gentlemen, I should like to ask you to join me in a toast to the people of the Republic of Turkey and to their President, Cevdet Sunay.

President Sunay

Mr. President, Mrs. Johnson, ladies and gentlemen: I am deeply moved by your warm and cordial welcome. I would like to express to you on my behalf and on behalf of my wife our sincere thanks for your kind words about us and for the gracious hospitality we have received here in Washington.

I have been to Washington several times before, but this time I have the great privilege, as President of the Republic of Turkey, of being here as your guest.

I am particularly happy to be surrounded here tonight by so many distinguished Americans, many of whom I had the pleasure of meeting earlier.

I think, Mr. President, that my visit is timely, not that there are any unresolved problems between our countries but because for more than a decade a Turkish President has not visited the United States and because, this year, as you have mentioned, we are celebrating the Truman Doctrine, which constitutes a landmark in the history of Turkish-American relations.

It is proper that on this occasion I pay a warm tribute to President Truman for his farsightedness and wisdom in laying down the basis of a policy which culminated later on in the signing of the Atlantic alliance.

President Eisenhower, whom we remember with respect and admiration as a great soldier and a great statesman and whom I had the honor of meeting personally, also visited us in Turkey in 1959.

Mr. President, in 1962 we had the privilege of welcoming you and your charming wife. I have a very vivid recollection of this visit and of the spontaneous demonstration of friendship and esteem with which you were greeted wherever you went in Turkey.

I am referring to these events to illustrate the closeness of our relations and the depth of our friendship.

We have in Turkey a profound admiration for the great American democracy from which all struggles for freedom have drawn such inspiration.

I know, Mr. President, that you know how much the Turkish nation is resolute in its unflinching adherence to the ideals of individual and political freedom. We are proud, in Turkey, of the strength and vitality of our democratic institutions.

It is within the framework of liberty and democracy that the Turkish nation also undertook the difficult task of insuring rapid economic growth and social progress. In this field, also, we feel encouraged by our recent progress.

The rate of our economic growth is not far behind the target set for us by the 5-year development plan, and there is strong hope that this rate may be increased in future years.

We are in need of foreign economic aid to attain our target at the present, but our intention is not to rely indefinitely on the inflow of such assistance. Our goal is, on the contrary, to use our internal and external resources as effectively as possible in order to reach the stage of self-sustaining growth during our third 5-year development plan.

Mr. President, great changes have occurred in the international field over the last 20 years. Europe, which was for the most part desolate in the aftermath of a tragic war, has now reached, behind the shield of NATO, a peace of stability, prosperity, and progress never attained before in all its history.

Vast areas in Asia and Africa have entered the cause of freedom, independence, and technical progress.

In recent times we have also observed and shared hopes for a *détente* in East-West relations. The valuable objective of building and maintaining bridges of contact between the West and the East, which I know, Mr. President, you attach special importance to, is a further indication that progress has been made in this direction.

Any decrease in international tension and

any progress toward a stable peace and greater international cooperation is, of course, of deep satisfaction to the people and Government of my country.

Indeed, Turkey is not failing to bring fully its contribution to this end in its international relationships. But as long as peace does not rest on solid foundations, insuring effectively the security of each nation, we cannot afford to relinquish our individual and collective strength.

NATO remains, therefore, in our view, an essential element of peace and security.

NATO is even more than that. It is, we believe, the instrument of the close partnership in which we can cooperate to an ever-growing extent for reinforcing peace and enhancing international cooperation.

Mr. President, we are grateful to the United States for the military and economic aid extended to Turkey since the inception of the Truman Doctrine. This aid has contributed greatly to the strengthening of our defensive capability and furthering our economic development.

But I am convinced, Mr. President, that you would agree with me that this assistance is serving our common interests.

To safeguard her own security and to contribute to the mutual defense effort of the free world, Turkey is indeed under a heavy defense burden. On the other hand, a strong, vigorous, and developing Turkey is certainly to the best interests of the free world. We value deeply in Turkey our partnership, our friendship, and our alliance with the United States.

No relationship can flourish if it is not based on mutual respect, equality, and confidence. I am certain that our two Governments will develop their close associations in that spirit.

We can only regret that we continue to be involved in an unfortunate dispute in our area. You know how much effort we spent to solve this problem peacefully in a way to safeguard the legitimate interests of the parties concerned. We will continue on this path, but at the same time we are determined

not to permit or tolerate any attempt to impose a unilateral solution or any pressure to that end.

Mr. President, in closing my remarks I would like to say how happy we are in Turkey to have as your representative a distinguished and most capable diplomat—Ambassador Parker Hart. His contribution to Turkey-American understanding and cooperation has been invaluable.

I invite you, ladies and gentlemen, to join me in drinking a toast to the health of the President of the United States of America and the people of the United States of America.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

White House press release dated April 4

At the invitation of President Johnson and Mrs. Johnson, President Cevdet Sunay of the Republic of Turkey and Mrs. Sunay are paying a state visit to the United States.

The warm welcome and cordial hospitality extended to President Sunay and his party reflect the deep and traditional friendship between the peoples of Turkey and the United States. President Sunay expressed his sincere thanks to the Government and the people of the United States for the warm and friendly reception accorded him.

During the visit to Washington, April 3-5, the two Presidents, joined by Foreign Minister [Ihsan Sabri] Caglayangil and Secretary Rusk, engaged in wide-ranging talks during which they reviewed the relations between the two countries and the important international problems affecting world peace and security.

The two Presidents recalled the history of Turkish-United States relations and recognized the substantial contributions made by Turkey to the Free World. They also stressed the close association between the two countries which began with implementation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947.

Both Presidents found themselves in agreement that Turkey and the United States continue to share a community of interests in questions affecting the peace of the world, a devotion to democracy and freedom, a commitment to the principles of harmony and mutual respect among nations. It is on the basis of these common interests and principles that they reaffirmed the determination of their countries further to develop their relations based upon mutual respect, understanding, and trust.

One of the main subjects dealt with was the eco-

conomic development of Turkey. President Sunay described the encouraging progress in this field and stressed the efforts of Turkey to achieve the objectives set forth in the five year development plan. The two Presidents agreed that the consortium for aid to Turkey has provided an efficient multilateral mechanism for securing the foreign aid needed by Turkey, and that this cooperative endeavor should continue. President Johnson reaffirmed the United States determination to continue to support the development efforts of Turkey by maintaining at a significant level its economic assistance, the aim being to assist Turkey to reach its declared goal of vigorous, self-sustaining economic growth.

Both Presidents recognized the need of promoting cooperation in areas of science and technology for peaceful purposes. The two Presidents discussed the problems concerning the Atlantic Alliance. They welcomed the lessening of tension in Europe. They agreed, however, that the Atlantic Alliance remains an indispensable safeguard to peace and security in Europe and in the world. They reiterated the need to maintain the integrated military structure of NATO as the basis of an adequate defense and deterrent, and to reinforce the solidarity of the Alliance in the spirit of partnership. They noted with satisfaction that the arrangements for nuclear planning constitute a development reflecting allied solidarity and cooperation.

President Johnson, recognizing the vital role which Turkey plays within the NATO defense alliance, pledged the continuing assistance of the United States for the strengthening of Turkey's defense capabilities. Reviewing the situation in Europe, the two Presidents agreed that a stable peace requires the healing of the division of that continent. In this regard they also discussed the efforts which their Governments have been making to ease East-West tensions. They stressed the importance of improving East-West relations and of developing an atmosphere of mutual trust. They agreed that this development would contribute to peace.

The two Presidents reiterated the attachment of their countries to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and expressed the hope that the United Nations would become increasingly an effective instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security.

President Sunay and President Johnson stressed the need to work unceasingly towards complete and

general disarmament under effective international controls. They stressed their concern over the dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear weapons and expressed the hope that a non-proliferation treaty would soon be completed in a way that would take fully into account the interests of all.

During their talks the two Presidents reviewed recent developments in Southeast Asia. President Johnson described the situation in Vietnam and the efforts of the United States Government to bring about a peaceful settlement. President Sunay expressed his appreciation for the reaffirmation by the United States Government of its desire for early negotiations. Both Presidents expressed regret that recent intensive efforts to find a way to a solution had not so far yielded any positive results. They found themselves in agreement on the need to support the right of the Vietnamese, both in the South and in the North, to determine their own future in peace.

President Johnson and President Sunay discussed also the problem of Cyprus in all its aspects. They reviewed the developments since the unhappy events of 1963, which caused so much distress and suffering on the island, especially to the Turkish community. They emphasized the need to refrain from any action likely to increase tension on the island and between interested parties. President Sunay invited the attention of President Johnson to the sufferings resulting from the present situation on the island. He reiterated Turkey's desire to arrive at a peaceful and agreed settlement. Referring to bilateral talks between Turkey and Greece, both Presidents expressed the hope that such talks would lead to an honorable solution reconciling the legitimate interests of all the parties concerned, including the communities living on the island. In their discussion, proceeding from the binding effects of existing treaties, both Presidents agreed that these remain an essential factor in seeking such a solution. The two Presidents expressed their appreciation of the task performed by the United Nations force in Cyprus and discussed ways in which the efforts of the United Nations to preserve peace and to secure a return to normal conditions can be strengthened.

The two Presidents expressed the conviction that their frank and cordial talks would further the bonds of friendship, alliance, and cooperation between Turkey and the United States.

President Reviews Action Taken on ICY Recommendations

Following is a statement made by President Johnson on April 3 upon receipt of the report of the White House committee which reviewed the recommendations made at the White House Conference on International Cooperation.

White House press release dated April 3

In late November of 1965, as part of this country's International Cooperation Year (ICY) program, I convened the White House Conference on International Cooperation.¹ The conference brought together more than 5,000 American leaders who exchanged views with people in the government and produced over 400 recommendations in 30 reports dealing with specific subject areas for international cooperation. On August 1, 1966, I appointed a White House committee to oversee a review of the ICY recommendations. This committee, which has continually advised me on actions taken on these recommendations, has now completed its work.

It is with great pleasure that I can report that action has been taken or is now in progress in fields covered by about three-fourths of the more than 400 recommendations. Others are being subjected to further study. Fewer than 10 percent are considered to be impractical at this time.

This is a splendid example of cooperation between private citizens and their government. It confirms what I said when I called the conference: that "international cooperation is no longer an academic subject; it is a fact of life."²

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 20, 1965, p. 966.

² *Ibid.*, Oct. 19, 1964, p. 555.

The ICY recommendations in the time ahead will continue to guide us. A number of the issues they dealt with are high on our agenda of business at this moment:

War on Hunger. The ICY reports brought out the critical interrelationship between the supply of food and the rapid increase of the world's population.

In recognition of these problems, we made major adjustments last year in our Food for Peace Act and other laws. In my message to the Congress this year,³ I reaffirmed our intention to make the present food emergency in India the occasion for all nations to launch a new, continuing international campaign against hunger. The Congress approved the resolution to commit the United States to share fully in this effort to meet India's remaining food grain deficit.

World Weather Watch. The ICY reports recommend active U.S. participation in the development of a World Weather Watch—an international system to observe the world's atmosphere and to communicate and analyze worldwide weather data rapidly and efficiently.

For centuries man's inability to predict weather far enough ahead has caused incalculable human suffering and property damage from storms, floods, and other natural disasters. The Congress of the World Meteorological Organization is meeting this week to consider plans for the World Weather Watch. The proposed system will, through international cooperation, lead to improved weather forecasting and protection of life and prop-

³ For text of President Johnson's message to Congress of Feb. 2, see *ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1967, p. 295.

erty and deserves the wholehearted support of the American people. I am instructing our representatives to the meeting to pledge the full and continuing participation of the United States in this important endeavor.

Outer Space Treaty. The ICY reports urged an international agreement to assure the exploration and use of outer space solely for peaceful purposes.

On January 27 of this year the United States signed such a treaty with the Soviet Union and more than 60 other nations. Hearings are now under way in the Senate on the question of U.S. adherence.

Moratorium on Antiballistic Missiles. The ICY reports recommended a U.S.-U.S.S.R. moratorium on new deployment of systems for ballistic-missile defense.

We are taking no actions to deploy ABM's, pending the outcome of discussions with the Soviet Union. Responding to our initiative, Chairman [Aleksii N.] Kosygin has confirmed the willingness of his government to discuss the question of both offensive and defensive systems.

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Consular Convention. The ICY reports called for ratification of this convention to provide greater legal protection to our citizens visiting the Soviet Union.

In response to my request, the Senate has now given its advice and consent, and I have ratified and confirmed this treaty as a constructive step in our policy of "bridgebuilding" with Eastern Europe.

East-West Trade Relations. The ICY reports pointed to the necessity for new ground rules to liberalize U.S. trade with Eastern European countries.

I have recommended to the Congress early passage of the East-West trade relations bill as an essential move in this direction.

New Directions for Foreign Assistance. The ICY reports recommended continued commitment of substantial U.S. resources to foreign assistance, with emphasis on changed foreign assistance policies, strengthening of technical assistance, and greater utilization of private resources in assistance programs.

In my message of February 9,⁴ I asked the Congress to enact a new foreign assistance

bill based on six guiding principles: (1) self-help; (2) sharing costs with other nations; (3) encouragement to regional development; (4) emphasis on agriculture, health, and education; (5) protecting our balance of payments; and (6) improved administration. Early enactment of that bill is essential to an effective foreign assistance program.

A Nonproliferation Treaty. The ICY reports called for the early conclusion of a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

We are continuing to press our negotiations with other nations for a nonproliferation agreement, recognizing this problem as one of the most urgent of our times.

These are only a few of the outstanding recommendations in the ICY reports on which the Government is seeking completed action.

The White House committee which over the past 8 months has been evaluating these recommendations was chaired by Director of the Bureau of the Budget Charles L. Schultze. Other members were my Special Assistants Walt W. Rostow and Joseph A. Califano, Jr. The executive director of the White House conference and also chairman of the ICY Committee on Urban Development, Mr. Raymond D. Nasher of Dallas, Texas, also served as a member.

In order to make sure that action does not end here, I am sending a memorandum to the heads of those departments and agencies that took part in the ICY program, directing them to take specific further actions as required and to continue the dialog with interested citizens. I have also asked Mr. Schultze to work with the agency heads in order to assure action on, and attention to, the recommendations.

It has long been my conviction that those of us in Government can greatly profit by a continuing and frank exchange with people in business, education, other professions, and in civic life. For this reason, at my direction, there have been appointed in the State Department alone during the past year seven

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Mar. 6, 1967, p. 378.

citizens' committees including over 125 individuals to serve in an advisory capacity. The ICY program has convinced me there can be no substitute for this dialog in a vital democracy. The White House committee's review indicates that this sort of contact can be an extremely useful part of the regular business of Government. It is one of the best

ways to keep the people and their Government close to each other.

I again express my gratitude to all those who participated in the ICY program. The future of mankind demands ever-increasing international cooperation. It must become a way of living—a way that will lead to better living for all peoples.

U.S.—Philippine Relations: Where We Stand Today

*by Eugene M. Braderman*¹

I should like first to sketch briefly the background of change that has been a part of Philippine life, and of Philippine-American relations, since 1946. Certainly, a serious consideration of the future shape of Philippine-U.S. relations, our purpose in meeting here, is only possible after a look back at the road we have traveled and a look at where we stand now.

The nature of Philippine nationalism will be a critical element in all aspects of our discussions during the next 2 days. In a large sense it has been one of the dominant factors in our bilateral relationship since 1946. We will want to look deeply into our mutual relationship and deal candidly with those issues which seem to have set us at cross-purposes. Every area of misunderstanding that we can identify, every failure of cultural perception that we can bring to light, will ease—at least a little—our path in the future. We may well be able to identify some recurrent themes that are standard elsewhere for developing countries.

I often think that when we talk about “international understanding” we ought really to be thinking first about cultural differences. We ought to consider carefully the different angles from which our varying histories make different countries see life. We should be taking into account our own unspoken assumptions and aspirations and those of other men. Once we have mastered that difficult exercise—and it *is* difficult—we will be ready to deal with lofty generalities like “international understanding.” This sort of international empathy is not easy. It requires an unsentimental understanding of one's own country and an equally clear-eyed knowledge of the other. All of us, including Americans and Filipinos, have had less than 20/20 vision in the past, but I think it is improving rapidly now.

The past 20 years have seen an accelerating growth of Filipino consciousness of the Philippines as a national state. It is fair to say that the Filipinos are groping for a finished view of themselves and are casting about for a new role in international life. This may take shape as a more consciously Asian participation in world affairs; it is highly likely that it will be increasingly consciously Filipino.

¹ Address made before the Philadelphia Regional Assembly, the World Affairs Council, and the American Assembly at Philadelphia, Pa., on Mar. 9 (press release 48). Mr. Braderman is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Commercial and Business Activities.

Whatever the final shape of Filipino society, the road there is apt to be a rocky one and the reserves of good will and patience of everyone will be frequently tested in the years ahead.

But it is heartening that the Philippines, in developing its own national role in the world, and tending to its own enlightened interests, continues to grow in stature among the nations of Southeast Asia. Deeply conscious of our own close relations with the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China, with Thailand and with Malaysia, we see Philippine friendship with these nations as a crucial link in a chain of mutual interdependence among the free peoples of the Far East to assure their continued freedom. The growth of Philippine relations with Japan, which we hope will expand still further, is another encouraging development in the interest of both nations and a further impetus to ever-growing mutual cooperation in this region of the world.

Another basic ongoing development that will affect all sectors of Philippine life is the rapid rate of population growth. As you all know, modern public health measures resulting in the suppression of many killing diseases have contributed significantly to the population explosion that is now underway across the world. This tremendous population increase is of great concern. In the Philippines the population is estimated to be growing at a rate of between 3 and 3½ percent annually, probably closer to 3½ percent than to 3. The present estimated population of about 33 million, which has more than doubled since 1939, will have grown to about 55 million by 1980. This rate of population growth tends to put a very heavy burden on the country's economic structure and on its political institutions. Real economic growth has to reach 3½ percent annually just to avoid losing ground to population growth.

It will be difficult for the Government of the Philippines to raise the quality of life for the average man—as it ardently wants to do—for more and more resources will have to be poured into infrastructure to cope with

the growing population, to the probable detriment of industrial investment. This is a major problem and will surely leave its mark on the Philippines in the years to come.

The first step in meeting the problem—more food for more mouths—is already underway under the vigorous, able direction of President [Ferdinand E.] Marcos. The introduction of the new strain of rice, with its great possibilities for the Philippines and later for all of Asia, is an example of the kind of answers that will have to be found.

A final bit of background concerns the development of the economy. There are three main lines that concern us here today—the overall growth, industrialization, and the role of the United States relative to Philippine economic development.

In recent years we have seen the economy of the Philippines develop at an impressive rate; especially noteworthy has been the increase in industrialization. Fifteen years ago 11½ percent of the national income of the Philippines came from manufacturing. Today about 20 percent does; and manufacturing will become increasingly important in the future economic life of the Philippines.

There is a vigorous, eager, and growing private sector. It is reaching out for new ideas and new techniques and will be a growing source of strength for the economy in years to come.

Economic Growth Targets

The Philippines is well justified in being proud of the great progress of the past two decades, since the time within easy memory when it lay prostrate and ravaged by war. By the beginning of the 1960's the Philippine economy had achieved all the essentials for self-sustained and vigorous growth. Still we must observe that the average rate of growth—4.9 percent in the period 1957–64 and less than 4.5 percent in 1965—while ahead of many Latin American countries, of India, Pakistan, and Iran, ranked the Philippines behind Thailand with 7.4 percent over the same period, behind Taiwan with 7.1 percent, and behind Malaysia with 5.9 percent. In the more relevant terms of per capita

gross national product over the same years, the Philippines averaged only a 1.7 percent rate of growth, well behind that of Thailand, Taiwan, Iran, India, and Pakistan, and markedly behind the Philippines' own average of 2.5 percent in the years from 1953 to 1959.

The problem that remains to be tackled if the Philippine economy is to achieve a satisfactory rate of growth in per capita income, assuming an annual population increase of well over 3 percent, is illustrated by calculating gross investment requirements for the remaining years of this decade. With this rate of population increase, an annual growth rate of 6 percent in GNP is by no means an excessive target for the Philippine economy. Such a growth rate will only yield an annual increase in per capita income of about 2.8 percent. Best estimates are that the Philippines will need a large inflow of foreign capital—approaching \$1 billion over the next 5 years—to achieve this rate of growth. I believe that an examination of the underlying statistics and estimates on which this prediction is based will reveal it to be a prudent one, given the necessity for building up foreign exchange reserves, as well as debt repayment and servicing costs.

In summary, we are here to consider our relationships with a vital, vigorous, growing country now moving rapidly into consciousness of full, independent maturity.

Nonetheless, President Marcos' problems are almost overwhelming when we detail them one by one, as we will no doubt be doing in the course of this assembly. It will take every bit of even his enormous dynamism and executive skill to grapple with these successfully. An insufficient rate of economic growth, a still undefined sense of direction in terms of future trade and investment policies, the deterioration of law and order, the tendency to laxness and overindulgence in both public and private sectors—all these compound President Marcos' problems.

Perhaps most important is the need for Filipinos to agree on a consciously identified set of national goals. Without such a consensus it may be doubted whether in the long run Philippine politics can harmonize with

the needs of the economy and whether development can proceed on a vigorous basis to reach determined targets.

What now seems most important is to stimulate rising levels of income and purchasing power in the countryside. President Marcos has placed high priority on increased rice production and improved standards of living for the rural population. In addition to improving the quality of rural life, economic development in this sector will do much to create the markets which Philippine industry will need in order to develop and prosper.

What is, I think, required most of all is a clear realization on both sides of the need for continued private as well as public resources to meet the development goals of the Philippines.

We note that long-range expansion in the level of trade stems not from preferential devices but from the natural circumstance that increasing prosperity in both our countries is creating a higher level of demand. For the Philippines, as for all nations, this means that both its capacity to export and its ability to buy are inescapably dependent upon the success of its overall program for economic growth and development.

I have mentioned earlier what we believe to be conservatively estimated needs for foreign investment inflow if the Philippines wishes to grow at a reasonable and realistic target rate. The record shows that U.S. direct investment has contributed substantially over the years to the buildup of Philippine capital; it has been instrumental in building Philippine economic prosperity and has contributed to raising the earning capacity of the nation and of many Filipinos individually.

The Philippine experience in this respect is similar to our own. Foreign investment played a very significant role in U.S. economic growth. It continues to make a major contribution. We welcome it and our investment climate is warm, because we want capital to flow. The need for a stable, receptive investment climate in capital-importing countries is especially important today. As more and more attractive opportunities for investment open up all over the world, investment

capital is in a position to pick and choose its opportunities. There is truly a sellers' market in the capital markets of the world; and this being the case, there can be no doubt of the need of the Philippines for the adoption of a clear investment policy providing stable conditions and reasonable incentives. President Marcos clearly has this problem in mind.

The Laurel-Langley Agreement

As the Philippines has evolved politically and economically over the past 20 years, our relationship has changed with the times and the altering circumstances of history. As the most enthusiastic backer of Philippine independence, we have acted over the years to support the aspirations of the Philippines. In a communique issued by Presidents Johnson and Marcos last September,² President Johnson pledged a wide range of cooperative measures with the Philippines in the scientific, educational, economic, and military spheres. The two Presidents agreed at that time that exploratory work would begin before June 30 of this year looking toward a new instrument to replace the Laurel-Langley agreement³ on its expiration in 1974.

Thus, the Laurel-Langley agreement is a timely subject for discussion. This agreement has special meaning for me because I participated in its negotiation 13 years ago. As the principal framework for economic relations between the Philippines and the United States, it has been a subject of critical attention for years. It has inevitably been drawn into the self-questioning and self-examination that are a part of developing political and economic nationalism and sometimes, I think, has loomed larger than life on that account.

The Laurel-Langley agreement was signed in September of 1955 and replaced the trade agreement of 1946. The agreement is to terminate in 1974. Certain aspects of the treaty deserve special attention, for they raise broad policy issues for which solutions must be found.

Articles I and II of the agreement provide

² For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 10, 1966, p. 531.

³ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3348; for text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 19, 1955, p. 463.

for a declining scale of tariff preferences which will end in 1974 with the termination of the agreement. Currently Philippine goods entering the United States pay 40 percent of the U.S. tariff. This will increase to 60 percent in January 1968, then to 80 percent in January 1971, and will reach 100 percent in 1974. On the U.S. side, American goods entering the Philippines began paying 90 percent of the Philippine tariff 2 years ago—in January 1965—and will begin paying 100 percent on January 1, 1974.

The purpose of these articles was to provide an adequate period during which Philippine producers and exporters could rationalize their production costs and diversify their markets in the change from a free-trade to a normal commercial relationship with the United States. The move toward a normal relationship also reflects the legitimate desire of Filipinos for economic independence.

Sugar, on which the Philippines receives currently an annual import quota of 1,050,000 tons, is an entirely separate matter, not affected by the declining scale of tariff preferences mentioned earlier.

“National Treatment” of Investments

Article VI of the agreement, which deals with parity rights, is of special concern. Presidents Johnson and Marcos have already agreed that no extension of these rights will be sought after 1974. What happens after the cessation of parity rights is a very complex and thorny question. Both Presidents recognized this in their September 15 communique by pointing out the necessity of providing an adequate framework after 1974 for a fair and equitable treatment of new and existing investments.

The existing uncertainty about what will happen after 1974 is an inhibiting factor to American investment in the parity areas, and this uncertainty may well extend the area of doubt about other American capital investment in the Philippines. I hope that we will find the beginning of an answer during our deliberations.

Article VII of the agreement provides for

the national treatment by either party of citizens or enterprises of the other engaged in business activities. That is to say, a Filipino business operating in Ohio would receive exactly the same treatment as an Ohio corporation, and vice versa. National treatment of American firms in the Philippines has caused some Filipinos to raise the cry of economic invasion. Long-continued public debate on the matter seems to have caused a hardening of public attitudes on the question of foreign investment.

We sympathize with the turmoil and questioning of a country caught up in the growth of economic nationalism, for its dilemma is a hard one. It is an area of decision often faced these days as developing countries find their role in the world. A developing country frequently sees foreign investment as a form of invasion designed to tear away the natural resources that are an irreplaceable part of the national wealth. At least this is an argument put forward, often whether natural resources are involved or not. But thoughtful, sophisticated men, after considering the alternatives, come up against the hard economic fact that economic development calls for investment capital and the only source for much of this is from abroad. But it requires a stable, attractive investment climate, as I mentioned earlier.

Though it may be small consolation to the developing society to be reminded that it is in its turn going through the same economic and psychological process that the capital-exporting countries had to go through when they were struggling with the problem of economic development, it is nevertheless a fact.

Another area of doubt and concern relates to the Retail Trade Nationalization Act of 1954 and the questions involved in its application. The operation of many and varied corporate enterprises has been made very uncertain. It would be inappropriate for me to more than touch on this question in passing, since aspects of the operation of the law are currently before the judiciary of the Philippines.

I would like to conclude these remarks this

morning on a note that I feel accurately reflects what is enduring in the relationship between our two countries and what we must do to gear our new ties to one another. It mirrors my own view of our relationship: We must not see it through rose-colored glasses, but neither must we allow ourselves to forget the real and enduring values it contains and will contain in the future.

We must remember that we share a long stretch of history; this sharing in its way has shaped our national philosophies and our national aspirations. We came to this shared history from half a world away, from differing economies, and from distinct historical backgrounds. But we meet in our mutual regard and respect for human dignity, for the individual's right to live as he chooses in a free society, for the conduct of international relations on the basis of equality and law rather than on coercion and conquest.

As was said in the final report of the American Assembly meeting in Davao:

"Our problems are not automatically self-liquidating; their resolution requires constant effort, good will and a sense of responsibility on both sides—particularly as new generations of Filipinos and Americans assume leadership."

U.S. To Increase Civilian Hospital Capacity in Viet-Nam

The Department of State announced on April 6 (press release 84) that the United States plans to increase civilian hospital capacity in Viet-Nam. Three U.S. military field type hospital units manned by U.S. military personnel will be established to provide interim relief pending enlargement of the Vietnamese hospital system. The three field units will be established as soon as possible in temporary construction at Da Nang, Quang Ngai, and Qui Nhon. These hospitals will work in close coordination with the existing civilian and military hospitals in Viet-Nam.

This measure to close gaps in the civilian

medical assistance program was discussed at the Guam conference in March.¹

Despite enormous effort in the past to provide needed capacity, some hospitals are overcrowded and inadequately staffed. Certain types of surgical treatment cannot be provided in some of the hospitals.

In undertaking this further expansion of medical assistance the U.S. Government hopes that the need for these civilian facilities will end soon.

The Agency for International Development is now assisting the Vietnamese Government to expand several hospitals and construct seven additional hospitals of surgical units in other parts of the country.

AID also is exploring with the Government of Viet-Nam and private U.S. groups alternative means of providing reconstructive surgical treatment not presently available in Viet-Nam.

Unprecedented measures have been taken over the past year to assist the Vietnamese Ministry of Health to care for war refugees, civilian war casualties, and other elements of the population of South Viet-Nam who could not afford private medical care. The U.S. military medical services, civilian and medical personnel from 13 other free-world nations, and American volunteer doctors and agencies have joined with AID to provide emergency assistance. The AID medical assistance program alone has increased from \$5 million in 1965 to nearly \$50 million in 1967. Forty-three surgical and medical teams, of which 25 are from the United States and 18 from other countries, are working with the Vietnamese Health Ministry staffs in provincial hospitals throughout South Viet-Nam. In addition, 32 volunteer physicians on 2-month rotational assignments under the auspices of the American Medical Association and AID supplement the regular Vietnamese and foreign staffs. Vietnamese and American military units also are providing outpatient treatment and diagnoses in villages throughout the country.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 10, 1967, p. 586.

New Policy Outlined on Funds for U.S. Voluntary Organizations

White House press release dated March 29

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

I have received the report from the committee which I appointed on February 15 to review relationships between the Central Intelligence Agency and private American voluntary organizations. This committee consisted of Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, as chairman, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare John Gardner, and CIA Director Richard Helms.

I accept this committee's proposed statement of policy and am directing all agencies of the government to implement it fully.

We will also give serious consideration to the committee's recommendation "that the Government should promptly develop and establish a public-private mechanism to provide public funds openly for overseas activities of organizations which are adjudged deserving, in the national interest, of public support." To review concrete ways of accomplishing this objective, I am requesting Secretary Rusk to serve as chairman of a special committee which will include representatives from the Executive, the Congress, and the private community.

TEXT OF REPORT

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The committee which you appointed on February 15, 1967 has sought, pursuant to your request:

—To review relationships between government agencies, notably the Central Intelligence Agency, and educational and private voluntary organizations which operate abroad; and

—To recommend means to help assure that such organizations can play their proper and vital role abroad.

The committee has held a number of meetings, interviewed dozens of individuals in and out of government, and reviewed thousands of pages of reports. We have surveyed the relevant activities of a number of federal agencies. And we have reviewed in particular and specific detail the relationship between CIA and each relevant organization.

Our report, supplemented with supporting classified documents, follows.

In summary, the committee offers two basic recommendations:

1. It should be the policy of the United States Government that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations.

2. The Government should promptly develop and establish a public-private mechanism to provide public funds openly for overseas activities of organizations which are adjudged deserving, in the national interest, of public support.

1. A New Policy

The years immediately after World War II saw a surge of communist activity in organizations throughout the world. Students, scientists, veterans, women and professional groups were organized into international bodies which spoke in the cadences, advocated the policies, and furthered the interests of the communist bloc. Much of this activity was organized, directed, and financed covertly by communist governments.

American organizations reacted from the first. The young men and women who founded the United States National Student Association, for example, did so precisely to give American youth the capacity to hold their own in the international arena. But the importance of students as a force in international events had yet to become widely understood and NSA found it difficult to attract private support for its international activities. Accordingly, the United States Government, acting through the Central Intelligence Agency, provided support for this overseas work.

We have taken NSA as an example. While no useful purpose would be served by detailing any other CIA programs of assistance to private American voluntary organizations, one fundamental point should be clearly stated: such assistance was given pursuant to National Security Council policies beginning in October, 1951 and with the subsequent concurrence of high-level senior interdepartmental review committees in the last four Administrations. In December, 1960, in a classified report submitted after a year of study, a public-private Presidential Committee on Information Activities Abroad specifically endorsed both overt and covert programs, including those assisted by CIA.

Our study, undertaken at a later time, discloses new developments which suggest that we should now re-examine these policies. The American public, for example, has become increasingly aware of the importance of the complex forms of international competition between free societies and communist states. As this awareness has grown, so have potential

sources of support for the overseas work of private organizations.

There is no precise index to these sources, but their increase is suggested by the growth in the number of private foundations from 2,220 in 1955 to 18,000 in 1967. Hence it is increasingly possible for organizations like NSA to seek support for overseas activities from open sources.

Just as sources of support have increased, so has the number of American groups engaged in overseas work. According to the Agency for International Development, there has been a *nine-fold* increase just among voluntary organizations which participate in technical assistance abroad, rising from 24 in 1951 to 220 in 1965. The total of *all* private American voluntary groups now working overseas may well exceed a thousand.

The number of such organizations which has been assisted covertly is a small fraction of the total. The vast preponderance have had no relationship with the government or have accepted only open government funds—which greatly exceed funds supplied covertly.

The work of private American organizations, in a host of fields, has been of great benefit to scores of countries. That benefit must not be impaired by foreign doubts about the independence of these organizations. *The committee believes it is essential for the United States to underscore that independence immediately and decisively.*

For these reasons, the committee recommends the following:

STATEMENT OF POLICY

No federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations. This policy specifically applies to all foreign activities of such organizations and it reaffirms present policy with respect to their domestic activities.

Where such support has been given, it will be terminated as quickly as possible without destroying valuable private organizations before they can seek new means of support.¹

We believe that, particularly in the light of recent publicity, establishment of a clear policy of this kind is the only way for the government to carry out two important responsibilities. One is to avoid any implication that governmental assistance, because it is given covertly, is used to affect the policies of private voluntary groups. The second respon-

¹ On the basis of our case-by-case review, we expect that the process of termination can be largely—perhaps entirely—completed by December 31, 1967. [Footnote in original.]

sibility is to make it plain in all foreign countries that the activities of private American groups abroad are, in fact, private.

The committee has sought carefully to assess the impact of this Statement of Policy on CIA. We have reviewed each relevant program of assistance carried out by the Agency in case-by-case detail. As a result of this scrutiny, the committee is satisfied that application of the Statement of Policy will not unduly handicap the Agency in the exercise of its national security responsibilities. Indeed, it should be noted that, starting well before the appearance of recent publicity, CIA had initiated and pursued efforts to disengage from certain of these activities.

The committee also recommends that the implementation of this policy be supervised by the senior interdepartmental review committee which already passes on proposed CIA activities and which would review and assist in the process of disengagement.²

2. New Methods of Support

While our first recommendation seeks to insure the independence of private voluntary organizations, it does not deal with an underlying problem—how to support the national need for, and the intrinsic worth of, their efforts abroad.

Anyone who has the slightest familiarity with intellectual or youth groups abroad knows that free institutions continue to be under bitter, continuous attack, some of it carefully organized and well-financed, all of it potentially dangerous to this nation.

It is of the greatest importance to our future and to the future of free institutions everywhere that other nations, especially their young people, know and understand American viewpoints. There is no

² If the Statement of Policy is to be effective, it must be rigorously enforced. In the judgment of this committee, no programs currently would justify any exception to this policy. At the same time, where the security of the nation may be at stake, it is impossible for this committee to state categorically now that there will never be a contingency in which overriding national security interests may require an exception—nor would it be credible to enunciate a policy which purported to do so.

We therefore recommend that, in the event of such unusual contingencies, the interdepartmental review committee be permitted to make exceptions to the Statement of Policy, but only where overriding national security interests so require; only on a case-by-case basis; only where open sources of support are shown to be unavailable; and only when such exceptions receive the specific approval of the Secretaries of State and Defense. In no event should any future exception be approved which involves any educational, philanthropic, or cultural organization. [Footnote in original.]

better way to meet this need than through the activity of private American organizations.

The time has surely come for the government to help support such activity in a mature, open manner.

Some progress toward that aim already has been made. In recent years, a number of federal agencies have developed contracts, grants, and other forms of open assistance to private organizations for overseas activities. This assistance, however, does not deal with a major aspect of the problem. A number of organizations cannot, without hampering their effectiveness as independent bodies, accept funds directly from government agencies.

The committee therefore recommends that the Government should promptly develop and establish a public-private mechanism to provide public funds openly for overseas activities of organizations which are adjudged deserving, in the national interest, of public support.

Such a mechanism could take various forms. One promising proposal, advanced by Mr. Eugene Black, calls for a publicly funded but privately administered body patterned on the British Council.

The British Council established in 1934, operates in 80 countries, administering approximately \$30,000,000 annually for reference libraries, exhibitions, scholarships, international conferences, and cultural exchanges. Because 21 of its 30 members are drawn from private life, the Council has maintained a reputation for independence, even though 90 percent of its funds are governmental.

According to the UNESCO Directory of Cultural Relations Services, other nations have developed somewhat similar institutions. The Indian Council for Cultural Relations, for example, is entirely government-financed but operates autonomously. The governing body of the Swedish Institute for Cultural Relations consists of both government and private members. This institute receives 75 percent of its funds from the government and the remainder from private contributions.

The experience of these and other countries helps to demonstrate the desirability of a similar body in the United States, wholly or largely funded by the federal government. Another approach might be the establishment of a governmental foundation, perhaps with links to the existing Federal Inter-Agency Council on International Education and Cultural Affairs.

Such a public-private body would not be new to the United States. Congress established the Smithsonian Institution, for example, more than a century ago as a private corporation, under the guardianship of Congress, but governed by a mixed public-private Board of Regents.

The committee began a preliminary study of what might be the best method of meeting the present need. It is evident, however, that, because of the great range both of existing government and private

philanthropic programs, the refinement of alternatives and selection among them is a task of considerable complexity. Accordingly, we do not believe that this exclusively governmental committee is an appropriate forum for the task and we recommend, instead, the appointment of a larger group, including individuals in private life with extensive experience in this field.

The basic principle, in any event, is clear. Such a new institution would involve government funds. It might well involve government officials. But a premium must be placed on the involvement of private citizens and the exercise of private judgments, for

to be effective, it would have to have—and be recognized to have—a high degree of independence.

The prompt creation of such an institution, based on this principle, would fill an important—and never more apparent—national need.

Respectfully,

JOHN W. GARDNER

Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare

RICHARD HELMS

Director of Central Intelligence

NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH

Under Secretary of State, Chairman

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

CENTO Economic Committee Meets at Washington

The 15th meeting of the Economic Committee of the Central Treaty Organization took place at Washington March 14-16. Following are texts of a statement made at the opening session on March 14 by William S. Gaud, Administrator of the Agency for International Development, a communique issued on March 16 at the close of the meeting, and a list of the members of the U.S. delegation.

STATEMENT BY MR. GAUD

It gives me great pleasure to have this opportunity to welcome the CENTO Economic Committee to Washington. It's an opportunity that doesn't arise very often—once every 5 years. We look forward to it. We are glad to have you here. And we look forward to the next meeting 5 years hence.

We are particularly happy that the Secretary General [Abbas Ali Khalatbary] has been able to attend this meeting. He is now in his 6th year of service for CENTO. He has made many contributions to the organization and to its members. And we are de-

lighted to have him here to give us some guidance.

CENTO is now in its 13th year. If it were a human being, it would just be becoming a teenager—a rather dubious prospect. You can't be too sure what happens to teenagers. Normally they go through a fairly difficult time.

But the comparison is not appropriate. CENTO is in no sense a teenager. It has been a responsible member of the world community for a good many years. It has served its members well—and those like the United States which are not members but vitally interested in its proceedings and its success. It has served us well in the past and seems destined to do so in the future.

CENTO's immediate purpose, of course, has been the defense of the CENTO region against Communist aggression. Its object has been to provide security, to form a shield, to erect a barrier of mutual defense. It has done this.

But it would not have served its full purpose or its deeper purpose if that were all that it had done. Why did the regional members of CENTO want a shield? What was the purpose of this shield? Not to let them relax at ease and in comfort, not to preserve the status quo, not to keep the world as it was;

not a bit of it. They wanted a shield behind which they could work, behind which the economic, social, and political development of their countries and of the region could take place without outside interference. They believed that by pooling their resources, by working together, by getting others to work with them, they would be able to devote more of their resources to development than would otherwise have been the case.

Security, freedom from external aggression, freedom from internal subversion—these are prerequisites to fruitful development anywhere. This is the constant tussle that those of us in the aid business see all around the world.

How do you use the limited resources that are available to make as much progress as possible? If you had your way, if you had your choice, you would devote all of these resources to long-term development.

The world isn't that easy. We are always being diverted from this long-term business of economic development by short-term problems, by the necessity for security. The problem is always the same: How do we keep this diversion of resources from the long-term job of development as small as possible; how do we keep it to a minimum so that we can spend as much as possible of the limited resources we all have on development?

One answer clearly lies in regional organizations such as CENTO. One of the most encouraging features of today's world, it seems to me, is the growth of these regional organizations.

You started early. Yours was one of the first. You have had this security, and you have made good use of it. Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey have all made great strides in development in the last 12 years in the field of agricultural production, in the field of industrial production, in health, in education, in the growth of private enterprise, in the growth of those institutions which are strong enough to support the weight of a free society—and it takes a good deal more to support the weight of a free society than it does to support other types of societies. In all these ways, your countries have made great prog-

ress: a better life for your people, a fuller life for your people, and as a result, greater internal strength, greater intrinsic security.

We in the United States are very proud to have had a hand in helping this development. We have contributed a good deal in the way of resources—food aid, economic aid, and military aid—to the countries in the CENTO region. Much of this has been direct assistance to regional projects: the telecommunications system, the airway system, the highway, the railroad, many others. Some of them are less monumental than these but, in the long run, at least as important.

But we all know that external aid can't do much by itself. It is the people of the developing countries who have the main job. It's their resources which count primarily; and more than their resources, it's their spirit, it's their will. It's only the developing countries that can provide the sparks that will ignite the fire of development. These have to come from within, and they have come from within in your part of the world.

I don't want to exaggerate. None of us can rest on our oars; the job is far from finished. There are many challenges ahead, and they are all pretty obvious.

The first and the foremost challenge, it seems to me, is that of increasing the production of food worldwide. It's not only a matter of producing more food, it's a matter of distribution and teaching people to eat better food. The world doesn't face immediate starvation today. It will—in 10 years, in 15 years—unless we do better. But we do face today, and we have been facing for many years, the results of malnutrition, insufficient protein, not enough of the right kind of food. And we know that malnutrition stunts both bodies and minds. Our job in the food line, the job of all of us, is not only more food, but better food, better types of food—and to see that these better types of foods reach all of our people.

Closely allied to this question of food is that of achieving a balance between foods and mouths. The world can grow the food necessary to feed our increasing populations for a time, but not forever. We all know this

today. And we have got to get to work on the problem—one of the biggest challenges of our times.

In the field of health there are cholera, measles, chickenpox, smallpox, typhoid fever, malaria—any number of diseases. They needn't take the toll that they do. But we haven't stopped them yet. We haven't really started to stop them.

There is the need for education—training, enabling people to fit into the kind of a world that we want to live in in the future. All nations must learn how to make constructive use of the many advances in technology that the world sees today. They come so fast they make you dizzy. They come a lot faster than we are able to adapt them to their best use.

There is a need for adaptive research, in all fields, to make what is useful in one part of the world useful in another part of the world.

There are any number of areas in which there are still challenges. There are many frontiers to be explored, many worlds still to be conquered.

I am sure that CENTO and its members will rise to these challenges. You will do so as individual nations, as members of CENTO, as members of the Regional Cooperation for Development Organization, and in other ways that will present themselves as time goes on.

You have already proved your ability to do this. You already have a substantial momentum toward development. As I said earlier, you have the added strength of belonging to a regional organization; you are not working alone. Through this union, you have greater strength, greater knowledge, and greater capacity to meet these challenges.

We in the United States are happy to assist you in your continuing efforts to promote the peace and the well-being of your people. We will certainly continue to help you with present cooperative programs. The initiatives for what needs to be done in the region are coming, increasingly, from you; and we will be glad to give such help as we can to new regional projects to which the member countries of CENTO give high priority as a part of their own development plans.

We look forward, with interest and anticipation, to future meetings of this Committee at which we can all assess the further progress that you will have made toward the peaceful development of the CENTO region.

Delegates, again I greet you with enthusiasm and with warmth, and I wish you well in your deliberations.

Thank you very much.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE

The role of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in the economic development of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey was the central theme of the deliberations of CENTO's Economic Committee in its annual meeting which concluded in Washington on Thursday [March 16]. The Committee assessed the momentum already achieved in this direction and opened the way to initiatives in the field of industrial development in the CENTO region.

Delegates of all five CENTO countries—Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States—participated in the three-day session, under the chairmanship of Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell, head of the United States delegation. The Secretary General of the Organization, Dr. A. A. Khalatbary, addressed the Committee at its opening meeting.

In response to an initiative of the Turkish Delegation the Committee moved into a new field and agreed that an ad hoc Working Group be formed to identify those fields of industrial development which would be of substantial economic benefit to the Regional Countries and to make recommendations for the conduct of feasibility studies of specific projects and other activities under CENTO auspices in these fields.

Earlier, the Committee had noted with appreciation the statement of Mr. William S. Gaud, Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, at the opening meeting. The Committee invited the attention of the Regional Member Governments particularly to Mr. Gaud's remarks concerning initiatives by the Regional Members and his assurance that the United States would be glad to give such help as it could to new regional projects to which Member Countries give high priority as a part of their own development plans.

The Committee also welcomed the statement by the leader of the United Kingdom's Delegation that, despite economic difficulties, the amount of his Government's annual contribution to the economic activities of CENTO would not be reduced.

The Committee also noted that CENTO projects were making definite contributions in such fields as public health, agriculture, science and education. For example, an Emergency Working Party on Cholera was formed following an epidemic in the region and

as a result of its recommendations stockpiles of anti-cholera supplies and equipment were being built up and a Regional Health Advisor provided. Pakistan and Iran offered vaccines as needed, and provided special training in anti-cholera techniques to doctors of the region.

The Committee directed its Sub-Committee on Agriculture to continue to concern itself with the development of the Van-Rezaiyeh area in eastern Turkey and northwestern Iran, and to identify other areas where similar developmental projects could be sponsored by CENTO. The Sub-Committee was also instructed to pursue further initiatives in the marketing and processing of agricultural products, including livestock.

Recognizing the vital importance of developing the water resources of the regional countries, the Committee approved the establishment of a Working Group on Hydrology and Water Resource Development with terms of reference embracing water power, irrigation of agricultural lands and supplies for human consumption and industrial use.

In the field of science and education, the Committee welcomed the establishment of the new Multilateral Scientific Fund, which is to be administered by the CENTO Scientific Coordinating Board, with its headquarters in Tehran.

The Committee also reviewed the work of CENTO's own technical assistance programme under the Multilateral Technical Cooperation Fund. This Fund is designed to make use of the rapidly growing resources of technical expertise to be found in Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. Currently, funds contributed annually by the five countries are used to offer scholarships in the Region's own technical colleges and universities, to make the services of outstanding technical experts of one Regional Country available to the other two, and in other ways. In a move to enhance the effectiveness of this programme, the Committee approved a revision of the Fund's terms of reference designed to make it even more flexible and responsive to the needs of the three Regional Countries.

The full report of the Economic Committee's deliberations and recommendations will be submitted to the Organization's Council of Ministers which is due to meet in London April 25-26.

U.S. DELEGATION

Stuart W. Rockwell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, *U.S. Representative*

Scott L. Behoteguy, U.S. Economic Coordinator for CENTO Affairs (Ankara), *Alternate U.S. Representative*

Albert R. Baron, Economic Adviser, Office of the U.S. Economic Coordinator for CENTO Affairs (Ankara)

John H. Funari, Director, Office of Greece-Turkey-Iran-Cyprus-CENTO Affairs, Agency for International Development

Victor Gauthier, Officer in Charge, CENTO Affairs, Agency for International Development

William C. Nenko, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

Sidney Sober, Director, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

Robert A. Stein, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

THE CONGRESS

President Urges Accession to 1961 Single Convention on Narcotics

Following are texts of a letter of transmittal from President Johnson to the Senate and a report to the President from Acting Secretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach regarding the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961.

PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

White House press release dated March 8

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to accession to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, open for signature at New York March 30, 1961 to August 1, 1961, I transmit herewith a copy of the Convention along with the Final Act¹ of the United Nations Conference at which the Convention was adopted.

For nearly sixty years the United States has taken a leading part in international cooperation for the control of narcotic drugs. We should continue this cooperation to the fullest possible extent in combating the scourge of drug abuse.

After a survey by a special task force on

¹ For texts, see S. Ex. G, 90th Cong., 1st sess.

the contribution of the Convention to the control of illegal international drug traffic, I have concluded that the national and international interest in drug control will be significantly advanced by United States accession.

I recommend that the Senate give the Convention early and favorable consideration.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE, *March 8, 1967*

**REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FROM
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE**

White House press release dated March 8

FEBRUARY 15, 1967

THE PRESIDENT: I have the honor to submit to you a copy of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1953, with the recommendation that the Convention be transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to accession.

The Convention was adopted at the United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, held in New York from January 24, 1953 through March 25, 1953. The Final Act of that Conference, which is bound along with the Convention, is transmitted for the information of the Senate.

The Convention was designed to replace by a single instrument the existing multilateral treaties in the field of narcotic drugs, to reduce the number of treaty organs exclusively concerned with the control of narcotic drugs, and to make provision for the control of the production of raw materials of narcotic drugs.

During the period March 30 to August 1, 1953 when the Convention was open for signature it was signed for sixty-four countries. Thirty-four of those countries have deposited ratifications of the Convention and twenty other countries have acceded to it.

The Convention was not signed for the United States for several reasons. The principal reason was a concern that omission from the Convention of the "closed list" provision embodied in the 1953 Protocol (14

UST 10), under which only seven named countries could engage in the production of opium for export, would result in many additional countries engaging in such production and a consequent spiralling of the amount of opium that would be diverted into illicit traffic.

Another principal reason for not signing the Convention was a concern that the provisions permitting reservations would result in States making reservations that would cripple the international measures necessary for the control of narcotic drugs.

Because of the concerns noted, it was considered that if the 1953 Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the Production of, International and Wholesale Trade in, and Use of Opium were brought into force, it would provide more effective international control of narcotic drugs than would be possible under the Single Convention. However, even though that Protocol was brought into force on March 8, 1963, only five States have become party to it since that date. Three of those five States were newly independent States that gave notification that they continued to consider themselves bound by the Protocol by reason of its ratification on their behalf prior to independence. At present, fourteen years after the date it was signed, only fifty States are parties to the Protocol.

Neither the omission of the "closed list" provision from the Single Convention nor the provisions permitting reservations appear to be affecting the application of the Single Convention.

Although under a provision of Article 24 of the Convention any country can undertake the production of opium for export in amounts not exceeding five tons annually, there appears to be no record of any country having undertaken the production of opium for export under that provision since the Convention entered into force on December 13, 1964.

The reservations that have been made to the Convention have been modest and of little apparent effect when compared with the reservations that are permitted under its pro-

visions. Experience under the Convention during the past two years has not shown that the reservations made have resulted in any apparent weakening of the international controls provided in the Convention.

The above-mentioned "closed list" provision of the 1953 Protocol as compared with the provisions of the 1961 Convention on the limitation on production of opium for international trade, and the effect of the provisions of the 1961 Convention permitting reservations are discussed in detail in the enclosed "Report on the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, and Comparative Analysis of the Single Convention, 1961 and the Protocol of 1953". That report and analysis also outline the background of the Convention, its principal merits, and discuss the international controls and prohibitions provided therein. The substance of the report and comparative analysis was transmitted to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations with a letter dated October 24, 1961 from the Department of State in response to a request from the Chairman.

It appears from the relatively large number of ratifications and accessions to the Single Convention that have taken place in the few years since it was signed that it will become the most widely accepted of the narcotics control treaties. Because of this, and because all international controls will soon be exercised through the organs specified in the Single Convention, accession to the Single Convention would be in keeping with the long-standing leadership exercised by the United States in the international control of narcotic drugs. All international narcotic controls will be exercised through the international control organs specified in that Convention, namely, the existing Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the Economic and Social Council, and the new International Narcotics Control Board established by the Convention (Article 5).

Under the Transitional Provisions of the Convention (Article 45) the functions of the Board are being provisionally carried out by the Permanent Central Narcotics Board (PCNB) constituted under Chapter VI of

the International Opium Convention signed at Geneva February 19, 1925 and by the Drug Supervisory Body (DSB) constituted under Chapter II of the Geneva Convention of July 13, 1931. The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 45 of the 1961 Convention, has fixed March 2, 1968, as the date upon which the new Board will enter upon its duties and replace the PCNB (on which the United States has long been represented) and the DSB. The Board will consist of eleven members to be elected by the Economic and Social Council (Article 9). The United States, as a member of the World Health Organization, has a voice in the nomination of three of the members and also, as a Member of the United Nations, has a voice in the nomination of eight of the members. It is considered desirable that the United States be represented on the Board and it may be expected that a United States member would be elected by the Council. Effective participation by the United States member in the work of the Board would, however, be materially advanced by accession to the Convention by the United States.

The Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare concur in my recommendation that the Convention be transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to accession.

Respectfully submitted,

NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Customs convention on the temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943.

Accession deposited: Australia, January 6, 1967.
Convention concerning customs facilities for touring.
Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into
force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.
Accession deposited: Australia, January 6, 1967.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April
24, 1964.¹

Accession deposited: Mongolia, January 5, 1967.²

Maritime Matters

Convention on facilitation of international maritime
traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965.
Entered into force March 5, 1967.¹

Acceptance deposited: Ivory Coast, February 16,
1967.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement amending the agreement of March 9,
1959, as amended (TIAS 4192, 5608, 5117, 5551),
governing tolls on the St. Lawrence Seaway and
a lockage fee on the Welland Canal. Effected by
exchange of notes at Ottawa March 31, 1967.
Entered into force March 31, 1967.

Portugal

Arrangement concerning trade in cotton textiles.
Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon March 23,
1967. Entered into force March 23, 1967.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² With a reservation and a declaration.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on April 5 confirmed the following
nominations:

Lucius D. Battle to be an Assistant Secretary of
State. (For biographic details, see White House
press release dated January 26.)

Ellsworth Bunker to be Ambassador to the Re-
public of Viet-Nam. (For biographic details, see
Department of State press release 85 dated April
12.)

William W. Heath to be Ambassador to Sweden.
(For biographic details, see White House press re-
lease dated March 22.)

Henry Cabot Lodge to be Ambassador at Large.

Douglas MacArthur to be Ambassador to Austria.

John M. McSweeney to be Ambassador to Bul-
garia. (For biographic details, see White House
press release dated March 22.)

Richard H. Nolte to be Ambassador to the United
Arab Republic. (For biographic details, see White
House press release dated February 21.)

Karl F. Rolvaag to be Ambassador to Iceland.
(For biographic details, see White House press re-
lease dated March 22.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LVI, NO. 1452 PUBLICATION 8230 APRIL 24, 1967

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of

the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-

intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. PRICE: 52 issues, domestic \$10, foreign \$15; single copy 30 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).

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Africa
 Advisory Panel Named for African Affairs Bureau 651
 Africa and America (Palmer) 646
Asia. Battle confirmed as Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 674
Austria. MacArthur confirmed as Ambassador 674
Bulgaria. McSweeney confirmed as Ambassador 674
Congo (Kinshasa). Africa and America (Palmer) 646
Congress
 Confirmations (Battle, Bunker, Heath, Lodge, MacArthur, McSweeney, Nolte, Rolvaag) 674
 President Urges Accession to 1961 Single Convention on Narcotics (Johnson, Katzenbach) 671
Department and Foreign Service
 Advisory Panel Named for African Affairs Bureau 651
 Confirmations (Battle, Bunker, Heath, Lodge, MacArthur, McSweeney, Nolte, Rolvaag) 674
Developing Countries. CENTO Economic Committee Meets at Washington (Gaud, communique) 668
Economic Affairs
 Africa and America (Palmer) 646
 CENTO Economic Committee Meets at Washington (Gaud, communique) 668
 U.S.-Philippine Relations: Where We Stand Today (Braderman) 660
Foreign Aid
 Africa and America (Palmer) 646
 Turkey and the United States Reaffirm Bonds of Friendship and Cooperation (Johnson, Sunay, joint communique) 652
 U.S. To Increase Civilian Hospital Capacity in Viet-Nam 664
Iceland. Rolvaag confirmed as Ambassador 674
International Cooperation. President Reviews Action Taken on ICY Recommendations (Johnson) 658
International Organizations. CENTO Economic Committee Meets at Washington (Gaud, communique) 668
Middle East
 Battle confirmed as Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 674
 CENTO Economic Committee Meets at Washington (Gaud, communique) 668
Nigeria. Africa and America (Palmer) 646
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Turkey and the United States Reaffirm Bonds of Friendship and Cooperation (Johnson, Sunay, joint communique) 652
Philippines. U.S.-Philippine Relations: Where We Stand Today (Braderman) 660
Presidential Documents
 New Policy Outlined on Funds for U.S. Voluntary Organizations (Johnson, text of Presidential committee report) 665
 President Reviews Action Taken on ICY Recommendations 658
 President Urges Accession to 1961 Single Convention on Narcotics 671
 Turkey and the United States Reaffirm Bonds of Friendship and Cooperation 652
South West Africa. Africa and America (Palmer) 646

Southern Rhodesia. Africa and America (Palmer) 646
Sweden. Heath confirmed as Ambassador 674
Trade. U.S.-Philippine Relations: Where We Stand Today (Braderman) 660
Treaty Information
 Current Actions 673
 President Urges Accession to 1961 Single Convention on Narcotics (Johnson, Katzenbach) 671
Turkey. Turkey and the United States Reaffirm Bonds of Friendship and Cooperation (Johnson, Sunay, joint communique) 652
United Arab Republic. Nolte confirmed as Ambassador 674
United Nations
 Africa and America (Palmer) 646
 President Urges Accession to 1961 Single Convention on Narcotics (Johnson, Katzenbach) 671
Viet-Nam
 Bunker confirmed as Ambassador 674
 U.S. To Increase Civilian Hospital Capacity in Viet-Nam 664

Name Index

Battle, Lucius D 674
 Braderman, Eugene M 660
 Bunker, Ellsworth 674
 Gardner, John W 665
 Gaud, William S 668
 Heath, William W 674
 Helms, Richard 665
 Johnson, President 652, 658, 665, 671
 Katzenbach, Nicholas deB 665, 671
 Lodge, Henry Cabot 674
 MacArthur, Douglas 674
 McSweeney, John M 674
 Nolte, Richard H 674
 Palmer, Joseph, 2d 646
 Rolvaag, Karl F 674
 Sunay, Cevdet 652

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 3-9

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to April 3 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 48 of March 9, 75 of March 30, and 79 of March 31.

No.	Date	Subject
*81	4/3	Department publishes "The Country Team."
†82	4/5	Indefinite validity of multiple-entry visitors visas (rewrite).
†83	4/5	U.S. delegation to 3d session of 11th Meeting of Consultation of American Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
84	4/6	U.S. to increase civilian hospital capacity in Viet-Nam (rewrite).

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Free World Assistance for South Viet-Nam

Free World Assistance for South Viet-Nam (publication 8213), the most recent pamphlet in the series of Viet-Nam Information Notes published by the Department of State, describes the military, economic, and social assistance being provided to the Republic of Viet-Nam by nations other than the United States.

The three other background papers on various aspects of the Viet-Nam conflict published earlier were: *Basic Data on South Viet-Nam*, *The Search for Peace in Viet-Nam*, and *Communist-Directed Forces in South Viet-Nam*.

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May 1, 1967

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY RETURNS FROM TRIP TO EUROPE

*Remarks by President Johnson and Vice President Humphrey
at Washington; Addresses by the Vice President in Europe 678*

CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE UNITED STATES

by David H. Popper 689

PRESIDENT SIGNS JOINT RESOLUTION ON FOOD ASSISTANCE TO INDIA

*Statement by President Johnson and Text
of Congressional Resolution 700*

Vice President Humphrey Returns From Trip to Europe

Following are remarks made by President Johnson and Vice President Humphrey at a ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House on April 10 upon the Vice President's return from a 2-week working visit to seven European countries. Also included are three addresses made by Vice President Humphrey during his European trip.¹

WELCOMING CEREMONY, WASHINGTON, APRIL 10

White House press release dated April 10

Remarks by President Johnson

Mr. Vice President, Mrs. Humphrey, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen: Mr. Vice President, you will see here this morning, assembled to greet you, a large part of the Government of the United States, as well as many of our most distinguished private citizens.

We have with you here the Cabinet, the Under Secretaries, the heads of many of the most important agencies. We have the Speaker, the Majority Leader, and other members of the leadership in Congress, as well as many of the leading members.

Their presence here this morning speaks, more eloquently than any words of mine, of the importance your country attaches to the mission that you and your charming wife have just completed.

For more than 2 weeks now you have been the authentic voice of America in the council halls of our European allies.

You have told both the leaders and the

¹For details of the Vice President's itinerary, see Department of State press release 66 dated Mar. 25.

peoples of seven friendly nations that America is still the daughter of Europe and that we intend to continue doing our share as we pursue our common destinies.

You have also carried to them, with great eloquence and ability, our conviction that peace, like freedom, is indivisible. Neither the New World of the Americas nor the Old World of Europe can ever hope to fulfill either its dreams or its ambitions until the Ancient World of Asia has become a full and equal partner in the forward movement of men.

No one knows better than you, Mr. Vice President, that this conviction lies at the very roots of American policy in Viet-Nam and throughout Asia. I believe that that conviction and that policy are much clearer today in the minds of our friends in Europe, because you and Mrs. Humphrey were there to personally express it to them.

During these past 2 weeks you have been more than America's spokesman: You have also been America's eyes and ears. You left here bearing an American message to the people of Europe; this morning you return with Europe's message to the people of America.

Within a few hours, I expect to depart on a similar mission to our friends in Latin America.

Between us, we will then have shared within a few weeks a degree of consultation and discussion with other nations that is unequaled, so far as I can recall, in American history.

There is good reason for these consultations. I think it was very well expressed during your visit to Europe.

"The essence of statesmanship," you said, "is not a rigid adherence to the past but a

present and probing concern for the future.”²

We have that concern.

We hope that others share it.

We seek their advice and recommendations as earnestly as we ask them to consider ours.

In all of this, Mr. Vice President and Mrs. Humphrey, you have played a profoundly important part. You have served as a bridge for better understanding—and better understanding among nations, in this nuclear era, is really the best hope of mankind.

Mr. Vice President and Muriel, we welcome you home. We were very proud of you. We followed you every step of the way. We are so glad to have you back.

Now you can pick up for the next week some of the problems here that I will leave with you.

Remarks by Vice President Humphrey

Mr. President, Your Excellencies, members of the Cabinet, Mr. Speaker, leaders of the Congress, and my fellow Americans: Mr. President, I am sure you know, first of all, that my heart is filled with appreciation and gratitude for the opportunity that you have afforded me, because it has been indeed a high honor to represent you and our beloved country these past 2 weeks in several of the nations of Europe.

But, as you have indicated, it is so good to be home once again and to be with fellow Americans to continue our efforts in the cause of peace and freedom.

The purpose of my mission was to listen, to look, and to learn—and, if called upon, to explain. In so doing I was given the opportunity to see Europe as it is more than two decades after the end of World War II, 20 years after the inception of the Marshall Plan, and 10 years after the signing of the Rome treaties.

I saw a new Western Europe that has achieved an unprecedented degree of well-being, prosperity, and security and an in-

creased sense of identity and pride. That Europe, Mr. President, is testimony to the soundness of our policies, past and present, and to the genius and industry of the people and of the nations of that continent.

My discussions with European leaders covered the Kennedy Round trade negotiation, which is now entering its final stage, discussions toward a nuclear nonproliferation treaty, relations between East and West, the building of a larger European unity, the revitalization of the NATO alliance, the responsibility of the rich nations to the poor, the need for modernizing our international monetary system, and, above all, the strengthening of international institutions for peace.

I found the leaders of Western Europe ready and eager to join with us in meeting these challenges—but as our equal partners. I gave them our assurance that a full and equal Atlantic partnership, a partnership based on true equality, was and continues to be the objective of American policy. I assured them that we welcomed a growing sense of “Europeanism” and independence. I expressed our confidence that this new assurance and vitality would be directed toward cooperation internationally as well as within Europe’s own borders.

Mr. President, as you have stated on several occasions in these past months, we are entering a new era in our relations with the peoples of Europe.

We are, in a sense, at the end of the post-war period. Now, in this last third of the 20th century, we are moving forward in a period of productive partnership in the West and of peaceful engagement with the East.

There are concerns, yes, and there are questions. There is the need for an even closer relationship between ourselves and our European partners. But there is even more a common basis of understanding, an agreement on fundamental principles, and a willingness to work together which I believe can open the road ahead.

Twenty years ago the most that any of us dared hope for was the revival and renewal of a war-torn continent.

² At a luncheon address before the U.S. Chiefs of Missions in Europe at Bonn on Mar. 30.

Today, our expectations have been fulfilled—and far beyond. I believe that if we and our partners can maintain our unity, our cohesion, and our common will, the next 20 years can bring to full realization the final healing of Europe's old wounds and divisions, the replacement of the Iron Curtain with an open door, and a chance to meet the new priorities of nation-building and peaceful development all around the world.

Mr. President, I shall give you a full report on my mission. In the meantime, I bring back to you and to the American people my firm belief that our friends in Europe remain our good friends and that we do have reason for optimism.

While I have this moment, Mr. President, may I wish you a very successful and, indeed, a most productive voyage to Latin America, where the mission that you undertake is of the greatest significance.

It is a high honor and a rare privilege to be your partner in these endeavors.

ADDRESSES MADE IN EUROPE BY VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY

Berlin House of Representatives, April 6

Governing Mayor [Heinrich] Albertz, distinguished Senators, and Members of the House of Representatives, ladies and gentlemen: I am honored to speak to you on the occasion of this special session of the Berlin House of Representatives. I am honored, too, to bring to the Members of this House this personal message from the President of the United States:

It is a special pleasure to send you, through Vice President Humphrey, my own good wishes and those of the American people as you assume your new responsibilities.

More than 5 years ago I had the privilege of being with the people of Berlin during a time of crisis. Their courage, which won the admiration and support of free men everywhere, met the challenge of those dark days. Their strength and fortitude since then have kept Berlin a free and thriving city. All Americans look forward to the time when the tragic division of Berlin is ended and Germany is once again a united country.

My countrymen join me in the hope and expectation that the future will bring you peace and prosperity.

My remarks will be brief. I mean them to be direct and to the point. You will remember when President Johnson spoke to this House. It was a time, for Berlin, of deep crisis.

President Johnson spoke then of the need for confidence, for poise, and for faith. And he pledged our commitment to the people of Berlin. You have shown confidence, poise, and faith. And I renew now his pledge.

Berliners, more than anyone else, know the value of commitments that are kept.

Just as Berliners—with the help of allies—have maintained the integrity of their city, so are the people of South Viet-Nam—with the help of allies—struggling today to maintain the integrity of their country.

And I know that the people of Berlin know, as all free peoples know, that our commitment to freedom in one place is no less than our commitment to freedom in another.

Today Berlin stands stronger than ever before. Berlin is strong because her citizens have an indestructible spirit.

Berlin is strong because her men and women stand not only together but in solidarity with free men and women all over the world.

Berlin is strong because her people look not to the past but always to the future.

This city owes much to one of your members, the former Governing Mayor of this city, and my friend, Willy Brandt. Today he has joined hands with Chancellor [Kurt] Kiesinger to help the new Government of the Federal Republic meet new opportunities. We in America are impressed by the great strides which this German Government has made toward reconciliation with the countries of Eastern Europe. And we welcome the initiatives now being taken by your country so that yesterday's Iron Curtain may become tomorrow's open door.

We welcome the movement of people, of goods, and of ideas which is today permeating societies formerly closed to the outside world.

Berlin has the chance to play a large role in making the open door a reality. And I know, in a spirit of confidence and hope, that you will. For, as your Chancellor said only last night, Berlin can be a bridge—an open bridge on the path to peace.

In the center of free Berlin there stands today a stark ruin—the skeleton of a church, preserved to symbolize eternally the depravity of war.

It is our hope that the Iron Curtain may one day, too, lie in ruins, its remnants a symbol of a time that mercifully ended.

A great act in the human drama lies at hand: Through peaceful engagement in Europe we have the chance to shape a commonwealth of progress dedicated not to war but to peace, not to doctrinal conflict but to constructive reconciliation.

We have the chance, as President Johnson has expressed it,³ to help the people of Europe to achieve together:

—a continent in which the peoples of Eastern and Western Europe work shoulder to shoulder for the common good;

—a continent in which alliances do not confront each other in bitter hostility, but instead provide a framework in which West and East can act together in order to assure the security of all.

Berlin is a city that is alive. Berlin is a city moving forward. Berlin will always be a great city. And, if we stand together, one day Berlin will once more be the capital of a reunited Germany in a safe and peaceful world.

North Atlantic Council, Paris, April 7

Mr. Chairman and members of the North Atlantic Council: This organization—this NATO—has been so close to the heart of my country's foreign policy for so long that it is a part of our everyday vocabulary, one of our assumptions about national commitment that almost everyone takes for granted.

We look upon NATO's success as an established fact of contemporary life. Its strength

³For an advance text of President Johnson's address at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 7, 1966, see BULLETIN of Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.

is a matter of high priority in our nation's policy.

It has survived both external and internal crises and we have come to assume that this is a hardened habit.

Even when we indulge in the periodic luxury of disagreement among ourselves, our disagreements do not run to the merits of NATO but rather to the best or more effective or most economical way to keep it in business for the long term.

Even when we are committed in other parts of the world, it simply does not occur to us that the way to pursue our purposes in other areas is to abandon our purposes in the Atlantic and European area.

But to accept NATO as a constant in our foreign policy is not to assume that its tasks, its opportunities, and its form of organization must remain fixed from decade to decade.

This organization came into being after the historic decision of Stalin to go it alone in the postwar world and to use the threat of Soviet armed force and to expand westward.

NATO first blunted, then contained, that outward thrust into Europe. The threat from the East is not gone, but it has moderated. It has moderated to a large degree because we have held together. And the passage of time, the increasing material well-being of Soviet society, the growing flexibility of the Soviet economy, the moderating experience of dealing with other nations, are leading to modifications within the once-monolithic Soviet bloc.

Just as Western Europe has changed, so have the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. New conditions require a new response.

We will need to find our way to a resolution of those fundamental European issues which, so long as they remain unresolved, will prevent true security and the reconciliation of East and West which we all seek.

When the Marshall Plan followed the program of defense aid to Greece and Turkey, President Truman described it as the "other half of the walnut."

My point here is that our goal in the years

ahead is to add the other half of the walnut to the half we already have—by matching deterrence with peaceful engagement.

If we are to be successful, we must stand together in this new period just as firmly as we did at the height of the cold war.

We have not surmounted three crises over Berlin in an atmosphere of protracted tension to lose now, in a moment of relaxation, what we then dared to stand for and sustain. And despite the limitations of what we can do to encourage the tides of change in relations between East and West, much remains that we can do.

We are all aware of the quickening tempo of East-West contacts. Your own compilations here show more than half a hundred significant political contacts between Eastern and Western governments last year; many of them involved ministers and chiefs of government.

For my part, I found this two-way traffic significant enough to refer to the prospect for an open door between East and West when I spoke last month at Fulton, Missouri, on the 21st anniversary of Winston Churchill's Iron Curtain speech.⁴

The increasing exchange of people, official and unofficial, is matched by an increasing exchange of goods and services as each of our countries has tried to expand its volume of trade and tourism with the East. This, too, is hopeful. Indeed, we expect to engage more vigorously in this trade ourselves in the months and years ahead.

You are aware of the various steps—a commercial air agreement, a consular treaty, export credit guarantees to some of the countries of Eastern Europe, a proposed East-West trade bill, and other proposals—which my Government has made or hopes to make to help thaw the ice in the East.

And, of course, we are all expectantly aware that in recent times the Soviet leaders have been gradually more open to the idea

of entering into negotiations—more interested in talking seriously about possible agreements, less unreasonable in formulating their positions, and less dogmatic in putting them forth.

This beginning of thaw is reflected in the foreign policy and, I suppose, the domestic policies of every nation represented at this table.

We have a way of safeguarding and harmonizing our interests as the traffic quickens through the open door.

It is by consultation through this Council.

Our task around this table will be to design the other half of the walnut—by stimulating, guiding, and monitoring the process of movement together.

In the words of President Johnson last October 7: "The alliance must become a forum for increasingly close consultations. These should cover the full range of joint concerns—from East-West relations to crisis management."

He meant just what he said, and our representatives in NATO are instructed to live by this policy.

In sum then, my Government believes that we have to maintain a credible NATO deterrent.

If we do, there will be more and more opportunities to work constructively on East-West relations, because NATO will continue to prove the futility of aggressive behavior in Europe.

But as we have managed together the business of deterrence, we must manage together the even more complex business of making a durable peace in Europe. Our presence in the midst of the alliance bears witness to our firm commitment to act as faithful partners of our allies.

And if we follow the Golden Rule—that each of us consult as soon, as often, and as frankly as he would wish the other to consult—the alliance will prove to be the midwife of more helpful times.

Mr. Chairman, my countrymen can never lose interest in the peace and security and

⁴ For Vice President Humphrey's address on Mar. 5, see *ibid.*, Mar. 27, 1967, p. 486.

well-being of Europe for historical reasons that are too obvious to need recalling here.

We have felt since the end of the last war that the security of Berlin, the security of Germany, the security of Europe, the security of the North Atlantic and Canada, and of the United States itself, are all one and the same thing—a common concern, the common expression of which is NATO. And we still think so.

In these years we have together prevented war and given protection against aggression.

Now, on the threshold of a new period, we must move together beyond defense to the business of peace and peaceful progress.

We face, perhaps, the opportunity of our century. And if we stand together now as in the past, we shall have success.

OECD Council, Paris, April 7

This year we mark the anniversary of two decades of cooperation between America and Europe in the cause of reconstruction and economic progress.

These have been years of accomplishments unprecedented in character and scope.

The member countries of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] have had the longest period of uninterrupted economic growth in the modern era. That growth has been far beyond our expectations, and its benefits have been widely distributed among our peoples. International trade has flourished. Goods and capital have moved across the borders at high and rising levels.

This exchange has taken place within a system of monetary arrangements which, whatever its shortcomings and strains, has worked. We have had no competitive devaluations, no major dislocations, no depressions. We have, in short, been phenomenally successful in dealing with our common economic problems.

Perhaps even more noteworthy, when seen in the perspective of history, we have together embarked on a deliberate and sus-

tained effort, involving the transfer of resources and skills on a substantial scale, to improve the lot of those hundreds of millions of human beings in other parts of the world less fortunate than our own.

It is not possible now to allocate credit for these achievements very exactly among the several international organizations that have contributed to them. When a balance is finally struck, however, the work of this organization and its predecessor, the OEEC [Organization for European Economic Cooperation], will have to be given great weight.

And without waiting for the historian's verdict, Mr. Secretary General, I believe that in this 20th anniversary year of Secretary Marshall's Harvard speech, we are justified in looking with great pride at what the organization has accomplished.

But it is a part of the human condition that we are never lacking for unsolved problems and for new tasks.

The OECD has been at the center of the process of economic change and development ever since its founding. Its influence and the actions of its member nations must be directed to a host of problems still with us.

First, because the deadline is directly upon us, is the Kennedy Round.

Trade has been the great growth industry of the postwar years.

Trade of the OECD countries with the world has tripled since 1948, while production was doubling.

A great design for further reducing barriers to trade is now being painfully worked out at Geneva. It must succeed for both the industrial and agricultural sectors if this remarkable growth is to continue.

The Kennedy Round will be decided in a matter of weeks. The period in which we need to come to basic agreement on reform and improvement of the international monetary system can be measured in months.

This is an area where agreement is necessary, not to enable the United States to solve its balance-of-payments problems but rather to assure that the international economy has

the monetary underpinning for the expansion of output and trade and, in the end, welfare that our peoples properly expect.

Another great and unfinished task confronting us is the bridging of the division between Eastern and Western Europe. This is a major objective of my own Government.

We are encouraged at seeing that the process, however slow, is underway.

I know that you, Mr. Secretary General, have been charged with considering, along with the permanent representatives here, ways and means through which the OECD can widen the range of East-West economic relations. The United States does not expect miracles out of this process. But we wish you and the OECD every success in finding the means to fruitful contact with the East.

In recent months, a new coinage has entered the intellectual currency of this organization. The phrase "technological gap" has come to stand for a whole complex of ideas, apprehensions, and even some misconceptions.

The underlying idea is that there is an important disparity in the level of technology achieved by the United States in comparison with other members of the OECD.

The apprehension is that by virtue of our size and wealth and the emphasis we place on research and development, this disparity will increase. That there may be some elements of misconception here is suggested by the fact that over the past 15 years, the economic growth of Western Europe and Japan has outpaced that of the United States.

In point of fact, there are no technological monopolies in the world today. Technology flows readily and freely through the normal channels of trade and investment.

If technological advance occurs more rapidly in the United States than elsewhere, the explanation must be sought in educational, organizational, and economic factors.

And if there is a relative lack of technological innovation in other countries of this organization, I believe that it is these factors

that must be considered and dealt with.

President Johnson, some months ago, established a high-level committee, chaired by his Science Adviser, Dr. Donald Hornig, to examine the technological gap and to make appropriate recommendations for dealing with it. We are taking a full part, of course, in the study that is underway in the OECD. We expect that the OECD investigation will not only help to determine the dimensions of the problem but will also provide guideposts to the cooperative actions which may contribute to its solution.

And we stand ready to be forthcoming in helping our partners in their technological development.

As we learn more of the technological revolution, we must use its potential jointly for the common good.

As I have said elsewhere, we need to find ways to insure a continuous exchange of technological and organizational experience among the members of this organization and perhaps to expand it some day to include Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

The most threatening and intractable problem confronting members of this organization, Mr. Secretary General, is represented by the chasm separating the affluent society of a few hundred million peoples represented at this table from that other society which includes the largest part of the human race.

That other society is populated by people living on the ragged edge of poverty, never free of want, who now—in many areas—face the threat of famine on a catastrophic scale.

It is to the lasting credit of the OECD that from its inception it has recognized this problem and tried to do something about it.

There is a growing recognition that the gap between the affluent and the poor nations is the primordial problem of our times.

It is at once massive, stubborn, and urgent.

It is understandable in simple terms of human morality.

But it can be solved only by the most imaginative and far-reaching measures, involving all of our countries in a cooperative effort that must be sustained for years.

A few days ago, Pope Paul VI treated this subject in an encyclical that will surely take its place among the great documents of our times.

He set forth the problem in terms which speak both to the mind and to the heart.

He described entire continents where countless men and women suffer hunger and where, because of malnutrition, children never attain their proper physical and mental development.

He pointed out the pressing duty of the developed countries to help and urged that they should consider such aid as a normal and proper charge on their resources.

He prescribed the measures needed in terms so appropriate to the OECD that I can do no better than to repeat them.

If these efforts are to attain their full effectiveness, they cannot remain scattered and isolated; less still can they compete for reasons of prestige or power; the situation demands planned and coordinated programs. A program is in fact more than, and better than, single acts of assistance dependent on individual expressions of good will. It involves . . . thorough studies, a fixing of objectives, a determination of means, and a consolidation of efforts, to respond to present needs and predictable requirements.

The OECD has made a beginning on this path. And it is even now grappling with the most urgent and the most harrowing aspect of the development problem: how to feed the world's teeming millions.

I had the privilege of addressing the members of the Development Assistance Committee of the organization when they met in Washington last summer.⁵ I said then that we in the DAC would have to answer two key questions: How much help is needed? How can our countries best work together in providing that help?

I said our study should look not just to pil-

ing up data but should look to action—action directed toward a clear and feasible goal: the eradication of large-scale famine and hunger.

Within the past few weeks the DAC has published documents which seem likely to contribute significantly to answering the two questions I posed. Next week, I am told, competent officials from the member countries of the Committee will meet here to consider these documents.

It is both the hope and the expectation of my Government that from these deliberations will emerge the outlines of actions to cope decisively with the threatening catastrophe that we simply cannot accept: the tragedy of starvation in a world of growing affluence. Hunger is the immediate problem.

But, as we all know, our plans must extend much farther.

Together with the developing nations we must concert measures that will increase per capita growth at a rate which will reduce the enormous disparity between their world and ours.

A few months ago, Mr. George Woods, the president of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, gave a very thoughtful speech to the Economic and Social Council. In his remarks he called for review at high political levels of the state of development aid in relation to the needs. He suggested that careful staff preparation would be a necessary preliminary to any such review.

It seems to me that the OECD has an important contribution to make to this kind of preparation. Its work ought to be even more specifically addressed to obstacles to economic growth in the developing countries and to the specific measures that the rich countries can make toward accelerating that growth.

For, as Pope Paul said, if development is the new name of peace, who would not wish to work at this task with all his strength?

⁵ *Ibid.*, Aug. 8, 1967, p. 202.

NATO Nuclear Planning Group Holds First Ministers Meeting

The first meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group at the ministerial level was held April 6-7 at Washington. Following is a statement concerning the meeting made by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara at his news conference on April 3, together with the text of a communique released by the NATO Nuclear Planning Group at the close of the meeting on April 7.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY McNAMARA

On Thursday and Friday of this week [April 6-7] I shall be meeting in Washington with the defense ministers of Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom; and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. These ministers comprise the new NATO Nuclear Planning Group which, together with the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee, was established as a permanent body by the North Atlantic Council last December to advise it on matters of nuclear policy.¹

I am especially pleased to be the host for this meeting. It represents, I believe, a significant new approach and achievement after more than a decade of persistent endeavor by many individuals and by many nations to bring all members of the alliance into fuller partnership in the planning of nuclear strategy. It is a milestone in the history of NATO.

The personal participation of the seven defense ministers in the Nuclear Planning Group reflects the new intimate involvement of nationally responsible government leaders in NATO planning activities. Such active participation by top defense authorities is essential to assure realism in our work and the vigorous support of the member govern-

ments in carrying out NATO plans. It is, I believe, largely responsible for the great progress we have made in nuclear planning in the past 2 years.

The foundation of the security of the alliance is nuclear power. Thus, it is only natural that the nonnuclear members of the alliance have always felt a need to be informed about nuclear matters and to participate in nuclear planning. They have been uncertain of their role. They believed, and rightly so, that they should have a greater voice in assessing the nuclear threat to the alliance, in determining the nuclear forces required to meet that threat, and in working out how and under what conditions these nuclear forces would be employed.

For more than 10 years the NATO nations have struggled with the problem of how to better integrate the nuclear and nonnuclear powers on nuclear matters and have considered many recommendations and proposals.

These efforts include:

1. A proposal in 1960 that the United States sell or assist in the European production of Polaris missiles to be deployed under SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe].

2. Another suggestion in 1960 to create a multilateral atomic authority which would have made NATO "a fourth atomic power."

3. An additional proposal in 1960 for a NATO medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) force involving Polaris submarines and missile-carrying surface ships, with multilateral ownership, financing, and control and "mixed manning to the extent operationally feasible."

4. A proposal in 1961 for a NATO sea-borne force.

5. A suggestion in 1963 for an inter-Allied nuclear force to include U.K. V-bombers, Polaris submarines, and other nuclear elements.

6. A proposal in 1963 for a multilateral nuclear force comprising Polaris submarines provided by the United Kingdom, United States forces, and possibly mixed-manned ships.

7. A proposal in 1964 for an Atlantic

¹ For text of a final communique released at the close of the North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting on Dec. 16, 1966, see BULLETIN of Jan. 9, 1967, p. 49.

nuclear force of British V-bombers, British Polaris submarines, U.S. Polaris boats, and other elements.

8. Suggestions in the early 1960's that mobile medium range ballistic missiles (MMRBM) might be deployed in Europe on railroad cars or truck-drawn trailers.

It has only been in the last year and a half that substantial progress in expanding the role of the nonnuclear powers in nuclear affairs has been accomplished.

The meeting this week stems from a proposal by the United States to the NATO defense ministers in June 1965 for consultation by a small group of the ministers about the problems of nuclear planning. As a result, a Special Committee of Defense Ministers met in Paris in November 1965. It set up the Nuclear Planning Working Group composed of five NATO defense ministers. This *ad hoc* group met four times in 1966: in Washington, London, Paris, and Rome. It reviewed and discussed the strategic and tactical nuclear resources of the alliance, the potential circumstances and consequences of their use, and the way in which the alliance should organize to carry on future discussion of these subjects.

These were by far the most substantive and effective discussions on nuclear matters ever attempted between NATO's nuclear and nonnuclear powers. For example, one of my colleagues stated in February that there had been more progress on NATO nuclear problems during the past 12 months than in the preceding 17 years.

The Working Group recommended that a permanent organization be created to carry on this work, and the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee, open to all NATO countries, and the Nuclear Planning Group were established by the foreign and defense ministers during the meeting of the North Atlantic Council last December.

At this week's meeting, the Nuclear Planning Group will continue to examine NATO nuclear strength in all of its aspects, including plans for the development, production, and use of strategic and tactical weapons systems. In addition, we shall discuss the recent

steps taken by the Soviet Union to deploy an anti-ballistic-missile system, as well as the status of the U.S. ABM program. We shall also discuss the effort being made by this country to persuade the Soviet Union to join with us in holding down the spiraling of a fruitless arms race.

Again, I want to emphasize the significance of this meeting. It is without question one of the most important and far-reaching steps of the last decade in the evolution of NATO.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE, APRIL 7

The NATO Nuclear Planning Group, composed of Ministers of Defense of seven NATO countries, adjourned today after a two-day conference in Washington. Attending the first meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group were Paul Hellyer, Canada; Gerhard Schroeder, Germany; Roberto Tremeloni, Italy; Willem den Toom, Netherlands; Ahmet Topaloglu, Turkey; Denis Healey, United Kingdom; and Robert S. McNamara, United States. NATO Secretary-General Manlio Brosio was chairman.

The United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. Robert S. McNamara, led a discussion of the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance and anti-ballistic missile defense. The Ministers reviewed the changes which have occurred in the strategic nuclear threat facing the Alliance since the meeting of the Nuclear Planning Working Group in February 1966, and the means and plans available to counter that threat. They concluded that the size of existing strategic nuclear forces and the plans for employing them are adequate to the need. They discussed the technical, strategic and financial aspects of ballistic missile defense including both the Soviet deployments and the U.S. R&D program, and agreed to keep this subject under review. The Ministers also received a report from Secretary McNamara on the current status of discussions initiated by the U.S. with the Soviet Government to explore ways of preventing a further spiraling of the arms race. The Ministers noted that the U.S. Government intends to keep its allies fully advised as these discussions progress.

The United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defense, Mr. Denis Healey, led a discussion of tactical nuclear forces. The Ministers agreed that the number of tactical nuclear weapons available to the Allied Commanders in Europe and the Atlantic are adequate but that the appropriate distribution of types of weapons should be kept under continuous review. They also agreed to initiate a number of specific studies to help in clarifying important questions related to the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

Mr. Ahmet Topaloglu, the Minister of Defense of Turkey, led a discussion of atomic demolition munitions and considerations related to the possible use of these weapons in the defense of the treaty area. The Ministers agreed to conduct further studies on this subject.

Dr. Gerhard Schroeder, Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, led a discussion on the role of host countries in Allied arrangements for the planning and use of nuclear weapons.

The Ministers noted that the Nuclear Planning Group itself as well as the Military Committee of the Alliance offer the opportunity for national governments to exert a direct influence on nuclear planning in the Alliance through their senior political and military authorities. They will conduct further detailed studies on specific aspects of this question and will continue their discussion at the next Ministerial meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group.

The Ministers set a work program for the future and agreed to meet again in Ankara in September 1967.

The Nuclear Planning Group is part of the permanent structure established by the North Atlantic Council at its Ministerial Meeting in Paris in December 1966. At that time, the Council established the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee, open to all NATO countries, to advise the Council on nuclear policy. At the same time the seven-nation Nuclear Planning Group was created to handle the detailed work of the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee.

Letters of Credence

Singapore

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Singapore, Wong Lin Ken, presented his credentials to President Johnson on April 7. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated April 7.

Zambia

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Zambia, Rupiah Bwenzani Banda, presented his credentials to President Johnson on April 7. For texts of the Am-

bassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated April 7.

U.S. Decides Not To Resume Arms Aid to India and Pakistan

*Department Statement*¹

The Department of State announced on April 12 that the Government has concluded an extensive review of policy with regard to the provision of military equipment to India and Pakistan and has decided that the United States will not resume grant military assistance, which has been suspended since September 1965.

The United States is, therefore, closing the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group in Pakistan and the U.S. Military Supply Mission in India. This process is expected to be completed by July 1, 1967, in both cases.

The U.S. Government has also decided to remove its present restrictions on the kinds of spare parts which may be sold to India and Pakistan for previously supplied equipment. Henceforth, the Government will be prepared to consider on a case-by-case basis all requests for export permits covering the cash purchase of spare parts.

The United States will continue to keep its military sales policy under careful review to insure that it is not contributing to an arms race between India and Pakistan. The United States strongly hopes that both countries will make progress in resolving the problems and differences that divide them and that they will accord an increasing priority in the allocations of their resources to agricultural and industrial development.

¹ Read to news correspondents by the Department spokesman on Apr. 12.

China, the United Nations, and the United States

by *David H. Popper*

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*¹

We must, I think, approach the problem of United States policy regarding the representation of China in the United Nations in the perspective of history. In this perspective it quickly becomes clear that it is an oversimplification to regard Chinese-American relations as habitually or necessarily antagonistic. Indeed, looking backward one is struck by the long-continued interest of the United States in the development of China and in the close ties which have typically existed between the Chinese and the American peoples.

For almost 150 years there have been Americans who were passionately interested in China. The earliest basis of interest was economic: Students of American history know how important the China trade was to the seafarers of New England and the mid-Atlantic. In visiting collections of early 19th-century Americana—for example, at the Winterthur Museum near Wilmington, Delaware—one is struck by the amount of magnificent Chinese furniture, tableware, and fabrics then to be found in the finer American homes.

At a later stage, when European countries were engaged in carving out concessions in a China which seemed to be falling apart, the United States played an active role in seeking equality of commercial opportunity for all in China. Americans benefited as a result from concessions exacted

by others, but the fact is that Americans were not in the forefront in inflicting the colonial indignities to which China was subjected as the 19th century drew to its close.

Our national interest in the period of the 20th-century World Wars tended on the whole to bolster Chinese independence. We reacted strongly, though as it turned out not strongly enough, to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, which perhaps began the melancholy train of events leading to Pearl Harbor. And we collaborated very actively indeed with the Chinese Nationalist Government in fighting the Japanese during World War II.

Through all this period, in increasing measure, American educators, missionaries, and traders were at work in China. There was, I think, a rather unique bond between the two countries. "Old China hands" formed a very special group of commitment and expertise, and they had a strong influence on American policy.

It was not surprising, therefore, that in drafting the United Nations Charter the United States insisted that China should be one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. We should not overlook the fact that this decision represented something of an innovation. A non-European state was included in the inner circle of nations possessing major responsibility in the U.N. for maintaining international peace and security. Japan had attained permanent membership in the League of Nations Council, but this was a far less

¹ Address made before the public affairs fellows of the Brookings Institution at Washington, D.C., on Mar. 28.

significant body than the U.N. Security Council.

Unhappily, China was not able to turn to the task of peaceful development at the end of the Second World War. Years of strife—invasion by foreign foes and civil conflict at home—had drained China of its wealth, riddled its human resources, and destroyed its internal stability. The Chinese Communists were able to exploit this situation to seize power in large areas of the country. Strenuous efforts were made by the United States to help the Chinese to form an overall coalition government which would restore peace. These efforts unfortunately failed, and in 1949 victorious Communist armies forced the legitimate government of China and a million of its supporters to take refuge on the island of Taiwan, where the Government of the Republic of China is located today.

The establishment of the Chinese Communist regime throughout mainland China while the legitimate government of China continued in existence on Taiwan presented the U.N. with a serious political and legal problem. The government—indeed the very personalities—associated with the original Chinese assumption of membership in the United Nations still exercised the functions of government in an area they controlled. The de facto control of the Chinese Communists on the mainland could not be denied; but in 1949–50 it could hardly be said that enough time had elapsed to draw any conclusions as to how much support that regime had in mainland China or how firmly it would become established.

Aggression Against the U.N. in Korea

Then, as the statesmen and lawyers wrestled with this problem, North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel and invaded the free territory of the Republic of Korea in June 1950. In the events which followed, Communist Chinese forces became massively involved in the aggression. It was not only an active aggression against the Republic of Korea; it was an aggression against the

United Nations itself. And the United Nations, in a historic resolution of the General Assembly, directly condemned the Chinese Communists for participating in the aggression against the U.N. The actual language of one paragraph of that resolution, adopted on February 1, 1951, reads as follows:

The General Assembly . . .

Finds that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, by giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities against United Nations forces there, has itself engaged in aggression in Korea.

This put the problem of Chinese representation in a new and different perspective. It was now complicated by the fact that from the United Nations standpoint the Chinese Communists had, as it were, the status of an outlaw. To most U.N. members, including the United States, it seemed at the time quite inappropriate to regard the Chinese Communist regime as qualified in political terms to be represented in the halls of the United Nations, which it directly defied by armed force.

Legally speaking, we were not talking at this stage about the admission of a new member to the organization but about the narrower question of who should sit in the seats reserved for China in the U.N. Yet by analogy, the question of qualifications for U.N. membership necessarily came to the forefront. The U.N. Charter provides that U.N. membership is open to "peace-loving states" which accept the obligations contained in the U.N. Charter and which, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations. As long as Communist China defied the provisions of the U.N. Charter having to do with the maintaining of international peace and security, as long as it persisted in defending and justifying its acts of aggression in Korea, as long as it would not undertake to measure up to the standards to which all United Nations members subscribe, it did not seem to most U.N. members that Com-

munist China could properly be seated in the U.N.

The Korea episode has not been liquidated to this day, though relatively stable conditions exist along the 38th parallel. Yet, on top of the Korean experience, the U.N. has observed one manifestation after another of resort to aggressive force by the Chinese Communist regime. The Chinese Communists used force to subdue Tibet. In two military episodes the Chinese Communists overran the frontiers of India. They endeavored to force their way into control of the offshore islands which remained under the Government of the Republic of China.

Reaction to Communist Chinese Extremism

Nor were Chinese Communist efforts limited to the immediate borders under their control. Representing the most extreme wing of Communist doctrine, the Chinese Communists embarked on subversive activities in widely scattered areas, both in Asia and on other continents. Communists plotted to seize control in Malaya and later Indonesia. Chinese Communist support for subversion turned up in Africa. And Chinese Communist logistic and ideological support is a very appreciable factor in sustaining North Viet-Nam's aggression against South Viet-Nam.

In the end, Communist Chinese extremism has succeeded in alarming or offending almost everyone. You cannot, after all, preach a doctrine of permanent revolution without antagonizing governments and people who feel that they have already passed through their national revolutions. Even the Communist associates of Peking have found it impossible—save only Albania, Peking's ever-faithful spokesman—to maintain close and friendly relations with the Chinese Communists. And now, in recent months, we have observed astounding political convulsions within China itself.

This, then, is the background against which the problem of Chinese representation in the United Nations has been considered from year to year. It helps to explain why

the Chinese Communists have never attained representation in the United Nations despite the admitted fact that they hold under their control so large a population and so great an area of the earth's surface.

Let me say a few words now regarding efforts to obtain Chinese Communist participation in the U.N.

Originally these efforts were spearheaded by the then great and good friend of the Chinese Communists, the Soviet Union. Indeed, at the beginning of 1950 the Soviet Union sought unsuccessfully to challenge the credentials of the Republic of China in the U.N. Security Council. The Soviets actually walked out of the Council temporarily when they were defeated on this issue—ironically, thereby enabling the Security Council to act with great dispatch when the Republic of Korea was invaded in June of that year.

Since the Council is a continuing body, credentials are not periodically resubmitted as they are at the annual sessions of the U.N. General Assembly, and thus the issue has not recently arisen in the Security Council. It is worth remembering, however, that what would be at stake if it were would be more than a simple question of whether the Chinese representatives' credentials were in good form. A political issue of first-rank importance would be involved, and only the Security Council could make the determination.

In the U.N. General Assembly, the Chinese representation question has been taken up from year to year, always with the same result. For many years the Assembly adopted a so-called "moratorium" resolution in which the Assembly simply decided to take no action on proposals to change the representation of China. More recently, the direct issue of choice has been debated at length and put to the vote. As a matter of procedure, the Assembly has decided that any change in Chinese representation is an important political matter which, pursuant to the charter, requires a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly.

Actually, proposals for a change have never attained even a simple majority. There was a hair-trigger tie vote in 1965² (a two-thirds majority being required for action), but the balance in 1966 swung against the Chinese Communists by 11 votes. And the decisions taken at the General Assembly have been applied throughout the U.N. system of specialized agencies in the economic and social field.

Chinese Communist Attitude Toward U.N.

What are the reasons for this rare uniformity of action? Why is it that, in literally hundreds of decisions taken in the most diverse U.N. bodies over a period of 17 years during which the number of U.N. members has doubled, the results have always—with only one minor and temporary exception—been the same?

The answer cannot, I suggest, be reduced to the oversimplification that United States pressure has dragooned U.N. majorities into voting against their own convictions year after year. Certainly we have made our views known. Those holding different views have done the same. But we have made our views known on many other questions as well, with a less successful batting average than this. And be it noted, the cleavage on this subject splits the NATO allies, splits Asia, and splits Africa.

It seems more reasonable to believe that the facts bearing on the problem are the decisive element in the situation. This must be so, by the very nature of the case. For the entire thrust of the philosophy of the U.N. tends toward universality of participation; other things being equal, universality should enable the organization to function with maximum effectiveness.

But this does not mean that the members of the United Nations are willing to pay any price whatever to attain that goal. There are limits which they have not hitherto been willing to disregard.

The fact is that the Communist Chinese

² For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 13, 1965, p. 940.

leaders have not been willing, to date, to take any step which would indicate that they value participation in the United Nations system or that they particularly desire to participate.

First, they have never renounced the doctrine of the unfettered use of force in international affairs which they have advocated and pursued since they gained power. All around them, their nearby neighbors fear that they may be attacked.

Second, they persist in supporting subversive activities in other countries, boasting of their intention to foment "peoples wars" or "wars of liberation" in a kind of permanent wave of revolution. The effects are far reaching, as our involvement in Viet-Nam amply demonstrates. And the Maoist doctrine and mystique are unmatched in the advocacy of violence.

It will be argued that some states which are at present members of the U.N. are also less than completely committed to U.N. Charter objectives. We may admit that this is true and that unfortunately not every U.N. member observes standards of conduct which in our eyes would represent full compliance with the charter. But none has a record which stands comparison with that of the Chinese Communists. I am reminded of the recent report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement, which cites a survey indicating that 91 percent of those questioned admitted that they had at some time committed some act punishable by law. We do not on that account treat criminal elements as if they were ordinary men.

A third point impeding the Chinese Communist cause in the United Nations is the constant shrill, incredible campaign of abuse and vilification of the organization and its Secretary-General which spews forth from Chinese Communist sources.

A fourth point is the array of conditions put forward by the Chinese Communists for their entry. Seeking to stand history on its head, the Communists in 1965 demanded that the United Nations rescind its resolution condemning them for aggression in Korea, brand the United States as the ag-

gressor in that case, reorganize the United Nations in a fashion more to their liking, and expel states they regard as imperialist puppets while admitting others they consider qualified. How serious these demands are one cannot know, but they certainly give substance to the view that the Chinese Communists are intent on isolating themselves.

Fifth, and in the long run perhaps most important, the Chinese Communists insist as a condition of participation that the United Nations expel the Government of the Republic of China and leave Peking a free hand to take over the people and territory of Taiwan. This is a condition that the United States could not accept. The Republic of China on Taiwan with its population of 13½ million is larger than more than 80 other U.N. members. Its record in sustaining the principles and the work of the organization bears comparison with that of any member. We are not prepared to repudiate our commitments to the Republic of China—nor will other U.N. members do so.

This, then, is the record of the Chinese Communist problem in the United Nations in the past. Must we assume that the position will persist unchanged in the future?

No one can answer that question today—if only because no one can predict the outcome of the extraordinary political drama now gripping mainland China.

Yet, very few elements in international affairs are immutable. Changes are bound to occur in China, in other states, and in the United Nations. What bearing they will have on the problem as we see it today is obscure.

The "Study Committee" Proposal

One new and interesting element appeared in the consideration of the Chinese representation problem at the 21st General Assembly session last fall.

A number of Western governments—Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Italy, and Trinidad and Tobago—introduced a resolution³ proposing the establishment of a committee to explore and study the Chinese repre-

sentation situation in all its aspects in order to make recommendations to the 1967 session for an equitable and practical solution to the question of the representation of China in the United Nations in keeping with United Nations Charter principles.

The resolution was rejected by a vote of 34 for and 62 against, with 25 abstentions. We voted for it as a means of determining, through the proposed committee, answers to questions which, as Ambassador Goldberg informed the General Assembly,⁴ can only be answered by Peking. He put the questions this way:

Will they refrain from putting forward clearly unacceptable demands, and specifically the unacceptable demand that the Republic of China be expelled from this organization?

And will they assume the obligations of the U.N. Charter, in particular the basic obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state?

In supporting the "study committee" proposal, we made it clear that we did not consider that it prejudiced in any way our own commitment to the Republic of China.

Why did the proposal fail? In large part, I believe, because it was so strongly opposed by both the Republic of China and the sponsors of the Chinese Communists. Both of them resented any hint that it might be possible to settle the Chinese representation problem on any basis other than by a clear choice between one and the other.

It is not for us as Americans to question the reality of this sentiment on both sides. We are compelled to recognize that as matters stand today it tends to undercut proposals made by American citizens and others for what is known as a "two China" solution. Whatever plausibility such suggestions may have, the hard fact is that no one has as yet been able to convince either of the parties immediately concerned that they form an acceptable basis for dealing with this perennial problem.

This, then, will be the situation as we prepare for the United Nations General As-

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1966, p. 929.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 926.

sembly session of September 1967. As we did last year, we shall thoroughly review our tactics. I would not want to speculate now on the procedures which, 6 months from now, will seem most appropriate. But I can say that our actions regarding the problem will be determined within this very clear framework.

Chinese Communists' Isolation Self-Decreed

We do not have a frozen attitude on questions relating to China. The Korean conflict is slipping back into history. The fusillades of the cold war, as applied to other Communist countries, are now more muted; and we are exploring ways in which we can cooperate with these countries in limited areas to mutual advantage. The questions raised by Ambassador Goldberg are therefore very much in point: They do not demand from Communist China anything we would not expect from any other regime.

It should be clear that the United States is not engaged in a policy with regard to Communist China which is vindictive for its own sake. We are not conducting or planning a holy war in Asia. Nor do we have any designs or pretensions on the territory of Communist China or any other political entity.

Our concern is with practices of aggression and subversion. We oppose these because unless they are curbed our objective of a world governed by law and able to unleash its latent energies for peaceful progress cannot be attained.

Not only have we no desire to attack Communist China; we do not wish to isolate it. The recent record on this subject is quite clear. American and Communist Chinese negotiators have held 132 meetings since 1956 in Geneva and Warsaw. It may be that the United States has had more continued contact on matters of high policy with the Chinese Communists than any other Western country.

