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Jan. 6-June 30, 1969

INDEX

<i>Number</i>	<i>Date of Issue</i>	<i>Pages</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Date of Issue</i>	<i>Pages</i>
1541	Jan. 6, 1969	1- 20	1554	Apr. 7, 1969	289-304
1542	Jan. 13, 1969	21- 44	1555	Apr. 14, 1969	305-332
1543	Jan. 20, 1969	45- 72	1556	Apr. 21, 1969	333-348
1544	Jan. 27, 1969	73- 88	1557	Apr. 28, 1969	349-376
1545	Feb. 3, 1969	89-120	1558	May 5, 1969	377-396
1546	Feb. 10, 1969	121-140	1559	May 12, 1969	397-416
1547	Feb. 17, 1969	141-156	1560	May 19, 1969	417-432
1548	Feb. 24, 1969	157-172	1561	May 26, 1969	433-456
1549	Mar. 3, 1969	173-188	1562	June 2, 1969	457-476
1550	Mar. 10, 1969	189-216	1563	June 9, 1969	477-500
1551	Mar. 17, 1969	217-236	1564	June 16, 1969	501-524
1552	Mar. 24, 1969	237-272	1565	June 23, 1969	525-548
1553	Mar. 31, 1969	273-288	1566	June 30, 1969	549-576

Corrections for Volume LX

The Editor of the BULLETIN wishes to call attention to the following errors in Volume LX:

March 24, p. 266, first column: President Nixon's remarks on departure from Ciampino Airport, Rome, on February 28 should begin: "Mr. Prime Minister and Your Excellencies: As we leave Rome I want you to know how deeply grateful I am for the hospitality that has been extended to us on our visit and how reassured I am by our conversations with the President, with you, and with members of your Government with regard to the future relations between the United States and Italy. . . ."

March 24, p. 266, second column: These remarks, incorrectly attributed to President Saragat, were made by Italian Prime Minister Mariano Rumor.

April 14, p. 305, second column: The third sentence in the third full paragraph should read: "Clearly, withdrawal should take place to established boundaries which define the areas where Israel and its neighbors may live in peace and sovereign independence."

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INDEX

Volume LX, Numbers 1541-1566, January 6-June 30, 1969

A

- ABM (Anti-ballistic missile system).
See Defense, national
- Abrams, Creighton W. (Nixon), 277, 457, 549
- Acheson, Dean, 397
- AEC (Atomic Energy Commission), 173, 371
- Afghanistan:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 188, 348, 376, 455, 548
Visit of Secretary Rogers: 434; Rogers, 433
- Africa (*see also* Organization of African Unity and names of individual countries):
Economic and social development: 106; Nielsen, 292; Nixon, 211; Rogers, 310
Regional development: Nielsen, 293; W. W. Rostow, 5
Southern:
Problems: Finger, 453; Peal, 538; Rogers, 311; W. W. Rostow, 6; Yost, 326
U.N. educational and other programs (Yost), 328, 329
Spanish bases: Nixon, 246, 518; Rogers, 359
U.S. appropriations request FY 1970: 97, 98; Nixon, 518; Richardson, 571, 573
U.S. relations and role: Nielsen, 292; Nixon, 160, 294 (quoted); Peal, 537; Rogers, 310
Unity (OAU): Nixon, 539
- Africa Fund (Yost), 329
- African Development Bank (Richardson), 571
- African Liberation Day (Peal), 537
- Agency for International Development (*see also* Foreign aid programs, U.S.): Rogers, 126
- Administrator (Hannah), confirmation, 348
- Appropriations request FY 1970: 96, 97; Nixon, 518
- Auditor-General, position of: Nixon, 518; Richardson, 573
- Family planning program assistance (Johnson), 117
- Aggression (*see also* China, Communist; Communism; and Soviet Union):
Definition of, 147, 155
U.S. role against: Johnson, 96; Nixon, 381
- Agnew, Spiro, 271
- Agricultural surpluses, U.S. use in overseas programs:
Agreements with: Afghanistan, 376; Bolivia, 304; Ceylon, 332; Chile, 88, 456; Congo (Kinshasa), 524; Dominican Republic, 396, 432; Ghana, 20; Guinea, 172; Iceland, 548; India, 88, 456, 576; Indonesia, 524; Israel, 120; Jordan, 432; Korea, 272, 396; Morocco, 288; Sierra Leone, 416; Tunisia, 88; Turkey, 216; Vietnam, 88, 172, 216; Yugoslavia, 88
Debt rescheduling agreements, Indonesia, 172
- Agriculture (*see also* Agricultural surpluses, Food and Agricultural Organization, and name of product):
Cattle disease, U.S.-Mexican efforts to eradicate (Johnson), 24
Latin America (Johnson), 73
Less developed countries, importance to: Johnson, 117; Nixon, 517; Richardson, 570; W. W. Rostow, 6
Narcotic drug crops, U.N. efforts to control: 65*n*; Squire, 64
Nuclear power applications (Seaborg), 182
Technical problems (Dubos), 135
Trade barriers: 105; Johnson, 102
U.S. aid: 96, 98; Richardson, 572
U.S. exports, 103
World Weather Watch, value to, 369
- AID. *See* Agency for International Development
- Albania, treaties, agreements, etc., 88, 548
- Aleman, Roberto Ramon, 222
- Algeria, radio regulations (Geneva, 1959, as amended), partial revision re maritime mobile service, 119
- Alianza para el Progreso. See* Alliance for Progress
- Alliance for Progress (*see also* Inter-American Development Bank): Meyer, 441; Nixon, 159; Rockefeller, 471; W. W. Rostow, 5
Accomplishments and role: Johnson, 73; Meyer, 473; Nixon, 335; Rogers, 310
U.S. financial support: Johnson, 73; Rogers, 310
Appropriations request FY 1970: 97, 98; Nixon, 518; Richardson, 573
- American Falls. *See* Niagara Falls
- American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966*, released, 348
- American ideals: Nielsen, 294; Nixon, 121, 245, 526, 539; Rogers, 478
- Amistad Dam (Diaz Ordaz), 23
- Andean Development Corporation (Johnson), 74
- Anders, William G.: 77; Johnson, 76
- Anderson, George W., 295
- Anderson, James, 534
- Angola (Finger), 453
- Annenberg, Walter H., 304
- Antarctic Treaty (1959) Rogers, 307; Smith, 335; Yost, 327
Measures re furtherance of principles and objectives (1966): Argentina, France, 415
Measures re furtherance of principles or purposes (1968): Argentina, France, 415; South Africa, 455; U.K., 548; U.S., 575
- Anti-ballistic missile system. *See* Defense, national
- ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States): Gorton, 439; Nixon, 438
- Apartheid*: 151; Finger, 453; Goldschmidt, 9; Loy, 395; Sisco, 29; Wiggins, 9; Yost, 302, 566
- APOLLO 8: Anders, Borman, Lovell, 77; Johnson, 76, 89; Nixon, 123; Seaborg, 183
- Arab-Israeli conflict: de Gaulle, 78; Nixon, 364; Richardson, 560; W. W. Rostow, 6
Arms limitation agreement, need for: Sisco, 29, 392, 444; Wiggins, 54
Cease-fire violations: Rusk, 51; Sisco, 392
Security Council resolution: text, 342; Yost, 340, 341
- Civil airlines attacks: Rusk, 45; Sisco, 392; Yost, 197
- Four-power talks: Nixon, 142, 161, 218, 240, 244, 280; Rogers, 305, 306, 360, 501; Rusk, 46; Sisco, 392, 393, 445, 446; Wiggins, 33; Yost, 341, 565
Conference, joint communique, 337
- Human rights in occupied territories, 153
- Iraqi trials and executions: 282; Yost, 145
- Peace, basis for: King Hussein I, 364; Rogers, 363; Sisco, 391, 443

- Arab-Israeli conflict—Continued
 Refugees: 41, 148, 151; Rogers, 306; Sisco, 393, 445
 Soviet role: Nixon, 244, 315; Rusk, 49; Sisco, 391, 444
 U.S.—Soviet talks, question of: Nixon, 142, 240; Rogers, 362, 501, 532; Sisco, 392
 U.N. Role: 147, 151; Johnson, 90; Nixon, 142; Rogers, 305, 387; Rusk, 45, 51; Sisco, 391, 443; Wiggins, 54, 82; Yost, 565
 U.S. policy and position: Nixon, 159; Rogers, 305, 362, 396c, 387, 506; Sisco, 391, 444
- Arbitral awards, foreign, convention (1958), Italy, 331
- Arenales Catalán, Emilio (Kennedy), 426
- Argentina:
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 88, 331, 348, 415, 548
 U.S. Ambassador (Lodge), confirmation, 500
- Armaments (*see also* Defense, Disarmament, Military assistance and Nuclear weapons):
 Arms race: Johnson, 90; Nixon, 123, 247, 315
 Nuclear. *See* Nuclear arms race and Nuclear nonproliferation treaty
- Conventional arms transfers, informational system proposed (Foster), 61
- Middle East, demilitarization, proposed (Rogers), 306
- Seabed, need for arms control. *See* Marine resources: Seabed
- Soviet supplies to:
 Middle East: (Nixon), 244; Sisco, 392, 444
 Pakistan (Rogers), 505
 Viet-Nam (Nixon), 243, 244
- Strategic arms talks: 150; DePalma, 496; Johnson, 90; Nixon, 142, 159, 246, 276, 279, 289, 353; Richardson, 418, 561; Rogers, 308, 359, 361, 363, 397, 501, 531, 534; Rusk, 48; Rostow, 6; Smith, 334
- U.S. position on supply of arms to:
 Middle East (Sisco), 392
 Nigeria (Rogers), 311
 South Africa (Loy), 395
- Armed conflict, human rights, 152
- Armed forces:
 Geneva conventions (1949) re treatment in time of war: Barbados, Malta, 43; Uruguay, 576
- NATO. *See* NATO
- U.S.:
 Balance of payments, effect on: 114; Barnett, 448; Johnson, 101; Nixon, 404; W. W. Rostow, 5
 Customs regulations re cargo consigned to U.S. military authorities or armed forces personnel, agreement with Philippines, 456
 Tribute (Nixon), 259, 525
- Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S. (Rogers), 126
 Appropriations request FY 1970, 97
- Arms Control, etc.—Continued
 Director (Smith): Nixon, 289; confirmation, 211; nomination, 159a
- ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations): U. A. Johnson, 491
- Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia (*see also* ANZUS, Asian and Pacific Council, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and individual countries):
 Bangkok seven-nation meeting. *See under* Viet-Nam
 Economic and social progress: 552; U. A. Johnson, 489; Richardson, 572; Rogers, 397; SEATO, 479
 Japan, role of: Barnett, 449; U. A. Johnson, 491; Rogers, 397; W. W. Rostow, 5
- Peace:
 Asian role: 433; Rogers, 484, 505
 Prospects for: Johnson, 77; Lodge, 125
- Regional cooperation: U. A. Johnson, 491; Richardson, 573; Rogers, 397, 484, 501, 504; W. W. Rostow, 5; SEATO, 479; Symington, 35
 Communist participation, question of: 483; Lodge, 486
- U.K. withdrawal from South Asia, effect (Rusk), 51
- U.S. aid, appropriations request FY 1970: 96, 97, 98; Nixon, 518; Richardson, 570, 573
- U.S. relations and interests: U. A. Johnson, 491; Nixon, 160; Rogers, 433, 461, 477, 504
- Viet-Nam, importance to: Johnson, 90; Nixon, 458; Rogers, 400; SEATO, 479
- Visit of Secretary Rogers: 434; Nixon, 460
 Purpose (Rogers), 357, 433, 461, 462, 463, 503, 505
 Results (Rogers), 463
- Visit of Secretary Stans, 367
- Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC): U. A. Johnson, 491
- Asian Development Bank: U. A. Johnson, 491; Kennedy, 427; Richardson, 571
- Japanese financial contributions (Barnett), 449
- U.S. appropriations request FY 1970: 99; Johnson, 103; Nixon, 517
- U.S. Governor (Kennedy), confirmation, 282
- Asian Parliamentarians Union (U. A. Johnson), 491
- ASPAC (Asian and Pacific Council): U. A. Johnson, 491
- Association of Southeast Asian Nations (U. A. Johnson), 491
- Aström, Sverker C. (Yost), 329
- Astronauts. *See* Outer space
- Atlantic Alliance. *See* North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- Atomic energy, peaceful uses of: Dubos, 132; Seaborg, 173, 199, 209
 Bilateral agreements for cooperation (Seaborg), 175
 Iran, 304; U.K., 348
- Atomic energy, etc.—Continued
 Centre European pour la Recherche Nucleaire (Dubos), 135
 Natural uranium transfers, agreement with Canada re application of safeguards, 216, 456c
 Nuclear explosions: 150; Nixon, 162; Seaborg, 183
 Gasbuggy and Long Shot experiments (Foster), 59
 Seismic investigation, proposed: Fisher, 412; Foster, 58, 60
 U.S.—Australia feasibility study, 186
 U.S.—Soviet technical talks, 356, 401
 U.N. resolutions, 150
- Atomic Energy Agency, International (Seaborg), 174, 201
- Nuclear explosive services, role in, 150
- Safeguards: Fisher, 410; Nixon, 162; Seaborg, 203, 207
- Application to existing bilateral agreements (Seaborg), 181, 202
- Current actions, Iran, 303
 Nuclear nonproliferation treaty. *See* Nuclear nonproliferation treaty
- Statute (1956) with annex, current actions: Liechtenstein, 20; Malaysia, 139; Niger, 331; Zambia, 87
- Atomic Energy Commission, U.S.: 371; Seaborg, 173
- Atoms for Peace: Nixon, 162; Seaborg, 174, 199
- “Atoms in Action” nuclear science demonstration centers (Seaborg), 179
- Australia:
 Asia, role in: Nixon, 438; Rogers, 398
 Military and other aid to Viet-Nam (U. A. Johnson), 492
 Singapore and Malaysia, peacekeeping forces in: 480; Rogers, 478
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 156, 187, 216, 303, 499
 U.S. nuclear excavations study, 186
 U.S. visit of Prime Minister Gorton, 198, 436
- Austria, treaties, agreements, etc., 119, 120, 156, 215, 348, 455
- Aviation:
 Air transport:
 Civilian, safeguards for (Yost), 197
 South Africa, question of agreement with (Loy), 394
- Aircraft:
 Biafran relief, 30, 31
 Nigerian attacks on relief flights and civilians, 281, 556
 Hijacking, problems of and proposals for international action (Loy), 212
- Civil aviation, Middle East attacks (*see also* Arab-Israeli conflict: Cease-fire violations): Rusk, 45; Wiggins, 53; Yost, 340, 341
- ICAO Council, U.S. representative (Butler), appointment, 499
- International airspace: 383; Nixon, 380

Aviation—Continued

Treaties, agreements, etc.:

Air transport, bilateral agreements with: Czechoslovakia, 272, 283; France, 547; Greece, 72

Aircraft, international recognition of rights in, convention (1948), Lebanon, 475

Basic pilot aircraft provision by U.S., agreement with Indonesia, 416

Civil aviation convention (1944), international protocol on authentic trilingual text: Australia, 187; Chad, 499; France, 236; Germany, 187; Ivory Coast, 395; Luxembourg (with reservation), 415; Mali, 548; Malawi, 575; Niger, 395; Panama, 375; Switzerland, 139; Togo, 395

Procès-verbal of rectification, entry into force, 499

F-4EJ aircraft and related equipment and materials, agreement with Japan, 396

Offenses and certain other acts committed aboard, convention (1963): Belgium, 187; Brazil, 331; Colombia, 172; Mexico, 187, 415; Niger, 475; U.K., 87; U.S., 475

Ratification urged (Loy), 212

U.S. reconnaissance plane shot down by North Korea: 383; Nixon, 377, 379; Rogers, 398; Yost, 497

B

Bailey, Charles W., II, 159, 279

Baker, William O., 295

Balance of payments:

Central America (Meyer), 422

OECD countries: 196; Richardson, 193

U.K., 108

U.S., problems of and efforts to improve: 52, 92, 96, 114, 297; Barnett, 448; Johnson, 89, 101; Kennedy, 428; Nixon, 403; Richardson, 193; W. W. Rostow, 5

Council of Economic Advisors report (excerpts), 103

Ballistic early warning station at Fylindales Moor, agreement with U.K., 43

Bank for International Settlements, 110

Barall, Milton, 375

Barbados, treaties, agreements, etc., 43, 331, 548

Barnett, Robert W., 447

Barrientos Ortuño, René: Nixon, 423; Rogers, 424

Bartch, Carl, 221*n* (quoted), 282, 509

Beam, Jacob D., 304

Belgium:

Treaties, agreements, etc., 72, 187, 188, 272, 431, 499

U.S. Ambassador (Eisenhower), confirmation, 304

U.S. visit of King Baudoin, proposed (Nixon), 253

Belgium—Continued

Visit of President Nixon: King Baudoin, 249; Nixon, 157, 158, 250, 252

Visit of Secretary Stans, 367

Berckemeyer, Fernando, 75

Bergsten, Fred, 164

Berlin:

Presidential election convention: 186; Nixon, 238

Right of access: NATO, 355; Nixon, 238; Richardson, 560; Rogers, 387; Tripartite (U.S., U.K., France), 186

Soviet allegations of Federal German military activities, 248

U.S. responsibilities as occupying power: 248; Nixon, 258, 261; Rogers, 387; W. W. Rostow, 5

Visit of President Nixon: Nixon, 157, 158, 249, 258, 260, 262; Schütz, 258, 259

Bhutan, Universal Postal Union Constitution, with final protocols, adherence, with reservation, 303

Biafra (*see also* Nigeria):

Air raids by Nigeria, U.S. concern, 281

Cease-fire, proposed (Johnson), 3

Relief efforts: 30, 31; Nixon, 222

Nigerian attacks on relief flights, 556

Bianchi, Manuel, 152

Big-power responsibility: Barnett, 447; Meyer, 474; Nixon, 218, 246, 259, 266, 315, 525; Rogers, 305, 388; W. W. Rostow, 4; Rusk, 50; Sisco, 27; Yost, 327

Bills of lading, unification of certain rules of law, protocol to amend international convention (1924), France, 87

Biological and chemical warfare. *See* Chemical and biological warfare

BIS (Bank for International Settlements), 110

Blatchford, Joseph H., 492

Bolívar, Simón, 386 (quoted)

Bolivia:

President Barrientos, death of: Nixon, 423; Rogers, 424

Treaties, agreements, etc., 215, 304, 548

BOMEX (Barbados Oceanographic and Meteorological Experiment), 373

Borman, Frank: 77; Johnson, 76

Botswana:

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 390

Treaties, agreements, etc., 272, 416, 431

Boyle, Robert P., 499

Brandt, Willy: 350; Shütz, 259

Brazil:

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 222

Soluble coffee exports agreement with U.S., announcement and text, 455

Treaties, agreements, etc., 88, 272, 288, 331, 456, 548

U.S. Ambassador (Elbrick), confirmation, 432

Bronheim, Dave (Rockefeller), 472

Brosio, Manlio: 350; Nixon, 253

Buffum, William B., 348

Bulgaria, treaties, agreements, etc., 188, 396

Bunker, Ellsworth (Rusk), 48

Burma, GATT agreements, 120

Burundi, investment guaranties agreement, 500

Butler, Charles F., 499

Butler, William, 472

Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, treaties, agreements, etc., 396, 416

C

Caglayangil, Ihsan Sabri, 502

Calendar of International conferences, 17, 299

Cambodia:

Geneva agreement, need for implementation: Lodge, 125, 367, 390, 402, 436, 485; Rogers, 307; SEATO, 479

North Vietnamese forces, presence of: Lodge, 365, 419; Walsh, 338

Treaties, agreements, etc. 287, 548

Withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces as part of Viet-Nam peace settlement: 482, 551; Lodge, 389, 420, 507, 536; Nixon, 459; Rogers, 307; Walsh, 555

Cameroon, treaties, agreement, etc., 119, 236

Canada:

Columbia River Basin treaty (1961), agreement re Canadian storage, 272

Domestic communications satellite, 324

International Joint Commission, U.S.-Canada. *See* International Joint Commission, U.S.-Canada

Joint Cabinet Committee on Trade and Economic Policy, 324

Niagara Falls (American) beautification agreements, 345

Niagara River diversions agreements: 332, 476, 500; Nixon, 408

Treaties, agreements, etc., 119, 139, 188, 216, 272, 331, 332, 455, 476, 500, 524, 548

U.S. visit of Prime Minister Trudeau, 319

Visit of President Nixon, question of (Nixon), 323

Canal site agreement with Panama, 376

Capital punishment, 152

Carrillo Flores, Antonio (Rusk), 46, 74

Cassin, Rene, 152

Castiella, Fernando Maria, 324

Castillo, Carlos Manuel, 421

Catholic Relief Services, 281

Center for Educational Research and Innovation (Richardson), 194

CENTO. *See* Central Treaty Organization

Central African Republic, international coffee agreement (1968), with annexes, 215

Central America:

Economic development (W. W. Rostow), 6

Institute for Nutrition (Dubos), 135

Central American Bank for Economic Integration (Meyer), 421

- Central American Common Market: Johnson, 74; Meyer, 421
- Central Treaty Organization; Council of Ministers, 16th session: Rogers, 357, 501, 506; text of communique, 502
- U.S. delegate (Rogers): 434; Rogers, 433
- Ceylon:
 - Agricultural commodities sales agreement, 332
 - U.S.-owned foreign currencies, 52
- Chad, treaties, agreements, etc., 120, 499
- Chartner, William, 171
- Chemical and biological warfare: 150; Foster, 60; Nixon, 289; Popper, 343; Smith, 336
- Chief Lenchwe Molefi Kgafela II, 390
- Chile, treaties, agreements, etc., 88, 120, 455, 548
- China, Communist (*see also* Aggression and Communism):
 - Cancellation of Warsaw meeting regretted (Rogers), 197, 312, 398
 - Intelsat, relation to (Marks), 230
 - Nuclear threat, question of: Nixon, 160, 273, 275, 279, 316, 379; Rogers, 397
 - U.N. membership, question of: 149; Nixon, 141; Wiggins, 82; Yost, 567
 - U.S. relations and efforts to improve: Nixon, 141, 238; Rogers, 312, 388, 398, 533; Rusk, 48
 - World relations and role: Richardson, 558; Rogers, 361, 398; Sisco, 30; Wiggins, 84
- China, Republic of (*see also* Taiwan):
 - Economic and social development: Richardson, 570; Rogers, 397
 - Science cooperation agreement, announcement, 171
 - Treaties, agreements, etc., 20, 72, 156, 172, 331, 548
 - U.N. membership, Communist position: 149; Nixon, 141; Yost, 567
- Church World Service, 281
- Churchill, Sir Winston: Nixon, 255; quoted, 132, 511
- Civil Aviation Organization, International, aircraft hijacking action proposed (Loy), 213
- Civil rights (*see also* Human rights and Racial discrimination), U.S.: Johnson, 3; Nixon, 121; Peal, 538
- Civilian persons in time of war, Geneva convention (1949): Barbados, Malta, 43; Uruguay, 576
- Claims:
 - Foreign arbitral awards, convention (1958), Italy, 331
 - Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, appropriations request FY 1970, 97
 - Gut Dam, U.S.-Canada agreement, 139
 - U.S.S. *Liberty*, payment of compensation by Israel, 473
- Cleveland, Harland, 356
- Clifford, Clark (Rusk), 48
- CODAF (U.S.-Mexico Commission for Border Development and Friendship): 544; Diaz Ordaz, 26; Johnson, 22
- Coffee:
 - International coffee agreement (1968), with annexes: Bolivia, Central African Republic, Congo (Kinshasa), Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Ghana, Guinea, Honduras, India, Kenya, Mexico, Netherlands, Panama, Paraguay, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 215; Spain, 499; Togo, Venezuela, 215
 - Entry into force, 215
 - U.S. participation, Executive order, 126
 - Soluble coffee exports, 329
 - Agreement with Brazil, 455
- Collective security (*see also* Mutual defense): Barnett, 448; Richardson, 558; Rogers, 478; Rusk, 50, 51; Sisco, 30
- ANZUS. *See* ANZUS
- NATO. *See* NATO
- Nuclear nonproliferation treaty, question of effect on U.S. security arrangements (Rogers), 189
- SEATO. *See* SEATO
- U.S. commitments, importance of: Nixon, 143, 525; Richardson, 570; Rogers, 501; W. W. Rostow, 5
- Colombia:
 - Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 92
 - Economic development (W. W. Rostow), 6
 - Treaties, agreements, etc., 88, 172, 548
 - U.S. Ambassador (Vaughn), confirmation, 500
- Colonial countries and peoples, declaration on granting of independence: 154; Finger, 452
- Colonial issues, U.N. consideration, 153
- Columbia River Basin treaty (1961), agreement re special operating program for Canadian storage, 272
- Commerce, Department of, 370, 374
- Communications (*see also* Radio and Telecommunications): Dubos, 128, 132
- Satellites:
 - Canada, 324
 - Direct broadcast satellites: 150; DePalma, 494; Wiggins, 86
 - Global commercial communications satellites system:
 - Agreements establishing interim arrangements and special agreement (1964): Guatemala, 272; Ivory Coast, 188; Jamaica, 172; Luxembourg, 224*n*, 236; Nicaragua, 188; Viet-Nam, 224*n*, 236
 - Background: Marks, 224; Richardson, 232
 - Plenipotentiary conference (Wiggins), 87
 - U.S. delegation, 367
- Communications—Continued
- Satellites—Continued
- INTELSAT: Loy, 229; Wiggins, 87
- Conference on definitive arrangements: 231; Marks, 224, 232; Richardson, 231
- U.S. delegation, 367
- TV satellites, U.S.-India cooperative project (Wiggins), 86
- Communism (*see also* Aggression; China, Communist; and Soviet Union):
 - Countermeasures: Richardson, 558, 570, 573; Rogers, 477, 484; SEATO, 480
 - Spheres of influence, 147
 - Threat of: Rogers, 501; SEATO, 479, 480
- Compulsory settlement of disputes, optional protocol to Vienna convention, Botswana, 431
- COMSAT (Communications Satellite Corporation), INTELSAT management: 231; Loy, 229; Marks, 227, 228, 233
- Conferences, international calendar, 17, 299
- Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943, The*, released, 43
- Conger, Clement E., 140
- Congo, Democratic Republic of the (Kinshasa):
 - Treaties, agreements, etc., 215, 524
 - U.S. Ambassador (Vance), confirmation, 500
- Congo, Republic of (Brazzaville), treaties, agreements, etc., 88, 215, 548
- Congress, U.S.:
 - ABM system, position on (Nixon), 277, 379
 - Foreign policy, documents relating to, lists, 79, 119, 146, 235, 519, 574
 - Investment of U.S. private capital abroad, protection for (Meyer), 407
 - Legislation, IDA contributions: Richardson, 571; Yost, 326
 - Legislation, proposed:
 - American selling price recision (Johnson), 102
 - Asian Development Bank and Special Fund, appropriations request: 99; Johnson, 103; Nixon, 517
 - Credit for countries desiring to purchase essential military equipment, proposed (Nixon), 518
 - Foreign assistance program FY 1970: Nixon, 515; Richardson, 569
 - Interest equalization tax: 105, 114, 404; Johnson, 101; Nixon, 404
 - Trade Expansion Act of 1962, amendment urged, 91, 106
 - National defense, position on (Richardson), 559

Congress, U.S.—Continued

- Senate advice and consent:
 - Broadcasting agreements with Mexico: 42; Nixon, 330
 - Conduct of North Atlantic fishing convention, ratification requested (Nixon), 425
 - Crimes and certain other offenses committed aboard aircraft, convention, ratification: 475; Loy, 212
 - IMF special drawing rights agreement: 108; Johnson, 102; Nixon, 404; Richardson, 193
 - Niagara River diversions agreement with Canada (Nixon), 408
 - Nuclear nonproliferation treaty: Johnson, 90; Nixon, 142, 161, 162, 279; Rogers, 189, 308; Rostow, 6
 - Protection of industrial property, Paris convention, ratification urged, 298
 - Vienna convention on consular relations and optional protocol, ratification urged (Nixon), 475
 - World intellectual property convention, ratification urged (Nixon), 298
- Senate confirmations, 140, 188, 211, 282, 291, 304, 348, 416, 432, 476, 492, 500, 576
- Conservation (*see also* Fish and fisheries): 148; Dubos, 129, 134
- Nature protection and wildlife preservation in the Western Hemisphere, convention (1940), Trinidad and Tobago, 475
- Consular relations:
 - Soviet-U.S. leases on new chancery sites, 469, 500
 - Vienna convention and optional protocol, Pakistan, 499
 - Special diplomatic missions draft convention, 155
 - U.S. ratification urged, (Nixon), 475
- Cooper, John Sherman, 39, 147
- Cooper, Richard, 164
- Cornier, Frank, 157, 238, 377
- Costa Rica, treaties, agreements, etc., 172, 215, 548
- Cotton textiles, bilateral agreements with: Greece, 396, 430; Singapore, 72, 136
- Coyne, J. Patrick, 295
- Crimes against humanity, time limits for, 153
- Crimmins, John Hugh, 348
- Crowe, Philip K., 432
- Cuba:
 - Aircraft hijacking problems and refugee airlift (Loy), 214
 - Inter-American relations, question of (Rockefeller), 472
 - Treaties, agreements, etc., 72, 287, 331, 332, 432, 476
- Cuban missile crisis: Nixon, 315; W. W. Rostow, 5
- Culbertson, Robert E., 375
- Cultural relations and programs (Loy), 394
 - Academic and cultural exchanges and programs agreement with Belgium and Luxembourg, 72

Cultural relations—Continued

- Soviet tour of University of Minnesota Concert Band: Dobrynin, 541; Nixon, 540, 541
- Customs:
 - ATA carnet for temporary admission of goods, customs convention (1961), with annex: Gibraltar, 187; U.S. 139, 548
 - Cargo assigned to U.S. military authorities or armed forces personnel, agreement with Philip-pines, 456
 - Commercial samples and advertising material, international convention (1952) to facilitate importation, of Romania, 43
 - Containers, customs convention (1956), with annex and protocol, U.S., 139
 - Customs cooperation council convention (1950), with annex, Romania, 215
 - ECS carnets for commercial samples, customs convention (1956), with annex and protocol, U.S., 139
 - Professional equipment, customs convention (1961) on temporary importation of, and annexes, U.S., 139
 - Relief supplies and packages, agreement with India for duty-free entry and defrayment of inland transportation charges, 88
 - TIR carnets, international transport of goods under cover of, customs convention (1956) with annexes and protocol, U.S., 139
 - Voluntary agency supplies and equipment, agreement for duty-free entry and defrayment of inland transportation charges of, India, 43
- Cyprus:
 - Treaties, agreements, etc., 283, 455, 524
 - U.N. peacekeeping forces (Yost), 565
 - Extension, 148
 - U.S. Ambassador (Popper), confirmation, 500
- Czechoslovakia:
 - Soviet intervention: 155; Brosio, 351; W. W. Rostow, 6
 - Effect: Brosio, 351; Johnson, 90; Nixon, 161, 162, 381; Rogers, 189, 309, 312, 359, 361; W. W. Rostow, 6; Seaborg, 176, 207
 - U.N. consideration: 147; Wiggins, 81
 - Treaties, agreements, etc., 216, 272, 548
 - U.S. air transport agreement, 283
 - U.S. Ambassador (Toon), confirmation, 476

D

- Dahomey, U.S. Ambassador (Loomram), confirmation, 500
- Davis, Shelby, 476
- de Gaulle, Charles: 78, 267, 268, 269, 270; Nixon, 245, 268, 270
- de Jong, Petrus J. S., 561, 562, 563
- de Tocqueville, Alexis (quoted), 322

Defense (*see also* Collective security and Mutual defense):

- Ballistic early warning station at Fylingdales Moor, agreement with U.K., 43
- National:
 - ABM safeguard system: 324; Ellsworth, 513; Nixon, 159, 160, 240, 244, 316, 378; Rogers, 397
 - Compatibility with nuclear nonproliferation treaty (Nixon), 279
 - Nonpartisan support (Nixon), 277, 379
 - Objectives (Nixon), 273, 275
 - Soviet interpretation: Nixon, 276, 278; Rogers, 308
- Armament sufficiency: Nixon, 143, 274, 280, 315, 380; Richardson, 418, 560
- Congress, position of, 559
- Minuteman sites (Nixon), 277, 315
- Presidential responsibility (Nixon), 314, 316, 527
- Shelter program (Nixon), 279
- U.S. budget: Barnett, 447; Johnson, 89, 95; Richardson, 570
- Self-defense (Lodge), 144, 220, 389
- Submarine fleets: Popper, 343; Smith 336
- Defense, Department of: 371; Nixon, 273
- Deniau, Jean-Francois, 514
- Denmark:
 - Treaties, agreements, etc., 72, 87, 120, 172, 416, 455
 - U.S. Ambassador (Dudley), confirmation, 476
- Denny, Brewster C., 11, 14
- DePalma, Samuel, 188, 493
- Desalination, U.S. joint study projects (Seaborg), 182
- Diaz Ordaz, Gustavo: 21, 22, 25; Johnson, 23
- Diplomatic recognition and relations, Vienna convention (1961): Botswana, 431; Peru, 236; Swaziland, 455
- Special diplomatic missions, draft convention, 155
- Diplomatic representatives abroad. *See* Foreign Service
- Diplomatic representatives in the U.S., credentials: Botswana, 390; Brazil, 222; Columbia, 92; Germany, 146; Guinea, 446; Kenya, 446; Lesotho, 390; Nepal, 390; Panama, 222; Peru, 75; Philippines, 390; Singapore, 146; Tanzania, 75; Uruguay, 146
- Dirhams, U.S.-owned, purchases by U.S. visitors to Morocco, 52
- Disarmament (*see also* Armaments, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Nuclear weapons):
 - General and complete: 62, 542; De Palma, 496; Foster, 62
 - NATO role, 355
 - Nuclear disarmament. *See* Nuclear headings
 - U.N. role: 150; Yost, 327, 566
 - U.S. position: Foster, 58; Nixon, 289, 526; Rogers, 307, 309, 397; Smith, 333

- Dobrynin, Anatoliy F.: 541; Rogers, 532
- Dominican Republic (W. W. Rostow), 5
- Treaties, agreements, etc., 396, 416, 432
- U.S. Ambassador (Meloy), confirmation, 500
- Double taxation, conventions for prevention of, Trinidad and Tobago, 120, 138
- Drugs, narcotic:
- Illegal narcotic drugs crops, control (Squire), 64
 - Manufacture and distribution convention (1931), addition of bezitramide to drugs covered by, entry into force, 43
 - Poppy plant and opium, protocol (1953) for limitation and regulation of: New Zealand, including Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau Islands (denunciation), 215
 - Single convention (1961): China, 548; Cyprus, 288; France, Venezuela, 347
- Dubos, René Jules: 127, 128; Rusk, 128
- Dudley, Guilford Jr., 476
- E**
- Earth survey, agreement with Mexico re remote sensing cooperative research, 72
- East-West relations: 324; Nixon, 353; Richardson, 557; Rogers, 309
- Communist China, influence of (Rogers), 312
- Czechoslovakia, effect of: 354; Brosio, 351; Rogers, 359
- NATO role (Ellsworth), 511
- Trade (Greenwald), 545
- Eaves, John, 413
- Eban, Abba (Nixon), 244
- ECA (Economic Commission for Africa): Nielsen, 292; Nixon, 211
- ECAFE (Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East), 38
- ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America), 375
- Economic and Social Council, U.N.: Documents, lists of, 345, 429, 454
- Membership enlarged, 152
- Social Commission, U.S. representative (Picker), 223
- Status of Women and Human Rights Commissions, U.S. representatives, appointments, 167
- U.S. representative (Olds), confirmation, 348
- Economic and social development (*see also name of country*): Johnson, 3; Yost, 327
- Communism, as a countermeasure to: Richardson, 570, 573; Rogers, 484; SEATO, 480
- Environmental control, importance of, 143
- Industrialized nations, role of: 107; Barnett, 449; Richardson, 570; Yost, 327, 566
- Less developed countries. *See* Less developed countries
- OECD countries, 196
- Economic & social development—Con. U.N. role: DePalma, 496; Rogers, 311; Yost, 564, 566
- U.S.: 106; Johnson, 89, 95, 96; Nixon, 121; Richardson, 192; W. W. Rostow, 6
- U.S. aid, role. *See* Foreign aid programs, U.S.
- World Weather Watch, benefits from, 368
- Economic Commission for Africa (Nielsen), 292
- Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, 33
- 10th anniversary (Nixon), 211
- Economic Commission for Latin America, U.S. delegation, 375
- Economic policy and relations, U.S.: Domestic policy:
- Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers (excerpts), 103
 - Budget of the U.S. Government FY 1970 (excerpts): Johnson, 95
 - Economic report of the President (excerpts): Johnson, 101
 - Inflation control: 92; Johnson, 89, 95; Kennedy, 427; Nixon, 403; Richardson, 192
 - National problems: Johnson, 89, 95, 96; Richardson, 194, 539
 - State of the Union (excerpts): Johnson, 89
- Foreign policy:
- Commercial bank loans (Nixon), 404
 - Forms of government or conduct, effect on (Loy), 394
- Economic Report of the President, Transmitted to the Congress January 1969, Together With the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers*, 101n
- Ecuador, treaties, agreements, etc., 215, 288, 347, 475, 548
- Education (*see also* Cultural relations and programs and Educational exchange programs): Dubos, 134; Rusk, 128
- Atomic energy science (Seaborg), 180
- Central America (Meyer), 421
- Latin America (Johnson), 73
- Less developed countries: McNamara (quoted), 15; Yost, 329
- OAS regional fund, U.S. pledge, 425
- OECD programs (Richardson), 194
- Southern Africa, U.N. educational programs (Yost), 328, 329
- UNRWA, role (Cooper), 39
- U.S. universities, problems of (Richardson), 194, 557
- World Weather Watch programs, 372
- Education for the Socially Disadvantaged, Conference for (Richardson), 194
- Educational exchange programs, agreements with: Belgium and Luxembourg, 72; Mexico (Johnson), 24; Philippines, 348
- Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee: 150; Foster, 58, 62; Nixon, 289; Popper, 344; Rogers, 308; Yost, 327
- Eighteen-Nation Disarmament—Con. Japan and Mongolia recommended for admission, 542
- Eisenhower, Dwight D.: 354 (quoted); Brandt, 350; Brosio, 351; CENTO, 502; Nixon, 351; Schütz, 259
- Eisenhower, John S. D., 304
- Eklund, Sigvard, 179 (quoted)
- El Salvador, treaties, agreements, etc., 139, 215, 455
- Elbrick, C. Burke, 432
- Ellsworth, Robert, 476, 511
- Energy, cross-border movement, 324
- Environmental control (*see also* Conservation and Pollution): Dubos, 128; Ellsworth, 511; Sisco, 30; Wilson, 256; Yost, 568
- Human environment (Wiggins), 82
- International Conference on Problems of Human Environment, proposed: 148; Rogers, 311; Wiggins, 80
- OECD programs (Richardson), 194
- Equatorial Guinea:
- ICJ membership, 88
 - U.N. membership, 88, 149
 - U.S. Ambassador (Sherer), confirmation, 188
- Eshkol, Levi, condolences on death of: Nixon, 272; Richardson, 272
- Ethiopia, treaties, agreements, etc., 288, 331
- Europe (*see also* European Economic Community and individual countries):
- Eastern:
- Czechoslovakia, effect on: Brosio, 351; Rogers, 361; W. W. Rostow, 6
 - Nationalism: Richardson, 559; Rogers, 309
 - Unification: King Baudoïn, 249; Johnson, 90; Nixon, 237, 246, 265; Rogers, 309; W. W. Rostow, 6; Saragat, 262, 264, 266; Wilson, 254, 255
- Western:
- Economic development: 106; Nixon, 265
 - U.S. relations and role: Johnson, 90; Nixon, 157, 218, 237, 246, 251 (quoted), 253, 354; Rogers, 309, 501
 - U.S. trade policies, problems (Nixon), 242
 - Visit of President Nixon (*see also name of country*): Nixon, 157, 158, 249, 254
 - Purpose: Nixon, 217, 237, 249, 251; Wilson, 253
 - Results: Agnew, 271; Nixon, 240, 271; Rogers, 308
 - Visit of Secretary Stans, 367
- European Atomic Energy Community: Safeguards system, IAEA relationships (Seaborg), 203, 208
- U.S. joint projects (Seaborg), 180
- European Coal and Steel Community, steel imports to U.S., voluntary limitations (Rusk), 93
- European Center for Nuclear Research (Dubos), 135
- European Communities, U.S. trade talks, 514
- European Economic Community, agricultural imports, effect of restrictions, 103

European Migration, Intergovernmental Committee for, Director (Thomas), 223

Executive orders:

- Certain fishery commissions, Secretary of State authority for approval of recommendations and actions (11467), 544
- Interest equalization tax, rates modified (11464), 405
- International office agreement, U.S. participation (11449), 126
- President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, establishment (11460), 295
- Service of documents convention implementation (11471), 544

Export-Import Bank:

- Appropriations request FY 1970, 97, 99
- President (Kearns), confirmation, 291

Exports (*see also* Imports; Tariffs and trade, general agreement on; and Trade):

- Korea (Rogers), 397
- Latin America (Johnson), 73
- Less developed countries, 106
 - OECD preferential treatment, 196
- Pacific Basin (U. A. Johnson), 490
- Soluble coffee, 329, 455
- Steel exports to U.S., Japanese and ESCS voluntary limitations (Rusk), 93
- U.S.: 92, 96, 103, 104; Nixon, 403
- Export Control Act extension recommended (Greenwald), 545
- World exports growth, 1952-1967 (table), 106

F

FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) : Squire, 65

Far East. *See* Asia and names of individual countries

Farrington, Elizabeth R., 424

Federal Reserve program, 404

Fedorov, Yevgeny K., 356, 401

Ferguson, Clarence Clyde, Jr.: 281 (quoted), 510, 556; Nixon, 223; Rogers, 311

Fernandez Baca, Marco, 401, 472

Finance Corporation, International, articles of agreement (1955), China, 156

Finger, Seymour M., 414, 452

Finland:

- OECD convention, accession to, 195
- Treaties, agreements, etc., 156, 172, 215, 499, 548
- U.S. Ambassador (Peterson), confirmation, 432

Fish and fisheries:

- Conference (Peru, Ecuador, Chile, U.S.), proposed: Meyer, 407; Rogers, 310
- North Pacific fisheries commissions, authority of Secretary of State for approval of recommendations, 544
- Northeastern Pacific fisheries, U.S.-Soviet talks, 79
- Treaties, agreements, etc.:
 - Certain fisheries off coast of U.S., agreement with Japan, 43

Fish and fisheries—Continued

- Conduct of North Atlantic fishing, convention (1967), ratification urged (Nixon), 425
- Conservation of Atlantic tunas, convention (1966), international: Brazil, 455; Spain, 375
- Entry into force, 375
- High seas in western areas of middle Atlantic Ocean, agreements with: Poland, 576; Soviet Union, 19, 20
- King crab fishery agreements with: Japan, 43; Soviet Union, 156, 187
- Northeastern Pacific Ocean, agreements with Soviet Union re certain fishery problems and fishing operations, 156, 187
- Northwest Atlantic fisheries, international convention (1965), protocols re measures of control and entry into force of commission proposals: Germany, 524; Poland, 87
- Salmon fishing in waters contiguous to territorial sea of U.S., agreement with Japan, 43
- U.S. fishing boat incidents off coast of Peru: 184, 282, 509; Meyer, 407; Nixon, 245; Rogers, 310
- U.S. purchase of stockfish to replenish ICRC stocks in Nigeria, 510
- World Weather Watch, value to industry, 369

Fisher, Adrian S., 409, 520, 542

Fitness of the Environment, The, cited, 130

Flores, Antonio Carrillo (Rusk), 46, 74

Food Aid Convention (1967), Germany, 376

Food and Agricultural Organization (Squire), 65

Food and population crisis: McNamara (quoted), 15; Nixon, 517

Food for Freedom, appropriations request FY 1970, 97, 100

Food for Peace, 1968 report, transmittal (Nixon), 547

Force, use of. *See* Aggression

Foreign aid programs, U.S. (*see also* Agency for International Development, Alliance for Progress, and Peace Corps):

- Balance of payments, effect of: 114; Johnson, 101
- Foreign Assistance Program:
 - FY 1968, annual report, transmittal (Johnson), 117
 - FY 1970: Nixon, 515; Richardson, 569
- Multilateral coordination: 96; Johnson, 103; Kennedy, 427; Nixon, 515, 517; Richardson, 572; Yost, 326
- Policy review: Nixon, 518; Richardson, 571; Sisco, 30
- Principles and objectives: Meyer, 441; Richardson, 569; Rogers, 478
- Reductions in, effect: Johnson, 90; Richardson, 571, 573; W. W. Rostow, 6; Rusk, 50; Yost, 326
- Results: 107; Nixon, 237

Foreign aid programs of other countries:

- Australia (Nixon), 439
- China, 490
- Japan (Barnett), 449
- OECD countries, 196

Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, appropriations request FY 1970, 97

Foreign currency, U.S.-owned Moroccan dirhams, purchase authorized, 52

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, establishment: 294; Nixon, 295

Foreign policy, U.S. (*see also* Vietnam and World peace):

- American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966*, released, 348
- Congressional documents relating to, lists, 79, 119, 146, 235, 519, 574
- Military-industrial complex, question of: Nixon, 525; Rogers, 360
- 1939-1941 records opened to researchers, 543
- Nonpartisan nature of (Nixon), 539
- Principles, objectives, and problems: Nixon, 123, 525; Richardson, 557; Rogers, 387, 451 (quoted), 478; W. W. Rostow, 4; Sisco, 27, 28
- Responsibilities:
 - National Security Council: 162; Nixon, 160; Rogers, 164
 - Presidential (Nixon), 142, 160, 170, 243, 274, 276, 315, 316
 - Secretary of State: 162, 165; Greenwald, 545; Nixon, 160, 169; Rogers, 125, 164
- Review, proposed (Rogers), 305
- Science and technology, effects of (Rusk), 127

Foreign Service, U.S.:

- Foreign Affairs Manual Circular: 165; Rogers, 164
- Overseas employees, reduction in, 100

Foreign Service Board, appointments, 451

Foreign Service Institute, Director (Hart), designation, 188

Foreign students in the U.S. (Rogers), 310

Foster, John, 164

Foster, William C., 58

France:

- Air transport agreement with U.S. amended, 547
- Berlin, position on, 186, 248
- Four-power talks on Middle East. *See* Arab-Israeli conflict
- INTELSAT participation (Marks), 226
- NATO, position on (Nixon), 241
- Treaties, agreements, etc., 87, 188, 236, 288, 347, 415
- U.S. relations: de Gaulle, 78; Rogers, 309
- U.S. visit of President de Gaulle, proposed (Nixon), 270
- Viet-Nam, question of French role in peace settlement (Nixon), 241
- Visit of President Nixon: de Gaulle, 267, 268, 270; Nixon, 157, 158, 237, 267, 268, 269, 270
- Visit of Secretary Stans, 367

Freedom of navigation: Popper, 343; Smith, 336
Freedom of press, 514
Freeman, John, 318
Freeth, Gordon, 481
Funkhouser, Richard, 576

G

Gabon:
Astronauts rescue and return treaty, accession, 347
U.S. Ambassador (Funkhouser), confirmation, 576
Galbraith, Francis J., 500
Gandar, Laurence (Denny), 12
GARP (Global Atmospheric Research Program), 370, 373
Gas and bacteriological methods of warfare, Geneva protocol (1925): Foster, 61
Gasbuggy experiment (Foster), 59
General Assembly, U.N.:
Aircraft hijacking action proposed (Loy), 214
Documents, lists of, 345, 429, 454
Nuclear explosions, worldwide seismic investigation, proposed (Foster), 58
Resolutions:
General and complete disarmament, question of, 62
Korean question, 38
Namibia, question of, 14
Narcotic drug crops, control, 64
Suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, need for, 63
23rd session, summary of developments: 147; Wiggins, 80
U.N. bond repayments issue: 57*n*; Wiggins, 55
Geneva accords. *See* Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam
Genocide, convention (1948) on prevention and punishment, Nepal, 287
Germany, reunification (Nixon), 261
Germany, Federal Republic of:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 146
Berlin, Soviet allegations of military activity: 248; Tripartite (France, U.K., U.S.), 248
INTELSAT participation (Marks), 226
Nuclear nonproliferation treaty, position on (Nixon), 241
Treaties, agreements, etc., 156, 187, 272, 331, 376, 431, 499, 524, 548, 576
Visit of President Nixon (Nixon), 157, 158, 257, 258, 260, 262
Visit of Secretary Stans, 367
Ghana, treaties, agreements, etc. 20, 215, 548
Gibraltar, customs convention (1961) on ATA carnet, extension to, 187
Gibson Barbosa, Mario, 222
Gilbert, Carl J., 514
Goat Island cofferdam, temporary, agreement with Canada, 332
Goldschmidt, Arthur E., 8, 15
Godley, G. McMurtrie, 576
Goose Bay, Newfoundland, agreement with Canada re release of certain leased areas, 216
Gorton, John G., 437, 439
Gould, Kingdon, Jr., 500

Gould, Samuel B., 472
Gray, Gordon, 295
Great Lakes:
Pollution of connecting channels, IJC meetings and text of report, 234
Water levels, interim report, 186
Greece:
Cotton textile agreement, text and announcement, 430
Economic and social development, 107
Treaties, agreements, etc., 72, 120, 376, 396, 431
U.S. radio transmitting facilities, 100
Green, Marshall, 432
Greenwald, Joseph A., 171, 545
Guatemala, treaties, agreements, etc., 272, 548
Guernsey, investment disputes between states and nationals of other states, convention (1965) on settlement, extension to, 20
Guinea:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 446
Treaties, agreements, etc., 172, 215, 432
U.S.-owned foreign currency, 52
Gut Dam, U.S.-Canada agreement re settlement of U.S. claims, 139
Guyana:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 215, 548
U.S. Ambassador (King), confirmation, 500

H

Habib, Philip C. (Nixon), 465
Hadsel, Fred L., 476
Haiti, GATT protocol to introduce part IV and amend annex I, acceptance, 120
Hammarckjold, Dag (quoted), 568
Handley, William J., 432
Hannah, John A., 348
Hardin, Clifford M., 514
Harriman, W. Averell: 450; Rusk, 48
Hart, Parker T., 188
Hauser, Rita, 167
Hayat Junejo, 481
Health and medical research (Dubos), 129, 132, 134
Central America (Meyer), 421
Radioactive isotopes, uses (Seaborg), 183
U.S.-Japan medical science program, 2d annual report, transmittal (Johnson), 118
Henderson, Douglas, 401
Henderson, L. J. (quoted), 130, 133
Hensley, Stewart, 529
Herrera, Felipe (Kennedy), 427
Herter, Christian (Nixon), 218
Hickel, Walter J., 424
High seas: 383; Nixon, 380
Hightower, John M., 358, 529
Hill, Robert C., 432
Hillenbrand, Martin J., 188, 451
Historical summaries:
Atomic energy, peaceful uses of (Seaborg), 174, 199
U.S. foreign policy (Richardson), 557
Hodges, Duane D.: Johnson, 1; Rusk, 2
Hollifield, Chet (Nixon), 279
Holland, Kenneth, 472

Holy See. *See* Vatican City State
Holyoake, Keith, 481
Honduras, treaties, agreements, etc., 215, 499, 548
Hong Kong, visit of Secretary Stans, 367
Human rights (*see also* Civil rights and Racial discrimination):
Czechoslovakia, 147
Human Rights Year 1968, final report on U.S. observance: Harriman, 450; Nixon, 450
International Year for Human Rights, U.N. activities, 152
Iraqi mass public executions, as violation of (Yost), 146
U.N. commission on, U.S. representative (Hauser), appointment, 167
U.N. role (Yost), 566
Humphrey, Hubert H. (Johnson), 76
Hungary:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 348, 524, 548
U.S. Ambassador (Puhan), confirmation, 432
Husain, Zakir: Nixon, 469; Rogers, 469
Hydrographic Organization, International, convention (1967): Norway, 331; Spain, 575; U.A.R., 119

I

IAEA. *See* Atomic Energy Agency, International
IBRD. *See* International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICAO Council, U.S. representative (Butler), appointment, 499
ICC (International Control Commission): Rogers, 532; Walsh, 338
Iceland, agricultural commodities sales agreement with U.S. 548
ICSU (International Council of Scientific Unions), 370
IDA. *See* International Development Association
IFC (International Finance Commission): Goldschmidt, 15
IMCO. *See* Maritime Consultative Organization, Intergovernmental
IMF. *See* Monetary Fund, International
Imports (*see also* Customs; Exports; Tariffs and trade, general agreement on; and Trade):
Commercial samples and advertising material, international convention (1952) to facilitate importation of: Romania, 43
U.S. (*see also* Tariff policy, U.S.): Effect of: 91, 103, 106; Nixon, 161
Reprocessed wool fabrics, tariff reduction recommended (Johnson), 92
Voluntary agency supplies and equipment, agreement for duty-free entry and defrayment of inland transportation charges of (India), 43
Inaugural address (Nixon), 121
Income, Arab refugees, U.N. custodian proposed, 151

- Income tax conventions for the relief of double taxation. *See* Double taxation.
- India:
Cooperative satellite project with U.S. for broadcasting TV programs (Wiggins), 86
Economic development: Johnson, 117; Richardson, 570; Rogers, 504
President Husain, condolences on death of: Nixon, 469; Rogers, 469
Treaties, agreements, etc., 43, 88, 156, 215, 455, 576
U.S. aid 97n
Appropriations request FY 1970: 98; Richardson, 570, 573
U.S. Ambassador (Keating), confirmation, 432
U.S. military supplies, question of resumption of sales to (Rogers), 531
U.S.-owned foreign currency, 52
U.S. talks, proposed (Rogers), 504
Visit of Secretary Rogers: 434; Rogers, 433, 503
- Indonesia:
Economic and political progress: U. A. Johnson, 490; Richardson, 573; Rogers, 397
Japanese aid (Barnett), 449
Treaties, agreements, etc., 172, 303, 416, 524
U.S. Ambassador (Galbraith), confirmation, 500
- Industrial property, convention of Paris (1883 as revised):
1925 and 1958 conventions, denunciation, Laos, 416
1967 convention: Panama (with reservation and declaration), 376; Soviet Union (with reservation and declaration), 88; U.K., 376
U.S. ratification urged (Nixon), 298
- Information activities and programs:
Rusk, 128; Seaborg, 178, 181
Academic and cultural exchanges and programs agreement with Belgium and Luxembourg, 72
Appropriations request FY 1970, 97, 100
- Insecurity of Nations* (Wiggins), 80
Institute for Nutrition for Central America and Panama (Dubos), 135
- INTELSAT. *See* International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium
- Inter-American Development Bank:
Agreement (1959) with annexes, Barbados, 331
10th annual meeting: Kennedy, 426; Nixon (quoted), 426
U.S. financial support: Johnson, 73; Nixon, 517; Richardson, 571
U.S. Governor (Kennedy), confirmation, 282
- Interest equalization tax: 105, 114, 404, 405; Johnson, 101; Nixon, 404
- Interior, Department of, 371
- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 150
Annual report (Goldschmidt), 15
- International Bank—Continued
International Development Association: 99, 107; Goldberg, 15; Johnson, 103; Richardson, 571; Yost, 326
U.S. Governor (Kennedy), confirmation, 282
- International Boundary and Water Commission, U.S.-Mexico (Johnson), 21
- International Civil Aviation Organization Council, U.S. representative (Butler), appointment, 499
- International conferences:
Atomic energy utilization, on (Seaborg), 178, 181
Calendar, 17, 299
- International Control Commission:
Rogers, 532; Walsh, 338
- International cooperation: Rogers, 502; Rusk, 127; Seaborg, 178
Deep ocean floor exploration and use, 150
IBRD and IFC role (Goldschmidt), 15
- International Council of Scientific Unions, 370
- International Court of Justice (Yost), 301
Statute (1945), Equatorial Guinea, 88
- International Decade of Ocean Exploration (Popper), 344
- International Development Association. *See under* International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
- International Finance Commission (Goldschmidt), 15
- International grains arrangement (1967), with annexes: Costa Rica, 172; Cuba, 72; Ecuador, 475; Germany, Greece, 376; Iran, 215; Peru, Portugal, 43
- International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research Seismic Study Group (Foster), 58
- International Joint Commission, U.S.-Canada:
Great Lakes connecting channels, pollution, IJC meetings and text of report, 234
Great Lakes water levels interim report, 186
Lake Erie oil spills pollution risk study requested, 296
Red River pollution study released, 543
- International monetary system:
Gold prices and reserves: 108, 110, 116; Johnson, 102
IMF special drawing rights. *See* Monetary Fund, International Strengthening, need for: 92, 105, 107, 111; Goldschmidt, 16; Johnson, 90; Nixon, 404; W. W. Rostow, 6
- International organizations:
Calendar of conferences, 17, 299
Protocol I to universal copyright convention (1952), Tunisia, 475
U.S. appropriations request FY 1970, 97, 98
- International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm: Fisher, 412; Smith, 335
- International Petroleum Company:
232, 400, 509; Meyer, 406; Nixon, 245; Rogers, 310, 357, 363
- International Red Cross, Nigerian and Biafran relief: 31, 281, 510; Cooper, 41; Nixon, 222
- International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT): Loy, 229; Wiggins, 87
Conference on definitive arrangements: 231; Marks, 224, 232; Richardson, 231
U.S. delegation, 367
- International waterways: Rogers, 305; Sisco, 393, 445
- International Year for Human Rights, 152
- Intersputnik (Marks), 228, 229
- Investment disputes between states and nationals of other states, convention (1965), current actions: China, 20; Finland, 156; Germany, Greece, 431; Guernsey, 20; Nepal, 119
- Investment guaranties, agreements with: Burundi, 500; El Salvador, 456
- Investment of private capital abroad:
Finger, 452; U. A. Johnson, 488; Nixon, 404, 515; Richardson, 570, 571; Yost, 327
Central and Latin America: Kennedy, 426; Meyer, 422, 441
IBRD and IFC role (Goldschmidt), 15
Mandatory controls, effect, 104, 114
Overseas Private Investment Corporation, proposed: Nixon, 516; Richardson, 571
Peru: Meyer, 407; Rogers, 387
South Africa (Loy), 395
- IPC. *See* International Petroleum Company
- Iran:
Economic development: Johnson, 117; Richardson, 570; W. W. Rostow, 6
Treaties, agreements, etc., 88, 215, 303, 304, 432, 548
Visit of Secretary Rogers: 434; Rogers, 433, 506
- Iraq:
Racial discrimination, international convention (1965) on elimination of, signature, 376
Trials and executions, U.S. concern: 282; Yost, 145
- Ireland, U.S. Ambassador (Moore), confirmation, 416
- Irwin, John N., II: 282, 364, 401, 472; Meyer, 406; Nixon (quoted), 282; Rogers, 310
- Isolationism: Brosio, 351; Nixon, 525; Richardson, 559
- Israel (*see also* Arab-Israeli conflict):
Airliner and airport attacked: Wiggins, 53, 54; Yost, 197
Compensation paid for men injured on U.S.S. *Liberty*, 473
Dual-purpose desalting and electric power plant, U.S. joint study (Seaborg), 182
Economic and social development: 107; Richardson, 570

Israel—Continued

- Existence as state: Rogers, 363; Sisco, 391, 444
 - 21st anniversary (Nixon), 403
 - Prime Minister Eshkol, death of: Nixon, 272; Richardson, 272
 - Treaties, agreements, etc., 120, 499
 - U.S.-owned currencies, sale of, 52
 - Visit of President Nixon, question of (Nixon), 240
- Italy:
- Economic development (Nixon), 265
 - Treaties, agreements, etc., 119, 120, 156, 331
 - Visit of President Nixon: Nixon, 157, 158, 262, 264, 266, 396c; Saragat, 262, 263, 266, 396c
 - Visit of Secretary Stans, 367
- Ivory Coast, treaties, agreements, etc., 188, 395

J

- Jamaica, treaties, agreements, etc., 172, 395, 476, 499, 548
- Japan:
- Asian development, role in: Barnett, 449; U. A. Johnson, 491; Rogers, 397; W. W. Rostow, 5
 - Economic and social development: 106; Barnett, 447; U. A. Johnson, 490
 - ENDC admission recommended, 542
 - INTELSAT participation (Marks), 226
 - Steel exports to U.S., voluntary limitations (Rusk), 93
 - Treaties, agreements, etc., 43, 156, 396, 432, 476
 - U.S. Ambassador (Meyer), confirmation, 500
 - U.S.-Japan cooperative medical science program, 2nd annual report, transmittal (Johnson), 113
 - U.S. relations (Rogers), 531, 533
 - Visit of Secretary Stans, 367
- Jarring, Gunnar: 147, 153, 161, 337, 365; Cooper, 41; Johnson, 77; Nixon, 159; Rogers, 305, 306, 360; Rusk, 45, 51; Sisco, 29, 393, 394, 443; Wiggins, 54, 82; Yost, 340
- Jefferson, Thomas: 523 (quoted); Rusk, 74
- Johnson, Lyndon B.:
- Addresses, correspondence, remarks, and statements: APOLLO 8, 76
 - Arms races, 90
 - Christmas tree lighting ceremony, 3
 - France, exchange of New Year's greetings with President de Gaulle, 77
 - James Webb, 76, 77
 - Latin America, 73
 - Mexican-U.S. friendship reaffirmed, 21, 23
 - New administration, support for, 3
 - Nigerian truce, appeal for, 3
 - Nuclear nonproliferation treaty, 90
 - Peace, international scientific cooperation (quoted), 181

Johnson, Lyndon—Continued

- Nuclear treaty—Continued
- Pueblo* crew released, 1
- Trygve Lie, tribute, 78
- Viet-Nam, 89, 90
- Paris peace talks, prospects, 91
- Meeting with President Diaz Ordaz of Mexico, 21
- Messages, letters, and reports to Congress:
 - Budget of the U.S. Government, FY 1970 (excerpts), 95
 - Economic report of the President (excerpts), 101
 - Foreign Assistance Program, annual report FY 1968, transmittal, 117
 - Peace Corps, 7th annual report, transmittal, 118
 - State of the Union (excerpts), 89
 - Tariff reduction on reprocessed wool fabrics recommended, 92
 - U.S.-Japan cooperative medical science program, 2d annual report, transmittal, 118
 - Nuclear nonproliferation treaty, role in (Nixon), 279
 - Pan American Society of the United States annual gold medal award, 73n
 - Space program, role in: Borman, 77; Paine, 77
- Johnson, U. Alexis, 188, 488
- Johnston, Edward E., 424
- Jordan, agricultural commodities sales agreement with U.S., 432
- Juárez, Benito: Diaz Ordaz, 22; quoted, 21, 74, 75; Rusk, 46
- Statue, dedication (Rusk), 74
- Judicial procedures, judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters, convention (1965) on the service abroad of, current actions: Denmark, 172; Sweden, 188; U.A.R., 20; U.S., 87
- U.S. implementation (Nixon), 544

K

- Kamentsev, V. M., 19
 - Kantor, Harry, 406
 - Kaplow, Herbert, 159, 246, 278
 - Kearns, Henry, 291
 - Keating, Kenneth B.: 432; (Rogers), 503
 - Keeny, Spurgeon, 164
 - Keita, Fadiala, 446
 - Kennedy, David M., 282, 426
 - Kennedy, John Fitzgerald. Diaz Ordaz, 22; Johnson, 21; Schütz, 259
- Kenya:
- Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 446
 - Treaties, agreements, etc., 120, 215, 331, 548
- Khrushchev, Nikita (quoted), 558
- Kibinge, Leonard Oliver, 446
- Kiesinger, Kurt (Nixon), 245
- King Baudoin: 249, 252; Nixon, 253
- King Hussein I, 364
- King, Spencer M., 500
- Kipling, Rudyard (quoted), 256
- Kissinger, Henry A. (Nixon), 143, 157
- Knapp, Burke (Goldschmidt), 16
- Knapp, James B., 382
- Knox, Philander (Nixon), 171
- Koontz, Elizabeth Duncan, 167

Kopytin, Viktor, 514

- Korea, U.N. objectives and role: 38, 149; Lodge, 389; Symington, 32, 34; Wiggins, 37
- Korea, North:
- Military action against Republic of Korea: 383, 483, 497; Nixon, 377; Symington, 32; Wiggins, 36; Yost, 497
 - U.S. reconnaissance aircraft shot down by: 382, 383; Nixon, 377, 379, 380; Rogers, 398; Yost, 479
 - U.S.S. *Pueblo*: 383; Nixon, 380; Symington, 33
 - Release of crew: 1, 2; Johnson, 1; Rusk, 2
- Korea, Republic of:
- Economic and political development: 107; U. A. Johnson, 490; Richardson, 570, 573; Rogers, 397; W. W. Rostow, 6; Symington, 35; Wiggins, 37
 - Military and other aid to Viet-Nam: U. A. Johnson, 492; SEATO, 479
 - Treaties, agreements, etc., 119, 272, 347, 396, 499
 - U.S. and other troops, presence of (Symington), 34
 - Visit of Secretary Stans, 367
- Kosygin, Aleksei N. (Rogers), 308
- Kraft, Joseph, 417
- Ky, Nguyen Cao (Nixon), 243

L

- Labor:
- Adjustment assistance: 91, 106; Johnson, 92; Nixon, 161
 - Strikes, effect on U.S. 1968 trade balance, 103
- Labor Day (Lodge), 420
- Labor Organization, International, instrument for amendment of constitution (1946): Cambodia, 287; Southern Yemen, 416
- Lagdameo, Ernesto V., 390
- Laird, Melvin R.: 484; Nixon, 143, 159, 277, 278, 315; Rogers, 360
- NAC, U.S. delegate, 356
- Visit to Viet-Nam (Nixon), 239
- Lake Erie, oil spills pollution risks, IJC study requested, 296
- Land, Edwin H., 295
- Land-locked states, transit trade of, convention (1965): Denmark, Turkey, 416
- Langeraar, W. (Popper), 344
- Laos:
- Geneva accords:
 - Communist violations: Lodge, 317, 389; Souvanna Phouma, (quoted), 339; Walsh, 338
 - Implementation, need for: Lodge, 125, 367, 390, 402, 436, 485; Rogers, 307; SEATO, 479; Walsh, 338
 - North Viet-Nameese forces, presence of: Lodge, 365, 419; Rusk, 49
 - Withdrawal of, as part of Viet-Nameese peace settlement: 482, 551; Lodge, 389, 420, 507, 536; Nixon, 459; Rogers, 307; Walsh, 555
 - Treaties, agreements, etc., 119, 304, 416

Laos—Continued

- U.S. aid: Nixon, 518; Richardson, 570, 573
 U.S. Ambassador (Godley), confirmation, 576
 LASA (The Montana Large Aperture Seismic Array): Foster, 59
 Latin America:
 Economic development: 106; Meyer, 440; Rogers, 310; W. W. Rostow, 6
 U.S. relations and interests: Johnson, 73; Meyer, 406, 440, 473; Nixon, 180, 384; Richardson, 572; Rogers, 310, 534
 Visit of Governor Rockefeller: Meyer, 473; Nixon, 198, 385, 470; Rockefeller, 470; Rogers, 310
 Results: Richardson, 573; Rogers, 530, 532
 Visit of President Nixon, question of (Nixon), 240
 Latin American Free Trade Association (Johnson), 74
 Lebanon:
 International recognition of rights in aircraft convention (1948), adherence, 475
 Israeli attack on Beirut airport (Wiggins), 53, 54
 U.N. resolution, text, 55
 Leonhart, William, 432
 Lesh, Donald R., 164
 Lesotho, Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 390
 Less developed countries:
 Agriculture. *See* Agriculture
 Communication satellites, importance to (Marks), 233
 Economic and social development (*see also* Economic and social development: 105, 106; Rogers, 504; W. W. Rostow, 6; Seaborg, 177; Yost, 327
 IMF/World Bank role (Goldschmidt), 15
 Narcotic drug crops, problem of (Squire), 64
 Family planning programs (*see also* Population growth): Johnson, 117; Yost, 327
 Trade, tariff preferences: 107, 196; Meyer, 441
 U.N. bond repayments, question of effect (Wiggins), 56
 U.S. aid; 96, 99; Johnson, 90, 102; Richardson, 569
 World Weather Watch, value to, 369
 Liao, Ho-shu (Rogers), 197
 Liberia, treaties, agreements, etc. 548, 576
 Lie, Trygve: Johnson, 78; Rusk, 78; Wiggins, 78
 Liechtenstein, IAEA Statute (1957), acceptance, 20
 Lilienthal, David (U. A. Johnson), 490
 Lincoln, Abraham: Rusk, 74; Wiggins, 54
 Lincoln, Franklin B., Jr., 295
 Lincoln, General (Nixon), 279
 Lisagor, Peter, 158, 242, 378
 Load lines:
 International convention (1930), final protocol and annexes: Denmark (denunciation), 87

Load lines—Continued

- International convention (1966), current actions: Belgium, Bulgaria, 188; Cuba, 237; Cyprus, 524; Germany, 499; Nigeria, 20; Pakistan, 87; Philippines, 416; U.A.R., 87; Yugoslavia, 20
 Lodge, Henry Cabot: (Nixon), 465
 Paris peace talks, 124, 144, 145, 166, 184, 190, 220, 221, 247, 280, 290, 316, 365, 388, 401, 418, 434, 465, 467, 485, 507, 535
 Lodge, John Davis, 500
 Long Shot experiment (Foster), 59
 Looram, Matthew J., Jr., 500
 Lord Ismay (Brosio), 351
 Lord Shephard, 481
 Los Indios (Diaz Ordaz), 23
 Lovell, James A., Jr.: 77, 195 (quoted); Johnson, 76
 Loy, Frank E., 212, 229, 394
 Luisi, Hector, 146
 Luns, Joseph M. A. H., 561, 563
 Luthuli, Albert, 152
 Luxembourg:
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 72, 119, 236, 331, 415
 U.S. Ambassador (Gould), confirmation, 500
 Lyng, John, 78

M

- MacLeish, Archibald (quoted), 123, 294
 Malagasy Republic, treaties, agreements, etc. 119, 188, 331, 548
 Malawi, treaties, agreements, etc., 332, 348, 575
 Malaysia:
 Australian and New Zealand peacekeeping forces: 480; Rogers, 478
 Economic development: U. A. Johnson, 490; Rogers, 398; W. W. Rostow, 6
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 139, 476, 499
 Maldiv Islands, safety of life at sea convention (1960), amendments to chapter II, acceptance, 119
 Mali, international civil aviation convention (1944), protocol on authentic trilingual text, acceptance, 548
 Malta, treaties, agreements, etc., 43, 395
 Manoutchehrian, Mrs. Mehranguiz, 152
 Marine resources (*see also* Fish and fisheries):
 Exploration and utilization: Popper, 344; Rogers, 311; Rusk, 127; Yost, 566
 International Decade of Ocean Exploration, proposed, 150
 U.N. role: 149; Wiggins, 83
 Seabed:
 Arms control, need for: DePalma, 484; Fisher, 409, 520; Nixon, 289; Popper, 342; Rogers, 308; Smith, 335
 U.S. draft treaty: Fisher, 520; text, 523
 Boundaries, problem of definition: 523; Fisher, 521; Popper, 344
 Maritime Consultative Organization, Intergovernmental, convention (1948), Saudi Arabia, 303
 Maritime traffic. *See* Ships and shipping
 Marks, Leonard H., 224, 231, 232, 367
 Marriage, convention (1962) on, Spain, 456
 Martin, William McChesney, 404
 Mashologu, Mothusi Thamsanqa, 390
 Mateos, Adolfo López: Diaz Ordaz, 22; Johnson, 21, 24
 Mauritius, treaties, agreements, etc., 215, 376, 396, 455
 Mbindi, Gabriel (Denny), 12
 McBaine, James P., 164
 McBride, Robert H., 576
 McCloskey, Robert J., 30, 161, 162_n, 247_n, 281
 McKerman, Donald L., 19, 79
 McNamara, Robert S. (quoted), 15
 Mekong River Basin (U. A. Johnson), 491
 Meloy, Francis E., Jr., 500
 Meteorological research: 369; Dubos, 134
 Application Technology Satellite (ATS), 374
 Balloon sampling of radioactivity of upper atmosphere, agreement with Australia, 499
 BOMEX (Barbados Oceanographic and Meteorological Experiment), 373
 Cloud seeding project, agreement with Philippines, 456
 Cooperative meteorological observation program, agreements with: Canada, 524; Colombia, 88; Dominican Republic, 416; Mexico, 396
 Global Atmospheric Research Program, 370, 373
 Meteorological Organization, World, convention (1947), Southern Yemen, 156
 Mexico:
 Benito Juárez statue at Washington, dedication (Rusk), 74
 Chamizal: Diaz Ordaz, 25; Johnson, 21, 24
 Dual-purpose nuclear power plant, U.S.-IAEA study (Seaborg), 182
 Economic development: 107; W. W. Rostow, 6
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 72, 139, 187, 215, 236, 396, 415, 548
 U.S. Ambassador (McBride), confirmation, 576
 U.S.-Mexican efforts to eradicate cattle disease (Johnson), 24
 U.S.-Mexico Commission on Border Development and Friendship: Diaz Ordaz, 26; Johnson, 22
 U.S. chairman (Meyer), announcement, 544
 U.S. relations (dedication of President Adolfo López Mateos Channel): Diaz Ordaz, 22, 25; Johnson, 21, 23
 Meyer, Armin H., 500
 Meyer, Charles A.: 348, 406, 421, 429, 440, 473, 544; Nixon, 385
 Michelmore, Laurence (quoted), 40

- Middendorf, J. William, 11, 576
 Military assistance:
 India and Pakistan, question of resumption (Rogers), 531
 Peru, suspension of, 509
 U.S. appropriations request FY 1970: 98; Nixon, 518; Richardson, 569, 573
 Viet-Nam. *See* Viet-Nam
 Military bases (Finger), 453
 Ryukyu (Barnett), 447
 Spanish North African bases: Nixon, 246, 518; Rogers, 359
 Military expenditures. *See* Defense and Military assistance
 Military missions, agreements with:
 Iran, 88; Liberia, 576
 Minuteman bases (Nixon), 274, 277, 379
 Monetary Fund, International:
 Annual report (Goldschmidt), 15
 Director Schweitzer, reappointment, (Goldschmidt), 16
 Special drawing rights, importance of and need for ratification: 107, 108; Goldschmidt, 16; Johnson, 102; Kennedy, 427, 428; Nixon, 404; Richardson, 193
 U.S. Governor (Kennedy), confirmation, 282
 Mongolia:
 ENDC admission recommended, 542
 Treaties, agreements, etc. 87, 215
 Montana Large Aperture Seismic Array (LASA): Foster, 59
 Monteiro, Ernest Steven, 146
 Moor, Dean, 164
 Moore, John D. J., 416
 Moos, Malcolm, 540*n*
 Morocco:
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 120, 288, 548
 U.S.-owned dirhams, purchases by U.S. citizens, 52
 Morris, Roger, 164
 Mosbacher, Emil, Jr., 140
 Mozambique (Finger), 453
 Mueller, George (Johnson), 76
 Murphy, Franklin D., 295
 Murphy, Robert D., 295
 Mutual defense agreements (Barnett), 448
 Agreements with: Japan, 432; Spain, 324; U.K., 43, 348
- N**
- Nachmanoff, Arnold, 164
 Namibia:
 Background (Yost), 301
 Self-determination, right of: Denny, 11, 14; Yost, 301
 South African administration: 153; Denny, 11, 14; Finger, 453; U.N. resolution, text, 14; Yost, 301
 Narcotic drugs. *See* Drugs, narcotic
 NAS (National Academy of Sciences), 370
 NASA. *See* National Aeronautics and Space Administration
 National Academy of Sciences, 370
 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 370, 374
 NASA Distinguished Service Medals, (Johnson), 76
 National Maritime Day, 1969, proclamation, 297
 National Science Foundation, 370
 National Security Council (Nixon), 240
 Foreign policy responsibilities: 162, Nixon, 160; Rogers, 164, 308
 Reorganization: 163, 165; Rogers, 164
 National U.N. Day for 1969, 451
 Nationalism:
 Africa (Rogers), 310
 Eastern Europe: Richardson, 559; Rogers, 309
 Newly independent nations (U. A. Johnson), 489
 Nationality, acquisition of, optional protocol to Vienna convention (1961), Botswana, 431
 Nationals, administration of justice, right of state (Yost), 146
 Nauru, Universal Postal Union, constitution (1964), accession, with reservation, 431
 Nawaz, Shah, 502
 Near and Middle East (*see also* Arab-Israel conflict and country):
 Arms limitations, proposed, need for: Sisco, 29, 392, 444; Wiggins, 54
 Dual-purpose nuclear plant, U.S. proposal (Seaborg), 182
 Economic growth, need for (Rogers), 502
 Soviet role and influence: Nixon, 142, 240, 244, 315; Rogers, 362, 501, 532; Rusk, 49; Sisco, 28, 391, 392, 444
 U.S. strategic interests (Sisco), 391, 443
 Near East Emergency Donations, Inc. (Cooper), 39
 Nedballo, Petr, 152
 Nepal:
 Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 390
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 199, 287, 548
 NREVA (Nuclear Engine for Rocket Vehicle Application): Seaborg, 183
 Netherlands:
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 156, 188, 215, 272, 288, 303
 U.S. Ambassador (Middendorf), confirmation, 576
 U.S. visit of Prime Minister deJong and Foreign Minister Luns, 561
 Visit of Secretary Stans, 367
 New York Times, 130
 New Zealand:
 Asia, role in (Rogers), 398
 Military and other aid to Viet-Nam (U. A. Johnson), 492
 Singapore and Malaysia, peace-keeping forces in: 480; Rogers, 478
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 88, 215
 Newly independent nations (*see also* Less developed countries):
 Africa: Nielsen, 293; Nixon, 539; Rogers, 310
 Nationalism (U. A. Johnson), 489
 U.N. membership and role: Sisco, 29; Yost, 566
 Niagara (American) Falls, agreements with Canada: 332, 343, 476, 500, 548; Nixon, 408
 Nicaragua, treaties, agreements, etc., 120, 188, 348
 Nielsen, Waldemar A., 292
 Niger, treaties, agreements, etc., 88, 119, 331, 395, 475
 Nigeria (*see also* Biafra):
 Air raids on Biafra U.S. concern, 281, 556
 Civil war: 556; Johnson, 3; Nielsen, 293; Rogers, 311; W. W. Rostow, 5
 Relief efforts, U.S. and other: 30, 31, 281, 510; Nielsen, 295
 Special U.S. coordinator, appointment: Nixon, 222; Rogers, 311, 388
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 20, 331, 332, 548
 NIMBUS, 374
 Nixon, Richard M.:
 Addresses, remarks, and statements:
 Africa, 160, 211, 294 (quoted), 518, 539
 Alliance for Progress, 159, 385, 518
 Antiballistic missile system, 159, 160, 240, 244, 273, 275, 277, 279, 314, 316, 378, 379, 527
 Arab-Israeli conflict, 159, 364
 Discussions for settlement of, 142, 161, 218, 240, 244, 280, 315
 Armaments, strategic talks on, 142, 159, 246, 276, 279, 289, 353
 Balance of payments, 403
 Berlin, 238, 249, 261
 Visit to, 157, 158, 249, 258, 260, 262
 Collective security, 143, 525
 Communist China, 141, 238
 Nuclear threat, 160, 273, 275, 316, 379
 Cuban missile crisis, 315
 Czechoslovakia, Soviet occupation, 381
 Effect on nuclear nonproliferation treaty, 161, 162
 De Gaulle, 245, 246, 268, 270
 Department of Peace, 160
 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 351
 Environmental problems, 251
 Europe:
 U.S. relations and role, 246
 Visit to, 157, 158, 237, 249, 250, 251, 252, 254, 256, 257, 258, 260, 262, 264, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 396*c*
 Foreign policy, 123, 125 (quoted), 525, 539
 Presidential responsibilities, 142, 160, 170, 243, 274, 276, 315, 316
 Inaugural address, 121
 Italy, visit to, 157, 158, 262, 264, 266, 396*c*
 John N. Irwin, 282 (quoted)
 Latin America, visit of Governor Rockefeller, 198, 385, 470
 National defense (*see also* Antiballistic missile system, *supra*), 143, 273, 527
 NATO, 158, 217, 237, 252, 257, 262, 263, 265, 278, 352, 354
 French position, 241
 20th anniversary, 219, 318, 351

Nixon, Richard M.—Continued
 Addresses, remarks—Continued
 Nigeria, relief efforts, comprehensive review and special U.S. coordinator, 222
 Nuclear nonproliferation treaty, 142, 161, 162, 279
 Germany, position on, 241
 Organization of African Unity, 6th anniversary, 539
 Organization of American States, 384, 386
 Peru, U.S. relations, 245
 Reconnaissance aircraft shot down by North Korea, 377, 379, 380
 Seabed, need for nuclear-free agreement on, 289
 Secretary of State, 163, 165, 168
 Soviet Union:
 Armament capability, 274, 279, 315, 379, 380
 U.S. confrontation, question of, 311 (quoted)
 U.S. strategic arms talks, proposed, 142, 159, 246, 276, 279, 289, 353
 U.S. summit meeting, question of, 157, 240, 244, 278
 University of Minnesota Concert Band tour, 540, 541
 Spanish North African bases, 246, 518
 Textile imports, effect of, 161
 Trade, 160, 242, 404
 U.N., U.S. support (quoted), 311, 325, 451, 568
 U.S.S. *Pueblo*, 380
 Vatican City, question of U.S. representative, 239
 Viet-Nam:
 Communist aggression, 239, 247, 277
 U.S. response, question of, 239, 241, 276, 277, 279, 460
 Economic and political progress, 378, 549
 Elections, U.S. position, 460
 Midway meeting with President Thieu, 549, 552
 Mutual withdrawal of forces, 143, 457, 459, 554
 Paris peace talks, 141, 157, 239, 378, 457, 459, 465
 U.S. negotiating team members, 465
 Peace:
 Prospects for, 143, 243, 377
 U.S. goal, 243, 277, 313, 457, 460, 553
 Prisoners, 460
 Private contacts, 157, 276, 314
 Self-determination, 458, 550
 Situation reports, 239, 277, 313
 South Vietnamese army, 158, 243, 378, 552
 U.S. forces, replacement of, 458, 549, 553
 Soviet position and role, 242, 243, 244
 U.S. appropriations request FY 1970, 518
 U.S. casualties, 240, 278, 378
 U.S. forces, conditions for withdrawal, 158, 243, 279, 313, 378, 457
 U.S. objectives, 313

Nixon, Richard M.—Continued
 Addresses, remarks—Continued
 Viet-Nam—Continued
 U.S. public opinion, 243, 313, 461
 Visits to Israel or Latin America, questions of, 240
 World order, 251, 352, 519, 525
 World peace, 121, 249, 250, 255, 265, 289, 316, 461
 Yost, background and qualifications, 159
 Youth, problems of, 245
 Administration: Meyer, 440; Nixon, 378, 385; Richardson, 417; Rogers, 362; Sisco, 27
 Correspondence, memoranda, and messages:
 Economic Commission for Africa, 10th anniversary, 211
 Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference, U.S. position, 289
 Human Rights Year 1968, final report on U.S. observance, 450
 Inter-American Development Bank, 10th annual meeting, 426 (quoted)
 Israel, 21st anniversary, 403
 President Barrientos of Bolivia, condolences on death of, 423
 President Husain of India, condolences on death of, 469
 Prime Minister Eshkol of Israel, condolences on death of, 272
 Meetings with Heads of State and officials of, remarks and joint communiques: Australia, 198, 436; Canada, 316, 319; Jordan, 364; Netherlands, 561; Viet-Nam, 549
 Messages, letters, and reports to Congress:
 Broadcasting agreements with Mexico, transmittal, 330
 Food for Peace, 1968 report, transmittal, 547
 Foreign aid program FY 1970, 515
 Industrial property, revision of Paris convention for protection of, ratification urged, 298
 Niagara River diversions, agreement with Canada, approval asked, 408
 North Atlantic fishing, conduct of, convention, ratification requested, 425
 Nuclear nonproliferation treaty, ratification urged, 162
 Vienna convention on consular relations and optional protocol, ratification urged, 475
 World Intellectual Property Organization Convention, ratification urged, 298
 World Weather Program, 368
 News conferences, transcripts, 141, 157, 237, 275, 377
 Presidential responsibilities: Gorton, 437; Nixon, 142, 160, 170, 243, 274, 276, 315, 316
 Tribute to (Trudeau), 321
 Visit to Canada, question of, 323
 Visit to Europe, 157, 158, 249, 254
 Purpose: Nixon, 217, 237, 249, 251; Wilson, 253