It is unfortunately true that these meet-

ings of ambassadors have produced little of substantive significance. That is because, to the Chinese Communists, a precondition for all progress is a requirement that the United States abandon the Republic of China—something which we are unwilling to do. But the essential fact is that both parties have a desire to maintain in being this unusual channel through which cases can be argued and points of view advanced. Given a more reasonable attitude on the part of the Chinese Communists, there is no reason why some day this channel cannot become more useful.

Furthermore, we have felt that Communist China's isolation is not a matter of United States or United Nations action, but something the Chinese Communists have decreed for themselves. It is not the United States or other Western countries which have maintained a modern Chinese Wall of rigid controls around Communist China. On the contrary, for many years the United States has vainly tried to persuade the Chinese Communists to agree to an exchange of journalists as one of the first steps to an increase in understanding between our people. More recently, we have taken steps to permit American scholars, experts in medicine and public health, and other specialists to travel to Communist China. But almost invariably all of our initiatives have been rejected by the Chinese Communists.

In a speech on the essentials for peace in Asia, President Johnson last July reviewed our policy toward Communist China.⁵ One of those essentials, he said, was "reconciliation between nations that now call themselves enemies."

The President developed this theme in his state of the Union message on January 10:⁶

We shall continue to hope for a reconciliation between the people of mainland China and the world community—including working together in

⁵ BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1966, p. 158.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1967, p. 158.

all the tasks of arms control, security, and progress on which the fate of the Chinese people, like their fellow men elsewhere, depends.

We would be the first to welcome a China which decided to respect her neighbors' rights. We would be the first to applaud her were she to apply her great energies and intelligence to improving the welfare of her people. And we have no intention of trying to deny her legitimate needs for security and friendly relations with her neighboring countries.

Our hope that all of this will some day happen rests on the conviction that we, the American people and our allies, will and are going to see Viet-Nam through to an honorable peace.

Thus, the door to cooperation between ourselves and the people of mainland China could be opened—but the keys are in their hands. The basic requirement is a desire on the part of Peking to cooperate peacefully with others. This could be demonstrated if Peking were to cease its support for the aggression against South Viet-Nam or if it would throw its influence on the side of unconditional negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the Viet-Nam conflict.

And there are many other areas in which, with absolutely no impairment of dignity or rights, the signal could be given that fair and free negotiation on problems of general concern could be undertaken. The world cries out for effective arms control measures, for a halt to the spread of nuclear weapons, for the freer flow of ideas and people and goods, for peaceful economic development, for conditions of security for all.

As of today there is no sign whatever of any response from Communist China to these imperatives of a better world order.

We await developments, in the spirit of President Johnson's address last July:

We persist because we know that hunger and disease, ignorance and poverty, recognize no boundaries of either creed or class or country.

We persist because we believe that even the most rigid societies will one day awaken to the rich possibilities of a diverse world.

And we continue because we believe that cooperation, not hostility, is really the way of the future in the 20th century.

That day is not yet here. It may be long in coming, but I tell you it is clearly on its way, because come it must.

These are our guidelines for the period ahead.

U.S. Issuing Visitors Visas With Indefinite Validity

The Department of State announced on April 5 (press release 82) that beginning April 15 it would authorize the issuance of visitors visas valid for multiple entries to the United States over an indefinite period of time instead of the present maximum duration of 4 years.

U.S. consular officers will issue the new visas on a selective basis to nationals of countries which do not require visas of American tourists and business travelers. The new visas permit temporary visits to the United States for business or pleasure any number of times. As heretofore, the Immigration and Naturalization Service will set the maximum period of time that a visitor may remain in the United States on the occasion of each visit.

The new visa procedure was instituted in recognition of this year's designation as International Tourist Year by the United Nations. It was developed jointly by the State Department and the United States Travel Service as members of the Presidential Cabinet Task Force on Travel chaired by Vice President Humphrey.

An amendment to the visa regulations of the Department of State was published in the *Federal Register* on April 6¹ with an effective date of April 15 authorizing issuance of indefinite validity visas under section 101(a)(15)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

¹ 32 *Fed. Reg.* 5620.

President Hails U.S. Council's Support of East-West Trade

Following is an exchange of letters between President Johnson and Christopher H. Phillips, president of the United States Council of the International Chamber of Commerce, together with a statement by the council.

TEXT OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S LETTER

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, March 25, 1967.

DEAR MR. PHILLIPS: I very much appreciated your letter transmitting the Council's policy statement on East-West trade. I know that the conclusions and recommendations are the products of profound study. All Americans can take pride in the creative spirit in which you, Mr. [Arthur K.] Watson, Mr. [Hoyt P.] Steele, and your other associates have approached this important question.

In my judgment, the statement is an eloquent expression of the case for giving the President the tools necessary to work for the improvement in East-West relations which is the best hope for a lasting peace. As you point out, increased peaceful trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union will serve our broad political objectives as well as our economic interests. Peaceful economic competition builds a common stake in stability. The day that it replaces the arms race as the primary form of East-West rivalry will be a landmark in the history of man.

Of course, we shall have to feel our way carefully. The East-West trade legislation I have proposed¹ was recommended by a distinguished group of businessmen, economists, and labor leaders; it is carefully designed to be used only when it is clear that our interests are served. It provides for trade, not aid. It does not affect the system of controls on the export of strategic goods. It does

¹ For text of the proposed legislation, see BULLETIN of May 30, 1966, p. 843.

not lower our guard; it simply permits us to grant the same tariff treatment to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe which we grant all other nations if, and to the degree that, it will further our interests.

The issue reduces to a simple question: should we be prepared to do our part to bridge the chasm between East and West which has so long threatened the peace of the world? Trade alone will not be sufficient to this task. But it will certainly be necessary. I believe, as you do, that we must be ready to respond as opportunities arise. The East-West Trade Act which I have proposed to the Congress would equip us to do so.

The policy statement of the United States Council of the International Chamber of Commerce is further powerful testimony to the wisdom of this course. Your countrymen are deeply in your debt.

My best personal regards to you and your fellow Council members.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Mr. CHRISTOPHER H. PHILLIPS

President

*United States Council of the International Chamber of Commerce, Inc.
New York, New York*

TEXT OF MR. PHILLIPS' LETTER

MARCH 3, 1967

THE PRESIDENT
*The White House
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The United States Council has devoted considerable attention in recent months to the possibility of changes in U.S. policies towards East-West trade. In view of the more hopeful and constructive relations which now appear to exist between the United States and the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the Council has concluded that the United States should work for an increased flow of mutually beneficial trade and production with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

I enclose a statement which details the

Council's recommendations, prepared by our Committee on Commercial Policy under the Chairmanship of Mr. Hoyt P. Steele, Vice President of the General Electric Company, and approved by our Executive Committee, whose Chairman is Mr. Arthur K. Watson, Vice Chairman of International Business Machines Corporation.

As you, probably know, the U.S. Council represents some 300 major U.S. corporations and banks engaged in international trade and production. It is the American section of the International Chamber of Commerce, an organization of world business leaders from some 75 countries. The recommendations contained in the U.S. Council's statement are those of our members only, but they are shared by the business communities of the other nations represented in the ICC.

It is our hope that legislation to permit an expansion of trade between the United States and the U.S.S.R. and other Eastern European nations will shortly be enacted by Congress and that hearings will be scheduled in the near future looking toward this end.

Respectfully,

CHRISTOPHER H. PHILLIPS

TEXT OF U.S. COUNCIL STATEMENT

The U.S. Council believes, for the reasons set forth in the next six paragraphs, that the United States should pursue a more flexible policy than in the past towards trade with Eastern Europe. To this end, the U.S. Council supports enactment of the proposed East-West Trade Relations Act and offers a further series of recommendations in the balance of this statement for measures it would urge the U.S. Government to take over a period of time should the climate for a regularization of trade between East and West continue to improve.

The recent NATO meetings decisively reflected the changes in East-West relations which have taken place in the last twenty years. After a generation of concentration on the defense of the West against the East, including commercial and economic policies oriented to that objective, the emphasis at this session and in the summary communique² issued at its conclusion was almost exclusively on commercial policies in keeping with the developing detente between East and West. The noticeable improvement in rela-

² *Ibid.*, Jan. 9, 1967, p. 49.

tions among Western nations and those of Eastern Europe certainly has at least some of its origins in the growing coincidence of the long-run interests of the United States and Russia in peaceful conditions in the world at large. To the extent that this coincidence is recognized by both parties, there is reason to hope that recent guarded progress toward normalization of commercial contacts will prove durable.

The gradual relaxation of cold-war tensions has already brought about a substantial increase in trade flows between Eastern European countries and those of the rest of the world. Both industrialized and developing countries have participated in this growth. However, in comparison with other industrialized nations, U.S. trade with the Eastern European nations has remained very small. During 1965, for example, Western Europe and Japan exported \$3.8 billion in goods to the Eastern European countries, excluding Yugoslavia, and imported almost \$4.5 billion from them. U.S. figures for this same period were only \$139 million in exports and \$138 million in imports.

As *The Economist* put it: "The communist countries remain the one market where America virtually leaves the field clear to Western Europe and Japan." The same article points out that Comecon (a limited Eastern European effort to mirror Common Market economic collaboration) includes within its perimeter over 330 million people—almost 60 million more than the countries of the EEC [European Economic Community] and the EFTA [European Free Trade Association] combined.

The U.S. Council does not believe that controls over strategic materials can at present be relaxed, but it does believe that the argument against trading with the USSR and other Eastern European countries on the grounds that such trade might contribute to their economic power is of limited validity. Trade by definition does not take place unless benefits accrue to both parties. If one nation refuses to participate, insofar as the second party can find another trading partner, the loss is entirely sustained by the country refusing to do business. This is the situation into which the United States has drifted. While other countries of the world are increasingly enjoying the benefits of expanded two-way trade with the Eastern European countries, our policies to a great extent deny these markets to our exporters and deny to our consumers those products in which the Eastern European countries are becoming competitive.

As other industrialized countries expand their markets within the Eastern countries, there is a natural tendency for the exporter's technology and standards to be accepted and adhered to in the importing nation. The longer that U.S. exporters refrain from participating in the markets of Eastern Europe the more firmly established in those markets will be the standards and technology of our competitors in other Western industrialized countries—

and the more difficult will it be for American companies to enter these markets in the future.

From the U.S. view, the most fundamental gain of all may well be the imprint inevitably made by successful and growing daily commercial operations, carrying as they do a continuous effective argument for the freer contractual trading policies which they inculcate.

Accordingly, the U.S. Council believes that the time has come for the United States to do what it can to make possible a regularization of trade and payments with the Eastern European countries. New opportunities are, in fact, arising for the U.S. to negotiate with the countries of Eastern Europe for modification on their part of policies which have rigidly reinforced the differences between our economic systems. We should be ready to take advantage of these opportunities.

Specifically, as noted above, the U.S. Council supports enactment of the East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966. Eastern European nations have more and more been pursuing individual national policies over recent years. They no longer constitute a monolithic bloc. The United States should be in a position to forge new relationships with these countries individually. New economic policies are being adopted by Russia and the other Eastern European countries designed to make their production more responsive to market considerations and their prices more reflective of costs. These policies, if successfully implemented, should gradually result in the production of more goods marketable in the United States and Western markets generally. The President should be empowered to grant most-favored-nation status to Eastern nations, enabling their goods to be imported into the U.S. at the same tariff rates as those of other countries of the world. Since tariffs at present have little meaning in the controlled economies of Eastern Europe, other concessions should be sought in exchange, such as market access for U.S. products, the protection of industrial property rights, the right to more direct contact between U.S. businessmen and the ultimate consumer/supplier, and satisfactory arbitral arrangements for the settlement of commercial disputes.

The extension of most-favored-nation treatment to Eastern European countries should enable the U.S. consumer to benefit from competitive imports from the Eastern European countries, and, at the same time, enable those countries to earn the foreign exchange with which to purchase U.S. goods. United States suppliers should be able to participate to the fullest extent consistent with our national security in the markets of Eastern Europe. To permit this participation there should be further removals of non-strategic items from the Export Control List, as

in the case of 400 items recently removed. Items which are freely available elsewhere in the world should not require individual export licenses in the United States.

The U.S. Council would not like to see a so-called credit race develop among Western suppliers to Eastern Europe. It recognizes, however, that recently credits of longer than five years duration have been granted in other industrialized countries. It does not believe that U.S. industry should be precluded from bidding on an equal basis with its competitors in other nations. It is recognized that a shortage of hard currencies in many ways places the countries of Eastern Europe in a position similar to that of many less developed countries, and that if sales of heavy equipment are to take place longer-term credits, more realistically representative of periods of amortization, may be essential. Bearing in mind that such exports are beneficial to the United States, the U.S. Council accordingly urges that U.S. suppliers be enabled to match the terms offered by their competitors. To this end, the credit guarantee policies of the Export-Import Bank should be similarly normalized to permit credits to be extended to buyers in Eastern European countries which are competitive with those of other Western suppliers, and the full use of these facilities should be encouraged. In principle, we believe that Eastern European governments should equally extend adequate credit to Western buyers, and would recommend that the Administration attempt to include provisions for reciprocal credit in trade agreements negotiated with individual countries.

The recent trend toward internationalization of production has not left Eastern Europe untouched. In the past few years a number of agreements have been concluded under which individual Western firms have undertaken to participate in the actual production of the USSR and other countries of Eastern Europe. American firms, which are prime initiators and leaders in the field of overseas production, should be able to participate in the opportunities which the large and growing markets of Eastern Europe present. U.S. government policy should support private efforts to respond to these markets. Where the underlying transaction warrants, credit terms should be as favorable as for other areas; similarly, the program of government guarantees against political risks ought in principle to include these markets. More systematic payment arrangements than now exist would be desirable, if not essential, to the growth of producing arrangements. To assist in the determination of credit-worthiness, and thus to expand the use of credits in business transactions, countries of Eastern Europe should be encouraged to publish financial data similar to that published

by Western countries—and by Yugoslavia—covering gold and foreign exchange reserves, total foreign indebtedness, and repayment schedules.

Many, if not most, of the problems encountered in attempting to increase peaceful commerce between East and West stem from the lack of participation of the Eastern countries in Western institutions. The present move toward association on the part of Poland with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade should be encouraged. It is to be hoped that other Eastern European countries will follow suit. Compliance on their part with the general rules of GATT in their external trade would do much to regularize the conditions for their Western trading partners.

Most important, however, is a return to normal commercial relations, as it was for the industrialized countries of the West after World War II, is eventual currency convertibility. Every opportunity should be pressed to broaden convertibility with the rest of the world. Increased transferability among Eastern European currencies should, where possible, be encouraged as an interim step. The recent addition of \$33 million of gold and convertible currencies to the fixed capital of the Comecon's bank, the International Bank for Economic Cooperation, should be welcomed. While there is little that can be done on our part to hasten this process, the U.S. Council recommends that the U.S. Government attempt to emphasize in its negotiations with Eastern European governments the benefits accruing from early convertibility. The question of Eastern countries' membership in the I.M.F. [International Monetary Fund] and the I.B.R.D. [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] could usefully be restudied by member countries and by Eastern countries. It is in the interest of the United States to see these countries assume the responsibilities that are inherent in membership in these organizations.

U.S. and Portugal Sign New Cotton Textile Agreement

The Department of State announced on March 24 (press release 64) that the Governments of the United States and Portugal had concluded a new comprehensive bilateral agreement concerning cotton textile exports from Portugal to the United States. The agreement was effected at Lisbon on March 23 in an exchange of notes between U.S. Am-

bassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., and Portuguese Foreign Minister Alberto Franco Nogueira.¹

The new agreement runs for 4 years, beginning January 1, 1967. It replaces the bilateral agreement of March 12, 1964, which was to expire on December 31, 1966, but was extended for 3 months to March 31, 1967, in an exchange of notes signed at Lisbon on December 19, 1966.²

Like its predecessors, the new agreement is designed to promote the orderly development of trade in cotton textiles between Portugal and the United States pursuant to the objectives of the Long-Term Arrangement for international trade in cotton textiles in which both countries participate.

The new agreement sets an aggregate limit for calendar 1967 of 102,300,000 square yards equivalent and covers all 64 categories of cotton textile trade. It provides for three group ceilings covering yarn (66,100,000 square yards equivalent), fabric (27,000,000 square yards equivalent), and apparel (9,200,000 square yards equivalent). Nineteen specific ceilings are also provided for. They include: each of the four yarn categories; those fabric categories covering ginghams, carded-yarn sheeting, carded-yarn twill and sateen, carded and combed yarn-dyed fabrics, as well as carded-yarn fabrics not elsewhere specified; and apparel categories covering T-shirts, knitshirts, sportshirts and slacks, blouses, dresses, ladies' suits, dressing gowns and nightwear.

Other provisions on flexibility, undue concentration, spacing, exchange of statistics, categories and conversion factors, consultation, administrative arrangements, equity, termination, and relationship of the agreement to the Geneva Long-Term Arrangement are also included.

¹ For text of the U.S. note, see Department press release 64 dated Mar. 24.

² Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5741 and 6186.

President Signs Joint Resolution on Food Assistance to India

Following is a statement by President Johnson made on April 1 upon signing H.J. Res. 267, to support emergency food assistance to India, together with the text of the joint resolution.¹

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

White House press release dated April 1

The war on hunger is the work of the entire world. H.J. Res. 267—supporting emergency food assistance to India—is a new expression of America's commitment to that humane task.

In passing the resolution by an overwhelming vote, the Congress has once again responded compassionately to India's critical food needs. We will provide her people with up to 3 million additional tons of food grain. An additional \$25 million worth of food is authorized for distribution by CARE and other voluntary agencies to families in drought-stricken areas.

The joint resolution demonstrates our faith in India's own drive to achieve self-sufficiency in food grains. We believe that her ambitious program of agricultural development will be rewarded with steadily increasing food grain production. What we and the other more fortunate nations do to help India through a crisis will enable her to push forward with an economic development plan which will, we hope, bring sufficient food within the reach of her 500 million people.

The resolution also underlines the fact that success depends on other nations' help. The United States is not able to supply all the

assistance that India needs. This offer endorsed by the Congress of up to 3 million tons of food grain in this resolution is contingent on appropriate matching from other countries. Other nations have responded in the past. We hope and trust they can and will meet these new and compelling needs.

The World Bank is already playing an important role in mobilizing the worldwide effort to assist India. It has called a meeting of the nations belonging to the India Consortium in early April to discuss this and other economic problems which India faces. We will carefully follow these deliberations and decisions.

I urge the nations attending that meeting to continue and to expand their food aid and general economic aid. I hope that nations which have not been associated with this effort in the past will join with us now, either formally or informally.

Hunger transcends national borders and ideologies. It is a condition that all understand and none can countenance. This resolution reaffirms America's intention to do its part to help India meet the threat of hunger that confronts her today.

TEXT OF CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION

JOINT RESOLUTION²

To support emergency food assistance to India.

Whereas the Congress has declared it to be the policy of the United States to combat hunger and malnutrition and to encourage economic development in the developing countries; and

Whereas two years of drought have caused a grave food shortage in India which threatens the lives and health of millions of people; and

Whereas the urgency of the need of the Indian people and the time needed for congressional deliberation have required the United States already to commit three million six hundred thousand tons of grain valued at \$275,000,000 as a part of the eight to ten million tons of grain estimated to be required during the calendar year 1967 from outside India to prevent irreparable hardship to the people of India; and

¹ For text of President Johnson's message to Congress on food for India dated Feb. 2, see BULLETIN of Feb. 20, 1967.

² Public Law 90-7, 90th Cong.; H.J. Res. 267, Mar. 20, 1967.

Whereas the programs of economic and agricultural development which have been launched by the Government of India would be seriously impaired if the international community failed to act promptly and on an adequate scale to meet the urgent needs of the people of India: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves the participation of the United States in cooperation with other countries and with multilateral organizations, including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and others, in urgent international efforts designed to—

(a) develop a comprehensive self-help approach to the war on hunger based on a fair sharing of the burden among the nations of the world;

(b) encourage and assist the Government of India in achieving food self-sufficiency; and

(c) help meet India's critical food and nutritional needs by making available agricultural commodities or other resources needed for food procurement or production.

Because uncertainty in connection with Public Law 480 transactions tends to depress market prices, it is the sense of Congress that, in carrying out this Aid to India program, the Administration should, subject to the requirement of section 401 of Public Law 480 with respect to the availability of the commodity at the time of exportation, make announcements of intention, purchases and shipments of commodities on schedules and under circumstances which will protect and strengthen farm market prices to the maximum extent possible.

The Congress endorses the President's policy of equal participation on the part of the United States with all other nations, under terms and conditions set forth in Public Law 480, as amended, in assisting the Government of India to meet these needs.

Further, the Congress recommends, on the basis of estimates now available, that the United States provide an additional amount of food grain not to exceed three million tons at an estimated cost of \$190,000,000 as the United States share toward meeting the India food deficit, provided it is appropriately matched, and specifically extends its support to the allocation of approximately \$190,000,000 of funds available to the Commodity Credit Corporation in calendar year 1967 which will be required to accomplish this purpose.

The Congress further recommends that the President provide an additional \$25,000,000 of emergency food relief for distribution by CARE and other American voluntary agencies.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.

Adherences deposited: Barbados, March 21, 1967; Uganda, April 10, 1967.

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963.¹

Ratification deposited: Argentina, March 7, 1967.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.

Readmitted to membership: Indonesia, February 21, 1967.

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.

Readmitted to membership: Indonesia, April 13, 1967.

Health

Amendment to article 7 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 20, 1965.²

Acceptance deposited: Morocco, March 2, 1967.

Postal Matters

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and convention with final protocol and regulations of execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881.

Adherences deposited: Guyana, Mauritania, Zambia, March 22, 1967.

Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly December 21, 1965.²

Signatures: Burundi, February 1, 1967; Colombia, March 23, 1967; Dahomey, February 2, 1967; Federal Republic of Germany, February 10, 1967; India, March 2, 1967; Iran, March 8, 1967; Somalia, January 26, 1967; Uruguay, February 21, 1967.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

Ratifications deposited: Costa Rica, January 16, 1967; Iceland, March 13, 1967; Tunisia, January 13, 1967.

Safety at Sea

Amendments to chapter II of the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted by the IMCO Assembly at London November 30, 1966.²

Acceptance received: United States, April 7, 1967.

Space

Treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. Opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow January 27, 1967.²

Ratification deposited: Bulgaria, April 11, 1967.

BILATERAL

Argentina

Agreement relating to radio communications between amateur stations on behalf of third parties. Effected by exchange of notes at Buenos Aires March 31, 1967. Entered into force April 30, 1967.

Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio operators of either country to operate their stations in the other country. Effected by exchange of notes at Buenos Aires March 31, 1967. Entered into force April 30, 1967.

Australia

Amendment to the agreement of June 22, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3830, 4687), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington April 11, 1967. Enters into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

² Not in force.

Ghana

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of March 3, 1967. Effected by an exchange of notes at Accra April 6, 1967. Entered into force April 6, 1967.

India

Agreement extending the agreement of April 15, 1964, as amended and extended (TIAS 5559, 5664, 6151, 6190), relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at New Delhi March 30, 1967. Entered into force March 30, 1967.

Israel

Agreement amending the agreement of June 18 and 22, 1962 (TIAS 5097), for financing certain educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem March 21 and 23, 1967. Entered into force March 23, 1967.

Korea

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454, as amended; 7 U.S.C. 1691-1736D), with annex. Signed at Seoul March 25, 1967. Entered into force March 25, 1967.

Mali

Understanding relating to the delivery of two C-47 aircraft and related articles and services. Effected by exchange of notes at Bamako January 5, 1967. Entered into force January 5, 1967.

Somali Republic

Agreement extending the technical cooperation program agreement of January 28 and February 4, 1961, as extended (TIAS 4915, 5332, 5508, 5738, 5814, 6148). Effected by exchange of notes at Mogadiscio February 27 and March 1, 1967. Entered into force March 1, 1967.

Agreement extending the technical cooperation program agreement of January 28 and February 4, 1961, as extended (TIAS 4915, 5332, 5508, 5738, 5814, 6148). Effected by exchange of notes at Mogadiscio March 30 and 31, 1967. Entered into force April 1, 1967.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LVI, NO. 1453 PUBLICATION 8232 MAY 1, 1967

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of

the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-

intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. PRICE: 52 issues, domestic \$10, foreign \$15; single copy 80 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).

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China. China, the United Nations, and the United States (Popper) 689

Communism. China, the United Nations, and the United States (Popper) 689

Congress. President Signs Joint Resolution on Food Assistance to India (Johnson, text of joint resolution) 700

Economic Affairs

President Hails U.S. Council's Support of East-West Trade (Johnson, Phillips) . . . 696

U.S. and Portugal Sign New Cotton Textile Agreement 699

Vice President Humphrey Returns From Trip to Europe (Johnson, Humphrey) 678

Europe

President Hails U.S. Council's Support of East-West Trade (Johnson, Phillips) 696

Vice President Humphrey Returns From Trip to Europe (Johnson, Humphrey) 678

Foreign Aid

President Signs Joint Resolution on Food Assistance to India (Johnson, text of joint resolution) 700

U.S. Decides Not To Resume Arms Aid to India and Pakistan (Department statement) 688

Germany. Vice President Humphrey Returns From Trip to Europe (Johnson, Humphrey) 678

India

President Signs Joint Resolution on Food Assistance to India (Johnson, text of joint resolution) 700

U.S. Decides Not To Resume Arms Aid to India and Pakistan (Department statement) 688

International Organizations and Conferences.

Vice President Humphrey Returns From Trip to Europe (Johnson, Humphrey) 678

Military Affairs. NATO Nuclear Planning Group Holds First Ministers Meeting (McNamara, communique) 686

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO Nuclear Planning Group Holds First Ministers Meeting (McNamara, communique) 686

Vice President Humphrey Returns From Trip to Europe (Johnson, Humphrey) 678

Pakistan. U.S. Decides Not To Resume Arms Aid to India and Pakistan (Department statement) 688

Passports. U.S. Issuing Visitors Visas With Indefinite Validity 695

Portugal. U.S. and Portugal Sign New Cotton Textile Agreement 699

Presidential Documents

President Hails U.S. Council's Support of East-West Trade 696

President Signs Joint Resolution on Food Assistance to India 700

Vice President Humphrey Returns From Trip to Europe 678

Singapore. Letters of Credence (Wong) . . . 688

Trade. President Hails U.S. Council's Support of East-West Trade (Johnson, Phillips) . . 696

Treaty Information

Current Actions 701

U.S. and Portugal Sign New Cotton Textile Agreement 699

United Nations. China, the United Nations, and the United States (Popper) 689

Zambia. Letters of Credence (Banda) 688

Name Index

Banda, Rupiah Bwenzani 688

Humphrey, Vice President 678

Johnson, President 678, 696, 700

McNamara, Robert S 686

Phillips, Christopher H 696

Popper, David H 689

Wong Lin Ken 688

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 10-16

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to April 10 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 64 of March 24 and 82 of April 5.

No.	Date	Subject
*85	4/12	Bunker sworn in as Ambassador to Viet-Nam (biographic details).
*86	4/13	Battle sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (biographic details).
*87	4/14	Nolte sworn in as Ambassador to the United Arab Republic (biographic details).

* Not printed.

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THE
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OF
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BULLETIN

Vol. LVI, No. 1454



May 8, 1967

PUNTA DEL ESTE CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN CHIEFS OF STATE

*Statements by President Johnson at Punta del Este
and Text of the Declaration of the Presidents of America* 706

*Excerpts From an Address by Ambassador Sol M. Linowitz
Before the National Press Club* 729

Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Meet the Press" 722

American Chiefs of State Meet at Punta del Este

The Chiefs of State of 20 member nations of the Organization of American States met at Punta del Este, Uruguay, April 12-14, to renew their commitment to the cause of Latin American economic and social development.

President Johnson arrived at Punta del Este on April 11 after a brief stop at Montevideo, where he was greeted by President Gestido of Uruguay. At Punta del Este, President Johnson attended the sessions of the 3-day Summit Conference, speaking at an informal session on April 12 and at a public session on April 13. During his 4-day visit to Punta del Este, President Johnson also held bilateral talks with the Latin American Presidents.

Following are President Johnson's remarks and statements at Montevideo and Punta del Este and the text of the Declaration of the Presidents of America, which was signed by 17 Chiefs of State, the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, and the representative of the President of Haiti at the closing session of the conference on April 14.¹

STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

Arrival, Carrasco Airport, Montevideo, April 11

White House press release (Punta del Este, Uruguay) dated April 11

President Gestido, Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen: Mr. President, I appreciate deeply your warm and generous welcome.

This is the first time that I step on South American soil. It is my very great privilege that it should be the land of Artigas.

More than 150 years ago, Artigas said:

"The cause of the people does not admit of the slightest delay."

The same cause brings us here to Punta del Este.

Six years ago a great charter was written in Punta del Este. Under its banner we have moved forward and made progress. We are demonstrating that free men working through institutions of representative democracy can best satisfy man's ambitions.

But we also know that our task is only in its beginning. The experience of the first 6 years of the Alliance tells where we must quicken the pace.

Diligent work has gone on during the past year in preparing the program which the Presidents will consider at this conference. This program is not a reaction to crisis, but it is a response of farsighted Latin American leadership to the needs of present and future generations.

The progress of our Alliance shows that the initiative is increasingly with Latin America. We in the United States welcome this—as we believe you do. I would repeat what I said to my fellow Presidents last August:² "Move boldly along this path and the United States will be by your side."

Mr. President, I look forward to this conference and to the opportunity it will afford me to exchange views with my fellow Presidents. I believe that personal contact is essential to understanding, and I know that understanding is the foundation of our common effort.

¹ President Otto Arosemena Gómez of Ecuador declined to sign the declaration; Bolivia did not attend the conference, and Cuba is not presently participating in the inter-American system.

² BULLETIN of Sept. 5, 1966, p. 330.

The hemisphere is grateful to your Government and your people for opening its doors to all of us. I should like to join my colleagues in saying *muchas gracias*.

Informal Session of Chiefs of State Conference, Punta del Este, April 12

White House press release (Punta del Este, Uruguay) dated April 12

Mr. Chairman, fellow Chiefs of State: I shall be presenting some thoughts in the agenda of our conference tomorrow; but as we enter into our private discussion of the declaration before us which our foreign ministers have prepared, I wish to make a few specific observations.

First, I want to restate my support of the program which you have set for yourselves.

In my message to the Congress on March 13,³ I recommended increased financial assistance to your countries in the areas covered by the declaration before me: economic integration, multinational projects, agriculture, education, and health. This represents my convictions and my policy today.

The decisions which you take here—and the followup action which you take in the months ahead—will enable me to pursue that policy.

Second, I wish to state my country's position on how we might assist in expanding Latin American trade.

Much of our thought and work in the hemisphere has centered in recent years on ways to expand the volume and the value of Latin American exports.

We all know that basically the answer lies in the diversification of agriculture and in making overly protected Latin American industry competitive and efficient. This is one of the reasons that we all support Latin American economic integration.

But we wish to be as helpful as we can in this transitional period in Latin American history.

We are now devoting a major effort to try to make the Kennedy Round negotiations a success. If they succeed, they will help us

all—including Latin America. But the process of freeing trade from unnecessary restrictions will not come to an end when the current important Kennedy Round negotiations are completed.

We have been examining the kind of trade initiatives that the United States should propose in the years ahead. We are convinced that our future trade policy must pay special attention to the needs of the developing countries in Latin America and elsewhere in the world.

We have been exploring with other major industrialized countries what practical steps can be taken to increase the export earnings of all developing countries. We recognize that comparable tariff treatment may not always permit developing countries to advance as rapidly as desired. Temporary tariff advantages for all developing countries by all industrialized countries would be one way to deal with this.

We think this idea is worth pursuing. We will be discussing it further with members of our Congress, with business and labor leaders, and we will seek the cooperation of other governments in the world trading community to see whether a broad consensus can be reached along these lines.

We also recognize the very special importance for certain Latin American countries of earnings from coffee exports. In our programs for assistance for agricultural development we are already helping to carry forward the process of diversification—which alone can prevent chronic surpluses. As a further step in this direction, we are prepared to lend \$15 million to the proposed international coffee diversification and development fund, with the understanding that the coffee-producing countries agree to contribute \$30–\$50 million per year over the next 5 years, and to lend up to \$15 million more to match contributions by other coffee-consuming members of the International Coffee Agreement.

I have been informed of the great importance which you attach to the use of Alliance for Progress funds to finance procurement in other Alliance for Progress countries as

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 3, 1967, p. 540.

well as in the United States. I know that you are all aware of the United States balance-of-payments problems, and we deeply appreciate your cooperation in helping us meet them.

The cooperative nature of our Alliance is very important to me. I want you to know that we shall undertake consultations on this matter. We shall try to establish whether we can agree that aid funds for capital projects and related technical assistance can be used in Alliance for Progress countries in ways which will protect the U.S. balance of payments.

The final point I would make has to do with the declaration which is before us. As the political leaders of our countries, we have the responsibility to translate complex issues into understandable language for our peoples. The decisions reached at this meeting are complicated decisions. Though essential to the progress and prosperity of our people, they may seem removed from pressing everyday needs unless we extract them from the language of the economists and diplomats—on whom we so greatly rely.

I know that when I return home I shall try to make clear to our people these basic decisions we have made together. And I am sure you will all wish to do the same.

Public Session of Chiefs of State Conference, Punta del Este, April 13

White House press release (Punta del Este, Uruguay) dated April 13

Mr. Chairman, fellow Chiefs of State, ladies and gentlemen: First, President Gestido, may I express, on behalf of my entire delegation, gratitude to you for the courtesy and generosity that Uruguay has offered her sister nations at this conference.

We have come to Punta del Este as the leaders of 20 governments—and as the trustees for more than 400 million human beings.

We meet in a city where, 5½ years ago, an alliance was formed, a pledge was made, and a dream begun.

Now we must measure the progress we have made. We must name the barriers that

still stand between us and the fulfillment of our dream. Then we must put in motion plans that will set us firmly on the way toward the proud destiny that is our peoples' right.

We meet as friends, as neighbors, and as allies. Hundreds of years ago we were the New World. Now each of us faces the problems of growing maturity—of industrialization, of rapid urban growth, of sharing the opportunities of life among our people.

We no longer inhabit a new world. We cannot escape from our problems, as the first Americans could, in the vastness of an uncharted hemisphere. If we are to grow and prosper, we must face the problems of our maturity. And we must do it both boldly and wisely—and we must face them now.

If we do, we can create a new America—where the best in man may flourish in freedom and dignity. If we neglect the planning, if we ignore the commitments that it requires, if our rhetoric is not followed by action, we shall fail not only the Americans of this generation but hundreds of millions to come.

In unity, and only in unity, is our strength. The barriers that deny the dream of a new America are stronger than the strongest among us acting alone. But they cannot stand against our combined will and our common effort.

So I speak to you as a ready partner in that effort. I represent a nation committed by history, by national interest, and by simple friendship to the cause of progress in Latin America. But the assistance of my nation will be useful only as it reinforces your own determination and builds on your own achievements—and only as it is bound to the growing unity of our own hemisphere.

As I have listened to the able and eloquent addresses of my fellow Presidents and Prime Ministers who have gathered here, and as I have surveyed the constructive suggestions that have been made, here are the tasks before us as I see it:

First, you will be forging a great new common market—expanding your industrial

base, increasing your participation in world trade, and broadening economic opportunities for your people. I have already made my position clear to my Congress and my people: If Latin America decides to create a common market, I shall recommend a substantial contribution to a fund that will help ease the transition into an integrated regional economy.

Second, you will design, and join together to build, great multinational projects that will open up the inner frontiers of Latin America. These will provide—at last—the physical basis of Simón Bolívar's vision of continental unity. I shall ask my people to provide over a 3-year period substantial additional funds for the Inter-American Bank's Fund for Special Operations as our part of this special effort. I have also asked the Export-Import Bank to give urgent and sympathetic attention, wherever it is economically feasible, to loans for earth stations that will bring satellite communications to Latin America so that this great hemisphere can have the communications it so sorely needs.

Third, I know how hard you are striving to expand the volume and value of Latin American exports. Bilateral and multilateral efforts to achieve this are already under way. But, as I made very clear yesterday afternoon in our private session, we are prepared to consider a further step in international trade policy. We are ready to explore with other industrialized countries—and with our own people—the possibility of temporary preferential tariff advantages for all developing countries in the markets of all the industrialized countries. We are also prepared to make our contribution to additional shared efforts in connection with the International Coffee Agreement.

Fourth, all of us know that modernizing agriculture and increasing its productivity is an urgent task for Latin America, as it is for the whole world. Modernizing education is equally important. I have already urged our Government to expand our bilateral assistance in the field of agriculture and in the field of education.

Fifth, you are engaged in bringing to

Latin American life all that can be used from the common fund of modern science and technology. In addition to the additional resources we shall seek in the field of education, we are now prepared to join with Latin American nations in:

- creating an inter-American training center for educational broadcasting and supporting a pilot educational television demonstration project in a Central American country that will teach the children by day and entertain and inform their families at night;

- establishing a new inter-American foundation for science and technology;

- developing a regional program of marine science and technology; and

- exploring a Latin American regional program for the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Sixth, the health of the people of Latin America ultimately depends on everything we do to modernize the life of the region. But we must never forget that when children are not provided with adequate and balanced diets they are permanently affected as human beings and as citizens. Therefore, we in our country propose to increase our food program for preschool children in Latin America by tripling it and substantially improve our school lunch program by doubling it in the year ahead. We are also prepared to set up in Latin America a demonstration center in the field of fish protein concentrates. We believe that this essential ingredient of a balanced diet can be provided at a much lower cost than has ever been known in our history.

Finally, I shall urge funds be provided to help establish Alliance for Progress centers at colleges and universities in the United States. Our partnership must be based on respect for our various cultures and civilizations. And respect is built upon knowledge. This new education program will offer new opportunities for students and educators of your countries and of my country to understand each other and to work closer together.

Our discussions here are couched in the

technical terms of trade and development policies. But beyond these impersonal terms stands the reality of individual men, women, and children. It is for them—not for the statisticians and economists—that we have come here to plan, to dream, and to work. It is for them—and especially for the young among them—that the hope and the challenge of this Alliance exists.

For them, we must move forward from this hour. Each of us present should engage in some introspection and ask ourselves:

What are we ourselves doing to build more schools, more hospitals, and more roads?

What are we doing to produce more food and to take the steps necessary on our own initiative to see that this job is done?

What are we ourselves doing to develop more trade; to take on the hard problems in our own countries of tax reform and land reform, of creating new jobs and new economic opportunities for our own people whom we presume to lead, of cleaning out the red tape and acting with the sense of urgency that our times require; and, above all, providing action to carry out the record and following through on the plans we have made?

I pledge to you today that I will do all I can, in my time of leadership, to help you meet these challenges.

One of the first groups that I met with the first week I was in the White House, when I became President, was the Ambassadors to Washington from Latin America. I called them to the East Room to talk to them about this program and their plans.⁴

From that hour until this I have accelerated America's contribution to the hemisphere by increasing substantially the flow of my country's funds—substantially increasing them by 35 percent the last 3 years over the preceding 3 years—to this hemisphere.

I know what is at stake for you, and I know what is at stake for me and my country. More than that, I know what is at stake for Latin America.

We raised the total flow of funds. For the

3 years 1961 to 1964, it ran \$3,700 million. From 1964, 1965 and 1966, that \$3,700 million was raised to about \$5 billion.

I know that the demands are increasing and the clock is ticking. I know that the dream of the new America will not wait. I know that most of you sense the same urgency, the same need for speedy decision and effective action in your own country, as well as in mine.

My fellow Presidents, I should like to conclude by speaking not only to you but speaking to the young people of your countries who will follow you, the youth of our nations—to the students in the schools and universities, to the young people on the farms and in the new factories, to the labor unions, to the civil service of our governments—to all of those who are moving into their time of responsibility.

This is the way I would like to speak to them this afternoon; this is the message that I would like to bring to them:

All that has been dreamed of in the years since the Alliance started can only come to pass if your hearts and your minds are dedicated and committed to it.

It is our duty—we who hold public office and bear great private responsibilities—to create an environment in which you can build your part of the new America.

It is your duty to prepare yourselves now—to use the tools of learning and the idealism that is your natural heritage for the humane purposes that lie deep in our common civilization.

You cry out for change, for what President Franklin Roosevelt called a New Deal. And you do not want it imposed from above. You want a chance to help shape the conditions of your own lives.

You—the youth of the Americas—should know that revolutions of fire have brought men in this hemisphere, and in jungles half the world away, still greater tyrannies than those they fought to cast off.

Here in the countries of the Alliance, a peaceful revolution has affirmed man's ability to change the conditions of his life through the institutions of democracy. In

⁴ *Ibid.*, Dec. 16, 1963, p. 912.

your hands is the task of carrying it forward.

The pace of change is not fast enough. It will remain too slow unless you join your energies, your skills and commitments, in a mighty effort that extends into the farthest reaches of this hemisphere.

The time is now. The responsibility is ours.

Let us declare the next 10 years the decade of urgency. Let us match our resolve and our resources to the common tasks until the dream of a new America is accomplished and is a reality in the lives of all of our people.

Thank you.

Statement After Conclusion of the Summit Conference⁵

The leaders of the Americas met in Bogotá and Punta del Este 6 years ago to inaugurate one of the most audacious programs in the annals of mankind.

The goal was to demonstrate that freedom and economic development are not enemies, that massive social and political transformations can be accomplished without the lash of dictatorship or the spur of terror.

That was a time to state the challenge. The years that have passed prove beyond any doubt that the nations and peoples of the Americas responded creatively to this challenge.

We returned to Punta del Este for an assessment of our achievements and our future obligations. We met in a spirit of candor, with a full realization of the scope of the problems that confront us.

We have looked at the past and the future with cold realism, knowing that our cause will not be served by either naive optimism or cynical pessimism.

We have learned much, and much that we have learned confirms the judgment of Ecclesiastes that "he who increaseth wisdom, increaseth sorrow." We have long since abandoned the view that rhetoric could alter a social system or that a blueprint could guarantee economic growth. Economic and social development is a task not for sprinters but for long-distance runners.

⁵ Released to news correspondents by the White House at Punta del Este on Apr. 14.

We know now that transforming the lives of over 250 million people requires a commitment to specifics. It requires a fierce, a stubborn, dedication to those undramatic day-to-day attainments that are the sinews of economic and social progress. This is especially true of the United States and Latin America.

We are greatly impressed by the steps that have been taken—the progress made by Latin America in recent years. We are also impressed by the high level of cooperation that has developed among the proudly independent nations of the Americas.

In my judgment this has been an extremely valuable conference. We have set our priorities for the next stage.

First, we have made some vital structural commitments. The fulfillment of these objectives will not only be a major accomplishment in its own right, but it will make possible wide-ranging improvements presently beyond our reach.

The Latin American Common Market, once achieved, will alter the whole economy of the hemisphere and will have consequences in every sector of social and political organization.

Multinational projects, opening the way for the movement of people, goods, electricity, will have a similar impact.

Second, we have moved to deal with a number of immediate problems:

- to expand Latin American trade;
- to modernize Latin American agriculture and increase food production to meet the needs of an expanding population;
- to combat illiteracy and improve educational systems;
- to provide access to the latest scientific and technological developments and so to help bridge the "technological gap";
- to expand health measures so that the latest fruits of medical science will be at the disposal of all our people;
- to eliminate unnecessary military spending.

The first phase of the Alliance has been a success by any realistic standard.

The second phase is now under way. It will cut to the heart of the problem—the modernization of overprotected Latin American industry, underfinanced Latin American agriculture and education. It will be difficult and demanding. It will require sustained effort.

The American people have responded generously to the needs of their fellow Americans; and I am sure that our friends in Latin America realize that we can be depended upon in the long struggle that will follow, as we could in the beginning of the Alliance.

I return to my country in good heart for this reason. I have met all of the Presidents of the Latin American Republics and the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago. I am convinced that the leaders of Latin America are serious and determined to develop their nations. And I believe the people of the United States will continue to respond to their efforts.

DECLARATION OF THE PRESIDENTS OF AMERICA

THE PRESIDENTS OF THE AMERICAN STATES AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO MEETING IN PUNTA DEL ESTE, URUGUAY,

RESOLVED to give more dynamic and concrete expression to the ideals of Latin American unity and of solidarity among the peoples of America, which inspired the founders of their countries;

DETERMINED to make this goal a reality within their own generation, in keeping with the economic, social and cultural aspirations of their peoples;

INSPIRED by the principles underlying the inter-American system, especially those contained in the Charter of Punta del Este,⁶ the Economic and Social Act of Rio de Janeiro,⁷ and the Protocol of Buenos Aires amending the Charter of the Organization of American States;

CONSCIOUS that the attainment of national and regional development objectives in Latin America is based essentially on self-help;

CONVINCED, however, that the achievement of those objectives requires determined collaboration by all their countries, complementary support through mutual aid, and expansion of external cooperation;

⁶ For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 462.

⁷ For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 20, 1965, p. 998.

PLEGGED to give vigorous impetus to the Alliance for Progress and to emphasize its multilateral character, with a view to encouraging balanced development of the region at a pace substantially faster than attained thus far;

UNITED in the intent to strengthen democratic institutions, to raise the living standards of their peoples and to assure their increased participation in the development process, creating for these purposes suitable conditions in the political, economic and social as well as labor fields;

RESOLVED to maintain a harmony of fraternal relations in the Americas, in which racial equality must be effective;

PROCLAIM

The solidarity of the countries they represent and their decision to achieve to the fullest measure the free, just, and democratic social order demanded by the peoples of the Hemisphere.

I

Latin America will create a common market.

THE PRESIDENTS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN REPUBLICS resolve to create progressively, beginning in 1970, the Latin American Common Market, which shall be substantially in operation in a period of no more than fifteen years. The Latin American Common Market will be based on the complete development and progressive convergence of the Latin American Free Trade Association and of the Central American Common Market, taking into account the interests of the Latin American countries not yet affiliated with these systems. This great task will reinforce historic bonds, will promote industrial development and the strengthening of Latin American industrial enterprises, as well as more efficient production and new opportunities for employment, and will permit the region to play its deservedly significant role in world affairs. The ties of friendship among the peoples of the Continent will thus be strengthened.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, for his part, declares his firm support for this promising Latin American initiative.

THE UNDERSIGNED PRESIDENTS AFFIRM THAT:

We will lay the physical foundations for Latin American economic integration through multinational projects.

Economic integration demands a major sustained effort to build a land transportation network and to improve transportation systems of all kinds so as to open the way for the movement of both people and goods throughout the Continent; to establish an adequate and efficient telecommunications system; to install interconnected power systems; and to develop jointly international river basins, frontier re-

gions, and economic areas which include the territory of two or more countries.

We will join in efforts to increase substantially Latin American foreign-trade earnings.

To increase substantially Latin American foreign-trade earnings, individual and joint efforts shall be directed toward facilitating nondiscriminatory access of Latin American products in world markets, toward increasing Latin American earnings from traditional exports, toward avoiding frequent fluctuations in income from such commodities, and, finally, toward adopting measures that will stimulate exports of Latin American manufactured products.

We will modernize the living conditions of our rural populations, raise agricultural productivity in general, and increase food production for the benefit of both Latin America and the rest of the world.

The living conditions of the rural workers and farmers of Latin America will be transformed, to guarantee their full participation in economic and social progress. For that purpose, integrated programs of modernization, land settlement, and agrarian reform will be carried out as the countries so require. Similarly, productivity will be improved and agricultural production diversified. Furthermore, recognizing that the Continent's capacity for food production entails a dual responsibility, a special effort will be made to produce sufficient food for the growing needs of their own peoples and to contribute toward feeding the peoples of other regions.

We will vigorously promote education for development.

To give a decisive impetus to education for development, literacy campaigns will be intensified, education at all levels will be greatly expanded, and its quality improved so that the rich human potential of their peoples may make their maximum contribution to the economic, social, and cultural development of Latin America. Educational systems will be modernized taking full advantage of educational innovations, and exchanges of teachers and students will be increased.

We will harness science and technology for the service of our peoples.

Latin America will share in the benefits of current scientific and technological progress so as to reduce the widening gap between it and the highly industrialized nations in the areas of production techniques and of living conditions. National scientific and technological programs will be developed and strengthened and a regional program will be started; multinational institutes for advanced training and research will be established; existing institutes of this kind in Latin America will at the same

time be strengthened and contributions will be made to the exchange and advancement of technological knowledge.

We will expand programs for improving the health of the American peoples.

The fundamental role of health in the economic and social development of Latin America demands that the prevention and control of communicable diseases be intensified and that measures be taken to eradicate those which can be completely eliminated by existing techniques. Also programs to supply drinking water and other services essential to urban and rural environmental sanitation will be speeded up.

Latin America will eliminate unnecessary military expenditures.

THE PRESIDENTS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN REPUBLICS, conscious of the importance of armed forces to the maintenance of security, recognize at the same time that the demands of economic development and social progress make it necessary to devote to those purposes the maximum resources available in Latin America.

Therefore, they express their intention to limit military expenditures in proportion to the actual demands of national security in accordance with each country's constitutional provisions, avoiding those expenditures that are not indispensable for the performance of the specific duties of the armed forces and, where pertinent, of international commitments that obligate their respective governments. With regard to the Treaty on the Banning of Nuclear Arms in Latin America, they express the hope that it may enter into force as soon as possible, once the requirements established by the Treaty are fulfilled.

IN FACING THE PROBLEMS CONSIDERED IN THIS MEETING, which constitute a challenge to the will of the American governments⁸ and peoples, the Presidents proclaim their faith in the basic purpose of the inter-American system: to promote in the Americas free and democratic societies, existing under the rule of law, whose dynamic economies, reinforced by growing technological capabilities, will allow them to serve with ever-increasing effectiveness the peoples of the Continent, to whom they announce the following program.

⁸ When the term "Latin America" is used in this text, it is to be understood that it includes all the member states of the Organization of American States, except the United States of America. The term "Presidents" includes the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago. The term "Continent" comprises both the continental and insular areas. [Footnote in original.]

II ACTION PROGRAM

Chapter I

LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

1. Principles, objectives, and goals

Economic integration is a collective instrument for accelerating Latin American development and should constitute one of the policy goals of each of the countries of the region. The greatest possible efforts should be made to bring it about, as a necessary complement to national development plans.

At the same time, the different levels of development and economic and market conditions of the various Latin American countries must be borne in mind, in order that the integration process may promote their harmonious and balanced growth. In this respect, the countries of relatively less economic development, and, to the extent required, those of insufficient market, will have preferential treatment in matters of trade and of technical and financial cooperation.

Integration must be fully at the service of Latin America. This requires the strengthening of Latin American enterprise through vigorous financial and technical support that will permit it to develop and supply the regional market efficiently. Foreign private enterprise will be able to fill an important function in assuring achievement of the objectives of integration within the pertinent policies of each of the countries of Latin America.

Adequate financing is required to facilitate the economic restructuring and adjustments called for by the urgent need to accelerate integration.

It is necessary to adopt all measures that will lead to the completion of Latin American integration, above all those that will bring about, in the shortest time possible, monetary stability and the elimination of all restrictions, including administrative, financial, and exchange restrictions, that obstruct the trade of the products of the area.

To these ends, the Latin American Presidents agree to take action on the following points:

a. Beginning in 1970, to establish progressively the Latin American Common Market, which should be substantially in operation within a period of no more than fifteen years.

b. The Latin American Common Market will be based on the improvement of the two existing integration systems: the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Central American Common Market (CACM). The two systems will initiate simultaneously a process of convergence by stages of cooperation, closer ties, and integration, taking into account the interest of the Latin American countries not yet associated with these systems, in order to provide their access to one of them.

c. To encourage the incorporation of other countries of the Latin American region into the existing integration systems.

2. Measures with regard to the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA)

The Presidents of the member states of LAFTA instruct their respective Ministers of Foreign Affairs, who will participate in the next meeting of the Council of Ministers of LAFTA, to be held in 1967, to adopt the measures necessary to implement the following decisions:

a. To accelerate the process of converting LAFTA into a common market. To this end, starting in 1970, and to be completed in a period of not more than fifteen years, LAFTA will put into effect a system of programmed elimination of duties and all other nontariff restrictions, and also a system of tariff harmonization, in order to establish progressively a common external tariff at levels that will promote efficiency and productivity, as well as the expansion of trade.

b. To coordinate progressively economic policies and instruments and to harmonize national laws to the extent required for integration. These measures will be adopted simultaneously with the improvement of the integration process.

c. To promote the conclusion of sectoral agreements for industrial complementation, endeavoring to obtain the participation of the countries of relatively less economic development.

d. To promote the conclusion of temporary subregional agreements, with provision for reducing tariffs within the subregions and harmonizing treatments toward third nations more rapidly than in the general agreements, in keeping with the objectives of regional integration. Subregional tariff reductions will not be extended to countries that are not parties to the subregional agreement, nor will they create special obligations for them.

Participation of the countries of relatively less economic development in all stages of the integration process and in the formation of the Latin American Common Market will be based on the provisions of the Treaty of Montevideo and its complementary resolutions, and these countries will be given the greatest possible advantages, so that balanced development of the region may be achieved.

To this same end, they have decided to promote immediate action to facilitate free access of products of the LAFTA member countries of relatively less economic development to the market of the other LAFTA countries, and to promote the installation and financing in the former countries of industries intended for the enlarged market.

The countries of relatively less economic development will have the right to participate and to obtain preferential conditions in the subregional agreements in which they have an interest.

The situation of countries characterized as being of insufficient market shall be taken into account in temporary preferential treatments established, to the extent necessary to achieve a harmonious development in the integration process.

It is understood that all the provisions set forth in this section fall within or are based upon the Treaty of Montevideo.

3. Measures with regard to the Central American economic integration program

The Presidents of the member states of the Central American Common Market commit themselves:

a. To carry out an action program that will include the following measures, among others:

(1) Improvement of the customs union and establishment of a Central American monetary union;

(2) Completion of the regional network of infrastructure;

(3) Promotion of a common foreign-trade policy;

(4) Improvement of the common market in agricultural products and implementation of a joint, coordinated industrial policy;

(5) Acceleration of the process of free movement of manpower and capital within the area;

(6) Harmonization of the basic legislation required for economic integration.

b. To apply, in the implementation of the foregoing measures, and when pertinent, the temporary preferential treatment already established or that may be established, in accordance with the principle of balanced development among countries.

c. To foster closer ties between Panama and the Central American Common Market, as well as rapid expansion of trade and investment relations with neighboring countries of the Central American and Caribbean region, taking advantage, to this end, of their geographic proximity and of the possibilities for economic complementation; also, to seek conclusion of subregional agreements and agreements of industrial complementation between Central America and other Latin American countries.

4. Measures common to Latin American countries

The Latin American Presidents commit themselves:

a. Not to establish new restrictions on trade among Latin American countries, except in special cases, such as those arising from equalization of tariffs and other instruments of trade policy, as well as from the need to assure the initiation or expansion of certain productive activities in countries of relatively less economic development.

b. To establish, by a tariff cut or other equivalent measures, a margin of preference within the region for all products originating in Latin American countries, taking into account the different degrees of development of the countries.

c. To have the measures in the two preceding

paragraphs applied immediately among the member countries of LAFTA, in harmony with the other measures referring to this organization contained in the present chapter and, insofar as possible, to extend them to nonmember countries in a manner compatible with existing international commitments, inviting the latter countries to extend similar preference to the members of LAFTA, with the same qualification.

d. To ensure that application of the foregoing measures shall not hinder internal readjustments designed to rationalize the instruments of trade policy made necessary in order to carry out national development plans and to achieve the goals of integration.

e. To promote acceleration of the studies already initiated regarding preferences that LAFTA countries might grant to imports from the Latin American countries that are not members of the Association.

f. To have studies made of the possibility of concluding agreements of industrial complementation in which all Latin American countries may participate, as well as temporary subregional economic integration agreements between the CACM and member countries of LAFTA.

g. To have a committee established composed of the executive organs of LAFTA and the CACM to coordinate implementation of the foregoing points. To this end, the committee will encourage meetings at the ministerial level, in order to ensure that Latin American integration will proceed as rapidly as possible, and, in due course, initiate negotiation of a general treaty or the protocols required to create the Latin American Common Market. Latin American countries that are not members shall be invited to send representatives to these meetings and to those of the committee of the executive organs of LAFTA and the CACM.

h. To give special attention to industrial development within integration, and particularly to the strengthening of Latin American industrial firms. In this regard, we reiterate that development must be balanced between investments for economic ends and investments for social ends.

5. Measures common to member countries of the Organization of American States (OAS)

The Presidents of the member states of the OAS agree:

a. To mobilize financial and technical resources within and without the hemisphere to contribute to the solution of problems in connection with the balance of payments, industrial readjustments, and retraining of the labor force that may arise from a rapid reduction of trade barriers during the period of transition toward the common market, as well as to increase the sums available for export credits in intra-Latin American trade. The Inter-American Development Bank and the organs of both existing inte-

gration systems should participate in the mobilization of such resources.

b. To mobilize public and private resources within and without the hemisphere to encourage industrial development as part of the integration process and of national development plans.

c. To mobilize financial and technical resources to undertake specific feasibility studies on multinational projects for Latin American industrial firms, as well as to aid in carrying out these projects.

d. To accelerate the studies being conducted by various inter-American agencies to promote strengthening of capital markets and the possible establishment of a Latin American stock market.

e. To make available to Central America, within the Alliance for Progress, adequate technical and financial resources, including those required for strengthening and expanding the existing Central American Economic Integration Fund, for the purpose of accelerating the Central American economic integration program.

f. To make available, within the Alliance for Progress and pursuant to the provisions of the Charter of Punta del Este, the technical and financial resources needed to accelerate the preparatory studies and work involved in converting LAFTA into a common market.

Chapter II

MULTINATIONAL ACTION FOR INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS

The economic integration of Latin America demands a vigorous and sustained effort to complete and modernize the physical infrastructure of the region. It is necessary to build a land transport network and improve all types of transport systems to facilitate the movement of persons and goods throughout the hemisphere; to establish an adequate and efficient telecommunications system and interconnected power systems; and jointly to develop international watersheds, frontier regions and economic areas that include the territory of two or more countries. In Latin America there are in existence projects in all these fields, at different stages of preparation or implementation, but in many cases the completion of prior studies, financial resources, or merely the coordination of efforts and the decision to bring them to fruition are lacking.

The Presidents of the member states of the OAS agree to engage in determined action to undertake or accelerate the construction of the infrastructure required for the development and integration of Latin America and to make better use thereof. In so doing, it is essential that the groups of interested countries or multinational institutions determine criteria for assigning priorities, in view of the

amount of human and material resources needed for the task.

As one basis for the criteria, which will be determined with precision upon consideration of the specific cases submitted for study, they stress the fundamental need to give preferential attention to those projects that benefit the countries of the region that are at a relatively lower level of economic development.

Priority should also be given to the mobilization of financial and technical resources for the preparation and implementation of infrastructure projects that will facilitate the participation of landlocked countries in regional and international trade.

In consequence, they adopt the following decisions for immediate implementation:

1. To complete the studies and conclude the agreements necessary to accelerate the construction of an inter-American telecommunications network.

2. To expedite the agreements necessary to complete the Pan American Highway, to accelerate the construction of the Bolivarian Highway (Carretera Marginal de la Selva) and its junction with the Trans-Chaco Highway and to support the studies and agreements designed to bring into being the new highway systems that will join groups of countries of continental and insular Latin America, as well as the basic works required to develop water and airborne transport of a multinational nature and the corresponding systems of operation. As a complement to these agreements, negotiations should be undertaken for the purpose of eliminating or reducing to a minimum the restrictions on international traffic and of promoting technical and administrative cooperation among land, water, and air transport enterprises and the establishment of multinational transport services.

3. To sponsor studies for preparing joint projects in connection with watersheds, such as the studies commenced on the development of the River Plate basin and that relating to the Gulf of Fonseca.

4. To allocate sufficient resources to the Preinvestment Fund for Latin American Integration of the IDB for conducting studies that will make it possible to identify and prepare multinational projects in all fields that may be of importance in promoting regional integration. In order that the aforesaid Fund may carry out an effective promotion effort, it is necessary that an adequate part of the resources allocated may be used without reimbursement, or with reimbursement conditioned on the execution of the corresponding projects.

5. To mobilize, within and outside the hemisphere, resources in addition to those that will continue to be placed at the disposal of the countries to support national economic development programs, such resources to be devoted especially to the implementation of multinational infrastructure projects that

can represent important advances in the Latin American economic integration process. In this regard, the IDB should have additional resources in order to participate actively in the attainment of this objective.

Chapter III

MEASURES TO IMPROVE INTERNATIONAL TRADE CONDITIONS IN LATIN AMERICA

The economic development of Latin America is seriously affected by the adverse conditions in which its international trade is carried out. Market structures, financial conditions, and actions that prejudice exports and other income from outside Latin America are impeding its growth and retarding the integration process. All this causes particular concern in view of the serious and growing imbalance between the standard of living in Latin American countries and that of the industrialized nations and, at the same time, calls for definite decisions and adequate instruments to implement the decisions.

Individual and joint efforts of the member states of the OAS are essential to increase the incomes of Latin American countries derived from, and to avoid frequent fluctuations in, traditional exports, as well as to promote new exports. Such efforts are also essential to reduce any adverse effects on the external earnings of Latin American countries that may be caused by measures which may be taken by industrialized countries for balance of payments reasons.

The Charter of Punta del Este, the Economic and Social Act of Rio de Janeiro and the new provisions of the Charter of the OAS reflect a hemispheric agreement with regard to these problems, which needs to be effectively implemented; therefore, the Presidents of the member states of the OAS agree:

1. To act in coordination in multilateral negotiations to achieve, without the more highly developed countries' expecting reciprocity, the greatest possible reduction or the elimination of tariffs and other restrictions that impede the access of Latin American products to world markets. The Government of the United States intends to make efforts for the purpose of liberalizing the conditions affecting exports of basic products of special interest to Latin American countries, in accordance with the provisions of Article 37(a) of the Protocol of Buenos Aires.

2. To consider together possible systems of general nonreciprocal preferential treatment for exports of manufactures and semimanufactures of the developing countries, with a view to improving the condition of the Latin American export trade.

3. To undertake a joint effort in all international

institutions and organizations to eliminate discriminatory preferences against Latin American exports.

4. To strengthen the system of intergovernmental consultations and carry them out sufficiently in advance, so as to render them effective and ensure that programs for placing and selling surpluses and reserves that affect the exports of the developing countries take into account the interests of the Latin American countries.

5. To ensure compliance with international commitments to refrain from introducing or increasing tariff and nontariff barriers that affect exports of the developing countries, taking into account the interests of Latin America.

6. To combine efforts to strengthen and perfect existing international agreements, particularly the International Coffee Agreement, to obtain favorable conditions for trade in basic products of interest to Latin America and to explore all possibilities for the development of new agreements.

7. To support the financing and prompt initiation of the activities of the Coffee Diversification Fund, and consider in due course the creation of other funds to make it possible to control the production of basic products of interest to Latin America in which there is a chronic imbalance between supply and demand.

8. To adopt measures to make Latin American export products more competitive in world markets.

9. To put in operation as soon as possible an inter-American agency for export promotion that will help to identify and develop new export lines and to strengthen the placing of Latin American products in international markets, and to improve national and regional agencies designed for the same purpose.

10. To initiate such individual or joint action on the part of the member states of the OAS as may be required to ensure effective and timely execution of the foregoing agreements, as well as those that may be required to continue the execution of the agreements contained in the Charter of Punta del Este, in particular those relating to foreign trade.

With regard to joint action, the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) and other agencies in the region shall submit to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IA-ECOSOC), for consideration at its next meeting, the means, instruments, and action program for initiating execution thereof.

At its annual meetings, IA-ECOSOC shall examine the progress of the programs under way with the object of considering such action as may ensure compliance with the agreements concluded, inasmuch as a substantial improvement in the international conditions in which Latin American foreign trade is carried on is a basic prerequisite to the acceleration of economic development.

Chapter IV

MODERNIZATION OF RURAL LIFE AND INCREASE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY, PRINCIPALLY OF FOOD

In order to promote a rise in the standard of living of farmers and an improvement in the condition of the Latin American rural people and their full participation in economic and social life, it is necessary to give greater dynamism to agriculture in Latin America, through comprehensive programs of modernization, land settlement, and agrarian reform when required by the countries.

To achieve these objectives and to carry out these programs, contained in the Charter of Punta del Este, it is necessary to intensify internal efforts and to provide additional external resources.

Such programs will be oriented toward increasing food production in the Latin American countries in sufficient volume and quality to provide adequately for their population and to meet world needs for food to an ever-increasing extent, as well as toward improving agricultural productivity and toward a diversification of crops, which will assure the best possible competitive conditions for such production.

All these development efforts in agriculture must be related to the overall development of the national economies in order to harmonize the supply of agricultural products and the labor that could be freed as a result of the increase in farm productivity with the increase in demand for such products and with the need for labor in the economy as a whole.

This modernization of agricultural activities will furthermore create conditions for a development more in balance with the effort toward industrialization.

To achieve these goals, the Latin American Presidents undertake:

1. To improve the formulation and execution of agricultural policies and to ensure the carrying out of plans, programs, and projects for preinvestment, agricultural development, agrarian reform, and land settlement, adequately coordinated with national economic development plans, in order to intensify internal efforts and to facilitate obtaining and utilizing external financing.

2. To improve credit systems, including those earmarked for the resettlement of rural workers who are beneficiaries of agrarian reform, and for increased productivity, and to create facilities for the production, marketing, storage, transportation, and distribution of agricultural products.

3. To provide adequate incentives, including price incentives, to promote agricultural production under economic conditions.

4. To foster and to finance the acquisition and intensive use of those agricultural inputs which contribute to the improvement of productivity, as well

as the establishment and expansion of Latin American industries producing agricultural inputs, particularly fertilizers, pesticides, and agricultural machinery.

5. To ensure the adequacy of tax systems that affect the agricultural sector, so that they may contribute to the increase of productivity, more production, and better land distribution.

6. To expand substantially programs of specialized education and research and of agricultural extension, in order to improve the training of the rural worker and the education of technical and professional personnel, and, also, to intensify animal and plant sanitation campaigns.

7. To provide incentives and to make available financial resources for the industrialization of agricultural production, especially through the development of small and medium industry and the promotion of exports of processed agricultural products.

8. To facilitate the establishment of multinational or international programs that will make it possible for Latin America to supply a larger proportion of world food needs.

9. To foster national programs of community development and of self-help for small-scale farmers, and to promote the creation and strengthening of agricultural cooperatives.

By recognizing the importance of the stated objectives, goals and means, the Presidents of the member states of the OAS undertake, within the spirit of the Alliance for Progress, to combine intensified internal efforts with additional external support especially earmarked for such measures.

They call upon CIAP, when analyzing the agricultural sector as included in national development plans, to bear in mind the objectives and measures indicated herein, giving due attention to agrarian reform programs in those countries that consider these programs an important basis for their agricultural progress and economic and social development.

Chapter V

EDUCATIONAL, TECHNOLOGICAL, AND SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT AND INTENSIFICATION OF HEALTH PROGRAMS

A. *Education and Culture*

Education is a sector of high priority in the overall development policy of Latin American nations.

The Presidents of the member states of the OAS recognize that, during the past decade, there has been development of educational services in Latin America unparalleled in any other period of the history of their countries.

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that:

- a. It is necessary to increase the effectiveness of national efforts in the field of education;

b. Educational systems should be more adequately adjusted to the demands of economic, social, and cultural development;

c. International cooperation in educational matters should be considerably intensified, in accordance with the new standards of the Charter of the OAS.

To these ends, they agree to improve educational administrative and planning systems; to raise the quality of education so as to stimulate the creativity of each pupil; to accelerate expansion of educational systems at all levels; and to assign priority to the following activities related to economic, social, and cultural development:

1. Orientation and, when necessary, reorganization of educational systems, in accordance with the needs and possibilities of each country, in order to achieve:

a. The expansion and progressive improvement of preschool education and extension of the period of general education;

b. An increase in the capacity of secondary schools and the improvement of their curricula;

c. An increase in opportunities following general education, including opportunities for learning a trade or a specialty or for continuing general education;

d. The gradual elimination of barriers between vocational and general education;

e. The expansion and diversification of university courses, so that they will include the new professions essential to economic and social development;

f. The establishment or expansion of graduate courses through professional schools;

g. The establishment of refresher courses in all branches and types of education, so that graduates may keep their knowledge up to date in this era of rapid scientific and technological progress;

h. The strengthening and expansion of adult education programs;

i. The promotion of special education for exceptional students.

2. Promotion of basic and advanced training for teachers and administrative personnel; development of educational research and experimentation, and adequate expansion of school building programs.

3. Broadening of the use of educational television and other modern teaching techniques.

4. Improvement of rural elementary schools to achieve a level of quality equal to that of urban elementary schools, with a view to assuring equal educational opportunities to the rural population.

5. Reorganization of vocational education, when necessary, taking into account the structure of the labor force and the foreseeable manpower needs of each country's development plan.

6. An increase in private financing of education.

7. Encouragement of local and regional communities to take an effective part in the construction of school buildings and in civic support to educational development.

8. A substantial increase in national scholarship and student loan and aid programs.

9. Establishment or expansion of extension services and services for preserving the cultural heritage and encouraging intellectual and artistic activity.

10. Strengthening of education for international understanding and Latin American integration.

Multinational efforts

1. Increasing international resources for the purposes set forth in this chapter.

2. Instructing the appropriate agencies of the OAS to:

a. Provide technical assistance to the countries that so request:

i) In educational research, experimentation, and innovation;

ii) For training of specialized personnel;

iii) In educational television. It is recommended that study be made of the advisability of establishing a multinational training center in this field;

b. Organize meetings of experts to recommend measures to bring national curricula into harmony with Latin American integration goals;

c. Organize regional volunteer teacher programs;

d. Extend inter-American cooperation to the preservation and use of archeological, historic, and artistic monuments.

3. Expansion of OAS programs for fellowships, student loans, and teacher exchange.

National educational and cultural development efforts will be evaluated in coordination by CIAP and the Inter-American Council for Education, Science, and Culture (now the Inter-American Cultural Council).

B. Science and technology

Advances in scientific and technological knowledge are changing the economic and social structure of many nations. Science and technology offer infinite possibilities for providing the people with the well-being that they seek. But in Latin American countries the potentialities that this wealth of the modern world offers have by no means been realized to the degree and extent necessary.

Science and technology offer genuine instruments for Latin American progress and must be given an unprecedented impetus at this time. This effort calls for inter-American cooperation, in view of the magnitude of the investments required and the level attained in such knowledge. In the same way, their organization and implementation in each country cannot be effected without a properly planned scientific and technological policy within the general framework of development.

For the above reasons the Presidents of the member states of the OAS agree upon the following measures:

Internal efforts

Establishment, in accordance with the needs and possibilities of each country, of national policies in the field of science and technology, with the necessary machinery and funds, the main elements of which shall be:

1. Promotion of professional training for scientists and technicians and an increase in their numbers.

2. Establishment of conditions favoring full utilization of the scientific and technological potential for solving the economic and social problems of Latin America, and to prevent the exodus of persons qualified in these fields.

3. Encouragement of increased private financial contributions for scientific and technological research and teaching.

Multinational efforts

1. Establishment of a Regional Scientific and Technological Development Program designed to advance science and technology to a degree that they will contribute substantially to accelerating the economic development and well-being of their peoples and make it feasible to engage in pure and applied scientific research of the highest possible quality. This Program shall complement Latin American national programs in the area of science and technology and shall take special account of the characteristics of each of the countries.

2. The Program shall be oriented toward the adoption of measures to promote scientific and technological research, teaching, and information; basic and advanced training of scientific personnel; and exchange of information. It shall promote intensively the transfer to, and adaptation by, the Latin American countries of knowledge and technologies originating in other regions.

3. The Program shall be conducted through national agencies responsible for scientific and technological policy, through institutions—national or international, public or private—either now existing or to be established in the future.

4. As part of the Program, they propose that multinational technological and scientific training and research institutions at the post-graduate level be established, and that institutions of this nature already existing in Latin America be strengthened. A group, composed of high-ranking, qualified persons, experienced in science, technology, and university education, shall be established to make recommendations to the Inter-American Council for Education, Science, and Culture (now the Inter-American Cultural Council) on the nature of such multinational institutions, including such matters as their organization, the characteristics of their multinational administration, financing, location, coordi-

nation of their activities among themselves and with those of pertinent national institutions, and on the other aspects of their operation. The aforementioned group, selected and convoked by the Inter-American Council for Education, Science, and Culture (now the Inter-American Cultural Council) or, failing this, by CIAP, shall meet within 120 days after the close of this meeting.

5. In order to encourage the training of scientific and technological personnel at the higher academic levels, they resolve that an Inter-American Fund for Scientific and Technological Training shall be established as part of the Program, so that scientists and research workers from Latin American countries may pursue advanced scientific and technological studies, with the obligation to engage in a period of scientific work in Latin America.

6. The Program shall be promoted by the Inter-American Council for Education, Science, and Culture (now the Inter-American Cultural Council), in cooperation with CIAP. They shall coordinate their activities with similar activities of the United Nations and other interested organizations.

7. The program may be financed by contributions of the member states of the inter-American system, inter-American or international institutions, technologically advanced countries, universities, foundations, and private individuals.

C. Health

Improvement of health conditions is fundamental to the economic and social development of Latin America.

Available scientific knowledge makes it possible to obtain specific results, which, in accordance with the needs of each country and the provisions of the Charter of Punta del Este, should be utilized to attain the following objectives:

a. Control of communicable diseases and eradication of those for which methods for total elimination exist. Pertinent programs shall receive international coordination when necessary.

b. Acceleration of programs for providing drinking-water supplies, sewerage, and other services essential to environmental sanitation in rural and urban areas, giving preference to lower-income groups. On the basis of studies carried out and with the cooperation of international financing agencies, national revolving fund systems shall be used to assure the continuity of such programs.

c. Greater and more rapid progress in improving nutrition of the neediest groups of the population, taking advantage of all possibilities offered by national effort and international cooperation.

d. Promotion of intensive mother and child welfare programs and of educational programs on overall family guidance methods.

e. Priority for basic and advanced training of professional, technical, administrative, and auxiliary personnel, and support of operational and adminis-

trative research in the field of health.

f. Incorporation, as early as the preinvestment phase, of national and regional health programs into general development plans.

The Presidents of the member states of the OAS, therefore, decide:

1. To expand, within the framework of general planning, the preparation and implementation of national plans that will strengthen infrastructure in the field of health.

2. To mobilize internal and external resources to meet the needs for financing these plans. In this connection, to call upon CIAP, when analyzing the health sector in national development programs, to take into account the objectives and needs indicated.

3. To call upon the Pan American Health Organization to cooperate with the governments in the preparation of specific programs relating to these objectives.

Chapter VI

ELIMINATION OF UNNECESSARY MILITARY EXPENDITURES

The Latin American Presidents, conscious of the importance of the armed forces in maintaining security, at the same time recognize that the demands of economic development and social progress make it necessary to apply the maximum resources available in Latin America to these ends.

Consequently, they express their intention to limit military expenditures in proportion to the actual demands of national security, in accordance with each country's constitutional provisions, avoiding those expenditures that are not indispensable for the performance of the specific duties of the armed forces and, where pertinent, of international commitments that obligate their respective governments.

With regard to the Treaty on the Banning of Nuclear Arms in Latin America, they express the hope that it may enter into force as soon as possible, once the requirements established by the Treaty are fulfilled.

DONE at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in the English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish languages, this Pan American Day, the fourteenth of April of the year one thousand nine hundred sixty-seven, the seventy-seventh anniversary of the founding of the inter-American system.

LIST OF SIGNATORIES TO THE DECLARATION OF THE PRESIDENTS OF AMERICA (In the order of signing)

JUAN CARLOS ONGANIA
Presidente de la República Argentina

ARTHUR DA COSTA E SILVA
Presidente de República do Brasil

CARLOS LLERAS RESTREPO
Presidente de la República de Colombia

JOSE JOAQUIN TREJOS FERNANDEZ
Presidente de la República de Costa Rica

EDUARDO FREI MONTALVA
Presidente de la República de Chile

FIDEL SANCHEZ HERNANDEZ
Presidente Electo de la República de El Salvador

LYNDON B. JOHNSON
President of the United States of America

JULIO CESAR MENDEZ MONTENEGRO
Presidente de la República de Guatemala

ARTHUR BONHOMME
Représentant du Président de la République d'Haiti

OSWALDO LOPEZ ARELLANO
Presidente de la República de Honduras

GUSTAVO DIAZ ORDAZ
Presidente de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos

LORENZO GUERRERO
Presidente de la República de Nicaragua

MARCO A. ROBLES
Presidente de la República de Panamá

ALFREDO STROESSNER
Presidente de la República del Paraguay

FERNANDO BELAUNDE TERRY
Presidente de la República del Perú

JOAQUIN BALAGUER
Presidente de la República Dominicana

ERIC WILLIAMS
Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago

RAUL LEONI
Presidente de la República de Venezuela

OSCAR DIEGO GESTIDO
Presidente de la República Oriental del Uruguay

MEMBERS OF THE U.S. DELEGATION

President Johnson

Dean Rusk, Secretary of State

Henry A. Hoyt, Ambassador to Uruguay

William S. Gaud, Administrator, Agency for International Development

Sol M. Linowitz, U.S. Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States

Leonard H. Marks, Director, United States Information Agency

Donald F. Hornig, Special Assistant to the President

Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President

George E. Christian, Press Secretary to the President
Anthony M. Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

Lincoln Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

W. True Davis, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Treasury

David Bronheim, Deputy U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress

Secretary Rusk Discusses the Punta del Este Conference and Viet-Nam on "Meet the Press"

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Rusk on April 16 on the National Broadcasting Company's television and radio program "Meet the Press." Interviewing the Secretary were John Hightower of the Associated Press, Philip Potter of the Baltimore Sun, Ray Scherer of NBC News, and Lawrence E. Spivak, permanent member of the "Meet the Press" panel.

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, the history of Latin America is full of pacts and promises to bring social and economic reform or change. Why do you think this latest agreement at Punta del Este will succeed where the others have fallen so far short in the past?

Secretary Rusk: I think, in the first place, at Punta the Presidents of Latin America committed themselves to move toward a common market for Latin America. This is a major decision, perhaps the most important decision they will have made since they became independent states, and I was impressed with the seriousness of their determination on this point.

Further, I think there are solid accomplishments already in the Alliance for Progress, but everyone, I think, recognizes that time is running short, that this total effort must be stepped up; and I think our Latin American friends understood that on their side as well as on our side. The notion that this next 10 years must be a decade of urgency is one that was generally accepted and came out in the speeches of the Latin American Presidents.

I was impressed with the fact that there was so little empty rhetoric. There was some

very serious discussion of some very important practical problems.

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, what relevance does a common market that isn't started until 1970 and isn't going to be in real operation until 1985 have to the very serious and immediate problems of Latin America: poverty, illiteracy, overpopulation, lack of liberties?

Secretary Rusk: There are two different parts of it. One has to do with the development that goes on in each country. I have no doubt that this great development effort will be stepped up, but as far as the common market is concerned, there are certain things they will begin doing immediately.

For example, they have agreed that they will not interpose any additional restrictions on trade among themselves. Now, that is a negative decision but it is an important one.

Secondly, between now and 1970 they will begin to create some margins of preference within the inter-American countries in their own tariff structure. But I would like to emphasize that this is an extremely complex problem in putting together the economies of some 19 or 20 countries.

Mr. Spivak: What do you consider are some of the major problems they face in bringing the common market into execution?

Secretary Rusk: Well, one of the problems is that there are countries in the common market at different stages of development. Even within South America alone there are three that are relatively underdeveloped—Paraguay, for example, Ecuador. There are others who are called countries of limited markets, countries like Colombia, Venezuela,

Uruguay, Chile; and there are the three advanced countries of Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico.

Now, it isn't easy to mesh countries together into a single economy that are in different stages of development, and so they will be taking some time between now and 1970 to put together the machinery of the common market. My guess is that if they will work very hard they can just about make it, but it is not the kind of decision that can be made overnight.

Opportunities of Economic Coalition

Mr. Hightower: Mr. Secretary, so many of the Latin American countries have been unable to solve their individual problems. Is there any reason to think they can solve their joint problems by going into a continentwide market? Are you merging strength, or are you merging weakness?

Secretary Rusk: I think the key point to bear in mind is that economic integration in Latin America will surely contribute to a rapid industrial development, based upon the prospect of a market that now would contain some 250 million people and by another 30 years might be a market of 500 million people. That makes it possible for industries to establish themselves with quite different opportunities than they now face with more limited national markets if they are contemplating investment in Latin America. This would apply also to the mobilization of their local resources.

I think also the Latin American countries are getting into a position to help each other more. Mexico, for example, is contributing very strongly in the economic—in the technical and scientific field to other countries in Latin America; Chile is training economists; Brazil is training doctors; Mexico and Colombia are providing improved seed. And I think as they move toward economic coalition there will be many more opportunities opening up for them and for outsiders than would be true if they remained, say, 20 national markets.

Mr. Hightower: The next question relates to how the United States may be able to assist

in this process. Does the President intend to go through with his plan of asking Congress for additional funds for assistance to Latin America, and if so, how much?

Secretary Rusk: We have indicated we would hope this year to replenish the Fund for Special Operations of the Inter-American Bank at a somewhat higher level, the range of \$300 million instead of \$250 million, in order that that additional money can be used in these multinational projects, such as connecting highways and telecommunications systems and projects of that sort, to provide some of the physical basis for economic integration.

Then we will be asking for an increased appropriation this year to the Alliance for Progress.

The third principal source of possible aid would come in 1969 to 1970 in connection with the possibility of some fund in support of the common market itself, but that is a long time off yet.

Mr. Hightower: Our present aid is running at the rate of about \$1 billion a year to Latin America.

Secretary Rusk: Just over a billion dollars from all sources.

Mr. Hightower: Is the idea that in the next year or so this might go up to \$1.3 billion or a billion and a half?

Secretary Rusk: Well, the President has indicated to the Congress that this year we will expect to increase our appropriation to the Alliance for Progress by \$100 million and next year by \$200 million.

Mr. Potter: Before going to that Summit Conference you tried to get a resolution through Congress of support for our position there and it was amended to the point where administration spokesmen said it was worse than useless. How, in view of that, do you anticipate getting more money out of Congress for increased spending that the President has promised—

Secretary Rusk: I think in the first place this question of a resolution in the Congress got caught up in a procedural debate as to how the President and the Congress should consult each other and whether the Congress

itself ought to come up with a resolution in advance of a commitment of this sort.

Now, as you may recall, when President Johnson was Majority Leader he helped President Eisenhower get an almost immediate resolution in the Congress in support of a \$500 million additional Latin American effort that was agreed to at Bogotá in 1960. And the President felt that it would be important for him to know what the Congress had to say on this matter before he went to the conference. Now, the House of Representatives expressed itself. The resolution in the Senate more or less left the situation as it would have been had the President simply gone on his own without consulting the Congress.

But in that discussion a number of the Senators who had apparently some doubts about the procedure expressed their support for an increased effort in Latin America and more or less encouraged us to go ahead in the confidence that the Congress would probably back us up after we hear from the Latin Americans as to what they wanted to do.

Mr. Potter: Why didn't the population explosion, which is the world's worst, figure in the context of the conference there?

Secretary Rusk: Quite frankly, Mr. Potter, I think that these countries could do more about it if we talked as little about it as possible. Some of them are taking steps in that direction, but they prefer to take them quietly rather than create a great national debate—as we would have had in our own country, say, 25 or 30 years ago.

Recognition of Importance of Self-Help

Mr. Scherer: Mr. Secretary, again on the question of the resolution, some observers have made the point that perhaps it was an unintended blessing that the Senate did not give the President that resolution, that it tended to put the emphasis at the conference on self-help. Could you go along with that view?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I don't want to go through a postmortem now on the resolution, because we know where we are now and we go on from here and get our job done; but I think the notion that development turns critically upon self-help has been getting around the hemisphere in a very realistic fashion for a period of some months. The Latin American press has reflected that in relation to this particular meeting, and this is understandable. External assistance to Latin America will be in the order of perhaps up to 2 percent of their gross national product. What they do with the 98 percent of their gross national product will determine their success or failure in development, and this is beginning to get across in Latin America. And so I was very pleased there was such strong insistence by the Latin Americans themselves on self-help and a recognition that that is a necessary preliminary to anything that external aid could do.

Mr. Scherer: President [Oscar D.] Gestido of Uruguay said that the conference turned out better than he expected. What do you suppose he meant by that?

Major Decisions Reached

Secretary Rusk: I have participated in the preliminary meetings of the Foreign Ministers on at least two occasions, and we did not know to what extent the different countries would be willing to put aside their bilateral problems or the smaller technical problems in order to come together on the great strategic issues of the hemisphere in the economic and social field. Well, I was pleased that at the meeting of the Presidents, the Presidents gave their attention to those things which were genuinely of Presidential importance, and they did not pursue some of the technical details which have been raised in the Foreign Ministers meeting; and I think if you looked at the connection between the advance preparations on the one side and the results of the meeting on the other you would see what President Gestido had in mind.

Mr. Scherer: Mr. Secretary, everybody is

calling this conference a success. How many years will it be before we know it really was the success it seemed to be; when will progress toward a common market be measurable?

Secretary Rusk: I think we can see some beginning of that now, but I think we would not know until about 1969 or 1970 whether they will be able to agree on the machinery and the basic principles of the common market that would be necessary for it to get started. This involves marrying the LAFTA [Latin American Free Trade Association] common market in South America with the Central American Common Market without having one get in the way of the other. As I say, this is a very complicated matter and it will take a lot of work, but it will be about 1969 or '70 before we can see the major decisions reached which will put the common market into business.

Effect of Antiwar Demonstrations

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, I'd like to take you to Viet-Nam for a question or two. We had huge demonstrations again yesterday. Do you think these demonstrations are having an effect in North Viet-Nam? Do you think that they are prolonging the war in any way?

Secretary Rusk: Well, these have been called "huge." I suppose they are large, but remember, we have a population of almost 200 million people and those who speak for the 200 million Americans are the President and the Congress on such issues. We have in our constitutional system an opportunity for lawful and peaceful expression. I am concerned, Mr. Spivak, that the authorities in Hanoi may misunderstand this sort of thing and that the net effect of these demonstrations will be to prolong the war and not to shorten it. You see, if we heard that 100,000 people were marching in Hanoi for peace, we would draw very important conclusions from it. Now, we don't know whether Hanoi is sufficiently sophisticated to understand that this is not the way the American people come to

their decisions and that these demonstrations will not affect the conduct of the war.

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, we have had these divisions of opinion before, and we have had wars before; but I think you must agree that these are demonstrations and the opposition is much greater than it has been in the past. What is your explanation for these demonstrations in this country and in other areas of the world?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I am not sure that, in terms of numbers, these expressions of dissent are larger than we have had in other wars. That is a matter that the historians can check up on some day. But I would think that part of it is that half the American people can now no longer remember World War II or the events that led up to it, and the great central question of our day, How do you organize a durable peace? is slipping into the background. And if we get our eyes off of that question, I don't know where the human race comes out. Because it is important to us in organizing a durable peace in the Pacific that the commitments of the United States be respected by us and by others. And if we once start down the trail that we started down in the thirties, if you try to get a little peace by giving away one little country at a time and giving the aggressors the idea that they can get away with aggression with impunity, then there is going to be no peace.

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, I think the historians were right that we had nothing like this either in the First World War or in the Second World War. Do you think that these, as some people think, that these are Communist-inspired, that these demonstrations—

Secretary Rusk: I have no doubt at all that the Communist apparatus is very busy indeed in these operations all over the world and in our own country, but I do not mean to say by that that all those who have objections to the war in Viet-Nam are Communists. But the worldwide Communist movement is working very hard on this.

Mr. Spivak: Do we have evidence of that?

Secretary Rusk: I am giving you my responsible personal view that the Communist apparatus is working very hard on it.

Mr. Hightower: Mr. Secretary, the United States now for a year and a half has brought enormous military power to bear against Communist forces in South Viet-Nam. Are these forces now getting weaker or stronger or holding their own?

Military Situation in Viet-Nam

Secretary Rusk: Well, we have a good deal of evidence, from prisoners and from documents and from what we know of their deployments, that the other side is having considerable difficulty in maintaining their forces, in giving them supply, keeping up their morale. They have encountered real problems in dealing with such things as the mobility of our own forces through helicopters and the massive firepower which we can bring to bear if necessary.

That does not mean, however, in a guerrilla situation that the matter can be wound up quickly, overnight, just through military means. It does indicate, however, that the kind of war that involves large units in fixed battle clearly is not on as far as the other side is concerned.

No, I think we have seen some very favorable signs that we are making headway on the military side, but that does not mean that the war is just about over.

Mr. Hightower: Can you say more specifically what you mean, sir, when you say this kind of large-unit war is not on? Is it not possible, for example, to have a major engagement of large units somewhere south of the demilitarized zone?

Secretary Rusk: It is possible. This is particularly true in the far north where some three or four divisions of North Vietnamese forces are in the vicinity of the demilitarized zone. But the massed firepower that can be brought to bear by the Allied forces would make this, I think, a very unremunerative undertaking for the other side, and there is some reason to think from the captured

documents that we have seen that they also agree that this is not their best way of fighting.

Mr. Hightower: If you treat the conflict as having a conventional warfare element and a guerrilla warfare element and keep these two very distinct, are you suggesting it would be possible, as I think Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge has suggested, to win and conclude the conventional warfare aspect of this conflict this year?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I am reluctant to put dates on, but I would think we made very, very substantial headway during 1966 on the conventional type of warfare. Now, the pacification effort against the guerrillas is almost by nature a slower task, because it means winking out these people in the countryside and in the mountains under conditions where it is very hard to find them, quite apart from dealing with them. But that is beginning to move now, and I think that behind the cover of the military success against the large units can come an increased pace against the guerrillas. I must say I have been impressed by the doubling of the rate of defectors from the other side. Thus far in 1967 that is double 1966, which in turn had doubled over 1965, and I think that is a very important indicator of what is happening on the other side.

Mr. Potter: Mr. Rusk, the Reverend Martin Luther King said yesterday at this antiwar rally in New York City that the Viet-Nam conflict is bringing us into increasing scorn around the globe. Is that your reading? Is there validity to that statement?

Secretary Rusk: No, that is not my understanding, and I doubt that other people around the globe have elected anyone here as their particular spokesman on that.

We have no doubt about the attitude of the free nations of Asia on this point, for example. We know that there are demonstrations in Europe; but I think our friends in Europe know that, from their own point of view, the integrity of the United States in a security treaty is very important for Europe. The governments there understand that, and they

also understand that the United States inescapably must be deeply concerned about the organization of peace in the Pacific. We are not a one-ocean country. We look upon our commitments in the North Atlantic as very fundamental, but we also are concerned with our allies in the Pacific, and I think there is broad understanding for this point of view. I would hope that people here would let these other nations and other people speak for themselves and not come to too rapid a conclusion about what they might think about this situation.

Mr. Potter: Do you think that a trip by the President to Europe might be advisable to kill this idea that we are not acceptable over there?

Secretary Rusk: I wouldn't want to go into that. The Vice President has had a very successful visit there recently, and I wouldn't want to pick up the question as to whether there should be an immediate sequel.

Mr. Scherer: Mr. Secretary, how disturbed is this Government over the mounting indications that Peking and Moscow have put aside their differences to assure a flow of arms to Hanoi?

Secretary Rusk: The political differences between Moscow and Peking continue to be very deep and very serious. We do not yet know to what extent there is any practical effect from the rumored adjustments of arrangements about transporting arms through China to Hanoi that has been going on all along, with occasional interruptions for one reason or another, but I wouldn't think this itself changes the basic situation very much.

Mr. Scherer: Your view is that this is just a rumor?

Secretary Rusk: No, I am just saying that we have not confirmed just what it means and therefore I am referring to it as a report.

Mr. Scherer: Mr. Secretary, up until the end of the year casualties were running about a hundred a week. Now, rather suddenly, they have almost doubled that. What is the meaning of this? Isn't Hanoi hardening its attitude?

Secretary Rusk: I don't think that is reflected—that the casualties have to do with Hanoi's attitude so much as with the fact that the pace of the fighting is increased; and the casualties on the other side have gone up much faster than our own casualties.

Negotiations Without Conditions

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, Secretary-General U Thant said again recently that he was convinced that if bombing of North Viet-Nam ceased there would be talks within a few weeks. Now, if he gave us his assurance of that, would we stop the bombing on his assurance, or Ho Chi Minh's assurance, that there would be talks?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think we need to know, for example, what those three divisions that are poised in the demilitarized zone are going to do if we stop the bombing. Are they going to attack our Marines that are 6 miles away? No one has been able to give us the slightest whisper that if we stopped the bombing those divisions would not move against our Marines.

Mr. Spivak: Are you saying then that we will not stop the bombing even for an assurance of talks by anybody, that it isn't talks we are seeking—

Secretary Rusk: We have asked for some reciprocal action on the other side of a military character. Let me take just a moment here on this point. If we were to propose today that we would negotiate only if they stopped all the violence in South Viet-Nam while we continued bombing the North, everybody would say we are crazy. Now, why is it—if it is crazy for us, why is it reasonable for Hanoi to put forward exactly the same proposition and have it embraced by a good many people in different parts of the world? We are prepared to talk today without conditions; we are prepared to talk about conditions if they want to talk about arrangements that might lead to talks—

Mr. Spivak: Isn't that a condition, though? Aren't you making a condition?

Secretary Rusk: No, this is a condition which Hanoi has raised, that there can be no talks unless we stop the bombing. All right, we will talk with them about conditions—what should they do in relation to our stopping the bombing—or we will talk with them today without conditions of any sort.

Mr. Spivak: If they now say they will talk if you stop the bombing?

Secretary Rusk: That is a major condition they raised. We need something from them by way of reciprocity.

Mr. Hightower: On another aspect of this issue, Mr. Secretary, do you feel that Communist forces are now being hurt badly enough, or may in the near future be hurt badly enough, so that they would have to resort to negotiation on some acceptable terms in order to open another front in this conflict, to offset the military force?

Secretary Rusk: I don't know, Mr. Hightower, quite frankly, whether they would at some point bring this matter to a conclusion through negotiations or whether they would simply let the matter dribble away, wither away, and disappear.

There are some very difficult problems for them in negotiations. In the first place, they would have to recognize in negotiations that they have been doing what they have been doing, which they have not publicly done before. So I can't really tell yet just how this is going to wind up.

Southern Hemisphere Telescope To Be Built in Chilean Andes

White House press release (Punta del Este, Uruguay) dated April 13

President Johnson and President Frei [of Chile] announced on April 13 that a 150-inch reflecting telescope, the largest in the Southern Hemisphere, will be built in the Chilean Andes. This will make available for the first time one of the world's largest telescopes for exploration of the half of the sky which has been relatively neglected.

The center of our own galaxy, as well as our nearest neighbor galaxy, the Magellanic Clouds, can be seen only from the Southern Hemisphere. The combination of the size of the telescope and the extreme clarity of the atmosphere at this site will give qualified astronomers from all of Latin America and the United States a scientific instrument of unprecedented power.

Design and construction of the new telescope will be a joint effort of the University of Chile, the U.S. National Science Foundation, and the Ford Foundation. The total cost of the telescope is \$10 million and will be financed jointly by the United States institutions.

The new telescope will be located at the Cerro Tololo Inter-American Observatory in the Chilean Andes. It will be used in conjunction with 36- and 60-inch instruments that are already under construction.

Reflections on the Inter-American Conference of Chiefs of State

by Sol M. Linowitz

*U.S. Representative to the Organization of American States*¹

What were the expectations with reference to the Summit Conference at Punta del Este and how well were they realized?

In launching and moving forward the conference the Latin American Presidents anticipated that the Presidents of this hemisphere might come together, recognizing their common problems, and talk together frankly, freely, and with mutual respect about how to reach answers on the fundamental issues. The hope was that they might then undertake important commitments affecting the future of the hemisphere. The conference would be a Latin American conference, organized and led by the Latin American leaders; and President Johnson would be present as a cooperating partner assuring the Latin Americans of our support and understanding and following their lead in hemispheric progress and unity.

What happened at Punta del Este was precisely that: 18 Presidents, one Presidential representative, and the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago met, spoke frankly, and, with one exception, reached agreement on issues of profound significance to the future of Latin America.

The conference was a Latin American conference, led by the Latin American Presidents and involving fundamental commitments on their part more far-reaching than any since these countries achieved their independence. President Johnson was there as a helpful junior partner in the effort, making

clear our own involvement and support and our willingness to walk at their side as they proceed along the bold path before them.

The relationships established, the understandings reached among the Presidents, and the spirit in which discussions were conducted, all give promise of a new era in inter-American relationships.

It may be that the greatest contribution of this Summit Conference will have been not the decisions to move forward boldly along specific lines—fundamental as these decisions are—but rather its impact on the minds of men. The millions of the hemisphere were watching as their top political leaders looked at their common problems, discussed their differences, and chose the difficult way of peaceful revolution and development. This was a dramatic demonstration of a dominant fact of Latin America today: that the Alliance for Progress represents the mainstream of political, social, and economic thought and action.

Is a Latin American Common Market really a feasible objective? Taking into account the disparity of development among the countries of Latin America, is it reasonable to expect that there can indeed be fashioned a common market for the continent overriding political, economic, and social barriers?

I believe that it is. And my belief is grounded in the knowledge that many of the leaders of Latin America today are men of vision, men who know how to dream and how to achieve; men who know that what is needed most for that breakthrough is a unified assault by their nations against their

¹ Excerpts from an address made before the National Press Club at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 21 (press release 96).

common problems, an assault that will launch both new life into the Alliance for Progress and a new era of common understanding in the Americas.

They also understand that nowhere is that unified assault more important than in this complex problem of Latin American economic integration. For success here truly could result in an upheaval of a continent that would cast out the ills now paralyzing so much of its potential.

And there is evidence that, vast though the undertaking may be and potentially difficult though it admittedly is, it can be done. The first steps have already been taken through the organization of the Central American Common Market and the Latin American Free Trade Association. The countries of Central America, for example, have expanded intrazonal exports from \$33 million in 1960 to \$155 million in 1966. Upward of 90 percent of all trade among the five countries of Central America is now restriction-free and the proportion of their intraregional trade has more than doubled.

It is true that in the larger Latin American Free Trade Association—which includes Mexico and all of South America—progress has been slower. But even there, intrazonal trade jumped from \$775 million in 1962 to an estimated \$1.5 billion in 1966. In addition, some 9,000 tariff concessions have been negotiated since LAFTA was organized.

Will the development of a Latin American Common Market provide increased competition for some of our own export markets? Probably. The same was also true of the European Common Market. Yet the growth of the European market has not affected our industrial growth adversely; quite the contrary. For whether it be Europe or Latin America—or any region, for that matter—our prosperity is bound up with the world's.

We will have to make some adjustments and there may be some short-term losses, but these cannot be compared to our—and their—long-term gains as we engage in a mutually profitable trade. And the story does not end with economics. There is a political moral too: An economically viable Latin America will have an even greater stake than it does

today in a free, stable, and secure world.

In conjunction with steps toward economic integration the Presidents agreed that there will have to be action to overcome physical obstacles to the regional flow of goods and services; this will mean continental road projects, interconnection of electric power systems and telecommunications, and joint investment in air transport, railroads, and steamship lines, as well as in such basic industries as fertilizers, pulp and paper, iron and steel, and petrochemicals. These and more are now grist for the Alliance mill as approved by the Presidents, and each project offers vast possibilities for transforming the map of Latin America.

I believe that much of this imagination and vision can be provided by private enterprise. Certainly it has both the technical know-how and the capital which are sorely needed.

Considerable misunderstanding still exists about the purposes and value of U.S. private investment in Latin American countries. Some of the blame for this may fall squarely on business, but less than popular conception has it.

Today many of the Latin American countries are indeed making efforts to create a better environment for private investment; and United States businesses already supply one-tenth of the continent's production, pay one-fifth of all taxes, account for a third of all export earnings, and provide jobs for an estimated 1,500,000 Latin Americans. I hope it will continue to participate to an even greater degree, recognizing always the great role it can and must play in meeting the needs of the people of the continent.

In concluding his address at the Latin American Summit Conference in Punta del Este, Uruguay, earlier this month, President Johnson spoke directly to the youth of the Americas.² To them he said:

All that has been dreamed of in the years since the Alliance started can only come to pass if your hearts and your minds are dedicated and committed to it. . . . Here in the countries of the Alliance, a peaceful revolution has affirmed man's ability to change the conditions of his life through the insti-

² See p. 708.

tutions of democracy. In your hands is the task of carrying it forward.

Behind these words was the recognition that the people of Latin America today are basically a young people, younger than we. Three-fifths of the Latin American population are under 24 years of age, compared with two-fifths for the United States and Canada. These young people now constitute the bulk of the electorate in Latin America—the people the governments must answer to and heed, the people who in a few years' time will be the leaders of the continent.

It is the young people who must be convinced that the Alliance for Progress holds out a true promise for their future. It is they who must understand that while the Alliance for Progress can be their revolution, all of us in both North and South America share its ideals and its aspirations for something better; for hope, for dignity, for democratic institutions under law to carry on the fight in the only way it must be carried on—constructively, compassionately, and concerned with the right of the individual.

In my visits to Latin America I've talked to university students about the Alliance and the relations between the United States and Latin America. I've been disappointed in their lack of awareness of how much the Alliance has been and is doing and their lack of excitement about its potential. Yet unless we can arouse that sense of excitement, that feeling of enthusiasm and loyalty among the masses of people of Latin America, neither the Presidents' program nor the Alliance can succeed.

There are, of course, some who are afraid of change, who fear that rocking the boat can only lead to communism in a region so scarred with misery, poverty, and special interests. I think that the reverse is true—that the sure way to communism or to any other extreme, right or left—is not to change, not to understand the needs of the people, not to give them the opportunity to attain the economic mastery of their lives and, perhaps even more important, social justice. The United States must, of course, deeply concern itself with methods of opposing any overt or covert Communist attempts to in-

filtrate this hemisphere. But in doing so we must also remember that anticommunism as such will not automatically command the attention of the average Latin American, who is steeped in his own personal struggle to keep his head above water. We must show that we stand for something better.

City slum dwellers denied hope and illiterate rural Indians denied even a glimpse of the 20th century cannot offer a foundation to sustain or nurture democracy. A demagog who elbows his way upward through the masses and who offers them protection and food will have their sullen support or mute acquiescence. For these are the staple commodities they desperately want and need. No promise or vision can vie with that.

And that is the meaning of the program undertaken at Punta del Este which must become known to the people in human terms. They must recognize that the Alliance for Progress is their charter, that the commitments at Punta del Este are their promise, and that even though "social justice" was not listed on the formal Summit agenda, it was never absent from the Presidents' conference table. As President Johnson said in his address:

Our discussions here are couched in the technical terms of trade and development policies. But beyond these impersonal terms stands the reality of individual men, women, and children. It is for them—not for the statisticians and economists—that we have come here to plan, to dream, and to work. It is for them—and especially for the young among them—that the hope and the challenge of this Alliance exists.

The promise of Latin America will be a difficult one to fulfill. We will incur many disappointments and encounter many frustrations. We shall probably become discouraged from time to time, and then there will be voices raised urging us either to withdraw or to turn our backs on Latin America. Yet this is a risk which we do not dare take. If we lose heart in Latin America now, there may never be another place nor another day anywhere or any time. For the stakes there are high—just about the highest for which we have ever played—and we cannot afford to lose.

U.S. Delegation to Fifth Special U.N. General Assembly Confirmed

The Senate on April 19 confirmed the following to be representatives and alternate representatives of the United States to the fifth special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations:

Representatives

Arthur J. Goldberg
William B. Buffum
Richard F. Pedersen
Mrs. Eugenie Anderson
Samuel C. Adams, Jr.

Alternate Representatives

Garland R. Farmer, Jr.
Michael Iovenko

1966 Report on Automotive Trade With Canada Sent to Congress

Letter of Transmittal

White House press release dated March 22

To the Congress of the United States:

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress the First Annual Report on the operation of the Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965.¹ By this Act Congress authorized implementation of the United States-Canada Automotive Products Agreement.

This historic Agreement is a joint undertaking by the United States and Canada to create a broader market for automotive products, to liberalize automotive trade between the two countries, and to establish conditions conducive to the most efficient patterns of investment, production and trade in this critical industry. It is symbolic of the spirit of coop-

¹ The 85-page report *Canadian Automobile Agreement; First Annual Report of the President to the Congress on the Implementation of the Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965* (printed for the use of the Senate Committee on Finance) is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402 (25 cents).

eration between these two friendly neighbors.

The first year of operations under the Act provides solid proof of its importance. The value of total trade in automotive products between the United States and Canada during 1966 exceeded \$2 billion—compared with approximately \$1.1 billion in 1965. The benefits to the people of both countries are impressive and fully detailed in the Report.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 22, 1967.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964.¹

Ratification deposited: Sweden, March 21, 1967.
Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on diplomatic relations concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964.¹
Ratification deposited: Sweden, March 21, 1967.

Judicial Procedure

Convention on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters. Done at The Hague November 15, 1965.²
Senate advice and consent to ratification: April 14, 1967.

Load Lines

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London April 5, 1966.²
Accessions deposited: Somali Republic, March 30, 1967.

Maritime Matters

Convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965. Entered into force March 5, 1967.
Acceptances deposited: Finland, March 20, 1967; Trinidad and Tobago, March 16, 1967.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

Nationality

Protocol relating to military obligations in certain cases of double nationality. Done at The Hague April 12, 1930. Entered into force May 25, 1937. 50 Stat. 1317.

Accession deposited: Nigeria, March 17, 1967.

Oil Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, with annexes. Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered into force for the United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900. Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954 (TIAS 4900). Done at London April 11, 1962. Enters into force May 18, 1967, and, for amendments to Article XIV, June 28, 1967. TIAS 6109. *Acceptance deposited:* Greece, March 28, 1967.

Postal Matters

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union, with final protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and convention with final protocol and regulations of execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881.

Ratifications deposited: Pakistan, December 19, 1966; Sweden, December 13, 1966; Syrian Arab Republic, November 18, 1966.

Sea

Convention for the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea. Done at Copenhagen September 12, 1964.²

Ratification deposited: Netherlands, February 13, 1967.

Space

Treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. Opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow January 27, 1967.²

Signature: San Marino, April 21, 1967.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention, with annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. Entered into force January 1, 1967.¹

Senate advice and consent to ratification: April 18, 1967.

Trade

Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.²

Acceptance: Korea, March 15, 1967.

Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955.²

Acceptance: Korea, March 15, 1967.

Sixth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 11, 1957.³

Acceptance: Korea, March 15, 1967.

Seventh protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 30, 1957.²

Acceptance: Korea, March 15, 1967.

Protocol relating to negotiations for the establishment of new schedule III—Brazil—to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 31, 1958.²

Acceptance: Korea, March 15, 1967.

Eighth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva February 18, 1959.²

Acceptance: Korea, March 15, 1967.

Ninth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva August 17, 1959.²

Acceptance: Korea, March 15, 1967.

Protocol for the accession of Switzerland to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 1, 1966. Entered into force August 1, 1966. TIAS 6065.

Acceptance: New Zealand, March 31, 1967.

Protocol for the accession of Yugoslavia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva July 20, 1966. Entered into force August 25, 1966. TIAS 6185.

Acceptance: France, February 24, 1967.

Ratification deposited: Austria, February 28, 1967.

Third procès-verbal extending the declaration on the provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 17, 1966. Entered into force January 9, 1967. TIAS 6224.

Acceptances: France, February 24, 1967; Federal Republic of Germany, March 8, 1967;³ India, March 23, 1967; Kenya, March 21, 1967; South Africa, March 22, 1967; Yugoslavia, March 15, 1967.³

Second procès-verbal extending the declaration on the provisional accession of the United Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 17, 1966. Entered into force January 18, 1967. TIAS 6225.

Acceptances: France, February 24, 1967; Federal Republic of Germany, March 8, 1967;³ India, March 23, 1967; Kenya, March 21, 1967; Yugoslavia, March 15, 1967.³

Trade, Transit

Convention on transit trade of land-locked states. Done at New York July 8, 1965.²

Accession deposited: Chad, March 2, 1967.

BILATERAL

Congo (Kinshasa)

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of March 15, 1967. Effected by an exchange of notes at Kinshasa April 6, 1967. Entered into force April 6, 1967.

France

Agreement regarding the operation, maintenance and security of the Donges-Metz pipeline system, with protocol and exchange of letters. Signed at Paris March 24, 1967. Entered into force April 1, 1967.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

³ Subject to ratification.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents. A 25 percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders.

Dear Student Leaders: An Exchange of Correspondence on Viet-Nam. Secretary Rusk, in a point-by-point reply, answers a letter from a representative of 100 student leaders around the country. He outlines the basic philosophy of the United States position on Viet-Nam and gives his thoughts on "how to organize a durable peace." Pub. 8190. East Asia and Pacific Series 154. 17 pp. 15¢.

Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Korea. Agreement with Korea—Signed at Seoul July 9, 1966. Entered into force February 9, 1967. With agreed minutes, agreed understandings, and exchange of letters. TIAS 6127. 155 pp. 45¢.

Defense—Establishment of Petroleum Products Pipeline. Agreement with France—Signed at Paris June 30, 1953. Entered into force June 30, 1953. TIAS 6133. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Colombia—Signed at Bogotá March 10, 1966. Entered into force March 10, 1966. With exchange of notes. TIAS 6138. 12 pp. 10¢.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Protocol amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and development. Done at Geneva February 8, 1965—Signed on behalf of the United States February 8, 1965. Entered into force June 27, 1966. TIAS 6139. 46 pp. 20¢.

Education—Joint Commission for Review of Operation of Certain Scholarship Funds. Agreement with Mexico. Exchange of notes—Signed at México September 30 and October 25, 1966. Entered into force October 25, 1966. TIAS 6140. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Morocco, amending the agreement of April 23, 1965, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rabat October 25, 1966. Entered into force October 25, 1966. TIAS 6141. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Morocco. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rabat August 12, 1966. Entered into force August 12, 1966. With related notes. And amending agreement. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rabat October 25, 1966. Entered into force October 25, 1966. TIAS 6142. 17 pp. 10¢.

Peace Corps. Agreement with Mauritania. Exchange of notes—Signed at Nouakchott September 19 and October 17, 1966. Entered into force October 17, 1966. TIAS 6143. 4 pp. 5¢.

Peace Corps. Agreement with Paraguay. Exchange of notes—Signed at Asunción November 4, 1966. Entered into force November 4, 1966. TIAS 6144. 5 pp. 5¢.

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of

the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-

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Canada. 1966 Report on Automotive Trade With Canada Sent to Congress (Johnson) 732

Chile. Southern Hemisphere Telescope To Be Built in Chilean Andes 728

Congress

1966 Report on Automotive Trade With Canada Sent to Congress (Johnson) 732

U.S. Delegation to Fifth Special U.N. General Assembly Confirmed 732

Economic Affairs

American Chiefs of State Meet at Punta del Este (Johnson, Declaration of the Presidents of America) 706

1966 Report on Automotive Trade With Canada Sent to Congress (Johnson) 732

Reflections on the Inter-American Conference of Chiefs of State (Linowitz) 729

Secretary Rusk Discusses the Punta del Este Conference and Viet-Nam on "Meet the Press" 722

Foreign Aid

American Chiefs of State Meet at Punta del Este (Johnson, Declaration of the Presidents of America) 706

Reflections on the Inter-American Conference of Chiefs of State (Linowitz) 729

Secretary Rusk Discusses the Punta del Este Conference and Viet-Nam on "Meet the Press" 722

International Organizations and Conferences

American Chiefs of State Meet at Punta del Este (Johnson, Declaration of the Presidents of America) 706

Reflections on the Inter-American Conference of Chiefs of State (Linowitz) 729

Latin America

American Chiefs of State Meet at Punta del Este (Johnson, Declaration of the Presidents of America) 706

Reflections on the Inter-American Conference of Chiefs of State (Linowitz) 729

Secretary Rusk Discusses the Punta del Este Conference and Viet-Nam on "Meet the Press" 722

Presidential Documents

American Chiefs of State Meet at Punta del Este 706

1966 Report on Automotive Trade With Canada Sent to Congress 732

Publications. Recent Releases 734

Science. Southern Hemisphere Telescope To Be Built in Chilean Andes 728

Trade

American Chiefs of State Meet at Punta del

Este (Johnson, Declaration of the Presidents of America) 706

1966 Report on Automotive Trade With Canada Sent to Congress (Johnson) 732

Reflections on the Inter-American Conference of Chiefs of State (Linowitz) 729

Treaty Information. Current Actions 732

United Nations. U.S. Delegation to Fifth Special U.N. General Assembly Confirmed 732

Viet-Nam. Secretary Rusk Discusses the Punta del Este Conference and Viet-Nam on "Meet the Press" 722

Name Index

Adams, Samuel C., Jr 732

Anderson, Mrs. Eugenie 732

Buffum, William B 732

Farmer, Garland R., Jr 732

Goldberg, Arthur J 732

Iovenko, Michael 732

Johnson, President 706, 732

Linowitz, Sol M 729

Pedersen, Richard F 732

Rusk, Secretary 722

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 17-23

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*88	4/17	Inauguration of Viet-Nam Training Center at Foreign Service Institute.
*89	4/17	MacArthur sworn in as Ambassador to Austria (biographic details).
†90	4/18	Rusk: SEATO Council of Ministers.
*91	4/19	Rolvaag sworn in as Ambassador to Iceland (biographic details).
†92	4/19	Rusk: message to German Foreign Minister on the occasion of the death of former Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.
*93	4/19	Regional foreign policy conference to be held at Chicago May 12.
*94	4/19	Personnel changes in the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs.
†95	4/21	Katzenbach: Foreign Policy Association, New York, N.Y.
96	4/21	Linowitz: National Press Club, Washington (excerpts).

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Free World Assistance for South Viet-Nam

Free World Assistance for South Viet-Nam (publication 8213), the most recent pamphlet in the series of Viet-Nam Information Notes published by the Department of State, describes the military, economic, and social assistance being provided to the Republic of Viet-Nam by nations other than the United States.

The three other background papers on various aspects of the Viet-Nam conflict published earlier were: *Basic Data on South Viet-Nam*, *The Search for Peace in Viet-Nam*, and *Communist-Directed Forces in South Viet-Nam*.

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THE
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BULLETIN

Vol. LVI, No. 1455



May 15, 1967

UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

by Under Secretary Katzenbach 753

SEATO COUNCIL REAFFIRMS RESOLVE TO REPEL AGGRESSION

Statement by Secretary Rusk and Text of Communiqué 742

INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON WATER FOR PEACE
SURVEYS WORLD WATER PROBLEMS

Memorandum of Transmittal and Excerpt From Report 758

A REPORT TO CONGRESS BY GENERAL WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND,
COMMANDER OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES IN VIET-NAM 738

A Report to the Congress by the Commander of U.S. Military Forces in Viet-Nam

by General William C. Westmoreland¹

I am deeply honored to address the Congress of the United States. I stand in the shadow of military men who have been here before me, but none of them could have had more pride than is mine in representing the gallant American fighting men in Viet-Nam today. These service men and women are sensitive to their mission, and, as the record shows, they are unbeatable in carrying out that mission.

As their commander in the field I have seen many of you in Viet-Nam during the last 3 years. Without exception you gentlemen have shown interest, responsibility, and concern for the commitment which we have undertaken and for the welfare of our troops.

The Republic of Viet-Nam is fighting to build a strong nation while aggression—organized, directed, and supported from without—attempts to engulf it. This is an unprecedented challenge for a small nation. But it is a challenge which will confront any nation that is marked as a target for the Communist stratagem called “war of national liberation.” I can assure you here and now that militarily this stratagem will not succeed in Viet-Nam.

In 3 years of close study and daily observation, I have seen no evidence that this is an internal insurrection. I have seen much

¹ Address made before a joint session of Congress on Apr. 28. General Westmoreland is Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Viet-Nam.

evidence to the contrary—documented by the enemy himself—that it is aggression from the North.

Since 1954, when the Geneva accords were signed, the North Vietnamese have been sending leaders, political organizers, technicians, and experts on terrorism and sabotage into the South. Clandestinely directed from the North, they and their Hanoi-trained southern counterparts have controlled the entire course of the attack against the Republic of South Viet-Nam.

More than 2 years ago, North Vietnamese divisions began to arrive, and the control was no longer clandestine. Since then, the buildup of enemy forces has been formidable. During the last 22 months, the number of enemy combat battalions in the South has increased significantly, and nearly half of them are North Vietnamese. In the same period overall enemy strength has nearly doubled in spite of large combat losses.

Enemy commanders are skilled professionals. In general, their troops are indoctrinated, well trained, aggressive, and under tight control.

The enemy's logistic system is primitive in many ways. Forced to transport most of his supplies down through southeastern Laos, he uses a combination of trucks, bicycles, men, and animals. But he does this with surprising effectiveness. In South Viet-Nam the system is also well organized. Many of the caches we have found and destroyed have

been stocked with enough supplies and equipment to support months of future operations.

The enemy emphasizes what he calls strategic mobility, although his tactics are based on foot mobility, relatively modest firepower, and often primitive means of communications. However, his operational planning is meticulous. He gathers intelligence, makes careful plans, assigns specific tasks in detail, and then rehearses the plan of attack until he believes it cannot fail. Local peasants are forced to provide food, shelter, and porters to carry supplies and equipment for combat units and to evacuate the dead and wounded from the battlefield.

When all is ready he moves his large military formations covertly from concealed bases into the operational area. His intent is to launch a surprise attack designed to achieve quick victory by shock action. This tactic has failed because of our courageous men, our firepower, and our spoiling attacks.

Viet Cong Terrorism and Brutality

For months now we have been successful in destroying a number of main-force units. We will continue to seek out the enemy, catch him off guard, and punish him at every opportunity.

But success against his main forces alone is not enough to insure a swift and decisive end to the conflict.

This enemy also uses terror—murder, mutilation, abduction, and the deliberate shelling of innocent men, women, and children—to exercise control through fear. Terror, which he employs daily, is much harder to counter than his best conventional moves.

A typical day in Viet-Nam was last Sunday. Terrorists near Saigon assassinated a 39-year-old village chief. The same day in the delta, they kidnaped 26 civilians assisting in arranging for local elections. The next day the Viet Cong attacked a group of Revolutionary Development workers, killing 1 and wounding 12 with grenades and machinegun fire in one area, and in another

they opened fire on a small civilian bus and killed 3 and wounded 4 of its passengers. These are cases of calculated enemy attack on civilians to extend by fear that which they cannot gain by persuasion.

One hears little of this brutality here at home. What we do hear about is our own aerial bombings against North Viet-Nam, and I would like to address this for a moment.

Enemy Waging Total War All Day—Every Day

For years the enemy has been blowing bridges, interrupting traffic, cutting roads, sabotaging power stations, blocking canals, and attacking airfields in the South, and he continues to do so. This is a daily occurrence. Bombing in the North has been centered on precisely these same kinds of targets and for the same military purposes—to reduce the supply, interdict the movement and impair the effectiveness of enemy military forces.

Within his capabilities, the enemy in Viet-Nam is waging total war all day, every day, everywhere. He believes in force, and his intensification of violence is limited only by his resources and not by any moral inhibitions.

To us a cease-fire means "cease fire." Our observance of past truces has been open and subject to public scrutiny. The enemy permits no such observation in the North or the South. He traditionally has exploited cease-fire periods when the bombing has been suspended to increase his resupply and infiltration activity.

This is the enemy; this has been the challenge. The only strategy which can defeat such an organization is one of unrelenting but discriminating military, political, and psychological pressure on his whole structure at all levels.

From his capabilities and his recent activities, I believe the enemy's probable course in the months ahead can be forecast.

In order to carry out his battlefield doctrine I foresee that he will continue his build-up across the demilitarized zone and through

Laos, and he will attack us when he believes he has a chance for a dramatic blow. He will not return exclusively to guerrilla warfare, although he certainly will continue to intensify his guerrilla activities.

I expect the enemy to continue to increase his mortar, artillery, rocket, and recoilless rifle attacks on our installations. At the same time, he will step up his attacks on villages and district towns to intimidate the people and to thwart the democratic processes now under way in South Viet-Nam.

Free-World Forces

Given the nature of the enemy, it seems to me that the strategy we are following at this time is the proper one and that it is producing results. While he obviously is far from quitting, there are signs that his morale and his military structure are beginning to deteriorate. Their rate of decline will be in proportion to the pressure directed against him.

Faced with this prospect, it is gratifying to note that our forces and those of the other free-world allies have grown in strength and profited from experience. In this connection it is well to remember that Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines all have military forces fighting and working with the Vietnamese and Americans in Viet-Nam. It also is worthy of note that 30 other nations are providing noncombat support. All of these free-world forces are doing well, whether in combat or in support of nation-building. Their exploits deserve recognition, not only for their direct contributions to the overall effort but for their symbolic reminder that the whole of free Asia opposes Communist expansion.

As the focal point of this struggle in Asia, the Republic of Viet-Nam Armed Forces merit special mention.

In 1954 South Viet-Nam had literally no armed forces in being. There was no tradition of military leadership. The requirement to build an army, navy, and air force in the face of enemy attack and political subversion

seems, in retrospect, almost an impossible task. Yet, in their determination to resist the Communists, the Vietnamese have built an effective military force.

South Viet-Nam's Effective Military Force

What I see now in Viet-Nam is a military force that performs with growing professional skill. During the last 6 months, Vietnamese troops have scored repeated successes against some of the best Viet Cong and North Vietnamese army units.

Perhaps more important in this total effort is the support given by the Vietnamese military to the Government's nation-building, or Revolutionary Development, program. Nearly half of the Vietnamese Army now is engaged in or training for this vital program which will improve the lot of the people. This is a difficult role for a military force. Vietnamese soldiers are not only defending villages and hamlets, but with spirit and energy they have turned to the task of nation-building as well.

In 1952 there were some who doubted that the Republic of Korea would ever have a first-rate fighting force. I wish those doubters could see the Korean units in Viet-Nam today. They rank with the best fighters and the most effective civic action workers in Viet-Nam. When I hear criticism of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, I am reminded of that example.

As you know, we are fighting a war with no front lines, since the enemy hides among the people, in the jungles and mountains, and uses covertly border areas of neutral countries. Therefore, one cannot measure the progress of battle by lines on a map. We therefore have to use other means to chart progress. Several indices clearly point to steady and encouraging success:

As an example, 2 years ago the Republic of Viet-Nam had fewer than 30 combat-ready battalions. Today it has 154.

Then there were three jet-capable runways in South Viet-Nam. Today there are 14.

In April 1965 there were 15 airfields that could take C-130 transport aircraft. We now have 89.

Then there was one deepwater port for seagoing ships. Now there are seven.

In 1965 ships had to wait weeks to unload. Now we turn them around in as little as 1 week.

A year ago there was no long-haul highway transport. Last month alone, 161,000 tons of supplies were moved over the highways. During the last year the mileage of essential highways open for our use has risen from about 52 percent to 80 percent.

During 1965 the Republic of Viet-Nam Armed Forces and its allies killed 36,000 of the enemy and lost approximately 12,000 friendly killed, and 90 percent of these were Vietnamese.

During recent months this 3 to 1 ratio in favor of the Allies has risen significantly and in some weeks has been as high as 10 or 20 to 1.

In 1965, 11,000 Viet Cong rallied to the side of the Government. In 1966 there were 20,000. In the first 3 months of 1967 there have been nearly 11,000 ralliers, a figure that equals all of 1965 and more than half of all of 1966.

In 1964 and the first part of 1965 the ratio of weapons captured was 2 to 1 in favor of the enemy. The ratio for 1966 and the first 3 months of this year is 2½ to 1 in favor of the Republic of Viet-Nam and its allies.

Our President and the representatives of the people of the United States, the Congress, have seen to it that our troops in the field have been well supplied and equipped. When

a field commander does not have to look over his shoulder to see whether he is being supported, he can concentrate on the battlefield with much greater assurance of success. I speak for my troops when I say: We are thankful for this unprecedented material support.

As I have said before, in evaluating the enemy strategy, it is evident to me that he believes our Achilles' heel is our resolve. Your continued strong support is vital to the success of our mission.

Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen in Viet-Nam are the finest ever fielded by our nation. And in this assessment I include Americans of all races, creeds, and colors. Your servicemen in Viet-Nam are intelligent, skilled, dedicated, and courageous. In these qualities no unit, no service, no ethnic group, and no national origin can claim priority.

These men understand the conflict and their complex roles as fighters and builders. They believe in what they are doing. They are determined to provide the shield of security behind which the Republic of Viet-Nam can develop and prosper for its own sake and for the future and freedom of all Southeast Asia.

Backed at home by resolve, confidence, patience, determination, and continued support, we will prevail in Viet-Nam over Communist aggression.

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of Congress, I am sure you are as proud to represent our men serving their country and the free world in Viet-Nam as I am to command them.

SEATO Council Reaffirms Resolve To Repel Aggression

The Council of Ministers of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization met at Washington April 18-20. Following is a statement made by Secretary Rusk at the opening session on April 18, together with the text of the final communique issued at the close of the meeting on April 20.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK¹

This alliance was formed some 12 years ago to defend peace and security in a very important part of the world. It so happened that the first international conference which I attended as Secretary of State was the meeting of the SEATO Ministerial Council in Bangkok in 1961. All of us were then deeply concerned with the threats to both Laos and to South Viet-Nam. With your permission, I shall recall certain remarks which I made at the opening of that meeting, not merely to indulge in self-quotation but as a reminder that the great issues with which we are confronted today have been of concern for a long time and that the present crisis did not start yesterday or last week or last month.

I said then that:²

The hard fact is that this particular meeting finds the treaty area in a situation full of danger for the future of its nations and peoples—a possibility clearly envisaged at the time of the founding of the treaty. . . .

The people of this treaty area, no less than elsewhere, have an inherent right to create peaceful, independent states and to live out their lives in ways of their own choosing. . . .

¹ As-delivered text; an advance text was issued as Department of State press release 90 dated Apr. 18.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 17, 1961, p. 547.

We cannot hope for peace for ourselves if insatiable appetite is unrestrained elsewhere. . . . If we are determined, as we are, to support our commitments under SEATO, it is because peace is possible only through restraining those who break it in contempt of law. . . .

We believe, and we feel confident that our views are shared by the other members of this Organization, that it is our obligation to assist the peoples of Southeast Asia in their fight for their freedom, both because of our responsibilities in connection with the formation of these states and because of the duties undertaken in the formation of the SEATO organization.

Speaking for my country (I then said), I wish to assure the members of this Organization and the people of Southeast Asia that the United States will live up to these responsibilities. . . .

And then in its 1961 communique³ the SEATO Council endorsed the efforts, then just begun, for a cease-fire and peaceful settlement in Laos but said also that:

If those efforts fail, however, and there continues to be an active military attempt to obtain control of Laos, members of SEATO are prepared, within the terms of the treaty, to take whatever action may be appropriate in the circumstances.

And with regard to Viet-Nam, that same 1961 communique said that:

The Council noted with concern the efforts of an armed minority, again supported from outside in violation of the Geneva accords, to destroy the Government of South Viet-Nam, and declared its firm resolve not to acquiesce in any such takeover of that country.

Agreements on the independence and neutrality of Laos under a Government of National Union were achieved, at least on paper. But as we all know, the Communist North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao never did what they promised to do. In violation of the Geneva agreement of 1962, North Viet-Nam

³ *Ibid.*, p. 549.

never withdrew all its troops from Laos and has continued to use Laotian territory to infiltrate arms and men into South Viet-Nam. Then the International Control Commission has been denied facilities for investigating violations of the Geneva agreement in Communist-held territory. And the coalition Government of Laos itself has not been able to exercise its authority in those same areas. The Council expressed its increasing concern with these violations in its communiqués in 1964 and 1965 and 1966.⁴

The members of this alliance represented here understood from the beginning that the conflict in South Viet-Nam was not just a "civil war." I have already quoted the Council's 1961 communiqué on the element of outside support.

In 1964 the Council described the assault on the Republic of Viet-Nam as a "Communist aggression" and as an "organized campaign . . . directed, supplied and supported by the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam. . . ."

In 1965 and 1966 the Council called attention to the enlarging scale of the aggression from the North—the increasing infiltrations of armed and combat personnel, including "members" and, later, "many units" of the regular armed forces of North Viet-Nam.

There are still people in the world who prefer to shut their eyes and ears to these realities. The governments represented here know, as they said in 1966, that North Viet-Nam is engaged in a "continuing armed attack" against the Republic of Viet-Nam "in contravention of the basic obligations of international law and in flagrant violation of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962."

And we as a Council have recorded some fundamental convictions about security and peace; for example: "that the elimination of aggression is essential to the establishment and maintenance of a reliable peace" and that "efforts to meet the Communist challenge" in the treaty area "must not fail."

And we as a Council have expressed con-

cern with the continuing "serious threat" of subversion to the Asian member countries—to Thailand in particular. The members of the Council have reiterated "their determination to do whatever is necessary to assist their ally to eliminate this threat."

And while the Council has made clear the determination of its members to meet their commitments to repel aggression, either overt or indirect, it has made equally clear that the goal of this alliance is peace.

Last year, after taking cognizance of the efforts of many governments and individuals to initiate negotiations looking toward peace in Viet-Nam, it expressed the "common resolve" of its members "to do everything in their power to promote the peaceful settlement of the conflict."

Since then there have been many further efforts to get peace talks started, and some of them most important, by our distinguished cochairman [of the Geneva conferences, the United Kingdom] and member of this organization, and the sometimes contemptuous refusal by Hanoi. My Government has made clear that we are willing to try any promising path to peace. We are prepared to talk about a final settlement—and then work out the steps by which it might be reached. We are prepared to take steps to deescalate the conflict whenever we are assured that the North will take appropriate corresponding steps.

But every effort we and others have thus far made to talk peace has met a curt refusal by Hanoi.

I should like to repeat here still once again what President Johnson and I have said many times: that we are ready for negotiations without conditions of any sort. If the authorities in Hanoi put forward conditions, we are ready to talk about conditions preliminary to more formal negotiations, or we're prepared to discuss the shape of a final settlement and try to work back from there.

We're prepared for public or private talks, talks direct or indirect, with small numbers or in a general conference.

And so, once again, we urge Hanoi to make use of some machinery—and there are many

⁴ For texts, see *ibid.*, May 4, 1964, p. 692; June 7, 1965, p. 923; and Aug. 1, 1966, p. 172.

options—or to make use of some diplomatic process—and there are many options—to engage seriously in a discussion which could lead toward peace.

But there is some evidence that Hanoi is sustained by the hope that dissenting opinion, here or abroad, will cause the United States to abandon or weaken its support of South Viet-Nam. Any such supposition is a basic miscalculation which can only prolong the war, thus adding to the casualties.

I believe that President Johnson expressed the resolve of a large majority of the American people when he said, very simply:⁵

We will not be defeated.

We will not grow tired.

We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement.

And that, I believe, is the resolve of all who are helping South Viet-Nam to repel this aggression. And at the same time, we shall continue unceasingly the search for a peaceful settlement. Eventually Hanoi must come to realize that it will not be permitted to conquer South Viet-Nam by force.

Let me say just a word about the wider significance of SEATO. We all recognize that security is only the foundation on which nations seek to build better lives for their citizens. The Council has repeatedly expressed the dedication of this alliance to economic development and to social progress. It has applauded the commitment of the Government of South Viet-Nam “to the work of social revolution and to the goal of free self-government.” It has also “welcomed steps towards increased regional cooperation in political, economic and cultural matters.” And I am sure that all of us will continue to act in every possible constructive way toward the great objectives of political stability and economic and social progress in conditions of peace.

And I believe that we see, all of us, solid

grounds for confidence in the future of Southeast Asia—indeed, of the free nations of East Asia and the Western Pacific generally. Many individual nations have made dramatic economic progress. New regional organizations have come into being that carry with them tremendous promise.

Moreover, last August agreements were reached to bring to an end the sterile confrontation between Indonesia and its neighbors in Malaysia and Singapore. The present government in Indonesia is dedicated to promoting the welfare of its citizens and to living at peace with its own neighbors.

All of these developments are essentially due to the good sense and creative spirit of the peoples and governments of East and Southeast Asia. Yet I think it is fair to relate them in some degree to a growing climate of security and confidence in the area, and to relate that climate in turn to South Viet-Nam’s heroic efforts to defend itself, to the efforts of other nations to assist South Viet-Nam, and to the broad contribution that SEATO as a whole has made over a long period of years.

And so, even as we continue with the difficult and complex tasks in South Viet-Nam, and with our other efforts to insure security among the members of SEATO, let us look outward to what is happening in all of Asia.

As President Johnson said on returning to the United States from his Pacific tour last fall:⁶

“We found people who are determined to be free. We found people who are determined to have a better life for their children and for their families. We found people who are dedicated and determined to stand on their own feet.

“The United States of America has taken its stand in Asia and the Pacific. We are fighting . . . in Viet-Nam to make that stand come true. And we are going to be successful.”

Thank you very much.

⁵ For President Johnson’s address at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., on Apr. 7, 1965, see *ibid.*, Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Nov. 28, 1966, p. 806.

TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE, APRIL 20

The Twelfth Meeting of the Council of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization was held in Washington from April 18 to 20, 1967, under the Chairmanship of the Honourable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State of the United States.

All SEATO members, except France, participated. The Republic of Vietnam, a Protocol State, was represented by an observer Delegation headed by His Excellency Dr. Tran Van Do, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

In viewing the Treaty Area as a whole, the Council was encouraged by the progress achieved in many directions since it met in Canberra in June 1966. Economic conditions have continued to improve. Transportation and communications have expanded. Ever greater attention is being given to the housing, health, education and general welfare of the people. The easing of political tensions among certain States of the area has been sustained, and has led to greater possibilities for regional co-operation.

The spirit of co-operation within the Asian and Pacific region under Asian initiative has continued to show vigorous growth in many directions. The Asian Development Bank is now a reality; the Asian and Pacific Council has been established and is soon to hold its Second Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok; the Association of South-East Asian States has taken on renewed life; the South-East Asian Ministers of Education Secretariat is pursuing an active program; and there have been several regional or sub-regional conferences devoted to economic development and other matters of mutual concern. The Council observed with gratification these developments, in which SEATO members are working towards common ends with other countries.

The Council reaffirmed its conclusion in 1965 and again in 1966 that "history shows that the tolerance of aggression increases the danger to free societies everywhere". It reaffirmed its belief "that the rule of law should prevail and that international agreements should be honoured and steps taken to make them operative". It again declared its "conviction that the elimination of aggression is essential to the establishment and maintenance of a reliable peace".

Communist aggression, both overt and by subversion, infiltration and terrorism, accompanied by vicious propaganda, remains a major threat to the peace and security of the Area. The Council expressed its conviction that the threat in the Treaty Area cannot be considered in isolation from global problems of peace and security. The outcome of the struggle now going on against aggression, both overt and by subversion, would, the Council believed, have profound effects, not only in Asia,

but throughout the world. It was therefore of the utmost importance that these aggressions should not succeed.

The Council reaffirmed its conviction that SEATO continues to have a prime role in deterring or repelling aggression in all its forms while at the same time helping to improve economic and social conditions in the Area.

Dedication to Peace and Progress

The Members of the Council reaffirmed "their faith in the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments", as stated in the preamble to the Treaty. They look forward to the day when there will be peace and reconciliation throughout the Area and when the resources and talents of all countries, irrespective of ideology, can be devoted towards constructive efforts to achieve a better life for mankind.

The Council welcomed the persistent efforts of the Republic of Vietnam, the United States Government, the United Kingdom as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962, and other members of the Alliance, as well as of many interested third parties to bring about a peaceful resolution of the conflict in South-East Asia. It recorded its disappointment that Hanoi had rejected all the opportunities open to it for negotiations on a reasonable basis. It agreed that reciprocity is an essential element of any acceptable proposal for reduction in the fighting. Members of the Council reiterated their common resolve to persist tirelessly in the search for a just and lasting peace in Vietnam.

Vietnam

The Council noted with grave concern that North Vietnam continues its aggression by means of armed attack against the Republic of Vietnam, in patent violation of the principles of international law and of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962. It noted that during the past year North Vietnam has continued to infiltrate arms and combat personnel into South Vietnam, including large units of the regular army of North Vietnam. It noted also that Communist military operations in South Vietnam have long been directed and controlled by North Vietnam, and that recently there has been made public evidence further confirming the long standing presence in the South of Generals of the regular Army of the North.

The Council heard with deep interest a statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Vietnam. It reaffirmed its admiration

for the courage and determination with which the Government and people of the Republic of Vietnam are defending their freedom and its concern and sympathy for the suffering so long endured by the Vietnamese people. Council Members welcomed the progress which is being made by the Republic of Vietnam in the political, economic and social fields, in particular the promulgation of a new Constitution, the holding of local elections and preparations for national elections in September. They also welcomed the program for national reconciliation announced by the Republic of Vietnam and expressed their hope that those South Vietnamese who have been misled or coerced by the Communists would make use of the opportunity now open to them to contribute to the political progress and prosperity of the Republic of Vietnam.

The Council noted that the aggression against the Republic of Vietnam is supported by a worldwide Communist propaganda campaign which has systematically distorted essential facts about the origin and the nature of the conflict and the present situation in Vietnam. The Council expressed regret that this campaign has misled many people of good intent.

The Council again recalled that various Communist leaders have declared their belief that the assault on the Republic of Vietnam is a critical test of the concept of what they call a "war of national liberation" but which is in reality a technique of aggression to impose Communist domination. It reaffirmed its conclusion at Manila in 1964, at London in 1965 and at Canberra in 1966, that the defeat of this aggression is essential to the security of South-East Asia and would provide convincing proof that Communist expansion by such tactics will not be permitted.

The Council noted with appreciation the increases in military, economic and humanitarian assistance by Member Governments to the Republic of Vietnam during the past year, in fulfillment of or consistent with their obligations under the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty. The Council also noted with appreciation the increase in such assistance to the Republic of Vietnam from non-SEATO members, notably the substantial increase in the Armed Forces provided by the Republic of Korea. Member Governments reaffirmed their determination to maintain, and where possible to increase, their efforts in support of Vietnam in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Laos

The Council expressed its serious concern over the continuing violation by North Vietnam of the 1962 Geneva Agreements through such acts as the maintenance of North Vietnamese military forces in Laos, the use of these forces against the Royal

Government of Laos, and the use of the territory of Laos to reinforce and supply the Communist forces in South Vietnam, and to support insurgency in Thailand. The Council again called for the implementation of the 1962 Geneva Agreements and expressed support for the efforts of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's Government of National Union to obtain peace by securing the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of an independent and neutral Laos.

Philippines

The Council expressed deep concern over the resurgence of Communist activity in Central Luzon in the Philippines and agreed that this local Communist movement continued to pose a threat to the peace and security essential to the development and progress of that SEATO member.

Thailand

The Council, conscious of the long-standing Communist efforts to foment insurgency in Thailand, noted the increase of such efforts in the past year and the conclusive evidence of support and direction by Peking and Hanoi. The Council was encouraged by Thailand's determination to defeat this Communist threat. It noted the Royal Thai Government's effective moves against the existing guerrilla forces and the impressive rural programs designed primarily to enhance the well-being of the people and to strengthen further their capacity to resist Communist blandishments and alien domination. The Council reiterated the determination expressed in earlier communiqués to do whatever is necessary to assist that country to eliminate the threat.

The Council noted that Thailand, despite the problems of Communist subversion at home, is contributing actively to the defence of the Republic of Vietnam. It also noted that, in addition to sending contingents from all three of its armed services to serve in Vietnam, Thailand is allowing other SEATO members to use Thailand's military installations and facilities for purposes of common defence, both with a view to shortening the war in Vietnam and to contributing to the effort to make "another Vietnam" impossible.

Counter-Subversion

The Council reaffirmed its support for SEATO's role in assisting national efforts in countering subversion. It expressed its satisfaction with the steadily increasing capability shown by SEATO, under the energetic direction of the Secretary-General, to find appropriate means of complementing the already vigorous efforts of member countries to combat this Communist tactic.

Economic, Medical and Cultural Co-operation

The Council reaffirmed its continued support for the economic, medical and cultural activities of SEATO and expressed satisfaction with the Organization's efforts to ensure that these activities are being carefully directed to complement and augment national and regional programs. The Council took particular note of the progress during the year in many projects, including the Thai-SEATO Regional Community Development Technical Assistance Centre, the SEATO Vehicle Re-build Workshop, the Skilled Labour Projects and the SEATO Regional Agricultural Research Project in the economic field; the SEATO Medical Research Laboratory, the Pakistan-SEATO Cholera Research Centre and the SEATO Clinical Research Centre in the medical field; and the Tribal Research Centre; also the Research Fellowships, Post-Graduate and Undergraduate scholarships, Professorships and the recent Seminar on problems of youth under the cultural program.

The Council reviewed the progress in the transition of the SEATO Graduate School of Engineering to the independent and greatly expanded Asian Institute of Technology. It noted that the transition will be completed during the coming year.

The Council noted that the Philippines and Thailand have submitted various economic project proposals under the economic program of the Organization mainly designed to help strengthen their national economies and thereby to increase their capacity to resist Communist subversion. Pakistan also has submitted an extensive project for economic assistance. The Council agreed to give sympathetic and urgent attention to those proposals.

Co-operation in the Military Field

The Council approved the Report of the Military Advisers and paid tribute to the work of the Military Planning Office during the past year. The Council reiterated its conviction that the continuous planning and periodic military exercises carried out under the aegis of SEATO have helped to underline the determination of SEATO members to guarantee South-East Asia's freedom from Communist domination, thereby helping to deter aggression within the Treaty Area.

Pakistan

The Pakistan Delegate wished it to be recorded that he did not participate in the drafting of the Communique and that the views expressed in it do not necessarily reflect the position of the Government of Pakistan.

Next Meeting

The Council accepted with pleasure the invitation

of the Government of New Zealand to hold its next Meeting in Wellington.

Expression of Gratitude

The Council expressed its gratitude to the Government and people of the United States for their hospitality and for the excellent arrangements made for the Meeting. The Council voted warm thanks to the Chairman, the Honourable Dean Rusk.

Leaders of National Delegations

The leaders of the National Delegations to the Twelfth Council Meeting were:

Australia	The Rt. Hon. Paul Hasluck, M.P., Minister for External Affairs
New Zealand	The Rt. Hon. Keith Holyoake, C.H., M.P., Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs
Pakistan	H. E. Mr. A. Hilaly, S.Pk., Ambassador to the United States
Philippines	H. E. Mr. Narciso Ramos, Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Thailand	H. E. Mr. Thanat Khoman, Minister of Foreign Affairs
United Kingdom	The Rt. Hon. George Brown, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
United States	The Hon. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Republic of Vietnam (Observer)	H. E. Dr. Tran Van Do, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Seven Asian and Pacific Nations Consult on Efforts in Viet-Nam

Following is the text of a communique issued at the close of the seven-nation meeting on Viet-Nam held at Washington April 20-21.

The Minister for External Affairs of Australia, Mr. Paul Hasluck; the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, Mr. Young Choo Kim; the Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs of New Zealand, Mr. Keith Holyoake; the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philip-

pinos, Mr. Narciso Ramos; the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Mr. Thanat Khoman; the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam, Dr. Tran Van Do; and the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. Dean Rusk, met in Washington, D.C., on April 20-21, 1967. The meeting was held at the invitation of the United States Government pursuant to the agreement reached by the seven nations of the Asian and Pacific region at the Manila Summit Conference last October¹ that there should be continuing consultations among them including meetings of their Foreign Ministers as required. Their purpose was to carry forward and strengthen programs in which they are jointly engaged to assist the people of the Republic of Viet-Nam to defend their country and preserve their freedom.

The participants renewed their commitment to the Goals of Freedom promulgated at Manila:

1. To be free from aggression.
2. To conquer hunger, illiteracy, and disease.
3. To build a region of security, order, and progress.
4. To seek reconciliation and peace throughout Asia and the Pacific.

The opening statement by the Secretary of State of the United States included a review of the recent conference at Guam between American and Vietnamese leaders² and of pertinent aspects of the recently concluded Twelfth SEATO Council Meeting.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam, Dr. Tran Van Do, then discussed in detail the developments in several programs in his country which have taken place since the Manila Summit Conference last October. He highlighted the steps toward constitutional, representative government taken since the Manila Summit Conference, as well as the accelerating prog-

ress of the Revolutionary Development Program.

The representatives of the seven nations noted that heartening progress had been recorded in virtually every field of effort in South Viet-Nam. They applauded the fact that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam had promulgated a new Constitution on April 1, that elections under the Constitution are scheduled for September and October, and that village and hamlet elections are now well under way. They welcomed and offered encouragement to the continued development of the foundations of representative government in the Republic of Viet-Nam. They were also pleased to note that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam had launched its program of national reconciliation, which seeks to encourage those Vietnamese who have been misled or coerced by the Communists to return and participate freely in the political and economic life of the nation.

The meeting also noted with satisfaction that since the Manila Summit Conference there had been increases in allied force contributions to South Viet-Nam.

The representatives of the seven nations reaffirmed their resolve to continue their military and all other efforts, as firmly and as long as may be necessary, in close consultation among themselves until the aggression is ended. They agreed that actions in pursuance of these policies should be in accordance with their respective Constitutional processes.

At the same time, they reaffirmed that their united purpose was peace, and that they were prepared to pursue any avenue which could lead to a secure and just peace. In this connection they reviewed prospects for a peaceful settlement and held an intensive discussion of the various peace proposals and avenues to such a settlement. They noted with regret the continuing refusal on Hanoi's part to resolve the conflict by peaceful means and the continuing campaign of distortion and calumny against those striving for peace. They agreed that continuing efforts should be made in search of peace in Viet-Nam and that such a peace must guarantee, among other

¹ For the Manila Summit Conference documents, see BULLETIN of Nov. 14, 1966, p. 730.

² For background, see *ibid.*, Apr. 10, 1967, p. 587.

things, the cessation of acts of aggression by the Communists, and uphold and respect the independence of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the right of the Vietnamese people to choose their own way of life.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam described his Government's position with regard to the essential elements of peace in Viet-Nam and the other participants responded by reaffirming their own undertakings, as stated in the Communiqué of the Manila Summit Conference. It was agreed that a settlement in Viet-Nam, to be enduring, must respect the wishes and aspirations of the Vietnamese people; that the Republic of Viet-Nam should be a full participant in any negotiations designed to bring about a settlement of the conflict; and that the allied nations which have helped to defend the Republic of Viet-Nam should participate in any settlement of the conflict.

The participants expressed their serious concern that North Viet-Nam continued to ignore its obligation to accord prisoners of war the rights to which they are entitled under the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The participants noted particularly that North Viet-Nam has refused to permit the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit the prisoners and assure their welfare and proper treatment. They reiterated their determination to continue to comply fully with the Geneva Conventions of 1949, called on North Viet-Nam once again to honor its commitments under those Conventions, and reaffirmed their willingness to discuss prisoner exchanges in any appropriate forum.

Finally, the Representatives agreed to strengthen the consultation and cooperation of the seven nations through their Ambassadors in Saigon and through other channels. In this connection, they agreed to examine the establishment of appropriate groups comprising representatives of the seven nations to help present the objectives of the allies in regard to their efforts in Viet-Nam, which aim at halting aggression and securing an honourable and durable peace in that war-torn country as well as in the Southeast Asian region.

ANZUS Council Discusses Political and Security Problems

Following is the text of a communique issued at the close of the 16th ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty) Council meeting, which was held at Washington April 21-22.

The 16th meeting of the ANZUS Council was held in Washington on April 21 and 22. The Right Honorable Keith J. Holyoake, Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs, represented New Zealand. The Right Honorable Paul Hasluck, Minister for External Affairs, represented Australia, and the Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, represented the United States.

This year, as in the past, the Ministers conducted a wide-ranging discussion of international political and security matters, with particular emphasis on the South East Asian region. They agreed that the 12th SEATO Council meeting had concluded with good results, and they agreed that the Seven Nation Meeting on Viet-Nam had been a valuable continuation of the consultation among allies begun at the Manila Summit Conference last October. The Ministers agreed that:

The most dangerous threat to the security of the world continues to come from Peking's brand of militant communism and communist armed aggression and subversion in Southeast Asia.

The focal point of this threat is the aggression by North Viet-Nam against the Republic of Viet-Nam.

The past year had seen the concerted free world effort in South Viet-Nam make considerable progress in strengthening South Viet-Nam and stopping aggression.

The Ministers reaffirmed their hope that North Viet-Nam, realizing the determination of the people of South Viet-Nam and their allies, would reverse its intransigent stand and manifest a willingness to bring the conflict to an end on fair and reasonable terms.

The Ministers expressed their continued willingness to explore any serious initiative for peace, despite past disappointments.

The Ministers discussed and took note of the earnest efforts of Indonesia to reconstruct its economy. They endorsed the work of those nations involved in plans and action to assist Indonesia in its economic program.

Noting that Communist China and France had conducted atmospheric testing during the past year, the Council reaffirmed its opposition to all atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons in disregard of world opinion as expressed in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

The Ministers expressed their desire to continue the frank exchanges that have marked the annual ANZUS Council Meeting and to continue to place great importance on the ANZUS alliance which binds together three nations dedicated to a common ideal of peace and prosperity for their own nations and for all people of the Pacific area.

U.S. Proposes 10-Mile Buffer Area North and South of Viet-Nam DMZ

*Department Statement*¹

The United States Government has carefully studied Mr. Paul Martin's four-point proposal.² We believe that it offers considerable promise for deescalating the conflict in Viet-Nam and for moving toward an overall settlement. The United States Government also supports the statement of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam made on April 18 with respect to the Canadian proposal.

We believe an important step toward resolving the conflict could be taken if military forces were withdrawn from a significant area on both sides of the 17th parallel. The United States Government and the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam would be prepared to withdraw their forces to a line 10 miles south of the demilitarized zone if the

¹ Read to news correspondents by the Department spokesman on Apr. 19.

² Made in a statement before the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs at Ottawa on Apr. 11. Mr. Martin is Canadian Minister for External Affairs.

DRV (North Viet-Nam) were willing to withdraw its forces simultaneously to a line 10 miles north of the DMZ.

If the DRV agreed to such a mutual withdrawal, all military actions in and over the demilitarized zone and the areas extending 10 miles north and south of the zone could stop.

Both the Governments of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States would be ready to cooperate fully with the International Control Commission and to grant it complete access to monitor and to supervise the withdrawal and the continued inspection of the southern part of the DMZ and the additional demilitarized area, provided the DRV would grant the ICC equivalent cooperation and access in its territory.

The ICC would be asked to certify that North Vietnamese troops had, in fact, been withdrawn to a line 10 miles north of the DMZ and the DRV was not using the zone to support military activities.

Upon the separation of forces, the United States Government and the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam would be ready to undertake talks leading to further deescalation and to an overall settlement. Such talks could be public or private and take place at any appropriate level and site that the Government of the DRV might suggest.

U.S. Reviews Situation in Greece Following Military Takeover

*Statement by Secretary Rusk*¹

We have followed closely the situation in Greece since the military takeover there last Friday [April 21].

I am encouraged to see that King Constantine [on April 26] in his first public statement since last Friday has called for an early return to parliamentary government. We are now awaiting concrete evidence that the new Greek government will make every effort to reestablish democratic institutions

¹ Released to news correspondents on Apr. 28.

which have been an integral part of Greek political life. I am gratified that Greece will continue its strong support of NATO.

I also note that Minister [George] Papadopoulos at a press conference yesterday [April 27] is quoted as saying that the detained persons connected with the political leadership of Greece will be set free in a few days. I trust that this step will indeed be taken.

Ambassador [Phillips] Talbot has made unmistakably clear to the new government our concern for the safety of all political prisoners. He has received repeated assurances that they are well.

President Johnson Attends Funeral of Konrad Adenauer

President Johnson attended funeral services for Konrad Adenauer, former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, which were held at Bonn and at Cologne on April 25.

The President arrived at Bonn April 23 and remained there until April 26. During his stay, the President called upon President Heinrich Luebke and Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger of the Federal Republic.

Following is an exchange of remarks between Chancellor Kiesinger and President Johnson at the conclusion of their meeting at the German Chancellory on April 26, together with a statement by President Johnson on April 19 on the death of Dr. Adenauer and a message sent by Secretary Rusk to Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister Willy Brandt.

MEETING WITH GERMAN CHANCELLOR, BONN, APRIL 26

White House press release (Bonn, Germany) dated April 26
Chancellor Kiesinger

The President and I had a long, open, and frank discussion on the problems which concern our two countries.

I would like to say, first of all, what a great honor and token of friendship it was for President Johnson and such a great number of most distinguished American citizens to come to us to participate in Konrad Adenauer's funeral.

I would like to assure you, Mr. President, that these people will not forget what you have done.

So far as our conversations are concerned, I think that we have, in a very good atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence, discussed all the matters that concern our two countries.

The President himself will, I am sure, agree with me that we have come to the view that we will continue to have frank and confident cooperation which, of course, takes into consideration the matters of our two nations and that any problems that might crop up will be discussed frankly without any attempt to bring about results which a partner would ignore.

I can only say, in conclusion, that I am very happy and satisfied with this meeting: first of all, the very fact that I had the privilege of getting to know President Johnson, and secondly, of the results of our conversations altogether.

President Johnson

It was more than two decades ago that I first came to Europe. It is astonishing to observe the great progress that has been made since I first came here.

That progress is a great tribute to the leadership of the great man that we laid to rest yesterday and whose passing we all mourn.

He would want us to do what we have done today, and that is to reaffirm the friendship that exists between the Federal Republic of Germany and its peoples and the peoples of the United States of America.

We have not made any hard and fast decisions today, although we have explored many of the interests of our respective people. We talked about, first, that the people in America hoped that it may be possible for the Chancellor and his lady to visit our country at an early date. We will both be in touch

with each other about that date, and a new announcement will be forthcoming.

At that time, we will review in depth and perhaps have more announcements for you concerning the various subjects that are in the public mind and of great interest to the two nations: the nonproliferation treaty, the trade and monetary matters, the troop deployments, the security of the two nations, and the prosperity of our people.

The Chancellor reviewed the viewpoint of his people in connection with all of those subjects. I attempted to tell him how we felt about them.

It is clear from our discussions that the friendship that has existed and the close relationship that has existed between our two countries for more than the past two decades will be continued, that there will be constant, complete, and full consultation between us before decisions by either of us.

Both of us believe that those consultations will not only be friendly but will be understanding, and will result in the agreement and the approval of the peoples of both nations.

True, there will be differences of opinion, there will be decisions to be made and adjustments to be entered into; but we both know that in unity there is strength, and we both expect strength for our respective peoples.

We want, more than anything else, peace in the world and prosperity for all of its peoples. By working together, we believe we can best make our contributions to that end.

DEATH OF CHANCELLOR ADENAUER

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release dated April 19

Americans mourn the passing of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. To us, to Europe, and to the world, he will always be a symbol of the vitality and courage of the German people. We will never forget his lifelong opposition to tyranny in any form. Nor will we forget how, with single-minded determination, he led his nation from the ruins of war to a prosperous and respected position in the family of free nations.

Konrad Adenauer will be missed everywhere, but his dauntless spirit will live on in the Atlantic partnership he did so much to create. The contribution he made is one from which all free men will profit. There can be no greater monument to the memory of a great and beloved man.

Message From Secretary Rusk

Press release 92 dated April 19

DEAR MR. VICE CHANCELLOR: May I express to you, Mr. Vice Chancellor, my deep personal sorrow at the passing of Dr. Konrad Adenauer who led your country so ably and so long. My fellow countrymen join the German people in this period of mourning. Konrad Adenauer's long and creative life will stand out in history as an inspiring example of courage and dedication. For myself it was a privilege and honor to have known him; all of us will continue to benefit from his great achievements.

"We do not expect Soviet ideology suddenly to dissolve in a flood of American intentions. To the extent that cooperation proceeds, it will have to reflect the solid interests of both sides and it will have to be measured by the reciprocal actions of both sides."

United States Relations With the Soviet Union

*by Under Secretary Katzenbach*¹

How should we now deal with the Soviet Union? I have been struck by the paradoxical answers offered, here and abroad, to that question.

There are those who say, on occasions like the recent Consular Convention debate, that we cannot deal at all with the same Russians who are supporting North Viet-Nam.

There are others who, on the same occasions, insist that the Soviet Union has changed so much in recent years that we now have at hand that placid condition which has come stylishly to be called *détente*.

I believe neither argument to be persuasive. It is no feat of statesmanship to assert that it would be wrong for us to insist on full, bellicose confrontation with the Soviet Union nor, on the other hand, to say we should guard against excessive optimism about our relations with the Soviet Union.

What we should do, it seems to me, is to acknowledge coldly the inherent present limits to *détente* but also to analyze, encourage, and take those progressive steps beneficial to the interests of the United States and the West.

It is such an analysis about which I would like to speak today, touching first on the present obstacles to any large-scale *détente*, second on why some steps are in our interests, and third on the longer range relevance of such steps.

It is perhaps a law of nature, or at least of politics, that when an abstract word is much used, it is also ill-used. *Détente* is such a word. Is there a *détente* with the Soviet Union?

If by that one means simply some degree of easing of tension, then certainly it is true that tensions do not run as high today as they did in the dark days of Stalin. But if by *détente* one means that the basic issues which gave rise to the cold war between the United States and the U.S.S.R. are over and done with, I would have to demur.

It is not yet possible—nor will it be possible even at the point that aggression is turned back in Viet-Nam—to talk of an end to confrontation. To do so is to talk of harbingers and of hopes, not yet of facts.

While Viet-Nam, for example, has not been the complete obstacle to cooperative steps that might have been feared, Moscow continues to provide Hanoi with economic and military assistance, augmenting North Viet-Nam's ability to persist in its aggression against South Viet-Nam. Confrontation between East and West is hardly over.

An equal obstacle is the division of Europe and Germany. The course of world events is toward diversity and away from the bipolar world of the 1950's. Yet in Europe the East-West deadlock remains apparent; Germany remains divided. Our security is inseparable from that of our Atlantic allies, and *détente* can have no real meaning without a stable and secure Europe.

¹Address made before the Foreign Policy Association at New York, N.Y., on Apr. 21 (press release 95, revised).

Another obstacle lies in the character of the Soviet Union. Were it simply another great power pursuing its national interests, we would still live in a dangerous age. But the Soviet Union is not just a great power with nuclear might and with national interests of its own. It is also the center of supremely ambitious ideology. To be sure, Soviet leaders have recently shown increasing restraint and caution. Yet the ultimate supremacy of communism remains central to the Soviet world view.

The grounds of basic confrontation remain.

Because it is not yet possible to end this confrontation, it does not follow that we must accept a policy of unrelieved hostility. In his handbook on English usage, Fowler divides the English-speaking world into five parts: those who neither know nor care what a split infinitive is; those who do not know, but still care very much; those who know and condemn; those who know and approve; and those who know and distinguish.

What he finds true of syntax, I believe we should find true of our dealings with the Soviets. Surely we are able now to know and to distinguish.

The cold war no longer means monolithic belligerence. It may, indeed, be more accurate to talk of many small cold battles than of a single war, of many truces than of a single armistice. And all involve shifting interests and mobile fronts.

—In the Antarctic, for example, Soviet and American scientists work in harmony. In the Arctic both nations maintain vigil against possible attack.

—We exchange weather data from space satellites at the same time we compete in the race to the moon.

—The Soviets responded to President Johnson's October 7 speech² by saying we were strangely deluded if we thought any improvement in relations was possible while the Viet-Nam war continued. A few days later, they accepted our proposal to conclude

² For President Johnson's address at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 7, 1966, see BULLETIN of Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.

an air agreement for direct air traffic between New York and Moscow.

The lesson, I would suggest, is that for our part we ought not simply, on the basis of old cold-war rigidities, to reject cooperative steps—in the way many opposed a Consular Convention. There may have been a time when such inflexible, ideological, hostile responses were appropriate. But we ought now to act on self-interest, not self-righteousness.

I suggest that there are three categories of constructive steps which have already been taken or which it is possible to take.

One category involves common interests between the United States and the Soviet Union. The second category encompasses complementary interests. The third category involves compatible interests.

Common interests. By far the most important consideration for both nations is that their great power places them in unique relationship. For the first time in history, two nations live each with its hands on the jugular of the other—and of every other nation.

One small manifestation of our common interest in this most central of all subjects is the hot line between Moscow and Washington, intended to provide both with the additional margin of insurance which instant communication can afford against miscalculation.

A second common interest is that we each have unfinished tasks at home which must be dealt with at the expense of rivalry. We each in our own contexts have internal frontiers to push back—frontiers of poverty, inefficiency, discrimination, and frustration.

This is a consideration in which the Soviet Union may well have an even greater stake than we do. The gross national product of the U.S.S.R. is about half of ours. The Soviets have only begun to make the basic investments in consumer industry necessary to approach the American standard of living. The Soviets themselves have admitted serious shortages of housing, automobiles, appliances, and at times even food. They face a tremendous task in satisfying the rising aspirations of their people.

Let me now turn to the second category: *Complementary interests*.

Such an interest, in stability on the Asian subcontinent, led the United States and the Soviet Union to take independent but parallel action to allay the Kashmir dispute and to offset Chinese mischief.

Another, quite different, example is that of the Consular Convention. For the Soviets to have the prospect of additional consulates in the United States is no necessary loss to us. For us to gain reciprocal rights, and for American citizens to secure elemental protection when they visit the Soviet Union, are hardly disadvantages to the Soviets.

Finally, there is the category of: *Compatible interests*.

In a number of instances each country calculates its gains and losses differently; both may find the same step acceptable because of different assessments of relative advantage.

East-West trade is one example. The Soviets hope to buy capital equipment from the West. We would like to see more consumer goods provided to the Soviet people. There may be the basis for trade arrangements here which each side finds advantageous.

Another manifestation comes in scientific and cultural exchanges. The Soviets value the opportunities for collecting technical information from scientific exchanges and the propaganda impact of such cultural attractions as the Bolshoi Ballet. For our part, we believe we gain more on our side by exposing millions of Soviet citizens to the fruits of our open society through exhibits and monthly distribution of the magazine *Amerika*.

Such environmental contacts mean familiarity and, the old axiom to the contrary, familiarity should not mean contempt but understanding.

What does this analysis mean in terms of American foreign policy?

So far, we have pursued, and often taken the lead in, peaceful engagement: the Consular Convention, the Civil Air Agreement, the Outer Space Treaty. We are seeking East-

West trade legislation in the Congress. We have proposed talks on limiting defensive and offensive missile deployment.

In every case American and Soviet interests are, or would be, served. In every case progress is dependent on the willingness of the Soviet Union to advance with us step by step.

The Soviet Union shares with us the special responsibility to build a more secure world. Simultaneously, in my view, its own self-interest demands such a policy. Soviet leaders may find it awkward publicly to agree with that assessment. But in any event, *détente* obviously must work both ways.

The outline of the forward movement sought by President Johnson and this administration is plain. As the President said last August:³

... what is the practical step forward in this direction? I think it is to recognize that while differing principles and differing values may always divide us, they should not, and they must not, deter us from rational acts of common endeavor. The dogmas and the vocabularies of the cold war were enough for one generation. The world must not now flounder in the backwaters of the old and stagnant passions.

In concert with other interested countries:

—We seek to abate the strategic arms race. We hope that continued discussion will lead both sides to conclude that it is in neither's interest to expand defensive and offensive deployments.

—We seek a worldwide nonproliferation agreement which will in fact inhibit the spread of national nuclear weapons and will be a step toward general disarmament.

—We would like to see the Soviet Union join others in promoting more open East-West relations in Europe. Attempts by the Federal German Republic to develop more intimate ties with the Eastern European nations should be encouraged, not hindered.

—And finally, we seek mutual restraint and mutual influence for peace in troubled areas, whether in the Middle East or Laos or elsewhere. The greatest contribution

³ For President Johnson's address at Arco, Idaho, on Aug. 26, 1966, see *ibid.*, Sept. 19, 1966, p. 410.

would be to help bring an end to the fighting in Viet-Nam.

In the meantime, in its relations with the Soviet Union the United States will continue to seek out the kinds of cooperation that are now feasible. We do not expect Soviet ideology suddenly to dissolve in a flood of American intentions. To the extent that cooperation proceeds, it will have to reflect the solid interests of both sides and it will have to be measured by the reciprocal actions of both sides.

All this will not soon transform the world. The process of change in the Communist world and in East-West relations will be slow at best. But it holds promise for us, for our friends in Europe and the developing countries—and for the U.S.S.R. It is for the leaders of that great country to decide whether this promise will, at the end of the day, be fulfilled.

Under Secretary Katzenbach Visits 11 African Countries

The Department of State announced on April 26 (press release 97) that Under Secretary Katzenbach would visit 11 African countries May 10–27. He will be accompanied by Mrs. Katzenbach, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Wayne Fredericks, and several officials of the Department of State.

Mr. Katzenbach will make his first stop in Senegal and will proceed to Guinea, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Congo (Kinshasa), Zambia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, and Ethiopia.

The trip, which was originally planned for February–March, will be the first extensive tour of Africa to be taken by an Under Secretary of State. Mr. Katzenbach's trip will allow him to see a significant cross section of African countries and to meet many African officials and other personalities. It reflects his longstanding desire to visit Africa and to see at firsthand some of the interesting developments and trends in that continent.

World Trade Week, 1967

A P R O C L A M A T I O N ¹

World trade joins the United States with other nations in a creative partnership that supports the growth of our free enterprise economy and advances the well-being of all our citizens.

Last year, total trade among the non-communist countries amounted to about \$180 billion. Since 1960, this trade has grown by more than \$67 billion, or an annual rate of more than 8 percent. Trade among the nations of the free world should reach the astounding annual rate of \$200 billion in the year ahead.

The exchange of goods and services builds a foundation for mutual trust among nations. It sustains our hopes for the attainment of a better world, in which all peoples may live in peace.

Expanding trade with nations around the world accelerates the pace of economic progress at home and abroad.

—It enlarges the opportunities for United States businessmen to sell more products and services in world markets. Since 1960, U.S. exports of merchandise have risen by 50 percent. In 1966, they exceeded \$29 billion, close to \$3 billion more than the year before.

—It provides employment for more American workers. About three and a half million Americans are engaged, directly or indirectly, in the production, transport and marketing of our exports. The growth of this trade will create jobs for many more workers in both rural and urban areas throughout the United States.

—It widens the range of materials and consumer goods available at competitive prices in the domestic marketplace.

—It helps the developing countries make fuller use of their energies and resources.

—It encourages the international exchange of ideas, knowledge, and experience.

Vigorous expansion of our export volume is essential. We have succeeded in reducing the deficit in our balance of payments, but we must make still further improvement.

The United States will continue to support the reciprocal reduction of trade barriers to stimulate the flow of international commerce. To this purpose, an early and successful completion of the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations is especially important. There are only a few weeks remaining; by April 30, major issues must be settled and a balance of concessions achieved. The final agreement must be signed by June 30. An historic opportunity to broaden vastly the world's trade horizons is within reach. This opportunity must not be lost.

¹ No. 3771; 32 *Fed. Reg.* 5241.

We are negotiating with other nations on the improvement of the international monetary system. International agreement that will assure an adequate growth of world reserves is a key to the future expansion of world trade.

We believe that trade also offers a means of achieving fruitful cooperation with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European nations. In 1966, U.S. exports to Eastern Europe totalled only \$200 million while other non-communist countries sold Eastern Europe goods worth over \$6 billion. U.S. ratification of a consular agreement with the U.S.S.R., our various trade missions to Eastern Europe, and our participation in the 1967 food processing fair in Moscow illustrate our effort to build bridges through trade. We must continue to pursue lasting peace by seeking out every possible course to healthy economic and cultural relations with these countries.

The principal objective of our foreign trade policy is to promote the increase of peaceful, profitable commerce among our Nation and others.


World Trade Week reaffirms and supports this objective.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the week beginning May 21, 1967, as World Trade Week; and I request the appropriate Federal, State, and local officials to cooperate in the observance of that week.

I also urge business, labor, agricultural, educational, professional, and civic groups, as well as the people of the United States generally, to observe World Trade Week with gatherings, discussions, exhibits, ceremonies, and other appropriate activities designed to promote continuing awareness of the importance of world trade to our economy and our relations with other nations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twenty-fourth day of March, in the year of our [SEAL] Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-seven, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and ninety-first.



By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 2d Session

A Study of the Communist Party and Coalition Governments in the Soviet Union and in Eastern European Countries. Prepared for the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. April 4, 1966. 33 pp. [Committee print.]

Contingency Planning for U.S. International Monetary Policy. Statements by private economists submitted to the Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments of the Joint Economic Committee. December 30, 1966. 160 pp. [Joint Committee print.]

90th Congress, 1st Session

Fifth Annual Report of the Federal Maritime Commission. Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1966. H. Doc. 11. 47 pp.

Annual Report of the Maritime Administration. Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1966. H. Doc. 21. 116 pp.

Fiftieth Annual Report of the United States Tariff Commission. Fiscal year ended June 30, 1966. H. Doc. 26. 26 pp.

Fourth Annual Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs. H. Doc. 32. January 10, 1967. 14 pp.

Consular Convention With the Soviet Union. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. January 23-February 17, 1967. 374 pp.

The Communist World in 1967. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations with former Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia George F. Kennan. January 30, 1967. 68 pp.

Asia, the Pacific, and the United States. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations with former Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer. January 31, 1967. 76 pp.

Harrison E. Salisbury's Trip to North Vietnam. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. February 2, 1967. 151 pp.

Changing American Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations with Henry Steele Commager, Professor, Amherst College. February 20, 1967. 59 pp.

Conflicts Between United States Capabilities and Foreign Commitments. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations with Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin (U.S. Army, retired). February 21, 1967. 44 pp.

Our Changing Partnership With Europe. Report of Special Study Mission to Europe, 1966, of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, November 25-December 16, 1966. H. Rept. 26. February 22, 1967. 53 pp.

Interdepartmental Committee on Water for Peace Surveys World Water Problems

The Department of the Interior on April 10 released the text of a report prepared by the Interdepartmental Committee on Water for Peace¹ and transmitted to the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of State by the chairman of the Committee, Assistant Secretary of the Interior Kenneth Holum. Following are the chairman's memorandum of transmittal, an excerpt from the report comprising the Committee's recommendations, and a list of the members of the Committee.

TEXT OF MEMORANDUM

President Johnson launched the Water for Peace Program in his address of October 7, 1965,² in which he pledged United States participation in a "massive cooperative international effort to find solutions for man's water problems." Steps already have been taken to increase U.S. support for water projects within the foreign assistance program. The enclosed report prepared by an Interdepartmental Committee on Water for Peace representing interested agencies of the Federal Government briefly surveys the world's water problems and considers further actions which can be taken to advance this international cooperative effort.

Water is vital to human life and to man's pursuit of happiness. It is essential to man's health, yet almost a billion people in the world lack even the simplest dependable sup-

plies of potable water for personal and domestic use. Most of them suffer or have recently suffered from debilitating diseases that are water borne or that are attributable to a lack of water for personal hygiene; each year an estimated 500 million people are afflicted by such illnesses, and ten million people—about half of them infants—die. Millions suffer undernourishment and starvation because water supplies are not properly used or developed for food production. Water contributes in important ways to commerce and industrial development. Water also is an integral part of the human environment.

All nations have water problems, but they differ in kind and character depending upon the nature and extent of their water resources, the state of technological and industrial development, population density, historical experience, and cultural values. In the industrialized countries these problems revolve around water management, water pollution, and water reuse to serve highly intricate and intensive demands. In the less developed countries the lack of information, skilled manpower, cultural, legal and government institutions, and adequate planning represent the areas of most immediate need. International river systems in all regions of the world present significant opportunities to the riparian countries for mutual advantage and peaceful cooperation through coordinated development programs.

For these reasons, an international cooperative effort to advance water development throughout the world is aptly named the Water for Peace Program because the water cycle pays no attention to the boundaries men draw on maps; because hunger, disease and misery are everywhere the enemies of mankind; because no one nation has a mo-

¹ Single copies of the 79-page report, *Water for Peace; A Report of Background Considerations and Recommendations on the Water for Peace Program* (March 1967), are available upon request from the Water for Peace office, Department of the Interior, Washington, D.C., 20240.

² BULLETIN of Nov. 1, 1965, p. 720.

nopoly of knowledge and talent; and because by working together toward the solution of their common problems, men advance a little down the road to universal peace.

Chapter II of the enclosed report summarizes the ways in which water can fulfill human needs and promote a better life. Chapter III reviews the programs required to develop water resources to serve these purposes, particularly from the point of view of national and local entities responsible for water development programs. Chapter IV describes the opportunities available to develop international river systems. Chapter V briefly reviews the many interrelated bilateral and multilateral programs and organizations operating to improve water development. Chapter VI discusses several suggested organizational arrangements that should be undertaken to improve mutual cooperation in water development within the United Nations family, at the regional and subregional level, and within the United States to support the worldwide effort.

Chapter VII sets forth a number of specific recommendations which the Interdepartmental Committee on Water for Peace believes are worthy of consideration to stimulate the rate of progress in water development throughout the world and to promote a more systematic framework in which the efforts of individual countries and international organizations can be coordinated to fulfill this end.

This preliminary review of the world's water problems has led the Committee to four basic conclusions: First, that notwithstanding the many significant current international water programs, the worldwide effort is not keeping pace with the worldwide needs. Second, water problems are so varied and the opportunities for development so complex, that water resources development in each country should be fully coordinated with the development of other economic and human resources. Third, that the most urgent need throughout the developing world is for an increased understanding of and capacity to deal with the problems involved in water resources development and manage-

ment. Fourth, that existing and anticipated technological advances make possible the solutions of problems which earlier were considered insurmountable.

Within the framework of these conclusions the recommendations include a number of specific proposals to provide more *data and information* about water problems, resources, and opportunities for development; more *trained manpower* to put knowledge and technology to work; improved *planning and organization* of water programs at local, national and regional levels; and enhanced utilization of *science and technology* for water development. The recommendations also implement the Committee's belief that many of the cooperative efforts of the world community to assist in these programs can best be coordinated by, and channeled through, strengthened or newly established *multilateral institutions and programs at the regional and subregional levels*.

No specific recommendations are included with respect to international financing of construction projects other than that this subject be further studied and kept under constant surveillance. One reason for this is that the immediate need is not for new capital financing but for more well-planned projects which can meet the lending requirements of the many existing sources of financial assistance. Second, internal sources of financing must be more thoroughly surveyed since these sources must provide the greatest percentage of capital requirements. A third consideration is that many of the countries in greatest need of new water facilities lack the technical and institutional capacity to operate and maintain them after construction.

Inasmuch as this report has been prepared by a group within the United States Government, these recommendations are focussed on what the United States might do both through its own programs and through its representation and voice in international councils in urging other nations to make parallel and cooperative contributions. This should not obscure recognition of the basic premise that nations and regions of the

world which have water problems and desire to respond to them by promoting water development, must undertake this responsibility themselves. Through the Water for Peace Program the world community can exchange knowledge and experience, offer encouragement, supply technology, and provide technical and financial assistance, but one nation or region cannot do the job for any other. This principle of self-help is fundamental to the program.

In addition it is hoped that this report, which was produced primarily for the purpose of orienting the thinking in U.S. government agencies toward making a more effective contribution to solving the world's water problems, will be useful to participants at the International Conference on Water for Peace. It seems probable that it contains material which should be helpful in discussions, and should stimulate action along constructive lines.

EXCERPT FROM REPORT—CHAPTER VII: RECOMMENDATIONS

INTRODUCTION

The following recommendations are advanced by the Interdepartmental Committee on Water for Peace in the belief that they are worthy of consideration to stimulate the rate of progress in water development throughout the world and to promote a more systematic framework in which the efforts of individual countries and international organizations can be coordinated to fulfill this end.

The recommendations take into account the programs the President has launched to combat hunger, ignorance and disease and the corresponding planned increases in U.S. aid to international agricultural, educational, and health programs. Although addressed to the subject of what the United States additionally might do, both through its own programs and through its representation and voice in international councils in urging other nations to make parallel and cooperative contributions, the recommendations are founded on the basic premise that nations and regions of the world which have water problems and desire to respond to them by promoting water development, must undertake this responsibility themselves. Through the international Water for Peace Program the world community can exchange knowledge and experience, offer encouragement, supply technology, and provide technical and financial assistance, but one nation or

region cannot do the job for any other. This principle of self-help is fundamental to the program.

The recommendations are for both short- and long-term actions. Although they focus on water problems and ways to solve them, all such efforts should be planned within the broader framework of the overall economic and social development requirements of the respective country or region. The goal of giving the less developed countries increased ability to solve their own problems requires stress on more extensive planning; education and training at the subprofessional and professional levels; institution building; discovery of new ways to utilize local labor, local materials and equipment, and local sources of finance; and enhanced application of science and technology. A regional or subregional approach to many of these problems can be especially useful.

In the long run, progress in solving water problems will be measured through new capital construction, ranging in size from the installation of simple sanitation facilities to the construction of large-scale river basin projects. Most of the financing inevitably must come from local and national sources. Supplementary capital assistance must also be provided from international and bilateral sources, at expanded levels; requirements for this financing will need to be under constant review and should be related to the ability of countries to use the assistance effectively.

The recommendations that follow are not mutually exclusive. Some overlap; all are complementary. For example, the program under the International Hydrological Decade supplements activities covered in four preceding sections on regional centers, education and training, research and information and data. This does not result in a duplication of activity, rather, the objectives of one recommendation will be advanced by the successful carrying out of other related recommendations.

1. *Water for Living*

a. *Goals.*—We recommend that the United States encourage countries and regions having water supply problems to establish realistic goals for their national efforts, as Latin America has done in the Charter of Punta del Este.³ For example, consideration might be given to establishing the goal that by 1980 the percentage of urban and rural populations in the developing countries served by piped drinking water will be increased at least by 50 percent.

b. *U.S. Bilateral Community Water Supply Development Program.*—(1) We recommend an increase in U.S. financial assistance to community water supply and sewerage projects in areas of critical need. This assistance should include pro-

³ For text of the Charter of Punta del Este, see *ibid.*, Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

vision for necessary institutional support to establish and operate water supply installations, including training programs and the enactment of national water legislation if necessary.

(2) We recommend that the United States sponsor and cooperate in studies into ways and means to sharply accelerate improvement in urban and rural water supplies throughout the developing world consistent with the establishment of an institutional base that will in the future provide adequate water supplies financed largely through local revenues.

c. *International Water Supply Effort.*—We recommend that the community water supply programs of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) be strengthened and that all governments and other international organizations increase technical assistance and capital support for community water supply programs.

d. *Desalination.*—(1) We recommend that the United States offer to assist in the construction of—

(a) Small- and medium-scale desalination plants, including solar stills, in those areas where the need for additional drinking water is critical, where humanitarian purposes would be fulfilled, and where there is no obviously cheaper source;

(b) Desalination plants in areas where acute water shortages exist or occur unexpectedly or where economic development is retarded to the point of stagnation;

(c) Large-scale desalting plants, particularly when joined with the production of electrical energy, which can make a dramatic impact in the solution of specific water problems. Decisions to assist in capital arrangements for such large-scale plants will, of course, have to be preceded by careful assessment of individual projects as presented.

(2) We recommend that the United States continue to offer to provide all appropriate technical assistance to countries interested in developing desalting projects.

e. *Pollution Control.*—(1) We recommend that the Water for Peace Program be used as a foundation for a world effort at providing clean, health-preserving water. The U.S. contribution to this, which will depend heavily on the expanded Community Water Supply Development Program of AID, should be coordinated with those health activities which are to be carried out under the proposed International Health Act of 1966,⁴ and also with the health activities of other governments, the specialized agencies of the U.N., and other organizations as appropriate.

(2) We recommend that pollution problems both in developed and developing countries be discussed at the International Conference on Water for Peace.

2. *Water for Food*

a. *Goals.*—We recommend that the United States encourage countries needing more water and water management for increased food production to establish specific goals, at least over the next 10 years to support their plans for food production to feed their expected population. Goals should be set for the development of water resources through improved water uses, supplemental water supply, elimination of flood damage, improved water management, installation of needed drainage facilities, addition of new irrigation acreage, and fish production and processing.

b. *Expansion of AID Programs.*—It is recommended that AID's expanded activities in support of the President's Food for Freedom Program include assistance for the solution of agricultural water problems, including planning, training, development of irrigation and reclamation facilities, flood control and drainage improvements, which, together with that furnished by all other sources, will support the attainment of the planned levels of food production.

c. *Support to the Food and Agriculture Organization.*—We recommend that the United States urge the strengthening of the FAO, especially with respect to increased development and improved use of surface and ground water resources, and irrigation, drainage and flood control, for agriculture; improvement and management of upland watersheds; and greater production of fish for food, particularly fish farming in conjunction with agricultural land use, notably in rice-producing areas, and for conducting studies, inventories and the establishment of demonstration projects for promoting fishery production in coastal estuaries.

d. *Opportunities for Fish Production and Processing.*—Water development programs, where appropriate, should provide for protection of fishery resources and their development, including methods for harvesting, processing, distribution, and marketing in an efficient and economic manner. Emphasis should be placed on management for sustainable yield of fisheries resources and on development of fish protein concentrate from freshwater species.

e. *U.S.-Owned Local Currencies for Water Development.*—(1) We recommend that, within the context of country program priorities, a portion of U.S.-owned excess local currencies be offered for the creation of agricultural development banks (or be added to the resources of existing banks) for irrigation and other water conservation and development activities and for making loans to farmers for these purposes.

(2) We recommend that foreign currencies to be obtained under the Food for Freedom Program be used more extensively for the development of water projects.

(3) We recommend that a larger share of excess

⁴ For text of President Johnson's message to Congress on international education and health, see *ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 328.

foreign currency funds available to the U.S. Government be used for research on water-related problems. Where congressional authorization is required, it should be sought. Any other limitations which might prevent the use of such funds for research on local water problems within developing countries should be removed.

f. *Special Demonstration Projects.*—We recommend that AID give special attention to large-scale projects for demonstration and training of nationals, consisting of coordinated development of water and land resources to be established in tributary watershed areas in selected countries or regions suffering a critical food shortage. In most instances these projects could be integrated with or become a part of river basin development projects.

3. *Water for International Cooperation—International Rivers*

We recommend that nations sharing international river basins as well as appropriate U.N. agencies be encouraged to give special attention to the cooperative development of international river systems, not only to realize the full economic values of their development but also because such effort is in itself a valuable encouragement to general international cooperation.

In support of this policy, we recommend:

(1) That the United States encourage the Secretary-General of the United Nations to pursue his suggestion of early 1966 to conduct a survey of the potential for development in international rivers, but along regional or subregional lines and on a selective basis with respect to specific river basin projects. Although financing of regional surveys would presumably be through the UNDP [United Nations Development Program], the United States should be ready to make contributions to arrangements for such surveys.

(2) That the United States encourage with other interested nations and U.N. agencies to give priority to the development of at least one additional international river basin in each continent.

(3) That the United States encourage countries bordering on international rivers to join in creating appropriate international bodies to promote the cooperative development of the river systems.

(4) That the United States in calling the Water for Peace Conference invite the participants to report on studies of the development potentials of international river systems of particular interest to them.

4. *Regional Centers for Water Resources Development*

(1) We recommend that the United States offer to assist in the creation or strengthening of a number of regional or subregional centers for water

resources development, where appropriate, under the leadership of regional and subregional international entities, particularly the United Nations regional economic commissions and the Organization of American States. The sponsoring organization and the participating countries of the region should in each case work out the location and functions of the center and its relations with other institutions.

(2) The sponsoring organization and the participating countries of the region should clearly establish their determination to provide long-term support for each center.

(3) The United States should be prepared, at least by the time of the international conference, to offer to contribute a substantial percentage of the annual cost for the first 5 years of nine new centers. The goal might be to establish or expand two centers in 1968, three in 1969, and four in 1970.

5. *Education and Training*

a. *Regional Institutions for Professional Training.*—We recommend the creation or enlargement of a number of regional or subregional institutions and programs for professional training sponsored by appropriate multinational groups or by national groups with appropriate multinational involvement. A major input also could come from participation by industrial and other private groups. The functions of these institutions, we suggest, would be to provide undergraduate and graduate education in water-related disciplines, either as separate institutions or as adjuncts to existing universities. The Water for Peace Program should be prepared to contribute to the support of these institutions, including arranging for the exchange of professors and scientists, as discussed below. These centers would complement, or, in appropriate cases, be combined with the Regional Centers for Water Resources Development proposed in recommendation 4 above.

b. *Regional Technical and Vocational Training.*—(1) We recommend that the United States, in cooperation with U.N. agencies and other countries, establish regional programs to train teams of instructors who can conduct vocational training in connection with water resources projects.

(2) We recommend that where special skills are required, special courses or training centers should be organized on a regional basis.

(3) We recommend an expansion of the U.S. program of sponsoring regional short-term institutes on a continuing basis outside of the United States for training technicians in water specialties.

(4) We recommend that private industry and other private groups be considered as a source of instruction, personnel, materials, equipment and financing in these programs.

c. *Education and Training Programs in the United States.*—We recommend that the U.S. Gov-

ernment assist universities, foundations, schools and Government agencies to improve their programs for the training of both foreign and U.S. nationals in curricula and practical field techniques essential to international water resources development. It would be desirable to have arrangements facilitating the return of advanced students in the United States to their own countries later to do thesis work.

d. *Exchange and Fellowships Programs.*—We recommend an expansion of exchange programs for professors, government officials, water specialists, and other experienced persons active in water matters. We also recommend an expansion of exchange fellowship programs for graduate students in all fields related to water resources development.

e. *Education Study.*—We recommend that the United States urge and support the initiation by an appropriate U.N. organization of a survey of available data concerning the facilities available and explicit needs for expanded education and training in water resources subjects.

f. *Peace Corps.*—We recommend that the Peace Corps give greater emphasis to training and direct assistance on water resources development activities.

g. *Coordination With International Education Programs.*—In his message on international education and health, the President made a number of proposals to strengthen U.S. position in international education programs. We recommend that as appropriate these programs include attention to education, training and study in the fields related to water resources development.

6. Research and Surveys

a. *Existing Research Programs.*—We recommend that on-going domestic research programs in the water field be encouraged and expanded, and that results and findings that could be of value in solving the world's water problems be made available to the world community on a regular basis.

b. *Research and Development on Specific Problems.*—We recommend that the Water for Peace Program give active support to research, including testing, directed to the solution of specific problems in water resources development that are particularly characteristic of the less developed countries. Funding could come in part from U.S.-owned local currency funds.

c. *Regional Centers for Tropical Research.*—We recommend that the United States contribute financial and other support to the establishment and operation of several regional or subregional research centers, where appropriate, to study water-related problems peculiar to tropical areas. This research function might be added to those already assigned to the proposed Regional Water Resources Development Centers. Participation by universities located in the regions should be enlisted by the centers.

d. *Cooperative Research and Studies.*—We recommend that broadly representative teams of U.S. experts be formed to engage in research and studies in cooperation with other countries on international and regional problems of water conservation and management of mutual interest.

e. *Resource Reconnaissance Surveys.*—We recommend that the developing countries participating in the international conference mutually establish a common goal of completing by 1975 compatible reconnaissance surveys of their water and related land resources. If possible, this would be desirable against a background of overall resource inventories; and demographic and economic surveys could also be useful. To this end, the United States should offer technical assistance, as requested, and employ all available and newly developed techniques of radar, modern photography, and remote-sensing equipment as appropriate.

f. *Use of Satellites.*—We recommend that the cooperation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) be enlisted in the Water for Peace Program to study the feasibility of making surveys of water and related resources on a world basis, using instrumented earth orbiting vehicles.

g. *Basic Data Networks.*—We recommend that the United States offer to assist with the planning, design, and establishment of new or enlarged basic-data networks and compilation systems, particularly in the developing countries.

h. *Resource Studies and Project Evaluation.*—We recommend that the United States provide increased support for planning studies of integrated resources development and in the application of project evaluation methods, and that the U.S. and international banking institutions be encouraged to expand their activities along these lines.

7. Information, Data and Publications

a. *Information and Data Retrieval.*—We endorse and support current U.S. efforts to establish facilities and advisory councils for coordinated water resources information retrieval and data storage and retrieval, and we recommend that the systems include categories relating to international water activities as well as domestic.

b. *Assistance to Regional Centers.*—We recommend that the United States provide assistance to the Regional Centers for Water Resources Development and to other regional groups in regard to the establishment of libraries, publications exchange, water information retrieval, and the development of interest profiles to take advantage of U.S. and other retrieval facilities.

c. *Publications Exchange.*—We recommend that studies of existing facilities and programs for international exchange of publications relating to water resources be made with a view to improving these

programs and filling in the gaps; that limited funds be made available to finance publications exchanges; and that the subject of international publication exchanges be discussed at the international conference.

d. *Translations.*—We recommend that arrangements be made for the translations of pertinent technical reports, manuals, and textbooks into other languages where such materials are needed.

8. *International Hydrological Decade*

We recommend that the United States participate fully in the International Hydrological Decade, and we support the proposals of the U.S. National Committee [for the International Hydrological Decade] for inclusion under the Water for Peace Program.

9. *United Nations Programs*

a. *Strengthened Water Program.*—We recommend that the United States reinforce and support the United Nations, the specialized agencies and the international development banks in accelerated and expanded programs for water resources development. We also recommend that the United States support increased allocation of funds for technical assistance and preinvestment surveys in the U.N. Development Program. The United States is planning to increase its pledge to the UNDP for 1967 by \$5 million; and expects to continue increasing its contributions in future years, with the result that additional financing should be available for water development projects as well as other purposes.

b. *Intergovernmental Committee on Water Questions.*—It is recommended that the U.S. Government, in addition to its support of the U.N. Administrative Committee on Coordination, support the establishment of an intergovernmental committee on water questions under the Economic and Social Council in order to help fill the need for a higher level coordinating mechanism among the many elements of the United Nations that are concerned with water questions.

c. *Ground Water Surveys.*—We recommend that the United States encourage the U.N. to undertake a 5-year program of assembling, compiling and making available in published or other suitable form, information and data relating to the ground water resources in developing countries.

10. *Foreign Bilateral Programs*

We recommend that the United States representative inform the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in Paris of the proposed Water for Peace Program, including the international conference, and urge increased support for water resources projects in the bilateral programs of the member nations.

11. *Water Law and Legal Institutions*

a. *Legal Aspects of International Rivers.*—The U.S. Government should encourage governmental and private organizations in the United States and abroad and international agencies to continue to study and make available the legal aspects of the use and development of water resources of international rivers and river basins. The United States should also encourage specific bilateral and regional arrangements, in each case of international river basin development, to establish agreed legal principles, including provisions for the settlement of disputes through permanent institutions selected for the particular development.

b. *Water Legislation.*—We recommend that assistance be provided by the United States, by regional centers and by other countries to each developing nation asking aid in establishing the codes and legal institutions necessary for the rapid and orderly development of its water resources. We also recommend that legal studies be included in the programs of U.S. international centers.

c. *U.N. Legal Experts.*—The United States should urge that U.N. development programs relating to water resources should provide legal experts to the countries being assisted. These experts should give advice and assistance on international and domestic water law problems and on the organization and functioning of international and domestic institutions needed for water resource development.

12. *Strengthening U.S. Capabilities to Support Overseas Water Development*

a. *Careers in International Water Service.*—We recommend that appropriate steps be taken to encourage U.S. experts in all water-related disciplines from both inside and outside of Government to concentrate on, or to augment their professional careers by, studies and work in overseas water problems.

b. *Expert Teams.*—We recommend an expansion in the capacity of the United States to send abroad qualified teams of water resources experts to provide various technical services to countries and regional entities requesting such help, particularly with regard to planning, administering, and financing water resource programs.

c. *Water for Peace Organization.*—We recommend the establishment within the U.S. Government of a Water for Peace Office, under interdepartmental guidance, to coordinate U.S. participation in overseas water resource efforts, to serve as a central point to stimulate interest in international water programs, and to ensure the effective discharge of U.S. commitments under the Water for Peace Program.

d. *Mobilizing Private Participation.*—The Water for Peace Program should promote the interest and cooperation in international water activities of indi-

viduals and of universities, private organizations, industry, and State governments, through such mechanisms as conferences and seminars, advisory committees, information exchanges, and group cooperation.

13. *The International Conference on Water for Peace*

The United States will sponsor an International Conference on Water for Peace in Washington, D.C., on May 23-31, 1967. This Conference should serve to identify problems, exchange knowledge, discuss goals, and consider cooperative action programs in furtherance of the worldwide objectives of the Water for Peace Program.

MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Kenneth Holum, Assistant Secretary, Department of the Interior, *chairman*

John A. Baker, Assistant Secretary, Department of Agriculture

Alfred B. Fitt, General Counsel, Department of the Army

Philip Lee, Assistant Secretary, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

Albert H. Moseman, Assistant Administrator, Agency for International Development

Herman Pollack, Acting Director, International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State

James T. Ramey, Commissioner, Atomic Energy Commission

Robert White, Administrator, Environmental Science Services Administration, Department of Commerce

Appointments

Nathan Lewin as Deputy Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, effective April 17. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 94 dated April 19.)

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol to amend the convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international carriage by air signed at Warsaw on October 12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000). Done at The Hague September 28, 1955. Entered into force August 1, 1963.¹

Ratification deposited: New Zealand, March 16, 1967.

Convention on offenses and certain other acts committed on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo September 14, 1963.²

Signature: Saudi Arabia, April 6, 1967.

Finance

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.

Ratification deposited: Senegal, April 21, 1967.

Property

Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, as revised, for the protection of industrial property. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered into force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931.

Notification of accession: Morocco, April 15, 1967.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.

Acceptance deposited: Somali Republic, March 30, 1967.

Space

Treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. Opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow January 27, 1967.²

Senate advice and consent to ratification: April 25, 1967.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on April 17 confirmed the nomination of Claude G. Ross to be Ambassador to Haiti. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated March 22.)

Designations

Miss Barbara M. Watson as Acting Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, effective April 17. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 94 dated April 19.)

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention, with annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. Entered into force January 1, 1967.¹
Ratifications deposited: Iceland, March 8, 1967; Jordan, Peru, March 1, 1967.
Partial revision of the radio regulations, 1959 (TIAS 4893, 5603), to put into effect a revised frequency allotment plan for the aeronautical mobile (R) service and related information, with annexes. Done at Geneva April 29, 1966.²
Notifications of approval: Austria, March 2, 1967; Canada, February 23, 1967; Denmark, February 28, 1967.

Trade

Protocol for the accession of Korea to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 2, 1967. Entered into force April 14, 1967.
Acceptances: Korea, March 15, 1967; Austria, March 15, 1967;³ Turkey, March 20, 1967; Netherlands, March 30, 1967;⁴ United States, April 21, 1967.

BILATERAL

Indonesia

Agreement relating to the furnishing of military equipment, materials, and services for a program of civic action. Effected by exchange of notes at Djakarta April 14, 1967. Entered into force April 14, 1967.

Israel

Understanding regarding certain errors in the translation of the Hebrew text of the extradition convention of December 10, 1962 (TIAS 5476). Effected by exchange of notes at Jerusalem and

Tel Aviv April 4 and 11, 1967. Entered into force April 11, 1967.

Poland

Agreement relating to the use of zlotys accrued under the agricultural commodities agreement of February 3, 1964 (TIAS 5517), for international travel. Effected by an exchange of letters at Warsaw April 10, 1967. Entered into force April 10, 1967.

Agreement on understandings relating to the level of Polish purchases in the United States in 1967 and 1968 under the agricultural commodities agreement of February 3, 1964 (TIAS 5517). Effected by an exchange of letters at Warsaw April 10, 1967. Entered into force April 10, 1967.

Agreement supplementary to the agreement of February 3, 1964 (TIAS 5517), relating to the use of zlotys for English language teaching and to finance programs under the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (75 Stat. 527). Effected by an exchange of notes at Warsaw April 10 and 11, 1967. Entered into force April 11, 1967.

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreements of June 7, 1957, as amended (TIAS 3839, 3878, 3973, 4243, 4532); February 15, 1958, as amended (TIAS 3991, 4046, 4243, 4532); June 10, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4245, 4288, 4415, 4532); July 21, 1960, as amended (TIAS 4535); December 15, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4907, 4998); and February 3, 1964, as amended (TIAS 5517). Effected by an exchange of notes at Warsaw April 10 and 11, 1967. Entered into force April 11, 1967.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

³ Subject to ratification.

⁴ Ad referendum.

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of

the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Africa. Under Secretary Katzenbach Visits 11 African Countries 756

Asia. SEATO Council Reaffirms Resolve To Repel Aggression (Rusk, communique) 742

Australia. ANZUS Council Discusses Political and Security Problems (text of communique) 749

Canada. U.S. Proposes 10-Mile Buffer Area North and South of Viet-Nam DMZ 750

Congress

Confirmations (Ross) 765

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy 757

A Report to the Congress by the Commander of U.S. Military Forces in Viet-Nam (Westmoreland) 738

Department and Foreign Service

Appointments (Lewin) 765

Confirmations (Ross) 765

Designations (Watson) 765

Economic Affairs

Interdepartmental Committee on Water for Peace Surveys World Water Problems (chairman's memorandum and excerpt from report) 758

SEATO Council Reaffirms Resolve To Repel Aggression (Rusk, communique) 742

Foreign Aid. Interdepartmental Committee on Water for Peace Surveys World Water Problems (chairman's memorandum and excerpt from report) 758

Germany. President Johnson Attends Funeral of Konrad Adenauer (Johnson, Kiesinger, Rusk) 751

Greece. U.S. Reviews Situation in Greece Following Military Takeover (Rusk) 750

Haiti. Ross confirmed as Ambassador 765

Health. Interdepartmental Committee on Water for Peace Surveys World Water Problems (chairman's memorandum and excerpt from report) 758

International Organizations and Conferences

ANZUS Council Discusses Political and Security Problems (text of communique) 749

SEATO Council Reaffirms Resolve To Repel Aggression (Rusk, communique) 742

Seven Asian and Pacific Nations Consult on Efforts in Viet-Nam (text of communique) 747

Military Affairs

A Report to the Congress by the Commander of U.S. Military Forces in Viet-Nam (Westmoreland) 738

U.S. Proposes 10-Mile Buffer Area North and South of Viet-Nam DMZ 750

New Zealand. ANZUS Council Discusses Political and Security Problems (text of communique) 749

Presidential Documents

President Johnson Attends Funeral of Konrad Adenauer 751

World Trade Week, 1967 756

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. SEATO Council Reaffirms Resolve To Repel Aggression (Rusk, communique) 742

Trade. World Trade Week, 1967 (proclamation) 756

Treaty Information. Current Actions 765

U.S.S.R. United States Relations With the Soviet Union (Katzenbach) 753

United Nations. Interdepartmental Committee on Water for Peace Surveys World Water Problems (chairman's memorandum and excerpt from report) 758

Viet-Nam

ANZUS Council Discusses Political and Security Problems (text of communique) 749

A Report to the Congress by the Commander of U.S. Military Forces in Viet-Nam (Westmoreland) 738

SEATO Council Reaffirms Resolve To Repel Aggression (Rusk, communique) 742

Seven Asian and Pacific Nations Consult on Efforts in Viet-Nam (text of communique) 747

U.S. Proposes 10-Mile Buffer Area North and South of Viet-Nam DMZ 750

Water for Peace. Interdepartmental Committee on Water for Peace Surveys World Water Problems (chairman's memorandum and excerpt from report) 758

Name Index

Johnson, President 751, 756

Katzenbach, Nicholas deB 753

Kiesinger, Kurt Georg 751

Lewin, Natnan 765

Ross, Claude G 765

Rusk, Secretary 742, 750, 751

Watson, Miss Barbara M 765

Westmoreland, Gen. William C 738

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 24-30

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to April 24 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 92 of April 19 and 95 of April 21.

No.	Date	Subject
97	4/26	Itinerary for visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach to Africa, May 10-27.
*98	4/28	Heath sworn in as Ambassador to Sweden (biographic details).
*99	4/29	Katzenbach: acceptance of 1967 Bellarmine Medal, Bellarmine College, Louisville, Ky.
†100	4/29	Harriman: "The United States and Eastern Europe in Perspective."

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Political Development in South Viet-Nam

Political Development in South Viet-Nam (publication 8231), the most recent pamphlet in the series of Viet-Nam Information Notes published by the Department of State, discusses South Viet-Nam's steady progress toward an elected government and representative institutions at all levels of government.

The four other background papers on Viet-Nam published earlier are: *Basic Data on South Viet-Nam*, *The Search for Peace in Viet-Nam*, *Communist-Directed Forces in South Viet-Nam*, and *Free World Assistance for South Viet-Nam*.

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THE
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BULLETIN

Vol. LVI, No. 1456



May 22, 1967

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS
Address by Secretary Rusk 770

SEVENTEEN YEARS IN EAST ASIA
by Assistant Secretary Bundy 790

AMBASSADOR LODGE DISCUSSES VIET-NAM
IN NEW YORK TIMES INTERVIEW 795

A CONVERSATION WITH DEAN RUSK
Transcript of Interview
on National Educational Television Network 774

The Role of the United States in World Affairs

*Address by Secretary Rusk*¹

I am deeply complimented by your invitation and this chance to express my respect and appreciation to the United States Chamber of Commerce. I have 20 minutes in which to talk to you about our relations with the rest of the world. I shall use shorthand, therefore, and not pursue each paragraph to its obvious conclusion. Perhaps I might offer some thoughts which will be of some use to you in your discussions of the next 3 days.

Let us begin by noting the enormous capacity of the United States. We need not dwell on our military power. It is so vast that the effects of its use are beyond the comprehension of the mind of man. It is so vast that we dare not allow ourselves to become infuriated.

Our economic strength is only slightly less formidable. The gross national product of the United States equals that of all of the rest of NATO and Japan combined. It is twice that of the Soviet Union, and the gap is widening. It is 10 times that of mainland China, out of which they must try to take care of the needs of more than 700 million people. It is 10 times that of all of Latin America combined.

What the United States does, therefore, is of vital importance to the rest of the world. It is necessary for us to be reasonably predictable—both by our friends and by

those who might be our adversaries. Were we not to remain steady on course, the world situation could disintegrate into the law of the jungle and utter chaos.

General Omar Bradley, a very wise man, once said that the time has come for us to chart our course by the distant stars and not by the lights of each passing ship. Today I wish to identify some of those distant stars.

Our foreign policy derives from the kind of people we are and from the international environment in which we live. It is relatively simple, relatively long term, and nonpartisan. I have now had the privilege of being present for hundreds of meetings of committees and subcommittees of the Congress in executive session. On no single occasion have differences of view turned on party lines. There are, of course, differences of view—as there would be in this audience and as there are within the executive branch. Most of our problems are complex, and many of them turn upon razoredge differences in judgment. But it is no accident that the main lines of our policy under Democratic and Republican administrations have been national in character.

Our supreme aspiration is “to secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” This means that the beginning of our foreign policy is the kind of society we build here at home. Our example casts its shadow around the globe. Our words about freedom and justice would ring hollow if we were not making it apparent

¹ Made before the Chamber of Commerce of the United States at Washington, D.C., on May 1 (press release 101).

that we were trying to make our own society a gleaming example of what free men can accomplish under the processes of consent. The performance of our economic system under the conditions of liberty is itself one of the most powerful supports of the simple notions of liberty to which we as a nation are dedicated.

Our policy reflects the inescapable reality that we can no longer find national security in a world which is torn with violence and aggression and the awful reality that a great war fought with modern weapons would destroy most of our civilization.

Maintenance of Peace

A central problem of our nation, therefore, must be to pursue an organized peace—a lasting peace, a world in which disputes are settled by peaceful means, a world free of the threat of thermonuclear catastrophe, in which each nation lives under institutions of its own choice but in which all nations and peoples cooperate to promote their mutual welfare.

This does not mean that we are the world's policeman. It does not mean we aspire to a Pax Americana. We do not participate in most of the crises which arise in different parts of the world. We use our diplomatic resources and our membership in such bodies as the United Nations to try to lay the hand of restraint upon high tempers and excessive violence and to help find ways and means to bring about a peaceful settlement of the many disputes that appear upon the world's agenda.

But we do have our own more direct share in maintaining the peace. We have more than 40 allies with whom we are mutually pledged to resist aggression. These alliances were formed through the most solemn process of our Constitution—the treaty process. Their purpose was to let others know in advance that aggression against those to whom we are committed will not be accepted. I hope that you will not consider it presumption for me to say

that the integrity of these alliances is at the heart of the maintenance of peace, and if it should be discovered that the pledge of the United States is meaningless, the structure of peace would crumble and we would be well on our way to a terrible catastrophe.

Arms Reduction

We must try with all of our intelligence and skill to turn downward the arms race. It is not easy when there are those who will not accept simple requirements of inspection to give assurance that agreements will be carried out. It will not be easy so long as there are major unresolved questions such as the division of Germany. It will not be easy when there are powerful countries who are committed to what they consider a world revolution—fundamentally in opposition to the kind of world envisaged in the United Nations Charter. But we must continue to try.

I take no comfort from the fact that the defense budget of the United States this year equals the total gross national product of all of Latin America. I take no pleasure from the fact that, since 1947, the NATO nations have been required to invest more than a trillion dollars in defense budgets.

Even though progress may be slow, we must continue to wrestle with the problems of reducing the levels of arms in order that these vast resources can be put to the service of the humane purposes of ordinary men and women throughout the world.

Even before vast resources might be freed through disarmament, we must take a responsible share in the process of economic and social development among those nations who are just beginning to enter the age of science and technology. We cannot sustain our own prosperity in a poverty-stricken world. Nor can we allow ourselves to be indifferent to misery and disease which burden so vast a proportion of the world's population. In this great task you in private enterprise are playing a major

and crucial role. The contributions which you will make in capital, managerial skills, and technical assistance are larger in total effect than those being made by governments.

In the Western Hemisphere we have a role as a major partner both in the defense of the American system and in the great cooperative social and economic enterprise, the Alliance for Progress.

In all the tasks of building peace and a better world, we encourage regional cooperative undertakings: Atlantic partnership, the prospective Latin American common market, the beginnings of regional cooperation in Africa, and new regional and subregional organizations in East Asia and the Western Pacific.

Where problems extend beyond the limits of effective national or regional action, we encourage broader approaches, through the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], and others.

Nor do we forget that the United States is a trading nation. The promotion of trade is a major object of our diplomacy—and has been since the time of Benjamin Franklin. We have an important role in creating a vigorous system of international trade and monetary arrangements which are adequate to the needs of an expanding world economy.

Working Toward Reduction of Tensions

In our relations with present or potential adversaries we must be resolute when firmness is required. On the other hand, we should make it clear that we are prepared to meet everyone else more than halfway in building a durable peace. Despite the presence of tension and violence, we should try to resolve every outstanding question and extend the hand of cooperation where there is any response from the other side.