Nixon, Richard M.—Continued
 Visit to Europe—Continued
 Results: Agnew, 271; Nixon, 240, 271; Rogers, 308
 Nongovernmental organizations (Yost), 325, 328
 Non-nuclear-weapon states conference, 150
 NORSAR (Norwegian Seismic Array): Foster, 59
 North Atlantic Council (Nixon), 250, 354
 Spring ministerial meeting, Washington, 1969: 349, 355; Brandt, 350; Brosio, 350; Nixon, 351; Rogers, 349, 357, 362; text of final communique, 354
 U.S. delegation, 356
 U.S. permanent representative (Ellsworth): 511*n*; confirmation, 476
 North Atlantic Treaty:
 Status of personnel at International Military Headquarters, agreement (1969): Belgium, Canada, Germany, Netherlands, U.K., U.S., 272
 U.S. and U.K. armed forces and International Military Headquarters, agreement re accommodation: Germany, U.K., U.S., 272
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization:
 Ellsworth, 511; W. W. Rostow, 5; Saragat, 263; Wilson, 254
 Armed forces: Nixon, 278, Rusk, 50
 Consultation: 355; Ellsworth, 512; Nixon, 252, 353; Rogers, 531
 Contributions of members: 355; Rogers, 361
 Deterrent role: 354; Nixon, 251, 354; Richardson, 559; Rogers, 309, 349
 France, position on (Nixon), 241
 Headquarters (Nixon), 253
 Nuclear nonproliferation treaty, question of effect on (Rogers), 189
 20th anniversary: Brandt, 350; Brosio, 350; Nixon, 219, 318 (proclamation), 349, 357; Rogers, 309, 349, 357
 U.S. interests: 323; Ellsworth, 512; Nixon, 158, 217, 237, 257, 262, 263, 265, 352, 354; Rogers, 309
 Norway:
 Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR): Foster, 59
 Treaties, agreements, etc. 120, 172, 215, 331
 U.S. Ambassador (Crowe), confirmation, 432
 Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR): Foster, 59
 Nuclear arms race (*see also* Nuclear nonproliferation treaty): Rogers, 388; Rusk, 128; Seaborg, 210; Sisco, 29
 Nuclear-free areas, 150
 Seabed, proposed: DePalma, 494; Fisher, 520; Nixon, 289; Popper, 342; Rogers, 308; Smith, 333
 Nuclear nonproliferation treaty (1968): Fisher, 409; Foster, 58; Rogers, 189; Seaborg, 204; Smith, 333; Yost, 327

Nuclear nonproliferation treaty—Con.
 ABM system, compatibility with (Nixon), 279
 Current actions: Cameroon, Canada, 119; Denmark, 72; Ecuador, 288; Finland, 172; Hungary, 524; Italy, 156; Jamaica, Malta, 395; Mauritius, 376; Mexico, 139; Norway, 172; Poland, 575; Turkey, 156; U.S., 288
 Germany, position on (Nixon), 241
 Peaceful uses of nuclear explosions, provisions, 150, 401
 Ratification:
 Effect of Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia: Nixon, 161, 162; Rogers, 189; Seaborg, 207
 Need for: Johnson, 90; Nixon, 142, 279; W. W. Rostow, 6; Saragat, 264
 U.S. ratification (Rogers), 308
 Safeguards: Fisher, 410; Rogers, 190; Seaborg, 208
 Nuclear testing:
 Comprehensive test ban, proposed: 63; DePalma, 496; Foster, 58; Nixon, 289; Rogers, 308
 Verification: Fisher, 409, 411; Smith, 334
 Limited test ban treaty (1963): Rogers, 307, 312; Seaborg, 206; Smith, 335; Yost, 327
 Current actions: Mauritius, 456; Swaziland, 548
 Soviet tests (Rogers), 397, 534
 Nuclear war: Nixon, 276; Rogers, 363; Rusk, 50
 Nuclear weapons:
 Cut off on production of fissionable materials and transfer of to peaceful purposes, U.S. proposal: DePalma, 496; Fisher, 409; Nixon, 289; Rogers, 308; Smith, 334
 Seabed, prohibition of weapons, proposed: DePalma, 494; Fisher, 409; Nixon, 289; Popper, 342; Rogers, 308; Smith, 335
 U.S. draft treaty: Fisher, 520; text, 523
 Technology (Seaborg), 205
 Nutter, G. Warren, 484

O

Ocean bed. *See* Marine resources
 Oil:
 Exports, 106
 U.S.—Canada, 324
 Prevention of pollution of sea by oil, convention (1954), international, Syria, 172
 Okinawa (Rogers), 360, 398, 531
 Olds, Glenn A., 343
 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, ministerial council meeting, Paris: Richardson, 192, 194; text of communique, 195
 U.S. delegation, appointment, 171
 Organization of African Unity (Rogers), 311
 6th anniversary: Nixon, 539; Peal, 537

Organization of American States (Nixon), 384, 386
 Charter, protocol of amendment (1967): Brazil, 88; Panama, 475
 Inter-American Economic and Social Council, U.S. representative (Meyer), 429
 Regional education, science and technology programs, U.S. aid, 425
 Ortez Colindres, Enrique (Meyer), 421
 Outer space: Johnson, 76; Nixon, 526; Wiggins, 84
 APOLLO 8 astronauts, tribute to: deJong, 562; Johnson, 76; Nixon, 123
 NIMBUS, 374
 Nuclear power uses (Seaborg), 183
 Treaties, agreements, etc.:
 Exploration and use of outer space, treaty (1967) on: Anders, 77; Popper, 343; Rogers, 307, 312; Smith, 335; Wiggins, 85; Yost, 327
 Current actions: Argentina, 331; Brazil, 272; Ecuador, 288; El Salvador, 139; Mauritius, 396
 Liability treaty, proposed: 150; DePalma, 494; Wiggins, 83
 Rescue and return of astronauts and space vehicles, agreement (1968): Anders, 77; Wiggins, 85
 Current actions: Argentina, 331; Botswana, 416; Bulgaria, 396; Czechoslovakia, 215; Denmark, 456; Ecuador, 288; Gabon, 347; Hungary, 576; Korea, 347; Malagasy, 188; Mauritius, 396; Niger, 119; Poland, 188; Swaziland, 576; Thailand, 548
 U.N. role: 150, DePalma, 493; Wiggins, 83, 84; Yost, 566
 Vienna conference on peaceful uses of (Wiggins), 85, 86

P

Pace, Frank, Jr., 295
 Pacific Basin potential (U. A. Johnson), 488
 Pacific Islands Trust Territory:
 Japan-U.S. agreement re, 476
 Visit of Secretary Hickel, 424
 Packard, David (Nixon), 316
 Paine, Thomas O., 77
 Pakistan:
 Economic development: 107; Johnson, 117; Rogers, 505; W. W. Rostow, 6
 Satochlera laboratory (Dubos), 135
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 87, 188, 348, 499
 U.S. aid: 97*n*; Richardson, 570, 573
 Appropriations request FY 1970, 98
 U.S. military supplies, question of resumption of sales (Rogers), 531
 U.S.-owned foreign currency, 52
 Visit of Secretary Rogers: 434; Rogers, 433, 505

Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 1969, proclamation (Nixon), 386
 Pan American Railway Congress Association, U.S. National Commission member (Meyer), 429
 Pan American Society of the United States, 73*n*
 Panama:
 Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 222
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 215, 375, 376, 475
 Paraguay, treaties, agreements, etc., 215, 236
 Paris peace talks. *See under* Viet-Nam
 Pastrana Borrero, Misael Eduardo, 92
 Patents. *See* Industrial property
 Pauls, Rolf Friedemann, 146
 Peace, Department of, proposed (Nixon), 160
 Peace Corps programs (Rogers), 126
 Appropriations request FY 1970, 97, 99
 Director (Blatchford), confirmation, 492
 Seventh annual report, 1968, transmittal (Johnson), 118
 Peal, S. Edward, 537
 Pearson, Lester (Goldschmidt), 15
 Pedersen, Richard F., 140
 Peru:
 Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 75
 Rockefeller visit and U.S. military missions, position on, 509
 Seizure of U.S. oil company and fishing boat incidents: 184, 282; Meyer, 406; Nixon, 245; Rogers, 310, 357, 363, 387
 U.S. special emissary (Irwin), appointment, 282
 U.S. talks, 364, 400, 472
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 43, 236, 548
 U.S. military sales suspended, 509
 Peterson, Val, 432
 Petroleum. *See* Oil
 Philippines (*see also* Association of Southeast Asian Nations):
 Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 390
 Economic and social development: Johnson, 117; Richardson, 570; Rogers, 398; SEATO, 480
 Military and other aid to Viet-Nam (U. A. Johnson), 492
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 120, 348, 416, 455, 548
 U.S. radio transmitting facilities, 100
 Phillips, Christopher H., 348
 Picker, Jean, 223
 Plowshare program: Seaborg, 183; Smith, 335
 Poland, treaties, agreements, etc., 87, 88, 188, 348, 575, 576
 Pollution:
 Environmental: 148; Dubos, 129, 132, 134, 135; Nixon, 251; Richardson, 195
 Great Lakes connecting channels, IJC meetings and text of report, 234
 Lake Erie oil spills pollution risk, IJC study requested, 296
 Oil, prevention of pollution of sea by, convention (1954), international: Syria, 172

Pollution—Continued

Red River, IJC study, 543
Seabeds, prevention of, 150
Pope Paul VI, 270
Popper, David H., 342, 500
Population growth (Rogers), 398
Control:

Basic human right, 152
Family planning programs: 38;
Johnson, 102, 117; Nixon, 517;
Richardson, 570, 572; W. W.
Rostow, 6; Rusk, 128; Yost,
327

Environmental problems (Dubos),
129

U.N. Population Trust Fund: De-
Palma, 498; Yost, 567

Portugal, treaties, agreements, etc., 43,
88

Portuguese overseas provinces (Finger-
ger), 453

Universal Postal Union, constitution
(1964) with final protocols, ac-
cession, 88

Postal matters:

Postal Union of the Americas and
Spain, convention (1966),
money order agreement, parcel
post agreement, and final pro-
tocols, Paraguay, 236

Universal Postal Union (1964), con-
stitution (1966) with final pro-
tocols: Afghanistan, 456; Al-
bania, 88; Bhutan, 303; Came-
roon, 236; Cuba, 476; Cyprus,
456; Jamaica, Malaysia, 476;
Mongolia, 88; Nauru, 431;
Portugal and overseas pro-
vinces, 88; Qatar, 188; Yemen,
236

Power and energy:

U.S.—Canadian agreements on tem-
porary cofferdam construction:
346; Nixon, 408

World Weather Watch, value to,
369

President's Foreign Intelligence Advi-
sory Board, 295

Prince Souvana Phouma, 339 (quoted)

Prisoners:

Geneva convention (1949) re treat-
ment of:

Communist violations of: Laird,
484; Lodge, 487; Rogers, 529

Current actions: Barbados, Malta,
43; Uruguay, 576

U.S.S. *Pueblo*. See U.S.S. *Pueblo*

Viet-Nam. See Viet-Nam

Proclamation of Tehran, 152

Proclamations by the President:

National Maritime Day, 1969
(3902), 297

NATO, 20th anniversary (3906),
318

Pan American Day and Pan Ameri-
can Week, 1969 (3903), 386

World Trade Week, 1969 (3901),
297

Public Law 480 (Richardson), 572

Publications:

Congress, documents relating to for-
eign policy, lists, 79, 119, 146,
235, 519, 574

Publications—Continued

*Economic Report of the President,
Transmitted to the Congress
January 1969, Together With
the Annual Report of the
Council of Economic Advisers,
101n*

State Department:

*American Foreign Policy: Cur-
rent Documents, 1966*, released,
348

*Conferences at Washington,
1941-1942, and Casablanca,
1943, The*, released, 43

Recent releases, lists, 44, 72, 216,
304, 332, 376, 455

*Treaties and Other International
Agreements of the United
States of America 1776-1949*,
released, 139

*Treaties in Force: A List of
Treaties and Other Interna-
tional Agreements of the
United States in Force on
January 1, 1969*, released, 332

U.N., documents, lists, 345, 429, 454
*World Weather Program—Plan for
Fiscal Year 1970*, 368n

Puerto Rico Nuclear Center (Sea-
borg), 180

Puhan, Alfred, 432

Q

Qatar, Universal Postal Union, con-
stitution (1964) with final pro-
tocols, adherence, 188

R

Racial discrimination (see also Civil
Rights and Human rights): Loy,
394; Wiggins (quoted), 152

Africa: Rogers, 311; W. W. Rostow,
6; Yost, 326, 329

Apartheid: 151; Finger, 453; Gold-
schmidt, 9; Loy, 395; Sisco, 29;
Wiggins, 9; Yost, 302, 566

International convention (1965) for
elimination of: Byelorussian
Soviet Socialist Republic (with
reservation), 396; Germany,
576; Guyana, 215; Holy See,
499; India (with reservation),
88; Iraq, 376; Madagascar
(with reservation), 331; Poland
(with reservation), 88; Soviet
Union (with reservation), 331;
Swaziland, 396; Syria (with
reservation), 476; Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic (with
reservation), U.K. (with reser-
vation), 347

Entry into force, 303

Southern Rhodesia: 415; Finger,
415

Radio:

Broadcasting in the standard band,
agreement with Mexico; 42,
236; Nixon, 330

Licensed amateur radio operators,
reciprocal authorization for op-
eration of stations in other
countries, Indonesia, 304

Long-range radio paths, agreement
with Australia re receiving sta-
tion on Norfolk Island to study
ionospheric propagation, 216

Radio—Continued

Partial revision of radio regulations
(Geneva, 1959), as amended:

Maritime mobile service, with an-
nexes and final protocol: Al-
geria, 119; Argentina, 348;
Austria, 119; Belgium, 499;
Canada, China, 331; Congo
(Brazzaville), 88; Finland, 499;
Guinea, Japan, 432; Kenya,
331; Korea, 499; Laos, Lux-
embourg, Madagascar, 119;
Malaysia, 499; New Zealand,
Niger, 88; Senegal, Singapore,
Spain, 432; Sweden, 119; Tan-
zania, Uganda, 331; Upper
Volta, Vatican City State, 348;
Yugoslavia, 499

Revised frequency allotment plan
for aeronautical mobile (R)
service and related information:
Pakistan, 348; Senegal, 432;
Spain, 331

Pre-sunrise and post-sunset radio
operation, agreement with Mex-
ico: 42, 236; Nixon, 330

Pre-sunrise operation of certain
standard (AM) radio broad-
casting stations, agreement with
Canada, 188

U.S. transmitting facilities in Philip-
pines and Greece, 100

Reconnaissance missions: 382, 383;
Nixon, 377, 381; Rogers, 398

Recruitment and employment of Fili-
pino citizens by U.S. military
forces and contracts of U.S. mili-
tary and civilian agencies, agree-
ment with Philippines, 120

Red Cross. See International Red
Cross

Refugees:

Cuban airlift (Loy), 214

Middle East. See Arab-Israeli con-
flict and United Nations Relief
and Works Agency for Pales-
tine (UNRWA)

Protocol I annexed to universal copy-
right convention (1952), appli-
cation to works of, Tunisia, 475

Status of, protocol (1967): 156n;
Belgium, 431; Botswana (with
reservation), 272; Ecuador,
347; Netherlands, 156; Swazi-
land (with reservation), 331

Regional cooperation and develop-
ment (Johnson), 90

Africa: Nielsen, 293; W. W. Ros-
tow, 5

Asia. See Asia

CENTO programs: 502; Rogers,
502

Central and Latin America: John-
son, 74; Meyer, 421; Rogers,
310

Scientific centers (Dubos), 135

Reininger, Robert, 73n

Reprocessed wool fabrics, tariff reduc-
tion recommended (Johnson), 92

Reston, James, 130

Reynolds, Clark, 472

Richardson, Elliot L., 140, 162, 171,
192, 194, 231, 272, 417, 451, 514,
557, 569

Rimstad, Idar, 451

Roberts, Chalmers M. (Rusk), 50

Rockefeller, Nelson A.: 295, 470, 509;
 Nixon, 198, 240, 385, 470; Rich-
 ardson, 573; Rogers, 310, 530, 532
 Rodriguez, Antonio F., 544
 Rogers, William P.:
 Addresses, remarks, and statements:
 ABM safeguard system, 308, 397
 Africa, 310
 Ambassador Jarring, 306, 360
 Arab-Israeli conflict, 305, 362,
 396c, 387, 501, 506, 532
 Four-power talks, 360
 Asia, 397, 501
 Security, 400, 484, 501, 505
 U.S. interests, 357, 433, 461,
 462, 463, 477, 504
 Berlin, 387
 Cambodia, 307, 362
 CENTO, 16th session of Council
 of Ministers, 501, 506
 China, Republic of, 397, 398
 Communist China, 312, 361, 388,
 398, 533
 Cancellation of Warsaw meet-
 ing regretted, 197, 398
 Czechoslovakia, 189, 309, 312,
 359, 361
 Disarmament and arms control,
 307, 309, 388, 397
 East-West relations, 312, 359
 Europe, U.S. relations and role,
 308, 309, 501
 Foreign policy, 125, 163, 305,
 387, 478
 India, 433, 503, 531
 International waterways, 305
 Japan, 397, 531, 533
 Latin America, 310, 534
 Visit of Governor Rockefeller,
 530, 532
 Military-industrial complex, 360
 National Security Council, reor-
 ganization and foreign policy
 responsibilities, 164, 308
 NATO, 189, 309, 361, 531
 20th anniversary, 349, 357, 362
 Nigeria, 311, 388
 Nuclear nonproliferation treaty,
 189, 308
 Okinawa, 360, 398, 531
 Overseas bases, U.S. position, 359
 Pakistan, 505, 531
 Peru, U.S. fishing boats and pe-
 troleum industries incidents,
 310, 357, 363, 387
 Seabed, prohibition of nuclear
 weapons proposed, 308
 SEATO meeting, 447, 483
 Sino-Soviet dispute, 361
 Soviet Union:
 Armaments capability, 308, 363,
 397
 Nuclear tests, 534
 Strategic arms talks, 308, 359,
 361, 363, 397, 501, 531, 534
 U.S. relations and effect of
 Czechoslovakia, 309, 312,
 359, 501
 State Department, question of re-
 organization, 360
 United Nations, 311, 363
 U.S. reconnaissance plane shot
 down by North Korea, 398

Rogers, William P.—Continued
 Addresses, remarks—Continued
 Viet-Nam (*for details, see Viet-
 Nam*):
 Civil liberties, 361, 533
 Coalition government, question
 of, 464, 530, 532
 Communist rocket attacks on
 South Vietnamese cities con-
 demned, 247, 461, 463
 Consultation with South Viet-
 namese and allies, 306, 387,
 462, 463, 483
 Elections, 464, 505, 530, 532,
 533
 Mutual troop withdrawals, 307,
 358, 359, 399, 463, 484
 Peace, U.S. goal, 306, 359, 362,
 387, 400, 433, 461, 462, 463,
 503, 505, 506
 Political development, 307, 400,
 533
 Prisoners, 307, 399, 529
 Private talks, 306, 358
 U.S. forces:
 Replacement by South Viet-
 namese, 399, 400, 463,
 464, 529
 Unilateral withdrawal, 359,
 360, 462, 464, 533
 U.S. position and objectives,
 307, 387, 399, 433, 461, 478,
 501, 503, 529
 Visit to Asia, 433, 461, 462, 463,
 503, 505
 World order, 387
 CENTO meeting, U.S. delegate, 502
 Correspondence, memoranda, and
 messages:
 President Barrientos of Bolivia,
 condolences on death of, 424
 President Husain of India, con-
 dolences on death of, 469
 NAC, chairman of U.S. delegation,
 355
 News conferences, transcripts, 357,
 462, 463, 529
 SEATO Council meeting, U.S. dele-
 gate, 481
 Secretary of State (Rusk), 49
 Confirmation, 140
 Visit to Asia: Nixon, 460; Rogers,
 357, 433, 461, 462, 463, 503,
 505
 Visit to Europe (Nixon), 157
 Visit with Ambassador von Braun,
 248
 Romania (Rogers), 309
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 43, 215,
 376, 455
 Romnes, H. L., 451
 Romulo, Carlos P., 481
 Roosevelt, Mrs. Eleanor, 152
 Roosevelt, Franklin D. (quoted), 121
 Roshchin, A. A., 542
 Rostow, W. W., 4
 Roth, William M. (quoted), 91
 Rumor, Mariano: 396c; Nixon, 245
 Rusk, Dean:
 Addresses, remarks, and statements:
 Arab-Israeli conflict, 45, 46, 51
 Benito Juárez statue, dedication,
 46, 74
 China, Communist, U.S. relations
 and efforts to improve, 48
 Science and technology, 127

Rusk, Dean—Continued
 Addresses, remarks—Continued
 Singapore and South Asia, ques-
 tion of effect of U.K. with-
 drawal, 51
 USS *Pueblo* crew released, 2
 Viet-Nam, 45, 46, 49
 Correspondence and messages:
 Japanese and ECSC steel exports
 limitations, 93
 Trygve Lie, tribute, 78
 Future plans, 49
 News conference, transcript, 45
 Rutabanzibwa, Gosbert Miarcell, 75
 Rwanda, international coffee agree-
 ment (1968), with annexes, rati-
 fication, 215
 Ryukyu bases (Barnett), 447

S

Safety of life at sea, international con-
 vention (1960), current actions:
 Honduras, Singapore, 499; Syria,
 172; Venezuela, 236
 Amendments to, current actions:
 Israel, 499; Yugoslavia, 20
 Amendments to chapter II; Italy,
 Korea, Maldives Islands, South
 Africa, 119
 Salvage at sea, convention (1910) for
 unification of certain rules, pro-
 tocol amending, Austria, 215
 Samuels, Nathaniel, 348
 Saragat, Giuseppe: 262, 263, 266,
 396c; Nixon, 245
 Satellites. *See* Communications: Satel-
 lites and Outer space
 Saudi Arabia, IMCO convention
 (1948), acceptance, 303
 Saunders, Harold, 164
 Scali, John, 244, 278, 380
 Schurmann, Carl W. A. (Nixon), 563
 Schütz, Klaus, 258, 259
 Schweitzer, Pierre-Paul (Goldschmidt)
 16
 Science and technology:
 Brain drain: Dubos, 134; Seaborg,
 177
 Cooperation, bilateral agreements
 with China, 171, 172
 Creation of new problems: 196;
 Rogers, 311
 Environment and human factors:
 Dubos, 128; Rusk, 127
 Human rights problems, 152
 OAS regional fund, U.S. pledge,
 425
 World Weather Watch, 369, 374
 Scranton, William W., 367
 Seabed. *See* Marine resources
 Seaborg, Glenn T., 173, 179 (quoted),
 199, 209 (quoted)
 Security Council, U.N.:
 Arab-Israeli conflict, role in. *See*
 Arab-Israeli conflict
 Cyprus, extension of peace force,
 148
 Documents, lists of, 345, 429
 Namibia, General Assembly recom-
 mendations for consideration,
 14

Security Council, U.N.—Continued

Resolutions:
 Israeli air attacks condemned, 342
 Israeli attack on Beirut airport condemned, text of resolution, 55
 Namibia, responsibilities of South Africa, 303
 U.S. deputy representative (Phillips), confirmation, 348
 U.S. representative (Yost), confirmation, 140
 Seismic research: Fisher, 412; Foster, 58; Smith, 334
 Self-determination: 355; Finger, 452
 Africa: Denny, 11; Finger, 453; Nielsen, 294; Rogers, 310
 Namibia, right of: 14; Denny, 11, 14; Yost, 301
 Southern Rhodesia (Eaves), 414
 U.N. role (Wiggins), 10
 Semple, Robert B., Jr., 279
 Senegal, radio regulations (Geneva, 1959), partial revision, notification of approval, 432
 Sentinel system (Nixon), 159, 160, 273, 275
 Seward, William H. (quoted), 75
 Shakespeare, Frank J., Jr., 211
 Sharma, Kul Shekhar, 390
 Sherer, Albert W., Jr., 188
 Ships and shipping:
 National Maritime Day, 1969, proclamation, 297
 Treaties, agreements, etc.:
 Load lines:
 International convention (1930), final protocol and annexes, Denmark (denunciation), 87
 International convention (1966), current actions: Belgium, Bulgaria, 188; Cuba, 287; Cyprus, 524; Germany, 499; Nigeria, 20; Pakistan, 87; Philippines, 416; U.A.R., 87; Yugoslavia, 20
 Maritime traffic, international, convention (1965), with annex, Tunisia, 287
 Salvage at sea, convention (1910) for unification of certain rules, protocol amending, Austria, 215
 U.S. fishing boat incidents off coast of Peru, 184
 U.S. vessels, bilateral agreements re loans of: Argentina, 88; China, 72
 Shoup, David M. (Rogers), 360
 Shub, Anatole, 514
 Sierra Leone, treaties, agreements, etc., 215, 416
 Sieverts, Frank A., 162
 Singapore (*see also* Association of Southeast Asian Nations):
 Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 146
 Australian and New Zealand peace-keeping forces: 480; Rogers, 478
 Cotton textile agreement with U.S., announcement and text, 136
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 72, 432, 499
 U.K. withdrawal from, question of effect (Rusk), 51

Sino-Soviet dispute: Nixon, 316; Richardson, 558; Rogers, 361
 SIPRI (International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm), 335, 412
 Sisco, Joseph J.: 27, 188, 391, 443; Rogers, 532
 Sithole, Ndabaningi, 415
 Slavery and slave trade, convention (1926), and supplementary convention (1956): Ethiopia, 331; Mongolia, 215
 Smith, Gerard C.: 159*n*, 211, 333; Fisher, 409; Popper, 343
 Smith, Merriman, 157, 276, 377
 SNAP (Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power): Seaborg, 183
 Sneider, Richard L., 164
 Somali Republic, U.S. Ambassador (Hadsel), confirmation, 476
 Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, 164
 South Africa:
 Air transport agreement with U.S., question of (Loy), 394
Apartheid: 151; Goldschmidt, 9; Loy, 395; Sisco, 29; Wiggins, 9; Yost, 302, 566
 Economic and political problems (Denny), 13
 Namibia, administration of: 153; Denny, 11, 14; Finger, 453; Yost, 301
 U.N. resolution, text, 14
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 119, 455
 UNCTAD, question of continued membership: 10*n*, 151; Goldschmidt, 8; Sisco, 29; Wiggins, 9, 81
 South West Africa. *See* Namibia
 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, 14th council meeting, Bangkok (Rogers), 357, 433, 477, 483
 Delegations, 480
 Text of final communique, 479
 Southern Rhodesia (Finger), 453
 U.N. resolution, U.S. position: 153; Eaves, 413; Finger, 414
 Southern Yemen, treaties, agreements, etc., 156, 416
 Soviet Union:
 Arab-Israeli conflict, question of role in. *See* Arab-Israeli conflict.
 Armament capability: Nixon, 274, 279, 315, 379, 380; Richardson, 418; Rogers, 308, 363, 397
 Arms supplies to:
 Middle East: Nixon, 244; Sisco, 29, 392, 444
 Pakistan (Rogers), 505
 Viet-Nam (Nixon), 243, 244
 Arms talks with U.S., proposed. *See* Armaments: Strategic arms talks
 Atomic energy, cooperation with U.S. in use of (Seaborg), 176
 Berlin:
 Allegations of German military activity, 248
 Responsibility for access to: Nixon, 238; Tripartite (U.S., U.K., France), 186
 Chancery sites, U.S.-Soviet agreement on leases, 469
 Cold war (Richardson), 558

Soviet Union—Continued
 Doctrines and policies: 147, Richardson, 559; Rogers, 359, 501; Wiggins, 80, 81
 INTELSAT membership, question of (Marks), 227, 230
 Middle East, four-power talks on. *See* Arab-Israeli conflict
 Northeastern Pacific fisheries talks with U.S., 79
 Nuclear explosions, U.S.-Soviet technical talks, 356, 401
 Nuclear tests (Rogers), 397, 534
 Russian as a U.N. working language, 155
 Search and rescue assistance for U.S. reconnaissance plane: 382; Nixon, 380
 TASS correspondent required to depart U.S., 514
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 20, 88, 156, 331, 500
 U.N. peacekeeping costs, position on: DePalma, 495; Yost, 567
 U.S. ABM decision, interpretation of: Nixon, 276, 278; Rogers, 308
 U.S. Ambassador (Beam), confirmation, 304
 U.S. confrontation, question of (Nixon), 311 (quoted)
 U.S. discussions, question of: 355; Nixon, 217, 238, 252, 263, 265, 353; Rogers, 308, 309, 312, 362; Saragat, 262, 266
 U.S. fisheries agreements, announcement, 187
 U.S. relations and efforts to improve: 323; Richardson, 560; Rogers, 501; W. W. Rostow, 5
 Czechoslovakia, effect of: Johnson, 90; Nixon, 381; Rogers, 309, 312, 359; Seaborg, 176
 U.S. summit meeting, question of (Nixon), 157, 240, 244, 278
 University of Minnesota Concert Band tour: Dobrynin, 541; Nixon, 540, 541
 Viet-Nam, position and role: Nixon, 242, 243, 244; Richardson, 560; Yost, 567
 Visit of Dr. Jarring, 52
 Spaak, Paul-Henri (Brosio), 351
 Spain:
 North African bases: Nixon, 246, 518; Rogers, 359
 Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, convention (1966), money order agreement, parcel post agreement, and final protocols, Paraguay, 236
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 331, 375, 432, 455, 499, 575
 U.S. Ambassador (Hill), confirmation, 432
 U.S. defense agreement, extension, 324
 Squire, David F., 64
 Stans, Maurice H.: 367, 514; Nixon, 242
 State Department:
 Appointments and designations, 140, 188, 348, 432, 451, 476, 500
 Appropriations request FY 1970, 97, 100

State Department—Continued
 Assistant Secretaries of State (DePalma, Hillenbrand, Sisco): confirmations, 183; Green, 432; Meyer, 348; Nixon, 159
 Chief of Protocol (Mosbacher), confirmation, 140
 Classified foreign policy records 1939–1941 opened to researchers, 543
 Counselor (Pedersen), confirmation, 140
 Foreign policy responsibilities: Greenwald, 545; Rogers, 125
 Latin America, interests in (Rockefeller), 470
 Publications. *See* Publications
 Reorganization, question of (Rogers), 360
 Secretary of State (Rogers), confirmation, 140
 Foreign policy responsibilities: 163, 165; Nixon, 160, 169; Rogers, 164
 Under Secretary of State (Richardson), confirmation, 140
 WMO, role in, 370
 State of the Union (excerpts); Johnson, 89
 Stateless persons and refugees, protocol I to universal copyright convention (1952), Tunisia, 475
 Stevenson, Adlai (quoted), 565
 Stewart, Michael, 502
 Stikker, Dr. (Brosio), 351
 Straits of Tiran (*see also* Arab-Israeli conflict): Rogers, 305–306; Sisco, 393, 445
 Strategic arms control (Greenwald), 545
 Sudan, law of treaties, convention (1969), signature, 548
 Suez Canal (*see also* Arab-Israeli conflict): Rogers, 306; Sisco, 393, 445
 Sukhoruchenko, M. N., 79
 Sullivan, William H., 432
 Surplus property agreement with Indonesia, 172
 Swaziland:
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 331 396, 455, 548, 576
 U.N. membership, 149
 Sweden, treaties, agreements, etc., 119, 188
 Switzerland:
 International civil aviation convention (1944), protocol on authentic trilingual text, acceptance, 139
 U.S. Ambassador (Davis), confirmation, 476
 Visit of Secretary Stans, 367
 Symington, Stuart, 32, 149
 Syrian Arab Republic, treaties, agreements, etc., 172, 476
 Szabo, Daniel, 500

T

Tagore, Rabindranath, 131
 Taiwan (*see also* China, Republic of):
 Rusk, 48
 Economic development: 107; U. A. Johnson, 490; W. W. Rostow, 6
 Visit of Secretary Stans, 367

Tanzania:

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 75
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 331, 548
 Tape, Gerald F., 356, 401
 Tariff Commission, U.S., appropriations request FY 1970, 97
 Tariff policy, U.S. (*see also* Economic policy and relations; Tariffs and trade, general agreement on; and Trade):
 American selling price: 106; Johnson, 102
 Protectionism, dangers of: Barnett, 448; Johnson, 91, 102; Nixon, 160, 242; Richardson, 193; Rusk, 50
 Reprocessed wool fabrics, tariff reduction recommended (Johnson), 92
 Tariffs and trade, general agreement on; 92, 105, 113
 Agreements, exchange of notes, procès-verbal, and protocols:
 Accessions to, current actions on:
 Tunisia, provisional:
 4th proces-verbal: Denmark, 120
 5th proces-verbal: Australia, Austria, 156; Canada, Cuba, 331; Czechoslovakia, 548; Denmark, 120; France, 288; Germany, 548; India, Japan, 156; Kenya, 548; Malawi, 331; Netherlands, 188; Nigeria, 331; Norway, 120; Pakistan, 188; Tanzania, 548; Tunisia, 120; Turkey, 288; U.K., 156
 U.A.R., provisional: Austria, 120
 3rd proces-verbal: Austria, Denmark, 120
 4th proces-verbal: Australia, Austria, 156; Canada, Cuba, 331; Czechoslovakia, 548; Denmark, 120; France, 288; Germany, 548; India, Japan, 156; Kenya, 548; Netherlands, 188; Nigeria, 331; Norway, 120; Pakistan, 188; Tanzania, 548; Turkey, 288; U.A.R., 331; U.K., 156
 Article VI, implementation: Germany, 156; Netherlands, 288
 French text, protocol of rectification: Uruguay, 288
 Entry into force re part I, 303
 Geneva (1967) protocol: Germany, Netherlands, 156
 New schedule III—Brazil—protocol re negotiations for establishment: Burma, Chile, Nicaragua, 120; Uruguay, 288
 Entry into force, 304
 Part I and articles XXIX and XXX, protocol amending, proces-verbal of rectification: Uruguay, 288
 Part IV on trade and development, protocol and annex I: Burma, Greece, Haiti, Nicaragua, 120; Uruguay, 288
 Preamble and parts II and III, protocol: Uruguay, 288

Tariffs and trade, agreement—Con.

Agreements—Continued
 Rectifications and modifications to texts of GATT schedules:
 5th protocol: Uruguay, 288
 Entry into force, 304
 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th protocols: Nicaragua, 120; Uruguay, 288
 Entry into force, 304
 Taxation:
 Border tax adjustments: 106; Johnson, 102; Nixon, 242
 Tax surcharge extension (Johnson), 95
 Taylor, Maxwell D., 295
 Technical assistance: 97, 98; Johnson, 117; Nixon, 515, 516; Richardson, 571
 IMF facilities (Goldschmidt), 16
 U.N. (Yost), 326
 Technical cooperation agreement with Afghanistan, 188
 Technology. *See* Science and technology
 Telecommunications (*see also* Radio):
 International convention (1965), with annexes: Afghanistan, 347; Albania, 548; Austria, 347; Chad, 119; Cuba, 432; Germany (including Land Berlin), 331; Hungary, 347; Iran, 432; Italy, 119; Jamaica, 499; Kenya, 119; Luxembourg, 331; Malawi, 347; Morocco, 119; Nicaragua, Poland, 347; Portuguese overseas provinces, 88; Thailand, 432; Venezuela, 499
 Satellites. *See* Communications: Satellites
 Telles, Raymond, 544
 Thailand (*see also* Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization):
 Communist activity in: Rusk, 49; SEATO, 480
 Economic development: U. A. Johnson, 490; Rogers, 398; W. W. Rostow, 6; SEATO, 480
 Military and other aid to Vietnam: 482; U. A. Johnson, 492; SEATO, 480
 7-nation meeting of representatives of Viet-Nam and nations contributing troops. *See* Viet-Nam: Bangkok meeting
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 432, 548
 U.S. military and economic assistance: Nixon, 518; Richardson, 570, 573
 Thanat Khoman, 481
 Thanh, Tran Chanh, 481
 Theis, J. William, 279, 378
 Thieu, Nguyen Van: 550, 553; Nixon, 457; Rogers, 307, 358, 462
 Thomas, John Frederick, 223
 Thompson, Llewellyn F.: 540n; Nixon, 541
 TIROS satellites, 370
 To Continue Action for Human Rights, 450n
 Togo, treaties, agreements, etc., 215, 395
 Toon, Malcolm, 476
 Touring and tourism, 404
 U.S. balance of payments considerations (Johnson), 101

- Trade (*see also* Agricultural surpluses; Economic policy and relations, U.S.; European Economic Community; Exports; Imports; Tariff policy, U.S.; and Tariffs and trade, general agreement):
 Balance of payments. *See* Balance of payments
 Expansion, need for, 324
 Japan: Barnett, 448; Rusk, 93
 Latin America (Meyer), 441
 Less developed countries: 106, 196; Meyer, 441
 Nontariff trade barriers: 92, 105, 514; Johnson, 102; Nixon, 242; Richardson, 193
 Pacific Basin (U. A. Johnson), 489
 Southern Rhodesia, effect of sanctions (Eaves), 414
 Transit trade of land-locked states, convention (1965): Denmark, Turkey, 416
 U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, 155
 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, 1968, 107
 U.S.:
 European Communities trade talks, 514
 Free trade association membership, question of, 92
 Policies: 91; Johnson, 90; Loy, 394; Nixon, 404
 South Africa (Loy), 395
 Soviet and Eastern Europe, non-strategic trade (Greenwald), 545
 U.S.-Canada Joint Cabinet Committee on Trade and Economic Policy, 324
 Visit of Secretary Stans to Europe and Asia, 367
 World Trade Week, 1969, proclamation, 297
 Trade Expansion Act of 1962, amendment urged, 91, 106
 Transportation, World Weather Watch, value to, 368
 Transportation Department, 371, 374
 Travel (*see also* Touring and tourism), foreign travel to U.S., encouragement, 404
 Treaties, agreements, etc.:
 Current actions, 20, 42, 72, 87, 119, 139, 156, 172, 187, 215, 236, 272, 287, 303, 331, 347, 375, 395, 415, 431, 455, 475, 499, 524, 548, 575
 Law of, convention (1969): Afghanistan, Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, Chile, Columbia, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, Ecuador, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Iran, Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Sudan, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Zambia, 548
 Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949, released, 139
 Treaties, agreements, etc.—Continued
 Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 1969, released, 332
 Trezise, Philip H., 171, 451
 Trinidad and Tobago:
 Income tax convention, announcement, 138
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 120, 475, 548
 Troxel, Oliver L., Jr., 500
 Trudeau, Pierre Elliot: 28 (quoted), 319, 321, 323; Nixon, 320
 Trust Territory of the Pacific:
 Japan-U.S. agreement re, 476
 Visit of Secretary Hickel, 424
 Tunisia:
 Economic development (W. W. Rostow), 6
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 83, 120, 156, 188, 287, 288, 331, 475, 548
 U.S.-owned foreign currency, 52
 Turkey:
 Economic development: Johnson, 117; Richardson, 570; W. W. Rostow, 6
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 156, 216, 288, 416
 U.S. aid (Richardson), 570, 573
 U.S. Ambassador (Handley), confirmation, 432
- ## U
- Uganda, radio regulations (Geneva, 1959), partial revision re maritime mobile service, notification of approval, 331
 Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, treaties, agreements, etc., 272, 347
 UNCITRAL (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law), 155
 UNCTAD. *See* United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
 UNCURK (United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea): Symington, 32
 UNDP. *See* United Nations Development Program
 UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund): 281; Yost, 328
 United Arab Republic:
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 20, 87, 119, 120, 156, 188, 283, 331, 548
 U.S.-owned foreign currency, sales to U.S. tourists, 52
 United Kingdom:
 Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 318
 Balance of payments, 108
 Berlin, position on, 186, 248
 Devaluation of pound sterling, problems arising from, 107, 110
 Four-power talks on Middle East. *See* Arab-Israeli conflict
 INTELSAT participation (Marks), 226
 Singapore and South Asia, U.K. withdrawal from, question of effect (Rusk), 51
 United Kingdom—Continued
 Treaties, agreements, etc., 43, 87, 156, 272, 347, 348, 376, 548
 U.S. Ambassador (Annenberg), confirmation, 304
 Visit of President Nixon: Nixon, 157, 158, 237, 254, 256; Wilson, 253
 Visit of Secretary Stans, 367
 United Nations:
 Accomplishments and role: DePalma, 496; Nixon (quoted), 564; Rogers, 311; Sisco, 29; Wiggins, 80; Yost, 326, 564
 Administrative system, revision needed (DePalma), 496
 Bonds repayment (Wiggins), 55
 Budget, 154, 156*n*
 Documents, lists of, 345, 429, 454
 Headquarters expansion, 155
 Membership:
 Charter provisions: Goldschmidt, 8; Wiggins, 10
 Communist China, question of: 149; Nixon, 141; Wiggins, 82; Yost, 567
 Equatorial Guinea, 88
 Expansion: 149; Sisco, 29; Yost, 566, 568
 National United Nations Day for 1969, 451
 Outer space, role in: 150; DePalma, 493; Wiggins, 83, 84; Yost, 566
 Peacekeeping operations and problems of: DePalma, 495; Nixon (quoted), 311; Rogers, 311, 363; Sisco, 29; Wiggins, 84; Yost, 325, 564
 Netherlands support (Nixon), 561-562
 Seabed and ocean floor resources, role in development: DePalma, 494; Popper, 343; Smith, 335
 Southern Rhodesia, Special Committee resolution: Eaves, 413; Finger, 414; text, 415
 Specialized agencies: Nixon, 293; Yost, 326
 25th anniversary, observance (Yost), 328
 U.S. deputy representatives (Bufum, Phillips), confirmation, 348
 U.S. representative (Yost), confirmation, 140
 U.S. support (Nixon, quoted), 325, 451, 568
 Working languages, 154
 United Nations Association of the United States of America (Yost), 329
 United Nations Charter:
 Current actions: Equatorial Guinea, 88
 Principles: Denny, 12; Goldschmidt, 8; Warner, 66; Wiggins, 10; Yost, 326
 United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF): 281; Yost, 328
 United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea: 149; Symington, 32
 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 155

- United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1968, 107
- South African membership, question of continuance: 10*n*, 151; Goldschmidt, 8; Sisco, 29; Wiggins, 9, 81
- United Nations Development Decade, Second: 152, 153; Goldschmidt, 15; Yost, 327, 566
- United Nations Development Program: 150; Goldschmidt, 15; Squire, 65; Yost, 566
- U.S. contributions: Nixon, 517; Richardson, 572; Yost, 326
- United Nations Disarmament Commission: 150; Foster, 62
- United Nations Educational and Training Program for Southern Africans (Yost), 329
- United Nations Human Rights Prizes, 152
- United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 154
- United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine (Michelmores, quoted), 40
- Extension of: 151; Cooper, 39
- United Nations Secretary-General's Population Trust Fund, 38
- United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (Yost), 340
- United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa (Yost), 329
- United States citizens and nationals: Foreign policy records research, 543
- Moroccan dirhams, purchase of, 52
- Relief contributions: 281; Cooper, 41
- United States Information Agency (Rogers), 126
- Appropriations request FY 1970, 97, 100
- Director (Shakespeare), confirmation, 211
- United States-Mexico Commission for Border Development and Friendship: Diaz Ordaz, 26; Johnson, 22
- U.S. chairman (Meyer), announcement, 544
- United States-Mexico International Boundary and Water Commission (Johnson), 21
- U.S.S. *Liberty*, 473
- U.S.S. *Pueblo*: 383; Nixon, 380; Symington, 33
- Release of crew: 1, 2; Johnson, 1; Rusk, 2
- UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization): Yost, 340
- Universal copyright convention (1952):
- Current actions: Australia, 303; Tunisia, 475
- Protocols 1, 2, 3: Tunisia, 475
- Universal Postal Union. *See* Postal matters Upper Volta, radio regulations (Geneva, 1959), partial revision re maritime mobile service, notification of approval, 348
- Upshur, Abel P. (Rogers), 397
- Urban renewal: Dubos, 134; Nixon, 142
- Uruguay:
- Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 146
- Treaties, agreements, etc., 288, 548, 576
- V
- Vaky, Viron P., 164
- Van Hollen, Christopher, 476
- van Lennep, Emile, 196
- Vance, Cyrus R. (Rusk), 48
- Vance, Sheldon B., 500
- Vatican City State:
- Treaties, agreements, etc., 348, 499
- U.S. permanent representative, question of (Nixon), 239
- Visit of President Nixon: Nixon, 270; Pope Paul VI, 270
- Vaughn, Jack Hood, 500
- Velasco Alvarado, Juan, 364
- Venezuela, treaties, agreements, etc., 215, 236, 347, 499
- Viet-Nam:
- Bangkok meeting of allied foreign ministers: 481, 551; Rogers, 307, 357, 433, 483; text of communique, 481
- Casualties:
- Civilian (Lodge), 220, 247, 291, 435
- Communist (Lodge), 290, 390
- U.S.: Lodge, 435; Nixon, 240, 278, 378
- Cease-fire, proposed: 148; Lodge, 436; Nixon, 143; Rogers, 307, 399
- Civil liberties (Rogers), 361, 533
- Coalition government, question of: 482, 551; Lodge, 508; Rogers, 464, 530, 532; Walsh, 555
- Communism, rejection of (Lodge), 166
- Communist aggression and subversion:
- Communist attacks continued, U.S. response, question of: Lodge, 247; Nixon, 241, 276, 277, 279
- Communist responsibility for situation: Lodge, 144, 166, 185, 220, 290, 316, 317, 365, 388, 402, 419, 435; Nixon, 277; Rusk, 47, 49; Walsh, 338
- Terror tactics: Lodge, 166, 220, 221, 247, 280, 291, 317, 419, 435, 469; Rogers, 247, 461, 463
- Weapons and ammunition, sources of: Lodge, 317; SEATO, 479
- Communist objectives, failure to achieve, 551
- Communist offensives (Lodge), 290, 317
- Communist propaganda (*see also under* Paris peace talks): Lodge, 290, 420
- Communist reliance on U.S. public opinion: Lodge, 465; Nixon, 239, 461
- Demilitarized zone: Lodge, 222, 365; Rusk, 46
- U.S. proposals: Lodge, 124, 144, 145, 167, 190, 220, 248, 291, 367, 390, 402, 420, 436, 485; Rogers, 307, 399; Walsh, 339
- Viet-Nam—Continued
- Economic and social development: 481, 552; U. A. Johnson, 490; Lodge, 185; Nixon, 549
- Elections (Rogers), 505
- Participation of all political elements, question of: 552; Lodge, 468, 486, 507, 508, 536; Nixon, 459, 460; Richardson, 418; Rogers, 307, 358, 532; Walsh, 554
- Supervision, proposals for:
- ICC (Rogers), 532
- International: Lodge, 465, 487; Nixon, 460; Rogers, 530, 551; Walsh, 555
- National Liberation Front (Rogers), 530, 533
- South Vietnamese (Rogers), 464, 533
- Freedom of press (Rogers), 464, 533
- Geneva accords:
- Basis for peace, as: Lodge, 124, 125, 185, 190, 220, 248, 367, 485, 535; Nixon, 460; Rogers, 307; SEATO, 479; Walsh, 339
- Communist violations (Lodge), 317, 389, 419
- International law aspects (Lodge), 389
- Manila formula (Rogers), 358
- Midway meeting of President Nixon and President Thieu: joint statement, 550; Nixon, 549, 552; Rogers, 464, 530; Thieu, 550, 553; Walsh, 555
- Military and other aid from other countries: 482; U. A. Johnson, 492; Lodge, 144, 185; Nixon, 437, 438; SEATO, 479, 480
- Mutual troop withdrawals, U.S. position: 482, 551; Lodge, 124, 144, 167, 185, 191, 220, 248, 291, 318, 366, 390, 402, 420, 434, 435, 466, 467, 468, 486, 487, 506, 535; Nixon, 143, 459, 554; Richardson, 417; Rogers, 307, 358, 359, 399, 463, 484; Walsh, 339, 554
- National Liberation Front:
- Status (Rusk), 47, 48
- South Vietnamese willingness for discussions. *See* South Vietnamese, *infra*
- National reconciliation, 551-552
- National rights (Lodge), 535
- Neutrality, question of, 436
- Open arms policy, 481
- Pacification program: 481; Nixon, 239, 549; Thieu, 550
- Paris peace talks: 148; Johnson, 91; Lodge, 124, 144, 145, 166, 184, 190, 220, 247, 280, 290, 316, 365, 388, 401, 418, 434, 467, 485, 507, 535; Walsh, 338, 554
- Communist military activity, question of effect on: Bartch, 221, 247, 468; Nixon, 239, 460; 221, 247, 468; Nixon, 239, 460; Rogers, 247, 463; SEATO, 479; Walsh, 556
- Communist position: Lodge, 166, 418; Rogers, 433, 531

Viet-Nam—Continued

Paris peace talks—Continued
 Communist position—Continued
 Contrasted with U.S. and South Vietnamese: 482, 551; Lodge, 190, 220, 280, 366, 507, 535; Nixon, 459; Rogers, 399; Walsh, 554
 National Liberation Front: Lodge, 466, 468, 485; Rogers, 463
 Communist propaganda: Lodge, 145; Walsh, 554
 Private talks, question of: Lodge, 467; Nixon, 157, 276, 314; Rogers, 306, 358
 Procedural arrangements: Rusk, 46, 48; Walsh, 554
 Prospects: Johnson, 89; Lodge, 25, 434, 466; Nixon, 141, 143, 157, 243, 277, 378, 457; Richardson, 400, 463; SEATO, 478
 South Vietnamese representation and role: 551; Lodge, 185, 291, 508; Nixon, 460; Rogers, 306, 400; Rusk, 47; Thieu, 550
 U.S. negotiating team members (Nixon), 143, 465
 U.S. position and proposals: Lodge, 166, 184, 190, 220, 248, 280, 366, 434, 465, 467, 468, 485, 507, 535; Nixon, 141, 158, 460; Rogers, 307, 387, 399, 503; SEATO, 479; Walsh, 554
 Review and reassessment (Nixon), 158, 457
 Peace:
 France, question of role (Nixon), 241
 International verification and supervision: 482, 551; Lodge, 436, 467, 468, 487, 507, 508, 536; Nixon, 459, 460; Rogers, 307, 464, 505; Walsh, 555, 556
 Prospects for: deGaulle, 78; Johnson, 90, 91, 95; Lodge, 467; Nixon, 143, 243, 377; Rogers, 362, 464
 U.S. goal: Lodge, 145, 185, 280, 291, 390, 434; Nixon, 313, 314; Richardson, 417, 560; Rogers, 306, 359, 387, 399, 433, 461, 462, 463, 478, 501, 505, 506; Sisco, 28; Walsh, 339, 554, 556
 Political development: 481, 552; Lodge, 185; Nixon, 378; Rogers, 307, 400, 533; SEATO, 479
 Prisoners:
 Communist, testimony of (Lodge), 291
 Communist treatment: Laird, 484; Lodge, 487; Rogers, 529
 Exchange or release, U.S. position: Laird, 484; Lodge, 125, 221, 318, 367, 390, 402, 420, 436, 485; Rogers, 307, 399; SEATO, 479
 U.S. supervisor (Under-Secretary Richardson), 162
 Reunification: Lodge, 124, 167, 185, 191, 221, 248, 402, 436, 485; Nixon, 459; Rogers, 307

Viet-Nam—Continued

Self-determination: 482, 551; Lodge, 124, 144, 166, 185, 221, 248, 280, 318, 402, 419, 420, 435, 467, 486, 507, 508, 536; Nixon, 458, 550; Rogers, 307, 387, 399, 433, 462, 463, 478, 484, 501, 503, 505, 506, 532; SEATO, 479; Walsh, 554
 Soviet Union, position and role: Nixon, 242, 243, 244; Richardson, 560; Yost, 567
 South Vietnamese:
 Army: 482; Lodge, 403; Nixon, 158, 243, 378, 549; Richardson, 417; Rogers, 399, 400; SEATO, 479
 Replacement of U.S. forces and equipment, gradual: 551; Lodge, 435; Nixon, 458, 549, 553; Richardson, 417; Rogers, 399, 400, 463, 464, 529; Thieu, 550, 553; Walsh, 555
 Decisions, U.S. respect: 551; Lodge, 185, 402, 486; Rogers, 529; Walsh, 555
 Legitimate government of South Viet-Nam: Lodge, 185, 221, 280, 291, 402, 509; Rusk, 47
 People: Lodge, 166; Nixon, 552; Richardson, 573; Rogers, 463
 Self-determination. *See* Self-determination, *supra*
 Willingness to talk to NLF: 481, 551, 552; Lodge, 434, 468, 486; Nixon, 459; Richardson, 417, 419; Rogers, 307, 358, 400, 531; Walsh, 555
 Treaties, agreements etc., 88, 172, 216, 236
 U.N. role: 148; Yost, 567
 U.S. commitment: Johnson, 90, 91; Nixon, 458, 461; Rogers, 463; W. W. Rostow, 5, 6; Rusk, 48, 49
 U.S.—Communist confrontation, question of (Nixon), 458
 U.S. consultation with South Vietnamese and allies (*see also* Bangkok meeting and Midway meeting, *supra*): Nixon, 460, 553; Rogers, 306, 387, 462, 463; Thieu, 553
 U.S. Military and economic aid: 114; Johnson, 89, 95; Lodge, 144
 Appropriations request FY 1970: 97, 98; Nixon, 518; Richardson, 570, 573
 U.S. Military escalation, question of: Nixon, 277; Rogers, 307
 U.S. Military forces:
 Manpower levels and deployment (Lodge), 291
 Morale: Johnson, 90; Nixon, 259, 459; Rogers, 463
 Unilateral withdrawals: Lodge, 402, 419, 435, 465, 486, 507, 535; Nixon, 378, 458, 549; Richardson, 417; Rogers, 359, 360, 462; Walsh, 555
 Timing: Nixon, 549; Rogers, 529, 533
 Withdrawal, conditions for: Nixon, 158, 243, 279, 313, 457; Rogers, 399

Viet-Nam—Continued

U.S. military intelligence (Lodge), 290, 435
 U.S. military operations, escalation, Communist allegations of: Lodge, 145, 222, 291; Rogers, 534
 U.S. objectives (*see also* Paris peace talks: U.S. position and proposals, *supra*): Lodge, 124, 144, 191, 248, 318, 435, 467; Nixon, 313; Rogers, 462; Sisco, 28; Walsh, 554
 U.S. public opinion: Nixon, 243, 313; Richardson, 418; W. W. Rostow, 4; Rusk, 50
 Communist reliance on: Lodge, 465; Nixon, 239, 461
 Visit of Secretary Rogers: 434; Nixon, 460; Rogers, 357, 433, 461, 462, 463
 Visas, reduction or abolition of certain fees, agreement with Romania, 456
 Volcker, Paul, 171
 Voluntary assistance program, 372
 von Braun, Sigismund, 248

W

Wald, George (Richardson), 557
 Walsh, Lawrence: 338, 554; Nixon, 465
 War crimes, time limits, 153
 Warner, Marvin L., 66
 Washburn, Abbott, 367
 Water (*see also* Pollution):
 Desalination, U.S. joint study projects (Seaborg), 182
 El Morrillo salinity problem (Diaz Ordaz), 23
 Watson, Arthur K.: 472; Rockefeller, 472
 Webb, James (Johnson), 76, 77
 Welsh, Ed (Johnson), 76
 Welsh, Matthew E., 234
 Wheat:
 International Grains Arrangement, 324
 Wheat trade convention, current actions: Costa Rica, 172; Cuba, 72; Ecuador, 475; Germany, Greece, 376; Iran, 215; Peru, Portugal, 43
 Whitman, Walter G. (quoted), 179
 Wiggins, James Russell, 9, 36, 53, 54, 55, 78, 80, 84, 152 (quoted)
 Williamsburg, Va. (deJong), 562
 Wilson, Harold: 253, 255; Nixon, 245
 Wilson, Richard L., 241
 Wilson, Woodrow (quoted), 250, 255, 263
 Women:
 Political rights, convention (1953): Austria (with reservation), 456; Ethiopia, 288; Laos, 304
 U.N. Commission on the Status of Women, U.S. representative (Koontz), appointment, 167
 Woods, George D.: 472; Goldschmidt, 16; Rockefeller, 471
 Woodward, Gilbert H.: 1; Johnson, 2; Rusk, 2
 World Bank. *See* International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

World Food Program: 281; Cooper, 41

World grains arrangement (1967), memorandum of agreement on basic elements for negotiations: Netherlands, 303

World Health Organization: Dubos, 135; Squire, 64

Constitution (1946): Mauritius, 215

World Intellectual Property Organization, convention (1967):

Current actions: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, 416; Romania, 376; Soviet Union, 38; Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, 272; U.K., 376

U.S. ratification urged (Nixon), 298

World Meteorological Organization: 370; Dubos, 135

World order:

Interdependence of modern world: Nixon, 251; Pope Paul VI, 270; Rogers, 387; W. W. Rostow, 6; Sisco, 27, 391

Principles: 355; Nixon, 352, 519; Rusk, 50

U.S. role: 559; Nixon, 525; Rusk, 51

World peace: Johnson, 3, 21; Nixon, 461; Pope Paul VI, 270; Rostow, 7

Southeast Asia, importance to: Nixon, 458; Rogers, 484; Rusk, 49; SEATO, 479

U.S. goal: 96; Johnson, 89, 96; Nixon, 121, 249, 250, 255, 256, 289, 316; Rogers, 388

World Trade Week, 1969, proclamation, 297

World Weather Watch (Dubos), 135

U.S. plan for participation: 368; Nixon, 368

Y

Year 2000, The (Barnett), 449

Yemen Arab Republic, Universal Postal Union, constitution (1964), with final protocols, 236

Yost, Charles:

Addresses, correspondence, remarks, and statements:

Civilian aviation, safeguards for, 197

Disarmament, 327

Foreign aid, 326

Iraq, mass public executions deplored, 145

Israel, Security Council resolution and U.S. position, 340, 341

Yost, Charles—Continued

Addresses, correspondence—Con. Korea, Communist:

U.S. reconnaissance aircraft shot down by, 383*n*

Violations of Armistice Agreement during 1968, 497

Namibia, U.S. support for Security Council resolution, 301

Southern Africa, private aid for U.N. programs, 328, 329

U.N., 325, 564

Qualifications (Nixon), 159

U.S. representative to U.N.: confirmation, 140; Wiggins, 80

Youth, problems of (Nixon), 245

Yugoslavia (Rogers), 309

Treaties, agreements, etc., 20, 88, 499, 548

U.S. Ambassador (Leonhart), confirmation, 432

Z

Zahedi, Ardeshir, 502

Zambia:

Treaties, agreements, etc., 87, 548

U.S. Ambassador (Troxel), confirmation, 500

Ziegler, Ron, 217

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OF
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Vol. LX, No. 1541



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CREW OF U.S.S. PUEBLO RELEASED AT PANMUNJOM;
U.S. POSITION ON FACTS UNCHANGED 1

U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY REJECTS MOVE TO BAR SOUTH AFRICA
FROM MEMBERSHIP IN UNCTAD

U.S. Statements 8

LIMITS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF AMERICAN POWER

by W. W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President 4

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Crew of U.S.S. Pueblo Released at Panmunjom; U.S. Position on Facts Unchanged

STATEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE SPOKESMAN, DECEMBER 22

Department press release 280 dated December 22

The crew of the U.S.S. *Pueblo* was freed today at Panmunjom. They will immediately be given medical examinations and returned to the United States. Their families will meet them in San Diego.

The agreement to free the men involved the acceptance by both sides of the following procedure. General Woodward, our negotiator, signed a document prepared by the North Koreans. He made a formal statement for the record just before signing. The text of his statement had earlier been transmitted to the North Koreans and they had accepted our requirement that this statement be coupled with the signature of their document. Our statement read:

The position of the United States Government with regard to the *Pueblo*, as consistently expressed in the negotiations at Panmunjom and in public, has been that the ship was not engaged in illegal activity, that there is no convincing evidence that the ship at any time intruded into the territorial waters claimed by North Korea, and that we could not apologize for actions which we did not believe took place. The document which I am going to sign was prepared by the North Koreans and is at variance with the above position, but my signature will not and cannot alter the facts. I will sign the document to free the crew and only to free the crew.

General Woodward then signed the North Korean document and received the custody of the crew.

As he said, General Woodward placed his name on the false North Korean document for one reason only: to obtain the freedom of the crew who were illegally seized and have been illegally held as hostages by the North Koreans

for almost exactly 11 months. He made clear that his signature did not imply the acceptance by the United States of the numerous false statements in that document. Indeed, the prior acceptance by the North Koreans of the statement which General Woodward read into the record just before signing shows clearly their recognition of our position that the facts of the case call for neither an admission of guilt nor for an apology.

STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON¹

I am deeply gratified that after a long 11 months of totally unjustified detention by the North Koreans, the crew of the U.S.S. *Pueblo* have been freed. They should be reunited with their families in time for Christmas, and I am happy for them that their time of ordeal ends on a note of joy.

I want to pay tribute also to the patience and courage of these relatives while their husbands, fathers, and sons were held by the North Koreans.

The negotiations at Panmunjom were cruelly drawn out, and I am grateful for the understanding which the *Pueblo* families showed through the long and painful period during which their Government has sought to free the crew.

I must express my deep sorrow over the death of one crew member, Seaman Duane D. Hodges, who was killed while endeavoring to carry out his duties during the seizure of the ship.

I also want to thank our negotiator at Pan-

¹ Read to news correspondents by Tom Johnson, Acting Press Secretary to the President, on Dec. 22 (White House press release).

munjom, Major General Gilbert H. Woodward. He carried out his difficult and successful assignment with distinction and has preserved the integrity of the United States while obtaining the release of the men of the *Pueblo*.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK, DECEMBER 22

Department press release 281 dated December 22

President Johnson and I are pleased to report that the United States representative at Panmunjom has just obtained the release of the 82 officers and men of the U.S.S. *Pueblo* who last January were illegally seized with their ship on the high seas.

The men will stop first at an American Army hospital near Seoul and will fly from there to San Diego after any immediate medical needs have been met. The body of Seaman Dnane D. Hodges, who lost his life at the time the ship was captured, has also been returned.

The men were released after long and difficult negotiations. The North Korean negotiator insisted from the beginning that the men would not be released unless the United States falsely confessed to espionage and to violations of North Korean territory and apologized for such alleged actions.

We necessarily refused these demands. We repeatedly offered to express our regrets if shown valid evidence of a transgression. But this Government had—and has now—no reliable evidence that the *Pueblo* in any way violated her sailing orders and intruded into waters claimed by North Korea.

After 10 months of negotiations during which we made every sort of reasonable offer, all of which were harshly rejected, we had come squarely up against a most painful problem: how to obtain the release of the crew without having this Government seem to attest to statements which simply are not true. Then within the past week, a way which does just that was found, and a strange procedure was accepted by the North Koreans. Apparently the North Koreans believe there is propaganda value even in a worthless document which General Woodward publicly labeled false before he signed it.

General Woodward said:

The position of the United States Government with regard to the *Pueblo*, as consistently expressed in the negotiations at Panmunjom and in public, has been that the ship was not engaged in illegal activity, that

there is no convincing evidence that the ship at any time intruded into the territorial waters claimed by North Korea, and that we could not apologize for actions which we did not believe took place. The document which I am going to sign was prepared by the North Koreans and is at variance with the above position, but my signature will not and cannot alter the facts. I will sign the document to free the crew and only to free the crew.

If you ask me why these two contradictory statements proved to be the key to effect the release of our men, the North Koreans would have to explain it. I know of no precedent in my 19 years of public service. The simple fact is that the men are free and our position on the facts of the case is unchanged.

We regret that the ship itself, U.S.S. *Pueblo*, has not yet been returned; that will have to be pursued further.

During these painful months I met with the families of a number of the crew. I want to pay tribute to the understanding which relatives have shown toward our efforts to free the men, even at times when it seemed that these efforts were getting nowhere.

And the American people deserve a word of thanks. This has been a most frustrating episode. There have been a few among us who counseled either violent reprisals, which could not save the men, or abject surrender to North Korean demands. But the great majority of our people have kept their heads. And the crew has now been released in time to have Christmas with their loved ones.

NORTH KOREAN DOCUMENT SIGNED BY U.S. AT PANMUNJOM

To the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,

The Government of the United States of America, Acknowledging the validity of the confessions of the crew of the USS *Pueblo* and of the documents of evidence produced by the Representative of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the effect that the ship, which was seized by the self-defense measures of the naval vessels of the Korean People's Army in the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on January 23, 1968, had illegally intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,

Shoulders full responsibility and solemnly apologizes for the grave acts of espionage committed by the U.S. ship against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea after having intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,

And gives firm assurance that no U.S. ships will intrude again in the future into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Meanwhile, the Government of the United States of America earnestly requests the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to deal leniently with the former crew members of the USS Pueblo confiscated by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea side, taking into consideration the fact that these crew members have confessed honestly to their crimes and petitioned the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for leniency.

Simultaneously with the signing of this document, the undersigned acknowledges receipt of 82 former crew members of the Pueblo and one corpse.

On behalf of the Government
of the United States of America
GILBERT H. WOODWARD, *Major General, USA*

The Lighting of the Nation's Christmas Tree

*Remarks by President Johnson*¹

For the sixth—and last—time I have come to light this Christmas tree in the Nation's Capital.

My prayer now, as it has been in each of these other Decembers, is for peace and reconciliation abroad, justice and tranquillity at home.

This prayer is not easily answered in the world in which we live. During the past 5 years we have had to act with other nations to preserve the possibility of freedom for those threatened by totalitarian power—to preserve the dream in Asia and Latin America and elsewhere of how men might work, in cooperation with their neighbors, to lift the great burdens of poverty, ignorance, hunger, and disease.

Our next President will also face many difficult challenges in international affairs. He deserves the support of all of us in helping him to meet those challenges. I hope, and I believe, that what America has done in the past few years will strengthen his ability to meet his responsibilities to America and to the world.

For here at home, too, we have had to preserve a dream: to work day and night to close the gap between promise and reality so that all would have equal opportunity to fulfill the talents that God granted them, and to do so in an environment which protected the rights of all, including the right to expect that the law will be obeyed by everyone among us.

We cannot say that we have triumphed in this endeavor. But we have begun at long last.

Problems remain for the President and the

¹ Made at Washington, D.C., on Dec. 16 (White House press release).

new administration. But I sense that there is coming now in our land an understanding of how much can be done if we will only, all of us, work together—and how much can be lost if men look to violence and confrontation as the answer to frustration and injustice.

At this moment of Christmas we Americans join our prayers with all our human brothers in a spirit of hope. We pray for an early and durable settlement of the war that has called many brave young men to duty far from our shores and who cannot be in their homes this Christmas. In the hour of the Prince of Peace, we pray for them, for ourselves, and for all of our fellows on this earth.

I wish all of you a very merry Christmas and a full New Year of both peace and happiness.

President Johnson Joins Appeal for Holiday Truce in Nigeria

*Statement by President Johnson*¹

His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia has appealed to both sides in the Nigerian civil war to observe a week-long truce on the occasion of Christmas and the Muslim holiday of 'Id al-Fitr.

I wish to express the heartfelt support of the American people for this statesmanlike act. We earnestly hope that all nations will join us in urging the parties in this tragic conflict to accept this truce.

The Nigerian Government has already issued orders for a 2-day cease-fire. It is the fervent desire of all Americans that this action will be reciprocated by the Biafran authorities and that both sides will agree to extend this arrangement to the full period proposed by the Emperor.

A cease-fire, however brief, will be a precious respite from the bloodshed and destruction that has stricken Nigeria. But silencing the guns for 7 days will not alone save the millions who face starvation or heal the deep wounds dividing a great nation.

Only the end of fighting will permit a deeply concerned world to provide the necessary quantities of food and medicine to those in desperate need on both sides of the lines of battle. From this pause we hope that both sides will summon new courage to make peace.

¹ Issued on Dec. 21 (White House press release).

Limits and Responsibilities of American Power

by *W. W. Rostow*

*Special Assistant to the President*¹

The theme of your meeting is clearly well chosen. The coming in of a new administration is inevitably a time for stocktaking. The Nation's debate over policy in Viet-Nam has, moreover, raised in many minds the question of the limits and responsibilities of American power.

And there is a third reason to consider the theme. We are more than a generation beyond the fundamental decisions taken by the Nation in the face of Stalin's effort to thrust into Western Europe. We are almost 22 years from that memorable day in February 1947 when the First Secretary of the British Embassy brought word to the State Department that the United Kingdom could no longer bear the burdens of supporting Greece and Turkey. The famous 18 weeks followed—weeks which yielded the Truman doctrine and the Marshall Plan and which set the pattern for our global policy ever since. It is fair to examine critically where we have come from since the spring of 1947 and where we should go.

But in opening up the subject, I should like to begin not with broad generalizations but by recalling the 8 years through which we all have passed, the 8 years since we were last in a transition between administrations. I suspect that we shall be able to plot the course ahead with greater wisdom if we look at the question of how U.S. power can and cannot—should and should not—be applied in fairly specific terms.

When President Kennedy and then-Vice President Johnson came to responsibility on January 20, 1961, here were their major foreign policy concerns:

¹ Keynote address at the 14th Student Conference on National Affairs, on the "Limits and Responsibilities of American Power," at Texas A. and M. University, College Station, Tex., on Dec. 4 (White House press release).

—Castro had taken over Cuba, was mounting significant subversive operations in the Caribbean area; and Latin America was shaken by the possibility that Castro's pattern of revolution might prove to be the wave of the future throughout the region.

—Khrushchev's ultimatum of 1958 still hung over Berlin, backed by the image of Soviet nuclear strength and Khrushchev's conviction that the West would not hold up in the face of nuclear blackmail pressed by a hardened Bolshevik against a materialist and uncertain West.

—President Eisenhower informed President-elect Kennedy on the 19th of January that Laos was in a state of military, and possibly political, disintegration endangering the whole of Southeast Asia and that the new President had to face the possibility of putting U.S. forces into the area to back our treaty commitments and preserve the region from Communist control.

—Elsewhere in Asia, South Korea was a study in stagnation and political instability; Japan was isolated from the rest of Asia, its relations with the United States badly strained; Indonesia engaged in dangerous adventures abroad, with Sukarno dependent increasingly on a strong Communist Party at home, importing a billion dollars of Communist arms, and leading his country to bankruptcy.

—Many states of Africa were just emerging into precarious independence; the Congo, in particular, was in dangerous turmoil, with a major effort underway to establish there a Communist base.

—Relations with the Soviet Union were at a very low ebb with the failure of the summit in Paris of May 1960 and the U-2 incident.

—The ability of the United States to sustain its forces in Europe was shadowed by the heavy

balance-of-payments drain they caused, and President Eisenhower thought that the only answer might prove to be significant troop withdrawals.

In broader terms, the world was troubled by a U.S. rate of growth about half that of the Soviet Union and the widespread belief—even among some experts in the West—that in the 1960's the Soviet Union might come close to surpassing the United States in total production.

There was perhaps an even more grave question: whether the methods of freedom would permit the developing parts of the world to do as well in economic and social progress as Communist China; and even some Western experts were coming to the view that the hardhanded methods of communism might prove more effective in mobilizing resources for investment and thrusting the developing nations into sustained growth.

Eight years later, as we move through another transition, it is possible to take stock of what the United States, working with others, has been able to accomplish in dealing with this array of problems which were our lot in 1961.

Castro's Cuba has been successfully contained by hemispheric action. He remains a nuisance and a potential threat which requires alertness, but Latin America has moved forward. On the basis of the Bogotá conference, the initial foundations for the Alliance for Progress were laid late in the Eisenhower administration, but carried forward with vigor by President Kennedy and President Johnson. Latin America has had a sufficient taste of success to know that the job of creating a modern Latin America, loyal to its own history and culture and principles, is a job that can be done; although much work lies ahead, notably in the field of Latin American integration. President Johnson's difficult decision on the Dominican Republic was vindicated by the subsequent evolution of political life in the Dominican Republic.

Khrushchev's attempt to thrust Soviet missiles into Cuba was defeated without war, with far-reaching repercussions that both added to the confidence that free men could cope with nuclear blackmail and laid the basis for the atmospheric test ban treaty.

The threat to Berlin was faced down in 1961 and 1962, and a free West Berlin survives. Berlin remains a sensitive place, but there is an inner confidence that the West has the capacity to sustain its commitment there.

President Kennedy and then—decisively—in 1965 President Johnson faced the mortal threat to Southeast Asia which President Eisenhower had foreshadowed. They did so, conscious of the cost of their decisions, but conscious also of the cost to the Nation, to Asia, and to the world of a failure to meet our treaty commitments and the Communist takeover of Southeast Asia that would clearly follow.

Against the background of President Johnson's 1965 commitment, a new wave of confidence swept through Asia; Indonesia freed itself from the Communist threat; and above all, there was a beginning of Asian regional cooperation for the first time in recorded history. Japan moved away from a life of prosperity in isolation and began to play a role of construction in the region, a role which should grow as the war in Southeast Asia comes to an end and a new chapter in Asian history opens up.

In Africa, despite the vicissitudes of the new nations which emerged in the 1960's—including the tragic civil war in Nigeria—the Africans have shown an increasing will to maintain their independence and manage their own affairs. They have systematically eliminated Communist footholds in the countries south of the Sahara and have begun to forge regional and sub-regional institutions of great longrun promise.

In his 1966 speech before the Ambassadors of the Organization of African Unity, President Johnson, in the first talk by an American President wholly devoted to Africa, threw this nation's weight behind the movement toward African regionalism.

Despite Viet-Nam, we have moved in the 1960's with the Soviet Union to isolate and act on limited areas of common interest, yielding not only cultural and air agreements and a consular convention but, working with others, a Nonproliferation Treaty and now the possibility of serious talks to damp down the arms race in strategic missiles.

Despite the strain on our balance of payments, we have found ways, in cooperation with the Europeans, to offset the foreign exchange costs of maintaining forces in Europe; and President Johnson will turn over to President Nixon a strong NATO—despite the French defection—which, in the wake of the Czechoslovak crisis, deeply understands that a vital NATO will be required as far ahead as anyone can foresee.

And, in broader terms, we emerge at the end of 8 years of strain with an American financial position—in terms of the national budget and

balance of payments—which makes the dollar a source of stability in the world as we move forward to build a new cooperative international monetary system.

So far as the domestic economy is concerned, President Kennedy and President Johnson made good the campaign promise of 1960 to get this country moving again. Our high rate of growth, sustained through 8 years of regular expansion, has demonstrated the continued vitality of the American economy and removed from the world scene the anxiety that somehow Soviet methods of economic and social progress would become an appropriate model for others. Most advanced thought in Communist nations now looks, in fact, not to the Soviet Union but to the United States, Western Europe, and Japan as representing more nearly the way a modern sophisticated economy should perform.

Finally—much more than is generally understood—the 1960's proved to be the period when it was demonstrated that the pragmatic methods we have evolved with others for developing nations at early stages of growth are vastly more effective than those of the Communist world. There are some remarkable success stories: South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Tunisia, Mexico, Colombia, Central America, and other parts of Latin America. It is in the last 5 years that Latin America has approximated the growth targets set in the Punta del Este conference of 1961.

And along the way, under President Johnson's leadership, the developing nations have accepted a new priority for agriculture and a new understanding that agriculture and industrial development must go hand in hand. This priority, plus the new rice and wheat strains, has bought time for programs of family planning to take hold and postponed—at least—the terrifying prospect of a Malthusian crisis in the 1970's, a prospect that was almost a certainty a few years back.

These are solid achievements; but let me be clear. We have also had major disappointments in the 1960's, and we leave an ample agenda for our successors.

We regret that an honorable peace in Southeast Asia could not be brought about in our time of responsibility.

We regret that Europe has not been able to make more progress in this period toward that effective unity which is required for its own sta-

bility and progress as well as for Europe to fulfill the world role of responsibility it should carry.

We regret that we could not have carried further forward the Nonproliferation Treaty and the missile talks with the Soviet Union.

We regret that political currents in our Congress and elsewhere in the world have not permitted us to generate as many resources for development as could be effectively absorbed in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Moreover:

—Acute danger remains in the Middle East;

—Southeast Asia must be seen through to a stable and honorable settlement, and then we must all work together to bring fully to life the new cooperative Asia whose institutions and policies began to take shape in the wake of President Johnson's 1965 decision on Viet-Nam;

—Our margin of influence must be used to encourage Latin America to move down the path toward economic and physical integration, the only road that promises to Latin America a setting where the most advanced and sophisticated industries can thrive efficiently;

—Profound unresolved problems remain between white and black men in Africa;

—The crisis in Czechoslovakia raises grave anxieties about the future peaceful evolution of Eastern Europe.

In short, there is no reason to believe our successors will find time on their hands or be short of challenging tasks; and I am reasonably certain that my successor will be called by the White House Situation Room quite often in the night with news of crisis and danger in one part of the world or another.

Against the background of this quick review, let me turn now to the central theme of this conference: the limits and responsibilities of American power.

The simple truth about our world position in the 1960's is that none of the things that have been accomplished in the past 8 years could have been accomplished without the determined and often courageous use of American economic, political, and military power; but equally, none of these things could have been accomplished by the United States acting alone.

As President Johnson said in his state of the Union address on January 10, 1967:²

² For excerpts, see BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1967, p. 158.

We are in the midst of a great transition—a transition from narrow nationalism to international partnership; from the harsh spirit of the cold war to the hopeful spirit of common humanity on a troubled and a threatened planet.

We have moved in the 1960's some considerable distance through that great transition. In particular, President Johnson has perceived that our nation demanded an alternative somewhere between a return to isolationism and the overwhelming direct responsibility into which we fell in the immediate postwar years.

In trade and monetary affairs, in development policy, and in his support of regionalism in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, he has laid the foundations for resolving this dilemma.

Speaking at New Orleans, President Johnson recently said:³

We have always hoped and believed that as our friends and allies grew in strength, our burden would grow less lonely. We have been moving over the last few years toward a long-term position in which the United States would be able to assume its responsibility in enterprises of common concern, but our partners would be able to assume theirs. . . .

I believe the day will soon come—which we have been building toward for 20 years—when some American President will be able to say to the American people that the United States is assuming its fair share of responsibility for promoting peace and progress in the world, but the United States is assuming no more and no less than its fair share.

President Johnson also perceived that there is a basis outside the United States for this policy of fair shares and partnership. In every quarter of the globe, within the Communist world as well as outside, men and nations desire to take a larger hand in shaping their own destiny. They cannot do so, however, in a world as interdependent as ours unless they set aside old-fashioned nationalism and learn to work together.

And so our task has been to use our margin of influence to encourage abroad what we have always set as our target at home; namely, the

³ For President Johnson's address at New Orleans, La., on Sept. 10, see BULLETIN of Sept. 30, 1968, p. 325.

effective organization of diffuse centers of power and authority.

Again, I would underline, this kind of world cannot be created by the United States acting alone; but we remain, whether we like it or not, the critical margin: in Europe, in Latin America, in Asia, in Africa, and, I believe also, in the end, in the Middle East. And we shall remain the critical margin in the years ahead if the world is going to make its way through the great transition toward the goal of stable peace.

We cannot abdicate our responsibilities as the greatest industrial power in the world. We cannot abdicate our responsibilities as one of the two great nuclear powers in the world. And we cannot—in our interest or in the common interest—opt out of our treaty responsibilities; for if we create vacuums, as we once did in South Korea, they are not likely to remain empty. But what we can do, and are doing, is to use our influence and power to help organize the world community in ways which distribute the burdens more evenly and give to others a sense that they, too, are shaping the destiny of man.

The nation-state, whatever its size and resources, cannot solve the vast problems now before us or foreseeable in the future. Nor is this any longer a bipolar world, despite the continued disproportionate concentration of nuclear power in the United States and the Soviet Union. The dynamics of the first postwar generation have yielded a world arena of diverse nations determined, as I say, to take a hand in their own destiny. We shall achieve arrangements of authentic partnership based on mutual respect and acknowledgement of interdependence, or we shall not move successfully through the great transition.

Despite the debates and anxieties at home about our world role, I deeply believe our nation will continue to play its proper role—as the decisive margin—in such partnerships. And it is in a world of partnership and fair shares that we shall find the right answer to the limits and responsibilities of American power.

U.N. General Assembly Rejects Move To Bar South Africa From Membership in UNCTAD

Following are texts of a statement made in Committee II (Economic and Financial) by U.S. Representative to the Economic and Social Council Arthur E. Goldschmidt on December 3 and a statement made in plenary by U.S. Representative to the General Assembly James Russell Wiggins on December 13.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GOLDSCHMIDT, COMMITTEE II, DECEMBER 3

U.S./U.N. press release 227 dated December 3

The United States delegation opposes the draft resolution contained in document L.1022 and, if this resolution is put to a vote, will vote against it. I should like to explain why.

In the first place, we believe this proposal raises serious legal questions. The United Nations Charter states the terms and conditions upon which all of us have entered into membership in the United Nations. One of the most fundamental is stated in article 2, paragraph 1: "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members." Under this principle member states cannot properly be deprived of benefits which the charter, or the Assembly acting under the charter, makes available to member states generally, except on the grounds and by the procedures provided in the charter itself.

Today, we are asked to suspend a single member state from membership in a U.N. organ which at present includes all members. We are asked to take this action on the ground that that member pursues policies which are almost universally acknowledged to be abhorrent to the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

Now, clearly the General Assembly may establish subsidiary organs which do not include the

entire membership; considerations of size and efficiency are a reasonable basis for limiting membership and have been taken into account in limiting the membership of the vast majority of suborgans created by the General Assembly since the inception of the United Nations. UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development], however, is a body which is not so limited. The General Assembly has extended the benefits of participation in UNCTAD to all members of the United Nations, and there is no proposal to change this general principle, but only to make this sole exception. We seriously doubt that the Assembly may properly exclude one or two members because the majority—even the overwhelming majority—finds their domestic or other policies in conflict with the charter or otherwise obnoxious, without itself affronting the principle of sovereign equality stated in article 2, paragraph 1.

This judgment is reinforced by the presence of articles 5 and 6 in the charter. For these articles do provide general procedures by which a member may be deprived of any or all of the benefits of membership; they provide also the grounds upon which these procedures may be invoked.

The terms and conditions upon which any right or privilege of membership might be lost were written into the charter at the outset. This being the case, the proposal which is now before us is additionally objectionable because it ignores the substance and procedure of articles 5 and 6 and infringes on the prerogatives which these articles confer on the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Mr. Chairman, I have tried to set out in these brief words the relevant law of the charter as it bears on this proposal. Member states do not necessarily have a right to be included in every

United Nations body. They do have the right, however, not to be singled out for unequal treatment as regards the benefits flowing from membership in the United Nations, except as has been provided by the basic law of the United Nations.

It is difficult for us to see any other viable or effective basis on which an organization like the United Nations could be expected to proceed. For if any of the benefits of U.N. membership may be denied any member other than as agreed upon in the charter, then none of the charter rights of any can be regarded as secure.

If the basis upon which such action is taken is the majority's abhorrence for the policies of that member, then violence has been done to one of the very concepts upon which the United Nations was established. The United Nations was intended to serve as a means by which nations would try to deal with each other in pursuit of the aims of the charter despite the deepest political differences among them. Indeed, it is the very depth, and in our times the danger, of political cleavages within the international community that makes a United Nations the compelling necessity which it is. Sitting down in the United Nations with members whose conduct we despise, and recognizing their rights as members, implies no moral or political acquiescence in their conduct. On the contrary, it is a recognition of the simple fact that otherwise the United Nations cannot hope to fulfill its role, and that if the United Nations does not fill that role, it will not be filled at all.

Mr. Chairman, my delegation does not need to be reminded of the outrage with which virtually the whole world regards the institution of *apartheid*. We are among the outraged. We know how difficult it is for any person of normal moral sensibilities to talk of extending equal protection of the law of the charter to a member which for reasons of race has so systematically denied equal protection of its own laws to the great majority of its citizens. But it should be plain that what I have said has not been said for the sake of South Africa. It has been said for the sake of the United Nations and all its members. For the issue before us is not whether *apartheid* is a heinous evil. It is, and the United Nations has condemned it as such. But the question now before us is whether in our effort to express our outrage at that evil we shall risk doing serious injury to the integrity of the charter and the effectiveness of the United Nations. We believe

there are such risks in the proposal before us.

For our part, we would look on the adoption of this proposal by the General Assembly as a very grave step with unforeseeable consequences. We therefore appeal to the sponsors of the proposal to reflect upon the full implications of the course which they have set and to reconsider it in the interest of our common institution—the United Nations itself.¹

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR WIGGINS, PLENARY SESSION, DECEMBER 13

U.S./U.N. press release 248, Corr. 1, dated December 13

The General Assembly is face to face with a crisis involving an ancient dilemma: the dilemma of ends and means.

The overwhelming majority among us strongly desire to achieve a just end; namely, to abolish the evil system of *apartheid* in South Africa. It is now proposed to promote that just end by what my Government believes to be an unjust and unwise means; namely, to strip South Africa of certain rights and privileges to which it is entitled as a member of the United Nations and of which the Assembly acting alone may not legally deprive it.

Let me emphasize that we oppose this plan because of our deep concern for the future of the United Nations—not out of any solicitude whatsoever for the system of *apartheid*.

The United States Government has for many years shown its opposition to *apartheid* by both word and deed.

Unfortunately, the proposal now before us holds no promise of being effective in suppressing *apartheid*. I know it expresses the honest feelings of indignation which its authors feel against South Africa. But there is no reason to believe that it would hasten the end of *apartheid*. The injury it would inflict would not be on South Africa but on the institution of the United Nations.