We need not be under illusions about the word *détente*, but we must work toward a genuine reduction of tensions. This is why

we have concluded the test ban treaty, the civil air and consular agreements with the Soviet Union, and the space treaty. This is why we are working hard on such matters as the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and the attempt to impose some ceiling upon the further developments of defensive and offensive nuclear missiles. This is among the reasons why we have proposed to the Congress that we be given authority to negotiate trade agreements with the countries of Eastern Europe—the other big reason being that we are Yankee traders and would like to benefit from that trade.

You should also know that we attach the greatest importance to the official structure of diplomacy and to what are called the rights of legation. We have been concerned that the structure of diplomacy, built with great care and effort over a period of centuries, is not accorded the protection and the dignity which are essential if even minimum relations among states are to be preserved. Among the purposes of diplomatic relations is to have the means for discussing differences between states. We shall do everything that we can to support the rights of legation by our own conduct, and we shall insist upon full compliance with those same rights by all with whom we have relations.

Although we do not expect other nations to copy our political or economic institutions, we have convictions about these matters, based on ideals and experience, and therefore will continue to do what we can to encourage trends toward self-determination, government with the consent of the governed, open societies, and individual human rights.

Peace Proposals Rejected by Hanoi

It is not our purpose today to discuss Viet-Nam in any detail, but you would consider it strange if I should ignore it. You should know that your President spends just as much time on the search for peace as he does on the military struggle itself. You should know that we keep in touch

with all the nations of the world, including some with whom we do not have formal relations. You should recall that half the governments of the world have tried, singly or in groups, to move the violence in Southeast Asia toward a peaceful solution.

Let me remind you of the many proposals which have been made by ourselves or by others as a part of this effort to take a step toward peace:

—A reconvening of the Geneva conference of 1954 and a return to the agreements of 1954;

—A reconvening of the Geneva conference of 1962 on Laos and a return to the agreements of 1962;

—A conference on Cambodia;

—An all-Asian peace conference;

—A special effort by the two cochairmen;

—A special effort by the ICC [International Control Commission];

—A role for the United Nations Security Council, or the General Assembly, or the Secretary-General;

—Talks through intermediaries, single or group;

—Direct talks—with the United States or with South Viet-Nam;

—Exchange of prisoners of war;

—Supervision of treatment of prisoners by International Red Cross;

—Demilitarize the DMZ [demilitarized zone];

—Widen and demilitarize the DMZ;

—Interposition of international forces between combatants;

—Mutual withdrawal of foreign forces, including NVN forces;

—Assistance to Cambodia to assure its neutrality and territory;

—Cessation of bombing and reciprocal de-escalation;

—Cessation of bombing, infiltration, and augmentation of United States forces;

—Three suspensions of bombings to permit serious talks;

—Discussion of Hanoi's 4 points along with points of others, such as Saigon's 4 points and our 14 points;

—Discussion of an agreed 4 points as basis for negotiation;

—Willingness to find means to have the views of the Liberation Front heard in peace discussions;

—Negotiations *without* conditions, negotiations *about* conditions, or discussion of a final settlement;

—Peace and the inclusion of North Viet-Nam in large development program for Southeast Asia;

—Government of South Viet-Nam to be determined by free elections;

—Question of reunification to be determined by free elections;

—Reconciliation with Viet Cong and readmission to the body politic of South Viet-Nam;

—South Viet-Nam can be neutral if it so chooses.

I have recalled these particular items without a complete search of the record; there may be more. But what is important for you to know is we have said yes to these some 28 proposals and Hanoi has said no. Surely all those yeses and all those noes throw a light upon motivation—upon the question of who is interested in peace and who is trying to absorb a neighbor by force. Surely some light is thrown upon the character of American policy and the attitudes of the American people. Surely these yeses and noes are relevant to the moral judgments which one might wish to make about the situation in Southeast Asia.

A Conversation With Dean Rusk

Following is the transcript of an hour-long interview with Secretary Rusk by Paul Niven, Washington correspondent of the National Educational Television Network, which was televised from the Department of State to 75 affiliated stations of NET on May 5.

Mr. Niven: Whether deliberately or not, the last few weeks have brought an escalation of the war in Viet-Nam. Whether it was deliberate or not remains a matter of semantic argument between the administration and its critics. There is no doubt, however, that criticism of and dissent from the war has escalated both in depth and in breadth.

Viet-Nam is not the only issue of the hour, even if it is the towering one. Indeed, one of the themes of the critics is that the war is deflecting high officials here in Washington from other and larger issues. Despite Viet-Nam there has been a considerable relaxation of tension between East and West, as symbolized by the consular and space treaties and our continuing talks on antimissile defense and the spread of nuclear weapons.

The spirit of *détente* was symbolized also by the arrival in this country of the daughter of Joseph Stalin with no outburst of chauvinistic exultation on our part, no public anguish on the part of the Kremlin, and a civilized demeanor on the part of the lady involved.

Even as the United States and the Soviet Union pull closer together, China pulls farther and farther apart from both. In Western Europe new issues and old issues are at hand and recently took Vice President Humphrey on an important and not uneventful tour of the capitals of some of our NATO allies.

Substantive questions give rise anew on Capitol Hill and elsewhere to larger ques-

tions concerning the overall American commitment all over the world, about its moral validity, and about its practicability in terms of our power in the world.

It seems a very appropriate time, all in all, to talk with a man who for 6 years and 3 months now has been the principal foreign policy adviser to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Here we are then in the State Department to talk to Secretary Dean Rusk.

Mr. Secretary, I don't think we've had polls in the last 3 or 4 weeks to see whether opposition to the war in Viet-Nam is actually increasing among the country as a whole. But certainly there has been an increase in the intensity and depth of public manifestations of opposition. How do you and other officials of the administration who have spent so many hours trying to put your case and explain it to so many people account for this increase in public opposition?

Secretary Rusk: Well, we have seen some highly organized demonstrations of minorities here and there in the country. But the people of the United States elect a President and a Congress to make these great decisions of national policy.

And it is my impression that the ordinary men and women around the country understand what is involved in Viet-Nam. Now, we understand that many of them are impatient and want to see the steps taken to finish this war. Because after all that has happened since 1945, it is tragic that once again we should have to use force to resist an aggression because we have learned a lot of lessons of what happens when aggression occurs.

Mr. Niven: When you say that these are highly organized demonstrations, obviously the Communists are not uninterested in doing this in this country and elsewhere—but do you suggest that even among the orga-

nizers of this opposition the Communists are anything like the majority?

Secretary Rusk: Oh, I am not trying to establish any sense of numbers in this matter. I think there are different groups. The Communist apparatus is busy all over the world, and it is busy in this country. Others who are genuine pacifists, conscientious objectors, people with strong religious convictions on this point—for them I have the greatest respect. There are others who, for one reason or another, doubt that Viet-Nam is our problem. There is a variety of reasons why people object. But particular demonstrations are pretty highly organized.

The Dilemma of Dissent

Mr. Niven: Well, you and General [William C.] Westmoreland and others have pointed out that such demonstrations are bound to raise questions on the other side about our will to continue. On the other hand, isn't there a great danger that in trying to stifle dissent we create new problems?

Secretary Rusk: Well, Mr. Niven, there has never been any effort to stifle dissent. We have a dilemma in this respect, because two things are true.

The one is that in our kind of free society there must be complete freedom of expression, the opportunity for dissent, the right lawfully and peacefully to register one's difference of view. Now, that is fundamental to our system, and there has never been any effort to stifle that.

The other thing that is equally as true is that Hanoi undoubtedly is watching this debate and is drawing some conclusions from it. Now, if we were to see 100,000 people marching in Hanoi calling for peace we would think the war was over. Now, it requires a good deal of sophistication on the part of Hanoi to understand that this is not the way we make decisions in this country—that there are a President and a Congress who are elected by the people and that the President and the Congress are supported by the great majority of the American people in these great decisions.

Mr. Niven: Senator [Thruston B.] Morton suggested the other day that—quoting General Westmoreland—when someone speaks of irresponsible acts at home without distinguishing between the genuinely irresponsible burners of draft cards and people who lay down in front of trains and so forth and the really idealistic citizens who have strong reservations about the war, he only encourages the irresponsible elements among the dissenters. Don't you think there is something to that?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I wouldn't know how to judge something of that sort. I think all of us, whether we are official or private citizens, have a responsibility for all of the consequences of our acts and what we say. And when people elect to go into these matters and make their opinions known they should take into account what the total effect will be.

But, again, in our society there must be full opportunity for free expression and there must be a debate in this country. And when differences exist we couldn't have our kind of free society without it.

Mr. Niven: It would be perhaps too much to expect for the North Vietnamese to understand that these demonstrations are a minority. But surely their Soviet allies are sophisticated enough at this stage of the game to understand this and to tell them that what is more important is the polls showing 70 percent of the people—

Secretary Rusk: Oh, I think there are those in the Communist world who understand this better than Hanoi might. I think the Soviet Union undoubtedly has more experience with us and they have a closer familiarity with our institutions and the way we operate. I think there is more understanding in Moscow on this point than there is in Hanoi.

Mr. Niven: Mr. Secretary, the war itself—are we now in such a position that any substantial deescalation unilaterally would be almost as disastrous as pulling out?

Secretary Rusk: Well, let me point out that partial deescalation on our side seems to be uninteresting to Hanoi. For example, they object to the idea of a pause in the bombing,

the suspension of bombing. We have tried that seriously three times, and then there were two holiday truces in addition, a total of five times when there was no bombing. And before that we went through 5 years of increasing North Vietnamese attacks upon South Viet-Nam without any bombing in North Viet-Nam on our part.

They are saying now that we must stop the bombing permanently and unconditionally and at the same time are refusing to undertake the slightest military step which they would take on their side to draw back on their part of the war.

Now, let me illustrate what this means. If we were to say that we would negotiate only if they stopped all of their violence in South Viet-Nam while we continued to bomb North Viet-Nam, most people would say we were crazy. Now, why is what is crazy for us reasonable to some people when exactly the same proposition is put by the other side? What we need to have is some tangible step toward peace. And they have had many, many opportunities to register a willingness to engage in serious talks, to take some de facto practical steps to move this matter toward a peaceful solution.

Mr. Niven: Well, you have got just one interpretation of their attitude. Max Frankel of the Sunday Times magazine did the same thing. But he also said that the President's letter to Ho Chi Minh¹ said in effect "We will stop the bombing if you will leave your quarter of a million Communist forces in South Viet-Nam unreplenished and unsupplied against a million troops on our side." Now, is that not a fair representation?

Secretary Rusk: Well, we said that we will stop the bombing if you will stop the infiltration and if you stop the infiltration we will stop the further augmentation of our forces.

Mr. Niven: Would they not hold that our forces at this point are so augmented and so well supplied that they could not leave their forces?

Secretary Rusk: They may, but their forces

are where they have no right to be. They have no business being there. They have no right to try to seize South Viet-Nam by force. We are entitled under the SEATO treaty, as well as under the individual and collective security-self-defense arrangements of the U.N. Charter, to come to the assistance of South Viet-Nam upon their request when they are subjected to this kind of aggression.

Now, we are not referring to something as though there is no difference between the two sides here. North Viet-Nam is trying to seize South Viet-Nam by force. If tomorrow morning they were to say that "This is not our purpose," we could have peace by tomorrow night. Now, it is just as simple as that, Mr. Niven. They are trying to impose a political solution upon South Viet-Nam by force from the North. Now, it can be peace if they hold their hands. And I don't see how there can be peace as long as they continue in that effort.

Hanoi's Demand for Cessation of Bombing

Mr. Niven: Is the principal objection to a cessation of bombing for the fourth time that we would incur more and more odium in the world were it renewed if they didn't come to the conference table, or is it purely military?

Secretary Rusk: Well, the principal problem is that, as I indicated, a suspension in the bombing would be rejected by Hanoi as an ultimatum. They say that we must guarantee that this suspension would be permanent and unconditional. Now, that means stopping half the war without knowing what will happen with the other half of the war. And the President has said that we will be glad to hear from them on almost anything they would do on the military side in order to take a step toward peace in the situation.

At the moment there are three or four divisions up in the so-called demilitarized zone, in that general area, North Vietnamese troops. No one is able to whisper to us behind his hand that if we stop the bombing those divisions will not attack our Marines who are 3 or 4 miles away. Now, we can't be children

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 10, 1967, p. 595.

about this. We can't be foolish. We need to know what the military effect would be if we stopped the bombing in North Viet-Nam on a permanent and unconditional basis. And no one is able or willing to give us the slightest information as to what the result would be.

Mr. Niven: It seems to me that the great weakness in the case of your critics, including the highly placed ones in this country, is that they are forever looking for evidence of unwillingness to negotiate on the part of the administration without examining the question, "Is there any willingness to negotiate on the other side?" But isn't it fair to say, Mr. Secretary, that over the years the willingness of either side to negotiate and consequently the terms on which it was willing to negotiate has varied according to its appraisal of the military and political situation, where the advantage lay at the moment?

Secretary Rusk: Not really. It depends upon what result would be brought into being.

Now, for example, in 1962, on the basis of an agreement between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy in Vienna in June 1961, we went to Geneva. We made substantial concessions in order to get an agreement on Laos. That was signed in July 1962. Among the concessions we made, for example, was to accept the nominee of the Soviet Union to be Prime Minister of Laos, Prince Souvanna Phouma.

Now, we did not get performance by Hanoi on any one of the four principal elements in that agreement. They did not withdraw their North Vietnamese forces from Laos. They did not stop using Laos as an infiltration route into South Viet-Nam. They did not permit the coalition government to function in the Communist-held areas of Laos. And they did not permit the International Control Commission to function in the Communist-held areas of Laos.

That agreement was based upon a major effort on our part to take a giant step toward peace in Southeast Asia. It didn't derive from any close-in, narrow view of what the military situation would be. Now, from that time

forward we have been probing in every way that we could think of to try to find a peaceful basis to bring this war to a conclusion in South Viet-Nam.

Now, we can't bring it to a conclusion by giving them South Viet-Nam. We have major commitments there.

U.S. Will Talk Without, or About, Conditions

Mr. Niven: Weren't our conditions for talking a year ago, during the bombing pause in January '66, a little more unconditional than they are this time? Did we then not make it clear that we were willing to sit down and negotiate and continue the bombing pause?

Secretary Rusk: Well, there was a temporary suspension of the bombing, and we had been told before that pause started that a somewhat longer pause than the 5-day pause which we had had earlier might make it possible for something constructive to open up. We had been told that by some of the Communist countries. As a matter of fact they said, some of them, that if you stop 15 or 20 days that might open up some possibilities. Well, we stopped for twice as long as they suggested. But on the 34th day of that pause Hanoi came back and said that you must stop your bombing permanently and unconditionally and only then can there be any talks. And at that time they said you must take the four points of Hanoi and you must accept the Liberation Front as the sole spokesman for South Viet-Nam. In other words, they were demanding that, in effect, we surrender South Viet-Nam to the North.

Mr. Niven: We have, however, as a result of that experience perhaps, upped the ante, have we not, this time, where we have said that we demand the cessation of infiltration of men—

Secretary Rusk: We will talk to these people without conditions of any sort. Now, they have raised a major condition, the stoppage of the bombing on a permanent basis. So we have said all right, we will talk to you about conditions, we will talk to you about that condition, we will talk about other

things—what you should do on your side, as a preliminary to negotiation, if you wish, you see.

So we will talk to them either way, without conditions or about conditions. Now, it shouldn't be all that difficult for contacts to explore the possibilities of peace even while the fighting is going on. We negotiated on the Berlin blockade while Berlin was under blockade. We talked about Korea while the shooting was going on.

Mr. Niven: You can talk while the bombing and infiltration continues.

Secretary Rusk: Yes. Indeed, in Korea we took more casualties after the talks started than we did before the talks started. And in the case of the Cuban missile crisis, we negotiated that question with the Soviet Union while they were building their missile sites just as fast as they could, you see. So there is nothing in our statements that means that if there is any real interest in peace that contacts and explorations cannot occur, either about the settlement or about the first steps toward peace and deescalating the violence, either one of them.

Mr. Niven: Their position for 2 years now, of course, has been the bombing must stop. But if they were to abandon that and Ho Chi Minh cabled the President and said, "I will meet you in New Delhi 2 weeks from now without conditions, let the war go on," the President would go?

Secretary Rusk: Well, we will be in touch with them at the first opportunity that there will be a representative of Hanoi somewhere to talk about peace. We will be there.

Mr. Niven: Publicly or privately?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think it is very likely that the most profitable contacts initially would be private. But we have asked for a conference of—of the Geneva conference of '54 or the Geneva conference of '62 or an all-Asian peace conference or a meeting between North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam in the demilitarized zone; or we have suggested the two cochairmen [of the Geneva conferences] might be in touch with the two parties to do something about it, that is, Britain and the Soviet Union; or we would

be glad to see the three members of the International Control Commission—India, Canada, and Poland—undertake this role. Public or private, direct or indirect—it makes no difference to us.

Mr. Niven: Through your own knowledge, would you expect to end the war with negotiations or with a fizzling out, notably of the cessation of infiltration?

Secretary Rusk: It is very hard to say. The Greek guerrilla operations fizzled out. There were systematic discussions preceding that. I think we ought to keep both doors open. And we have said to the other side on more than one occasion that if you don't want to come into a conference, if that is complicated, if you don't want to get into formal negotiations, then let's start doing some things on the ground of which each one of us can take note and to which we can respond, let's begin some de facto deescalation of this situation. And that hasn't produced any results either.

Geneva Accords a Basis for Serious Talks

Mr. Niven: Apart from the question of how to get into negotiations, what really is there to negotiate about, Mr. Secretary? As long as Hanoi is not willing to represent—to accept the South Vietnamese government or the emerging South Vietnamese government as the principal political structure of South Viet-Nam, as long as we are unwilling to accept the National Liberation Front as the principal political structure there, what really is there for the United States and North Viet-Nam to talk about?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that they and the Soviet Union continue to talk in terms of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962. The Warsaw Pact countries in their meeting in Bucharest last year put out a statement in which they called upon us to comply completely with those accords. We said fine, let's get going. When we took this matter to the Security Council of the United Nations, the Soviet representatives said, "No, the United Nations is not the proper forum, the Geneva machinery is the proper forum." So Ambassador Goldberg said, "All

right, if that is your view, then let's get going with the Geneva machinery."

I think if there is to be serious talk it is likely to be on the basis of the 1954 and 1962 agreements which were signed by the other side. We signed the 1962 agreements, although we did not sign the 1954 agreements. But we accepted both of these agreements as an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia.

Mr. Niven: The President has said he would be happy to accept the outcome of free elections throughout Viet-Nam.

Secretary Rusk: That is correct.

Mr. Niven: Mr. [Henry Cabot] Lodge last week said it was unthinkable that we let the Viet Cong into the democratic structure of South Viet-Nam.

Secretary Rusk: I think what he perhaps meant was that we don't see any indication that the South Vietnamese under genuinely free elections would elect the Liberation Front or the Viet Cong. Now, you have many groups in South Viet-Nam, the Buddhists and the Catholics, the Montagnards, the million ethnic Cambodians who have been living there for a long time, the million refugees who came down from Hanoi in 1955, that period. They disagree among themselves on a number of points. But the point that they seem to have in common is that they do not want the Liberation Front. So we would not expect that the South Vietnamese would elect the Viet Cong if there were free elections.

Program of Reconciliation

Mr. Niven: But what kind of a settlement would filter down to the village and end the situation in which the Viet Cong and the present agents of South Viet-Nam are struggling for control of that village? What would end the guerrilla war?

Secretary Rusk: Oh, I think in the first place a decision by Hanoi to abandon the effort to seize South Viet-Nam by force. This is by all means by all odds the most important single decision that could affect that result. I think that the rapid increase in the

rate of defections from the Viet Cong, the growing disillusionment in the countryside, as one can sense it, with the Viet Cong and their very severe impositions upon the villagers, are having an effect without that decision by Hanoi. But this is a simple problem of an attempt by Hanoi to do something in the South. If they would abandon that, I am quite sure the South Vietnamese, including the Viet Cong, would come to terms among themselves.

Very recently the South Vietnamese Government announced a program of reconciliation in which they said that they would accept back into the body politic those genuine southerners who had gone over to the Viet Cong and would like to return. There would be amnesty. They would not be mistreated. They could resume their place in society. And indeed some of the defectors from the Viet Cong, the so-called returnees, have been candidates in village elections in the last three Sundays. And some of them have been elected.

So I have no real doubt that the southerners, if left alone, would resolve these problems among themselves. They can't do it so long as the North is insisting upon keeping this pressure going against the South by military means.

Mr. Niven: With the continuing pressure are you confident that the emerging democratic apparatus is going to survive and that the generals won't say "No" at the last minute?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think the military leadership is very strongly committed to the constitutional process, because in January of last year they themselves took the initiative to start this process going. Now, when it came to the meeting at Honolulu,² they repeated that and we indicated that we were in favor of it, and this process has been going on ever since. But I think the military leadership is strongly committed to this constitutional process which they initiated and which has been picked up by the people in electing a constituent assembly, which has promul-

² For background, see *ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

gated a constitution, and with elections that are anticipated this September.

Mr. Niven: To return for just a moment to the question of bombing, Mr. Secretary, there is a projected lull of a day or two on the Buddhist birthday later this month. Is there any possibility that that will be attended by a flurry of diplomatic activity and be extended?

Secretary Rusk: The Government of South Viet-Nam has again said that they would be glad to meet with the Government of North Viet-Nam in the demilitarized zone to talk about an extension of that truce. Now, the short period of cessation of the bombing is not the kind of cessation that North Viet-Nam has described as a prerequisite for serious negotiations. Now, if between now and then there was some indication that they were prepared to talk without that condition or about that condition, then of course that would be of some interest. But we have no indication that that is coming.

Mr. Niven: Wouldn't this perhaps be a face-saving means of getting something going on both sides?

Secretary Rusk: Well, if they wish to raise the question further to extend that pause they can do so with Saigon, or they can communicate in other respects if they would be interested in some such arrangement. The problem has been that they don't seem to think very much of any temporary arrangement.

Hanoi Takes Advantage of Truce Periods

Mr. Niven: Well, suppose they proposed to suggest it be extended a week or so. Would that inevitably bring the reply from us "What will you do by way of reciprocation to reduce—"

Secretary Rusk: Well, these are matters that need to be discussed. That is why Saigon has offered to meet them in the demilitarized zone to talk about it—because an extended pause without something serious going on simply means that they have an opportunity to resupply and move their people about and to load all the sampans in North Viet-Nam with supplies for the guer-

rilla troops and get everything all set for a fresh lunge, you see, when it is over.

During the Tet pause, when the hour arrived for the Tet truce to begin, hundreds of ships, boats, barges, trucks, suddenly raced for the South. They were there at the starter's gate like horses on a racetrack, and they just rushed pellmell to the South with thousands of tons of supplies to reequip their forces and resupply them. But the important thing is that, although they knew that suspension was coming and they knew that we were interested in talking seriously during that suspension, they didn't have a diplomat at the starting gate. They were not willing to talk seriously about a settlement of the problem or about prolonging the arrangements or have some mutual deescalation of the violence during that Tet truce.

Mr. Niven: It has been argued that the military advantage to us, in terms of infiltration, of continuing the bombing may be outweighed by the unifying effect of the population of North Viet-Nam, may actually increase their will to continue the war. What is your appraisal of that?

Secretary Rusk: Well, no one likes bombing. People get mad under bombing. But there are some very important operational questions there. I mentioned those three divisions in the demilitarized zone. These North Vietnamese forces are just a few miles away from our Marines. Are we going to say to our Marines, "You must wait until those fellows get 2 miles away before you shoot at them, but don't shoot at them when they are 9 miles away because that would be too rude—that is over on the other side of the border"? If we see a truck column of 40 trucks coming down just north of the demilitarized zone, are we going to leave them alone and then have them use that ammunition against our men the next day? You can't do that. Let's have some peace.

We can have peace literally within 24 hours if Hanoi is willing to take seriously the 1954 and 1962 agreements, abandon its effort to seize South Viet-Nam by force, and join in mutual steps to turn down this violence and get to the conference table.

Mr. Niven: Mr. Secretary, will you turn to East-West relations as a whole? Up to a year or so ago it seemed to be the position of the Soviet Union until Viet-Nam was settled nothing could be settled. Now, we never agreed to that. The proliferation of talks and treaties since then suggests that the Russians have now turned away and are quite anxious to continue, and expand if possible, the *détente* in spite of Viet-Nam. Is that a fair appraisal?

Effect of Viet-Nam on East-West Relations

Secretary Rusk: Well, undoubtedly the Viet-Nam question injects a serious problem of tension, and on both sides. For example, there are many people in this country who have serious questions about whether we should ourselves open the door to expanding trade with Eastern Europe while the Viet-Nam situation is still going on. And I have no doubt they have some problems on their side in the same direction. However, we were glad to see that despite Viet-Nam it was possible to proceed with the space treaty, and we have been working hard on the nonproliferation treaty despite Viet-Nam. So as far as we are concerned, we are prepared to continue to work at these individual questions, small or large, if the other side is willing to do so. But there are tensions there that complicate the question on both sides, and I wouldn't want to deny that.

Mr. Niven: You brought up a political question I would like to ask you—would like to pursue with you. Some of the people on the Hill opposed to the administration's policy in Viet-Nam have said when you send people around the country, military officers or others, as they put it, talking the language of the cold war and whipping up passions about the war in Viet-Nam, you create a body of public opinion in this country which makes it difficult to get the consular treaty, to get through an increased East-West trade, and so forth. Is this true?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I cannot generalize about that. Our general view is that we have to do what is necessary in Viet-Nam because of our commitments and because of its rela-

tion with the general problem of organizing a durable peace in the world. But on the other hand we ought to be ready to try to resolve other questions, large or small, if we can.

Now, that's difficult. And it is not easy for all of our people to understand why it's important. But I think the central question in front of us all is the question of organizing a peace. And every policy needs to be weighed in terms of whether it will contribute toward that objective or not.

Now, we send out a thousand cables a day out of this Department. My guess is that most of the people would approve of most of those cables and that those who object to one particular part of the policy would support much of the rest. But the object of the entire effort is to organize a global peace, because we are in a situation—and have been for over a decade—where the organization of a peace is necessary to the survival of the human race, in very simple terms.

Moscow-Peking Problems

Mr. Niven: In the process of getting closer to the Russians, are they ever at all frank about their problems with their Chinese allies?

Secretary Rusk: No, they have not talked about China with us very much. We would not expect them to. This is a problem within the Communist world.

Mr. Niven: Do they ever say, "Don't push us too far at this point, because you know what problems we are up against with the Chinese"?

Secretary Rusk: No, no, they don't go into questions of that sort. We know that they are concerned about China, as we are—perhaps not for the same reason. We know that there has been a major difference between Moscow and Peking on the tactics to be pursued in advancing the world revolution. That has reached its high point in the period since 1961. But China does not discuss the Soviet Union with us in our bilateral talks in Warsaw. The Soviet Union does not discuss China with us on these important questions.

Mr. Niven: The Soviet Union never tries

to lead us along toward something they want by the stated or implicit threat of their—

Secretary Rusk: No, there has been a minimum of exchange as far as China is concerned with the Soviet Union. Now, China is accusing Moscow of being in some sort of a conspiracy with us, and sometimes you hear charges out of Moscow that Peking is assisting us by standing in the way of Communist unity. They throw these charges back and forth at each other. But as far as we are concerned, we are not ourselves brought directly into the middle of that particular situation.

Mr. Niven: Sir, many people were struck by the singularly calm atmosphere in which Mrs. [Svetlana] Alliluyeva arrived in this country. Was this accidental, or was it a result of considerable effort by the higher echelons of the administration and of the Soviet Union, perhaps?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I cannot speak for the Soviet Union. As far as we are concerned, nothing special was done on our side. I have the impression that she is a rather calm person—that this was not one of those great cold-war episodes that one might have expected 10 years ago or 15 years ago. She has made her own statement about her own views, and they are rather simple and civilized views. My guess is that she would like a little peace and quiet. She will publish her memoirs or her autobiography while she is here and make her own decision about where she wants to live in the future. But this has not been a major political problem between ourselves and the Soviet Union.

Mr. Niven: But did you and the President not delay—seek to delay her arrival, discourage her coming here for a few weeks in order to avoid its becoming a problem between us and the Soviet Union?

Secretary Rusk: Well, she had the choice of going to several places when she left India, and she considered going to several places. She went to Switzerland temporarily. There was some problem about her coming here under those—under the circumstances of the emotion of the first moment. I mean all you gentlemen in the news media, for ex-

ample, would not give her any privacy.

Mr. Niven: I fully realize that.

Secretary Rusk: And she was looking for a little peace and quiet and wanted apparently to catch her breath and decide what she wanted to do.

Mr. Niven: Wasn't the delay desirable from the administration's point of view, and therefore suggested by the administration?

Secretary Rusk: We did not impose a delay on her as far as we were concerned. We did not have in front of us the specific question of whether we should grant her political asylum in a political sense. She had a visa to come to this country. But I think she handled herself very well, and I think the whole situation has been handled rather well up to this point.

Mr. Niven: Are you surprised that the Russians have said nothing, made no complaint?

Secretary Rusk: Well, we have not come to the end of the chapter yet. We are not sure whether they will or not. They have not raised any questions with us about it.

Rotation of U.S. Forces From Europe

Mr. Niven: Sir, the Vice President has recently been on a long trip, a tour of European capitals, and we now have the news today that we are reducing our troops in Europe. Can you give us anything on the background of this decision? We have had groups of Senators wanting to cut forces; we have had others wanting us not to cut forces. We have had the reactions of the Europeans themselves to consider. Can you illuminate today's announcement?³

Secretary Rusk: Well, back in 1951 we had in mind that we would have in Europe about 5 $\frac{2}{3}$ divisions. In fact, we have about six divisions there now. We added certain strength to it for our own reasons.

Now, we are rotating two-thirds of a division, which means that we would expect to have present in Europe at all times the 5 $\frac{1}{3}$ divisions rather than the 5 $\frac{2}{3}$ divisions. In addition, those brigades that are in this coun-

³ See p. 788.

try will be in full readiness and will be able to return promptly if needed in Europe. They will replace each other in a regular rotation in Europe, and once a year the entire division will be together in Europe.

This will give us a good test of mobility, of the idea of rotation. It also permits us to bring home a considerable number of dependents, which is of some importance to us from an expense and from an exchange point of view.

And I think it does not in any significant way affect the military capabilities of NATO.

Now, we will have to see whether there is any response from the other side in this general direction of any sort. But these are matters that are being discussed in NATO as a part of the general NATO structure, and we think that what has been discussed thus far is reasonable under the circumstances.

Mr. Niven: When you talk of looking for a response from the other side, do you mean that you are looking for a similar reduction of forces among the Warsaw Pact countries?

Secretary Rusk: Well, it would be interesting if such reduction would occur. We are not expecting it. We have not been told that one would happen. And in London Mr. Kosygin [Alekssei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers] related the reduction of Warsaw Pact forces to a confirmation of the status quo in Germany, in Central Europe. And that is not a very encouraging prospect.

But I am sure the NATO countries will keep their eyes on what the Warsaw Pact forces are doing in this situation as they from year to year make their own judgment about what NATO should do.

Mr. Niven: Do you think there is any substantial likelihood of a substantial deescalation?

Secretary Rusk: I would not be able to project, because I don't have any information from Eastern Europe on that.

Mr. Niven: In the meantime, our motive is primarily balance of payments rather than increasing the availability of troops for Viet-Nam.

Secretary Rusk: Well, these troops are not

intended to be used in Viet-Nam. They remain in a condition of readiness so they can not only rotate to Europe but go back quickly if needed in an emergency, and would remain a part of the same organized division and committed to NATO, assigned to NATO.

Mr. Niven: But they will in fact, however, be 3,000 miles closer to Viet-Nam in case of need.

Secretary Rusk: Well, they will be 3,000 miles closer to a lot of other places. But the point is that they remain assigned to NATO, they will be available for immediate return to NATO, and every 6 months there will be a change in the brigade that is actually stationed in NATO. So I just would prefer not to get into the question of tying this to other situations, because it is not a part of the plan.

Britain and the Common Market

Mr. Niven: Sir, the British have again announced their intention to apply for membership in the Common Market. The French have indicated they are not going to veto them this time but they will take a long, hard look at it. Does this mean anything new in terms of our position?

Secretary Rusk: Well, we have stayed out of the public discussion of this matter. This is basically a European question for the Six and for Britain.

Everyone knows that we ourselves would be very glad to see this occur. But the issues there are so fundamental to our friends on the other side of the Atlantic that we have felt it is not for us to take an active part.

My guess is that there will be some serious discussion and some rather complex negotiation before this can come about. But we just have no way of predicting the end of the road.

Mr. Niven: If Britain is admitted to membership, will it mean the end or the substantial diminution of what we have talked about over the years as the special relationship between the U.S. and the U.K.?

Secretary Rusk: Well, the special relationship has been both real and unreal, depending upon how one views it. Obviously this

country has had a long and traditional tie with Britain because of our historic past and because we have been so closely associated in so many common struggles and common efforts.

I would suppose that if Britain enters Europe we would be working very closely with that new Europe, just as closely as we would have with Britain separately or with any of our European partners. So I don't think the problem of the special relationship is one that would bother us. It may bother somebody on the other side of the Atlantic.

Mr. Niven: Well, now, even in the troubled 1950's and '60's there have been a few shrinking areas of the world where when there was a crisis you or whatever Secretary of State or President of the United States could say, "Well, that area is primarily a British responsibility." If Britain turns her face now toward Europe, aren't those areas going to shrink even more and aren't we going to be playing the policeman in more places?

Secretary Rusk: Well, we are not ourselves looking for more business in this regard, and we are quite clear that we are not the policeman of the world. We have some very specific commitments under existing treaties. But if you went back over the last 60 or 70 crises of one sort or another that have occurred in the world, we have taken part in about 6 or 7 of them. We have been involved as a member of the United Nations and the Security Council, or diplomatically, in trying to reduce tensions and trying to help find a peaceful settlement of some of these disputes.

But rather than think of a reduction of European influence with, say, the admission of Britain into Europe, I would hope that Europe as a whole, enlarged as it would be by the admission of Britain, would play its full role in world affairs that is there for it and that it is fully capable of playing. So that I don't look upon the development as one in which various people pull away and then we go rushing in filling in vacuums in different parts of the world. We have our basket pretty full.

Mr. Niven: That brings up the overall question of our commitment in the world. And of course you get it from both sides. Whenever anything goes wrong in the world that we do not interfere in we are accused of sitting by and letting it happen; at the same time people say we are overextended and we are in too many places. How do you judge when we should be there and when we should not, what we should do? Perhaps in terms of Greece and Yemen in the last few weeks: Is each case one to be judged in terms of our central purpose? How do you make the determination in each case?

The U.S. Commitment in the World

Secretary Rusk: Well, it depends upon a number of things. In the first place, where we have a specific treaty commitment and a threat occurs against that treaty commitment, then we have a very specific obligation to do what we can as a signatory of that treaty.

We have responsibilities as a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations to take an active and responsible part in helping the Security Council resolve those questions that are brought to the Security Council.

We encourage other groups—such as the Organization of African Unity to try to pick up some of the disputes that exist on the continent of Africa and find local African solutions to those disputes on that continent.

I would not want to speculate about individual hypothetical cases, but these are very complex questions.

Our primary responsibilities have to do with our treaty commitments.

But I think the United Nations effort is a very important part of our total effort in resolving disputes that have occurred in different parts of the world.

Mr. Niven: Do you ever have the feeling when you learn from cables of a new crisis that we are overextending, perhaps we shouldn't be in some of the countries that we are in, even on an aid basis? I don't expect you to name names of countries. But do you

ever feel that we could concentrate our effort more if we were—

Secretary Rusk: Well, that is somewhat of a nostalgic view in one sense. We have carried heavy burdens in this postwar period. But so have some other countries.

We cannot really be completely indifferent to the developments in other continents. That doesn't mean that we should go rushing in unilaterally wherever there is a problem, trying to solve it unilaterally.

For example, in the fighting between India and Pakistan, the Security Council of the United Nations acted very effectively there with the permanent members—and that includes the Soviet Union and the United States—acting in a parallel fashion there to assist the Security Council in bringing that matter to a conclusion.

But I think also we are encouraged by the fact that other countries have been taking a considerable share of the aid program burden. For example, a country like France spends more of its gross national product on foreign aid than we do. And Canada and Japan have been making their contribution in relation to their total gross national product. Japan put in as much capital in the Asian Development Bank as the United States. They matched ours, \$200 million.

So the total effort is steadily growing. But nevertheless we have to be interested in one way or another in difficult and dangerous problems that arise anywhere in the world. That doesn't mean we go and police them.

International Communist Movement

Mr. Niven: The charge has been made that this worldwide complicated multifaceted effort is perpetuated in the name of resistance to a monolithic international Communist conspiracy which no longer exists. The critics say that the international Communist movement is no longer an extension of the Soviet Union, it is fragmented, and therefore why shouldn't we relax? And if a particular area of the world goes Communist, can't we relax on the ground that it will eventually—nationalism will prevail over communism, as

to some extent it seems to be doing in Eastern Europe?

Secretary Rusk: Well, that depends upon what happens.

In Southeast Asia we have treaty commitments that obligate us to take action to meet the common danger if there is an aggression by means of armed attack. That aggression is under way.

If these questions can be decided by people in free elections, perhaps we could all relax. I don't know anyone who through free elections, any great nation—we have a particular State in India—that brought Communists to power with free elections. They are not monolithic—they are not monolithic.

But all branches of the Communist Party that I know of are committed to what they call the world revolution. And their picture of that world revolution is quite contrary to the kind of world organization sketched out in the Charter of the United Nations.

Now, they have important differences among themselves about how you best get on with that world revolution. And there is a contest within the Communist world between those who think that peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition is the better way to do it and the militants, primarily in Peking, who believe that you back this world revolution by force.

But I think the Communist commitment to world revolution is pretty general throughout the Communist movement.

Now, if they want to compete peacefully, all right, let's do that. But when they start moving by force to impose this upon other people by force, then you have a very serious question about where it leads and how you organize a world peace on that basis.

Mr. Niven: A decade or a decade and a half ago the threat was that of one Communist superpower supported by Communist movements all over the world. Isn't the challenge reduced every time the Communist world becomes depolarized, every time at least a European government or even the Communist Party in Western Europe shows new signs of independence?

Secretary Rusk: Well, it may be reduced, but that does not mean it has disappeared.

Mr. Niven: You don't feel—

Secretary Rusk: I mean the fact that Moscow and Peking have not been very close friends has not reduced the danger created by the attack of Hanoi against South Vietnam. It is there—in a very accentuated form.

Mr. Niven: For a time they quarreled over supplies. That has been resolved, apparently.

Secretary Rusk: Well, we are not sure that that so-called quarrel had a great deal of effect upon the actual delivery of supplies. We are not very sure of that. At least I personally am not. I don't have detailed information.

Efforts Toward Easing Tensions

Mr. Niven: You don't feel, then, that our posture in the world can be relaxed because of the increasing variety in the Communist world—that we still have a worldwide challenge—

Secretary Rusk: It depends upon what you mean by being relaxed, Mr. Niven.

We are only 4 or 5 years away from two very grave crises with the Communist countries of Eastern Europe, particularly with the Soviet Union, the Berlin crisis of 1961-62 and the Cuban missile crisis.

So we cannot suppose that these problems have disappeared forever. And the Warsaw Pact forces are in Central Europe in great strength right now. And the German problem is unresolved.

But on the other hand we would hope very much that we are entering a period of prudence and mutual respect on the possibility of settling outstanding problems.

I remind you that President Kennedy and President Johnson and their Secretary of State have not gone down to the Senate with new alliances. President Kennedy took down the nuclear test ban treaty. President Johnson concluded the civil air agreement and the consular agreement, the space treaty. We are working on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons treaty. We would like to see some ceiling put on this race involving ABM's

[antiballistic missiles] and additional offensive nuclear missiles.

We would like to take up seriously the question of increasing trade between ourselves and Eastern Europe.

So we are prepared to do our part in contributing toward that easing of tension and settlement of outstanding questions. But that doesn't mean that the dangers have completely disappeared and that we can just let down our guard and think that everything is all over. It just isn't. There is a lot to happen before we get to that point.

Mr. Niven: Well, President Kennedy said in effect once that we can't settle anything with the Communists until we settle everything. Do you feel that some people now expect that just because we can settle some things that everything else is automatically solved, too?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I wouldn't want to speak for the others. My own feeling about this is that we must continue to gnaw at these questions and wrestle with them and try to get on with them.

Now, one could be discouraged, if one let oneself be, with the slow pace of disarmament. Yet we cannot afford to abandon the effort to get on with that job. Since 1947 the NATO countries alone have spent well over a trillion dollars on defense budgets. And the Soviet Union and its allies have spent comparable amounts in relation to their own economic base. Now, think of the enormous unfinished business that their people and our people have to which we could commit those vast resources. We can't afford to abandon the disarmament effort, even though it seems to move slow.

So let's keep working at these questions. Maybe today we can find some small question to settle. Maybe tomorrow it will be a somewhat larger question. And maybe if we can get the nonproliferation treaty, that would be a rather important breakthrough on a particular front. But, of course, in the background is the overriding need to bring this Viet-Nam question to a peaceful settlement, just as soon as we can and the other side can, just as soon as the other side will let us.

Mr. Niven: I was going to ask: Do you ever feel that the Viet-Nam war, however justified—merely in terms of the time, attention, and energy which you and the rest of this Capital have to devote to it—is deflecting all of you from other things?

Secretary Rusk: Oh, not at all. I think that the serious business of the Government goes on, and the President's time and my time are committed to European questions, disarmament questions, trade questions, Latin American questions, the Alliance for Progress. No, life goes on. It is not true that Viet-Nam is diverting our attention from other parts of the world.

Mr. Niven: But some of our former diplomats and some of the critics are forever contending that the Viet-Nam war places strings upon our alliances, it complicates and exacerbates other problems.

Secretary Rusk: I think that is nonsense—because if you want to put some strain on our other alliances, just let it become apparent that our commitment under an alliance is not worth very much. Then you will see some strain on our alliances.

Mr. Niven: You are suggesting if we don't uphold this commitment other people will lose faith in our commitments all over the world.

Secretary Rusk: And more importantly, our adversaries or prospective adversaries may make some gross miscalculations about what we would do with respect to those commitments.

Mr. Niven: Mr. Secretary, if you had your way and this thing could be ended, what problems would be solved with it and what new problems, if any, would come along in its wake? Do you see the war, the end of the Viet-Nam war, ending the chapter in history and suddenly opening up all sorts of new possibilities, or do you see it ushering in new problems?

Secretary Rusk: I would think that peace in Viet-Nam would open up some real opportunities for the nations of Asia to get on with their new momentum in the field of economic and social development and in terms of regional cooperation.

As you know, President Johnson has invited North Viet-Nam to take part in that total effort in Southeast Asia and the President has said that we would make a very large contribution to that total effort if there were conditions of peace.

So I think there are very stimulating new opportunities that will open up.

Now, I am not going to suggest that the end of the Viet-Nam situation will settle every other problem. I am the 54th Secretary of State, and I think I can guarantee that the 55th Secretary of State is going to have plenty of problems. But because change is built into our present world, rapid change is going to be with us for as long as one can see into the future.

But I think that the end of the aggression in Viet-Nam would put us a very long step forward toward this organization of a durable peace. I think there is a general recognition in the world that a nuclear exchange does not make sense, that sending massed divisions across national frontiers is pretty reckless today. If we get this problem of these "wars of national liberation" under reasonable control, then maybe we can look forward to a period of relative peace, although there will continue to be quarrels and neighborhood disputes and plenty of business for the Security Council of the United Nations.

Mr. Niven: Without nuclear confrontation or anything like that, do you see more brush-fire wars, more "wars of national liberation"? Is peaceful coexistence always going to lapse into a war here and there, a limited war?

Secretary Rusk: I just cannot be a prophet on that. It would seem to me that the general trend has been toward the use of less violence in settling political disputes and toward competition by peaceful means. I think there is some evidence pointing in that direction. I hope that's true. And we must work toward insuring that it is true. But we will have to take these things one step at a time and work on them as best we can.

Mr. Niven: The question arises, of course: Even if the Soviet Union is from here on

going to be a pacific influence within the Communist world, what is the influence of China going to be?

Secretary Rusk: We don't know very much about what the second generation in Peking will look like. Indeed, part of that commotion that is going on there now may have to do with some shift in influence between the first generation and the second generation of leadership. Most of the members of the present government in Peking are veterans of the Long March. They are the first generation—with the rather dogmatic and rather harsh views of the primitive Marxist, if you like.

Now, what does the second generation look like? Will they be managers, bureaucrats, technicians, scientists, people of that sort, or will they be dynamic ideologists still pursuing this rather militant brand of communism? We don't really know yet—although we have a very great stake in the answer. So we can hope that in time some of the elan of that original violence will spend itself, and that we look forward to a little more pragmatism, a little more prudence in their relations with the rest of the world.

Mr. Niven: Mr. Secretary, our time is up. Thank you very much.

U.S., U.K., and Germany Conclude Trilateral Talks

The final sessions of the series of trilateral discussions by representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany were held at London April 27–28.¹ Following is the text of a U.S. Government statement on the conclusion of the talks, which was released at Washington on May 2.

Press release 104 dated May 2

Since last October the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom and Federal Republic of Germany have been engaged in a series of discussions of the problems posed for the defense of NATO and the balance of payments position of the respective parties by the forces stationed in the Federal Re-

public of Germany. The three Governments have now completed these talks. The discussion of questions regarding forces of the United States and United Kingdom are continuing in NATO.

The United States believes that constructive proposals have been made toward answering the questions faced. In particular the financial arrangements that have been concluded between the British and German Governments, between the American and British Governments, and between the United States and the German Government and the German Bundesbank, will help deal with foreign exchange costs of American and British forces in Germany. The German Government intends to continue procurement of military goods and services in the United States on a scale significant in relation to the German defense effort. The Federal Republic decides what levels of procurement it wishes to undertake. The total of the prospective German military purchases does not match the United States foreign exchange expenditures in Germany for military purposes. The arrangements also include the willingness of the Bundesbank to invest during the period July 1967–June 1968 \$500 million in special medium-term United States Government securities, which will mean a capital import for the United States. In addition, the Bundesbank, in agreement with the German Government, has made known its intention to continue its practice of not converting dollars into gold as part of a policy of international monetary cooperation. Between the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic, there are arrangements for German offsetting purchases in the defense and civil sectors, which are expected to amount in all to nearly \$150 million. To assist the British to meet their foreign exchange costs in Germany the United States Government has undertaken to make on a basis of open and competitive bidding, an additional \$19.6 million of military purchases in Britain between April 1, 1967 and March 31, 1968. The basis for these

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 31, 1966, p. 670, and Dec. 5, 1966, p. 867.

financial decisions is the recognition that the balance of payments consequences, arising from the stationing of forces abroad for the common defense continue to pose a problem for joint attention.

With regard to alliance strategy and forces and how available resources can be used most effectively for the common defense, the Representatives recognized that the NATO Defense Planning Committee offers the best forum for continuing discussions of these matters. Discussions in that committee, which have just begun, will enable the Governments to confer fully with their Allies before taking decisions concerning adjustments in the structure or deployment of the armed forces now committed to NATO.

With a view to initiating such discussions in the Defense Planning Committee, the Representatives concluded with respect to United Kingdom forces, that some force redeployments may be appropriate.

These forces would remain in the United Kingdom and committed to NATO. With respect to United States forces, the Representatives concluded that the flexibility provided by developments in strategic mobility should permit some changes in the deployment of certain ground and air force units which could be made without affecting their availability for combat in Europe within the time required.

The United States has proposed to NATO that it redeploy from the FRG to the United States up to 35,000 military personnel. The ground and air units affected, whether at their United States or FRG bases, will remain fully committed to NATO.

The proposal for the Army is as follows: The United States Army division involved will be the 24th Infantry Division. At least one brigade of that division will be in Germany at all times. The other two brigades and an appropriate share of divisional and non-divisional support units—totaling approximately two-thirds of a United States division force—will be redeployed from Germany to the United States. Once a year, all three brigades will be in Germany for exercises involving the entire division. The rotation plan provides that the three brigades would succeed each other on temporary duty in the FRG. Forces redeployed to the United States will be maintained in a high degree of readiness, and equipment will be maintained in the FRG in sufficient quantity and readiness to ensure that the forces can be promptly redeployed to Germany.

The proposal for the Air Force is as follows: The three tactical fighter wings, now based in Germany, are involved in the plan. Five squadrons will be in Germany at all times. Four squadrons of the aircraft will be redeployed to the United States.

All of the aircraft will be together in Germany once a year for exercises. The aircraft in the United States will be at a high degree of readiness to assure their rapid return to Europe.

First movements under both plans will not take place before January 1, 1968 and the plans may be in operation as soon as June 30, 1968, but in no event before the United States is ready to operate the system effectively.

Seventeen Years in East Asia

by William P. Bundy

*Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs*¹

I stand before you today at a time when American military forces, with those of other nations, are engaged in assisting a small nation of Asia—South Viet-Nam—to preserve its own independence. This is the situation that is in the forefront of our thinking.

But as I do so, my mind goes back to June 1950, nearly 17 years ago. Then President Truman took the decision to send American forces to assist another small Asian nation that was the victim of aggression. Although that decision shortly became part of an action by the United Nations—an action made possible by the Soviet Union's fortuitous boycott of the Security Council—it stands as a landmark in our own postwar policy in East Asia. And it is perhaps particularly fitting to use it as a reference point before a gathering of this organization, many of whose members joined the Legion as a result of their service in the Korean conflict.

This group hardly needs to be told why we are acting as we are in South Viet-Nam. We are acting to preserve South Viet-Nam's right to work out its own future without external interference, including its right to make a free choice on unification with the North. We are acting to fulfill a commitment that evolved through the actions of Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson and that was originally stated in the SEATO treaty, overwhelmingly ratified by the Senate in 1954. And we are acting to demonstrate to the world that the Communist technique of "people's wars" or "wars of national liberation"—in essence, imported subversion, armed terror, guerrilla action, and ultimately conventional military action—can be de-

feated even in a situation where the Communist side had the greatest possible advantages through an unfortunate colonial heritage, political difficulty, and the inherent weaknesses to which so many of the new nations of the world are subject.

All of these are valid reasons for what we are doing in Viet-Nam. As the plain and straightforward speech of General Westmoreland last week² once again made clear, we are acting to meet an attempt by one nation to take over another nation by force, by externally supported, directed, and now manned military force. Whatever the internal discontents at any time within the South, this is the root of the matter and of our involvement.

I could talk to you today solely about Viet-Nam, where we stand and where we are headed. But with General Westmoreland's full appraisal of the situation still fresh in your minds, I thought it would be more useful to put the conflict into the perspective of which it is also a vital part—that of the policies we have followed in East Asia consistently, at least since our historic 1950 decision to assist South Korea, and in some areas for still longer.

In essence, for the past 17 years under both parties and four Presidents, we have pursued a policy of seeking to assist the non-Communist nations of East Asia and the Pacific to work out their own future in their

¹ Address made before the National Executive Committee of the American Legion at Indianapolis, Ind., on May 3 (press release 107).

² For text, see BULLETIN of May 15, 1967, p. 738.

own way and in accordance with their own traditions. We have made a bet with history that the peoples and nations of this area are capable of surviving as free and independent states and that progress can best be achieved if they are protected against external force and are assisted in their economic and social development by the nations in a position to do so.

Our policies have been guided essentially by two propositions rooted deeply in our own national interest:

First, that the extension of hostile control over other nations or wide areas of Asia, specifically by Communist China, North Korea, and North Viet-Nam, would in a very short time create a situation that would menace all the countries of the area and present a direct and major threat to the most concrete national interests of this country.

Second, and directly related to the first proposition, is the belief that an East Asian and Pacific region comprised of free and independent states working effectively for the welfare of their people is in the long run essential to preventing the extension of hostile power and also essential to the regional and world peace in which the United States as we know it can survive and prosper.

The First 15 Years

So in the years from 1950 to 1965 the United States acted in two different spheres. To meet the security threat to the area and to individual nations, we stood firm in Korea and entered into a progressive series of treaty commitments: to Japan, to Korea, to the Republic of China, and to the Philippines on a bilateral basis; to Australia and New Zealand under the ANZUS treaty; and to member nations and the protocol state of South Viet-Nam under the SEATO treaty. In support of these commitments we deployed major forces to the area and we assisted the nations of the area to develop, to the best of their ability, military forces appropriate to the threat that each faced.

But our actions were never confined to security alone, for we knew that security was

a necessary but not a sufficient condition to lasting stability and progress in the area. Thus, beginning with the reconstruction of Japan in the early postwar years, we developed a wide pattern of programs to provide economic assistance to those nations that wished it and were prepared to use it effectively.

Let us then draw back and see what happened by 1965 as a result of the inherent great capacity of the nations of Asia and of our own assistance efforts.

In Japan, American forces were withdrawn and, with substantial United States economic help until the midfifties, spectacular economic advances took place. Major land reform programs were concluded and democracy flourished.

South Korea, devastated by the conflict to a degree far beyond anything that has happened in Viet-Nam, had great difficulty for many years but beginning in the early 1960's took hold of its affairs, carried through a genuine democratic election, and began to make real economic progress.

The Republic of China on Taiwan beat back a Communist threat to the offshore islands in 1958 and on the economic side carried out sound and effective policies, including land reform, which made possible the reduction and in 1965 the elimination of U.S. assistance programs. By 1961 the Republic of China began a small but still very significant program of technical assistance, mainly in agriculture, throughout Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

The Philippines beat back a Communist Huk rebellion and consolidated a working democracy.

Thailand, which had the great advantage of never having been subject to colonial control, made steady progress.

There were similar success stories in other parts of the area where we were not directly involved, notably in Malaysia and Singapore, where the British carried through wise and realistic programs to make these nations independent and self-governing.

In other nations developments were more uneven. Indonesia, in particular, fell under

the spell of Sukarno's extreme nationalism. By 1965 she was hostile to us, engaged in a sterile but dangerous military confrontation with Malaysia and Singapore, and headed very shortly for Communist control and an effective alliance with Communist China.

So, in early 1965, the overall picture in East Asia was one where a number of the key nations had shown what could be done, but there remained serious dark spots. Yet East Asia as a whole had resisted any extension of Communist control and had demonstrated a capacity for social development and economic growth—on an extraordinary scale in Japan and markedly in other key nations. That economic performance contrasted sharply, as the Asians were aware, with the deteriorating economic situation in Communist China, whose gross national product did not increase and may even have declined from 1958 to 1965 and whose per capita income dropped steadily. Realistic Asians must already have concluded that the economic methods of communism were vastly inferior to the variety of methods used by the free nations of the area.

The Last 2 Years

But, of course, the situation in Viet-Nam in 1965 stood, alongside the trend in Indonesia, as the major dark spot in the area. And in early 1965 it became clear that unless the United States and other nations introduced major combat forces and took military action against the North, South Viet-Nam would be taken over by Communist force. If that had happened, there can be no doubt whatever that, by the sheer dynamics of aggression, Communist Chinese and North Vietnamese subversive efforts against the rest of Southeast Asia would have been increased and encouraged, and the will and capacity of the remaining nations of Southeast Asia to resist these pressures would have been drastically and probably fatally reduced.

So our actions in Viet-Nam were not only important in themselves or in fulfillment of our commitment but were vital in the wider

context of the fate of the free nations of Asia. The leaders of free Asia are fully aware of the relationship between our stand in Viet-Nam and the continued independence of their nations. The Prime Minister of Malaysia has emphasized that if South Viet-Nam were to fall before the Communists, his nation could not survive. The Prime Minister of Singapore has stated that our presence in Viet-Nam has bought time for the rest of the area. The Japanese Government has made known its conviction that we are contributing to the security of the area.

Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand have shown their convictions by sending military units to assist the South Vietnamese. Their efforts, joined with ours and with the South Vietnamese, have ended the threat of a Communist military takeover.

The other great dark spot of 1965—the probability of a Communist takeover in Indonesia—has also disappeared. A premature and abortive attempt at a coup was defeated in a struggle that extended eventually over many tricky months, and there emerged a strongly nationalist non-Communist government.

This has been a tremendously important change in Southeast Asia as a whole. A hostile and eventually Communist Indonesia could over time have undermined all that we were doing to defend Viet-Nam and to preserve the security of the rest of Southeast Asia. The present Indonesia—nationalist, prepared to live at peace with its neighbors, and directing its attention to its long-neglected internal problems—not only is a highly significant development in terms of Indonesia's own history, aspirations, and the welfare of its people; it also opens the way to a Southeast Asian community of nations living at peace, adopting the international posture each may choose, and making human betterment their central objective.

As the major dark spots have changed for the better, the light spots have become brighter. Korea is advancing the progress of

its people at rates close to those of Japan a decade ago. Japan is well on its way to becoming the third nation of the world in terms of gross national product and has pledged 1 percent of its income for aid to lesser developed countries, principally in East Asia. Thailand continues to surge ahead at a rate that has averaged 7 percent in economic growth over the last decade and which should be sustained. The election of Ferdinand Marcos as President of the Philippines in late 1965 brought to power the most skilled, vigorous, and attractive leader the Philippines has produced for some time.

Another extremely encouraging sign is the growth of regional spirit and the emergence of new regional institutions, notably the Asian Development Bank, the Asian and Pacific Council of 10 nations, the ASA [Association of Southeast Asia] grouping of Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines in Southeast Asia, and the host of constructive international cooperative efforts centered on education, transportation, development of the Mekong Valley, and other projects of a regional nature.

Also heartening is the enlarged role of multilateral aid—economic assistance by the European nations, by Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and by international institutions such as the World Bank. Multilateral aid not only involves the sharing of economic resources but also lessens political sensitivity to any one donor nation in the recipient country. Furthermore, in the most concrete way, it represents a vote of confidence by the aid-granting nations in the future of free Asia.

I could discuss other success stories at length. Malaysia and Singapore held off Indonesia's confrontation during Sukarno's time with the vital help of Britain, which continues to play a major stabilizing role in the area. Australia and New Zealand helped in that effort, and their own steady progress and growing assumption of responsibility in Asia speak for themselves.

The point is clear. With security help from

the United States and, in Malaysia and Singapore, from the Commonwealth, and with economic aid from ourselves and increasingly from international institutions and other nations, very real progress can be and has been made.

The Role of Viet-Nam

In the broad picture what is the role of Viet-Nam? Behind the great and emerging changes I have sketched lies an atmosphere of growing confidence, a sensing by the peoples of free Asia that progress is possible and that security can be maintained. Our action in Viet-Nam has been vital in helping to bring about that confidence. For, as virtually all non-Communist governments in the area realize, their security requires a continuing United States ability to act, not necessarily an American presence, although that, too, may be required in individual cases, but an ability to act for a long time. And that we must—and, I think, shall—provide.

That increasing confidence also depends deeply on the belief that essential economic assistance will continue to be provided. Without what we have done in Viet-Nam and the assistance we have provided throughout the region, I doubt very much if a considerable number of the favorable developments I have spoken of would have occurred, and certainly they would not have come so rapidly. I think that responsible people in East Asia would agree strongly with this judgment.

I cannot too strongly stress this "confidence factor." It is an intangible, the significance of which is difficult to perceive unless one has visited the countries of Asia recently or, better still, periodically over an interval.

Today, the increase in confidence among the non-Communist nations of Asia is palpable. Communist Chinese past failures and present difficulties play a part, but our own role in Viet-Nam is a major element even as the war goes on.

The New York Times is not wholly in accord with our Viet-Nam policy, to put it mildly, though one sometimes has difficulty

in finding what ultimate settlement they do propose. But I do find myself in accord with a senior correspondent of the Times who reported last Sunday, after a tour in Southeast Asia, under the headline "Non-Red Nations in Asia Take Hope," that:

Non-Communist countries of Southeast Asia appear to be more confident about the future as a result of the United States' stand in Viet-Nam and the political convulsions in Peking. . . .

The officials [in these countries] believe that in the pause occasioned by allied resistance in Viet-Nam and Communist China's turmoil, this area can be strengthened to the point of successful resistance to political subversion and economic pressures.

I submit that this is a central and important change in the whole Southeast Asian position and one to which we have not given adequate weight.

Moreover, this growing confidence, as well as the end of such extremist regimes as that of Sukarno, has led to one other major change. This is the increased willingness of the peoples and nations of Southeast Asia, and of Asia generally, to pass beyond the psychological scars of the colonial period and to accept a partnership role by ourselves and the other developed nations. Even as the white man's domination in Asia is a thing of the past—and rightly so—the sincere cooperation of white nations is today accepted virtually throughout the area.

So, last October, President Johnson joined with the heads of six other East Asian and Pacific nations in declaring "our unity, our resolve, and our purpose in seeking together" four goals of freedom.³ These are:

1. To be free from aggression.
2. To conquer hunger, illiteracy, and disease.
3. To build a region of security, order, and progress.
4. To seek reconciliation and peace throughout Asia and the Pacific.

The Manila Conference was the occasion for affirming these goals, which we deeply believe to be shared not only by the six nations that joined in that declaration but by all the free nations of the area.

At the same time, the fact that these goals could be declared at Manila, and considered realistic as never before, reflected the tremendous constructive changes now taking place in East Asia and the Pacific. It is not too much to say that we may well stand at a turning point in the evolution of Asia toward the kind of free and independent states that the nations of Asia seek, each in its own way, and that we, in our national interests, wish to support.

The Future

We must and shall persevere in Viet-Nam, for, without a just and honorable solution there, the very "confidence factor" now abroad in Asia would surely dissipate.

But we must look wider than Viet-Nam and in a sense beyond Viet-Nam. Asia may indeed have turned the corner, but on any realistic forecast there remain great difficulties and the possibility of serious setbacks in individual nations. The spirit of regional cooperation is only beginning to take effect and needs the kind of support envisaged in President Johnson's historic Baltimore speech 2 years ago.⁴

So I hope that such responsible groups as yours—and indeed our people as a whole—will never lose sight of the continuing need throughout the rest of the area for economic and military assistance. Such assistance represents a very small fraction of the financial burden, not to mention the lives, that our effort in Viet-Nam is costing us. It could play a vital part in preventing future Viet-Nams. And it can further the presently constructive trends throughout Asia.

In essence, East Asia is on the move as never before in its history. Our role is that of a partner in the great changes that are under way. In that role, we are already joined by nations of the region itself—Japan, Australia, and New Zealand—and there have come into being multilateral

³ For texts of the Manila Conference documents, see *ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1966, p. 730.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

frameworks for assistance to Thailand, Malaysia, and, in the past year, for the critical situation in Indonesia.

Our role differs greatly from one country to another. We cannot and should not act where we are not wanted or where there are not adequate local government programs to support. More and more, we shall act in concert with others, and the burden of assistance will thus be more widely and fairly shared.

But act we must. The bet with history that we made 17 years ago looks better than it ever has. The nations of Asia have shown the capacity and the talent that any study of his-

tory would have always told us that they had. But their job is a long one, and we must look at our own efforts from the longrun standpoint too.

For what is at stake is nothing less than a historic transformation of Asia. We have a part to play in that transformation. This is in our national interest. But it is also because we ourselves, with the other nations of the West, are in large part the source of the ideas of nationalism, participation of the people in their own government, and the possibility and techniques of economic progress—and these are the true revolutions in this period of history in Asia.

Ambassador Lodge Discusses Viet-Nam in New York Times Interview

Following is the transcript of an interview with Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge at Saigon on April 18 by four New York Times correspondents, which was published on April 26 after Ambassador Lodge had left for the United States and his new assignment as Ambassador at Large.

Q. You have said on a number of occasions during the last 6 months that the war was going much better than when you arrived but that much still remained to be done. Could you talk for a moment about the tasks that remain unfinished?

A. I think the biggest thing within Viet-Nam still ahead of us is to get pacification really rolling. When I say pacification, I mean the effort to overcome clandestine aggression. We've got two kinds of aggression here—overt aggression, that is, conventional war, and clandestine aggression or terrorism. And I think the effort to overcome clandestine aggression—which, behind a military shield, requires a braiding together of super-police techniques with political, economic, and social programs—is still the thing ahead of us in South Viet-Nam.

I'm inclined to agree with the remark attributed to Ho Chi Minh (and which I think he probably made) that when Americans and South Vietnamese learn how to overcome the guerrilla infrastructure that will be decisive. That's still ahead of us. We have made more progress on that than ever before, and we've had some very successful episodes.

But to have some successful episodes which have been conducted by some unusually brilliant people isn't the same thing as having it rolling. When a program is really rolling, it means that average people can take it and make it work. So that, I think, is the big thing within South Viet-Nam.

I think the big thing outside South Viet-Nam would be if in the United States we were to give the appearance of unity and if it were no longer possible for Hanoi to toss in some kind of bone and we all start snarling at each other over it. They have been very good at that, I think.

Think, for example, of a proposal such as the bombing pause, in which they ask us to give up our trump card against their aggression and they would do nothing in exchange.

Yet that proposal was taken with a great deal of respect in America and had a very divisive effect on public opinion. If these propaganda ploys of theirs were to stop working, I think that might bring the war to a close very quickly. The appearance of unity could be very important.

The Pacification Program

Q. On the question of pacification, do you believe the present plan is sound? If so, what's going to be needed to achieve the rolling momentum you are speaking of?

A. Well, pacification begins with the following Vietnamese military forces: ARVN [Army of the Republic of Vietnam], the Regional Forces, and the Popular Forces, whose job it is to create enough security with the help of the provincial reconnaissance units, provincial night fighters, so that the police can function.

At that point you can bring in revolutionary development teams who are trained in political community organization and then the economic and social programs—schools, clinics, et cetera—can begin.

That's roughly the order in which things should happen. As you know, the ARVN is being retrained and revamped and reoriented so as to concentrate on this phase rather than on conventional war, and the quicker that goes, the quicker the whole thing will go.

Q. Do you think the American advisory effort has been a success?

A. We have military advisers at all different echelons. The decision was taken about a year ago by the Vietnamese to concentrate ARVN on pacification work, which I call a sort of superconstabulary work. Now the difference between constabulary and military work—the difference between a man under arms who is a policeman and a man under arms who is a soldier—is that the policeman fights where he lives, and his home and his wife and his children, his father and mother, are right near by.

In pacification work he has the advantage over the man who comes from a distance in

that the local man knows the trails, he knows the caves, he knows who the hard-core terrorist leaders are. Or, if he doesn't know, he can find out much more easily. He knows where they are, and the crux of this matter is eliminating three or four thousand hard-core leaders because they are the people the enemy cannot replace easily and quickly. If they started to disappear, it would have a very sobering effect on Hanoi.

This is different from straight military fighting, and ARVN has to be refocused and reoriented to do this, and I think some progress has been made. I wouldn't say the job was completely done.

Appeal of Viet Cong Lower Than Ever

Q. It used to be felt that the guerrillas were more dedicated and better motivated than the Government forces opposing them. Has that changed at all, or do you disagree with the thesis in the first place?

A. I don't disagree with the thesis that if you go far enough back—that in '46 and in '53, '54, and '55 there was great ideological motivation, to use a rather big mouthful of words, on the side of the Viet Minh, as it then was. I think there has been a big change.

I think that today if you would eliminate terrorism, the whole Viet Cong thing would fall apart. Terror is the glue that holds it together now. It's the egg in the cake. I think, in a funny kind of way, that the Vietnamese people—whenever they get a chance to express themselves—express themselves against the Viet Cong.

Now that doesn't mean a vote of confidence in any individual government of Viet-Nam or any person, because that kind of public character does not exist here yet. But when, for example, they want to get out of where they are so as to be safe, they very seldom go over to the Viet Cong side; they go to the Government side.

I have, over a 4-year period, noticed some very profound psychological changes in Viet-Nam. There is a feeling of self-confidence, there is a spirit of compromise which is in

marked contrast to the coup-plotting and violence of which there has been so much, and there has been a tendency to take responsibility for one's actions.

The new Constitution and the new National Solidarity Proclamation—and the process of vision, hard work, and compromise by which they were achieved—are heartening evidence of this new spirit. I think the unifying tendencies are much stronger in this country than they were in 1954. And I would say the ideological appeal of the Viet Cong was very much less.

It's been very hard for us here in Viet-Nam to see the Viet Cong and the NLF [National Liberation Front] as a political thing. I know in the United States people talk about it as though it were a socially conscious group of liberals. I can't see that here at all. To us they look wildly unpopular and feared. To me it's a very formidable force based on terrorism with very, very professional terrorist leaders and organizers, and I think the ideological appeal of it is lower than it's ever been—it's almost nil.

And to invite such a politically trained subversive group into the Government here, as some people at home suggest, would be unthinkable to someone who has lived through this period in Viet-Nam, or for that matter through 1948 in Czechoslovakia. It would mean total defeat.

Progress Toward Social Consciousness

Q. In your opinion, after years here, do you think you can have lasting progress until something is done about the inequities and shortcomings in Vietnamese society? Are we really going to get anywhere until the society is fundamentally revolutionized?

A. You are absolutely right: This must happen and people must see it happening. I don't think there is a country in the world where it is a greater waste of time to make a political speech. Americans, with all their experience in democracy, take politicians' speeches more seriously than Vietnamese do. They have got a skepticism that is very

marked, and they must believe that a real revolution is under way by what they actually see happening.

Most of those in authority whom I know, and most of the ones who want to get into authority, all agree that this must happen. Now, it's one thing to say, "I'm a revolutionary and in favor of a revolution." It's another thing to bring it about. Bringing it about requires a tremendous lot of trained people, requires organizing ability, money, all kinds of things they lack. But I think there is a realization that a medieval social system won't do.

My memory goes back 4 years, and I think there has been progress in 4 years. I think there can be more. It's not a thing you are going to do all at once. But there is a trend in that direction.

Q. Is it an expedient or is it something that will last?

A. That's one of the big questions here.

Can a society emerge from medievalism, can it emerge from a state of mind of "Every man for himself and devil take the hindmost" and "dog eat dog" and all that? Can all that happen in East Asia without an iron Communist dictatorship? The iron Communist dictatorship has eliminated that kind of thing but has had to enslave people to do it.

One of the things our presence is doing here is encouraging the Vietnamese to move into a socially conscious state of mind without having people subjected to ironclad dictatorship. But this is still one of the big questions.

Q. The assertion is sometimes made that the Vietnamese don't want us here, that they want to be left alone. What do you think?

A. When you have over 400,000 Americans coming into a small country like this, you are bound to have some friction and some anti-Americanism—particularly at the beginning when there was only one real port, the port of Saigon, and 95 percent of everything came in through Saigon.

We therefore had to come in through Saigon, too, and jostle everybody and push

everyone around and say in effect, "Make room for me." We put up the price of cigarettes and the price of beer and rents, all that. There was some rowdyism, some drunks, and so on.

Gradually we are getting things organized so most Americans are not in the cities. This is better for Americans and better for Vietnamese. In Saigon the American military population started with 18,000 at the beginning of the year. It is about 12,000 now and will be down to 6,000 by the end of 1967.

Q. In the presidential elections this fall, if we had civilian and military candidates of roughly equal competence, which would be more desirable?

A. I am not going to answer that question quite the way you put it, but I will say that the military in the United States has a military job to do, and that's all. The military in Viet-Nam, as in many tropical, underdeveloped countries, has a military job to do as well as a very big sociological job.

A country like Viet-Nam, which has existed ethnically and linguistically and artistically for a long time and has a strong sense of peoplehood, is just beginning to get the kind of sense of nationhood we know in the West and which it must create if it is to survive with such predatory neighbors.

Certainly the biggest nation-building entity is the military. Also, it has the reservoir of administrative talent. It's the most likely place where they can go to find people to do certain administrative jobs. I grant you, ideally speaking it is better for the military not to get into those things, and it's better for the community not to have the military do them. But in a country at this stage of development, they must do it.

Therefore, one of the essentials to stability in South Viet-Nam is for the military not to fight within itself, and one of the things accomplished in the last few years was to keep the military together.

Any administration here which excluded the military completely from the Government would be doing something dangerous, be-

cause you can't take the strongest element in a society and deprive it of responsibility and exclude it.

What you want to do with the strongest element is to impose duties on them and watch them and not keep them outside where the inherent power they have is bound to make itself felt—maybe in a disorderly way.

So, I believe the military must be a participant in the Government here in the future. This doesn't mean that you have to have a military man as President—I don't mean that, although it may happen. But it does mean they must be involved and have responsibilities imposed upon them which everybody understands, and the press must watch them and report on them and not have them out in the bushes. That would be a very serious error.

Effect of a Cease-Fire

Q. People seem to talk a lot about a cease-fire. If there were a cease-fire, would that cripple the pacification effort? Would it make it impossible to take what you regard as the most important single step: bringing the Government back into the hamlets?

A. You asked me two questions. I'd like to answer the first by calling attention to a statement recently made in the Christian Science Monitor by Professor John Fairbank, the East Asia expert at Harvard, who said that Ho Chi Minh and his colleagues are committed to permanent revolutionary struggle rather than to an interlude of war which is terminated by formal peace.

In other words, where we want peace they want conquest. We and they, therefore, are not having a misunderstanding which can be dispelled and elucidated by the good offices of third parties. There have been situations like that many times in history, but this is not one of them.

There is no misunderstanding, and the war will not be ended by pretending that there is. I am not sure that that truth is sufficiently understood.

Now, on the question of cease-fire, one kind

of cease-fire would be a situation in which they would stop infiltrating and stop killing village officials and we would stop bombing. That's an illustration of one kind of cease-fire which has some merit to it.

There's another kind of cease-fire whereby the military forces in South Viet-Nam would have to stop operations but the terrorists could go on terrorizing.

Incidentally, many of the terrorists don't use firearms. The cease-fire would not apply to these people who torture and kidnap and do this kind of thing. Such a cease-fire would be profoundly unacceptable.

Any kind of arrangement which can't be inspected, or which we respect and they don't, simply gives them an engraved invitation to take over the country. That's why I believe that the first thing to be done is to agree upon an enforceable inspection system. If a cease-fire can't be inspected, I wouldn't bother to talk about it.

Q. Some persons argue that we would have been better off if Diem [President Ngo Dinh Diem] had not been overthrown by his own army in 1963, that the war would have gone better. What do you think?

A. When President Kennedy nominated me to come out here, I had a long talk in Washington with a distinguished Vietnamese who said that unless they left the country no power on earth could prevent the assassination of Mr. Diem, his brother Mr. Nhu, and Mr. Nhu's wife—that the situation here had developed to a point where their deaths were inevitable. I got out here and had not been here one week before I was absolutely convinced that this person was right, that the Diem government was in its terminal phase.

Maybe, I said, it could last for 3 weeks or 6 weeks, but its days were numbered. And so to talk of how nice it would have been had they gone on is quite beside the point.

There was an abuse of the police power that aroused deep, deep resentment. The Vietnamese people, let it be said to their credit, deeply resent abuse of the police

power. There was never any question that the regime could not have lasted.

Q. Mr. Ambassador, why do you suppose it is that in the United States so many distinguished, so many thoughtful people, are, in Mr. [Richard M.] Nixon's words, so "mistaken and misguided" about the war and the justice of it?

A. I think most of the, "misguidedness" is a result of the strangeness. Some Americans compare this war with World War II. Why wouldn't they compare it with World War II, since it's the war all of us know?

In World War II you beat the German army and the war was over. Here you beat the North Vietnamese army and it simply gives you a hunting license to go after the terrorists.

Those are discouraging, depressing thoughts. And none of us were taught about this area in college—at least I never heard anything about Southeast Asia. Therefore you must come out here to learn, and for most people to come out here is a big undertaking.

Q. Mr. Ambassador, when you leave, a great number of people will be leaving at roughly the same time—the three American corps commanders, your political officer, the Deputy Ambassador, the economic counselor, and so on. Is it dangerous to change so many people at once? Wouldn't it be better to stagger them and provide better continuity in the handling of our policy here?

A. I think in these senior jobs a year is too short, but I think when you get around 3 years it gets to be too long for most people. Of course, there are exceptions to these rules. It is a pity that some of the terms happen to come to an end at the same time. That's just coincidence.

I do think the new people are very, very good. Ideally speaking, I think if we could have staggered it a little more it might have been better, but that was more or less chance.

Q. People talk in terms of a war that may continue 2 years, 5 years, or 10 years, we

don't know. Given the duration and the intensity of the quarrel so far, this might turn out to be a conflict that was almost passed down from father to son. Would you care to comment on this at all?

A. Well, we have had our troops in Germany ever since 1945. That's father to son. We have had troops in Korea since 1950. The world is dangerous, the world is disorderly, the world is very, very complicated, and there's no use pretending it isn't. There isn't a nice, straight, smooth, cellophane-wrapped, sanitized path to peace which our Government is deliberately ignoring.

You have a choice between dangers and, realistically, our young men ought to expect to render some military service during the course of their lives. After all, what's going to happen to the United States if, when it's in trouble, the young men don't rally around and help?

Q. But it's not the United States that's in trouble. It's South Viet-Nam.

A. I don't agree with that. I think this is a vital concern of ours.

Q. Are there places that are not of vital concern?

A. Yes, a lot of them. The well-advertised domino theory applies here and applies in Berlin. I don't think it applies in the middle of the Sahara Desert.

Q. What do you say to the argument that in this case the United States has undertaken a commitment that may surpass our capabilities to deal with it?

A. I don't think so. I think if we are steadfast and give the appearance of unity, this is going to be a success. I think success here is going to start off an upward spiral in the world that will be very far reaching. I think it will be the beginning of a much better era for humanity generally. I think we are going to be successful here if we have the patience and persistence, and that it will be richly worth while.

Rush-Bagot Agreement Days

A P R O C L A M A T I O N ¹

The Rush-Bagot Agreement, signed on April 28-29, 1817, provided for naval disarmament between Canada and the United States along the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain.

It is the oldest arms limitation treaty existing in the world today. For that reason alone it deserves wide recognition.

The Rush-Bagot Agreement—expressed in an exchange of notes between Richard Rush, Acting Secretary of State, and Sir Charles Bagot, British Minister to the United States—was one of the most significant steps in the development of peaceful relations between the United States and Canada. The unfortified boundary between our two countries is a symbol to the rest of the world of the harmony and understanding which can be achieved by two sovereign governments.


The celebration of this event in the United States and Canada coincides with the opening of the 1967 Universal and International Exhibition—known as EXPO 67—in Montreal. The theme of the Exhibition, "Man and His World," has a close relationship to the spirit of peace and good will embodied in the Rush-Bagot Agreement.

In recognition of the significance of this agreement signed 150 years ago, the Congress by a joint resolution approved April 27, 1967, has requested the President to issue a proclamation designating April 28-29, 1967, as Rush-Bagot Agreement Days.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate April 28-29, 1967, as Rush-Bagot Agreement Days; and I invite the Governors of the several States, the chief officials of local governments, and the people of the United States to observe these days with appropriate ceremonies and activities.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twenty-seventh day of April in the year of our [SEAL] Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-seven, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and ninety-first.



By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

¹ No. 3781; 32 *Fed. Reg.* 6757.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

90th Congress, 1st Session

- An Economic Profile of Mainland China. Studies prepared for the Joint Economic Committee. Vol. 1: General Economic Setting, The Economic Sectors, 339 pp.; Vol. 2: Population and Manpower Resources, External Economic Relations, Appendix, 345 pp. February 1967. [Joint Committee prints.]
- Food for Progress in Latin America. A report on agricultural development in Latin America by Henry S. Reuss, chairman, Subcommittee on International Finance, House Committee on Banking and Currency, together with supplemental views of the Honorable Paul A. Fino. February 8, 1966. 255 pp. [Subcommittee print.]
- Sixth Annual Report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. H. Doc. 58. February 20, 1967. 41 pp.
- Study Mission to East Berlin, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Report by Senator Claiborne Pell to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. February 23, 1967. 6 pp. [Committee print.]
- Trade Involving Southern Rhodesia. A communication from the President. H. Doc. 63. February 28, 1967. 5 pp.
- Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Analysis and background data. Staff report prepared for the use of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. March 1967. 84 pp. [Committee print.]
- The Atlantic Alliance: Unfinished Business. A study submitted by the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations to the Senate Committee on Government Operations. March 1, 1967. 15 pp. [Committee print.]
- The Fiat-Soviet Auto Plant and Communist Economic Reforms. A report by four members of the Subcommittee on International Trade, House Committee on Banking and Currency. March 1, 1967. 99 pp. [Subcommittee print.]
- Twenty-second Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information. H. Doc. 74. March 6, 1967. 31 pp.
- Emergency Food Assistance to India. Reports to accompany H.J. Res. 267. H. Rept. 67, March 6, 1967, 18 pp.; S. Rept. 70, March 15, 1967, 11 pp.
- Interest Equalization Tax Extension Act of 1967. Report to accompany H.R. 6098. H. Rept. 68. March 6, 1967. 51 pp.
- Extension of Time for Filing Certain Requests Under Tariff Schedules Technical Amendments Act. Report to accompany H.R. 4880. H. Rept. 100. March 8, 1967. 2 pp.
- Duty-Free Treatment of Dicyandiamide. Reports to accompany H.R. 286. H. Rept. 110, March 9, 1967, 2 pp.; S. Rept. 78, March 22, 1967, 2 pp.
- Duty on Certain Nonmalleable Iron Castings. Report to accompany H.R. 653. H. Rept. 111. March 9, 1967. 4 pp.
- Duty-Free Treatment of Limestone for Cement. Report to accompany H.R. 1141. H. Rept. 112. March 9, 1967. 2 pp.

- Tariff Classification of Chinese Gooseberries. Report to accompany H.R. 2155. H. Rept. 114. March 9, 1967. 2 pp.
- Amending the Act of June 30, 1954, as Amended, Providing for the Continuance of Civil Government for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Report to accompany H.R. 5277. H. Rept. 117. March 10, 1967. 31 pp.
- Latin American Summit Conference. Message from the President. H. Doc. 84. March 13, 1967. 7 pp.
- Support for a New Phase of the Alliance for Progress at Forthcoming Meeting of the American Chiefs of State. Report to accompany H.J. Res. 428. H. Rept. 145. March 20, 1967. 9 pp.
- The International Bridge Act of 1967. Report to accompany S. 623. S. Rept. 80. March 23, 1967. 4 pp.
- Temporary Suspension of Duties on Metal Scrap. Report to accompany H.R. 5615. H. Rept. 164. March 23, 1967. 4 pp.
- Suspension of Duties on Certain Forms of Nickel. Report to accompany H.R. 3349. H. Rept. 165. March 23, 1967. 3 pp.
- Suspension of Duty on Manganese Ore. Report to accompany H.R. 3652. H. Rept. 166, March 23, 1967. 3 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Postal Matters

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and convention with final protocol and regulations of execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881.

Ratifications deposited: Dahomey, January 13, 1967; Gabon, January 27, 1967; Nigeria, January 10, 1967.

Space

Treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. Opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow January 27, 1967.¹

Ratification deposited: Niger, May 3, 1967.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. Entered into force January 1, 1967.²

Ratified by the President: April 25, 1967.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

BILATERAL

Norway

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington May 4, 1967. Enters into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

Philippines

Agreement relating to the loan of an additional vessel to the Philippines pursuant to the agreements of September 8 and October 4, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4865, 6137), and June 23, 1953 (TIAS 2834). Effected by exchange of notes at Manila March 21 and 28, 1967. Entered into force March 28, 1967.

Agreement on the use of the Veterans Memorial Hospital and the provision of inpatient and outpatient medical care and treatment of veterans by the Philippines and the furnishing of grants-in-aid by the United States. Signed at Manila April 25, 1967. Entered into force April 25, 1967.

Agreement on the use of the Veterans Memorial Hospital and the provision of medical care and treatment of veterans by the Philippines and the furnishing of grants-in-aid by the United States. Signed at Manila June 30, 1958, as amended. Entered into force July 1, 1958. TIAS 4067, 5378.

Terminated: April 25, 1967.

Somali Republic

Agreement extending the technical cooperation program agreement of January 28 and February 4, 1961, as extended (TIAS 4915, 5332, 5508, 5738, 5814, 6148). Effected by exchange of notes at Mogadiscio April 25 and 26, 1967. Entered into force April 26, 1967.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

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Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet-Nam, amending the agreement of March 21, 1966, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Saigon November 3, 1966. Entered into force November 3, 1966. TIAS 6145. 2 pp. 5¢.

Defense—Winter Maintenance of Haines Road. Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ottawa October 31 and November 17, 1966. Entered into force November 17, 1966. TIAS 6147. 3 pp. 5¢.

Technical Cooperation. Agreements with the Somali Republic, extending the agreement of January 28 and February 4, 1961, as extended. TIAS 6148. 15 pp. 10¢.

Cultural Relations—Exchanges in the Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural and Other Fields in 1966–1967. Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—Signed at Washington March 19, 1966. Entered into force March 19, 1966, with effect from January 1, 1966. With annexes. TIAS 6149. 66 pp. 25¢.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LVI, NO. 1456 PUBLICATION 8238 MAY 22, 1967

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of

the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. PRICE: 52 issues, domestic \$10, foreign \$15; single copy 30 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).

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American Principles. The Role of the United States in World Affairs (Rusk) 770

Asia. Seventeen Years in East Asia (Bundy) 790

Canada. Rush-Bagot Agreement Days (proclamation) 800

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy 801

Diplomacy. The Role of the United States in World Affairs (Rusk) 770

Economic Affairs

A Conversation With Dean Rusk (transcript of NET interview) 774

Seventeen Years in East Asia (Bundy) . . . 790

Europe. A Conversation With Dean Rusk (transcript of NET interview) 774

Germany. U.S., U.K., and Germany Conclude Trilateral Talks (U.S. statement) 788

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

A Conversation With Dean Rusk (transcript of NET interview) 774

U.S., U.K., and Germany Conclude Trilateral Talks (U.S. statement) 788

Presidential Documents. Rush-Bagot Agreement Days 800

Publications. Recent Releases 802

Treaty Information

Current Actions 801

Rush-Bagot Agreement Days (proclamation) . 800

U.S.S.R. A Conversation With Dean Rusk (transcript of NET interview) 774

United Kingdom

A Conversation With Dean Rusk (transcript of NET interview) 774

U.S., U.K., and Germany Conclude Trilateral Talks (U.S. statement) 788

Viet-Nam

Ambassador Lodge Discusses Viet-Nam in New York Times Interview 795

A Conversation With Dean Rusk (transcript of NET interview) 774

The Role of the United States in World Affairs (Rusk) 770

Seventeen Years in East Asia (Bundy) . . . 790

Name Index

Bundy, William P 790

Johnson, President 800

Lodge, Henry Cabot 795

Niven, Paul 774

Rusk, Secretary 770, 774

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 1-7

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
101	5/1	Rusk: "The Role of the United States in World Affairs."
*102	5/1	National foreign policy conference for editors and broadcasters, Washington, D.C., May 22-23.
†103	5/1	Linowitz: "The Road From Punta del Este."
104	5/2	U.S. statement on conclusion of tripartite talks.
*105	5/2	Visit of Yen Chia-kan, Vice President and Prime Minister of the Republic of China.
†106	5/2	U.S. delegation to ECLA meeting, Caracas, May 2-13.
107	5/3	Bundy: "Seventeen Years in East Asia."
†108	5/3	Martin: Overseas Press Club, New York, N.Y.

* Not printed.
 † Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

The Country Team

An Illustrated Profile of Our American Missions Abroad

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THE OTHER AFRICA: THE MAGHREB
by Assistant Secretary Palmer 806

THE UNITED STATES AND EASTERN EUROPE IN PERSPECTIVE
by Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman 815

THE ROAD FROM PUNTA DEL ESTE
by Ambassador Sol M. Linowitz 822

THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR 1968
*Statement by Secretary Rusk
Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 826*

For index see inside back cover

The Other Africa: The Maghreb

by Joseph Palmer 2d

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs¹

The Texan commander of a division en route for the North African landings in World War II is said to have told his troops that he wanted them to avoid trouble with the local population whatever the provocation. "They may even try to tell you that Africa is bigger than Texas," he said. "Well, you just agree with them."

This vast continent is, of course, three times the size of the United States. And like North America, it is characterized by great diversity. To many, it brings to mind Black Africa, the sub-Saharan heartland of the continent. To others, it evokes the problems of its troubled southern extremity.

Tonight I want to talk about another part of Africa, that portion which lies between the Sahara and the Mediterranean. In our terminology we call it North Africa. To the Arabs it is known as the Maghreb, or Arab "West." Sometimes, with the poetic imagery which characterizes the Arabs, they call it the "Island of the West"—an island, that is, surrounded by the oceans and the desert.

In a more precise geographical sense, North Africa falls in the northwest quadrant of Africa, a rectangle of Atlantic and Mediterranean coastline and Saharan hinterland stretching to the borders of Egypt and the Sudan. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya are the four countries of the Arab Maghreb,

but the influence of their Berber-Arab-Islamic-Moorish culture has spread to the outer rim of the Sahara.

The Maghreb itself is no insignificant portion of the earth's surface. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya comprise an area half the size of the United States. Algeria, the second largest country of Africa after the Sudan, is one-third the size of the United States. Libya is 2½ times as large as Texas. After one has traveled 1,200 miles from Algiers to Tamanrasset, there are still 300 miles to go before reaching the borders of Niger and Mali. The North African coastline from Morocco to the eastern limits of Libya matches the coastline of southern Europe from Portugal to Turkey.

The population of the Maghreb is approaching 35 million and at the present rate of growth—one of the fastest in the world—will double in our lifetime.

Geography helps explain the unique role which this area has filled throughout history. North Africa overlaps several intersecting worlds. It stands at one of the great crossroads of civilization.

For nearly 3,000 years North Africa's indigenous Berber stock has survived invasion after invasion from one direction or another around the Mediterranean basin. Phoenician, Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Vandal, Arab, Spaniard, Turk, Frenchman, and Italian have had their day. To a greater or lesser extent, the North African has variously absorbed the invader's blood, assim-

¹Address made in the Walsh lecture series at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, Washington, D.C., on May 9 (press release 109).

lated his culture, and been subjected, for a while at least, to his government. But throughout, the North African has steadfastly remained his own separate, stoic, resilient, independent-minded self. Far from losing his distinctive character, he has been broadened in his outlook, enriched in his culture, fortified in his knowledge of himself.

Now, with his newly won independence, the North African moves forward on the world stage as a proud and distinct figure, qualified by his history to serve as an interpreter among men of different origins and background. No doubt this is why North Africans attach such importance to playing a full and active role in the United Nations, in the Organization of African Unity, and in other international bodies.

Geographic and Cultural Affinities

North Africa has affinities in all directions of the compass. It has always been a part of that Mediterranean world from which so much of our own civilization has derived. It has received from the Mediterranean world and given to the Mediterranean world. The great Arabo-Islamic civilization of the Moors that arose in Spain and North Africa from the 9th to the 15th centuries was the main custodian and conduit of the learning of the times and in turn inspired the rich outpouring of Moorish literature, music, art, and architecture that have characterized the Maghreb's cultural life down to our day.

From the Near East came the external factors which have so strongly influenced the Maghrebian character: the religion, language, and culture of the Arabs. The invasions in the early centuries of the Arab conquest probably brought no more than a few hundred thousand Arabs into North Africa, but the bonds of language and culture are so strong that North Africans take their membership in the Arab family for granted. So do the other Arabs. The attachment to Islam is even more pervasive and deep rooted. To the North African, his religion is a dominating factor in his daily life.

But do not ask a North African whether

he thinks of himself as an Arab or an African, for he sees no contradiction and no need to make a choice. He is both—by birth-right and by birthplace.

The more we have learned about Africa's great desert, the Sahara, and the historic commercial routes which have linked its northern and southern shores, the more we have come to realize that the caravan trails across this sea of sand have been as important in their way as the shipping lanes of the Mediterranean. Yesterday, the camel; today, the oil company trucks and the airplanes bridge the physical gap. Tomorrow, one of the several ambitious schemes to carry modern roads across the desert will undoubtedly materialize. The desert itself, as an increasing fount of wealth, will be a resource shared by the surrounding nations.

North Africa is part of modern Africa politically and emotionally as well as geographically. The decolonization process, which provides the principal unifying theme for Africans today, had its beginnings in North Africa. Libya led the way in 1951, the first African country to achieve its independence in the modern era. The struggles which ensued in Morocco and Tunisia, and above all, the long, bitter, and bloody war for national independence in Algeria, helped to encourage conditions in which other African countries would gain their independence under more peaceful and auspicious circumstances. Today the North African states share with the other new African nations the problems of consolidating and realizing the full potential of their sovereign freedom.

A few statistics underline the importance of North Africa's ties with Europe. Within the past century—during the period of colonial rule—the North African has been extensively exposed to the economic and social consequences of Western European industrialization. A newcomer to Morocco, Algeria, or Tunisia is struck by the well-developed infrastructure of roads, railroads, communications, utilities, buildings, light industry, and modern farms created by the French. Trade is overwhelmingly with

Western Europe. Two examples: More than 80 percent of Algeria's exports still go to France; about a third of West Germany's crude oil supplies come from Libya. The West is the main source of investment capital and technical assistance. The school systems of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia employ thousands of French teachers. More likely than not, an educated Moroccan, Algerian, or Tunisian has been exposed to much the same learning process as a Frenchman. He is almost as familiar with Paris as with Casablanca, Algiers, or Tunis. The interrelationship of the two areas is well illustrated by the fact that three quarters of a million North Africans today find employment in the labor-short economies of Western Europe.

North Africa's interrelationship with Europe is buttressed by its strategic importance to that continent and to the Mediterranean area generally. The region commands the Pillars of Hercules and looks out upon the Atlantic. Casablanca is over a thousand miles closer to New York than is Rio de Janeiro. The genuine independence and stability of this area is therefore of great importance to the free world.

U.S.—North African Community of Interests

American ties with this area go back to our earliest history as a nation. To encourage and protect a thriving trade into the Mediterranean in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the establishment of satisfactory diplomatic relations with the Barbary States was one of the first tasks of our new Republic. The first American consulate was established in Algiers in 1792. A treaty of peace and friendship concluded with Morocco in 1787 has been maintained in its essential provisions to this day for what is said to be the longest unbroken treaty relationship in United States history.

The modern period of our relations with North Africa began in World War II when thousands of Americans came to know North Africa and North Africans came to know the United States through the friendly and personable GI. Two historic moments

in the war and postwar period greatly reinforced the good name which the American soldier, with his innate democratic behavior, had created for this country: President Roosevelt's meeting with the Sultan of Morocco at Casablanca in 1943 and John F. Kennedy's historic Senate speech in 1957 on the Algerian problem. Both had a resonance which is still alive in North Africa today. Not only was the United States seen as a great and powerful nation, but one understanding and sympathetic toward North Africa's own desire for freedom and self-expression.

The United States, as a world power, and the emerging nations of North Africa are today developing a growing community of interests which is finding expression in the major programs of economic development aid we have undertaken in Morocco and Tunisia; the substantial amounts of American agricultural supplies going to Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia to help meet their food deficits; the major role of American enterprise in Libya's booming oil development, and to a lesser but growing extent, the part played by American capital in the other countries of the Maghreb.

American capital and skills are sought, along with those of Western Europe and other sources, to help North Africa realize its economic promise. North Africa's oil and gas resources represent one of the world's great energy potentials. The needs of North Africa and the world market enhance the prospects that this potential will increasingly be realized. Much the same can be said of North Africa's vast possibilities for producing phosphate and nitrogenous fertilizers. A world facing hunger will require also that these resources be developed. The question is mainly when and by whom.

This rapid survey of external influences active in the area must take into account the increasing interest of the Soviet Union and of several other Eastern European states in the area. The principal manifestations are the steadily mounting Soviet naval and merchant shipping in the Mediterranean, the growing trade with North Africa, and the large Soviet

programs of economic and military aid to Algeria. Soviet financial and technical commitments to Algerian industrialization are second only to those of France, while the Soviet Union is the primary source of military weapons and training for an Algerian army that has become the third most powerful on the African Continent. On a smaller scale, Soviet economic and technical assistance is also furnished to Morocco and Tunisia, while several of the Eastern European countries are actively pursuing the attractive commercial opportunities in Libya.

Finally, North Africa is a focal point of interest for the entire third world. Here, in a sense, intersect the East-West competition between the Communist states and those of the free world, and the North-South disparity between the richer and the poorer nations. North Africa is thus exposed to all the great political currents and controversies of the day and has become one of the principal laboratories of African independence. If the new nations of North Africa, with their economic and political promise and their relatively advanced stage of technical and educational development, cannot develop resilient, durable, progressive societies in this complex age, the outlook for the rest of the underdeveloped world is bleak. Happily, there are a number of reasons to be optimistic about North Africa's future.

Strong Spirit of Independence

Despite the inner stresses and problems which seem at times to threaten its tranquillity, independent North Africa has built up a rather remarkable record of stability. There has been only one significant change of government, the overthrow of Ben Bella, but even this change was accomplished without bloodshed. The border clash between Morocco and Algeria in 1963 over disputed territory was quickly brought to an end by the good sense of the two parties and the good offices of the Organization of African Unity. By and large, North African governments have devoted themselves diligently to the challenge of nation-building. Economic improvement is the major interest and the

major objective of all the Maghreb countries.

The people of this area are proudly independent in fact as well as name. They have a strong historical tradition of their own and an innate sense of dignity and self-respect. They have struggled resolutely for their independence and can be expected to remain fiercely resistant to any attempt from any quarter to dominate their lives. More than this, the North African states are deeply committed to the cause of freedom throughout Africa.

The North African states seek friendly relations with all nations that reciprocate their friendship and respect their sovereignty. But they are determined to chart their own course.

Algeria is a case in point. At the governmental level it has close relations with the Soviet Union. The U.A.R. apart, it is the principal beneficiary of Soviet aid in Africa. Yet Algeria is motivated by an intense view of its national self-interest, has dealt severely with its domestic Communists, recognizes that its most fruitful economic relationships are those with its former adversary, France, and has repeatedly expressed to our own Government the desire for closer relations.

I should add that we fully reciprocate this expressed desire for friendship. There is no denying that certain well-known problems—the sharp difference of view over Viet-Nam, the concerns arising in the area from the inflow of Soviet arms, issues relating to investment climate and property rights—do not make the task any easier. But the dialog is both frank and useful, as our officials in Algiers and my colleagues and I in Washington know from personal experience. We consider it to be clearly in the interests of both countries, and equally important to stability and progress in the area as a whole, to try to find a way around the obstacles and to enlarge the bases of cooperation. The key lies in patience, perseverance, mutual respect, and underlying good will.

It is well to remember that the hardheaded nationalism and strong spirit of independence characteristic of all of the North African nations in fact provide the surest safeguard

that they will not yield to alien doctrines or dictation. We have good reason to welcome this outlook, for with us it is axiomatic that United States interests in the world are best served by free relations among free men.

Prospects for Development and Stability

The economic takeoff prospects in North Africa are among the most hopeful anywhere in the developing world. Algeria alone accounts for a substantial portion of the world's reserves of natural gas. Libya is already one of the world's leading oil producers, with output nearing 2 million barrels a day and annual income from oil revenues of over \$600 million, almost \$400 for each of Libya's 1.6 million inhabitants. Morocco, Tunisia, and Spanish Sahara are rich in phosphates, and throughout North Africa iron and other minerals are found in significant quantities. We do not yet know what other wealth still undiscovered may lie beneath the Sahara or in the waters off the North African coast.

In a sober appreciation of development prospects throughout the underdeveloped world, the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Mr. George Woods, has placed the countries around the Mediterranean, including those of North Africa, in a special category:

Given at least moderate political stability, these countries can be expected to make steady progress. Apart from their own talents and resources, they have the advantage of proximity to the industrial heartland of Europe, which makes possible substantial earnings from trade. A number have oil and gas deposits and other mineral resources which can serve as the basis for material development. All of them will surely profit from tourism—the apparently limitless urge of the Europeans and Americans to visit old places which are new to them and to seek the sun.

In assessing the prospects for future development and stability, one cannot fail to be impressed by the unifying forces within the region. While it is true that the inevitable customs and police formalities serve to differentiate national frontiers, the forces for cooperation run wide and deep. The people speak a common language, a dialectical form of Arabic. The overwhelming majority are

Moslems. Customs, cuisines, dress, and traditions are much alike. All have emerged from a common colonial past, three of the four under the same foreign power. To the North African, his neighbors are "brothers," whatever the differences among governments may be. This unity is worth building on.

The North African countries even share their most pressing problems in common. Each has a swelling population. Fifty percent of the people in the area are under 21. There is a clear danger that this new generation, coming of age in new countries with institutions which have not yet met the test of time and with economies that are still weak, will demand more of their governments than they can possibly provide. None of the governments of the area has been in power very long; Libya has just celebrated its 15th birthday, and Algeria is not quite 5. With the rapid growth of population, none of the countries is presently able to feed itself, even though agriculture remains the base of each economy. The magnitude of these problems suggests that a common approach would be useful, and I will have more to say about this aspect a little later on.

Causes of Tension

But despite these cohesive factors and common problems, the North African nations are to a regrettable degree diverted from their real interests at the present time by a climate of mutual suspicion and distrust.

Cooperation is to some extent inhibited by the differing nature of the regimes: Morocco a hereditary monarchy seeking progress along an evolutionary path; Algeria a revolutionary republic of the left imposing a rather rigid form of state socialism; Tunisia a moderate republic pragmatic in its policies and favorable to Western liberal principles; Libya a constitutional monarchy with a free enterprise economic system.

A much more important cause of tension, however, arises from the legacy of disputed territorial borders which the North African countries, like other parts of the continent, have inherited from the colonial past. For the most part the border differences are

minor, but in the western Maghreb a serious problem arises from Morocco's contention that it has been deprived of an historic right to large parts of southwestern Algeria, as well as Spanish Sahara and Mauritania. This assertion is flatly rejected by Morocco's neighbors.

The territorial problem has in turn been an important contributing factor in the buildup of arms in the North African countries, which has now become the most serious obstacle to close, confident relations in the Maghreb. The causes are complex, but the consequences can be all too clear and dangerous.

In 1963 an obscure incident in the remotest reaches of the Sahara sparked a short, intensive armed conflict between Morocco and Algeria. Since that time Algeria has concentrated on creating a strong modern army. Supplied by the Soviet Union with nearly \$200 million worth of jet planes, tanks, and other sophisticated armament, Algeria has now acquired a significant lead in weapons over its neighbors. Algeria repeatedly stresses that its intentions are solely defensive, points to the remote and lengthy borders which it must protect, and emphasizes that it has no territorial ambitions of its own. Unfortunately, however, through the mere acquisition of such a formidable arsenal Algeria has aroused the fear and suspicion of its neighbors. They in turn have requested additional military assistance from the United States and others.

While we see no present evidence that any country in North Africa has any intention of attacking its neighbor, we have not felt that we could fail to take into account the concerns which have been evoked by the obvious arms imbalance in the area. We have therefore responded with minimal programs for Morocco and Tunisia designed purely for defensive purposes and calculated to give these countries a basic sense of security within which to continue their internal development efforts. Within the framework of such legitimate needs, we are determined to do everything within our power to avoid contributing to a Maghreb arms race.

Arms expenditures are a tragic waste of money. With the millions of dollars now allocated to North African defense budgets, how many factories might have been built, how many shantytowns replaced by decent modern housing, how many sick healed, how many more children educated.

Then, too, the existence of armaments itself breeds suspicion and inhibits the sort of confident cooperation required to launch regional projects. Opportunities to engage in fruitful collaboration are lost because each side is watching another aspect of his neighbor's behavior.

Finally, arms procurement tends to become a vicious, destructive spiral whose continuing escalation increasingly dilutes constructive efforts by governments to improve the economic levels of their people.

The United States would earnestly hope to see these arms increases halted. Great powers and small have a responsibility to work toward this end. The basic question for the political leadership in the Maghreb states is whether, in this day and age, expenditure for armaments brings more security or less. But this is a question which cannot be answered by any one of the states alone. It is a matter for the collective wisdom and collective conscience of all the nations of the region.