It is important to note that the proposal is not simply to “change the membership” of UNCTAD. That body was constituted by the Assembly itself to include *all* states members of the United Nations, the specialized agencies, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Under the present resolution it would remain

¹ Draft resolution A/C.2/L.1022, as orally revised, was approved by the committee on Dec. 3 by a vote of 49 to 22 (U.S.), with 23 abstentions.

so constituted. Only one exception would be made, the suspension of one member, singled out by name: South Africa. That suspension is clearly not a change in the general membership but rather a sanction against one member.

Membership in UNCTAD, given the inclusive basis on which that body is constituted, is clearly one of the rights and privileges of membership in the United Nations. If it is proposed to take such a right away from any member, such a step must follow the provisions of the charter set forth in articles 5 and 6.

These are not just our views; they are the views of the Legal Counsel of the United Nations which have been referred to by several other speakers. These rules and procedures are laid down in the charter to assure equal treatment for all members of the United Nations. The pending resolution would deny such equal treatment to one member. It is thus a violation of one of the most fundamental principles of the charter: that principle set forth in article 2, paragraph 1, that "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members." By adopting this resolution we would, in effect, be treating article 2, paragraph 1, as if it contained the words "except such Members as the General Assembly may decide from time to time do not deserve to be treated as sovereign equals."

When we seek to deny to any member any of the rights that flow from membership in the United Nations, we thereby put in jeopardy all the rights of all members. An unlawful act against my neighbor—whether he be guilty or not—is an act against the community.

If we are to live together with one another in anything but chaos, we must have reliable safeguards of law and due process by which each may be protected against the hostility of others.

All of the nations we represent look to the

United Nations as a great instrument of peace and justice. It is often a weak instrument, because it cannot go faster than the concerted will of its members will permit it to go. Yet it has done noble services to both peace and justice. Among those services, none is nobler than the assistance the United Nations has rendered to the cause of independence, self-determination, and human rights for a billion human beings inhabiting the former colonial areas of the world.

That work is not finished. We are facing now some of its last and most difficult chapters. Together we, the United Nations, can and will finish that work. But if we are to fall apart, if the law which is so essential to this community of ours is so weakened by arbitrary exceptions that no member, strong or weak, dare depend upon it, then I fear we shall be able to do little together. It will be a matter of each nation for itself, and the future will look very dark indeed.

If this resolution is adopted, the Assembly will be telling the world what the world already knows: that it detests and deplores *apartheid*; but, sadly and ominously, it also will be telling the world that in the United Nations General Assembly there is no law, no provision of the charter, no guarantee of the legal rights of any nation, that may not be overridden if it obstructs the majority will.

We will therefore oppose this resolution.²

²The draft resolution recommended by Committee II in part I, par. 9, of its report (A/7383) was considered by the Assembly on Dec. 13. The President of the Assembly ruled that the matter was an important question requiring a two-thirds majority for adoption; this ruling was upheld by a rollcall vote of 56 (U.S.) to 48, with 13 abstentions.

After a revision of operative par. 2, the draft resolution as a whole was voted upon by rollcall and failed to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority, the vote being 55 in favor, 33 (U.S.) against, with 28 abstentions.

United States Calls Upon South Africa To Recognize Right of People of Namibia to Self-Determination

Following are statements made in plenary sessions of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative Brewster C. Denny on December 10 and 16, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Assembly on December 16.

STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 10

U.S./U.N. press release 228 dated December 10

In considering the question of Namibia,¹ the United Nations returns to a case which is among the most difficult and frustrating it has known.

For all who have watched the United Nations with hope for its growth and success since the signing of the charter at San Francisco and who have shared, as concerned citizens of their countries, both its triumphs and its disappointments, this issue epitomizes many of the greatest hopes and bitterest frustrations of the organization.

It is basic to the United Nations—and to the political beliefs and foundations of my own country—that every nation has the right to rule itself and that every individual has the inalienable right to equality and social justice. The United Nations in its 23 years has helped to foster a steady growth in the recognition and realization of these ideals. Nowhere is this more true than in Africa, where nearly 250 million people have emerged from dependent status since the founding of the United Nations and have achieved the right to rule themselves.

In the southernmost part of Africa progress toward human equality and self-determination has, tragically, been halted. There, the Gov-

ernment of South Africa has chosen to stand against the tide of history. Stubbornly, and I believe foolishly, it has persisted in its attempts to build a society which institutionalizes racism. And not content with perpetuating injustice at home, it has defied the international community by moving to consolidate its rule over Namibia, to extend its own racist policies to that territory, and, increasingly, to deny the people of the territory the elementary protection of the rule of law.

The United States continues to support the position, adopted by the General Assembly in 1966, that the Republic of South Africa, by its disregard of the interests of the people of Namibia, has forfeited the right to administer the territory which it received under the League of Nations mandate.

The United States will continue to support the search for peaceful and practical means to bring about the effective—and not only the legal—termination of South Africa's administration of Namibia. Unfortunately, the United Nations has not yet been able to find the means to reach this goal.

In this situation, I should like to add a *caveat* for the Government of South Africa. Let this Government not suppose that the termination of its legal mandate absolves it from international responsibility for its actions in this territory. Regardless of the fact that South Africa no longer has any legal right in Namibia, it continues, as illegal occupant, to be answerable before the international community for all of its actions in the territory.

The United Nations has already examined at length one such action: the application to Namibia of the Terrorism Act of 1967. Both this Assembly and the Security Council have called upon South Africa to cease applying

¹ The General Assembly on June 12, 1968, proclaimed (A/RES/2372 (XXII)) that South West Africa should be known as Namibia.

this act to the international territory and its people.²

The Government of South Africa has failed to heed the voice of the international community or its obligations under the United Nations Charter. Thirty-one inhabitants of Namibia remain imprisoned on Robben Island following their conviction under the Terrorism Act. As matters now stand, 15 of the Namibians convicted under this act are under sentence for the rest of their natural lives, 14 for 20 years, and two for 5 years.

The United States continues to maintain that South Africa has no right to apply the Terrorism Act to Namibia or to these prisoners. At the time this legislation was enacted in June 1967, South Africa's right to legislate for Namibia had already been forfeited and its occupation of the territory had become illegal. Moreover, the act would in any event have been in flagrant violation of rights of the inhabitants under the Covenant of the League of Nations, the mandate agreement, and chapters IX and XI of the United Nations Charter.

For example, the act authorizes indefinite detention by the police without the right of access to courts, counsel, family, friends, or clergy; it imposes harsh criminal penalties for acts committed 5 years prior to its passage; it places intolerable burdens on the defense and, in effect, transfers to the accused the onus of proving his innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. Offenses are so broadly defined as to create risks of extreme penalties for all who incur the disfavor of police and prosecuting officials. And for the occasional defendant who survives these obstacles or has served his sentence, there loom the risks, created by statute, of a new trial on charges arising out of the same facts or of banishment without recourse to the courts.

The Appellate Division of the South African Supreme Court has recently held that the South African courts are constitutionally excluded from any consideration or remedy of these and other denials of the rule of law. Whatever slim hope the international community could have had that South Africa's courts might be able to end or limit the application of the Terrorism Act or other legislation to the Territory of Na-

mibia has been unequivocally ended by the recent judgment of the Appellate Division.

In the absence of any reassurance or other information from the South African Government, we must assume that a large number of Namibians, perhaps hundreds, remain in detention without right of access to the outside world under this act. Some may have been held for over 2 years. The South African Government has thus far ignored the questions which the United States Government has posed in several representations.

The accountability of South Africa on this issue is clear. My delegation considers that the international community is entitled to know the full facts about the application of the Terrorism Act to Namibia. We should like to know: How many other Namibians, apart from the 31, already are being held now under the Terrorism Act? If others are or have been held, what are their names? What are the specific charges? Where are they, and for how long have they been held? And what provisions have been made for their care and defense? If South Africa has nothing to conceal, let us know the facts.

Further, since the trial judge himself declared that all 31 Namibians convicted under the Terrorism Act could have been tried for the same acts under common law, why does the South African Government not erase this act from the books or, at the very least, cease to apply it in Namibia?

The representative of South Africa will be aware of the timeliness and relevance of these questions, since the issue of torture of the 31 Namibians now on Robben Island, and the broader issue of intimidation of suspects and witnesses by the Special Branch, are currently matters of lively controversy in the press and elsewhere in South Africa. This controversy results from two recent events: the settlement out of court of the case of a 68-year-old Namibian detainee, Mr. Gabriel Mbindi, before there could be a public hearing of the facts relating to claims of brutality made by him and numerous defendants in the terrorism case, and the current trial of a distinguished South African newspaper editor, Mr. Laurence Gandar, on charges of violating the statutory secrecy surrounding South African prisons.

The General Assembly has also called upon South Africa not to apply to the international

² For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 15, 1968, p. 92, and Apr. 8, 1968, p. 474.

territory the so-called Self-Government for Native Nations of South West Africa Act of 1968. The response of the Government of South Africa has been to move from enactment to implementation. The allocation of over one-half the territory, including the farms, mines, and towns of the heartland, to the 16 percent of the population who are white—with the nonwhite majority consigned to less desirable and fractionalized units cut off from the sea and without hope of independent economic development—can only be interpreted as a denial of self-determination and a means of perpetuating white supremacy.

The South African Government has claimed that the provisions of this act were arrived at through consultations with the people of Namibia and therefore represent a valid form of self-determination. We should like to know: What was the nature of these consultations? What procedures and guarantees were provided against intimidation? Were various options offered for free choice among different plans for the political future of Namibia, or were those consulted merely asked to endorse the Odendaal report?

Unless such questions, already raised by the United States with South Africa, can be satisfactorily answered and the answers verified, we are obliged to maintain our view that this act represents not a valid form of self-determination but rather a complicated exercise in divide and rule, designed to entrench *apartheid* and to delay forever any possibility of true self-determination.

There are important relationships between the Self-Government for Native Nations Act and the Terrorism Act. Both involve violation of South Africa's international obligations, of the status of the territory, and of the rights of its inhabitants. Both reinforce the policy of maintaining white supremacy over the economic and political development of Namibia. Together, they seek to legalize the intimidation of free expression and association, to break the will and strength of the people of Namibia, and to deny them their rightful self-determination.

Even if the question of racial discrimination did not arise in Namibia, the attempt of South Africa to perpetuate its rule of an alien minority over an international territory and over a people increasingly aware of rights elsewhere held inviolable would be doomed to failure. But in Namibia we have not only the anachronism

of alien domination, we have the blind attempt to make over another country according to ideas of racial difference which all peoples, in this age, should have long since put behind themselves as the relics of a dark and shameful past.

Despite the walls of censorship and propaganda with which their own Government has surrounded them, the people of South Africa must soon realize that the system they are trying to entrench in Namibia will not work—that it will neither satisfy the wants and needs of the nonwhite population nor, by some conjuring trick, conveniently make them disappear.

In South Africa itself, especially within some parts of the religious, university, press, and legal communities, there is evidence of growing concern about the moral implications of a policy which separates thousands of men from their wives, families, and normal social ties and consigns large populations to poverty-stricken reserves without hope of economic development. It is increasingly evident that the effort to separate the races and yet keep a modern economy functioning cannot succeed and that the Government's plans for providing adequate employment in the so-called native homelands in South Africa are unworkable.

We must hope that the growing realization of the political bankruptcy and economic absurdity of the system the South African Government is attempting to entrench in Namibia will at last force a fundamental reappraisal of these policies and particularly of South Africa's attempt to enforce its own rule upon the international Territory of Namibia. Meanwhile, the Government and people of South Africa should understand that the international community will not surrender its responsibility for Namibia or be satisfied with unverified claims that the rights and well-being of the people of the territory are being protected.

The United States profoundly believes that no nation in this world can be impervious to the force of world opinion and to the trends of history—trends which are flowing today in the direction of true equality and the fullest realization of human rights. Nor can any nation long survive on policies which promote conflict, rather than peaceful reconciliation, both with other nations and among its own people.

We call upon South Africa today to recognize the right of the people of Namibia to meaningful self-determination. We call upon South

Africa to recognize the absurdities, the immoralities upon which its racial policies and its actions in Namibia are based. We call upon South Africa to correct these evils for the sake of the people of Namibia and, in the final analysis, for its own sake.

My Government has no higher purpose and no more sacred commitment than the achievement of full social justice for all of our citizens. As the world can see, we are in the midst of this difficult and historic process in which our Constitution, our courts, our laws, our leaders, and most important, our youth, are fully engaged. For us, so engaged, there is a deep concern for those who, unlike our own citizens, do not yet enjoy the most rudimentary rights upon which man's highest aspirations first depend. The course of social justice will prevail. What we do here can speed its triumph in Namibia.

STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 16

U.S./U.N. press release 260 dated December 16

The United States position on the issue of Namibia was set forth in detail before this Assembly on December 10. This morning we wish briefly to state our position on the resolution before us.

We shall abstain on the resolution.

When the Assembly undertook its debate on the future of Namibia in 1966, culminating in its major decision stated in Resolution 2145, the United States Representative at that time stated that the United States would do its utmost by all appropriate and peaceful means to help carry to fruition the aims of that resolution so that the people of Namibia would be enabled to exercise their right to self-determination.³ We continue to share that view and shall continue to join with others in seeking to formulate steps which can be practically implemented and which lie within the capacity of this organization.

We appreciate the effort made by the cosponsors in drafting the present resolution to make it more moderate in tone. We regret that we are unable to vote affirmatively on it. There are certain provisions within the resolution with which we agree. There are, on the other hand, other provisions which my delegation either did not support in previous resolutions or is unable to support in the present resolution because of the approach advocated.

I wish to reiterate on behalf of my Government that we remain determined to see the peo-

ple of Namibia achieve their just rights and determined also that the United Nations shall do its part in accordance with its decision of 1966 to see this matter through to a conclusion.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ⁴

Question of Namibia

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 and subsequent resolutions on this question,

Recalling further Security Council resolution 246 (1968) of 14 March 1968,⁵ in particular the last preambular paragraph in which the Council took cognizance of its special responsibility towards the people and Territory of Namibia,

Noting with appreciation the report of the United Nations Council for Namibia,⁶

1. *Reaffirms* the inalienable right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence in conformity with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the legitimacy of their struggle against the foreign occupation of their country;

2. *Reiterates* its condemnation of the Government of South Africa for its persistent defiance of the authority and resolutions of the United Nations, for its refusal to withdraw from Namibia and for its policy and actions designed to destroy the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia;

3. *Decides* to draw the attention of the Security Council to the serious situation which has arisen as a result of the illegal presence and actions of the Government of South Africa in Namibia;

4. *Recommends* the Security Council urgently to take all effective measures, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to ensure the immediate withdrawal of South African authorities from Namibia so as to enable Namibia to attain independence in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2145 (XXI);

5. *Commends* to the appropriate organs of the United Nations acting in conformity with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, for their consideration, the recommendations contained in the report of the United Nations Council for Namibia;

6. *Requests* the United Nations Council for Namibia to continue to discharge by every available means the responsibilities and functions entrusted to it;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide the necessary assistance and facilities to enable the United Nations Council for Namibia to perform its duties and functions.

³ For background and text of the resolution, see BULLETIN of Dec. 5, 1966, p. 870.

⁴ U.N. doc. A/RES/2403 (XXIII); adopted by the Assembly on Dec. 16 by a vote of 96 to 2, with 16 abstentions (U.S.).

⁵ For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 8, 1968, p. 477.

⁶ U.N. doc. A/7338 and Corr. 1.

Reports of the World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund

*Statement by Arthur E. Goldschmidt*¹

It was a happy decision to allow us to hear the annual reports of the Bank and the IMF in series and thus allow us to ponder the relationship between the two. Indeed, it is striking to note the mutually reinforcing functions of the two, particularly as they relate to support for the developing countries. The World Bank group has sustained its great record of performance during the past fiscal year. In view of the unusual problems and stresses of the past year, its success in making available more than \$1 billion of development finance—and most of that to developing countries—has been remarkable. But even more remarkable has been its spirit of dynamism in looking to the future.

My Government has also been heartened by the growing closeness of the Bank to the U.N. system; this can only be a source of added strength to U.N. institutions. For example, the Bank's cooperative arrangements with UNDP and the executing agencies have proven beneficial and will be more so in the future. The development financing provided by the Bank is integral to a wide range of technical assistance services and has become a builder of multilateral research, advice, and coordination that holds much promise for the future.

Mr. McNamara has very courageously and wisely, in my view, singled out for special attention the problems of population growth, food supply, and education.² As he noted: "In one poor country after another, the rising tide of population swamps the school system, literally eats away the margin of saving, and inundates the labor market. . . ."

We hope the help so badly needed in preparing projects in these and other fields will be accelerated. We welcome the plans outlined for significantly expanding the Bank's operations

and for devising new policies responsive to today's changing requirements.

We have been deeply disappointed over the unfortunate delay in replenishing the resources of the IDA. We are, however, confident that the wisdom of supporting that valuable institution will be recognized and that the necessary steps to implement the replenishment agreement will be taken at the earliest opportunity. I would particularly thank those countries that have been able to step into this breach so promptly and effectively and thus prevent the worst from happening. Despite these problems, it is noteworthy that in spite of the lower dollar amount of commitments in the last fiscal year, the IDA provided credits to more countries than it did in any other year. This more diversified sharing of its resources is a commendable policy.

On the other hand, the IFC reached a record level of commitments in fiscal year 1968, and the substantial share of IFC obligations is an encouraging development that demonstrates the growing confidence placed in the IFC by investors around the world.

One of the most important characteristics of the World Bank group has been its attentiveness to the need for coordination and mobilization of various sources of financial assistance. The IBRD and the IFC have been quite successful in channeling private capital into development through borrowings and participations. World Bank borrowing in recent months has shown that considerable sources of capital can still be tapped.

We urge the continuation of efforts to develop new techniques of multilateral cooperation aimed at broadening the base upon which capital is regularly raised and to develop more effective techniques for utilizing those resources. Through imagination, diligence, and the constant refinement of such cooperative ventures, we should be able to advance faster in helping to close the gap between needs and availabilities.

My Government has been much impressed by the vigorous new plans announced by Mr. McNamara and wishes especially to note the great potential usefulness to Development Decade II of the "grand assize," headed by Mr. Lester Pearson of Canada. We particularly approve the sound policy behind the complete freedom and independence granted to the grand assize, as it determines what has been good and what has been ineffective in past activities in support of development and what should be done in the future. This freedom from the territorial imper-

¹ Made in the U.N. Economic and Social Council on Dec. 5 (U.S./U.N. press release 230). Ambassador Goldschmidt is U.S. Representative to the Council.

NOTE: Key to abbreviations: IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank); IDA, International Development Association; IFC, International Finance Corporation; IMF, International Monetary Fund; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNDP, United Nations Development Program.

² Robert S. McNamara is President of the IBRD.

atives in the ecology of bureaucracy—or to put it more bluntly, from the precedents, the guidelines, the memoranda, and the other jealously guarded prerogatives of bureaucracy—will, I am sure, result in a report of great significance to our plans for Development Decade II.

In this connection, I cannot fail to comment on the speech made by Mr. McNamara to the Board of Governors of the World Bank on September 30 and on the remarks made by Mr. Woods to the UNCTAD meeting in New Delhi early in 1968.³ Both of these speeches, one marking a beginning and one an ending, were products of the thought of wise and statesmanlike men. Both speeches, which are well known to you, are remarkable for their wisdom, their unflinching realism, and the hope they express for the future. The World Bank group and the U.N. have been fortunate indeed to have, and to have had, men of the sagacity and depth of understanding of Mr. Woods and Mr. McNamara to guide them. It goes without saying that even men of the formidable talents of Mr. Woods and Mr. McNamara would find it difficult to be productive without extremely able associates like Mr. Burke Knapp.⁴

Turning to the IMF, my Government welcomes the reappointment of another wise and able man, Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, as Managing Director of the Fund. Mr. Schweitzer has provided calm, thoughtful, and extremely able leadership during this crucial and eventful period in the evolution of the international monetary system, an evolution which is continuing and which will call for all of his great talents to harness and guide it.

It is almost superfluous to note that this past year has been marked by the most violent strains the modern international monetary system has been subjected to in 30 years. My Government offers its wholehearted commendation to the Fund for its particularly vital contribution to the efforts at stabilization of the international monetary system during the past year. In this connection the extraordinarily large volume of new or renewed standby arrangements was especially valuable in assuring member nations of the availability of financing to meet temporary imbalances. In the absence of such assistance the substantial threats to the stability of the international monetary system during the past year could have proven even more

serious, with widely detrimental effects on industrial and developing nations alike.

We note the importance attached by the Fund report to the contribution of reserve creation as an essential element of progress toward international payments equilibrium and liberalization of current and capital transactions. The United States considers it a matter of high priority for both industrial and developing nations that ratification of the amendment to the articles of agreement to create a special drawing right facility be completed promptly by the necessary number of member countries. It is our desire to see this facility ratified by the end of this year if at all possible.

The Managing Director of the IMF very properly stresses the important bearing the SDR scheme has on the welfare of the developing countries. The developing countries will derive additional reserves from the new facilities and even more important for them, although less direct, will be the high level of economic activity the SDR will help insure in the developed countries. Here again, we see the activities of the IMF strengthening other programs underway in the less developed countries.

As another admirable example of a useful contribution to the strengthening of United Nations organizations, we note with gratification the continued growth of the Fund's technical assistance to members through the Fiscal Affairs Department, the Central Banking Service, and the IMF Institute. The expansion of the Fund's technical assistance facilities reflects the growing needs, particularly of newer member countries, for skilled and expert advice and training courses. The expansion of technical assistance facilities brings to bear the excellent resources and wide experience of the IMF on the linkage, which is sometimes unnoticed, between financial programing and development planning. The importance of this relationship needs no explanation here; the expertise of the IMF in helping to match the demand on resources with their availability, and thus reducing stress on the price level and balance of payments to within tolerable limits, can only be seen as of the most fundamental helpfulness to developing countries.

In closing, let me quote from President Johnson's remarks to the opening joint session of the Boards of Governors of the Fund and of the Bank.⁵ I am quoting the President's language,

³ George D. Woods was then President of the IBRD.

⁴ Mr. Knapp is Vice President of the IBRD.

⁵ BULLETIN of Oct. 28, 1968, p. 433.

in part because it sums up in lucid fashion what we must concern ourselves with here today and in part because it is a speech which did not receive the public notice it deserved.

“So in the world that started with Bretton Woods, the more we move out of phase with each other, the more we will each have to restrict ourselves. The more we move together, the more rapidly each of us will be able to advance the prosperity of our own people.

“The same principle holds in lending for international development. This is our common challenge, and it demands a common response. Development is not the responsibility of just a few countries, but of many. A multilateral approach can be a practical way to get at the job for countries providing assistance as well as for those receiving it.

“The institutions that we created at Bretton Woods and the cooperation that we built upon these institutions led to the highest sustained rate of economic growth in the history of the world. Total world income today is \$2.5 trillion.

“So by working closely together—in monetary policy, in economic policy, in development policy—we can realistically hope to increase world output by 5 percent a year over the next decade. This is what we averaged over the past 6 years.

“. . . this is the measure of the stakes that are involved in constructive relations: constructive relations among the industrial countries, between industrial and developing countries, among the developing countries themselves, and between East and West.

“Let us not fail to be wise.”

Calendar of International Conferences ¹

Scheduled January Through March

Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (to be resumed March 6, 1969).	Geneva	Mar. 14, 1962—
UNDP Governing Council: 7th Session	New York	Jan. 5-17
ECAFE Committee on Trade: 12th Session	Bangkok	Jan. 6-15
ILO Inter-American Advisory Committee	San Salvador	Jan. 13-23
ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 23d Session	Geneva	Jan. 13-31
IMCO Subcommittee on Radio Communications: 5th Session.	London	Jan. 14-17
Inter-American Housing Congress: 2d Session	Caracas	Jan. 18-26
IMCO Subcommittee on Subdivision and Stability: 9th Session.	London	Jan. 21-24
UNCTAD Trade and Development Board: 8th Session	Geneva	Jan. 21-Feb. 7
ECE Committee on Gas: 16th Session	Geneva	Jan. 27-30
FAO Study Group on Jute, Kenaf, and Allied Fibers	Rome	Jan. 27-30
ECOSOC Human Rights Commission: <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Periodic Reports.	New York	Jan. 27-31
WHO/FAO Codex Alimentarius Commission: 6th Meeting and Executive Committee Meetings.	Geneva	Jan. 27-Feb. 7
ECOSOC Commission on the Status of Women: 22d Session.	New York	Jan. 27-Feb. 12
IMCO Subcommittee on Bulk Cargoes: 8th Session	London	Jan. 28-31
International Coffee Council Executive Board	Abidjan	Jan. 31-Feb. 9
ICAO Panel on Study of the Economics of Route Facilities: 2d Session.	Montreal	January

¹This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on Dec. 13, 1968, lists international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period January-March 1969. The list does not include numerous nongovernmental conferences and meetings. Persons interested in those are referred to the *World List of Future International Meetings*, compiled by the Library of Congress and available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Following is a key to the abbreviations: CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNDP, United Nations Development Program; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization.

Calendar of International Conferences—Continued

Scheduled January Through March—Continued

UNESCO Universal Copyright Committee/Intergovernmental Copyright Committee.	Paris	January
WIO Executive Board: 43d Session and Standing Committee.	Geneva	January
GATT Committee on Trade in Industrial Products.	Geneva	January
Inter-American Technical Meeting on Urban Development .	Rio de Janeiro	January
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law: Special Committee To Review 1964 Convention.	Rome	January
International Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission: Committee Meetings on Regulatory Measures, Financial Matters, and Assessments.	London	January or February
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: 9th Meeting of Bureau and Consultative Council.	Woods Hole, Mass	Feb. 3-7
ECAFE Transport and Communications Committee: 17th Session.	Bangkok	Feb. 3-11
ECA Commission: 9th Session	Addis Ababa	Feb. 3-14
IMCO Subcommittee on Lifesaving Appliances	London	Feb. 4-7
NATO Science Committee	Brussels	Feb. 6-7
ECE Inland Transport Committee	Geneva	Feb. 10-13
ECE <i>Ad Hoc</i> Meeting on Air Pollution	Geneva	Feb. 10-14
OECD Ministerial Meeting	Paris	Feb. 13-14
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Customs Questions Concerning Containers.	Geneva	Feb. 17-21
ECAFE Committee on Industry and Natural Resources . . .	Bangkok	Feb. 17-24
UNCTAD Committee on Invisibles and Financing Related to Trade.	Geneva	Feb. 17-28
ECOSOC Commission for Social Development: 20th Session .	New York	Feb. 17-Mar. 5
ILO Governing Body: 174th Session	Geneva	Feb. 17-Mar. 7
ECOSOC Human Rights Commission: 25th Session	Geneva	Feb. 17-Mar. 14
ECE Preparatory Group of Experts on Environment	Geneva	Feb. 24-28
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 19th Session	London	Feb. 24-28
ECOSOC Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations . . .	New York	Feb. 24-28
International North Pacific Fur Seal Commission	Tokyo	Feb. 24-Mar. 1
Plenipotentiary Conference on Definitive Arrangements for the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium.	Washington	Feb. 24-Mar. 21
FAO Committee on Fisheries	Rome	February
IMCO Legal Committee: 3d Session of Working Group II. .	London	February
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: International Group for Scientific Coordination of the Cooperative Study in the Mediterranean.	Paris	February
International Coffee Organization Executive Board.	London	February
FAO Committee on Statistics of the Banana Study Group . .	Panama	February or March
U.N. Direct Broadcast Satellite Working Group	Geneva	February or March
FAO Codex Alimentarius Executive Committee on General Principles.	Geneva	Mar. 3-14
U.N. Commission on International Trade Law: 2d Session .	Geneva	Mar. 3-29
International Hydrographic Bureau: 2d Meeting of the Commission for the International Chart.	Monte Carlo	Mar. 10-11
CENTO Economic Committee: 17th Session	Ankara	Mar. 10-12
ECE Working Party on the Construction of Vehicles	Geneva	Mar. 17-21
International Coffee Council.	London	Mar. 17-21
International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: Joint Working Group on Selectivity and Analysis.	Moscow	Mar. 22-29
ECE Trade Development Committee: Working Group	Geneva	Mar. 24-28
ECE Working Party on Transport of Perishable Foodstuffs .	Geneva	Mar. 24-28
IMCO Subcommittee on Safety of Navigation: 7th Session .	London	Mar. 25-28
CENTO Military Committee: 20th Meeting	Washington	Mar. 27-28
Joint ECE/FAO Codex Alimentarius Group of Experts on the Standardization of Fruit Juices.	Geneva	Mar. 31-Apr. 3
ECOSOC Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development: 11th Session.	New York	Mar. 31-Apr. 12
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: 2d Meeting of the Working Group on an Integrated Global Oceanic Station System.	Paris	March

U.S. and Soviet Union Sign New Fisheries Agreement

The Department of State announced on December 13 (press release 277) that the United States and the Soviet Union had that day signed in Washington an agreement on fisheries off the Middle Atlantic coast of the United States. The agreement constitutes an extension and modification of a fisheries agreement which was originally concluded on November 25, 1967, in Moscow.¹ The new agreement affords greater protection to the four species of fish in the area which have been in decline and which traditionally have been of prime interest to American sports and commercial fishermen. At the same time it permits fishermen of both countries access to some underutilized commercial species also found in the area, especially herring.

After continued cooperative efforts by fisheries scientists of the two countries during the past year and further evaluation of numerous factors affecting the fisheries by experts from the two countries, it was concluded that the four species could be given greater protection by redefining a large portion of the area which is closed to fishing by large vessels. From January 1 to April 1, 1968, the closed zone extended over a rectangular area, of several thousand square miles, south of Long Island and Rhode Island. Under the new agreement, from January 1 to April 1 in 1969 and 1970 the closed area, which is outside U.S. jurisdiction, will be an elongated belt offshore from Rhode Island, Long Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia that encompasses the wintering grounds of scup, fluke, and red and silver hake.

The American delegation was led by Donald L. McKernan, Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife to the Secretary of State.² The Soviet delegation was led by First Deputy Minister of Fisheries V. M. Kamentsev. Experts and advisers from sports-fishing interests and the

commercial fishing industry in New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C., participated in the negotiations. Also participating were fisheries officials of the States of New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Maine, as well as officers of the Departments of State and Interior and the United States Coast Guard, and staff members of the Senate Commerce Committee and the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

Ambassador McKernan noted that the change in the area of the closed zone would especially benefit both the sports and commercial fishermen of the mid-Atlantic area. "The area to the south, off New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia, which will be newly closed to fishing by large vessels for 3 months each year is a particularly important wintering ground for the scup and fluke (summer flounder)," he said. "These species have never been available in large numbers, but recent natural causes as well as heavy fishing pressure have reduced their numbers substantially. Scientific evidence indicates that the red and silver hake situation is now improving, although the abundance of these two species of fish is still at a low level compared to the past."

Scientists attribute part of the reason for the decline in fish stocks in the Middle Atlantic region to a reduction in water temperature in the area, beginning in the late 1950's and continuing to the present time. This apparently has influenced the abundance of the warmer water species such as menhaden, scup, butterfish, and fluke. Colder water species have shown a general increase at the same time, including sea herring, mackerel, and yellowtail flounder.

Scientists using research vessels from the United States and the U.S.S.R. conducted joint surveys and research again this year from the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries biological laboratory at Woods Hole, Mass. Scientists from State fisheries departments of Virginia, New Jersey, New York, and Massachusetts also participated in this work. Both Ambassador McKernan and Minister Kamentsev noted the

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 6377.

² For names of other members of the U.S. delegation, see Department of State press release 277 dated Dec. 13.

importance of this cooperative scientific work to the successful conclusion of the improved agreement. During the meeting, plans were made for continuing and increasing this scientific collaboration.

Under the terms of the agreement, the large Soviet vessels fishing in the area will continue to restrict their catches of the four species to the 1967 level, which was considerably diminished from the 1966 catch. For example, the Soviet catch of red hake declined from 25,722 tons to 14,884 tons. Overall Soviet catch in the area declined from 131,075 tons to 47,086 tons. Preliminary data indicate that the 1968 Soviet red hake catch will be about 2,000 tons and the overall catch less than 50,000 tons. The Soviet catch of fluke, yellowtail, and other flounders, now specified for special protection in the new agreement, has been nil.

Noting the significant reduction in Soviet fishing effort on the high seas in the area, the United States agreed to permit the Soviet fishing fleet to continue to use two small areas within the United States contiguous fishing zone for loading purposes—off New Jersey September 15–May 15 and off Long Island November 15–May 15—and to permit the Soviets to fish in a small area off Long Island January 1–April 1. These areas are unchanged from the 1967 agreement.

The new agreement is for 2 years, January 1, 1969, through December 31, 1970, but modification of the agreement will be permitted after 1 year at the request of either country. The original agreement was for 1 year but was extended through December 31 to permit the negotiations to take place during December.

The current meeting was called for in the 1967 agreement and is one of a series that has taken place since Soviet fishing effort greatly increased off the Middle Atlantic coast several years ago. Previous meetings were held in Moscow, Boston, and Washington.

Ambassador McKernan noted at the conclusion of the meeting, which began December 4, that the new terms significantly increase the chances of recovery of the American fisheries in the mid-Atlantic area. In addition, the United States attempted to arrive at similar arrangements for the area south of Cape Cod, which is a part of the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) convention area. While such arrangements were not agreed upon, the United States will pursue the matter within ICNAF at the 1969 meeting.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, with annex. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284.
Acceptance deposited: Liechtenstein, December 13, 1968.

Disputes

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.
Ratification deposited: Republic of China, December 10, 1968.
Extension to: Bailiwick of Guernsey, December 10, 1968.

Judicial Procedure

Convention on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters. Done at The Hague November 15, 1965.
Ratification deposited: United Arab Republic, December 12, 1968.
Entry into force: February 10, 1969.

Load Lines

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331.
Acceptance deposited: Yugoslavia, October 25, 1968.
Accession deposited: Nigeria, November 14, 1968.

Safety at Sea

Amendments to the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London November 30, 1966.¹
Acceptance deposited: Yugoslavia, November 22, 1968.

BILATERAL

Ghana

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreements of March 3, 1967 (TIAS 6245), and January 3, 1968 (TIAS 6453). Signed at Accra December 10, 1968. Entered into force December 10, 1968.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement extending the agreement of November 25, 1967 (TIAS 6377), on certain fishery problems on the high seas in the western areas of the middle Atlantic Ocean. Effected by exchange of notes at Moscow October 9 and December 3, 1968. Entered into force December 3, 1968.

Agreement modifying and extending the agreement of November 25, 1967 (TIAS 6377), on certain fishery problems on the high seas in the western areas of the middle Atlantic Ocean. Signed at Washington December 13, 1968. Enters into force January 1, 1969.

¹ Not in force.

INDEX *January 6, 1969 Vol. LX, No. 15/1*

Asia. Limits and Responsibilities of American Power (Rostow) 4

Developing Countries. Limits and Responsibilities of American Power (Rostow) 4

Economic Affairs

Reports of the World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund (Goldschmidt) . . . 15

U.S. and Soviet Union Sign New Fisheries Agreement 19

Europe. Limits and Responsibilities of American Power (Rostow) 4

International Organizations and Conferences

Calendar of International Conferences 17

Reports of the World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund (Goldschmidt) . . . 15

Korea. Crew of U.S.S. *Pueblo* Released at Panmunjom; U.S. Position on Facts Unchanged (Johnson, Rusk, Woodward) 1

Latin America. Limits and Responsibilities of American Power (Rostow) 4

Military Affairs. Crew of U.S.S. *Pueblo* Released at Panmunjom; U.S. Position on Facts Unchanged (Johnson, Rusk, Woodward) 1

Namibia. United States Calls Upon South Africa To Recognize Right of People of Namibia to Self-Determination (Denny, text of resolution) 11

Nigeria. President Johnson Joins Appeal for Holiday Truce in Nigeria (Johnson) 3

Presidential Documents

Crew of U.S.S. *Pueblo* Released at Panmunjom; U.S. Position on Facts Unchanged 1

The Lighting of the Nation's Christmas Tree 3

President Johnson Joins Appeal for Holiday Truce in Nigeria 3

South Africa

U.N. General Assembly Rejects Move To Bar South Africa From Membership in UNCTAD (Goldschmidt, Wiggins) 8

United States Calls Upon South Africa To Recognize Right of People of Namibia to Self-Determination (Denny, text of resolution) . . . 11

Treaty Information

Current Actions 20

U.S. and Soviet Union Sign New Fisheries Agreement 19

U.S.S.R.

Limits and Responsibilities of American Power (Rostow) 4

U.S. and Soviet Union Sign New Fisheries Agreement 19

United Nations

Reports of the World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund (Goldschmidt) . . . 15

U.N. General Assembly Rejects Move To Bar South Africa From Membership in UNCTAD (Goldschmidt, Wiggins) 8

United States Calls Upon South Africa To Recognize Right of People of Namibia to Self-Determination (Denny, text of resolution) . . . 11

Viet-Nam. Limits and Responsibilities of American Power (Rostow) 4

Name Index

Denny, Brewster C 11

Goldschmidt, Arthur E 8, 15

Johnson, President 1, 3

Rostow, W. W 4

Rusk, Secretary 1

Wiggins, James Russell 8

Woodward, Maj. Gen. Gilbert H 1

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: December 16-22

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to December 16 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 277 of December 13.

No.	Date	Subject
†279	12/20	U.S.-Greece air transport agreement modified.
280	12/22	Statement by Department spokesman on release of crew of U.S.S. <i>Pueblo</i> .
281	12/22	Rusk: release of crew of U.S.S. <i>Pueblo</i> .

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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January 13, 1969

UNITED STATES AND MEXICO REAFFIRM BONDS OF FRIENDSHIP

Remarks by President Johnson and President Diaz Ordaz of Mexico 21

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN FOREIGN POLICY

by Assistant Secretary Sisco 27

U.N. CALLS UPON UNCURK TO CONTINUE PURSUIT
OF U.N. OBJECTIVES IN KOREA

U.S. Statements and Text of Resolution 32

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE **BULLETIN**

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January 13, 1969

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

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United States and Mexico Reaffirm Bonds of Friendship

President Johnson and President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz met at the U.S.-Mexican border on December 13 for a ceremony marking the opening of the President Adolfo López Mateos Channel, which forms the international boundary between the two countries. Following are remarks exchanged by the two Presidents at the ceremony, held on the Paso del Norte Bridge between El Paso, Tex., and Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, together with their exchange of toasts at a luncheon at the Paso del Norte Hotel in El Paso after the ceremony.

CEREMONY AT U.S.-MEXICAN BORDER

President Johnson

White House press release dated December 13

About a year ago, two signatures were placed on a declaration in Spanish and English in the City of Juárez.¹

The international boundary between Mexico and the United States was changed. It was changed without a shot being fired, without the massing of troops on frontiers, without an exchange of threats through respective embassies.

The course of a historic river was to be permanently altered.

The Chamizal, symbol of contention for more than 100 years, was returned to Mexico. It was no small accomplishment.

Credit for it must go to hundreds of dedicated Mexicans and Americans who labored long for many years to achieve it.

It must go particularly to President Adolfo López Mateos, with whom I first discussed this project as far back as 1958 and after whom the new Rio Grande channel is deservedly named—and for whose improved health we all pray—and to the farsighted and the beloved late President, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, who gave a new urgency to the settlement of this old dispute.

These men were determined to seek justice for both of their countries. They believed that nations, like men, must not be trapped by the ideologies or the events of the past.

They had the courage to believe that there are few problems between reasonable nations which cannot be solved, no matter how complicated, no matter how emotional or sanctified by age.

So for 4 long years now, I have worked with my dear friend, and the friend of all of the citizens of my country, the most distinguished President of Mexico, Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, to complete the Chamizal story.

We believe that we have worked out together a fair and a just solution, and we have worked it out in peace.

“Respect for the rights of others is peace,” said Benito Juárez. Peace is also sharing the burdens of hemispheric leadership. Peace is mutual respect for the unique national and cultural identity of other peoples.

I told my daughter only yesterday that my wish for my grandson was that he would learn to speak Spanish as he learned to speak English. And I believe he understands a little more Spanish today than he does English.

Peace is the free commerce of men and ideas and goods across borders.

The finest thing I know to say about both countries, and both Presidents, and both peoples is that as we sit here today we have no armies patrolling our borders. We have confidence in each other, and we have peace with one another.

Peace is the active development of physical resources and human potential. The International Boundary and Water Commission has shown us in concrete terms how peace and understanding can bring about economic, social, and educational development.

The magnificent works along this river are eloquent testimony to the Commission's success.

Land has been redeveloped.

New bridges have been built, including the impressive structure on which we gather here today.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 20, 1967, p. 684.

An unpredictable river has been converted into a controlled source of water—water for irrigation, water for electric power, water for recreation—for Mexicans and Americans alike.

To insure that the movement of men and ideas and goods will continue between our two countries in the border areas, President Diaz Ordaz and I agreed to create the United States–Mexico Commission for Border Development and Friendship 2 years ago during my happy visit to your capital, Mexico City.²

Long after our words of today are gone and forgotten, something more important is going to endure: channels between men, bridges between cultures, border commissions which link the human values that Mexico and America hold dear. These, my friends, will never pass away if we are true to our heritage.

Together we have shown that borders between nations are not just lines across which men shake their fists in anger. They are also lines across which men may clasp hands in common purpose and friendship; and throughout our periods of respective service, no head of state, no leader of any nation has worked closer, cooperated better, or extended the hand of friendship more than the most distinguished President of Mexico, and we are all grateful for it.

In the years to come, Mr. President, the American people are going to demonstrate to you and your people that we are worthy of your trust and your confidence and we are going to return the hand of friendship that you have extended all the time to us.

Gracias, amigos.

President Diaz Ordaz

Translation

President and Mrs. Johnson, I wish to extend, in the name of the people of Mexico, a cordial greeting to the people of the United States and to reiterate the warm and increasingly deep friendship that unites our peoples and our countries.

I also wish to tell you, President and Mrs. Johnson, that the hand of friendship extended a little over 4 years ago at your Texas ranch was the hand of friendship of a Mexican man and woman who consider loyalty above all else when they offer their friendship. Again we meet at a place that was, as you have just said, Mr. President, a symbol of dispute, and which is

now a symbol of understanding and friendship. For that change to come about, it was necessary, as you said, for many men from our two countries to work actively with a broad vision of the future and a profound knowledge of our two peoples in settling that longstanding dispute and converting it into an abiding symbol of peaceful solutions.

President Benito Juárez lived in one of the most dangerous, most difficult periods in Mexican history, when a very small part of Mexican territory had been removed by changes in the channel of the Rio Grande; as a result, steps were taken to file a claim to have that land duly returned to us.

After many efforts to no avail, the voice of Lyndon Baines Johnson was raised in the United States Senate approximately 14 years ago, asking that the solution of the Chamizal problem, a thorn in the relations between Mexico and the United States, be accelerated.

A few years later, in Mexico City, during the visit of President John F. Kennedy to our country, Adolfo López Mateos again brought up the matter, and the two men resolved to recommend to their associates that an immediate effort be undertaken to find a solution to the problem.³

And later, President Johnson and I discussed the final points in order that we might come to today's ceremony.

The boundary was changed without irritating words in embassies, without threats or troop movements, as you stated, Mr. President, because the work of many men had been effective, and those men had not thought of annoying words or offensive actions; rather they had applied a much more effective means of action, that is, law.

As soon as man began to live in society, he invented a system of rules of general conduct for the benefit of all, which have demonstrated throughout history that they are capable, by their moral power and at times by the coercive force of the penalties they establish, of solving disputes among men in the best possible manner. These rules are called law.

We all know this, but from time to time we endeavor to set aside these rules of conduct that lead to peaceful, fruitful solutions and apply other means that, quite naturally, produce results that are akin to the means used.

The use of law to solve the problem of the Chamizal is also producing fruitful results. The

² For text of a joint statement issued at Mexico City on Apr. 15, 1966, see BULLETIN of May 9, 1966, p. 731.

³ For a joint communique issued at Mexico City on June 30, 1962, see BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 135.

construction of the imposing Amistad Dam to make these waters, which previously were only a source of problems for the two nations and the people living along the banks of the river, produce electric power and render the land they irrigate fertile.

The first months of 1969 will see the completion of the work we are doing also on the course of the Rio Grande at a place called El Morrillo to solve a problem of salinity that Mexican waters were causing in United States lands.

As the bed of this river was nearly ruined during the disaster at the end of 1967, another piece of Mexican territory was detached and formed the bank known as Los Indios. With the application of the same principles that had been applied to solve the Chamizal problem, this land was returned to us immediately; thus, we did not have to wait another 100 years.

I hope that in a few months we shall be able to conclude a bilateral agreement to solve, with similar legal treatment, the problem which sometimes arises and which is much like the problem of the banks that form in the river; that is to say, the islands that this river leaves in changing its course.

When disputes are solved by law, not only does the solution bring peace of mind to those involved in the dispute but also one of the finest manifestations of human relations: friendship.

You gave us an example of that friendship a little more than a year ago, Mr. President, when you were good enough to accept the suggestion that the new course of the Rio Grande determined by the agreement putting an end to the Chamizal problem should bear the name of an illustrious Mexican President, Adolfo López Mateos.

Many places in the United States still bear the Spanish names given them long ago, but since October 28 of last year, a small strip of territory in your country—that is, the part of the river bed that lies north of the boundary—has borne the name of that distinguished Mexican. And for us, it will always be a symbol of friendly cooperation that you decided to give this name to the new part of the bed of the Rio Grande, and we shall always be grateful for it.

Mr. President, we seem to be in competition. Just as your grandson is learning to speak Spanish, my grandson is learning to speak English.

I speak very bad English—only a few words and with terrible pronunciation. And when he hears me say something in English, he immedi-

ately corrects me, because his pronunciation is very good.

A little more than a year ago, Mr. President, in this same area, we vowed to make every effort in our power not to hamper but rather to improve the friendship of our peoples.

I should like to invite you to join with me in renewing that pledge in order that we may continue doing everything possible so that men, women, children, and old people on both sides of this new riverbed may always live in increasingly cordial friendship; and so that when the children of today, the grandchildren of millions of Americans and Mexicans, our grandchildren, are grown and assume responsibility for their countries, they may come together anywhere on our common border to speak in friendship and make plans for the benefit of all.

My closing words are to renew the friendly wishes of the Mexican people for the American people, for the great and noble people of the United States, and to repeat to you, President and Mrs. Johnson, that the hand of friendship extended to you on the LBJ Ranch in Texas a little over 4 years ago was offered not only to the President of the United States but also to the man, Lyndon Baines Johnson, and the woman, Claudia Alta Taylor Johnson.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS

President Johnson

White House press release dated December 13

This is probably the last time that I shall meet you as President of the United States. But it will not be our last visit together. For my friendships in Texas and my career in public life have been linked with Mexico and its citizens and its leaders. You and your countrymen hold a very special place in my heart.

Almost 40 years ago I taught in a little school at Cotulla, where many of the students were Americans of Mexican heritage. I learned a good many lessons in life from these students. I learned that differences in language and culture and where you were born were not important if you had the same dreams of promise and fulfillment.

In the past 4 years I have learned even more about Mexico—its proud and energetic and talented people. We have been blessed by a very close personal and professional relationship with a farsighted leader, President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz.

Because of our friendship and our common trust, a number of problems between Mexico and the United States have already been resolved.

When I look at President Diaz Ordaz, when I consider the closeness of our families, when I look at all our friends at these tables, I am reminded of the priceless advantage that the United States has in sharing a 2,000-mile unfortified border with a hospitable, stable, and staunchly independent Mexico.

Mexico and the United States are linked by a common border.

We are linked by a personal philosophy of individual freedom and worth.

We are linked by the ideals of both the Mexican and the American Revolutions.

And we are linked more and more by common projects.

In 1958, when I met with former President López Mateos prior to his inauguration, at his request, in Mexico—whose restored good health we never cease hoping for—we discussed a number of very important matters that we hoped Mexico and the United States someday could undertake together.

We agreed that a concentrated attack ought to be made on the persistent problem of the screw-worm, with its damaging effects on livestock in Mexico and in the American Southwest. Well, enormous progress has been made during the last 10 years in our two countries' common efforts to eradicate that cattle disease. The battle is not yet won totally, but I hope in my day to see that parasite completely eliminated from both nations. And I am going to continue my strong personal interest in this problem, which afflicts both Mexico and the United States.

We discussed ways to increase substantially the exchange between our two nations—the exchange of our legislators, of our students, of our teachers, of our professors—and visits of people between our two countries. That hope was fulfilled beyond our expectations, as both private and Government exchange programs between our two nations have reached new dimensions.

Our distinguished majority leader has been present at these discussions, as have other members of the Senate and House; and Senator Mansfield, a great leader of the United States, has been present at eight meetings of our Congressmen of the two Republics.

We planned for the building of dams on our

rivers and controlling the great water resources which we share as neighboring countries.

That, too, will have come to pass with the completion of the great dams, such as Amistad and Falcon.

And we spoke of the Chamizal. We expressed our earnest hopes that one day that age-old problem would be resolved by sitting down together and working out a just solution that would be beneficial to both Mexico and the United States. And that, too, has happened.

Along the Rio Grande this morning we saw the new channel that is named for the illustrious former President, López Mateos, which now fixes the course of that historic river; and land which was once disputed is returned to the jurisdiction of Mexico.

A century-old dispute has been ended, but the common projects which involve men and minds and rivers and dams must never be ended.

In the reaches of space, Mexico helps to track the orbits of America's Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo space missions. Millions of tourists cross our borders both ways each year. The strength of your peso adds to the stability of our dollar. And together we fight crop disease and animal plague. Each year trade between our two nations continues to grow.

We must continue to seek out new projects which require the cooperation between our two energetic and growing nations. For in such cooperation lies the key to a new era of development for all of us.

I said this morning that a border need not be a line across which people shake their fists. It can be, instead, a line across which men may clasp their hands in common purpose and friendship.

I am delighted to say today that President Diaz Ordaz and I have tried very, very hard, and I think somewhat successfully, to do just that for 4 years.

We have tried to be, and I think we have been, good neighbors for each other. We have allied ourselves for progress. We have helped and supported each other in every way we knew how, whenever we knew what the need was.

Now, conscious of the rich contributions of each country to the well-being of the other country, I ask all of you to rise and join me in toasting His Excellency, our great friend, the President of the Republic of Mexico, Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, his lovely wife, his family, and most of all, the beloved Mexican people.

Mr. President and Lady Bird—which, I think, as an old friend, I may be permitted to call you—ladies and gentlemen:

A little over 4 years ago, just after the elections in Mexico, I received an invitation from President Johnson, not to attend a cold formal ceremony but to enjoy for 2 days the warmth of his home and his cordial friendship.⁴ Afterward we met at the border between our two countries to inspect the work on the Amistad Dam being built over the Rio Grande.⁵ There also, as at your ranch, I had the opportunity to talk to you, to analyze and study various problems and questions of concern to our two countries, and to plan solutions to many of them, which, fortunately, we have been able to carry out gradually in the course of the years.

In a very different atmosphere we again met at Punta del Este, Uruguay, to combine our efforts with those of the other Presidents of the American Republics to accelerate the development of our countries and bring prosperity to our peoples as soon as possible.

A little later, in October of last year, I had the great privilege and honor of enjoying once more the hospitality of President and Mrs. Johnson and the American people in Washington, where I had an unusually cordial and friendly contact with the United States Congress and with many of its Members.⁶ That trip culminated at El Chamizal, when the distinguished President of the United States actually turned over the land known as El Chamizal, which had been a source of friction between us for so many years.

A year ago, nature was not very kind to this region of our two countries. During the ceremony there was a wind of almost hurricane force, which made me think that if that piece of our country had once been taken away by the Rio Grande when its waters rose, perhaps now that it was being returned to us we might not have it very long, because, to use the title of the motion picture, it might be "gone with the wind" and thus be brought back to this side.

And now we are here in this place again, not to discuss problems or plan joint solutions but to renew vows of friendship and common efforts

and to express, in another personal meeting, our now longstanding friendship.

Now nature has been kind and has given us a lovely day. President Johnson very generously told me that the good weather had come from Mexico. And I, applying the basic principles of Mexican policy of equitable treatment of all peoples, told him that the United States brought half and we Mexicans contributed the other half.

Perhaps this enumeration of the meetings the Presidents of these two nations have had has seemed rather long to you, but I wished to remind you of them at this time and publicly to thank this extraordinary President of the United States for the spirit of understanding and friendship with which he has always listened to our problems and the way in which he has always seen, in each of our meetings, the possibility of friendly, peaceful, and constructive solutions.

I wanted to do this, not only in my name and that of Mrs. Diaz Ordaz but also in the name of my entire people, because the questions we discussed were not matters of concern to Mrs. Diaz Ordaz and me personally; the matters that we were seeking to solve—some of which we have solved—affected the Mexican people, some of them very deeply.

In this connection, I have purposely left to the last a mention of the opportunity I had to talk to President Johnson in our capital, when he did us the honor of visiting us, because, in addition to the conversations, he had occasion to see, to feel, to witness, the enthusiasm of the Mexican people who filled the streets and avenues to overflowing to shake hands with the President of the United States.

The public usually thinks that these conversations are easy and simple, but that is not true. President Johnson is responsible for looking out for the interests of his country and his fellow countrymen. And it is my patriotic mission to look out for everything relating to Mexico to the best of my ability. Sometimes our viewpoints and our interests are conflicting, and it is very difficult to overcome the obstacles, but that is precisely where the challenge lies; that is, to use our imagination and to find formulas that, while allowing us to defend our own interests, with courage, enable us to find solutions that can satisfy both sides. My friend President Johnson and I have been able, by applying our most earnest efforts and good will, to achieve a great deal.

⁴ For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 7, 1964, p. 805.

⁵ For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 2, 1967, p. 12.

⁶ For background, see BULLETIN of Nov. 20, 1967, p. 673.

And so thank you, Mr. President, for the effort you have made, for your patience in listening to me, for your good will, the actions you have taken which have enabled us, without betraying—which neither of us would have done—the flag entrusted to each of us—that permitted us, I repeat, in many cases to find suitable solutions to common problems or problems which appeared to be diametrically opposed to each other and which, when all was said and done, turned out to be beneficial to both peoples.

Thanks also for the extraordinary attention you have devoted, first to setting up and later to the operation and development of that body, which may prove to be a pilot organization, known as the United States-Mexico Commission for Border Development and Friendship, an organization in which we have placed high hopes, from which we are beginning to reap the first fruits, and which we hope will have a long and productive life and will bring a closer spiritual relationship between the people living on our long border, making them cordial channels of communication between our citizens.

You have crossed the border several times to visit our country, always on business and with official commitments. We now very cordially repeat the invitation that you visit us for pleasure. You will not be received with the ceremony that the high office you have held requires, but with the same cordial hospitality by the Mexicans in general and by my wife and myself, your friends.

As a memento of that visit you made to Mexico City, there is in one of its beautiful parks a magnificent statue of one of the most representative figures of the people of the United States, Abraham Lincoln. We have tried to reciprocate that friendly gesture by giving the city of Washington a statue of the great Mexican President, Benito Juárez.

That statue, soon to be unveiled, was selected with deep affection, and a copy made of an old original statue of President Juárez, which is on

the top of Cerro del Portín in the capital of the State of Oaxaca, his native State. We wanted it to have the value added by time and we wanted it to come precisely from his native land. This hero of the Americas is seen—with his classic features of a Zapotec Indian—the penetrating look of one who sees into the future—his feet firmly planted on the soil of Oaxaca, so firmly that they appear to be roots deeply penetrating that soil—his left hand resting on a book containing the Reform Laws, a key body of laws in our history—wearing a Spanish-style cape, tied in front, on top of his coat—the right hand raised, the index finger pointing toward the infinite, indicating surely how Mexico extracts from its roots the rich sources that give it life and that will nourish a constant desire to strive for the progress and well-being of its people.

It is our hope that this statue may symbolize in Washington the presence of the independent Mexican, who defends his rights, but in conformity with the Juárez doctrine of respect for the rights of others; who is prepared to contribute his effort to joint labors that can redound to the common benefit of the two peoples; and who upholds, along with the fundamental principles of his people, two standards which Juárez defended unceasingly as long as he lived—that of Mexico and that of democracy.

I shall close, because I am becoming an egotist. The definition of an egotist is one who talks so much about himself that he does not let me talk about myself. And I have been talking—as was logical and natural—about those who have not acted for themselves, but to carry out important, sacred duties of their peoples; that is, the Presidents of our two countries.

I wish to express my fervent, sincere wishes for the prosperity, freedom, and peace of the people of the United States and for the personal happiness of President Johnson and Lady Bird Johnson.

Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy

by Joseph J. Sisco

*Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*¹

These are days of transition in Washington. They afford an opportunity to examine our policies anew—to undertake a searching scrutiny at a time when a new President is about to assume office and the country's mood is one of unrest and of questioning over some of our key policies: Viet-Nam, the U.N., foreign aid, and our security commitments abroad.

A new administration takes over about noon on January 20. On that day the fighting in Viet-Nam which may have occurred in the morning while the present administration was still in office will likely be extended into the afternoon after the new administration has taken over. If there is a flareup in the Middle East that morning, the new administration will be required to consider what action to take in the U.N. or elsewhere before the sun sets.

A new administration will have to balance continuity and change. It will have new opportunities. It can start afresh, less bound to the past. At the same time, it will face the stark realities of the present. There are constants of geography and power to which any administration must be responsive. There are certain responsibilities that it cannot shirk. Secretary Rusk's successor will have to take into account that in the nuclear age awesome American power may tend to limit rather than give greater freedom of action. No successor can ignore problems which exist in the Middle East, in Europe, in Africa, or in other critical areas of the world. That is, no President or Secretary of State can do so unless there should be a radical shift toward isolationism. I doubt whether any but a small minority of Americans would favor becoming dropouts in world affairs.

I am glad to see in this audience a number of young people. In the final analysis, all of us, whatever our age and outlook, will bear the consequences of the decisions which lie ahead. In

particular, the youth of our country will soon become directly involved in the policymaking process, some as public officials but many more as citizen participants. It is understandable, therefore, that our young should want "a piece of the action" in influencing decisions.

So I want to talk about transition in foreign policy, about continuity and change, in terms of the need for communication between the young and their parents in what I should like to call an attitude of reciprocal responsibility between the generations.

No one can deny that a mood of disaffection and of deep skepticism exists in the country today, above all, among the young. Institutions and policies in both the domestic and foreign fields are being questioned.

Partly this is because, as a recent report of the White House Fellows said, there are marked disparities between our expectations from our institutions—including the State Department—and the capacity of these institutions to deliver. Partly it is because of a feeling that in this complex world the United States can no longer—if it ever could—singlehandedly assure the avoidance of war. Others possess the power to annihilate, and there is great risk that still others will develop the capacity. This is a reality which all of us, young and old, must live with and face squarely.

The particular anguish of the young is understandable. However, we will get nowhere by the politics of confrontation between the generations, by the belief that institutions and policies cannot be changed by working within the system. Any constructive discussion of foreign

¹ Address made on Dec. 11 at San Diego, Calif., before a regional foreign policy conference cosponsored by the Department of State and the World Affairs Council of San Diego (press release 275 dated Dec. 10).

policy must assume that young and old alike share certain goals, certain underlying basic interests in peace and the welfare of the nation.

Assumptions for Responsible Policy

If we are to talk with each other and not past each other about foreign policy, there are assumptions—or truisms if you prefer—that the dissenters and the “establishment” alike need to accept.

First, there can be no doubt that American democracy and freedom, admittedly imperfect, are worth cherishing and protecting, and that this is the underlying purpose of our foreign policy. Some of the dissenting young may believe that there is not much to choose between freedom in our open society and that of the closed Communist societies—but the youth of Prague, the Jewish minorities of Poland, and the intellectuals of the Soviet Union know better.

In this connection, a responsible policymaker must accept the underlying idea of national interest and national well-being, in the broad and not the narrow chauvinistic sense, as the legitimate base of action. For the President has the responsibility for all the people of the country, and, indeed, his decisions may affect all mankind.

Second, there must be mutual respect on both sides of the generation gap. My generation may have been guilty of disparaging some of our youth, mistaking unconventional hairdos and style of dress for lack of seriousness and immaturity. But the error is not all on one side. Those of our young who reflect unreasoning distrust must shed it and discard the idea that policy is made by evil old men. As Canada's Prime Minister Trudeau remarked in a press interview recently:

What I would like young people to understand—that perhaps our answers are not right as regards Viet-Nam, or Biafra, or NATO . . . but we are not evil men trying to force a diabolical solution upon them. We are men who are coming up with answers as best we can, and if they have better answers, I would like to know what they are.

My generation has a responsibility to take youth seriously. They have the right to question since they will live with the answers. The young are right in saying that policy, to be effective, must involve the people and must include the right to challenge assumptions. It is not surprising that they feel policy must be open to review and that events should be looked at from

perspectives other than that of the establishment. As the drama critic of the New York Times noted in reviewing the Broadway play “Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead,” the mousetrap looks different from the other side of the cheese.

On the other hand, the young have a responsibility not to advance moral posturing and generalities as substitutes for policy. Foreign policy issues and decisions rarely present themselves as generalities. Nor do they always offer identifiable choices between moral and immoral courses of action. The next administration and the next generation will face specific problems and specific crises, as did the last and the one before it. These will often pose hard choices. The specific case will not be solved by presenting alternatives so general as nationalism versus internationalism or bilateral versus multilateral.

It is with some of the specifics which will face the new administration that I now wish to deal briefly. These concern the broad range of our interests: how we meet world crises and build a peaceful and humane order on this planet at a time when perforce we will also be heavily engaged putting our own house in order.

Viet-Nam and the Middle East

First and foremost is the need to bring an end to the war in Viet-Nam on the basis of a reasonable and honorable settlement. Any Viet-Nam solution must be approached in the perspective of our overall foreign policy. For apart from the sacrifices in lives and national wealth, there are broad concerns over what should be the proper and responsible role of the United States in the world. Particularly, the American people want to make sure that our power and responsibility overseas are exercised properly to accomplish basic American purposes. And they want to make sure that other nations pull their weight and share the responsibilities of collective security and building the peace.

Second in the scale of priorities is the Middle East. We face an increasingly serious and deteriorating situation there, as is evidenced by the continuing outbreaks of violence and hostilities over the past days and weeks. These incidents are the latest reminders that the divisions and distrust between the Arabs and Israelis remain deeply embedded. The situation has become more complicated also because the Soviet Union, whatever its statements about

peace, is seeking ways to expand its influence in the area. We noted a recent *Pravda* article which referred to the need for a political solution. What we are looking for is concrete evidence that the Soviets are exerting their influence toward peace in the Middle East. Progress toward peace is unlikely as long as the U.S.S.R. continues to blame one side, beams propaganda epithets to the area against the so-called "imperialists," rejects offers to talk seriously about arms limitations in the area, and refuses to cooperate with Security Council efforts to deal effectively with cease-fire violations.

While the question of peace rests primarily with the parties, your Government has worked long and hard in support of the efforts of U.N. Representative Gunnar Jarring, who was mandated by the U.N. Security Council to try to promote agreement on a just and lasting peace. There can be no flagging of efforts to reverse the spiral of violence and counterviolence and to promote the live-and-let-live attitude which is a precondition for a stable and agreed regime of peace.

Third, there is need to regain the momentum of negotiations to moderate the arms race, as quickly as the international climate permits. Negotiating in good faith on effective measures for an early limitation of the nuclear arms race is an urgent item on the agenda. In the absence of any agreement, the nuclear arms race in offensive and defensive missile systems could escalate to new levels. Any unnecessary diversion of resources from peaceful pursuits with no real increase in security could be a tragic development for all.

Fresh Look at the United Nations

Fourth, there is need for a fresh look at the role of the U.N. in today's world—a world very different from that in which the U.N. started in 1945. Since then, the U.N. has helped promote our national interest and the cause of peace. It has now grown from a Western-oriented institution of 51 countries to a body of 126 nations, three-quarters of which are poor and more than half of which are new countries from Africa and Asia. We need to review the capacities and limitations of the modern United Nations and find practical ways to strengthen it as a world forum and site for negotiation, as a place where peaceful settlement of disputes can be promoted, as a place for action in peacekeeping, as a place for action in the field of economic and social de-

velopment, as a place for developing constructive actions in disarmament, peaceful uses of outer space, the deep seabeds, and the control of the human environment.

The stark fact is that with the expansion of U.N. membership our influence in the organization has been diluted. We face a discrepancy between power and responsibility. Formal voting power in various organs of the United Nations has shifted to the new, impecunious nations. Too many unrealistic resolutions adopted by the General Assembly have weakened the influence of that body. And there is increasing need for restraint on rising costs and for insuring sound budgetary and administrative practices.

In the Assembly the new majority—understandably impatient at slow progress on matters it considers vital, especially colonialism and racial discrimination—too often tries an end run around rules and procedures, claiming that "moral" issues take precedence over legal methods. There is a current illustration. Last week a main committee of the General Assembly adopted a resolution which would deprive a member, in this case South Africa, of its right to participate in the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development because of its racial policies. The U.S. strongly opposes the policy of *apartheid*. But the remedy does not lie in disregarding due process at the U.N. Such action is legally unsound, politically unrealistic, and irresponsible.

If the U.N. is to respond more effectively to the real needs of nations, the abuse of procedures must be checked. Impatience with due process and the consequent impairment of established U.N. procedures could threaten the effective functioning of international organizations.

Fifth, through the U.N. and in other ways, we need to take a new look at how the political and security crises resulting from local conflicts can be contained and alleviated collectively and insulated from big-power confrontation. The U.N. has had valuable experience in damping down conflict in such places as Cyprus and the Middle East. It has demonstrated a capacity—still limited and rudimentary—to take emergency action to halt fighting, to keep outbreaks of violence in check, and to spur peaceful settlement. The U.N. has been able to act in certain instances where the major powers held similar views that local conflict must not spread to involve them directly.

We may be entering a period of more rather than fewer local conflicts. There are increasing constraints on unilateral involvement by the

major powers in such conflicts. Yet no nation can be safe or responsible in a world of increasing disorder without provision for reliable and effective peacekeepers.

That is why there is need to explore all the avenues to collective security which the U.N. Charter provides, including the arrangements it contemplates for agreements to provide forces to the Security Council.

In fact, in recent years, the U.N.'s peacekeeping activities have increasingly reflected a limited parallelism of interest among the major powers. It may be that new paths to collective security can be opened up in this direction, through regional arrangements as well as in the U.N.

Benefits and Perils of Technology

Finally, there lies ahead the task of adjusting to the consequences of new technologies. All nations can be the beneficiaries of the technological changes our scientists and engineers are producing. These changes can help to improve the lives of more people around the globe in a shorter time than any utopians ever dreamed would be possible.

At the same time, the promise of the new technology is accompanied by new perils. We are beginning to recognize that our increasingly voracious demands on the human environment and our increasing powers of destruction bring with them threats to health, life, and psychic stability. We must find ways to deal with pollution, threats to air safety, jet-borne epidemics, soil depletion, noise, and other nuisances. We must prevent nuclear accidents, excessive population increase, and the ever-present specter of famine and malnutrition.

As a great power, the United States can do much to deal with these problems within its own territory. But the problems are worldwide. For this reason, international institutions will have to be perfected to deal with them.

We are beginning to move in this direction, very tentatively, in the United Nations family today. We are, for example, elaborating new safeguards systems in connection with the peaceful uses of atomic energy. We are looking at the prospects for an international system which would allow harmonious exploitation of the resources of the deep seabed. We are preparing for a world conference on the problems of the human environment. In these and other ways, we are gearing up for the job of insuring that men

can live together in tolerable conditions on a planet which is increasingly crowded.

These are some of the key problems and some of the possibilities.

Many others will occur to you. There is the need to review foreign aid policy so that our priorities at home and abroad are equitably balanced, taking into account budgetary and other considerations. There is the problem of bringing mainland China into the mainstream of international affairs.

Our guiding principle must be to reconcile the constants of our world situation and the need to adapt to change. This is easy to say; it is difficult to practice. I am confident that America will find the way. One thing is clear: We must reject equally the illusion of isolation within fortress America and the opposite illusion of total involvement. We must stay on the sensible middle ground, that of a great and responsible world power whose foreign policy seeks to foster the great aims of the Republic and relentlessly pursues world peace.

The task of developing a responsible and workable foreign policy does not fall on Washington alone. That is why conferences like this one are important; there needs to be reciprocal responsibility between government and electorate, between those inside the policy process and those on the outside. We welcome your participation and involvement.

U.S. Planes Available To Assist Relief Efforts in Nigeria

Following is a Department announcement read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey on December 27, together with a statement released by the American Embassy at Lagos on December 31.

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT, DECEMBER 27

Despite a steady increase in international relief shipments to both sides of the battlelines in Nigeria, the prospects are for deepening tragedy as a shortage of carbohydrates develops in the Biafran-held area. As we have emphasized on past occasions, the situation requires the utilization of every possible channel of relief,

including most importantly a surface corridor, which we continue to hope can be arranged.

In the meantime, we continue to seek means of strengthening the airlift of relief supplies. We are therefore making available for the international relief airlift eight C-97G "stratofreighter" cargo aircraft which are no longer required by the U.S. Air Force. Four will be provided to the American voluntary agencies and four have been offered to the International Committee of the Red Cross. We are discussing with the officials of these organizations the details of transferring ownership of these aircraft as soon as possible.

No U.S. military personnel will be involved in the operation of these aircraft. The planes are provided with the clear understanding that they are to be used solely for humanitarian purposes in transporting urgently needed food and medical supplies for noncombatants. We are prepared, therefore, to cooperate in establishing inspection procedures toward this end.

These aircraft can substantially increase the tonnage delivered. It remains true, however, that the aircraft now operating in the relief effort, not to mention this additional capacity, cannot be fully utilized into the present airstrip in Biafra unless daylight flights are permitted. The Federal Military Government has approved such flights on humanitarian grounds. We continue to regret the failure of the Biafran authorities to sanction daylight flights into the existing airstrip.

**STATEMENT BY AMERICAN EMBASSY,
LAGOS, DECEMBER 31**

The December 27 decision by the United States Government to make available C-97G "stratofreighter" cargo aircraft to the international relief airlift to assist victims of the Nigerian civil war was motivated solely by pressing humanitarian concern. Furnishing these transport planes is simply an extension of the continuing American effort to help relieve suffering.

In no way does this relief action reflect, either directly or indirectly, U.S. Government politi-

cal support of the rebellion. Nor does it portend such support. The United States continues to recognize only the Federal Military Government. It continues to believe that only a negotiated settlement, in the context of a single Nigeria, with realistic guarantees for the safety and protection of all Nigerians, will bring an end to the tragedy which has befallen Nigeria.

The aircraft are cargo carriers of a type which have been used widely by commercial airlines and have become available to relief agencies because they are no longer required by the U.S. Government. They will be sold, not loaned. No U.S. military personnel will be involved in their operation.

The United States Government informed the American voluntary agencies and has stated publicly that the aircraft are made available with the clear understanding that:

- a. Their use will be in accord with the strictly humanitarian purposes and operations of the total ICRC relief effort;
- b. They are to be used solely for the relief of noncombatants in transporting urgently needed food and other nonmilitary supplies;
- c. Workable procedures will be instituted for inspection of cargoes.

Representatives of Joint Church Aid, USA, comprised of Catholic Relief Services, Church World Service, and the American Jewish Committee, have assured the United States Government that they agree with these points and that they will cooperate in their implementation.

The United States Government wishes particularly to emphasize that its humanitarian concern applies equally to both sides of the battlelines. It has, in fact, been assisting massively on the Federal side through the ICRC with large quantities of relief supplies to needy civilians in Mid-Western, South-Eastern, and Rivers States, as well as Federally controlled areas of East-Central State. The U.S. Government has agreed to provide financial support to the relief and rehabilitation programs of the Nigerian Red Cross and the Federal Rehabilitation Commission.

U.N. Calls Upon UNCURK To Continue Pursuit of U.N. Objectives in Korea

Following are statements made in Committee I (Political and Security) and in plenary by Stuart Symington and James Russell Wiggins, U.S. Representatives to the General Assembly, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Assembly on December 20.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR SYMINGTON, COMMITTEE I, DECEMBER 11

U.S./U.N. press release 241 dated December 11

At this commencement of debate, Mr. Chairman, our committee has before it various proposals which are in sharp contrast.

Three proposals, taken together and as submitted by advocates of North Korea, would appear to spell out a single message: "United Nations, get out of Korea and stay out."

Another proposal, which my country has joined in cosponsoring, says in effect: "United Nations, stay in Korea and continue to work for peace, stability, and unification in freedom."

It is now 21 years since the cause of a free, independent, and united Korea became a concern of the United Nations; and it is 15 years since the armistice agreement halted the tragic 3-year war which resulted when North Korea invaded South Korea.

During the period in which this war was fought, many nations represented here today were not members of the United Nations; and perhaps it is easier than formerly to forget those goals for which this body has struggled in Korea, along with how much remains to be accomplished before those goals are reached.

Some now argue that the United Nations should not concern itself with peace and stability in northeast Asia nor with the question of how the Korean nation shall be unified; that is, whether by free, internationally supervised elections open to all Korean citizens or by what

North Korea calls carrying the "revolutionary struggle" from North to South.

Nevertheless Korea is one of the world's major testing grounds for the principles upon which the United Nations was founded: collective security, peaceful settlement, and self-determination. What happens to this country is of grave concern to all nations interested in keeping those principles alive; and therefore it is imperative for the United Nations to make clear to all that its presence in Korea will be maintained, also that the responsibilities of the international community toward this area must and will continue.

What the world has been witnessing for the past 2 years—ever since North Korea embarked on a policy of stepped-up violence—is not a mere succession of minor incidents, rather a systematic campaign to export revolution into the South through violence and terrorism.

Growing Violence in Korea

As mentioned in my previous presentation to this committee on the matter of the seating resolution, the reports of UNCURK [United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea], of the United Nations Command in Korea, and of the world press all attest to the serious increase in the number of North Korean violations of the 1953 armistice agreement.¹ These violations have taken place not only in and near the demilitarized zone but, in some cases, have occurred many miles inside the Republic of Korea.

In 1967 more than 10 times as many incidents took place—armed North Korean bands and agents infiltrating below the armistice demarcation line—as did during either of the 2 pre-

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 30, 1968, p. 712.

ceding years. And this year it would appear that the 1967 level will be exceeded.

As but one example, and as I also mentioned previously, a band of men who last January invaded as far south as Seoul actually made an all-out attempt to murder the President of the Republic of Korea. One does not like to think of the consequences if they had succeeded.

Then a few weeks ago a group more than twice as large landed on the east coast of South Korea, 100 miles from the demilitarized zone, evidently to see if guerrilla bases could be set up in that mountainous area. At latest report, 63 of these intruders have been killed and five captured.

The committee of UNCURK, after an on-the-spot investigation of this incident, reported "that these activities have been carried out by North Korean armed agents and that their purpose is to undermine the security of the Republic of Korea."

True, North Korea denies all these facts; but its denials carry little conviction, for North Korea itself has repeatedly refused to permit investigation of such alleged incidents by the machinery the armistice agreement established for that very purpose.

In its report to the Security Council last October 3,² the United Nations Command appealed for "suggestions about steps that could be taken to enlist North Korean cooperation" in making use of the existing machinery for investigating such incidents and continued, "or, in the absence of such cooperation, suggestions for alternative procedures."

So far no suggestions on this matter have been forthcoming, however, either from the authorities in North Korea or from their advocates here.

Let me now say to this committee that the United States is prepared either to use the existing machinery of the armistice agreement or to consider suggestions for other procedures by means of which such incidents could be investigated promptly.

In addition, we would be glad to cooperate with members of this Assembly who might desire to send out representatives to see how very serious these incidents have been and also who actually instigated them.

Another manifestation of this North Korean strategy of disruption was the illegal seizure and detention since last January 26 of the United States Ship *Pueblo*, along with her crew. North

Korea has even refused to permit neutral representatives to visit members of this crew. Let me again state before this forum that the American people are becoming increasingly impatient about the results of this act of piracy.

Against this background of growing violence, North Korea still presses its perennial demands that UNCURK be abolished, that the United Nations Command leave Korea, and that the United Nations itself cease to concern itself with Korea—demands embodied once again in proposals which are now before this committee.

Let us not deceive ourselves about what North Korea really seeks with these demands. Their policy became clear on December 16, 1967, when Premier Kim Il-Sung addressed the Supreme People's Assembly as follows:

The entire people in the northern half of the Republic bear the heavy responsibility for carrying the South Korean revolution completion.

The accomplishment of the great cause of the liberation of South Korea, and the unification of the fatherland at the earliest possible date, depends not only on how the revolutionary organizations and revolutionaries in South Korea expand, and strengthen the revolutionary forces and how they fight the enemy, but, in a large measure, on how the people in the northern half of the Republic prepare themselves to greet the great revolutionary event.

The people in the northern half of the Republic should always remember the brothers in the South and have a revolutionary determination to liberate them at all costs; they should be firmly prepared ideologically, so that they may be mobilized to a decisive struggle to accomplish the cause of unification of the fatherland, by joining hands with the South Korean people, whenever called upon, to come to their aid, as the struggle of the people surges forward, and the revolutionary situation ripens in South Korea.

Events of 1949 and 1950

When we compare this stated policy with the events of 1949 and 1950, there is a parallel which serves as sober warning to all who might think of withdrawing from Korea, at this time, the support of the United Nations.

On June 29, 1949, under the eyes of the United Nations Commission, the last United States troops embarked from South Korea. At that time the Commission also tried to gain access to North Korea so as to observe the promised withdrawal of Soviet troops. That access was denied.

As the United States withdrawal was being completed, Pyongyang Radio broadcast a manifesto from a group called the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification for the Fatherland. This broadcast said in part:

² For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 11, 1968, p. 512.

The time has come for us to solve with our own hands the question of the unification of our fatherland. . . . Anyone who persists in opposition and obstruction of the task for peaceful unification shall not escape punishment by the Korean people.

This propaganda campaign was accompanied by a heavy increase in North Korean raids across the 38th parallel.

In July of 1949 the United Nations Commission reported that some of these raids appeared to be "for introducing groups of trained saboteurs into the territory of the Republic of Korea." And these incidents continued through the 12 months that ended in June 1950.

On June 25 the Commission cabled the Secretary-General:

Northern regime is carrying out well-planned concerted and full-scale invasion of South Korea . . . South Korean forces were deployed on wholly defensive basis . . . they were taken completely by surprise.

A 3-year war followed; and 131,773 military of the Republic of Korea and their allies lost their lives, as well as hundreds of thousands of South Korean civilians.

My purpose in recalling these facts is to point up the risks which would be incurred if today the forces of the United Nations Command were withdrawn, UNCURK were dissolved, and the United Nations turned its back on Korea.

Forces in Korea Today

It is pertinent to recall "for what purpose" and "by what authority" troops of the United States and other countries went to Korea and why some of them are still there today.

American troops, as well as troops of 15 other countries, went to Korea in 1950 to repel the North Korean invasion, in response to urgent appeals for assistance from the Government of the Republic of Korea and in accordance with resolutions of the Security Council. The forces of these 16 nations were placed under a United Nations Command established pursuant to another resolution of the Security Council.

In July 1953 the fighting stopped. Since then, the number of troops has been reduced steadily; and the forces which currently remain do so only at the express invitation of the Government of Korea. That Government is free to request their departure at any time.

Virtually all of these troops are stationed just south of the demilitarized zone. Their sole mission is to help the Republic of Korea defend itself against any possible new aggression from the North.

My Government and the other governments concerned have repeatedly stated their readiness to withdraw all remaining forces from Korea whenever (1) such action is requested by the Republic of Korea or (2) conditions for a lasting settlement, formulated by the General Assembly, have been fulfilled.

I hereby reaffirm this pledge on behalf of the Government of the United States.

The presence and activities of all forces under the United Nations Command are open for all to see: the press, UNCURK, and representatives of those countries which maintain diplomatic, trade, or consular missions in the Republic of Korea. If members of this Assembly should desire to send official representatives to observe the activities of these troops, my Government would have no objection.

All troops in South Korea have exercised admirable restraint in the face of stepped-up armed attacks by North Korea. In its latest report, the United Nations Command states its belief that "such restraint, by affording no grounds whatsoever for escalation by North Korea of its hostile activities, has helped to minimize the tension and instability North Korea is intent on engendering."

This is the military and political picture with respect to the two parts of a Korea divided today. It is the picture of a risky and unstable situation, one which does not promote the cause of peace. It is the promotion of that cause which convinces my Government that the presence of the United Nations in Korea must be fully maintained.

Basic U.N. Objectives in Korea

For many years the United Nations has pursued the same basic objectives in Korea—objectives reaffirmed a year ago in General Assembly Resolution 2269, which states: "to bring about, by peaceful means, the establishment of a unified independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government, and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area."³

Many of these objectives remain unfulfilled. Much has been achieved, however, during the 21 years of United Nations activity.

Since 1953, both South Korea and North Korea have had the opportunity of giving pri-

³ For a U.S. statement and text of the resolution, see BULLETIN of Dec. 18, 1967, p. 814.

mary attention to the works of peace, at home and abroad.

The Republic of Korea has taken far better advantage of this opportunity. It has a representative government, with an active political opposition. Its citizens enjoy free speech and a free press. In recent years, this determined country has been outstanding among the developing nations of the world. Its economic growth now runs at an annual rate of 8.9 percent, and its per capita income is rising steadily.

Internationally, this Republic has played a leading role in promoting East Asian regional economic and social cooperation. It cooperates with many U.N. agencies in development projects and has diplomatic or consular relations with some 80 other nations.

Measured against the stated objectives of the United Nations, these achievements show substantial progress.

The Republic of Korea is independent. That is a partial fulfillment of one of our objectives.

The Republic of Korea has a representative democratic form of government. That is another fulfillment.

Currently this country lives in a condition of tenuous peace and security.

The major unfulfilled objective of the United Nations is a peaceful unification of Korea through free elections, and our main instrument for promoting that objective is UNCURK.

UNCURK takes very seriously its responsibility to promote unification. Last July the chairman of the committee of UNCURK broadcast an appeal for "any fresh proposals or new approaches which leaders may wish to address to the Commission and which are conducive to the achievement of the unification of Korea." The chairman appealed "to all leaders of the Korean people to exercise restraint and to contribute to an easing of the tension and to the establishment of peace and tranquility without which unification could not be achieved."

This was the voice of reason, raised in the interest of a permanent peace, and its message is worthy of serious consideration and constructive reply. Such efforts should be encouraged, for they offer the best hope of progress toward our objective.

It is in the light of all these events that the United States and other members have joined in proposing a draft resolution which has been circulated to the committee and which it is my privilege to present at this time.

The text draws upon resolutions approved by

the Assembly in past years and fully reaffirms the historic objectives of the United Nations. The text also includes certain new elements to which I would draw the committee's attention.

New Elements in the Resolution

Incidents of the past 2 years, previously referred to, have disturbing implications to the point where we now believe it wise for the Assembly to express concern about them. That concern is expressed in the sixth preambular paragraph and the third operative paragraph. The latter paragraph calls for cooperation in the easing of tensions, also for the avoidance of incidents and activities in violation of the armistice agreement. In our judgment, both these paragraphs will help restore peace and security in this area.

Operative paragraph 4 contains a deserved commendation of UNCURK for efforts made to encourage the easing of tensions and also to seek cooperation and assistance from all parts of Korea, North as well as South, looking toward the goal of peaceful unification.

Operative paragraph 5 reflects our belief that under present circumstances members of the United Nations should be more regularly informed of developments in the area. For example, under our existing practice the guerrilla landing on the east coast of South Korea a month ago which I mentioned would not be reported to the United Nations until some time next summer. Paragraph 5 would cure this defect by calling upon UNCURK to submit regular reports to the Secretary-General, the first of these to be submitted within 4 months of the adoption of this resolution.

An element of flexibility has been introduced by leaving UNCURK to decide whether to submit its reports to the Secretary-General or to the Assembly and how frequently to submit them. Whenever the situation seems to call for a report directly to the Assembly, we believe UNCURK should be in a position to make such a report. When the report is made directly to the Assembly, it will of course go on the provisional agenda in accordance with rule 13 (b and c) of the rules of procedure, as it has in the past.

This draft resolution⁴ expresses the earnest

⁴ U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.453; adopted in Committee I on Dec. 16 by a rollcall vote of 72 (U.S.) to 23, with 26 abstentions.

hope of its sponsors that the long-deadlocked issue of the reunification of Korea can be moved off dead center, also their conviction that the United Nations can and will make a contribution to that end.

I shall not discuss other proposals before the committee except to observe that all of them, in one way or another, seek to remove Korea from the concern and protection of the United Nations.

My delegation hopes that, as in past years, these proposals will be rejected by this committee and that instead we approve a forward-looking resolution which will bring us, at long last, closer to the fulfillment of the historic goals of this community of nations—a Korea free and united.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR WIGGINS, PLENARY SESSION, DECEMBER 20

U.S./U.N. press release 270 dated December 20

The United States will vote for the resolution in document A/7460, and in explaining our vote I wish to underscore the importance of the resolution.

It is particularly to be regretted that North Korea has continued to maintain not only a belligerent policy toward the Republic of Korea but also an inflexible and rigid opposition to the United Nations. The First Committee, in a resolution of which the United States was a co-sponsor, expressed a willingness to invite North Korea to appear before the committee;⁵ and North Korea's views were, of course, put before the committee in written form. If North Korea has not appeared, this is not because any delegation was unwilling to hear their views but because North Korea continued to reject any acknowledgement of the right of the United Nations to take action on the matter.

The resolution before us was thoroughly debated in the First Committee and all sides were heard. The resolution was then approved by a committee vote of 72 to 23, with 26 abstentions. That is a larger vote than resolutions on the same subject have received in any previous years—and properly so, for two reasons:

First, the situation in Korea itself, created by the increasingly aggressive behavior of North

Korea, is more dangerous and disturbing than it has been for many years; and thus the reassuring presence of the United Nations in that situation is more necessary than ever.

Second, the resolution before us varies from those of the past in certain ways which are significant and, in the belief of the sponsors, will prove constructive in the cause of peace.

The facts of recent North Korean aggressiveness can be quickly summarized. Never since July 1953, when the Korean war was ended by the armistice agreement, has North Korea so frequently and dangerously violated its undertakings in that agreement. The reports of the United Nations Command and of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea give dramatic testimony to this fact. In 1967 more than 10 times as many armed North Korean bands and agents intruded below the armistice demarcation line as in either of the 2 preceding years; and this year it appears that the record of 1967 will be broken. Casualties suffered by the United Nations Command in dealing with these intrusions have also risen dramatically.

Among these incidents, some have been of a most ominous size and character. Last January a band of 31 North Koreans from the 124th Guerrilla Unit slipped into Seoul with orders to kill the President of the Republic of Korea. They were wiped out, but delegates can well imagine what the consequences for peace would have been had they succeeded. Then, only a few weeks ago, a group from the same North Korean unit, more than twice as large as the earlier band of Seoul infiltrators, landed on the east coast 100 miles south of the armistice line. Already 63 of them have been killed and five captured.

For these facts we have direct testimony from the UNCURK and from the United Nations Command. It is true that the North Koreans have done their best to impugn this testimony and to lay all the blame for trouble in Korea, from 1947 to the present, on the United Nations and especially on my country. How much weight should be given to their assertions, especially as to recent facts, I leave to my fellow delegates to judge. The North Koreans have shown a constant aversion to impartial inquiry of any kind. They have never opened any territory under their control to the United Nations or the world press. They have refused to let the impartial investigating machinery of the armistice agree-

⁵ U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.423; for text, see par. 11(b) of the report of the First Committee (A/7460).

ment function even in areas outside North Korean control, and their advocates in the First Committee would not even support language requiring respect for the armistice agreement. They have refused to suggest alternative machinery. They have not even responded to my country's offer to let any doubting member of the United Nations send official representatives to do their own investigating on the spot. In these circumstances, the facts as stated by the United Nations authorities in Korea stand uncontroverted.

What is the purpose behind North Korea's violent acts? Are they merely pinpricks or perhaps normal clashes that can be expected along any disputed frontier? It would be comforting to think so; but we are denied such comfort by the explicit words of Premier Kim Il-Sung, who made a long speech a year ago this week to the Supreme People's Assembly in Pyongyang, in the course of which he said:

The entire people in the northern half of the Republic bear the heavy responsibility for carrying the South Korean revolution to completion.

And again:

The people in the northern half of the Republic should always remember the brothers in the South and have a revolutionary determination to liberate them at all costs.

It was against this background, Mr. President, that the First Committee considered, and decisively rejected, three resolutions put forward by advocates of North Korea: one to strip the Republic of Korea of international protection by withdrawing the troops of the United Nations Command; another to abolish UNCURK; and a third to end forever the discussion of Korea in the United Nations. In other words, we were asked to put Korea outside the pale of United Nations concern; to say to the world that the writ of the charter does not run in Korea any more. By large majorities, the committee refused to recommend any such course to the General Assembly.

The course we did approve in the committee, and which the Assembly is now asked to adopt, lies in the opposite direction. It fully reaffirms the historic objectives of the United Nations in Korea: "to bring about, by peaceful means, the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government, and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area."

In addition, the resolution contains some notable new language. The preamble and the third operative paragraph both express concern over the increasing number of disturbing incidents in the area. The latter paragraph also makes a timely call for an easing of tensions and for the avoidance of incidents and activities in violation of the armistice agreement.

Operative paragraph 4 goes on to commend UNCURK for its recent efforts to encourage restraint and reduce tensions and to seek cooperation and assistance from all parts of Korea, both North and South, toward the goal of peaceful unification.

Finally, operative paragraph 5 is written to provide the United Nations with more frequent and more timely reports of conditions and developments in the area instead of the annual reporting system which was considered sufficient in the past. The first such report is asked for within 4 months, with others to follow on a regular basis. The Commission is given flexibility both as to the frequency of its reports and as to whether a particular report shall be made to the Secretary-General or, if the situation seems to require it, directly to the General Assembly, in which case it would go on our provisional agenda as in past years.

By means of this resolution, Mr. President, we shall reaffirm the peaceful and dependable presence of the United Nations in Korea. We shall renew the mandate of the United Nations both to promote the immediate security of the area against further attempts at disruption and to press on toward the goal of reunification in peace and freedom.

In the past 15 years, since the Korean armistice was signed, much has been achieved toward our goals in that war-torn nation. By means of the armistice and the stabilizing and deterrent presence of the United Nations Command and UNCURK, a minimum of peace and security and tranquillity has been maintained all through these years. Behind the shield thus erected, the Republic of Korea has made rapid progress toward political development as a democratic nation and toward economic and social well-being.

There is every hope that, if we are steadfast and faithful to our charge, the present dangers in the area will subside and that the entire nation can progress toward the final goal of national unity, freedom, and peace.

This resolution is the vehicle of that hope.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ⁶

The Korean question

The General Assembly,

Having noted the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, signed at Seoul, Korea, on 24 August 1968,

Reaffirming its resolution 2269 (XXII) of 16 November 1967⁷ and previous resolutions on the Korean question noted therein,

Recognizing that the continued division of Korea does not correspond to the wishes of the Korean people and constitutes a source of tension which prevents the full restoration of international peace and security in the area,

Recalling that the United Nations, under the Charter, is fully and rightfully empowered to take collective action to maintain peace and security and to extend its good offices in seeking a peaceful settlement in Korea in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter,

Anxious that progress be made towards creating conditions which would facilitate the reunification of Korea on the basis of the freely expressed will of the Korean people,

Concerned at reports of recent events in Korea which, if continued, could hamper efforts to create the peaceful conditions which are one of the prerequisites of the establishment of a unified and independent Korea,

1. *Reaffirms* that the objectives of the United Nations in Korea are to bring about, by peaceful means, the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government, and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area;

2. *Expresses the belief* that arrangements should be made to achieve these objectives through genuinely free elections held in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;

3. *Calls* for co-operation in the easing of tensions in the area and, in particular, for the avoidance of incidents and activities in violations of the Armistice Agreement of 1953;

4. *Notes with approval* the efforts made by the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, in pursuit of its mandate, to encourage the exercise of restraint and the easing of tensions in the area and to secure maximum support,

⁶ U.N. doc. A/RES/2466 (XXIII) (A/C.1/L.453); adopted by the Assembly on Dec. 20 by a vote of 71 (U.S.) to 25, with 20 abstentions.

⁷ For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 18, 1967, p. 845.

assistance and co-operation in the realization of the peaceful reunification of Korea;

5. *Requests* the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to pursue these and other efforts to achieve the objectives of the United Nations in Korea to continue to carry out the tasks previously assigned to it by the General Assembly and to keep members of the Assembly informed on the situation in the area and on the results of these efforts through regular reports submitted to the Secretary-General and to the Assembly as appropriate, the first report to be submitted to the Secretary-General no later than four months after the adoption of the present resolution;

6. *Notes* that the United Nations forces which were sent to Korea in accordance with United Nations resolutions have in greater part already been withdrawn, that the sole objective of the United Nations forces at present in Korea is to preserve the peace and security of the area, and that the Governments concerned are prepared to withdraw their remaining forces from Korea whenever such action is requested by the Republic of Korea or whenever the conditions for a lasting settlement formulated by the General Assembly have been fulfilled.

U.S. Contributes \$1 Million to U.N. Population Trust Fund

U.S. Representative to the United Nations James Russell Wiggins announced on December 16 (U.S./U.N. press release 252) the contribution by the United States of \$1 million to the United Nations Secretary-General's Population Trust Fund.

This is the first U.S. contribution to the trust fund to finance action projects requested by member states in population and family planning. The United States contributed \$500,000 to the Population Trust Fund in fiscal year 1968 for the development of projects and programs and \$235,000 early in fiscal year 1969 for increased staffing and development work by the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.

The funds are from the appropriations of the Agency for International Development's program of multilateral assistance.

United Nations Extends UNRWA to June 30, 1972

*Statement by Senator John Sherman Cooper
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

We meet again, as we have each year since UNRWA's establishment in 1949, to consider the report of the Agency's Commissioner-General² and to adopt new resolutions dealing with the plight of the Palestine refugees. Each year the number of refugees grows, and now over 1.3 million are living in neighboring countries deprived of their homes, their lands and belongings. A large proportion of the refugees continue to live in difficult circumstances, threatened by war and enduring the hardships of the dispossessed.

Despite the resolutions and the efforts of the United Nations, it must be said that no substantial progress has been made toward repatriating the refugees or compensating them for their lost property.

The work of UNRWA has been increased. During the hostilities of 1967, several hundred thousand additional persons fled their homes—and some for the second time. Much was demanded of UNRWA's resources, both human and financial, in the past year and especially during the months following the hostilities of June 1967. As the Commissioner-General stated in his report, UNRWA was required to carry out its mission in the face of the dislocation of Agency personnel and many refugees, and to provide emergency assistance to thousands of persons displaced from their homes during and after the war. UNRWA facilities on the West Bank of the Jordan were destroyed, overrun, or evacuated during the hostilities. And when

armed clashes occurred along the cease-fire line in the Jordan Valley, UNRWA was forced to relocate a number of tented camps sheltering some 75,000 people on the hills beyond the river.

Confronted with almost 150,000 applications for reinstatement on the ration rolls in this chaotic period, UNRWA worked magnificently to insure that rations were fairly distributed to those in greatest need.

We welcome the fact that UNRWA has been able to resume its work slowly but steadily for the rehabilitation of refugees, particularly in the field of education. The Agency, aided by more than \$7 million in special contributions from a number of governments and private organizations, including very substantial sums from Near East Emergency Donations, Inc., has been able to offer additional scholarship opportunities to refugees and to begin its program of improving and expanding education and training facilities.

It is gratifying to note that the Agency received during this past year fine cooperation of the Governments of Jordan and Lebanon, and we can hope that this will continue. I express also, upon behalf of my Government, our appreciation and admiration for the special assistance rendered to UNRWA's education and training programs by the Governments of Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, and the Federal Republic of Germany. It is of great importance that progress be made in these programs along with the health programs to enable the refugees to prepare themselves for the work and satisfaction of a more normal and productive life.

There is a further suggestion I should like to make at this time which I offer in full recognition that no final solution of the refugee problem is likely to take place outside the context of

¹ Made in the Special Political Committee on Dec. 6 (U.S./U.N. press release 234, Corr. 1).

² For text of the Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for the period July 1, 1967-June 30, 1968, see U.N. doc. A/7213.

the agreed settlement envisaged by the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.³

I believe it would be useful for the United Nations, other appropriate international agencies, and interested governments to begin giving some study to plans for economic development programs in the area, in cooperation with the affected governments. When a political settlement in accordance with the framework provided by Security Council Resolution 242 is achieved, or progress is made, and the refugees are afforded a voice in determining their future, there will be an opportunity to undertake such imaginative programs. Moreover, they could help facilitate the carrying out of a refugee solution and contribute generally to stability and maintenance of peace. The uses of technology for peace in the area would cost far less than preparations for war. We should begin, I think, to consider how to bend our efforts toward these uses of our capabilities rather than to destructive purposes which can bring misery to millions.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to comment in greater detail on other problems, problems which go to the heart of the issues now facing UNRWA. Dr. [Laurence] Michelmore has stated in the summary to his report:

(UNRWA's) capacity to help is reduced by the fact that some of its best camps, schools, clinics and other facilities stand idle in Jericho and other camps on the West Bank are partly empty, while the former inhabitants eke out a bare subsistence in tented camps or other temporary accommodation in east Jordan. UNRWA has been prepared, and is prepared, to improve the conditions within these emergency, tented camps to the best of its ability. But the incongruity of having to improvise and expend limited resources, while decent, permanent camps and facilities lie idle on the West Bank is striking.

UNRWA's position has therefore been that, in the absence thus far of the "just settlement of the refugee problem", which the Security Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 rightly views as an essential part of a "just and lasting peace in the Middle East", those who fled after the outbreak of hostilities should be allowed to return to the places where they were living before June 1967. This, it is believed, corresponds to the expressed will of both the Security Council and the General Assembly.

In any event, with or without this enormous relief to UNRWA which such a return would bring, UNRWA is determined to carry out its present mandate from the General Assembly to the maximum limits possible within its budgetary capabilities. UNRWA believes, in the event that the General Assembly should decide to

³ For text of Security Council Resolution 242, adopted on Nov. 22, 1967, see BULLETIN of Dec. 18, 1967, p. 843.

prolong its mandate, that the situation of the refugees requires it not only to maintain, but also to expand its health and education services and it will do so to the extent that the availability of funds permits. Some funds for capital projects, particularly in the field of education, are already being made available by generous donations from governments and non-governmental bodies. Above all, what is needed by the Agency is the basic, and assured, cost of running its established services and the new facilities being made available from these funds for capital projects. It is these normal, operational costs which are vital to the maintenance of these services and, correspondingly, to the daily lives of the refugees. In recent years, appeals for increased voluntary contributions have been made repeatedly by the General Assembly itself, the President of the General Assembly on occasion and the Secretary-General, and by the Commissioner-General of UNRWA. While increased support has come from some contributors, the total response has fallen considerably short of what is required. . . . The Commissioner-General feels bound to point out . . . that unless the Agency in one way or another receives additional contributions, amounting to 10 per cent of its prospective income for the current year, a reduction in services to the refugee population would be inescapable, with resulting human hardship and suffering and the likelihood that the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative appointed under Security Council resolution 242 (1967) would be jeopardized. The Commissioner-General knows that the General Assembly is fully aware of the importance of the fact that a prolongation of UNRWA's mandate should be accompanied by the willingness of the Member States to provide the funds necessary to carry out that mandate.

The summary speaks of the Commissioner-General's concern over the projected budget deficit for 1969 and the consequences of reduced services and human suffering which are bound to follow if the deficit is not corrected. The Government of the United States shares his concern and expresses the hope that member states who have not contributed to UNRWA in the past will now do so. We are confident that UNRWA's leadership, informed by its realistic appraisal of anticipated income and outgo of funds and holding the sound position that the Agency's remaining working capital cannot be used to support large deficits, will make every effort to hold the deficit projected for 1969 within manageable limits. But I would emphasize again that all of our countries should inquire of their governments as to whether we can do more in the way of contributions so that UNRWA's work may be performed adequately and without the deficit. My Government finds itself compelled to say that one aspect of the Commissioner-General's report was particularly disturbing, and that is that exorbitant rail charges have been levied by host governments

and that these levies deprive UNRWA of funds that should be spent on the people whom the Agency serves.

The United States Government has supported UNRWA faithfully since its establishment, and it will continue to do so as long as UNRWA continues the services it has rendered in past years. The Government of the United States has contributed approximately \$425 million to the Agency since it was created, almost 70 percent of the \$640 million that UNRWA has required to carry out its mandate to date.⁴

In addition, the United States has responded to the appeals for emergency assistance of the General Assembly Resolutions 2252 (ES-V) and 2341-B (XXII). Shortly after the June war it made a special contribution to UNRWA of \$2 million. It contributed also \$340 thousand to the International Committee of the Red Cross; \$2 million worth of tents, supplies, and air transportation to the Government of Jordan for urgent relief needs; and commodities valued at \$3.7 million to the Government of Jordan through the World Food Program, UNRWA, and other voluntary organizations.

Private American groups have also responded to the General Assembly's appeal with contributions and pledges to UNRWA and other agencies amounting to some \$10 million since June 1967.

We cite these figures to emphasize the urgent need and with the hope that governments, organizations, and individuals which have not yet made emergency contributions may see fit to do so.

I now turn to the second issue which Dr. Micheltore has raised in his summary because it required special consideration. I refer to the status of those thousands of persons who were displaced from their homes and camps and the territories now occupied during and following the 1967 hostilities. Many of these are now facing extreme hardship on the East Bank of the Jordan; and as has been noted so many times, some 75,000 people have been relocated in tented camps in the hills beyond the river under conditions of greater hardship.

The Security Council in Resolution 237 of June 14, 1967,⁵ called upon the Government of

⁴ For a statement made by Senator Cooper in the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Dec. 6, announcing a U.S. pledge to UNRWA of \$22.2 million for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969, see U.S./U.N. press release 233.

⁵ For text, see BULLETIN of July 3, 1967, p. 11.

Israel to facilitate the return of the persons who had fled the areas where military operations took place. This request has been welcomed by the General Assembly. As Ambassador Wiggins informed this committee, the Government of the United States continues to support this request and believes it should be complied with to the fullest extent possible.⁶

But to date, only about 20,000 of the thousands of the 1967 refugees and displaced persons who have indicated a desire to return to their homes have been allowed to do so. We consider this an inadequate response to the Security Council appeal, and we have so informed the Israeli Government. The United States welcomes the assurance of action by Israel to implement the announcement made by Foreign Minister Eban to the General Assembly on October 8. However, the provision of Security Council Resolution 237 has yet to be carried out. I quote the paragraph relevant to humanitarian concern: "Calls upon the Government of Israel . . . to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas (where military operations have taken place) since the outbreak of hostilities."

My delegation asks the Government of Israel to take appropriate steps needed to carry out the purposes of this resolution, purposes which we hope very much will help to lay the foundation of a just peace.

The history of the Palestine refugee problem and of the devoted efforts that have been made to deal with it effectively have instructed us that it is not likely that a basic solution of the refugee problem will be achieved except as a part of a Middle East peace settlement. The plight of the refugees is one factor, and a human factor, which makes it vital that a settlement be achieved. As Ambassador Wiggins of the United States said in this committee on November 18, our hopes for the achievement of such a settlement now lie with the continuing efforts of Ambassador [Gunnar] Jarring to carry out the mandate introduced to him by the Security Council in its resolution of November 22, 1967. It is the purpose of my delegation, my Government, and our people to do everything possible to help him in his task.

This committee can help Ambassador Jarring in his task. We have the duty to do all that is

⁶ For Ambassador Wiggins' statement of Nov. 18, see BULLETIN of Dec. 23, 1968, p. 677.

possible in the absence of a settlement to ameliorate the conditions under which the refugees live and to provide for their rehabilitation and integration into a productive life in society. We are fortunate that UNRWA, which has done so much for the refugees over the past two decades, stands ready to carry on its task and mandate under the able leadership of its Commissioner-General, aided by his excellent staff.

Mr. Chairman, there can be no question in the minds of any of us here that in the present circumstances the work of UNRWA is essential. Complementary to the continued search for an acceptable settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of Resolution 242, UNRWA's activities must also continue. The draft resolution which I introduce formally at this time on behalf of my Government includes a provision for the extension of UNRWA's mandate for 3 years, through June 30, 1972.⁷ This period would, in our view, enable the Agency to effectively plan, administer, and carry out its valuable work. At the same time, it should be clear that in the event political developments during this period warrant a change in the direction or emphasis of UNRWA's activities, the General Assembly would be free to consider the matter and if necessary provide whatever flexibility might be required to meet the new circumstances. But in the meantime, UNRWA must be able to continue its efforts to provide relief and health services for the sick and destitute, and education and training to all who can profit from them.

Mr. Chairman, my Government has done and will continue to do all it can to contribute to the goal of justice for the refugees of the Middle East. As President Johnson said on September 10 of this year:⁸

We share a very deep concern for these refugees. Their plight is a symbol in the minds of the Arab peoples. In their eyes, it is a symbol of a wrong that must be made right before 20 years of war can end. And that fact must be dealt with in reaching a condition of peace.

All nations who are able, including Israel and her Arab neighbors, should participate directly and wholeheartedly in a massive program to assure these people a better and a more stable future.

⁷ U.N. doc. A/SPC/L.165; adopted by the Special Political Committee on Dec. 11 by a vote of 101 to 0, with 1 abstention, and by the General Assembly on Dec. 19 (A/RES/2453 (XXIII)) by a vote of 105 to 0, with 3 abstentions.

⁸ For President Johnson's address at Washington, D.C., on Sept. 10, see BULLETIN of Oct. 7, 1968, p. 345.

The need for positive action to help the plight of the refugees is apparent. The United States wishes to make it known that it will join with all other nations in making it possible for UNRWA to carry out its humanitarian tasks effectively, and by so doing to strengthen the chances of a settlement and peace in this troubled part of the world.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Mexico Sign Broadcasting Agreements

Press release 278 dated December 13

On December 11 at Mexico City American Ambassador Fulton Freeman and Mexican Secretary of Communications and Transport José Antonio Padilla Segura signed an Agreement Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States Concerning Radio Broadcasting in the Standard Broadcast Band (535-1605 kHz) and an Agreement Concerning Pre-Sunrise and Post-Sunset Operation.

Both of the agreements will be sent to the United States Senate for advice and consent to ratification in accordance with treaty procedures.

Article XVIII of the agreement concerning radio broadcasting provides that upon its entry into force, it will replace the agreement of January 29, 1957, relating to the same subject.¹ Like the 1957 agreement, the new agreement will govern the relationship between the two countries in the use of the standard broadcast band. It will enter into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification and will remain in force for a period of 5 years unless, before the end of such period, it is replaced by a new agreement or unless terminated by either Government as a result of a 1-year notice to the other Government.

Provisions regarding presunrise and postsunset operation were considered as an integral part

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 4777, 12 UST 734, as extended by protocol.

of the negotiations concerning the agreement on radio broadcasting but, for technical and administrative purposes, were placed in a separate agreement.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Customs

International convention to facilitate the importation of commercial samples and advertising material. Dated at Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered into force November 20, 1955. TIAS 3920.
Accession deposited: Romania (with declarations), November 15, 1968.

Grains

International grains arrangement, 1967, with annexes. Open for signature at Washington October 15 through November 30, 1967. Entered into force July 1, 1968. TIAS 6537.
Ratification to the Wheat Trade Convention deposited: Portugal, December 26, 1968.
Accession to the Wheat Trade Convention deposited: Peru, December 26, 1968.

Narcotic Drugs

Addition of bezitramide to drugs to be covered by the regime of control laid down in the 1931 convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs, as amended (TS 863; TIAS 1671, 1859). Notification dated November 15, 1968. Entered into force November 15, 1968.

War

Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners of war;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea;
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian persons in time of war.
Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1950; for the United States February 2, 1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and 3365, respectively.
Declarations they consider themselves bound: Barbados,¹ Malta, August 20, 1968.

BILATERAL

India

Agreement for duty-free entry and defrayment of inland transportation charges of voluntary agency supplies and equipment. Signed at New Delhi December 5, 1968. Entered into force December 5, 1968.

¹ With declarations with respect to the convention relative to treatment of prisoners of war and the convention relative to treatment of civilian persons in time of war.

Japan

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of November 25, 1964, as amended and extended (TIAS 5688, 6155), regarding the king crab fishery in the eastern Bering Sea. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington December 23, 1968; entered into force December 23, 1968.

Agreement relating to salmon fishing in waters contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States, with agreed minutes. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington December 23, 1968; entered into force December 23, 1968.

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of May 9, 1967 (TIAS 6287), concerning certain fisheries off the coast of the United States, with agreed minutes. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington December 23, 1968; entered into force December 23, 1968.

United Kingdom

Agreement extending the agreement of February 15, 1960 (TIAS 4425), relating to the establishment and operation of a ballistic early warning station at Fylingdales Moor. Effected by exchange of notes at London November 26, 1968. Entered into force November 26, 1968.

PUBLICATIONS

New Volume Released in Foreign Relations Series on World War II Conferences

On December 19 the Department of State released *The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943*, a volume in the series *Foreign Relations of the United States*. Previous volumes in the special subseries on the major Allied conferences of World War II dealt with the meetings at Cairo and Tehran in 1943 and at Malta, Yalta, and Berlin (Potsdam) in 1945. Subsequent volumes will cover the meetings at Washington and Quebec in 1943 and at Quebec in 1944.

The present volume offers much previously unpublished documentation on the meetings of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at Washington in December 1941-January 1942 and June 1942 and at Casablanca in January 1943. Others present at one or more of these meetings included Harry Hopkins, Cordell Hull, Lord Beaverbrook, Mackenzie King, Harold Macmillan, and Generals Marshall, Eisenhower, de Gaulle, and Giraud. In far-ranging discussions these Allied leaders reached agreement on many political and economic matters and worked out a grand strategy against the Axis Powers.

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Communications. United States and Mexico Sign Broadcasting Agreements 42

Disarmament. Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy (Sisco) 27

Israel. United Nations Extends UNRWA to June 30, 1972 (Cooper) 39

Korea. U.N. Calls Upon UNCURK To Continue Pursuit of U.N. Objectives in Korea (Symington, Wiggins, text of resolution) 32

Mexico

United States and Mexico Reaffirm Bonds of Friendship (Diaz Ordaz, Johnson) 21

United States and Mexico Sign Broadcasting Agreements 42

Near East

Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy (Sisco) 27

United Nations Extends UNRWA to June 30, 1972 (Cooper) 39

Nigeria. U.S. Planes Available To Assist Relief Efforts in Nigeria 30

Population. U.S. Contributes \$1 Million to U.N. Population Trust Fund 38

Presidential Documents. United States and Mexico Reaffirm Bonds of Friendship 21

Publications

New Volume Released in Foreign Relations Series on World War II Conferences 43

Recent Releases 44

Refugees. United Nations Extends UNRWA to June 30, 1972 (Cooper) 39

Science. Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy (Sisco) 27

Treaty Information

Current Actions 43

United States and Mexico Sign Broadcasting Agreements 42

U.S.S.R. Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy (Sisco) 27

United Nations

Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy (Sisco) 27

U.N. Calls Upon UNCURK To Continue Pursuit of U.N. Objectives in Korea (Symington, Wiggins, text of resolution) 32

U.S. Contributes \$1 Million to U.N. Population Trust Fund 38

United Nations Extends UNRWA to June 30, 1972 (Cooper) 39

Viet-Nam. Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy (Sisco) 27

Name Index

Cooper, John Sherman 39

Diaz Ordaz, Gustavo 21

Johnson, President 21

Sisco, Joseph J 27

Symington, Stuart 32

Wiggins, James Russell 32

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: December 23-29

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to December 23 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 275 of December 10 and 278 of December 13.

No.	Date	Subject
†282	12/26	U.S.-Singapore cotton textile agreement.
*283	12/27	Oliver: "Development: What More?"

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE
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Vol. LX, No. 1543



January 20, 1969

SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JULY 3 45

U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMNS ISRAEL FOR ATTACK ON BEIRUT AIRPORT

Statements by Ambassador Wiggins and Text of Resolution 53

THE U.N. BOND REPAYMENTS ISSUE

Statement by Ambassador Wiggins 55

U.S. PROPOSES WORLDWIDE SEISMIC INVESTIGATION
OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS

Statement by Ambassador Foster and Texts of Resolutions 58

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LX, No. 1543
January 20, 1969

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Secretary Rusk's News Conference of January 3

Press release 1 dated January 3

Secretary Rusk: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I am glad to be here for the press conference that I promised you in another place. I don't want to deny myself the privilege of having another one, so I won't announce this as a final press conference. In any event, I am not very good at valedictory speeches.

I do have one brief but serious statement to make this morning.

As we begin the New Year, we in the United States are deeply concerned about the continuing, indeed increasing, violence in the Middle East. The present level of violence has again made peace in the area extremely precarious. To the dismal pattern of cease-fire violations there has been added an extension of the violence beyond the areas of the cease-fire lines to attacks on passengers and aircraft of international civil airlines.¹ The present prospects are therefore serious and require the immediate and prudent attention of all leaders on both sides. There is little question but that a breakdown of the present tenuous arrangements would be catastrophic for all the peoples of the area.

I urge all concerned, in and outside of the area, to do everything possible to reverse the cycle of violence and replace it with a new impetus to help bring about both the climate and the reality of peace.

We call upon the Arab governments to recognize that they must do their utmost to restrain terrorist activity. We call upon Israel to recognize that a policy of excessive retaliation will not produce the peace that Israel surely desires.

An intense search for a Middle East peace has been going on since the November 22, 1967, Security Council resolution which set in motion the Jarring mission.² There have been too many lost opportunities since the end of the June war. Deep distrust and suspicion have prevented significant progress from being made. But it is surely not too much to hope that as we begin

the New Year all peoples in the area will try to put old recriminations behind them and think long and soberly, with imagination and good will, about finding the path to a just and lasting peace.

The elements of a peaceful settlement seem to us to be clear. They are contained in the U.N. Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. If agreement could be achieved on the fundamentals contained in that resolution, the real beginnings of a just and lasting peace could be found. The United States has fully supported that resolution, and continues to do so, as well as the policy principles laid down by President Johnson in his important statements of June 19, 1967,³ and September 10, 1968.⁴ Those principles continue to be relevant and indeed essential to peace in the area.

It is for those nations which confront each other in the area to work with Ambassador [Gunnar] Jarring and construct the foundations for agreement and peace. Other nations can help by contributing their full support, and the United States will use for this purpose whatever influence it has. I hope, therefore, that in the days ahead all concerned will redouble their efforts to help Ambassador Jarring bring about a just and lasting peace in an area that has known no real peace for so long.

Let me add that I have seen some speculation overnight that somehow the United States is marking time in this matter of peace in the Middle East or perhaps even in Viet-Nam. This is not at all the case. There is nothing which we would desire more than to be able to turn over to the new administration significant advances toward peace, both in the Middle East and in Viet-Nam.

The President and I and our Ambassadors abroad will do everything that we can in the days remaining to advance both these matters several steps toward peace if we can.

It gives me great pleasure to announce that

¹ See p. 53.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 18, 1967, p. 843.

³ BULLETIN of July 10, 1967, p. 31.

⁴ BULLETIN of Oct. 7, 1968, p. 345.

the Foreign Secretary of Mexico, the very distinguished Dr. Antonio Carrillo Flores, will be in Washington to dedicate the monument of Benito Juárez next Tuesday, January 7. The monument is the gift of the Government of Mexico to the people of the United States, and it will be my great privilege to accept the monument on behalf of the American people. The monument is located on the small island on the south side of Virginia Avenue where it intersects with New Hampshire Avenue. I am looking forward to that occasion very much. I am now ready for your questions.

The Middle East Situation

Q. Mr. Secretary, in speaking of the Middle East situation, you talk about working within the framework of last November's resolution and so forth. But you say other nations can help. In that connection there have been reports from Paris and London that the Russians are suggesting a Big Four initiative to move this thing forward. Here we are told that they haven't made any suggestion here. What is the situation as regards the big powers working on this at present?

A. I myself received the Russian Chargé d'Affaires on the 30th and received from him what I suppose is the same communication which was given to London and Paris. It did not propose a special four-power initiative. Nevertheless, the four are the principal permanent members of the Security Council involved in the Middle East.

I have no doubt that full contact among the four could be constructive in helping to bring peace to that area. We do not believe that peace can be found outside the area. This is a matter for the countries who live there to find the basis on which they can live with each other in the long-range future. But nevertheless, there are others who can help. We ourselves have taken a good many initiatives. Many of those initiatives have not become public.

In a situation where almost every detail of a possible settlement is a matter for lively internal debate or controversy on both sides in the Middle East, quiet diplomacy has perhaps a special role to play. But we shall be consulting not only with the parties in the area but with other governments who have some possibility of exercising influence in the area to see if we can begin to put the pieces together.

Now, one of the aspects of the Middle East problem which is—which makes it very complicated is one which is not unfamiliar in diplomacy. Here is a situation which has many component parts, somewhat like a jigsaw puzzle. It is very difficult to arrange one of the parts without reference to the whole, and it is very difficult to take up the whole and settle that quickly.

And so our problem is, Where do you begin? Where are the handles to take hold of? How do you get the process started?

We have probed over and over again to see if we could find one or another handle in order that we could get two or three of the pieces of the puzzle into place and then perhaps by steady work add other pieces to it.

Now, what we really need in this situation is a determination on the part of those who live in the area to cut through the well-known and deep feelings that exist in order to begin to build a peace. I have no doubt that there are many Arabs who think that Israel is bent merely on territorial expansion. I have no doubt that there are many Israelis who believe that the Arabs want the destruction of Israel.

Now, these are questions which have to be penetrated. These are feelings which have to be set aside, and it is up to the parties on both sides to try to dissipate those feelings on the other side which stand in the way of peace.

So we will do everything we can between now and January 20 to move this matter forward, and I hope that we can show some additional progress to the new administration when it assumes responsibility.

The Viet-Nam Peace Talks

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you give us your appraisal of the Viet-Nam situation as it stands now? The President has talked about dillydallying. There has been a feeling that everything has slowed down.

A. Well, I think there are two or three stages that one can anticipate. We are anxious to cut through the procedural problems that still remain in Paris in order to get to a more systematic discussion of the substance of the problem in Southeast Asia. I say a more systematic discussion, because there has been already, as you know, discussion of some of the substantial questions with the North Vietnamese delegation, such matters as the DMZ [demilitarized

zone] and the threat to the cities in South Viet-Nam, matters that were involved in the President's decision of October 31.⁵

Now, we have become pretty good amateur topologists here in the last several weeks. We have made a large number of suggestions about tables and how these things can be arranged. Basically, we feel that these procedural questions ought to be overcome in order that we can get to the table and talk seriously about the substance of peace in Southeast Asia.

I would put in a word of caution, however. This is—these procedural matters do conceal important questions of substance. I can remember back in April that we were having a wrangle about where we would meet. Two suggestions had been made by the other side which seemed to us to make it difficult for the South Vietnamese to come to such a meeting. We rejected those locations. It took us a month to get around to a mutually agreeable site for the talks.

There are a great many alternatives, a great many choices as far as we are concerned, with respect to tables and other procedural arrangements. We would like to cut through those and get around to the serious business of the talks, but if the other side is trying to accomplish purposes which are not appropriate to be dealt with in a procedural manner, then the matter is difficult. It is not just a dance. There are questions of substance that are involved.

We would hope that the other side would be able to accept one of the many alternatives that we put to them and get these talks started.

Aggression From the North the Central Issue

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the matter of substance, there have been a number of suggestions recently that the United States and North Viet-Nam should negotiate a mutual troop withdrawal and leave the political problem of the future of South Viet-Nam to the various groups, governments, alleged governments, in South Viet-Nam to negotiate themselves. What is the Government's, this Government's, position on that line of reasoning?

A. I know but one Government in South Viet-Nam: the Republic of Viet-Nam. I don't know anyone else who recognizes, for example, the National Liberation Front as a government.

⁵ For President Johnson's address to the Nation on Oct. 31, 1968, see BULLETIN of Nov. 18, 1968, p. 517.

Q. Excuse my misstatement.

A. That is one of the problems. Obviously, both we and the South Vietnamese are interested in all aspects of the problem. It is quite clear that from our point of view the central issue is aggression from the North, the movement by the North of large numbers of armed people, both in units and as individuals, into the South.

We ourselves would like to see that basic cause for the presence of our combat forces removed. At the Manila conference the Allies made it clear how we could proceed on that point.

Now, I myself have no doubt that, within the framework of acceptance of a constitutional system and amnesty and reconciliation and other matters that the South Vietnamese have talked about, if the South Vietnamese could be left to work out their own arrangements among themselves without the intrusion of external forces, we could be well on the way toward peace. But 75 percent of the forces on the other side are from the North, and that has to be dealt with. Their presence in South Viet-Nam is the primary reason why we have combat troops in South Viet-Nam. So we would like to get at this problem just as quickly as possible, cut through these procedural matters and get to the table and deal with just such issues as were raised at the Manila conference.

How we divide the load, the negotiating burden as between ourselves and South Viet-Nam if a division becomes necessary, is something to be worked out in the future. But there is no question that both we and South Viet-Nam have an important stake in the principal questions that will be before the negotiators in Paris.

Q. When you say you have an important stake, both we and they, does this mean, then, pretty much that you would favor both parties being involved in both parts of the negotiations—that is, both the military and then the diplomatic?

A. Oh, I think you could assume that when we're in our negotiations in Paris, we will be in close touch with our friends, allies, in South Viet-Nam, and we and they will move in close step on these negotiations. I don't see the basis on which we and they would go off in different directions.

Q. But we have a substantive interest in the political future of South Viet-Nam, and therefore would want to be involved in any negotia-

tions in the political future of South Viet-Nam. Is that what you are saying?

A. I don't want to prejudge the various means by which some of these questions can be discussed. It has been suggested at times that—by Vice President Ky, for example—that they might meet with some of the personnel of the NLF [National Liberation Front] in South Viet-Nam. It's possible that this might occur in Paris, I don't know. I don't know—I think those questions are for the future, but we have a stake in the security and the stability and the economic and other elements of well-being in South Viet-Nam, and so I would not want to say that we are indifferent to what the future of South Viet-Nam holds. We are there because an effort has been made by force to change the future of South Viet-Nam contrary to the wishes of its own people as expressed at the ballot box.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Clifford [Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford] seems to have a different view of how you approach this problem in Paris. A lot of the newspapers have called your apparent differences with him a "civilized collision." How would you describe it?

A. Well, I have seen some of that speculation and I don't connect it with the world in which I live. I don't recall that I have ever wrestled on the rug with Secretary Clifford.

The instructions which the President has sent to Ambassadors [W. Averell] Harriman and [Cyrus R.] Vance and to Ambassador [Ellsworth] Bunker go out with the full agreement of the Secretary of Defense and myself. So I am not able to be very helpful on that matter, because I don't recognize the circumstances which are being discussed.

Q. Mr. Secretary, today again, as in the past when discussing these delays and obstructions, you have said that the trouble is with the other side. Mr. Clifford seems to feel there is a problem on our side, as well; and this, I think, is what perhaps leads us to believe that there may, indeed, be a cleavage there.

A. We have been in close touch with our friends in South Viet-Nam. The proposals we have made in Paris are proposals we have made in agreement with the Government of South Viet-Nam.

We have laid out a very rich menu of possi-

bilities. We think they are reasonable. Any one of them would be agreeable to us. Where we get into difficulty is where the delegates of Hanoi are trying to accomplish something indirectly, by means of procedural arrangements, which they are not entitled to do.

No one in the world recognizes the NLF as a government. There are three parties at the table who are recognized, at least by a considerable number of countries, as governments: ourselves, the Government of South Viet-Nam, and the authorities in Hanoi. It is not unusual for these differences to be taken into account in international gatherings. International organizations have special rules of procedure for hearing those who are not governments.

Now, we are trying to find some way to put such questions to one side in a way that is not prejudicial, so that each side can have its own theory about who is sitting at the table. But thus far we have not had enough help from the Hanoi delegation.

Relations With Communist China

Q. Mr. Secretary, the other day Senator Russell suggested a U.S. initiative in resuming relations with Communist China. What is your own view on this?

A. Well, I think we again come to the central question which we have had for a long time now, and that is the insistence by the authorities in Peking that there is nothing to discuss unless we are prepared to surrender Taiwan.

I have had occasion to comment on that many times at press conferences, and thus far I am not aware of any change in the attitude of the authorities in Peking. This is a matter that I have no doubt the new administration will look into in connection with the forthcoming talks with the representatives of Peking in Warsaw in February. But that remains, as far as I can tell, the central question.

Q. Mr. Secretary.

A. Yes?

Q. Can you give us what the outlook is for setting the date and level of the missile talks with the Soviet Union before the end of the Johnson administration?

A. We are doing some additional work on that, but I cannot give you any guidance today

about the possible arrangements for pursuing that matter. I am just not in a position to be helpful on that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how close has been your liaison with members of the incoming administration? Do you—have you talked weekly or daily or when with the—with Mr. [William P.] Rogers—or not?

A. Mr. Rogers has been here in the Department a good deal of time since his prospective appointment was announced. He has had complete access to the Department and to the personnel in the Department. He has been very diligent about visiting different offices and different parts of the Department to see what we are like and how we conduct our business. I am always available to him. We have met on quite a number of occasions.

I have tried to give it to him in easy doses so he doesn't get it all at once; because he will face some formidable problems, and I hope very much that he and the new administration will have a very successful 1969.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what will you be doing, in what specific terms, in the next year?

A. I am deliberately—I say this very honestly—I have deliberately postponed all such questions until after January 20th. I know that I will spend some time in the Presidential libraries of President Johnson and President Kennedy, not in recording the story as I see it but in perhaps recording some helpful household hints for the future historians as to points which they ought to look into when they are trying to write about this period.

But beyond that, I haven't made specific plans. I don't want to complicate future planning with my present responsibilities.

We are going flat out between now and January 20th to try to improve some of these problems, such as the Middle East and Viet-Nam, before we turn over responsibility.

Q. Do you have any new information or any new assessment of the significance of the reduction in force—of the Mediterranean fleet that the Russians—

A. No, that varies from time to time. I think it would be a little precarious to draw any conclusions from what may be temporary variations in strength. There has been recently some reduction in that strength, but the Soviet Union

is not far away, and it could increase it again—and I would not want to speculate about what that might mean.

Security of Southeast Asia Vital to U.S.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your first press conference, nearly 8 years ago, you said, and I quote: “. . . there can be little doubt that our democracy works best when its leaders are candid.”⁶

Looking back over the 8 years and the problem which has dominated, come to dominate, this administration, would you in a final burst of candidness tell us what went wrong in Viet-Nam?

A. What went wrong in Viet-Nam was a persistent and determined attempt by the authorities in Hanoi to take over South Viet-Nam by force.

Now, at different times we were faced with a particular scale of effort on their side. Then they increased their scale. I mean after the election in 1964, for example, sometime in December, in January of 1965, the North Vietnamese began to move major units of their Regular Army into South Viet-Nam. That had to be met by ourselves and by the increase in South Vietnamese forces and by additional Allied forces.

The thing which is wrong from the very beginning about the situation in Southeast Asia is that these authorities in Hanoi have employed their military forces in Laos, in South Viet-Nam, and with trained guerrillas and other activity in Thailand, to do things to their neighbors that they are not permitted to do under general standards of international conduct. That has been our problem.

And to overcome that problem has been the agony of the situation. We are there not because we enjoy being there. We are in this struggle not because we can't think of anything else to do with our men or our resources. We are there because what we are doing there is directly related to the national interests of the United States, to determinations by our Government through our most formal constitutional processes that the security of Southeast Asia is vital to the United States, and because what

⁶ For the transcript of Secretary Rusk's news conference of Feb. 6, 1961, see BULLETIN of Feb. 27, 1961, p. 296.

happens in Southeast Asia is vital to the general peace of the world.

Q. How do you explain the inability of the administration to sell these premises to the American people?

A. I think that there are those who do not accept what has been formally decided by solemn constitutional process; that is, the significance to the peace of the world and to the interests of the United States of the security of Southeast Asia.

Let me remind you, Mr. Roberts [Chalmers M. Roberts, of the Washington Post], that we have also tried to do what is necessary in this situation calmly and soberly and without whipping up a general atmosphere of war psychology. There may be those who think that we have made a mistake in that regard. But the true fact is that there's too much power in the world. It's too dangerous for great nations to get too mad. And that has made it difficult to do calmly what has to be done, when our gallant young people in South Viet-Nam are having to risk everything to help us get this accomplished.

There may be other factors. I have expressed at times in other places my concern about whether some of the great central decisions that we made at the end of World War II are being undermined by the passage of time. When I see the sharp reductions in a prudent foreign aid budget, when I see the mobilization of protectionist interests ganging up to interfere with liberal world trade, when I see pressures to withdraw our forces from NATO in Europe, when I see some of the arguments used in opposition to the Viet-Nam war, I wonder if we do not need that great debate all over again—which we had at the end of World War II and during the late forties—in order either to reaffirm these great notions of collective security and American responsible participation in world affairs or to find something better to put in their place.

I have said many times that I would be glad if we could find something better, but I am desperately concerned lest we find something worse by inadvertence or inattention or laziness or a withdrawal from world affairs. Because the world is just too dangerous now for this country to slack off and forget its responsibility in world affairs.

Q. Mr. Secretary, this question comes from

what you have just said. It may not be a fair question. But, looking back over the 8 years, is the world a worse or a better place to live in since you took this office?

Some Hopeful Trends Throughout the World

A. Well, I'm a little reluctant to try to generalize about 8 years. They have been very crowded years, and perhaps I'm not the one to do it. I have been too heavily involved personally in so many of these events. And perhaps a little time and space will be needed before one can make a sober assessment of the period.

I must say that in the long run I am optimistic. I do believe that there is a general recognition that man is capable of utter catastrophe if he does not act with reason and with prudence and with some elements of good will.

I think there is a broad recognition that violence must be restrained; and we have had 8 years without a nuclear war, and I attach great importance to that, although most people just take it for granted. One can't take it for granted. It takes a lot of doing to be able to make that statement.

I see general trends throughout the world that are hopeful in character. I believe that over time there is going to be some reduction in the sharpest ideological confrontations and conflicts that we have seen in this postwar period. I believe some of the elementary commitments of the American constitutional system are those, as our forefathers themselves taught, of universal force, such notions as the role of the individual, personality, human dignity, the relation between the governors and the governed.

We have seen improvements in a good many special situations, such as Indonesia and the Congo, and I can name others. But we have in front of us two very dangerous situations on the near horizon right with us today; that is, Viet-Nam and the Middle East. If we could find some way to sort these things out and get them behind us, I would be relatively optimistic about the longer range.

Q. Well, Mr. Secretary, following logically your proposition that the American—or the United States should not slack off at this particular period in history, with the withdrawal of the British, for example, from Singapore and South Asia, does this not mean that we have

future commitments or will have future problems or commitments to face in that area, that Viet-Nam is only the beginning of the commitment?

A. I think it would not be for me to speculate about that very much, because that is not a question that can be relevant to the period between now and January 20th. I think the new administration will want to think about those and other questions.

We have not, in the last 8 years, been seized with what some commentators have called "pactomania." I call to your attention that President Kennedy and President Johnson and their Secretary of State have not gone down to the Senate with additional security treaties. We have concluded security treaties in this hemisphere and across the Atlantic and across the Pacific which we consider to be in the vital security interest of the United States. But we have not gone around the world trying to extend those arrangements.

One of the things that I may find a chance to comment on after I leave office is the myth of the "world's policeman." There is just no truth in the suggestion that somehow we look upon ourselves as the country that is supposed to go around everywhere in the world tidying up all the disputes that occur or intervening in them.

I had one study that indicated that in the last 400 crises of one sort or another involving the use of violence, we were involved in about six of them. We don't go around looking for business. But we are committed to those situations which are considered to be in the vital interest of the United States, and those are recorded in our solemn treaty commitments.

Implementing U.N. Resolution on Middle East

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your opening statement you said that if agreement could be reached on the principles of the U.N. resolution on the Middle East, we could move toward peace. Where does the responsibility lie? Who has not agreed to these principles? And who has? How do you move?

A. I think one of the problems—perhaps I shouldn't try to go into too much detail under these circumstances—but one of the problems is that the November resolution is not self-executing. It doesn't spell out how these various

declarations of policy are to be put into effect. Therefore, the implementation of the November resolution must be worked out by negotiation and agreement.

Now, there is some tendency for one side to try to impose upon the other a particular formulation of words. For example, some of the Arabs say that Israel must say that it will accept and implement the November resolution. Now, if that means that Israel must say that it accepts the resolution as interpreted by the Arab side, obviously this is a great difficulty for Israel. Israel has said that it will accept and implement that resolution in accordance with the agreements to be reached in the process of discussion and negotiation—in effect. This is a paraphrase. This is not their exact language.

We believe that in this situation Ambassador Jarring plays a crucial role. Israel has put to Ambassador Jarring some considerable number of points of substance with which he might be able to work with governments on the other side. There has been some response from governments on the other side, but this process has not yet grappled with the central issues in a way that would find some of those pieces of the jigsaw puzzle that I referred to earlier.

We are going to do everything we can to support Ambassador Jarring's effort and, beyond that, to do what we can in the capitals on both sides to see if we ourselves can help find some of these pieces to the jigsaw puzzle and begin to put this thing into shape.

Q. Is this situation acute enough at the moment to bring Dr. Jarring back from Moscow and get him into play again?

A. Well, I think it's acute. I think that Ambassador Jarring has been talking with the parties about his own arrangements. And I wouldn't want to comment on what those might be.

What concerns me is the continual military activity on the cease-fire lines. The terrorists on the Arab side have to accept a very heavy responsibility for their unwillingness to accept the cease-fire lines and leave the situation in an atmosphere or a mood where some progress toward peace can be made. One can understand how impatient the Israelis get from time to time when these terrorist raids continue, raids for which the Arab governments do not accept direct responsibility. And that leads to

action which, again, inflames the situation further.

There have been too many of these incidents. We would like to see both sides act with the utmost restraint here to try to give us a few months in which you don't have this violence occurring in order that we can make a maximum effort through Ambassador Jarring and otherwise to begin to put these pieces together.

Q. But this has not been the experience since June of '67 and, unfortunately, is not likely to be the experience in the time ahead. What can we do despite this?

A. Well, in diplomacy you never throw in your hand. It's true that we have not made as much progress since June 1967, and Ambassador Jarring has not made as much progress, as all of us would have hoped. But there is a very simple answer to that. You try and you try again. You don't give up. Because when diplomacy throws in its hand, then there is nothing left but the guns and the soldiers. And no one wants that answer.

Q. Dr. Jarring's being in Moscow does not mean he has thrown in his hand?

A. No.

Q. There is no need to get him into play at this moment?

A. Well, that is—I don't want to comment on his schedule or his travel plans and things like that. You put a question to him in Moscow on that if you can find—get access to him.

Q. Would you favor that?

A. I think he is continuing his activity, and we would strongly favor that, and we will give him all the support we can.

Q. Mr. Secretary, thank you. We hope that wasn't your valedictory.

A. Thank you very much.

U.S. Citizens Visiting Morocco May Purchase U.S.-Owned Dirhams

The Department of State and the Treasury Department announced on January 5 (Department of State press release 2 dated January 3 for release January 6) that United States citizens visiting or residing in Morocco may purchase Moroccan dirhams from the United States Embassy and consulates general in Morocco. Sales will be made at the official rate of exchange, and no conversion fees will be charged.

United States-owned foreign currencies are now being sold to American tourists, businessmen, and residents in eight countries. The others are Ceylon, Guinea, India, Israel, Pakistan, Tunisia, and the U.A.R. (Egypt).

Purchases of these United States-owned currencies by private American citizens relieve strain on the United States balance of payments by reducing the flow of dollars abroad. The United States Government, therefore, urges Americans to take advantage of these arrangements.

In Morocco, Moroccan dirhams owned by the U.S. Government may be purchased at the United States Embassy in Rabat and at the American consulates general in Casablanca and Tangier in exchange for United States currency, personal checks drawn on a bank in the United States, or for United States travelers checks. Purchasers must present their passports for identification.

U.N. Security Council Condemns Israel for Attack on Beirut Airport

Following are statements made in the Security Council on December 29 and 31 by U.S. Representative James Russell Wiggins and the text of a resolution adopted by the Council on December 31.

STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 29

U.S./U.N. press release 274 dated December 29

The year ends on a note of tragedy and violence in the Middle East. The Council, which has met so many times during the year to consider acts of terrorism and military counteraction, meets on this occasion to deal with a most regrettable Israeli action, which my Government strongly condemns.

As Ambassador Goldberg stated in the Council on March 21,¹ my Government opposes violence from any quarter in the Middle East. Carrying the pattern of terrorism and reprisal into the centers of international commerce and travel adds a new dimension of destruction and risk which directly touches the interests of all states.

My Government can understand, and in fact shares, the concern of the Israeli Government over the increasing interference with the right of unimpeded air travel between states. Israel was rightly aroused and legitimately concerned about the attack upon an Israeli aircraft in Athens on December 26 and the previous hijacking of another Israeli airliner. The free movement of peaceful transport among countries is a matter to which we are going to have to give increasing attention. Armed intervention that interrupts the movement of civilian aircraft is an outrageous disregard of the laws of nations and an intolerable interference with the safety of civilian passengers.

However, the United States feels that this

action does not justify the Israeli retaliation of December 28. In the first place, we do not see a justification for a retaliation of any kind against Lebanon. Nothing that we heard has convinced us that the Government of Lebanon is responsible for the occurrence in Athens. To the contrary, the Lebanese Government has made efforts to control the actions of Fedayeen groups on its territory. Lebanon is a country which clearly has been doing its best to live in peace with all other states in the area.

Secondly, apart from the question of Lebanese culpability, the Israeli action is unjustified. Such a military attack upon an international airport is an unacceptable form of international behavior. In magnitude it is entirely disproportionate to the act which preceded it. It is disproportionate in two ways: first, in the degree of destruction involved; and second, and more fundamental, in the difference between the acts of two individual terrorists and those of a sizable official military force operating under governmental orders. It can be attributed to good fortune that there was no loss of life. The risk to scores of innocent people, including passengers on aircraft in the airport at the time, was very great. Our reports confirm a substantial amount of damage to equipment and facilities.

Beyond a strong sense of concern at this specific action is the increasing evidence that terrorism and other acts of violence have become a way of life in the Middle East. We see no way to peace in this direction. The history of the past year has shown that violence leads to violence and that retaliation does not bring a halt to terrorism. In fact, it tends to weaken the forces of peace rather than to strengthen them.

Mr. President, it must now be plain to the Government of Israel itself that the attack on the International Airport at Beirut has introduced new dangers into the already alarming

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 15, 1968, p. 508.

U.S./U.N. press release 276 dated December 31

In view of the extent to which this debate has wandered from the matters relevant to the agenda adopted on Sunday, December 29, I feel obliged to say that the remarks of my delegation have been addressed to the attack upon the Beirut Airport on December 28 and the incident at the Athens Airport on December 26.

We wish explicitly to dissociate ourselves from the sweeping generalizations, the crude denunciations, and the reckless attacks upon Israel for alleged policies and acts having nothing to do with episodes properly before us. Israel is not on trial here for its life. Israel is not being asked here to defend its right to exist. This Council is not a court, sitting on all the issues of the 1967 war, the 1956 war, the 1948 war, and authorized to pronounce final judgment on all matters in between the wars. If it were such an omnipotent court, we doubt not but that Israel could give an effective accounting of its struggle to survive the repeated acts of hostility that have contributed to the climate in the Middle East out of which these latest acts of violence have emerged.

It has been alleged, in the course of this debate, that my Government, in supporting the resolution before us, has exhibited inconsistency. It is the kind of inconsistency of which Abraham Lincoln spoke when he said that he stuck by his friends while they were right and parted with them when they were wrong. We do not apologize for the fact that our policies are governed by principle or for the coincidence that friends sometimes disagree on principle. On the contrary, we suspect that if some other members of this Council were equally willing to differ with their friends on occasion, peace would be more secure than it now is.

I have spoken previously on the views of my Government toward disarmament in the Middle East and on the willingness of the United States at any time to discuss measures to limit the flow of arms into the area. President Johnson has repeatedly pointed out that the suspension of this traffic is one of the conditions of peace in the Middle East.

The resolution we have just voted does not entirely suit my delegation. It is our view that all these interventions against civil aviation are intolerable and that they place in jeopardy the lives and property of innocent persons, even when by good luck or good fortune that risk

situation in the Middle East. This destructive operation has enlarged the ring of reprisal and widened the circle of terror to touch areas and peoples hitherto struggling to keep aloof from these measures. Surely the Government of Israel must be having sober second thoughts about this act of arrogance. It would be a refreshing variation from previous patterns of behavior in the region if that Government would candidly and frankly itself give voice to its own misgivings about the results of its military operation. An honest acknowledgement that this enterprise was ill conceived and a candid expression of regret would illumine the bleak political landscape of the region like a flash in the night. It would reassure the friends of Israel who regret a situation in which that Government seems to be putting its confidence in the almost unrestricted use of force. It would silence many of Israel's critics who find in this episode new arguments with which to reproach the Israeli Government. It would even set before its enemies an example of reasonableness without which peace can never be achieved in the Middle East.

Mr. President, the Security Council—every member of the United Nations—has a responsibility to help break the pattern of violence in the Middle East. We hope this Council will speak promptly and clearly on the issues before it. Surely all of the parties in the area have a responsibility to adhere scrupulously to the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council. Surely it is evident to all that a meaningful arms limitation agreement in the area should not await the conclusion of a political settlement of differences which have proved intractable for over two decades. Surely the principal parties in the area, as well as the members of this Council, must redouble their efforts in support of the mission of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, whose whole purpose is to help facilitate the just and lasting peace which would benefit all peoples of the area and help bulwark the political independence and territorial integrity of both the Israeli and Arab states.

The time is long past for a halt in the vicious cycles that could lead to further tragedy, pain, and destruction. For its part, the United States is prepared to support prompt action by the Security Council to condemn this latest Israeli action. In the meantime, we will continue our intensive efforts in support of Ambassador Jarring as we will continue to seek a meaningful arms limitation agreement in the area. In these ways the foundation for peace in the Middle East can be developed.

does not result in great loss of life. This body, in our view, should put the United Nations in the forefront of an effort to perfect new rules of international law that will give to the great airports of the world and to civilian air transport generally a special status that will provide for appropriate examination of every situation in which that status is disregarded. Not having dealt extensively with this matter in this resolution, it remains for the Security Council or other appropriate agencies to deal with it soon, so as to make it clear that no pretext whatever justifies interference with international civil aviation.

Notwithstanding any differences over language or substance, however, my Government supports this resolution and endorses its condemnation of the military action against the airport at Beirut, in accordance with my Government's initial response to this operation.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ²

The Security Council,

Having considered the agenda contained in document S/Agenda/1462,

Having noted the contents of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon (document S/8945),

Having noted the supplementary information provided by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization contained in documents S/7930/Add. 107 and 108,

Having heard the statements of the representative of Lebanon and of the representative of Israel concerning the grave attack committed against the civil International Airport of Beirut,

Observing that the military action by the armed forces of Israel against the civil International Airport of Beirut was premeditated and of a large scale and carefully planned nature,

Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation resulting from this violation of the Security Council resolutions,

And deeply concerned about the need to assure free uninterrupted international civil air traffic,

1. *Condemns* Israel for its premeditated military action in violation of its obligations under the Charter and the cease-fire resolutions;

2. *Considers* that such premeditated acts of violence endanger the maintenance of the peace;

3. *Issues* a solemn warning to Israel that if such acts were to be repeated, the Council would have to consider further steps to give effect to its decisions;

4. *Considers* that Lebanon is entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction it suffered, responsibility for which has been acknowledged by Israel.

² U.N. doc. S/RES/262 (1968); adopted unanimously by the Security Council on Dec. 31.

The U.N. Bond Repayments Issue

*Statement by James Russell Wiggins
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

The General Assembly has before it a draft resolution calling for a study of the legal commitments it made in 1961 when it provided for the repayment of approximately \$170 million worth of United Nations bonds.² It is just 7 years too late for this body to revise the terms of a contract which it freely entered into or to study the rearrangement of the security it then pledged for the liquidation of this debt.

The authors of this proposal have made clear their wish to abandon the established formula, on the basis of which the United Nations has pledged its good faith and its credit, and put in its place some other formula by which certain members would pay less than they now do and others would be expected to pay more.

I do not question the intentions of the proponents of this resolution; I speak only of its certain effects. The question which it would reopen was conclusively decided 7 years ago by the General Assembly, which stipulated in authorizing the issuance of United Nations bonds that the repayment of principal and interest on these bonds would be provided for in the regular budget of the United Nations and thus would be assessed against the members according to the regular scale of assessments.

The authority for United Nations bonds was contained in Resolution 1739. It provided for bonds with an interest rate of 2 percent and a term of 25 years—very unattractive terms, yet nearly \$170 million of bonds were subscribed by 64 member states, simply because these members set a great value on the United Nations and wanted to help restore it to financial health. On that basis my own country subscribed some \$76 million of the bond issue, nearly half of the bonds that were sold.

It was the same Resolution 1739 that provided also for the repayment of principal and interest on the bonds through the regular budget of the United Nations and therefore under the regular scale of assessments on each member. And let me point out to the members that the bonds themselves have printed on them, as an earnest of the good faith of the United Na-

¹ Made in plenary on Dec. 21 (U.S./U.N. press release 272).

² For text of draft resolution XI recommended by Committee V, see U.N. doc. A/7476, p. 77.

tions, the full text of Resolution 1739, adopted December 20, 1961. Here is a facsimile copy of a United Nations bond, and from that bond I now read paragraph 3 of the resolution, by which the Assembly

Decides to include annually in the regular budget of the United Nations, beginning with the budget for the year 1963, an amount sufficient to pay the interest charges on such bonds and the instalments of principal due on the bonds.

Now, why was that resolution printed on the bonds? Clearly, because the General Assembly's decision concerning the terms of the bonds, including particularly the method of repayment, was the fundamental assurance of the good faith of the United Nations that the bonds would be honored. The words of the resolution which I just quoted concerning repayment through the regular budget are, as the representative of Italy said in the debate in the Fifth Committee, "the very clause which guaranteed the execution of the contract." Yet that is the clause which the draft resolution now before us proposes to reopen.

Let me remind the Assembly that 64 governments, including the United States, in presenting the request for purchase of United Nations bonds to their respective parliaments, relied on the commitment of the General Assembly as to the basis on which the bonds would be repaid. The United States Government assured the United States Congress that the United Nations would live up to its commitments as to the method of repayment.

In spite of these considerations, the pending draft resolution has been recommended to us by its sponsors on two counts, both of which, I submit, are not persuasive. First, the sponsors have made clear that they would like to relieve the less developed countries of what is represented as a heavy burden on them. Second, they propose by this means to bolster "the hope of the Secretary-General . . . that the United Nations might celebrate its twenty-fifth anniversary as a financially sound and solvent organization."

I submit, Mr. President, that the resolution is the wrong way to pursue both of these declared objectives.

As for the burden on the less developed countries, the dollars and cents involved are not large amounts by any standards. For the majority of members falling in the less developed category, the assessment that goes to repay the bonds is on the order of \$3,500 a year. What

such a country would save if its share were reduced would thus be some amount between that figure and zero.

Moreover, the analogy by which the resolution suggests that this already small burden be reduced does not stand up to scrutiny. The preamble refers to resolutions of 1962 and 1963, reducing the share of the less developed countries for the further costs of the two peace-keeping operations in question. When those resolutions were adopted, the bond issue had already been approved and its method of repayment had been established; yet nothing was said in the resolutions of 1962 and 1963, or in any subsequent decision of the Assembly, about changing the method of repayment of the bonds. It was recognized then, as it must still be recognized now, that that method of repayment had already been conclusively decided, the good faith of the United Nations was engaged upon it, and it could not be reopened.

Now let me say a word about the second argument: that the proposed move would in some way improve the prospects for the United Nations to celebrate its 25th anniversary in a financially sound and solvent condition. This is the exact reverse of the reality. A decision to reopen the method of repayment of the bonds would immediately call into question the credit of the United Nations.

This may not be the last time that the United Nations finds it necessary to resort to an issue of its bonds in order to meet a financial crisis. It will be a poor assurance to any future bond purchaser if the United Nations has to acknowledge that it is willing to reconsider the terms nominated in its bonds, to revise the method of repayment, or to diminish the reliability of the source of that repayment.

Mr. President, I am obliged to say that if the Assembly were to make a change in the methods, terms, or conditions of repayment of the bonds, the United States would have to take a very hard look at the entire range of United Nations finances.

Let me make it quite clear why the United States feels so strongly on this issue and what interests of ours we seek to protect. To us this is not simply a pocketbook matter. My country's pecuniary interest in the bonds is and will be protected regardless of the pending resolution. The law of the United States requires that, as a bondholder, the United States deduct from its annual assessed contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations "an amount equal

to the corresponding annual installment of principal and interest due to the United States" on account of the \$76 million in United Nations bonds which we hold.

But the interest of the United States in this matter is more than financial and budgetary. It is an interest in the United Nations itself, in its vigor, its honor, its standing and effectiveness in the councils of the world. That, I trust, is an interest which all members, whatever our differences, hold in common and must defend in common.

The pending resolution, Mr. President, is a direct threat to that common interest. Nor can we take any comfort from the fact that the draft resolution only provides for a study by an essentially technical body, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. The question proposed for study is not a technical but a political question of great magnitude. It is entirely inappropriate for consideration by the advisory committee. The injection of such a far-reaching question into such a technical body would be an exceedingly bad precedent. But no matter what body is given such an assignment, the raising of this question by the General Assembly would be rightly regarded throughout the world as a self-inflicted blow to the good name of this organization.

There are ways in which to advance the financial soundness of the United Nations and to relieve the burdens of all of us who now contribute to the repayment of the bonds. The best way is one which the pending resolution does not even mention. It is to insist that all the duly levied assessments against member states be paid, especially those assessments for peace-

keeping expenditures which a number of important members have refused to pay although they are financially quite able to do so. Let all such past assessments and arrearages be paid without further delay, and most of the bond issue can then be quickly retired. Let current assessments be paid in full, and let those countries that now arbitrarily withhold certain parts of their duly assessed contributions to the regular budget stop this crippling practice. That is the proper road to financial soundness and to a lifting of the unfair burdens which fall on the more conscientious members, developed and less developed alike.

Mr. President, the size of any country's pledged obligations is indeed a proper subject for concern, whether the payment in question be a few thousand dollars or many millions. But far more important is whether we keep to those obligations which we have pledged in the name of the United Nations. For the good name and good health of the United Nations are a boon to all of us, far beyond any monetary price that has been spoken of in this debate.

Whatever the future may hold for the family of nations, the United Nations, as a center for peace and freedom and fruitful collaboration among the nations of the earth, will have a great and noble work to perform. Let us now be mindful of that future and let us resolve not to weaken or undermine this our common instrument and common hope.

I trust that the resolution will be rejected.³

³ On Dec. 21, after approving a U.K. proposal that a two-thirds majority be required for adoption of draft resolution XI, the Assembly rejected the resolution by a rollcall vote of 51 to 34 (U.S.), with 33 abstentions.

U.S. Proposes Worldwide Seismic Investigation of Underground Nuclear Explosions

Following is a statement made in U.N. Committee I (Political and Security) by William C. Foster, U.S. Representative to the General Assembly, on December 5, together with texts of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on December 20.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR FOSTER

U.S./U.N. press release 229 dated December 5

The past year has been one of substantial accomplishment in the field of arms control and disarmament. This should encourage us to face up to the need for making even greater progress in the future if we are to achieve the momentum required to turn back the nuclear arms race and to begin making progress in other areas of arms control and disarmament. The United States believes the Nonproliferation Treaty holds the promise of facilitating further significant progress.

I have already shared with the committee my Government's views on prospects for international cooperation opened up by the treaty. We have emphasized that turning these prospects into concrete achievements requires an approach which will enable the competent bodies and experts to get to work without delay.

Today, I would like to discuss several of the arms control and disarmament questions now before the committee and the related draft resolutions, bearing in mind the practical, step-by-step approach which has led to progress.

Foremost among the arms control issues which have seized our attention for more than two decades is the problem of nuclear disarmament. The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee recognized the preeminence of this area of concern in the program of work which was adopted at its last session. From the discussion in this committee, it is also clear that within this broad and complex field, the question of further limitations on nuclear weapon testing stands as a priority item.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I would like first to comment on the draft resolution placed before the committee on the suspension of nuclear tests.¹ On numerous occasions in the past, and particularly since the conclusion of the limited test ban treaty in 1963, my delegation has strongly supported the conclusion of an adequately verified comprehensive test ban. We remain convinced that if we are to reach such an agreement, we must continue to work toward a treaty providing for adequate verification.

As for the draft resolution before us, the United States delegation intends to support it as in fact we supported similar resolutions during previous sessions of the General Assembly. I would, in addition, like to reemphasize the basic point of our remarks on those previous occasions. We made clear, and I wish to repeat, that with respect to operative paragraph 2 of the present resolution, we understand the call for a suspension of tests in all environments to mean suspension pursuant to an adequately verified treaty.

I am pleased to note that the present resolution expresses the hope that states will contribute to an effective international exchange of seismic data. As all delegations are aware, the United States has, in connection with possible limitations on nuclear testing, long urged increased international exchange of seismic data. We have also urged, in the same context, technical discussions relating to identification of seismic events. Therefore, it was especially heartening to us that the meetings of the Seismic Study Group of the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research held earlier this year in Sweden were able to accomplish much in both these areas. There can be no doubt that exchanges and discussions such as occurred at the Seismic Study Group meetings can be very useful and should continue to be encouraged.

In this connection I should like to note that

¹ U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.447; approved by Committee I on Dec. 10 and adopted by the General Assembly on Dec. 20 (A/RES/2455 (XXIII)).

there has been an unfortunate tendency in some quarters to draw unwarranted conclusions from the opinions given in the summary report of the study group's meetings. A careful reading of this summary report will leave no one in doubt that the participants agreed that there were sizable manmade explosions which could not be identified as such—that is, differentiated from earthquakes—using only the available long-range seismic identification criteria. These unidentifiable events are in the range of explosive yields equivalent to many tens of thousands of tons of TNT.

Thus, the explosions which were agreed to be unidentifiable seismically by the Seismic Study Group participants are indeed of yields which are of great military significance. The technical inability to distinguish at long distances between explosions and earthquakes in this yield range is one which cannot be dismissed, no matter how much some might value the political advantages of doing so.

U.S. Seismic Research Projects

The United States has reported from time to time on seismic research it is undertaking to improve the capability for detecting and identifying underground seismic events, and I should now like to mention briefly several recent endeavors.

The Montana Large Aperture Seismic Array (LASA), established in 1965 and previously described in detail here and at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, continues to be operated as a research tool to provide data for evaluation of the detection capability of such arrays. The LASA is also used for studies of identification techniques utilizing high-quality long- and short-period array data and for development and evaluation of sophisticated on-line and offline data processing techniques for handling the large volume of data generated by large arrays.

In accordance with an agreement signed in June of this year between the Governments of the United States and Norway, a second large aperture seismic array, the Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR), will be installed as a cooperative enterprise in southern Norway. Preliminary studies began in 1967, and the NORSAR is expected to be completed by the fall of 1969. It will be operated by Norwegian agencies.

The NORSAR will permit evaluation of performance of large aperture arrays in geologic

and geographic environments different from the Montana LASA. Among other things, the NORSAR will allow a determination of the improvement that can be made in identification of small seismic events by using multiple large arrays. The NORSAR will consist of a heptagonal pattern of 22 subarrays, each of which will contain six short-period seismographs and one three-component long-period seismograph, with data being transformed into digital form at the center of each subarray and transmitted by telephone lines to a central point for processing and analysis. The total array aperture will be about 110 kilometers.

When the Gasbuggy underground nuclear explosion experiment for gas stimulation was performed in New Mexico on December 10, 1967, as part of the United States Atomic Energy Commission's Plowshare Program, advantage was taken of the opportunity to record this relatively large seismic-energy source—26 kilotons—in order to obtain data on the crust and upper mantle of the earth in the region of the explosion. More than 50 portable seismic stations were especially deployed to record this event at distances ranging from 50 to several thousand kilometers.

The average seismic magnitude of the Gasbuggy explosion was 4.5. Detailed studies of the structure of the crust and upper mantle are presently in progress and will be made available when completed. It is certain that detailed studies of the Gasbuggy data will significantly add to our knowledge of the crust and upper mantle structure in North America and of the seismic characteristics of this structure.

Of course, data has been released for other U.S. underground nuclear explosions, and this release has proven most useful for seismic purposes worldwide. Indeed, some explosions, such as the Long Shot experiment of the United States Department of Defense's Vela program in 1965, have had preplanned worldwide seismic coverage.

As demonstrated by activities such as these, the United States is continuing to devote considerable resources to seismic research so as to improve the capability to detect and identify underground seismic events. However, it is a fact that with the existing technology we are unable to gather all available seismic data at long distances. We are unable at such distances to detect or locate accurately all seismic events or to identify positively whether certain seismic signals come from earthquakes or manmade explosions.

Fortunately, there is clearly a widespread desire, fully shared by the United States, for further advancement in seismic technology and for increased international exchange of information in this field.

Seismic Investigation Proposal

It is in keeping with this desire that I should like to present today a proposal which the United States considers could do much to advance objectives in these areas. The United States proposes that some underground nuclear explosions be conducted with the collateral objective that these serve as explosions for worldwide seismic investigation. This investigation is one in which all states with the appropriate seismic instrumentation could participate. Indeed, the success of this proposal would depend in large measure on the extent of worldwide participation in the collection and evaluation of the seismic data.

Such underground explosions could provide, among other things, a means of determining important seismological characteristics both of the geological media and of the explosions. Furthermore, implementation of the proposal would systematize, in a most valuable manner, worldwide use for seismic purposes of information released on certain underground nuclear explosions as well as worldwide evaluation of seismic information gathered on such explosions.

I should like to note that the United States underground nuclear explosions contemplated in connection with this proposal would not involve development or testing of nuclear weapons.

The proposal would be implemented as follows: Sufficiently in advance of an explosion with the collateral seismic purpose, seismic stations throughout the world would be alerted so as to be fully prepared to record the explosion. Data on scheduled time, location, depth, geological medium, and predicted explosive yield would also be provided in advance. Following the explosion, the actual time of explosion, yield, and other pertinent data from national seismic systems would be furnished.

Seismic data would then be exchanged worldwide. To compare known results with derived results, interested states would in turn calculate, using the seismic data, the explosion's geographic coordinates, time of origin, and explosive yield. The states would also calculate the explosion's measured seismic magnitude. Also, they would analyze the data using various avail-

able identification criteria, such as the surface-wave/body-wave magnitude criterion, which the Stockholm Seismic Study Group considered to be of significant value. The results of the seismic analysis would be published and distributed and then could be discussed in the relevant forums.

As I have already said, the success of this proposal would depend greatly on the extent of worldwide participation in collecting and evaluating the seismic data; and I am sure that a great many states would want to participate to the fullest extent possible and thus assure the success of this endeavor.

Of course, it will be obvious to this audience that the carrying out of the seismic investigation proposal, useful as it would be, would not be in any way a panacea for the problems regarding negotiation of a comprehensive test ban. A situation whereby the world's seismic stations are in a very high state of readiness, awaiting an explosion of known and substantial yield in a specified location and medium and for which no attempt at evasion would be made, simply cannot be considered as being directly relevant and applicable to a comprehensive test ban situation. However, a proposal need not be a cure-all to be of value. The United States is convinced that its proposal for seismic investigation using underground nuclear explosions is of significant value and has much to commend it. Finally, this is a proposal in which many states represented here can and, we hope, will participate directly and fruitfully.

This proposal, Mr. Chairman, is the kind of practical effort required to make serious progress in the field of arms control and disarmament.

Chemical and Bacteriological Warfare

My Government is gratified that a practical approach has also been suggested in tackling the question of chemical and biological warfare.

The draft resolution² on this subject before the committee properly reflects the serious concern which has been expressed over the potential threat to mankind posed by the development and possible use of lethal chemical and biological weapons. We believe this proposal constitutes a realistic first step to further consideration of an issue that has only too often been

² U.N. doc A/C.1/L.444; approved by Committee I on Dec. 6 and adopted by the General Assembly on Dec. 20 (A/RES/2454 A (XXIII)).

approached with divisive political motives by some who have sought to exploit it mainly for propaganda purposes.

I would now like to discuss the draft resolution before us. The United States is pleased to associate itself again with the request in operative paragraph 1 that the Secretary-General prepare a concise report on the effects of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare, in accordance with both the proposal in part II, paragraph 32, of his introduction to the annual report for 1967-68³ and the recommendation contained in paragraph 26 of the recent report by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.⁴

My Government, however, would like to suggest that such a study should deal equally and individually with the effects of chemical and biological weapons. In our view, the scientific and technological differences between the two systems, as well as differences which obtain in their operational applications, warrant such a particular approach to each category of weapons.

While the language in the recommendation by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee specifically refers to chemical and bacteriological means of warfare, it is our understanding that the latter would embrace those types of weapons also referred to as biological, as is made clear in the Secretary-General's introduction to his report to the 23d General Assembly. I might add that this form of warfare is also at times referred to as microbial warfare, bacterial warfare, microbiological warfare, or germ warfare. We should all understand that it means disease-causing living micro-organisms, be they bacteria, viruses, or whatever, used as deliberate weapons of war.

The United States earnestly hopes that a study undertaken along these lines will provide the requisite scientific and technical perspective for further consideration by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and this committee of ways of dealing with these weapons; and as requested in operative paragraph 3, we are prepared to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General as well as with the experts appointed by him.

Mr. Chairman, my Government agrees with the request in operative paragraph 4 that the report be furnished to the Eighteen-Nation Dis-

armament Committee, the Security Council, and the General Assembly at an early date. At the same time, we believe the experts should be given sufficient time to develop a complete and technically sound appraisal of the effects of such weapons.

Also, the United States welcomes the reaffirmation in preambular paragraph 1 of General Assembly Resolution 2162 B (XXI), of December 5, 1966, which, *inter alia*, called for the strict observance by all states of the principles and objectives of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare and condemned all actions contrary to those objectives. However, in noting that operative paragraph 6 of the draft now before us reiterates, in effect, both operative paragraphs of Resolution 2162B, I should like to recall that the United States cosponsored and supported the first operative paragraph of Resolution 2162 B, which I have just cited. At that time, my Government set forth its position with regard to that protocol and our consistent support of its principles and objectives, together with our reasons for not having ratified that instrument.

I would like to reiterate that the United States takes the view that whether, or by what procedure, states that have not yet done so should adhere to the Geneva protocol is for each of them to decide in the light of constitutional and other considerations that may determine their adherence to any international instrument. Accordingly, we regard the substance of operative paragraph 6 as not intended to prejudice for political purposes the results of the study to be undertaken.

Other Draft Resolutions

Mr. Chairman, I should like to comment briefly on the resolution that would request the Secretary-General to ascertain the position of member governments on establishing a system for the registration and publication of information on the international transfer of conventional arms, ammunition, and implements of war.⁵ My delegation believes the resolution would provide an opportunity for governments to give serious thought to, and to make their views known on, a subject where progress is

³ U.N. doc. A/7201/Add. 1.

⁴ U.N. doc. A/7189.

⁵ U.N. doc. A/C.1/466; not pressed to a vote in Committee I.

needed: the subject of conventional arms transfers. This is an important, as well as a complex and difficult, subject.

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to say a few words on the problems of general and complete disarmament. It is one of mankind's oldest hopes and it continues to be an urgent task.

No one who is familiar with the complex negotiations which led to the limited test ban treaty, the Outer Space and Antarctic Treaties, and the Nonproliferation Treaty can have any illusion that the road to general and complete disarmament is an easy one. But however difficult that road may be, my Government remains determined that general and complete disarmament must be our final goal.

My Government supports the draft resolution requesting the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to pursue renewed efforts toward achieving substantial progress on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as well as on important partial measures of disarmament.⁶

We also have before us a draft resolution submitted by the distinguished representative of Cyprus.⁷ While appreciating the concerns which underlie this suggestion, I frankly believe it would be most inadvisable to place before the United Nations Disarmament Commission, as this draft resolution proposes, most of the major problems that confront the United Nations. In particular the United States would oppose a change in the established mandate of the UNDC in order to include matters not now within its competence. Grafting additional responsibilities onto a body charged with arms control and disarmament would so overload it as to render it ineffective. Moreover, a broadened and diffused mandate could lead to overlap and interference in the work of other institutions.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to comment on the draft resolution on the nonnuclear conference submitted by the delegations of Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Japan, and the Netherlands.⁸ As everyone is aware, my Government was not a voting participant in that conference. For this reason, and quite apart from some of the views it expresses, we do not

⁶ U.N. doc. A/C.1/448/Rev.2; approved by Committee I on Dec. 6 and adopted by the General Assembly on Dec. 20 (A/RES/2454 B (XXIII)).

⁷ U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.449; not pressed to a vote in Committee I.

⁸ U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.450; withdrawn by the cosponsors on Dec. 17.

believe the United States should be asked to endorse the declaration of the conference.

However, aside from this reservation, I find that overall this resolution does embody an approach to the problem of dealing with the results of the nonnuclear conference that the United States can support. It meets our concern that existing bodies have an opportunity to work on the constructive suggestions adopted at the nonnuclear conference and that subsequently the General Assembly have an opportunity to look at the results of these efforts to see whether further steps might be required—including, in that context, the possibility of convening a session of the UNDC. To consider calling for further steps before the 24th session of the General Assembly would, in our view, be premature and detrimental to the efforts underway in existing bodies. Notwithstanding our reservation concerning the declaration, we hope, Mr. Chairman, that this resolution will find wide support in this committee and in the plenary of the General Assembly.

TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS

Question of General and Complete Disarmament⁹

A

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the recommendations of its resolution 2162 B (XXI) of 5 December 1966 calling for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, condemning all actions contrary to those objectives and inviting all States to accede to that Protocol,

Considering that the possibility of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons constitutes a serious threat to mankind,

Believing that the people of the world should be made aware of the consequences of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons,

Having considered the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament which recommended that the Secretary-General appoint a group of experts to study the effects of the possible use of such weapons,

Noting the interest in a report on various aspects of the problem of chemical, bacteriological and other biological weapons which has been expressed by many Governments and the welcome given to the recommendation of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament by the Secretary-General in the

⁹ U.N. doc. A/RES/2454 (XXIII); adopted by the General Assembly on Dec. 20.

introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization for 1967-1968,

Believing that such a study would provide a valuable contribution to the consideration in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament of the problems connected with chemical and bacteriological weapons,

Recalling the value of the report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to prepare a concise report in accordance with the proposal in section II of the introduction to his annual report for 1967-1968 and in accordance with the recommendation of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament contained in paragraph 26 of its report;

2. *Recommends* that the report be based on accessible material and prepared with the assistance of qualified consultant experts appointed by the Secretary-General, taking into account the views expressed and the suggestions made during the discussion of this item at the twenty-third session of the General Assembly;

3. *Calls upon* Governments, national and international scientific institutions and organizations to cooperate with the Secretary-General in the preparation of the report;

4. *Requests* that the report be transmitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the Security Council and the General Assembly at an early date, if possible by 1 July 1969, and to the Governments of Member States in time to permit its consideration at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly;

5. *Recommends* that Governments give the report wide distribution in their respective languages, through various media of communication, so as to acquaint public opinion with its contents;

6. *Reiterates* its call for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 and invites all States to accede to that Protocol.

B

The General Assembly,

Considering that one of the main purposes of the United Nations is to save mankind from the scourge of war,

Convinced that the armaments race, in particular the nuclear arms race, constitutes a threat to peace,

Believing that it is imperative to exert further efforts towards reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Noting with satisfaction the agreement of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America to enter into bilateral discussions on the limitation and the reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles,

Having received the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, to which are annexed documents presented by the delegations of the eight non-aligned members of the Committee and by Italy, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America,

Noting the Memorandum of 1 July 1968 of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and

achieve disarmament¹⁰ and other proposals for collateral measures which have been submitted at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,

Recalling its resolutions 1767 (XVII) of 21 November 1962, 1908 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, 2031 (XX) of 3 December 1965, 2162 C (XXI) of 5 December 1966, 2344 (XXII) of 19 December 1967 and 2342 B (XXII) of 19 December 1967,

1. *Requests* the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to pursue renewed efforts towards achieving substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and urgently to analyse the plans already under consideration and others that might be put forward to see how in particular rapid progress could be made in the field of nuclear disarmament;

2. *Further requests* the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to continue its urgent efforts to negotiate collateral measures of disarmament;

3. *Decides* to refer to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament all documents and records of the meetings of the First Committee concerning all matters related to the disarmament question;

4. *Requests* the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume its work as early as possible and to report to the General Assembly, as appropriate, on the progress achieved.

Urgent Need for Suspension of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests¹¹

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,

Recalling its resolutions 1762 (XVII) of 6 November 1962, 1910 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, 2032 (XX) of 3 December 1965, 2163 (XXI) of 5 December 1966 and 2343 (XXII) of 19 December 1967,

Recalling further the Joint Memorandum on a comprehensive test ban treaty submitted on 26 August 1968 by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic and annexed to the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,

Noting with regret the fact that all States have not yet adhered to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963,

Noting with increasing concern that nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere and underground are continuing,

Taking into account the existing possibilities of establishing, through international co-operation, an exchange on a voluntary basis of seismic data so as to create a better scientific basis for national evaluation of seismic events,

¹⁰ U.N. doc. A/7134.

¹¹ U.N. doc. A/RES/2455 (XXIII); adopted by the General Assembly on Dec. 20.

Recognizing the importance of seismology in the verification of the observance of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests,

Noting in this connexion that experts from various countries, including four nuclear-weapon States, have recently met unofficially in order to exchange views and hold discussions in regard to the adequacy of seismic methods for monitoring underground explosions, and the hope expressed that such discussions would be continued,

1. *Urges* all States which have not done so to adhere without further delay to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water;

2. *Calls upon* all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear weapon tests in all environments;

3. *Expresses the hope* that States will contribute to an effective international exchange of seismic data;

4. *Requests* the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to take up as a matter of urgency the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests and to report to the General Assembly on this matter at its twenty-fourth session.