Regional Cooperation for Development

While the arms problem is serious, it is in curious contrast with the hopeful—if still only preliminary—steps toward area cooperation that are taking place. Throughout the Maghreb there is a heartening understanding of the need to pool resources and work out problems in common.

Institutions have been developing for some years to coordinate policies. There are annual meetings of the Maghreb economic ministers, as well as a Permanent Consultative Committee in Tunis with a staff of about 50. Seven permanent commissions meet regularly to consider specific products and problems in the fields of air transport, highways, railways, maritime transport, tourism, telecommunications, and commercial relations.

There is in being a regulatory body which oversees and coordinates the production of esparto grass for all four countries and which markets the product. A similar body handles all national problems of control of locusts, long a fearsome plague in the southern Maghreb.

Plans for additional steps in a regional direction are well under way. There has been considerable consultation on the creation of a regional airline, replacing the four small national carriers. The Tourism Commission has inaugurated a hotel training program, with United Nations assistance, in Algiers. There is a Center for Industrial Studies at Tripoli which serves as a central clearing-house for information on industrialization. Studies are under way on lowering of customs barriers and quotas among the four countries.

Potential of Water and Natural Resources

Regional planning in North Africa could look to still broader horizons. In parts of the Maghreb there is enough rainfall for only one crop every 3 years. Last year's drought in the normally productive areas of Morocco and Algeria was so severe and crops so sparse that these two countries alone had to import 2 million tons of the world's increasingly scarce supplies of wheat. The outlook for the harvest this year is somewhat better but still uncertain. Even in the best of present conditions the countries of North Africa are not able to feed themselves.

Yet in Roman times, and even much more recently, the Maghreb was a grain exporting area. We know that there are substantial untapped water resources. Studies over the past few years have indicated the existence of an enormous underground fresh water lake beneath the Sahara several hundreds of miles in radius. Deep wells have been drilled in all four countries, but the most ambitious effort has been undertaken in Tunisia under the AID "50-well project."

We know from our experience in this country that some desert soils, given adequate water, can be unusually productive. It has been estimated that in the region

around Colomb-Béchar in Algeria there is sufficient underground water to irrigate nearly 500,000 acres and that the soil and climate are virtually identical to those of the Imperial Valley in California.

Current studies are under way to test the prospects for utilization of these vast soil and water resources, some with the assistance of the United Nations Special Fund. What is needed, however, is a comprehensive plan for utilization of water on the scale of the Maghreb itself, because there can obviously be inequitable withdrawals from common resources threatening the balance of the entire region. To these new sources might be added the benefits of desalinization and "rainmaking" techniques through cloud seeding as these processes become commercially feasible.

A regional approach to industrialization based on the largely unutilized natural resources of each country would speed up the development process immeasurably. North Africa's oil and gas open up a whole range of possibilities in the field of petrochemical manufactures. North Africa can also draw on its own reserves of iron ore in building a steel industry. While the area also has some coal, it may be that the new gas reduction process for making steel will prove more economic for North Africa in view of its huge deposits of natural gas.

Meanwhile, in Europe there is a nearby market for the petroleum output not presently needed by North Africa's nascent industry. The most direct routes for Algerian natural gas pipelines to Spain and Italy and on to Central Europe run through Morocco and Tunisia.

Morocco, with vast phosphate reserves, is already beginning to specialize in fertilizer production; Algeria and Libya have a comparable advantage in nitrogenous fertilizers based on natural gas. Full utilization of both types will not only stimulate industrial production but will also have an immediate impact on agricultural yields.

There are many other examples of regional projects worth study and eventual implementation. The traveler who visits

Tunisia's rapidly developing tourist centers would doubtless like to continue on to Morocco via Algeria, but the lack of facilities en route inhibit this development despite the beauty and historic attraction of the area. Telecommunications inside the area and to the outside world need expansion. Opportunities in many fields are almost unlimited, and given bold initiatives, the pace and extent of development throughout the region could be given substantial new dimensions through collective efforts.

North Africans will have to rely primarily on their own efforts to realize these goals, but there are numerous outside sources of help, public and private, that can be drawn on to assist. In the realm of planning, promotion, and coordination, the services of such international agencies as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program deserve particular attention. The IBRD has made comprehensive studies of all four North African economies and probably has a greater amount of current information essential to regional planning than any other institution. In the development of North Africa's petroleum and other mineral resources, the need for outside private investment would seem to be immense.

As President Johnson told the African Ambassadors in his address to them last May 26:²

The world has now reached a stage where some of the most effective means of economic growth can best be achieved in large units commanding large resources and large markets. . . .

This does not mean the loss of hard-earned national independence. But it does mean that the accidents of national boundaries do not have to lead to hostility and conflict or serve as impossible obstacles to progress.

Why is North Africa important to the United States and to the rest of the free world? I have already suggested some of the reasons.

It is a new area in the sense that it has just emerged in freedom and independence. It is seeking to express itself in its own way and to build a better life for its peoples. It

has its divisive tendencies, but neither the border dispute nor the arms race has yet reached the point of no return where the prestige of governments is committed to reckless courses of action.

North Africa is an area whose capacity to develop is highly promising provided the four governments—and their friends—pursue wise policies. It is favored in combining the potential factors required for takeoff, with one of its countries, Libya, already having passed from international debtor to creditor. Tunisia has maintained a remarkable rate of growth—an average of about 6 percent per annum—for several years, utilizing her human resources in tandem with extensive United States and other foreign assistance. Algeria, more generously endowed with material resources than her immediate neighbors, has spent several millions of dollars to make sure that it has the best available technical advice, much of it from private American consultants, in planning the development of these resources. Morocco, recognizing that the future prosperity of much of its growing population is linked to agriculture, is making strong efforts to improve productivity through the introduction of modern agricultural practices.

North Africa is a key area from several points of view: in human terms, because of its long experience as a crossroads and because of the major role it assumes in the vanguard of the newly liberated nations of the African Continent.

In terms of geography, it is as important to the stability of the key Mediterranean region as its neighbors to the north.

North Africa is important as a testing ground. In an area with exceptional human and physical homogeneity one finds widely different forms of government and social systems at work. The success or failure of each of these systems will have lessons to teach us as well as the developing world.

North Africa is also important as a commercial partner. Total American investment in the area is over a billion dollars, and this figure will continue to rise. Because of colonial patterns of trade, the area is less im-

² For text, see BULLETIN of June 13, 1966, p. 914.

portant as a trading partner than it will become in time. American technology is greatly appreciated throughout the Maghreb, and its role can be expected to become more important.

North Africa is one of those regions of the world where the problem of feeding a growing population has become critical but where the possibilities of overcoming the food-population gap are reassuring if temporary foreign support is combined with intensive self-help. I am gratified to say that in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, the three North African countries where we have had substantial P.L. 480 programs, there seems to be an increased determination to push ahead with needed self-help measures.

I have throughout dealt with the Maghreb as a whole. This is not an accident. Our basic policy interest is in the stability and progress of the area as a whole.

As in other parts of the developing world, we support the national integrity and independence of all the countries of the region, attempt to help them promote social and economic development, and seek to encourage their efforts to move toward regional cohesion. We earnestly desire to have friendly relations with all four countries of the Maghreb.

For us to adopt any other policy would be to run grave risks of political polarization. Such a development would not be in the interests of any of the countries of the region—nor any of those outside it.

It is basic American policy to stimulate and assist regional economic cooperation. We believe that sheer economic necessity makes such a policy desirable in the Maghreb. We welcome the steps already taken in this direction. Although small, they compare favorably with efforts of regional groupings at similar stages of development. We will be looking carefully for opportunities to assist, with the limited resources we have available, in this evolutionary process.

Our policy on the underlying causes for tension in the Maghreb is also clear. U.S. spokesmen have said repeatedly that we endorse the principles on frontiers in Africa

enunciated by the Organization of African Unity. We have been and remain opposed to any attempt to modify them by force. Our military assistance programs in the area are modest, are specifically for defensive purposes, and are tailored carefully to the policy I have already outlined. We would much prefer to put our resources into other types of aid.

I have met all of the present leadership of the states of the Maghreb, and I remain optimistic that they will choose the paths of cooperation and development rather than narrow nationalist advantage. They know that their people have at last achieved the most precious right to determine their own destinies. We have every reason to believe they will not give up that right again.

As for us, we are heartened by the reservoir of good will toward the United States and Americans that exists so widely among the people of the Maghreb. We want to preserve this good will. We believe that to assist countries like the new nations of North Africa is a challenging task. In standing ready to help them achieve constructive ends, we seek no special position, no special advantage.

The United States has only one fundamental objective in North Africa: its peaceful and orderly development in conformity with its own aspirations and in ways that will best serve the common good. Along with other nations dedicated to constructive development in the area, we stand ready to play our proper part in this endeavor. What President Johnson said in addressing the African Ambassadors applies in full force to the part of the continent we have been discussing tonight:

... none of us can be content when we measure what is being done against what could be done. We are anxious to work with you to fulfill your ambitions. Working with others, we are prepared to help build with you a modern Africa.

North Africa's true vocation is to be a zone of prosperity through cooperation. The realization of this area's unusual promise for economic self-fulfillment is today the goal toward which all efforts—national, regional, and international—should converge.

The United States and Eastern Europe in Perspective

by Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman¹

United States relations today with Eastern Europe are still being shaped by past events, attitudes, and policies. The states of central Eastern Europe came into being as a result of the Versailles conference. They were established in deference to a political principle, national self-determination, with little consideration of economic realities. As a result, these nations suffered serious economic difficulties. The greatest tragedy was Vienna—a head left without a body—with unmanageable unemployment. The leaders of the new countries made gallant efforts, with some success particularly in Czechoslovakia and Poland, to overcome the dislocations and construct viable economies. Another significant development of the early twenties was the network of treaties encouraged by France known as the *cordon sanitaire*, intended to create a buffer against the inroads of Bolshevism.

An abrupt change in attitude occurred on the day the Nazis invaded Russia in June 1941 when Churchill accepted the Soviet Union as an ally. The early discussions between the Soviet Union and the British and ourselves related largely to immediate considerations of the war—military strategy and supply matters to help the Soviet Union withstand the Nazi onslaught.

From October 1943, the time of the Moscow conference of foreign ministers, the political problems of the postwar Europe were increasingly discussed, with particular concentration on the future of Eastern

Europe. By that time it was already apparent that the Red army would occupy these countries as it forced the invading Nazi armies back to Germany. In this conference, however, Mr. Hull was primarily interested in reaching agreement with the Soviets on the overall declaration of principles expressed in the Moscow declaration. This he felt would form a basis for detailed decisions at a later time. Mr. Eden's approach was the more direct one of attempting to reach understandings on specific issues. At that meeting, he proposed a confederation of Eastern European states, a plan that had been tentatively approved by Sikorski and Benes. He hoped this federation would create political as well as economic strength in Central Europe and could overcome the weakness which the dismemberment of the Habsburg empire had created.

But Molotov would have none of it. He piously cloaked his rejection with what he called the need to await the "result of a free, peaceful and well-considered expression of the will of the people." The Soviets made it plain that they would not permit the reconstruction of any new *cordon sanitaire*, and they showed little respect for what they called "the *émigré* governments" in London. We got the impression that the Soviets wanted a fragmented postwar Europe consisting of small, weak states throughout—easily dominated by the Soviet Union.

A month later at Tehran, Churchill sought Stalin's agreement specifically regarding an independent Poland. Stalin responded by demanding a revision of the Riga treaty boundary, which the Soviets had always considered unjust. He referred to the prior

¹Address made before the 31st American Assembly at Arden House, Harriman, N.Y., on Apr. 29 (press release 100).

British proposal of the Curzon line as being a more correct ethnic division. He offered compensation to Poland at the expense of Germany.

U.S. Interest in Poland's Future

From then on, Poland became the primary political topic of discussion between the British and ourselves and the Russians. Hitler's invasion of Poland had brought Britain into the war, and Poland was a country with which many Americans were especially concerned. Under instructions from President Roosevelt, I talked about Poland with Stalin more frequently than any other subject.

I recall, one time in the late winter of 1944, opening a discussion with Stalin by saying that President Roosevelt had asked me to talk to him about the future of Poland. Stalin replied, "The Poles, the Poles—can't you think of anything else to talk about but the Poles?" He asserted that Poland had always created difficulties for Russia and that it was the invasion corridor through which Western European armies had attacked Russia. Since Poland was so important to Russia's security, he could not see why we did not leave the future of Poland to the Soviet Union. Stalin insisted that they must have a "friendly neighbor."

I explained to Stalin that American public opinion would not support a U.S. administration that failed to protect the right of these peoples to determine their own future. Stalin's reply amazed me. He said that he had his own public opinion to think about—that the Ukrainians and the Byelorussians wanted to be reunited with their brothers in the areas that had been unfairly taken from them. As Stalin was blunt, I could be also. I suggested that Stalin was in a position to take care of public opinion in the Soviet Union. His reply was revealing. He maintained that he had to pay constant attention to public opinion since, he explained, "We have had three revolutions in a generation." In other words, Stalin regarded suppression of counterrevolution as his primary concern in dealing with Russian public opinion.

The talks continued. In October 1944 Churchill brought the London Polish leaders with him to Moscow, hoping thereby to reach an understanding. Finally, at Yalta in February 1945, an agreement was reached not only for Poland but for all of the states of Eastern Europe. Through the Declaration for Liberated Europe, as well as the Agreement on Poland, the Soviet Union undertook to work with the British and American Governments to assure the holding of free and unfettered elections with all democratic, non-Fascist parties having a full right to participate. The unhappy fact is that Stalin failed to keep his Yalta agreements.

It is hard to understand why Stalin should have made agreements at Yalta and then broken them so soon thereafter. One explanation, which I am inclined to believe, is that he had expected that the Red army would be welcomed as the liberator from the Nazi tyranny and that in the first blush of this enthusiasm a Communist-dominated government could be elected. Perhaps this explains why at Yalta he had proposed elections within 1 month of liberation.

Bierut, the leader of the Lublin Poles, was in Moscow when Stalin returned from that conference, and he must have learned from him that in Poland a free election could not be trusted, that the Red army was being regarded as a new invading force. The historic fear and distrust of Russia was still paramount in people's minds. This proved true in other countries as well. Later, in the summer of 1945, for some reason free elections were permitted in Hungary, which exposed the fact that the Communist Party there had little popular support. It could only command 17 percent of the vote.

The fate of Eastern Europe in the immediate postwar period was sealed by the presence of the Red army. The effort of Churchill and Roosevelt at Yalta to come to an agreement with Stalin failed, but that effort in itself had the value of exposing Stalin's perfidy and aggressive intentions to the world.

It is important to recall that the United States did not accept for several years the

inevitability of conflict with the Soviet Union. It is well to keep in mind that even as late as June 1947 General Marshall in his famous Harvard speech offered assistance to all of Europe, including the Soviet Union. However, Molotov walked out of the conference convened in Paris to consider the offer, and the Soviets compelled Poland and Czechoslovakia to reverse their preliminary decision to participate. The Iron Curtain which Churchill had described came down to divide Europe—with a bang that all could hear—and the cold war was intensified.

American opinion had been slow to accept the split. It was hard for Americans to understand that the Soviet leaders, after all the tragic losses of the war, would not want to cooperate in rebuilding a peaceful world. It is significant to recall that after Churchill's Fulton speech, his hotel in New York was picketed and he was met with student demonstrations at Columbia, where he was given an honorary degree. Many of these people were not extremists. They hated war. A Foreign Service officer with whom I have worked closely in recent years confessed to me that he had taken part as a student in the demonstration at Columbia in the belief that Churchill was fanning war emotions.

In the intervening 20 years, certain events have tended to exacerbate our conflict with the Soviet bloc: the Berlin blockade, the North Korean attack, the Cuban missile crisis, and the Soviet's continuing support for so-called "national liberation movements" in South America and elsewhere.

Trends in Eastern Europe

But other events have tended to ameliorate the tensions. Stalin's hopes for a monolithic structure of international communism have been shattered. The accord between Moscow and Peking, though never complete, has been ruptured, seemingly beyond repair. Tito's break with Stalin has encouraged the other Eastern European countries to force a loosening of Moscow's domination. It is well for us to remember that although we had nothing to do with Tito's break with Stalin, there is no doubt that our military and eco-

nomie help made it possible for him to maintain his independence. Another favorable trend has been the changes within the Communist countries themselves which have somewhat eased the most rigid controls, making easier contacts with the West.

When in 1955 Khrushchev welcomed Tito back into the fold, Tito insisted on retaining complete independence—political, military, economic, and ideological. Tito has continued the development of his relations with the West to the point where 65 percent of his foreign trade is with the free world and only 35 percent is with the Soviets and the Eastern European bloc.

Trade between Western and Eastern Europe has steadily increased in nonstrategic items. Throughout the period we and our allies have maintained what is known as a COCOM list, controlling shipments of products that are considered of strategic value.

In addition, cultural exchanges and mutual tourism have substantially increased. The larger numbers, of course, go from the West to the East. Not only Yugoslavia's Dalmatian coast but Bulgarian and Romanian Black Sea beaches are attracting large numbers of Western European vacationists. However, Hungary, for example, permitted 244,000 of its citizens to visit non-Communist countries in 1965.

Each of the Eastern European countries has in its own way undertaken to reduce the rigidities of Communist economic control. The economic difficulties faced by Communist countries have compelled them to experiment with ways to decentralize management and increase incentives.

Controls were never as complete in the Eastern European countries as in the Soviet Union. The most striking example is agriculture. In Poland, for instance, 87 percent of the land remains in the hands of the peasants.

In the new experiments, Yugoslavia has shown the way in breaking down central direction of the economy. Step by step individual enterprises, controlled in theory at least by the workers, have been forced to compete with one another. Bank credits have

replaced Government-provided funds. Each enterprise must earn its right to exist by producing a profit. Also, the need to expand exports has compelled these enterprises to meet foreign competition as well. This has led Yugoslavia to join GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] in August 1966 and to welcome private foreign investment in its industry. It is still too early to judge how this will work.

Although the Communist Party in Yugoslavia still controls the ideology and policy of the Government, it is planning to give up its detailed direction of Government operations. Politically, the Assemblies of the local Republics as well as the Federal Assembly in Belgrade are assuming greater responsibility. In Slovenia last December a cabinet submitted its resignation when it lost an Assembly vote on a health insurance bill. But the Communist Party still dominates political expression, as is evidenced by Mihajlov's recent conviction.

The other countries of Eastern Europe are undoubtedly watching with fascination events in Yugoslavia. There can be no doubt that Yugoslavia's example will be followed if it is successful, even though at a more cautious pace. Unfortunately, our ability to help Yugoslavia at this critical period has been checked by the adoption by Congress of the ill-considered Findley and Belcher amendments. The greater success Yugoslavia has with its experiments in the freeing of its economy, the greater influence its example will have on the other countries of Eastern Europe.

The increasing complexities of the Soviet economy are also compelling Moscow to experiment with new methods of decentralization and incentives. Their economists are studying the methods of the United States and Western Europe, in an attempt to understand the reason for the extraordinary post-war Western economic success which has belied so dramatically the predictions of Stalin's economists of the early economic collapse of the West. In Moscow one no longer hears such predictions.

In fact, I was interested in the attitude of one of the senior Soviet economists in a con-

versation I had with him the last time I was in Moscow. He complained that too many of the Americans he met were specialists on the *Soviet* economy. He wanted to talk instead to "the specialists on the *American* economy."

In no sense am I suggesting that the Communist one-party system is breaking down. Irreversible changes, however, are taking place; and this includes, to a small degree at least, freedom of expression. Control of individual thought and expression seems to be the last stronghold to which the Communists are clinging, even though the demand for more freedom is growing in strength. Some criticism is permitted and the strict insistence on "Socialist realism" in art has been relaxed. However, those who have the courage to overstep the bounds of "propriety" in their attack on the current regimes or Communist doctrine are severely punished.

U.S. Trade With Eastern Europe

The American attitude, particularly in Congress, toward Eastern Europe has adjusted itself haltingly to the changes that have taken place. President Johnson has appealed to the country to undertake building bridges to the East, and in his October 7 speech to the National Conference of Editorial Writers he brought into focus the interrelationship of our European policies.²

In referring to the unnatural partition of Europe he warned that Europe must be made whole again if peace is to be secure. He stated:

Our purpose is not to overturn other governments, but to help the people of Europe to achieve:

—a continent in which the peoples of Eastern and Western Europe work shoulder to shoulder together for the common good;

—a continent in which alliances do not confront each other in bitter hostility, but instead provide a framework in which West and East can act together in order to assure the security of all.

In a restored Europe, Germany can and will be reunited.

The distance the United States has lagged

² For the advance text of President Johnson's address at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 7, 1966, see BULLETIN of Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.

behind Western Europe in bridgebuilding to the East is clearly shown by the trade figures. Whereas the trade between Western and Eastern Europe exclusive of the Soviet Union was over \$5 billion in 1965, the U.S. trade was less than \$200 million.

Under these circumstances, it doesn't make any sense for us to continue to restrict trade in nonstrategic goods as we have been doing. This self-denial is achieving no useful purpose. We are simply losing business to Western European competitors and creating a lot of unnecessary ill will.

Over the years, Congress has placed restriction on restriction. Crippling amendments have been added to essential legislation which Presidents could not afford to veto. Even today, there is danger that ultraconservative Congressmen may attempt to further damage our national interests by offering amendments to such legislation as the Export-Import Bank Charter renewal, handicapping its usefulness in expanding trade. The effect of legislation has been compounded by rigid bureaucratic interpretations. President Johnson has reversed some of these bureaucratic interpretations. He has reduced export controls with respect to hundreds of nonstrategic items, and he has authorized the Export-Import Bank to guarantee commercial credits to selected countries.

Incidentally, the President has most wisely authorized the Export-Import Bank to help finance the purchase by Fiat of \$50 million of machinery for incorporation into their project in the Soviet Union. This project will undoubtedly increase the pressures by the people on the Government for more automobiles, with all the diversion of resources that that will entail. Every family I have met throughout the Soviet Union longs for an automobile and the release that that will give them.

The President has also taken other steps within his authority, but legislation is essential before we can begin to encourage a reasonable flow of trade.

The proposed East-West trade relations bill,³ if approved by Congress, would authorize the President to extend most-favored-

nation tariff treatment to individual Communist countries when he determines this to be in the national interest. This authority would be exercised through a commercial agreement with a particular country for a period of not more than 3 years. Aside from the export of strategic items, which would of course remain prohibited, the trade itself would depend on the decisions of individual private firms. The President would have the power to suspend or terminate such commercial agreements if he determined that the other party was not living up to its obligations or if he determined that suspension or termination were in the national interest. Communist China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Cuba, and the Soviet Zone of Germany are specifically excluded by the provisions of this bill.

The people of Eastern Europe want to expand contacts with the West. In fact, they feel that they have more in common with the West than with Russia. They particularly long for better relations with us. The individual family ties with the United States are still close. But more than that, to Eastern Europeans the United States exemplifies a better life. They seek not only technical knowledge and products but also personal contacts and the opportunity to visit the United States.

Enlarging NATO's Role

Hopes of improved relations with the United States have been encouraged by the decreasing threat of hostilities in Europe. This has, of course, also influenced the people of Western Europe and has led to a demand for the rethinking of NATO's role.

The receding fear of war has given impetus to the desire of Western Europe for less dependence on the United States and a sense of greater independence. I do not see why we should be overly concerned by this natural development, but we must take into account this change in psychology and appreciate its sensitivities.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, May 30, 1966, p. 843.

There are certain principles, however, that we must clearly continue to support in Western Europe. Since the Marshall Plan, encouragement of the integration of Western Europe has been one of our foremost policies. Our concern for the reunification of Germany must remain our firm policy as an essential means to achieve eventual European stability. The basic security interests of the North Atlantic community must be safeguarded, but detailed arrangements must be modernized to meet changing conditions.

Except for France, the other 14 members of NATO have agreed to maintain integrated forces, but we are also exploring together ways in which NATO can enlarge its activities, including the field of East-West relations. The President has given encouragement to the development of common policies in this area.

Obviously, trade agreements and other detailed matters will be dealt with through bilateral understandings. However, all except France agree that the NATO nations must stand together to prevent the Soviet Union from succeeding in fragmenting Western Europe again and to concert policies in East-West relations.

Although nationalism among the nations of Eastern Europe has led to their demand for greater independence from Moscow, there is reason for our recognizing that cooperation among the countries of Eastern Europe can contribute to the health of the entire continent. The President clearly recognized this when he pointed out that the alliances provide a framework in which West and East can act together in order to advance common interests and assure the security of all.

The hope that the peoples of Western and Eastern Europe can work together for the common good can only be realized if both accept the existence of each other's political systems and avoid interference in each other's internal affairs. Yet progress depends in no small degree on the development of more open societies in the East. These changes can only come from within, but they can be encouraged by our readiness to cooperate.

Increased Eastern European participation in various international economic organizations should be encouraged. Yugoslavia already is a member of the World Bank, the IMF [International Monetary Fund], the International Development Association, and GATT. The U.N. Economic Commission for Europe can be made more effective in furthering East-West relations. We should attempt to get Eastern Europe as well as the Soviet Union to cooperate in the immense and pressing task of assisting the developing nations, perhaps through association with the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] and its subcommittee, the DAC [Development Assistance Committee].

Differences in Ideology

At best, progress can be made only on a step-by-step basis.

We must realize that the outward thrust of international communism is not dead. With all of the Soviets' protestations of peaceful coexistence, the Soviets still support "national liberation movements" and claim that so-called "wars of national liberation" are just. They call upon Eastern European Communist parties to do the same.

I have had an opportunity to discuss this question bluntly with Soviet leaders, and although they are pragmatic in considering methods of achieving production, they still hold rigidly to the concept that communism will eventually sweep the world.

Although I doubt that they are prepared to take the risks their predecessors did, and they certainly do not wish to face nuclear war, they will take advantage of any opening in any part of the world to expand the influence of communism.

There is no secret about this activity. The Communist press reports the actions taken at the international conferences held in Havana that blatantly call for "intensification of all forms of the struggle, including the armed struggle of the peoples of the three continents (of Asia, Africa, and Latin America)." Eight Latin American countries, including such

democratic countries as Venezuela and Peru, have been specifically named as targets for "organized revolution and violence." They even call for "resolute aid . . . for the struggle for the independence of Puerto Rico"! A *Pravda* editorial has supported these actions, stating: "The Soviet people . . . regard it as their sacred duty to give support to the peoples fighting for their independence" and referred to the terrorists as "the Latin American patriots."

It is hard for a Westerner to understand how the Communists can maintain that we are the imperialist aggressor when, for example, we help the freely elected Government of Venezuela in its efforts to stamp out the terrorist movement that is responsible for acts of sabotage and murder. They consider that we are attempting to block the inevitable trend of history. They contend that the small group of terrorists is, in fact, speaking for the people. One must understand that they still think in terms of the handful of Bolsheviks who arrived in Petrograd in April 1917 and within 6 months took over control of the country and have been "speaking for the people" of Russia ever since.

Nothing we say or do today will change that conviction. Developments within the Soviet Union and, particularly, Eastern Europe have tempered the ardor of the international revolutionary spirit and have made the Soviets more conservative in undertaking risky actions. This trend will probably continue, and I feel they will be less and less ready to invest in foreign adventures as time goes on.

Improved relations between East and West can speed that day. This is the answer to those who ask why we should improve relations with the Communist countries while they are giving assistance to North Viet-Nam

in its aggression against the South. Whether we like it or not, the governments of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe consider North Viet-Nam as an allied Communist country and believe it is their duty to support it when it is engaged in a conflict.

Certainly, the Vietnamese war is making it more difficult to come to agreements with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. But such agreements as we have been able to reach tend to relieve tensions and to encourage the Soviet Union and others to use their influence to end the conflict. I am satisfied the Soviet and the Eastern European governments would like to see the Viet-Nam war ended. They believe it contributes primarily to Peking's interests, and they do not want a confrontation with us. They want stability in Europe. The Soviets want to make progress in the control of nuclear weapons and want to be able to reduce military expenditures. Their resources are already strained, and they would like to devote more of their resources to improving the living conditions which their people are demanding.

But we must expect them to continue to give assistance to a sister Communist country, North Viet-Nam, which they consider an overriding obligation.

With our differences in ideology, we must expect continuing frictions in one place or another. We cannot today expect an ultimate settlement. But we can expect the gradual breaking down of barriers, improvement of relations, more areas of common agreement.

If we are wise enough to pursue the opportunities as they unfold, we will certainly hasten the day when we can hope for a viable settlement in Europe—"a continent," as the President has suggested, "in which the peoples of Eastern and Western Europe work shoulder to shoulder together for the common good."

“With an investment of \$10 billion in Latin America, American business has a vital stake in the Alliance for Progress. . . . Our business firms, therefore, have an immense responsibility and opportunity. They can do much to assist the nations of Latin America attain the exciting goals they set for themselves at Punta del Este.”

The Road From Punta del Este

by Sol M. Linowitz

*U.S. Representative to the Organization of American States*¹

The most important achievement of the Presidents' conference at Punta del Este² was the determination to launch a new concerted effort in the war against want, the war that must be the prime concern of all who search for peace. In that context the agreement to press forward with the economic integration of the continent was historic in every sense of the word, and I believe it will be remembered as one of the truly important international developments in the decade of the sixties.

But the meetings also pointed up the urgency of a greatly intensified effort in virtually every area if the Alliance is to fulfill its vision of a hemisphere of nations—north and south—free and independent, economically viable, socially just, and politically secure.

And they emphasized anew what we have believed all along: that in a day of intense danger and infinite promise, the hope and idealism that inspired the Alliance in its beginnings are nothing less than a practical approach to some of the world's most perplexing problems, a roadmap to the future

¹ Address made before the annual congressional dinner of the New York State Chambers of Commerce at Washington, D.C., on May 1 (press release 103).

² For background, see BULLETIN of May 8, 1967, p. 706.

of the hemisphere. To find our way, however, will require some basic changes in attitude and concepts both in the United States and in Latin America—changes that began at the meetings and now, hopefully, will continue.

For to face up to the job ahead requires reality, not rhetoric. It requires a primary understanding of the brute fact that two-thirds of the continent of Latin America is ill-fed, ill-clad, sick, and illiterate. It requires an even deeper understanding of how vital is the peaceful revolution that is now attempting what is unquestionably the greatest economic and social change in the history of the world. It is the success—or failure—of this revolution that is at stake.

Thus far, as so many of the Latin American Presidents themselves made clear at Punta del Este, the nations of this continent have not sufficiently unified their assault on their mutual problems. It is true they share a common geographic locale and two Iberian languages for the most part, but in great measure that is about as far as their unity has gone in the past.

It is now the resolve of virtually all of them—and certainly the hope of the United States—that the future which began at Punta del Este will see a different story unfold, a story in which the unity of economic integration will give ultimate victory to the

Republics of America in their common fight against their common enemies of poverty, hunger, and underdevelopment. And the only victory that will be meaningful will be an economic awakening that will eventually cast out the ills that now paralyze so much of the region's rich and limitless potential.

The leaders who came to Punta del Este were mostly men of vision, men who know how to dream and to reach for grand accomplishments. They do not need us to tell them of the advantages that will accrue to their nations individually and their region collectively when all of them begin to pull together instead of separately.

They realize, even as we, that the job begun by the Alliance nearly 6 years ago is already taking longer, much longer, than had been planned. But they also realize, again even as we, that only catastrophe can result if we or they quit now. The job must be finished, and all of us must have the patience and the continuing will to see it through. And lest anyone misunderstand the facts, let me emphasize that the success of the effort is essential to North America and South America alike. For when all is said and done, we need Latin America as much as Latin America needs us.

But the will to grow, to succeed, cannot come from any plan; it must grow into an avalanche, one that will sweep away the massive wall of poverty and social inequality still grounded all too deep on single-commodity exports, government monopolies, lack of any mass market or widespread industry, and unspeakable slums.

None of us dares forget then that to succeed the Alliance must hold true to the original philosophy that gave it life: to satisfy the basic needs of the Latin American people for homes, work and land, health, and schools—*techo, trabajo y tierra, salud y escuela*. If it is to do this in fact, it must stimulate the profound social changes that are the prerequisites of a life of dignity. Only thus will the gap between the rich and the poor be narrowed in any meaningful way. Only thus will the dams, the highways, the housing projects, the new schools, the

integrated continentwide economy, and all the other goals of the Alliance that were reaffirmed at Punta del Este have any lasting value or true meaning.

For the most efficient factory cannot justify a city's slums, and economic growth is to no avail if it serves only a fraction of the people. It must serve them all. And that, in sum, is the ultimate goal of the Alliance in the years ahead—the goal to which the Presidents of the American Republics have pledged themselves.

And the goals of the Alliance, let me make clear, are no idle pie-in-the-sky yearnings put there because they sound good or just serve some propaganda value. The goals of the Alliance are real, as real as the atom and, indeed, as powerful as the atom. They reflect what can be accomplished by the force of international cooperation, the most powerful constructive force our society knows. Indeed, when the 20th century is out, no small part of the judgment we will have earned will be determined by how well or poorly international cooperation will have been used in Latin America.

It would be a mistake to assume, however, that this cooperation in the economic sphere and its coordinated assault on the assorted ills of the region must await the definitive establishment of the common market, which the Presidents hoped would be in operation by 1985. Certainly it cannot—and the Presidents were quite emphatic about this, and rightfully so. A common market would require the servicing of smaller regional markets, of a transport system, a communications system, and a variety of other systems and services, some large, some small, but all indispensable for economic integration.

Today, in some cases—just to cite one example—it would be impossible to arrange the surface transportation of goods to various parts of the continent. So here is a good beginning: the development of a continental road system, part of which could well mark the historic completion of the Pan American Highway.

And what about a linking together of vari-

ous national electric grid works and power systems, as well as a continentwide telecommunications system?

Then there are all sorts of existing possibilities for hydroelectric projects harnessing the largely untapped power of the continent's rivers. Many of them, such as the Amazon, could also be used for convenient and economical transportation if navigable channels would only be developed and new ports built.

And would not the continent's airlines, its railroads, its steamship lines, offer other excellent and readymade areas for joint enterprise? Add to these such basic industries—some now hard pressed—as fertilizers, pulp and paper, iron and steel, and petrochemicals, and already there is the wherewithal for an economic boom the likes of which the continent has never known.

I have mentioned possible projects at random. But they are part of a long list that raises exciting prospects of victories that can be won. More important, they are all essential to an integrated Latin American market and prove the feasibility of the entire undertaking.

I believe that much of the imagination and vision to realize these opportunities without undue delay can be provided by private enterprise. And here I wish to sound a word of caution.

American business is our country's most conspicuous and most important presence in Latin America today. It employs 1½ million Latin Americans; its investments account for one-tenth of the total output of goods; it pays one-fifth of all Latin American taxes; it is responsible for one-third of all Latin American exports. With an investment of \$10 billion in Latin America, American business has a vital stake in the Alliance for Progress. Whether American investments there will grow—and in some cases whether they will be allowed to remain—may well depend on the success or failure of the Alliance. Our business firms, therefore, have an immense responsibility and opportunity. They can do much to assist the nations of Latin America attain the exciting goals they set for themselves at Punta del Este.

I know that American business has already done much in fields ranging from heavy investments to training for community development. But I hope it will undertake to do even more. It can do this in part by utilizing local people not merely for unskilled or assembly-line work but by training them to become supervisors and part of management. It can do this by giving special consideration to becoming active in less developed parts of the continent where efforts are under way to bring the 20th century to areas which have for years remained in darkness.

I hope that our American business firms will always recognize that the needs of the people of Latin America must come first and that their investments can be made most secure by building on solid foundations for the future—taking into account the needs of the community.

In short, I hope that American business will, in the truest and deepest sense, always be a good neighbor to the people of Latin America.

Doing so will involve a great deal more than economics. For if we know all there is to know about all the rich natural resources of Latin America without knowing or understanding the continent's most important resource of all—its people—we fail in our undertaking. To know the statistics of Latin America's gross national product without knowing, too, its history and its culture is, in fact, to be ill prepared for the challenges ahead, challenges that can only be met on a people-to-people basis.

It is here, I believe, we must raise our sights. Our traditional concepts of time and distance have already been radically altered by the conquests of science and technology. One of the benefits of the common market will be a closer relationship among all the nations of the Americas, and we should be thinking even now of ways to make that relationship one of mutual trust and regard. There is much that can and should be done here, within and without the Alliance. There is room here for government, for business, and for the institutions of learning in Latin America and in the United States. They must

participate even more than they are now, from meeting the very elementary needs to the highest and most complex of challenges.

That is why it is obviously insufficient to think of economic development as synonymous with progress, that the job will be done merely by concentrating on industry and agriculture. If we do, the victory achieved may be Pyrrhic indeed. What is needed is the support and enthusiasm of the Latin American people for the Alliance and its broad social objectives.

For in the long run, as I have said, it will not be the politician or government representative from North America or South America who will make or break the Alliance in the future. It will be the little man, particularly the young man and the young woman, the restless youth of Latin America who are searching to express themselves in a revolution for social justice. The Alliance must become their personal revolution. Only when it does, if it does, can we say there will be a true chance of success.

Where do we go from here? That is the big question of the moment. The obvious answer, of course, is that we must now move to implement all that was said and all that was agreed upon at Punta del Este.

Latin America is strewn with false starts and disappointed hopes. That cannot be the destiny of the Alliance. Its future must be written in terms of partnership, of shared hopes and hemispheric unity—the “brave new world” we have sought to build since the days of Simón Bolívar. And we will do it if we continue the momentum of Punta del Este and work together to improve and enrich and ennoble the common life of the people of the Americas. We shall not do this between today and tomorrow, and we shall not do it if our forward movement is tied to paper solutions rather than to the determination to succeed no matter how painful.

With time we will do it. The ancient lesson

that the journey of a thousand leagues begins with a single step is indeed a lesson for today and for all the American Republics, our own included. And each forward step we take in helping Latin America to build a continent of hope and accomplishment is a step not confined only to this hemisphere but one that advances outward to all the world and moves us closer to our universal goal of peace and justice for all men.

U.S. Protests Hanoi's Violation of Geneva Convention on POW's

*Department Statement*¹

The United States Government is concerned at reports that United States prisoners of war in North Viet-Nam were paraded through the streets of Hanoi on May 6 and put on display at a press conference. These actions by the North Vietnamese authorities are a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war, especially article 13, which states: “. . . prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.”

This action by North Vietnamese authorities is especially disturbing in light of indications that one or more of the prisoners were wounded and unwell. The United States Government has repeatedly called on North Vietnamese authorities to live up to and honor their responsibilities under the Geneva Convention, to which they adhered in 1957.

The United States Government is sending a protest on this matter to North Viet-Nam through the International Committee of the Red Cross.

¹Read to news correspondents by the Department spokesman on May 8.

The Foreign Assistance Program for 1968

*Statement by Secretary Rusk*¹

Thank you very much for the opportunity of appearing before you in support of the President's economic and military assistance programs.²

Twenty years ago President Truman transmitted to the Congress a recommendation for funds to help reconstruct war-torn Europe.³ The Marshall Plan was launched. President Truman called it "an investment toward the peace and security of the world and toward the realization of hope and confidence in a better way of life for the future. . . ."

This creative act of statesmanship accomplished everything that President Truman had hoped. Within a comparatively few years free Europe became economically strong and politically stable.

The focus of our foreign assistance programs has long since shifted from Europe to the less developed countries, but our purposes are basically the same. Our programs today, as they were 20 years ago, are "an investment toward the peace and security of the world. . . ."

The job that we are trying to do today is much more complex than it was during the Marshall Plan. The task today is the building of viable societies in the less developed coun-

tries, not merely the rebuilding of temporarily shattered economies, as in Europe.

The dominant facts of life in the developing countries are impatience, unrest, and, above all, rapid change. Men see widening alternatives and expansive futures. Disillusionment must not follow. Frustrated societies lack stability; they are prey to subversion and aggression; they themselves are sometimes hostile and aggressive. We must help to encourage the dynamic elements of the new societies to address themselves to constructive tasks of economic, social, and political progress.

In most developing countries the obstacles to steady progress are formidable. In varying degrees these countries lack the technology and managerial experience which are the basic tools of the economically advanced nations. They lack the foreign exchange needed to invest in their futures. And often they lack the sound policies, institutions, and laws needed to modernize rapidly.

It is important that we and the other economically advanced countries share with the less developed countries our technological knowledge and our experience in organizing complex economic and social enterprises. It is important that we and others provide some financial assistance.

The United States has a strong commitment to foreign aid and the job that we, other developed nations, and the less developed nations have to do together. Last year the Congress expressed this commitment

¹ Made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 4.

² For text of President Johnson's message to Congress on foreign aid, see BULLETIN of Mar. 6, 1967, p. 378.

³ For text of President Truman's message of Dec. 19, 1947, see *ibid.*, Dec. 28, 1947, p. 1233.

by authorizing development loans and the Alliance for Progress through fiscal year 1969. This year the President has requested similar authorizations for all other Foreign Assistance Act programs. I urge this committee and the Congress to authorize all economic and military assistance programs through fiscal year 1969.

Military Assistance

Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara has appeared before the committee to discuss with you the proposed military assistance program; and other witnesses, including the Assistant Secretaries of State responsible for the geographic regions concerned, have discussed with you how these programs support the foreign policy and the defense interests of the United States.

I should like at this time to state my conviction that this program—for which the President is requesting \$596 million in new appropriations for fiscal year 1968—is the minimum necessary to support the foreign policy of our country.

It will be used primarily for these purposes:

—To strengthen the ability of friendly nations adjacent to the Soviet Union or Communist China to meet external military threats;

—To help developing nations protect themselves against internal violence and thereby provide the stability that is essential to development; and

—To provide essential military help to four or five countries so that their development programs will not be paralyzed by military requirements.

The military assistance program is a necessary complement to the economic assistance program; and it is a small insurance policy against the growth of situations around the world which might require far greater commitments of our resources, perhaps even including our military manpower.

I fully support the proposed transfer of military assistance programs for Laos, Thai-

land, NATO infrastructure and international military headquarters from the military assistance accounts to the regular Defense Department budget. By mutual agreement with Secretary McNamara, the Department of State will continue, as in the past, to coordinate these programs with our overall political and economic interests in each area.

I strongly urge approval of the military assistance program for fiscal year 1968.

Economic Assistance

Over the past years both the Congress and the Executive have learned a good deal about the development process and the role the United States can and should play in it. The legislation and program before this committee reflect that experience.

The less developed countries hold in their own hands the keys to their own future. It is their efforts—not ours or those of other donor countries—that will open the doors to better lives for their peoples. That is why we insist on *self-help*. This is not just because it is important that the taxpayer's dollar yield a dollar's worth of return but for the deep humanitarian reason that without self-help the job cannot be done. As Mr. Gaud [William S. Gaud, Administrator, Agency for International Development] mentioned when he appeared before this committee on April 5, the legislation before you emphasizes the importance of self-help in a number of ways, including authorization for a National Advisory Committee on Self-Help.

There have been remarkable adjustments in the AID program to reflect our *balance-of-payments* problems. In fiscal year 1959 only 40 percent of AID funds were spent for U.S. goods and services. In fiscal year 1968 it is estimated that 87 percent of AID expenditures will be for American goods and services and that the net adverse impact of the program on the U.S. balance of payments will be about \$107 million. The United States must continue to watch carefully its balance of payments. That is why the AID program today transfers U.S. skills and commodities

—not U.S. dollars—to the less developed countries.

Governmental actions are important, but, without *private sector* support, the job cannot be done. That is why the AID program works both with and through American private enterprise and other private organizations in helping to build strong private sectors in the developing countries.

We cannot do everything everywhere. The job is too big. That is why we concentrate our programs in a few key countries and on a few key problems—agriculture, education, and health.

The United States is not the only advanced country which recognizes its stake in development. Other developed nations now have strong aid programs. It is to our advantage to coordinate our program with theirs and to encourage them to enlarge their programs. That is why we prefer to provide most of our development loans in a *multilateral* framework.

Cooperation among the less developed countries themselves can lead to faster progress. Many of them face the same challenges; and by pooling resources and energies they will be better able to meet these challenges. That is why the United States actively encourages and supports *regional efforts*. The movement toward regionalism reflects the growing recognition among both advanced and developing countries of the necessity for economic and political interdependence. We are hopeful that the momentum of regional cooperation will be quickened in the next few years.

These are the main principles of the proposed AID program and legislation. Mr. Gaud and others have discussed them in detail with you.

The President originally requested a total of \$2.53 billion in new appropriations to carry out the proposed AID program for fiscal year 1968. In addition, he plans to request an additional \$100 million for the Alliance for Progress in connection with the recent Summit Conference. This would bring the total request for fiscal year 1968 to \$2.63 billion. The \$100 million, however, is included

in the President's budget, and therefore the size of the Federal budget would not be increased by this request.

This is a prudent request and takes into account the burdens resulting from the struggle in Viet-Nam. A strict and simple standard was applied to the AID budget: What is the minimum amount needed to serve our short-term security interests and to maintain the forward momentum in less developed countries that is essential to our long-range security? The AID budget request reflects this approach. And it is worth noting that the fiscal year 1968 Foreign Assistance Act request, along with other foreign assistance requests such as Peace Corps, Public Law 480, and contributions to the International Development Association, total less than 7 percent of our GNP. By contrast, in 1949, economic assistance funds totaled nearly 3 percent of our gross national product.

We know that time is short, and we must use it to our best advantage. If we have inadequate aid programs, if progress in most developing countries is not visible and continuous, we shall be living in a less stable and more threatening world. But time can be our ally, if we use our opportunities wisely to help build economic and social strength and political stability in the developing areas of the world. While setbacks in the developing countries have occurred and will occur, there is ground for encouragement.

Latin America

In Latin America the Alliance for Progress, now 6 years old, is in some ways a touchstone of our efforts in the less developed areas of the world.

We know the perils to our own security of economic or political instability and social injustice in Latin America. While the Castro regime in Cuba has made a mockery of the aspirations of the Cuban people, it continues to be a reminder of the urgency of our common tasks in Latin America. Castro-supported subversion and insurgency have been quashed in a number of countries. But recent outbreaks in Venezuela and Bolivia indicate a continuing potential for disorder and vio-

lence, which warns against apathy. In the Dominican Republic we are working now to help repair a legacy of injustice and inaction.

There is increasing evidence that the Alliance is taking hold and that most Latin American nations are making healthy strides toward stability and future self-sufficiency. In all but a few, governments are now working to meet the needs of all the people. Much has been done to improve tax structures and tax administration, to fight inflation, and to strengthen institutions required for more productive private enterprise. A start has been made to expand educational and health facilities and a number of countries have instituted far-ranging agricultural and land reforms. Of course, much remains to be done.

The recent meeting of Presidents in Uruguay⁴ expressed an understanding of the tasks ahead. The Summit Conference not only reaffirmed the basic tenets of the Alliance for Progress but placed new emphasis on accelerated progress in the vital areas of agriculture, health, education, and science. It also made an historic decision to undertake the economic integration of the countries of Latin America.

Long before the Summit, President Johnson said,⁵

We are ready . . . to work in close cooperation toward an integrated Latin America. . . . To my fellow Presidents, I pledge: Move boldly along this path and the United States will be by your side.

At long last, a concrete commitment to a continental common market has been set in motion. A timetable and technical procedures for moving ahead have been agreed upon, and this is a very important milestone.

I am confident that discussions at the Summit will lead to a greatly increased number of regional development projects in Latin America. With the cooperation of the Inter-American Development Bank, we will support promising initiatives. The future of Latin America depends to a considerable degree on the growth of effective multinational

projects—transportation and communications links, educational and training centers, joint industrial ventures, and frontier and river basin development projects.

I am glad to take the opportunity of thanking this committee and the House of Representatives for the nonpartisan support of the President through the resolution adopted by the House prior to the Summit Conference. I assure you that it was much appreciated and was helpful in our deliberations at Punta del Este.

Because of the interest of this committee and the enactment last year of title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act, our attention is more clearly focused on the creation and growth of local institutions, both private and public, to promote democratic participation in economic, social, and political development. There already have been some notable achievements. In the last 2 years, for example, in Central America alone, more than 479 credit unions were organized, with 76,000 members. The recent local municipal elections in Peru were the first held in the last 40 years. As the committee knows, people with a personal stake in a nation's progress will work toward responsible and effective government. Those nations will move quickest who rely on expanding sources of local initiative.

A number of Latin American countries are particularly well placed to influence favorably the future course of the Alliance. Brazil, for example, is so large that its performance strongly influences events in the rest of the hemisphere. Some countries, such as Mexico and Venezuela, are now in a position to lend a hand to their neighbors in speeding their development. The Central American countries are setting the pace in economic integration.

Our largest program in Latin America is for Brazil. Its landmass is larger than the continental United States, and its people comprise one-half of all South Americans. A healthy Brazil is essential to a prospering Alliance. In the last 3 years, the drive to stabilize Brazil's economy and curb the inflation which had distorted national life for

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, May 8, 1967, p. 706.

⁵ For an address by President Johnson at Washington, D.C., on Aug. 17, 1966, see *ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1966, p. 330.

many years has achieved a measure of success. The annual rate of inflation has dropped from a peak of 140 percent in early 1964 to the current level of about 25-30 percent. Our large fiscal year 1968 aid program will help a new government to sustain improvements in agriculture, housing, and health, while stemming continuous inflationary pressures.

Near East and South Asia

The countries of the Near East and South Asia are more distant but hardly less important than those in Latin America to the establishment of a reliable and durable peace. For this reason, I regard economic assistance to these countries as a vital necessity.

We are pleased that the three major aid recipients there—India, Pakistan, and Turkey—have increasingly turned their great talents to the domestic challenges of modernization. These three countries will get about 90 percent of fiscal year 1968 development assistance planned for this region.

Excepting only Viet-Nam, the India program is our largest economic aid program, although we provide less than half of India's external aid. Members of the Consortium for India have pledged over \$6 billion for the third 5-year plan and the first year of the fourth plan—our share has been 42 percent. The efforts of the India Consortium reflect not only India's great needs but the supreme importance which all free nations attach to Indian strength and independence.

Indian development efforts are sharply focused on the food and population problem. Over 40 percent of the proposed AID funds will be used to help India improve food output. The Indian Government plans to double its outlays for agriculture over the next 5 years and to quadruple spending for family planning programs. Fertilizer purchases increased 85 percent over the last year. Crash programs in farmland development have been initiated, and the supply of improved seeds and pesticides has been increased. I think it is imperative that we continue to give India the backing it requires in its days of difficulty.

We hope that India and Pakistan can find

a way to achieve genuine cooperation in the subcontinent. Such cooperation would constitute a formidable bulwark of free-world strength. Pakistan is on its way to realizing its potentials. Its economic performance has been very good. Our planned program for Pakistan is also one of our largest, although again our assistance is more than matched by others.

The strategic importance of Turkey has been obvious for generations, poised as it is on the flanks of East Europe, Russia, and the Near East. Our large but declining level of economic assistance there is designed to facilitate the Turkish Government's goal of self-sustaining growth by 1973. Turkey's performance has been impressive. For example, in 1966 its GNP increased by over 8 percent; agricultural production went up 11 percent; and its foreign exchange earnings increased by over 15 percent.

Africa

Our sympathies run deep for African aspirations for more decent and plentiful lives. We fully realize the importance of Africa in our contemporary world. Its landmass is more than three times our own, and it holds 300 million people. It is rich in natural resources important to the international community. Its geographical location is pivotal.

There continues to be political instability in Africa. Some 35 countries are experiencing the growing pains of new independence. In these formative years our help can be important in determining the type of societies that will develop in Africa and the role they will play in world affairs.

While we regard African developments with close attention, other advanced nations, mainly Great Britain and France, with long historical relations with Africa, have provided the most assistance, along with international institutions. AID's African program averages less than \$200 million a year. Other U.S. programs, such as Food for Freedom and Peace Corps, bring our total share to about 25 percent of annual free-world assistance to Africa.

We have sought to make our aid in Africa more effective and efficient. In the last year, we have reexamined our approach to helping African nations and have recast our AID policies and programs in Africa along lines which will emphasize regional projects and multilateral participation and will reduce the number of African countries with bilateral AID programs. I understand that State Department and AID witnesses have appeared before you and testified extensively on the details of this approach. In brief, AID has regular bilateral development assistance programs in 34 countries in Africa in the current fiscal year. Under the new policy, AID will continue bilateral programs—coordinated in most cases with other donors—in 10 African countries: Nigeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan, Ghana, Ethiopia, Liberia, and the three countries of East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda). In other African countries, as existing activities are completed over the next few years, AID expects to shift most assistance to regional and multilateral projects and reduce the number of bilateral programs substantially. An indispensable part of this policy will be our continued use of a modest self-help fund in each country for short-term, high-impact projects.

The reduction of programs must be gradual to avoid the waste involved in stopping technical assistance projects that are only partially completed or in not going ahead with development loans that have reached an advanced stage of joint planning. We need flexibility to carry out this policy and achieve our foreign policy objectives. For these and other important reasons, I do not think it is wise to impose arbitrary ceilings on the number of countries eligible for aid.

This new aid policy should prove effective in serving both our interests and the development needs of the Africans. If adjustments in the policy prove necessary, we will make them. The Africans themselves recognize the need for multinational efforts to overcome the limitations of natural resources and boundaries. Nowhere is the idea of regional cooperation more relevant for achieving the commonly shared goal of a better future. We are

encouraged by the progress initiated by the Africans in instituting the African Development Bank, which was conceived and organized and is capitalized entirely by Africans. We and other donors plan to provide help to a new special fund of the Bank. Regional development schemes should receive in fiscal year 1968 twice the funds that they received in fiscal year 1966. These include projects for agricultural production, disease control, regional training, and education.

East Asia

In East Asia, Viet-Nam and her Southeast Asian neighbors are a most crucial battleground in the struggle for a durable world order. In Viet-Nam, it is necessary for us to meet our commitments because our commitments are the principal support for the structure of peace. We have sought repeatedly to bring the other side to the conference table, thus far without success. We must persist in all our efforts. As I have said before, our economic assistance programs, while smaller in scale, are as important as our military efforts in the achievement of our objectives. For fiscal year 1968 we plan to use \$550 million. These funds will serve four vital purposes.

—First, in a most literal sense, they will support the drive to build a viable nation, piece by piece, area by area, in which all the South Vietnamese may identify themselves with national purposes and national programs to achieve security and order. Our aid helps with the task of reconstruction and development for the future and helps to sustain the morale of the South Vietnamese today.

—Second, another sizable portion of our funds will help maintain economic stability in the midst of the war. The commodity import program which we finance has dampened dangerous inflationary pressures.

—Third, we conduct programs to relieve wartime suffering and dislocation. AID personnel and our military forces work in close partnership to cope directly with the human and material destruction of war.

—Fourth, we are building for the future, with a growing program of long-term de-

velopment in electrical power, transportation, agriculture, medicine, and other fields.

Like the war itself, the conditions under which we conduct our economic assistance are most difficult. In 1965, rapidly increasing military expenditures threatened the South Vietnamese economy with crippling inflation which might well have undercut the whole military effort. Rather than risk this threat, we decided to expand quickly and sizably the AID commodity import program. We made this necessary decision knowing full well that for a while there would be some theft and diversion and we would suffer enormous problems stemming from logistics limitations. AID simply did not have a large enough staff at the time; there were not enough end-use inspectors or auditors, and it would take time to get them out to Viet-Nam; port facilities, storage and transportation facilities, and so on, were at that time inadequate to the expansion of the import program. We knew all that at the time and went ahead anyway, because, as I said, the only alternative was to risk the real threat of ruinous inflation. Thefts and diversions of goods, corruption, and other serious dislocations are inevitable in some measure under wartime conditions. But we have made important progress over the last year and particularly the last 6 months in overcoming these difficulties. We have placed some U.S. military in operational control of handling commodities in transit between port and warehouse; the AID Mission has doubled its audit staff; it has instituted an automated accounting system, sent a U.S. Bureau of Customs team to assist the Viet-Nam Customs Office, and much more. We are keeping a close watch on all aspects of the aid program, and we are encouraged by the rapidly growing effectiveness of the necessary controls.

I believe that we are already witnessing the dividends of our stand in Viet-Nam. A few years ago, it was assumed by many in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific that mainland China was the wave of the future. Now throughout all the free nations of East Asia we sense a new vitality and confidence.

Most of them are making impressive economic progress. They are also working together more and more effectively.

Nowhere is the momentum of regional cooperation more evident than in East Asia and the Western Pacific. The Asian Development Bank is now established and in business. Development of the Mekong Valley is proceeding despite the war. Throughout East Asia a variety of regional associations are taking root, all founded on a common interest to foster development in a climate of peace. Cooperative arrangements in education, agriculture, transportation, and communications are coming into existence rapidly.

In Thailand and Laos, it is necessary to conduct substantial economic aid programs to thwart increased Communist subversion and insurgency. Other nations are helping. We expect that requirements for more conventional types of development assistance to Thailand over the next several years will be met by a combination of governments and international institutions.

Korea is now growing at an annual rate of 8 percent and will likely repeat the gratifying economic and social successes already achieved in Taiwan. Both nations show what can be accomplished in a relatively few years. Dean Jacoby in his newly published study on Taiwan development⁶ has concluded that, while vigorous self-help efforts were the key to success, it would nonetheless have taken Taiwan as much as 40 years to achieve self-supporting growth, not 15, without substantial American assistance.

Indonesia is now at the start of this journey, and the new government is committed to addressing the energies of the Indonesian people to the problems of internal construction. We are prepared to support sound stabilization and development programs along with other governments and international agencies.

Mr. Chairman, this is my seventh formal

⁶ *U.S. Aid to Taiwan; a Study of Foreign Aid, Self-Help, and Development* by Neil H. Jacoby (F. A. Praeger, New York, 1967).

appearance before your committee to seek your authorization for foreign aid.

There is involved here a fundamental issue in our relations with the rest of the world, particularly with the struggling underdeveloped world. The economic growth and power of the United States are almost beyond comprehension. Our gross national product equals that of all of NATO and Japan combined; it is twice that of the Soviet Union, with the gap continuing to widen; it is 10 times that of mainland China with its 700 million people; it is 10 times that of all of Latin America. This year's defense budget of the United States equals the total gross national product of Latin America. If we are to be negligent about the needs of the rest of the world, we shall soon be in a position of a voracious nation calling upon the rest of the world to feed our own economy in order to widen the gap between us and all the rest. We cannot accept so stark a contrast between the future we would ask for ourselves and the future to which others can aspire. If we are not to become isolated by the choice of others, we must make it clear that we are prepared to engage in their problems, help to share their burdens, and be ourselves a good-citizen nation in the community of nations.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Copyright

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Accession deposited: Netherlands, March 22, 1967.

Protocol 1 annexed to the Universal Copyright Convention concerning the application of that convention to the works of stateless persons and

refugees. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Accession deposited: Netherlands, March 22, 1967. Protocol 2 annexed to the Universal Copyright Convention concerning the application of that convention to the works of certain international organizations. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Accession deposited: Netherlands, March 22, 1967. Protocol 3 annexed to the Universal Copyright Convention concerning the effective date of instruments of ratification or acceptance of or accession to that convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force August 19, 1954. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Netherlands, March 22, 1967.

Customs

Customs convention regarding ECS carnets for commercial samples. Done at Brussels March 1, 1956. Entered into force October 3, 1957.¹

Ratified by the President: May 3, 1967.

Customs convention on the international transport of goods under cover of TIR carnets with modifications of annexes. Done at Geneva January 15, 1959. Entered into force January 7, 1960.¹

Ratified by the President: May 3, 1967.

Customs convention on containers. Done at Geneva May 18, 1956. Entered into force August 4, 1959.¹

Ratified by the President: May 3, 1967.

Customs convention on the temporary importation of professional equipment. Done at Brussels June 8, 1961. Entered into force July 1, 1962.¹

Ratified by the President: May 3, 1967.

Customs convention on the ATA carnet for the temporary admission of goods. Done at Brussels December 6, 1961. Entered into force July 30, 1963.¹

Ratified by the President: May 3, 1967.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964.¹

Accession deposited: Dahomey, March 27, 1967. *Notification that it considers itself bound:* Malta, March 7, 1967.²

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on diplomatic relations concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964.¹

Notification that it considers itself bound: Malta, March 7, 1967.

Fisheries

International convention for the conservation of Atlantic tunas. Done at Rio de Janeiro May 14, 1966.³

Ratified by the President: April 24, 1967.

Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization. Done at New York July 22, 1946, as amended. Entered into force April 7, 1948; as to the United States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643.

Acceptance deposited: Barbados, April 25, 1967.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² With a declaration.

³ Not in force.

Narcotic Drugs

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December 13, 1964.¹

Senate advice and consent to ratification: May 8, 1967.

Ratification deposited: Mexico, April 18, 1967.

Publications

Convention concerning the international exchange of publications. Adopted at Paris December 3, 1958. Entered into force November 23, 1961.¹
Senate advice and consent to ratification: May 8, 1967.

Convention concerning the exchange of official publications and government documents between states. Adopted at Paris December 3, 1958. Entered into force May 30, 1961.¹
Senate advice and consent to ratification: May 8, 1967.

Sea

Convention for the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea. Done at Copenhagen September 12, 1964.³

Ratified by the President: April 24, 1967.

United Nations

Amendment to Article 109 of the Charter of the United Nations. Adopted by the General Assembly at United Nations Headquarters, New York, December 20, 1965.³

Senate advice and consent to ratification: May 8, 1967.

Ratifications deposited: Argentina, April 12, 1967; Mexico, April 18, 1967.

Women—Political Rights

Convention on the political rights of women. Done at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force July 7, 1954.¹

Signature: Gabon, April 19, 1967.

Ratification deposited: Gabon, April 19, 1967.

Accession deposited: United Kingdom, with reservations, February 24, 1967.⁴

BILATERAL

Afghanistan

Agreement extending the technical cooperation program agreement of June 30, 1953, as amended and extended (TIAS 2856, 4670, 4979, 5243, 5477, 5714, 5807, 5901, 5993, 6123). Effected by exchange of notes at Kabul December 26, 1966, and April 16 and 29, 1967. Entered into force April 29, 1967.

Australia

Amendment to the agreement of June 22, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3830, 4687), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington April 11, 1967.

Entered into force: May 5, 1967.

Canada

Canadian note of April 5, 1966, and proposed United States reply concerning amendment of the Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries (TIAS 3326).³

Ratified by the President: April 24, 1967.

Kenya

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of December 7, 1964, as amended (TIAS 5725, 5769, 5870, 5919, 5963). Effected by an exchange of notes at Nairobi March 14 and April 25, 1967. Entered into force April 25, 1967.

Morocco

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities under Title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454, as amended; 7 U.S.C. 1691-1736D), with annexes. Signed at Rabat April 20, 1967. Entered into force April 20, 1967.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

³ Not in force.

⁴ Including the territories under the territorial sovereignty of the United Kingdom; and Brunei, Tonga, British Solomon Protectorate, and Swaziland.

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of

the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Africa
 The Foreign Assistance Program for 1968 (Rusk) 826
 The Other Africa: The Maghreb (Palmer) 806
 Algeria. The Other Africa: The Maghreb (Palmer) 806
 Asia. The Foreign Assistance Program for 1968 (Rusk) 826
 Congress. The Foreign Assistance Program for 1968 (Rusk) 826
 Economic Affairs
 The Other Africa: The Maghreb (Palmer) 806
 The Road From Punta del Este (Linowitz) 822
 Europe. The United States and Eastern Europe in Perspective (Harriman) 815
 Foreign Aid. The Foreign Assistance Program for 1968 (Rusk) 826
 Latin America
 The Foreign Assistance Program for 1968 (Rusk) 826
 The Road From Punta del Este (Linowitz) 822
 Libya. The Other Africa: The Maghreb (Palmer) 806
 Middle East. The Foreign Assistance Program for 1968 (Rusk) 826
 Morocco. The Other Africa: The Maghreb (Palmer) 806
 Poland. The United States and Eastern Europe in Perspective (Harriman) 815
 Trade. The United States and Eastern Europe in Perspective (Harriman) 815
 Treaty Information. Current Actions 833

Tunisia. The Other Africa: The Maghreb (Palmer) 806
 U.S.S.R. The United States and Eastern Europe in Perspective (Harriman) 815
 Viet-Nam
 The United States and Eastern Europe in Perspective (Harriman) 815
 U.S. Protests Hanoi's Violation of Geneva Convention on POW's 825
 Yugoslavia. The United States and Eastern Europe in Perspective (Harriman) 815
 Name Index
 Harriman, W. Averell 815
 Linowitz, Sol M 822
 Palmer, Joseph, 2d 806
 Rusk, Secretary 826

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 8-14

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to May 8 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 100 of April 29 and 103 of May 1.

No.	Date	Subject
109	5/9	Palmer: "The Other Africa: The Maghreb."
†112	5/10	Rostow: "The Importance of Agricultural Development in Our Strategy for Peace."

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Political Development in South Viet-Nam

Political Development in South Viet-Nam (publication 8231), the most recent pamphlet in a series of Viet-Nam Information Notes published by the Department of State, discusses South Viet-Nam's steady progress toward an elected government and representative institutions at all levels of government.

The four other background papers on Viet-Nam published earlier are: *Basic Data on South Viet-Nam*, *The Search for Peace in Viet-Nam*, *Communist-Directed Forces in South Viet-Nam*, and *Free World Assistance for South Viet-Nam*.

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THE
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BULLETIN

Vol. LVI, No. 1458



June 5, 1967

PERSEVERING FOR PEACE

by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg 838

THE UNITED STATES AND THAILAND

by Ambassador Graham Martin 851

THE IMPORTANCE OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
IN OUR STRATEGY FOR PEACE

by Under Secretary Rostow 856

Persevering for Peace

by Arthur J. Goldberg

*U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

It is a real pleasure to join in this regional foreign policy conference in my native city of Chicago. If there is anybody who still thinks of the Midwest as the bastion of American isolationism, he ought to be here today. He would find proof in this meeting that the modern Midwest agrees with what one of the great statesmen of this region, Arthur Vandenberg, said near the end of World War II: "I do not believe that any nation hereafter can immunize itself by its own exclusive action."

The basic fact of our world position in this generation is not isolation but—to use a favorite word of President Kennedy—"interdependence." So you as leaders in your own communities are right to concern yourselves, as you have been doing today, with the problems which the United States faces in the larger community of nations.

Since I represent our country at the United Nations, perhaps you are now wondering what the United Nations can do to solve these problems. I would not be candid if I did not report that progress at the United Nations on many international questions is painfully slow and uncertain. Many of the issues we deal with are more frustrating than anything I ever encountered during my years in the field of labor-management negotiations.

There are international disputes that have been with the United Nations almost since

its founding. Sometimes we manage to move forward—one difficult step at a time. At other times, like Alice in Wonderland, we have to run as fast as we can just to stay in the same place.

And sometimes, indeed, the situation gets worse—as when large-scale fighting broke out in Kashmir in 1965, shortly after I arrived at the United Nations. When that happened, the Security Council took swift action to restore the cease-fire and bring about the withdrawal of armed forces by India and Pakistan. This step, even without any resolution of the basic issue, was regarded as a major achievement of the United Nations; and indeed it was.

Similarly, the U.N.'s peacekeeping operations—in the Middle East, in the Congo, in Cyprus—have effectively prevented the fires of war from spreading, from perhaps even involving the great powers. From the standpoint of the United States interest in a more stable and secure world, the United Nations by what it has done in these situations, as well as in Korea, has paid for itself many times over.

It is important that the United Nations should always have this capacity to intervene for peace and to deploy impartial international peace forces where the need arises. We are working on this very problem right now in the General Assembly. For the first duty of the U.N., as Churchill said long ago, is "not to get us to heaven but to keep us from going to the other place."

In addition, the U.N. is pledged to pro-

¹ Address made before a regional foreign policy conference at Chicago, Ill., on May 12 (U.S./U.N. press release 54).

mote positive cooperation among nations. And in fact it does so. It is the main center for a tremendous range of international cooperative activities ranging from weather observation to education, health, population control, food, the welfare of children, and the delivery of mail. It operates the very effective United Nations Development Program. And it is deeply involved in the continuing effort for a reliable system of disarmament and arms control.

Only last year the United Nations played a key part in our successful negotiation of the Outer Space Treaty. This treaty, which has now been approved by a unanimous vote of the United States Senate, is the basic charter for international action in the newly entered realm of outer space. It contains major arms control provisions. It provides for cooperation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space and for the safety of astronauts. Like the Antarctic Treaty and the partial test ban treaty, it is an important step toward a more constructive and less dangerous relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. This treaty, too, is a major United Nations achievement—the most significant, I think, in the nearly 2 years since I came to my United Nations post.

Viet-Nam Peace Efforts at the U.N.

Despite these achievements, I do not at all consider that the United Nations record is one with which we can be satisfied. But we would do well to remember that, as Adlai Stevenson pointed out, when the nations criticize the U.N. they are criticizing themselves. We, the sovereign member nations, are the United Nations. It has no special magic apart from what its members bring to it; and if that magic is less than it should be, truly “the fault lies not in our stars but in ourselves”—not just in the United States but in all the members.

This truth applies with particular emphasis to the subject on which I want to concentrate today: the infinitely difficult and frustrating search for peace in Viet-Nam.

By rights Viet-Nam, as the main focus of war in the world today, ought also to be the main focus of peace efforts at the United Nations. Indeed, I have sought to make it so from the outset of my service at the United Nations nearly 2 years ago. I doubt if a single day has gone by during that period when we have not had some conversation or some diplomatic probing with the Secretary-General or with other members concerning Viet-Nam. U Thant has sought repeatedly, but unavailingly, to move toward a solution. Although we have not agreed with everything he has said on the subject, we have encouraged him—and we still encourage him—to pursue his efforts. And we responded affirmatively to his proposal of March 14.²

Also, at our initiative the Security Council put the matter on its agenda more than a year ago—but has taken no action on it. The inability of the Security Council to act must be ascribed not to the organization itself but primarily to certain powerful members which possess the veto power and which have been unwilling to see it act. Just 3 weeks ago in the General Assembly I had occasion to reply to a Soviet speech against our involvement in Viet-Nam.³ In my reply I reminded the Assembly that the matter is already on the Security Council’s agenda and that the Council could proceed immediately to consider Viet-Nam if the Soviet Union would withdraw its objections and its implied threat of a veto. To this we received no reply.

We do not cease to hope that the Soviet Union will see its own interest in working for a peaceful solution in Viet-Nam, whether through the United Nations or through the Geneva conference, of which the Soviet Union is cochairman, or through any other channel. If their attitude, and that of Hanoi and Peking, should change, the United Nations might indeed play a major role—both in achieving a just peace in Viet-Nam and in

² For texts of the Secretary-General’s aide memoire of Mar. 14 and U.S. replies, see *BULLETIN* of Apr. 17, 1967, p. 624.

³ For Ambassador Goldberg’s statement of Apr. 25, see U.S./U.N. press release 48.

helping to maintain and implement the peace once it is achieved. Thus, the fact that Viet-Nam remains on the Security Council's agenda provides, as I have often said before, a reference point which could be highly useful in the future.

In the meantime, the United States and other members continue at the United Nations and in many capitals of the world to pursue unrelentingly the search for a just peace. The admirable courage and perseverance of our men on the battlefield must be fully matched by our perseverance in seeking through diplomacy to find the common ground on which a fair and honorable political settlement can be built.

U.S. Debate on Viet-Nam

Probably it is inevitable that, as our citizens view this complex dual process in which so much is at stake, some should be confused and distressed by it and should vigorously dissent. A great deal of the dissent arises from a desire to simplify the situation—to pursue either peaceful or warlike methods, not both at the same time. Some of the dissenters would have us stop the peace effort and seek to end the war exclusively by military means. Others, on the contrary, would unilaterally reduce or even end the war effort and step up the peace effort.

Whatever misunderstanding and occasional excesses this national debate may involve, I see no reason to deplore dissent itself—and certainly not to try to curb it. At a time when we have even heard it suggested that we lay aside the first amendment, perhaps we would do well to remind ourselves of the wise counsel of Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes that in “the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly . . . lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government.”

Certainly no one, including especially our adversaries in Viet-Nam, should draw the wrong conclusions from the fact that some Americans openly disagree with each other in a time of war. As the Supreme Court said long ago, our Constitution “is a law for

rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances.” The fact that such a national debate can be held is far from being a sign of weakness or irresolution; on the contrary, it is a sign of strength. Our nation can emerge from this debate stronger than ever—provided we remain always on guard against the danger of equating dissent with disloyalty.

But there may also be another danger. Even now, as successive peace efforts have been frustrated and the military conflict has sharpened, some observers have begun to assert that the United States has changed its basic policy and is no longer seeking to negotiate a peaceful and honorable political solution of the Vietnamese conflict. Instead, it is asserted, we are now trying to impose a military solution—to crush our adversary by main force, to break his will, and to impose on him an unconditional surrender.

U.S. Policy Remains Constant

Speaking for this administration, let me say categorically that such speculations are unfounded. The United States continues without letup to seek a just political solution of the conflict. We have not sought, and we do not now seek, to impose a military solution or an unconditional surrender in Viet-Nam. By the same token, we reject the notion that North Viet-Nam has the right to impose a military solution on the South. Our policy is the same that President Johnson announced in his address at Baltimore 2 years ago:⁴ that “the only path for reasonable men is the path of peaceful settlement”; and that “we will never be second in the search for such a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam.” This policy of ours is constant; it has not changed; it remains the dominant impulse of the United States concerning Viet-Nam.

But if this is true, some critics say, why does the United States not stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam and thus improve the

⁴ BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

prospects for peace? I would like to comment briefly on this question.

It is sometimes forgotten that we have expressed repeatedly our readiness to consider moves to deescalate the war and to take the first step. I reaffirmed yesterday⁵ the offer we made in my speech of September 22⁶ in the General Assembly. At that time, we offered to take the first step and "order a cessation of all bombing of North Viet-Nam the moment we are assured, privately or otherwise, that this step will be answered promptly by a corresponding and appropriate deescalation on the other side."

The authorities in Hanoi have made a number of statements implying, without quite saying so, that if the bombing were stopped permanently and unconditionally Hanoi would be willing to talk. But surely it would not be unreasonable for us, before proceeding along these lines, to ask that certain clarifying questions be answered, such as:

1. What would we talk about, and how soon?
2. Would the talks embrace our proposals as well as those of Hanoi?
3. Would the purpose of the talks be an honorable negotiated settlement and not a mere surrender of one side?
4. How would Hanoi reciprocate militarily to our action in ceasing the bombing?
5. What assurances would there be that neither side would derive any military advantage from the other's deescalation?

If Hanoi's answers to such questions as these were such as to provide assurances rather than vague promises, the prospects for peace would be brighter.

Then there are those who argue that serious peace talks are unlikely to begin until both sides can envisage in advance the common ground on which the final settlement can be built. Some light must be visible at the end of the tunnel—so the argument goes—before the parties can be expected even to sit down together.

⁵ For a statement by Ambassador Goldberg on May 11, see U.S./U.N. press release 53.

⁶ BULLETIN of Oct. 10, 1966, p. 518.

This argument, too, deserves to be explored; and I do not hesitate to do so, because I do see light at the end of the tunnel. It is much too soon to see the actual terms of settlement in detail. But the outlines can be discerned if we study the facts of the situation and the attitudes of the two sides.

At this point I am not talking about the procedural problems—the "who, when, where, and how" of a political negotiating forum. These problems are, of course, highly important, and we have made known our ideas concerning them. But it may well be that both sides would find it easier to agree on "who, when, where, and how" if there were some beginning of mutual hope that agreement could ultimately be reached on "what"—in other words, on the kind of political future to be envisaged for Viet-Nam. So let me address myself to that central question.

Limited U.S. Aims in Viet-Nam

As far as the United States is concerned, our aims in respect to Viet-Nam are strictly limited. They have not been widened or inflated or changed in any way since the President stated them 2 years ago at Baltimore. Indeed, I restated them last September in my address to the General Assembly.

There are, to begin with, certain aims which we do not pursue and which we have explicitly disavowed. We are not embarked on a "holy war" against communism. We do not seek to do any injury to mainland China nor to threaten any of its legitimate interests. We seek no American sphere of influence in Asia nor any permanent American military presence in Viet-Nam. As regards North Viet-Nam, we do not seek to overthrow its government, nor do we ask for the surrender of anything that belongs to it.

As regards South Viet-Nam also, we have made further important disclaimers. We do not seek a military alliance with South Viet-Nam nor a policy of political alinement. Nor do we seek to exclude any segment of the South Vietnamese people from peaceful participation in their country's future. Indeed, we heartily welcome the policy of national

reconciliation on which the South Vietnamese Government has recently embarked. In accordance with this policy, Chief of State Thieu recently pledged that those who return from the Viet Cong will be treated as first-class citizens and will enjoy full rights. As a further earnest of our good faith, we have stated our willingness to agree to a time schedule for the supervised phased withdrawal from South Viet-Nam of all external forces—those of North Viet-Nam as well as those from the United States and other countries aiding South Viet-Nam. We agreed at Manila⁷ that all Allied forces in South Viet-Nam should be withdrawn not later than 6 months after the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides.

All these assurances stand, and I reaffirm them today.

Stated affirmatively, our strictly limited aims in Viet-Nam can be summed up very briefly. They are as follows:

1. We seek to assure for the people of South Viet-Nam the same right of self-determination—to decide their own political destiny, free of force or external interference—that the United Nations Charter affirms for all.

2. We believe that reunification of Viet-Nam should be decided upon through a free choice by the peoples of both the North and the South without outside interference, the results of which choice we are fully prepared to support.

These two points, we believe, are faithful to the Geneva accords; and as we have often stated, we believe the essence of the Geneva accords provides the basis for a settlement.

Now, if we compare this position of ours with that of North Viet-Nam, we find that in many respects they are parallel. But there is one difference which is fundamental and cannot be ignored. This is found in the third of Hanoi's "four points," which calls for the settlement of South Viet-Nam's internal

affairs "in accordance with the program of the National Liberation Front for South Viet-Nam." Ho Chi Minh has raised the same problem in a different way in his demand that we recognize the National Liberation Front as the "sole genuine representative" of the people of South Viet-Nam.

It is strange that Hanoi should propose such conditions and at the same time agree with us that the Geneva accords offer a proper basis for peace. Actually, the National Liberation Front was not even in existence in 1954 when the Geneva accords were written; whereas a South Vietnamese Government was in existence in 1954 and was a participant at the Geneva conference. To demand that it be ignored in the peace settlement would be tantamount to a demand for unconditional surrender by the South Vietnamese Government and could not lead to peace.

But it is important to recall that not all of Hanoi's statements on the National Liberation Front have been as categorical as this, and indeed some of them have been open to more than one interpretation. We therefore owe it to the cause of peace to continue to probe in order to determine whether they have more to say on the subject.

Political Evolution in South Viet-Nam

Meanwhile, we trust that the leaders in Hanoi, as well as those of the National Liberation Front, have observed closely not only the course of the fighting but also the recent political events below the 17th parallel.

If they have, they will have seen the Government of South Viet-Nam, despite the distractions of war and terrorism, carrying out a series of difficult steps on the road to full and legitimate constitutional government. A constituent assembly was popularly elected. It produced a constitution providing for a representative government. This constitution has already been promulgated and, pursuant to it, the dates have been set for the election this year, by popular vote, of a president and a national parliament.

Meanwhile, elections are being held this

⁷ For text of the joint communique issued at the close of the Manila Conference on Oct. 25, 1966, see *ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1966, p. 730.

spring in the South for village and hamlet officials. These elections have been bringing nearly 80 percent of the registered voters to the polls, despite the efforts of the Viet Cong to prevent them by terrorism.

It should also be recalled that all the elections thus far have been held under the scrutiny of the world press, whose verdict is that they have been conducted freely and honestly. Moreover, the South Vietnamese Government has expressed its willingness to have United Nations observers, as well as the diplomatic corps, present at its elections.

Certainly anybody interested in having the popular will expressed, and in the growth of representative government in South Viet-Nam, will welcome these developments.

And a further fact which ought surely to be of interest to North Viet-Nam, as well as to the Viet Cong and the National Liberation Front, is the commitment by the South Vietnamese Government to the policy of national reconciliation. In this policy they might well see at least the beginning of an assurance that those who now follow the Viet Cong and the National Liberation Front, whether their rank be high or low, will suffer no political reprisals and will have a chance in a future peaceful South Viet-Nam to pursue their legitimate aims by peaceful and democratic means.

Surely it is altogether wise and proper that there should be such assurances. If there is to be peace in Viet-Nam, those who have taken arms against the Government should be confident that when the fighting is ended they will be free to go to North Viet-Nam if that is their decision; that if they choose to remain, they will suffer no reprisals for having fought in the war; and that in a future South Viet-Nam they will have an equal chance, as first-class citizens with full rights, to pursue a peaceful life so long as they do not seek, contrary to the constitution under which they live, to overthrow the government by force and violence. This, as I understand it, is precisely what is implied in the program of national reconciliation.

No doubt, this political evolution in South Viet-Nam falls short of the maximum aims

of the government of Hanoi. But it should by now be clear to them that their maximum aims cannot be realized—as indeed, in all justice, they should not be. This being so, would not this political evolution—which has already begun—when implemented in good faith, with all that may develop from it, form a basis for a negotiated settlement of this particular issue underlying the conflict?

And would this not be all the more true if mutual distrust regarding implementation of the withdrawal provisions of the Geneva accords and the Manila communique could be dissipated by appropriate international guarantees and supervision? These, too, I submit, are questions worth exploring for the sake of a just peace.

Such are some elements of the picture of a peaceful settlement which can be envisaged in broad outline even now. It is a picture in which no party to the conflict can claim a triumph—but in which none will taste humiliation or defeat. It is a picture entirely consistent with the Geneva accords. The leadership in North Viet-Nam, and in the National Liberation Front, would perhaps do well to consider this picture and to ponder whether the bitter sacrifices of this war, however long continued, could possibly bring about a result any nearer to their heart's desire.

It has occasionally happened in past ages that wars have taken on a terrible momentum of their own in which the original causes were virtually forgotten and the prolonged suffering led only to deeper hatred and more ambitious war aims on both sides. This must not be allowed to happen in Viet-Nam. The ferocity of combat must be for us not an incitement to hatred or a temptation to revenge but rather a stern discipline requiring us to define responsibly the minimum interests for which our soldiers fight and which a peace settlement must protect. In this way the maximum hope is preserved for the discovery of common ground on which such a settlement can be based.

I do not want to arouse any false expectations by anything that I have said. I cannot report that the outlook for an early settle-

ment is promising. But it is precisely at the time when the outlook is dark that we must refuse to lose hope and continue to approach the problems of peace, formidable though they are, with energy and resourcefulness.

The history of other conflicts amply demonstrates that the search for peace is seldom easy. It is full of stops and starts and of hopes deferred. We Americans have a reputation for being impatient, and this can be a good quality—provided that when difficulties arise which impatience cannot cure we show that we can also be resolute and persevering.

In the most tragic struggle of our American history, President Lincoln summed up the spirit of his policy in those famous words of his second inaugural: "With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in."

Those words expressed then, and they still express today, more than a laudable moral sentiment: They express the best strategy and the best policy. We may well take them as our guide as we strive to bring to Viet-Nam the peace which the people of that country and of the United States, and the vast majority throughout the world, fervently desire.

U.S. Support of Pacification Effort in Viet-Nam Reorganized

Following is a statement by Ellsworth Bunker, American Ambassador to the Republic of Viet-Nam, made at the opening of his news conference at Saigon on May 11.

My colleagues and I have been busy over the past 2 weeks discussing how we could best organize the U.S. Mission and maintain a seasoned top-level U.S. team. Having served as Ambassador in three major posts before this one, I am a firm believer in team operation and in fullest continuity.

Though it will not be a normal practice, I

called a special press conference today so that I could share my decisions with you.

First, Ambassador Eugene Locke, of course, is my alter ego. As such, he will insure coordination of all Mission activities.

Second, I am delighted that Barry Zorthian, Minister-Counselor for Information and Director of the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, has agreed to stay on indefinitely to handle this vital function.

Third, I am equally delighted that Major General Edward Lansdale has also agreed to stay on indefinitely as Mission liaison officer for the revolutionary development program and indispensable source of advice. That Mr. Zorthian and General Lansdale will stay on gives an important element of continuity to our top team.

Fourth, Dr. Charles Cooper, who served for the last year as economic deputy to Mr. Komer in the White House and who was previously special assistant to Walter Heller, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, will come out in June to replace Leroy Wehrle as Counselor for Economic Affairs. As most of you know, Mr. Wehrle's work has been invaluable here. Mr. Cooper is the best successor he could have.

Fifth, since being appointed U.S. Ambassador to Viet-Nam, I have given a great deal of thought to how to organize most effectively the U.S. advisory role in support of the Vietnamese Government's revolutionary development effort. Like my predecessor, I regard revolutionary development—often termed pacification—as close to the heart of the matter in Viet-Nam.

Support of revolutionary development has seemed to me and my senior colleagues to be neither exclusively a civilian nor exclusively a military function but to be essentially civil/military in character. It involves both the provision of continuous local security in the countryside—necessarily a primarily military task—and the constructive programs conducted by the Ministry of Revolutionary Development, largely through its 59-member revolutionary development teams. The Government of Viet-Nam has recognized the dual civil/military nature of the revolu-

tionary development process by assigning responsibility for its execution to the corps/region commanders and by deciding to assign the bulk of the regular army of the Republic of Viet-Nam, as well as the regional and popular forces, to provide the indispensable security so that revolutionary development can proceed in the countryside.

As senior American official in Viet-Nam, I have concluded that the U.S. advisory and supporting role in revolutionary development can be made more effective by unifying its civil and military aspects under a single management concept. Unified management, a single chain of command, and a more closely dovetailed advisory effort will, in my opinion, greatly improve U.S. support of the vital revolutionary development program.

Therefore, I am giving General [William C.] Westmoreland the responsibility for the performance of our U.S. Mission field programs in support of revolutionary development. To assist him in performing this function, I am assigning Mr. Robert Komer to his headquarters to be designated as Deputy for Revolutionary Development to COMUSMACV, with personal rank of Ambassador.

I have two basic reasons for giving this responsibility to General Westmoreland. In the first place, the indispensable first state of pacification is providing continuous local security, a function primarily of the Republic of Viet-Nam Armed Forces, in which the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Viet-Nam, performs a supporting advisory role. In the second place, the greater part of the U.S. advisory and logistic assets involved in support of revolutionary development belong to MACV. If unified management of U.S. Mission assets in support of the Vietnamese program is desirable, COMUSMACV is the logical choice.

I have directed that a single chain of responsibility for advice and support of the Vietnamese revolutionary development program be instituted from Saigon down to dis-

trict level. Just as Mr. Komer will supervise the U.S. advisory role at the Saigon level as Deputy to General Westmoreland, so will the present OCO regional directors serve as deputies to the U.S. senior advisers to the Vietnamese corps/region commander.

At the province level, a senior adviser will be designated, either civilian or military, following analysis of the local situation.

While management will thus be unified, the integrity of the Office of Civil Operations will be preserved. It will continue to perform the same functions as before and will continue to have direct communication on technical matters with its field echelons. The present Revolutionary Development Support Division of MACV will be integrated into OCO, and its chief will serve as deputy to the Director of OCO.

As senior U.S. official in Viet-Nam, I intend to keep a close eye on all U.S. activities, including our support of revolutionary development. I am simply having this advisory effort report to me through COMUSMACV rather than through two channels as in the past. I intend to keep fully informed personally about all developments in this field and to hold frequent meetings with General Westmoreland and Ambassador Komer for the purpose of formulating policy.

Such a unified civil/military U.S. advisory effort in the vital field of revolutionary development is unprecedented. But so, too, is the situation which we confront. Revolutionary development is in my view neither civil nor military but a unique wartime need. Thus my solution is to have U.S. civilian and military officials work together as one team in order to more effectively support our Vietnamese allies. Many further details will have to be worked out, and various difficulties will doubtless be encountered; but I am confident that this realignment of responsibilities is a sound management step and I count on all U.S. officers and officials concerned to make it work effectively in practice.

Vice President of the Republic of China Visits the United States

The Vice President and Prime Minister of the Republic of China, Yen Chia-kan, visited the United States May 7-25. In Washington, May 9 and 10, he met with President Johnson and other U.S. Government officials. Following are an exchange of greetings between President Johnson and Vice President Yen at an arrival ceremony at the White House on May 9, their exchange of toasts at a White House luncheon that afternoon, and a joint statement released on May 10 at the conclusion of their meetings.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS

White House press release dated May 9

President Johnson

Mr. Vice President, Mrs. Yen, honored members of the Chinese Government, distinguished guests: We welcome you today, Mr. Vice President, as a leader of a very gallant and resourceful nation.

We always value our exchanges with your Government. We welcome this new opportunity to benefit from your views on world affairs, especially on the developments in East Asia.

The example of the Republic of China encourages and inspires us all.

We all know how you have staunchly maintained your independence far out on the frontier of aggression. Less well known is how constantly and vigorously your people have worked to achieve that economic level which alone can make longrun freedom a reality.

Once the economic outlook for free China was very dim. But your people were determined to apply their wisdom and skill, and the United States was prepared to offer assistance.

Today an admiring world witnesses these results:

—Since 1952, your per capita gross national product has doubled.

—Since 1960, your exports have tripled.

—Today, you have one of the highest standards of living in Asia.

History will surely note, Mr. Vice President, your impressive personal role in these achievements and your nation's role in helping the family of nations upward to new dignity and to new hope.

You have given vital substance to one of your oldest and wisest proverbs: "Give a man a fish, and he will eat a meal. But teach him how to fish, and he will eat forever."

That philosophy, that wisdom, and that compassion have made the Republic of China a model for many lands. Your people have taught men of different cultures many valuable lessons—particularly in those regions where there is yet no winner in the grim race between population growth and food supply.

They can look to free China for evidence that this race can be won for humanity. In the past 10 years your population growth rate has dropped from 3.5 percent to 2.7 percent, while your food production has increased by almost 6 percent.

Mr. Vice President, your successes have been many and great, and it has been our privilege to share some of them. But our sense of common achievement was greatest when, in 1965, I was able to tell the Congress that free China no longer needed American economic assistance.

The Republic of China, strong itself, is now able to contribute to the development of other countries. Through your Project Vanguard, some 500 agricultural technicians

are assisting 23 nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Another 100 technicians are helping South Viet-Nam with its agricultural, electrical power, and medical problems. You are also doing your part in the Asian Development Bank, which promises so much for all the people of Asia.

Mrs. Johnson and I shall never forget the delightful visit we had to your country 6 years ago. We are delighted that you could come here and be with us today.

Your great philosopher said what is in our hearts when he asked, "Is it not delightful to have a friend come from a far place?"

Mr. Vice President and Mrs. Yen, we take great pride and pleasure in welcoming you to our land. We hope that your visit here will be one that you will enjoy and remember.

Vice President Yen

Mr. President, Mrs. Johnson: First of all, allow me to express my appreciation for the honor that you, Mr. President, have done me, in inviting me to visit your great country. I again thank you for all the complimentary remarks you have made on me and also on my country, the Republic of China.

My wife and I are deeply grateful to you, Mr. President, and to Mrs. Johnson, and to all those who are here today.

I have brought with me the very warm greetings of President and Madame Chiang Kai-shek and of the people of the Republic of China to you, Mr. President, to Mrs. Johnson, and to all the people of the United States of America.

The people of my country still cherish with very endearing remembrances the visit which you, Mr. President and Mrs. Johnson, made to my country in 1961.

It was during the course of your visit that your country and my country reaffirmed their common determination to fight for and to extend the frontiers of freedom and democracy in Asia.

Ever since that time, while the dark forces of communism have been stemmed in some parts of Asia, it was this great

country of the United States of America which has chosen to honor its commitments by responding very resolutely and very heroically against aggression and for the preservation of peace and freedom in my part of the world.

As an ally and a free nation, the Republic of China is proud to pledge its support to the noble cause which the United States is upholding.

The traditional ties of friendship between your country and mine have had a very long standing and have withheld many trying times and many trying events.

The present visit of mine to your country, I hope, will afford me the opportunity of learning from the wisdom of your thinking, Mr. President, and also of discussing with you many problems of common interest, with particular reference to those problems which are now existing in Asia.

I also am looking forward to the opportunity of meeting with many leaders in your administration, with members of your Congress, and with citizens of your country in many walks of life.

I am sure this visit of mine will further cement the very strong ties which have already existed between our two countries, and will also serve to enhance our mutual understanding and strengthen our friendship.

Again, Mr. President, I take this opportunity to thank you for your kindness and for the honor that you have bestowed upon me. Thank you, Mr. President. Thank you very much.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS

White House press release dated May 9

President Johnson

Your Excellency the Vice President of the Republic of China and Mrs. Yen, members of the Cabinet, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen: There is an old American proverb that says, "An hour's intelligent conversation is worth a thousand memos."

This morning I have had the privilege of such a conversation with a wise and devoted

friend of the United States, Vice President C. K. Yen of the Republic of China.

Mr. Vice President, we are delighted that you and Mrs. Yen could be with us, both for personal reasons and because your presence is symbolic of a long and cherished bond between our two peoples.

When China sought a leader for its first diplomatic mission to the West a hundred years ago, it chose Anson Burlingame, the first American Minister to reside in China's Capital, as its trustee. Our relationship has grown more intimate, more meaningful, over the intervening century.

Our countries are joined by a treaty of mutual defense. But our alliance goes far deeper. It is an alliance that has been tested in times of war. It has been tempered by our struggle against forces that would have destroyed both of us.

We were loyal to that alliance then. We are loyal to it today.

We are firmly committed to the defense of Taiwan, and to upholding your rights as a member of the United Nations.

Mr. Vice President, we in America admire what you have done to bring economic prosperity to Taiwan. We are proud to have worked with you.

—Taiwan's land reform program is outstanding in Asia—a model for countries around the world.

—In the past 15 years you have doubled your per capita gross national product so that your people now enjoy one of the highest standards of living in all Asia.

But the Republic of China has gone far beyond any selfish concern with its own fortunes—you have helped other countries to help themselves.

As valiant soldiers in the war against hunger and want—the war on which the future of civilization depends—farmers and technicians from Taiwan have traveled to other countries, other continents, to offer help, knowledge, and technical ability to less fortunate peoples.

Mr. Vice President, I have witnessed some of these miracles with my own eyes. I hope

that your visit here will further encourage your people and will give us the opportunity to, in part, try to repay the warm hospitality which Mrs. Johnson and I enjoyed in our visit to your country 6 years ago.

Ladies and gentlemen, I should like to ask you to please join me in a toast to the President of the Republic of China and to lasting friendship between the Chinese and the American peoples.

Vice President Yen

Mr. President and Mrs. Johnson, Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen: My wife and I feel overwhelmed by the kind comments that have been made by President Johnson. I think it is an honor which has been done not only to my wife and myself but also to my country as a whole.

The traditional friendly relations between the United States of America and my country have been long lasting and, as the President has already indicated, such friendship will go on and on forever and forever in the common cause of peace and of righteousness in this world.

When Mr. Burlingame came to my country about 100 years ago, both the United States and my country were already partners in the international scene. It might be interesting that at one time or another Americans have been representing my country on many occasions.

Subsequently many events happened in the world and those events have testified to the unflinching friendship and strong ties between the two countries.

I think those ties have already undergone such trying events and such trying times that we are sure in the future these ties will be even stronger.

But we have to be conscious of the changing world as it is and as it will be. We know that probably in the future more challenges will be posed against the freedom-loving countries, especially the United States of America and the Republic of China.

We know that only international cooperation can withstand all these challenges, but I

believe the wisdom of the American people and the wisdom of President Johnson, together with all the conscientious efforts made on the part of my country, will combine to turn the tide of world events so that eventually righteousness, peace, freedom, democracy, and human dignity will win.

I have just been talking to Mrs. Johnson about the great antipoverty program that the President is now sponsoring. I consider this not only a program of the United States; I consider that as a program for the whole world in which the United States will play a leading role and, in that role, my country will very fervently join.

Ladies and gentlemen, may I ask you to join with me in a toast to the continued health of our host and hostess, the President of the United States and Mrs. Johnson.

JOINT STATEMENT

White House press release dated May 10

His Excellency Yen Chia-kan, Vice President and Prime Minister of the Republic of China, has concluded a two-day visit to Washington at the invitation of President Johnson. Vice President Yen met with President Johnson to discuss matters of common concern on May 9. Also present were Ambassador Chow Shu-kai, Minister of Economic Affairs Li Kwoh-ting, Ambassador to the United Nations Liu Chieh, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Samson C. Shen, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Ambassador to China Walter P. McCaughy, and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs William P. Bundy. Director of the Information Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lai Chia-chiu was present as recorder for the Chinese side.

The President welcomed the opportunity to reaffirm to the Vice President the solemn commitment of the United States as provided for in the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. Vice President Yen noted that the Chinese Communists pose a continuing threat, and the President reassured the Vice President that the United States intends to continue to furnish military aid to the Republic of China in accordance with the provisions of the Military Assistance Agreement of 1951.

The President and Vice President reviewed the international situation, with particular reference to the current situation in East Asia. They exchanged information and views on conditions on the Chinese mainland resulting from the Cultural Revolution. They agreed that the struggle for power is far from

over and that developments on the Chinese mainland are closely related to the peace and security of Asia. They further agreed to consult on future developments on the Chinese mainland.

The President and the Vice President reviewed the Free World effort to halt Communist aggression against the Republic of Vietnam. President Johnson and Vice President Yen agreed that unless the aggression is stopped, peace and security cannot prevail in Asia and the Pacific region. The President expressed his gratification with the Republic of China's contributions to the development of Vietnam's economy, noting especially the work of Chinese technicians in assisting the Republic of Vietnam to increase her food production. The Vice President expressed the strong support of the Republic of China for the United States policy in Vietnam and the hope that the Republic of China would find it possible further to strengthen her economic and technical cooperation with the Republic of Vietnam.

It was agreed that periodic consultations between the United States and the Republic of China on problems of common concern in East Asia had been fruitful and should be continued.

The President and the Vice President discussed the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations. They noted the favorable outcome of the 21st General Assembly when efforts to expel the Republic of China from the United Nations and seat the Chinese Communists were decisively defeated. The President reaffirmed that the United States firmly supports the Republic of China's seat in the United Nations. The President and the Vice President agreed that their Governments would continue to consult closely on the best means for achieving their common objectives in the United Nations.

The President expressed admiration for the continuing progress made by the Republic of China in developing Taiwan's economy since the conclusion of the U. S. economic aid program in 1965. He also noted the sharp contrast between economic conditions in Taiwan and on the Chinese mainland.

The President congratulated Vice President Yen on the remarkable success of the Republic of China's technical cooperation programs in friendly countries, particularly in the field of agriculture, and noted that the Republic of China is making a most significant contribution to the collective War on Hunger.

In the course of their conversation President Johnson and Vice President Yen also reviewed programs intended to develop cooperation among Asian nations. The President and Vice President noted the potentialities of the Asian and Pacific Council and the Asian Development Bank to promote peace and prosperity in Asia and the Pacific region.

Vice President Yen spoke of the need to strengthen science and technology in the Republic of China as a vital force in national and regional

development. He welcomed the President's offer to have his Science Adviser, Dr. [Donald F.] Hornig, lead a team of experts to Taiwan to survey scientific and technological assets and needs in the Republic of China. Dr. Hornig will also advise on ways by which more career opportunities might be provided in Taiwan for Chinese scientists now teaching and working outside China.

President Johnson and Vice President Yen reaffirmed the strong ties between the United States and the Republic of China founded on the historic friendship between the Chinese and American peoples.

U.S. and Philippines Agree on School Building Project

The Department of State announced on May 18 (press release 114) that the Governments of the United States and of the Philippines had approved a project calling for an expenditure of \$13,077,000 from the Special Fund for Education, which was created by the U.S. Congress in an amendment to the Philippine war damage legislation of 1962. The funds will be utilized to construct 6,545 school buildings in the Philippines.

The agreement on the project, the first negotiated by the American and Philippine panels, follows the guidelines set forth in the communique of Presidents Johnson and Marcos of September 16, 1966.¹ In paragraph 22 of that communique the two Presidents agreed "to put to effective and creative use the Special Fund for Education" and directed the joint panels to accelerate their discussions and to implement rapidly projects as they are mutually agreed.

The school buildings, a portion of the Philippines' Presidential School Building

¹ For text of the communique, see BULLETIN of Oct. 10, 1966, p. 531.

Committee's school construction program, will include 5,000 units of the three-room "Marcos" type and 1,545 units of the two-room prefabricated "Army" type. The school buildings will be erected throughout the Republic of the Philippines to help meet a serious shortage of classroom space.

The agreement, which was signed at Manila on May 18, provides that the first disbursement from the Special Fund for this project will be made within 2 weeks of the signing of the agreement.

Letters of Credence

Burundi

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Burundi, Terence Nsanze, presented his credentials to President Johnson on May 10. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated May 10.

Dahomey

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Dahomey, Maxime-Leopold Zollner, presented his credentials to President Johnson on May 10. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated May 10.

Morocco

The newly appointed Ambassador of Morocco, Ahmed Osman, presented his credentials to President Johnson on May 10. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated May 10.

The United States and Thailand

by Graham Martin
*Ambassador to Thailand*¹

I see that your club bulletin forecast a candid appraisal of American relations with the Kingdom of Thailand. I shall try to justify that expectation. I hope you will also permit me to go a bit beyond Thai-American relationships and add a few comments on the Thai role in Asia. I would like to sketch in brief outline the extraordinary initiatives that have originated in Bangkok in the past few years, initiatives which have caught the imagination and elicited the cooperation of almost all other nations in Asia.

It would be, I think, almost impossible to exaggerate the enormous importance of these developments to our country. It seems to me that they provide a striking validation of the correctness of our decision to meet fully the commitments this country has undertaken in Southeast Asia.

I think the steady, progressive evolution of these new institutions of Asian cooperation provides one of the more dramatic stories of this decade. We have been perhaps unduly preoccupied with military minutiae in the past. I was therefore happy to see that one of the lead articles in last Sunday's New York Times by one of your distinguished and perceptive members, Mr. Drew Middleton, after extensive talks with senior officials in most of the countries of the area, did record his impression that "The officials believe that in the pause occasioned by allied resistance in Viet-Nam and Communist China's turmoil,

this area can be strengthened to the point of successful resistance to political subversion and economic pressures." I am convinced this is indeed the case, and I hope many more of you will investigate thoroughly the significance of these developments and report your conclusions to the American people.

Finally, I would like to expose my concern over the difficulties, as I see them from half-way round the world, that the virtual revolution in communications has posed for you in meeting the responsibilities we both have, responsibilities I believe you have always accepted as an automatic corollary of the constitutional protection afforded you to keep the American people completely informed.

In speaking of Thai-American relations, I can start with no better authority than the distinguished Foreign Minister of Thailand, His Excellency Thanat Khoman. It was only a little less than a year ago that I had to cut short a visit to the United States in order to be back in Bangkok on May 29 to sign on behalf of the United States an important treaty with Thailand—a new Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations. The date of May 29 was chosen by the Thai Foreign Minister because it was the anniversary of a similar treaty that had been signed 110 years before, on May 29, 1856.

In our remarks we both recorded the often overlooked fact that Thailand was the first Asian nation with which the young United States of America had a treaty relationship—in 1833. The Foreign Minister, in recalling the mutually beneficial relationship that had

¹ Address made before the Overseas Press Club at New York, N.Y., on May 3 (press release 108).

characterized the intervening period, went on to observe that

. . . our relationship stands out as a remarkable example where a small nation can work with a great power without being dominated or indeed losing its identity. In this area and at this time when expansionist and domineering tendencies are dangerously lurking, Thai-American cooperation is a worthy encouragement to our own constant endeavors to preserve our freedom and independence as well as to those who are striving to achieve the same objective. Relationship between a great and a small nation can be mutually fruitful and beneficial provided both sides acknowledge and respect the rights to equal opportunity and to enjoy equal benefits, over and above the inequalities of life and practical realities. If that principle is observed, as it has been in the present case, there can be a partnership which will not smother or jeopardize the free existence of the smaller party but rather enhance the latter's growth and development. On our part, we intend to secure the observance of such a principle and I am confident that this also corresponds to the desire of the United States Government. We, therefore, look forward not only to the continuing close association between our two nations, but particularly that it will serve as a model to an orderly and peaceful development of the relationship between the nations, large and small, in this part of the world, relationship which will not entail subservience to one of the other but rather mutually trustworthy and fruitful partnership and cooperation.

This comment from an Asian statesman whose qualities of fierce independence, courage, and high diplomatic skill are in the true tradition of his nation—which was the only bit of geography along the littoral of Asia which managed to maintain its freedom and independence during successive waves of European colonization—does not, I suggest, support the current stereotypes we hear all too often about the quality of American relationships with other nations and peoples. It does attest, on the contrary, to our continuing ability to conduct our relations with due regard for the sensibilities and the traditional values of others. Our relationship with Thailand has been and continues to be a partnership of equals.

Nor can there be any doubt, among those who have taken the trouble to become informed, that Thailand brings to this partnership as much as she receives. The one mani-

festation of this cooperation best known at the present moment is the military cooperation being afforded by Thailand.

As you know, Thailand and the United States both undertook commitments to the security of Southeast Asia when both nations ratified their accession to the SEATO treaty in 1954. In recognition of that commitment, the Government of Thailand has permitted the United States, as a SEATO ally, to use certain Thai bases to facilitate military operations in the defense of South Viet-Nam from externally organized and directed aggression. In so doing, Thailand expressed by its action a complete faith in the validity of American statements that we intended fully to carry out our commitments in Southeast Asia.

As we all know, other countries in the area have chosen not to risk their national existence in so direct and immediate a response to the aggressors. But the Thai, who have always been free, fully intend to remain a free nation. Indeed, the very word "Thai" means free; and as a free nation it felt that it had no recourse except to honor its obligations to the best of its ability, as we were also doing. During the past 3 years there have been literally hundreds of times when I have, at the request of our Government, presented requests to the Thai for additional assistance. I would like to openly record the fact that never once in this period has there ever been an association between their affirmative response and our action—or too often lack of action—on a request which they may have made to us for assistance. I suggest that many of you will find the same difficulties that I have experienced in finding a parallel in the history of American alliances with other countries.

These bases, which have been fully described to the American people, have made a major contribution to the Allied war effort. It is impossible to estimate how many thousands of Allied lives have been saved in Viet-Nam as a direct result of Thailand's cooperation. However, a partial sampling of the stream of propaganda protests beamed

at Thailand by Peking and Hanoi gives ample evidence that our concerted actions have hurt them painfully.

Long-range Communist plans for Thailand's subversion, openly announced by Peking some years ago, have been accelerated. Thai-U.S. cooperation has taken these new tactics into account. In addition to our long-range program which has assisted in training and modernizing Thailand's armed forces, we have added other training assistance, including an American Special Forces unit which is assisting in the training of additional Thai military units in counter-insurgency operations. The Thai desired to move with extreme rapidity to meet this new threat. Pending completion of training of Thai pilots, we provided last year at Thai request a company of unarmed American helicopters to provide the all-important element of mobility and logistical flexibility for Thai security units.

I might add for the record that neither the Special Forces nor other American training personnel nor these temporarily provided helicopters participated in any way in actual counterinsurgency combat operations. The Thai have insisted that this is their own responsibility which they will meet within their own country with their own forces. Consequently, on the completion of the training of the Thai helicopter pilots, the unit which we had provided was withdrawn to Viet-Nam on schedule on the first of February this year.

You are all aware that the Royal Thai Government has recently decided to add to the Royal Thai Navy and Royal Thai Air Force units already operating in South Viet-Nam an additional fighting force from the Royal Thai Army. They will be warmly welcomed in resisting aggression by their other SEATO allies who became familiar with their courage and valor when they fought as allies in the United Nations Command in Korea.

In recent days you have heard from one of America's distinguished soldiers of the military successes of the free-world Allied

forces in Viet-Nam. We should also note that Asians have not waited for these military successes to begin the creation of a new Asia. They began this process some time ago when it became certain we fully intended to honor our commitments.

Initiatives in Asian Regional Cooperation

A few moments ago I alluded to the extraordinary initiatives which have been bubbling up out of Bangkok, initiatives which before our eyes are rapidly filling in the outlines of firm patterns of regional cooperation in Asia.

Among these, I would like particularly to call attention to the patient, determined, and persistent diplomacy of U Nyun of Burma, the Executive Secretary of ECAFE [Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East], which led to the creation of the Asian Development Bank.

It is in Bangkok that the activities of the four riparian states of the Mekong Basin have joined together in the Mekong Commission, successfully subordinating their political differences to a concerted effort for the development of the incredible potential inherent in this great river system, a potential judged by many experts to be as vast as that of our own TVA.

In a few weeks we shall see in Bangkok the second meeting of the Asian and Pacific Council, formed a year ago in Seoul. That meeting was preceded by a year and a half of patient work in Bangkok by the ambassadors of the nations concerned under the chairmanship of the Thai Foreign Minister. This resulted in a degree of cooperation evidenced in Seoul which proved so startling to Western observers last year. I think we may confidently anticipate in the forthcoming meeting in Bangkok revelations of additional progress which has been made in the intervening year.

The reactivation of the Association of Southeast Asia has already proved an enormously attractive magnet for other nations in the area, and I believe we can confidently

expect a broadening of this subregional framework in the near future.

The progress of the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education is proceeding in the perfecting of the details of the new Asian Institute of Technology and the cooperative broadening of existing institutions in the fields of agriculture and tropical medicine which will provide additional momentum to the development of these badly needed additional human resources.

We have just seen concluded in Manila the second meeting of the Conference on Asian Economic Development which was first convened in Tokyo last year at Japanese initiative.

Dramatic and Constructive Change

These are illustrations of the startling momentum already achieved on the basis of Asian acceptance of the validity of America's commitment. We are seeing here the exploratory stirrings of the rising Asian urge to get on with the business of orderly regional growth through the collective engagement of Asian resources. As I have said before, the breadth of these activities is as impressive as it is little known. These new cooperative efforts extend not only into such fields as irrigation, hydroelectric power, transportation, communication, natural resources exploration, scientific and technical research, experimental agriculture, and quality manufacturing controls but also into the fields of coordinated economic planning and cooperative fiscal policies.

Last October here in New York, Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, in commenting on these developments, observed:

The smaller nations in Southeast Asia have felt the need of getting closer with one another. If division has been the characteristic of the past and had brought about grievous losses of freedom and independence and had allowed interference and pressure by outside powers, the future aims should be for closer and more fruitful cooperation and integration. While such cooperation should be basically regional, it is not in our interest to make it exclusive. Outside elements may have a role to play but not a domineering or dominating role. If anything, it will be a cooperation on the basis of equality and partnership.

I would like to reiterate that Asian efforts to unify and fortify the region have begun to move so fast that a real danger now exists that American and Western adjustments to such dramatic and constructive change will fall behind. The fact that the President has engaged the vision, the statesmanship, and the extraordinary competence of Eugene Black to coordinate our activities in these fields gives me confidence that we will surmount the bureaucratic resistance to the necessity for new techniques and accelerated action to match these Asian initiatives.

Free Asia has reached the point where it is prepared to associate itself with new Western initiatives which complement its own. It would be a pessimist indeed who could not see the newly compelling opportunities for fruitful cooperation which Asians are providing in the course of regional reformation and development. The question now is whether America and others have mastered the technique of full and equal partnership in Asia. I am increasingly confident that the answer will be affirmative.

Perspective in the News

I said in the beginning that I wished to share with you my concern over the difficulties we both face in our responsibilities to keep the American people as completely informed as we possibly can. I mention these problems with some diffidence because I have no solutions to offer. However, I could not think of a better place to come for advice and counsel, since your membership, I am certain, representing as it does such a broad spectrum of influence on all media, is actively engaged with the same concerns.

Having been rather fully occupied half the world away for these last 3½ years, I am perhaps only dimly aware of the effects of the massive revolution in the field of communications. For example, I have had time to delve only briefly into the observations of Mr. Marshall McLuhan. Perhaps if I had more time I would not have found myself more puzzled than before. I did find appealing the recent comment of Mr. Richard Coe. Recognizing that we are living in a period of

change, he observed that change is never orderly but chaotic, that not one thing but an awesome range of things happen at the same time, that the greatest danger was in missing the perspectives, and that the ironic cause for the lack of perspective perhaps is that instant communications stresses the chaos and not the order of civilization.

In reporting a war, I suppose it is unfortunately true that the most dramatic incidents are those involving violence and destruction. Instant communication also faces the editor, whether TV or newspaper, with the problem of instant choice. If I had the responsibility for making the choice, I would probably also choose the dramatic. But the problem is how do we get at least a bit of perspective.

We have been told of the military competence of our sons, and for this we may be justly proud. But how do we tell the American people that their sons are also engaged in constructive tasks as well, that our soldiers in Southeast Asia have eagerly welcomed the opportunity to assist whenever they could in the tasks of nation-building, that in so doing they have earned the affection and regard of the Southeast Asian peoples as well as their respect for their fighting prowess?

How do we tell the American people of the staunchness and steadfastness of an ally like Thailand?

And how do we tell the American people of the initiatives and ingenuity with which the Asians are creating the institutions of regional cooperation which hold every prospect of bringing an increasing stability and strength to the area?

How do we explain, in reference to SEATO, the difference between the machinery of an alliance and the alliance itself; that this alliance has demonstrated a truly remarkable flexibility, under the Rusk-Thanat clarification² of the "jointly and

separately" language of article II; that this flexibility and resilience has permitted all five of the Pacific members of the SEATO alliance to engage troops in combat in Viet-Nam, while maintaining the full participation of the non-Pacific members in the economic and social tasks which are also contributing to the stability and progress of the area?

How do you tell the Asians that the extended coverage we have given the use of the right of dissent, which we cherish in a free society, does not represent the great preponderance of American public opinion, which does understand what we are about and which has and which will continue to overwhelmingly support our doing what has to be done?

How do you look and see and arrange to tell the American people that as a result of that steadfastness and support all objective evidence now establishes that we have in the making in Asia and the Pacific a success of American policy fully as great as our success in Europe in the fifties?

For this is indeed the fact.

As I said in the beginning, I have no answers to these questions, but I do believe it important that answers be found.

May I close by reverting again to the occasion of the signing of the treaty on May 29 last year. In my reply to the Foreign Minister's comments I read the entry my predecessor had made in his personal journal describing those events at the signing of the treaty 110 years before. As I review the totality of our efforts in Southeast Asia, I have concluded that his closing sentence is as appropriate now as it was then.

He said 111 years ago: "I have great confidence for the future."

And so do I.

² For text of a joint statement of Mar. 6, 1962, see BULLETIN of Mar. 26, 1962, p. 498.

The Importance of Agricultural Development in Our Strategy for Peace

by *Eugene V. Rostow*
*Under Secretary for Political Affairs*¹

This first International Agribusiness Conference in itself marks an important stage in our thought about the specter of hunger which haunts the world. All of us know—at least we know intellectually—that the race between population and food supply is still in doubt and that the gloomy prophecies of Malthus are now a matter of urgent concern. We know that there is no rational reason for mankind to drown in a sea of hunger, that foresight and policy can and should assure all men the opportunities of affluence.

But we know, too, that there is a gap between intellectual awareness of a problem and the emotional sense of urgency which drives men to act. Your presence here shows how many of us, in Government, in private life, and in the important enterprises you so responsibly represent, have crossed that boundary line.

I was asked to talk today about agricultural development as part of the war on hunger and more particularly about the role of private business in the process of agricultural development abroad. I should like to ask you to consider these questions in the context of our foreign policy as a whole.

Defining the goal of our foreign policy is simplicity itself: to make American democracy safe. But there is nothing simple about achieving that goal in a turbulent world. Processes of disintegration have been reinforced by two World Wars, and they have

not yet been brought under control by our instinct for order. We have lost the privilege of delegating to others the protection of our national interest in world political stability. Britain and France are no longer able to conduct a "concert of the powers," as they did for a century before 1914, to maintain an equilibrium in world politics.

By necessity, we have inherited leadership in that quest for equilibrium. Two wars and more than 20 years of postwar crisis have convinced us that "The buck stops here," as President Truman once said. We cannot retreat from our obligations, for they are obligations we owe to ourselves—obligations of our own national security in a small, disorderly, and interconnected world. A serious tremor in Asia is felt today in Europe and the United States. The existence of nuclear weapons gives every controversy which may involve either the Soviet Union or the United States a special dimension. We are too rich, too powerful, and too important in the life of the world to be able to stand safely aside. Any disturbance in the general balance of power necessarily involves us. We must therefore continue to play an active, forward role with other friendly nations in seeking order, the indispensable predicate of progress. The order we seek is not ideological in character, nor is it the enemy of progress. To the contrary, our goal is the flexible, hospitable order described in the United Nations Charter—a world of independent nations, each free to pursue its own institutions, but cooperating with each other to prevent aggression, maintain peace, and further mutual

¹Address made before the International Agribusiness Conference of the Chicago Board of Trade at Chicago, Ill., on May 10 (press release 112).

interests, a peaceful, progressive world order of diverse but cooperative national societies.

Our relations to the developing countries should be viewed in this perspective and in terms of these goals. It is a relationship of many threads, and it is rapidly becoming one of the major problems in our foreign policy and that of the other developed countries. In this realm, it is fair to say that while there can be no progress without order, there can be no order without progress, either.

18 Years of Experience and Experiment

A generation ago, development assistance was not part of the job of our State Department or of other Foreign Offices—it was the responsibility of the imperial powers. But World War II brought an end to the old order of empire as the main organizing principle of the Southern Hemisphere. New governments began to struggle with the responsibilities of nationhood. Many floundered and regressed. Most of them lacked enough trained people to organize and direct a modern society. Often they lacked coherent social and political systems beyond those of the tribal order or of primitive agricultural villages. They needed time and resources with which to build. Meanwhile, their weaknesses tempted aggression—both external and from within. From the point of view of world security, they constitute a gigantic Balkan problem on a totally new scale, as the recent history of Asia and Africa attest. The conflicts threatening the general peace have arisen recently not in Europe but in Korea, the Congo, Cuba, and the whole sweep of Southeast Asia.

The new nations that emerged from the old colonial empires expected our protection against the tide of encroachment. And they asked for our help in the tasks of development. Our answer was President Truman's Point 4—his call for international programs of economic and technical assistance, designed to help the new nations achieve economic independence.

We have come a long way since that day 18 years ago when President Truman asked

Americans to help build a better way of life for the millions overseas who lived in poverty, ignorance, sickness, and despair. Few then realized the complexity of the task. Indeed, in most of Asia, Africa, and Latin America the job is still not done—far from it.

But through 18 years of experience and experiment, of success and of failure, the world has learned many lessons about the process of development. And those lessons are indispensable to success in the years ahead.

First, we have learned just how hard the challenge is. It is one thing to be faced, as we were under the Marshall Plan, with a problem of recovery involving 16 nations and 260 million people; and quite another to confront the task of helping over 70 countries and 1½ billion people.

It was one task to encourage the revival and reconstruction of developed countries which had a solid human and technical foundation for advanced industrial life; quite another to initiate the first basic steps toward development in countries without a middle class or an educated working class, without entrepreneurs, and without the experience of modern economic life, with an illiteracy rate of 70 percent or more and a per capita income of \$100 or less.

Second, we have learned that—despite the difficulty of the task—our purposes today must remain what they were in 1949 when President Truman proposed Point 4.

On humanitarian grounds, as President Kennedy put it 6 years ago,² we must pledge “to those people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery . . . our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required—not because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right.”

On grounds of self-interest, we should seek to end the polarization of the world into rich and poor nations, because poverty and

² For President Kennedy's inaugural address, see BULLETIN of Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.

deprivation and hunger destroy dignity, block progress, and open the way to political disorders which could rip the fabric of peace upon which our own security depends.

Third, we have learned that for all our zeal and energy, our role in the process of development is a secondary one. The chief responsibility for development rests on the developing nations themselves. Unless they adopt realistic policies and programs capable of encouraging growth, no amount of outside assistance can impose modernity upon them. Only their will, and their acceptance of reality, can transform their static, rural societies into modern ones. We know that that task requires hard choices on their part and often the abandonment of treasured myths. But difficult decisions of this kind are being made in many of the new countries of the world and in some of the older Socialist countries as well. They are discovering that the market is an efficient way to organize many aspects of economic life and that private enterprise is a powerful force even in state-directed economies.

Fourth, we have learned that the essence of the development process is as much sociological as it is economic and technological: that it calls for transformations of attitudes as well as habits of work. All over the world, men are realizing that development is a task beyond the reach of governments alone, however devoted. Modernization requires the energies of the private sector—the decisions of farmers and businessmen—as well as the plans of government agencies, and the discipline of those twin apostles of international rectitude, the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development].

Fifth, we have learned that though the task is difficult it is far from hopeless. Commendable records of growth have been attained in certain less developed countries, including Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Taiwan, and Venezuela. Others, such as Pakistan, South Korea, Thailand, and Turkey, are approaching that objective.

Finally, we have learned that sufficiency in food must be accorded a first priority in development plans and that agricultural development is crucial to overall economic development. After all, agriculture has proved to be the most progressive of all Western industries in terms of output per manhour. This is a fact which is only beginning to be realized in many of the new countries. There, in a mercantilist perspective, agriculture has been regarded as a badge of colonial dependence and industrialization as a symbol of independence. Thus, for many years agriculture was relatively neglected in the development plans of new countries which were fully capable of growing all or a large part of the food they needed. Often, such decisions reflected the erroneous judgment that it was more profitable in the long run to bypass agriculture on the road to development, while food needs were met by imports, sometimes, indeed, by imports of surplus foods on concessional terms.

The advanced countries contributed to this misplaced emphasis—often, I suppose, out of impatience to see rapid and visible results from their assistance, but more seriously, by their failure to insist on agricultural self-help in food-deficient developing countries which have the capacity to grow food economically.

Let me be very clear on this point. We do not want to repeat or to compound the economic mistakes of agricultural protectionism in earlier centuries—or indeed those of our own time. We are not advocating agricultural self-sufficiency for its own sake. There are many countries where it makes sense to produce machinery or oil and to import food. But there are many food-importing countries where it would make good economic sense to grow food. That is the problem I am talking about.

As a principle of development policy, however, both the United States and the countries we help now place a much higher emphasis on agricultural development and on investment in agricultural and agriculture-related industries.

This basic change—the new stress on agricultural development in formulating policy—has come about in response to a growing awareness of the “mathematics of hunger.”

Let me review that somber litany.

Despite the fact that they have 50–80 percent of their working force in agriculture, the developing countries face a growing food problem. Until World War II these nations were exporters of grain. This year they will import over 30 million tons of grain from the industrialized world. For the past 6 years, indeed, the world has consumed more grain than it produced, filling the gap largely with stored surpluses from North America.

Now these surpluses are gone, and the United States has taken the unprecedented step of putting half our unused acreage back into production to help meet world food needs, which are increasing at the rate of 4 percent a year. But our unused capacity is limited, and so is that of the other grain-producing countries. There are no longer inexhaustible reservoirs of food grains for the hungry of the world.

On the demand side, population growth in the developing countries, as a result of sharply reduced death rates and increased births, has been nothing short of spectacular, frequently exceeding 3 percent a year, or treble that of the industrialized countries. At this rate, by 1980 there will be more than another billion people in the world to feed, most of them in the food-short countries of the world. India's population alone will increase by a figure equal to the present population of the United States. By the year 2000, Latin America's population could triple, reaching 600 million. Will those 600 million people have to compete for food resources presently inadequate to feed 200 million?

The FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization] estimates that cereals deficits in all developing countries would total around 42 million tons by 1975, a deficit greater than the wheat crop expected in the United States this year. By 1985, the deficit could exceed 80 million tons—an amount greater than the total wheat capacity we can presently foresee for the United States even if all reserve

acreage were brought back into production and technological improvement continued at its present rate.

The growing demand for food is not a function of population growth alone. As income rises, food demand increases sharply and of course shifts from grains to meat and other proteins. The effect of rising income on food demand can certainly be expected to continue through the decade of the seventies, thereby compounding the food problems we face in the years ahead.

The conclusion is obvious. The developing world must acquire a far greater capacity to produce its own food.

Our objective, therefore, must be dramatically to transform the low yields per acre of the traditional agriculture practices in most developing countries into the high yields of modern scientific agriculture. The problem is also one of time. Development which took decades to achieve in Europe, the United States, and Japan must occur in these countries in a matter of years. At the same time, we and the other developed countries must promote and support similarly ambitious programs to check the rate of population growth.

Highest Priority to the War on Hunger

United States development assistance policy has been restructured in the light of the lessons we have learned.

I am not suggesting that because we have refined our development policies we can indulge in self-congratulation. For all the aid efforts of the United States, Western Europe and Japan over the last 20 years, the prosperous few are still islands of affluence in a sea of appalling poverty. Eighty percent of the world's people live in rural areas eking out a bare subsistence with methods unchanged since Biblical times. The disparity between the rich and the poor continues to grow wider. Our growth in GNP in one year is greater than the whole GNP with which India must support a population of nearly 500 million people.

But we have made progress. The Presi-

dent's recent messages on the subject³ squarely face the basic problems which have emerged in the course of these years of trial and error. They stress the primacy of the problem of hunger and agricultural development and the international character of the task of development. They state over and over again that these problems transcend ideology: They concern—and starkly concern—the human family as a whole.

Development, the President has said, is too large a problem for governments alone. Success requires a mobilization of all available energies, those of business, of education, of foundations, of cooperatives, of voluntary agencies, and other private groups.

Above all, he has urged, development requires a concentration of limited resources on the tasks which are fundamental—food, education, and health.

On the domestic front, we have drastically revised our Food for Peace program. Under the new legislation, Public Law 480 is no longer a surplus disposal program. Indeed, there is no longer a surplus. The United States is growing more food to help feed developing countries. By conditioning our food aid on a showing that the receiving countries are engaged in meaningful programs of agricultural "self-help," we are promoting an agricultural revolution abroad which is essential to meeting both food and development requirements.

Our economic assistance programs for the coming year will give highest priority to the war on hunger. Almost \$700 million, a 35 percent increase over this year's allocation, will be spent on AID programs to support developing-country efforts to increase their food production.

The President has created in AID a central staff office devoted to the war on hunger as a central point within the Government for leadership and coordination of these war on hunger programs. The War on Hunger Office, headed by Herbert Waters, who is with us today, will coordinate the physical and tech-

³ *Ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1967, p. 295, and Mar. 6, 1967, p. 378.

nical side of these activities, including rural and agricultural development research, Food for Freedom, food from the sea, population and family planning, and nutrition and child feeding. And the new Office of Private Resources, headed by Herbert Salzman, who is also with us today, will supply skills and resources through loans and investment guarantees, research financing, and other incentives to enlist private resources in the process of development.

These programs should enable us to help the developing countries to establish coherent strategies for economic and agricultural development. We stress that agriculture is more than just the application of inputs—that the farmer must be educated in new techniques and given adequate economic incentives if he is to accept new practices. We direct attention to government pricing policy and producer incentives, and we insist that agriculture be given a high priority in government planning and investment. One of the most striking lessons of recent experience in the developing countries is the effectiveness of economic incentives in changing agricultural practices and output. The ratio between grain and fertilizer prices, the opening of roads and markets, the availability of forecasts—all these familiar tools of farm economics seem to have the same impact on a farmer's decisions in Thailand as they do in Iowa.

We also stress the importance of research on the development of better seed strains, on the more intensive use of fertilizers and pesticides, on water use, farmer credit and marketing problems, and improved transportation, storage, and processing facilities.

Shared Power and Mutual Responsibility

The President has also worked unceasingly to mobilize the truly international effort required to achieve a world agricultural revolution. On every possible occasion and in every appropriate international forum the United States has sought to draw international attention to the world's food problems.

—In the context of the Kennedy Round of

trade negotiations, the United States has taken the lead in working toward a multi-lateral food aid program as a part of an international grains agreement, a program in which all major wheat exporting and importing countries would participate.

—In the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], to facilitate the flow of fertilizer and other inputs so essential to increasing agricultural production we have proposed that a fund be established to guarantee agricultural resources investment in developing countries by OECD private investors.

—In the Food and Agriculture Organization of the U.N. we have encouraged other nations to contribute to the World Food Program by pledging our contributions in food commodities and cash on a matching basis.

—Most recently, President Johnson, in support of India's efforts to feed its population in the face of severe drought, proposed and obtained international agreement on a new initiative making food aid to India an international responsibility coordinated through the World Bank India Aid Consortium.

We seek in these efforts to systematize and coordinate international efforts and to enlarge them. Why? Because we recognize that, powerful as the United States is, the job is far greater than the resources we can offer. Therefore, we must work to increase the size and effectiveness of our collective contributions. Moreover, and perhaps more fundamentally, we believe that it is healthy for the international community as a whole to assume responsibility for great problems which affect the general interest. We are convinced that joint action is the most effective action in today's world. All the advanced countries have a responsibility to unite in the basic common enterprises upon which the possibility of future peace and progress depend. We must develop habits of collective action through great peaceful coalitions for specific tasks. Such coalitions among governments in the areas of peacekeeping, development aid, arms control, and trade will, I believe and hope, be the dominant characteristic of the coming decade.

These necessities define our strategy: a search for authentic partnership of shared power and mutual responsibility.

Opening the Door for Private Resources

Up to now, I have been speaking of the role that governments must play in stimulating development. But the task of development is not a task for governments alone; the need for capital in the developing world is very large—a multiple of existing or prospective aid programs if progress is to be generated and accelerated. The knowledge, initiative, managerial experience, and capital required for development can come only from the business and professional communities of the advanced countries. The companies, large and small, which do business in the countries of the developing world can be among the most important agents of economic progress. They carry with them the absorptive capacity required to make effective use of the resources they transfer to developing countries. They and they alone can help to build a strong and vigorous private sector in the countries in which they operate. In agriculture, for example, private business operations have important byproducts; Salesmen teach farmers the lessons of scientific agriculture; policy planners seek to coordinate and balance the operations of their firms with other operations critical to agricultural development viewed as a system or matrix of relations; and technical personnel strive to adapt agricultural techniques and procedures to particular country environments in ways unique to the creative force of free enterprise.

Success in development will thus depend in substantial measure upon our ability to open the door for these private resources and talents. This is a lesson we have learned from the history of our own development, which was largely financed throughout the 19th century by continuing flows of capital from Europe. It is also the experience of the developing world. Those developing countries which have enjoyed the most rapid growth and the most broadly based progress have been countries where the creative force of national and international private enterprise

has been welcomed and encouraged by public policy. Israel, Taiwan, Greece, and now Korea, Pakistan, and Peru, have all experienced the regenerative effect of an upsurge in productive private activity.

The institutional capacity of private enterprise to transfer capital and technology is vast, yet as of now far too little United States private investment is taking place in developing countries. Excluding the Western Hemisphere, direct investment in all of the rest of the developing world comes to only \$800 million. A sample study of broad industry categories in 20 major developing countries reveals that only 70 United States firms account for nearly half of United States investment of such categories in these countries and that less than 500 firms are involved in all. In 1965 the net capital outflow from the United States for direct investment, other than oil and mining, in all developing countries in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East came to only \$66 million, about the cost of one large shopping center in a United States city.

How can this be explained? The simple fact is that until now the profit prospects from investing in developing countries, taking into account the risks and difficulties involved, have not been as attractive as comparable investment opportunities in the United States, Canada, or Europe.

One of the great tests for the politics of progress for the coming years will be the ability of governments and business firms, both within and without the developing world, to find policies to bridge this gap between risk and reward in private business investment in developing countries—new approaches to improve profit prospects, reduce risks, and ease investment difficulties.

When one considers the magnitudes involved, the effort is certainly worth making. Total United States domestic investment is nearly \$120 billion. With investment decisions being made each year which total \$120 billion, it is obvious that even a small impact on these investment decisions in favor of venturing into developing countries could dramatically increase the flow of United States capital abroad. Governments must find new ways to

catalyze private enterprise and must search for new institutions and new instruments which make risk taking more attractive.

We need a break from past traditions, a quantum leap forward in our approach to encouraging private enterprise to participate in the process of development.

Responsible and enlightened leaders of our business community have called for such policies. Academic studies have documented the case for them. Your Government believes that a truly international response is required. We are seeking in the OECD and in other forums a broadly based international agreement which would establish internationally recognized rules respecting both the rights and responsibilities of overseas investors. Such an agreement should include appropriate safeguards for the interests of all the countries concerned. If such an agreement can be reached, it could multiply the availability of enterprise, capital, and management in the developing countries.

From Traditional to Scientific Agriculture

Nowhere is this need more urgent than in the field of agriculture.

In the coming years, the indispensable transformation from traditional to scientific agriculture in the developing world will require the intensive application of billions of dollars of additional manufactured requisites, such as fertilizers, pesticides, improved seed strains, irrigation pumps, and farm equipment. Such transformations cannot occur without a corresponding development in the agricultural infrastructure.

Projected fertilizer costs alone stagger the imagination; estimates of foreign exchange requirements for fertilizer investment run beyond \$1 billion a year for the 1970's.

The same urgent need and potential demand exists for the skills and know-how of Western agricultural technicians, research scientists, and extension workers.

The challenge of development is how to transfer these desperately needed resources—capital and managerial, technological and distributive—from the great agribusiness complexes of North America, Western Europe,

and Japan to those areas of great food needs so as ultimately to create a worldwide food production and marketing system of high productivity.

The Western World must find ways to export the industrial capitalist revolution which has made its own agriculture the greatest in the world. In the United States and Canada in the last 25 years, yield per acre has gone up over 100 percent, many times that in the developing world. An American rice farmer grows four times more food per acre than the Indian. The American farmer now feeds himself and 32 others. In Japan, wheat yield per acre is three times greater than the yields in India; in the Netherlands, five times greater. We now have sufficient technical answers, the capital, and managerial know-how necessary to produce enough food to give all people of the world a decent diet. The question is how to adapt these tools to the situation in the less developed world.

I take it the search for answers to this question is why we have all assembled for this conference.

This is not to say that we are starting from scratch. Far from it.

Indeed, it might be helpful to our deliberations to describe briefly some of the programs already in train and some of the new program ideas being considered right now.

U.S. agribusiness firms—many of those represented here today—are currently making good use of AID's investment incentive and risk reduction programs. For example:

—Since last June AID has agreed to reimburse half the cost of 23 preinvestment feasibility studies of agribusiness projects. These 23 agreements represent potential investments of about \$150 million.

—In the past 2 years AID has insured \$130 million of U.S. investment in 113 agribusiness projects against inconvertibility, expropriation, and war damage. We now have \$3.6 billion in total coverage of all types of private investment outstanding.

—Six of AID's 12 extended "all risk" guaranties outstanding are for food and agriculture projects: major fertilizer complexes in

Korea, India, and Brazil, fish processing in Somalia, grain marketing in Thailand, and a feed and poultry operation in Korea. Through the use of these "all risk" guaranties we are making it possible for major U.S. institutional lenders—insurance companies, pension funds, and trusts—to provide for the first time long-term capital for important private projects in less-developed countries.

AID also has under way new programs to promote large-scale, vertically integrated agricultural projects in Africa and to carry out high protein food studies in Latin America and elsewhere.

Just as the Office of the War on Hunger has been established as the central focus for Government programs on food, nutrition, population, and agricultural development, so the Office of Private Resources, headed by Herbert Salzman, has been established as a central point for contact with American business firms and other private groups, such as voluntary agencies, foundations, and cooperatives. To cut down red tape and speed up decisions affecting the businessman, a private investment center will be set up within the Office of Private Resources to administer AID's investment incentive programs.

We in the Government have taken seriously the suggestion made by the agribusiness community that the problem of agriculture must be approached as a "systems" problem. With that in mind, a pilot program has been launched to test the applicability of the "systems" approach to agricultural development.

In addition, our planners and technical experts, working in close cooperation with the business community, have been trying to find an institutional framework for an across-the-board approach to agricultural development through consortia arrangements in which a number of related production facilities would associate together and operate under one single general management.

So as you can see, the United States Government is trying to involve U.S. private enterprise more deeply, more actively, and on a broader front in the war on hunger.

But we really have just begun to inventory

the resources, both public and private, which could be mobilized for the purpose.

The climate for cooperation between Government and business has never been better. It is up to all of us to translate that climate into meaningful action.

We don't expect businessmen to invest in the absence of a reasonable likelihood that fair profits can be earned. But we can ask that you consider overseas prospects very carefully and act on the basis of your long-term self-interest. We can ask that you explore with us the innovations we are considering and that you offer us the full benefit of your advice and experience. We must know more precisely what is needed to increase the flow of private resources.

I can promise that your suggestions will be carefully considered and that we are willing to propose new solutions, radical solutions, which have a chance to speed up the achievement of the goal. We know that we don't have all the answers in this new and challenging field and that without your help we cannot know what the world of planning is actually like in the markets and marketplaces of distant countries.

But we need more from you, as well. The people assembled here tonight represent a powerful constituency, an important voice in the country, influential in molding public opinion. You in the agribusiness community have indicated your appreciation of the grave crisis in agricultural development and food supply facing the world. Yet public support for development assistance has not been sufficient to make possible the increase in public assistance levels which must be forthcoming to avert disaster.

In the last 20 years we have learned enough about development to know what is needed. The battlelines are drawn, but the outcome is still in doubt. In large measure, success will depend on you in your roles as citizens and businessmen. We ask you to help us carry the message—to serve as a development constituency in maintaining public support for this critical element in our strategy for peace.

For the Government's part, we remain a ready and willing partner—constantly seeking to improve our services to you and to provide an increasing variety of investment incentives and information programs to make investment more attractive.

In particular, I hope we can work together more closely on the difficult task of improving the investment climate in the developing countries. We recognize that where the climate is hostile or otherwise inhospitable to private enterprise, private enterprise is unlikely to invest regardless of the Government programs and incentives that we make available. But in many countries investment climate can be improved, through favorable experience with a pilot project, through better communications, and through effective negotiations. For this to happen, however, we must know a great deal more about the individual country's obstacles which deter you as businessmen from investment there.

It may well be that we should establish a framework for a continuing dialog between business and Government on problems like that of investment climate—an ongoing mechanism for Government-business cooperation in the agribusiness field involving people at the highest level and meeting on a regular basis. Certainly the desirability of such a mechanism should be discussed at this conference.

I should also hope that the conferees will discuss the role that business might play in education abroad, either through the direct efforts of our advanced education-technology firms developing educational material for farmers, and our agribusiness firms working directly with the farmer, or through the usual channels of educational exchange such as foundations, universities, or governmental organizations.

The simple goal of our foreign policy is a new period in human affairs—not an American Century or a Rich Country Century, but an era of international partnership in which we can all work together on the basis of mutual respect and full responsibility in the interest of our common humanity. Here at

home that task requires us to test the ability of Government and business firms to work together in new and imaginative ways toward consistent objectives. We wish to explore new frontiers in Government-business relations because we cannot afford not to. As Pope Paul has said in his last encyclical, "the new name for peace is development."

And in this all of us have a stake.

Pacific Islands Trust Territory To Receive Additional Funds

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release dated May 10

I have today [May 10] signed S. 303, amending the law authorizing funds for the government of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.¹

Present law authorizes the appropriation of \$17.5 million annually. S. 303 increases that authorization, for fiscal 1967, to \$25 million. For fiscal 1968 and 1969, it raises the figure to \$35 million—double today's amount.

The United States has an obligation, under the terms of our trusteeship agreement with the United Nations, to promote the educational, social, political, and economic development of the Trust Territory—where 90,000 people inhabit 2,000 islands scattered over more than 3 million square miles of the Western Pacific.

We have made an appreciable start toward meeting that obligation—though a great deal remains to be done to raise living standards in the islands.

From my visit to American Samoa in October of last year, and from conversations with leaders of the Trust Territory in Guam last March,² I know of the urgency that attends this responsibility. I am happy to sign into law a measure that recognizes that ur-

gency and allows us to respond to it meaningfully.

I have already asked that the Congress appropriate additional funds, both this year and next, so that among other projects we can build schools, hospitals, roads, airfields, and communication facilities, hire teachers and doctors and nurses, and provide for the economic development of the area. We are working to help the people of the islands become self-reliant, and ultimately joined in a full relationship with other nations bordering the Pacific.

Another beneficial feature of the bill I am signing today is the recognition it gives to the presence of our Peace Corps volunteers in this area. They are serving at the request of the people of the Trust Territory in education, health, public works, and community development work. They represent a vital expression of America's interest in the islands.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Labor

Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the International Labor Organization. Dated at Montreal October 9, 1946. Entered into force April 20, 1948. TIAS 1868.

Admission to membership: Barbados, May 8, 1967.

Maritime Matters

Amendment to the convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044). Adopted at London September 15, 1964.¹
Proclaimed by the President: May 10, 1967.

Convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965. Entered into force March 5, 1967; for the United States May 16, 1967.

Proclaimed by the President: May 10, 1967.

Publications

Agreement relating to the repression of the circula-

¹ Not in force.

¹ As enacted, S. 303 is Public Law 90-16.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 10, 1967, p. 598.

tion of obscene publications, signed at Paris May 4, 1910, as amended by the protocol signed at Lake Success May 4, 1949. Entered into force September 11, 1911, and May 4, 1949. 37 Stat. 1511; TIAS 2164.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Malta, March 24, 1967.

Safety at Sea

International regulations for preventing collisions at sea. Approved by the International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, London, May 17–June 17, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965. TIAS 5813.

Acceptance deposited: Brazil, March 8, 1967.

Space

Treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. Opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow January 27, 1967.¹

Signature: Sierra Leone, May 16, 1967.

White Slave Traffic

Agreement for the repression of the trade in white women, as amended by the protocol of May 4, 1949 (TIAS 2332). Signed at Paris May 18, 1904. Entered into force July 18, 1905; for the United States June 6, 1908. 35 Stat. 1979.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Malta, March 24, 1967.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement governing the coordination of pilotage services on the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence Seaway, with memorandum of arrangements. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington April 13, 1967. Entered into force April 13, 1967.

¹ Not in force.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders.

Maintenance of Certain Lights in the Red Sea. Agreement with Other Governments. Done at London February 20, 1962—Signed on behalf of the United States of America, subject to acceptance, March 2, 1962. Entered into force October 28, 1966. TIAS 6150. 17 pp. 10¢.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with India, extending the agreement of April 15, 1964, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at New Delhi October 21, 1966. Entered into force October 21, 1966. Effective October 1, 1966. TIAS 6151. 3 pp. 5¢.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with the Republic of Korea, amending the agreement of January 26, 1965. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington November 22, 1966. Entered into force November 22, 1966. Effective January 1, 1966. With related letters. TIAS 6152. 6 pp. 5¢.

Claims—Indemnification for Losses Arising from Ammunition Shipments. Agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Exchange of notes—Signed at London October 27, 1966. Entered into force October 27, 1966. TIAS 6154. 5 pp. 5¢.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LVI, NO. 1458

PUBLICATION 8244

JUNE 5, 1967

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of

the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Asia. The United States and Thailand (Martin) 851

Burundi. Letters of Credence (Nsanze) 850

China. Vice President of the Republic of China Visits the United States (Johnson, Yen) 846

Dahomey. Letters of Credence (Zollner) 850

Department and Foreign Service. U.S. Support of Pacification Effort in Viet-Nam Reorganized (Bunker) 844

Economic Affairs

The Importance of Agricultural Development in Our Strategy for Peace (Rostow) 856

The United States and Thailand (Martin) 851

Foreign Aid. The Importance of Agricultural Development in Our Strategy for Peace (Rostow) 856

Morocco. Letters of Credence (Osman) 850

Non-Self-Governing Territories. Pacific Islands Trust Territory To Receive Additional Funds (Johnson) 865

Philippines. U.S. and Philippines Agree on School Building Project 850

Presidential Documents

Pacific Islands Trust Territory To Receive Additional Funds 865

Vice President of the Republic of China Visits the United States 846

Publications. Recent Releases 866

Thailand. The United States and Thailand (Martin) 851

Treaty Information. Current Actions 865

United Nations. Persevering for Peace (Goldberg) 838

Viet-Nam

Persevering for Peace (Goldberg) 838

The United States and Thailand (Martin) 851

U.S. Support of Pacification Effort in Viet-Nam Reorganized (Bunker) 844

Name Index

Bunker, Ellsworth 844

Goldberg, Arthur J 838

Johnson, President 846, 865

Martin, Graham 851

Nsanze, Terence 850

Osman, Ahmed 850

Rostow, Eugene V 856

Yen, Chia-kan 846

Zollner, Maxime-Leopold 850

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 15-21

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to May 15 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 108 of May 3 and 112 of May 10.

No.	Date	Subject
†110	5/16	Brown to maintain liaison on foreign policy with U.S. Governors.
†111	5/15	Valenti to head U.S. delegation to International Film Festival, Moscow, July 5-20 (rewrite).
†113	5/17	U.S.-Mexico fishery talks.
114	5/18	Agreement to construct school buildings in the Philippines (rewrite).

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

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THE
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BULLETIN

Vol. LVI, No. 1459



June 12, 1967

OUR FOREIGN POLICY COMMITMENTS TO ASSURE A PEACEFUL FUTURE

Address by Secretary Rusk 874

EAST-WEST TRADE: AN AVENUE TOWARD WORLD PEACE

by Acting Secretary of Commerce Alexander B. Trowbridge 881

UNITED STATES URGES DIALOG REGARDING SOUTH WEST AFRICA

*Statements by Ambassador Goldberg in the Fifth Special Session
of the U.N. General Assembly and Text of Resolution 888*

THE UNITED STATES CALLS FOR RESTRAINT IN THE NEAR EAST

Statements by President Johnson and Ambassador Goldberg 870

The United States Calls for Restraint in the Near East

Following is a statement made by President Johnson on May 23, together with a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative Arthur J. Goldberg on May 24 during consideration by the Council of the crisis in the Near East.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

White House press release dated May 23

In recent days tension has again risen along the armistice lines between Israel and the Arab states. The situation there is a matter of very grave concern to the whole international community. We earnestly support all efforts, in and outside the United Nations and through its appropriate organs, including the Secretary-General, to reduce tensions and to restore stability. The Secretary-General has gone to the Near East on his mission of peace with the hopes and prayers of men of good will everywhere.

The Near East links three continents. The birthplace of civilization and of three of the world's great religions, it is the home of some 60 million people and the crossroads between East and West.

The world community has a vital interest in peace and stability in the Near East, one that has been expressed primarily through continuing United Nations action and assistance over the past 20 years.

The United States, as a member of the United Nations, and as a nation dedicated to a world order based on law and mutual respect, has actively supported efforts to maintain peace in the Near East.

The danger, and it is a very grave danger, lies in some miscalculation arising from a

misunderstanding of the intentions and actions of others.

The Government of the United States is deeply concerned, in particular, with three potentially explosive aspects of the present confrontation.

First, we regret that the General Armistice Agreements have failed to prevent warlike acts from the territory of one against another government or against civilians or territory under control of another government.

Second, we are dismayed at the hurried withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from Gaza and Sinai after more than 10 years of steadfast and effective service in keeping the peace, without action by either the General Assembly or the Security Council of the United Nations. We continue to regard the presence of the United Nations in the area as a matter of fundamental importance. We intend to support its continuance with all possible vigor.

Third, we deplore the recent buildup of military forces and believe it a matter of urgent importance to reduce troop concentrations. The status of sensitive areas, as the Secretary-General emphasized in his report to the Security Council,¹ such as the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba, is a particularly important aspect of the situation.

In this connection I want to add that the purported closing of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping has brought a new and very grave dimension to the crisis. The United States considers the gulf to be an international waterway and feels that a blockade of Israeli shipping is illegal and potentially

¹ U.N. doc. S/7896.

disastrous to the cause of peace. The right of free, innocent passage of the international waterway is a vital interest of the entire international community.

The Government of the United States is seeking clarification on this point. We have already urged Secretary-General Thant to recognize the sensitivity of the Aqaba question, and we have asked him to give it the highest priority in his discussions in Cairo.

To the leaders of all the nations of the Near East, I wish to say what three American Presidents have said before me—that the United States is firmly committed to the support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of that area. The United States strongly opposes aggression by anyone in the area, in any form, overt or clandestine. This has been the policy of the United States led by four Presidents—President Truman, President Eisenhower, President John F. Kennedy, and myself—as well as the policy of both of our political parties. The record of the actions of the United States over the past 20 years, within and outside the United Nations, is abundantly clear on this point.

The United States has consistently sought to have good relations with all the states of the Near East. Regrettably, this has not always been possible, but we are convinced that our differences with individual states of the area and their differences with each other must be worked out peacefully and in accordance with accepted international practice.

We have always opposed—and we oppose in other parts of the world at this very moment—the efforts of other nations to resolve their problems with their neighbors by the aggression route. We shall continue to do so. And tonight we appeal to all other peace-loving nations to do likewise.

I call upon all concerned to observe in a spirit of restraint their solemn responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations and the General Armistice Agreements. These provide an honorable means of preventing hostilities until, through the efforts

of the international community, a peace with justice and honor can be achieved.

I have been in close and very frequent contact—and will be in the hours and days ahead—with our able Ambassador, Mr. Goldberg, at the United Nations, where we are now pursuing the matter with great vigor, and we hope that the Security Council can and will act effectively.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG IN THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL

U.S./U.N. press release 70 dated May 24

The United States strongly supported the request by Canada and Denmark last evening for an immediate meeting of the Security Council.² We did so out of our grave concern over the sharp increase of tension between Israel and her Arab neighbors since the Secretary-General's departure and out of our belief that the Secretary-General should be accorded all possible support in the difficult peace mission on which he is now embarked.

When the Secretary-General announced his intention to undertake this critically important journey, my Government immediately gave him our full backing. We agreed with his assessment of the gravity of the situation when he said on May 19, in his report to the Council (S/7896), that "the current situation in the Near East is more disturbing, indeed, I may say more menacing, than at any time since the fall of 1956."

We, like others in the Council, would normally have awaited a further report from the Secretary-General before convening a meeting of the Council. However, since the Secretary-General made his report—indeed, in the 2 days since he departed for Cairo—conditions in the area have taken a still more menacing turn because of a threat to customary international rights which have been exercised for many years in the Gulf of Aqaba. This had led us to the belief that the Council, in the exercise of its responsibilities,

² U.N. doc. S/7902.

should meet without delay and take steps to relieve tension in the area.

In his report to the Council, the Secretary-General correctly singled out two areas as "particularly sensitive." One was the Gaza Strip. The other was Sharm el-Sheikh, which stands at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba.

The position of the United States on these matters was publicly stated yesterday by President Johnson, and I shall not take the time of the Council to reiterate what he explicitly said.

We are well aware, of course, of the long-standing grievances, some of them of many years' standing, in all sides of this complex dispute. Whoever is familiar with the area knows that, regrettably, these underlying problems are not going to be resolved tomorrow.

The cause of peace which we here are pledged to serve will not be advanced by raking over the past or attempting over-ambitiously to settle the future. Our objective today should be much more limited—but nonetheless of crucial importance under present circumstances. It should be to express full support for the efforts of the Secretary-General to work out a peaceful accommodation of the situation. Accordingly, we should call upon all states to avoid any action which might exacerbate the already tense situation which prevailed when the Secretary-General departed on his mission.

Judging from what we heard in this morning's meeting, there should be no difficulty in obtaining the agreement of all members for this course of action by the Council. And surely it is the plain obligation of the parties, as members of the United Nations committed to the cause of peace, to assure that there is no interference with existing international rights which have long been enjoyed and exercised in the area by many nations. Such interference would menace the mission of the Secretary-General and could abort his efforts to work out a peaceful accommodation.

We are fully aware, as are all the members of the Council, of the longstanding underlying problems in the area. But no problem

of this character can be settled by warlike acts. The United States opposition to the use of aggression and violence of any kind, on any side of this situation, over the years, is a matter of record. As our actions over many years have demonstrated, and as President Johnson reaffirmed in his statement yesterday,

. . . the United States is firmly committed to the support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of that area. The United States strongly opposes aggression by anyone in the area, in any form, overt or clandestine.

My country's devotion to this principle has been demonstrated concretely—not only in the Suez crisis, where we stood against old allies, but consistently through the years. In fact, in the most recent debate in this Council involving this area,³ we made very clear the United States commitment to the solution of all problems of the area by exclusively peaceful means and by recourse to the armistice machinery.

Mr. President, only 2 days ago many of us here had occasion, during the debate on the peacekeeping question in the General Assembly, to speak of the vital interest which all powers, great and small alike, share in maintaining an impartial international instrument of stability—an instrument which, when danger and discord arise, can transcend narrow self-interest and put power at the service of peace. That instrument is the United Nations; and above all, it is this Security Council with its primary charter responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The view is sometimes stated that the smaller powers, because they are most vulnerable, are the real beneficiaries of United Nations efforts to maintain the peace, whereas the great powers "can take care of themselves." My country does not accept this view. Nobody questions the vital interest of the smaller powers in this activity; indeed, they have manifested that interest time and time again by their votes and their contributions. But neither should anybody suppose

³ For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 26, 1966, p. 974.

that the exercise by the United Nations of its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security does not serve the basic interests of the great powers also. Great powers have both interests and responsibilities in this matter—and the greater the power, the greater the responsibility.

In this spirit, Mr. President, I am authorized to announce that the United States, both within and outside the United Nations, is prepared to join with other great powers—the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France—in a common effort to restore and maintain peace in the Near East.

Mr. President, all must join in the search for peace: the Secretary-General, the Security Council, and the great powers. Both separately and together let us work in this common cause which so vitally affects our own interests and those of all the world.

Prayer for Peace, Memorial Day, 1967

A P R O C L A M A T I O N ¹

In reverent tribute on this Memorial Day 1967 we salute the gallant men of our country who have served us and still serve us so nobly and selflessly in defense of freedom.

We can never repay their sacrifices. Our honored dead sleep in hallowed ground on five continents. The debt we owe them, and that our children will owe for generations to come, is beyond measure.

Today, our young men are fighting and dying in Vietnam so that other young men may stand as they have stood—proudly independent, free to determine their own destiny. Before their common sacrifice and dedication the barriers of race, color, or creed crumble. The heroism of a just cause makes all men brothers against tyranny.

Every President in time of armed conflict must act in the deep conviction that the cause for which our young men suffer and die transcends their sacrifices.

A century ago President Lincoln expressed his grief over the terrible losses of the war between the States. He pointed out that all deprecated war, all sought to avoid it, but as there were those who would make war, so there must be those who could accept war.

We have had to accept the war in Vietnam to redeem our pledge to those who have accepted in good faith our commitment to protect their right of free choice. Only in this way can we preserve our own right to act in freedom.

So we shall continue to resist the aggressor in Vietnam, as we must.

But we continue to hold open the door to an honorable peace, as we must.

On this hallowed day, on behalf of the American people—indeed, on behalf of all of the people in the world—I repeat to the leaders of those whom we fight: Let us end this tragic waste; let us sit down together to chart the simple course to peace; let us together lead our peoples out of this bloody impasse.

And I ask you, my fellow Americans, to join me in prayer that the voice of reason and humanity will be heeded, that this tragic struggle can soon be brought to an end.

The Congress in a joint resolution approved May 11, 1950 (64 Stat. 158), has requested the President to issue a proclamation calling upon the people of the United States to observe each Memorial Day as a day of prayer for permanent peace and designating a period during such day when the people of the United States might unite in such supplication:


NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate Memorial Day, Tuesday, May 30, 1967, as a day of prayer for permanent peace and I designate the hour beginning in each locality at eleven o'clock in the morning of that day as a time to unite in such prayer.

I urge the press, radio, television, and all other information media to cooperate in this observance.

I also urge all of the people of this Nation to join me in prayer to the Almighty for the safety of our Nation's sons and daughters around the world, for His blessing on those who have sacrificed their lives for this Nation in this and all other struggles, and for His aid in building a world where freedom and justice prevail, and where all men live in friendship, understanding, and peace.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twenty-second day of May in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-seven, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and ninety-first.



By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

¹ No. 3785; 32 *Fed. Reg.* 7621.

Our Foreign Policy Commitments To Assure a Peaceful Future

Address by Secretary Rusk¹

I am not going to take your time to talk about things that you know more about than I do, but I would just say this: I hope that none of you will ever underestimate what you're doing in relation to the future prospects for peace in the world.

I would guess that in the next two or three decades we will have two overriding problems. The one is to keep the beast of nuclear power in its cage, and the other is to keep the beast of hunger away from the doors of our families throughout the world.

And these are not unrelated. We may be in a very special period of history, limited in time, which gives us a chance to do something that we had better do if we do not move into another period of history. Because at the present time there is no government, Communist or otherwise, reaching out to absorb other nations on the theory that they must do so in order to feed their own people. There is in the world at the present time a rather general hope and expectation that somehow science and technology and improved productivity will be able to meet the increasing demands of rising populations. Orville Freeman and many of you here in the audience can predict for us about how long we have to test whether that is so, because if that effort fails, then I think we will find that food itself will become a major element in hostility among nations.

So the more that you and your colleagues can become missionaries of the agricultural revolution and can help carry the best that the mind of man can devise to the needs of

production in every corner of the world, the more you are genuinely building a peaceful world.

I would like to make some comments today about peace and the organization of a durable peace, because that is not only what our business in the State Department is all about but what the life of our nation in the long run depends upon.

I will preface my remarks by a reminder that half the people can no longer remember World War II and less than half can remember the events which led up to World War II. That means that the great central overriding question which was in front of us in 1945 is being forgotten. And that question is, How do you organize a durable peace? Although there may be differences of view about this or that or the other policy, I would hope that all of us could at least agree that that is the overriding question and not let ourselves become indifferent or careless or forgetful about its importance.

Looking backward, let us recall that when many of you and I were students, the governments of the world of that day were unable or unwilling to take the steps necessary to organize a durable peace. We went into the conflagration of World War II for the most part without the arms and without the training and without the acts of prevention which might have saved that generation from that great catastrophe where tens of millions of lives were lost all over the world by the countries engaged in it.

Nevertheless, we did have a chance to sit down and write article 1 of the United Nations Charter, which represents the lessons learned from World War II. That article

¹ Made before the national conference of the U.S. Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service at Washington, D.C., on May 18.

talks about the need to suppress aggression and breaches of the peace, to settle disputes by peaceful means, to extend the right of self-determination to all peoples, and to cooperate freely across national frontiers to get on with the great humanitarian tasks of mankind, including those tasks in which you are engaged. Now, we ought to be respectful of what is written in article 1 of the United Nations Charter, if for no other reason than that we paid such a terrible price for the chance to write it.

But there is an even more pressing reason why we must read it often and thoughtfully and prayerfully, and it is that we shall not have a chance to draw the lessons from world war III. There will not be enough left. And so if there are some of us who speak with passion about the necessity for organizing a durable peace, I hope that we can understand something about the tremendous power of destruction in the hands of frail human beings all over the world. At long last men must learn how to live together on the same planet under institutions of law, settling disputes by peaceful means and not permitting violence and aggression, appetite and ambition, to run unrestrained throughout the earth.

Although we have many unresolved problems with Eastern Europe, this is why we have been trying to probe for the possibilities of resolving some of those questions.

We are under no illusion about the major objectives of the Communist world. They have not given up their aim of a world revolution. But we ought to be interested in trying to work, even with them—or perhaps even especially with them—to move toward something that they and we can call in due time peaceful coexistence.

This is why President Kennedy and President Johnson and their Secretary of State have not taken down to the Senate additional alliances in these past 6 years. President Kennedy, on the heels of the Cuban missile crisis, was able to present the nuclear test ban treaty. President Johnson, despite serious differences with the Soviet Union and countries of Eastern Europe, has concluded

the Civil Air Agreement, the Consular Treaty, the Space Treaty in the United Nations. This is why we are working hard on a treaty to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is why we should like to have serious discussions about limiting new levels in the arms race which might be precipitated by building antiballistic missiles and then multiplying the offensive missiles on top of those at costs of additional tens of billions to our respective defense budgets on both sides. And this is why the President has suggested to the Congress that it might be well for us to have legislative authority with which we could negotiate bilateral trade agreements with particular countries in Eastern Europe.

So we are in a position to make our contribution toward a solution of some of the problems, whether large or small, which stand in the way of organizing a durable peace.

Now, it is of course no secret that one of the greatest obstacles in this process is the situation in the Pacific. We do not believe that we can be loyal to our alliances in the Atlantic and disloyal to our alliances in the Pacific. We do not believe that this earth can be safe for the human race if there is a certain repose and calm in half of it across the Atlantic and violence and destruction and terror in the other half of it across the Pacific.

Myths About Viet-Nam

So I should like to comment to you today on a few points involving the discussion of Viet-Nam and in the direction of trying to brush away some of the underbrush in our discussion, perhaps some of the myths, some of those elements which come into the discussions which contribute as much to misunderstanding as understanding.

First, I have heard it said that Viet-Nam is such a preoccupation that it causes us to neglect things that are going on in other parts of the world. We send out about a thousand cables a day from the State Department on every working day. I think most of you

would agree with most of those cables, although I suspect no one of you would agree with all one thousand of them on any particular day. But the work of the world goes on. And I have not been able to have people tell me of subjects that are important, requiring our interest and participation, in which we are not fully taking part—whether it is the Kennedy Round or NATO or monetary reform, or the economic integration of this hemisphere or Latin America or a new life for the Alliance for Progress, or economic and social development in Africa, or the organization of the Asian Development Bank, or whatever it might be.

The work of the world goes on, and your President spends his time and attention comprehensively on these large tasks before all of us. And so it just isn't so that this is causing us to neglect what is going on. That doesn't mean that some difficult problems don't arise in some other parts of the world and that full attention to solutions sometimes may not be difficult.

“Civil War” Concept Not Applicable

Secondly, I hear it said that Viet-Nam is just a civil war, therefore we should forget about it, that it is only a family affair among Vietnamese. Well, it's quite true that among the Viet Cong and the National Liberation Front there is a large component of authentic Southerners who are in rebellion against the several authorities who have been organized in Saigon.

But those are not the people who explain the presence of American combat forces in South Viet-Nam. Because beginning in 1960 the authorities in the North activated the Communist cadres which had been left behind at the time of the division of the country. Then from 1960 onward they sent in substantial numbers of Southerners who had gone North, were trained in the North, and were sent back as cadres and armed elements to join in seizing the country. And by 1964 they had run out of authentic Southerners and were sending Northerners in increasing numbers, and late that year they began to

send regular units of the North Vietnamese Regular Army. Today there are more than 20 regiments of the North Vietnamese Regular Forces in South Viet-Nam and substantial forces in and just north of the demilitarized zone in direct contact with our Marines.

It was what the North is doing to the South that caused us to send combat forces there, because we felt we had an obligation to do so under the SEATO treaty, a treaty which calls upon us to take steps to meet the common danger. And if the North would decide to hold its hand and not persist in its effort to seize South Viet-Nam by force, this situation could be resolved peacefully, literally in a matter of hours.

And I can assure you that in these divided countries this concept of civil war is not really applicable. If the Federal Republic of Germany sent 20 regiments of its forces into East Germany, I can be very sure that the countries of Eastern Europe would not look upon that as a family affair among Germans. Or if North Korea sent 20 regiments into South Korea, or the other way around, that that would not be looked upon by either side as a civil war.

So let us note that there is a Southern element in the Viet Cong, but note also that it is the aggression from the North which raises the problem of international security and it is that aggression which must be ended if peace is to come. And peace would come very quickly just as soon as that effort is stopped.

Then I have heard a good deal about this word “escalation.” Now, I would just call to your attention in passing that that seems to be a word reserved only for the United States and Allied forces. Very seldom do you see any reference to escalation by the other side. Before we put any ground combat units into South Viet-Nam and before we started the bombing of North Viet-Nam, major elements of the 325th North Vietnamese Regular Army were sent into South Viet-Nam. That wasn't escalation. That was infiltration, generally, in the way in which people talked about it.

Let me give you a good example of what I mean by this word. The North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, for several months now, have been mining Saigon harbor. Not too long ago they sank a British-flag ship in the Saigon River. I daresay you don't recall having read about that mining as an escalatory step on the part of the other side. But I'm sure you would agree with me that if we were to pick up their mines out of the Saigon River and simply take them home where they came from, to Haiphong, everybody would cry "Escalation! Escalation!"

Have you seen the use of Cambodia by Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces referred to as an escalation of the war by the other side? We haven't bombed the headquarters in Hanoi of General [Vo Nguyen] Giap. But the other side set up some mortars in the center of Saigon and tried to shell General [William C.] Westmoreland's headquarters not long ago.

So at least this is a word that ought to be used on both sides, if necessary, along with the firm realization that we are prepared this afternoon to start the process of deescalation just as soon as the other side is willing to join in.

No "Unconditional Surrender" Demand

There have been many, many dozens of proposals made by ourselves, by other governments, or by groups of governments, pointing toward deescalation on both sides as a means for reducing the violence and bringing this matter to the conference table.

Just recently, we have suggested that both sides pull 10 miles away from each side of the demilitarized zone.² But all of these measures have been turned down by Hanoi.

I have heard it said that we are asking the other side for unconditional surrender. Well, let's look at that just for a moment.

We are not asking North Viet-Nam to surrender an acre of ground nor a man. We are not asking them to change their regime. We

are not asking them to pay any reparations. Indeed, we have invited them to take part in the Southeast Asian development program, to which we would contribute a billion dollars. The only thing we are asking them to do is to stop their effort to seize Laos and South Viet-Nam by force. To call that "unconditional surrender" is, it seems to me, an abuse of the English language.

Time and time again, we've put proposals to them trying to probe for peace. But we have not asked to occupy their country or to impose upon them the kind of unconditional surrender that anyone associates with that term in World War II in connection with Germany or Japan.

We have had a good many people in this country who are inclined to speak for the Asians without letting the Asians speak for themselves. The free nations of Asia are deeply concerned that there be peace in Southeast Asia and that this small country—South Viet-Nam—have a chance to make its own choice about its future. And I am sure that there would be general panic throughout free Asia if the United States were to fail to meet its obligations in that situation.

Then, there are those who say, from time to time, that "Well, Viet-Nam is too bad, because it gets in the way of a *détente* with the Soviet Union." Well, it is true that Viet-Nam is a subject of tension between ourselves and the Soviet Union. So was Azerbaijan, the northern province of Iran, in 1946, when the Soviets tried to retain their troops there after the war. So were the Eastern provinces of Turkey in about the same year, when the Soviets demanded special concessions in those parts of Turkey. And Greece was a source of tension when the guerrillas were storming in from Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, with Soviet support, to try to seize Greece. And Berlin was a source of tension when it was put under blockade by the Soviet Union in '47 and '48. And, of course, Korea was a source of tension. And the Cuban missiles were a source of tension.

We do not move to peace and the relaxation of tension by giving away one small

² For a Department announcement of May 8, see BULLETIN of May 29, 1967, p. 825.

country after another—increasing the appetites of those on the other side and leaving them with the hope and expectation that by additional pressures they might get more and more.

The Soviet Union is a cochairman of the Geneva conferences on Southeast Asia. We should be very glad indeed to sit down with them in a conference, or in any other fashion, to talk about the full application of the agreements of 1954 and 1962. It need not be a source of tension between us.

We would like to see it settled. But we cannot contribute somebody else's country on the thesis that the other side would be happy about it were we to do so—if that is what is meant by *détente*, which it does not mean to me.

Reciprocity Required for Peaceful Solution

I have seen doubts cast upon the extent of our desire for a peaceful settlement in Southeast Asia. On occasion, I have seen signs, such as "Peace in Viet-Nam," when I go out to speak. I have wanted to go up to some of these people and ask them to let me help them carry the sign, because at President Johnson's request, I have carried that sign into every capital of the world over and over again. There are literally hundreds of conversations, dozens of offers, continuing contacts, probing for the possibility of a peaceful settlement.

But today the situation is, unhappily, relatively simple. North Viet-Nam is saying that we must make an unconditional and permanent commitment to stop the bombing at a time when they will make no military move on their own side in the direction of deescalation. And, in that circumstance, they might talk after a period of—well, we don't know; we have heard 3 weeks; we don't know what the exact time period would be.

Now, let me call your attention to what that really means. If we were to say that we would negotiate only if the other side stops all of its violence in South Viet-Nam while we continue to bomb North Viet-Nam, every-

one would say we're crazy. But when Hanoi makes the same proposition, the other way around, there are many people who would say, "Well, that's a reasonable proposition. Why don't you take it? Why don't you take it?"

We would like for someone to be able to tell us, either publicly or by a whisper behind the hand, that if we stop our part of the war somebody will stop the other part of the war; that if we stop the bombing those three or four divisions of North Vietnamese forces in the demilitarized zone will not attack those Marines who are 3 or 4 miles away. There has to be some elementary notion of reciprocity in this thing if the two sides are going to bring this matter to a peaceful solution.

Now, these are some of the points that I think have confused the situation. There are others. A pause in the bombing, for example, is not good enough for the other side. They call that an "ultimatum." So if some of you write me a letter urging us to pause in the bombing, I hope that you will understand you are not arguing with us, you are arguing with Hanoi. Because Hanoi says it must be permanent and unconditional and without reciprocal action on their side in the military arena to reduce or turn back their part of the war.

Well, now, this deals with matters far more important than South Viet-Nam, although that's important. It is more important than Southeast Asia, though that is of great importance. How we deal with a situation of this sort is central to the question of organizing a durable peace. Imagine, in mind's eye, a map of the world redrawn—with Iran and Turkey and Greece and Berlin and Korea and the Congo and the Philippines and Malaya and Southeast Asia all having been absorbed by the other side. Do you think that there could be any peace in the world under those circumstances? Of course, we would long since have been in a general conflagration.

The commitment of the United States to its 40 or more allies is a very important element

in the building of a durable peace. And if those who would be our adversaries should ever suppose that our commitments are not worth anything, then we shall see dangers we have not yet dreamed of.

My concluding remark is this: Don't sell your country short with respect to its motivations and its purposes and its hopes for the future of the world.

Lord Acton once said that "Power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely."

The American people came out of World War II with incredible power, and that has been multiplied many, many times. The effects of the use of the power at our disposal are almost literally beyond the comprehension of the mind of man. But that kind of power has not corrupted the American people.

The purposes of this nation are determined by those people, and those purposes are what you know them to be in your own homes, in your own communities, and on your farms and in your co-ops, and in your local institutions. They are: A little peace in the world. To live and let live. A chance for families to grow up in decency. None of that knock on the door of terror at midnight. A little organization of law. A chance to let the blessings of science and technology come to bear on the daily needs of ordinary men and women. These are the simple purposes of the American people, and they are shared by ordinary men and women throughout the world.

Now, that's what it's all about—to give those purposes of ordinary men and women a chance to operate in a world in which governments give them expression. Now, there will be some burdens, and it is tragic that they are the kinds of burdens present today in Southeast Asia, after all that has happened since 1945. There will be some burdens. But those who believe in freedom have had to bear burdens before. And when the United States puts its hands to some of these great tasks, then something happens. So keep up your spirit.

Kennedy Round Holds Promise of Free-World Economic Growth

The Sixth Round of Tariff Negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Kennedy Round) was concluded at Geneva on May 16. Following is a statement made by President Johnson at Washington that day, together with a statement made by William M. Roth, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, at a news conference at Washington on May 23.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

White House press release dated May 16

General agreement has been reached on all the major issues in the trade negotiations. The way is now clear for the conclusion of a final agreement covering billions of dollars' worth of trade among more than 50 countries.

Much hard work remains for the weeks ahead. The general understandings reached must be put into concrete form. Thousands of tariffs are involved. The final details must await the completion of this work—and final approval given by governments.

I hope that the final action will meet the standards underlying the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, namely:

- to stimulate economic growth at home;
- to strengthen economic relations with the free world; and
- to reinforce our strength and vitality in the cause of freedom.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR ROTH

There are limitations on the extent to which I can discuss the results we have achieved in Geneva. Although almost all major substantive issues in the Kennedy Round have been resolved, numerous details are yet to be worked out and the final documentation prepared. The formal multilateral agreement concluding the Sixth Round of Tariff Nego-

tiations will be signed June 30, 1967. Until that time, we cannot disclose specifics of concessions made or received by the United States.

Throughout these negotiations, public attitudes—like my own—have been conditioned by the tedium and frustrations of these extended negotiations and by the crisis atmosphere that has prevailed through the last several weeks of final bargaining. Because failure seemed at times imminent and a minimum result often seemed the most likely alternative, it has been difficult for all of us to recognize how very well we have come out.

In scope and magnitude the concessions to which all major trading nations are committed are far greater than ever previously negotiated. Balance among the participants has been achieved without serious unraveling of initial offers, although a major scaling down was made in such sectors as aluminum, steel, and textiles. For the first time in international commercial negotiations, valuable concessions have been exchanged on a wide variety of farm products. Important progress on reducing nontariff barriers has been made.

A summation of the most important Kennedy Round results would include the following:

—Tariff cuts of 50 percent on a very broad range of industrial goods and cuts in the 30 to 50 percent range on many more.

—An agreement on the treatment of chemical products that deals with the American Selling Price (ASP) issue in a manner that provides major chemical traders with mutually advantageous concessions in the main Kennedy Round agreement and a separate and balanced package that makes additional concessions available to the United States if it abandons the American Selling Price system.

—Nontariff barrier (NTB) liberalization including a very significant accord on anti-dumping procedures as well as European NTB modifications in the ASP package.

—Useful, if limited, progress on the com-

plex and sensitive problems in the steel, aluminum, pulp and paper, and textile sectors, including a 3-year extension of the Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrangement.

—Agricultural concessions to which the United States attaches great value because they create new trading opportunities for our farmers and because they support our contention that international negotiation on trade in farm products can accomplish something.

—A world grains arrangement guaranteeing higher minimum trading prices and establishing a program under which other nations will share with us in the vital but burdensome task of supplying food aid to the undernourished people in the less developed countries.

—Significant assistance to the less developed countries through permitting their participation in the negotiations without requiring reciprocal contributions from them, through special concessions on products of particular interest to them, and through the food aid provisions of the grains arrangement.

These are the elements that added together make the Kennedy Round a success.

It is difficult to predict the trade impact of this agreement. It should certainly stimulate trade expansion. However, the tariff cuts become effective in five annual reductions and many other economic factors affect levels of world trade; so quantitative projections are impossible.

Finally, this agreement contains the promise of significantly improved international economic relations, particularly by strengthening ties between the United States and the European Economic Community, and the United States and Canada, and by reducing the wall between the Community and the EFTA [European Free Trade Association] countries. The Kennedy Round agreement holds the promise of economic growth and increasing prosperity for all free-world nations. It has been a very gratifying and rewarding effort.

East-West Trade: An Avenue Toward World Peace

by Alexander B. Trowbridge
Acting Secretary of Commerce¹

Two years ago, soon after becoming a Government official, I made a short visit to Budapest to open the U.S. exhibition at the Budapest International Trade Fair.

While there, I had an opportunity to talk with some Hungarians. They lost no time in illustrating their type of self-directed humor which has gained some fame as one method of commentary on their form of government. Their jokes take the form of question and answer. "Why," they ask, hasn't Switzerland become a Socialist country?" They answer, "Because it is too small—it couldn't afford it!"

We here in the United States are not small. As we exert every effort to build a permanent peace, we are indeed too big to be able to afford automatic rejection of any potential avenue of peaceful engagement.

"Trade," Emerson wrote, "is a plant which grows wherever there is peace, as soon as there is peace, and as long as there is peace."

United States policy is to cultivate this plant of progress and mutual benefit in the soil of peaceful engagement between the East and the West.

The administration, as President Johnson has stated clearly and often, favors the equitable liberalization of two-way trade in peaceful goods with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We have taken a number of steps in this direction. We have sought congressional action to further open the way. And we have encouraged the commercial

activists of the private sector to move ahead in this area, as indeed they are now doing.

This broad approach is a central element in President Johnson's policy of building new bridges of "ideas, education, culture, trade, technical cooperation, and mutual understanding for world peace and prosperity."² Peaceful trade can form one of the strongest and most durable of these bridges between East and West.

And, particularly with the passage of time, this expanding trade can yield tangible, meaningful material benefits on both the Eastern and Western ends of the bridge of commerce.

In this context, distinguished gatherings such as this one can play a major part in catalyzing progress. I am therefore very glad to be with you today, not only in personal terms but within this far more important international framework.

The very fact that this meeting is being held emphasizes a most important mutual realization both in the East and the West: Evolving conditions and evolving relationships in our complex, changing world demand that we be more flexible and forward looking—both in the East and in the West—in order to serve the peaceful and progressive future of all of our peoples. We know that to be hidebound and hypnotized by the divisions and antagonisms of former years is to serve only the past.

Even as we meet here today, the first industry-organized, Government-approved United States trade mission is visiting

¹ Address made before the East-West Trade Conference at Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio, on May 4.

² BULLETIN of Dec. 21, 1964, p. 876.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. We hope that during its stay in Moscow—as well as in Warsaw, Bucharest, and Belgrade—the Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce mission firmly plants its steps on the road to commercial growth.

And in addition, a second agricultural and business trade mission from California is now preparing to leave for Moscow next week on a trip that will also take them to the cities of Kiev, Kishinev, Krasnodar, and Kharkov. Their Moscow visit will coincide, as well, with the opening of the 21-nation international exhibition there—INPROD-MASH-67—at which some 18 United States companies will be displaying their food processing, packaging, and distribution equipment.

Add to this the series of industry-sponsored or Government-organized U.S. trade groups that have operated in Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria in the past few years—plus participation in numerous trade fairs and exhibits in this period—plus the initial U.S. trade mission to Czechoslovakia scheduled for later in 1967—and I believe you see examples of what I generally call a “steady movement from the permissive to the promotional” approach by our country as we consider East-West trade.

Growth of U.S. Trade With Eastern Europe

There are, of course, numerous other dimensions as well.

One was the significant growth of United States trade last year with the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe to the highest level in the past two decades, with the single exception of 1964 when an unusually large volume of wheat shipments inflated the total by \$180 million.

The two-way trade total in 1966 came to something over \$375 million, compared to \$277 million in 1965—an increase on the order of 35 percent overall, with a slightly larger increase in U.S. exports to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe than in U.S. imports from these nations. From 1965 to 1966, the U.S. export total rose from \$140

million to \$198 million, while the imports went from \$138 million to \$178 million.

Alongside aggregate U.S. two-way trade in 1966 of about \$55 billion, this is not a very large total. Nor does it come to more than a small percentage of the volume of commerce that flows between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and other major trading nations.

For example, according to the preliminary figures that I have seen, trade between the Federal Republic of Germany and these nations last year exceeded \$2 billion, contrasted to the U.S. \$375 million. The figure for the United Kingdom was about \$1 billion; and Japan, France, and Italy all fell in the range between \$600 million and \$1 billion.

The United States total does take on added perspective, however, with consideration of two additional factors.

First, United States trade figures do not include exports by the overseas subsidiaries or licensees of U.S. firms. Rather, these are reflected in the trade statistics of host nations. Although solid figures are not available, such trade between European-based U.S. subsidiaries and licensees and the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe appears to be growing rapidly.

Second, trade statistics are limited to commodities. Not included is the sales price or other monetary value of technical data or services. Yet such trade constitutes an increasingly important share of exports eastward by U.S. industrial and engineering firms. An increasing number of such transactions have been licensed under the Export Control Act.

There have been cases where the likely return to the U.S. firm from the export of technical data to Eastern Europe was several million dollars, and others often are known to total in the hundreds of thousands. Cumulatively, this element of East-West trade could represent a sizable addition to the value of exports reported for only the shipment of goods.

Although it is a generalization, we can say that United States participation in East-West

trade is somewhat larger than suggested by the bare statistics, with a growth rate that is significant, and has a potential for future expansion across a diverse range of peaceful products.

Such expansion will not come automatically, however. Considerable effort to build and broaden and strengthen the bridges of peaceful trade are necessary at both ends of the span. And considerable effort will be necessary to increase and enhance the flow of commerce across the bridges.

Let us not underestimate the difficulties of expanding trade at the same time as we are strongly committed to resist Communist aggression in Viet-Nam. We have adopted what I describe as a "dual track" policy. With one hand we confront such aggression where it must be resisted, and our resolve is firm. But in a time where pressures increase on one front, we need pressure relief valves on other fronts. Hence the desire to keep open channels of communication—in education, travel, culture—as well as trade.

Trade Liberalization Measures

President Johnson, carrying forward the efforts of the past three administrations in today's evolving world environment, has acted in a number of ways to liberalize, to stimulate, and to support East-West trade as a part of our overall, long-term policy toward Eastern Europe and Soviet Russia.

—Export controls have been liberalized. More than 400 nonstrategic items were removed from the Commerce Department's Commodity Control List late last year. These products, which now can be shipped without a specific license, cover a broad range including consumer products, textiles, certain metal manufactures and machinery, various chemical materials and products, and a considerable number of manufactured articles. In addition, the process of sifting, refining, and updating this list is an ongoing one. We want to make sure that our control list is realistic and unburdened with excessive or ineffective coverage.

—Commercial credit facilities have been

extended. In his October 7th speech,³ President Johnson authorized the Export-Import Bank to provide normal commercial credit guarantees on industrial export transactions with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria—as provided in July 1964 for exports to Romania. Commercial credit facilities are an important concomitant to trade that must and does receive our continuing attention.

—At the same time, the President announced that he had authorized the Export-Import Bank to extend a loan of some \$50 million to the Istituto Mobiliare Italiano to finance U.S.-origin machine tools and other equipment for the automobile plant to be constructed by the Italian firm Fiat in the Soviet Union. Eximbank participation encourages U.S. businessmen to compete for these sales, assists Fiat in obtaining the finest equipment available, and tangibly expresses our support for projects designed to serve the consumer goods requirements of the people of the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. While any equipment sold for this plant will be carefully examined to ascertain that it has basically peaceful applications, we operate from the general approach that we would rather see traffic jams of automobiles than of tanks.

—The East-West Trade Relations Act proposed by President Johnson⁴ can provide the conditions under which steady expansion can come about by authorizing the President to use nondiscriminatory tariff treatment as a bargaining element in negotiating commercial agreements with these nations. The basis for this proposal was developed by a group of distinguished American business leaders led by Mr. Irwin Miller of the Cummins Engine Company.⁵

Realistic judgment does not suggest that such legislative authority in itself would set in motion an immediate flood of two-way

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, May 30, 1966, p. 843.

⁵ For text of the report of the Special Committee on U.S. Trade With East European Countries and the Soviet Union, see *ibid.*, p. 845.

trade. But the power to extend such tariff treatment, which currently applies only to Poland of the nations concerned, could certainly help to increase the flow of East-West commerce.

I think it is true that the implementation of nondiscriminatory tariff treatment has psychological and political overtones as well as commercial importance. But if we are serious about desiring to increase the levels of peaceful trade—which we are—then we should frankly face the impediments that exist and reduce them where possible. The Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe will have to export to earn exchange to buy our products. We should recognize their need to operate under competitive conditions equal to other countries selling in our market.

Of course, agreements reached under this act would have to be based on mutual benefits. In return for the benefits of most-favored-nation treatment, the United States may seek settlement of commercial disputes, arrangements for protection of industrial property, provisions for promotion of U.S. products, entry and travel of commercial representatives, arrangements for market access and fair treatment for our goods, and settlement of claims.

Taken as a whole, as I say, these administration measures represent a broad and energetic administration approach. They are designed to reduce conspicuous obstacles to United States two-way trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Increasingly, we hope, the name of the game will become competition in each other's markets consistent with normal commercial relationships that extend across other international borders around the globe, and despite the differences in economic organization that exist between our countries.

The challenges, then, will be clear at both ends of the bridge. We will have to become increasingly aware of each other's market requirements, of competitive practices and conditions, of consumer likes and dislikes. We will have to develop advertising, promotional, and distribution techniques suited to the

varying markets. We will have to be patient and flexible. Long and time-consuming exchanges are probably necessary in order to build the kind of mutual confidence we hope for as part of "peaceful engagement."

This problem is neither simple nor insoluble. To a considerable extent, the answer is likely to be fully realized only through experience. Such experience as has been gained by Western businessmen negotiating in the Soviet Union indicates the need for patient and skilled bargaining techniques. Experience of Soviet and Eastern European state trading agencies has probably shown them the need to adapt to the competitive demands of our free economies.

A number of approaches present themselves for the acquisition and broadening of such experience. Perhaps, to speed the orientation process, trade officials of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe will want to broaden commercial relationships with businessmen in this country, and particularly importers. Perhaps it will be desirable in some cases to contract certain business services in the United States, at least during this orientation process.

Or again, possibly businessmen and trade officials on both sides might think in terms of general approaches to broadening communications. Trade missions or factfinding tours, such as the Time Inc. and Business International group visits, are undoubtedly useful. The use of business publications stimulates exchange of business or marketing information. Obviously, there are a good many alternate routes that could be followed.

As well as increased sales in each other's markets, this process could also lead to further expansion in the future through exploration of new trading techniques or the reexamination of existing trade tools for application to trade between the United States and these nations. To cite one example, it may be that the technique of switch trading—which is proving useful elsewhere—could have an application. As I have suggested, however, time, effort, and experience must interact before such specifics emerge.

The essential aim in this current period is

to get the ball moving—to allow the dynamics of peaceful international commerce to come fully into play here as in other areas of world trade that have seen such surging expansion.

Primary Role of American Business

Past this point, I cannot stress strongly enough the primary role of American business in this whole process of growth. While the government-to-government aspects of world trade can be decisive, the fact remains that in our system there is no business without business.

From a great many indications, there is indeed at the present time impressive and growing interest in the American business community in the potentials of East-West trade, just as an increasingly favorable commercial climate appears to be emerging in the nations of this region.

International cooperative efforts under way today also hold promise of important progress in the vital field of industrial property, particularly in connection with patents.

This is a complex and difficult area where material accomplishment comes slowly, but the pluses to date are encouraging. They include:

—Soviet accession to the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, or Paris Convention, the leading international treaty in the patent and trademark field.

—Subsequent U.S.S.R. and Eastern European support for the U.S. proposal, in the Executive Committee of the Paris Convention, that set in motion current detailed consideration of an international patent cooperation treaty.

—Formation of a state trading agency known as Licensintorg in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade to handle foreign licensing matters including promotion of export-import arrangements in this field.

—And issuance of basic Soviet publications in this field in English translation.

These are positive steps in an area that bears particularly on trade in the new products and processes that are staples in U.S.

business overseas. In particular, they stimulate the confidence that is fundamental to increased commerce.

So, in summary, what we see today throughout this broad field of U.S. trade with the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe are new activity, new interest, new developments. The picture is one of movement, and the direction is toward expansion and liberalization. We are increasingly talking of contracts rather than contrasts.

One very significant part of the picture is the notably increased national interest and national debate on this vital subject across the United States—by business groups, in the newspapers, at meetings such as this one, and among the general public. I applaud this, both because healthy, vigorous national dialog—pro or con—is at the very heart of our democratic process and because the views expressed by the business community and others provide important contributions to the President and the Congress in their considerations and decisions affecting East-West trade. I hope that this discussion can separate the myths and the realities of the situation and that our policy directions are based on realistic appraisals rather than emotional reactions.

All that we have said notwithstanding, I believe it is abundantly clear that the numerous diverse influences on the future of East-West trade that we have been discussing remain subordinate in impact to one single central determinant. I am referring, of course, to the general climate of relations between the United States and these nations.

In this regard, President Johnson has expressed United States hopes and intentions in a brief, historically eloquent declaration: "Our objective," he has said, "is not to continue the cold war but to end it."⁶

In the years to come, mounting traffic across the bridge of commerce between our nations could be one very effective element in achieving this objective for our own people and all of the peoples of the world.

⁶ For President Johnson's state of the Union message of Jan. 10, see *ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1967, p. 158.

President Johnson Sets Goal of Substantial Export Increase

*Remarks by President Johnson*¹

Acting Secretary [of Commerce Alexander B.] Trowbridge, distinguished Members of Congress, welcome guests, ladies and gentlemen: It has been said that the road to trust between nations passes through the marketplace.

Today we gather in the Rose Garden at the White House to honor 10 American companies whose worldwide efforts are helping us to prove that observation.

By developing new markets for American products, these companies have served their country and they have served it well. You gentlemen have advanced your own profits—but you have also furthered the cause of international cooperation. That, I think, is “enlightened self-interest” at its best.

This ceremony takes place during World Trade Week, when we affirm some basic principles of economic and foreign policy.

We believe that it is very much in our interest and is necessary to expand world trade.

We know it speeds the pace of economic progress.

We know it promises a better life for all men.

We know that it sustains our greatest hope: the hope of all people that there can be peace in the world.

Last year, two-way trade between the United States and our free Asian partners amounted to \$12 billion. Certainly that is good business—and good international policy.

Today, we are doing our best to bury our ancient differences—to achieve better relations among all nations. Part of that search is our effort to build new bridges between the East and West.

The flow of peaceful commerce across

¹Made upon presentation of Presidential “E” Awards for export excellence to 10 manufacturers and business organizations on May 23 (White House press release).

those bridges could bring lasting benefits to both sides.

The barriers which fell at Geneva last week clear the way for great advances in mutual trade. The Kennedy Round will open a new era of world commerce.

We are entering that new era with an excellent record in export expansion. Last year our United States merchandise exports soared to more than \$29 billion. That is a 50 percent increase since 1960.

Unfortunately, we have not achieved the balance-of-payments gains we hoped this expansion would bring, because imports have grown much more rapidly than exports.

That is a problem that we just must overcome. The way to solve it is not to limit imports but rather to dedicate ourselves to doing our best to increase the things that we produce and to increase those exports.

To accomplish that end, I have consulted with the new—I trust soon to be—Senator [Warren G.] Magnuson and the rest of you Senators willing—Secretary of Commerce. Mr. Trowbridge and the Cabinet Committee on the Balance of Payments are going to undertake a far-ranging export study.

Specifically, I have asked him to give me his recommendations and his advice on these questions. I think the answer to most of the questions, like the answer to most questions, is “Yes”; but I want him to study it and report as quickly as possible. The first question is:

—Should we increase the U.S. trade and industrial exhibitions overseas?

—If we should, to what extent; and what do they think should flow from this effort?

—Should we open new trade centers abroad? Should we undertake more trade missions? Should we have more mobile trade fairs?

—Should we modify our export-financing system? How can we improve the financing to help sell the products that our industry and our labor make?

—How can we make the U.S. industry—and the people who make up and contribute to it—more export minded?

I would like, this morning, to thank Mr. John R. Kimberly and Mr. Thomas Miner for the reports from the National Export Expansion Council. They will be used by us. We anticipate that they will be very helpful and of great value.

This is somewhat of a meeting to thank all of you and to say to you that your country is grateful. You deserve the recognition you are receiving. I am glad to welcome you here and to present the flags that we will give you that will be symbols of your achievement.

One of the most ambitious goals we have for the months ahead is under the direction of this youngest Cabinet member—to try to fire up the producers of this Nation to attempt to make a substantial increase in our exports and to find new ways and means of bringing about that result.

We welcome the advice and suggestions of Members of Congress, and of industry and labor generally.

Thank you very much for coming here and being a part of this ceremony.

President Requests \$400 Million for Latin American Loans

White House Announcement

White House press release dated May 17

President Johnson on May 17 submitted to Congress a 1968 budget amendment for \$400 million, most of it for self-help loans to Latin America to implement the Declaration of American Presidents at the Punta del Este conference last month.¹

Of the proposed \$400 million, \$300 million would be for the U.S. contribution to the Inter-American Development Bank's Fund

¹ For text of the Declaration signed at Punta del Este, Uruguay, on Apr. 14, see BULLETIN of May 8, 1967, p. 712.

for Special Operations and \$100 million for additional Alliance for Progress loans and grants.

The proposed \$300 million for the Inter-American Development Bank is for the first installment of the U.S. share of a \$1.2 billion increase in the resources of the Fund for Special Operations recommended by the Bank's Board of Governors last month. The Fund provides long-term, low-interest loans for economic and social development projects in support of the objectives of the Alliance for Progress. The increase voted by the Board of Governors will permit the Bank to continue the operations of the Fund through 1971.

To further the objectives agreed to at Punta del Este, the Inter-American Development Bank will use the expanded resources of the Fund to finance more agricultural and educational projects in Latin America, as well as to expand its financing of multinational projects, such as road and telecommunications networks.

The \$100 million request for the Alliance for Progress brings the total proposed for the Alliance in fiscal year 1968 to \$643 million.

Ninety million dollars of the new funds would be in the form of loans to finance priority projects in education and agriculture, the remaining \$10 million for grants to help support multinational projects in science and technology.

Loans in support of agricultural development will assist the Alliance countries to diversify crop production, reducing their dependence on surplus commodities such as coffee and sugar; also to help finance agricultural credit, irrigation projects, and farm-to-market roads.

Loans in the educational sector will supplement the self-help efforts of the Alliance countries to step up vocational and technical training and boost the production of textbooks and other educational materials.

United States Urges Dialog Regarding South West Africa

Following are statements made in the fifth special session of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative Arthur J. Goldberg on April 26 and May 19, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Assembly on May 19.

STATEMENT OF APRIL 26

U.S. delegation press release 49

The General Assembly is now convened in special session to give further consideration to the question of South West Africa. We meet in accordance with the terms of Resolution 2145, adopted with virtual unanimity last October 27.¹ It is my delegation's hope that, despite the difficulty of this matter and the known differences of view concerning it, we can again display the same unity of decision that we achieved last October; for it is from such a united stand, as well as from the intrinsic soundness of our decisions, that our Assembly resolutions derive their true force.

Since Resolution 2145 contains the basic agreed position of the United Nations on this question, it may be well to recall the essential steps we took in adopting that resolution:

—We decided that, since South Africa had failed to fulfill its obligations in respect of the mandated Territory of South West Africa and had in fact disavowed the mandate, the mandate was terminated, that apart from the mandate South Africa has no other right to administer the territory, and that South West Africa now comes under the

direct responsibility of the United Nations.

—We reaffirmed the right of the people of South West Africa to self-determination, freedom, and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

—We reaffirmed that South West Africa, until it attains independence, has an international status and called upon the South African Government to refrain and desist from any action which would tend to alter that status. In this regard, as the United States has already said, implementation of the recent statement by the South African Government concerning Ovamboland would fall into this category.

—We created the *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa to recommend practical means by which the responsibility of the United Nations in this matter is to be discharged.

—And we agreed to meet in special session no later than April to receive the Committee's report.

The United States today categorically reaffirms its support of this resolution and all that we have said in this Assembly in support of it.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee, among its 14 members, contained a fair and representative cross section of the entire membership of the United Nations. The United States served as a member. I should like to express our appreciation to those who participated in its work, particularly to Ambassador [Max] Jakobson of Finland, its wise and impartial Chairman; its Vice Chairman, Ambassador [José] Piñera of Chile; its rapporteur, Mr. [Kifle] Wodajo of Ethiopia; and indeed to all the members who, by their serious

¹For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 5, 1966, p. 870.

approach and by their willingness to consider all suggestions, helped the Committee in its difficult assignment. I also wish to acknowledge the indispensable support of the Secretariat, which performed with its customary efficiency.

The Committee's report is now before us.² There have been expressions of regret that the Committee was not able to unite on a single recommendation concerning the "practical means" to be adopted. Such unanimity would have been most desirable. Nevertheless, the Committee has performed a most useful and necessary function in presenting to the General Assembly the various alternative proposals which its report contains.

I agree entirely with our Chairman, Ambassador Jakobson, that it would serve no good purpose to gloss over the differences among these proposals. It will be a test of our statesmanship in this Assembly to find ways to maintain the vital unity of action that we achieved in our original resolution.

The United States, which joined in one of these three proposals in the Committee, fully understands and respects the motives of the sponsors of the other proposals. But I wish to state the reasons which impelled my country to join Italy and Canada in the proposal which we submitted together.³

It is important that all of us, whatever our differences as revealed in these various proposals, should remember what it is that unites us. We are united in our common purpose to bring self-determination, freedom, and independence to the people of South West Africa in accordance with the charter and in our common dedication to the terms of the Resolution 2145. That resolution is our anchor.

The greatest disservice to that resolution, and to its effective implementation, would be that "practical means by which South West Africa and in the world that the U.N. is fundamentally divided on how these principles are to be achieved. The issue is not among ourselves but between us and South Africa. Our objective is not to score debating

points against each other; it is to work together in the spirit of Resolution 2145 in order to find, in the words of that resolution, "practical means by which South West Africa should be administered, so as to enable the people of the Territory to exercise the right of self-determination and to achieve independence."

Now, some may question whether it is possible for the Assembly to unite on an effective course of action. I see no reason to doubt that we can do so. Indeed, we must do so, for unless we are substantially united our action cannot be effective. In our debate last October I said—and this can be said with equal relevance now—that to be effective on this issue we need more than world opinion voiced by words in a resolution; we need the cooperation of all manifested in concrete action.⁴

Last October we achieved such concrete action. Let no one underestimate the historic consequence of what we decided. After 20 years of wrestling with this problem of South West Africa—after many years of proceedings before the International Court of Justice—the United Nations, through Resolution 2145, took the decisive action of declaring South Africa's mandate terminated by its own default. We further decided that South West Africa now comes under the direct responsibility of the United Nations. These actions were unprecedented in the history of this organization—just as the problem which gave rise to them was unprecedented.

When the General Assembly took that action, the United States strongly supported it; and we still do. We do not in any way retreat from that support. On the contrary, we are prepared to move forward in keeping with the commitment which I made in my statement of last October 12, proposing "steps which can be immediately and practically implemented, and which lie within the capacity of this organization . . . to provide the community of nations promptly with a considered blueprint for united and peace-

² U.N. doc. A/6640.

³ U.N. doc. A/AC.129/L.6.

⁴ For a statement by Ambassador Goldberg on Oct. 12, 1966, see BULLETIN of Oct. 31, 1966, p. 690.

ful action for the benefit of the people of South West Africa.”

Indeed, Mr. President, it is precisely such steps that the United States has sought to develop by joining with Canada and Italy in the three-power proposal.

Let me briefly sum up the terms of this proposal:

1. It reaffirms the decisions of Resolution 2145.

2. It recommends that the General Assembly in this special session appoint a special representative for South West Africa, on the nomination of the Secretary-General.

3. It recommends that the special session also appoint a United Nations Council for South West Africa made up of three or more members to be designated by yourself, Mr. President, with which the Special Representative will cooperate and to which he will report.

4. It sets forth a concrete mandate for the Special Representative. He is to survey the situation, to establish all necessary contacts, and to consult with all representative elements in the territory, looking toward the establishment as soon as possible of a nucleus of self-government in South West Africa. He is also to recommend the nature and amount of external assistance for the administration of the territory and to determine the necessary conditions that will enable the people of that territory to achieve self-determination and independence.

5. Finally, it calls for a report by the Special Representative to the 22d regular session of the General Assembly in September on the progress made and on his recommendations for the further implementation of the Assembly's decisions.

Mr. President, these steps which we propose are practical and concrete. In offering them we propose not to delay nor to reconsider our commitment but to carry it forward. We propose not to step backward from Resolution 2145 but to find ways within the capacity of the United Nations to put it into practical effect. Indeed, certain provisions of

these joint proposals of Italy, Canada, and the United States parallel to a major degree provisions of the other two proposals tabled in the Committee.

It is, of course, also a fact that the other two proposals contemplate additional steps not embraced in ours. It is these additional steps that involve a real difference of view which must be candidly faced. Its essence, in our view, is simply this: We are convinced that the United Nations should, in present circumstances, continue to seek peaceful means to resolve this important problem which has been a source of international tension for decades; the other proposals, however, explicitly or implicitly look toward an immediate or early confrontation with South Africa.

Let me restate briefly why we believe our approach is to be preferred.

First, as I have already suggested, in all realism it would be too much to hope that this problem, which has been developing for nearly half a century and with which the United Nations itself has wrestled for 20 years, could be resolved in the few months since the General Assembly first took decisive action with respect to it.

Second, although the General Assembly has adopted a far-reaching policy, we have not yet—either individually or collectively—entered into any dialog with South Africa in an effort to implement that policy. Although we have declared South Africa's rights under the mandate in the territory to be terminated, it is still a fact—of which our Chairman, Ambassador Jakobson, correctly reminded us in his statement—that South Africa “has possession of the territory.”

In these circumstances, the members of the United Nations would clearly be remiss if we did not seek through diplomatic dialog a peaceful solution. I shall frankly add that I do not know—nobody can know—whether such a dialog would be fruitful. But I do know that public opinion in my country, and indeed in many parts of the world, would not understand a policy which seems

ready to resort to immediate coercion rather than explore the possibilities of peaceful progress.

Third, the world is already suffering from too many confrontations. It would be a strange irony if the United Nations—whose highest aim is to resolve disputes and achieve justice by peaceful means and to harmonize the actions of nations—should itself fail to pursue such means and instead add still another confrontation to a list already too long. What is needed now is not confrontation but consultation. We have no cause to imitate the conqueror Alexander, who when challenged to solve the puzzle of the Gordian knot took a sword and cut it through. In this day and age the U.N. should not be in a hurry to use the sword; rather we must apply ourselves to the task of untying the knot.

There is no reason whatever to think that the proposed dialog or consultation would go against the U.N.'s purpose. On the contrary, the aim of any such dialog would be to achieve genuine self-determination, freedom, and independence for the people of South West Africa in accordance with the charter—and their rapid advancement.

To consult for this purpose is not to capitulate; it is to explore the ground over which we must move. In this, as in every situation of conflict, the famous admonition of President Kennedy remains true: "Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate."⁵

Fourth, when we urge that progress be made with all reasonable speed, we do not thereby suggest or in any way condone indefinite delay. What we do suggest is that the next step we must take is one which employs the arts of diplomacy—the "peaceful means" enjoined upon us by the charter. One of our reservations about the other proposals is that they appear either to shun a dialog or to suggest in advance that any dialog would end in failure. Our proposal does not assume either success or failure; we do maintain, however, that no one can know until it has

been tried. We have a responsibility to history to try this next step, and to try it with all reasonable means at our disposal.

Fifth, we do not agree with the view expressed in this debate which would simply have the United Nations arbitrarily declare the Territory of South West Africa to be independent here and now, with no regard for the means by which that pretended independence is to be achieved or for the welfare of the people involved. Such a course would be an irresponsible step backward from our commitment under Resolution 2145. We have declared South West Africa to be a responsibility of the United Nations, and that responsibility should not be disowned. To retreat from that commitment would be a betrayal of the interests of South West Africa and would bring the United Nations into disrepute before the world.

For all these reasons, Mr. President, the United States believes that the proposal which we have joined in supporting is a sound approach. We do not suggest that in putting forward this proposal we and our Italian and Canadian colleagues have spoken the last word on the subject—nor that the General Assembly, if it adopts this proposal, will have spoken the last word.

But now is not a time for the last word to be spoken. Let the United Nations speak the next word—and let it speak with a united voice. It is of the utmost importance that we continue to manifest our common determination to proceed with all the unanimity and effectiveness we can muster to achieve the objectives of Resolution 2145.

In this effort the United States will not for a moment forget the basic human issue involved. We will continue to be guided by the view expressed by President Johnson last May:⁶

... that domination of one race by another leads to waste and injustice. . . . A nation in the 20th century cannot expect to achieve order and sustain growth unless it moves—not just steadily but rapidly—in the direction of full political rights for all its peoples.

⁵ For President Kennedy's inaugural address, see *ibid.*, Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.

⁶ *Ibid.*, June 13, 1966, p. 914.

If this human principle is to be realized against the obstacles that confront us, we cannot always hope for immediate success. We must know how to persist and to tackle resolutely the problems that face us, every step of the way.

A celebrated philosopher, Salvador de Madariaga, once uttered a wise saying about the most effective form of human action, and I shall conclude with his words:

Our eyes must be idealistic and our feet realistic. We must walk in the right direction but we must walk step by step. Our tasks are to define what is desirable; to define what is possible at any time within the scope of what is desirable; and to carry out what is possible in the spirit of what is desirable.

Let the U.N. proceed to discharge its duty to South West Africa in that spirit—expeditiously, faithfully, peacefully, in the greatest unanimity, and step by step—until our goal is attained.

STATEMENT OF MAY 19

U.S. delegation press release 63

We of the United States were heartened last October when the Assembly achieved, in the adoption of Resolution 2145 by the overwhelming vote of 114 to 2, an auspicious unity of action on this most difficult issue. In spite of wide differences of approach, we managed to unite in a historic decision that South Africa had forfeited its right to administer South West Africa; that South Africa's mandate over the territory was at an end; that the territory was now under the direct responsibility of the United Nations; and that an *Ad Hoc* Committee should recommend practical means by which the Territory should be administered so as to enable its people to exercise their right to self-determination and to achieve independence.

My country served on that *Ad Hoc* Committee. Throughout its meetings, and again in this special session of the Assembly, we labored long and hard with all schools of thought in search of a common approach.

Our hope was to achieve agreement on a resolution which would carry Resolution 2145 a further step forward—perhaps not as big a step as we might wish, but at all events a step which would be taken with the unanimity necessary to make it solid and effective.

Now, for the time being, we must candidly accept the fact that our efforts have not succeeded. The draft resolution A/L.516 just voted, for reasons which we made clear to the sponsors from the outset, could not be supported by my Government.

I have no desire whatever to engage in long explanations, and certainly not in recriminations. I entirely respect the motives of those who have put forward the draft resolution. And I wish to express appreciation for the attentive consideration which was given to the views of my delegation during our common attempts to reconcile our different approaches.

Lest there be any misunderstanding—and because the issue is still a long way from being resolved—I wish to restate at this time as succinctly as possible my country's position concerning South West Africa.

1. We continue our full support of Resolution 2145. This historic resolution stands as the virtually unanimous decision of the United Nations on this issue.

2. We shall continue to support the United Nations in its search for practical means by which its responsibility with respect to South West Africa, pursuant to Resolution 2145, can be discharged.

3. We believe further progress in this matter will inevitably require a good-faith effort to advance the purposes of Resolution 2145 through a dialog with the Government of South Africa, which still remains in physical control of the territory.

Fellow delegates, despite our differences, let us not forget how wide our agreement has been, and still remains, on this important issue. We are agreed in our abhorrence of *apartheid* and racism. We are agreed in our

determination to see the people of South West Africa enjoy their full rights under the charter. And we are agreed in our affirmation of the responsibilities of the United Nations in this regard.

In Resolution 2145, not quite 7 months ago, we closed the door on a chapter of history nearly 50 years in duration—the chapter of South Africa's rights in South West Africa under the mandate. The next chapter is still being written. Although we were unable to support today's resolution, we nevertheless pledge that the United States, faithful to its vote in support of Resolution 2145, will do whatever it can, by all appropriate and peaceful means, to implement the terms and purposes of that resolution.