U.N. To Develop Plans To Control Illegal Narcotic Drug Crops

*Statement by David F. Squire*¹

On behalf of the delegations of India, Mauritius, Pakistan, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, and the United States, I have the honor to introduce draft resolution A/C.3/L.1650.

There was a time when narcotic drug addiction was found only in a few countries in certain parts of the world, but now the situation is completely changed. There are no longer any frontiers to drug abuse and no country can be immune from it. The World Health Organization has said that every year there is evidence that drug abuse is spreading like an epidemic and it is reaching out to new countries and to new groups of people, especially young people. In a very real sense, drug addiction has already become an obstacle to economic and social development in some countries.

This drug addiction is supplied almost 100 percent by narcotic drugs—opium, cannabis

¹ Made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural) on Dec. 17 (U.S./U.N. press release 262). Mr. Squire is Alternate U.S. Representative in the committee.

(also known as hashish or marihuana) and coca leaf—produced illicitly, or outside government control, in a few parts of the world.

The irony is that the producers of these narcotic drugs are, in the most part, small-scale farmers who are poor, and these peasants and their families who raise the narcotic crop get very little out of it. It is the criminal, the middleman, who organizes and who feeds on this traffic, and it is he who makes the price of these drugs multiply many hundreds of times before they reach the addict, who is sometimes thousands of miles away from where the drugs were first produced.

To fight drug addiction effectively, this illicit traffic must be stamped out at the source—in the areas where the leaf is produced. It is not enough to fight the illicit traffic by the effort of police and customs officers; the supply of the basic drugs that go into this traffic should be eliminated.

Despite the earnest efforts of national agencies and the provisions for international control provided by the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the evil persists. Additional measures are necessary. A possible obvious method of effecting control and eliminating the traffic is to cut out primarily the production of opium. Unfortunately there is not now available as simple and direct a solution as this one.

In the first place, it is recognized that it would not be desirable to eliminate all production. There is obviously some legitimate medical need for narcotic drugs. The problem exists because of production substantially in excess of these legitimate needs and because some of the crop intended for proper uses finds its way into the illicit traffic.

In the second place, shifts from opium production to economic activities such as the production of alternative crops with comparable economic returns are not easy to achieve. The governments of the countries concerned should be helped, and in the interests of the whole world community—since every country is threatened by the danger of drugs—a world approach to eradicating this narcotics production should be developed. It is with this problem that the resolution before us is concerned.

When a country wishes to take land out of opium production, it must provide an alternative means of livelihood to the farmers. This is not easy nor inexpensive. Careful studies of

alternative economic activities, especially alternative crops suitable to the area, are required. It may be that new techniques are involved and there must be a period of training. Or perhaps new or different capital equipment is required. For these reasons a government may not, by only its own efforts, be able to end the illicit cultivation.

The third point is that measures to eliminate this production would also help substantially to protect from illicit traffic those countries which have eliminated the production of opium. These countries should receive strong support and encouragement from the international community.

These are the reasons and the purpose of this resolution. It carries further the intention behind Resolution 1395, which the General Assembly adopted at its 14th session, setting up the first separate program of technical assistance in narcotic drugs. The resolution before us requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with interested governments and in cooperation with the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the International Narcotics Control Board, to develop plans for putting an end to the illegal or uncontrolled production of narcotic raw materials. Action taken on these plans should gradually bring about the economic and social changes by which some farmers, now dependent on narcotic crops, are helped to change their production. Conditions have to be created in which the well-being of these peoples is advanced as they find a genuine economic interest in giving up narcotics production and turn to new forms of activity best suited to their area and their capacity.

We believe that interested governments will wish to take advantage of this opportunity to enlist the help of the United Nations in developing their plans for gradually putting an end to production. The specialized agencies, in particular the FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization], will also be available to help in planning. They and certain of the United Nations agencies could also participate in the implementation of any plans which may be developed.

In the last analysis, the initiative and responsibility for taking action rests with the governments concerned. The agencies to which I have referred are available to help them. The United Nations Development Program, on request, can be of assistance, and it is possible that there may be bilateral sources which could provide aid. The resolution recommends that governments seek this assistance.

The cosponsors hope and believe that, through the adoption and implementation of this resolution, the menace of drug addiction will begin to be contained and finally wiped out, as the drugs themselves will no longer be produced to feed this addiction.

We wish the governments concerned great success in developing and implementing plans to end the illegal or uncontrolled cultivation of narcotic raw materials, and the cosponsors urge the unanimous adoption of this resolution.²

² U.N. doc. A/C.3/L.1650/Rev. 1 was approved by Committee III on Dec. 17 and was adopted by the General Assembly on Dec. 19 (A/RES/2434 (XXIII)).

U.S. Reviews Work of U.N. Committee on Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States

*Statement by Marvin L. Warner
Alternate U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

The history of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States is one of continued progress made possible by the dedicated representatives of many nations continuing to work under difficult circumstances and in the face of direct affronts to the idealistic concepts of friendly relations. My delegation thinks it useful at this time for the Sixth Committee to review briefly the history and progress of work on principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among states.

As the United Nations expanded in the early 1960's, some began to suggest it might be worth while to take a fresh look at the basic principles of the United Nations Charter concerning the conduct of states and of the United Nations organization in international relations. Members who had recently achieved independence expressed the view that their membership in the organization would be more meaningful if they could join in taking a new look at the charter.

While these newer members of the international community had freely accepted the rights and obligations of the charter as a condition to joining the United Nations, they had not participated in the San Francisco conference in 1945 nor contributed to the 15-year process of action under the charter by United Nations bodies and authorities that followed. At the 16th session of the General Assembly in 1961 the Legal Committee determined that a study of

the basic rules of the charter would be appropriate.

Some proposed that the General Assembly study what they termed the principles of international law relating to peaceful coexistence. Others objected to the partisan coloring given to the term "peaceful coexistence" by the U.S.S.R. and certain other Eastern European countries. Finally, and without resort to voting, the Legal Committee agreed unanimously to study "principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations." The phrase "friendly relations" was chosen because it is a purpose of the organization, as stated in article 1, paragraph 2, of the charter.

In 1962 the Legal Committee sought to list the charter principles that are fundamental in establishing standards of international law and morality essential to international order. After a lengthy debate, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1815 (XVII) which identified seven principles of friendly relations and cooperation among states. These principles are: the prohibition against the use of force, the obligation to settle international disputes by peaceful means, the duty not to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states, the duty of states to cooperate with one another, the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the principle of sovereign equality of states, and the duty to fulfill in good faith obligations accepted in accordance with the charter. Support for this resolution in the General Assembly was again unanimous.

And, as if by premonition, Czechoslovakia at

¹ Made in Committee VI (Legal) on Dec. 10 (U.S./U.N. press release 237).

that very session of 1962 introduced a draft code of 19 "principles of peaceful coexistence," which provided, among other things, that "The State is independent in the exercise of its external and internal affairs, in particular in selecting its social, economic and constitutional systems." Supporting enthusiastically the Czechoslovak proposal in 1962 were the Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe.

In 1963 the General Assembly established a Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States and requested it to study four of the seven principles: nonuse of force, peaceful settlement, nonintervention, and sovereign equality.

The special committee met in Mexico City in the fall of 1964. Its most significant work was directed to the prohibition of threats and uses of force in international relations. It drafted a text elaborating the rule in article 2, paragraph 4, of the charter which came just short of achieving general agreement.

In 1965 the General Assembly decided to ask the special committee to include in its study the remaining principles of friendly relations and cooperation: the duty of states to cooperate with one another in accordance with the charter, equal rights and self-determination, and good-faith fulfillment of international legal obligations. The Assembly also added four countries to the special committee, thus bringing the membership to 31.

The scene shifted to New York in the spring of 1966 for the second session of the special committee, which resulted—and with unanimous agreement—in a significant statement on peaceful settlement providing that "Recourse to, or acceptance of, a settlement procedure freely agreed to by the parties shall not be regarded as incompatible with sovereign equality." The special committee also agreed that "Each State has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems."

The third session of the special committee in 1967 found the committee wisely agreeing on interpretations of basic principles of international cooperation and good-faith fulfillment of international legal obligations. It agreed that the obligations of articles 55 and 56 of the charter concerning human rights could be stated as follows: "States shall co-operate in the promotion of the universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and in the elimination of all forms of racial

discrimination and all forms of religious intolerance." Moreover, the members agreed on a succinct statement concerning good-faith fulfillment, that "Every State has the duty to fulfil in good faith its obligations under the generally recognized principles and rules of international law," which is more explicit than the charter on this point.

The special committee met again for a fourth session in September of this year despite the tension and disillusionment prevailing after the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia. Although the atmosphere was hardly conducive to optimism, progress was made on the principle concerning the prohibition of the use of force. The special committee agreed, *inter alia*, on the important statements that "Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular or volunteer forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another State" and that "States have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force." The special committee further agreed that "All States shall comply in good faith with their obligations under the generally recognized principles and rules of international law with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, and shall endeavor to make the United Nations security system based upon the Charter more effective."

Mr. Chairman, after this brief resume, my delegation believes it may be appropriate at this time to attempt to place the work and work methods of the special committee in perspective.

Elaboration of the Charter

First, the special committee's task does not involve amendment of the charter. The charter provides for amendment in the most explicit manner; and its provisions in article 108 have been used by the United Nations: to enlarge the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council and to bring the charter review conference procedure into alignment. The task of the special committee is to take a fresh look at the charter and the 20 years of interpretative action by the United Nations and, on this basis, to draft a set of elaborating rules that may reasonably be regarded as deriving directly from the charter and two decades of success and failure in applying it.

Take the principle of international cooper-

ation as an example. As I said earlier, the special committee has agreed on a statement of international cooperation that includes the rule that "States shall cooperate . . . in the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination and all forms of religious intolerance." This is a fair and reasonable statement of what is involved in article 55 of the charter, which obliges the U.N. to promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion," and article 56, by which all members pledge that they will take "joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." No charter amendment is involved.

We appreciate the difficulty of recognizing the line between charter elaboration on the one hand and outright charter amendment on the other hand. But although the line often seems subtle and obscure, we believe the United Nations must respect this distinction. For it is a distinction that protects each of us.

Process of Broad General Agreement

Second, the task of elaborating the legal norms of the charter can be properly accomplished only by a process of broad general agreement.

The General Assembly in 1965 clearly perceived this when it adopted Resolution 2103 (XX) on the friendly relations item and stated its conviction as to "the significance of continuing the effort to achieve general agreement at every stage of the process of the elaboration of the seven principles of international law . . . without prejudice to the applicability of the rules of procedure of the Assembly, and with a view to the early adoption of a declaration which would constitute a landmark in the progressive development and codification of these principles."

There have been some intense exchanges of views about consensus in both the special committee and in our committee. A number of delegations have noted that the practice of consensus is capable of abuse, and they have urged that all members should do what they can to prevent the transformation of consensus into veto. We agree that the practice of consensus implies very stern efforts to reach mutually beneficial compromise.

It is true that another aspect of consensus is that our work product often seems at first glance somewhat bland and pasteurized. One does not have to be hypercritical to realize that the agreed texts contain much that is colorless and general.

When our work is completed, no one will read with astonishment from the statement on international cooperation that "States Members of the United Nations have the duty to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the United Nations in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter." Nor will it be surprising for those who did not join in the negotiating process to read a saving clause in the peaceful settlement statement that "Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs prejudices or derogates from the applicable provisions of the Charter, in particular those relating to the pacific settlement of international disputes."

However, as Alfred North Whitehead wrote: "It requires a very unusual mind to undertake the analysis of the obvious." If we apply our minds to the full meaning of these familiar words, we may find that our time has not been wasted.

The Search for Legal Statements

Third, we recognize that the work of the special committee has been slow. What has made it so slow is the widespread and sobering awareness of the fact that we are dealing with the charter, which everyone—we hope—takes to be the central and fundamental core of international law and morality. We must not let this slowness tempt us to abandon the search for legal statements in favor of sweeping expressions of political will produced in other committees which, however superficially appealing, are far less relevant to state conduct. It is principles of international law we are dealing with—binding obligations—not precatory statements.

My Government continues to believe that the work of the special committee can be of value to developing the rule of law among nations. In addition to the value of the work product itself, the process of intensive exchanges of ideas has been most beneficial, as any who compare the report of the 1964 session of the committee with the most recent report can readily perceive. The very interaction of ideas is a source of vitality for the charter. This belief is in no way diminished by the violations of the charter that have

occurred with particular force and pain this year.

The difference between acceptance of obligations on a verbal level and their acceptance in practice in the real world has been brought home to us all in a shocking manner. We do not believe, however, that illegality in the international community can allow us the luxury of cynicism or despair. The illegal use of force and illegal intervention do not make the charter worthless but show, instead, how important is compliance with the charter's rules.

Can we not hope that our friendly relations work will bring to a higher degree in the consciousness of governments the importance of respect for international legality and morality? We are sustained in our work by the hope that rededication to the rule of law of the charter is not beyond the means—or the will—of any member of the United Nations. For these reasons my delegation pledges itself to continue to the best of our abilities to seek to arrive at agreed and meaningful statements of the law of the charter.

The position of the United States is that the Charter of the United Nations itself, with or without the Friendly Relations Committee, clearly enunciates the high principles of the United Nations. The United States delegation, in respect to the concerns and anxieties and aspirations of other states, has cooperated in the continued progress of the special committee. But today, on the threshold of the fifth year of its operation, is it not necessary to reexamine the basic desires, the basic integrity, the basic intents, certainly of that group of states that has pressed these procedures and exercises only so recently to destroy what they purport to protect? Do we really believe in the Charter of the

United Nations, do we really believe in the purposes and in the expressions of the Special Committee on Friendly Relations? If we do, in our acts and in our deeds and in our hearts, then the objective of the Friendly Relations Committee will be within sight. If not, all mankind is in very serious trouble.

Members of U.S. Delegation to Intelsat Conference Named

The Department of State announced on December 30 (press release 284, revised) that the following would be members of the U.S. delegation to the Plenipotentiary Conference To Establish Definite Arrangements for the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (Intelsat), which will be held at Washington, D.C., from February 24 to March 21:

Representative

Ambassador Leonard H. Marks (*chairman*), Department of State

Alternate Representatives

Frank E. Loy (*vice chairman*), Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

James McCormack (*vice chairman*), Chairman, Communications Satellite Corporation

Ward P. Allen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs

Rosel H. Hyde, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission

John A. Johnson, Vice President, International Communications Satellite Corporation

William K. Miller, Director, Office of Telecommunications, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State

James D. O'Connell, Director of Telecommunications Management, Executive Office of the President

United States and Greece Modify Air Transport Services Agreement

Press release 279 dated December 20

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Governments of the United States of America and Greece on December 20 concluded in Athens two exchanges of diplomatic notes modifying the existing air transport services agreement¹ between the two countries. These notes confirm the agreement reached in the bilateral consultations which took place in Athens from July 2 to July 13, 1968.

The notes were signed on behalf of the United States Government by the American Ambassador in Athens, Phillips Talbott, and on behalf of the Government of Greece by Panagiotis Pipinelis, Minister for Foreign Affairs. The first note exchange confirms the scope of United States traffic rights beyond Athens, grants Greece a new route to Chicago via Montreal, and delineates the traffic rights on Greece's existing route to New York. The second exchange sets forth understandings with respect to certain traffic rights, both on United States routes beyond Athens to Nairobi and Johannesburg and on the Greek route to New York.

FIRST NOTE EXCHANGE

U.S. Note

No. 13

ATHENS, *December 20, 1968*

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the consultations which took place in Washington from March 20 to April 1, 1968 and in Athens from July 2 to July 13, 1968 pursuant to Article 9 of the Air Transport Services Agreement of 1946 between the Government of the United States of America and the Government

¹Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1626 and 5982.

of Greece, as amended by an exchange of notes in Athens on February 7, 1966.

In lieu of the route beyond the United States in which the Hellenic Government had recorded an interest in the note exchange of February 7, 1966, the Hellenic Government requested access to a second traffic point in the United States. In the course of the consultations, the representatives of our respective Governments found themselves in agreement on the desirability of reviewing the route structure and harmonizing viewpoints on certain other aspects of the Agreement. To these ends, it was agreed as follows:

1. The traffic rights beyond Athens as granted to the United States by Paragraph A of the Annex to the 1946 Agreement remain unlimited as presently described. Hence, both Governments recognize that, without in any way intending to limit the generality of the foregoing, a route or routes from the United States to Athens and beyond to East Africa and South Africa, via intermediate points to and beyond Athens, is included within that open description.

2. Paragraph B of the Annex to the Agreement is amended to read as follows:

"B. Airlines of Greece, authorized under the present Agreement are accorded rights of transit and non-traffic stops in United States territory, as well as the right to pick up and discharge international traffic in passengers, cargo and mail on the following routes:

"1. Greece, via three points in Europe, to New York, in both directions.²

"2. Greece, via Montreal, to Chicago, in both directions.

"It is understood that points on any of the specified routes of Greece or of the United States may be omitted on any or all of the flights by the designated airlines of Greece and the United States at their option."

3. Neither Government will impose any unilateral restrictions on the capacity, frequencies, or type of aircraft employed by the designated airline or airlines of the other country.

4. Each Government has the right, under Article 9 of the Agreement, to request consultations at any time for the purpose of seeking additional traffic rights.

²The Government of Greece shall inform the United States of the three points selected. Such points may be changed thereafter at any time provided that prior to initiating service to any new points, the Government of Greece (a) gives notice of the change to the United States Government through diplomatic channels and (b) the Hellenic airline obtains an amended United States operating permit. [Footnote in original.]

The foregoing is acceptable to the Government of the United States of America. If likewise, acceptable to the Government of Greece, I have the honor to propose that the present note and Your Excellency's reply to that effect be regarded as an agreement between our two Governments, which shall enter into force on the date of your reply.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

PHILLIPS TALBOTT

His Excellency
PANAGIOTIS PIPINELIS,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Athens.

Greek Note

ATHENS, *December 20, 1968*

EXCELLENCY: I have the honour to refer to your Excellency's note of December 20th, 1968 which reads as follows:

(Text of U.S. note)

I have the honour to confirm the foregoing on behalf of the Government of Greece and to inform you that my Government considers your note and this reply constitute an agreement between our two Governments which enters into force on the date of this note.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

P. PIPINELIS

SECOND NOTE EXCHANGE

U.S. Note

No. 14

ATHENS, *December 20, 1968*

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the consultations which took place in Washington from March 20 to April 1, 1968, and in Athens from July 2 to July 13, 1968, pursuant to Article 9 of the Air Transport Services Agreement as amended, between the Governments of the United States of America and of Greece. In those consultations, the delegations representing the two respective Governments agreed as follows:

"Notwithstanding the full rights granted to the United States Government in the Agreement, the United States Government accepts an arrangement under which the designated US airlines will not exercise rights with respect to passenger traffic described in (a), (b) and (c) below over the Athens-Johannesburg and Athens-Nairobi route sectors for the period beginning with the inauguration of scheduled services on these sectors by Olympic Airways and terminating as follows:

"(a) With respect to local passenger traffic (as de-

termined by its initial origin and ultimate destination) rights between Athens and Nairobi and between Athens and Johannesburg, three years from the date on which Olympic Airways scheduled service to Nairobi or Johannesburg is inaugurated or on December 31, 1971, whichever is earlier;

"(b) With respect to passenger traffic en route to or from Johannesburg interlining at Athens (except for such traffic having an initial origin or an ultimate destination in the United States), three years from the date on which Olympic Airways' scheduled service to Johannesburg is inaugurated, or on December 31, 1971, whichever is earlier; and

"(c) With respect to passenger traffic en route to or from Nairobi interlining at Athens (except for such traffic having an initial origin or an ultimate destination in the United States), eighteen months from the date on which Olympic Airways' scheduled service to Nairobi is inaugurated, or on June 30, 1970, whichever is earlier.

"One year after Olympic Airways inaugurates service to Nairobi or Johannesburg, or at any time thereafter, either Government may request consultations for the purpose of seeking agreement, in the light of actual operating experience, on advancing the termination dates set forth in (a), (b) and (c) above. In the event such consultations are not requested or if no agreement is reached therein, the periods will expire without further agreement between the two Governments as set forth in (a), (b) and (c) above.

"Until the end of the period for non-carriage by US airlines of local passenger traffic between Athens and Africa, as specified above, Hellenic airlines will not apply to the United States Civil Aeronautics Board for authority to carry local passenger traffic between more than two points in Europe and New York."

I am instructed to confirm to Your Excellency that the foregoing is acceptable to the Government of the United States of America. If it is likewise acceptable to the Government of Greece, I have the honor to propose that the present note and Your Excellency's reply to that effect be regarded as an agreement between our two governments which shall enter into force on the date of your reply.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

PHILLIPS TALBOTT

His Excellency
PANAGIOTIS PIPINELIS,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Athens.

Greek Note

ATHENS, *December 20, 1968*

EXCELLENCY, I have the honor to refer to your Excellency's note of December 20th 1968 which reads as follows:

(Text of U.S. note)

I have the honor to confirm the foregoing on behalf

of the government of Greece and to inform you that my Government considers your note and this reply constitute an agreement between our two Governments which enters into force on the date of this note.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

P. PIPINELIS

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Education

Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Governments of Belgium and Luxembourg for the financing of certain academic and cultural exchanges and programs in the field of education. Signed at Brussels December 12, 1968. Enters into force when each government notifies the other governments by diplomatic note of the approval of the agreement.

Grains

International grains arrangement, 1967, with annexes. Open for signature at Washington October 15 through November 30, 1967. Entered into force July 1, 1968. TIAS 6537.

Accession to the Wheat Trade Convention deposited: Cuba, December 30, 1968.

Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968.¹

Ratification deposited at Washington: Denmark, January 3, 1969.

BILATERAL

Republic of China

Agreement relating to the transfer of the U.S.S. *Geronimo* to the Navy of the Republic of China. Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei December 12 and 16, 1968. Entered into force December 16, 1968.

Greece

Agreement modifying the air transport services agreement of March 27, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1626, 5982). Effected by exchanges of notes at Athens December 20, 1968. Entered into force December 20, 1968.

Mexico

Agreement relating to a program of cooperative research of remote sensing for earth survey, with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico City December 20, 1968. Entered into force December 20, 1968.

Singapore

Arrangement relating to trade in cotton textiles, with restraint schedule. Effected by exchange of notes at Singapore December 17 and 23, 1968. Entered into force December 23, 1968.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders.

International Exhibitions. Protocol amending article 4 of the convention of November 22, 1928. TIAS 6549. 8 pp. 10¢.

Technical Cooperation. Agreement with Afghanistan. TIAS 6552. 4 pp. 10¢.

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Whaling. Amendments to the Schedule to the International Whaling Convention. TIAS 6562. 1 p. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Colombia. TIAS 6563. 17 pp. 15¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Uruguay. TIAS 6564. 4 pp. 10¢.

Atomic Energy. U.S. Proposes Worldwide Seismic Investigation of Underground Nuclear Explosions (Foster, texts of resolutions) . . . 58

Aviation. United States and Greece Modify Air Transport Services Agreement (exchanges of notes) . . . 70

Communications. Members of U.S. Delegation to Intelsat Conference Named . . . 69

Diplomacy. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of January 3 . . . 45

Disarmament. U.S. Proposes Worldwide Seismic Investigation of Underground Nuclear Explosions (Foster, texts of resolutions) . . . 58

Economic Affairs. U.S. Citizens Visiting Morocco May Purchase U.S.-Owned Dirhams . . . 52

Greece. United States and Greece Modify Air Transport Services Agreement (exchanges of notes) . . . 70

International Law. U.S. Reviews Work of U.N. Committee on Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States (Warner) . . . 66

International Organizations and Conferences. Members of U.S. Delegation to Intelsat Conference Named . . . 69

Israel. U.N. Security Council Condemns Israel for Attack on Beirut Airport (Wiggins, text of resolution) . . . 53

Lebanon. U.N. Security Council Condemns Israel for Attack on Beirut Airport (Wiggins, text of resolution) . . . 53

Mexico. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of January 3 . . . 45

Morocco. U.S. Citizens Visiting Morocco May Purchase U.S.-Owned Dirhams . . . 52

Near East

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of January 3 . . . 45

U.N. Security Council Condemns Israel for Attack on Beirut Airport (Wiggins, text of resolution) . . . 53

Publications. Recent Releases . . . 72

Treaty Information

Current Actions . . . 72

United States and Greece Modify Air Transport Services Agreement (exchange of notes) . . . 70

United Nations

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of January 3 . . . 45

The U.N. Bond Repayments Issue (Wiggins) . . . 55

U.N. Security Council Condemns Israel for Attack on Beirut Airport (Wiggins, text of resolution) . . . 53

U.N. To Develop Plans To Control Illegal Narcotic Drug Crops (Squire) . . . 64

U.S. Proposes Worldwide Seismic Investigation of Underground Nuclear Explosions (Foster, texts of resolutions). . . 58

U.S. Reviews Work of U.N. Committee on Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States (Warner) . . . 66

Viet-Nam. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of January 3 . . . 45

Name Index

Foster, William C . . . 58

Rusk, Secretary . . . 45

Squire, David F . . . 64

Warner, Marvin L . . . 66

Wiggins, James Russell . . . 53, 55

**Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: Dec. 30-Jan.5**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to December 30 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 279 of December 20.

No.	Date	Subject
284 (revised)	12/30	U.S. delegation to Intelsat conference.
1	1/3	Rusk: news conference of January 3.
2	1/3	Local currency for sale to U.S. visitors to Morocco.

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BULLETIN

Vol. LX, No. 1544



January 27, 1969

THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA—A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

Statement by President Johnson 73

STATUE OF BENITO JUAREZ DEDICATED AT WASHINGTON

Remarks by Secretary Rusk 74

AMBASSADOR WIGGINS' NEWS CONFERENCE OF DECEMBER 20 (*Excerpts*) 80

THE FLIGHT OF APOLLO 8: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SPACE

President Johnson Presents NASA Medals to the Astronauts 76

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LX, No. 1544
January 27, 1969

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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The United States and Latin America—A Special Relationship

*Statement by President Johnson*¹

Latin America has always held a very special place in my mind and heart.

It has always stood in a very special relationship to the United States. In that relationship we have moved from controversy and dispute to cooperation, alliance, and partnership.

The Alliance for Progress is a revolutionary document. It was foreshadowed by the ideas of great Latin American spokesmen looking to the future of their peoples. Its policies and institutions began to take shape in the latter years of the Eisenhower administration and were brought to full life and vigor by President Kennedy.

It seeks peaceful revolution because it promotes economic and social transformation without violence.

It seeks to expand benefits for all the people rather than merely redistributing them.

It is an alliance against the status quo, when the status quo means ill health, hunger, latifundia and one-crop economies, illiteracy and ignorance.

It is an alliance for land reform, jobs, new schools, roads, more electric power, more consumer cooperatives, improved irrigation and bountiful agricultural yields, and, above all, an equitable sharing of national financial burdens by all citizens.

It is an alliance which will promote re-

gional economic cooperation and hemispheric integration.

In spite of setbacks and disappointments new beginnings have been made in our alliance. In the past 5 years:

—Latin American exports have diversified and increased by almost \$2 billion.

—Primary school enrollment is up by 7 million.

—Fifteen Latin American nations have enacted land reform measures since the Alliance formally began.

—Tax collections increased by \$3 billion from 1964–1967.

—In 1967 alone, Latin American farmers produced food at twice the rate of new mouths which had to be fed.

—1968 was a year of more than 5 percent growth in GNP for Latin America, the third year of the past five when the Punta del Este target has been approximated.

The United States has placed more than \$6 billion at the disposal of Alliance programs.

We have pledged \$900 million to the Inter-American Development Bank over the next 3 years.

We have placed our weight and financial support behind Latin American economic regionalism and integration.

And we have pledged our help to forge the new communications and transportation links needed to make Latin America a true regional entity.

With the passage of time it has become increasingly clear that the task of Latin American economic and social development is primarily a task for Latin Americans.

¹ Made upon receiving the annual gold medal award from the Pan American Society of the United States for the President's efforts on behalf of inter-American friendship, presented by Robert Reininger, president of the society, in the Cabinet Room at the White House on Jan. 9 (White House press release). The Pan American Society of the United States is a group of New York business and professional men interested in promoting inter-American friendship.

We in North America are the junior partners in this great enterprise. We have helped the nations of Latin America generate development momentum of their own. Along with them we must now do all we can to sustain that momentum. For our hemisphere has reached the crucial stage when the material foundations of development can now begin to provide a better life for more than 200 million Latin American citizens.

But all our efforts in the Alliance and other inter-American programs will succeed only if Latin America achieves the goal of a truly integrated economic system. The first promising steps have been taken in the Central American Common Market, the new Andean group, and the Latin American Free Trade Association.

There is clearly a long road ahead; but in the

1960's the peoples of Latin America have taken the most important step of all: They have proved to themselves—and to the world—that the job can be done. There has been enough progress for all to know that it is possible for a modern Latin America to emerge peacefully, true to its own traditions and culture and to its own vision of the future.

A decade ago that would have been a statement of faith. Now it is a statement of fact. And we in the United States shall always be proud to have played our part in this historic demonstration.

I accept this medal as a sign of past successes and as a reminder of how much more Americans—North and South—must achieve in the years ahead.

Statue of Benito Juárez Dedicated at Washington

Following are remarks made by Secretary Rusk at the dedication of the statue of Benito Juárez at Washington, D.C., on January 7.

Press release 3 dated January 7

The Mexican Government has paid us a double honor today. It has donated this magnificent statue of a truly great patriot and a foremost son of the Americas, and it has also sent us its distinguished Foreign Secretary, Dr. Antonio Carrillo Flores, to make the presentation.

Mr. Secretary, it is wonderful to greet you here again. I well remember my visit to Mexico City in April 1966, when I accompanied President and Mrs. Johnson to the dedication of the Abraham Lincoln statue. We started an exchange which we are now completing today. We shared with Mexico one of our greatest heroes, and now Mexico is sharing with us one of its very greatest.

There are, of course, a number of striking similarities in the lives of Lincoln and Juárez:

- their humble origins,
- their various political disappointments before gaining the Presidencies of their nations,

—their preoccupation with the concepts of liberty and human dignity, and

—their clear vision of the need to eliminate injustice.

And, unfortunately, both men were required to devote a great deal of their energies to resolving bloody domestic conflict.

We can only speculate about the achievements in Mexican-American relations which the two men might have brought about had they not been forced to concentrate their attentions on internal crises. Surely they spoke the same language.

Take, for example, Juárez' address to the Mexican Congress in December 1867:

It is one of the fundamental principles laid down in the Constitution that all public power emanates from the people and is instituted for their benefit. As a son of the people I can never forget that my sole title is their will and that my sole object should always be their highest good and prosperity.

Those are words which could easily have been spoken by Abraham Lincoln; they resemble the words of Thomas Jefferson.

The Lincoln-Juárez parallel reflects, in many ways, the parallel histories of our two countries.

We both came to independence with unresolved problems about our national identities. Both Lincoln and Juárez assumed leadership at a time of national peril, and both laid down the foundations for future social and political growth. Both Presidents espoused, and lived by, the conviction that the spirit of man can only be fully developed in an environment of freedom and justice.

But the honoring of one another's national heroes, as we are doing today, is symbolic not only of our parallel histories but also of our intertwined future.

We have come to realize that the true spirit of good neighborhood requires more than simply living side by side in the absence of hostility. It requires a mutual determination to understand one another's institutions and one another's aspirations. It requires a mutual effort to eliminate points of friction and to develop points of agreement.

Mr. Secretary, last month in El Paso, Texas, the Presidents of Mexico and the United States met to complete the Chamizal agreement and to end a border dispute which had plagued our relations for over a century.

At that meeting, President Johnson said about our relations:¹

The finest thing I know to say about both countries, and both Presidents, and both peoples is that . . . we have no armies patrolling our borders. We have confidence in each other, and we have peace with one another.

This confidence President Johnson referred to has been expressed in a great many ways in the past few years:

- in the Chamizal agreement,
- in our efforts to deal with other boundary problems,
- in our efforts to increase cooperation between border cities,
- in our ability to reach satisfactory arrangements in fishing, in civil aviation matters, in radio broadcasting, in mutual scientific endeavors, and in many other areas.

Clearly, we have passed the stage of merely living side by side without hostility. Instead, we are finding and developing a vast prospect of mutual opportunity.

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 13, 1969, p. 21.

For more than three decades our confidence in each other has steadily grown. As our peoples become more prosperous, our opportunities for travel and contacts increase; and these contacts in turn stimulate further curiosity and further appreciation.

I can say confidently that relations between Mexico and the United States have never been more cordial than they are today. I have no doubt that this happy situation will continue, with steadily accumulating benefits for both nations.

Respect has surely replaced suspicion. And respect, as Benito Juárez once said: ". . . is the only means of establishing cordial relations and peace between nations."

Mr. Secretary, the historians tell me that one of my most distinguished predecessors, William H. Seward, toured Mexico in 1869 after he left office and in a toast to Benito Juárez declared that Juárez was "a name indissolubly associated with the names of Presidents Lincoln and Washington, and with Simón Bolívar in the heroic history of republicanism in America." The perspective of 100 years supports the accuracy of Seward's prophecy.

Monuments to the memory of Lincoln, Washington, and Bolívar are all located within a few blocks of this spot. Today, we proudly welcome the presence of Benito Juárez.

Letters of Credence

Peru

The newly appointed Ambassador of Peru, Fernando Berckemeyer, presented his credentials to President Johnson on January 3. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated January 3.

Tanzania

The newly appointed Ambassador of Tanzania, Gosbert Miarcell Rutabanzibwa, presented his credentials to President Johnson on January 3. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated January 3.

The Flight of Apollo 8: International Cooperation in Space

Following are remarks by President Johnson made at the White House on January 9 upon presenting National Aeronautics and Space Administration Distinguished Service Medals to the Apollo 8 astronauts, Col. Frank Borman (USAF), Capt. James A. Lovell, Jr. (USN), and Lt. Col. William A. Anders (USAF), together with replies by the astronauts and remarks by Thomas O. Paine, Acting Administrator of NASA.

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

White House Press release dated January 9

There is little that has not been said or written in praise of these famous men who have come here to the East Room with us this morning.

We are quite naturally proud that they are all Americans. But we recognize that mere national pride is insufficient, that these men represented in the vastness of space all mankind—all of its races, all of its nationalities, all of its religions, all of its ideologies. For 7 days the earth and all who inhabit it knew a measure of unity through these brave men.

Colonel Borman, Captain Lovell, Colonel Anders, you have been where no human being has ever ventured. You have seen first hand what no human eye ever saw before you. Your flight was an unparalleled achievement of technology.

Yet, behind the sophisticated hardware of space, Apollo 8 was a story of men.

There were those first men who dreamed of powered flight into space. There were those men in our Government who 10 years ago fought to guarantee America's role in space. I am glad that I was one of them.

There was John Kennedy's fateful decision to make the great lunar effort. There were men of science and industry who designed and built the

capsules and engines which carried you into the heavens.

There were the great administrators and advisers like Jim Webb, Dr. George Mueller, Ed Welsh, and Hubert Humphrey—and the many unknown technicians whose perseverance and painstaking efforts and support finally brought us success.

There were the tough, trained, courageous young men like you who proved that space could be a thoroughly human adventure.

Our space program and this, its most spectacular achievement, have taught us some valuable lessons. We have learned how men and nations may make common cause in the most magnificent and hopeful enterprises of mankind.

We in the United States are already engaged in cooperative space activities with more than 70 nations of the world. We have proposed a variety of ventures to expand international partnership in space exploration.

This morning I renew America's commitment to that principle and to its enormous promise. The flight of Apollo 8 gives all nations a new and a most exciting reason to join in man's greatest adventure.

Finally, if there is an ultimate truth to be learned from this historic flight, it may be this: There are few social, scientific, or political problems which cannot be solved by men if they truly want to solve them together. That applies to the heavens or hunger. That applies to moon shots or to model cities.

Gentlemen, I am very proud to be privileged to present you with the NASA Distinguished Service Medals. They are very small tokens of our appreciation for what you have done for our country and for the world and for us.

This is the last time that I shall participate in a space ceremony as President of the United States.

I am proud that I have stood with the space effort from its first days, and I am so glad

to see it now flower in this most marvelous achievement.

I am proud to live in a country that has produced men like you and produced the men who lifted you into the heavens.

God bless you. I wish you and your program continued success in all the days ahead.

[At this point Dr. Paine read the citation.]

REPLIES AND CLOSING REMARKS

White House press release dated January 9

Colonel Borman: Mr. President, I thought that we had experienced every emotion known to man in the 20 hours we spent in lunar orbit, but I must confess that I believe this just topped it.

I know I speak for Jim and Bill when I say we are three grateful Americans—grateful to you personally. We recognize your interest and your contributions to the space program of our country, and we are grateful to this wonderful country. They have supported us in every way.

Although we are symbolic of the country's greatness, we certainly feel very inadequate, and we are just very, very grateful.

Sir, we did want to give you two things. We carried with us a Space Treaty around the moon, and Bill Anders would like to present that to you.

Colonel Anders: Mr. President, I was present in this room for the signing of the Space Treaty, and a few weeks ago at the dinner honoring Mr. Webb, our past Administrator.

All the astronaut guests signed in and witnessed that treaty and the Astronaut Rescue Treaty. Therefore, it became apparent to me that both you and Mrs. Johnson took a great personal interest in these two great documents.

We carried with us two miniature copies of these treaties on Apollo 8, with the hope that in the years to come they will remind you and Mrs. Johnson of those great achievements for which our country and the world will all be grateful.

Colonel Borman: Mr. President, Jim Lovell has a picture of the ranch I think you would like to have.

Captain Lovell: Mr. President, I would like to mention that I believe that picture, taken from the moon, of course, symbolizes just one thing—that there is but one world.

Dr. Paine: In concluding these ceremonies,

I would just like to state that all of us in the space program realize, Mr. President, the great contributions that you made, first as Senator, as Vice President, and as President in moving man on out into this great adventure.

We would all like to give to you our most heartfelt and sincere thanks.

The President: Dr. Paine, our dreams and our hopes and our prayers will be with you in the days ahead as you continue to direct and lead this great effort.

But before we conclude these ceremonies, I would like to present to this audience the single man most responsible for successfully administering this program and I think, the best Administrator in the Federal Government, James Webb.

Presidents Johnson and de Gaulle Exchange New Year's Greetings

White House press release dated January 3

President Johnson's Letter

DECEMBER 29, 1968

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On behalf of the American people I thank you for your warm message of congratulations on the completion of the Apollo VIII Mission. Colonel Borman, Captain Lovell, and Major Anders join me in this expression of appreciation for your gratifying words.

As we come to the New Year, I also wish to tell you again of the warmth of my feeling for the people of France and of my abiding faith that the destiny of our two nations will remain closely linked in the years to come.

We have both faced serious problems this year in bearing our respective responsibilities. But standing back from these immediate problems, I trust you share with me the faith that the clouds of war are slowly beginning to lift from Southeast Asia and that by giving our full support to the Jarring Mission we can prevent them from enveloping the Middle East again.

In different ways, we each have borne governmental responsibilities for some thirty years. Recalling what our nations have been through in this time and the underlying prosperity and

security they now enjoy, I would hope you, too, look with confidence on the future of our nations and the western family of which they are a part.

You have my very best wishes in carrying out the demanding tasks of leadership in the year ahead.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

President de Gaulle's Letter ¹

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I sincerely thank you for the sentiments that you were good enough to express to me in the letter that you sent me through your Ambassador.

On the threshold of this New Year, my fervent wish is that the United States and France may work together to help jointly in solving the grave problems weighing over the future of the world.

Among these subjects of international concern, some stand out owing to their urgency and their importance. That is true of Vietnam, where, thanks to the courageous decisions that you have already taken, and the other decisions that doubtless will follow upon them, there is reason to believe that the hostilities are nearing an end, pending a political settlement of the conflict, followed by the peaceful work of reconstruction. It is also true of the Middle East, where it has become necessary to repudiate the events occurring nearly nineteen months ago, which have produced a series of reciprocal acts of violence.

The friendship linking our two peoples, their esteem for one another, and their awareness, on both sides, of their worth and strength, could not, I believe, be more fruitfully manifested than by joint action in the cause of detente everywhere, and of cooperation with all other peoples.

Allow me to tell you, Mr. President, how glad I am of these signs, which seem to indicate that an important part of your personal work consists in guiding the United States into the path where our two countries have the best possible opportunity of feeling at one with each other, and standing shoulder to shoulder.

Most sincerely and cordially.

C. DE GAULLE

¹ Received Jan. 3.

Death of Trygve Lie

Trygve Lie, the first Secretary-General of the United Nations, died at Geilo, Norway, on December 30. Following are statements issued that day by President Johnson and by U.S. Representative to the United Nations James Russell Wiggins, together with a message from Secretary Rusk to Foreign Minister John Lyng of Norway.

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) dated December 30

All of us are saddened by the passing of Trygve Lie. He was more than an outstanding citizen and public official of his country; as first Secretary-General of the United Nations, he was in a very real sense the man who had more to do than any other in building up the structure of the United Nations Secretariat to carry the heavy burdens that organization has since assumed.

Trygve Lie responded to the crisis and strains in the early years of the organization. With unflinching courage and constancy he rendered great service to all men, and the world will miss him.

Message from Secretary Rusk to Mr. Lyng

Trygve Lie was a great public servant of his country and of the world. His whole life was dedicated to the cause of peace and to strengthening the security of all nations.

As first Secretary-General of the United Nations, he did much to make the organization the keystone of our international community. He was firm under stress and forthright in his defense of the principles of the United Nations Charter. In the United Nations Secretariat he created an international civil service guided by the ideal of impartial service to every member. He leaves us with a record of achievement for which men everywhere can be deeply grateful.

Please convey my condolences to the members of Mr. Lie's family.

DEAN RUSK

Statement by Ambassador Wiggins

U.S./U.N. press release 275 dated December 30

Trygve Lie was a pioneer in a new age of international peacemaking, the age of the United Nations. As the first Secretary-General he set a

standard of strength and integrity for all his successors in that critical post. During his 7 years in office the cold war raged at its worst; yet the framework of peace did not collapse, nor did aggression succeed. For his important part in these achievements, for his leadership in building an independent international Secretariat, and for the courage that helped make the seemingly powerless office of Secretary-General a pivotal office in world affairs, humanity owes lasting thanks to Trygve Lie.

To his family and his Norwegian compatriots the United States Mission expresses its sincere condolence.

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Hold Talks on Northeastern Pacific Fisheries

Press release 4 dated January 8

Representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union on January 8 began in Washington a review of three existing fishery agreements between the two countries in the northeastern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea with a view to future arrangements.

The first of these agreements, signed December 14, 1964, established certain areas near Kodiak Island, Alaska, in which fishing with mobile gear would not take place during certain months of the year in order to reduce incidents of damage to stationary fishing gear.¹ The second agreement, signed February 5, 1965, provides regulatory measures, including a catch quota, for the Soviet fishery for king crab in the eastern Bering Sea.² The third, signed February 13, 1967, provides a number of measures for the conservation of stocks of fish and the

reduction of conflicts between the fishermen of the two countries in areas off Alaska, Washington, and Oregon.³

In the discussions, which are being held in accordance with the agreements, the two delegations will review the operation of the agreements in the light of existing problems and new developments in the fisheries of the area. Depending upon their findings, the delegations may recommend renewal or modification of the agreements.

The United States delegation, which includes representatives of the fishing industry and governments of the States of Alaska, Washington, Oregon, and California, is led by Donald L. McKernan, Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife to the Secretary of State. The Soviet delegation is headed by M. N. Sukhoruchenko, Deputy Minister of Fisheries of the U.S.S.R.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

90th Congress, 2d Session

- Steel Imports. Staff study of the Committee on Finance. S. Doc. 107. December 19, 1967. 523 pp.
- East-West Trade. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Finance of the Committee on Banking and Currency, United States Senate. Part 2, June 4-25, 1968, 547 pp.; Part 3, June 4-25, 1968, 418 pp.
- Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1969. Report to accompany H.R. 19908. S. Rept. 1595. September 27, 1968. 25 pp.
- Report of the Eleventh Meeting of the Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group, March 20-24, 1968, Washington, D.C.-New Orleans, Louisiana. H. Rept. 1937. October 1, 1968. 22 pp.
- Duty on Certain Nonmalleable Iron Castings and Fabrics in Chief Weight of Wool. Conference report to accompany H.R. 653. H. Rept. 1949. October 3, 1968. 4 pp.

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5703.

² TIAS 5752.

³ TIAS 6218.

Ambassador Wiggins' News Conference of December 20

Following is a statement by James Russell Wiggins, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, made at the opening of his news conference held at U.N. Headquarters on December 20, together with excerpts from the question-and-answer portion of the transcript.

U.S./U.N. press release 267 dated December 20

OPENING STATEMENT

On the eve of adjournment of the 23d General Assembly I would like to share with you some impressions of this session and of its significance in the light of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

First, however, I wish to say to you how pleased I am at this morning's news that my successor as United States Representative to the United Nations is to be Charles Yost. Many of you here know Ambassador Yost well from the years of his outstanding service as a strong right arm to two of my predecessors, Governor Stevenson and Justice Goldberg. He is a brilliant professional in his lifelong field of diplomacy. He is a thorough expert on the United Nations, and is known and highly respected in this community of able diplomats. And, as anybody knows who has read his book "The Insecurity of Nations," beneath his calm exterior there burns a passionate and intelligent concern for the great aims of the United Nations and the survival of mankind in this dangerous age. Our representation in the United Nations will be in good hands.

Now, before answering questions, I would like to comment on three major aspects of this General Assembly which to me are highly significant.

First, in my view the most promising development of the session, the resolution to convene

an international Conference on the Human Environment in 1972.¹

Second, the most disturbing political question, the *Pravda* doctrine, which was widely discussed in our Assembly debates, that the necessities of Soviet *realpolitik* override all considerations of international law and all principles of the charter.

And third, the most momentous question for the United Nations itself: whether particular factions and voting blocs are to press their views to such extremes that the organization itself is endangered or whether, on the contrary, more moderate influences are to prevail, which although they make less exciting news copy, will enable the General Assembly to perform its classic function under the charter as "a center for harmonizing the actions of nations."

Human Environment

In the long view of history, I am convinced, the decision of the General Assembly to hold a Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 will turn out to be the most momentous of all the decisions of this Assembly. It is historically important in itself; and in addition, it illuminates that continuing contribution which the United Nations is making to the betterment of mankind by its handling of the relatively noncontroversial and nonpolitical issues that have to do with the world's social and economic problems.

The Conference on the Human Environment comes late in the human experience with pollution and destruction of our environment. We have already flooded the planet with such vast torrents of people and worked such massive and poorly understood transformations in our physical and biological surroundings as to raise

¹For background and text of the resolution, see BULLETIN of Dec. 30, 1968, p. 707.

questions about the very survival of generations still to come.

We are dealing here with the life and death of the human family; and surely when the history of our age is written and the records are studied a thousand years hence, the world will say of this decision of the General Assembly in 1968: "It was about time."

The Pravda Doctrine

The most disturbing political note sounded during this session of the General Assembly surely has been the Soviet Union's novel doctrine that "the laws of the class struggle" and "the interests of the world revolutionary movement" override the United Nations Charter principles of national self-determination and sovereignty. *Pravda* first put forward this doctrine in defending the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. Foreign Minister Gromyko elaborated on it in his speech to the Assembly, in which he proclaimed "the inviolability of the boundaries of the socialist commonwealth" but said not a word about the boundaries of his ally, a sovereign member of the United Nations, Czechoslovakia.

This doctrine is, of course, utterly inadmissible. It has implications for all Communist states, the independence of which it puts at the mercy of Soviet impulse and inclination. And it has serious implications for non-Communist states, who now have new reason to fear that Moscow will not feel restrained by international law or by the rules of the Charter of the United Nations if ever it should decide that they are to be subjugated in "the interests of the world revolutionary movement."

In the opening debate of this General Assembly, the Secretary of State and 76 other foreign ministers and chief delegates from every continent addressed themselves to the occupation of Czechoslovakia and the implications of this novel concept of Soviet prerogative.² Cynics may dismiss this debate as an exercise that proves the futility of mere words—Soviet troops are, after all, still in Czechoslovakia. But I dare to say that the world's instant recognition of the invasion for what it was, and the words of censure pronounced against it at the United Nations rostrum by so many leaders, have been a

cause of some anguish to the Soviet Union; and that they may give pause in future to any country that is tempted to transgress the rights of its neighbors.

Extremism Versus Moderation in the U.N.

The opposing tendencies of extremism and moderation have both been present in the current session. No one can say which tendency will prevail, although the fate of the United Nations depends in large part on the answer.

We have seen deplorable exhibitions of rancor, of impugning of motives, of bloc voting without reason, of readiness to toss the charter overboard, of rash and dangerous moves against the financial and administrative integrity of the United Nations. If these tendencies were to become dominant in future Assemblies, the value of this great world parliament would soon be at an end.

But the picture is not all gloomy. Some of the most ill-considered moves—notably the unconstitutional attempt to have the Assembly suspend a member of the United Nations from UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development]—did not prevail.³ We have hopes that the equally ill-advised attempt to change the repayment formula for United Nations bonds—a formula on which the full faith and credit of the United Nations are engaged—will also be defeated when it comes to a vote tomorrow.⁴

And on the affirmative side, the Assembly has recorded, often with unanimity, numerous constructive actions, not only political but economic, social, and legal, reflecting the fruitful give-and-take of many different interests.

Still more important, in recent weeks we have sensed the emergence of a spirit of reconciliation, and perhaps a renaissance of reason, in the affairs of the Assembly. This spirit manifested itself even on some of the highly emotional questions of a colonial nature in Africa, notably those concerning the Portuguese territories and Namibia. We have felt it also in our informal contacts with many of the delegates from Africa and other parts of the world. There is more of a tendency for these members to think and act in their own reasoned interests rather than in rigid blocs. There is more of a tendency to con-

² For a statement by Secretary Rusk made in the General Assembly on Oct. 2, see BULLETIN of Oct. 21, 1968, p. 405.

³ For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 6, 1969, p. 8.

⁴ For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 20, 1969, p. 55.

verse and reason together across the lines of division between old and new, rich and poor, north and south. There is, in short, a renewed sense of our common humanity and of how much we need each other; and from that sense will come, I greatly hope, new habits of mutual accommodation and mutual respect which the United Nations so profoundly needs if its promise is to be fulfilled.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. Ambassador Wiggins, when you spoke with Mr. Nixon in the Mission on Tuesday, I understand you raised the question of your interest in the environment item. Did you get the impression that he felt deeply enough about this subject that his administration would pursue it with some vigor?

A. I gathered, in the remarks that he made here as he left this building and in remarks that he made in his informal comments upstairs and in his conversations with us, that he is much interested in the human environment and in the other economic and social operations of the United Nations.

Chinese Policy on the U.N.

Q. Mr. Ambassador, you said that the new administration may have a bit more mobility on the China issue. Would it be reasonable to assume that the present policymakers may be prepared to hand new ideas to their successors that mean ideas that might open the door a little?

A. I think it can be reasonably assumed that you have to ask the new administration that question, although I gather your second point is whether you think the existing administration will advise them.

I think the position that was taken here—and that is the general assumption, if I may speak of it—has been that the policy is largely one of Chinese manufacture. And we didn't have before this session of the General Assembly any proposal on Chinese representation that represented any opportunity for change. We merely had the resolution on the important question; we had a resolution to throw the Government on Taiwan out of the United Nations and to

admit the Chinese People's Republic; and we had the Italian resolution.⁵

So these were the terms in which it came up here, as it has come up every year since 1961 but one. And I think that is still the situation: that in the long run the return of China to the community of nations will be largely governed by Chinese policy. And I assume that this still remains the opinion of this administration.

Q. Mr. Ambassador, the Secretary-General in the introduction to his report to the Assembly recommended that the foreign ministers of the Big Four meet and possibly draft an agenda for a summit meeting in 1969 of the Big Four leaders. Will your administration give a positive recommendation of this procedure to the incoming administration?

A. I believe the response of the United States Government to that was that they had received the Secretary-General's recommendations and that the kind of informal conferences to which he referred would take place here among the foreign ministers involved; and it has proceeded no further than that so far as I know.

The Jarring Mission in the Middle East

Q. When you came here you said that you hoped that you could do one thing at least: to accomplish some progress on a settlement of the Middle East problem. How do you feel now as you are nearing the end of your term? Have you accomplished anything, sir?

A. It is very painful for me to have to say that I don't think we have accomplished very much.

A great effort was made, if you will remember, early in this session to rescue the Jarring mission, which seemed on the point of acknowledging its inability to make any progress; and Ambassador Jarring felt that he had nothing very substantial with which to work.⁶ After his long endeavor in talking with the parties, there had been no real exchange of written views.

I think during the period of 2 months we held—I am speaking now of the United States Mission to the United Nations—more than 50

⁵ For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 9, 1968, p. 609.

⁶ Gunnar Jarring, Swedish Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., is the U.N. Secretary-General's special representative on the Middle East. For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 18, 1967, p. 834.

meetings with the parties and with Ambassador Jarring and with other states interested in the settlement of the Middle Eastern questions.

These exertions, along with those of other delegations here, I think, did succeed in getting, first, a substantial exchange of written views between the parties.

But after this initial progress I think that very little movement has taken place. I think very little was added to that progress in Ambassador Jarring's recent discussions at Nicosia, and I think that Ambassador Jarring has now decided, as you know, to return to his mission in Moscow; and I assume that shortly after the first of the year, when he has had time to review the exchanges that have taken place, Ambassador Jarring may assume a somewhat greater initiative in trying to renew the exchange of position papers that so far have occurred.

But it is certainly only candid to say that it has not been possible to reach a settlement of the Middle Eastern questions. I guess you could say we had a damage-control operation, in which we rescued the Jarring mission and preserved it for future effort. But that's about the limit of our achievement.

Q. Mr. Ambassador, when you say that Dr. Jarring may assume a greater initiative to obtain an exchange of views, could you tell us a little more—

A. No. He made an effort here to elicit more concrete views from the parties, and I suspect that after the first of the year he will renew that effort and try to get them to be more forthcoming with some material with which he can work.

Q. Mr. Ambassador, what was it that put the Jarring mission in danger of foundering? You say you rescued it.

A. No, I didn't say we rescued it. I said when he came here as the Assembly started, he had not been able to get any exchange of views really at all on paper, and during those 2 months at least he did get that much forthcoming exchange of views. He got some written statements, as you remember, from these states.

Q. Mr. Ambassador, you say that when Dr. Jarring returned at the beginning of the Assembly there was an absence of meaningful exchanges, and the mission was in a situation which needed some assistance from major

powers here concerned with the Middle East. Would you say that in the future, to bring about a Middle East settlement, involvement of the major powers in a more direct way to further the understanding between the parties is desirable and necessary?

A. I think it is very desirable that they continue to do what they did here. I think it would be very undesirable to have the great powers attempt to impose a settlement on the region.

Q. You said that the greatest achievement of this Assembly is setting up a conference on environment which will meet in 1972. Do you see anything else constructive that this Assembly has done?

A. Well, the Outer Space Committee deliberations, I think, have been put on the track toward a liability convention to match the astronauts convention, based on the Treaty on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

I think that at last we have made a little movement on the seabeds, with the Committee of 42, and I believe that will be useful and helpful.

These are some of the areas in which I think there has been some progress.

Realistic Appraisal of U.N. Progress

Q. Mr. Ambassador, if Mr. Yost were to ask you for suggestions on what to do to get the United Nations out of the present doldrums, what would you suggest?

A. Well, I have to accept your definition it is in the doldrums. I think that one of the problems is that at the outset of the United Nations the country labored under a great euphoric expectation about the possibilities of multilateral diplomacy in an organization of this kind.

And I suspect that over two decades the principal objective of concern has been to try to readjust that excessive expectation down to more realistic dimensions; we know better now than we knew then the limits of the framework within which this organization can operate.

We know that its potential may be just as great in the long run but that realistically it is simply not possible for it to compel instant solutions of very deep-seated, longstanding conflicts that arise either out of ideological differences or economic disparity. The slow erosion of these differences that can be expected to transform a quarrelsome and a contentious world into

one where we have a larger expectation of peace is not something the progress toward which you can measure in days, weeks, or months; the progress has to be measured in terms of years and decades.

And I would say that the great ingredient that is required here, in the country and in the world, is patience. I know that this sounds as though you were counseling people to be idle in the presence of great danger. But it is simply not possible to solve this accumulation of problems in a short space of time. My own interest and concern about such things as the Conference on the Human Environment and the work of the Economic and Social Council and all the work of human betterment that goes on in this organization, including work in the field of human rights, is that they are laying the foundations for a peace 50 years from now. And if similar exertions had occurred five decades ago, we would find the political problems far more tractable than they are.

I think the United Nations is quietly and unspectacularly getting at the roots of our political differences, and I expect that this progress will continue. I think the disenchantment that seems to pervade even these premises sometimes arises out of an inability to recover from our euphoria of 20 years ago.

Q. Mr. Ambassador, would you say that some of this disenchantment may have followed the use of force by the great powers, say, in Viet-Nam and Czechoslovakia and has prevented the United Nations from solving some of the other problems?

A. Well, I think many people are disappointed that here the United Nations, the General Assembly, in a world in which there are four great conflicts—the conflicts in the Middle East, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the civil war in Nigeria, and the war in Viet-Nam—that the United Nations has not been able to come to grips with these has been a matter of disappointment to many people.

But I think the disappointment springs in part from an excessive expectation of its capacity to deal with it. And the charter has never utterly proscribed—reserved the use of force for certain purposes. It's never said that force is prohibited in all circumstances, but I think that it will take time to deal with these matters.

Q. To go back to my own question—I asked you a question on China, and I believe in your

reply you indicated that the only hope for some kind of a new initiative, of some kind of a change in policy, would be a new initiative on Peking's part. Just what form would that take in your view?

A. Well, I should think the biggest single factor would be a larger indication that China itself really wishes to assume a normal role in the concert of nations. I have not myself seen any indications that it is in very great purpose toward that end. There has been some news in the last few months indicating a resumption of interest in normalizing its relationships; but even in those cases where it has had diplomatic relations, the experience of those who have recognized it and have had embassies there has not been exactly normal and certainly far from happy.

I think it will take more determination and will and inclination on China's part to repair what undoubtedly is a weakness in a world structure.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

International Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

*Statement by James Russell Wiggins
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

As the General Assembly this year again considers the peaceful use and exploration of outer space, we all know that one of man's most ancient dreams may soon be fulfilled. For we see unfolding before us today the final stages of one of the greatest explorations of all time—an exploration which may lead to man's landing upon the moon.

This adventure belongs not to one or two nations, but to all mankind. The voyage to the moon is part of man's historic quest for a more complete understanding of the universe in which he must make his way and a measure of his faith in his own human capabilities. Whatever the nationality of the men who make this voyage, they will be guided by the courage, imagination, and zest for life which are the

¹Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on Dec. 18 (U.S./U.N. press release 258).

common qualities of all peoples. Perhaps most important, the exploration of the moon, like that of all celestial bodies, will be governed by principles which represent the interests and aspirations of the community of nations. The Outer Space Treaty states that the exploration and use of outer space shall be "the province of all mankind." As we look forward to the dramatic extension of man's environment which lies ahead, this statement seems to us, Mr. Chairman, to be a very literal expression of fact.

There have been two events in the last year of major importance in the U.N.'s work in outer space. The first was the Vienna Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the first such conference to emphasize the practical benefits of space technology to all nations, no matter how large or small their own programs in space research. The second was the coming into force on December 3 of the Agreement on the Rescue and Return of Astronauts, which has now been signed by 66 nations and which will help to assure that astronauts in distress receive the assistance which they deserve and require.

My delegation would like to express its appreciation to Foreign Minister Waldheim of Austria and to Dr. Sarabhai of India for their able leadership in the Outer Space Conference at Vienna. We think that the conference provided a useful exchange of ideas and experience on opportunities for international cooperation in space research and on the benefits to all men here on earth of the new technology being used in the space above us.

In view of the rapid advances which are taking place, the conference sessions on such subjects as the use of satellites in communication and in meteorology were of particular benefit. The United States delegation to the conference was impressed with the commonsense approach taken to the questions discussed and with the general realization that the successful application of space technology must begin with a real and specific need which the new technology can fill.

Let me now turn to a disappointment in the past year in the U.N.'s work in outer space: the failure to complete the outer space liability convention. Like the Agreement on Assistance to and Return of Astronauts, the liability convention would be an important supplementary agreement to the Outer Space Treaty approved by the General Assembly in 1966.

In approving the astronaut agreement last

December, the General Assembly called upon the Outer Space Committee "to complete urgently the preparation of the draft agreement on liability for damage caused by the launching of objects into outer space and, in any event, not later than the beginning of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, and to submit it to the Assembly at that session."² Speaking for the United States in the General Assembly on December 19, Ambassador Goldberg pledged "the full and unstinting efforts of the United States to this end." Similar pledges were made by other members of the Outer Space Committee.

In the light of these pledges, the 1968 session of the Outer Space Legal Subcommittee, held last June in Geneva, was a failure. Not all members showed a willingness to negotiate meaningfully toward a satisfactory text. Some, in fact, showed no readiness whatsoever to advance beyond rigid and outdated positions. The result was a great deal of discussion and little progress.

Recently there has been evidence of a greater readiness to deal forthrightly with the issues involved in the liability convention. For example, the members of the Outer Space Committee now seem to agree unanimously that the convention should cover nuclear as well as non-nuclear damage. This is a big step forward. And while not all members yet agree that the convention should contain a limitation on liability, a large and growing number are now prepared to consider seriously a limitation, provided that the figure chosen is appropriately high.

A remaining issue of fundamental importance relates to the settlement of unresolved claims. The United States shares the view of most members of the Outer Space Committee that the liability convention must provide some way of resolving a dispute over a claim upon which a claimant and the launching state have not been able to agree. If negotiations have not led to a mutually acceptable result within a reasonable time, a dissatisfied claimant state should be able to invoke the jurisdiction of an impartial tribunal with the power to decide upon the existence of liability and the amount, if any, for which the launching state should be held liable. Such a provision is essential if the liability convention is to be meaningful.

² For U.S. statements and text of General Assembly Resolution 2345, see BULLETIN of Jan. 15, 1968, p. 80.

If an agreed solution can be reached on the question of arbitration or other procedures for resolving unsettled claims, agreement should come quickly on such remaining issues as the treatment of international organizations under the convention, the system or systems of law used to determine the amount of damage, and the question of sharing the liability from damage caused by space activities conducted jointly by two or more states.

We have waited too long for a convention to protect all states against damages which could result from space accidents. We hope all members of the Outer Space Committee will find it possible to finish the convention at the next session of the Outer Space Legal Subcommittee. There is no reason why this goal should not be reached.

Two other subjects rank high on the agenda of the Outer Space Committee for next year: the proposals of Sierra Leone and India that the United Nations establish a continuing mechanism to provide objective information on the applications of space technology, and the proposed study by a working group of the technical feasibility and various implications of communications by direct broadcast satellites.

At the Outer Space Conference in Vienna, considerable attention was given to broad questions of the future role of the United Nations in outer space. Discussions of the way in which the U.N. might assist developing countries in using space technology led to two concrete proposals, one by Sierra Leone and the second by India, that a mechanism be established to provide nations with analytical advice on advances in space technology which might have practical benefits. This mechanism might take various forms, but a successful United Nations service clearly must employ the best technical expertise available.

My delegation believes that these proposals point the way toward a useful new activity for the United Nations in the field of outer space. As I emphasized at the meeting of the Outer Space Committee last October, all nations—no matter what their stage of development or ultimate objectives—face insistent and competing demands on limited resources.³ Space techniques will be adopted only if there is sound

evidence that they are more efficient or less costly than conventional methods. There are times when the old-fashioned way of doing a job is more efficient than an esoteric application of space technology—when a sextant may be a more efficient instrument of navigation than a geosynchronous satellite, a landline more sensible for communication than a space relay, or a propeller-driven airplane a better choice for surveying resources than a satellite still on the drawing board. But there will also be times when a new space technology can be more economic or more effective than a conventional method. We believe that the United Nations can and should play an increasingly active part in providing the analytical information countries need in deciding where and when space technology can best assist their development.

My delegation also supports the proposal that a working group of the Outer Space Committee undertake a study of direct broadcast from communications satellites to local ground receivers. We believe that questions relating to technical feasibility should constitute the first phase of this study. Then the working group, on the basis of this report, should proceed to consider economic as well as social, cultural, legal, and other implications of direct broadcasting.

The promise of economically feasible direct satellite broadcast to home receivers may yet be some distance in the future. However, we think the value of such broadcasts for education and other purposes could be great, and we believe that the possibilities should be examined in depth.

The most immediately feasible applications of satellite broadcasting may be those which do not require that every home be equipped with a highly sophisticated receiving set and antenna. For example, the United States and India are currently considering a cooperative project which would make available to India a satellite capable of broadcasting television programs directly into small, inexpensive village receivers. India would be able to use this satellite for instructional programs, which would be prepared entirely by India on the basis of its own analysis of national priorities. We hope this pilot project will demonstrate how a developing country may bring sophisticated space technology to bear on its own national needs.

Seven years ago, Mr. Chairman, the General

³For background, see BULLETIN of Nov. 18, 1968, p. 529.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, with annex. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284. *Acceptance deposited:* Zambia, January 8, 1969.

Aviation

Convention on offenses and certain other acts committed on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo September 14, 1963.¹ *Ratification deposited:* United Kingdom, November 29, 1968.²

Bills of Lading

Protocol to amend the international convention for the unification of certain rules of law relating to bills of lading signed at Brussels August 25, 1924 (51 Stat. 233). Done at Brussels February 23, 1968.¹ *Signature:* France, December 4, 1968.

Fisheries

Protocol to the international convention for the north-west Atlantic fisheries (TIAS 2089), relating to measures of control;
Protocol to the international convention for the north-west Atlantic fisheries (TIAS 2089), relating to entry into force of proposals adopted by the Commission. Done at Washington November 29, 1965.¹ *Ratification deposited:* Poland, January 7, 1969.

Judicial Procedure

Convention on the service abroad of judicial and extra-judicial documents in civil or commercial matters. Done at The Hague November 15, 1965. Enters into force February 10, 1969. *Proclaimed by the President:* January 8, 1969.

Load Lines

International load line convention, final protocol, and annexes, together with the final act of the International Load Line Conference. Signed at London July 5, 1930. Entered into force January 1, 1933. 47 Stat. 2228. *Notice of denunciation:* Denmark, effective July 21, 1970.
International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331. *Acceptances deposited:* Pakistan, December 5, 1968; United Arab Republic, December 6, 1968.

Assembly adopted Resolution 1721,⁴ a landmark resolution which set forth basic principles and guidelines concerning international cooperation in outer space. The General Assembly expressed its belief in that resolution that "communication by means of satellites should be available to the nations of the world as soon as practicable on a global and non-discriminatory basis." Few people in 1961 could have foreseen the vast satellite telecommunications network which now spans the earth. The 63 members of that system are drawn from every continent. They represent widely different political and social systems but share a common interest in practical, effective satellite communications. My Government is proud of the part which it has played in making these communications available, through the medium of Intelsat, to all nations.

By the terms of the 1964 Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Communications Satellite System, my Government is obligated to convene a plenary conference during early 1969 for the purpose of establishing definitive arrangements for Intelsat. As host Government, we have invited all 63 Intelsat members to this conference, which will convene in Washington, D.C., on February 24, 1969. The Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Secretary General of the ITU [International Telecommunication Union] have been invited to send observers. In addition, notice of this conference has been sent to every country which is not a member of Intelsat but is a member of the United Nations or one or more of its specialized agencies. If any such country, in response to this notice, indicates that it would like to attend the conference, the Government of the United States would be pleased to extend an invitation to that Government to participate in the conference in an observer status.

Mr. Chairman, the year ahead may be one of achievement and high adventure in the exploration of outer space. But above all, I should like to emphasize that the United States will continue to work toward cooperation in the exploration and use of this new environment and especially in the uses of space technology which have direct, practical relevance to our daily lives on earth.

⁴ For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 185.

¹ Not in force.

² Does not include Southern Rhodesia.

Protocol of amendment to the charter of the Organization of American States (TIAS 2361). Signed at Buenos Aires February 27, 1967.¹
Ratification deposited: Brazil, December 11, 1968.

Postal Matters

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and convention with final protocol and regulations of execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881.
Ratifications deposited: Albania, November 4, 1968; Mongolia, April 8, 1968; Portugal, September 7, 1968.
Accessions deposited: Portuguese Provinces in West Africa, Portuguese Provinces in East Africa, Asia, and Oceania, November 20, 1968.

Property

Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, as revised, for the protection of industrial property. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967.¹
Ratification deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (with a reservation and a declaration), December 4, 1968.
 Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967.¹
Ratification deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (with a declaration), December 4, 1968.

Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Adopted at New York December 21, 1965.¹
Ratifications deposited: India (with a reservation), December 3, 1968; Poland (with a reservation and a declaration), December 5, 1968.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. Entered into force January 1, 1967; as to the United States May 29, 1967. TIAS 6267.
Ratification deposited: Portuguese Overseas Provinces, September 10, 1968.
 Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 1959), as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332), relating to maritime mobile service, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva November 3, 1967. Enters into force April 1, 1969. TIAS 6590.
Notifications of approval: Congo (Brazzaville), November 12, 1968; Niger, November 23, 1968; New Zealand, November 6, 1968.

United Nations

Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. Signed at San Francisco June 26, 1945. Entered into force October 24, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031.
Admission to membership: Equatorial Guinea, November 12, 1968.

¹ Not in force.

Argentina

Agreement extending the agreement of December 27 and 29, 1960 (TIAS 4653), relating to the loan of the destroyers *Heerman*, *Dortch*, and *Stemnell*. Effected by exchange of notes at Buenos Aires April 2 and December 10, 1968. Entered into force December 10, 1968.

Chile

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of December 29, 1967 (TIAS 6403), with exchange of notes. Effected by exchange of notes at Santiago December 17, 1968. Entered into force December 17, 1968.

Colombia

Agreement for the continuation of a cooperative meteorological observation program, with memorandum of arrangement. Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá December 19, 1968. Entered into force December 19, 1968.

India

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreements of February 20, 1967 (TIAS 6221), and June 24, 1967 (TIAS 6338). Signed at New Delhi December 23, 1968. Entered into force December 23, 1968.
 Agreement for duty-free entry and defrayment of inland transportation charges of relief supplies and packages, as extended and amended. Signed at Washington July 9, 1951. Entered into force July 9, 1951. TIAS 2291, 2919, 5781.
Terminated: December 5, 1968.

Iran

Agreement extending the agreement of October 6, 1947, as amended (TIAS 1666, 1924, 2068, 2947, 3112, 3520), relating to a military mission to Iran. Effected by exchange of notes at Tehran November 25 and December 14, 1968. Entered into force December 14, 1968.

Tunisia

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of March 17, 1967 (TIAS 6323). Signed at Tunis December 24, 1968. Entered into force December 24, 1968.

Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agreements for sales of agricultural commodities of January 6, 1968 (TIAS 6440), and October 24, 1967 (TIAS 6424). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon December 7, 1968. Entered into force December 7, 1968.

Yugoslavia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreements of April 21, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5008, 5053, 5222), April 27, 1964 (TIAS 5567), March 16, 1965 (TIAS 5772), and July 16, 1965 (TIAS 5840). Effected by exchange of notes at Belgrade December 20, 1968. Entered into force December 20, 1968.

China. Ambassador Wiggins' News Conference of December 20 (excerpts)	80
Communications. International Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Wiggins)	84
Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy	79
Foreign Aid. The United States and Latin America—A Special Relationship (Johnson)	73
France. Presidents Johnson and de Gaulle Exchange New Year's Greetings (texts of letters)	77
Latin America. The United States and Latin America—A Special Relationship (Johnson)	73
Mexico. Statue of Benito Juárez Dedicated at Washington (Rusk)	74
Near East. Ambassador Wiggins' News Conference of December 20 (excerpts)	80
Norway. Death of Trygve Lie (Johnson, Rusk, Wiggins)	78
Peru. Letters of Credence (Berckemeyer)	75
Presidential Documents	
Death of Trygve Lie	78
The Flight of Apollo 8: International Cooperation in Space (President Johnson presents NASA medals to astronauts)	76
Presidents Johnson and de Gaulle Exchange New Year's Greetings	77
The United States and Latin America—A Special Relationship	73
Space	
The Flight of Apollo 8: International Cooperation in Space (President Johnson presents NASA medals to astronauts)	76
International Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Wiggins)	84
Tanzania. Letters of Credence (Rutabanzibwa)	75
Treaty Information	
Current Actions	87
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Hold Talks on Northeastern Pacific Fisheries	79

U.S.S.R.	
Ambassador Wiggins' News Conference of December 20 (excerpts)	80
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Hold Talks on Northeastern Pacific Fisheries	79
United Nations	
Ambassador Wiggins' News Conference of December 20 (excerpts)	80
Death of Trygve Lie (Johnson, Rusk, Wiggins)	78
International Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Wiggins)	84

Name Index

Anders, Lt. Col. William A	76
Berckemeyer, Fernando	75
Borman, Col. Frank	76
de Gaulle, Charles	77
Johnson, President	73, 76, 77, 78
Lovell, Capt. James A	76
Paine, Thomas O	76
Rusk, Secretary	74, 78
Rutabanzibwa, Gosbert Miarcell	75
Wiggins, James Russell	78, 80, 84

**Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: January 6-12**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
3	1/7	Rusk: dedication of statue of Benito Juárez.
4	1/8	U.S.-U.S.S.R. meeting on north-eastern Pacific fisheries.

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THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
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BULLETIN

Vol. LX, No. 1545



February 3, 1969

THE STATE OF THE UNION

Excerpts From President Johnson's Address to the Congress 89

THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT—FISCAL YEAR 1970
(EXCERPTS) 95

THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY

*Excerpts From the President's Economic Report
and the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers 101*

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE **BULLETIN**

VOL. LX, No. 1545

February 3, 1969

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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The State of the Union

ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO THE CONGRESS (EXCERPTS)¹

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, Members of the Congress and my fellow Americans:

For the sixth and the last time, I present to the Congress my assessment of the state of the Union.

I shall speak to you tonight about challenge and opportunity—and about the commitments that all of us have made together that will, if we carry them out, give America our best chance to achieve the kind of great society that we all want.

Every President lives not only with what is but with what has been and what could be.

Most of the great events in his Presidency are part of a larger sequence extending back through several years and extending back through several other administrations.

Urban unrest; poverty; pressures on welfare; education of our people; law enforcement and law and order; the continuing crisis in the Middle East; the conflict in Viet-Nam; the dangers of nuclear war; the great difficulties of dealing with the Communist powers—all have this much in common.

They—and their causes, the causes that gave rise to them—all of these have existed with us for many years. Several Presidents have already sought to try to deal with them. One or more Presidents will try to resolve them or try to contain them in the years that are ahead of us.

But if the Nation's problems are continuing, so are this Nation's assets:

- our economy,
- the democratic system,
- our sense of exploration, symbolized most recently by the wonderful flight of the Apollo 8, in which all Americans took great pride,

¹ Delivered on Jan. 14 (White House press release).

—the good common sense and sound judgment of the American people and their essential love of justice.

We must not ignore our problems. But neither should we ignore our strengths. Those strengths are available to sustain a President of either party, to support his progressive efforts both at home and overseas.

Americans, I believe, are united in the hope that the Paris talks will bring an early peace to Viet-Nam. And if our hopes for an early settlement of the war are realized, then our military expenditures can be reduced and very substantial savings can be made to be used for other desirable purposes as the Congress may determine.

In any event, I think it is imperative that we do all that we responsibly can to resist inflation, while maintaining our prosperity. I think all Americans know that our prosperity is broad and it is deep and it has brought record profits—the highest in our history—and record wages.

Our gross national product has grown more in the last 5 years than any other period in our nation's history. Our wages have been the highest. Our profits have been the best. This prosperity has enabled millions to escape the poverty that they would have otherwise had the last few years.

I think also you will be very glad to hear that the Secretary of the Treasury informs me tonight that in 1968 in our balance of payments we have achieved a surplus. It appears that we have, in fact, done better this year than we have done in any year in this regard since the year 1957.

The quest for a durable peace, I think, has

absorbed every administration since the end of World War II. It has required us to seek a limitation of arms races not only among the superpowers but among the smaller nations as well. We have joined in the test ban treaty of 1963, the outer space treaty of 1967, and the treaty against the spread of nuclear weapons in 1968.

This latter agreement, the Nonproliferation Treaty, is now pending in the Senate and it has been pending there since last July. In my opinion, delay in ratifying it is not going to be helpful to the cause of peace. America took the lead in negotiating this treaty, and America should now take steps to have it approved at the earliest possible date.

Until a way can be found to scale down the level of arms among the superpowers, mankind cannot view the future without fear and great apprehension. I believe that we should resume the talks with the Soviet Union about limiting offensive and defensive missile systems. I think they would already have been resumed except for Czechoslovakia and our election this year.

It was more than 20 years ago that we embarked on a program of trying to aid the developing nations. We knew then that we could not live in good conscience as a rich enclave on an earth that was seething in misery.

During these years there have been great advances made under our program, particularly against want and hunger, although we are disappointed at the appropriations last year. We thought they were woefully inadequate. This year I am asking for adequate funds for economic assistance in the hope that we can further peace throughout the world.

I think we must continue to support efforts in regional cooperation. Among those efforts, that of Western Europe has a very special place in America's concern.

The only course that is going to permit Europe to play the great world role that its resources permit is to go forward to unity. I think America remains ready to work with a united Europe, to work as a partner on the basis of equality.

For the future, the quest for peace requires

—that we maintain the liberal trade policies that have helped us become the leading nation in world trade;

—that we strengthen the international mone-

tary system as an instrument of world prosperity; and

—that we seek areas of agreement with the Soviet Union where the interests of both nations and the interests of world peace are properly served.

The strained relationship between us and the world's leading Communist power has not ended—especially in the light of the brutal invasion of Czechoslovakia. Totalitarianism is no less odious to us because we are able to reach some accommodation that reduces the danger of world catastrophe.

What we do, we do in the interest of peace in the world. We earnestly hope that time will bring a Russia that is less afraid of diversity and individual freedom.

The quest for peace tonight continues in Viet-Nam and in the Paris talks.

I regret more than any of you know that it has not been possible to restore peace to South Viet-Nam.

The prospects, I think, for peace are better today than at any time since North Viet-Nam began its invasion with its regular forces more than 4 years ago.

The free nations of Asia know what they were not sure of at that time: that America cares about their freedom and it also cares about America's own vital interests in Asia and throughout the Pacific.

The North Vietnamese know that they cannot achieve their aggressive purposes by force. There may be hard fighting before a settlement is reached; but, I can assure you, it will yield no victory to the Communist cause.

I cannot speak to you tonight about Viet-Nam without paying a very personal tribute to the men who have carried the battle out there for all of us. I have been honored to be their Commander in Chief. The Nation owes them its unstinting support while the battle continues—and its enduring gratitude when their service is done.

Finally, the quest for stable peace in the Middle East goes on in many capitals tonight. America fully supports the unanimous resolution of the U.N. Security Council which points the way.

There must be a settlement of the armed hostility that exists in that region of the world today. It is a threat not only to Israel and to

all the Arab states, but it is a threat to every one of us and to the entire world as well.

Now it is time to leave. I hope it may be said, a hundred years from now, that by working together we helped to make our country more just, more just for all of its people, as well as to insure and guarantee the blessings of liberty for all of our posterity.

That is what I hope. But I believe that at least it will be said that we tried.

President Johnson Welcomes New Talks on Viet-Nam

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release dated January 16

We are all pleased that certain basic procedural problems in Paris have been solved and new talks on the substance of peace in Southeast Asia can open.

There are three lessons of our experience since March 31st.¹

First, we must be clear and firm in pursuing with our allies the limited but vital objectives we seek in Southeast Asia.

Second, we must be patient and face the hard fact that fighting is likely to continue as the negotiations are carried forward.

Third, we should be confident that an honorable peace is possible if we here at home remain steady.

We have had three crises in these negotiations since they opened 9 months ago: on the place for the talks, on the terms for a bombing cessation, and on the procedures for the new talks. In each case, patience, firmness, and fairmindedness achieved a satisfactory result.

We must pursue peace as diligently as we have fought aggression. And this year we have made steady progress toward the peace we all devoutly pray for.

I deeply believe that if we only remain united and stay together on this path we will achieve honorable peace in Southeast Asia.

¹ For President Johnson's address to the Nation on Mar. 31, 1968, see BULLETIN of Apr. 15, 1968, p. 481.

Report Completed on Future U.S. Foreign Trade Policy

White House press release dated January 14 for release January 16

The President today received from Ambassador William M. Roth, his Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, a report with recommendations on future United States foreign trade policy. This report was requested by the President and has been in preparation for the past year. In receiving the report, he said:

"Strengthening the position of the United States in world trade has been a constant concern of this administration. Ambassador Roth's recommendations focus on this objective, and they deserve the thoughtful attention of all Americans whose well-being is affected by trade—businessmen, workers, farmers, and consumers generally."

The report notes striking changes in the pattern of world trade, caused by keener international competition, the growing importance of regional trading blocs and multinational corporations, and the urgent need of the less developed countries to expand their exports.

"There are great dangers ahead," Ambassador Roth warned, "dangers of serious international confrontation among the major trading nations and incipient protectionism as well. However, there are also great and exciting opportunities to build even further towards a freer world market—a market that will be increasingly open to American exports . . . New tactics, even new policies, must be devised without losing sight of our fundamental goals."

In preparing the report, the Special Representative took into account the views of a Public Advisory Committee on Trade Policy, appointed by the President and composed of 35 distinguished business, farm, labor, and consumer leaders. Separate comments by members of the Committee are included as a significant contribution to the report, although they do not necessarily endorse the report as a whole.

The report rejects the quota or market-sharing approach as a general response to the pressures of world competition. Rather, it puts major stress on the need to help businessmen and workers adjust to import competition. For this purpose, it recommends the amendment of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to liberalize

the criteria for escape-clause relief to industries seriously injured by import competition and for adjustment assistance to individual firms and workers adversely affected by imports. In both cases the report recommends that the injury need no longer be related to a previous tariff concession. It suggests, however, a more stringent test for the granting of relief to industries than for firms and workers.

The report stresses the need for continued and determined effort to reduce or eliminate tariff and nontariff barriers to trade. The United States, it declares, should continue to insist upon strict adherence to the rules of trade, as set forth in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Existing statutes protecting American industry and agriculture against unfair competition must be stringently enforced—as they have been.

The report recommends early negotiations in specific agricultural and industrial sectors and for the removal of particularly burdensome nontariff barriers. Although it does not foresee another general round of trade negotiations until the Kennedy Round agreements have been implemented, it recommends that study and preparation for such negotiations be immediately initiated.

The report declares that a fundamental strengthening of the world monetary system is essential. Domestic monetary and fiscal measures and international monetary adjustments, it is held, are the proper methods of meeting balance-of-payments difficulties. However, the report recognizes that temporary trade measures may help to alleviate such difficulties until more basic corrective actions take effect. The report recommends a study of the international rules governing such measures in order to make them more responsive to present needs.

It emphasizes the need to restrain inflation as essential to U.S. ability to compete both at home and abroad. It also urges an intensified export promotion effort, based upon improved credit facilities and a working partnership between industry and government.

The report recommends against consideration at this time of American membership in a free trade association of North Atlantic and other countries. Instead, the United States should continue to conduct trade negotiations on a most-favored-nation (i.e., nondiscriminatory) basis.

After reviewing alternative means of coordinating trade policy within the executive branch, including the establishment of a Cabinet-level department for international trade, the report recommends that this responsibility continue to be lodged in the White House.

In preparing the report, the Special Representative took into account the congressional and public hearings on trade policy held over the past 2 years.

Letters of Credence

Colombia

The newly appointed Ambassador of Colombia, Misael Eduardo Pastrana Borrero, presented his credentials to President Johnson on January 17. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated January 17.

Reduction in Tariff Recommended on Reprocessed Wool Fabrics

Following is the text of identical letters from President Johnson to Wilbur D. Mills, chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means, and Russell B. Long, chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance.

White House press release dated January 13

JANUARY 13, 1969

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On October 24, 1968, I signed H.R. 653, a bill which amended the tariff schedules of the United States to establish a uniform tariff on imports of re-processed wool fabrics or blends of such fabrics.

At the time of signing this bill, I indicated my concern that the tariff rate it established on these fabrics could result in a duty which was so high that it was not in the national interest. In an effort to avoid this undesirable result, I directed the Tariff Commission to study the effect of this legislation and make recommendations as to what simple ad valorem rate or rates of duty would provide a reasonable degree of tariff protection.

The Tariff Commission completed its work

and reported to me on December 31. A majority of the Commission concluded that an ad valorem rate of 55% is equitable and will provide a reasonable degree of tariff protection for the U.S. domestic industry.

Accordingly, I have today directed the Department of State to prepare and submit to you draft legislation amending H.R. 653 to reduce the duty on these fabrics to a 55% ad valorem rate. I urge you to introduce this legislation at the earliest practical date and give prompt consideration to it in the Committee. It is my hope that both Houses of the Congress will see fit to take favorable action on this measure.

Attached to this letter is a copy of my signing statement on H.R. 653¹ and the report of the Tariff Commission.² I have today requested the Commission to make its report public.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Steel Industries of Japan and ECSC Offer To Limit Exports to U.S.

Following is the text of identical letters from Secretary Rusk to Wilbur D. Mills, chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means, and Russell B. Long, chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance, transmitting communications from the steel industries of Japan and of the European Coal and Steel Community.

TEXT OF SECRETARY RUSK'S LETTER

JANUARY 14, 1969

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The President has asked me to transmit to you communications received from the steel industry of Japan and the steel industries of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) expressing the intentions of these industries to limit their exports of steel mill products to the United States in the years 1969 through 1971.

We estimate that as a result of the export limitation of the Japanese and ECSC producers, which together provide about 82 percent of

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 25, 1968, p. 545.

² Not printed here.

our steel imports, total imports will amount to about 14 million net tons in 1969, about 14.7 million net tons in 1970 and about 15.4 million net tons in 1971. Other major foreign producers have not formally offered to cooperate in the voluntary export limitations but, as a practical matter, are expected to maintain their exports at levels which yield the estimates stated above.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN RUSK

Enclosures

TEXTS OF STEEL INDUSTRIES' COMMUNICATIONS

Japanese Steel Industry

MEMORANDUM

DECEMBER 23, 1968

To: The Honorable Secretary of State,
Washington 25, D. C., U. S. A.
FROM: Yoshihiro Inayama, Chairman,
Japan Iron & Steel Exporters' Association
SUBJECT: Statement of the Intention of the Japanese
Steel Industry

Statement of the Intention of the Japanese Steel Industry

1. With the desire to assist in the maintenance of an orderly market for steel in the United States, the nine leading steel companies of Japan, namely, Yawata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd., Fuji Iron & Steel Co., Ltd., Nippon Kokan Kabushiki Kaisha, Kawasaki Steel Corporation, Sumitomo Metal Industries, Ltd., Kobe Steel Works, Ltd., Nisshin Steel Co., Ltd., Osaka Iron & Steel Co., Ltd., and Nakayama Steel Works, Ltd. gave assurances in their statement of July 5, 1968 that their steel mill product shipments from Japan to the United States would not exceed 5.5 million metric tons during Japanese fiscal year 1968. These nine companies account for approximately 85 percent of all Japanese steel mill products shipped to the United States. In the light of subsequent events and as a result of discussions concerning this matter with the representatives of the Government of the United States of America, they now want to make a new statement to the following effect.

2. With greater understanding of market conditions for steel in the United States, and with the cooperation of the medium and small steelmakers of Japan which account for the remaining 15 percent of shipments to the United States, the same nine leading steel companies wish to state their intention, subject to measures permitted by the laws and regulations of Japan, to limit the Japanese shipments of steel mill products to the United States to a total of 5,750,000 net tons during calendar year 1969.

3. During the subsequent two calendar years (through 1971), it is also their intention to confine the Japanese shipments within limits which would represent, at most, a 5 percent increase over 5,750,000 net

tons in 1970 and over 6,037,500 net tons in 1971, depending upon demand in the United States market and the necessity to maintain orderly marketing therein. During this period the Japanese steel companies will try not to change greatly the product mix and pattern of distribution of trade as compared with the present.

4. This statement is made upon the assumptions: i) that the total shipments of steel mill products from all the steel exporting nations to the United States will not exceed approximately 14,000,000 net tons during 1969, 105 percent of 14,000,000 net tons in 1970, and 105 percent of 14,700,000 net tons in 1971, ii) that the United States will take no action, including increase of import duties, to restrict Japanese steel mill product exports to the United States, and iii) that the above action by the Japanese steel companies does not infringe upon any laws of the United States of America and that it conforms to international laws.

YOSHIHIRO INAYAMA
Chairman
Japan Iron & Steel
Exporters' Association

Steel Industries of the ECSC

DECEMBER 18, 1968

The Honorable
SECRETARY OF STATE
New State Building
Washington 25, D.C.
U.S.A.

SIR, The associations of the steel producers of the ECSC united in the "Club des Siderurgistes", to wit:

- Associazione Industrie Siderurgiche Italiane
ASSIDER, Milan
represented by Prof. Dr. Ernesto Manuelli
- Chambre Syndicale de la Siderurgie Francaise,
Paris
represented by the President, Mr. Jacques Ferry
- Groupement des Hauts Fourneaux et Acieries
Belges, Brussels
represented by the President, Mr. Pierre van der Rest
- Groupement des Industries Siderurgiques Luxem-
bourgeoises, Luxembourg
represented by the President, Mr. Rene Schmit
- Vereniging de Nederlandse Ijzer- en Staalprodu-
cerende Industrie, IJmuiden
represented by Mr. Evert van Veelen

—Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie,
Dusseldorf
represented by the President, Bergassessor Dr.
Hans-Gunther Sohl

referring to the repeated talks they have had in this matter with representatives of the Government of the United States in behalf of the sustenance of liberal international trade in steel and to assist in the maintenance of an orderly market for steel in the United States declare the following:

1.) It is their intention to limit the total ECSC deliveries of steel mill products, i.e. finished rolled steel products, semis, hot rolled strip, tubes, and drawn wire products, to the United States to 5.750.000 net tons during the calendar year 1969.

2.) It is also their intention in the calendar years 1970 and 1971 to confine their deliveries within limits which would at the utmost represent for the year 1970 a five percent increase over 5.750.000 net tons and for the year 1971 a five percent increase over 6.037.500 net tons.

During the named periods the ECSC producers will try to maintain approximately the same product mix and pattern of distribution as at present.

This statement is based on the assumption

A) that the total shipments of steel mill products (finished rolled steel products, semis, hot rolled strip, tubes, and drawn wire products) from all the steel exporting nations to the USA will not exceed approximately 14 million net tons during 1969, and five percent over 14 million net tons in 1970, and five percent over 14.7 million net tons in 1971, and

B) that the United States will take no action to restrict ECSC steel mill product exports to the USA like

- a) quota systems
- b) increase of import duties
- c) other restrictions on the import of steel mill products to the USA.

This proposal of the ECSC steel producers is made provided that it does not infringe on any laws of the United States and that it conforms to international laws.

ERNESTO MANUELLI
PIERRE VAN DER REST
EVERT VAN VEELLEN

JACQUES FERRY
RENE SCHMIT
HANS-GUNTHER SOHL

The Budget of the United States Government—Fiscal Year 1970 (Excerpts)¹

PART 1—THE BUDGET MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT

To the Congress of the United States:

The 1970 budget, which I am transmitting to you today, points the way toward maintaining a strong, healthy economy and continuing progress in meeting the Nation's highest priority military and domestic needs.

The record of achievements of the past 5 years is an impressive one. We have witnessed a period of unprecedented economic growth, with expanded production, rising standards of living, and the lowest rates of unemployment in a decade and a half. Our military forces today are the strongest in the world, capable of protecting the Nation against any foreseeable challenge or threat. Last month saw man's first successful flight to the moon. In domestic matters, the legislative and executive branches, cooperatively, have forged new tools to open wider the doors of opportunity for a better life for all Americans.

In my first budget message 5 years ago, I stated: "A government that is strong, a government that is solvent, a government that is compassionate is the kind of government that endures." I have sought to provide that kind of government as your President. With this budget, I leave that kind of government to my successor.

The 1970 budget program calls for:

- Support for our commitments in Southeast Asia, and necessary improvements to maintain and strengthen our overall military capabilities.

¹H. Doc. 91-15, Part 1, 91st Cong., 1st sess.; transmitted on Jan. 15. Reprinted here are the introductory paragraphs and conclusion from part 1 and the section on international affairs and finance from part 3 of the 551-page volume entitled *The Budget of the United States Government—Fiscal Year 1970*, for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (\$2.75).

- Continued emphasis on domestic programs which help disadvantaged groups obtain a fairer share of the Nation's economic and cultural advancements.

- A budget surplus in the year ahead, as well as in the current fiscal year, to relieve the inflationary pressures in the economy and to reduce the strains that Federal borrowing would place on financial markets and interest rates.

This Nation can and must bear the cost of the defense of freedom, and must at the same time move ahead in meeting the pressing needs we face at home. But caution and prudence require that we budget our resources in a way which enables us to preserve our prosperity, strengthen the U.S. dollar, and stem the increased price pressures we have experienced in the past few years.

We can meet these objectives and achieve desirable budget surpluses by:

- Holding down total Federal spending and lending through strict control of program commitments.

- Extending for one year the 10% tax surcharge on individual and corporation income taxes enacted last June beyond the present expiration date of June 30, 1969.

Americans are united in the hope that the Vietnam peace talks now taking place in Paris will be soon and successfully concluded, so that reconstruction can begin. Meanwhile, the fighting continues. Under these circumstances, the 1970 budget necessarily provides funds to support our military operations in Vietnam for the year ahead. At the same time, we are taking steps to assure an orderly reduction in Southeast Asia support as soon as conditions permit.

With the attainment of a just and honorable peace, consideration can be given to removal of the tax surcharge as military spending declines. At that time, such action could ease the post-Vietnam transition, smooth the conversion to

greater peacetime production, and help assure continued economic growth and full employment.

Our domestic programs are increasingly focused on urgent national problems—inadequate educational opportunities, slum housing, increased crime, urban congestion and decay, pollution of our air and water, lack of proper health care, and hunger and malnutrition. The 1970 budget continues to place the greatest emphasis on progress in overcoming these ills.

A substantial part of every budget reflects the continuing momentum of program decisions made in past years, by past Presidents and past Congresses. While adhering to a restrictive expenditure policy, I am making reasonable provision in the 1970 budget for the requirements of ongoing programs, proposing reductions wherever possible and recommending some selective improvements and expansions, including social security benefit increases.

Conclusion

This Nation remains firmly committed to a world of peace and human dignity. In seeking these goals, we have achieved great military strength with the sole aim of deterring and resisting aggression. We have continued to assist other nations struggling to provide a better life for their people. We are successfully pushing forward the frontiers of knowledge to outer space and promoting scientific and technological advances of enormous potential for benefit to mankind.

In recent years, we have taken significant strides toward expanding the opportunity for each American to:

- Develop his mind, skills, and earning power to their maximum potential.
- Contribute his full share to a society which respects and values differences in race, religion, or culture.
- Escape the withering bonds of poverty, which stifle and starve the spirit.
- Live in an environment free of pollution, in a community stimulating but safe, in a neighborhood diverse but harmonious, and in a home or apartment both adequate and available at a reasonable price.

We have come far in our journey, but we are still a long way from our destination. We can be justly proud of our recent achievements,

but we must look ahead to those victories yet to be won.

No course of action can have a higher purpose than that of furthering world peace and human freedom. In this budget, as in my previous budgets, I have pursued that course to the best of my ability. I have faith that America will not now fail in its resolve, nor founder in its responsibility, to press ahead for freedom and justice at home and abroad.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

JANUARY 15, 1969.

PART 3—FEDERAL ACTIVITIES BY FUNCTION

International Affairs and Finance

Through its international programs the United States seeks to promote a peaceful world community in which all nations can devote their energies to improving the lives of their citizens. Our assistance programs are undertaken cooperatively with other nations to help lessen the critical problems confronting today's world. We participate in these efforts because we cannot in good conscience enjoy freedom and economic well-being in a world of poverty, violence and despair.

Program highlights.—In 1970, our international programs will:

- Encourage developing nations to promote social progress along with economic growth, as two essential ingredients of national development.
- Concentrate more than 84% of our bilateral economic assistance in 11 nations which have demonstrated national self-reliance by taking the difficult steps necessary to sustain development.
- Support Southeast Asia's struggle to achieve political and economic stability in that strife-torn section of the globe.
- Maintain the momentum of the agricultural revolution now under way.
- Promote multilateral assistance by providing about 95% of our development lending in concert with other industrialized nations and contributing to international financial institutions where our aid will be matched in large measure by contributions of other donors.
- Assure a favorable long-range impact on our balance of payments by financing the growth of U.S. exports and by building new markets for our exports through our aid.

Budget highlights.—Outlays for international programs in 1970 are estimated at \$3.8 billion, compared to \$3.9 billion in 1969 and \$4.6 billion in 1968. The major outlay changes between 1969 and 1970 are:

- Agency for International Development spending

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND FINANCE

[In millions of dollars]

Program or agency	1968	1969	1970	Recom- mend- ed budget author- ity for 1970 ¹
	actual	esti- mate	esti- mate	
Conduct of foreign affairs:				
Department of State ²	339	358	370	366
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.....	11	10	10	10
Tariff Commission.....	4	4	4	4
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.....	1	1	1	1
Economic and financial programs:				
Agency for International Development:				
Development loans.....	598	620	518	720
Technical cooperation ²	222	193	194	227
Alliance for Progress.....	406	448	462	606
Supporting assistance.....	433	543	513	515
Contingencies and other.....	277	290	287	282
Subtotal, Agency for International Development ²	1,936	2,093	1,973	2,350
Subtotal, excluding special Southeast Asia.....	(1,644)	(1,713)	(1,637)	(1,910)
International financial institutions:				
Present programs.....	201	140	170	320
Proposed programs.....			46	185
Export-Import Bank.....	790	165	140	---
Peace Corps ²	111	106	110	110
Other ²	15	22	26	14
Food for Freedom.....	1,204	1,037	925	1,017
Foreign information and exchange activities:				
United States Information Agency ²	187	191	195	179
Department of State and other ²	66	53	41	41
Deductions for offsetting receipts:				
Interfund and intragovernmental transactions.....
Proprietary receipts from the public.....	-245	-242	-256	-256
Total.....	4,619	3,938	3,755	4,342
Total, excluding special Southeast Asia.....	(4,327)	(3,558)	(3,419)	(3,902)
Expenditure account.....	3,712	3,647	3,507	4,342
Loan account ²	907	291	247	---

¹ Less than \$500 thousand.

² Compares with budget authority for 1968 and 1969, as follows:

1968: Total, \$4,769 million (NOA [new obligations authority], \$4,362 million; LA [lending authority], \$407 million).

1969: Total, \$3,405 million (NOA, \$2,848 million; LA, \$558 million).

³ Includes both Federal funds and trust funds.

⁴ For greater detail, see table on page 99.

will decrease by \$120 million to \$2.0 billion, reflecting the reduced appropriations of the past 2 years;

- Food for Freedom will decrease by \$112 million to \$925 million as requirements for our overseas food shipments decline; and

- Contributions to international financial institutions will increase by \$76 million to \$216 million, principally for the International Development Association.

Budget authority of \$4.3 billion is requested for international programs in 1970, compared to \$3.4 billion

enacted in 1969 and \$4.8 billion in 1968. Last year, there were sharp cuts in appropriations for AID. Such reductions endanger the continuing effectiveness and efficiency of our efforts; they also cast doubt on the degree of our commitment.

Agency for International Development.—The Agency for International Development administers our bilateral economic assistance programs through three principal instruments:

- *Long-term development loans* provide capital assistance for projects and other types of investment needed for economic growth;

- *Technical assistance grants* contribute to the development of the human and institutional resources required for effective long-term growth; and

- *Supporting assistance loans and grants* are provided in a limited number of countries, primarily in Southeast Asia, to help maintain a stable environment in which political, economic, and social progress are possible.

To protect the U.S. balance of payments, more than 92% of AID's \$2 billion of outlays in 1970 will finance exports of U.S. goods and services, and special measures will continue to be taken to insure that these exports do not replace U.S. commercial exports.

Because of the very deep reductions made by the Congress last year, new obligational authority recommended for AID in 1970 is \$966 million above the 1969 appropriation, but \$152 million below the 1969 request.

The following table summarizes total obligational authority.

SUMMARY OF THE AID BUDGET PROGRAM


[In millions of dollars]

MAJOR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS	Total obligational authority			
	1967 actual	1968 actual	1969 estimate	1970 estimate
East Asia (excluding Vietnam).....	276	240	214	240
Vietnam.....	495	400	326	440
Near East and South Asia.....	² 893	533	352	679
Africa.....	203	157	130	135
Latin America (Alliance for Progress)....	585	547	429	668
Contributions to international organizations.....	144	148	140	161
Contingency fund (unallocated).....			22	50
General support.....	140	148	160	149
Total obligational authority ¹.....	2,735	2,173	1,773	2,572
Of which:				
New obligational authority.....	2,143	1,894	1,382	2,348
Prior year funds and loan repayments.....	592	279	391	224

¹ Excludes trust funds.

² Includes \$320 million of 1966 funds, which were available to support 1967 programs in India and Pakistan because aid to those countries was suspended during the Kashmir crisis.

Agency for International Development – Program Trends



East Asia (excluding Vietnam).—In 1970, \$240 million is planned for the East Asia program, \$26 million more than 1969. This assistance will help promote stability and economic development, primarily in Indonesia, Thailand, Laos, and Korea.

Vietnam.—Aid for Vietnam in 1970 is estimated at \$440 million, up from \$326 million in 1969. The increase will finance a more normal level of imports and projects, after the unusual reductions brought about by the Tet offensive in January 1968. The commercial import program will continue to finance imports needed to help reduce the inflationary pressures caused by the high, war-induced demand for goods.

Near East and South Asia.—The program in 1970 will increase to \$679 million, nearly double the much reduced 1969 level of \$352 million. More than 40% of the 1970 program will support improved agricultural practices and investments in water, seed, pesticides, and fertilizer. Substantial increases in food production have already been stimulated by our assistance. The U.S. program, along with aid from others, will help India and Pakistan expand their food production still further and enable them to take advantage of the development momentum provided by the agricultural revolution.

Africa.—About 65% of our aid to Africa will provide capital and technical assistance to countries making significant progress toward economic growth. The remaining 35% will be for regional projects such as education centers to serve the manpower needs of the smaller countries and transportation facilities to assist in integrating the region. Total obligational authority in 1970 is estimated to increase to \$185 million, \$55 million above 1969.

Latin America.—The program of assistance for the Alliance for Progress will increase from \$429 million in 1969 to \$668 million in 1970. Most of the increase will be for education, agriculture, health and regional integration programs. Greater emphasis will be given to promoting social development as well as economic growth. The Alliance program is directly related to the recipients' commitments of self-help toward promoting economic and social reforms. Our assistance is closely coordinated with the growing help from other donors through the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress.

Foreign assistance.—The term "foreign assistance" generally applies to our bilateral economic and military grant assistance authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act. The following table summarizes outlays and

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TOTALS ¹

[In millions of dollars]

	Outlays			Budget authority		
	1968 actual	1969 esti- mate	1970 esti- mate	1968 actual	1969 esti- mate	1970 esti- mate
Economic assistance.....	1,933	2,091	1,971	1,894	1,382	2,348
Military grant assistance..	619	544	481	500	375	375
Total.....	2,552	2,635	2,452	2,394	1,757	2,723

¹ Excludes trust funds, which do not require congressional action. Offsetting receipts are not deducted.

budget authority for both programs. Military assistance is discussed in the section on National Defense.

Other economic and financial programs.—In addition to loans and grants provided by AID, the United States promotes economic growth abroad through contributions to international financial institutions, Export-Import Bank lending activities, and the Peace Corps.

International financial institutions.—In 1970, the United States will contribute to three international financial institutions which provide economic assistance to developing nations. The table below summarizes budget authority for these institutions.

The International Development Association (IDA), an affiliate of the World Bank, is a crucial part of the efforts of the industrialized nations to finance projects and programs essential to the growth and advance of developing nations. The financing of long-term loans on easy repayment terms to developing nations has been sharply curtailed by IDA because it lacked the necessary resources. All donors agreed in early 1968 to provide a 3-year replenishment of these funds total-

ing \$1.2 billion. Other donors are acting to make these resources available now, but without U.S. action the agreement will not go into effect. The entire U.S. contribution would be \$480 million, or 40% of the total. Legislation is proposed authorizing this contribution. Budget authority of \$160 million is recommended for the U.S. contribution both in 1969 and in 1970.

Budget authority will be requested for the third \$300 million contribution to the Fund for Special Operations of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). This Fund finances long-term loans at low interest rates for projects within countries or spanning regions in Latin America. The United States has also agreed to participate in a multilateral increase in the ordinary capital resources of the IDB, which finances development projects on commercial terms. The first of two U.S. contributions of \$206 million to this increase was provided in 1969.

Budget authority of \$20 million will be requested for the U.S. contribution to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) for its ordinary capital operations which finance development projects on commercial terms. Under proposed legislation, budget authority of \$25 million is recommended in each of the years 1969 and 1970 to support with other nations the operation of ADB special funds which finance projects on favorable terms in such fields as agriculture and transportation.

Export-Import Bank.—This Government agency supports the growth of U.S. exports through its direct loan, insurance, and guarantee programs. Net lending by the Bank is expected to decrease from \$291 million in 1969 to \$247 million in 1970. Under the new export expansion program (Public Law 90-390) the Bank will make a greater number of loans under broader lending criteria in order to encourage exports and thereby improve our balance of payments. By the end of 1970, the Bank's insurance and guarantee programs will protect \$2.9 billion of U.S. exports against both commercial and political risks.

CREDIT PROGRAMS—INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND FINANCE ¹

[In millions of dollars]

Program or agency	1968 actual	1969 esti- mate	1970 esti- mate
Export-Import Bank:			
Commitments.....	(3,752)	(4,901)	(4,945)
Disbursements.....	1,646	1,730	1,638
Repayments.....	739	1,440	1,390
Net lending.....	907	291	247

¹ Excluding credit programs in the expenditure account.

Expenditures of the Bank (that is, its nonlending transactions) include the costs of the guarantee and insurance programs, interest paid, and other expenses. In 1970, income of the Bank, primarily from interest received on loans, will exceed such expenditures by \$107 million—\$18 million less than in 1969.

Peace Corps.—The Peace Corps will continue to pro-

CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

[In millions of dollars]

Institutions	Budget authority		
	1968 actual	1969 esti- mate	1970 esti- mate
International Development Association.....	104	160	160
Inter-American Development Bank:			
Fund for Special Operations.....	300	300	300
Ordinary capital.....		206	
Asian Development Bank:			
Special funds.....		25	25
Ordinary capital.....		20	20
Total.....	404	711	505

¹ Proposed for separate transmittal, upon enactment of recommended authorizing legislation.

vide Americans with opportunities to work alongside the peoples of developing countries on a variety of projects, mainly in education, agriculture and health. In 1970, there will be 10,300 American volunteers serving in more than 60 nations. An additional 8,500 volunteers will be receiving language and skill training prior to serving abroad on 2-year tours. Outlays for the Peace Corps in 1970 will be \$110 million, an increase of \$4 million over 1969.

Food for Freedom.—Under the authority of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (Public Law 480), agricultural commodities will continue to be sold and donated abroad in order to combat hunger and malnutrition, promote economic growth in the developing nations, and develop and expand export markets for U.S. commodities. In accordance with amendments to the act adopted in 1966 and 1968:

- All sales agreements will identify self-help measures to be taken by the recipient country;
- A progressive transition from sales for local currency to sales for dollars (or for local currency convertible to dollars) will continue in order to make this transition complete by 1971;
- Food assistance and economic assistance will be closely linked to assure the most effective use of both types of resources;
- The emphasis in food donation programs will be on development purposes, primarily food for children and food in exchange for work; and
- Efforts will continue to assure that the United States obtains a fair share of expanding commercial purchases of recipient countries.

Efforts to expand food production in the developing nations are beginning to succeed. Accordingly, Food for Freedom net outlays will decline by an estimated \$112 million in 1970 to a total of \$925 million. About

60% of these outlays will be made under sales agreements; the rest will be for donation programs.

Foreign information and exchange activities.—The United States Information Agency and the Department of State conduct a variety of programs aimed at improving mutual understanding with other people. Outlays for these programs will total \$236 million in 1970, a decrease of \$8 million from 1969. In the spring of 1969, the United States Information Agency will put major radio transmitting facilities into operation in the Philippines. Construction will continue on the new facility in Greece which is scheduled for completion in the spring of 1972.

Increases in budget authority are requested to broaden further the exchange of persons with other countries beyond the traditional academic groups, to include those in business, the professions, and other segments of the society.

Conduct of foreign affairs.—As the agency responsible for the overall direction and coordination of foreign affairs, the Department of State has played a key role in reducing U.S. Government employment abroad. Between January 1, 1968 and September 30, 1969, departmental employment abroad will be reduced by 1,900—750 Americans and 1,150 foreign nationals. This reduction, along with lowered requirements for the acquisition and construction of buildings abroad, will allow the Department to meet foreign price rises and to develop further its urgently needed information-handling system, without increasing expenditures for the administration of foreign affairs in 1970. However, the U.S. share of assessed contributions to international organizations will rise by \$13 million. Thus, total outlays by the Department for the conduct of foreign affairs will reach \$370 million in 1970, \$12 million higher than in 1969.

The International Economy

ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT AND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS (EXCERPTS)¹

Following is the portion of the Economic Report of the President which deals with "The International Economy," together with excerpts from the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers which include sections on the balance of payments from chapter 1 (pages 49-53 and 59-60) and the full text of chapter 4 "The International Economy" (pages 123-150).

ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT

To the Congress of the United States:

THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY

Balance-of-Payments Adjustment

Our international accounts were in balance in 1968—for the first time since 1957. Much of the improvement came from the program I announced in an atmosphere of world financial crisis a year ago. The contrast today is striking and gratifying.

The excellent results of last year were aided by temporary factors. Hence, we cannot relax our efforts to achieve fundamental improvement—especially in our disappointing trade performance. To strengthen our trade surplus and achieve a healthy balance of payments, we must

- restore price stability at home,
- encourage our farms and factories to be-

come ever more competitive in quality and price so that they can export more,

- intensify efforts to secure the removal of barriers to freer trade,

- bring more foreign tourists to our shores to enjoy America with us, and

- minimize the foreign exchange cost of our military commitments and economic aid overseas.

Our temporary programs to restrain capital outflows worked well in 1968. American businesses showed remarkable ingenuity and cooperation in pursuing their activities abroad while drastically cutting the drain on the Nation's balance of payments. These programs clearly aided in preserving the strength of the dollar.

Capital restraints should never become permanent features of our economy. They should be ended as soon as possible.

But the war continues and the movement toward noninflationary prosperity has just begun. We cannot now scrap our defenses against large capital outflows. For the present, we must

- renew the Interest Equalization Tax before it expires on July 31,

- maintain the direct investment control program in the more flexible form recently announced, and

- continue the Federal Reserve program of voluntary restraint of foreign lending.

To maintain our gains, ever closer international cooperation is needed among the highly interdependent nations of the world. Countries in deficit must meet their responsibilities. And countries in surplus must also pursue appropriate policies—striving especially for rapid economic expansion and giving world traders greater access to their markets.

¹ *Economic Report of the President, Transmitted to the Congress January 1969, Together With the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers* (H. Doc. 91-28, 91st Cong., 1st sess.; transmitted on Jan. 16): for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (\$1.50).

World Monetary System

The international monetary system was strengthened in 1968. An historic international agreement was reached, creating in the International Monetary Fund a new reserve asset—the Special Drawing Right.²

We spent 3 years studying, exploring, and negotiating with our commercial partners in order to reach this agreement. I eagerly await the day that actual distribution of SDR's will begin. They can meet the future needs of the world for international liquidity—in the proper amounts and in a usable form. I am proud that the United States acted so promptly to ratify this agreement with such overwhelming bipartisan support in the Congress.

Some did not believe that such an agreement was possible, arguing that a rise in the official price of gold was the only way to increase international reserves. We and our trading partners rejected this futile course; it would have offered a ransom payment to speculators and would have failed to provide for the orderly growth of reserves. I have carried out my pledge that the United States would sell gold to official holders of dollars at \$35 an ounce. There is clearly no need to change that price.

Myths about gold die slowly. But progress can be made—as we have demonstrated. In 1968, the Congress ended the obsolete gold-backing requirement for our currency.

Another major step in freeing the international monetary system from disturbances by gold speculators was taken in March, when the United States and the other active gold pool countries agreed to cease supplying gold to the private market.³ The resulting two-price system for gold is working successfully.

The international economy has made major strides in the past. But we must recognize the problems that remain. The financial crises of 1968 stimulated constructive discussion of many proposals for further evolutionary improvements in the international economic system.

These proposals are not an agenda for action in a week or a month or even a year. The issues posed cannot be resolved in a summit meeting or by a superplan. But they can be tackled effectively with the same kind of careful study and negotiation that led to the successful SDR

² For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 23, 1967, p. 523, Apr. 22, 1968, p. 525, and July 8, 1968, p. 49.

³ For a communique issued at Washington on Mar. 17 by governors of the central banks of the seven "gold pool" nations, see BULLETIN of Apr. 8, 1968, p. 464.

plan. The United States should actively participate in such a procedure in order to strengthen the foundation of the world economy.

Trade

World trade has continued to expand briskly—virtually unaffected by the sporadic crises in financial markets. Tariff barriers that once stifled international commerce have been substantially lowered—most notably by the Kennedy Round reductions which began in 1968 and will continue until 1973.

We must reinforce this success by devoting equal energy to the removal of nontariff barriers. On our part, Congressional action to rescind the American Selling Price provision is essential for achieving reductions of nontariff barriers offered by several of our trading partners.

Other nontariff barriers also need revision.

- Agriculture has been the stepchild of trade negotiations, and deserves prompt and proper attention.

- The international rules governing border tax adjustments should be revised so that they no longer give special advantage to countries that rely heavily on excise and other indirect taxes.

While we work to reduce trade barriers, we must not drop our guard against the advocates of protectionism at home and abroad. We will never neglect the legitimate concerns of any citizen. But the only real solutions are ones that improve our economy—not ones that erect new barriers that could provoke retaliation, or insulate producers from the invigorating force of world competition. To provide the right kind of aid to those seriously hurt by import competition, present provisions for temporary adjustment assistance must be liberalized, as I have repeatedly recommended.

Aid

Important economic progress is being made in the world's less developed countries. The beginnings of spectacular advances in world agriculture are now clearly evident. Family planning is gaining widespread support.

The United States can and should help to promote further progress in world agriculture and family planning, and the achievement of more rapid economic growth in the less developed countries. Only if funds for foreign

aid programs are restored to an adequate level can we do our part.

The United States has long supported multi-lateral assistance as an equitable and efficient means of channeling aid from wealthy to poorer nations. We must reaffirm this support by promptly authorizing the U.S. contributions to the replenishment of the International Development Association and to the Special Funds of the Asian Development Bank.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

January 16, 1969.

REPORT OF COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS

CHAPTER 1—STRENGTHENING THE FOUNDATION OF PROSPERITY

Balance of Payments in 1968

Although excessive economic growth generated a surge in imports and a sharp deterioration in the trade surplus in 1968, the overall balance of payments improved markedly. This primarily reflected a dramatic shift in the direction of capital flows. In 1967, the U.S. balance of payments as measured on the liquidity basis registered a deficit of \$3.6 billion; the deficit was reduced to \$1.1 billion at an annual rate during the first 3 quarters of 1968. (Table 6 and Chart 4). For the full year, preliminary estimates show a liquidity surplus—for the first time since 1957. The balance on the official reserve transactions basis improved dramatically, achieving a surplus of \$1.9 billion during the first 3 quarters of 1968, partly as a result of a marked shift in the holdings of liquid dollar assets abroad from foreign central banks to private investors. Such a shift improves the official settlements measure but does not affect the liquidity balance.

The improvement in the balance of payments can be attributed to the President's program announced on January 1, 1968;⁴ to some special factors affecting primarily capital flows; and to the continuation of some longer term trends.

GOODS AND SERVICES

The merchandise trade surplus deteriorated markedly from \$3.5 billion in 1967 to an annual rate of only \$0.4 billion during the first 3 quarters of 1968. Imports rose about 22 percent above 1967. Exports, reflecting mainly the vigorous growth of income abroad, grew by 10 percent.

The U.S. trade balance during 1968 was influenced by strikes in the copper and aluminum industries and a threatened strike in the steel industry, all of which stimulated metal imports and reduced the trade surplus by perhaps \$600 million.

⁴ For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 22, 1968, p. 110.

TABLE 6.—United States balance of payments, 1963–68

[Billions of dollars]

Type of transaction	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968, first 3 quarters ¹
Balance on goods and services.....	5.8	8.4	6.9	5.1	4.8	2.4
Balance on merchandise trade.....	5.1	6.6	4.7	3.6	3.5	.4
Balance on investment income.....	3.3	3.9	4.2	4.2	4.6	4.9
Balance on other services.....	-2.6	-2.2	-2.0	-2.7	-3.3	-2.9
Remittances and pensions.....	-9	-9	-1.0	-1.0	-1.3	-1.1
Government grants and capital, net.....	-3.6	-3.6	-3.4	-3.4	-4.2	-4.3
U.S. private capital, net.....	-4.5	-6.6	-3.8	-4.3	-5.5	-5.2
Direct investment.....	-2.0	-2.3	-3.5	-3.6	-3.0	-3.3
U.S. bank claims.....	-1.5	-2.5	.1	.3	-.5	.4
Other U.S. private capital ²	-.9	-1.8	-.4	-.9	-2.0	-2.3
Foreign private capital, net.....	1.3	1.9	.3	4.2	3.4	10.4
U.S. securities (excluding Treasury issues).....	.3	-.1	-.4	.9	1.0	3.7
Foreign private liquid capital, net ³6	1.6	.1	2.4	1.5	5.4
Other foreign private capital ⁴4	.5	.5	.9	.9	1.3
Errors and omissions.....	-2	-9	-3	-2	-.5	-3
BALANCE ON OFFICIAL RESERVE TRANSACTIONS BASIS.....	-2.0	-1.6	-1.3	.3	-3.4	1.9
Plus: Increases in nonliquid liabilities to foreign monetary authorities.....	(⁵)	.3	.1	.8	1.3	2.4
Less: Foreign private liquid capital, net ⁶6	1.6	.1	2.4	1.5	5.4
BALANCE ON LIQUIDITY BASIS.....	-2.7	-2.8	-1.3	-1.4	-3.6	-1.1

¹ Average of the first 3 quarters at seasonally adjusted annual rates.

² Includes redemptions of foreign securities.

³ Includes changes in Treasury liabilities to international nonmonetary institutions.

⁴ Includes certain Government transactions associated with special transactions.

⁵ Less than \$50 million.


NOTE.—Detail will not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.

SOURCE: Department of Commerce.

Nonagricultural goods accounted for the entire growth of merchandise exports during 1968, with exports to Western Europe and Latin America expanding especially rapidly. Agricultural exports, the most rapidly growing category between 1960 and 1966, declined rather abruptly in 1967 and remained depressed in 1968. While this decline was partially the result of a reduction of sales and donations to less developed countries, it also reflected a sharp decline in commercial exports to the European Economic Community, greatly influenced by EEC restrictions on agricultural imports.

The service account in the balance of payments improved, reaching a surplus of \$2.0 billion annual rate (during the first 3 quarters of 1968), as compared to \$1.3 billion in 1967 (Table 6). The major gain came in net income from foreign investments, which continued its upward trend. Some improvement also occurred in the travel account in 1968, reflecting the reduced attractiveness of the Canadian exposition.

U.S. Balance of International Payments



1 FIRST 3 QUARTERS AT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED ANNUAL RATES.
 2 SECURITIES OTHER THAN TREASURY ISSUES.
 SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE.

There were other improvements in the capital account that were not directly related to the balance-of-payments program. By the end of September, foreigners had already purchased \$1.2 billion (net) of American securities in the open market (in addition to the \$1.6 billion of new issues previously mentioned). In all of 1967, foreign purchases in the market amounted to only \$0.6 billion, as a \$450 million liquidation of holdings by the United Kingdom held down the total. The greater foreign interest in U.S. stocks and bonds during 1968 can be attributed to rising prices of U.S. equities and high yields on U.S. bonds, as well as to political developments in France and Czechoslovakia that made European securities seem less attractive. Moreover, long-term forces continued to work, including the basic strength of the U.S. economy, the growing affluence of other countries, and the shortage of foreign corporate securities.

A major inflow of liquid funds resulted from borrowings by American banks from their foreign branches. During 1968, these borrowings increased by \$1.8 billion, compared with only \$200 million in 1967. The major causes of this increase were the existence of relatively tight monetary conditions in the United States and fears about the stability of some European currencies. American banks also seem to be strengthening their ties to the European money market, giving them access to additional sources of funds.

The U.S. Government increased its special financing arrangements during the year. In part, this increase resulted from greater efforts to obtain military offsets or neutralizations in line with the President's program. Some portion also resulted from a bilateral agreement with Canada whereby that country was exempted from the mandatory controls on direct investments.

CAPITAL ACCOUNT

The capital account improved markedly, swinging from a net outflow on private account of \$2.2 billion in 1967 to a net inflow of \$5.2 billion in 1968 (first 3 quarters at annual rate). The new balance-of-payments programs had their major impact on the capital account. Mandatory controls on foreign direct investment, imposed January 1, 1968, greatly stimulated efforts by American firms to raise money abroad. During the first 9 months of 1968, \$1.6 billion of new U.S. corporate securities were sold abroad to finance foreign investments, compared with less than \$500 million during all of 1967. Firms also borrowed other funds totaling \$0.7 billion, about twice the total for 1967. These borrowings permitted direct investment abroad to increase slightly, apparently proceeding in accordance with original intentions. Thus the target of \$1 billion of balance-of-payments savings from the controls over direct investment was achieved without reducing American participation in the economies of other countries.

Operating under new directives issued by the Federal Reserve Board, American banks reduced their claims on foreigners by \$300 million during the first 9 months of 1968, compared with an increase of about \$500 million during 1967. The swing of \$800 million in bank lending exceeded the target of \$500 million set in the January program.

Economic Outlook for 1969

OUTLOOK FOR THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

With the anticipated slowing of economic growth, only a modest increase in imports is expected in 1969. The special strike situations which adversely affected trade in 1968 should not be repeated, although new problems of this kind could arise. Continuation of the rising trend in earnings on foreign investment should be another source of improvement in our current account position.

U.S. exports should increase in line with the expansion of foreign markets. The restrictive measures taken by France and the United Kingdom to safeguard their payments positions have reduced our export prospects, but these are likely to be offset by the German measures in the opposite direction.

The capital account is unlikely to show improvement, and indeed may deteriorate. The restraint on bank lending cannot provide another large swing in net loans. Foreign purchases of U.S. securities can hardly be expected to continue at present rates. Even more important will be the state of financial markets at home and abroad. If European monetary conditions remain fairly relaxed relative to those prevailing in the United States, capital inflows can be expected—even if not on the same scale as in 1968.

In view of the uncertain prospects for the balance of payments, the measures for controlling capital move-

ments must be maintained for the present. The Interest Equalization Tax which expires at mid-year must be continued to assure against a major rise of new foreign security issues in the United States. Moreover, the program for controlling bank lending and the direct investment controls should be maintained. Both have been modified to make them more responsive to needs and more equitable. While further modifications will be possible as the balance of payments improves, the defenses provided by these programs cannot be lowered without risking the destabilizing effects of substantial refinancing of previous years' borrowings. Ultimate dismantling of the controls should proceed as soon as this can be accomplished without impairing the strength of the dollar.

CHAPTER 4—THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY

In the past two decades, enormous progress has been made in building a closely knit international economy. Remarkable growth in the volume of international commerce has gone hand in hand with sustained world prosperity; each has contributed to the other. At times, deep and obvious strains in the international monetary system have imperiled this progress, but these financial difficulties have been weathered without a serious setback in economic growth or world trade.

The world economy emerged from the Second World War in a gravely weakened state, with many countries suffering severely from war damage. International trade was disrupted, and exchange controls and bilateral trading arrangements were the order of the day. However, the recuperative strength of the European nations, assisted by U.S. aid, resulted in rapid economic recovery.

During the 1950's, the increasingly prosperous countries of western Europe liberalized trade and capital movements substantially. Meanwhile U.S. capital exports promoted economic growth abroad, and our balance-of-payments deficits contributed to a desirable expansion of world monetary reserves.

However, by the end of the 1950's, U.S. deficits were beginning to cause concern. A nagging question was raised: Did the international monetary system require continuous U.S. deficits and an intolerable, persistent weakening of the reserve position of the United States if serious reserve inadequacies for other countries were to be avoided?

The growth of world trade and income has continued—indeed, has accelerated—during the 1960's. But there have been periodic monetary disturbances associated with expected or feared realignments of exchange rates. While financial officials have shown wisdom and ingenuity in modifying and strengthening the international monetary system, important problems remain. Recent major financial disturbances have emphasized the need for further evolution to insure that the system can continue to support growing world trade and income.

This chapter briefly reviews the growth of world trade and output and some of the key policy issues regarding our trade relationships with the developed and less developed countries. The review is followed by discussion of international financial problems and by analysis of several current proposals designed to strengthen the international monetary system.

Economic Growth and World Trade

In the years since the Second World War growth has come to be accepted as a normal feature of the world economy. It is easy to forget that this was not the case in earlier periods. The depression years of the 1930's present a particularly sharp contrast. But by any historical comparison, the economic progress of the last 20 years is unprecedented.

World income has more than doubled since 1950. In the fifties, growth was especially rapid in the western European countries, while in recent years the United States has grown more vigorously (Table 12). Japan has experienced rapid and sustained growth throughout the period.

With their more rapid population growth, the less developed countries, taken together, have experienced a slower growth of per capita income than have the developed countries, even though total income has grown at about the same rate in both groups of countries. Growth of per capita income has varied widely among the less developed countries, in recent years ranging from high rates for Iran, Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand to virtual stagnation or even decline for some parts of Asia and Latin America.

TRADE AND TRADE BARRIERS

The rapid growth of recent decades has contributed much to the increase in the world trade (Table 13). A continuing reduction in trade barriers has also stimulated trade. As a result of six multilateral trade negotiations within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), levels of protection have been repeatedly lowered during the past 20 years. As the staged tariff reductions negotiated during the recent Kennedy Round are completed during the next 3 years, this downward trend will continue. Even after these reductions, tariffs will remain a significant barrier to trade and further efforts will be required to reduce them.

Nontariff Barriers

As tariffs have been reduced, other barriers to trade have increased in relative importance. Nontariff barriers have been adopted for a variety of reasons. For example, some import quotas are surviving remnants of supposedly temporary restrictions imposed by certain countries during periods of balance-of-payments difficulties, as permitted under the rules of the GATT. Other barriers result from domestic laws aimed at protecting consumers, such as sanitary and health regulations. Government procurement policies discriminating in favor of domestic producers are another form of nontariff barrier and are at times a serious impediment to international competition for government contracts.

While protection on industrial goods has been reduced in recent years, restrictions on agricultural trade, including tariffs, have risen. These barriers are of particular concern to the United States because they have proven to be a major hindrance to U.S. agricultural exports.

The GATT rules are interpreted as permitting a country to exempt exports from indirect taxes and to impose on imports a charge equivalent to these indirect taxes. Countries such as the United States that rely heavily on income or other direct taxes may suffer a

TABLE 12.—Growth of gross national product in developed and less developed countries, 1950-67

[Percentage change per year]

Region and country	Total real GNP			Per capita real GNP		
	1950 to 1955	1955 to 1960	1960 to 1967	1950 to 1955	1955 to 1960	1960 to 1967
Developed countries.....	4.7	3.4	4.9	3.5	2.2	3.7
United States.....	4.3	2.2	4.7	2.6	.5	3.3
Europe ¹	5.0	4.4	4.2	4.3	3.6	3.2
EEC ²	6.3	5.3	4.6	5.5	4.4	3.6
Other countries ³	6.2	6.1	7.7	4.4	4.6	6.3
Japan.....	7.7	9.8	10.4	6.2	8.8	9.3
Less developed countries ⁴	4.7	4.5	5.0	2.8	2.2	2.5
Latin America.....	5.1	5.0	4.6	2.3	2.1	1.7
Near East ⁵	(?)	5.9	6.4	(?)	3.4	3.9
South Asia.....	3.4	4.2	4.3	1.3	2.1	1.9
East Asia.....	(?)	3.8	5.2	(?)	1.2	2.5
Africa.....	(?)	(?)	3.6	(?)	(?)	1.3

¹ Excludes Spain, Greece, and Turkey.

² European Economic Community (EEC) consists of Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Germany (Federal Republic and West Berlin), Italy, and Netherlands.

³ Consists of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Japan.

⁴ Change from 1952 to 1955.

⁵ Estimates based on countries for which data are available.

⁶ Includes Greece and Turkey.

⁷ Not available.

NOTE.—Data exclude U.S.S.R., other East European countries, Mainland China, and Cuba.

SOURCE: Agency for International Development.

disadvantage, since similar "border adjustments" are not permitted for direct taxes. This urgent problem is under intensive discussion with our trading partners.

Work on other nontariff barriers is going forward in the GATT. Continuing and concerted efforts are necessary both for the United States and for its trading partners. Meaningful negotiations require that the United States as well as foreign countries be prepared to make concessions.

The barrier maintained by the United States that is of greatest concern to our trading partners is the "American Selling Price" provision. Under this practice, applicable to certain benzenoid chemicals and a few other goods, tariffs are based on the prices of domestic products rather than actual prices of imports.

During the Kennedy Round, conditional agreement was reached for the United States to eliminate this provision, in return for commitments by others to undertake additional reductions in tariffs on chemicals. In addition, Belgium, France, Italy, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom agreed, as part of the package, to modify certain of their nontariff barriers. Legislation to eliminate the American Selling Price provision would permit this significant agreement to be carried out.

Adjustment Assistance

The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 provided for adjustment assistance to those injured by tariff reductions. It recognized that, because the gains from trade are widely distributed to the consuming public, the Nation as a whole should share the costs of adjustment associated with trade liberalization. In practice, however, the criteria of the Act have proved too rigorous. In no actual case has it been possible to demonstrate, as required, both that tariff reductions have been the major cause of an increase in imports and that the increase in imports has been the major cause of serious injury to an industry, firm, or group of workers. Legislative modification of these criteria is required in order to establish an effective program of adjustment assistance.

LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

International trade and capital transfers have made important contributions to the growth of many less developed countries during the postwar period, and they will have a major role to play in the future.

As shown in Table 13, less developed countries have not shared fully in the growth of world trade. Apart from a few countries which export manufactured goods or petroleum, exports of the less developed countries have grown only about half as rapidly since 1952 as those of developed nations.

Most of the less developed countries depend heavily on export earnings from the sale of primary products. These products are subject to marked year-to-year price fluctuations and in some cases to declining price trends, making them a highly unreliable source of foreign exchange. Some experts have proposed formal international commodity agreements aimed at changing market price behavior. While some commodity agreements are already in existence, they have not provided a complete solution, and few additional commodities appear suited to such agreements. Additional borrowing arrangements to compensate for shortfalls in export earnings, similar to the facility established by

TABLE 13.—Growth of world exports, 1952-67

[Percentage change per year]

Region and country	1952-53 to 1959-60	1959-60 to 1966-67	1952-53 to 1966-67
World total.....	5.7	8.1	6.9
Developed countries.....	6.2	8.8	7.5
Industrialized countries ¹	6.5	8.9	7.7
Other developed countries ²	3.7	8.0	5.8
Less developed countries.....	4.1	5.9	5.0
Latin America.....	2.3	5.1	3.7
Other Western Hemisphere.....	3.1	3.5	3.3
Middle East.....	9.4	8.3	8.8
Asia excluding Japan.....	4.2	4.0	4.1
Africa excluding South Africa.....	3.4	7.8	5.6
Other countries.....	7.3	6.1	6.7
By type of export:			
Selected exporters of manufactures ³	5.3	15.7	10.4
Selected oil exporters ⁴	9.7	8.2	8.9
Other less developed countries.....	3.0	4.6	3.8

¹ Includes United States, United Kingdom, Industrial Europe, Canada, and Japan.

² Includes other Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.

³ Includes Israel, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.

⁴ Includes Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Kuwait.

NOTE.—Data include Yugoslavia, but exclude U.S.S.R., other East European countries, Mainland China, and Cuba.

SOURCE: International Monetary Fund.

the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1963, have also been suggested. The staffs of the IMF and the World Bank have been studying the problem of volatile export receipts and are expected to report soon on the additional part these two institutions might play in arrangements to increase the stability of foreign exchange inflows to primary producers.

Tariff Preferences

In the long run, dependence of the less developed countries on primary products can be lessened through increased exports of manufactured goods. The advanced countries can assist in this process by removing some of their current restrictions on imports of those manufactured and semimanufactured goods of particular interest to less developed countries. Since further general tariff reductions seem unlikely in the immediate future, the granting of tariff preferences to less developed countries may represent a way of achieving a more rapid reduction of these barriers.

The 1968 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) unanimously endorsed the early establishment of a system of generalized non-reciprocal tariff preferences for less developed countries. The United States and other developed nations are now engaged in discussions to determine whether a mutually acceptable system can be devised.

A generalized tariff preference system would help the less developed countries, but it would be only a modest step toward meeting their total foreign exchange needs. The developed countries are likely to insist on excluding certain products from the preference scheme, and trade in other commodities will continue to be restricted by quotas and other nontariff barriers. Furthermore, the initial benefits of the preference scheme would go largely to the minority of less developed countries that have already begun to export manufactured goods.

Foreign Aid

The experience of the 1950's and the 1960's has demonstrated the value of foreign assistance in promoting economic development. Foreign capital and technical assistance from both public and private sources have been significant factors in the highly successful development efforts of such countries as Greece, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, and Taiwan.

While the total volume of foreign assistance has been growing during the 1960's, it has not kept pace with the rising ability of the less developed countries to make efficient use of such funds. Foreign assistance expenditures by the United States rose sharply in fiscal 1962 but have not increased significantly since then. Unless the recent declining trend in appropriations is reversed, expenditures must ultimately fall.

The International Development Association, an affiliate of the World Bank, was established in 1960 to make credits available to developing countries on liberal terms. It has been an effective channel of multilateral assistance, of which the United States has been a major proponent. However, its resources have been largely exhausted and replenishment is essential. It is important that the United States authorize its contribution promptly, because the contributions of other countries depend on the U.S. decision.

The Bretton Woods System

The rapid growth in the world economy in the post-war period has been built on a greatly improved financial base. At the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, the major industrial countries created through the IMF an international monetary system based on pegged exchange rates. The system has been strengthened by the great strides in cooperation in the IMF and in other institutions such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).

This cooperation has paid handsome dividends in times of crisis. International understanding, carefully nurtured during periods of calm, has permitted the multilateral assessment of problems and the determination of mutually acceptable solutions. This was well illustrated in March 1968, when decisions taken with respect to the private gold market ended the immediate threat to stability and basically strengthened the system. At times of severe strain, such as the British devaluation in 1967, international cooperation has contained crises and prevented chain reactions.

To be sure, the international monetary system has had its problems. Crises have occurred all too frequently. Yet the system has consistently been able to meet the needs of the day, it has evolved and adapted, and it can be strengthened further to meet the remaining strains. While conserving proven arrangements, governments seem increasingly ready to consider additional improvements. Proposed evolutionary changes require careful study and deliberation, based on widespread official and public discussions. It is particularly important that these involve the bankers and traders who would be directly affected. The following discussion is intended to contribute to such a dialogue, rather than to make specific recommendations.

International monetary disturbances have entered around three interrelated problems: adjustment, confidence, and liquidity.

"Adjustment" is the process of reestablishing balance-of-payments equilibrium when a country is substantially out of balance. An adjustment problem exists when the relevant forces and policies are either too weak to reestablish equilibrium within a reasonable period or involve domestic or international effects that are inordinately costly.

"Confidence" refers to the willingness to hold monetary assets. A problem arises when holders either become dissatisfied with the safety of some of these assets or see the possibility of profit in switching them abruptly into a different form. This problem is related to adjustment: dissatisfaction with a currency often reflects a lack of faith in the ability of the issuing country to eliminate its balance-of-payments difficulty without resort to a change in its exchange parity.

"Liquidity" relates to international monetary reserves which are held by countries to finance temporary balance-of-payments deficits. If world reserves are too low or too high, or if their rate of growth is inadequate or excessive, a liquidity problem exists. Liquidity needs are closely related to adjustment: the less rapidly and effectively the adjustment process works, the higher the level of reserves needed to finance temporary balance-of-payments deficits, and the less likely it is that any given level of reserves will be adequate.

The Liquidity Problem

A country incurs a balance-of-payments deficit when its payments to other countries exceed its receipts from them, apart from "settlement items" required to square accounts. The immediate consequence of a deficit is that the foreign exchange market becomes unbalanced. More of the deficit country's currency is supplied than demanded at the existing price of the currency, and this will depress the price—the exchange rate. Because of their commitment to a fixed exchange rate, however, central banks intervene to limit the fall in the rate. The floor on the exchange rate is within 1 percent of the official parity established by the country in agreement with the IMF.

In order to prevent the exchange rate from dropping below this floor, a country in deficit must use its foreign exchange reserves to buy the excess supply of its own currency. If the country has ample reserves, it will have sufficient breathing space to restore equilibrium—without resort to policies of excessive domestic restraint or direct intervention in external transactions. If reserves are scanty, however, pressures will develop to deal immediately with the deficit, even through undesirable means. If a general shortage of reserves should occur, economic growth could be retarded by widespread deflationary policies, and international trade and investment could be burdened by restrictions. On the other hand, excessive amounts of reserves could unduly weaken the incentives of deficit countries to adjust, thereby encouraging worldwide inflation.

TYPES OF RESERVES

Existing stocks of world reserves include gold, foreign exchange, and IMF reserve positions.

Gold is the largest component of reserves, but gold holdings have expanded very little for many years; most recently, they have declined. As was discussed in the Council's 1968 Annual Report, nonmonetary demand for gold seems to be absorbing a substantial and increasing share of current new production at existing prices.

The value of official gold reserves would be increased if the official price of gold were raised. This action is explicitly rejected for compelling reasons. Although it would immediately increase world reserves, it could not provide the orderly growth of reserves needed by the world economy. It would grant unearned windfall gains to private speculators, to gold producers, and to countries holding their reserves mainly in gold; it would encourage speculation; and it would divert scarce resources into the production of a metal already adequately supplied for nonmonetary uses.

The foreign exchange component of reserves grows only if the major reserve currency countries, the United States and the United Kingdom, incur balance-of-payments deficits; and if surplus countries are willing to hold more dollars and sterling. Thus, as the foreign exchange component of world reserves is expanded, the liquidity position of the reserve currency countries may be undermined. It is generally recognized that the United States should not run large deficits, and policies have been formulated and implemented for reaching an acceptable payments position. The United Kingdom also is determined not to run deficits and has in fact designed its economic policy

to yield balance-of-payments surpluses in order to retire external debt. To some extent, such debt repayments will actually contract world reserves.

Thus world reserves cannot be expected to grow substantially through expansion of official holdings of either gold or foreign exchange. Some limited expansion through normal IMF lending is to be expected. Reserve positions in the Fund are expanded, however, only when countries draw on the Fund beyond their "gold tranche" or automatic drawing rights. In so doing, they accept obligations to repay. The natural reluctance of countries to become overcommitted to the Fund or to other countries through borrowings sharply limits the probable expansion of reserves in this form.

SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS

In order to deal with the liquidity problem, steps have been taken to create a new international reserve asset, the Special Drawing Right (SDR), as discussed in the Council's 1968 Annual Report. SDR's will be allocated by the IMF to member countries. They will be a form of owned reserves, usable for balance-of-payments needs without an obligation of repayment. Their use is subject only to the reconstitution provision, which requires that during the initial 5-year period a country's average holdings of SDR's should be at least 30 percent of its average net cumulative allocation over this period.

A draft outline of the proposed arrangements for issuing SDR's was approved at the 1967 meetings of the IMF in Rio de Janeiro⁵ and subsequently translated into legal form by the Executive Directors of the Fund. In March 1968, at a meeting in Stockholm of Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the major industrial countries,⁶ a consensus was reached on an amendment to the IMF Articles of Agreement. The amendment was subsequently approved by an overwhelming majority of the Board of Governors of the Fund.

The amendment was then submitted to member countries for ratification, which requires acceptance by 67 member countries (total membership is 111) having 80 percent of the voting power in the IMF. By January 1, 1969, the amendment had been accepted by 27 countries representing 47 percent of the voting power. Seven countries have taken the further required step of depositing with the IMF instruments of participation indicating that they are prepared to carry out their obligations under the proposed amendment. The United States, acting with overwhelming bipartisan support in the Congress, was the first country to complete both of these steps. When participation has been certified by member countries having 75 percent of total IMF quotas, the new facility will be established in the Fund.

Resolving the world liquidity problem requires actual creation of SDR's—a major step beyond legal establishment of the facility. The basic decisions lie ahead—namely when to activate the facility and in what amounts. These decisions will require collective

⁵ For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 23, 1967, p. 523.

⁶ For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 22, 1968, p. 525.

judgment concerning the desired growth of world reserves and the portion of that growth which should take the form of Special Drawing Rights.

THE NEED FOR RESERVE GROWTH

The problem of estimating reserve needs has attracted much interest among economists and government officials in the last few years. The needed volume of reserves depends in part on the probable size of temporary balance-of-payments deficits which must be financed, because this affects the judgment of monetary authorities as to the amounts of reserves they need to hold. According to findings by the staff of the IMF, the magnitude of deficits requiring financing has tended to increase at the same rate as the volume of world transactions. This suggests that the prospective growth of world transactions might be a helpful guide to the required growth in reserves. Since trade in commodities makes up the largest portion of international transactions and is the one most reliably reported in statistics, it is useful as an indicator of trends.

The historical relation between the growth of reserves and the growth of trade (measured by imports) is depicted in Chart 9. Between 1950 and 1968 imports increased 7.6 percent a year, while reserves grew at only 2.5 percent a year. Thus, in the aggregate, reserves declined quite substantially in relation to imports, and probably in relation to the average size of deficits. These over-all results are, however, heavily influenced by the large net decline in reserves of the United States, the world's largest holder. The United States was able to give up these reserves because of its excess holdings at the beginning of the period. But this loss cannot continue. No other country now appears to have excess reserves sufficient to replace the United States as a willing and able net loser of reserves.

The relationship between growth of reserves and growth of imports is significantly altered when the United States is excluded from world totals. Between 1950 and 1968, reserves of countries other than the United States grew 5.6 percent a year, on the average, while their imports grew at 7.8 percent.


Some have suggested that reserves in the future should grow at essentially the same rate as world transactions—about 8 percent a year—to avoid any further decline in the ratio of average reserves to potential deficits. However, the world economy has been able to adapt to reductions in this ratio in the past. And a moderate further decline may be appropriate, both because countries should have increasing access to borrowed reserves and because possible improvements in the adjustment process may reduce the need for reserves.

Some guidance might be derived from the 5.6 percent growth rate of reserves experienced between 1950 and 1968 by countries other than the United States. In any case, a major increase from the very slow growth of the past 2 years is needed. Whatever the desired rate of growth of reserves, its achievement will depend mainly on the creation of Special Drawing Rights, since other components of total reserves, as noted above, are unlikely to expand significantly.

While it is still too early to make a decision about the proper size of the initial issue of SDR's, amounts

Chart 9

World Trade and Reserves



J. E. TIMMESTES BASED ON DATA FOR FIRST 3 QUARTERS.

NOTE: TRADE DURING YEAR; RESERVES AT END OF YEAR. DATA INCLUDE YUGOSLAVIA, BUT EXCLUDE U.S.S.R., OTHER EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, MAINLAND CHINA, AND CUBA.

SOURCE: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND.

of \$1 billion or \$2 billion a year—which have been used as illustrative examples of SDR creation—appear to be inadequate. These amounts imply a rate of reserve growth of only about 1.4 to 2.8 percent. With such slow growth, the SDR facility might fail to achieve its objective of avoiding a destructive competition for reserves.

The Confidence Problem

Shifts in confidence can be reflected in two ways: through actions initiated in the private economy and through actions by governments. Private holders of liquid assets constantly adjust the composition of their holdings. When they decide to shift from the financial assets of one country to those of another—a process described for simplicity as shifting from one currency to another—either exchange rates or official reserve holdings or both are affected. In addition, shifts by private holders between currencies and gold can have an impact on monetary stability, although the significance of such shifts has been substantially altered by the gold accord reached in Washington in March 1968.

PRIVATE SHIFTING AMONG CURRENCIES

Some shifts by private holders out of one currency into another are merely responses to differentials in short term interest rates. Other shifts among currencies may be induced by the expectation of, or anxiety about, a change in exchange rates—and thus can be viewed as reflecting changes in confidence. Such speculative movements occur when the payments and reserve positions of some countries create significant uncertainties that exchange parities will remain fixed. Speculative capital flows can result from direct sales of the suspect currency for stronger ones, or through the operation of the so-called "leads and lags" mechanism, under which normal commercial disbursements denominated in foreign currency are accelerated while receipts

denominated in domestic currency are delayed. (This was an important element in the 1968 French crisis.) A crisis of confidence can severely deplete the monetary reserves of a nation. Flows of this kind can be very large—up to \$1 billion in a single day.

Crises resulting from shifts of confidence have occurred from time to time. At different times in 1968, the Canadian dollar, the British pound, and the French franc were under downward pressures, and the German mark was subjected to upward pressures. As international businesses and financial institutions have matured, additional currencies have been brought into wide international use. Thus the number of currencies potentially subject to such crises has increased.

It is quite appropriate that countries should borrow reserves, if necessary, to deal with temporary emergencies of this kind. The "swap network" has traditionally provided lines of credit among central banks for this purpose; it was expanded and enlarged during 1968. Further improvements could be made in central bank borrowing procedures through a proposal whereby speculative funds would be immediately "recycled"—returned to countries suffering losses from countries experiencing gains.

Even if generous lines of short term credit are available, they leave countries vulnerable, because crises may be long lasting. Lenders or borrowers may be reluctant to renew loans, fearing overcommitment. Fortunately, in recent years, improvements in cooperation among the central banks and in the procedures of the IMF have reduced such fears.

However generous borrowing facilities may be, they cannot deal fully with a crisis of private confidence that arises from a major disequilibrium in the underlying balance-of-payments position of a country. In such circumstances, prompt and decisive measures to achieve a basic adjustment are the key to the restoration of confidence. But the requirements for adequate adjustment are aggravated when a loss of confidence imposes a heavy drain on reserves.

PRIVATE DEMAND FOR GOLD

Private asset holders may respond to a loss of confidence in a currency by buying gold rather than other currencies, particularly when the choice of a "safe" foreign currency is not obvious. Gold speculation is rather common in many countries, although not in the United States where it is illegal. Private imports of gold can be an important channel for currency flight and thus become a claim on a country's reserves. Furthermore, because the price of gold in the private market is sometimes used by speculators as a barometer of confidence in currencies, increases in that price can intensify currency runs.

While governments still retain some concern over private demands for gold, they are now much less directly involved than prior to March 1968. For the preceding 7 years, countries participating actively in the "gold pool" had stabilized the price of gold in the private market in London by buying and selling near the official price of \$35 an ounce. In March 1968, these countries agreed to discontinue their activities.

Prior to 1966, the pool was a net purchaser of gold, and the resulting additions of gold to monetary reserves strengthened the international monetary system. Subsequently, however, the pool became a substantial net seller, parting with gold out of monetary stocks to

keep the price from rising. Following British devaluation in late 1967, and in the early months of 1968, the volume of net gold sales became a serious drain on international monetary reserves. Moreover, the market took on a highly speculative tone. Several large and irregular waves of gold purchases had destabilizing domestic monetary effects in certain countries and transmitted speculative fever to foreign exchange markets.

In March, the active gold pool countries agreed to cease selling gold in the private market, and agreed that purchases of gold from the private market were no longer necessary. They obtained the cooperation of other central banks in this decision. As a result, the international monetary system has been substantially insulated from the destabilizing effects of changes in the private demand for gold, and gold can no longer be drained from monetary stocks into private uses.

SHIFTS AMONG OFFICIAL RESERVE ASSETS

Problems may arise if monetary authorities decide to shift their holdings abruptly among the various reserve assets. They may shift for political or other reasons, but they are often motivated by changes in the relative degrees of confidence attaching to the future values of these assets. For example, if official holders, fearing a sterling devaluation, were to shift into dollars, the United Kingdom would be forced to give up some of its international reserves. Likewise, if official holders of dollars decided to convert them into gold, the United States would lose some of its reserves. Crises of confidence may feed on themselves; for example, a significant decline in U.K. reserves could further weaken the confidence of both official and private holders of sterling.

Shifts out of officially held sterling by sterling area countries became a serious problem following the British devaluation of November 1967. The great majority of the sterling area countries did not devalue along with the British; thus the purchasing power of the reserves of sterling holders was reduced in terms of their own currencies as well as in dollars. This loss led to a movement toward reserve diversification which became particularly pronounced in the spring of 1968.

In recognition that the burden of such reserve diversification should not be borne by the British alone, 12 industrial countries, including the United States, together with the Bank for International Settlements, set up a new \$2 billion loan facility in September 1968. It was designed to provide finance to Britain to replace reserves lost as a result of the decline of sterling balances within the sterling area. The BIS will act as an intermediary and will obtain the required funds by borrowing in international markets, by accepting reserve deposits from central banks of the sterling area, and by calling upon standby lines of credit provided by the cooperating countries. The United Kingdom has given a dollar-value guarantee to the sterling area on eligible official sterling reserves, and the sterling-area countries in return have undertaken to maintain an agreed proportion of their reserves in sterling. The new facility should go far toward moderating the sterling diversification problem.

Some observers have pointed to the possibility of large-scale conversions of dollars into gold by central banks. The likelihood of such an abrupt shift of pref-

erences must, however, be viewed in perspective. There are several reasons why countries choose to hold dollars. Dollars are useful because they can be readily employed in exchange markets and are more easily put to use in emergencies than gold. Countries recognize that they can convert dollars to gold as they see fit, although they may at times refrain from gold conversions through a cooperative desire not to weaken the international monetary system by reducing total world reserves. Dollars—unlike gold—earn interest, and the efficient American money and capital markets make investment easy. Thus there is and should continue to be a strong demand for dollars by central banks.

Some central banks have a preference—arising mainly from tradition—in favor of gold as a reserve asset. They often appear unconcerned about earning interest on reserves, perhaps because their income is usually turned over to their national treasuries.

When dollars are acquired by countries with a preference for gold from countries with a preference for currencies as reserves, conversions into gold may occur. This could happen even with no increase in total dollars held abroad and no shift in general sentiment toward gold or away from the dollar. Furthermore, as world reserves grow, there would be a demand for added gold if countries attempted to maintain their “traditional” ratios of gold to total reserves. However, countries recognize that gold will decline as a proportion of total world reserves. And as the SDR agreement indicated, they seem prepared collectively to adjust the composition of their reserve holdings.

Preferences that now exist among sterling, dollars, and gold could become more complicated as SDR's are added, thereby creating further possibilities for shifts in the composition of reserves. Certain safeguards, however, were provided in the plan: the power given the IMF to direct SDR's to various holders was designed to prevent inadvertent destabilizing shifts from SDR's into other types of reserves. Furthermore, additional SDR's could be created to offset world reserve losses arising from shifts among reserve assets.

PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING RESERVE MANAGEMENT

It has been suggested that agreement on mutually acceptable rules of reserve management might help to avoid destabilizing changes in reserve composition. If deficit countries used each of their reserve assets in proportion to its share in their total holdings, and if surplus countries were willing to accept and hold different types of reserves in the exact proportions made available, the system would be internally consistent. Before such rules could be endorsed, their workings would need to be examined and agreed upon in detail.

A more sweeping suggested reform would be to eliminate the differences among reserve assets. Countries could combine all their reserves by depositing them in a joint account, which would be drawn upon when reserves were used. Such a scheme was discussed in the September 1968 Report of the Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments, of the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) of the Congress. In an examination of proposals of this kind, many questions arise which would require careful study: What would be the role of the United States? Would participation be voluntary or compulsory? Would countries be per-

mitted to withdraw from the pool? In view of the progress already made in dealing with world liquidity and in strengthening international cooperation, how urgent is such a major reform?

The Adjustment Problem

The Bretton Woods system was designed to correct the weaknesses in the international monetary system that were apparent in the interwar years. Faced with domestic economic collapse during the 1930's, some countries attempted, by deliberately undervaluing their currencies, to stimulate exports, retard imports, and thus add to employment. But one country's gain was another country's loss. Competitive devaluations, and restrictions on exchange and trade, imposed a heavy toll on international commerce.

The postwar economy was built upon the general understanding that full employment would be the target of national economic policies, and that this goal would be sought primarily through domestic monetary and fiscal policies. It was also expected that excessive price increases would normally be avoided. In the absence of both chronic deflation and chronic inflation, continuous balance-of-payments problems were viewed as unlikely. The IMF was to help in the adjustment process by granting credit to allow countries time to adjust without parity changes.

Provisions were included to put pressure on surplus countries to take an appropriate part in the adjustment process—for example, the “scarce currency” clause, which permits discrimination in trade against persistent surplus countries whose currencies are formally declared to be scarce. Under these conditions, a system of stable exchange rates was expected to operate successfully and to stimulate international trade and capital movements, while removing the temptation for governments to solve domestic problems by external means.

Although pegged parities were made the normal operating rule of the system, provision was also made for changing parities to correct fundamental disequilibria. The meaning of “fundamental disequilibrium” was not fully clarified, but the expectation at the time was that changes in parities would not be unusual. Actually, parity changes for developed countries have been rare. In part, this is because major countries have been reasonably successful in avoiding excesses of inflation and deflation; but it also reflects concern about the serious economic and political consequences of changes in the parities of major currencies, including the possibility of a worldwide chain reaction. Furthermore, greater freedom for international capital transactions has complicated the process of changing parities.

CAUSES OF DISTURBANCES

Despite the real accomplishments of stabilization policies, the international economy has been subject to disturbances. Some have been caused by the relatively mild cyclical fluctuations that have occurred, and others by differences among countries in long term trends of prices, economic growth, technological advance, and import demand. Countries differ with respect to the maximum rate of price increase—or the maximum volume of idle resources—that they view as tolerable. In general, a country incurring price

increases greater than the average of other countries will find its exports becoming less competitive and its domestic market more accessible to imports. Countries which grow particularly rapidly tend to experience stronger increases in imports (although they may simultaneously improve the competitive position of their exports). Or a country may experience long term deterioration in its external position if its demand for imports is more responsive to income growth than is the demand for its exports. These factors, singly and in combination, have led to some serious imbalances.

Adjustment problems may also reflect, in part, an insufficient growth of global reserves. When over-all reserves are growing only slowly, there can be acute pressures on deficit countries to adjust. At the same time, surplus countries may find that their reserves are not accumulating too rapidly; hence they may have little incentive to correct their imbalances. A world shortage of reserves could particularly complicate the adjustment problem of the United States, subjecting it to intense pressures from other countries in weak payments positions or from countries not satisfied with their reserve holdings. The United States might literally be prevented from correcting its balance-of-payments deficit, because every improvement in the U.S. position would cause some other countries to take protective actions to counter any weakening of their own positions.

There are a number of means open to a country for correcting balance-of-payments disequilibria without altering its exchange rate. These means differ in speed, in effectiveness, and in their side effects. They include internal measures such as fiscal and monetary policies, together with supporting incomes, manpower, and regional policies; and direct measures affecting international movements of goods, services, or capital.

INTERNAL ADJUSTMENTS

Often the domestic policies which would contribute to balance-of-payments adjustments are also desirable for domestic reasons. Thus if a country faces a balance-of-payments deficit and rapidly rising prices, it should follow tighter monetary and fiscal measures, supported by incomes policy to help restrain wages and prices, both to improve its trade balance and to curb inflation. Indeed, one argument sometimes made in favor of a system of fixed exchange rates is that balance-of-payments deficits stiffen the resolve of governments to achieve price stability. Conversely, if high levels of unemployment are accompanied by payments surpluses, expansionary domestic policies are clearly indicated.

However, a country may face a balance-of-payments deficit at a time when domestic demand is not excessive. It will then be understandably reluctant to attack its payments problem by restrictive monetary and fiscal policies. The opposite problem may arise if a payments surplus occurs when the domestic situation calls for anti-inflationary policies.

While the situations of surplus and deficit countries are symmetrical, incentives to adjust may not be equally strong in the two cases. There is no definite limit on the accumulation of reserves, so surplus countries often are under little pressure to restore equilibrium. But for deficit countries whose freedom of action is constrained by a limited supply of reserves, pressures to take corrective action may become inexorable. If real progress is to be made in achieving a bet-

ter balance of world payments, it is crucial that surplus countries participate in the adjustment process, as was indicated in the 1966 Report on the Balance of Payments Adjustment Process by Working Party No. 3 of OECD.

Changes in the Policy Mix

There are some opportunities to mitigate conflicts between international and domestic goals by altering the mix of monetary and fiscal policies. By influencing interest rates, monetary policies have direct effects on capital flows as well as on domestic demand. If a country has a balance-of-payments deficit and a satisfactory or inadequate level of domestic demand, fiscal policy may be eased and monetary policy simultaneously tightened. This combination can, in principle, avoid any reduction of internal demand, and capture the benefits of tighter money in reducing capital outflows or attracting foreign capital. Thus it may be possible to improve the balance of payments without adding to unemployment. The reverse combination of policies may be used by countries facing the surplus-inflation dilemma.

While changes in the mix of monetary and fiscal policy have significant possibilities, and they can be reinforced by appropriate incomes and manpower policies, such adjustments cannot always be relied upon as an escape from major conflicts in objectives.

Some of the balance-of-payments gains resulting from interest rate adjustments may be temporary. A change in interest rates may initially cause investors to make large adjustments in the composition of their existing portfolios of financial assets. Once this initial stock adjustment is completed, however, further gains from this source may be quite small.

There are limits on the willingness of countries to alter the mix of monetary and fiscal policies. A deficit country may hesitate to raise interest rates, fearing that such a move would deter capital formation and thereby curtail the improvement in productivity that may be a basic solution to its balance-of-payments difficulties. Or high interest rates may be objectionable because of their uneven impact on the domestic economy. Or a growing level of foreign indebtedness may be undesirable because it will increase the burden of service payments.

Finally, increases in domestic interest rates may lead to higher interest rates abroad. In that event, the differentials between foreign and domestic rates may diminish, weakening the impact on capital flows. In the absence of international coordination of monetary policies, efforts by deficit countries to tighten credit may lead to a worldwide escalation of interest rates. This may not only impede the immediate objectives of the deficit countries but may also dampen world economic growth. Clearly, the adjustment mechanism could benefit from a continued strengthening of international cooperation in this area of policy.

Thus there are often important limitations on the practical scope for adjustments in the monetary-fiscal mix as a means of reconciling domestic and international objectives. One important principle stands out. In a country with a serious balance-of-payments problem, the use of monetary policy for expansionary domestic purposes may be severely constrained; and primary reliance may therefore have to be placed on fiscal policy to pursue stabilization objectives. In the United

States and in many other countries, this implies the need for greater speed and flexibility in the implementation of fiscal measures.

MEASURES DIRECTLY AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS

In the OECD Adjustment Process report, it was recognized that fiscal and monetary policies, no matter how skillfully combined, cannot always be relied upon as the exclusive means of balance-of-payments adjustment. Given the many goals of economic policy, numerous instruments are needed. Under some circumstances, the report suggests the use of measures directly affecting international transactions.

Most countries do make use of specific measures affecting trade or capital movements as part of their adjustment. These policies may help to reconcile domestic and international objectives. Such measures as import duties or quotas, export subsidies, changes in border taxes, and taxes and prohibitions on international capital movements offer opportunities for improving the payments balance while avoiding major effects on the domestic economy. Some of these measures, such as special tariffs and export subsidies, are prohibited by the GATT, but their use has at times been sanctioned, implicitly or explicitly, so long as they were considered temporary. Likewise, exchange controls on current transactions are generally discouraged for countries accepting the full obligations of convertibility in the IMF, but specific authorizations have been granted under emergency conditions.

Trade Measures

The only trade measure explicitly condoned by the GATT for safeguarding the balance of payments is the use of temporary quantitative restrictions. Quotas on imports can be a very powerful instrument. But they can be very disruptive of normal commercial arrangements, troublesome to impose and administer, and difficult to abandon. Over the last few years, developed countries have shown a growing preference for the use of import surcharges, export subsidies, or combinations of the two.

At times, countries change their normal pattern of tax adjustments at the border in an attempt to promote balance-of-payments equilibrium. When a deficit country is taking only partial advantage of its opportunity under the GATT to make border adjustments for domestic indirect taxes, it can help itself by moving to full compensation. However, such action by a surplus country conflicts with the policies that should be followed for balance-of-payments adjustment. For example, on January 1 and July 1, 1968, in conjunction with an internal tax reform, the German government raised its rate of border adjustment. This tended to increase the German merchandise surplus—much as a small devaluation of the mark would have done—and at a time when Germany's balance-of-payments position was very strong indeed.

Another example of a change in a domestic tax which permitted an increase in border adjustments was the action taken by the French government in November 1968. A rise in value-added taxes, which are eligible under the GATT for border adjustments, was substituted for the existing payroll tax, which was not eligible. In this case, the aim of the increase in border

adjustments was to help restore over-all payments equilibrium.

Also in November, the German government reduced by 4 percentage points its border charge on most imports and its tax rebate on most exports, without any corresponding domestic tax changes. This measure was taken deliberately to reduce the large German trade surplus and had effects somewhat similar to an upward valuation of the mark.

When countries resort to trade measures to affect their balance-of-payments positions, efforts should be made to minimize distortions. General import charges imposed by themselves favor production for the domestic market, thus shrinking the volume of international trade, while general export grants alone unduly favor production for export. When general import charges are combined with general export grants at the same rate, these two tendencies offset each other, with no more distortion of merchandise trade than would result from a devaluation.

Even such a uniform and general combination of import charges and export grants would distort the choice between merchandise transactions and other international flows, such as tourism. Furthermore, serious misallocations could occur if exemptions were given individual industries or classes of products. Finally, even under the best of circumstances, temporary trade measures may in practice become embedded and thus should be used with great caution. Nevertheless, this approach may be useful under some conditions. It should be explored further to determine whether proper safeguards can be established to ensure that equal use is made by surplus and deficit countries, and that the goals of liberal commercial policy are maintained.

Capital Account Measures

All major countries take actions at times to influence international capital flows. The techniques employed range from special incentives for domestic investment to exchange controls and capital issues committees. There is some rationale for concentrating on the capital account, since fewer basic adjustments in the allocation of real resources are required by shifts in financial flows than by changes in trade. And measures to influence the capital account are generally more easily reversed in response to shifting balance-of-payments fortunes.

Sometimes, however, restraints on capital movements develop into a patchwork of controls that involve major administrative difficulties, bear down unevenly and inefficiently on different types of capital flows, and create a search for loopholes. The distortions can be reduced to the extent that restraints can be applied more equally among categories of capital flows and interference can be minimized within any particular category.

There may be opportunities to make greater use of the price system by applying variable taxes to capital flows or by auctioning permits to export capital. While the allocation of capital might be improved and administrative burdens eased by innovations in the techniques of controlling capital flows, any system of major restraints is bound to be far from ideal. The possible need for temporary direct measures on the capital account must be recognized, but so should the long term

benefits of greater freedom in capital flows among nations.

THE ADJUSTMENT PROBLEM OF THE UNITED STATES

The difficulties of balance-of-payments adjustment for deficit countries are evident from the recent experience of the United States. In the early 1960's, the United States was faced with a payments deficit at a time when its economy was operating far below capacity.

The causes of the deficit were numerous. The United States was shouldering an extraordinarily large share of the burden of providing for the security of the Free World and of supplying aid to less developed countries. The United States possessed the only large and sophisticated capital market in which foreigners could borrow freely, and the European countries had advanced to the point where they desired capital and could attract it. Moreover, because of Europe's general economic progress and the formation of the EEC and the European Free Trade Association, American companies had developed an intense interest in making direct investments there. Finally, the U.S. competitive position had deteriorated during the 1950's.

The Over-All Strategy

In the early 1960's, U.S. domestic needs called for expansionary policies, while traditional balance-of-payments remedies would have required greater restraint on demand. To reconcile this conflict, a mixed strategy was followed. It emphasized those elements in the domestic expansion which tended to improve international competitiveness, together with specific measures of a temporary nature to influence the external position. The selection of balance-of-payments measures reflected several concerns: the determination to maintain, as far as possible, liberal policies with respect to international trade and capital flows; the desire not to shift problems to countries in a weak balance-of-payments position; and the need to maintain the stability of the international monetary system, which was so crucially dependent on the dollar. Further difficulties in designing appropriate balance-of-payments measures arose from uncertainty over how much correction was needed, from the unpredictability of the immediate quantitative impact of particular actions, and from the large and uncertain "feedback" effects inherent in the large size of the United States.

Some policies were clearly desirable on all counts, such as improving knowledge with respect to export prospects, trimming unnecessary government expenditures abroad, encouraging other industrial countries to give larger amounts of aid to less developed countries, pressing for a more equitable sharing of military burdens, and removing a tax penalty on foreigners trading in American securities.

Reducing the Impact of Government Activities

A further group of measures to reduce the foreign exchange costs of U.S. military and foreign aid required more difficult decisions. In principle, savings of foreign exchange in the military area could have been pursued through three alternative strategies: (1) reducing the level of security, (2) obtaining increased contributions of military forces from other countries, or (3) reducing, offsetting, or neutralizing

the foreign exchange costs of a maintained level of U.S. military effort. The first alternative was ruled out. The second was pursued but with little immediate prospect of success. Thus the third became the approach emphasized in the short run. Domestic producers were given a preference over foreigners in supplying defense needs, at some added cost to the Federal budget. Foreign governments were urged to purchase more of their military equipment in the United States. In recent years, special U.S. Treasury bonds have been sold to countries to neutralize their balance-of-payments inflows from U.S. military expenditures.

Reducing the foreign exchange costs of U.S. aid presented an equally difficult choice. Either the amount of foreign aid had to be reduced, or a method had to be found to ensure that more of the money provided by the United States was spent in this country. The second alternative—aid-tying—was chosen. This tended to reduce the effectiveness of a given dollar amount of aid, but the alternative of slashing the volume of aid would have been even more costly to recipient countries.

Restraining Capital Outflows

While gains were obtained through these measures in the early sixties, the over-all payments problem was intensified by a major increase in private capital outflows. Faced with an apparently insatiable demand for capital abroad, the United States had the choice of raising domestic interest rates enough to price foreigners out of our market, of taxing foreign loans specifically, or of using direct controls to stop capital outflows. The first alternative was inconsistent with domestic needs for economic expansion. The second alternative was chosen when the Interest Equalization Tax (IET) was proposed in 1963. It substantially reduced foreign portfolio investments by Americans, except new security issues from Canada and investments in less developed countries, which were exempted. But demand for capital shifted to American banks, so the IET was extended to longer term loans of banks. Other types of bank loans and direct investment were not covered by the tax, and these forms of capital outflow kept expanding.

In response to a large outflow of capital at the end of 1964, voluntary programs were initiated in February 1965 to cover the major remaining capital flows. The American corporations which were large direct investors were asked to help by reducing their capital expenditures abroad, by relying on foreign financing for a greater share of their investments, or by expanding reflows of dividends to the United States. Banks and other financial institutions were meanwhile asked to follow guidelines established by the Federal Reserve Board which suggested quantitative limits on foreign lending.

Most, if not all, of these measures have been successful in achieving the objectives for which they were designed. The basic balance-of-payments position improved through 1964 and 1965, and the liquidity deficit was sharply reduced. Further progress was interrupted in 1966 by the mounting foreign exchange costs associated with the war in Vietnam and by the reduced trade surplus resulting from overly rapid domestic expansion.

Because the U.S. external position deteriorated

sharply late in 1967 and the stability of the international monetary system seemed in serious danger, a new set of measures was proposed by the President on January 1, 1968. This program included mandatory restrictions on foreign direct investment, further tightening of the guidelines on lending by banks and other financial institutions, and various other steps to reduce the deficit. The program was successful. As noted in Chapter 1, the balance of payments has improved. In particular, American direct investors have managed to finance a much greater proportion of their investments abroad by foreign borrowing, and there has been a net reduction in U.S. bank credit to the rest of the world.

With the exception of more timely action to assure adequate domestic restraint in recent years, it is hard to see, even in retrospect, any preferable strategies in U.S. policies to correct the deficit. The eclectic, ad hoc measures that were taken involved certain costs. But they maintained the strength of the dollar and the health of the world economy. More basic improvements lie ahead—pending peace and the restoration of price stability.

Exchange Rate Adjustments

An efficient international adjustment mechanism should permit countries to choose their own domestic economic targets for growth, employment, and price-cost performance. Policies that restore balance at home should not lead to pressures on the international accounts—in the form of either excessive accumulation or rapid depletion of reserves.

Suggestions have been put forward for amending the adjustment mechanism to lessen the conflict between domestic and balance-of-payments objectives. It is claimed by some that greater reliance on changes in exchange rates would work in this direction.

PRESENT SYSTEM

Present IMF rules provide for adjustments of exchange parities as a means of correcting a fundamental disequilibrium. In practice, however, the process of exchange rate adjustment may involve major difficulties; and in consequence, there is often extreme reluctance to change exchange rates even when balance-of-payments difficulties are severe.

To illustrate, the currency of a country with a large and persistent deficit will become widely recognized as a candidate for devaluation and this may touch off a crisis in private confidence, as discussed above. Speculation based on the prospect of devaluation will aggravate the initial balance-of-payments difficulties and increase the outflow of reserves. To discourage such speculation, governments tend to make categorical assertions that devaluation is not being considered; once such assertions have been made, it becomes a matter of national pride and political reputation to maintain the parity.