My country's tradition concerning universal freedom is such that wherever any people come forward to claim it as their equal birthright, the United States must and will support them. We shall therefore faithfully support the people of South West Africa in their just aspirations by every effective peaceful means until those aspirations have been attained.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ⁷

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee for South West Africa,

Reaffirming its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Reaffirming its resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, by which it terminated the Mandate conferred upon His Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South Africa and decided that South Africa had no other right to administer the Territory of South West Africa,

Having assumed direct responsibility for the Territory of South West Africa in accordance with resolution 2145 (XXI),

Recognizing that it has thereupon become in-

⁷ U.N. doc. A/RES/2248 (S-V) (A/L.516/Rev. 1); adopted by the Assembly on May 19 by a vote of 85 to 2, with 30 abstentions (U.S.).

cumbent upon the United Nations to give effect to its obligations by taking practical steps to transfer power to the people of South West Africa,

I

Reaffirms the territorial integrity of South West Africa and the inalienable right of its people to freedom and independence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and all other resolutions concerning South West Africa;

II

1. *Decides* to establish a United Nations Council for South West Africa (hereinafter referred to as the Council) comprising eleven Member States to be elected during the present session and to entrust to it the following powers and functions, to be discharged in the Territory:

(a) To administer South West Africa until independence, with the maximum possible participation of the people of the Territory;

(b) To promulgate such laws, decrees and administrative regulations as are necessary for the administration of the Territory until a legislative assembly is established following elections conducted on the basis of universal adult suffrage;

(c) To take as an immediate task all the necessary measures, in consultation with the people of the Territory, for the establishment of a constituent assembly to draw up a constitution on the basis of which elections will be held for the establishment of a legislative assembly and a responsible government;

(d) To take all the necessary measures for the maintenance of law and order in the Territory;

(e) To transfer all powers to the people of the Territory upon the declaration of independence;

2. *Decides* that in the exercise of its powers and in the discharge of its functions the Council shall be responsible to the General Assembly;

3. *Decides* that the Council shall entrust such executive and administrative tasks as it deems necessary to a United Nations Commissioner for South West Africa (hereinafter referred to as the Commissioner), who shall be appointed during the present session by the General Assembly on the nomination of the Secretary-General;

4. *Decides* that in the performance of his tasks the Commissioner shall be responsible to the Council;

III

1. *Decides* that:

(a) The administration of South West Africa under the United Nations shall be financed from the revenues collected in the Territory;

(b) Expenses directly related to the operation of the Council and the Office of the Commissioner—the travel and subsistence expenses of members of

the Council, the remuneration of the Commissioner and his staff and the cost of ancillary facilities—shall be met from the regular budget of the United Nations;

2. *Requests* the specialized agencies and the appropriate organs of the United Nations to render to South West Africa technical and financial assistance through a co-ordinated emergency programme to meet the exigencies of the situation;

IV

1. *Decides* that the Council shall be based in South West Africa;

2. *Requests* the Council to enter immediately into contact with the authorities of South Africa in order to lay down procedures, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) and the present resolution, for the transfer of the administration of the Territory with the least possible upheaval;

3. *Further requests* the Council to proceed to South West Africa with a view to:

(a) Taking over the administration of the Territory;

(b) Ensuring the withdrawal of South African police and military forces;

(c) Ensuring the withdrawal of South African personnel and their replacement by personnel operating under the authority of the Council;

(d) Ensuring that in the utilization and recruitment of personnel preference be given to the indigenous people;

4. *Calls upon* the Government of South Africa to comply without delay with the terms of resolution 2145 (XXI) and the present resolution and to facilitate the transfer of the administration of the Territory of South West Africa to the Council;

5. *Requests* the Security Council to take all appropriate measures to enable the United Nations Council for South West Africa to discharge the functions and responsibilities entrusted to it by the General Assembly;

6. *Requests* all States to extend their wholehearted co-operation and to render assistance to the Council in the implementation of its task;

V

Requests the Council to report to the General Assembly at intervals not exceeding three months on its administration of the Territory, and to submit a special report to the Assembly at its twenty-second session concerning the implementation of the present resolution;

VI

Decides that South West Africa shall become independent on a date to be fixed in accordance with the wishes of the people and that the Council shall do all in its power to enable independence to be attained by June 1968.

United States Urges Agreement on Peacekeeping Question

*Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

The problem of United Nations peacekeeping operations has come before the General Assembly at the very moment when international developments have brought this subject to the forefront of world attention and concern. We would have to have our heads buried in the sand not to be aware of the connection between the question which we are debating here and the concrete and immediate realities in the Middle East.

The United States does not wish to say anything here today which would interfere with the Secretary-General's efforts to pacify the situation in the Middle East. The most that any of us can constructively do at this moment is to wish him Godspeed and every success in the critical mission on which he is about to embark.

In this situation, and in light of the fact that we are dealing with a procedural resolution, I do not believe it would contribute to progress for me to make an extensive statement on the substance of this question. The Special Committee of 33 on Peacekeeping Operations has proposed a resolution under which the General Assembly would ask the Special Committee to continue its work and report to the 22d General Assembly in the fall.² Although we would have preferred substantive action on this question at the 21st session, or indeed at this special session, we nevertheless stated in the Committee of 33 that we would acquiesce in this resolution. I pledge the best efforts of my Government in the Committee's efforts to reach agreement.

Mr. President, peacekeeping lies at the

¹ Made in the fifth special session of the U.N. General Assembly on May 22 (U.S. delegation press release 65).

² A/RES/2249 (S-V); adopted by the Assembly on May 23 by a vote of 90 (U.S.) to 1, with 11 abstentions.

very heart of the responsibilities of the United Nations under the charter. Whatever the import of the events of recent days, it is necessary to remember that we are dealing here with a problem which is not transitory. It will be with us for many years and perhaps generations to come. We heartily agree with the Secretary-General, in the concluding passage of his report to this Assembly last Thursday,³ when he appealed to the members to "intensify their efforts both for the maintenance of peace in this particular situation and for the improvement of the capacity of the organization to maintain peace." It is in the spirit of that appeal that I make this statement.

At the very outset I should like to take this occasion to pay tribute to Ambassador [Francisco] Cuevas Cancino of Mexico and Ambassador [Max] Jakobson of Finland for their commendable performance as chairmen of the two committees whose reports are before us.⁴ This appreciation extends also to the able bureaus and secretariats serving these committees.

The position of the United States on the principles involved in U.N. peacekeeping was set forth by me only 2 months ago in the Committee of 33.⁵

Broadly speaking, they are as follows:

—The capacity of the U.N. to deploy peacekeeping forces promptly in an emergency must be preserved.

—To support this capacity, viable and equitable financing arrangements must be agreed upon and faithfully implemented.

—Any U.N. peacekeeping operation, like any other complex operation, requires a single executive. That executive should be the Secretary-General. He should, of course, operate within the scope of his authority, remaining fully responsible to the authorizing body and consulting with members on his conduct of peacekeeping operations.

³ U.N. doc. A/6669.

⁴ U.N. doc. A/6637, Report of the Special Political Committee; U.N. doc. A/6654, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

⁵ For Ambassador Goldberg's statement of Mar. 22, see BULLETIN of Apr. 17, 1967, p. 636.

—No single country, however powerful, can or should be permitted to frustrate by the veto a peacekeeping operation of the United Nations properly initiated by an appropriate organ of the U.N.

Mr. President, my Government has not changed its belief that these principles are sound and that they express the true meaning of the charter. Indeed, the history of this question shows that this belief is shared by the vast majority of members. We are aware, of course, that some other members differ with us in varying degrees. But it is certainly not my intention today to prolong the constitutional debate. For we have never regarded this question in any of its aspects—legal, financial, or otherwise—as an issue in the so-called cold war. We have never looked upon it as a confrontation between the major powers. On the contrary, we believe the major powers, regardless of ideology, share a basic interest in the promotion of peace and security among all nations, large and small. And we believe the United Nations peacekeeping activities are vitally important to that end.

I do not hesitate to emphasize the interest of the great powers in this matter. The view is sometimes stated that the smaller powers, because they are more vulnerable, are the real beneficiaries of United Nations peacekeeping, whereas the great powers "can take care of themselves." My country does not accept this view. Nobody questions the vital interest of the smaller powers in this activity; indeed, they have manifested that interest time and time again by their votes and their contributions. But neither should anybody suppose that the United Nations peacekeeping operations do not serve the basic interests of the great powers also.

We live in a fast-changing and fast-shrinking world in which obsolete habits of thought can be suicidal. Great powers should not alone be responsible for policing trouble spots, settling quarrels, and protecting weaker nations. But if the United Nations cannot perform this task, what is the alternative? For all members, great and small alike, have obligations to uphold the law of

the charter and to help each other to maintain their integrity and independence. It is far better for nations to discharge these obligations collectively rather than individually. That is the root of the whole matter of peacekeeping.

Surely the era is long past when the world community could afford to ignore, or be indifferent to, wars between small powers; for bitter experience has taught us how infectious they can be. All such conflicts carry within them the danger of confrontations into which the great powers themselves could be drawn and whose destruction would rain impartially on great and small alike.

My country and the other major powers therefore share with all countries a vital interest in maintaining and fostering an impartial international instrument of stability—an instrument which, when danger and discord arise as they inevitably must, can intervene not for power but for peace. This interest has nothing to do with ideology. It has everything to do with human survival.

The impartial international instrument we need already exists. It is the United Nations. Its capacity to serve effectively has been demonstrated in some of the most dangerous situations of our time. In those instances where it has succeeded, it has repaid its cost a thousandfold. In those instances in which it fails, our response should not be despair or repudiation but a resolve to strengthen its effectiveness and to make it succeed. As Adlai Stevenson warned, "Let none of us mock its weakness, for when we do we are mocking ourselves."

In this connection much has been said in favor of fidelity to the limitations laid down in the charter. My country yields to none in this regard—although there are differences as to what the limitations are. But the charter does not consist exclusively of limitations. It also confers positive responsibilities to act for peace. These responsibilities rest on the organs of the United Nations; they also rest on us, the member states. Each member, in a manner commensurate with its power, must bear those responsibilities.

In this spirit, Mr. President, we of the

United States pledge anew our desire to see the peacekeeping question resolved and our readiness to work with all others to this end. We wish to respond flexibly to any initiative whose purpose is to assure the future of the United Nations as a keeper of the peace—to assure that every part of its peacemaking and peacekeeping machinery is kept in working order and improved. Progress to this end, as we have pointed out before, cannot be made by unrequited concessions from one side. But where a spirit of accommodation is apparent, my Government will respond.

And we shall display the same responsive and responsible attitude also on the collateral question of the United Nations financial deficit. As all members know, the United States over the years has been very forthcoming on this question. Through the years we have made large voluntary contributions to U.N. peacekeeping, over and above our assessed share. We also took a major initiative 2 years ago, which was reflected in the consensus of the General Assembly on September 1, 1965, in order to break the deadlock over article 19.

I am content to rest on the record of our performance and leave it to the judgment of the members whether others have fulfilled their obligations under the consensus.

Mr. President, we look forward to the day, which we trust is not far distant, when all members will see their interests in the same light and will support a vigorous United Nations peacekeeping role as readily as fellow townsmen, whatever their differences, support an efficient police force. That day, regrettably, is not yet. But we must not cease to work for its arrival.

Some will argue that it is unrealistic, in view of disappointments, to continue to believe in a world of law and order in which the responsibility for keeping the peace is shared collectively. I do not suggest that the road toward such an international order is easy or assured of success. But I do suggest that we are even less assured of success if we continued to rely on the so-called *Realpolitik* which has been the tradition of re-

cent centuries. There is nothing less realistic than *Realpolitik*. It has brought tragic wars, the loss of many millions of lives, and no real security for either the strong or the weak.

Surely in this great world organization, where the tremors of international upheaval from every quarter of the globe are recorded every day, it is not too soon for all members, great and small, to measure their response to the dangers that surround us. This is no time to make ingenious calculations of the least that we can be required to do by the letter of the charter. It is rather a time for us to see how much we can do, under the charter, to advance the purposes of peace. Such is our common unfinished task, for the completion of which the United States pledges its unceasing cooperation.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Ambassador Brown To Maintain Liaison With U.S. Governors

President Johnson on May 15 announced that Winthrop G. Brown, who has been Ambassador to Korea since July 1964, would become Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, with responsibility for liaison with the Governors of the various States. Following is a Department announcement concerning the assignment.

Press release 110 dated May 16

The purpose of Ambassador Brown's assignment is to achieve closer and more effective relationships with the Governors, responsive to their needs and interests in the realm of foreign affairs, through the liaison office recently established in Washington by the National Governors' Conference and through direct contacts in State capitals. Ambassador Brown will return to Washington in mid-June.

This new undertaking is in step with the

Department's efforts, especially in recent years, to contribute toward a greater community of understanding between the people of the United States and the officials who represent them in the conduct of our foreign relations. In large measure, this has also been the main focus of a number of ongoing programs arranged by the Department.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol relating to certain amendments to the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591). Done at Montreal June 14, 1954. Entered into force December 12, 1956. TIAS 3756.

Ratification deposited: Singapore, January 4, 1967.

Protocol relating to amendment of article 50(a) of the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591). Done at Montreal June 21, 1961. Entered into force July 17, 1962. TIAS 5170.

Ratification deposited: Singapore, January 4, 1967.

Cultural Relations

Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Concluded at London November 16, 1945. Entered into force November 4, 1946. TIAS 1580.

Signature and acceptance: Guyana, March 21, 1967.

Finance

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.

Ratification deposited: Morocco, May 11, 1967.

Narcotic Drugs

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December 13, 1964.¹

Accessions deposited: Turkey, May 23, 1967; United States, May 25, 1967.

Ratified by the President: May 15, 1967.

Property

Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, as revised, for the protection of industrial property. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered into force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931.

Notification of accession: Ireland, May 9, 1967.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

Space

Treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. Opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow January 27, 1967.²

Ratification deposited: Czechoslovakia, May 22, 1967.

Signature: Burma, May 22, 1967.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention, with annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. Entered into force January 1, 1967.¹

Ratifications deposited: Korea, March 14, 1967; Tunisia, Uganda, April 1, 1967.

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 1959) (TIAS 4893) with annexes and additional protocol. Done at Geneva November 8, 1963. Entered into force January 1, 1965. TIAS 5603. *Notification of approval:* Malaysia, March 15, 1967.

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 1959) (TIAS 4893, 5603) to put into effect a revised frequency allotment plan for the aeronautical mobile (R) service and related information, with annexes. Done at Geneva April 29, 1966.²

Notifications of approval: Argentina, April 4, 1967; Luxembourg, March 14, 1967; Madagascar, March 8, 1967; Malaysia, March 11, 1967.

United Nations

Amendment to Article 109 of the Charter of the United Nations. Adopted by the General Assembly at United Nations Headquarters, New York, December 20, 1965.²

Ratified by the President: May 15, 1967.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

BILATERAL

Australia

Agreement amending the agreement of August 28, 1964 (TIAS 5643), for the financing of certain educational and cultural exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra May 12, 1967. Entered into force May 12, 1967.

Canada

Agreement relating to Canada Pension Plan. Signed at Ottawa May 5, 1967. Entered into force May 5, 1967.

Japan

Agreements concerning certain fisheries off the coast of the United States with agreed minutes. Effected by exchanges of notes at Tokyo May 9, 1967. Entered into force May 9, 1967.

New Zealand

Agreement extending the agreement of June 8, 1962 (TIAS 5075), relating to the loan of a vessel to New Zealand. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington December 15, 1966, and May 5, 1967. Entered into force May 5, 1967.

Pakistan

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities under Title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454, as amended; 7 U.S.C. 1691-1736D), with annex. Signed at Islamabad May 11, 1967. Entered into force May 11, 1967.

Trinidad and Tobago

Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio operators of either country to operate their stations in the other country. Effected by exchange of notes at Port of Spain January 14 and March 16, 1967. Entered into force March 16, 1967.

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of

the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Department and Foreign Service. Ambassador Brown To Maintain Liaison With U.S. Governors 897

Economic Affairs

East-West Trade: An Avenue Toward World Peace (Trowbridge) 881

Kennedy Round Holds Promise of Free-World Economic Growth (Johnson, Roth) 879

Our Foreign Policy Commitments To Assure a Peaceful Future (Rusk) 874

President Johnson Sets Goal of Substantial Export Increase (Johnson) 886

Europe. East-West Trade: An Avenue Toward World Peace (Trowbridge) 881

Foreign Aid. President Requests \$400 Million for Latin American Loans 887

Latin America. President Requests \$400 Million for Latin American Loans 887

Near East. The United States Calls for Restraint in the Near East (Johnson, Goldberg) 870

Presidential Documents

Kennedy Round Holds Promise of Free-World Economic Growth 879

Prayer for Peace, Memorial Day, 1967 873

President Johnson Sets Goal of Substantial Export Increase 886

The United States Calls for Restraint in the Near East 870

South Africa. United States Urges Dialog Regarding South West Africa (Goldberg, text of resolution) 888

South West Africa. United States Urges Dialog Regarding South West Africa (Goldberg, text of resolution) 888

Trade

East-West Trade: An Avenue Toward World Peace (Trowbridge) 881

Kennedy Round Holds Promise of Free-World Economic Growth (Johnson, Roth) 879

President Johnson Sets Goal of Substantial Export Increase (Johnson) 886

Treaty Information. Current Actions 897

United Nations

The United States Calls for Restraint in the Near East (Johnson, Goldberg) 870

United States Urges Agreement on Peacekeeping Question (Goldberg) 894

United States Urges Dialog Regarding South West Africa (Goldberg, text of resolution) 888

Viet-Nam

Our Foreign Policy Commitments To Assure a Peaceful Future (Rusk) 874

Prayer for Peace, Memorial Day, 1967 (proclamation) 873

Name Index

Brown, Winthrop G 897

Goldberg, Arthur J 870, 888, 894

Johnson, President 870, 873, 879, 886

Roth, William M 879

Rusk, Secretary 874

Trowbridge, Alexander B 881

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 22-28

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Release issued prior to May 22 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 110 of May 16.

No.	Date	Subject
†115	5/22	U.S. delegation to International Conference on Water for Peace, May 23-31 (rewrite).
*116	5/25	Water for Peace Office established in Department.
†117	5/25	U.S.-Mexican fishery talks concluded.
*118	5/26	Ross sworn in as Ambassador to Haiti (biographic details).
†119	5/26	U.S. contribution to UNDP/FAO fishery project in Viet-Nam (rewrite).

* Not printed.
 † Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Commitment for Progress

The Americas Plan for a Decade of Urgency

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THE
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BULLETIN

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June 19, 1967

HUMANITY'S GREATEST NEED

*Addresses by President Johnson and Secretary Rusk
at the International Conference on Water for Peace 902*

U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL CONTINUES CONSIDERATION
OF THE CRISIS IN THE NEAR EAST

Statements by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg 920

SCIENCE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT
by Herman Pollack 910

Humanity's Greatest Need

**INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WATER FOR PEACE,
WASHINGTON, D.C., MAY 23-31**

OPENING ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, MAY 23

White House press release dated May 23

This Conference has a vital mandate. The questions that you will consider deal directly with the future of life on this earth.

No President has ever welcomed a gathering with greater expectations. I come from land where water is treasure. For a good many years, I have done my share of agitating to increase the water resources of my native State. I have known the frustrations of this task. A member of the Texas Legislature once recited some lines on this subject:

Oh the glamor and the clamor
That attend affairs of state
Seem to fascinate the people
And impress some folks as great.
But the truth about the matter,
In the scale of loss and gain:
Not one inauguration's worth
A good, slow, two-inch rain!

As man faces the next century, one question stands above all others: How well—and how long—can the earth sustain its ever-growing population?

As much as anything, water holds the key to that simple question: water to drink, water to grow the food we must eat, water to sustain industrial growth.

Today, man is losing his race with the growing need that he has for water.

We face, on a global scale, the plight of the Ancient Mariner:

Water, water, everywhere,
Nor any drop to drink.

For a planet two-thirds covered with water, this seems to be a very strange shortage. There is so much plenty all around us.

Yet 97 percent of our waters are in the ocean, thus far—but I hope not for very long—of little use to us for either drinking or irrigation.

Another 2 percent lies frozen in glaciers and icecaps.

The 1 percent remaining could meet most of man's needs—if only it were distributed when and where we need it most.

But today, while millions suffer the ravages of storms—and simultaneously suffer the ravages of floods—other millions are thirsty. While men barely tap the abundance of lakes and rivers and streams, others watch their crops shrivel with drought.

More and more, people dwell in cities, where clean water means the difference between sickness and health. Yet today 40 percent of the world's city dwellers—four out of 10—have no water service.

If this is the problem now, think for just a moment what the future will bring you.

By the year 2000, the world's population will have doubled to 6 billion—now it is a little over 3 billion. Our need for water will have more than doubled.

I ask this Conference to take as its point of perspective the year 2000. That is not very far away.

Imagine as you meet here that you are facing the needs of your children and your children's children. Imagine what we must do to move the world from now until then.

Ask yourselves the big questions:

How can we engineer our continents and how can we direct our great river systems to make use of the water resources that all of us are wasting today?

How can we tap the vast underground waters now undeveloped?

How can we modify the weather and better distribute the lifegiving rain?

How can we desalt the waters of the ocean, and how can we freshen our brackish waters?

How can we use our water supplies again and again before we finally yield them into the sea?

How can we curb the filth that pollutes our streams?

During the 3 years or more that I have been President, I have recommended and the Congress has approved programs in each and all of these areas—water management, river valley development, desalting, pollution control, and research on weather modification. But I realize—as you must have—that we have only begun.

You must consider, finally, the most important question of all: How can we, as responsible leaders and spokesmen, awaken the world's people and the world's leaders to the urgent problem that confronts the world?

Even at the risk of being called dreamers, you must ask these questions and seek the answers. Unless you do, you will not measure the true dimension of humanity's greatest need. You must chart the specific steps toward a more abundant future.

One step must be this: to quicken the pace of science and technology.

Last week, in the East Room of the White House, I signed an act of Congress to make possible a new plant which will more than double the world's present capacity for desalting water. A decade ago, the best plant design could produce only 50,000 gallons per day at a cost of \$5 per thousand gallons. This new plant, powered by nuclear energy, will eventually produce 150 million gallons of fresh water per day at a cost approaching 20 cents per thousand gallons. That is 3,000

times as much as could be produced 10 years ago, at one-twenty-fifth the cost.

But the world needs fresh water, and it needs it at much lower costs.

This is my country's pledge: to continue work in every area which holds promise for the world's water needs. And my country pledges to share the fruits of this technology with all of those who wish to share it with us.

American scientists will begin discussions next month with India on experimental rain-making projects which may hold promise for drought-ridden countries all over the world.

A second need we must face up to is to train more manpower.

We must attract the best technicians and the best planners to this lifegiving science. And we must devise programs to educate all our people in the wiser use of water.

Third, we need to build better institutions for managing water resources.

This point cannot be overstressed. We need improved management as much as we need new technology.

We must support the United Nations and the international agencies which are trying to provide world leadership in this field. We must develop more effective forms of local, national, and regional cooperation.

For this truth is self-evident: Neither water nor weather is a respecter of boundary lines.

Finally, we need to support new programs in water resource development.

Projects of international cooperation must be multiplied many times over what we have ever done before—projects like those now under way in the Mekong and the Indus River Basins.

Frankly, I am not—and I know you are not—satisfied with the progress that we are making in these fields now. We are not using all the imagination and all the enterprise that our problem requires. We need agents who will push, prod, shove, and move ahead with these international efforts. We need planners to help develop concrete projects. We need financial experts who know

how to interest the world's lending institutions, and educators that can recruit and train additional skilled manpower for us.

To set top priority for these endeavors in our own Government, I have already directed the Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, to establish immediately a Water for Peace Office. Its major role will be to lead and to coordinate this country's efforts in the world's water programs.

But we also need to create strong regional offices throughout this world to provide us with the leadership and to stimulate cooperation among all nations. The United States is prepared to join you and all others in establishing a network of regional water resource centers. We will provide our fair share of the expert assistance, the supplies and the equipment, and the financing that is needed.

We are confident that the United Nations and other international organizations represented here today can and will play a key role in this enterprise. We should seek to put the first two centers in operation within the next 24 months to serve as the spur and the goad in promoting Water for Peace—and freedom.

We have called this conference here in order to learn—and in order to share.

No group could have a more exciting or more worthwhile mission.

You study the life cycle of our planet. You deal with nature's elements as men have always known them: the river, the sea, the sun, and the sky.

Man once looked to these elements and found his poetry. Now he must look to them and find his preservation.

You will grapple with the political as well as the physical problems of mankind.

For ages past, men have fought wars over water without adding one single drop to the world's supply. Now we face and share the challenge to use water—more abundant water—as the enduring servant of peace, freedom, and liberty. Let this be your vision during the next week, and let this be your achievement in the years to come.

We are glad that you could come here and meet with us. We look forward to the productive and constructive results that will flow from your thinking.

We want you to know that we welcome you. We want to work with you. We truly believe that there are few problems that could engage men that offer such limitless opportunities.

We hope you enjoy your visit. We look forward to working with you in the years ahead.

ADDRESS BY SECRETARY RUSK, MAY 31

Press release 121 dated May 31

Just over a week ago, President Johnson greeted you here. He stressed the magnitude of the problems confronting us. He emphasized the significance of your deliberations. And he expressed high hopes for the benefits to mankind that may be expected to flow from them. Judging by what I have seen and heard, he will not be disappointed.

In fact, as this Conference draws to a close, I think we may all feel solid satisfaction. You, because of what your deliberations and discussions here have accomplished: There can be no doubt that they have set the stage for sharply accelerated progress in the field of water management. The unselfish devotion of time and energy which made such accomplishment possible is indeed admirable. For our part, we who have acted as hosts to this gathering can feel sincerely that our efforts have been more than justified by your serious, indeed enthusiastic, response.

Beyond this gratification at a job well done, there is another dimension to the results achieved. The value of endeavor is always proportional to the importance of the goal as well as to the quality of the endeavor. We all know that one of the most important tasks on earth is providing mankind with adequate sources of pure water. No one is immune from dependence on water. Man's need for it is as elemental as it is widespread. The presence of water means life

and health; its absence, disease and death. As populations mount with startling rapidity, the task becomes daily more vital.

The area of your interest, proper management of water resources, is broad as well as important. And it involves some extremely complicated and highly technical considerations:

—Desalination, pollution control, drainage and irrigation projects, hydroelectric installations;

—The establishment and direction of appropriate institutions;

—Cultivating the human resources without which no progress is possible.

All these require application of the most sophisticated techniques of scientist, engineer, administrator, and educator. The exchange of information, the cross-fertilization of ideas, among specialists has naturally been a most concrete and visible aspect of this Conference.

But there is another side to the picture. Though perhaps less immediate, it is equally real and in the long run may be no less constructive. I refer to the impact this gathering, and its repercussions, should have on the relations between states and peoples, to its influence in foreign affairs—to its political implications, if you will. This is a side which I am rather better equipped to discuss than the strictly technical. So I intend to concentrate on it during my few remarks this morning.

As President Johnson said so recently here, the field of water resource management is made for cooperation.

Neither its evaporation from the oceans nor its fall from the skies shows the least interest in boundaries. Many of its surface carriers, the great rivers, traverse two or several nations. Lakes and streams and wells may be the property of political entities, but their ultimate sources know no sovereignty.

Equally international is the demand. Possessing a certain citizenship bears no direct relations to a man's need for water. Such

secondary factors as stage of economic development do produce patterns of greater or less per capita consumption, it is true. But this is a matter of historic accident.

So water is vital, and both demand and supply are global. Water tends basically to unify and not to divide.

Secondly, the supply of pure water to communities of human beings is more productive of amity than enmity. There have been many cases when antagonisms were sharpened through disputes over water, to be sure. But the cause of friction was lack of water or improper distribution, not improved supplies or allocations. To the extent the water needs of a given community are better satisfied, both itself and its neighbors benefit. The former gains directly; the latter, through reduction in those tensions which always rise in a people deprived of an essential. So there is clearly a net gain to all when one is helped.

Further, water normally facilitates the arts of peace. It causes agriculture to flourish and turns the wheels of industry and commerce. The availability of plentiful supplies of water is not likely to direct a nation's thoughts to aggression—rather the reverse.

Beyond these broad tendencies, we see the same unifying principle operating upon practical measures. Though each land has its own specific problems, there are many common features. Slaking the thirst of arid regions by converting brine to fresh water involves the same industrial processes whether that region is in the Near East or the American Southwest. Effective approaches to pollution control will be much the same in Western Europe as on America's east coast. Erecting dams, controlling floods, sinking wells, collecting hydrological data—all these activities are carried out in much the same way regardless of location. The techniques of water resource management are to a considerable degree applicable everywhere, therefore are transferable.

When we turn to less comprehensive

areas, the same principle holds with even greater force. There are regions containing a number of countries which share an almost identical hydrological environment. The problems of each country in such regions will be very similar to those of its neighbors. By the same token, so will the solutions. In consequence, by far the most efficient approach to solutions will be through joint action. We believe much is to be gained by encouraging the development of regional centers where talent may be pooled to achieve common goals.

We thus see how the laws of logic point toward cooperation in this field of water management: cooperation between nations to avoid global catastrophe; between neighbors to enrich the lot of each; between institutions whose work is complementary; between individuals whose community of interest acts as a bond.

In turn, such cooperation can bring increasing understanding, mutual respect, and confidence. And this is simply another way of saying that it will work in the direction of better international relations, of an improved international political climate. It will be a force making for peace between nations.

It is this contribution, which we anticipate from your efforts, that has given rise to a phrase you have heard frequently—you have been attending a Conference on "Water for Peace."

Following this Conference, close study must be given to the ideas exchanged and the proposals suggested here. From this should come clearer and more specific guidelines for the work to be done. To assist in our share of this task and to coordinate the international activities of the United States Government agencies in the water field, the Department which I represent has been charged with establishing a special Water for Peace Office.¹ It will be an integral part

¹ For an announcement of the establishment of the Water for Peace Office, see Department of State press release 116 dated May 25.

of the Department of State but will draw heavily on the expertise of operating agencies, and especially on that of the Department of the Interior, which under the leadership of Secretary Udall has been making major contributions in this field.

Our objective is not an exclusive American activity. Our hope, rather, is for a massive multilateral effort in which all developed and developing countries will join. It will be necessary to work closely with and through existing international organizations, as well as to cooperate in expanded sharing of scientific and technical knowledge among nations on both a multilateral and a bilateral basis.

Much excellent work is now being done in the water field by international organizations. But the magnitude of the problem is so large that there is no lack of room for useful activity by all of us. As President Johnson indicated, progress in this field has not kept pace with the dimensions of the problem. So we must move from the general to the more specific. Some of you have suggested, as a followup to this global Conference, a series of meetings to develop action programs on particular aspects of water resource management. I agree. These meetings might be devoted to the needs of particular regions, including the establishment of regional water resource centers or pollution control or community water supply or irrigation—there is no lack of topics. All who can contribute should participate. They might be sponsored by an international organization such as the United Nations or one of its related agencies, or the lead could be taken by some country or countries with special interests in a particular area or problem.

We have no wish to dictate either the form or the content of such meetings. But I assure you my Government will be ready to lend its cooperation in any way suitable. The staff of our newly formed Office of Water for Peace will be prepared for consultation. Be-

tween us we can do much to translate the plans you have been developing into fruitful actualities.

In closing, let me thank you for your presence here.

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Department of State announced on May 22 (press release 115) that the International Conference on Water for Peace would convene on May 23 at Washington. The Conference had its origin in the President's statement on October 7, 1965,² when he announced the beginning of a Water for Peace program under which the United States would join in a massive cooperative international effort to find a solution for man's water problems. At that time he also announced that the United States would convene a conference to deal with all the world's water problems.

The primary purpose of the Conference was to provide a forum for the exchange of experiences, ideas, and technology. It is hoped that it will provide the basis for the subsequent development of specific courses of action or programs for the development of water resources. Ninety-six countries and 25 intergovernmental organizations were to participate in the Conference. Nineteen countries were to be represented at the ministerial level.

The U.S. representatives were Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of the Interior, *chairman*; Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture; Donald F. Hornig, Director, Office of Science and Technology, Executive Office of the President; David E. Lilienthal, chairman, Development and Resources Corporation, New York, N.Y.; and Joseph C. Swidler, cochairman, citizens advisory committee, International Conference on Water for Peace, Washington, D.C.³

President Johnson Visits EXPO 67 at Montreal

Following are remarks made by President Johnson on May 25 during his visit to the Canadian World Exhibition (EXPO 67) at Montreal on the occasion of United States National Day at the exhibition.

REMARKS AT ARRIVAL CEREMONY, PLACE DES NATIONS

White House press release dated May 25

It is always a great pleasure for me to visit Canada. Your magnificent EXPO 67—knowledge that this is your centennial anniversary—serves to heighten my interest.

My first trip outside of the United States after I became President was to visit Canada. That was to Vancouver, where we met with Prime Minister Pearson to proclaim the Columbia River Treaty.

We came to conserve the water resources of our great continent—and so naturally that day it was pouring down rain. It rained so hard, in fact, that I never delivered the speech that I had prepared for that occasion. But don't worry. While the temptation is hard to resist, I'm not going to deliver that speech here today.

I well recall some words your Prime Minister spoke to me on that rainy day in Vancouver more than 2 years ago. He told me then:¹

. . . I assure you, Mr. President, that had you landed at our most eastern airport in Newfoundland, 5,000 or more miles away, or at any place between, our welcome to you would have been equally warm both for yourself and as President of the United States. . . .

You have focused the eyes of the world on the theme of your exhibition: "Man and His World." We hope that among other lessons to be learned here will be this: that proud and independent peoples can live peacefully

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 12, 1964, p. 505.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 1, 1965, p. 720.

³ For names of the alternate U.S. representatives, see press release 115 dated May 22.

side by side, can live in peace and partnership as good neighbors; that they need not waste their substance and destroy their dreams with useless quarrels and senseless, unconstructive conflict.

We of the United States of America consider ourselves blessed. We have much to give thanks for. But the gift of providence that we really cherish is that we were given as our neighbors on this great, wonderful continent the people and the nation of Canada.

So we are very delighted to be here. We are so glad that you invited us. We thank you very much for your courtesy.

REMARKS AT U.S. PAVILION

White House press release dated May 25

It is a very great pleasure to come here today to present this "Great Ring of Canada" to the people of Canada. It was made in the United States of America, but it is all Canadian.

The 12 crystal plaques commemorate your 10 Provinces and your two Territories. It displays their coats of arms and their official flowers.

There is also the motto of Canada. That motto is in Latin, which I will not attempt to recite. But I recognize the source, because it is from the Book of Psalms. And in the version I read as a little boy, it promised that the righteous "shall have dominion also from sea to sea."

The Psalm from which Canada takes her motto—and which is so often repeated in this "Great Ring"—contains some other thoughts which I think would be appropriate to recall today.

It describes the just ruler, and it says:

He shall judge thy people with righteousness, and thy poor with judgment. . . .

He shall judge the poor of the people, he shall save the children of the needy, and he shall break in pieces the oppressor. . . .

In his days shall the righteous flourish; and abundance of peace so long as the moon endureth.

He shall have dominion also from sea to sea, and from the river unto the ends of the earth.

And so, Mr. Commissioner General [Pierre Dupuy], if the President of the United States may be permitted to comment on the internal affairs of a sister nation, Canada's motto was well chosen.

We share the goals and the ideals that are expressed in that motto. It is my profound hope that this eloquent expression of it will be viewed by generations yet unborn as an historic symbol. I hope they will have reason to remember it as tangible evidence that two great nations were united in their efforts to create the kind of world for which men have always longed but really have never achieved.

If that comes to pass, then Canadians and Americans alike may well say for all time: Our ancestors pointed the way.

This is not a crystal ball. We cannot see all that just by looking into it. But I believe it is there. It is there in the history of Canada. It is there in the history of the United States. And I strongly suspect that what is sometimes cloudy and obscure to us will be as crystal clear to our grandchildren as this great work of art that we have come here to unveil today to our friends.

President Johnson Confers With Canadian Prime Minister

On May 25, after his visit to EXPO 67 at Montreal, President Johnson conferred with Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson at Harrington Lake, Ontario. Following are their remarks at a joint press briefing held at Uplands RCAF Base, Ottawa, on May 25 upon President Johnson's departure for Washington.

White House press release dated May 25

PRESIDENT JOHNSON

I want to tell you about our visit here today and to thank the people of Canada, the distinguished Prime Minister, and the other officials of the Canadian Government for their hospitality.

We had a delightful visit at EXPO. We were thrilled to see what you people had done there in the way of permitting other nations to come here and demonstrate their friendship for your great country and to exchange exhibits and ideas with our neighbors.

I imposed on the Prime Minister by going with him to lunch and counseling with him on the problems that confront the peoples of the world today. We, of course, discussed the situation that exists in the Middle East, the discussions that took place yesterday in the Security Council of the United Nations,¹ and the likely discussions that will take place in the days ahead.

As you know, we in the United States have a very high regard for Prime Minister Pearson. He has worked with our people over a long period. He has served in our Capital. He has distinguished himself as a citizen of the world. He is one of the great living experts on the particular area of the world which greatly concerns us now.

The Prime Minister and I exchanged ideas. Our visit was a very agreeable one. We not only talked about the Middle East, but we talked about our respective countries, our problems with each other, the problems that good neighbors do have.

We also talked about the situation in Vietnam, as we have on other occasions. I brought him up to date on the reports that we have from there—our viewpoint. I am returning to Washington very shortly where I will meet Lord Casey, who is due there at 5:30.

I would summarize our visit by saying my talk with the Prime Minister and others was quite constructive and very agreeable. I hope that in the days ahead I might have the

opportunity to come here for a somewhat more extended stay than the situation today would permit.

I have been President a little over 3 years; I have had a chance to visit Canada three times. I would like to have some other visits in the future.

PRIME MINISTER PEARSON

The President is due in Washington at 5:30 to meet with the Governor General of Australia, so I hope he won't be detained.

I think the President, who I was so happy to have as my guest at Harrington Lake, has said all that can be said about our talks.

We covered a lot of ground. From my point of view, they were very helpful indeed, and I am very grateful indeed to the President for getting his viewpoint on some of the very dangerous and difficult international situations that face us today.

I just want to express my gratitude for the President taking time to come here, and as he has indicated, he hopes to get back in our centennial year to Canada for a little longer visit.

So I think if you will excuse us, I will go to the plane with the President and wave him goodbye to Washington.

Letters of Credence

Iran

The newly appointed Ambassador of Iran, Hushang Ansary, presented his credentials to President Johnson on May 26. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated May 26.

¹ See p. 920.

"The overlap between the fields of economics and politics and the fields of science and technology already dictates that these areas be handled as unities." In this address at the University of Illinois Centennial Colloquium on Science and Human Affairs on May 17, Herman Pollack, Acting Director, International Scientific and Technological Affairs, describes the Department's response to "the challenge of science in foreign affairs."

Science, Foreign Affairs, and the State Department

by Herman Pollack

Science in the State Department is a subject about which precious little is generally known. I feel it is of great importance that it be more widely understood—and especially in the academic community. My remarks today will deal with the subject broadly. I shall discuss, at least briefly, three principal themes: the present and future importance of the interaction between science and foreign affairs, the attitude of the Department of State on the subject, and the administrative response we have made to the challenge of science in foreign affairs.

This may be as good a point as any to note that I speak of science and technology as though they were one—which they are not—and when I use the term "science" I encompass both basic and applied—and I shall assume you fully understand the distinction. Dr. Walsh McDermott is credited with the following distinction, which may not prove too helpful to you. "The work you or your immediate colleagues are doing," McDermott said, "is clearly basic; all other research is applied."

Let me begin with a remark now so commonplace as to be almost platitudinous, yet nevertheless fundamental and very real; that is, we are in the midst of a technological revolution without precedent in its combination of scale, pace, and impact on the affairs of men.

The crucial element in that combination is pace, for the rate of development from the first demonstration of a new technological concept to its widespread commercial and social use tends to be incredibly brief.

Let me illustrate by taking you back 10 years—one brief decade—to 1957, in many ways a landmark year. That was the year of Sputnik and the year of the first full-scale nuclear power reactor, the prototype plant in Shippingport, Pennsylvania. Sputnik, let us recall, was deaf and blind and, save for a radio beep, dumb. Yet, in less than 10 years satellites have made possible revolutionary contributions to world communications, meteorology, and astronomy. Direct-broadcast TV, natural-resource sensing, and other far-reaching applications are offstage. Ten years after the Shippingport power reactor went on the line, nuclear power is no longer a thing of the future. It has arrived, and over 50 percent of the new powerplants now being contracted for in the United States are nuclear. I shall refer later to the international implications of this development.

In 1957 desalination was still largely a shipboard enterprise and water costs were in excess of \$5 per 1,000 gallons. Today, plants producing in excess of 1 million gallons a day are becoming general—in Kuwait, in Curacao, and in Florida, among others—and it has been agreed to build a combination

power and water plant for the Metropolitan Water District in Los Angeles which is planned ultimately to produce 150 million gallons of water at an estimated cost of 22 cents per 1,000 gallons. That plant is to the state of the art in large-scale desalting technology as was the Shippingport plant to the state of the art in nuclear power production.

In 1957 rain augmentation was still largely restricted to experiments carried on in a refrigerator. Today, rain augmentation experiments are being conducted on an increasingly large scale, and experience to date is sufficiently promising for our Department of the Interior to begin planning production activities.

Ten years ago the future of computer technology was but dimly seen, and very few really cared about the oceans.

Incidentally, 1957 was a landmark year in other ways, and it may help us to place these technical events in a larger context. That year witnessed the signing of the European Common Market treaty and the first racial controversy in Little Rock; the last battleship was being readied for mothballs; the first ballistic-missile nuclear submarine was about to be launched; and the U-2's were flying.

So in the brief decade since 1957, we have progressed from youth to adolescence, accompanied by the usual growing pains. The members of a Presidential panel who recently prepared a report on "Computers in Higher Education" would take exception to that statement. They allege in their opening sentence that "After growing wildly for years, the field of computing now appears to be approaching its infancy."

Whether infant, youth, or adolescent, the key point is that though there is ample to contend with today, there is much yet to come. A *Torrey Canyon* capable of polluting international waters with 120,000 tons of crude oil has sister ships now on the high seas at 205,000 tons, and vessels of 500,000 tons and more are not far off. The tankers used in World War II were generally less than 20,000 tons. Not only has the pace of discovery increased; the rate of application

has also increased. Furthermore, the impact of each innovation—like a pebble thrown into a pond—sends its eddies in ever-widening circles.

The leisurely tempo of our early history has vanished to the accompaniment of some shattering explosions, explosions of technology, of population, of information, and of rising expectations. We have the tools, we have the knowledge, and we have the opportunity to direct our destiny if we also exercise some common sense and political astuteness.

Significance for Diplomacy

Now, what does all this mean to the practitioner of diplomacy, to those who labor in the vineyard of the Department of State? Some of its significance is obvious. Take plutonium, for instance. Every nuclear power station in the world automatically produces plutonium, and plutonium is the material with which you make atomic bombs. The current international debate on the safeguards article of the nonproliferation treaty concerns ultimately this plutonium which is unavoidably produced by nuclear power reactors all over the world. Such reactors will increasingly dominate the electrical generating market in the years ahead, simply because the economics of producing large quantities of power to meet the needs of an energy-hungry world increasingly favor nuclear fuel over fossil fuels.

Now that nuclear energy as a power source is no longer a vision but a reality, we can anticipate dramatic and far-reaching changes in heretofore energy-poor countries, for nuclear energy is remarkably independent of the source of uranium ore.

The advent of large quantities of desalinated water may provide a basis for easing traditional differences among nations on the allocation and control of scarce water resources.

Space developments, by their very environment, must be essentially international in character. This is also true of weather modification and the exploitation of the mineral and living resources of the oceans.

The realization that the vigor of a nation's economy is now largely dependent upon the quality of and the use to which it puts its science and technology has given rise to international comparisons of technological proficiency and in turn to the problem of the "technological gap." This today is as meaningful to a diplomat as were comparisons of the size of standing armies several generations ago. The brain drain is no longer merely an interesting phenomenon. It has acquired the status of a political issue and a fairly hot one, at that.

Distance is no longer of much comfort in terms of providing security from one's enemies. The oceans no longer protect. Nowadays they are more noteworthy as the environment of the nuclear-powered missile-equipped submarine.

These quick illustrations are sufficient, I think, to indicate that the present-day interaction of science and foreign affairs is extensive. And these, of course, are the subjects on which we work daily. Not only do scientific and technological developments affect the basic geopolitical-economic considerations which underlie foreign policy decisions, but they become increasingly the very subject of international negotiations. They are providing a host of new problems, with awesome potential for the disadvantage of the amity of nations. On the other hand, their beneficial potential, imaginatively and effectively employed, could have immense favorable impact on the climate of international relations over the next century or more.

International Cooperation in Science

That a significant portion of the fabric of international affairs today is composed of relationships on scientific and technical subjects is attested to by reference to the host of international agencies concerned with such matters. Among the more noteworthy are the International Atomic Energy Agency, the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, and the scientific components of the various regional

security and economic organizations. We might also recall that the "S" in UNESCO stands for "Scientific" and there is a standing U.N. Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development.

Increasing in importance are bilateral programs such as the separate U.S.-Japan Scientific, Natural Resources, and Medical Cooperation programs; the U.S.-German Natural Resources Cooperative Program; and the well-publicized French-Soviet cooperative undertakings in science and technology. In the nongovernmental sector there are the large-scale activities of the great international scientific unions.

The United States well recognizes the importance and value of maintaining scientific contacts even when political differences may otherwise strain relations among nations. The Department of State accordingly puts in much effort in facilitating the movement of scientists. I am glad to report that considerable progress has been made in removing some of the red tape that has in times past been troublesome.

The United States is a strong supporter of international cooperation in scientific and technical programs and activities because we find such cooperation to be in the national interests.

We recognize that the sum of the world's scientific knowledge is a result of contributions from many lands and many peoples, and we exchange scientists and technical information partly to acquire the results of foreign research for our own programs. The scientific community has a very real interest in this aspect and seeks these international contacts for professional stimulation and recognition, as well.

The nations of the world are all interested in education and material progress. We work through the common denominators of science and technology as one means of enlarging the world sense of community. Broad national interest requires that we exert affirmative leadership in all areas to build a world environment which is congenial to the continued existence of free societies. It is, for

example, in that national interest to seek better ways to advance the material well-being of the have-nots and to work with other nations in developing effective arms control mechanisms.

We believe that effective international institutions are an essential part of that world environment we are seeking to build, and our actions reflect that belief. We also support and cooperate with regional scientific efforts, because we believe that strong regional organizations offer a superior future to that permitted by the parochial and limited national practices of the last century.

We are developing joint cooperative research programs with nations such as Japan, West Germany, and others. These nations can make contributions to research of mutual interest in equivalent measure with the United States, and these programs serve to strengthen American science.

There are substantial concerns about man's future which require worldwide integrated action. Such immediate problems as population pressures, protection of basic food crops and the development of new sources of food, and water management require a joint approach now. For the future, international action will be needed in disease control, resource exploitation and conservation, weather modification and control, and in the search for new energy sources. For the far future, mastery of and competence in the ocean depths and outer space will require a massive, sustained, and cooperative effort.

These things are together a practical reason for the Government's interest in providing strong continuing leadership to international cooperation in world scientific and technological affairs.

We cannot ignore one further and very real reason: that of native American idealism. We believe in a human response to human needs, we believe in the upgrading of human existence, and we have strong historical ties to many nations, particularly in Europe and in Latin America. We value the faith placed in the American people; it is our nature to respond to that faith affirmatively.

Department of State Science Office

It is quite clear that the Department of State must be equipped both with structure and with manpower capable of treating adequately these newly important facets of international affairs. The adequacy with which this is being done in the Department of State is from time to time subjected to public scrutiny and comment, as those of you who follow Science magazine are aware. One of your previous speakers, Professor Eugene B. Skolnikoff, has just published a book "Science, Technology, and American Foreign Policy," which discusses this subject very knowledgeably and with considerable insight. This scrutiny into our performance is both appropriate and timely, for within the Department we are still in our swaddling clothes in our ability to handle some of these subjects. And as I said at the outset, the subject is sufficiently important to warrant more attention than it has yet received.

Indeed, I am dismayed at how frequently worldly scientists and engineers and professors of international relations, men who should know better, express surprise at the existence of a science office in the Department. It is known as International Scientific and Technological Affairs or, more familiarly in our intramural alphabet soup, as SCI. Reporting directly to the Secretary, ranking with the other major components of the Department, it advises the Secretary on foreign policy and international relations to assure consideration of scientific and technological factors, and it develops policies and proposals for international science and technology programs and activities. It is a small organization, numbering approximately 20 officers, half of whom are scientists or engineers. The remaining are foreign affairs specialists.

Our organization includes an Office of Atomic Energy Affairs, an Office of Outer Space Affairs, and an Office of General Scientific Affairs. Although the principal focus for efforts in these areas in the Department, by no means does SCI have an exclusive jurisdiction, nor do we seek one. Practically every

bureau in the Department has a major involvement in some technological program. The European Bureau and EURATOM [European Atomic Energy Community]; the Near Eastern and South Asian Bureau and the U.S.-Israeli Joint Desalting Program; and the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs and the pioneering science and technology section of the Punta del Este communique of last month¹ are illustrative.

Just as wars can no longer be left entirely to the soldiers and science is too much a part of our lives to be left entirely to the scientists, so, too, foreign affairs is too comprehensive a field and involves too many aspects of American life to be left to the foreign affairs specialist alone. The overlap between the fields of economics and politics and the fields of science and technology already dictates that these areas be handled as unities. The increasingly elaborate relationships and interrelationships, both here and abroad, which are now developing require a new symbiosis in all aspects of human affairs.

It is for this reason, among others, that the Department of State has established an extensive pattern of relationships with the major scientific and technical agencies of the Government. There is a very tangible interplay between science operations and foreign operations and between science policy and foreign policy. Most of these relationships are informal, although a reasonable amount of activity is covered by interagency committees, many of which SCI chairs, including policy committees on space, marine sciences, and desalting. We also represent the Department of State on interagency technical committees too numerous to mention.

Abroad the principal structural response by the Department of State has been the establishment at some 18 major embassies of the position of scientific attaché, and at over 90 other posts of the position of science liaison officer. The latter is a Foreign Service officer who as a part-time responsibility

follows science and technology matters for his embassy. The problem of manpower, that is, staffing the attaché positions as well as science liaison officer positions and the Foreign Service generally, is one that concerns me greatly. Let me explain why.

I participate regularly in the training programs provided by the Department to our fledgling Foreign Service officers. These are the young men and women (average age about 27) who by 1980 will be on the brink of holding positions of great responsibility and authority in the upper echelons of the Department of State and who by 1990, less than 25 years hence, will in all likelihood be holding positions of Assistant and Under Secretary of State and will be heading the United States missions to the principal international organizations and to the key countries of the world.

These, then, are the people who will be responsible for providing advice and expertise on the problems posed in 1980, when the peaceful nuclear power reactors located throughout the world will be daily producing plutonium sufficient for dozens of nuclear weapons. Undoubtedly this will be the generation dealing with the critical phases of the international tensions posed by an explosively expanding world population that will continue well into the eighties. They will probably have to chart international law for the ocean bottoms. By 1980 the continuing problem of the definition and control of the Continental Shelf may well take on critical form.

As these young men and women reach their professional maturity, one might even speculate that instantaneous global communication by satellite, married to supersonic transport and a computer technology by several orders of magnitude more capable than that now existing, together with other scientific and technological developments, will have an increasingly upsetting impact upon the theories of the modern state upon which our present model of international relations is constructed.

Although technological forecasting is becoming fashionable, it remains a very uncertain occupation, and scientific forecasting is

¹For text of the Declaration of the Presidents of America signed at Punta del Este, Uruguay, on Apr. 14, see BULLETIN of May 8, 1967, p. 712.

literally not possible. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to assume that practitioners of diplomacy in 1980 will not be comfortable or qualified in their assignments unless they have a much deeper and more comprehensive knowledge of science and technology than do their present-day colleagues. Such knowledge will not be acquired by osmosis nor, I suggest, by self-study. It will have to be programmed and structured—both by the Department of State for its professional staff and by the academic institutions as part of their preparation of our future recruits.

The young men and women most recently recruited are not much better off, in terms of their academic preparations for a world in which science and technology loom so large, than the present crop of senior officers who completed their formal education when the table of elements had stabilized at 92 and space was a term in the lexicon of the real estate agent.

Training "Men of Science"

Let us look a bit more deeply into this question of manpower for science in the State Department. I have already mentioned the position of scientific attaché now established at 18 posts abroad. We view the scientific attaché as a policy officer with a scientific or technical background. It is his full-time job to focus on the political, economic, military, and public relations impact of science and technology on U.S. foreign policy objectives. Our first scientific attaché was such a man. Ben Franklin's scientific involvement, first in London and then in Paris, could well serve as a continuing model for our present-day scientific attaché program. We have such men serving in our embassies today and wrestling with problems which would leave Ben gasping—probably with delight. We need more such men capable of marrying science and foreign affairs, but I have found that the supply is inadequate to the demand.

We have found that scientists, like many others, frequently lack an awareness of the realities of world politics and, correspondingly, foreign affairs specialists are frequently resistant to the acquisition of

knowledge about scientific and technical developments applicable to foreign affairs. I don't mean to be disparaging toward either group—after all, some of my best friends are scientists, and I must live with the diplomats. The challenge is, in part, to our educational systems. I would like to quote two eminent men on this subject. Secretary Rusk told a congressional panel on science policy last January that:²

For any American involved in public affairs today, scientific literacy is a must; and that is particularly so in foreign affairs. We are firmly convinced that the Foreign Service officer should be familiar with the ways, the concepts, and the purposes of science. He should understand the sources of our technological civilization. He should be able to grasp the social and economic implications of current scientific discoveries and engineering accomplishments. I think it is feasible for nonscientists to be, in the phrase of H. G. Wells, "men of science" with real awareness of this aspect of man's advance.

This is one view from the ridge. Across the valley, on his own ridge, Glenn Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, said this last week:

Students should not specialize in science to the extent that the humanities are neglected. The significance of science and technology and their role in society cannot be understood apart from the human values and social institutions that are affected—often drastically—by the dynamic forces of scientific discovery and technological change. In our rapidly changing world the scientist has a special responsibility to think about the impact of science on people and to communicate to the public about science. Scientists must be concerned about the world in which science is used, and they must understand the values, the sensitivities, the wants, and the needs of people. Only the humanities and the social sciences can provide this essential, broad framework of understanding.

This recognition at the highest levels of Government of the need for fusing the fields of foreign affairs and science in using the new technology in the service of man has its corollary in activities such as this one at the University of Illinois. A number of American universities have started programs to blend

² For an address by Secretary Rusk before the eighth annual Panel on Science and Technology of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, on Jan. 24, see *ibid.*, Feb. 13, 1967, p. 238.

science and public policy, including foreign affairs, to this purpose. Some few have established institutes within the universities. These programs are of course independent of the Government, but we follow their development with great interest. These new initiatives in the universities may build the necessary bridge and may provide us with those "men of science" skilled in foreign affairs.

The scientific attachés, as good as they are, cannot operate in a vacuum, nor can they alone fill the vacuum. We must begin now to insure that the next generation of Foreign Service officers adds scientific literacy to the wide range of skills and knowledge already required in their profession.

For the benefit of junior officers as well as their older colleagues, we conduct a continuing indoctrination within the Department at many levels, ranging from the Secretary's science luncheons and briefings for principal officers of the Department to special courses at the State Department's Foreign Service Institute, general Departmental briefings, press releases, film presentations, and science articles in State Department journals. We have joined with the science agencies in an exchange program, involving annually 10 junior officers, in order to expose the members of the Foreign Service to substantive science programs and to give young officers of the science agencies an insight into the use of science in foreign policy. This program is about to celebrate its first anniversary.

These efforts are not enough, but at least they are a beginning. We would welcome the opportunity to cooperate with the universities in extending this training program throughout the country.

In conclusion, I would like to restate my principal points. Science and foreign affairs are inextricably linked today, and the bond will grow. We have barely scratched the surface, and one of our major problems is that of quality of manpower—not only for specialized jobs but for the Foreign Service as a whole. I don't know what the ultimate mix of training should be; I have urged the National Science Foundation to consider whether it could not stimulate the universi-

ties to help meet the State Department's requirements for diplomat-scientists, or scientist-diplomats, depending upon your own orientation; and I would urge those of you here to think about the opportunities presented by this new field of foreign affairs. We must begin equipping ourselves now with the men and women who are going to be making the foreign policy recommendations and decisions in the career generation to come. The Secretary of State put the problem this way:³

As the scientists put their minds to the problems of the future, it is just as important that the social sciences and the humanities do the same. The old notion that somehow the future is not the business of the humanities and the social sciences is rapidly disappearing, because the other half of our great universities is hurling us into the future at a breathtaking pace. Unless those who think about the problems of man similarly address themselves to the future, and not merely to some remote past nor to the views spoken somewhere else at an earlier stage, then we will have vast problems confronting us in the future. This joint action among all groups . . . is indispensable if we are to move ahead as rational human beings into this uncharted future.

We are all aware of the tremendous population explosion facing the world over the next quarter century; and the world's demands for new sources of power are increasing at three times that rate. The promise of the sea as a source of natural resources and food, the challenges of outer space, the information explosion and computer technology, advances in understanding the life processes, control of the physical environment, the containment of nuclear energy, and the search for controlled fusion are among the giant challenges of the new civilization. Three hundred and fifty years ago, in his "New Atlantis," Francis Bacon told of a civilization based upon science and technology used for the benefit of all. That potential exists today.

But science policy is about where economic policy was before Adam Smith. Understanding of the interaction of science and society, and intelligent forecasting and planning, are prerequisites to a realization of that potential.

³ *Ibid.*

The burst of energies at loose in all realms of life is cumulative. An adaptability and resourcefulness of unimagined dimension will be required of future generations, and for the remainder of the century we will live in the midst of rapid change. It is our job to insure the survival and health of the United States as a political entity—and in today's world that means the continued and careful exercise of leadership in all areas of interaction between nations.

Sacrifices in Viet-Nam Marked in Memorial Day Messages

Following is an exchange of messages on Memorial Day between President Johnson and Nguyen Van Thieu, Chairman of the National Leadership Committee of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) dated May 30

The President's Message

DEAR GENERAL THIEU: Your thoughtful Memorial Day message will be deeply appreciated by the American people. It will have particular meaning in those homes and families where a life has been given in the defense of our common freedom.

In remembering our own honored dead, our thoughts turn inevitably to the valiant allies with whom we have shared the burden of resisting aggression. Thus we are mindful today of the great sacrifices of the Vietnamese people and we look forward to a brighter day of peace and progress in Viet-nam, in Asia, and throughout the world.

General Thieu's Message

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On the occasion of Memorial Day, I wish to express to you, in the name of the Vietnamese people and in my own name, our most sincere gratitude for the valiant officers and men of the United States who have made the supreme sacrifice of their lives to defend freedom and to ensure a just and durable peace in this part of the world.

Americans and Vietnamese have toiled and struggled together on this soil for a noble cause. The sacrifices that our own peoples have made together in this common cause strengthen every day the bonds of friendship between our two nations. They constitute the bulwark against tyranny, for the preservation of an international society in which East and West can cooperate in harmony, in mutual appreciation and mutual respect.

We are confident of the successful outcome of this struggle, and shall do our best so that the sacrifices of these brave heroes will not be made in vain.

President Johnson Greet Japanese Governors

Following are remarks made by President Johnson on May 24 to nine Japanese Governors visiting the United States.

White House press release dated May 24

I am happy to extend to each one of you, on behalf of all the American people, our welcome to the United States and a warm welcome to the White House.

The mutual visits which the Governors of Japan and the Governors of the United States have been making for the past 3 years are, I think, a great benefit to our countries.

Much has been made of the great differences between our countries—differences of culture, religion, and geography. But I am struck by our similarities.

Our two countries are among the world's most active and vital and prosperous. And we are among the most deeply involved in world affairs.

Both of us face the problems of success: challenges of growth, of rising affluence, of social and political change.

In a turbulent world, the answers which our countries find to those problems will have influence far beyond our borders.

That is why I am grateful for the mutual understanding and the common progress which result from your contacts with our Governors—and theirs with you.

You are advancing the noblest cause of all: the cause of peace.

In meeting the problem of urban growth, for instance, I am struck by how our approaches coincide. Both Japan and America have experienced explosive urban growth. Two-thirds of our people now live in cities. Coping with this explosion tests not only our technology but the very power of democracy to govern creatively and effectively. Our responses are remarkably similar. Both of us cherish the principle of local initiative, local action.

And we have a great deal to learn from each other. We are already learning from Japan about the development of high-speed railways. When we see the Tokyo—Osaka express train streaking along at 125 miles an hour, we dream of the day when trains on our eastern seaboard will move as fast. And, at a time when mass urban transit is a major national issue in the United States, we are studying your suburban rail systems.

In this and other fields the exchange of ideas can be a way to better understanding between our people. We believe it leads to eventual peace and progress all over the world.

I hope that there are developments in our country which will be useful to you in Japan.

Our country is facing great new problems—and establishing great new programs. As a result, our Federal system is being challenged.

We believe that we will meet that challenge. Right now, we are establishing better communication, better cooperation, better understanding between our States and the Federal Government.

On your visit, you can see that happening. I hope it gives you some ideas to take home.

I am glad to observe that you are having lunch today with our friends in the Congress.

Gentlemen, you do us honor by your visit. I salute you—and I salute the National Governors' Conference for its part in this venture of understanding.

U.S. To Aid WHO in Developing Drug Reaction Reporting System

The White House announced on May 9 that President Johnson had that day authorized an agreement with the World Health Organization to establish, on a pilot basis, an international system to monitor and report adverse drug reactions.

Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare John W. Gardner was delegated authority to implement the project under the provisions of the International Health Research Act of 1960 [Public Law 86-610].¹

“A worldwide early warning system for drugs will be a vital health protection measure for people everywhere,” the President said. “Increasingly powerful and sophisticated drugs emerge from laboratories as boons to the struggle against man’s bodily afflictions. In actual use, however, some drugs have had unexpected and tragic consequences before medical communities could become aware of unpredictable side effects. This worldwide early warning system is a big step forward in protecting all people from these unforeseen hazards. We are glad to make this grant to assist in its establishment.”

The worldwide monitoring center for adverse drug reactions will parallel the program established by the Food and Drug Administration to provide such a warning system in the United States. A significant venture in international cooperation, the center will be similar in kind to other WHO-designated centers for the international coordination of efforts to control such diseases as shigella, rickettsia, and influenza.

Computer facilities of the FDA would be utilized in the international system. Data from national drug reaction reporting centers would feed into the central computer facility. Hazardous drug reactions detected

¹For text of a letter from President Johnson to Secretary Gardner, see White House press release dated May 9.

in any reporting nation could then be disseminated throughout the world.

The President authorized Secretary Gardner to grant to the World Health Organization the funds necessary to launch the pilot project. The estimated cost for the first year of operation is \$180,000. In addition, the FDA will provide computer services and office facilities in Washington, D. C.

Worldwide interest in the development of an international drug reaction reporting system was stimulated by the thalidomide tragedy in Europe, where thousands of deformed babies were born before the cause was attributed to the use of the sedative drug by women during pregnancy.

U.S.—Mexican Fishery Talks Held at Washington

Joint Statement

Press release 117 dated May 25

Informal and exploratory conversations between representatives of Mexico and the United States on fishery questions of mutual interest, which began in the Department of State, Washington, D.C., on May 15, were concluded today [May 25]. The motive of the conversations was the recent changes which both countries have made in their laws relating to jurisdiction over marine fisheries within the contiguous zone off their territorial seas, and their purpose was to exchange views regarding the conditions under which United States fishermen may be permitted to continue their traditional fisheries in that zone. The Mexican law establishing an exclusive fisheries zone between 9 and 12 miles off the Mexican coasts provides that under certain conditions foreign fishermen may continue their traditional fishing activities within that zone during the five years commencing with 1968.

The Mexican delegation was headed by

Mexico's Ambassador to the United States, Dr. Hugo B. Margáin, and included Ambassador Dr. Oscar Rabasa, Legal Adviser to the Secretariat of Foreign Relations, Capt. C. G. Gilberto Lopez Lira, Secretariat of the Navy, and Dr. Jorge Echaniz R., Director General of Fisheries, Secretariat of Industry and Commerce.

The United States delegation was headed by Ambassador Donald L. McKernan, Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife to the Secretary of State, and included Harold E. Crowther, Director, Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, Department of the Interior, Raymund T. Yingling, Legal Adviser for Special Functional Problems, Department of State, and William M. Terry, Assistant Director for International Affairs, Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, Department of the Interior. Both delegations were assisted by advisers representing their Pacific and Gulf coast industries.

In the course of their conversations, the representatives of both Governments presented fully their points of view on all aspects of questions related to the continuation of traditional United States fisheries in Mexico's exclusive fishery zone beyond its territorial sea. Considerable areas of coincidence of the views of the two delegations were found. These areas where the views of the two delegations were found to be in agreement, as well as the reservations and suggestions of both delegations in other areas, are incorporated into a joint report to the Governments. The report contains points which could serve as a basis on which traditional fishing by nationals of each country may continue within the exclusive fishery zone of the other country during a limited period of time. It is expected that this report will serve as the basis for further consideration towards reaching an agreement between the Governments.

The talks developed in a spirit of friendship and mutual respect which permitted them to reach a successful conclusion.

U.N. Security Council Continues Consideration of the Crisis in the Near East

*Statements by Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative in the Security Council*

FIRST STATEMENT OF MAY 29

U.S./U.N. press release 73

We are here today to consider what means the United Nations—and specifically the Security Council—should adopt to deal with the present crisis in the Near East. The Secretary-General has correctly assessed this crisis. He has described it as more serious, indeed, more menacing, than at any time since 1956.

In dealing with this problem we should avoid wasteful recriminations over the response of the United Nations to recent events. The organization has played a crucial role for many years in maintaining peace, however fragile, in the Near East. The General Armistice Agreements, the Truce Supervision Organization, the admirable 10-year service of the UNEF [United Nations Emergency Force], the many important actions of the Security Council and the General Assembly and the successive Secretaries-General and other United Nations officials—these are a great and memorable chapter in United Nations history. In the Near East more than in any other region, the world has looked to the United Nations to keep the door closed on the specter of war.

Now the door has come unhinged. This fact is not a reason to question the motives of the United Nations handling of the matter. Nor is it a reason for despair or handwringing. Our duty is rather to find new ways by

which the United Nations can reassert itself for peace, to the end that war may be averted and that the area may achieve the “reasonable, peaceful and just solutions” of which the Secretary-General has spoken in the concluding passage of the report which was circulated last Saturday [May 27].¹

We have seen one chapter of the U.N.’s role in the Near East come to an end. It is now our task to open a new chapter in this long search for peace.

In addressing this task we notably have before us the report of the Secretary-General. I wish to read to the Council a section of the report to which the Secretary-General clearly attaches particular importance:

The decision of the Government of the United Arab Republic to restrict shipping in the Strait of Tiran, of which I learned while en route to Cairo, has created a new situation. Free passage through the Strait is one of the questions which the Government of Israel considers most vital to her interests. The position of the Government of the United Arab Republic is that the Strait is territorial waters in which it has a right to control shipping. The Government of Israel contests this position and asserts the right of innocent passage through the Strait. The Government of Israel has further declared that Israel will regard the closing of the Strait of Tiran to Israel flagships and any restriction on cargoes of ships of other flags proceeding to Israel as a *casus belli*. While in Cairo, I called to the attention of the Government of the United Arab Republic the dangerous consequences which could ensue from re-

¹ U.N. doc. S/7906.

stricting innocent passage of ships in the Strait of Tiran. I expressed my deep concern in this regard and my hope that no precipitate action would be taken.

The Secretary-General further pointed out:

The freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran is not, however, the only immediate issue which is endangering peace in the Near East. Other problems, such as sabotage and terrorist activities and rights of cultivation in disputed areas in the Demilitarized Zone between Israel and Syria, will, unless controlled, almost surely lead to further serious fighting.

And it is, of course, quite clear from other references in this and in his previous report² that the tensions which arise from substantial military confrontation in the Gaza Strip following the withdrawal of UNEF from the area are also sensitive and serious.

Soberly appraising the situation and taking into account his conversations in Cairo with U.A.R. leaders, the Secretary-General in paragraph 14, a key paragraph of his report, said:

In my view, a peaceful outcome to the present crisis will depend upon a breathing spell which will allow tension to subside from its present explosive level. I therefore urge all the parties concerned to exercise special restraint, to forego belligerence and to avoid all other actions which could increase tension, to allow the Council to deal with the underlying causes of the present crisis and to seek solutions.

I cannot conceive that any member of the Security Council will not support this appeal.

This grave appeal from the Secretary-General has lost none of its relevance since his report was issued. A blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba has been announced. Armies stand within sight of each other on the armistice lines between Israel, Syria, and Egypt, including the Gaza Strip. Incidents have occurred resulting in casualties, some of which have been reported today. Thus the dangers in these three areas, which the Secretary-General has rightly identified as the most sensitive of all, remain at their height. Passions are still high and the need for utmost

restraint on both sides has in no way abated.

But we can take note today not only of the continuing dangers to which I have referred but also, I am glad to say, of a favorable development. Yesterday the Prime Minister of Israel [Levi Eshkol] stated that his Government has decided to rely on "the continuation of political action in the world arena" to stimulate "international factors to take effective measures to insure free international passage" in the Strait of Tiran.

This statement is very much to be welcomed. It is clearly in the spirit of the Secretary-General's appeal for a "breathing spell" and his urgent request that, to this end, the parties "exercise special restraint" and "forego belligerence." It has followed also upon strenuous diplomatic efforts by the governments of member states, including my own, in support of the Secretary-General's appeal. Last week, indeed, while he was in Cairo, I made on behalf of my Government a parallel appeal "to avoid any action which might exacerbate the already tense situation which prevailed when the Secretary-General departed on his mission."³

Prime Minister Eshkol's statement will be all the more effective if it is now matched in the same spirit by other parties and by all the governments principally concerned. We note in this connection the Secretary-General's account in his report of his conversations in Cairo, during which, he tells us, "President Nasser and Foreign Minister Riad assured me that the United Arab Republic would not initiate offensive action against Israel." But, regrettably, since then President Nasser has reiterated that the restrictions on shipping through the Strait which he imposed while the Secretary-General was en route to Cairo remain in effect.

Therefore, it would be a mistake to suppose that the crisis has now substantially eased. Diplomacy is still operating within very narrow limits and on a short time schedule. We in the Security Council, therefore, must intensify our efforts, both collectively and in

² U.N. doc. S/7896 and Corr. 1.

³ For a statement made by Ambassador Goldberg on May 24, see BULLETIN of June 12, 1967, p. 871.

our separate capacities, to promote a *modus vivendi*, particularly at the points of greatest danger. Surely all will agree that means must be found to liquidate this conflict as a military one, and in particular to de-fuse the most sensitive area, the Gulf of Aqaba.

It is necessary for me under the circumstances to make explicit the basic attitude of the United States as we approach this task. Our attitude is rooted in the charter, in opposition to aggression from any side, and in full support of international law and the role of the United Nations. Ours is not an attitude of partisanship. The foundation of our policy remains as President Johnson stated last week: ⁴

To the leaders of all the nations of the Near East, I wish to say what three American Presidents have said before me—that the United States is firmly committed to the support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of that area. The United States strongly opposes aggression by anyone in the area, in any form, overt or clandestine. This has been the policy of the United States led by four Presidents—President Truman, President Eisenhower, President John F. Kennedy, and myself—as well as the policy of both of our political parties. The record of the actions of the United States over the past 20 years, within and outside the United Nations, is abundantly clear on this point.

The United States has consistently sought to have good relations with all the states of the Near East. Regrettably, this has not always been possible, but we are convinced that our differences with individual states of the area and their differences with each other must be worked out peacefully and in accordance with accepted international practice.

These general observations have direct application to the concrete case before us. In the view of my Government the first step which the Council must take is to put its great authority behind the appeal of the Secretary-General. This first step is urgently required; for, however welcome yesterday's statements of restraint may be, tension remains great and the timespan in which to avert a clash is short. We need a breathing spell for diplomatic activity and for this

⁴ For a statement made by President Johnson on May 23, see *ibid.*, p. 870.

Council's more deliberate disposition of the underlying issues. Therefore, the United States believes that the Council, as an interim measure and without extended debate, should endorse the Secretary-General's appeal and call upon all parties concerned "to exercise special restraint, to forego belligerence and to avoid all other actions which could increase tension, to allow the Council to deal with the underlying causes of the present crisis and to seek solutions." The full authority of the Council would thus be placed behind his appeal.

We believe from the context of the situation that, with respect to the particularly sensitive area of Aqaba, "foregoing belligerence" must mean foregoing any blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba during the breathing spell requested by the Secretary-General and permitting free and innocent passage of all nations and all flags through the Strait of Tiran to continue as it has during the last 10 years. This would enable the Council to deal with the situation deliberately and free of the threat of "dangerous consequences" which, as the Secretary-General says in his report, "could ensue from restricting innocent passage of ships in the Strait of Tiran."

But such an expression of support for the Secretary-General's appeal would only be the beginning of our task. If the momentum for peace thus generated is to endure, the Council must address itself in longer range terms to all three of the points of tension which the Secretary-General has identified in his report: the Gulf of Aqaba situation, the confrontation in the Gaza area and on the Syrian-Israeli frontier, and the problem of terrorism. Let me comment on each of these three matters in turn.

Concerning the Gulf of Aqaba, the basic view of the United States was stated on May 23 by President Johnson as follows:

The United States considers the Gulf to be an international waterway and feels that a blockade of Israeli shipping is illegal and potentially disastrous to the cause of peace. The right of free, innocent passage of the international waterway is a vital interest of the entire international community.

With respect to innocent passage through the Strait of Tiran, it must be said with all gravity that the issue over international rights in the Gulf and in the Strait cannot be solved by unilateral steps to change the *status quo* which has existed for more than 10 years and has made peace possible in the area throughout that period and which is in accordance with international law. Not only are the rights of immediate parties at stake but also the rights of all trading nations under international law.

Such law, indeed, has been expressed in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,⁵ to which many nations are parties. Article 16, paragraph 4, of that convention states that:

There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign State.

I should like to observe, Mr. President, that both the United States and the Soviet Union among others are parties to this convention and joined in the declaration of article 16.

We are all aware, of course, that the U.A.R. is a coastal state and possesses territorial sea along the shores of the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. However, it is only one of four such coastal states possessing territorial seas bordering on these waters.

We are aware of the claim of the U.A.R. to control shipping through its territorial sea in the Strait. But surely it is not in keeping with the spirit and obligations of the U.N. Charter for such a coastal state to embark unilaterally on measures of force to press its claim. For over 10 years the settlement made by the U.N. in 1957 has been the basis of a peaceful regime for the Strait and Gulf. If any state wishes to alter the *status quo*, it has a clear obligation under the charter to proceed by peaceful means. Article 33 is unmistakable in the obligation that it lays upon all members:

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of in-

ternational peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

It is particularly important that the long-established practice in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran not be disturbed during the period in which efforts are made under article 33 to deal with claims that have been raised. This, I repeat, is our specific understanding of the meaning, in the context of the Aqaba problem, of the Secretary-General's appeal to the parties "to exercise special restraint" and "to forego belligerence." Surely the stopping, searching, and preventing the passage of ships through the Strait would clearly fall in the category of acts against which this appeal is directed.

I turn now to the second highly sensitive problem mentioned by the Secretary-General—the military confrontation in the Gaza Strip and on the Syrian-Israeli frontier. This confrontation is obviously highly dangerous, particularly in the heavily populated area of the Gaza Strip. The next step for the Security Council in both areas should be to find practical means, through whatever United Nations machinery is readily available, to minimize the danger of a military clash along this line and to help the opposing forces to disengage. We have only to read the news bulletins which are even now coming in, with their reports of firing going on in Gaza, to realize how urgent action is on this problem.

Third, it is necessary to face other problems, such as, in the Secretary-General's words, "sabotage and terrorist activities and rights of cultivation in disputed areas in the Demilitarized Zone between Israel and Syria." The Security Council has many times called upon the parties to observe scrupulously the General Armistice Agreements with their strict prohibition of all hostile acts from the territory of any of the parties

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, June 30, 1958, p. 1111.

and to return to the normal operations of the armistice machinery.

Fourth, there is a final step we must take if we are to achieve a more lasting reduction of tension in the Near East. Effective steps must be taken to reaffirm the General Armistice Agreements and revitalize the armistice machinery.

Mr. President, this critical hour is no time for selling the United Nations short. Its resources are far greater than some suppose. The diplomatic arsenal is not confined to debate or the adoption of resolutions. It encompasses quiet diplomacy by the Secretary-General and the members, the good offices of member states, the use of intermediaries, and all the devices comprehended in article 33 of the charter.

Therefore, the United States looks beyond today's debate toward further effective steps by all concerned, in the highest tradition of this organization and the spirit of the charter, to save the peace in the Near East.

What we do here today, Mr. President, and in the days to come, will affect not only the peace of the Near East but the good name and standing of this great organization. The eyes of the world are, quite literally, upon us in this debate. Now, more than ever, world opinion expects the United Nations to live up to its promise of peace.

But the United Nations cannot be an abstract entity in the clouds. Its life and its vigor depend totally on certain very concrete entities here on earth—namely, the governments of member states. The issue of war or peace lies not in our stars, but in ourselves. It lies in whether or not we, the members, are sufficiently alive to our common humanity and our manifold common interests, including the vital interest each one of us has in the maintenance of peace in accordance with the charter.

If we are alive to these interests, then surely we shall find ways to transcend today's conflicts and to "harmonize the actions of nations" as the charter bids us do—and thus to win together the only victories truly worth having, which are victories for peace.

SECOND STATEMENT OF MAY 29

U.S./U.N. press release 74

Mr. President, I make a few remarks in the exercise of my right of reply to the comments by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador [Nikolai T.] Fedorenko.

I am quite content to allow the members of the Council to judge whose statements in tone and content on the agenda item displayed the most impartiality—my statement or Ambassador Fedorenko's. Indeed, the record will show that I stated in the same terms our commitment to respect the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations in the area, Arabic and Israeli alike, and our desire—fervent desire—to have good relations with all states of the Near East. I fail to notice any such even-handed reference in his remarks.

Also, it is rather interesting, in trying to talk about the agenda item, I referred only once to the Soviet Union and then only in the context of a factual statement that the Soviet Union had adhered to an international convention on freedom of the seas. On the contrary, Ambassador Fedorenko's statement was studded with pejorative statements about my country, statements which I reject as being totally without foundation.

This type of statement of our colleague, the distinguished Soviet Ambassador, contributes nothing to the just resolution of the grave problem before us. Conspicuous in that was virtually the total absence of reference to the Secretary-General's report, which virtually every other member of the Council pointed to as the best guideline we could have in determining where we are to go from here. The distinguished Ambassador's statement heats up the situation rather than cools it off. Such statements divert our attention from the problem at hand. They do not—and I say this most regretfully—advance our search for a reasonable, peaceful, and honorable settlement.

It is also a strange phenomenon that the Soviet representative always, in a speech of

this character, injects a totally irrelevant subject. In the introduction to his speech, he sought to bring into this Council for discussion Viet-Nam. And it is also a strange phenomenon that, although this is not the agenda item, it is an agenda item before the Council at the request of the United States, but the Soviet Union objects. If the Soviet representative were really agreeable not only to talk but to vote on the Viet-Nam problem in this Council and would withdraw his objection to the Council's consideration of the subject, I shall be very glad to accommodate him at any time.

[In a further right of reply to the Soviet representative, Ambassador Goldberg said.]

My colleague and friend, Ambassador Fedorenko, says that the meaning of our discussion is not clear. I should like to clarify it for him.

The United States is opposed to belligerent acts and violence by anyone in the Middle East, no matter what their political ideology or alignment may be. We respect their right to their own political systems and to make their own alignments.

We stand ready to endorse the Secretary-General's appeal to all the parties concerned "to exercise special restraint, to forego belligerence and to avoid all other actions which could increase tension, to allow the Council to deal with the underlying causes of the present crisis and to seek solutions." Can the Soviet Union say the same?

STATEMENT OF MAY 30

U.S./U.N. press release 75

I speak very briefly in the exercise of my right to reply. And I shall do so in terms of what I conceive the main function of this Council is at the present time, and that is not to say anything that might exacerbate a situation which is by common recognition very tense, very grave, very serious, and menacing to the cause of world peace and security.

Our distinguished colleague, Ambassador Tomeh [George J. Tomeh, of Syria], made

reference to the position of the United States in relation, as he put it, throughout the past to the question of the regrettably longstanding differences between Israel and the Arab states. The import of his remarks was that the United States in this matter has taken a one-sided position, has not been impartial, and has lined itself up invariably on the side of Israel, regardless of the merits of the particular dispute.

I should say to my distinguished friend that the record does not bear out that assertion. Indeed, without referring to the very ancient past, all we have to do is refer to the very recent past, the recollection of which is fresh in the minds of all of us. The very last action taken by this Security Council in reference to the problems in the Near East was taken on the complaint of Jordan against Israel, and the expressions of the United States and the vote of the United States on that occasion was cast against Israel in that particular matter.⁶

If I were to go to the very long distant past, I should recall to the members of this Council what I scarcely need recall: that on October 29, 1956, an historic day in the history of the United Nations, it was the United States standing against old friends and allies that brought the matter of the Suez crisis to the United Nations. And I shall leave to the judgment of the United Nations what the position of the United States was in that area.

I am not going to burden the record of this Council with the long history of the positions of the United States in this matter. I have it before me, and should the occasion arise, I would have no hesitancy in doing it. I have the record of every resolution that has been discussed and voted upon in this Council in relation to this troublesome area. And the record of those resolutions amply demonstrates the consistent attitude of the United States to let the chips fall where they may and to take the position which I asserted yesterday in defense of the political

⁶ For background, see *ibid.*, Dec. 26, 1966, p. 974.

and territorial integrity of every country in the Middle East.

It would be very illuminating to look at the record of the past and see where our country has stood in relation to the many, many problems which have arisen in this area. It is a record of evenhanded conduct between the parties. It is a one-sided record in the cause of peace in the area and in defense of the charter. That type of partisanship, I readily concede, we have. We are partisan in the interests of peace. We are partisan in the interests of pacifying the situation in the area. We are partisan in the interests of protecting the territorial integrity and the political independence of all member nations of the United Nations which have been received in this body and which are entitled to equal respect on the part of all of us.

And I do not apologize for the statements of Vice President Humphrey or any other American official who professes friendship for any member of the United Nations, because our country professes friendship for all countries of the United Nations.

I shall not, Mr. President, because the right of reply should be exercised, encumber the record with this longstanding position of the United States, which is sustained in the records both of the Security Council and the General Assembly in the interests of impartial consideration of this particular problem.

Now, I should like to say a word about what my friend, the distinguished and able representative of the United Arab Republic [Mohamed Awad El Kony], said in his remarks. I did not enter into a long legal discussion yesterday about the problem of the free and innocent passage in the Strait of Tiran, specifically because I made the point that I thought we had a short-range problem and a long-range problem. The short-range problem, I said, was restoration of the *status quo ante* which existed on the Strait, and which has existed for 11 years, so that the Council, enjoying the breathing spell, the cooling-off period, that the Secretary-General

has suggested, could consider the underlying problems so we could arrive at a fair, just, and honorable solution of these problems.

Therefore, I said, if the members of the Council will recall, that the long-range problem of the Gulf of Aqaba and free and innocent passage in the Strait of Tiran was a long-range problem and that it deserved and required the attention of the Council. And in my view of what we ought to do—and I still have that view—we ought to support the Secretary-General's appeal unanimously for a cooling-off period. And I again remind the members of the Council that the Secretary-General included in that appeal the avoidance of acts of belligerence.

And I said that I thought we ought to honor the request of the Secretary-General, just coming back from the area, as to what course of action was indicated at this time so that we could more deliberately proceed to deal with the long-range problem.

But my professional pride is somewhat touched by the reference of my distinguished friend, Ambassador El Kony, concerning the legal question involved. I am not going to take the time of the Council to discuss it. But I am going to say something very simple about it. And that is not what my views are but what the views of the Security Council have been on this subject of the assertion which the Ambassador has made on behalf of his country of belligerent rights with respect to the free and innocent passage in the Strait and in the Gulf.

As long ago as 1951, the Council expressed itself on the subject of whether belligerent rights could be asserted in light of the Armistice Agreement which this Council has always endorsed between the parties to the dispute, Israel and the Arabic states. And that resolution⁷ contained the following passage:

Considering that since the Armistice regime, which has been in existence for nearly two and a half years, is of a permanent character, neither party can reasonably assert that it is actively a belligerent. . . .

⁷ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 17, 1951, p. 479.

Now, this is a fundamental principle which, when we address ourselves to the substance, I think we will have to talk about, because I also notice in the Secretary-General's report—a report which I noted from Cairo—about a desire on the part of the U.A.R. to reaffirm the validity of the General Armistice Agreement.

And here, too, it must be remembered we are equalhanded, because I should like in fairness to also recall that at various times the State of Israel has not always recognized the complete validity of the Armistice Agreement, saying on its part that the other side does not recognize the validity of the Armistice Agreement as a whole.

That is something I think we ought to discuss. I can state the position of my own Government. The position of my Government has always been consistently—and remains today—that since there is an Armistice Agreement which this organization has endorsed and which this organization was the principal architect of, neither side therefore has the right to exercise belligerent rights. That is the legal position which I assert.

Again, I apologize to this Council. As I said, my professional pride was slightly touched. I did not intend to enter upon a substantive argument at this point. I think we will have to consider that when we embark upon the necessary tasks of rebuilding the framework of the General Armistice Agreements. And obviously, when we do, we have to come to grips with the fundamental question, and that fundamental question which may be basic to the whole question in the area is: How does anybody assert rights of conducting war against anybody else if there is an armistice? How does anybody assert belligerent rights if there is an armistice?

That is the question that we will have a chance to talk about. I am sure Ambassador El Kony will want to say something more on that subject. It is a complicated legal subject. It does not permit adequate exploration in even the brief statement that I have made. And I did not want to make a legal argu-

ment yesterday. Yesterday I was trying simply to say: Let us do first things first. Let us have a cooling-off period. Let us restore the *status quo ante*. Let us then proceed upon the solemn task of rebuilding and revitalizing and reaffirming the Armistice Agreements.

STATEMENT OF MAY 31

U.S./U.N. press release 76

I have asked to speak briefly in order to table a resolution⁸ for the consideration of the Council. This resolution is simple and reads as follows:

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General in Document S/7906,

Having heard the statements of the parties,

Concerned at the gravity of the situation in the Middle East,

Noting that the Secretary-General has in his report expressed the view that "a peaceful outcome to the present crisis will depend upon a breathing spell which will allow tension to subside from its present explosive level", and that he therefore urged "all the parties concerned to exercise special restraint, to forego belligerence and to avoid all other actions which could increase tension, to allow the Council to deal with the underlying causes of the present crisis and to seek solutions",

1. *Calls on* all the parties concerned as a first step to comply with the Secretary-General's appeal,

2. *Encourages* the immediate pursuit of international diplomacy in the interests of pacifying the situation and seeking reasonable, peaceful and just solutions,

3. *Decides* to keep this issue under urgent and continuous review so that the Council may determine what further steps it might take in the exercise of its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security.

It is obvious that this is an interim resolution. It simply endorses the Secretary-General's appeal for a breathing spell in order, in his words, to "allow tension to subside from its present explosive level" and to gain time in which "to seek, and eventually to find, reasonable, peaceful and just solutions."

To this end the resolution urges all parties to exercise the restraint necessary so as

⁸ U.N. doc. S/7916.

to allow both this Council and international diplomacy to pursue the further steps required to de-fuse the situation and move toward peace.

Mr. President, in offering this resolution at this time, my delegation is conscious of the fact that it is now 1 week since the Council first met in the present crisis. Our meeting today is the fourth in this series of meetings, during which all of us—the members of the Council and the parties to the dispute—have had the opportunity to state our respective positions. Five days ago the Secretary-General returned from his arduous mission to Cairo. Four days ago his report was circulated to the Council, in which he said that his major concern at this critical juncture was “to gain time in order to lay the basis for a detente.”

The events since then have certainly underscored the urgency which the Secretary-General expressed to us last Friday in his report. To be sure, in my statement to the Council on Monday I was able to refer to a brief and welcome respite which had been obtained by diplomatic efforts in which my country actively participated. Nevertheless, I was obliged to emphasize that the crisis had not substantially eased, tension remained great, and the timespan in which to avert a clash was short. These remarks regrettably still hold true today.

The Security Council in a world body of 122 members is a relatively small and compact body, designedly so under the charter. It is charged in article 24 of the charter with “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” Let us not forget the reason, which is made expressly clear in the same article. It is, to quote the charter: “In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations. . . .”

To that end the United States believes the Council ought, step by step, to take the necessary decisions in this extremely grave and important matter. The resolution which we now submit reflects the first step which, in our view, the Council should take. The measures which we propose in this interim

resolution are designed, in the spirit of the Secretary-General’s report, to insure a cooling-off period in the Near East without prejudice to the ultimate rights or claims of any party. This will afford the necessary time for more deliberate disposition of the underlying issues.

It is not our intention, in offering this interim resolution, to attempt in any way to evade or delay the exercise by the Council of its responsibility to seek solutions to the underlying causes of the present crisis. On the contrary, our aim is to gain time and to create a climate in which such solutions can be sought under more favorable conditions.

Indeed, our resolution takes into account the fact that the Council has two types of responsibilities. In addition to its responsibility to avert an imminent clash, it has also the responsibility conferred by chapter VI of the charter, and described in the Secretary-General’s words, “to seek, and eventually to find, reasonable, peaceful and just solutions.”

And corresponding responsibilities lie also, under the charter, on every member state in the international community—to support our common effort in the United Nations to achieve peace and security in the Near East.

Mr. President, there is one great issue in the balance here today: the issue of keeping the peace in the Near East, with all that that implies for world security. But we in this Council must also recognize that we face another issue as well: the issue of the potency and efficacy of the United Nations.

The 21-year record of the Security Council contains numerous instances of historic decisions: decisions by which we, the members, were able to “harmonize our actions,” as the charter says, sufficiently to save the world from the scourge of war. We have proved that we have the capacity to serve the purpose assigned to us by the charter. The issue now is whether we have the courage, the resolution, and the vision to exercise that capacity.

Mr. President, it must be candidly acknowledged that we have many conflicting interests represented at this table. But we have one overriding common interest, which

is peace. I suspect that a detached observer, following these proceedings, will be watching, above all, to see whether partisan concerns and narrow interests can be subordinated to our overriding common interest in peace.

Mr. President, I earnestly commend this draft resolution to the attention of the Council.

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. and Hong Kong Amend Cotton Textile Agreement

The Department of State announced on May 31 (press release 122) that the United States-Hong Kong bilateral cotton textile agreement, signed in Hong Kong on August 26, 1966,¹ was amended on May 31 at Hong Kong by an exchange of diplomatic notes.²

The amendment resulted from the recent decision of the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] Cotton Textile Committee to extend the Long-Term Arrangement on international trade in cotton textiles (the LTA) for an additional 3 years, a decision which both Governments supported. It also concludes discussion between the U.S. and Hong Kong regarding the coverage of certain products under the bilateral agreement. Hong Kong will extend its system of export control so that all items which are by major weight or by chief value cotton textiles will be subject to the limitations of the agreement.

Other major features of the amendment are as follows:

1. The aggregate limit in the 1966 agreement is increased. For the second agreement year (October 1, 1966-September 30, 1967) the increase is 5 million square yards, making

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 26, 1966, p. 468.

² For text of the U.S. note, see Department of State press release 122 dated May 31.

the total 343,625,000 square yards equivalent. For the third agreement year (October 1, 1967-September 30, 1968) the increase is 15 million square yards so that the aggregate limit, including growth, will be 371,306,250 square yards equivalent.

2. Group and certain specific limits are also increased.

3. Hong Kong is permitted to carry over shortfalls from year to year of up to 5 percent of the aggregate and applicable group and specific limits.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962. Entered into force December 27, 1963. TIAS 5505.

Accession deposited: Jamaica, May 3, 1967.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964.¹

Ratification deposited: Ireland, May 10, 1967.

Fisheries

International convention for the conservation of Atlantic tunas. Done at Rio de Janeiro May 14, 1966.²

Ratification deposited: United States, May 18, 1967.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044). Adopted at London September 15, 1964.²

Acceptances received: Brazil, November 17, 1966; Finland, January 17, 1967; Indonesia, October 11, 1966; Israel, February 6, 1967; Lebanon, February 15, 1967; Mauritania, November 1, 1966; Philippines, October 31, 1966; Switzerland, January 9, 1967; Trinidad and Tobago, November 24, 1966.

Publications

Convention concerning the international exchange of publications. Adopted at Paris December 3, 1958. Entered into force November 23, 1961.¹

Ratified by the President: May 24, 1967.

Convention concerning the exchange of official publications and government documents between states, and procès-verbal relating thereto. Adopted at Paris December 3, 1958. Entered into force November 23, 1961.¹

Ratified by the President: May 24, 1967.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly December 21, 1965.²

Signature: Venezuela, April 21, 1967.

Ratifications deposited: Cyprus, April 21, 1967; Hungary (with reservation and statement), May 4, 1967; Niger, April 27, 1967; United Arab Republic (with reservation), May 1, 1967.

Slavery

Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade and institutions and practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva September 7, 1956. Entered into force April 30, 1957.¹

Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, May 1, 1967.

Space

Treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. Opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow January 27, 1967.²

Ratified by the President: May 24, 1967.

United Nations

Amendment to article 109 of the Charter of the United Nations of June 26, 1945, as amended (59 Stat. 1031, TIAS 5857). Adopted at New York December 20, 1965.²

Ratification deposited: Hungary, May 4, 1967.

Wheat

1967 Protocol for the further extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open for signature at Washington May 15 through June 1, 1967, inclusive.²

Signatures: Argentina, May 29, 1967; Australia, May 25, 1967; Belgium and Luxembourg, May 29, 1967;³ Brazil, May 25, 1967; Canada, Costa Rica, June 1, 1967; Cuba, May 31, 1967; El Salvador, June 1, 1967; Finland, May 29, 1967; France, May 26, 1967; Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, May 31,

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

³ Signed in name of Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union.

⁴ With a statement.

1967; India, June 1, 1967; Ireland, May 25, 1967; Israel, May 31, 1967; Korea, Lebanon, June 1, 1967; Mexico, May 26, 1967; Netherlands, Norway, June 1, 1967; Peru, May 17, 1967; Portugal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, June 1, 1967; Southern Rhodesia, May 26, 1967; Sweden, May 31, 1967; Switzerland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, June 1, 1967;⁴ United Arab Republic, May 15, 1967; United Kingdom, May 26, 1967; United States, May 31, 1967; Vatican City, May 29, 1967; Venezuela, June 1, 1967; Western Samoa, May 31, 1967.

BILATERAL

Honduras

Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio operators of either country to operate their stations in the other country. Effected by exchange of notes at Tegucigalpa December 29, 1966, January 24 and April 17, 1967. Entered into force April 17, 1967.

Correction

The Editor of the BULLETIN wishes to call attention to a printer's error in the issue of May 29, 1967, p. 828. In Secretary Rusk's statement on the Foreign Assistance Program for 1968, the fourth sentence in the first full paragraph in the second column, p. 828, should read:

"And it is worth noting that the fiscal year 1968 Foreign Assistance Act request, along with other foreign assistance requests such as Peace Corps, Public Law 480, and contributions to the International Development Association, total less than .7 percent of our GNP."

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of

the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Canada
 President Johnson Confers With Canadian Prime Minister (Johnson, Pearson) . . . 908
 President Johnson Visits EXPO 67 at Montreal (Johnson) 907

Department and Foreign Service
 Humanity's Greatest Need—International Conference on Water for Peace, Washington, D.C., May 23-31 (Johnson, Rusk) 902
 Science, Foreign Affairs, and the State Department (Pollack) 910

Economic Affairs
 U.S. and Hong Kong Amend Cotton Textile Agreement 929
 U.S.—Mexican Fishery Talks Held at Washington (joint statement) 919

Health U.S. To Aid WHO in Developing Drug Reaction Reporting System 918

Hong Kong U.S. and Hong Kong Amend Cotton Textile Agreement 929

International Organizations and Conferences
 Humanity's Greatest Need—International Conference on Water for Peace, Washington, D.C., May 23-31 (Johnson, Rusk) 902
 U.S. To Aid WHO in Developing Drug Reaction Reporting System 918

Iran Letters of Credence (Ansary) 909

Japan President Johnson Greets Japanese Governors (Johnson) 917

Mexico U.S.—Mexican Fishery Talks Held at Washington (joint statement) 919

Near East
 President Johnson Confers With Canadian Prime Minister (Johnson, Pearson) 908
 U.N. Security Council Continues Consideration of the Crisis in the Near East (Goldberg) 920

Presidential Documents
 Humanity's Greatest Need—International Conference on Water for Peace, Washington, D.C., May 23-31 902
 President Johnson Confers With Canadian Prime Minister 908
 President Johnson Greets Japanese Governors 917
 President Johnson Visits EXPO 67 at Montreal 907
 Sacrifices in Viet-Nam Marked in Memorial Day Messages 917
 U.S. To Aid WHO in Developing Drug Reaction Reporting System 918

Science
 Humanity's Greatest Need—International Conference on Water for Peace, Washington, D.C., May 23-31 (Johnson, Rusk) 902
 Science, Foreign Affairs, and the State Department (Pollack) 910

Treaty Information
 Current Actions 929
 U.S. and Hong Kong Amend Cotton Textile Agreement 929

United Nations U.N. Security Council Continues Consideration of the Crisis in the Near East (Goldberg) 920

Viet-Nam
 President Johnson Confers With Canadian Prime Minister (Johnson, Pearson) . . . 908
 Sacrifices in Viet-Nam Marked in Memorial Day Messages (Johnson, Thieu) 917

Water for Peace Humanity's Greatest Need—International Conference on Water for Peace, Washington, D.C., May 23-31 (Johnson, Rusk) 902

Name Index

Ansary, Hushang 909
 Goldberg, Arthur J 920
 Johnson, President . . . 902, 907, 908, 917, 918
 Pearson, Lester B 908
 Pollack, Herman 910
 Rusk, Secretary 902
 Thieu, Nguyen Van 917

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 29-June 4

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to May 29 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 115 of May 22 and 117 of May 25.

No.	Date	Subject
†120	5/29	Katzenbach: "America and Africa: The New World and the Newer World" (revised).
121	5/31	Rusk: Water for Peace Conference.
122	5/31	U.S.—Hong Kong bilateral cotton textile agreement amended (rewrite).
*123	5/31	Program for visit of Prime Minister of Australia.
*124	6/2	Program for visit of Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.
*125	6/2	Linowitz: commencement address, Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass., June 3 (excerpts).
†126	6/2	U.S.—Mexico cotton textile agreement (rewrite).
*127	6/2	Program for visit of King Bhumibol Adulyadej of Thailand.
*128	6/2	Program for visit of President of Malawi.
*129	6/3	Katzenbach: commencement address, Smith College, Northampton, Mass., June 4.
†130	6/3	U.S. reply to Soviet note concerning incident at Cam Pha.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE
DEPARTMENT
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BULLETIN

Vol. LVI, No. 1461



June 26, 1967

THE SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST

White House Statement on the Outbreak of Hostilities 949

Statements by Secretary Rusk at White House News Briefings 949

*Statements by Ambassador Goldberg in the U.N. Security Council
and Texts of Cease-Fire Resolutions* 934

*Statement by President Johnson on the Establishment
of a Special Committee of the National Security Council* 951

Exchange of Letters Between President Johnson and Senator Mansfield 951

AMERICA AND AFRICA: THE NEW WORLD AND THE NEWER WORLD

Address at Addis Ababa by Under Secretary Katzenbach 954

U.N. Security Council Demands a Cease-Fire in the Near East

Following are the major statements made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative Arthur J. Goldberg during the Council's consideration of the crisis in the Near East June 6-9, together with texts of the three resolutions adopted by the Council during that period and two U.S. draft resolutions submitted on May 31 and June 8.

FIRST STATEMENT OF JUNE 6

U.S./U.N. press release 80

In the resolution¹ just adopted the Security Council, acting in the exercise of its responsibilities under the charter, has issued a clear call for an end to the hostilities in the Near East. This resolution is a first step on the road back toward peace. It carries the full authority of the United Nations. It is now the duty of all the parties concerned to comply fully and promptly with the terms of this resolution. It is equally the duty of every member of the United Nations to support the implementation of the resolution by the full weight of its influence.

The resolution itself, as all members of the Council know, is the result of intensive political efforts here at the United Nations during the past 36 hours, under the leadership of our President and by various governments and their distinguished representatives here. It reflects a successful harmonizing of our respective points of view toward a single goal: to quench the flames of war in the Near East and to begin to move toward peace in the area.

This resolution, with its appeal for a cease-fire, calls for precisely the action which my

delegation has been urging since we met to consider the outbreak of hostilities yesterday morning. Indeed, Mr. President, it is consistent with the spirit in which we have approached every stage of this crisis. We have throughout supported every effort by our distinguished Secretary-General to maintain the peace in the area and sought to the best of our ability to exercise a restraining influence on the parties concerned. We have expressed willingness to join in the search for peace here in the United Nations and by our own diplomatic efforts as well.

Regrettably, our efforts and those of many others, including the Secretary-General, to prevent a war ended in failure. When that was apparent, my Government considered that the first and foremost urgent step was to put an end to the tragic bloodshed by bringing an immediate halt to the hostilities. For this reason, the United States and other members for the past 36 hours vigorously urged as a first step the adoption of a resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire by all the governments concerned.

We deeply regret that so much time has been lost in the process. However, it is gratifying that other members of the Council have now reached the same conclusion and that we can now issue a unanimous appeal to the parties to lay down their arms. It is our fervent hope that the Council's appeal will be immediately and fully complied with.

We believe that a cease-fire represents the urgent first step in restoring peace to the Near East. Once this is accomplished, Mr. President, my delegation believes that the Council should then turn its immediate attention to the other steps that will be required to achieve a more lasting peace.

¹ U.N. doc. S/233 (1967).

Mr. President, in that approach my country's policy remains as President Johnson stated it on May 23d in these words: ²

To the leaders of all the nations of the Near East, I wish to say what three American Presidents have said before me—that the United States is firmly committed to the support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of that area. . . .

The United States has consistently sought to have good relations with all the states of the Near East. Regrettably, this has not always been possible, but we are convinced that our differences with individual states of the area and their differences with each other must be worked out peacefully and in accordance with accepted international practice.

It was our concern about this, Mr. President, that brought us to this Council very early and prompted us in a series of efforts here to avert what has occurred. In implementation of this policy directed to all countries in the Near East, when the fires have been dampened and tension reduced, we stand ready to join in efforts to bring a lasting peace to the area, in which cooperative programs for the economic and social development of all countries of the region would be an integral part.

Before concluding, Mr. President, it is my duty to speak of a specific matter related to the position I have just reiterated. During the past 24 hours, fantastic allegations have been made about United States aircraft being involved in the hostilities in the Near East. These allegations are totally without foundation in fact. They are made up out of whole cloth.

I take this opportunity in the Security Council, on the complete authority of the United States Government, to deny them categorically without any ifs, ands, or buts.³ Indeed, yesterday morning, June 5, within hours after first hearing such charges, my Government denied them in a formal statement issued by the Department of Defense which I now quote:

There have been reports that United States aircraft from aircraft carriers assigned to the 6th Fleet have flown to Israeli airfields. Other reports

² For text, see BULLETIN of June 12, 1967, p. 870.

³ For a statement by Secretary Rusk, see p. 950.

U.S. Welcomes the "First Step" Toward Peace in the Near East

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release dated June 6

The cease-fire vote of the Security Council opens a very hopeful path away from danger in the Middle East. It reflects responsible concern for peace on the part of all who voted for it. The United States has warmly supported this resolution. We hope the parties directly concerned will promptly act upon it. We believe that a cease-fire is the necessary "first step," in the words of the resolution itself, a first step toward what we all must hope will be a new time of settled peace and progress for all the peoples of the Middle East.