Furthermore, an actual adjustment in an exchange rate may generate the expectation of a further change; once an exchange parity has been adjusted, a second adjustment seems less unthinkable. Fear of such a perverse reaction may cause a country to depreciate by an excessive amount in the first instance. This may lead other countries to devalue also, thus reducing the poten-

tial balance-of-payments gain of the initiating country. Such a chain reaction can severely disrupt foreign exchange markets. Thus the difficulties associated with parity adjustments have at times driven countries to commit themselves to existing parities in all but the most extreme situations.

PROPOSALS FOR EXCHANGE RATE FLEXIBILITY

A number of suggestions—ranging from minor adjustments to far-reaching changes—have been made for altering the current exchange rate arrangements of the IMF.

The most sweeping change, advocated primarily by some academic economists, would be to abandon the pegged exchange system in favor of "floating rates," completely free to fluctuate in response to market forces.

In contrast, other proposals call for a modest widening of the existing 1 percent limit on fluctuations of rates on either side of parity. Still another type of proposal would provide for small but frequent changes in parities.

Each of the proposals is intended to make adjustments in exchange rates a more acceptable and effective means of correcting payments imbalances, and to reduce the speculative disturbances that sometimes develop under the present system. Opinions differ widely over the probable effects of the various proposals; intensive study would be required before serious consideration could be given to the adoption of any of them. The dramatic advances in world trade and prosperity achieved under the present system provide a strong case for conservatism in considering innovations; at the same time, the recurrence of financial strains has aroused widespread interest in possible amendments to the system.

In general, the wider the latitude for changes in exchange rates, the greater would be the amount of adjustment provided; but also the greater would be the uncertainty of those engaged in international commerce and the possibility of a disturbance to trade and investment relationships.

Floating Rates

While a system of floating exchange rates would ensure essentially automatic adjustment to balance-of-payments disturbances, serious questions arise about its operation.

Advocates of flexible exchange rates are divided on whether official intervention in exchange markets should be permitted. A complete ban on official intervention would be a very radical change, obviating any need for central banks to hold international reserves. Exchange rates might fluctuate quite widely, causing substantial uncertainty. If, on the other hand, official intervention were permitted under a system of floating rates, it might smooth out transitory fluctuations in exchange rates, but it would open up the danger of exchange rate manipulation. For example, a government might wish to drive down the price of its currency in order to strengthen the competitive position of its exports. It is difficult to devise rules which would permit desirable smoothing and yet ban manipulation.

In general, fluctuating exchange rates would require shifts of resources among industries that export, those that compete with imports, and others, as relative

prices in world markets reflected changes in exchange rates. Moreover, uncertainty about future exchange rates would concern international traders and investors. They could obtain some insurance by entering forward exchange markets, buying or selling foreign currencies at definite prices for delivery at some specified future date. But such forward transactions might be quite expensive and thus add to the costs of world trade. Furthermore, international investors might not be able to satisfy their needs for protection in forward exchange markets, given the long time horizon of many capital transactions.

Advocates of floating exchange rates believe that the benefits outweigh the costs of these uncertainties. They point out that uncertainty about exchange rates is not unique to a system of floating rates. Indeed, no feasible international system can guarantee against exchange rate adjustments. Moreover, they emphasize that international businessmen live with many uncertainties, both political and commercial. Finally, it is their contention—not universally accepted—that, under floating rates, there would be an easing of pressures for exchange controls and trade barriers.

The adoption of floating exchange rates would constitute a drastic change in the international monetary system. If the present system were functioning very badly and if no other possibility of reform were available, there might be a compelling argument for adopting this one; but such is not the case.

Wider Bands

Under present arrangements, day-to-day market pressures can be reflected in small fluctuations of each exchange rate within a narrow band. Central banks of countries other than the United States intervene in the market by buying and selling foreign exchange to keep the dollar prices of their currencies within 1 percent or less of established parities. The United States rounds out the system by selling and buying gold in dealings with central banks at \$35 an ounce. Proposals have been made by the JEC Subcommittee on International Payments and by others to introduce greater flexibility of rates by widening the permissible band of fluctuation around the par value. With a band of 2 percent on either side of parity, the exchange rate between two nondollar currencies could change by as much as 8 percent. Suggestions for a wider band, like other proposals for greater flexibility in exchange rates, are *not* directed at the official price of gold. The latter is not an exchange rate. There is no need whatsoever for it to be altered to accommodate greater flexibility of exchange rates.

A widening of exchange rate bands could contribute to the adjustment process. The currency of a country with an incipient deficit would fall in price, thus making imports more expensive and lowering the cost of exports to buyers in world markets. Imports would be discouraged and exports stimulated, strengthening the balance of payments. If the exchange rate approached the floor with its future course expected to be upward, the stimulus might be particularly strong; there would be an incentive to take advantage of the temporary low price of the country's exports.

Advocates of a wider band believe that it might deter speculative runs in two ways. First, the additional adjustment permitted by the wider band might make discrete changes in parities appear less likely, thus re-

ducing uncertainty. Second, a wider band would increase the potential loss on a "wrong bet" against a currency. Under the present narrow band, the speculator has relatively little to lose if he bets against a currency and it is not in fact devalued. With a wider band, the risk of loss would be increased, because a currency that was initially under pressure could experience a larger rebound in price. There is, however, no concrete basis for estimating the extent to which these features would deter speculation.

The wider the band is made, the greater the potential uncertainty about the course of exchange rates, but also the greater the amount of balance-of-payments adjustment which may take place within the band. In an evaluation of a wider band, these conflicting considerations would have to be weighed in determining its optimum width. A very wide band comes close to a floating exchange rate and thus shares the shortcomings of this drastic reform. A small widening of the band, on the other hand, might not markedly reduce the need for, and the expectation of, discrete changes in parity.

Gradual Adjustment of Parities

The evolution toward greater exchange rate flexibility could involve a gradual, limited adjustment of exchange parities. Two forms of the so-called "crawling peg" have been proposed, one discretionary and one automatic.

Under the discretionary variant, a country in disequilibrium would no longer make one substantial change in its parity, but rather would announce a rate of increase (or decrease) in its parity of some specified small percentage per month, until further notice. Once the desired effect had been attained, the country would halt the process. This might make the transition to an equilibrium parity easier, and perhaps curb speculation. Its effect on the political obstacles to changes in parities is not entirely clear; governments might find it just as painful to announce a parity change in a series of small steps as in a single abrupt one. The discretionary crawling peg might therefore be used no more frequently than the present "adjustable peg."

The automatic form of gradual adjustment would remove parities from the direct control of individual countries. Under one variant, the parity on any business day would be the average of the actual exchange rates over the preceding 12 months (or some other suitable period). The actual exchange rate would be within a band around the parity prevailing on that day, with official intervention permitted only at the floor or ceiling. For a period of 1 year and a band of 1 percent, the largest possible change in the parity—attained only if a currency were continuously at its floor or ceiling—would be 2 percent a year. Larger or smaller potential changes could be permitted by adopting a different period for calculating the moving average, or by altering the width of the band. Again an optimum choice would depend upon the importance of certainty about future exchange rates, on the one hand, and on the speed of balance-of-payments adjustment to be permitted through the crawling peg, on the other.

Unlike fully flexible rates, the crawling peg would not be intended to offset all cyclical and random fluctuations in international transactions; but, unlike a widening of the band, it would permit sizable changes in exchange rates over the long run. Thus it could cope with the problem of modest trends in the equi-

Annual Report on Foreign Assistance Program Transmitted to Congress

*President Johnson's Letter of Transmittal*¹

To the Congress of the United States:

I am proud to transmit the Annual Report on the Foreign Assistance Program for Fiscal Year 1968.

The year's most significant development was the sharpened focus of our aid program on the priority problems of food and population.

During the 12 months covered by this report, major breakthroughs in food production occurred in the less developed countries.

—Record harvests were achieved in Pakistan, Turkey, and the Philippines. In India food grain harvests jumped to nearly 100 million tons, 10 percent above the previous record.

—Total food output in the developing countries rose 7 percent, the largest increase on record.

United States economic aid played a major role in this Green Revolution. Our programs encouraged more effective farm price policies, helped to extend irrigation and establish farm credit systems, and provided technical assistance, fertilizer, pesticides and tools that farmers need to take full advantage of the new "miracle" seeds.

Many less developed nations are now establishing family planning programs. During fiscal 1968 the Agency for International Development committed \$35-million to help them carry out these programs. This was nine times more than AID devoted to population programs during the previous year.

This report records the continuing concentration of American aid in relatively few countries where it can be most effectively used to help others help themselves. Fifteen nations accounted for 84 percent of total economic commitments by AID during the year. They were Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, India, Indonesia, Korea, Laos, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam.

Another country, Iran, achieved self-support

¹ H. Doc. 91-23; copies of the 85-page report are for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (45 cents).

librium values of currencies resulting from divergent national trends of prices, economic growth, export supply, import demand, or investment flows.

It might seem that, if a currency showed fundamental weakness and was therefore expected to move downward for an extended period, speculation would become a problem because of the predictability of the exchange rate movement. This kind of speculation could, in principle, be avoided by raising interest rates above the otherwise prevailing level by an amount equal to the anticipated rate of downward crawl of the currency. The exchange gain from moving out of the currency would then be offset by the loss of interest. Such changes in interest rates might, however, necessitate offsetting adjustments in fiscal policy and, as discussed earlier, marked changes in the policy mix are sometimes difficult to achieve. Limits on tolerable interest rate changes would thus be one constraint on the speed of parity adjustment which could be permitted in such a system.

The various proposed modifications in the exchange rate system raise many difficult technical issues, and clearly a proper evaluation of these proposals must be preceded by a great deal of careful study.

Conclusion

By far the most important attribute of the postwar international economy has been steady and rapid growth. The spectacular nature of recent international monetary disturbances should not obscure the mighty contribution that the international economic system has made to world prosperity. Worldwide flows of goods and investments have been the cornerstones on which the prosperity of many nations has rested; at the same time, the growth of national economies has made possible the tremendous increases in world trade and international investment.

Trade is the center of the international economic system, and it cannot prosper in the face of highly restrictive national policies. Only a continuous chipping away at tariffs and other trade barriers can provide assurance against backsliding. Pressures for protection must be successfully resisted.

The fruits of unprecedented prosperity are still not being fully shared by many nations in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. The future growth of these nations must be built primarily on the skills, intelligence, and labor of their citizens. But the developed countries must facilitate the process by providing technical assistance, capital resources, and access to markets.

The international monetary system established at Bretton Woods and developed through the years has made a major contribution to international economic growth. This system has served the world well, but it has increasingly been subject to serious strains.

To ensure the continuing smooth operation of the monetary system, work must go forward on the problems of liquidity, confidence, and adjustment. Great progress has been made in recent years as exemplified by the agreement creating Special Drawing Rights. This achievement required careful study and long negotiations. Similar extensive efforts will be needed in the future if progress is to be maintained, but the prospects for eventual success are bright.

during the fiscal year and the United States AID mission there was formally closed.

Among the most helpful signs of our times are the breakthroughs being made by the less developed countries in food production, and the programs they have launched in the field of family planning.

It is our responsibility—and the responsibility of other more developed nations—to give their efforts firm support through our foreign assistance program. To do less would be to court catastrophe in a world growing smaller day by day.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 15, 1969.

Annual Report of the Peace Corps Transmitted to Congress

*President Johnson's Letter of Transmittal*¹

To the Congress of the United States:

I take pleasure in transmitting to the Congress the Seventh Annual Report of the Peace Corps.

The statistics of 1968 are impressive by themselves.

—Volunteers began serving in seven new countries, and plans have been set for programs in two more.

—The number of volunteers increased to more than 12,000 men and women serving in 59 countries.

But statistics tell only part of the tale. The two greatest achievements of 1968 were intangible.

For the first time, host country nationals were integrated into the agency's overseas staff. They helped to recruit volunteers in the United States and to train abroad. They assured the pursuit of goals that they had established for themselves, not that we might have dictated to them. As a result, the Corps became a truly

¹ Transmitted on Jan. 7 (White House press release).

effective team effort for international understanding.

This report also shows proof of the relevance of the Peace Corps to problems we face at home. When the Corps began, it boldly promised that those who flocked to it for experience abroad would return better able to direct the destiny of their own country.

Of the 25,000 volunteers who have come home:

—A third have returned to school for advanced degrees.

—Almost a third of those employed teach in inner-city schools, working in jobs that educators find difficult to fill.

—Another third work for Federal, State, and local governments.

So a tour in the Peace Corps has become more than a two-year stint helping others; it has encouraged thousands of youngsters to pursue careers in public service.

This report is a testimony to America's commitment to the future. I commend it to your attention.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 7, 1969.

U.S.-Japan Medical Science Program Report Transmitted to Congress

*President Johnson's Letter of Transmittal*¹

To the Congress of the United States:

I am pleased to send to you the second annual report of the U.S.-Japan Cooperative Medical Science Program.

This joint program, undertaken in 1965 following a meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Sato and myself, is directed against serious diseases still too prevalent in Asian countries: cholera, tuberculosis, leprosy, virus diseases, parasitic diseases, and malnutrition. These are diseases which plague the people of

¹ Transmitted on Jan. 16 (White House press release); for text of the report, see H. Doc. 91-48, 91st Cong., 1st sess.

that great region, and which threaten our armed forces stationed in Southeast Asia.

Although the Cooperative Medical Science Program is not yet three years old, we can point to substantial progress in research on leprosy, cholera, and nutrition.

This report outlines that progress in detail.

It is heartening testimony to all of us who are committed to a better life for the world's people, and who believe that in broader international cooperation lies mankind's best hope for peace.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 16, 1969.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

90th Congress, 2d Session

Duty on Certain Articles of Alumina, Bauxite, Copper, and Cellulosic Plastics. Conference report to accompany H.R. 7735. H. Rept. 1950. October 3, 1968. 5 pp. Renegotiation Amendments Act of 1968, Etc. Conference report to accompany H.R. 17324. H. Rept. 1951. October 3, 1968. 9 pp.

Customs Conventions Relating to the Entry of Professional Equipment, Containers, and Carnets. Report to accompany H.R. 18373. S. Rept. 1618. October 8, 1968. 5 pp.

Extension of Temporary Duty Suspension on Certain Classifications of Yarn of Silk. Report to accompany H.R. 15798. S. Rept. 1619. October 8, 1968. 2 pp.

Twelfth Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program for 1967. H. Doc. 394. October 8, 1968. 79 pp.

The Oceans: A Challenging New Frontier. H. Rept. 1957. October 9, 1968. 128 pp.

Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces Treaty. S. Rept. 1630. October 9, 1968. 18 pp.

Foreign Military Sales Act. Report to accompany H.R. 15681. S. Rept. 1632. October 9, 1968. 6 pp.

Global Communications Satellite System. Report to accompany H.R. 18486. S. Rept. 1652. October 9, 1968. 4 pp.

Tariff Treatment of Imports of Certain Racehorses, Motion Picture Films, and Curling Equipment. Report to accompany H.R. 15003. S. Rept. 1657. October 9, 1968. 4 pp.

Tax Provisions Relating to Distilled Spirits and Tariff Classification of Certain Sugars, Sirups, and Molasses. Report to accompany H.R. 11394. S. Rept. 1659. October 9, 1968. 11 pp.

Increased U.S. Participation in the International Development Association. Report to accompany S. 3378. S. Rept. 1670. October 11, 1968. 11 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Disputes

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.

Ratification deposited: Nepal, January 7, 1969.

Hydrography

Convention on the International Hydrographic Organization, with annexes. Done at Monaco May 3, 1967.¹

Ratification deposited: United Arab Republic, December 13, 1968.

Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968.¹

Ratifications deposited at Washington: Cameroon, Canada, January 8, 1969.

Safety at Sea

Amendments to chapter II of the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London November 30, 1966.¹

Acceptances deposited: Italy, December 9, 1968; Korea, December 6, 1968; Maldive Islands, December 20, 1968; South Africa, December 2, 1968.

Space

Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return of astronauts, and the return of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow April 22, 1968. Entered into force December 3, 1968. TIAS 6599.

Ratification deposited at Washington: Niger, January 15, 1969.

Telecommunications

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 1959), as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332), relating to maritime mobile service, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva November 3, 1967. Enters into force April 1, 1969. TIAS 6590.

Notifications of approval: Algeria, October 9, 1968; Austria, October 10, 1968; Laos, October 3, 1968; Luxembourg, November 6, 1968; Madagascar, October 28, 1968; Sweden, October 18, 1968.

International telecommunication convention, with annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. Entered into force January 1, 1967; as to the United States May 29, 1967. TIAS 6267.

¹ Not in force.

Ratifications deposited: Chad, October 30, 1968; Italy, October 28, 1968; Kenya, October 25, 1968; Morocco, October 17, 1968.

Trade

Sixth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 11, 1957.¹

Acceptance: Nicaragua, November 28, 1968.

Seventh protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 30, 1957.¹

Acceptance: Nicaragua, November 28, 1968.

Protocol relating to negotiations for the establishment of new schedule III—Brazil—to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 31, 1958.¹

Acceptances: Burma, November 14, 1968; Chile, September 9, 1968; Nicaragua, November 28, 1968.

Eighth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva February 18, 1959.¹

Acceptance: Nicaragua, November 28, 1968.

Ninth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva August 17, 1959.¹

Acceptance: Nicaragua, November 28, 1968.

Declaration on the provisional accession of the United Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 13, 1962. Entered into force January 9, 1963; for the United States May 3, 1963. TIAS 5309.

Ratification deposited: Austria, October 9, 1968.

Protocol amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and development and to amend annex I. Done at Geneva February 8, 1965. Entered into force June 27, 1966. TIAS 6139.

Acceptances: Burma, November 14, 1968; Haiti, November 6, 1968; Nicaragua, November 28, 1968.

Ratification deposited: Greece, November 18, 1968.

Fourth procès-verbal extending the declaration on the provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 12, 1959 (TIAS 4498). Done at Geneva November 14, 1967. Entered into force December 18, 1967; for the United States April 2, 1968. TIAS 6484.

Acceptance: Denmark, December 10, 1968.

Third procès-verbal extending the declaration on the

provisional accession of the United Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 13, 1962 (TIAS 5309). Done at Geneva November 14, 1967. Entered into force December 27, 1967.²

Acceptance: Denmark, December 10, 1968.

Ratification deposited: Austria, October 9, 1968.

Fifth procès-verbal extending the declaration on the provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 12, 1959 (TIAS 4498). Done at Geneva November 19, 1968.²

Entered into force: December 17, 1968.

Acceptances: Denmark, December 10, 1968; Norway, Tunisia, December 17, 1968.

Fourth procès-verbal extending the declaration on the provisional accession of the United Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 13, 1962 (TIAS 5309). Done at Geneva November 19, 1968.¹

Acceptances: Denmark, December 10, 1968; Norway, December 17, 1968.

BILATERAL

Israel

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of August 4, 1967 (TIAS 6314). Signed at Washington January 17, 1969. Entered into force January 17, 1969.

Philippines

Agreement relating to the recruitment and employment of Filipino citizens by the United States military forces and contractors of military and civilian agencies of the United States in certain areas of the Pacific and Southwest Asia. Signed at Manila December 28, 1968. Entered into force December 28, 1968.

Trinidad and Tobago

Agreement extending the convention of December 22, 1966, as extended (TIAS 6400), for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income. Effected by exchange of notes at Port-of-Spain December 12 and 30, 1968. Entered into force December 30, 1968.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

Colombia. Letters of Credence (Pastrana Borrero) 92

Congress

Annual Report of the Peace Corps Transmitted to Congress (Johnson) 118

Annual Report on Foreign Assistance Program Transmitted to Congress (Johnson) 117

The Budget of the United States Government—Fiscal Year 1970 (Excerpts) 95

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy 119

The International Economy (excerpts from the President's Economic Report and the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers) 101

Reduction in Tariff Recommended on Reprocessed Wool Fabrics (Johnson) 92

The State of the Union (excerpts from President Johnson's address to the Congress) 89

Steel Industries of Japan and ECSC Offer To Limit Exports to U.S. (Rusk) 93

U.S.—Japan Medical Science Program Report Transmitted to Congress (Johnson) 118

Disarmament. The State of the Union (excerpts from President Johnson's address to the Congress) 89

Economic Affairs

The Budget of the United States Government—Fiscal Year 1970 (Excerpts) 95

The International Economy (excerpts from the President's Economic Report and the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers) 101

Reduction in Tariff Recommended on Reprocessed Wool Fabrics (Johnson) 92

Report Completed on Future U.S. Foreign Trade Policy (White House announcement) 91

The State of the Union (excerpts from President Johnson's address to the Congress) 89

Steel Industries of Japan and ECSC Offer To Limit Exports to U.S. (Rusk) 93

Europe

The State of the Union (excerpts from President Johnson's address to the Congress) 89

Steel Industries of Japan and ECSC Offer To Limit Exports to U.S. (Rusk) 93

Foreign Aid. Annual Report on Foreign Assistance Program Transmitted to Congress (Johnson) 117

Japan

Steel Industries of Japan and ECSC Offer To Limit Exports to U.S. (Rusk) 93

U.S.—Japan Medical Science Program Report Transmitted to Congress (Johnson) 118

Near East. The State of the Union (excerpts from President Johnson's address to the Congress) 89

Peace Corps. Annual Report of the Peace Corps Transmitted to Congress (Johnson) 118

Presidential Documents

Annual Report of the Peace Corps Transmitted to Congress 118

Annual Report on Foreign Assistance Program Transmitted to Congress 117

The Budget of the United States Government—Fiscal Year 1970 (Excerpts) 95

The International Economy (excerpts from the President's Economic Report and the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers) 101

President Johnson Welcomes New Talks on Viet-Nam 91

Reduction in Tariff Recommended on Reprocessed Wool Fabrics 92

The State of the Union (excerpts) 89

U.S.—Japan Medical Science Program Report Transmitted to Congress 118

Science. U.S.—Japan Medical Science Program Report Transmitted to Congress (Johnson) 118

Trade

Reduction in Tariff Recommended on Reprocessed Wool Fabrics (Johnson) 92

Report Completed on Future U.S. Foreign Trade Policy (White House announcement) 91

Steel Industries of Japan and ECSC Offer To Limit Exports to U.S. (Rusk) 93

Treaty Information. Current Actions 119

U.S.S.R. The State of the Union (excerpts from President Johnson's address to the Congress) 89

Viet-Nam

President Johnson Welcomes New Talks on Viet-Nam 91

The State of the Union (excerpts from President Johnson's address to the Congress) 89

Name Index

Johnson, President 89, 91, 92, 95, 101, 117, 118

Pastrana Borrero, Misael Eduardo 92

Roth, William M 91

Rusk, Secretary 93

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: January 13–19

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*5	1/17	General Services Administration concludes negotiations on site design and engineering of chancery enclave in Washington.

*Not printed.

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THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN

Vol. LX, No. 1546



February 10, 1969

THE INAUGURAL ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT NIXON 121

FIRST PLENARY SESSION OF NEW MEETINGS ON VIET-NAM HELD AT PARIS

Statement by Ambassador Lodge 124

THE HUMAN LANDSCAPE

Department of State Science Lecture by René Jules Dubos 127

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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February 10, 1969

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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The Inaugural Address of President Nixon¹

Senator Dirksen, Mr. Chief Justice, Mr. Vice President, President Johnson, Vice President Humphrey, my fellow Americans—and my fellow citizens of the world community:

I ask you to share with me today the majesty of this moment. In the orderly transfer of power, we celebrate the unity that keeps us free.

Each moment in history is a fleeting time, precious and unique. But some stand out as moments of beginning, in which courses are set that shape decades or centuries.

This can be such a moment.

Forces now are converging that make possible, for the first time, the hope that many of man's deepest aspirations can at last be realized. The spiraling pace of change allows us to contemplate, within our own lifetime, advances that once would have taken centuries.

In throwing wide the horizons of space, we have discovered new horizons on earth.

For the first time, because the people of the world want peace and the leaders of the world are afraid of war, the times are on the side of peace.

Eight years from now America will celebrate its 200th anniversary as a nation. Within the lifetime of most people now living, mankind will celebrate that great new year which comes only once in a thousand years—the beginning of the third millennium.

What kind of a nation we will be, what kind of a world we will live in, whether we shape the future in the image of our hopes, is ours to determine by our actions and our choices.

The greatest honor history can bestow is the title of peacemaker. This honor now beckons America—the chance to help lead the world at last out of the valley of turmoil and onto that high ground of peace that man has dreamed of since the dawn of civilization.

If we succeed, generations to come will say of

us now living that we mastered our moment, that we helped make the world safe for mankind.

This is our summons to greatness.

I believe the American people are ready to answer this call.

The second third of this century has been a time of proud achievement. We have made enormous strides in science and industry and agriculture. We have shared our wealth more broadly than ever. We have learned at last to manage a modern economy to assure its continued growth.

We have given freedom new reach. We have begun to make its promise real for black as well as for white.

We see the hope of tomorrow in the youth of today. I know America's youth. I believe in them. We can be proud that they are better educated, more committed, more passionately driven by conscience than any generation in our history.

No people has ever been so close to the achievement of a just and abundant society or so possessed of the will to achieve it. And because our strengths are so great, we can afford to appraise our weaknesses with candor and to approach them with hope.

Standing in this same place a third of a century ago, Franklin Delano Roosevelt addressed a nation ravaged by depression and gripped in fear. He could say in surveying the Nation's troubles: "They concern, thank God, only material things."

Our crisis today is in reverse.

We find ourselves rich in goods but ragged in spirit, reaching with magnificent precision for the moon but falling into raucous discord on earth.

We are caught in war, wanting peace. We are torn by division, wanting unity. We see around us empty lives wanting fulfillment. We see tasks that need doing waiting for hands to do them.

¹ Delivered on Jan. 20 (White House press release).

To a crisis of the spirit, we need an answer of the spirit.

And to find that answer, we need only look within ourselves.

When we listen to "the better angels of our nature," we find that they celebrate the simple things, the basic things—such as goodness, decency, love, kindness.

Greatness comes in simple trappings.

The simple things are the ones most needed today if we are to surmount what divides us and cement what unites us.

To lower our voices would be a simple thing.

In these difficult years, America has suffered from a fever of words; from inflated rhetoric that promises more than it can deliver; from angry rhetoric that fans discontents into hatreds; from bombastic rhetoric that postures instead of persuading.

We cannot learn from one another until we stop shouting at one another—until we speak quietly enough so that our words can be heard as well as our voices.

For its part, government will listen. We will strive to listen in new ways—to the voices of quiet anguish, the voices that speak without words, the voices of the heart—to the injured voices, the anxious voices, the voices that have despaired of being heard.

Those who have been left out, we will try to bring in.

Those left behind, we will help to catch up.

For all of our people, we will set as our goal the decent order that makes progress possible and our lives secure.

As we reach toward our hopes, our task is to build on what has gone before—not turning away from the old but turning toward the new.

In this past third of a century, government has passed more laws, spent more money, initiated more programs, than in all our previous history.

In pursuing our goals of full employment, better housing, excellence in education; in rebuilding our cities and improving our rural areas; in protecting our environment and enhancing the quality of life—in all these and more, we will and must press urgently forward.

We shall plan now for the day when our wealth can be transferred from the destruction of war abroad to the urgent needs of our people at home.

The American dream does not come to those who fall asleep.

But we are approaching the limits of what government alone can do.

Our greatest need now is to reach beyond government, to enlist the legions of the concerned and the committed.

What has to be done has to be done by government and people together or it will not be done at all. The lesson of past agony is that without the people we can do nothing, with the people we can do everything.

To match the magnitude of our tasks, we need the energies of our people—enlisted not only in grand enterprises but, more importantly, in those small, splendid efforts that make headlines in the neighborhood newspaper instead of the national journal.

With these, we can build a great cathedral of the spirit—each of us raising it one stone at a time as he reaches out to his neighbor, helping, caring, doing.

I do not offer a life of uninspiring ease. I do not call for a life of grim sacrifice. I ask you to join in a high adventure—one as rich as humanity itself and exciting as the times we live in.

The essence of freedom is that each of us shares in the shaping of his own destiny.

Until he has been part of a cause larger than himself, no man is truly whole.

The way to fulfillment is in the use of our talents. We achieve nobility in the spirit that inspires that use.

As we measure what can be done, we shall promise only what we know we can produce; but as we chart our goals, we shall be lifted by our dreams.

No man can be fully free while his neighbor is not. To go forward at all is to go forward together.

This means black and white together as one nation, not two. The laws have caught up with our conscience. What remains is to give life to what is in the law: to insure at last that as all are born equal in dignity before God, all are born equal in dignity before man.

As we learn to go forward together at home, let us also seek to go forward together with all mankind.

Let us take as our goal: Where peace is unknown, make it welcome; where peace is fragile, make it strong; where peace is temporary, make it permanent.

After a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiation.

Let all nations know that during this admin-

istration our lines of communication will be open.

We seek an open world—open to ideas, open to the exchange of goods and people—a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation.

We cannot expect to make everyone our friend, but we can try to make no one our enemy.

Those who would be our adversaries, we invite to a peaceful competition—not in conquering territory or extending dominion but in enriching the life of man.

As we explore the reaches of space, let us go to the new worlds together—not as new worlds to be conquered but as a new adventure to be shared.

With those who are willing to join, let us cooperate to reduce the burden of arms, to strengthen the structure of peace, to lift up the poor and the hungry.

But to all those who would be tempted by weakness, let us leave no doubt that we will be as strong as we need to be for as long as we need to be.

Over the past 20 years, since I first came to this Capital as a freshman Congressman, I have visited most of the nations of the world. I have come to know the leaders of the world, and the great forces, the hatreds, the fears, that divide the world.

I know that peace does not come through wishing for it—that there is no substitute for days and even years of patient and prolonged diplomacy.

I also know the people of the world.

I have seen the hunger of a homeless child, the pain of a man wounded in battle, the grief of a mother who has lost her son. I know these have no ideology, no race.

I know America. I know the heart of America is good.

I speak from my own heart, and the heart of my country, the deep concern we have for those who suffer and those who sorrow.

I have taken an oath today in the presence of God and my countrymen to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States. To that

oath I now add this sacred commitment: I shall consecrate my Office, my energies, and all the wisdom I can summon to the cause of peace among nations.

Let this message be heard by strong and weak alike:

The peace we seek—the peace we seek to win—is not victory over any other people but the peace that comes “with healing in its wings”; with compassion for those who have suffered; with understanding for those who have opposed us; with the opportunity for all the peoples of this earth to choose their own destiny.

Only a few short weeks ago we shared the glory of man’s first sight of the world as God sees it, as a single sphere reflecting light in the darkness.

As the Apollo astronauts flew over the moon’s gray surface on Christmas Eve, they spoke to us of the beauty of earth—and in that voice so clear across the lunar distance, we heard them invoke God’s blessing on its goodness.

In that moment, their view from the moon moved poet Archibald MacLeish to write:

To see the earth as it truly is, small and blue and beautiful in that eternal silence where it floats, is to see ourselves as riders on the earth together, brothers on that bright loveliness in the eternal cold—brothers who know now they are truly brothers.

In that moment of surpassing technological triumph, men turned their thoughts toward home and humanity—seeing in that far perspective that man’s destiny on earth is not divisible; telling us that however far we reach into the cosmos, our destiny lies not in the stars but on earth itself, in our own hands, in our own hearts.

We have endured a long night of the American spirit. But as our eyes catch the dimness of the first rays of dawn, let us not curse the remaining dark. Let us gather the light.

Our destiny offers not the cup of despair but the chalice of opportunity. So let us seize it not in fear but in gladness—and “riders on the earth together,” let us go forward, firm in our faith, steadfast in our purpose, cautious of the dangers, but sustained by our confidence in the will of God and the promise of man.

First Plenary Session of New Meetings on Viet-Nam Held at Paris

Following is the text of the opening statement on January 25 by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, head of the U.S. delegation, at the first plenary session of the Paris meetings on Viet-Nam.

Press release 15 (revised) dated January 25

Ladies and gentlemen: This is a unique moment in history. Today, in this new meeting in Paris, the search for peace in Viet-Nam enters a new stage. Today we begin together the search for an honorable and enduring settlement to the conflict which divides us. The world will be watching these proceedings with close attention. They will expect progress, not propaganda. They will expect agreement, not acrimony. The United States is determined to do everything it can to assure that these meetings will lead us to peace.

Last Monday, a new President was inaugurated, committed to an honorable peace and dedicated to an equitable solution. In his inaugural address he stated:

... the peace we seek to win is not victory over any other people but the peace that comes "with healing in its wings"; with compassion for those who have suffered; with understanding for those who have opposed us; with the opportunity for all the peoples of this earth to choose their own destiny.

I ask you to ponder these words.

No purpose is served by repeating the list of familiar charges or to recite once more the chronology which brought us here. Our responsibility is to the future, not the past. The problems we have settled have been procedural; the bulk of our substantive work is still ahead. The United States will enter these talks with a profound sense of responsibility and an open mind. It will put forth carefully considered proposals and hopes that the other side will do the same.

Undoubtedly we have many difficult sessions ahead of us. A good way to begin our task would be to deal with concrete proposals. The search for peace can begin in the DMZ. We believe that the demilitarized status of the zone between North and South Viet-Nam should be restored

immediately. Specifically, the United States Government proposes that the DMZ should be:

—Free of all regular and irregular military and subversive forces and personnel, military installations, military supplies and equipment.

—An area in which, from which, and across which all acts of force are prohibited.

—A zone temporarily separating North and South Viet-Nam pending their reunification through the free expression of the will of the people of the North and of the people of the South.

—An area the same in size and definition as that provided in the 1954 Geneva accords.

—Subject to an effective system of international inspection and verification.

We therefore propose that each side publicly declare its readiness to respect the provisions of the 1954 Geneva accords relating to the DMZ, and abide by those provisions.

We stand ready to begin today to work out the details for transforming this proposal for a DMZ into a practical move toward peace. We are prepared to give serious and openminded consideration to all proposals directed to this end by your side. Nothing could be more auspicious for our work here than an agreement today to begin urgent consideration of this matter.

We will put forward other concrete proposals at subsequent meetings. Our proposal today with respect to the DMZ is advanced as a practical first step on the road to peace.

Of course, our real task is not a partial but a complete peace. The United States goal can be stated simply: to preserve the right of the South Vietnamese people to determine their own future without outside interference or coercion.

For this reason, the United States believes that all external forces should be withdrawn from South Viet-Nam and that all military and subversive forces of North Viet-Nam must be withdrawn into North Viet-Nam. We are ready to work toward the implementation of the objective of such mutual withdrawal.

The United States Government seeks no

permanent establishment of troops, no permanent military bases, and no permanent military alliance. We have no desire to threaten or harm the people of North Viet-Nam or to invade that country or to overthrow its government. What we do seek is a South Viet-Nam that is free from attacks or subversion from without.

We seek peace not only in Viet-Nam but in the entire area of Southeast Asia. We believe that the Geneva agreements of 1962 on Laos must be observed. We consider it necessary that the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Cambodia be fully respected.

The United States has, on more than one occasion, expressed its conviction that the essential elements of the Geneva accords of 1954 provide a basis for peace in Viet-Nam. We reaffirm this today.

The Geneva accords provided for international supervision. Experience has demonstrated the shortcomings of existing methods. One of our principal tasks will be to work out more effective ways of supervising any agreement and to insure equitable and effective investigation of complaints. We believe that the nations of the area, which have the most crucial interest in peace and stability in the region, should be involved in the system of monitoring of the agreement at which we may arrive.

We seek the early release of prisoners of war on both sides so they can return to their homes and rejoin their families. We would be prepared to discuss this at an early date so as to arrange for the prompt release of prisoners held by both sides.

The United States is present here because we seek a permanent peace. The United States Government considers that it has a mandate for a fresh look. We know that peace cannot be achieved unless both sides can take part in its achievement.

Ladies and gentlemen, we here will be judged ultimately by history, not tomorrow's headlines. Let us talk without rancor and recrimination. President Nixon in his inaugural address stated in another context: "We cannot learn from one another until we stop shouting at one another—until we speak quietly enough so that our words can be heard as well as our voices." And he added: "Let us take as our goal: Where peace is unknown, make it welcome; where peace is fragile, make it strong; where peace is temporary, make it permanent."

Ladies and gentlemen, in that spirit let us—
together—take up the task of peace.

The Formulation of Foreign Policy: Responsibility and Opportunity

Following is a message of January 22 from Secretary Rogers to officers and employees of the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, the United States Information Agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Peace Corps.

Press release 8 dated January 22

In assuming today the responsibilities of the Secretary of State, I want all of you—Foreign Service and Civil Service, alike—to know how much I respect the dedicated contributions you make to our country's welfare.

It is to the Department of State that the President looks for his primary advice in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. As we proceed into the last third of the 20th Century, this places on us both a sobering responsibility and an exciting opportunity. For it is upon our judgment and the prudence with which we work—rather than on our institutional status—that our contribution to our country's well-being most depends. Such judgment and such prudence must come from deliberative evaluations based on the free flow of information and ideas.

President Nixon made this observation last September when he said:

We would bring dissenters into policy discussions, not freeze them out; we should invite constructive criticism, not only because the critics have a right to be heard, but also because they have something worth hearing.

In this spirit I hope to lead a receptive and open establishment where men speak their minds and are listened to on merit, and where divergent views are fully and promptly passed on for decision. We must tap all the creative ideas and energies of this Department in the formulation of a foreign policy responsive to the needs of the future. Only if we do so can we systematically delineate meaningful alternatives from which the President can determine a considered policy course.

To those in the levels of highest responsibility—the Under and Assistant Secretaries, and our Ambassadors—I look not only for your judgment but for stimulation of such a process and in particular your encouragement of the participation of our young people.

We are all conscious, I am sure, that foreign

policy no longer consists merely of diplomatic relations among states. Those of you who serve with us in the Agency for International Development and in the Peace Corps, and those of you who are so closely associated with the Department's work in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and in the United States Information Agency contribute fully and vitally to our foreign policy objectives, and I look forward to our association and the pleasure which comes from successful joint participation.

Together I trust that we may serve well the interests of our nation abroad and that we may contribute to the formulation of policies that will be a proud reflection of a free and democratic people.

International Coffee Agreement

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER¹

PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COFFEE ORGANIZATION

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution of the United States of America, the International Coffee Agreement Act of 1968 (Title III of Public Law 90-634, approved October 24, 1968, 82 Stat. 1348), hereinafter referred to as the Act, the International Coffee Agreement, 1962, as continued by the International Coffee Agreement, 1968, ratified November 1, 1968 and proclaimed November 18, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the Agreement), section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, and section 1 of the International Organizations Immunities Act (22 U.S.C. 288), and as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. *Secretary of State.* Subject to the provisions of this order, the powers of the President involved in the participation of the United States of America in the Agreement, including so much of the functions conferred upon the President by the Act as is neither

reserved nor delegated to other officers herein, are hereby delegated to the Secretary of State.

SEC. 2. *Secretary of the Treasury.* The functions conferred upon the President by subsections (1) (A) and (B) and (2) of section 302 of the Act, together with the authority to issue and enforce such rules and regulations as may be necessary to perform those functions, are hereby delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury.

SEC. 3. *Secretaries of State, the Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor.* The functions conferred upon the President by subsection (3) of section 302 of the Act, together with the authority to issue and enforce such rules and regulations as may be necessary to perform those functions, are hereby delegated to the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce and Labor, severally.

SEC. 4. *Functions reserved.* There are hereby reserved to the President the functions conferred upon him by sections 304, 305, 306 and subsections (1) (C) and (4) of section 302 of the Act.

SEC. 5. *Coordination.* The functions assigned by the provisions of this order shall be performed under effective coordination. The measures of coordination hereunder shall include the following:

(1) In effecting and carrying out the participation of the United States of America in the Agreement, the Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate heads of Federal agencies, including the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Labor.

(2) The delegates under section 3 of this order shall use the functions delegated thereunder as they and the Secretary of State shall mutually agree.

SEC. 6. *Redelegation.* Each Secretary mentioned in this order is hereby authorized to redelegate within his Department the functions hereinabove assigned to him.

SEC. 7. *Prior orders.* (a) Executive Order No. 11225 of May 22, 1965 shall continue in force subject to the following amendment: Insert the phrase "as continued by the International Coffee Agreement, 1968" after the phrase "TIAS 5055".

(b) Executive Order No. 11229 of June 14, 1965 is hereby revoked.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 17, 1969.

¹ No. 11449; 34 *Fed. Reg.* 917.

The Department of State is sponsoring a series of science lectures designed to improve understanding of social, economic, and foreign policy implications of the international cooperative activities in science and technology in which the United States is now involved. The lectures are open to Department and Foreign Service officers, invited representatives of the Government science community, chiefs of mission and foreign science attachés resident in Washington, Members of Congress, and the scientific press.

On December 9, in the Department Auditorium, Secretary Rusk inaugurated the new series and introduced the first lecturer, Dr. René Jules Dubos, whose topic, "The Human Landscape," reflects the growing international concern with the need to protect man and his global environment in our technological age. Dr. Dubos, a professor at the Rockefeller University, New York, N.Y., is a bacteriologist of international reputation. He was the 1966 winner of the Arches of Science Award of the Pacific Science Center.

The Human Landscape

SECRETARY RUSK

Advance text

Distinguished guests and fellow officers: I am glad to welcome you to the first Department of State science lecture.

On other occasions I have said that scientific and technological progress conditions the climate of our foreign affairs. I remain deeply convinced that we in the Department and the Foreign Service must prepare ourselves to deal with the scientific and technical aspects of man's advance. Nearly 2 years ago, speaking before the House Panel on Science and Technology, I expressed my conviction that:¹

... the Foreign Service officer should be familiar with the ways, the concepts, and the purposes of science. He should understand the sources of our technological civilization. He should be able to grasp the social and economic implications of current scientific discoveries and engineering accomplishments. I think it is feasible for nonscientists to be, in the phrase of H. G. Wells, "men of science" with real awareness of this aspect of man's advance.

That is why we are here today.

The man who will head this Department in 1988—and his colleagues—must be prepared to cope with the cumulative force of tremendous scientific discoveries, technological applications, and the social and political consequences of both.

We can only guess as to the foreign policy problems with which this combination will present us, but we do know that the complex future which casts its shadow over our own time cannot be held back. We must be ready for it.

Let me be more specific. From the foreign policy viewpoint, we must prepare ourselves to cope with two facets of that future: What foreign policy problems are inherent to a given technological breakthrough or scientific discovery? And what problems which we now face, or can be expected to face, are susceptible to technological solutions, at least in part?

It is increasingly within the capacity of *Homo sapiens* to make the rational selection of alternative futures. We will either plan for the future or we will be stuck with it.

Our international cooperative activities already span a wide spectrum of science and technology, from such pragmatic issues as increasing the quantity and quality of the world's food supply to the more esoteric fields of outer space and high-energy physics. We are even now extending our cooperative thinking and planning into such areas as greater utilization of the oceans and the seabeds and the polar regions for the benefit of mankind. Within this spectrum we have found virtually unlimited opportunities for cooperation with scientists and engineers from other countries to our common benefit.

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 13, 1967, p. 238.

Around the next corner I see mainly unanswered questions.

What of the "time bombs"?

What are the social and foreign policy implications of reliable and cheap birth control methods, of life extension, and of the modification of heredity?

What if a relatively cheap and easy method of producing nuclear weapons comes along? What would universal possession of nuclear weapons do to a world already teetering on the edge?

How can we estimate the far-reaching effects of ever-newer synthetic fibers, foods, and other materials on trade and international economic relationships?

What will widespread satellite communications techniques and effective computer translating devices do to the international concepts of education, culture, and language?

What about the speeding up of the learning process through computer teaching, earlier schooling, and chemical memory assistance?

These are some of the technological "time bombs"; but there are unpredictable horizons in other fields, too. We have not yet heard, in any comprehensive way, from the sociologists, the psychologists, the economists, the architects and urban planners, the lawyers, and many other expert groups; but in their fields, too, "time bombs" are ticking away.

There are, however, some foreseeable problems which are amenable in large part to technological solutions, provided that our approach is rational: for example, the food-population problem, the provision of better energy sources, and, more broadly, quickening the pace of economic development.

Another of these foreseeable problems is that of the environment of man, with all of its physiological, psychological, social, ecological, and, inevitably, foreign policy ramifications.

In this century man stands on the threshold of mastery over his environment. He already has demonstrated great capacity to damage and despoil its quality and to exhaust its resources. It is clear that he must not continue to be as callous in attitude or profligate in use as in the past. The environment squeeze is on. It is a global problem which will require global action.

The choice as to the future is still open. I asked Dr. René Jules Dubos to come here today precisely because he is a believer in the future

of man: a future, however, of responsibility exercised with foresight—and as a species, we are not especially noted for that. Dr. Dubos is a scientist of truly international stature. For many years he has applied his original and productive mind to the subject of man and his environment. We are privileged indeed to have him here today as the inaugural speaker of this first Department of State science lecture series.

Ladies and gentlemen, Dr. Dubos on "The Human Landscape."

DR. DUBOS

Department of State press release dated December 9

I wish to thank you, Mr. Secretary, for having given me the honor to speak before such a distinguished international audience. This honor is particularly meaningful to me, who was born and educated on the other side of the Atlantic, has spent his adult life in the United States, and knows how much his European and American experiences have been enriched by countless human contacts in other parts of the world.

In your letter inviting me to present this lecture you suggested, Mr. Secretary, that I discuss the impact of man on his environment and its likely effects on the future of the world community. The importance of this topic for our times was poignantly expressed by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson in his last speech before the United Nations Economic and Social Council just a few days before his death. These were the words:²

We travel together, passengers on a little spaceship, dependent on its vulnerable reserves of air and soil; all committed for our safety to its security and peace; preserved from annihilation only by the care, the work, and, I will say, the love we give our fragile craft.

At the turn of the 17th century, John Donne realized that no man is an island and that the bell tolls for us all. Picturesque as these images are, they were too parochial for so contemporary a man as Stevenson. He changed the parable to spaceship because he realized that we are all dependent not only on our neighbors but also on all other men and on the conditions prevailing over the whole earth.

The expression "spaceship earth" is no mere catchphrase. Now that all habitable parts of the

² For text, see BULLETIN of July 26, 1965, p. 142.

globe are occupied, the careful husbandry of its resources is a *sine qua non* of survival for the human species, more important than economic growth or political power. We are indeed like travelers bound to the earth's crust, drawing breath from its shallow envelope of air, using and reusing its limited supply of water. Yet we collectively behave as if we were not aware of the problems inherent in the limitations of the spaceship earth.

It would be easy, far too easy, to conclude from the present trend of events that mankind is on a course of self-destruction. I shall not discuss this possibility but shall instead focus my remarks on the certainty that the values and amenities identified with humanness are rapidly deteriorating.

Some of the supplies on which man depends are rapidly being depleted; even water will soon become scarce, not only in arid countries but also in the Temperate Zone. Most environments are being so grossly polluted that they may not long remain suitable for human existence. Smogs of various composition produced in urban and industrial areas are now hovering over the countryside and are beginning to spread over ocean masses. Sewage and chemical effluents are spoiling rivers, lakes, and coastlines and slowly but surely contaminating even the most carefully protected urban water supplies. Tin cans, plastic containers, discarded machines of all sorts, oil and other indegradable garbage, are accumulating all over the landscape, and in many cases ruining the land. Excessive sensory stimuli, and especially the mind-bewildering noise so ubiquitous as to be unavoidable, threaten to destroy the human quality or urban agglomerations.

The ancient words "soil," "air," "water," "freedom" are loaded with emotional content because they are associated with biological and mental needs that are woven in the fabric of man's nature. These needs are as vital today as they were in the distant past. Scientists and economists may learn a great deal about the intricacies of natural processes and of cost accounting. But scientific knowledge of environmental management will contribute little to health and happiness if it does not take into account the human values symbolized by phrases such as "the good earth," "a brilliant sky," "sparkling waters," "a place of one's own." Furthermore, the increase in population densities and in social complexity inevitably spells social

regimentation, loss of privacy, and other interferences with individual freedom, which may eventually prove incompatible with the traditional ways of civilized life.

Man can, of course, invent devices and techniques to minimize the effects of environmental pollutants, but he cannot protect himself against everything all the time. He is so adaptable that he can learn to tolerate many shortages and environmental insults, but medical and social experience shows that such tolerances eventually have to be paid in the form of decreases in the quality of life.

We might take comfort from the fact that during its long biological history, mankind has become adapted to many different kinds of environment and has been able to survive under very difficult conditions. However, this adaptive process required thousands and thousands of years, whereas profound environmental changes now occur in the course of a few years—far too rapidly to allow for biological adaptation.

The fact that modern man is now moving into nonterrestrial environments might also be interpreted as evidence that he has escaped from the bondage of his evolutionary past and is becoming independent of his ancient biological attributes. But this is an erroneous interpretation. The human body and brain have not changed significantly during the past 100,000 years, and there is no ground for the belief that they will change appreciably in the foreseeable future. The biological needs of modern man as well as his biological capabilities and limitations are essentially the same as those of the paleolithic hunter and the neolithic farmer. Civilization provides man with techniques that greatly enlarge the scope of his activities, but it does not change his fundamental nature.

Wherever he goes and whatever he does, in tropical deserts or arctic wastes, in outer space or ocean depths, man must maintain around himself a microenvironment similar to the one under which he evolved. He can survive outlandish areas only by functioning within enclosures that almost duplicate a Mediterranean atmosphere, as if he remained linked to the surface of the earth by an umbilical cord. He may engage in casual flirtations with nonterrestrial worlds, but he is wedded to the earth, his sole source of sustenance.

The strict dependence of the human organism

on the narrow range of terrestrial conditions imposes inescapable constraints on civilized life. In practice, social and technological innovations are viable and humanly successful only to the extent that they are compatible with the unchangeable aspects of man's nature. Man can retain his biological and mental health only if his civilizations maintain a healthy environment.

As used in the preceding paragraph, the phrase "healthy environment" implies much more than the maintenance of ecological equilibrium, the conservation of natural resources, and the control of the forces that threaten biological and mental health. Man does not only survive and function in his environment; he is *shaped* by it, biologically, mentally, and socially. To be really "healthy" the environment must therefore provide conditions that favor the development of desirable human characteristics.

The very process of living involves a constant feedback between man and his environment with the result that both are constantly being modified in the course of this interplay. Individual persons, and their social groups, acquire their distinctive characteristics as a consequence of the responses they make to the total environment. The exciting richness of the human landscape results not only from the genetic diversity of mankind but also and perhaps even more from the shaping influence that surroundings and ways of life exert on biological and social man.

The New Pessimism

Until a few decades ago, scientists and technologists took it for granted that all aspects of their work enriched human life and made it healthier and happier. Most enlightened persons also realized that scientific research generates wealth and power, as well as better understanding of man's nature and of the cosmos.

Confidence in the creative and predictive power of science is so great that several groups of scholars have now made it an academic profession to forecast the technological and medical advances that can be expected for the year 2000. Naturally enough, they predict spectacular breakthroughs in the production of nuclear energy, the development of electronic gadgets, the chemical synthesis of materials better than the natural ones, the discovery of drugs and surgical techniques that will keep men healthy or save them from death. From permanent lunar

installations to robot human slaves and to programmed dreams, many are the scientific miracles that can be anticipated for the year 2000. Individual scientists would differ as to what theoretical possibilities will be converted into reality during the forthcoming decades. But all of them would agree that scientific research is capable of providing very soon powerful new techniques for manipulating external nature and man's nature.

In view of the miraculous achievements of modern science and of the promise of many more to come, one might expect the general public to believe that life in the near future will be safe, abundant, comfortable, and exhilarating. Yet there prevails in modern societies—in particular among educated groups—a feeling of uneasiness and even hostility toward science and its technological applications.

Most persons still trust that scientific research can increase the factual knowledge of man's nature and of the cosmos. Few are those who now believe, however, that such knowledge necessarily improves health and happiness. In fact, so many environmental values are being threatened by technological and social forces that the word "environment" has acquired almost a pejorative meaning which reflects public concern for the quality of man's relationship to the rest of creation.

Early in the 20th century, the physiologist L. J. Henderson developed the view that the natural conditions peculiar to the planet earth are uniquely suited for the emergence and maintenance of life. In his classical book "The Fitness of the Environment," he stated:

Darwinian fitness is compounded of a mutual relationship between the organism and the environment. Of this, fitness of environment is quite as essential a component as the fitness which arises in the process of organic evolution.

Today, the word "environment" is no longer identified with fitness, but rather with the biological and social dangers arising from modern life—such as the degradation of nature, the exhaustion of resources, the effects of pollution, the behavioral disturbances caused by crowding and excessive stimuli, the thousand devils of the ecological crisis. For most laymen and not a few scientists, the word "environment" evokes not fitness but nightmares.

This atmosphere of anxiety, which has been called "the new pessimism" by Mr. James Reston in a New York Times editorial, has several different manifestations.

One is the feeling that science has weakened or destroyed many of the traditional values by which men function, yet has failed to provide a new ethical system. Science, the saying goes, gives man everything to live with but nothing to live for.

Experience has shown, furthermore, that the advantages derived from scientific discoveries and technological achievements usually have to be paid for in the form of new dangers and new threats to human welfare. The fact that nuclear science promises endless sources of energy but also makes it possible to build ever more destructive weapons symbolizes the two faces of the scientific enterprise. All too often, there exists a painful discrepancy between what man aims for and what he gets. He sprays pesticides to get rid of insects and weeds but thereby kills birds, fishes, and flowering trees. He drives long distances to find unspoiled nature but poisons the air and gets killed on the way. He builds machines to escape from physical work but becomes their slave and experiences boredom. Every week the pages of magazines bear witness to the public's somber anticipation that the legend of the sorcerer's apprentice may soon be converted from a literary symbol into a terrifying reality.

The tactical triumphs and human failures of technological civilization call to mind the remark made to Hannibal by one of his officers at the end of the Second Punic War: "You know how to win victories, Hannibal, but you do not know how to use them." No one doubts the power of science, yet a characteristic aspect of the new pessimism is the feeling that the most distressing social problems generated by scientific technology are not amenable to scientific solutions. Many are those who believe, indeed, that an environmental catastrophe is inevitable.

Fortunately, the word "catastrophe" can have two very different meanings, both applicable to the relationship between scientific technology and the future of the world community. In common usage, the word "catastrophe" denotes a disastrous event. In its etymological Greek sense, however, it means a change of course, an overturn not necessarily resulting in disaster. The disasters that threaten mankind are too obvious to need elaboration. But we can avoid these disasters if we keep in mind the etymological meaning of the word "catastrophe" and try to alter the present course of scientific technology.

In my judgment, scientists will contribute to the solution of the problems they create as soon as the scientific enterprise addresses itself in earnest to the present preoccupations of mankind. From this point of view, the technological breakthroughs predicted for the year 2000 are trivial and, indeed, irrelevant. They have no bearing on such problems as the raping of nature, environmental pollution, urban crowding, the feeling of alienation, racial and national conflicts, and other threats to decent life. The man of flesh and bone will not be much impressed by the fact that a few of his contemporaries can explore the moon, program their dreams, or use robots as slaves, if the planet earth has become unfit for his everyday life. He will not long continue to be interested in space acrobatics if he has to watch them with his feet deep in garbage and his eyes half-blinded by smog.

Despite our boasts, we do not truly *live* in an age of science. What we have done is to develop techniques for exploiting the external world, usually without regard to real human needs, and for correcting a few disorders of the body and of the mind, often without much concern for the achievement of happiness. In many cases, we know next to nothing of the consequences—especially the indirect and long-range consequences—that eventually result from the manipulations of the external world and of man's nature in which we engage so thoughtlessly.

Science and the technologies derived from it obviously exert profound effects on all human enterprises in the modern world. But we have not yet seriously applied scientific thinking to the creation of a desirable human life in the here and now, let alone in the future.

Focusing on Human Problems

When Rabindranath Tagore first arrived in Europe from India as a student on his way to England, he immediately sensed that the quality of the European landscape was a creation of human effort continued over many centuries. To him, the great adventure of European civilization had been what he called "the wooing of the earth." He saw in Europe a "great lesson in the perfect union of man and nature, not only through love, but through active communication."

Tagore's view of the human forces that have made the European land was rather sentimental

and sounds antiquated. Yet the phrase "wooing of the earth" is ecologically more sound than the assertion that we must "conquer" nature. There cannot be "perfect union of man and nature" without some creative interplay between the two.

Man inevitably changes nature, and inevitably also he is changed by the environmental forces that he manipulates and to which he exposes himself. Human societies have always manipulated nature—clearing forests, plowing prairies, developing irrigation or drainage systems, then converting farmland into roads, dwellings, or industrial plants. The word "environment" now includes all the technological forces that modern man sets in motion and that in turn shape his biological and mental characteristics. Sir Winston Churchill expressed this profound biological law in a picturesque sentence: "We shape our buildings, and afterwards our buildings shape us."

I shall illustrate with a few examples how the scientific enterprise can provide the kind of information that will help in maintaining the earth in a state suitable for human life and in creating environments favorable for the more complete expression of human potentialities.

(a) Physicists have shown that nuclear technologies could provide mankind with an endless source of energy. On the other hand, any perceptive person knows that energy improperly used contributes to the degradation of the environment. The so-called "conquest" of nature by the use of any form of energy is potentially dangerous if it is not carried out within the imperatives of certain ecological laws. Tagore's "wooing of the earth" means the achievement of a state in which man, other living things, and the physical environment can all survive and prosper.

The wise use of nuclear technologies requires that we develop the kind of ecological sciences that will enable us to foresee the consequences of environmental manipulations, measured not so much in the terms of economics as in present and future human values. From this point of view, the creation and maintenance of sound ecological systems is more important than the "conquest" of nature.

(b) Chemists and engineers will unquestionably produce more and more new materials and processes that will change many aspects of human life. It is commonly assumed that man can

and must adapt to these changes. But in fact human adaptability is not limitless.

We know little of the thresholds and ranges of human adaptability. It is certain in any case that the ready acceptance of social and technological changes does not mean that these are desirable. Past experience has shown for example that ionizing radiations and environmental pollution (of air, food, and water) have deleterious effects that manifest themselves very slowly; they behave like the pestilence that stealeth in the darkness. Similarly, social and technological innovations that appear to be readily tolerated may eventually ruin the quality of human life. The real limits of adaptability are not determined by what can be tolerated for a certain period of time, but by future consequences. These consequences are essential factors to be considered in deciding what technological and social innovations are safe and desirable.

(c) Medical scientists will certainly develop new techniques and new drugs for the treatment of the degenerative and chronic diseases that are now plaguing mankind. But such treatments will be increasingly expensive and, more importantly, will require highly specialized personnel. They cannot solve the massive health problems of the general public.

There is good reason to believe that most of the degenerative conditions that are becoming increasingly prevalent in the modern world need not have occurred in the first place. Greater knowledge of the environmental and social factors that cause disease would go much further toward improving human health than the discovery of drugs, surgical procedures, and other esoteric methods of treatment. Prevention is much less expensive than cure and always more effective.

(d) Parochial man could theoretically be replaced by global man because technical procedures enable him to read, hear, and see anything that goes on in the world. But in practice communications technology is only a small part of the communication.

We need more knowledge concerning the receptiveness of sense organs and of the brain to the information that technology can provide. We need to learn also how to make information become really *formative*, instead of being merely informative. Only those influences that are formative contribute to human development.

Pointing to some of the present inadequacies of science does not imply either a defeatist or an

anti-intellectual attitude. It directs attention rather to the need for engaging scientific inquiry into new channels. The solution to our social and environmental problems is not in less science but in a kind of science which is subservient to the fundamental needs of man.

The Fitness of the Environment

Our societies are slowly realizing that many social and technological practices are threatening human and environmental health; rather grudgingly, they are developing palliative measures to control some of the most obvious dangers. This piecemeal social engineering will be helpful in many cases, but it will not solve the ecological crisis and its attendant threats to the quality of life. Technological fixes amount to little more than putting a finger in the dike, whereas what is needed is a comprehensive philosophy of man in his environment. L. J. Henderson's concept of the "fitness of the environment," quoted earlier, provides a framework for such a philosophy.

Fitness implies that man has achieved some kind of adaptation to his environment. Many populations in the past have achieved a tolerable state of adaptation to their surroundings and ways of life, even when these were very primitive according to our own standards. In any case, however, adaptive fitness lasts only as long as conditions are stable. Changes that upset the equilibrium between man and environment are likely to disturb physical and mental health and thereby to generate unhappiness.

More interestingly, fitness also implies that all aspects of human development reflect the adaptive responses made by the organism to environmental stimuli. In the long run, most forms of adaptation involve evolutionary alterations of the genetic endowment. But in addition, the biological and mental characteristics of each individual person are shaped by his responses to the environmental forces that impinge on him in the course of his development. Genes do not determine the traits by which we know a person; what they do is only to govern his biological responses to environmental influences. As a result each person is shaped by his environment as much as by his genetic endowment.

The environmental influences that are experienced very early during the formative phases of development (prenatal and early post-

natal) have the most profound and lasting effects. From early nutrition to education, from technological forces to esthetic and ethical attitudes, countless are the early influences that make an irreversible imprint on the human body and mind. Most of the biological and mental characteristics that are assumed to be distinctive of the various ethnic groups—anywhere in the world—turn out to be the consequences of early environmental influences (biological and social) rather than of genetic constitution.

Human beings actualize only a small part of the potentialities they inherit in their genetic code, because these potentialities become reality only to the extent that circumstances favor phenotypic expression. In practice, mental development is greatly facilitated if the person—especially the child—is exposed at a critical time to the proper range of stimuli and acquires a wide awareness of the cosmos. Science and technology can play a crucial role in the shaping of mental attributes by making it possible to create environments more diversified and thereby more favorable for the expression of a wider range of human potentialities.

All men are migrants from a common origin. They have undergone biological and social changes that have enabled them to adapt to the different conditions they have encountered in the course of their migration. But as far as can be judged, all ethnic groups are similarly endowed with regard to biological and mental potentialities. This fact is of enormous practical importance because it justifies the belief that, given the proper opportunities, any population can shape its future and select the form it gives to its own culture by focusing its attention on the biological, technological, and social forces that affect human development.

The Collective Search for Knowledge

Programs of social betterment should be based on the ability to predict the effects that social and technological manipulations will exert on the human organism and on ecological systems, both the immediate and the long-range effects. Unfortunately, interest in scientific forecasting has been concerned almost exclusively with the technological and social developments themselves, rather than with their effects on human life and on ecological systems.

Needless to say, there exists some factual knowledge concerning man's interplay with his

environment; but it is a highly episodic kind of knowledge, derived from attempts to solve a few special problems—for example, the training of combat forces for operation in the tropics or the Arctic, the preparation of men and vehicles for space travel, the planning of river basins for water and land management.

Many scientific problems of relevance to human life in the urban and technological world cry out for investigation. Three examples will be mentioned here merely as illustrations:

(a) Everyone agrees that it is desirable to control environmental pollution. But what are the pollutants of air, water, or food that are really significant? Sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, and the nitrogen oxides generated by automobile exhausts are the air pollutants most widely discussed. But the colloidal particles released from automobile tires and from the asbestos lining of brakes grossly contaminate the air of our cities and may well be more dangerous than some of the gases against which control efforts are now directed.

The acute effects of environmental pollution can be readily recognized, but what about the cumulative, delayed, and indirect effects? Does the young organism respond as does the adult? Does he develop forms of tolerance or hypersusceptibility that affect his subsequent responses to the same or other pollutants?

Priorities with regard to the control of environmental pollution cannot be established rationally until such knowledge is available.

(b) Everyone agrees that all cities of the world must be renovated or even rebuilt. Technologies are available for almost any kind of scheme imagined by city planners, architects, and sociologists. But hardly anything is known concerning the effects that the urban environments so created will have on human well-being and especially on the physical and mental development of children.

We know how to create sanitary environments that permit the body to become large and vigorous. But what about the effect of the environmental factors on the mind? All too often housing developments are designed as if they were to be used as disposable cubicles for dispensable people.

(c) Everyone agrees that all citizens should be given the same educational opportunities. But what are the critical ages for receptivity to

various kinds of stimuli and for the development of mental potentialities?

We must develop a science concerned with the effects that the environmental influences created by massive urbanization and by ubiquitous technology exert on physical, physiological, and mental characteristics. We must learn how the effects of early deprivation or overstimulation can be prevented and corrected.

These three examples have been selected to illustrate that the environment must be considered not only from the point of view of technology but even more with regard to the responses that the body and the mind make to the surroundings and ways of life. And the same could be said, of course, for the responses of the total environment to technological interventions. The distant consequences of these responses both for human welfare and for ecological systems are the most important factors to be considered in social planning.

Few if any universities or research institutes, in this country or abroad, are equipped to deal effectively with the organization of existing knowledge, and with the acquisition of new knowledge, relevant to the interplay between environmental forces and the world community. In fact, the use of existing knowledge and development of additional knowledge will certainly require a cooperative approach between institutions either at an international or regional level.

Certain problems obviously involve the whole world community. For example:

(a) Weather modification (Who will be deprived of water if rain is made to fall on a given area?)

(b) Control of epidemics (How fast and along what routes do the various strains of influenza virus spread from one continent to another?)

(c) The protection of endangered species (Certain species of primates are used on an enormous scale in American and European research laboratories; what should be done to prevent the populations of these primates from being destroyed in their countries of origin?)

(d) Brain drain and related problems pertaining to the education and utilization of scientists.

Other problems are more regional in character. For example:

(a) The technical problems of agriculture and conservation are completely different in tropical, arid, and temperate areas. Soil management, plant rotations, animal husbandry must be designed to fit the geological, climatic, and social conditions peculiar to each area. One cannot solve the problems of India by using knowledge and technologies developed for the conditions prevailing in Indiana.

(b) Malnutrition may be due to shortage of calories in certain areas and to shortage of good quality protein elsewhere. The development of protein preparations that can serve as substitutes for animal and dairy products must be based on the kind of plant resources that can be economically produced. This in turn depends upon the geology and climate of the area under consideration.

(c) A recent UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] conference urged the development of programs for monitoring pollutants in entire airsheds and water basins—but what pollutants? The chemical nature of air pollution on the United States Pacific Coast differs completely from what it is in Taiwan or in Northern Europe. Water and food are chiefly polluted with microbes in certain parts of the world and with chemicals in industrialized countries.

(d) Cosmic rays at high altitude, radionuclides absorption in areas of high radioactive background, marine chemistry and biology on different types of shorelines are but a few of the many examples that may have great potential important for different countries in a same region.

Global and regional problems, whether focused on man or on his environment, necessarily deal with complex systems in which several interrelated factors interplay through feedback processes. The study of such multifactorial systems demands conceptual approaches very different from those involving only one variable, which are the stock in trade of orthodox academic science. Furthermore, this kind of study requires research facilities that hardly exist at the present time and that few institutions or countries can afford—hence, the need for the development of a collective approach in the mission-oriented institutions, either on a global or a regional level.

Fortunately, there is enough experience to feel

confident that supranational scientific centers can function and be effective.

The World Health Organization and its multifarious control and study programs; the World Meteorological Organization and its planned World Weather Watch are classical examples of scientific research and action on a global scale.

Even more promising, I believe, is the prospect for regional scientific centers. The Institute for Nutrition for Central America and Panama in Guatemala City, and the Satocholera laboratory in East Pakistan can serve as examples of regional institutions devoted to problems of health. The Centre European pour la Recherche Nucleaire in Geneva and the International Center for Theoretical Physics at Trieste illustrate what can be done for theoretical science. The success of these very different types of scientific institutes should encourage the creation of other regional institutions throughout the world in order to deal with the problems that are common to a group of nations.

The Diversity of Civilizations

Certain general principles are valid for all environmental problems, because they are based on unchangeable and universal aspects of ecological systems, and especially of man's nature.

The biological and mental constitution of *Homo sapiens* has changed only in minor details since the late Stone Age; and despite progresses in theoretical genetics, there is no chance that it can be significantly or safely modified in the foreseeable future. This genetic stability defines the limits within which human life can be safely altered by social or technological innovations. Beyond these limits, any change is likely to have disastrous effects.

On the other hand, mankind has a large reserve of potentialities that have not yet been expressed. By enlarging the range of experiences and increasing the numbers of options, science and technology can facilitate the actualization of these latent potentialities and thus bring to light much unsuspected richness in man's nature and in ecological systems.

As more persons find it possible to express their innate endowments because they can select from a variety of conditions, society becomes richer and civilizations continue to unfold. In contrast, if the surroundings and ways of life

are highly stereotyped—whether in prosperity or in poverty—the only components of man's nature that can flourish are those adapted to the narrow range of prevailing conditions. Mankind becomes actualized to the extent that we shun uniformity of surroundings and absolute conformity in behavior. Creating diversified environments may result in some loss of efficiency, but diversity is vastly more important than efficiency because it makes possible the germination of the seeds dormant in the human species. In the light of these facts, the continued existence of independent nations may be desirable even though it generates political problems, because the cultivation of national characteristics probably contributes to the cultural richness of mankind.

Diversity, however, does not imply complete permissiveness. Individual man must accept some form of discipline because he can survive and, indeed, exist only when integrated in a social structure. For related ecological and social reasons, no group, large or small, can be entirely independent of the other groups within the confines of the spaceship earth. Total rejection of discipline is unbiologic because it would inevitably result in the disintegration of individual lives, of the social order, and of ecological systems.

In the final analysis, the interplay between man and his environment must therefore be considered from three different points of view:

(a) The frontiers of social and technological changes are determined not by availability of power and technical prowess but by unchangeable aspects of man's nature and of ecological systems.

(b) The total environment must be sufficiently diversified to assure that each person can express as completely as possible his innate potentialities in accordance with his selected goals.

(c) The expressions of individuality can be allowed only to the extent that they are compatible with the requirements of the social group and of the world community.

The universality of mankind, the uniqueness of each person, and the need for social integration are three determinants of human life that must be reconciled in order to achieve individual freedom, social health, and the diversity of civilizations.

United States and Singapore Sign New Cotton Textile Agreement

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Department of State announced on December 26 (press release 282) that letters had been exchanged in Singapore between the Government of Singapore and the U.S. Embassy on a new bilateral agreement governing exports of cotton textiles from Singapore to the United States. The new agreement replaces an agreement of August 30, 1966,¹ which was due to expire on March 31, 1969. These agreements were negotiated in the context of the Long-Term Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles.²

The Singapore Government has agreed that exports of cotton textiles to the United States will be restrained in accordance with a cotton textile industry restraint schedule.

The new agreement differs from the old agreement in the following principal respects: extension of the agreement to December 31, 1970, revision of various limits, elimination of the contingent allocation provision, and arrangement for compensation of overshipments.

TEXT OF AGREEMENT

Letter From Singapore Government

His Excellency
FRANCIS J. GALBRAITH,
Ambassador,
Embassy of the United States of America,
Singapore.

17th DECEMBER, 1968.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I refer to the cotton textile arrangement between our two Governments, signed at Singapore on August 30, 1966, and to recent discussions concerning the exports of cotton textiles from Singapore to the United States. I wish to inform you that in accordance with the arrangement reached during

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 6105.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431.

the discussions, the Singapore Cotton Textile Industry will voluntarily restrain its exports to the United States in accordance with the Singapore Cotton Textile Restraint Schedule attached to this letter.

2. In view of this action by the Singapore Industry, I propose the following arrangement replacing the arrangement of August 30, 1966, to be effective as of January 1, 1968, concerning this trade:

(1) The Government of the United States of America agrees not to invoke procedures under article 6(C) and 3 of the Long-Term Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles to limit cotton textile exports from Singapore to the United States during the term of this arrangement.

(2) The Government of the Republic of Singapore undertakes that the exports of cotton textiles from Singapore to the United States will be restrained in accordance with the attached voluntary schedule.

(3) The Government of the United States shall promptly supply the Government of the Republic of Singapore with data on monthly imports of cotton textiles from Singapore. The Government of the Republic of Singapore shall promptly supply the Government of the United States with data on monthly exports of cotton textiles to the United States. Each government agrees to supply promptly any other available statistical data requested by the other government.

(4) The Government of the Republic of Singapore and the Government of the United States agree to consult on any question concerning trade in cotton textiles between our two countries, including levels of exports in categories not given specific limits in the attached schedule and in made-up goods or apparel made from a particular fabric.

(5) If the Government of the Republic of Singapore considers that as a result of the restraints specified in the attached schedule, Singapore is being placed in an inequitable position, vis-a-vis a third country, the Government of the Republic of Singapore may request consultations with the Government of the United States with a view to taking appropriate remedial action such as consent of the Government of the United States to reasonable modification of this arrangement, including the attached schedule.

(6) Mutually satisfactory administrative arrangements or adjustments may be made to resolve minor problems arising in the implementation of this agreement including differences in points of procedures or operation.

(7) This arrangement shall continue in force through December 31, 1970, except that either government may terminate this arrangement effective at the end of any limitation year by written notice to the other government to be given at least 90 days prior to such termination date. Either government may at any time propose revisions in this arrangement including the attached schedule.

3. If this proposal is acceptable to the Government of the United States, I would appreciate your letter of acceptance on behalf of your government.^a

Yours sincerely,

GOH KENG SWEE
Minister for Finance.

Singapore Cotton Textile Industry Restraint Schedule

The Singapore Cotton Textile Industry will restrain its exports of cotton textiles to the United States as follows:

1. During the period January 1, 1968 to December 31, 1970 exports of cotton textiles from Singapore to the United States will be limited to aggregate, group and specific limits at the levels specified below.

2. For the first limitation year, constituting the 12-month period beginning January 1, 1968, the aggregate limit shall be 36,000,000 square yards.

3. Within this aggregate limit the following group limits shall apply for the first limitation year:

	<i>In Square Yards Equivalent</i>
Group I Apparel Categories (Categories 39-63)	24, 000, 000
Group II All Other Categories	12, 000, 000

4. Within the aggregate limit and the applicable group limits, the following specific limits shall apply for the first limitation year:

<i>Category</i>	<i>Quantity</i>	<i>Unit</i>	<i>In Square Yards Equivalent</i>
Apparel Categories (Group I)			
42	70, 000	Doz.	506, 380
43	110, 000	"	795, 740
45	60, 000	"	1, 331, 160
46	50, 000	"	1, 222, 850
47	40, 000	"	887, 440
48	10, 000	"	500, 000
49	20, 000	"	650, 000
50	160, 000	"	2, 847, 520
51	70, 000	"	1, 245, 790
52	30, 000	"	435, 900
53	13, 000	"	588, 900
54	56, 000	"	1, 400, 000
55	36, 000	"	1, 836, 000
60	175, 000	"	9, 093, 000
62	110, 000	Lb.	506, 000
All Other Categories (Group II)			
9/10	1, 250, 000	Syds.	1, 250, 000
22/23	1, 000, 000	"	1, 000, 000
26	2, 270, 000	"	2, 270, 000
	(of which not more than 1, 500, 000 syds. in duck)		
31 Shoptowels	15, 230, 000	Pcs.	5, 300, 040
31 Other	2, 011, 000	"	699, 828

5. (a) Within the aggregate limit the limit for Group I may be exceeded by five percent, and the limit for Group II may be exceeded by 10 percent.

(b) Within the applicable group limit (as it may be adjusted under this paragraph) specific limits may be exceeded by five percent.

^a Ambassador Galbraith accepted the proposal on behalf of the U.S. Government in a letter dated Dec. 23.

6. (a) If it appears that cotton textile exports from Singapore to the United States in any category for which no specific limit is applicable are likely to exceed the consultation level specified below for any limitation year, the industry shall notify the Government of the Republic of Singapore. Until the industry has been informed that the Government of the Republic of Singapore and the United States Government have consulted on the effect of such shipments on conditions of the United States domestic market in the category in question and have concluded such consultations on a mutually satisfactory basis, these exports shall be limited to the consultation level. For the first limitation year, the consultation level for categories in Group I shall be 385,875 square yards, and for categories in Group II shall be 500,000 square yards.

(b) In the event that the United States Government requests consultations with the Government of the Republic of Singapore concerning undue concentration in exports from Singapore to the United States in made-up goods or apparel made from a particular fabric, these exports will be limited until the two Governments reach a mutually satisfactory solution. The limit shall be on the basis of the 12-month period beginning on the date the United States Government requests consultations under this paragraph and shall be 105 percent of the exports of such products from Singapore to the United States during the most recent 12-month period preceding the request for consultation and for which statistics were available to the two Governments on the date of the request. Any exports limited pursuant to this paragraph shall also be counted against all other applicable limits specified in this schedule.

7. In the second and succeeding 12-month periods that any limitation is applicable under this schedule, the level of exports permitted under that limitation shall be increased by five percent over the corresponding level for the preceding 12-month period. The corresponding level for the preceding 12-month period shall not include any adjustments under paragraphs 5 or 8.

8. (a) For any limitation year subsequent to the first limitation year and immediately following a year of a shortfall (i.e., a year in which cotton textile exports from Singapore to the United States were below the aggregate limit and any group and specific limits applicable to the category concerned) exports may be permitted to exceed these limits by carryover in the following amounts and manner:

(i) The carryover shall not exceed the amount of the shortfall in either the aggregate limit or any applicable group or specific limit and shall not exceed either 5 percent of the aggregate limit or 5 percent of the applicable group limit in the year of the shortfall, and

(ii) in the case of shortfalls in the categories subject to specific limits the carryover shall be used in the same category in which the shortfall occurred and shall not exceed 5 percent of the specific limit in the year of the shortfall, and

(iii) in the case of shortfalls not attributable to categories subject to specific limits, the carryover shall be used in the same group in which the shortfall occurred, shall not be used to exceed any applicable specific limit except in accordance with the provisions

in paragraph 5 and shall be subject to the provisions of paragraph 6 of this schedule.

(b) The limits referred to in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph are without any adjustments under this paragraph or paragraph 5.

(c) The carryover shall be in addition to the exports permitted in paragraph 5.

9. Cotton textile exports from Singapore to the United States within each category shall be spaced as evenly as practicable throughout the limitation year, taking into consideration normal seasonal factors.

10. In view of the special circumstances in 1968, including revision in the term of the schedule: (a) the quantity of 299,000 square yards shall be charged against the specific limit applicable to categories 22/23 in 1968 as compensation for overshipments during the 12 month period beginning April 1, 1967; and (b) Notwithstanding the limit provided for in paragraph 4, exports in 1968 only, in categories 9/10, may be permitted to total 1,800,000 square yards, provided the aggregate limit and the Group II limit are not exceeded. The provisions of paragraphs 5 and 8 shall not apply to categories 9/10 with regard to the year 1968.

11. In implementing this schedule the system of categories and the rates of conversion into square yard equivalents listed in the annex hereto shall apply.⁴ In any situation where the determination of an article to be a cotton textile would be affected by whether the criterion provided for in Article 9 of the Long-Term Arrangement is used or the criterion provided for in paragraph 2 of Annex E of the Long-Term Arrangement is used, the chief value criterion used by the Government of the United States of America in accordance with paragraph 2 of Annex E shall apply.

U.S., Trinidad and Tobago Extend Income Tax Convention

Press release 7 dated January 22

On December 12 and 30, 1968, notes were exchanged between the United States Government and the Government of Trinidad and Tobago extending through 1969 the duration of the convention of December 22, 1966, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and the encouragement of international trade and investment.¹

In article 5(3) of the convention it was provided in effect that the convention would terminate on December 31, 1967, unless the two con-

⁴For text of the annex, see Department of State press release 282 dated Dec. 26.

¹Treaties and Other International Acts Series 6400.

tracting states, on or before that date, agreed by notes exchanged through diplomatic channels to continue the convention in effect for the following year. Notes were exchanged on December 19, 1967, whereby the two contracting states agreed that the convention would continue to be effective during the year 1968. The notes exchanged in December 1968 have the effect of continuing the effectiveness of the convention through the year 1969.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency with annex, as amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284.

Acceptance deposited: Malaysia, January 15, 1969.

Aviation

Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of the convention on international civil aviation (Chicago, 1944) (TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170), with annex. Done at Buenos Aires September 24, 1968. Entered into force October 24, 1968. TIAS 6605.

Acceptance deposited: Switzerland, January 22, 1969.

Customs

Customs convention regarding ECS carnets for commercial samples, with annex and protocol of signature, as amended. Done at Brussels March 1, 1956. Entered into force October 3, 1957; for the United States March 3, 1969. TIAS 6632.

Proclaimed by the President: January 18, 1969.

Customs convention on containers, with annexes and protocol of signature. Done at Geneva May 18, 1956. Entered into force August 4, 1959; for the United States March 3, 1969. TIAS 6634.

Proclaimed by the President: January 18, 1969.

Customs convention on the international transport of goods under cover of TIR carnets, with nine annexes and protocol of signature, as amended. Done at Geneva January 15, 1959. Entered into force January 7, 1960; for the United States March 3, 1969. TIAS 6630.

Proclaimed by the President: January 18, 1969.

Customs convention on the temporary importation of professional equipment, and annexes A, B, and C. Done at Brussels June 8, 1961. Entered into force July 1, 1962; for the United States March 3, 1969. TIAS 6631.

Proclaimed by the President: January 18, 1969.

Customs convention on the ATA carnet for the temporary admission of goods, with annex. Done at Brussels December 6, 1961. Entered into force July 30, 1963; for the United States March 3, 1969. TIAS 6631.

Proclaimed by the President: January 18, 1969.

Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968.¹

Ratification deposited at Washington: Mexico, January 21, 1969.

Space

Treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. Opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow January 27, 1967. Entered into force October 10, 1967. TIAS 6347.

Ratification deposited at Washington: El Salvador, January 15, 1969.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement concerning settlement of United States claims relating to Gut Dam. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa November 18, 1968. Entered into force November 18, 1968.

PUBLICATIONS

Department Releases First Volume of New Compilation of Treaties

Press release 6 dated January 21

A new compilation entitled *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949* is now being published by the Department of State. It has been compiled under the direction of Charles I. Bevans, Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs. The first volume, released on January 21, covers multilateral agreements signed during the first 141 years of the Nation's history.

The 15-volume series will include the English texts or, in cases where no English text was signed, the official U.S. Government translations of treaties and other international agreements entered into by the United States from 1776 to 1950. (Instruments brought into force after January 1, 1950, are published at regular intervals in the series entitled *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST).) The compilation begins with four volumes of multilateral agreements, arranged chronologically, to be followed by approximately 11 volumes of bilateral agreements grouped alphabetically by country. The entire project will be completed within a year or two.

The 88 agreements included in the first volume cover a wide variety of subjects—lighthouses, postal ar-

¹ Not in force.

rangements, submarine cables, the Red Cross, sanitary regulations, telecommunication, opium, the Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907. The volume begins with an arrangement signed at Algiers March 21, 1826, by the consuls of 10 European powers, in which they agreed to seek authorization from their governments to enclose the European cemetery in Algiers, "where the bodies of Europeans are exposed to insults by the public and to damage by the sea. . . ." It closes with an arrangement proposed by the Chinese Government and approved by the diplomatic representatives of 11 countries at Peking October 19, 1915, relating to claims to land along the Whangpoo River.

It has been nearly 60 years since the compilation known as the "Malloy" series began to come off the press and more than 30 years since the fourth and last volume was published. The full title of that compilation, prepared under the direction of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, is *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements Between the United States and Other Powers*.

This new compilation is, in a sense, a replacement, an enlargement, and an updating of the "Malloy" volumes. It will be approximately four times the length of the earlier series because it will include some agreements not printed in "Malloy" and because there was a great increase in the number of treaties and other international agreements signed during the 1930's and 1940's. The fact that all the multilateral agreements for the years from 1776 to 1917 are contained in one volume of about 900 pages, while those for the 4 years from 1946 through 1949 will require about 1,200 pages, provides visible evidence of the increased tempo and complexity of international affairs.

Copies of volume 1 are for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. The price is \$8.50.

Confirmations

The Senate on January 20 confirmed the nomination of William P. Rogers to be Secretary of State. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 11 dated January 24.)

The Senate on January 21 confirmed the nomination of Charles W. Yost to be the representative of the United States to the United Nations and the representative of the United States in the Security Council of the United Nations.

The Senate on January 23 confirmed the following nominations:

Elliot L. Richardson to be Under Secretary of State. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 12 dated January 24.)

Richard F. Pedersen to be Counselor of the Department of State. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 13 dated January 24.)

Appointments

Clement E. Conger as Deputy Chief of Protocol, effective January 22. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release dated January 22.)

Emil Mosbacher, Jr., as Chief of Protocol, with the personal rank of Ambassador, effective January 24. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 14 dated January 24.)