It is toward this end that we shall now strive.

have stated that 6th Fleet aircraft have participated in air activity elsewhere in the area of conflict. All such reports are erroneous. All 6th Fleet aircraft are and have been several hundred miles from the area of conflict.

Mr. President, charges of this sort at a time like this cannot be treated lightly. They are in the category of a cry of "Fire!" in a crowded theater. They have been used in the overt incitement of mob violence against American diplomatic and other installations in several Arab states. These false reports—on the motives for which I do not wish to speculate—have been propagated in a highly inflammable situation.

In these circumstances, my Government considers it necessary to take prompt steps to prevent the further spread of these dangerous falsehoods. With this in mind, I am authorized to announce in this Council and propose two concrete measures:

The United States is prepared, first, to cooperate in an immediate impartial investigation of these charges by the United Nations and to offer all facilities to the United Nations in this investigation.

And, second, as a part of or in addition to such an investigation, the United States is prepared to invite United Nations personnel

aboard our aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean today, tomorrow, or at the convenience of the United Nations to serve as impartial observers of the activities of our planes in the area and to verify the past activities of our planes from our official records and from the log that each ship carries. These observers, in addition, will be free to interview air crews on these carriers without inhibition so as to determine their activities during the days in question. Their presence as observers on these carriers will be welcomed throughout the period of this crisis and so long as these ships are in the eastern waters of the Mediterranean.

In the meantime, I ask any government interested in peace to see to it that these false and inflammatory charges are given no further credence by any source within its control.

Mr. President, in conclusion let me commend to every state the Council's resolution just adopted: Our duty now, as member states bound by the charter, is to place all the influence at the command of our respective governments behind the fulfillment of the decision unanimously arrived at by the Council. Properly carried out, this resolution will be a major step toward peace and security in the Near East and will provide a point of reference from which to resolve underlying problems in a spirit of justice and equity.

SECOND STATEMENT OF JUNE 6

U.S./U.N. press release 81

Mr. President, I am impelled to exercise this right of reply to the statement just made by the distinguished Foreign Minister of Iraq [Adnan Pachachi], who is a man well known to all of us and who deservedly enjoys a very great and eminent reputation here at the United Nations. Nevertheless, I must reject as completely unfounded what he has just said. And I should like to do that by reference to the record, which is well known to every member of this Council.

The United States took the lead of all countries on this Council to attempt several weeks ago to bring this matter before the Council so that this Council in the exercise of its responsibilities could take the action necessary to prevent any—and I emphasize “any”—warlike action in the Middle East. Our record in this respect is a clear and plain record of what we did.

I should like to recall to the members of this Council that when we joined in this effort, there were members of this Council who took the position that we were attempting to dramatize the situation, that everything was all right, that it was not necessary for the Council to take any action, that things were tranquil, that all we had to do was sit by and let events happen.

We had a great Governor of this very State, Governor Al Smith, and his very favorite expression was: “Let us look at the record.” And now I shall recall the record, since our attitude is brought into question.

Incidents broke out in the Near East on May 5 and May 8. These incidents were reported by Security Council documents by our distinguished Secretary-General in the most objective terms, which is characteristic of him, on May 11 and May 13. What was the response of my Government? I should like to read what was issued on May 15th:

The United States strongly supports the efforts of the Secretary-General on behalf of the United Nations to maintain peace in the Middle East. We share his concern about the situation, as expressed in his recent statements of May 11th and May 13th, and are distressed over reports of increased tension and military preparations.

Diplomatic efforts on the part of my Government in support of the Secretary-General's appeals are now underway, and we hope the response to his efforts will be positive.

May I interject at this point that in our diplomatic efforts we went to all important capitals, including all of the countries concerned, with a fervent plea for restraint in the situation, a plea to avoid all threats and acts of force.

On May 18—and we were fairly lonely at this time, except for a few others—I made a

statement on behalf of my Government at that time, after visiting the Secretary-General and hearing at firsthand a report from him on his concerns, which he elaborated in his reports of May 11th and May 13th.

I should like to read you what I said publicly on that occasion: ⁴

The Secretary-General and I reviewed the present situation in the Middle East. I expressed the deep concern of the United States over reports of increased tension and military movements in the area.

On the same day, I met with the press here at the U.N. Building, after meeting with the Secretary-General, and this is what I said: ⁴

We are concerned, as I have said, over reports of increased tension and military movements in the area, and we would hope very much that the situation would stabilize. . . . I know of no other subject at the moment that is of greater concern. . . .

On May 19 I again made a statement of a public character, and I repeat that statement:

The United States fully shares the serious misgivings expressed by the Secretary-General in his letter of May 18 about the effect of the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force in the present tense situation in the Middle East and his expression of belief that UNEF has been an important factor in maintaining relative quiet in the area. We deeply regret the developments that are taking place. . . .

In the light of today's developments we are giving urgent consideration, in consultation with others, to the further steps that might be required in support of peace and the role of the United Nations in preserving it in the Middle East.

On May 20, when the Secretary-General announced his decision—a welcome decision—to proceed on an arduous mission to Cairo in the interest of peace in the area, I issued a formal statement on behalf of my Government as follows: ⁵

In light of the extreme gravity of the current situation in the Middle East and the state of tension prevailing there, the United States greatly welcomes the decision of the Secretary-General to travel to that area in an effort to assure peace. . . .

We note with great concern the Secretary-Gen-

⁴ For transcript of Ambassador Goldberg's news conference of May 18, see U.S./U.N. press release 61.

⁵ For text, see U.S./U.N. press release 64 dated May 20.

eral's report today to the Security Council warning that the situation is more menacing than at any time since the fall of 1956. We share this concern. . . .

On May 23 I made this statement here in New York: ⁶

We have been consulting intensively with other members over the last several days, since the crisis first arose, to determine in what way the Security Council could best contribute to the cause of peace in the area. We entirely agree that the time has now come, in the light of the gravity of the circumstances, for the Security Council to discharge its primary responsibility under the charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Then we had a meeting of the Security Council [May 24]. Some members here resisted a meeting because they said the Secretary-General was on his mission. We had said we did not want to do anything in any way to prejudice the result of the Secretary-General's mission, but nevertheless, in light of the increased tension in the area, we supported the effort made by Canada and Denmark to call a meeting to support the efforts of the Secretary-General. At that meeting I said this on behalf of my Government: ⁷

It has been said, for example, that one of the possibly adverse effects of a discussion at this time would be to dramatize a situation better left quiet. Mr. President, this Council would have to be burying its head in the sand if it refused to recognize the threat to peace implicit in the developments which have occurred since our distinguished Secretary-General left New York 2 days ago. It is precisely because of these developments, not known to him nor to any member of the Council, that we have been called here today urgently to consider what the Council ought to do in discharge of its responsibility to further his efforts and not to impede them.

Mr. President, this Council meeting cannot dramatize a situation which at this moment is at the central stage of world concern. It can, however, play a role, hopefully, in drawing a curtain on a tragedy which potentially threatens the peace and well-being of all people in the area and, indeed, of all mankind. . . .

⁶ For text, see U.S./U.N. press release 68 dated May 23.

⁷ For text, see U.S./U.N. press release 69 dated May 24.

On May 24, in the Security Council, I said:⁸

The United States strongly supported the request by Canada and Denmark last evening for an immediate meeting of the Security Council. We did so out of our grave concern over the sharp increase of tension between Israel and her Arab neighbors since the Secretary-General's departure and out of our belief that the Secretary-General should be accorded all possible support in the difficult peace mission on which he is now embarked.

And then I added:

. . . since the Secretary-General made his report—indeed, in the 2 days since he departed for Cairo—conditions in the area have taken a still more menacing turn. . . . This had led us to the belief that the Council, in the exercise of its responsibilities, should meet without delay and take steps to relieve tension in the area. . . .

Great powers have both interests and responsibilities in this matter—and the greater the power, the greater the responsibility.

On May 29 I said in this Council, after the return of our distinguished Secretary-General:⁹

This grave appeal from the Secretary-General has lost none of its relevance since his report was issued. A blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba has been announced. Armies stand within sight of each other on the armistice lines between Israel, Syria, and Egypt, including the Gaza Strip. Incidents have occurred resulting in casualties, some of which have been reported today. Thus the dangers in these three areas, which the Secretary-General has rightly identified as the most sensitive of all, remain at their height. Passions are still high and the need for utmost restraint on both sides has in no way abated.

On May 30, in this Council, I said this:

(The) situation . . . is by common recognition very tense, very grave, very serious, and menacing to the cause of world peace and security.

On May 31—and I am referring to events all of which transpired before the outbreak of hostilities—I said this:

The events since then have certainly underscored the urgency which the Secretary-General expressed to us last Friday in his report.

⁸ For text, see BULLETIN of June 12, 1967, p. 871.

⁹ For statements made by Ambassador Goldberg on May 29, 30, and 31, see *ibid.*, June 19, 1967, p. 920.

Then on June 3 I said this:¹⁰

The Secretary-General in his appeal, in this grave situation, has made an appeal to all concerned for restraint. The United States is supporting this appeal.

Mr. President, I am sorry to burden you with this recital of the position of my Government, but one thing I want to make crystal clear: It is not compatible with the statement that has been made that the United States in any way contributed to the cause of tension in the area. Quite the contrary, the United States, conscious of what the Secretary-General had called to our attention, has devoted every means at the disposal of our Government, public and private, in the interests of restraint in the area. We have gone diplomatically to Israel and the Arab states and have urged since May 15—when we had the Secretary-General's report before us—restraint and pacific settlement.

We, along with others, made every effort to get this Security Council to exercise its own responsibilities in the area. We are one of the members of the Security Council—only one; we cannot order its deliberations. The picture of a country egging someone on is scarcely compatible with our record of urging this Council to take action which we at all times supported—and have supported today—to urge all parties—I emphasize “all parties”—to refrain from force and to follow the charter prescription to settle disputes by peaceful means.

More than that, any allegation that the United States has given in this circumstance “massive assistance to Israel”—and I quote the distinguished Foreign Minister—is completely and entirely without foundation. What we have done is to urge restraint. Every communication, public and private, has been directed to this end.

I regret very much, Mr. President, that this Council did not heed our advice. Under the charter, we did not have to wait, as we pointed out in our presentation to the Coun-

¹⁰ For text, see U.S./U.N. press release 78 dated June 3.

cil, until a breach of peace occurred. The charter talks about "threats to the peace," and it was our considered judgment, based on events which were reported by the Secretary-General, that the Council should exercise its collective judgment, collective responsibility, collective power, in the interests of restraining all of the parties and bringing about a peaceful composition and averting the tragedy of war.

This is the record of the attitude of my country in this matter. It is a record not of partisanship; it is a record of sober responsibility; it is a record of attempting to work through the United Nations, the organ that we created for this purpose. It is a record also of exerting all diplomatic means at the disposal of my country to avoid what has occurred in the last few days.

So I cannot accept the concept that the United States, which took the lead even to the extent of offering a resolution before this Council for a breathing spell,¹¹ is in any way to be charged with having fomented and encouraged anything that occurred. It is just inconsistent with the facts—which are a matter of public record, as well as a matter of private record—known to all the Arab states involved in this conflict, as well as to Israel. Those communications were widespread so as to exercise by diplomatic means everything we could do to restrain what the Secretary-General pointed out was the most grave and menacing situation in the Middle East that we have faced since the Suez crisis.

Therefore, Mr. President, I only regret—and I say this without recrimination—that our appeals, diplomatically and to this Council, were not heeded. I only regret that there were members of this Council that took the position that we were artificially dramatizing a situation which already at that time was the most dramatic on the world scene and which today has resulted in the catastrophe of which we spoke.

¹¹ U.N. doc. S/7916; for a statement by Ambassador Goldberg on May 31, see BULLETIN of June 19, 1967, p. 927.

I say this—and I say it in all friendship for all who have spoken: It is not good, it is not good, to take a position which lays to our country a position which our country does not hold and which the facts belie and which cannot be supported.

But something more is involved. It has been a basic conception of the United States, as a principal supporter of the United Nations, and as one of its founders, that this organization had a responsibility to avert the catastrophe. And it was our effort to get this Council to discharge that responsibility which brought us here. In the negotiations which have taken place we made every attempt to do everything we could to urge restraint, and we shall continue to do so in light of the Council's resolution which has been passed today.

Mr. President, I would not like by any thought of omission to indicate that we do not, with the greatest regret, the greatest sorrow, share the views of my other colleagues about the deaths of members of the UNEF contingents of India and Brazil. We believe in peacekeeping. We think those brave soldiers paid a supreme sacrifice for their dedication to the United Nations. We express this regret now, and my Government at the highest levels is expressing its regrets to the heads of state. We think that this is a regrettable and sorrowful chapter in the history of the United Nations. And we have no hesitancy in condemning those responsible. We think that the lives of those soldiers are the first priority for all men who believe in the great peacekeeping effort of the United Nations.

Mr. President, I would say this: My country desires, as I have said, good relations with all. We try to have good relations with all. Good relations are not going to be the products of statements which are not founded upon fact. Indeed, I, in this Council, conscious of some documents that have been circulated, categorically stated on the highest authority of my Government that if there was any doubt about the position of the

United States with respect to any regime, whatever its ideology, in the Middle East, I wanted to lay that doubt to rest.

The passage which I read today—and have read three times—stands: We respect the territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the Middle East. It has been our consistent policy. We believe in it. We believe in the spirit of friendship for all of the countries concerned. That is our position. That remains our position. It is not changed by anything that has been said, because it represents the fundamental policy of our country.

Finally, Mr. President, when the historical record of this period is written, the United States will yield to no one in what it did through private channels to urge everybody to exercise restraint in this situation. We have worked day and night in this Council and outside this Council. We have accepted every suggestion that has been made by members of this Council to try to compose this situation. And I repeat the offer I made earlier—I know of no similar offer that has been made in the history of the United Nations—to admit on naval vessels of the United States, in terms of intimacy and confidence, the representatives of the United Nations, with complete access to verify the peaceful activities of the United States in this situation.

[In a further intervention Ambassador Goldberg said:]

I cannot allow to stand unchallenged a few of the statements by the distinguished Ambassador of Syria, Ambassador [George J.] Tomeh, to this group.

First of all, he purports to give me legal advice about my competency to sit on this Council. In this he joins the company of others who have been attempting to give me legal advice during the course of these debates. Well, I have heard the legal advice, and it sounds as if it comes from someone not admitted to the practice of law.

I have before me the agenda which has been adopted unanimously. I do not find on the agenda any complaint against the United

States. Syria is always welcome to lodge an agenda item, which can be discussed at the proper time.

Now, I can only conclude that Mr. Tomeh's speech was written before I made my categorical denial of American participation—military or otherwise—in this regrettable conflict which is going on now. And I shall say again for his information, for the information of this Council, and for the information of his countrymen that there are no United States carrier planes, no military aircraft, no military forces, carrying volunteers or anything else, involved in this conflict.

Now, we have an old American slang saying—I don't apply it to him, Mr. President—that when you are involved in a situation where your veracity is challenged you "Put up or shut up." Now, we have put up before this Council the very simple method to test the accuracy of statements which are taken out of whole cloth; and that is through the instrumentality of this organization. We have issued an invitation to this organization to provide observers in order to verify the accuracy of these unfounded statements. They will receive the greatest welcome from our country. I think that is the best proof that I could possibly offer concerning this extremely inflammatory and totally unfounded statement concerning the United States.

There is a statement which I must reject with great emphasis, because it relates to the essential fabric of our society; and that is a statement charging that any citizen of the United States has double loyalty to his country because he has attachments to his ancestral home. That is the implication, I take it, of the Ambassador's remark.

Our country is a pluralistic society. We draw our citizenry from virtually every country on the face of the globe. This is the source of our strength as a nation from which we derive the virility of American life in our culture, in our institutions, in our traditions, in all that we do. We do not accept the concept that because our citizens, whatever their faith or religion or ancestral origin may be, have an interest in their

ancestral homes, this is a sign of double loyalty or lack of attachment to our American institutions.

I served in President Kennedy's administration. One of the finest features of that administration in terms of world interest was the visit he made to his ancestral home. That was applauded by all Americans, regardless of their faith or of their religion or their traditions or their background.

I regret that Ambassador Tomeh does not understand our country, although he has lived here a long time. Our citizens are loyal to our country, and his references to the attitudes of our citizens, as I said the other day, are completely out of order. I would have challenged that statement and asked for a ruling that it is out of order, but I thought we ought to hear him out, because I believe profoundly in free speech for any member of the United Nations. But I do wish to state that it is untenable for members of the United Nations to intervene in our domestic affairs. That we reject as completely untenable. We would not presume to do that with respect to any country in the world. We would not presume to do it with respect to his country, which has several elements of religion and tradition. We simply cannot accept it as the appropriate thing to say about our country, and we do not accept it.

As I said the other day, our policies can be approved or disapproved, praised or criticized, in this Council. This is a world body, and we are not immune to that. But what is immune from consideration by this Council is the attitude of our own citizens in the exercise of their constitutional rights or the points of view, any points of view, that they may have in terms of their exercise of their democratic rights as citizens.

Finally, I would like to say this, and perhaps we can go back to the origins of this difficulty: The canard—and it was a canard—was circulated that the United States had something to do with alleged plots against Syria. I appeared before this Council and I told this Council on the highest authority that there was nothing to that allegation,

nothing to it. Now, repeating allegations without evidence and just making accusations is not proof. It does not sustain the charge; it just spreads defamation. I must reject completely a statement like this as defamatory and completely unfounded.

FIRST STATEMENT OF JUNE 8

U.S./U.N. press release 85

Mr. President, in its two resolutions calling for and then demanding a cease-fire, the Security Council in the past 3 days has taken the first essential step on the road back to peace in the Middle East. But we have not achieved our objective, as is evident from the letter read to us by the Secretary-General and by the oral report which he has just given to the members of the Council.

The increasing gravity of the situation makes it perfectly clear that we must take further steps in order to maximize the chances of building a peace in that tormented region, a peace which will be stable and just to all concerned. The cessation of hostilities and the building of such a peace, it is obvious, cannot be done quickly. But the steps toward it must be taken without delay. It is for this reason that my delegation has asked for this urgent meeting of the Council today and has submitted the draft resolution which has been distributed to the members of the Council. This resolution¹² reads as follows:

*The Security Council,
Recalling its Resolutions 233 and 234,*

Recalling that in the latter resolution the Council demanded that the governments concerned should as a first step cease fire and discontinue military operations at 2000 hours GMT on 7 June 1967,

Noting that Israel and Jordan have indicated their mutual acceptance of the Council's demands for a cease-fire, and that Israel has expressed with respect to all parties its acceptance of the cease-fire provided the other parties accept,

Noting further with deep concern that other parties to the conflict have not yet agreed to a cease-fire,

1. Calls for scrupulous compliance by Israel and Jordan with the agreement they have reached on a cease-fire,

¹² U.N. doc. S/7952.

2. *Insists* that all the other parties concerned immediately comply with the Council's repeated demands for a cease-fire and cessation of all military activity as a first urgent step toward the establishment of a stable peace in the Middle East,

3. *Calls for* discussions promptly thereafter among the parties concerned, using such third party or United Nations assistance as they may wish, looking toward the establishment of viable arrangements encompassing the withdrawal and disengagement of armed personnel, the renunciation of force regardless of its nature, the maintenance of vital international rights, and the establishment of a stable and durable peace in the Middle East,

4. *Requests* the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General to take immediate steps to assure compliance with the cease-fire and to report to the Council thereon within twenty-four hours,

5. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to provide such assistance as may be required in facilitating the discussions called for in paragraph 3.

It is obvious from the text of this resolution that the provisions in the resolution fall into two distinct parts.

First, paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 are designed to complete the essential—and I emphasize "essential"—first step of the cease-fire. Fighting must stop. It must stop now. It should have stopped before, but it certainly must stop now. We welcome the fact that a mutual cease-fire has already been accepted by Israel and Jordan. We also welcome the fact that the Government of Israel announced officially in a letter today to the Security Council President, document S/7945, that it accepts the Security Council call for an immediate cease-fire if the other parties accept. It is necessary that all the other parties now agree to put into effect a cease-fire immediately, and this resolution so provides. It further provides in paragraph 4 for the assistance both of yourself, Mr. President, and the Secretary-General to assure prompt compliance with the Council's call for a cease-fire. In this respect this provision draws on the useful idea put forward yesterday in the draft resolution submitted by the distinguished representative of Canada.¹³

Second, the resolution calls in paragraph 3 for prompt discussions after a cease-fire

has been achieved, looking toward the establishment of viable arrangements encompassing the withdrawal and disengagement of armed personnel, the renunciation of force regardless of its nature, the maintenance of vital international rights, and what I am sure every member of this Council hopes for: the establishment of a stable and durable peace in the Near East. And paragraph 5 asks our distinguished Secretary-General to assist in whatever way may be necessary to facilitate such discussions.

Mr. President, my Government believes that this dual approach, in which the completion of the cease-fire is combined with a call for longer range discussions, is the approach most likely to bring progress toward real peace in the Near East. In simple realism, in light of all that has occurred, we must all recognize that immediately beyond the first essential step of cease-fire there still lie the basic political issues which have fed the fires of conflict in this region for two decades. Indeed, the entire debate in this Security Council over the last several days has emphasized this essential fact. It would not do justice to the problem to confine our concerns exclusively to the cessation of hostilities without also thereafter promptly addressing ourselves to the causes of hostilities.

In order to initiate such a prompt approach to the causes of the hostilities, we have included in our draft resolution paragraph 3. Our purpose is to provide for movement toward the final settlement of all outstanding questions between the parties, which the U.N. envisaged nearly 20 years ago. And I should like to emphasize, when we say all questions, all outstanding questions, we mean *all*. No outstanding question should be excluded. The objective must be a decision by the warring powers to live in peace and to establish normal relations, as contemplated and pledged by the U.N. Charter.

Mr. President, clearly such major controversies as that which have plagued the Near East for these many years cannot be solved without difficulty, and anyone conversant with the situation would be lacking in candor

¹³ U.N. doc. S/7941.

if he did not acknowledge this. To minimize the obstacles to a prompt beginning of such a discussion, we have included in paragraph 3 the suggestion that the parties make use of such United Nations or third-party assistance as they may wish; and in paragraph 5 we have included a particular request to the Secretary-General, in his unique position as an impartial international servant, to provide such assistance in this connection as may be required.

Speaking for the United States, let me add that our view on all these many problems has been stated many times and has not changed. I wish to reaffirm in all sincerity that my country's wish for all the nations and peoples of the Middle East is a true peace of justice, mutual tolerance, and creative growth. We want to see that region get away from the dreadful cycle of arms races and war. We are ready to do anything necessary in order to achieve that eventual result. We want to see the gifted people of all nations in the area devote their talents and energies to the works of peace and construction, the eradication of disease and ignorance and prejudice and poverty, and the building of a better life for all the people, since we are convinced that this is what the people of the area truly want and seek. And to this end, I renew the pledge of the United States to join in efforts to bring a lasting peace to the Middle East and to lend all our energies to this end.

A wise philosopher once observed that there is no conflict which cannot be resolved if it is dealt with at a higher level than that on which it occurred. Let us now call on the parties to this conflict to rise to such a higher level, one which takes fully into account both all the hard realities of this complex situation and also its creative possibilities.

Now, in this moment of sad conflict and danger, is the time for the United Nations, through this authoritative organ, the Security Council, to point the way. And now also is the time for all loyal members of the United Nations, in and out of this Council, to put their influence at the service of peace. It is in this belief that my delegation has of-

ferred the present draft resolution, for which I ask the Council's prompt and constructive consideration.

Mr. President, when war breaks out it touches all of us; no one is immune. In the last few days we have had sad reports about death of U.N. personnel—Indian personnel, Brazilian personnel, Irish personnel. And today it is with sadness that I report that this morning we received information that an unarmed United States ship in the Mediterranean had been attacked and hit by a torpedo, with resultant loss of life, American life. The Government of Israel has admitted responsibility for the incident and has expressed apologies. I wish to express dismay at this incident and to call for vigorous steps to assure that it is not repeated and to inform the Council that the United States Government has already protested the attack directly to the Government of Israel.

Mr. President, this Council has a great responsibility, and that responsibility is to see to it that all fighting stops in the area. This is the purport of our resolution, which I commend to the members of this Council.

SECOND STATEMENT OF JUNE 8

U.S./U.N. press release 86

We have taken due note of the letter from the distinguished Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic, Ambassador [Mohamed Awad] El Kony, read to us by our Secretary-General, indicating that his Government is prepared to accept the cease-fire called for by this Council on the condition that the other party ceases the fire. This acceptance of the Council's resolutions calling for a cease-fire parallels the acceptance made by the Government of Israel with respect to a cease-fire.

My Government was very glad that this declaration has been made and conveyed to the Security Council. We hope it will lead to similar declarations by other countries concerned which have not yet responded affirmatively, that it will lead to the end of the military conflict, and that it will be the

beginning of the establishment of a stable and durable peace in the Near East.

Accordingly, in light of the information received since the circulation of our draft resolution, we have made the following revisions in our draft resolution and have asked the Secretariat to distribute our revisions.¹⁴ But I shall, with your permission, read the revisions, since apparently they are not yet ready for distribution.

In preambular paragraph 3, "*Noting* that Israel and Jordan," we revised that to read, "*Noting* that Israel, Jordan, and the United Arab Republic" and then go on as in the draft resolution.

And in operative paragraph 1, after the words "*Calls for* scrupulous compliance by Israel and Jordan," eliminate the word "and" and add the words after "Jordan": "and the United Arab Republic with their agreements," so that the paragraph will read, "*Calls for* scrupulous compliance by Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic with their agreements to a cease-fire."

The Secretariat will distribute these revisions, but I should like now to call them to the attention of the Council.

FIRST STATEMENT OF JUNE 9

U.S./U.N. press release 88

Mr. President, the United States voted for the draft resolution¹⁵ presented by you because of the extreme urgency of the situation and because ever since this grave conflict broke out we have consistently favored an immediate end to all fighting, and, indeed, before the conflict broke out we sought by every possible means to avert it. We were prepared to vote for such a cease-fire when we walked into the Council before 10:00 a.m. this morning. We only regret that over 2 hours were lost before the Council was able to come to this decision.

This delay, Mr. President, was due to no

¹⁴ U.N. doc. S/7952/Rev. 1. For text of a further revision (S/7952/Rev. 2), see p. 948.

¹⁵ U.N. doc. S/7960 (S/RES/235(1967)).

fault of yours. Throughout your handling of this grave affair, you have acted with extreme expedition and have made every effort to have the Council act urgently and energetically in the interests of stopping the fighting and bringing about more stable conditions in the area. And I would be less than candid if I did not also say that the delay was not due to the parties involved. Both parties involved were ready for us to proceed at 10:00 a.m.

Now, what is the delay due to? It is, in my opinion, more than time to call a spade a spade. The delay is due to the fact that other members of the Council insist upon attempting to inject into our discussions matters which should be handled next. It is because some members of the Council do not adequately, in my view, understand the extreme urgency of bringing the fighting to an end and because they bring into our discussion important matters which should require and will need the Council's consideration after we bring the fighting to an end.

It is only fair to recall that the same sort of unfortunate delay took place on Monday and Tuesday. If all of the members of the Council had been prepared, as we were, to demand a cease-fire the moment the fighting broke out, perhaps a great deal of bloodshed and many complications could have been avoided. Indeed, Mr. President, if all members of the Council had been prepared on the 24th of May to support the resolution that you offered on behalf of your country [Denmark], and the distinguished representative of Canada joined in doing, perhaps no conflict would have taken place.

Now we have had a grave conflict and now we must do everything within our power to bring the fighting to an end, to bring an end to the bloodshed and the hardship and the loss of lives that have occurred in the area. We have joined other members of the Council now for the third time in saying that there must be a cease-fire and there must be a cease-fire in practice on the part of all, not only in words. The cease-fire must promptly be made fully effective and durable in all sectors. That is our most urgent task.

Every minute that fighting continues in the present tense situation poses further dangers to peace. Further delay in full implementation of the cease-fire resolutions of this Council is not acceptable—not acceptable—I think to all members of the Council. All hostilities must stop promptly, and the cease-fire must be observed scrupulously and continuously by all parties. It must also be accepted by the other combatant states who have not yet done so.

To bring about this result and to insure that the cease-fire once achieved is strictly adhered to, my delegation is pleased that the Council has also acted to request the Secretary-General to take energetic efforts to implement its decision. Part of our problem here also has been the fact that some members of this Council have not been willing to authorize the appropriate officials of the U.N. to take action in implementation of the Council's resolution.

Mr. President, it is not a high mark in the history of this organization that a simple resolution offered a few days ago by the distinguished delegate of Canada was not promptly acted upon but was thought to be something that required study and consideration. What kind of study? What kind of consideration, when what was called for was the entire energy and resources of this organization in the interests of bringing the fighting to an end so that the Council could then proceed to deal with the underlying causes of the conflict and to pacify the situation and to help bring about a durable peace?

Now we are using the Secretary-General. We should have done so before. We should have followed the suggestion made by the distinguished delegate of Canada and utilized the resources of this organization for the purpose of bringing about peace in the area. We are not doing credit to the U.N. by the manner in which we are proceeding. I say this with the greatest regret, because I have great faith in this organization. But this organization is not stronger than the will of its members, and this organization has no magic wand unless its members are

prepared to give it the magic wand that will enable this organization to perform its duties.

If we go back, Mr. President—as we will have to go back at an appropriate time—and consider what happened in this situation, we will see that what has happened has been a lack of ability to concert our action here so that conflict can be avoided and also a lack of ability to concert our action here once conflict takes place to stop fighting so that there can then be a sorting out of the problems which develop when fighting takes place. This has been our consistent problem, and this morning we had another witness to the difficulties of doing the minimum that is required in order to contain a very dangerous situation.

Because of our delay, people have lost their lives, and that is something that we have to assume responsibility for before the conscience of the world. I believe that this type of maneuvering ought to stop in this Council, and I say this very plainly and very categorically. My Government is willing to concert its actions with every member of this Council so that we can stop fighting, so that we can take up all that we need to consider, so that we can make a major contribution toward the restoration of peace in the area. We are ready at any time to do that. We are ready under any circumstances.

We feel very strongly that when we delay and when we engage in elaborate and unnecessary negotiations, quibbling about words, quibbling about ideas which are not relevant to the particular problem that we have at hand, which is to stop the fighting, we do not do a service to the cause of peace.

We have acted now. By now we could have had the report of the Secretary-General which would have enabled us all to see what had happened and, hopefully, his intervention would have brought about full implementation of the cease-fire resolution.

I hope and trust, Mr. President, that as we proceed in the handling of this grave affair, we will all be conscious of our responsibilities—conscious of our responsibilities to humanity—and that we will proceed

in such fashion that this Council can act with expedition and with the full force and spirit of the charter to bring about an end to the fighting. Having done so, I pledge on behalf of my Government that we will do everything within our power to act together with members of the Council to deal with all the other problems which will remain before us. It was in that spirit that we offered our draft resolution yesterday. But we must take care of first things first; and the very first thing, as is apparent from the conflicting reports we received this morning, is that the fighting should stop and stop now.

SECOND STATEMENT OF JUNE 9

U.S./U.N. press release 92

I should like to make this statement on the full authority of my Government. The Security Council with the full support of the United States has adopted three resolutions calling for and demanding an unconditional cease-fire between Israel and the Arab states. The United States deems it of the gravest import that the Security Council's resolutions shall be complied with in letter and in spirit by Israel and the Arabic countries involved. There has been too much bloodshed and loss of life, and it is imperative that this war come to an end and that all governments involved in this conflict should return to the urgent task of restoring peace to the Middle East.

Mr. President, the policy of my Government with respect to this situation was prophetically stated by the President of the United States on May 23. It still remains the policy of our Government, as I indicated when I offered the resolution for the consideration of this Council yesterday, when I said: "Speaking for the United States, let me add that our view on all these many problems has been stated many times and has not changed." It is perhaps necessary to recall what the President of the United States stated on May 23. He stated that:

The Government of the United States is deeply concerned, in particular, with three potentially explosive aspects of the present confrontation.

First, we regret that the General Armistice Agreements have failed to prevent warlike acts from the territory of one against another government or against civilians or territory under control of another government.

Second, we are dismayed at the hurried withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from Gaza and Sinai after more than 10 years of steadfast and effective service in keeping the peace, without action by either the General Assembly or the Security Council of the United Nations. We continue to regard the presence of the United Nations in the area as a matter of fundamental importance. We intend to support its continuance with all possible vigor.

Third, we deplore the recent buildup of military forces and believe it a matter of urgent importance to reduce troop concentrations. The status of sensitive areas, as the Secretary-General emphasized in his report to the Security Council,¹⁶ such as the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba, is a particularly important aspect of the situation.

Mr. President, nothing could have been more specific than the statement of the President of the United States dealing with this particular situation. And then the President of the United States stated the policy of our Government, which has been a constant policy for 20 years. He stated it in explicit terms, and his statement was not matched by other governments, which might have assured an avoidance of this conflict.

To the leaders of all the nations of the Near East, I wish to say what three American Presidents have said before me—that the United States is firmly committed to the support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of that area. The United States strongly opposes aggression by anyone in the area, in any form, overt or clandestine. This has been the policy of the United States led by four Presidents—President Truman, President Eisenhower, President John F. Kennedy, and myself—as well as the policy of both of our political parties. The record of the actions of the United States over the past 20 years, within and outside the United Nations, is abundantly clear on this point.

The United States has consistently sought to have good relations with all states of the Near East. Regrettably, this has not always been possible, but we are convinced that our differences with individual states of the area and their differences with each other must be worked out peacefully and in accordance with accepted international practice.

Now, Mr. President, those words were not

¹⁶ U.N. doc. S/7896 and Corr. 1.

heeded at the time, and our efforts to obtain general recognition of their import were not heeded in this Council. They were frustrated by certain members of this Council.

But in presenting a draft resolution to this Security Council just yesterday, I pointed out that it was essential to our search for peace in the area that our objective must be a decision by the warring powers to live in peace and to establish normal relations, as contemplated and pledged by the United Nations Charter. And I said our purpose is to provide for movement toward the final settlement of outstanding questions between the parties, which the United Nations envisaged nearly 20 years ago.

Mr. President, we have had a long debate, and there have been charges and counter-charges in statements by the parties. And what is the situation in which the Security Council finds itself? Due to the fact that there is no effective United Nations machinery in the area, due to the fact that its effectiveness has been impaired by what we all know has occurred, no one in this Council, exercising the quasi-judicial character of the Council, can at this point resolve the conflicting statements which have been made.

What is imperatively required here are two things, which every fair-minded person must recognize. And the first is this, if it can be done in this Council and if obstructionism will cease: an impartial investigation by the Secretary-General of the allegations which have been made concerning the violation of the cease-fire orders, which all parties that have expressed themselves have now said—Israel, the United Arab Republic, Jordan, and Syria—an impartial investigation by the Secretary-General, with adequate machinery to make the investigation of the state of compliance in the area. Obviously, any group called upon to decide the conflicting charges and the conflicting statements which have been made would need this in order to make a decision in the matter.

And the second thing which we imperatively need is adequate machinery on the part of the Secretary-General to implement these cease-fire resolutions which have been ordered by this Council.

Today both of these are lacking. Today both of these are imperatively required if we are to do the job that this Council has to do and if we are to do it not on the basis of accepting one party's version as against the version of another but to do it on the basis of impartial, objective facts established by the most impartial agency we have—the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

My country would support those two proposals. My country has been willing to support it throughout this debate so that all that we do can be done in the interests of maintaining peace in the area. Therefore, Mr. President, I make these proposals to this Council so that this Council can act; not act on the basis of one-sided adherence to a point of view alleged but act on the basis of established facts that satisfy fairminded men and also act on the basis of what must really be done in a situation as complicated as this. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is lacking the tools to do the job of implementing a cease-fire resolution. Therefore, we will have what we have had in some other situations, and that is charges and counter-charges, allegations of violation of a cease-fire, which we, sitting in New York thousands of miles from the scene, are unable to resolve.

Finally, Mr. President, I say this: Debate here, accusations here, will not solve the problem. What will solve the problem is, first, ascertainment of the facts; second, action on the ground by United Nations machinery to make sure that the cease-fire is properly implemented. Those are the two ways which are necessary for us to proceed. This is the view of my Government, and I convey it to the members of this Council.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

Resolution of June 6¹⁷

The Security Council,
Noting the oral report of the Secretary-General in this situation,

¹⁷ S/RES/233 (1967); adopted unanimously on June 6.

Having heard the statements made in the Council,
Concerned at the outbreak of fighting and with the menacing situation in the Near East,

1. *Calls upon* the Governments concerned as a first step to take forthwith all measures for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the area;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the situation.

Resolution of June 7 ¹⁸

The Security Council,

Noting that, in spite of its appeal to the Governments concerned to take forthwith as a first step all measures for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the Near East (resolution 233 (1967)), military activities in the area are continuing,

Concerned that the continuation of military activities may create an even more menacing situation in the area,

1. *Demands* that the Governments concerned should as a first step cease fire and discontinue all military activities at 2000 hours GMT on 7 June 1967;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the situation.

Resolution of June 9 ¹⁹

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 233 (1967) and 234 (1967),

Noting that the Governments of Israel and Syria have announced their mutual acceptance of the Council's demand for a cease-fire,

Noting the statements made by the representatives of Syria and Israel,

1. *Confirms* its previous resolutions about immediate cease-fire and cessation of military action;

2. *Demands* that hostilities should cease forthwith;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make immediate contacts with the Governments of Israel and Syria to arrange immediate compliance with the above-mentioned resolutions, and to report to the Security Council not later than two hours from now.

¹⁸ S/RES/234 (1967); adopted unanimously on June 7.

¹⁹ S/RES/235 (1967); adopted unanimously on June 9.

²⁰ U.N. doc. S/7916/Rev. 1; for background, see BULLETIN of June 19, 1967, p. 927.

²¹ S/7952/Rev. 2.

U.S. DRAFT RESOLUTIONS

Draft Resolution of May 31 ²⁰

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General in document S/7906,

Having heard the statements of the parties,

Concerned at the gravity of the situation in the Middle East,

Noting that the Secretary-General has in his report expressed the view that "a peaceful outcome to the present crisis will depend upon a breathing spell which will allow tension to subside from its present explosive level", and that he therefore urged "all the parties concerned to exercise special restraint, to forego belligerence and to avoid all other actions which could increase tension, to allow the Council to deal with the underlying causes of the present crisis and to seek solutions",

1. *Calls on* all the parties concerned as a first step to comply with the Secretary-General's appeal,

2. *Encourages* the immediate pursuit of international diplomacy in the interests of pacifying the situation and seeking reasonable, peaceful and just solutions,

3. *Decides* to keep this issue under urgent and continuous review so that the Council may determine what further steps it might take in the exercise of its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Revised Draft Resolution of June 8 ²¹

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 233 and 234,

Recalling that in the latter resolution the Council demanded that the Governments concerned should as a first step cease fire and discontinue military operations at 2000 hours GMT on 7 June 1967,

Noting that Israel, Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic have indicated their acceptance of the Council's demand for a cease-fire,

Noting further with deep concern reports of continued fighting between Israel and Syria,

1. *Insists* on an immediate scrupulous implementation by all the parties concerned of the Council's repeated demands for a cease-fire and cessation of all military activity as a first urgent step toward the establishment of a stable peace in the Middle East;

2. *Calls for* discussions promptly thereafter among the parties concerned, using such third party or United Nations assistance as they may wish, looking toward the establishment of viable arrangements encompassing the withdrawal and disengagement of armed personnel, the renunciation of force regardless of its nature, the maintenance of vital international rights and the establishment of a stable and durable peace in the Middle East;

3. *Requests* the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General to take immediate steps to seek to assure compliance with the cease-fire and to report to the Council thereon within twenty-four hours;

4. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to provide such assistance as may be required in facilitating the discussions called for in paragraph 2.

The Situation in the Near East

Following, in chronological order, are releases relating to the crisis in the Near East which were issued by the White House June 5-8.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, JUNE 5 ¹

We are deeply distressed to learn that large-scale fighting has broken out in the Middle East, an eventuality we had sought to prevent.

Each side has accused the other of launching aggression. At this time the facts are not clear. But we do know that tragic consequences will flow from this needless and destructive struggle if the fighting does not cease immediately.

The United Nations Security Council has been called into urgent session.

In accordance with his policy instituted earlier to keep the Congress advised of developments in the Middle East crisis, the President has asked Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara to brief the Senate and House leaders at 9:30 a.m. today. At 8:30 this morning the President will meet with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Walt Rostow, and George Christian.

The United States will devote all its energies to bring about an end to the fighting and a new beginning of programs to assure the peace and development of the entire

¹ Read to news correspondents by George Christian, Press Secretary to the President (White House press release dated June 5).

area. We call upon all parties to support the Security Council in bringing about an immediate cease-fire.

STATEMENTS BY SECRETARY RUSK

News Briefing at the White House, June 5

White House press release dated June 5

Secretary Rusk: I understand there has been some discussion in the course of the day about the attitude of the United States in this situation in the Near East.

I would refer you to the very fundamental statement made by President Johnson on May 23^d ² and to his reaffirmation of the policies enunciated by four Presidents: that the United States is committed to the support of the independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of the area of the Near East.

We are in a situation where several governments have declared war. We are not a belligerent. We do not have forces involved in this violence. Our citizens in the area are entitled to the treatment that is due to citizens of countries who are not belligerents. They are not enemy aliens, wherever they might be out there.

But this traditional word of international law, "neutrality," does not involve indifference. The President has been deeply concerned about this situation since it flared up about 2½ or 3 weeks ago and has worked incessantly to try to stabilize the peace out there.

We have an obligation under the United Nations Charter, and very especially as a permanent member of the Security Council, to carry our full share of the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

At the present time we are making a maximum effort in the Security Council to bring about a cease-fire. In the course of the day,

² For text, see BULLETIN of June 12, 1967, p. 870.

that has been caught up in some of the political discussions which have to do with the longer range issues.

We have felt that it is important to work with the Security Council to stop the fighting in order that peaceful processes can have a chance to operate on those other questions.

So there is the position at law that we are not a belligerent. There is the position of deep concern, which we have as a nation and as a member of the United Nations, in peace in that area.

I would hope that this would clarify some of the discussion that I have heard in the course of the day. I can take just a question or two. I have to go to a meeting in a moment.

Q. Then, Mr. Secretary, what we are trying to get straightened out was Mr. McCloskey's [Robert J. McCloskey, the Department spokesman] statement that we were "neutral in thought, word, and deed." The tradition of neutrality, legally, in international law—would that foreclose any options that we would have in the future?

Secretary Rusk: I don't want to speculate about the future. What I am saying is that the President has stated in the most fundamental way our attitude on this in his statement of May 23d. You had his statement, of course, this morning, about our attitude toward this outbreak of violence.

I want to emphasize that any use of this word "neutral," which is a great concept of international law, is not an expression of indifference, and, indeed, indifference is not permitted to us because we have a very heavy obligation under the United Nations Charter, and especially as one of the permanent members of the Security Council, to do everything we can to maintain international peace and security.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has this Government made any determination on the basis of the information it has as to who initiated the violence in this present outbreak?

Secretary Rusk: No. The President commented on that this morning in his state-

ment. The facts are still very obscure. It may be some time before the facts can be clarified. It may take quite a long time. We have not tried to make a judgment on that, and we have no reason to think that the Security Council is trying to make a judgment on that at the moment. The key problem is to get the shooting stopped.

Q. Have we had any indication whether Russia will go along with the effort to get a cease-fire resolution through the Security Council?

Secretary Rusk: We hope that they will. There have been discussions with them in the course of the day at the Security Council. They, of course, as a permanent member, have the same obligations that we have to play their role in maintaining international peace and security. But when I last heard from the situation up there, those talks had not come to a final conclusion in the Security Council.

Q. Mr. Rusk, under our concept of neutrality, would it be a violation for one of the countries involved to raise funds by financing or floating bonds in this country, in your judgment?

Secretary Rusk: I wouldn't want to get into that. We are not in a situation that calls for judgment or decision on that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are we neutral in thought, word, and deed?

Secretary Rusk: I have in a good many words told you what our attitude is. I don't, I think, need to get into particular phraseology that goes beyond what the President has said and what I have said. Thank you.

News Briefing at the White House, June 6

White House press release dated June 6

Secretary Rusk: Early this morning I heard a charge made by Cairo that U.S. carrier-based planes had taken part in attacks on Egypt.

These charges are utterly and wholly false. The truth of the matter could have been ascertained very quickly if the authorities in

Cairo had picked up a telephone and asked our Ambassador about it, or if their Ambassador in Washington had asked the Department of State or the Department of Defense about it.

We know that they and some of their friends know where our carriers are. We can only conclude that this was a malicious charge, known to be false, and, therefore, obviously was invented for some purpose not fully disclosed.

I said yesterday that the United States is not a belligerent in this situation. Our forces are not participating in it. There is just no word of truth in the charge that U.S. aircraft have taken part in any of these present operations in the Near East.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do we have any idea why they might have made this charge?

Secretary Rusk: I think they are trying to create difficulties for Americans in the Near East. I suppose they are trying to make this a part of a propaganda campaign. But we don't like this kind of charge, and we would hope that they would make the minimum effort to deal with such matters in a truthful fashion.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, JUNE 7

White House press release dated June 7

The United Nations Security Council has called for a cease-fire in the Middle East.³ This first clear step toward lasting peace has the strongest support of our Government. We have worked as hard as we could to avoid hostilities and to end them. But the fighting came, and the road forward to real peace and progress will not be easy. Still, there is now a real chance for all to turn from the frustrations of the past to the hopes of a peaceful future. While the first responsibility falls to the peoples and governments in the area, we must do our best to that end, both inside and outside the United Nations.

³ See p. 934.

The continuing crisis and the effort to help build a new peace will require the most careful coordination of the work of our Government. To insure this coordination, I am today establishing a Special Committee of the National Security Council. The Secretary of State will preside over this committee, and its members will be the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the CIA, the Chairman of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and Mr. Walt Rostow. I shall meet with the committee from time to time as necessary and so will the Vice President and the Ambassador to the United Nations.

I have asked Mr. McGeorge Bundy to serve as a Special Consultant to the President and to be Executive Secretary of the committee. Mr. Bundy has worked with us before, and he has been in informal consultation in the last year on a number of subjects. Mr. Bundy has now asked his board of trustees at the Ford Foundation for a temporary leave of absence, and he is already at work. I am asking all agencies of the Government to assist him with such staff support as he may request for the Special Committee. The committee will meet regularly at the White House.

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS, THE PRESIDENT AND SENATOR MANSFIELD, JUNE 8

White House press release dated June 8

Senator Mansfield to the President

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As I said this morning, it would be a great help to me, and I think to the Senate as a whole if we could have your own current views on the situation in the Middle East. That situation has developed so rapidly in recent days, and the issues before us there are of such great importance, that the Senate would be grateful, I am sure, to have your own present assessment.

Sincerely,

MIKE MANSFIELD

The President to Senator Mansfield

DEAR MIKE: I am delighted to respond to your note with a brief statement on the current situation as we see it. I entirely share your view that it is good for the President and the Senate to be in close touch on this matter.

Our most urgent present concern is to find a way to bring the fighting in the Middle East to an end. We are deeply concerned that there has not yet been an effective response to the two unanimous votes by which the U.N. Security Council has called for a cease-fire. While the representative of Israel agreed to comply if other parties also agreed only Jordan, among the Arab States, has agreed to the cease-fire.

Ambassador Goldberg, on my instructions, has requested the immediate convening of another Security Council session, to deal with the current situation, and we have presented a Resolution whose text I attach.⁴

The fighting has already brought the suffering and pain that comes with all such conflict. These losses have included the lives of Americans engaged in the work of peaceful communication on the high seas. On this matter we have found it necessary to make a prompt and firm protest to the Israel Government which, to its credit, had already acknowledged its responsibility and had apologized. This tragic episode will underline for all Americans the correctness of our own urgent concern that the fighting should stop at once.

So we continue to believe that a cease-fire is the urgent first step required to bring about peace in that troubled part of the world. At the same time we know, of course, that a cease-fire will be only a beginning and that many more fundamental questions must be tackled promptly if the area is to enjoy genuine stability. Our new Resolution begins to deal with some of these questions.

Let me emphasize that the U.S. continues to be guided by the same basic policies which have been followed by this Administration and three previous Administrations.

⁴ Not issued as part of the release; see p. 941.

These policies have always included a consistent effort on our part to maintain good relations with all the peoples of the area in spite of the difficulties caused by some of their leaders. This remains our policy despite the unhappy rupture of relations which has been declared by several Arab states.⁵

We hope that the individual states in the Middle East will now find new ways to work out their differences with each other by the means of peace, and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. We look beyond the current conflict to a new era of greater stability which will permit all the peoples of the area to enjoy the fruits of lasting peace. Our full efforts will be directed to this end.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

P.S. While this letter was in the typewriter I learned of the announcement, by the President of the Security Council, that the United Arab Republic accepts the cease-fire resolutions subject only to acceptance by Israel. Thus we seem at the edge of progress in the directions this letter indicates. You can be sure that the Government will continue its work for peace, especially in the Security Council where Ambassador Goldberg has done such brilliant and productive work in the last days.

Notice to U.S. Travelers to the Middle East

The Department of State announced on June 5 (press release 131) that in view of the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East, U.S. citizens desiring to go to the following countries must until further notice obtain passports specifically endorsed by the

⁵ As of June 7, the following nations had severed relations with the United States: Algeria, Iraq, Mauritania, Sudan, Syria, United Arab Republic, and Yemen. Lebanon has recalled its Ambassador and has requested the United States to recall the American Ambassador, but has not severed relations.

Department of State for such travel: Algeria, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, and Yemen.¹

All outstanding passports, except those of U.S. citizens remaining in those countries, are being declared invalid for travel there unless specifically endorsed for such travel.

The Department contemplates that exceptions to these regulations will be granted to persons whose travel may be regarded as being in the best interests of the United States, such as newsmen or businessmen with previously established business interests.

Permanent resident aliens cannot travel to those countries unless special permission is obtained for this purpose through the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.

U.S. Rejects Soviet Charges of Attacks on Ship at Cam Pha

Following is the text of a U.S. note which was delivered to the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires at Washington on June 3.

Press release 130 dated June 3

JUNE 3, 1967.

The Government of the United States of America refers to the note of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics dated June 2, 1967.²

The United States Government has investigated the circumstances surrounding the incident described in the Ministry's note, which alleges that on June 2 at 1140 Moscow time American aircraft bombed the Soviet motor vessel "Turkestan" in the roadstead of the port of Cam Pha damaging the ship and seriously wounding two crewmen.

As a result of this investigation, it has been established that two flights of American aircraft were engaged in military operations on June 2 in the vicinity of Cam Pha. At-

tacks by these aircraft, however, were directed only against legitimate military targets and every possible care was taken to avoid damage to any merchant shipping in or near Cam Pha. The American pilots engaged in the strikes report that all ordnance was on target, but that intense anti-aircraft fire was present in the area. It appears, therefore, that any damage and injuries sustained by the Soviet ship and its personnel were in all probability the result of the anti-aircraft fire directed at American aircraft during the period in question. Accordingly, on the basis of facts available to us which we believe to be complete, the United States Government cannot accept the version of the incident contained in the Soviet note of June 2.

United States military pilots are under strict instructions to avoid engagement with any vessels which are not identified as hostile, and all possible efforts are taken to prevent damage to international shipping in Vietnamese waters. Nevertheless, accidental damage remains an unfortunate possibility wherever hostilities are being conducted, and the Soviet Government knows that shipping operations in these waters under present circumstances entail risks of such accidents.

It is unfortunate that the "Turkestan" was damaged and particularly that members of its crew suffered injuries. It is, indeed, regrettable that, according to subsequent reports, one member of the crew died as a result of injuries sustained. It is also regrettable that hundreds of Vietnamese, Americans, and citizens of allied nations are dying each week as a consequence of the aggression of North Vietnam against the Republic of Vietnam.

The Soviet Government may be assured that United States authorities will continue to make all possible efforts to restrict air activities to legitimate military targets. At the same time, the United States Government believes it would be helpful if the Soviet Government would make renewed efforts, as Co-chairman of the Geneva Conference, toward bringing about a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Vietnam.

¹ For text of Public Notice 266, see 32 *Fed. Reg.* 8250.

² Not printed here.

America and Africa: The New World and the Newer World

by Under Secretary Katzenbach¹

In the Congo there is a wise proverb: "Let him speak who has seen with his eyes."

It is so with this great continent. In the United States one can imagine Africa from the stereotypes generated by films and zoos and masks in museums. One can hear about Africa from a growing number of Americans with ties here. One can read about Africa from a swelling number of books. But none of this data can produce more than a Mercator projection. None of it can convey the vitality of Africa, the equal vitality of old villages and new cities. None of it can convey the diversity and spirit of your people. I can say this because, heeding the proverb, I have come to see with my own eyes.

I cannot now pretend to speak with great insight. A tour of 12 countries in 17 days can provide no more than a taste, a suggestion. But I do wish to share with you a few observations as this full and moving experience draws to a close.

It is fitting that I do so at this time, in this city, and in this place. It is a fitting time, for yesterday was the fourth anniversary of the creation of the Organization of African Unity—a date whose importance is already plain and which will, I believe, become even clearer in coming years. And today is the first anniversary of President Johnson's memorable address on Africa,² an

¹ Address made at Haile Selassie I University at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on May 26 (press release 120, revised, dated May 29).

² BULLETIN of June 13, 1966, p. 914.

expression of congratulation and confidence which he has asked me to renew to the officers and member nations of the OAU.

Equally, this is a fitting place. As one who was closely involved for 5 years in America's great effort to make law the instrument of full equality, I can have only the warmest feelings for your law school and for its seminal effect on legal education throughout Africa.

I expressed the hope that it would be possible to come here to offer some reflections on Africa, because to talk of Africa is to talk of change and to talk of youth. My words may have some interest in the United States. They may have some significance to political leaders in Africa. But it is the young people of Africa—you and the generation immediately to follow—who will determine the outcome. It is you who are the most important audience of all.

It has been observed that travelers are justified in describing what they have seen and need not rise to generalization. I might be greatly tempted to take that observation to heart, for we have seen magnificent things. Yet it is impossible to settle for mere description. The contrasts are still more startling than the sights.

In West Africa we saw the sun set on an uninhabited rain forest beach just as it might have 10 centuries ago. But only a few miles away, in Dakar, we saw a spectacular urban renewal project housing 60,000.

In Zambia we saw men pulling wooden carts to market. But only a few miles away we saw giant cargo planes unloading barrels

of oil and taking on tons of copper ingots, all within 12 minutes.

In Ghana we saw a village woman in a red loincloth cooking over an open fire. But only a few yards away we saw energy pouring out of the giant orange penstocks of the Volta River Dam.

We have seen, in short, the old Africa and the new.

Power of Revolutionary Change

If the changes that are taking place are far reaching, they are not unique to this continent. The whole world feels the power of revolutionary change. One level is external: the change in international relations impelled by the headlong technological advances of the past few decades. A second level is internal: the attempts by new nations to find appropriate institutions and responses to meet the needs of their peoples.

Change is all about us, and yet we are only dimly aware of the forces that it unleashes. The giant Volta River Dam at Akosombo means power, industry, and economic strength. But consider the problems that have come with it:

—The vast reservoir behind the dam has displaced thousands of families.

—After generations of fishing in a swift river, those who remain must now learn to catch lake fish.

—Medical specialists brood about which new diseases will be bred in the now still water.

On a larger scale, we send men into space. We communicate instantaneously with the most distant nations by satellites. His Imperial Majesty this year has twice flown to North America more easily than he traveled to the provinces not many years ago. Yet we are still trying to find a way to bring something so fundamental as human dignity and self-determination to the Africans in the southern part of this continent.

This is a cause in which we stand with you, conscience to conscience. Not for economic gain, not for political advantage, not for cos-

metic appearance, but because we share the certainty once expressed by President [of Zambia Kenneth] Kaunda: "We shall win because we are right."

Parallels in Development

As striking as these contrasts in change may be, I find myself impressed by some striking parallels between the new world of America and the newer world of Africa.

I do not mean America of the moment, for that is a deceptive model. First, America may be wealthy, America may be advanced, America may be a world power, but America also is troubled by internal problems. Like Africa, like other parts of the world, my country encompasses a great underdeveloped country, an underdeveloped America of citizens who are poor, who often are ignorant, and who for too long have been ignored. President Johnson and his administration have made the uplifting of these people a prime domestic goal, but that goal cannot soon be achieved.

Second, America of today is a deceptive model precisely because it is the developed America of today. Our concern, our devoted concern here, is the Africa of tomorrow.

What do I mean, then, by striking parallels between America and Africa? I mean parallels in development—the factors in the growth of my country which have relevance to the growth of the new nations of your continent.

Let me focus on three of these factors.

Education

The first is education, and I would like to begin by reading you a passage I find unusually descriptive:

... what sphere of patriotic exertion is left open for the lover of his country, but the sphere of improving the rising generation through the instrumentality of a more perfect and efficient system for their education?

We call our fathers patriots, because they loved their country and made sacrifices for its welfare. But what was their country? A vast tract of wilderness territory did not constitute it. It was not unconscious, insentient plains, or rivers, or moun-

tains, however beautifully and majestically they might spread, or flow, or shine, beneath the canopy of heaven. Their country was chiefly their descendants, the human beings who were to throng these vast domains, the sentient, conscious natures which were to live here, and living, to enjoy or suffer.

These words were written in 1842 by Horace Mann, an American and a leading exponent of public education. They have relevance to Africa now. Efforts like his were successful. The United States initiated widespread free public education. Was it merely coincidence that my country's mushrooming rush to industrial power began approximately 15 years later?

The importance Africa places on education is evident from statistics. Of 53 African universities, 30 have been created since 1952 and 11 since 1961. The number of all students on this continent has nearly tripled in 15 years, from 9 million in 1950 to 27 million today. The number of university students has gone from 70,000 in 1950 to more than 250,000.

Yet it is impossible to take too much cheer from such statistics, for there are other figures which suggest the enormity of the job ahead. University enrollment may be 180,000 greater than it was 15 years ago. Yet at the same time, the number of university-aged Africans has increased by 3 million in just the past 5 years.

Transportation

A second parallel between developing Africa and America when it was developing is transportation.

America began as a nation of 4 million, largely settled, like many of your countries, on the coastal fringe of a vast land containing vast mineral and agricultural treasure.

Unlocking that wilderness was an immediate goal. Even before the steam engine had been invented, we had completed what was then a national road. When the railroad did come, it became an object of high priority.

In 1830 America had 23 miles of railroads. Twenty-five years later there were 18,000 miles of railroads. Five years after that, in 1860, there were 30,000 miles.

I believe it is fair to say that from 1840

until the turn of the century transportation—the railroad—was the key to American success.

In 1869 came an historic date that symbolizes much of our past and your future—the completion of a transcontinental railroad line—a line that tied a vast nation together; a line that allowed ore, wheat, and timber to be taken out; a line that allowed men to come in.

"The railroad," an American historian has written, "tied the North and West into one massive free economy. It did much more. It tied business to politics and both to the life of the individual in a way unknown in America before."

What these words say about America seem to me to have great force on this continent.

The parallel with present-day Africa is indeed striking. The new nations of this continent require circulatory lifeblood, allowing the transport of your natural wealth and the ready infusion of human resources to help develop it.

In the Africa of the late 20th century, transportation might well center on highways, or even air routes, rather than railroads. But the principle—and the potential—are the same.

Agriculture and Natural Resources

Finally, let me turn to agriculture and natural resources. When America was settled, there were vast expanses of fertile but inaccessible land. There were hidden treasures in minerals. It was the railroad that opened up those riches to development. As transportation improved, young America could go beyond farming for subsistence and become a source of food for others; our Midwest was built on a foundation of wheat for the world.

The fertility provided by nature and the accessibility provided by technology were supported by another factor: extensive Government-private cooperation to improve both the production and the lives of our farm population.

One great advance was an act of Congress of 1862 providing for colleges to promote knowledge of "agriculture and mechanic

arts." In short order, such institutions were established in almost every eligible State.

These did more than train young men and women in needed skills. Through extension centers, they went out to the people. Ultimately, through resident agents in each county, they reached out to virtually every part of our agricultural areas. These county agents brought practical advice as well as technical and scientific information—not only to farmers but also to their wives and families.

The parallels of mineral and agricultural potential in this continent are plain. There is great need for information, tutelage, and advice at the village level. There is a need at least as great for instruction and assistance in marketing and distribution. Here in Ethiopia, the Agricultural High School at Jimma and the College of Agriculture at Alemaya are pioneering efforts on a fruitful frontier. For Africa could become an agricultural heartland for the world, given your unlimited potential for production. That is a potential for more than one-crop economies, for a wide diversity of crops, some with industrial applicability. And it is a potential for more than agricultural production, for it could readily lead to the development of the food-processing industry.

However appropriate these parallels may be, there is a basic defect in each of them: America was able to devise these answers to development alone and at its own pace for two reasons—reasons which make it possible for Americans to be thankful that our Thirteen Colonies won their independence in a simpler day.

One of these reasons is that we came to independence at a time when it was possible for us to be truly independent—to hold ourselves aloof from the rest of the world.

Though we were impoverished, we were left alone to build a nation and find our destiny. For decades, we found a watchword in Washington's farewell address: "It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world."

For us, nonalignment was an easy task.

The second reason is that, unlike some 30

new African nations, we became independent in a time when technological change was slow and slight.

Our arms were rudimentary, but they fired as well—sometimes better—than the naval cannon and muskets of imperial Britain.

Our economy was simple, but then so was that of every country, in a time when concepts like gross national product were a century away from definition.

And our industry was primitive, for there was no other sort of industry. It was conducted on spinning wheels and blacksmiths' anvils. The world had not yet even dreamed of megatons or megawatts, aluminum smelters, or titanium airplanes.

In short, newly independent America had time—time to explore itself, time to educate itself, time to learn new vocabularies and new technologies as they were devised.

By contrast, the new nations of Africa have been called to the main stage immediately—to go from the spear to the slide rule, from disunited tribes to the United Nations virtually in months.

Need for Skilled and Educated Africans

Can this transition be made with the speed which the influential young men and women of Africa believe necessary?

That is not a question for an outsider to answer. It is a central question in virtually every new African nation. Their answers undoubtedly will vary. I would suggest, however, that there are two irreducible factors to which we must reconcile ourselves, factors which must limit the telescoping of time on this continent.

The first of these factors is human capabilities. The education of intelligent men and women in complex skills can be improved in quality. It can be enlarged in quantity. But no amount of good motives, nor wealth, nor wisdom can, without the passage of time, produce the pool of skilled and educated African men and women who are required to manage the affairs and fuel the spirit of a modern nation.

You here in this eminent institution will be

frontiersmen in that effort. But not until your numbers swell—as surely they will—can this country and your sister countries on this continent find the manpower with which to generate widespread growth.

Emphasis on Cooperative Development

The second factor to which I believe we must reconcile ourselves follows the first. It is suggested occasionally that the development time gap could be overcome if only developed nations like the United States would more fully meet responsibilities of assistance to the underdeveloped world.

As a son of a free country and as a friend of Africa, I am unable to accept this case. It is theoretically possible for major industrial powers to send huge sums and corps of technicians to build and operate factories or transportation systems or railroads. And by doing so they would help build nations in Africa. But they would not be African nations in Africa. As we oppose neocolonialism, so should we oppose such a false solution.

President Johnson has observed accurately that development cannot be exported. And President [of Tanzania Julius K.] Nyerere has said of his people, they “recognize that the task of economic development is a long and heavy one . . . our people do not believe that it is better to be a wealthy slave than a poor free man.”

By no means do I wish to suggest that African nations can avoid losing their independence only by refusing outside assistance. Nor do I wish to suggest that already developed nations should not assist those parts of humanity who are coming late to political manhood. What I do believe is that, in the interests both of developed and developing nations, developmental assistance must be carefully offered—and it must be carefully received.

In his speech on Africa a year ago, President Johnson outlined a policy for such assistance, noting that:

The world has now reached a stage where some of the most effective means of economic growth can best be achieved in large units commanding large resources and large markets. Most nation-states are

too small, when acting alone, to assure the welfare of all of their people.

This is the principle which underlies our present policy of aid for Africa—cooperation among donors and cooperation among recipients.

This is not a new philosophy for us. Nearly a third of the aid we have provided in the past has been for projects benefiting not merely one country but several.

We are assisting river development in the Senegal River, Niger River, and Lake Chad basins. We are working with an organization of 14 Central African nations to combat measles, smallpox, rinderpest, and bovine pneumonia. In this decade Ethiopia and four other African countries have combined, with American and British support, to form the Desert Locust Control Authority, whose efforts have been completely successful. We have helped to establish advanced education institutions, like the regional heavy equipment training center in Togo.

Neither is such a cooperative policy new in the relations of other countries. The nations of Western Europe have made striking progress in the past decade toward a common market. The leaders of Latin America have just pledged themselves to work toward a similar goal.

The aim of our cooperative policy is simple: maximum benefit for all the new nations of Africa. We do not seek to dictate development priorities to recipient countries. The fact is that virtually every nation has the same developmental priorities to begin with—the same sort of priorities which I described as paralleling the experience of my country—education, transportation, and agricultural and natural-resource development.

Nor is it our aim to require rigid cooperative groupings. The new nations of Africa have varying links to each other. River development may run north and south; a railroad may benefit two nations; a public health program may involve 14.

We shall look with particular interest for programs organized by existing multilateral organizations: the World Bank, the African Development Bank, ECA [Economic Com-

mission for Africa], and the OAU. At the same time, we will welcome project proposals devised directly by the participating countries. Indeed, the competition among them may well serve as a spur and thus itself help bring the economies of scale to African development.

Impulse Toward African Unity

Even beyond flexibility, beyond economies of scale, beyond the more beneficial use of developmental assistance, our new emphasis on cooperation among donors and cooperation among recipients can have another result, a result which may, in the end, be the most important of all. It can serve as an additional impulse toward African unity.

In my various conversations across this continent I have found unity a goal that is widely shared and a goal that is particularly prized by young people. They see their young countries struggling against the arbitrary divisions inflicted by the colonial period—divisions created by inherited boundaries, divisions created by the imposition of different Western languages, divisions created by different levels of colonial development.

It is this aspect of cooperative development that is to me the most hopeful and the most exciting. For if it is conducted among groupings established by the recipient countries themselves, it seems to me that it can be an important force toward the eventual conquest of those arbitrary divisions.

We believe, in short, that this policy of coordination among donors and cooperation among recipients is sound. We hope it will be successful. But even if it succeeds beyond our wildest expectations, it can only hasten—and not bring about—the emergence of Africa as a community of strong and confident nations, able and willing to make their contribution to the welfare of their people and of the world.

And that work, that very difficult and patient and inspired and patriotic work, must be yours. The present leaders of Africa have begun that work with wisdom and courage. It will be in your lifetimes—and indeed because of your lifetimes—that this

work will come to fruition, that the land, and the people who animate the land, and the spirit that animates your people, will make their mighty contribution to the world.

I think of the words of President [of Senegal Léopold S.] Senghor, describing the spirit Africa can give to the world:

For who would teach rhythm to a dead world of machines and guns?

Who would give the cry of joy to wake the dead and the bereaved at the dawn?

Say, who would give back the memory of life to the man whose hopes are smashed?

I see, much more clearly now, what he means. Africa will not be easily mastered. One has only to see the struggle of wresting crops from difficult soil and hostile climate to know that it has taken people of character to make something of the land. It has taken courage, tenacity, humor, creativity—in short, spirit.

What has impressed me, then, about Africa is not so much its vastness, nor its resource potential, nor its beauty, but its people.

The foundation of Africa is the spirit of its people.

Africa is on the move. I knew that before I came. Now I believe it.

U.S.S. "John F. Kennedy"

Following are remarks made by President Johnson at Newport News, Va., on May 27 on the occasion of the christening of the aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy.

White House press release dated May 27

In March 1943, almost a quarter of a century ago, a young naval lieutenant assumed his first command—a tiny PT boat—and sailed intrepidly into the savage battle for the Solomons.

Next year 5,000 Americans will put to sea in this giant ship named *John F. Kennedy*—for whom the voyage of destiny began in the Solomons and ended tragically at the pinnacle of national affection and respect, the Presidency of the United States.

This is the third carrier since the end of

the Second World War to bear the name of a man. Carriers are normally named for famous battles or great ships of the past. Its only companions are named for Franklin Delano Roosevelt and James V. Forrestal.

This is highly appropriate because these three singular men had a great deal in common:

—Each of them died in the service of his country.

—Each of them understood that, whatever the risk, men must defend freedom, the leaven in the bread of life that alone makes true peace possible.

—Each of them believed, in John Kennedy's moving words:¹

. . . it is the fate of this generation . . . to live with a struggle we did not start, in a world we did not make. But the pressures of life are not always distributed by choice. And while no nation has ever been faced by such a challenge, no nation has ever been so ready to seize the burden and the glory of freedom.

To face that challenge, John Kennedy knew, took strength as well as idealism: He knew it as a student who saw the failure of appeasement in the 1930's; he knew it as a naval officer in the South Pacific; he knew it as President of the United States.

Because John Kennedy understood that strength is essential to sustain freedom, because he recognized that we cannot afford to mark time or stand in place, he requested funds for this carrier from the Congress in 1963.

In the year 2000—and beyond—this majestic ship we christen today may still be sailing the oceans of the world. We pray that her years will be years of peace. But if she must fight, both the flag she flies and the name she bears will carry a profound message to friend and foe alike.

For the 5,000 Americans who will man this great ship—and for all their countrymen, whose hopes ride with them—this is a moment of reflection.

Today, as throughout our history, we bear fateful responsibilities in the world. From the moment of our national creation, Ameri-

can ideals have served as a beacon to the oppressed and the enslaved.

In times past it has often been our strength and our resolve which have tipped the scales of conflict against aggressors or would-be aggressors. That role has never been an easy one. It has always required not only strength but patience—the incredible courage to wait where waiting is appropriate, to avoid disastrous results to shortcut history—and sacrifice, the tragic price we pay for our commitment to our ideals.

No President understood his nation's historic role and purpose better than John F. Kennedy. No man knew more deeply the burdens of that role. And no man ever gave more. Let this ship we christen in his name be a testament that his countrymen have not forgotten.

President Johnson Holds Talks With Australian Prime Minister

Prime Minister Harold E. Holt of Australia visited Washington June 1-2 to confer with President Johnson and other high Government officials. Following are texts of remarks by President Johnson and the Prime Minister at an arrival ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House on June 1.

White House press release dated June 1

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

Mr. Prime Minister, Mrs. Johnson and I are very happy that you and Mrs. Holt could join us here today for the beginning of what I know will be a most pleasant and enjoyable visit.

At the Manila Conference last fall, we and the leaders of five other nations of Asia and the Pacific proclaimed some goals that we felt all of our peoples could aspire to: to be free from aggression; to conquer hunger, illiteracy, and disease; to build a region of security, order, and progress; and to seek reconciliation and peace throughout this great region.

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.

We are ready, Australia and the United States—and all of the nations of the Asian and Pacific region—to vigorously pursue those goals with all the strength and determination that we can muster. We are ready to reshape the future of the peaceful and secure Asia that is to be.

But today we fight shoulder to shoulder with our Vietnamese, Korean, Thai, Filipino, and New Zealand allies. We fight not because we like to but only to insure the right of a small nation to make its own future and to have its own people determine what that future will be.

Tomorrow we shall work to build and to repair what has been broken, to make the harvest larger, and to make the future of all men brighter.

We shall do it with the power of electricity and not the power of bombs. We shall do it with tools instead of tanks. We shall do it with teachers, doctors, and technicians.

We know—you and I—that this is going to be done, for we know that it has already been done in both of our countries.

Your country, the great land of Australia, has only just begun. Ahead of it lies the promise of rapid growth, of ever-increasing prosperity. Each day, almost, I seem to see where you are discovering new sources of wealth, new buildings are rising up in your growing cities, new factories are open to make needed goods and to provide jobs.

Australia, I know, stands ready, as does the United States, to try to help others move down the path that we have trod from very simple and very hard beginnings to strength, independence, and wealth.

But these things will not come and they cannot come, unless there is a security, a dignity, and an opportunity. And security will never come to Asia unless there are men of courage and men who are prepared to stand up and resist when the aggressor moves in to steal, kill, and conquer.

This is what a man whom we both admire so much once said—Winston Churchill. This is what he meant when he declared: "Courage is the first of human qualities, because it is the one quality that guarantees all others."

The brave men who fight today wearing our uniforms—your men and ours and our other allies—struggle there to make all else possible. And we know that they will succeed.

Mr. Prime Minister, we take a great deal of pleasure in again welcoming you to this Capital City and to this country of ours.

I welcome you as a brave leader, as a long-time and a very loyal friend, and as a wise statesman.

I repeat again, for Mrs. Johnson and my family, we are so glad that you and Mrs. Holt are here.

REMARKS BY PRIME MINISTER HOLT

Thank you, Mr. President, for the friendliness and the warmth of your welcome, a warmth and friendliness of welcome to Australia, to my Government, to Mrs. Holt and myself, and to those members of the official party who are with me.

We are looking forward to another valuable talk in that series of talks that you and I have had together, which at all times have proved informative and helpful to us.

We have many important issues to discuss. There is, of course, our mutual concern with the events in Viet-Nam, the peaceful progress of which you have spoken in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, to which you have given so much constructive thought; the implications for our two countries of the United Kingdom's application to join the European Economic Community; the military dispositions of the United Kingdom east of Suez, which concern us both.

There will always be between two countries who are so prominent, despite our difference in size and stature, in affairs of world trade, economic and trade problems which we can usefully and fruitfully discuss together.

It is, perhaps, a mark of our mutual interest, of our friendship, our close relations, and the many matters that concern us together that this should be the fifth in a series of talks you and I have enjoyed together in the past 12 months.

I question whether any other head of government has had the same good fortune to see you so often and speak to you closely on so many different occasions: My two visits to Washington last year; your own spectacular and historic first visit of a United States President to Australia; the Manila Conference, which you have just referred to, with its reminder of those high goals we set at that very fruitful conference there; and now this series of talks together here in Washington.

As to Viet-Nam: On my journey here, I had the opportunity of a very valuable briefing from Admiral [U. S. G.] Sharp, your Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command. He was able to give me, in factual terms, evidence of the progress being made in all aspects of the military campaign.

Yesterday in Los Angeles, speaking to the World Affairs Council, I was able to canvass some of the aspects of our joint interest in this conflict. If the reaction I received there is typical of the feeling of the people of the United States, I would believe that there has been a growth in understanding and support for the place that the United States is playing in that significant conflict.

The last time I visited you, Mr. President, I was able to tell you something of the progress which, thanks to the shield of American protection, the free countries of Southeast Asia and the Pacific were able to make.

It seemed to me this had not been widely reported here. As one of those countries which had been able to take advantage of the security and the protection, the resistance to Communist aggression which had been made possible by the massive intervention of the United States of America, I was able to speak of the progress which we and other countries were making.

Now, nearly 12 months later, with many major developments, most of them favorable from our viewpoint, including the end of confrontation in Malaysia; the steady economic progress in countries running around the arc of Asia and Southeast Asia, from Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand; the emergence in Indonesia of a strong anti-Communist gov-

ernment anxious to cooperate in tasks of rehabilitation and the reconstruction of the economy there—these things have been substantial gains for us.

In my own most recent visit, which included, as you know, visits to Cambodia, Laos, to neutral countries, and to Taiwan and Korea, I found every evidence of friendship for my own country.

I found in those countries, which have alined themselves with us, not only appreciation of all that your great country is doing but a determination to press on with the economic progress which has been so spectacularly a feature of their recent experience.

So I think we meet together with hope in our hearts. Perhaps the struggle may still be long; perhaps it may be shorter than the superficial evidence would indicate.

I know from my own quite intimate contacts with you that there is no national leader in the world more anxious to secure a peace, more anxious to secure a just and enduring settlement in Viet-Nam, than yourself.

In all the endeavors that you make in order to bring about a peaceful conclusion to this struggle—which means so much to the free peoples of Asia and the Pacific and, indeed, to the free world as a whole—you have at all times been able to count, as you shall be able in the future, upon the friendly and loyal support of your ally, Australia.

We have countries with great needs of economic development. Even with the strength and power of the United States, I know that there are many tasks to which you would be willing and anxious to turn your hand if so much of your resources were not being deployed for the purposes of resistance to aggression and the need to insure the peace.

In my own country it is a deep deprivation for us to have to divert manpower and resources from the task of developing a continent of virtually the size of the United States.

So, apart from our own natural humanitarian instincts, we have a vested interest in the material welfare of our countries in the securing of a peace.

I reject the criticisms of those who question in some fashion our good faith in this particular matter.

You, sir, are the third in line of United States Presidents who have seen clearly the need to meet the aggression as it has come in Viet-Nam.

If peace is to be secured, it will not be by some wobbling in our actions, in our purposes. It will be by the demonstration of our unwavering resolution to press on, be it long or short, with the struggle until a settlement, a just and enduring settlement, can be secured. It will be in that spirit, I know, that you and I will embark on our fruitful talks together.

Thank you again, all of you, for the warmth of your welcome to the head of an Australian Government.

President Johnson Confers With British Prime Minister

British Prime Minister Harold Wilson conferred with President Johnson and other high Government officials at Washington June 2-3. Following are texts of remarks exchanged by the President and the Prime Minister at an arrival ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House on June 2.

White House press release dated June 2

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

Mr. Prime Minister, your visit here this morning maintains a tradition that was begun by two great statesmen representing our countries.

One was a great Englishman. More than a quarter of a century ago, he said:

It is not given to us to peer into the mysteries of the future; still I avow my hope and faith, sure and inviolate, that in the days to come the British and American peoples will for their own safety and for the good of all, walk together in majesty, in justice, and in peace.

That was Winston Churchill. He spoke to

the Congress of the United States only 19 days after Pearl Harbor.

I have never forgotten those words. Nor have I forgotten others spoken just 4 years earlier by a great American, who said:

. . . if we are to have a world in which we can breathe freely and live in amity without fear—the peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort to uphold laws and principles on which alone peace can rest secure. . . .

Those who cherish their freedom and recognize and respect the equal right of their neighbors to be free and live in peace, must work together for the triumph of law and moral principles in order that peace, justice, and confidence may prevail in the world.

That was Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

He and Winston Churchill struck a common theme of peace and justice. They pledged our countries to a common commitment which we have honored ever since.

We come here today in another time of trouble, when peace and justice are again in the balance. It is on occasions like this that the counsel of old and trusted friends is most welcome.

Mr. Prime Minister, we are so happy to have you and Mrs. Wilson and your party with us. We look forward with anticipation to a constructive meeting, a pleasant exchange of views on the future of our countries and the future of the world.

We know that your coming here is pleasing to the people of our country. We hope your stay will be a pleasant one.

REMARKS BY PRIME MINISTER WILSON

May I first, Mr. President, thank you for the very warm and colorful reception that has been given to my wife and myself here this morning and, Mr. President, for your own kind words of greeting.

I do not think that any words of yours or of mine are needed to underline what you have said, the gravity of the situation the world is facing at this time, nor the importance of the fact that our two countries at this time are able to have discussions on the way ahead. It is fully recognized in your country and in ours.

We have had a debate in Parliament this week that these talks today—as part of the wider talks and consultations going on throughout the world—above all, the talks in which your representatives, ours, and our friends' are concerned in the Security Council—are of vital importance in creating the conditions for a lasting peace.

Mr. President, I know you will agree when I say that however great the problem that has arisen with such dramatic and startling suddenness in these past 2 weeks, no consideration of that problem should allow or will allow us to be blinded to the continuing importance of very many other great problems that were in our minds and in our hearts before the recent crisis blew up.

This visit of ours was arranged some weeks ago. Even then, we were conscious that there were these great problems of peace and war in Asia, problems of cooperation, cooperation for peace, problems of cooperation for progress in economic affairs, that will be taking our time today.

And urgent though the present situation is in the Middle East—and we shall no doubt give a proper priority to it in our talks—both of us know that these other problems, these lasting and abiding problems, require a settlement and will be given the urgency which you and I know that they deserve.

Mr. President, I was heartened by your reminder of the close cooperation between our two countries in war and in peace—and, above all, in the struggle for peace.

That is what we are here to talk about today, Mr. President, and with you I look forward to getting down to work.

I thank you.

U.S. To Contribute to UNDP/FAO Fisheries Project in Viet-Nam

The Department of State announced on May 26 (press release 119) that the United States had on that day agreed to contribute \$2,012,000 to the Food and Agriculture Organization under the freedom from hunger campaign for assistance to a United

Nations Development Program fisheries project in South Viet-Nam.

Under the agreement, the U.S. contribution will help expand the scope of the project which FAO is carrying out for the UNDP at the request of the Vietnamese Government. Recent experience in the South China Sea has indicated that a great increase in the fish catch would be possible if traditional inshore operations of the Vietnamese fishing industry could be modernized and expanded to include deepwater operations. Since fish provide a large portion of the protein in the Vietnamese diet, this project could result in a much-needed improvement in the food supply of the average Vietnamese.

The original UNDP project, calling for \$1 million from the Special Fund and \$336,000 as the Government of Viet-Nam's counterpart contribution, consisted of inshore surveys and feasibility studies. The United States contribution will enable the project to be enlarged to include investigations and feasibility studies for offshore operations. It will enable FAO to pay for the charter of a deepwater trawler and necessary equipment and personnel, including a U.N. expert. The Netherlands is also planning to contribute to this enlarged project.

United States and Mexico Sign Cotton Textile Agreement

The Department of State announced on June 2 (press release 126) that the United States and Mexico signed on that day a 4-year cotton textile bilateral agreement covering the exports of Mexico's cotton textiles to the United States for the period May 1, 1967–April 30, 1971.¹ Ambassador Hugo B. Margáin signed on behalf of the Government of Mexico; Anthony M. Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, signed on behalf of the U.S. Government. Main features of the new agreement are:

¹ For text of the U.S. note, see press release 126 dated June 2.

1. The aggregate limit for the first year of the agreement is 75 million square yards. This limit, as well as the other limits in the agreement, will be increased by 5 percent for the second and subsequent years of the agreement.

2. The group limit applicable for the first agreement year for yarns (categories 1-4) is 51.8 million square yards; for fabric (categories 5-27), 21 million square yards; and for made-up goods, apparel, and miscellaneous (categories 28-64), 2.2 million square yards.

3. Specific ceilings are provided for six fabric and two apparel categories. There are also subceilings for duck and zipper tape. In the first year of the agreement only, three category ceilings may be exceeded by specified quantities within the group ceiling for fabric.

4. Other provisions are also included on flexibility, undue concentration, spacing, exchange of statistics, categories and conversion factors, consultation, administrative arrangements, equity, carryover, controls, termination, and relationship to the Geneva Long-Term Arrangement on trade in cotton textiles.

U.S. and Italy Terminate Air Transport Agreement

Following is the text of a joint communique issued on May 31 upon conclusion of talks at Rome between representatives of the U.S. and Italian Governments.

Representatives of the Italian Government and of the Government of the United States of America have been engaged in consultations to negotiate a new agreement governing scheduled commercial air services between the two countries. The new agreement was intended to replace the present air transport agreement,¹ which expires on May 31, 1967, as a result of its denunciation by Italy.

It has not been possible for a new agree-

¹Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1902, 2081, 4558.

ment to be reached prior to the expiration of the present agreement, and the discussions have been discontinued. The termination of this agreement has removed the present legal basis for air services between the two countries by their respective air carriers. Accordingly, each government may, in light of its applicable laws and civil aviation policies, determine whether and under what conditions the services should be permitted. In the meantime, no immediate effects on scheduled flights of Italian and U.S. carriers are foreseen at present.

Both delegations express the hope that it will be possible, in the near future, to resume conversations in order to arrive at an agreement satisfactory to both countries.

United States and Panama Amend Air Transport Agreement

Joint Statement

Press release 136 of June 7

The American Ambassador to Panama, the Honorable Charles W. Adair, Jr., and the Panamanian Vice Minister of Foreign Relations, His Excellency Arturo Morgan-Morales, concluded an exchange of diplomatic notes yesterday [June 6] in Panama City amending the Air Transport Services Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Panama. The original Agreement, which provides the basis for international air services between the two countries by U.S. and Panamanian airlines, was signed in Panama City on March 31, 1949 and amended in 1952.

The notes exchanged confirm agreements reached in bilateral consultations which the two Governments held in Washington, D.C., between March 13 and March 20, 1967. One amendment gives Panamanian airlines the right to establish services between Panama and New York, direct or via Miami, in addition to the present Panamanian route to the Miami terminal via intermediate points in the Caribbean. In amending the Route Schedule, the two Governments also inserted a paragraph recognizing that neither party will

impose unilateral restrictions on frequencies, capacity or type of aircraft offered by airlines of the other party over the agreed routes. A third amendment adds a new section to the Annex, to establish principles and procedures relating to airline tariffs over agreed routes.

Both Governments consider that the latest amendments to the Air Transport Agreement will ensure the continued orderly development of international air services between the United States and Panama, to the benefit of the travelling public, the airlines, and the friendly relations which exist between the two countries.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 2d Session

International Aspects of Antitrust. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Part 1, April 20–August 30, 1966. 645 pp., tables.

90th Congress, 1st Session

Human Rights Conventions. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the Convention on the Political Rights of Women (Ex. J, 88th Cong., 1st sess.), the Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor (Ex. K, 88th Cong., 1st sess.), Supplementary Slavery Convention (Ex. L, 88th Cong., 1st sess.). February 23 and March 8, 1967. 227 pp.

Communist Threat to the United States Through the Caribbean. Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Part 16, March 7, 1967, 85 pp.; part 17, March 7 and 8, 1967, 59 pp.

Marine Science Affairs—A Year of Transition. Message from the President transmitting the first report of the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development. H. Doc. 79. March 9, 1967. 162 pp.

Support for a New Phase of the Alliance for Progress. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.J. Res. 428. March 14 and 15, 1967. 93 pp.

Latin American Summit Conference. Report to accompany S.J. Res. 60. S. Rept. 83. April 3, 1967. 4 pp.

Authorizing the Continued Loan of Certain Naval Vessels and a New Loan. Extension of existing loans of 10 naval vessels to friendly foreign nations and authorizing a new loan to Korea. Re-

port to accompany H.R. 6167. H. Rept. 169. April 4, 1967. 13 pp.

Report of Audit of Export-Import Bank of Washington, Fiscal Year 1966. H. Doc. 96. April 5, 1967. 27 pp.

Report of Special Study Mission to the Near East, comprising Representative Edward R. Roybal, *chairman*, and Representatives E. Ross Adair, J. Irving Whalley, and E. Y. Berry of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. H. Rept. 172. April 5, 1967. 70 pp.

Disposal of United States Military Installations and Supplies in France. Report submitted by Senator Ernest Gruening, *chairman*, Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. S. Doc. 16. April 6, 1967. 47 pp.

National Science Foundation. Message from the President transmitting the 16th annual report of the National Science Foundation, for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1966. H. Doc. 102. April 7, 1967. 175 pp.

Immigration and Naturalization. Report by the Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. S. Rept. 168. April 12, 1967. 8 pp.

Rush-Bagot Agreement Days. Report to accompany S.J. Res. 49. S. Rept. 185. April 13, 1967. 3 pp.

Authorizing the President to Designate October 31 of Each Year as National UNICEF Day. Report to accompany S.J. Res. 56. S. Rept. 186. April 13, 1967. 3 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1967. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Part II. April 17–21, 1967. 240 pp.

Report of the Special Study Mission to the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Brazil and Paraguay, comprising Representative Armistead Selden, *chairman*, and Representative William S. Mailiard of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. H. Rept. 219. May 1, 1967. 61 pp.

Peace Corps Act Amendment of 1967. Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on S. 1031. May 4, 1967. 41 pp.

Report of Special Subcommittee Following Visit to Southeast Asia March 23 through April 4, 1967. House Committee on Armed Services. May 6, 1967. 15 pp.

Government, the Universities, and International Affairs: A Crisis in Identity. Letter from the Chairman, the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs transmitting a special report by Professors Walter Adams and Adrian Jaffe of Michigan State University. H. Doc. 120. May 11, 1967. 18 pp.

Export-Import Bank Extension. Report, together with supplemental and individual views, to accompany H.R. 6649. H. Rept. 256. May 11, 1967. 27 pp.

Inter-American Development Bank Act Amendments of 1967. Report, together with minority and individual views, to accompany H.R. 9547. H. Rept. 266. May 18, 1967. 32 pp.

Market Promotion Activity of Foreign Agricultural Service (Third Review). First Report by the House Committee on Government Operations. H. Rept. 311. May 25, 1967. 33 pp.

Amendments to the Act Creating the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission. Report to accompany S. 1566. S. Rept. 295. June 8, 1967. 11 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284.

Acceptance deposited: Sierra Leone, June 4, 1967.

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic with annexes and protocol. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

Accession deposited: Botswana, January 3, 1967.¹

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963.²

Ratifications deposited: Brazil, May 11, 1967; Ireland, May 10, 1967.

International Court of Justice

Statute of the International Court of Justice (59 Stat. 1055).

Declarations recognizing compulsory jurisdiction deposited: Malta, December 6, 1966; Malawi, December 12, 1966.

Postal Matters

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and convention with final protocol and regulations of execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881.

Ratification deposited: Morocco, April 7, 1967.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a global communications satellite system. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.

Accession deposited: Peru, June 9, 1967.

Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.

Signature: Junta Permanente Nacional de Telecomunicaciones of Peru, June 9, 1967.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965.

Entered into force January 1, 1967.²

Accession deposited: Lesotho, May 26, 1967.

Trade

Protocol extending the arrangement regarding international trade in cotton textiles of October 1, 1962 (TIAS 5240). Done at Geneva May 1, 1967. Entered into force October 1, 1967.

Acceptance deposited: United States, May 25, 1967.

Declaration on the provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 18, 1960. Entered into force October 14, 1962. TIAS 5184.

Acceptance: Ivory Coast, April 17, 1967.

Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade embodying results of the 1960-61 tariff conference. Done at Geneva July 16, 1962. Entered into force August 15, 1962; for the United States December 31, 1962. TIAS 5253.

Acceptance: Pakistan, April 27, 1967.

Declaration on provisional accession of the United Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 13, 1962. Entered into force January 9, 1963; for the United States May 3, 1963. TIAS 5309.

Acceptance: Ivory Coast, April 17, 1967.

Declaration on provisional accession of Iceland to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 5, 1964. Entered into force April 19, 1964; for the United States November 20, 1964. TIAS 5687.

Acceptance: Ivory Coast, April 17, 1967.

Procès-verbal extending the declaration on provisional accession of Iceland to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (TIAS 5687). Done at Geneva December 14, 1965. Entered into force December 28, 1965; for the United States December 30, 1965. TIAS 5943.

Acceptance: Central African Republic, April 24, 1967.

Third procès-verbal extending the declaration on provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (TIAS 4498), as extended (TIAS 4958 and 5809). Done at Geneva December 14, 1965. Entered into force January 6, 1966. TIAS 6005.

Acceptance: Central African Republic, April 24, 1967.

Protocol for the accession of Switzerland to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 1, 1966. Entered into force August 1, 1966. TIAS 6065.

Acceptance: Central African Republic, April 24, 1967.

Protocol for the accession of Yugoslavia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva July 20, 1966. Entered into force August 25, 1966; for the United States January 17, 1967. TIAS 6185.

Acceptance: Central African Republic, April 24, 1967.

Third procès-verbal extending the declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 17, 1966. Entered into force January 9, 1967. TIAS 6224.

Acceptances: Central African Republic, April 24, 1967; New Zealand, May 9, 1967; Pakistan, April 19, 1967.

Second procès-verbal extending the declaration on provisional accession of the United Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (TIAS 5309). Done at Geneva November

¹ With a reservation.

² Not in force for the United States.

17, 1966. Entered into force January 18, 1967. TIAS 6225.

Acceptances: Central African Republic, April 24, 1967; New Zealand, May 9, 1967; Pakistan, April 19, 1967.

Protocol for the accession of Korea to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 2, 1967. Entered into force April 14, 1967; for the United States April 21, 1967.

Ratification: Netherlands, May 1, 1967.

Acceptances: Central African Republic, April 24, 1967; European Economic Community, March 31, 1967; France, April 24, 1967; Federal Republic of Germany, May 9, 1967; Italy, May 8, 1967; Japan, April 18, 1967; United States, April 21, 1967.

BILATERAL

Italy

Agreement relating to air transport services, with annex, schedule and protocol, as amended and extended (TIAS 1902, 2081, 4558). Signed at Rome February 6, 1948. Entered into force September 2, 1948.

Terminated by Italy: May 31, 1967.

Switzerland

Agreement relating to the granting of authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio operators of either country to operate their stations in the other country. Effected by exchange of notes at Bern January 12 and May 16, 1967. Entered into force May 16, 1967.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on May 10 confirmed the nomination of Robert H. McBride to be Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 132 dated June 6.)

The Senate on May 24 confirmed the nomination of Andrew V. Corry to be Ambassador to Ceylon, and to serve concurrently as Ambassador to the Maldiv Islands. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated May 4.)

The Senate on June 8 confirmed the following nominations:

Benigno C. Hernandez to be Ambassador to Paraguay. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated May 30.)

Covey T. Oliver to be an Assistant Secretary of State. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated May 24.)

William J. Porter to be Ambassador to Korea. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated May 16.)

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders.

Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and, in some cases, a selected bibliography. Those listed below are available at 5¢ each.

Austria. Pub. 7955. 8 pp.

Greece. Pub. 8198. 8 pp.

Korea. Pub. 7782. 8 pp.

Malaysia. Pub. 7753. 8 pp.

Spain. Pub. 7800. 4 pp.

Upper Volta. Pub. 8201. 4 pp.

Uruguay. Pub. 7857. 4 pp.

Viet-Nam Information Notes. The first five pamphlets of a new series of background papers on various aspects of the Viet-Nam conflict:

No. 1. *Basic Data on South Viet-Nam* summarizes the history, geography, government, and economy of the country. Pub. 8195. East Asian and Pacific Series 155. 4 pp. 5¢.

No. 2. *The Search for Peace in Viet-Nam* reviews peace efforts by the United States and the United Nations, as well as other diplomatic initiatives. Pub. 8196. East Asian and Pacific Series 156. 8 pp. 5¢.

No. 3. *Communist-Directed Forces in South Viet-Nam* reviews the growth of Viet Minh and Viet Cong forces, Communist objectives, strengths, and weaknesses. Pub. 8197. East Asian and Pacific Series 157. 8 pp. 5¢.

No. 4. *Free World Assistance for South Viet-Nam* describes the military, economic, and social assistance being provided to the Republic of Viet-Nam by nations other than the United States. Pub. 8213. East Asian and Pacific Series 159. 8 pp. 5¢.

No. 5. *Political Development in South Viet-Nam* discusses South Viet-Nam's steady progress toward

an elected government and representative institutions at all levels of government. Pub. 8231. East Asian and Pacific Series 160. 8 pp. 5¢.

U.S. Participation in the U.N. Twentieth annual report by the President to the Congress, for the year 1965. Pub. 8137. International Organization and Conference Series 73. xvi, 415 pp., charts. \$2.

Fisheries—King Crab. Agreement with Japan amending and extending the agreement of November 25, 1964. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington November 29, 1966. Entered into force November 29, 1966. TIAS 6155. 3 pp. 5¢.

Sea Level Canal Site—Joint Technical-Economic Feasibility Investigations and Studies. Agreement with Colombia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bogotá October 25, 1966. Entered into force October 25, 1966. With memorandum of record. TIAS 6156. 11 pp. 10¢.

Peace Corps. Agreement with the Central African Republic. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bangui September 9 and November 24, 1966. Entered into force November 24, 1966. TIAS 6157. 6 pp. 5¢.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Paraguay, amplifying the agreement of October 28, 1955—Signed at Asunción August 11, 1966. Entered into force November 16, 1966. TIAS 6158. 3 pp. 5¢.

Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with Panama. Exchange of notes—Signed at Panamá November 16, 1966. Entered into force November 16, 1966. TIAS 6159. 4 pp. 5¢.

Satellite Telemetry/Telecommand Station Near Fairbanks, Alaska. Agreement with the European Space Research Organization. Exchange of notes—Signed at Paris November 28, 1966. Entered into force November 28, 1966. TIAS 6160. 10 pp. 10¢.

Joint Defense Space Research Facility. Agreement with Australia—Signed at Canberra December 9, 1966. Entered into force December 9, 1966. TIAS 6162. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Bolivia, amending the agreement of August 17, 1965. Exchange of notes—Signed at La Paz November 30, 1966. Entered into force November 30, 1966. TIAS 6164. 3 pp. 5¢.

Weather Stations—Continuation of Cooperative Meteorological Program. Agreement with the Dominican Republic. Exchange of notes—Dated at Santo Domingo June 17 and July 21, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1966. Effective June 30, 1965. TIAS 6167. 6 pp. 5¢.

Transfer of Certain Paintings for the Weimar Museum. Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington December 9 and 16, 1966. Entered into force December 16, 1966. TIAS 6169. 2 pp. 5¢.

Geodetic Satellite Observation Station. Agreement with Japan. Exchange of notes—Dated at Tokyo, September 12 and 19, 1966. Entered into force September 19, 1966. TIAS 6170. 4 pp. 5¢.

Joint Commission To Study Economic and Social Development of Border Area. Agreement with Mexico. Exchange of notes—Signed at México and

Tlatelolco November 30 and December 3, 1966. Entered into force December 3, 1966. TIAS 6171. 3 pp. 5¢.

Weather Stations—Continuation of Cooperative Meteorological Program in the Cayman Islands. Agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington November 23 and December 12, 1966. Entered into force December 12, 1966. Effective July 1, 1962. TIAS 6175. 7 pp. 10¢.

Headquarters of the United Nations. Agreement with the United Nations, amending the supplemental agreement of February 9, 1966. Exchange of notes—Signed at New York December 8, 1966. Entered into force December 8, 1966. TIAS 6176. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Vietnam—Signed at Saigon December 15, 1966. Entered into force December 15, 1966. With exchange of notes. TIAS 6177. 10 pp. 10¢.

Refunding of Indebtedness Due Under Certain Agreements. Agreement with Greece—Signed at Athens May 28, 1964. Entered into force November 5, 1966. TIAS 6178. 7 pp. 10¢.

Peace Corps. Agreement with Gambia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bathurst November 26 and December 5, 1966. Entered into force December 5, 1966. TIAS 6181. 5 pp. 5¢.

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Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Iran—Signed at Tehran December 20, 1966. Entered into force December 20, 1966. With exchange of notes. TIAS 6183. 6 pp. 5¢.

International Institute for Cotton. Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the International Cotton Institute. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the International Cotton Institute, at Washington, September 7, 1966. Entered into force September 7, 1966. TIAS 6184. 2 pp. 5¢.

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1966. Entered into force October 4, 1966. TIAS 6192. 3 pp. 5¢.

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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to June 5 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 119 and 120 of May 26, 126 of June 2, and 130 of June 3.

No.	Date	Subject
131	6/5	Notice to travelers to the Middle East (rewrite).
*132	6/6	McBride sworn in as Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (biographic details).
*133	6/5	Katzenbach: commencement address at Georgetown University.
*134	6/6	Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm at Stockholm, June 12–July 14 (U.S. delegation).
†135	6/6	Harriman: "L'opinion en 24 heures" luncheon in honor of 20th anniversary of the Marshall Plan, Paris.
136	6/7	U.S. and Panama amend air transport agreement.
*137	6/8	Amendment to program for visit of the King of Thailand.
†138	6/8	Transfer of oceanographic research vessel to Government of India.
*139	6/10	Harriman: "Continuity of Purpose in a Generation of Change," commencement address at Brandeis University, June 11.
†140	6/10	North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting, Luxembourg, June 13–14 (U.S. delegation).

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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Africa. America and Africa: The New World and the Newer World (Katzenbach) 954

American Principles. U.S.S. "John F. Kennedy" (Johnson) 959

Australia. President Johnson Holds Talks With Australian Prime Minister (Holt, Johnson) 960

Aviation

U.S. and Italy Terminate Air Transport Agreement (joint communique) 965

United States and Panama Amend Air Transport Agreement (joint statement) 965

Ceylon. Corry confirmed as Ambassador 968

Congo (Kinshasa). McBride confirmed as Ambassador 968

Congress

Confirmations (Corry, Hernandez, McBride, Oliver, Porter) 968

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy 966

The Situation in the Near East (Johnson, Mansfield, Rusk) 949

Department and Foreign Service. Confirmations (Corry, Hernandez, McBride, Oliver, Porter) 968

Economic Affairs

America and Africa: The New World and the Newer World (Katzenbach) 954

United States and Mexico Sign Cotton Textile Agreement 964

U.S. To Contribute to UNDP/FAO Fisheries Project in Viet-Nam 964

Foreign Aid. America and Africa: The New World and the Newer World (Katzenbach) 954

Italy. U.S. and Italy Terminate Air Transport Agreement (joint communique) 965

Korea. Porter confirmed as Ambassador 968

Latin America. Oliver confirmed as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs 968

Maldivé Islands. Corry confirmed as Ambassador 968

Mexico. United States and Mexico Sign Cotton Textile Agreement 964

Military Affairs. U.S.S. "John F. Kennedy" (Johnson) 959

Near East

Notice to U.S. Travelers to the Middle East 952

The Situation in the Near East (Johnson, Mansfield, Rusk) 949

U.N. Security Council Demands a Cease-Fire in the Near East (Goldberg, Security Council resolutions, U.S. draft resolutions) 934

U.S. Welcomes the "First Step" Toward Peace in the Near East (Johnson) 935

Panama. United States and Panama Amend Air Transport Agreement (joint statement) 965

Paraguay. Hernandez confirmed as Ambassador 968

Passports. Notice to U.S. Travelers to the Middle East 952

Presidential Documents

President Johnson Confers With British Prime Minister 963

President Johnson Holds Talks With Australian Prime Minister 960

The Situation in the Near East 949

U.S. Welcomes the "First Step" Toward Peace in the Near East 935

U.S.S. "John F. Kennedy" 959

Publications. Recent Releases 968

Treaty Information

Current Actions 967

U.S. and Italy Terminate Air Transport Agreement (joint communique) 965

United States and Mexico Sign Cotton Textile Agreement 964

United States and Panama Amend Air Transport Agreement (joint statement) 965

U.S.S.R. U.S. Rejects Soviet Charges of Attacks on Ship at Cam Pha (text of U.S. note) 953

United Kingdom. President Johnson Confers With British Prime Minister (Johnson, Wilson) 963

United Nations

The Situation in the Near East (Johnson, Mansfield, Rusk) 949

U.N. Security Council Demands a Cease-Fire in the Near East (Goldberg, Security Council resolutions, U.S. draft resolutions) 934

U.S. To Contribute to UNDP/FAO Fisheries Project in Viet-Nam 964

U.S. Welcomes the "First Step" Toward Peace in the Near East (Johnson) 935

Viet-Nam

President Johnson Holds Talks With Australian Prime Minister (Holt, Johnson) 960

U.S. Rejects Soviet Charges of Attacks on Ship at Cam Pha (text of U.S. note) 953

U.S. To Contribute to UNDP/FAO Fisheries Project in Viet-Nam 964

Name Index

Corry, Andrew V 968

Goldberg, Arthur J 934

Hernandez, Benigno C 968

Holt, Harold E 960

Johnson, President 935, 949, 959, 960, 963

Katzenbach, Nicholas deB 954

Mansfield, Mike 949

McBride, Robert H 968

Oliver, Covey T 968

Porter, William J 968

Rusk, Secretary 949

Wilson, Harold 963

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
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
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