Congress. Confirmations (Pedersen, Richardson, Rogers, Yost) 140

Department and Foreign Service

Appointments (Conger, Mosbacher) 140

Confirmations (Pedersen, Richardson, Rogers, Yost) 140

The Formulation of Foreign Policy: Responsibility and Opportunity (Rogers) 125

Economic Affairs

International Coffee Agreement (text of Executive order) 126

United States and Singapore Sign New Cotton Textile Agreement (text of Singaporean letter) 136

U.S., Trinidad and Tobago Extend Income Tax Convention 138

Government Organization. International Coffee Agreement (text of Executive order) 126

Health. The Human Landscape (Dubos, Rusk) 127

Presidential Documents

The Inaugural Address of President Nixon 121

International Coffee Agreement 126

Publications. Department Releases First Volume of New Compilation of Treaties 139

Science. The Human Landscape (Dubos, Rusk) 127

Singapore. United States and Singapore Sign New Cotton Textile Agreement (text of Singaporean letter) 136

Trade. United States and Singapore Sign New Cotton Textile Agreement (text of Singaporean letter) 136

Treaty Information

Current Actions 139

Department Releases First Volume of New Compilation of Treaties 139

United States and Singapore Sign New Cotton Textile Agreement (text of Singaporean letter) 136

U.S., Trinidad and Tobago Extend Income Tax Convention 138

Trinidad and Tobago. U.S., Trinidad and Tobago Extend Income Tax Convention 138

United Nations. Yost confirmed as U.S. Representative 140

Viet-Nam. First Plenary Session of New Meetings on Viet-Nam Held at Paris (Lodge) 124

Name Index

Conger, Clement E 140

Dubos, René Jules 127

Johnson, President 126

Lodge, Henry Cabot 124

Mosbacher, Emil, Jr 140

Nixon, President 121

Pedersen, Richard F 140

Richardson, Elliot L 140

Rogers, Secretary 125, 140

Rusk, Secretary 127

Yost, Charles W 140

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: January 20-26

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to January 20 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 282 of December 26.

No.	Date	Subject
6	1/21	Department issues first volume of "Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949."
7	1/22	Extension of income tax convention with Trinidad and Tobago.
8	1/22	Rogers: message to officers and employees of State, AID, USIA, ACDA, and Peace Corps.
*9	1/23	Francis O. Wilcox to represent U.S. at dedication of John F. Kennedy College of Arts and Sciences, Port-of-Spain, Trinidad.
†10	1/23	Science agreement concluded with Republic of China.
*11	1/24	Biography of Secretary Rogers.
*12	1/24	Elliot Lee Richardson sworn in as Under Secretary (biographic details).
*13	1/24	Richard F. Pedersen sworn in as Counselor of the Department (biographic details).
*14	1/24	Emil Mosbacher, Jr., sworn in as Chief of Protocol (biographic details).
15	1/25	Lodge: Meetings on Viet-Nam at (revised) Paris.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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PRESIDENT NIXON'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JANUARY 27 (*Excerpts*) 141

SECOND PLENARY SESSION ON VIET-NAM HELD AT PARIS

Statement and Remarks by Ambassador Lodge 144

THE 23^d SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Summary by the United States Mission to the United Nations 147

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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President Nixon's News Conference of January 27

Following are excerpts from the transcript of a news conference held by President Nixon at the White House on January 27.

The President: Ladies and gentlemen, since this is my first press conference since the inauguration, I can imagine there are a number of questions. Consequently, I will make no opening statement and we will go directly to your questions.

Q. Mr. President, now that you are President, what is your peace plan for Viet-Nam?

The President: I believe that as we look at what is happening in the negotiations in Paris, as far as the American side is concerned we are off to a good start. What now, of course, is involved is what happens on the other side.

We find that in Paris, if you read Ambassador Lodge's statement,¹ we have been quite specific with regard to some steps that can be taken now on Viet-Nam. Rather than submitting a laundry list of various proposals, we have laid down those things which we believe the other side should agree to and can agree to: the restoration of the demilitarized zone as set forth in the Geneva conference of 1954; mutual withdrawal, guaranteed withdrawal, of forces by both sides; the exchange of prisoners. All of these are matters that we think can be precisely considered and on which progress can be made.

Now, where we go from here depends upon what the other side offers in turn.

Q. Mr. President, now that you are President, could you be specific with us about what your plans are for improving relations with Communist China and whether you think they will be successful or not?

¹ For Ambassador Lodge's opening statement at the first plenary session of the meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on Jan. 25, see BULLETIN of Feb. 10, 1969, p. 124.

The President: Well, I have noted, of course, some expressions of interest on the part of various Senators and others in this country with regard to the possibility of admitting Communist China to the United Nations.

I also have taken note of the fact that several countries—including primarily Italy among the major countries—have indicated an interest in changing their policy and possibly voting to admit Communist China to the United Nations.

The policy of this country and this administration at this time will be to continue to oppose Communist China's admission to the United Nations.

There are several reasons for that:

First, Communist China has not indicated any interest in becoming a member of the United Nations.

Second, it has not indicated any intent to abide by the principles of the U.N. Charter and to meet the principles that new members admitted to the United Nations are supposed to meet.

Finally, Communist China continues to call for expelling the Republic of China from the United Nations, and the Republic of China has, as I think most know, been a member of the international community and has met its responsibilities without any question over these past few years.

Under these circumstances, I believe it would be a mistake for the United States to change its policy with regard to Communist China in admitting it to the United Nations.

Now, there is a second immediate point that I have noted: That is the fact that there will be another meeting in Warsaw. We look forward to that meeting. We will be interested to see what the Chinese Communist representatives may have to say at that meeting, whether any changes of attitude on their part on major substantive issues may have occurred.

Until some changes occur on their side, however, I see no immediate prospect of any change in our policy.

Q. Mr. President, what problems that you have to cope with do you feel require your most urgent attention now?

The President: Well, the major problems with which I have been concerned in this first week have been in the field of foreign policy, because there only the President can make some of the decisions.

And consequently, the Security Council, as you ladies and gentlemen are aware, has had two very long meetings; and in addition, I spent many long hours at night reading the papers which involve the foreign policy of the United States.

This afternoon I will go to the Pentagon for my first major briefing by military officials on our military situation.

Going beyond that, however, I would say that the problems of our cities, which have been discussed at length at the Urban Affairs Council, and our economic problems, which were discussed at the meeting we had in the new Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy, require urgent attention.

It is very difficult to single one out and put it above the other. There are a number of problems which this administration confronts; each requires urgent attention. The field of foreign policy will require more attention, because it is in this field that only the President, in many instances, can make the decisions.

Q. Mr. President, on foreign policy, nuclear policy particularly, could you give us your position on the Nonproliferation Treaty and on the starting of missile talks with the Soviet Union?

The President: I favor the Nonproliferation Treaty. The only question is the timing of the ratification of that treaty. That matter will be considered by the National Security Council, by my direction, during a meeting this week. I will also have a discussion with the leaders of both sides in the Senate and in the House on the treaty within this week and in the early part of next week. I will make a decision then as to whether this is the proper time to ask the Senate to move forward and ratify the treaty. I expect ratification of the treaty and will urge its ratification at an appropriate time and, I would hope, an early time.

As far as the second part of your question, with regard to strategic arms talks, I favor strategic arms talks. Again, it is a question of not only when, but the context of those talks.

The context of those talks is vitally important because we are here between two major, shall we say, guidelines.

On the one side, there is the proposition which is advanced by some that we should go forward with talks on the reduction of strategic forces on both sides—we should go forward with such talks, clearly apart from any progress on political settlement—and on the other side, the suggestion is made that until we make progress on political settlements, it would not be wise to go forward on any reduction of our strategic arms, even by agreement with the other side.

It is my belief that what we must do is to steer a course between those two extremes. It would be a mistake, for example, for us to fail to recognize that simply reducing arms through mutual agreement—failing to recognize that that reduction will not in itself assure peace. The war which occurred in the Mideast in 1967 was a clear indication of that.

What I want to do is to see to it that we have strategic arms talks in a way and at a time that will promote, if possible, progress on outstanding political problems at the same time—for example, on the problem of the Mideast and on other outstanding problems in which the United States and the Soviet Union, acting together, can serve the cause of peace.

Q. Mr. President, do you or your administration have any plan outside the United Nations proposal for achieving peace in the Middle East?

The President: As you ladies and gentlemen are aware, the suggestion has been made that we have four-power talks. The suggestion has also been made that we use the United Nations as the primary forum for such talks. And it has also been suggested that the United States and the Soviet Union bilaterally should have talks on the Mideast.

In addition to that, of course, the problem finally should be settled by the parties in the area. We are going to devote the whole day on Saturday to the Mideast problem, just as we devoted the whole day this last Saturday on the problem of Viet-Nam.

We will consider on the occasion of that meeting the entire range of options that we have. I shall simply say at this time that I believe we need new initiatives and new leadership on the part of the United States in order to cool off the situation in the Mideast. I consider it a powder keg, very explosive. It needs to be defused. I

am open to any suggestions that may cool it off and reduce the possibility of another explosion, because the next explosion in the Mideast, I think, could involve very well a confrontation between the nuclear powers, which we want to avoid.

Q. Mr. President, do you consider it possible to have a cease-fire in Viet-Nam so long as the Viet Cong still occupy Vietnamese territory?

The President: I think that it is not helpful in discussing Viet-Nam to use such terms as "cease-fire" because cease-fire is a term of art that really has no relevance, in my opinion, to a guerrilla war.

When you are talking about a conventional war, then a cease-fire agreed upon by two parties means that the shooting stops. When you have a guerrilla war, in which one side may not even be able to control many of those who are responsible for the violence in the area, the cease-fire may be meaningless.

I think at this point this administration believes that the better approach is the one that Ambassador Lodge, under our direction, set forth in Paris—mutual withdrawal of forces on a guaranteed basis by both sides from South Viet-Nam.

Q. Mr. President, back to nuclear weapons. Both you and Secretary [of Defense Melvin R.] Laird have stressed, quite hard, the need for superiority over the Soviet Union. But what is the real meaning of that in view of the fact that both sides have more than enough already to destroy each other, and how do you distinguish between the validity of that stance and the argument of Dr. Kissinger [Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs] for what he calls "sufficiency"?

The President: Here, again, I think the semantics may offer an inappropriate approach to the problem. I would say, with regard to Dr. Kissinger's suggestion of sufficiency, that that would meet certainly my guideline and, I think, Secretary Laird's guideline with regard to superiority.

Let me put it this way: When we talk about parity, I think we should recognize that wars occur usually when each side believes it has a chance to win. Therefore, parity does not necessarily assure that a war may not occur.

By the same token, when we talk about

superiority, that may have a detrimental effect on the other side in putting it in an inferior position and therefore giving great impetus to its own arms race.

Our objective in this administration—and this is a matter that we are going to discuss at the Pentagon this afternoon and that will be the subject of a major discussion in the National Security Council within the month—our objective is to be sure that the United States has sufficient military power to defend our interests and to maintain the commitments which this administration determines are in the interest of the United States around the world.

I think "sufficiency" is a better term, actually, than either "superiority" or "parity."

Q. Mr. President, during the transition period in New York, several persons who conferred with you came away with the impression that you felt the Viet-Nam war might be ended within a year. Were these impressions correct, sir?

The President: I, of course, in my conversations with those individuals, and all individuals, have never used the term "6 months," "a year," "2 years," or "3 years," because I do not think it is helpful in discussing this terribly difficult war, a war that President Johnson wanted to bring to an end as early as possible, that I want to bring to an end as early as possible.

I do not think it is helpful to make overly optimistic statements which, in effect, may impede and perhaps might make very difficult our negotiations in Paris. All that I have to say is this: that we have a new team in Paris, with some old faces, but a new team. We have new direction from the United States. We have a new sense of urgency with regard to the negotiations.

There will be new tactics. We believe that those tactics may be more successful than the tactics of the past.

I should make one further point, however: We must recognize that all that has happened to date is the settlement of the procedural problems, the size of the table, and who will sit at those tables.

What we now get to is really that hard, tough ground that we have to plow: the substantive issues as to what both parties will agree to; whether we are going to have mutual withdrawal; whether we are going to have self-

determination by the people of South Viet-Nam without outside interference; whether we can have an exchange of prisoners.

This is going to take time, but I can assure you that it will have my personal attention. It will have my personal direction. The Secretary of State, my adviser for national security affairs, the Secretary of Defense—all of us—will give it every possible attention and we hope to come up with some new approaches.

The press: Thank you, Mr. President.

Second Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris

The second plenary session of the new meeting on Viet-Nam was held at Paris January 30. Following are texts of an opening statement and additional remarks made by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, head of the U.S. delegation.

OPENING STATEMENT

Press release 18 dated January 30

Ladies and gentlemen: Last Saturday the new Paris meetings on Viet-Nam began. The eyes of the world were upon this meetingplace. The world will continue to watch and to hope for the success of our efforts. Let all of us do everything in our power to fulfill those hopes—for peace and for the reconciliation of those who now oppose each other.

We have reviewed the record of our last meeting and have read carefully the remarks of the other side. We find a one-sided view of history and a great many broad and unsupported generalities. But we have searched and have found no concrete or specific proposal that might bring us closer to peace.

I again urge that we look ahead.

President Nixon, in his inaugural address, said: "As we reach toward our hopes, our task is to build on what has gone before—not turning away from the old but turning toward the new."¹

The goal of the United States in Viet-Nam is simple and clear: to assure the right of the

people of South Viet-Nam to shape their own future in their own way without outside interference or coercion.

American and other Allied troops are in South Viet-Nam today because North Vietnamese troops are there. Our combat forces were sent there long after Hanoi's aggression against the South was clear to the entire world. Moreover, our combat units were sent only after regular units of the North Vietnamese Army had entered South Viet-Nam and fought on the soil of the South.

Our military assistance, like that of the other allies, was given only upon the request of the legal and legitimate government of the Republic of Viet-Nam. Let it be remembered that the right to defend oneself—and to ask friends to help in that defense—is firmly established in international law and in the Charter of the United Nations. Recognizing this right, six nations have contributed forces to help defend the independence of South Viet-Nam, to help the South Vietnamese people preserve their right to make their own future and to build their own political and economic institutions. More than 40 other nations have contributed economic assistance to help the people of South Viet-Nam.

We can review endlessly the events of the past and why they occurred. And we would probably be as far apart at the end as at the beginning.

Let us instead turn our attention to the future, to what must be done to bring an end to the fighting and to bring peace to the people of Viet-Nam.

The key to that solution is to arrange the mutual withdrawal of all external forces from South Viet-Nam, and that involves the withdrawal of North Vietnamese military and subversive forces to North Viet-Nam. As that happens, the withdrawal of Allied forces will commence. We are prepared to begin working now toward the objective of mutual withdrawal.

I said last Saturday—and I repeat today—that a logical first step in the direction of peace is the restoration of the demilitarized zone. This zone was originally arranged in the Geneva agreements of 1954. You have said that you support the essential elements of these agreements. We have said the same. Let us move forward, therefore, with this important first step toward reestablishing peace.

The demilitarized zone should be free of all regular and irregular military and subversive

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 10, 1969, p. 121.

forces and personnel. It should contain no military installations. It should be free of military supplies and equipment. There should be no firing of artillery or any other act of force from, into, or across the zone. And these provisions should all be subject to an effective system of international inspection and verification.

We are ready to start work on arrangements to this end.

Ladies and gentlemen, I reiterate our desire to progress. Let us get down to the serious business of finding a road to peace. Let us begin today.

ADDITIONAL REMARKS

Press release 19 dated January 30

Once again I am constrained, as I was last Saturday, to reject the statements made by the other side concerning American relations with South Viet-Nam. In all essential respects, notably as regards aggression and neocolonialism, they are contrary to fact. It is typical propaganda of the kind that the world knows well and which cannot contribute to progress at these meetings.

With respect to your remarks concerning alleged B-52 bombing in North Viet-Nam, no B-52's have been targeted against North Viet-Nam since an attack on military targets in the DMZ on October 28, 1968. In answer to allegations raised since that date, a spokesman from the U.S. Department of Defense stated on January 27: "That is not true. We have not resumed the bombing of North Viet-Nam."

As to reconnaissance—limited aerial reconnaissance, which is not an action involving the use of force, is being carried out over North Viet-Nam to assure that Allied forces in South Viet-Nam are not faced with imminent danger of military actions from the armed forces of North Viet-Nam. That reconnaissance does not threaten the security of North Viet-Nam. The only action which has been taken in North Viet-Nam by the United States has been to defend our reconnaissance planes and pilots when they have been fired upon.

We persist in our desire to find a basis for peace in Viet-Nam based upon agreements as to the future rather than polemics concerning the past.

The DMZ is presented as an issue for early substantive consideration in detail, because it is

an important problem which readily lends itself to a solution.

Our present problem is to find a practical point of departure for making some progress toward that ultimate objective. It is with this in mind that both the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States have proposed early consideration of the demilitarized zone issue. Any progress we can achieve between the two sides in solving this problem will create a better atmosphere, as well as a basis for solving the broader and more complex aspects which are involved in any settlement.

Therefore, we hope that we may approach the question of the DMZ as a matter susceptible of being discussed specifically—a matter which will be, in effect, a pilot project which will enable us to form a pattern for constructive work together.

Mass Public Executions in Iraq Deplored by United States

Following is the text of a letter dated January 29 from Charles W. Yost, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to the President of the Security Council.

U.S./U.N. press release 5 dated January 29

JANUARY 29, 1969

His Excellency
Mr. MAX JAKOBSON
President of the Security Council

EXCELLENCY: I have been instructed by my Government to draw to your attention the following statement issued by Secretary of State William P. Rogers on January 27, 1969, when he learned of the public execution of 14 persons convicted for espionage in Iraq:¹

"We have had no United States representation in Baghdad since the Government of Iraq broke relations in 1967. We are not, therefore, in a position to comment on the facts surrounding the trial. On humanitarian grounds [however] these executions are a matter of deep concern to us. The spectacle of mass public executions is repugnant to the conscience of the world. At my

¹ Secretary Rogers' statement was issued as Department of State press release 16 dated Jan. 27.

request, Ambassador Yost has called Secretary General U Thant today to express our deep concern and to tell him that we share the expressions noted in his statement issued earlier today."

The Government of the United States recognizes the legal right of any government to bring to trial and administer justice to any of its citizens. However, the manner in which these executions and the trials that preceded them were conducted scarcely conforms to normally accepted standards of respect for human rights and human dignity or to the obligations in this regard that the United Nations Charter imposes upon all members. Moreover, the spectacular way in which they were carried out seems to have been designed to arouse emotions and to intensify the very explosive atmosphere of suspicion and hostility in the Middle East.

The United States hopes that the world-wide revulsion aroused by the reports of these trials and executions will induce those responsible to carry out their solemn Charter obligations to promote "universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Repetition of the recent tragic events would be bound to make more difficult efforts within and outside the United Nations toward the goals of peace, tolerance, and human understanding among nations and peoples, in the Middle East and throughout the world.

I respectfully request that this letter be circulated as a Security Council document.

CHARLES W. YOST

Letters of Credence

Federal Republic of Germany

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, Rolf Friedemann Pauls, presented his credentials to President Nixon on January 31. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated January 31.

Singapore

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Singapore, Ernest Steven Monteiro, presented his credentials to President Nixon on January 31. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated January 31.

Uruguay

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, Hector Luisi, presented his credentials to President Nixon on January 31. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated January 31.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

90th Congress, 2d Session

Planning-Programming-Budgeting. Program Budgeting in Foreign Affairs: Some Reflections. Memorandum prepared at the request of the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. November 27, 1968. 24 pp. [Committee print.]

Postscript to Reports on Czechoslovakia, NATO, and the Paris Negotiations of September 1968. Report of Senator Mike Mansfield to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. December 1968. 7 pp. [Committee print.]

Measuring Hamlet Security in Vietnam. Report of a special study mission by Representative John V. Tunney of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. December 1968. 11 pp. [Committee print.]

The Gulf of Tonkin, the 1964 Incidents. Part II. Supplementary documents to February 20, 1968, hearing with Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. December 16, 1968. 14 pp. [Committee print.]

The Future of United States Public Diplomacy. Report No. 6, together with part XI of the hearings on "Winning the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive" by the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. December 22, 1968. 185 pp. [Committee print.]

Review of U.S. Military Commitments Abroad. Phase III—Rio and Anzus Pacts. Report of the Special Subcommittee on National Defense Posture of the House Committee on Armed Services. December 31, 1968. 18 pp. [Committee print.]

The 23d Session of the United Nations General Assembly

The 23d session of the United Nations General Assembly was held September 24-December 21. The following roundup was issued by the United States Mission to the United Nations on January 13, not as a new statement of policy but as a summary of developments during the session which are significant from the U.S. point of view.

U.S./U.N. press release 1 dated January 13

General Debate and Security Council

Czechoslovakia

At the 23d General Assembly the overwhelming majority of the members of the United Nations rejected the Soviet Union's rationale for its actions in Czechoslovakia and considered these actions to violate the principles of international law and of the United Nations Charter.

Rarely in the history of the United Nations has a major power been so isolated in the General Assembly on an important political issue involving its own actions. During the general debate, 76 speakers, led off by Secretary Rusk, criticized the Soviet action.¹ Strongly critical statements came from representatives of all geographic areas. Of the eight speakers who defended the Soviet action, only one was from outside the Soviet bloc.

In defending his country's actions, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko invoked the concept of a "Socialist commonwealth," which he called "an inseparable entity." "The Socialist states," he said, "cannot and will not allow a situation where the vital interests of socialism are infringed upon and encroachments are made on the inviolability of the boundaries of the Socialist commonwealth." He said nothing about the boundaries of his ally Czechoslovakia, nor did he mention the U.N. Charter in this connection.

This doctrine, also put forward in *Pravda* on September 25, recalls the old system of spheres

of influence, built upon domination of neighboring states by the great powers. It runs contrary to the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and political independence which are at the heart of the charter and are essential to a stable, peaceful world. Like the Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia, this doctrine was rejected by nation after nation in general debate.

The Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia also figured prominently in the discussion of the definition of aggression in Committee VI and of Human Rights Year in Committee III.

The discussion in Committee VI stemmed from a 1967 Soviet initiative which boomeranged on the Soviet Union because of Czechoslovakia. Speaking for the United States, Senator John Sherman Cooper denounced the Soviet occupation and pointed out the futility of attempting to elaborate a definition of aggression while the proponent of such a definition, the Soviet Union, was disregarding fundamental and clear principles of international law.² He stressed that the invasion of Czechoslovakia had violated every one of the U.S.S.R.'s own proposed definitions of aggression as well as those embodied in the United Nations Charter.

In Committee III, the United States Representative stressed the suppression in Czechoslovakia of various rights guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, especially those of freedom of expression, information, and peaceful assembly.

Middle East

Although the agenda item "the situation in the Middle East" was not brought up for debate, a number of significant U.N. developments bearing on the Middle East took place during the session.

During the opening weeks the presence in New York of the Foreign Ministers of Israel, Jordan, and the U.A.R. provided the Secretary-General's Representative, Ambassador Jarring, with an opportunity for intensive discussions

¹ For a statement by Secretary Rusk made in the General Assembly on Oct. 2, see BULLETIN of Oct. 21, 1968, p. 405.

² BULLETIN of Dec. 23, 1968, p. 664.

pursuant to his mandate under the Security Council resolution of November 1967.³ The willingness of the parties to exchange substantive views in writing through Ambassador Jarring was a positive and encouraging development.

The mission of Ambassador Jarring represents the best hope for peace in the Middle East. Although major obstacles still confront him, we consider it highly important that this vital mission should continue.

The Security Council met in September and November to consider a number of serious cease-fire violations. The Council reaffirmed the cease-fire and insisted that it be rigorously respected. In November, Ambassador Wiggins emphasized to the Council that scrupulous observance of the cease-fire is necessary to the shaping and building of a just and lasting peace.

The Council also met in September to consider the humanitarian plight of the civilian population in the area of the 1967 conflict. The United States favored the dispatch of a United Nations representative on the basis of previous Security Council action and in conformity with the mandate earlier defined by the Secretary-General for the mission in 1967 of Ambassador Gussing, who had reported on the situation both of populations of the areas occupied by Israel and of minority groups in the area of conflict. Unfortunately, this approach did not receive the necessary support, and the United States abstained when the Council acted to confine the representative's mandate to civilians in Israeli-occupied territories, thereby dissociating the Council from the fate of Jewish minorities in the area of conflict.

Viet-Nam

The problem of Viet-Nam was not on the agenda and created far less controversy than in recent years. Criticism of United States policy, though still substantial, was markedly diminished.

During the general debate, many member states welcomed the limited bombing halt and the talks then underway in Paris between representatives of the United States and North Viet-Nam. Following President Johnson's announcement on October 31,⁴ a number of delegations expressed their satisfaction to the United States

representatives that an agreement had been reached permitting a total bombing halt in North Viet-Nam and made clear their view that the preliminary talks in Paris should move as quickly as possible into expanded negotiations for an end to the conflict.

Cyprus

The Security Council on December 10 extended for 6 months the United Nations Force which has helped to keep peace on Cyprus since 1964. The atmosphere on Cyprus has improved markedly since the crisis of 1967. While a number of thorny problems remain, the United States hopes that the talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders now underway may soon show sufficient progress to make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the United Nations Force.

Items Considered Directly by Plenary

Conference on the Human Environment (1972)

With strong support from the United States, the General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution introduced by Sweden to convene an International Conference on the Problems of Human Environment in 1972.⁵ The resolution noted "the continuing and accelerating impairment of the quality of the human environment caused by such factors as air and water pollution, erosion and other forms of soil deterioration, waste, noise and the secondary effects of biocides, which are accentuated by rapidly increasing population and accelerating urbanization." It expressed concern about the effects of these phenomena "on the condition of man, his physical, mental and social well-being, his dignity and his enjoyment of basic human rights, in developing as well as developed countries." It expressed the conviction "that increased attention to problems of the human environment is essential for sound economic and social development" and that there is a need "for intensified action at the national, regional and international level in order to limit and, where possible, eliminate the impairment of the human environment and in order to protect and improve the natural surroundings in the interest of man."

To further these objectives and "to encourage further work in this field and to give it a com-

³ For text of the resolution, see BULLETIN of Dec. 18, 1967, p. 843.

⁴ BULLETIN of Nov. 18, 1968, p. 517.

⁵ For a U.S. statement and text of the resolution, see BULLETIN of Dec. 30, 1968, p. 707.

mon outlook and direction," the Assembly decided to convene the 1972 conference.

In summing up the work of the 23d session, Ambassador Wiggins stated his belief that, "in the long view of history," the calling of the Human Environment Conference "will turn out to be the most momentous of all the decisions of this Assembly."⁶

Chinese Representation

The General Assembly rejected, as it has consistently in past years, the attempt by some of the supporters of Peking to expel the Republic of China and to seat representatives of Communist China in the United Nations.⁷ The vote of 44 in favor and 58 opposed represented, for the third year in a row, an increased margin in opposition to the resolution. The Assembly also reaffirmed by 73 to 47—again an even wider margin than last year—the validity of its 1961 decision that any proposal to change the representation of China in the United Nations is an important question requiring a two-thirds vote for adoption.

The United States voted, as it has in the past, for an Italian resolution to appoint a committee to study the Chinese representation question and report to the General Assembly. Ambassador Wiggins made clear that in voting for this resolution and its predecessors we recognized that they did not in any way prejudge the outcome of the proposed study. However, as in previous years the proposal failed of adoption.

New Members

The General Assembly admitted two new members, Swaziland and Equatorial Guinea. This brings the membership of the United Nations to 126.

Agenda Items Allocated to Committee I

Korea

As in previous years, the Assembly adopted by a large majority a resolution reaffirming United Nations objectives and responsibilities in Korea.⁸ The resolution, cosponsored by the United States and 14 other countries, was approved by a vote of 71 to 25, with 20 absten-

tions. It responded to the heightened tension and increased North Korean military pressure against South Korea in the last year by calling for cooperation in the easing of tensions in the area and for the avoidance of incidents and activities in violation of the 1953 armistice agreement. It also provided for more frequent reports to the Secretary-General and/or the General Assembly by the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK).

Resolutions again were introduced by supporters of the North Korean regime, accompanied by vigorous, if stereotyped, propaganda efforts, calling (1) for the dissolution of UNCURK, (2) for the withdrawal of all United Nations forces from Korea, and (3) for an end to United Nations debate on Korean reunification. As Senator Stuart Symington, the United States Representative, observed, each of these proposals, in one way or another, sought "to remove Korea from the concern and protection of the United Nations." The three resolutions were decisively defeated in the First Committee by votes, respectively, of 27 in favor to 68 opposed, 25 to 67, and 24 to 70.

Seabeds

The General Assembly this year established a permanent committee to advance international cooperation in the exploration and peaceful uses of the deep ocean floor. This committee will carry further the work begun last year by the *ad hoc* committee established by the 23d General Assembly.

After lengthy negotiation the size of the new committee was fixed at 42 members, compared with 35 on the *ad hoc* committee. This increase reflects the desire of smaller and less developed members to gain greater influence in this and other continuing committees and agencies established by the Assembly or associated with the United Nations.

We recognized that every nation has an interest—some a vital interest—in the peaceful uses of the deep ocean floor. Against this widespread interest must be weighed the practical importance of keeping working committees within manageable size, bearing in mind that committee work is subject to review in the full General Assembly. The composition of the seabeds committee is a practical compromise between these opposing principles.

In addition to the resolution establishing the

⁶ For excerpts from Ambassador Wiggins' news conference of Dec. 20, see BULLETIN of Jan. 27, 1969, p. 80.

⁷ For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 9, 1968, p. 609.

⁸ For U.S. statements and text of the resolution, see BULLETIN of Jan. 13, 1969, p. 32.

seabeds committee, the Assembly also adopted a United States resolution embodying President Johnson's proposal for an International Decade of Ocean Exploration⁹ and a resolution sponsored by Iceland, of which the United States was a cosponsor, calling for action to prevent pollution of the seabeds.

The United States joined in efforts to work out in resolution form a set of principles for the exploration and use of the deep ocean floor to serve as guidelines for participating states until more permanent rules can be embodied in international agreements.¹⁰ Although these efforts were not wholly successful, the above-mentioned resolutions did help to establish that there is an area of the ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction which is of common interest to all states, in which international cooperation ought to be encouraged, and which ought to be reserved entirely for peaceful purposes.

Disarmament

The Assembly's debates on disarmament this year took place in the wake of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States last August, whose proceedings had tended at times to picture the interest of nuclear and nonnuclear states as essentially antagonistic. As against this tendency, the Assembly's decisions on disarmament were a significant accomplishment for the nations that support the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in the belief that the nuclear and non-nuclear nations must work together.

The Assembly gave expression to this view in a compromise resolution on the nonnuclear conference, emphasizing international cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The resolution avoids establishing a new U.N. body which could have interfered with the work of existing bodies dealing with disarmament and atoms for peace and could thus have damaged the prospects for early ratification of the NPT. It asks the International Atomic Energy Agency, the World Bank, and the U.N. Development Program to study the proposals of the nonnuclear conference and report to the 24th General Assembly. The Assembly will consider further steps at that time and will also consider whether to call a meeting of the U.N. Disarmament Commission in 1970.

In other resolutions on peaceful aspects of

nuclear energy, the Assembly asked the Secretary-General to conduct a study of the contribution of atomic energy to international development and to report on procedures for providing nuclear explosive services to non-nuclear-weapon states. We hope the IAEA, as the most qualified agency, will have a leading role in the Secretary-General's study of atomic energy and development. We believe also that the IAEA is the right body through which to provide nuclear explosive services under the NPT, a matter which the Agency is already actively studying. We hope the Secretary-General's report will promote and not compete with this work.

In further Assembly resolutions in the arms control field, the Assembly urged that the United States and the U.S.S.R. begin talks at an early date on limitation of strategic arms, endorsed the principle of nuclear-free zones, asked the Secretary-General to make a study of the effects of chemical and bacteriological (biological) warfare, called once again for a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons tests, and asked the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to continue its work.

The Soviet Union refrained from promoting its traditional propaganda items in this field and did not even press to a vote its resolution endorsing the Soviet disarmament proposals which had taken up a major part of Foreign Minister Gromyko's address to the Assembly.

Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

The General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution commending the results of the Outer Space Conference held in Vienna in August 1968 and welcoming the entry into force on December 3 of the Agreement on Assistance to and Return of Astronauts.

The resolution also asks the Outer Space Committee to examine, as a followup to the space conference, a proposal that a mechanism be established within the United Nations to provide nations with analytical advice on advances in space technology which might have practical benefits and requests that the "draft agreement on liability for damage caused by the launching of objects into outer space," currently under negotiation in the Outer Space Committee, be completed in time to be considered by the 24th General Assembly. A working group was also established to study all aspects of the question of direct broadcasts from satellites.

⁹ For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 2, 1968, p. 574.

¹⁰ For a U.S. statement, see BULLETIN of Nov. 25, 1968, p. 554.

Agenda Items Allocated to Special Political Committee

UNRWA and Arab Refugees

As in previous years, the Assembly adopted a United States resolution dealing with the work of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine (UNRWA) and appealing for its continued support. This year the resolution extends the mandate of UNRWA for 3 years beyond its present expiration date of June 1969. The Assembly also adopted without dissent a Swedish resolution calling for continued and increased assistance to the new refugees uprooted by the June 1967 war.

The United States also supported a resolution introduced by Turkey and adopted by an overwhelming majority, calling upon Israel to take effective and immediate steps to allow the newly displaced persons who fled the West Bank since the outbreak of the June 1967 war to return without delay. Speaking in the committee, Ambassador Wiggins appealed to Israel on humanitarian grounds to permit these people to return to their homes and camps on the West Bank of the Jordan River before they have to face the rigors of another winter in tent camps.¹¹ Senator Cooper also developed these themes in a speech to the committee in which he suggested that the United Nations and interested governments prepare plans for economic development of the area which could be put into operation following the achievement of a just and peaceful solution in the Middle East.¹²

The committee rejected a resolution calling on the United Nations to appoint a custodian to administer and receive income on behalf of Arab refugees from property they left behind in Israel. The United States opposed this resolution, believing that it raised serious problems relating to state sovereignty and the authority of the United Nations and that its adoption could jeopardize the search for an overall peaceful solution which would bring justice to the more than 1 million Arab refugees.

Apartheid

As in previous years, the Assembly adopted a resolution aimed against South Africa's policy of *apartheid*. The United States, despite our

strong opposition to *apartheid*, again found it necessary to abstain because of certain objectionable provisions in the resolution, including paragraphs requesting the Security Council to take enforcement action under chapter VII of the charter and condemning the actions of nations which trade with South Africa.

Senator Cooper made a statement during the debate reiterating this country's abhorrence of *apartheid* and pointing out that there was a body of opinion within the United States Congress that the United States should disengage from South Africa in trade and investment.¹³

Peacekeeping

The Assembly this year gave its approval to the first small area of agreement in the 4-year history of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping (Committee of 33). It did so by requesting that the documentation prepared for the Committee of 33 by the Secretariat on military observers established or authorized by the Security Council be made available to all members. It further requested that the Committee of 33 complete its study of observer operations before September 1969 and proceed with the documentation and study of other United Nations peacekeeping operations, including those involving military forces.

The United States is continuing to press for a faster pace of work in the Committee on Peacekeeping and particularly for efforts within the committee to improve preparations and arrangements for United Nations peacekeeping operations.

Agenda Items Allocated to Committee II

Attempt To Expel South Africa From UNCTAD

The United Nations stepped back from the brink of a serious constitutional crisis when a resolution which would have excluded the Republic of South Africa from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "until it shall have terminated its policy of racial discrimination" did not receive the necessary two-thirds vote in plenary. This resolution, which had earlier passed in the Second Committee by a vote of 49 to 18, received 55 votes in plenary, with 33 opposing and 28 abstentions; but since the Assembly had first decided the resolution

¹¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 23, 1968, p. 677.

¹² BULLETIN of Jan. 13, 1969, p. 39.

¹³ BULLETIN of Dec. 2, 1968, p. 582.

was an important question requiring a two-thirds vote, it therefore failed of adoption. The "important question" proposal, cosponsored by the United States, was carried by 56 to 48, with 13 abstentions.

Although fully sharing the sponsors' opposition to *apartheid*, the United States supported the opinion of the United Nations Legal Adviser that the Assembly did not have the right under the charter to exclude a member from a subsidiary body open to all. We consider that to have expelled South Africa from UNCTAD because the majority found its policies repugnant would have seriously undermined the Charter of the United Nations and weakened the authority and prestige of the organization.

As Ambassador Wiggins said in debate before the vote in plenary on this resolution:¹⁴

When we seek to deny to any member any of the rights that flow from membership in the United Nations, we thereby put in jeopardy all the rights of all members. An unlawful act against my neighbor—whether he be guilty or not—is an act against the community.

Ambassador Wiggins also repudiated the Tanzanian representative's charge that those opposing the resolution were "racist" and "enemies" of Africa. He said:¹⁵

... the United States, in this and every forum where it has had an opportunity to speak, has denounced and opposed *apartheid* in South Africa and has resisted every other form of racial discrimination. And I regret the inferences and the suggestions that the position taken on this issue on this occasion, out of a profound belief in the necessity of preserving the charter and the constitution, springs from racial discrimination or any species of racism.

Development Decade II

The Assembly's most important decision on an economic question was the establishment of a mechanism to recommend an international development strategy for the Second Development Decade, beginning in 1970. Reconciling various points of view, the Assembly agreed to entrust the matter to the Economic Committee of the Economic and Social Council, enlarged from its normal size of 27 to 54 so as to permit the participation of members of the United Na-

¹⁴ BULLETIN of Jan. 6, 1969, p. 9.

¹⁵ For a statement by Ambassador Wiggins made in plenary on Dec. 13 on the Canadian motion to postpone debate on the proposal to expel South Africa from UNCTAD, see U.S./U.N. press release 247.

tions or of other organizations in the United Nations system who are not members of ECOSOC.

Agenda Items Allocated to Committee III

International Year for Human Rights

The General Assembly reviewed the work of the International Conference on Human Rights held at Tehran in April and approved by acclamation a resolution endorsing the Proclamation of Tehran.¹⁶ This proclamation, adopted unanimously at the Tehran conference, includes a reaffirmation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It thus constitutes the first major endorsement of the Universal Declaration by the Soviet Union and others that had abstained when it was adopted in 1948, as well as by many newly independent countries that were not members of the United Nations in 1948. A novel feature of the proclamation is its affirmation that it is a basic human right for parents to determine the number and spacing of their children.

The Assembly adopted several other resolutions originating at the Tehran conference. These included a request to the Secretary-General to report to the next General Assembly on the possible need for new or revised international conventions for the protection of human rights in armed conflicts and another request to the Secretary-General to report to the Commission on Human Rights in 1970 on human rights problems arising from developments in science and technology.

As part of the International Year for Human Rights, the Assembly awarded the first six United Nations Human Rights Prizes to Manuel Bianchi of Chile, Rene Cassin of France, Mrs. Mehranguiz Manoutchehrian of Iran, Petr Nedbailo of the Ukrainian S.S.R., and posthumously to Albert Luthuli of South Africa and Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt of the United States.

Capital Punishment

The United States welcomed a resolution noting the worldwide tendency toward reduction in the number of criminal executions and in the number of offenses for which capital punish-

¹⁶ For text of the proclamation, see BULLETIN of Sept. 2, 1968, p. 258.

ment might be imposed. The resolution seeks to encourage these tendencies by inviting member states to provide the most careful legal procedures and safeguards for the accused in capital cases. It also requests the Secretary-General to report to ECOSOC in 1971 on the attitudes of member states toward further restriction of the death penalty or its total abolition.

War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity

The one new draft international agreement completed during the session was a draft convention banning time limits for the prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Although the United States was not opposed to the basic purposes of the convention, we voted against it because several provisions as finally drafted were not accurate statements of generally accepted international law. Specifically, we objected to the use of this essentially technical convention to redefine crimes against humanity in a legally unsatisfactory way and we shared the concern of many delegations about applying the convention's prohibition of time limits retroactively in some countries in which such limits have already expired.

Committee To Investigate Practices Affecting Human Rights in Occupied Territories of the Middle East

The General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for appointment of a new committee of three member states to investigate Israeli practices affecting human rights in occupied territories of the Middle East. The United States voted against this resolution. Although we recognize Israel as an occupying power under the 1949 Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, we opposed establishing this new committee because the Middle East question is still before the Security Council, because the new committee could complicate the mission of Ambassador Jarring, and because it is most unlikely to contribute to a settlement of the issues between the countries concerned. This is all the more true since Israel made clear during the debate that it would not permit a committee with these terms of reference to enter territory under its control.

Social Development

The Assembly adopted a resolution on social aspects of development to be taken into account

during the Second Development Decade. Committee III made progress on, but did not complete, a draft declaration on social progress and development.

Agenda Items Allocated to Committee IV

Colonial and Racial Issues

The Assembly's proceedings on colonial and racial issues revealed two opposing tendencies. As in recent years, some resolutions were adopted which, however laudable their aims, called for impractical or unlawful methods which the United States and other concerned members could not support. Some members of the Afro-Asian group, on the other hand, realizing that the Assembly's resolutions are only recommendations and must have the necessary support of governments in order to be effective, worked to achieve more reasonable and more widely acceptable resolutions on certain colonial issues.

This more moderate approach was evident particularly during the formulation of resolutions on Portuguese territories and Namibia (South West Africa). The sponsors showed a renewed readiness to consult in the drafting stage with the United States and other members, a practice which had unfortunately been neglected in the handling of earlier resolutions. A continuation of such consultation could contribute to more realistic and constructive resolutions commanding wider support.

Unfortunately, despite such efforts, most of the Assembly's resolutions dealing with colonial and racial problems (originating both in Committee IV and in the Special Political Committee) contained provisions which were unsound in method, and the United States was unable to support them. This was true even of the above-mentioned resolutions on Portuguese territories and Namibia, although through consultation some of the most objectionable provisions were removed or modified.¹⁷ It was still more true of other resolutions, such as those on Southern Rhodesia and *apartheid*, both of which called for sweeping measures which under the charter are within the sphere of the Security Council.

¹⁷ For U.S. statement and text of the resolution on the question of Namibia, see BULLETIN of Jan. 6, 1969, p. 11.

Resolutions against activities of foreign economic and other interests said to be impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and calling for implementation of that declaration by the specialized agencies were likewise unacceptable to the United States. The first resolution was based on false assumptions regarding private foreign investment; the second called upon the specialized agencies and international institutions to take actions which in many cases are inconsistent with their own statutes and with their agreements with the United Nations.

The United States continued to make clear its unswerving opposition to colonialism and racial discrimination in all of its forms. We remain convinced, however, that the U.N. can best contribute to progress against these evils by actions which are intrinsically sound, widely supported, and within the capacity of the United Nations to carry out.

Agenda Items Allocated to Committee V

Repayment of U.N. Bonds

The Assembly rejected a resolution calling into question the method of repayment of \$170 million in United Nations bonds, issued under a 1961 resolution to cover the deficits from peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and the Congo. This resolution, after passing the Fifth Committee by a one-vote margin, was rejected in plenary on the closing day by a vote of 34 in favor to 51 opposed, with 33 abstentions. Prior to the vote the Assembly decided, by a vote of 52 to 29, that the resolution was an important question under the charter, requiring a two-thirds vote for adoption. The United States voted for this motion and against the resolution itself.

Although the resolution called only for a "study" of the established method of repayment, the clear intent of the sponsors was to remove the assessments for repayment of the bonds from the regular United Nations budget and to establish a special scale under which the developed countries would be assessed a greater proportion.

The United States, which holds nearly half the bonds, argued that any move to alter the terms of repayment would be contrary to the conditions under which the bonds were sold and which are printed on the bonds them-

selves.¹⁵ We pointed out that under the law by which the U.S. Congress authorized purchase of the bonds, the amounts due to the United States for interest and repayment of principal are deducted in advance from the assessments which the United States pays as its share of the United Nations regular budget. We also made clear that we could not agree to contribute a larger percentage than we now do for retirement of the bonds. Thus a move to change the scale of assessments for the bond repayment could not in fact result in increased payments by the United States but could only undermine the credit of the United Nations and lead toward a new financial crisis.

United Nations Budget

Throughout the proceedings in Committee V the United States continued its longstanding pressure for economy and for improvements in the United Nations administrative and budgetary practices.¹⁹ While our efforts were partly successful, the final budget of \$154.9 million (an 11 percent increase over 1968) contained a number of provisions we considered excessive and unsound. We voted against one section of the budget and abstained on three others and only reluctantly voted for the budget as a whole. Among the defects of this budget are the failure to provide sound methods for dealing with unforeseen and extraordinary expenses, the failure to control the proliferation of United Nations conferences and documents, and a 50 percent increase (to \$9.7 million) in the budget of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) with no adequate explanation of how the increase is to be used.

Languages in the United Nations

The Assembly made two new decisions involving wider use of French, Russian, and Spanish in U.N. organs.

Following a decision in principle by the 22d General Assembly in favor of a bonus for Secretariat members who use two working languages, the French-speaking countries this year introduced a sounder resolution setting up a language incentive program in the Secretariat beginning in 1972. This proposal was adopted with United States support.

¹⁵ For a U.S. statement, see BULLETIN of Jan. 20, 1969, p. 55.

¹⁹ For a U.S. statement, see BULLETIN of Dec. 9, 1968, p. 614.

In addition, however, the Assembly took a step that is harder to justify when it approved a Soviet proposal that Russian (which only four members use as their principal language) be added to English, French, and Spanish as a fourth working language of the General Assembly. (All written records of the Assembly are translated and reproduced in all the working languages.) This step was clearly motivated by considerations of political prestige, not efficiency. Its ultimate cost, if it should be extended to all the principal U.N. organs, is estimated at \$2.8 million a year. Moreover, it threatens to increase still further the already excessive physical and mechanical delays in U.N. documentation. For these reasons a substantial number of members, including the United States, opposed the Russian-language proposal. However, it prevailed after having been amended to express the view that both Spanish and Russian should also become working languages of the Security Council.

U.N. Headquarters Expansion

The General Assembly approved (102 to 11, with 6 abstentions) a first step toward badly needed new construction and expansion of the New York Headquarters. It appropriated \$250,000 requested by the Secretary-General for engineering and technical studies of (a) construction of a new United Nations office building immediately south of the present Headquarters complex and (b) modifications to the present Headquarters Conference Building. This study, to be submitted to the 24th General Assembly next September, will contain the detailed cost estimates and other technical information which the Assembly will need in order to decide next year whether or not to proceed with the construction.

The proposal for the new United Nations office building was prepared by a private group, the Fund for Area Development and Planning. It would respond to a longstanding need of the Secretariat for more office space and would eliminate rental charges for outside offices in New York, which will cost the U.N. approximately \$1.3 million in 1969.

Agenda Items Allocated to Committee VI

Definition of Aggression

At the insistence of the Soviet Union, a special committee was established by the 22d Gen-

eral Assembly to reexamine the old question of a "definition of aggression." Although the Soviet Union in 1968 lost much of its enthusiasm for the item, the report of the committee was discussed at length in the Legal Committee of the General Assembly. The debate provided an opportunity for an examination of recent Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia in light of the law of the United Nations Charter and of the definitions of aggression the Soviets themselves had proposed over the years.

The debate also shed further light on the implications of the doctrine advanced by the Soviet Union to justify its invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia. Delegates from a number of countries, including the United States, analyzed the legal implications of the Soviet doctrine and pointed out that, in its attempt to assert a right to intervene in the affairs of other Communist states, it ran afoul of such fundamental provisions of the charter as the doctrine of sovereign equality.

It was further pointed out that the nature of the intervention the Soviets were seeking to justify violated the charter's prohibition of the threat or use of force as well as the doctrine of nonintervention.

The Assembly decided to continue the special committee for another year. The United States abstained on this proposal because of our doubts as to the utility of the exercise and because the mandate given to the Committee was ambiguous and unsatisfactory.

United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)

The Assembly received and approved the report of the first session of the new Commission dealing with private international law. At its next annual session in March the Commission will proceed with its work in light of the comments in the General Assembly, which included a recommendation that it establish shipping legislation as a priority topic.

Special Missions

The Sixth Committee made progress on, but did not complete, a draft convention on special diplomatic missions which would complement the existing Vienna conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Privileges and Immunities. The Committee expects to complete work at the next session on this important addition to the codification of international law.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Disputes

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.

Ratification deposited: Finland, January 9, 1969.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Finance Corporation. Done at Washington May 25, 1955. Entered into force July 20, 1956. TIAS 3620.

Signature and acceptance: Republic of China, January 15, 1969.

Meteorology

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.

Accession deposited: Southern Yemen, January 28, 1969.

Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968.¹

Signatures at Washington: Italy, Turkey, January 28, 1969.

Refugees

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York January 31, 1967. Entered into force October 4, 1967; for the United States November 1, 1968. TIAS 6577.

Accession deposited: Netherlands,² November 29, 1968.

Trade

Fifth procès-verbal extending the declaration on the provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 12, 1959 (TIAS 4498). Done at Geneva November 19, 1968. Entered into force December 17, 1968.³

¹ Not in force.

² Applies to the territory of the Kingdom of the Netherlands situated in Europe. Reservations to convention relating to the status of refugees of July 28, 1951, are applicable to the protocol.

³ Not in force for the United States.

Acceptances: Australia, January 16, 1969; Austria (subject to ratification), December 30, 1968; India, December 31, 1968; Japan, December 27, 1968; United Kingdom, January 15, 1969.

Fourth procès-verbal extending the declaration on the provisional accession of the United Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 13, 1962 (TIAS 5309). Done at Geneva November 19, 1968.¹

Acceptances: Australia, January 16, 1969; Austria (subject to ratification), December 30, 1968; India, January 3, 1969; Japan, December 27, 1968; United Kingdom, January 15, 1969.

Geneva (1967) protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 30, 1967. Entered into force January 1, 1968. TIAS 6425.

Acceptances: Federal Republic of Germany, December 30, 1968; Netherlands, December 30, 1968.

Agreement on implementation of article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 30, 1967. Entered into force July 1, 1968. TIAS 6431.

Acceptance: Federal Republic of Germany, December 30, 1968.

BILATERAL

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement relating to the agreement of December 14, 1964 (TIAS 5703, 6409), relating to fishing operations in the northeastern Pacific Ocean. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington January 31, 1969. Entered into force January 31, 1969.

Agreement extending and amending the agreement of February 5, 1965, as extended (TIAS 5752, 6217), relating to fishing for king crab. Signed at Washington January 31, 1969. Entered into force January 31, 1969.

Agreement extending and amending the agreement of February 13, 1967, as extended (TIAS 6218, 6409), on certain fishery problems in the northeastern part of the Pacific Ocean off the coast of the United States, with exchange of letters. Signed at Washington January 31, 1969. Entered into force January 31, 1969.

Correction

The Editor of the BULLETIN wishes to call attention to an error which appears in the issue of January 20, 1969, p. 57.

The vote shown in footnote 3 is incorrect. The U.N. General Assembly rejected draft resolution XI on the bond issue by a rollcall vote of 34 in favor to 51 (U.S.) against, with 33 abstentions.

China. President Nixon's News Conference of January 27 (excerpts) 141

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy 146

Germany. Letters of Credence (Pauls) 146

Iraq. Mass Public Executions in Iraq Deplored by United States (text of letter from Ambassador Yost to President of U.N. Security Council) 145

Near East. President Nixon's News Conference of January 27 (excerpts) 141

Presidential Documents. President Nixon's News Conference of January 27 (excerpts) 141

Singapore. Letters of Credence (Monteiro) 146

Treaty Information

Current Actions 156

President Nixon's News Conference of January 27 (excerpts) 141

U.S.S.R. President Nixon's News Conference of January 27 (excerpts) 141

United Nations

Mass Public Executions in Iraq Deplored by United States (text of letter from Ambassador Yost to President of U.N. Security Council) 145

The 23d Session of the United Nations General Assembly (U.S. Mission summary) 147

Uruguay. Letters of Credence (Luisi) 146

Viet-Nam

President Nixon's News Conference of January 27 (excerpts) 141

Second Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris (Lodge) 144

Name Index

Lodge, Henry Cabot 144

Luisi, Hector 146

Monteiro, Ernest Steven 146

Nixon, President 141

Pauls, Rolf Friedemann 146

Rogers, Secretary 145

Yost, Charles W 145

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Jan. 27-Feb. 2

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*16	1/27	Rogers: statement on mass public executions in Iraq. (Included in letter from Ambassador Yost to the President of the U.N. Security Council. See p. 145.)
†17	1/30	Interim report on Great Lakes levels by International Joint Commission (rewrite).
18	1/30	Lodge: meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris.
19	1/30	Lodge: additional remarks.
20	1/31	U.S.-U.S.S.R. fishery talks concluded.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE
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STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. LX, No. 1548



February 24, 1969

PRESIDENT NIXON'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF FEBRUARY 6 (*Excerpts*) 157

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM: RESPONSIBILITIES
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

White House Announcement and Message From Secretary Rogers 163

PRESIDENT NIXON URGES SENATE ACTION
ON NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

Text of Message to the Senate 162

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE **BULLETIN**

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President Nixon's News Conference of February 6

Following are excerpts from the transcript of a news conference held by President Nixon at the White House on February 6.

The President: Ladies and gentlemen, as you will note from a release from the Press Office, I will leave on the 23d of this month for a trip to Europe which will take me to Brussels, to London, to Berlin and Bonn, to Rome, and to Paris.

I will be accompanied on the trip by the Secretary of State, Mr. Rogers, and by my adviser for national security affairs, Dr. Kissinger.

The purpose of the trip I will describe as being a working trip rather than a protocol trip. I plan to see in each of the countries I visit the head of government, and in addition to that, I will have a visit with the members of our United States delegation in Paris, headed by Ambassador Lodge, and will have a meeting with Pope Paul in Rome.

While I am in Brussels, I will see leaders of the NATO community. As far as the agenda is concerned for these meetings, it is wide open. I have some ideas about the future of the European community which I will discuss, and I am sure that my colleagues in that community have some ideas that they will want to discuss.

I have requested that in addition to the usual group meetings which will take place, I have an opportunity to have an individual, face-to-face meeting with each head of government, with no one present except a translator when needed.

As I look at this trip and what it may accomplish, I want to make very clear that this is only a first step in achieving a purpose that I have long felt is vital to the future of peace for the United States and for the world. That is the strengthening and the revitalizing of the American-European community.

This will be the first, I would hope, of several meetings of this type that will take place in the years ahead. I would trust that as a result

of this meeting, and as a result of other meetings that will take place, this great alliance which, in my view, has been the greatest force for peace, to keep the peace, over the last 20 years—this great alliance which was brought together by a common fear 20 years ago—will be held together now and strengthened by a common sense of purpose.

I will now go to your questions, Mr. Smith [Merriman Smith, United Press International]?

Q. Mr. President, in connection with your visit to Paris and your talks with Ambassador Lodge, do you see any possibility of your having any direct contact with the other side in these negotiations, specifically, the representatives of North Viet-Nam or the NLF [National Liberation Front]?

The President: Mr. Smith, I do not see any possibility of that kind of conversation at this time. I would not rule it out at some later time if Ambassador Lodge and others who have responsibility for negotiation thought it were wise.

With Ambassador Lodge and his colleagues, I hope to get a complete report on the progress of the negotiations and also any recommendations that he or they may have with regard to new initiatives that we might take to make more progress than we have made.

I think we have made a good start in Paris, incidentally. I believe that we can now move forward to some substantive achievements.

Mr. Cormier [Frank Cormier, Associated Press]?

Q. Mr. President, looking beyond this trip, could you give us a clue to your attitude toward the possibility of future meetings with Soviet leaders?

The President: I believe that a meeting with Soviet leaders should take place at a future time. I should make clear that I think that

President Nixon To Visit Western Europe

*Statement by President Nixon*¹

I am pleased to inform you that after consultations with the heads of state and government concerned, I have decided to visit Western Europe late this month. I plan to visit Brussels, London, Bonn, Berlin, Rome, and Paris in that order. The precise schedule will be made available when it is completed.

The purpose of this trip is to underline my commitment to the closest relationship between our friends in Western Europe and the United States. I would like to lift these relationships from a concern for tactical problems of the day to a definition of our common purposes. The alliance, held together in its first two decades by a common fear, needs now the sense of cohesiveness supplied by common purpose. I am eager for an early exchange of views on all the important issues that concern us. I favor intimate and frank consultations, and I am delighted that it has proved possible to make this journey so early in my administration. I am going to discuss, not to propose; for work, not for ceremony.

The future of the countries of the West can no longer be an exclusively American design. It requires the best thought of Europeans and Americans alike. I look on this trip as laying the groundwork for a series of meetings to be continued over the months ahead.

While in Paris, I intend also to review intensively the Paris peace talks. To this end, I have set aside a morning to meet with Ambassador Lodge and his staff for a full review of the situation.

¹ Issued on Feb. 6 (White House press release).

where summitry is concerned, I take a dim view of what some have called instant summitry, particularly where there are very grave differences of opinion between those who are to meet.

I believe that a well-prepared summit meeting, where we have on the table the various differences that we have on which we can perhaps make progress, would be in our interest and in their interest; and it will be my intention after this trip is completed to conduct exploratory talks at various levels to see if such a meeting could take place.

I should point out, incidentally, that one of the reasons that this trip takes precedence is that I have long felt that before we have meetings of summitry with the Soviet leaders, it is vitally important that we have talks with our European allies, which we are doing.

Q. Mr. President, this morning South Vietnamese President Thieu said that the South Vietnamese Army is capable of relieving a sizable number of American troops in Viet-Nam. What is your understanding of sizable, and do you think there will actually be a reduction of the number of American troops?

The President: Well, speaking personally, and also as the Commander of the Armed Forces, I do not want an American boy to be in Viet-Nam for one day longer than is necessary for our national interest. As our commanders in the field determine that the South Vietnamese are able to assume a greater portion of the responsibility for the defense of their own territory, troops will come back. However, at this time, I have no announcements to make with regard to the return of troops.

I will only say that it is high on the agenda of priorities and that just as soon as either the training program for South Vietnamese forces and their capabilities, the progress of the Paris peace talks, or other developments make it feasible to do so, troops will be brought back.

Q. Mr. President, on your trip to Paris, do you plan to see the South Vietnamese negotiators there? In that connection, a general question on the talks themselves: Do you think you can continue to separate the military issues from the political issues and the political settlement of South Viet-Nam in the negotiations in Paris?

The President: Well, Mr. Lisagor [Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News], that is one of the matters that I want to discuss with Ambassador Lodge, to get his judgment on that point. It is our view that at this time the separation of those two items is in our interest and in the interest of bringing progress in those talks.

Now, as far as meeting with the South Vietnamese leaders is concerned, we have no present plans to do so. If Ambassador Lodge advises that it would be wise to do so, such meetings will be scheduled. There will be enough time in the schedule for a meeting if he does suggest it.

Q. Mr. President, your nominee and now your Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Yost, has been under attack from some conservative groups, such as the Liberty Lobby, for his past associations with certain individuals, particularly including Alger Hiss. In light of your more than passing familiarity with the Hiss case, would you comment on these attacks

on Mr. Yost and whether they should be given any credence?

The President: As far as Mr. Yost's background is concerned, I am completely aware of it because, of course, all of these matters are brought to my attention before appointments are made. But what I am looking to now is his capability to handle the problems of the future and not events that occurred over 20 years ago.

There is no question about his loyalty to this country. And I also think there is no question about his very good judgment on critical issues confronting the United States, particularly in the Mideast.

As I pointed out, he is one of our prime experts in the Mideast. He sat in on the National Security Council meetings when we discussed the Mideast and made some very valuable contributions.

U.S. Policy on the Middle East

Q. Mr. President, on the Middle East, now that you have completed your review with the NSC—you spoke of a need for new initiatives—can you tell us what your policy is going to be now and what initiatives you do expect to take?

The President: Mr. Bailey [Charles W. Bailey 2d, Minneapolis Star and Tribune], our initiatives in the Mideast, I think, can well be summarized by that very word that you have used. What we see now is a new policy on the part of the United States in assuming the initiative. We are not going to stand back and rather wait for something else to happen.

We are going to assume it on what I would suggest five fronts: We are going to continue to give our all-out support to the Jarring mission; we are going to have bilateral talks at the United Nations, preparatory to the talks between the four powers; we shall have four-power talks at the United Nations; we shall also have talks with the countries in the area, with the Israelis and their neighbors; and in addition, we want to go forward on some of the long-range plans, the Eisenhower-Strauss plan for relieving some of the very grave economic problems in that area.

We believe that the initiative here is one that cannot be simply unilateral. It must be multi-lateral. And it must not be in one direction. We are going to pursue every possible avenue to peace in the Mideast that we can.

Latin America

Q. Mr. President, would you please tell us how you plan to move in solving some of the problems of Latin America? Have you decided on your Assistant Secretary of State in that field?

The President: I believe we have decided on the Assistant Secretary of State, but I am not yet prepared to make the announcement because the necessary clearances have not taken place.

May I make one thing very clear: I have noted news stories to the effect that the job was going begging and we were unable to find a qualified man. We have several qualified people, but the Secretary of State and I agree that this is an area of top priority. We think we need new initiatives with regard to the Alliance for Progress.

I would describe that in this way: I think the difficulty in the past, a well-intentioned difficulty, has been that we have been putting too much emphasis on what we are going to do for Latin America and not enough emphasis on what we are going to do with our Latin American friends. The new Assistant Secretary will attempt to remedy that, and we shall attempt to develop new policies.

Q. Mr. President, the Pentagon announced this morning that Secretary Laird had ordered a temporary halt in the construction of the Sentinel system, pending a high-level review. Does that represent a change in policy on our part? Does it indicate that maybe we are getting somewhere with the Russians toward an agreement whereby neither one of us would have to build it?

The President: Mr. Kaplow [Herbert Kaplow, NBC News], answering the second part of your question first, there has been no progress with regard to the arms control talks with the Russians. I have made it clear in the appointment of Mr. Smith to that position¹ that we are going to put emphasis on those talks, but I do believe we should go forward on settling some of the political differences at the same time.

As far as the decision on the Sentinel is concerned, Secretary Laird and his colleagues at the Defense Department will make decisions based

¹ On Jan. 31 President Nixon submitted to the Senate his nomination of Gerard C. Smith to be Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

on the security of the United States, and he will announce those decisions and justify them at this point.

Q. Mr. President, there has been some apprehension, sir, in Asia that your reemphasis on U.S. relations with Europe would mean a lessening of U.S. interests in Asia. Would you comment on that, sir?

The President: This gives me an opportunity to perhaps state my philosophy about emphasis on different parts of the world.

The reason that we have been discussing the Mideast a great deal lately is that it is an area of the world which might explode into a major war. Therefore, it needs immediate attention. That does not mean, however, that we are not going to continue to put attention on Latin America, on Africa, on Asia.

I think you could describe me best as not being a "half worlder," with my eyes looking only to Europe or only to Asia, but one who sees the whole world. We live in one world, and we must go forward together in this whole world.

Anti-Ballistic-Missile System

Q. Mr. President, with regard to the ABM system, you know this was planned originally to protect us against the threat of a nuclear attack by Red China early in the 1970's. Does your information indicate that there is any lessening of this threat, or is it greater, or just where do we stand on that?

The President: First, I do not buy the assumption that the ABM system, the thin Sentinel system as it has been described, was simply for the purpose of protecting ourselves against attack from Communist China.

This system, as are the systems that the Soviet Union has already deployed, adds to our overall defense capability. I would further say that as far as the threat is concerned, we do not see any change in that threat, and we are examining, therefore, all of our defense systems and all of our defense postures to see how we can best meet them consistent with our other responsibilities.

Q. Mr. President, as you are aware, I am sure, there has been discussion on the Hill about trying to set up a Department of Peace to include the Peace Corps and the Disarmament

Agency and other organizations. I wondered about your reaction to that idea.

The President: In fact, one of my task forces recommended a Department of Peace. I think, however, that derogates and improperly downgrades the role of the Department of State and the Department of Defense.

I consider the Department of State to be a Department of Peace. I consider the Department of Defense to be a Department of Peace, and I can assure you that at the White House level, in the National Security Council, that is where we coordinate all of our efforts toward peace.

I think putting one department over here as a Department of Peace would tend to indicate that the other departments were engaged in other activities that were not interested in peace.

Q. Mr. President, there has been some confusion this week on the relationship between the National Security Council and the State Department—for example, the Assistant Secretary of State reporting to the NSC. Could you clarify that for us, please?

The President: Yes. The Secretary of State is my chief foreign policy adviser and the chief agent of this Government in carrying out foreign policy abroad. As one of my very close friends personally, he advises me independently as well as through the National Security Council.

The question has also, I know, been raised as to who makes the policy and the decisions: Are they made in the National Security Council or are they made in the State Department?

The answer is: neither place. The State Department advises the President. The National Security Council advises the President. The President has the authority to make decisions, and I intend to exercise that authority.

Q. Mr. President, during the election campaign, sir, you said that you would seek international agreements to limit the import of certain textiles. Can you tell us when you plan to get around to doing that? Also, could you give us some idea as to what you feel about the growing feeling of protectionism in Congress?

The President: Let me start at the second part of the question first. I believe that the interest of the United States and the interest of

the whole world will best be served by moving toward freer trade rather than toward protectionism.

I take a dim view of this tendency to move toward quotas and other methods that may become permanent, whether they are applied here or by other nations abroad.

Second, as far as the textile situation is concerned, that is a special problem which has caused very great distress in certain parts of this country and to a great number of wage earners, as well as those who operate our textile facilities.

For that reason, exploratory discussions have taken place and will be taking place with the major countries involved to see if we can handle this on a volunteer basis rather than having to go to a legislation which would impose quotas and, I think, would turn the clock back in our objective of trying to achieve freer trade.

invasion of Czechoslovakia. Can you tell me, sir, how you feel that situation has changed since then?

The President: It has changed in the sense that the number of Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia has been substantially reduced.

It has changed also in the sense that the passage of time tends somewhat to reduce the pent-up feelings that were then present with regard to the Soviet Union's actions.

I want to make it very clear that in asking the Senate to ratify the treaty, I did not gloss over the fact that we still very strongly disapproved of what the Soviet Union had done in Czechoslovakia and what it still is doing. But on balance, I considered that this was the time to move forward on the treaty and have done so.

The press: Thank you, Mr. President.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

Q. Mr. President, you have now asked the Senate to ratify the Nonproliferation Treaty. On your trip to Europe, do you have any hopes of trying to persuade particularly West Germany and France to move a little closer toward signing that treaty?

The President: My view about asking other governments to follow our lead is this: They know what we think, and I am sure that that matter will come up for discussion.

I will make it clear that I believe that ratification of the treaty by all governments, nuclear and nonnuclear, is in the interest of peace and in the interest of reducing the possibility of nuclear proliferation.

On the other hand, I do not believe that we gain our objectives through heavyhanded activities publicly, particularly in attempting to get others to follow our lead. Each of these governments is a sovereign government. Each has its own political problems. I think in the end most of our friends in Western Europe will follow our lead. I will attempt to persuade, but I will not, certainly, attempt to use any blackmail or arm twisting.

Q. On the Nonproliferation Treaty again, last fall during the campaign, Mr. President, you opposed ratification because of the Soviet

United States Agrees in Principle to Four-Power Talks on Middle East

Secretary Rogers on February 5 handed to French Ambassador Charles Lucet the U.S. reply to the French Government's note on the Middle East. Following is a statement read to news correspondents on February 5 by Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey.

The United States Government informed the Government of France that it is prepared in principle to consider favorably a meeting of United Nations representatives of France, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, and the United States within the framework of the Security Council to discuss ways and means to assist Ambassador Jarring to promote agreement between the parties in accordance with the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.¹

We suggested that there be prompt preliminary discussions, in the first instance on a bilateral basis, for the purpose of developing the measure of understanding that would make an early meeting of the permanent U.N. representatives of the four powers a fruitful and constructive complement to Ambassador Jarring's mission.

¹ For text of the resolution, see BULLETIN of Dec. 18, 1967, p. 843.

President Nixon Urges Senate Action on Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

*President Nixon's Message to the Senate*¹

To the Senate of the United States:

After receiving the advice of the National Security Council, I have decided that it will serve the national interest to proceed with the ratification of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.² Accordingly, I request that the Senate act promptly to consider the Treaty and give its advice and consent to ratification.

I have always supported the goal of halting the spread of nuclear weapons. I opposed ratification of the Treaty last fall in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. My request at this time in no sense alters my condemnation of that Soviet action.

I believe that ratification of the Treaty at this time would advance this Administration's policy of negotiation rather than confrontation with the USSR.

I believe that the Treaty can be an important step in our endeavor to curb the spread of nuclear weapons and that it advances the purposes of our Atoms for Peace program which I have supported since its inception during President Eisenhower's Administration.

In submitting this request I wish to endorse the commitment made by the previous Administration that the United States will, when safeguards are applied under the Treaty, permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply its safeguards to all nuclear activities in the United States, exclusive of those activities with direct national security significance.

I also reiterate our willingness to join with all Treaty parties to take appropriate measures to insure that potential benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made

¹ Transmitted on Feb. 5 (White House press release).

² For background, see BULLETIN of July 29, 1968, p. 126; for text of the treaty, see BULLETIN of July 1, 1968, p. 9.

available to non-nuclear-weapon parties to the Treaty.

Consonant with my purpose to "strengthen the structure of peace," therefore, I urge the Senate's prompt consideration and positive action on this Treaty.

RICHARD NIXON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
February 5, 1969.

Under Secretary To Supervise Prisoner of War Matters

*Department Statement*¹

Secretary Rogers has asked Under Secretary Richardson to assume overall coordination and responsibility for State Department actions concerning prisoners of war in Southeast Asia. This designation of the Under Secretary reaffirms our Government's commitment at the highest levels to continue to do everything possible to assist and protect Americans held by North Viet-Nam and the Viet Cong, to obtain their earliest possible release, and to encourage full compliance with the Geneva Convention of 1949 Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The Under Secretary will maintain close liaison on this subject with the White House, the Defense Department and the military services, and with Ambassador Lodge in Paris, who also is taking a close personal interest in our prisoners.

Assisting the Under Secretary on prisoner of war matters as Special Assistant will be Frank A. Sieverts, who previously served as Special Assistant to Ambassador Harriman working particularly on prisoner of war matters. Ambassador Harriman had overall responsibility for our prisoners beginning in May of 1966.

¹ Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey on Feb. 4; also issued as press release 22.

The National Security Council System: Responsibilities of the Department of State

Following are texts of a White House announcement of February 7; a message of February 6 from Secretary Rogers to all officers and employees of the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, the U.S. Information Agency, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Peace Corps; and the text of a Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Circular dated February 6.

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

White House press release dated February 7

During the past 2 weeks the President has set in motion a vigorous program for studying new approaches to pressing national security issues. These studies will be conducted in the framework of the revitalized National Security Council system which was urged by the President during the presidential election campaign.

Since January 20 the President has moved to restore the National Security Council to the role set for it in the National Security Act of 1947:

“. . . to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.”

The steps which have already been taken to reinvigorate the Council include the following:

—The President has indicated that the Council will henceforth be the principal forum for the consideration of policy issues on which he is required to make decisions.

—The President has directed that the Na-

tional Security Council meet regularly (five meetings have been held in the first 2½ weeks and one meeting will be held each week for the next few months).

—At the President's direction, a series of supporting NSC committees and groups have been organized to prepare forward planning for the Council as well as to facilitate the handling of more immediate operational problems within the context of the NSC system.

—The President has assigned to the supporting NSC bodies a comprehensive series of studies covering the principal national security issues now confronting the Nation or which are expected to be of importance in the months ahead. Several of these studies have already come before the Council, including ones dealing with Viet-Nam, the Nonproliferation Treaty, and the Middle East.

As important as the regularity and strengthened structure of the Council and its projected policy studies is the approach prescribed by the President for the examination of issues. The guidance to NSC study groups seeks to assure that all pertinent facts are established and all options presented—complete with pros, cons, and costs—so that decisions can be made with a clear understanding of their ramifications. The purpose of this procedure is to bring the full range of choices to the President and his principal advisers—not to bury them.

An explicit aspect of the above arrangements was the President's designation of the Secretary of State as his principal foreign policy adviser. As such, the Secretary of State has been delegated by the President clear authority, to the full extent permitted by law, in interdepartmental operations of the U.S. Government overseas.

In order to provide the President and the Council with the strongest possible support, the

President has directed the reorganization and strengthening of the NSC staff.

The substantive components of the new staff and the personnel now or soon to be on board are as follows:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF

OPERATIONS STAFF

Latin America

Viron P. Vaky
Arnold Nachmanoff

Europe

Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Donald R. Lesh

East Asia

Richard L. Sneider
Dean Moor

Near East and South Asia

Harold Saunders
John Foster

Africa

Roger Morris

International Economic Affairs

Richard Cooper
Fred Bergsten
James P. McBaine

Science, Disarmament and Atomic Energy

Spurgeon Keeny

ASSISTANTS FOR PROGRAMS

Morton Halperin
Laurence Lynn
Robert Osgood
Capt. Robert Sansom
Lt. Col. Dale Vesser
John Court

PLANNING STAFF

Richard V. Allen
Daniel I. Davidson
John F. Lehman, Jr.
Winston Lord

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Richard M. Moose
Col. Alexander Haig
Robert Houdek
Arthur McCafferty

SECRETARY ROGERS' MESSAGE, FEBRUARY 6

Press release 25 dated February 7

You will soon be receiving a Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Circular summarizing and explaining decisions taken recently by the President which restructure the National Security Council system and bear upon the development and execution of our foreign policy. The President's decisions place

challenging responsibilities before all of us in the Department of State.

The President has assigned to the Department of State authority and responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas. (As in the past this assignment does not include activities of United States military forces operating in the field where such forces are under the command of a United States area military commander or such other military activities as the President may elect as Commander-in-Chief to conduct through military channels.)

It is the President's intention that the Department of State will also play a central and dynamic role in the new National Security Council system. This role will be performed principally through the participation of the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary at all NSC meetings, the newly-constituted NSC Under Secretaries Committee chaired by the Under Secretary and in his absence the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Department of State participation on the NSC Review Group, and through the Interdepartmental Groups of regional and functional composition which are chaired by Assistant Secretaries of State. These responsibilities provide the Department a role of leadership which will require imagination and energy to be asserted by all involved.

The resources of the Department and its associated agencies will provide the strongest possible support to the President's desire to use the National Security Council system for an orderly examination of our foreign policy objectives.

The Department of State will energetically execute United States policy objectives overseas in accordance with the President's decisions. Ambassadors and our missions abroad will be depended upon for initiatives and support. Country Directors, under the guidance of their Assistant Secretaries, will exercise leadership in the Washington community in policy and program matters relating to the countries under their jurisdiction and in support of our missions abroad.

The President's goal is to enhance and insure the security and peaceful progress of the United States. Our success in this objective will contribute to the well-being of free people everywhere.

SUBJECT: Reorganization of the National Security Council System and Direction, Coordination and Supervision of Interdepartmental Activities Overseas

1. *Reorganization of the National Security Council System*

To assist him in carrying out his responsibilities for the conduct of national security affairs, the President has designated the National Security Council as the principal forum for consideration of national security policy issues requiring Presidential decision. In addition to utilizing the NSC itself he has reorganized the NSC system to constitute certain groups and committees, and has designated responsibilities to the Department of State, as described below:

a. *NSC Interdepartmental Groups*

The previously existing Interdepartmental Regional Groups and the Political-Military Interdepartmental Group, have been reconstituted as Interdepartmental Groups in the NSC system, chaired by the appropriate Assistant Secretary of the Department of State. The membership of these Groups will include representatives of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other agencies at the discretion of the Chairman depending on the issue under consideration.

The Interdepartmental Groups will:

—discuss and decide interdepartmental issues which can be settled at the Assistant Secretary level, including issues arising out of the implementation of NSC decisions;

—prepare policy papers for consideration by the NSC;

—prepare contingency papers on potential crisis areas for NSC review.

b. *NSC Ad Hoc Groups*

When appropriate, the President will appoint NSC *Ad Hoc* Groups to deal with particular problems, including those which transcend regional boundaries.

c. *NSC Review Group*

An NSC Review Group has been established to examine papers such as those coming out of the Interdepartmental Groups, NSC *Ad Hoc* Groups, or departments prior to their submission to the NSC. The Review Group, chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, will include representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other agencies at the discretion of the Chairman, depending on the issue under consideration. The Review Group will review papers to assure that:

—the issue under consideration is worthy of NSC attention;

—all realistic alternatives are presented;

—the facts, including cost implications, and all departments' and agencies' views are fairly and adequately set forth.

The Review Group may assign action to the NSC Interdepartmental Groups or NSC *Ad Hoc* Groups, as appropriate, and may refer issues to the Under Secretaries Committee.

d. *The NSC Under Secretaries Committee*

An NSC Under Secretaries Committee has been established under the Chairmanship of the Under Secretary of State, assisted by the Under Secretary for Political Affairs who will also act as his alternate, consisting of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, depending on the issues under consideration, ranking officers of other agencies at the discretion of the Chairman. The Under Secretaries Committee will consider:

(1) issues referred to it by the NSC Review Group;

(2) operational matters pertaining to interdepartmental activities of the U.S. Government overseas:

—on which NSC Interdepartmental Groups have been unable to reach agreement, or which are of a broader nature than is suitable to any such group;

—which do not require consideration at Presidential or NSC level; and

—which are referred to it by the Secretary of State.

(3) other operational matters referred to it jointly by the Under Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

2. *Authority and Responsibility of the Secretary of State*

a. The President has affirmed the position of the Secretary of State as his principal foreign policy adviser and his responsibility, in accordance with approved policy, for the execution of foreign policy.

b. He has assigned to the Secretary authority and responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas. This authority includes continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance, military assistance and sales programs, as provided in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. (The authority does not extend to

(1) the activities of United States military forces operating in the field where such forces are under the command of a United States area military commander,

(2) such other military activities as the President elects to conduct through military channels, and

(3) activities which are internal to the execution and administration of the approved programs of a single department or agency and which are not of such a nature as to affect significantly the overall U.S. overseas program in a country or region.)

c. Previously established responsibilities of the Department of State by virtue of law or Executive Order with respect to such matters as international educational and cultural affairs, information activities,

foreign assistance, food for peace, arms control and disarmament, supervision of programs authorized by the Peace Corps Act, social science research, immigration and refugee assistance continue in effect.

d. In the implementation of his responsibilities for the execution of foreign policy and for the direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities overseas the Secretary of State intends to utilize, in addition to the normal resources of the Department, the system of NSC Interdepartmental Groups and the Under Secretaries Committee outlined above. Within the purview of these responsibilities executive authority is delegated by the Secretary to the Chairmen of these Committees.

e. Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions in foreign countries, as representatives of the President and acting on his behalf, continue to be in charge of all elements of the United States Diplomatic Mission and to exercise affirmative responsibility for the direction, coordination and supervision of all activities of the United States Government in their respective countries.

Third Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris

The third plenary session of the new meetings on Viet-Nam was held at Paris on February 6. Following are preliminary remarks and the opening statement made by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, head of the U.S. delegation.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

Press release 26 dated February 7

Before presenting my prepared statement, I wish to say a few things about the remarks made on the other side.

You continue to speak of American aggression in South Viet-Nam and to present your distorted view of the origins of the war. What are the facts? The facts are that Hanoi decided at least 10 years ago to resort to force to impose its will on the people of the South. With that decision it organized, supplied, and directed the Viet Cong, sent its own military and subversive forces to the South, and brought down the horror of war upon the people of South Viet-Nam. Terrorism became a tool of this policy and destruction its result. The misery and the loss of life that followed is the direct responsibility of the leaders in Hanoi and their agents in the South.

The people of South Viet-Nam, by the millions, have resisted this attempt to use force and terror to bend an entire nation to the will of a few. The United States and other allies stand by their side. The leader of the delegation of the Republic of Viet-Nam has answered you with the dignity and honesty of a people embattled but determined to resist the heavy hand of your aggression.

I do not accept your erroneous statements about the United States.

While you of the other side reiterate your twisted version of past history, young men— young Vietnamese and young Americans—are dying. Innocent civilians are being killed.

We should be thinking and talking about the future, not arguing about the past.

We should be discussing the substance of a peaceful settlement of the war, toward which we have made a number of constructive and specific proposals.

OPENING STATEMENT

Press release 24 dated February 6

The purpose of these meetings on Viet-Nam is to bring a just and lasting peace. An essential element in such a peace must be the right of the people of South Viet-Nam to shape their own future without outside interference or coercion. The United States has stated many times that we are in Viet-Nam to help assure that the South Vietnamese people have that right. Our participation in these meetings is directed to that same end. You, too, have said you believe that a solution in Viet-Nam must rest upon the right of the South Vietnamese to self-determination. You have also said you favor a settlement without external interference. If that is common ground, let us search together for ways to achieve that goal. Otherwise, we shall find ourselves only repeating differing views of history and debating the philosophical and ideological differences that separate us.

Instead, let us come to grips with practical and concrete problems that lend themselves to solution. Let us look promptly and carefully for ways to separate the contending forces in Viet-Nam. Let us try to create conditions in which peaceful political processes can develop with no external interference. We find it hard to believe that it would be possible for the South

Vietnamese to know true self-determination or to build peacefully their own political institutions while hundreds of thousands of men from outside South Viet-Nam are engaged in bitter conflict throughout the country.

Because of this, we ask you once again to give serious consideration to our proposal that we start our discussions by directing our attention to specific military problems. We do not, thereby, set aside the importance of political matters. We do underline two things in this regard: First, as we have repeatedly said, we consider that the settlement of political affairs must be a matter for determination by the South Vietnamese themselves; second, we believe that the separation of the contending military forces will help to create a climate in which the political process can go forward without external interference.

We have raised here as a first proposal the restoration of the demilitarized zone. We have made this suggestion for a number of reasons:

First, we consider this an important step in the direction of separating the forces that now are in conflict.

Second, it appears to be a limited and manageable problem which should be easier to arrange than most of the other matters we may have to confront.

Third, agreement on this limited measure could set a constructive tone for our consideration of other problems.

Further, let me clear up one misconception expressed at the previous meeting. We do not regard the 17th parallel as a permanent political boundary. The restoration of the demilitarized zone does not in any way preclude the reunification of Viet-Nam, if that is the freely chosen preference of the people of North Viet-Nam and of the people of South Viet-Nam. But that kind of free expression of choice can only come with peace.

We also reject the charge made last week that we want to restore the DMZ so that we can maintain our military forces in South Viet-Nam. Indeed, the contrary is true. For we believe that restoration of the DMZ should facilitate the early withdrawal of external forces from South Viet-Nam.

We believe that if the South Vietnamese people are to have the opportunity to shape their own destiny in their own freely chosen way, we must arrange the mutual withdrawal of all external forces from South Viet-Nam. That means the withdrawal of all North Vietnamese military and subversive forces to North Viet-Nam. As that is happening, the withdrawal of American and Allied forces will commence.

Once these steps are arranged, we shall be well on the way toward creating conditions in which the people of South Viet-Nam can exercise the self-determination we both insist we want them to have. Progress toward a political settlement based on self-determination must surely be based upon such changes in the present extensive military confrontation. Without agreement on military issues, there would be great difficulty in achieving the solution of internal political problems.

It is for all these reasons that we have made specific proposals on these military matters. We need to move forward in these meetings toward a solution of concrete problems. We are ready to do so. We urge you to do the same.

White House Announces Appointments to U.N. Commissions

Commission on the Status of Women

The White House announced on January 29 that the President had appointed Mrs. Elizabeth Duncan Koontz to be the representative of the United States on the Commission on the Status of Women of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

Human Rights Commission

The White House announced on February 3 that the President had appointed Mrs. Rita Hauser to be the representative of the United States on the Human Rights Commission of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

President Nixon Visits the Department of State

Remarks by President Nixon¹

Mr. Secretary, ladies and gentlemen: I am very honored and privileged to be here in this auditorium on my first official visit with the key personnel of one of the departments.

I recall, incidentally, that on Inauguration Day the first building I visited was this one. We had then a prayer breakfast—not a breakfast, we had prayer without breakfast.

Now that we have had the prayers, we are back here to get the advice so that I can go back to the Senate and get the consent for everything that we have to do from now on.

I do want you to know, too, that in appearing here with the Secretary of State, I think his relationship with the President is of great interest to those in this Department.

I have been reading some dope stories lately about the rivalries that may develop between the various departments in Government and particularly the traditional struggles for power that sometimes take place when the State Department is concerned and the White House staff is concerned when it delves into foreign policy. I have often answered those who had concern in this point by saying that what really counts is not the table of organization but what really counts is the relationship between the two men—the President and his Secretary of State.

I am sure that all of you know that my relationship with Secretary Rogers goes back many, many years. We came into Government virtually together; as a matter of fact, we came into the service together—the Navy, when we were at Quonset Point in 1942. Since that time I have learned to respect his judgment, his courage, his basic intelligence, as I know and I am sure that you in this Department who have the opportunity to know him will learn to respect it.

I also am aware of the fact that in the pres-

ence of a Secretary of State I may be in the presence of someone who may turn out to be my successor in this Office.

I did a little historical research before coming over here, just as I did historical research before I went to the House yesterday and to the Senate today at noon. So in each place I pay proper tribute to the members of the body concerned.

In the House of Representatives, for example, I was able to point out that in a period between 1840 and 1880, 10 out of the 12 Presidents of the United States in that period had served in the House of Representatives. Then for a considerable period of time, up until the time of the election in 1960, the Nation moved to other areas for their Presidents, except for the election of Harry Truman in 1948.

I pointed out when I was at the Senate today that Andrew Johnson, in the 19th century, was the last President before John F. Kennedy who had served in both the House and the Senate. Then John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and now the present occupant of the Presidency, have served in both the House and the Senate.

Now, as far as the State Department was concerned, my history had to go back a little further.

I found, for example, that in days long gone—not gone, but long past—that in the past the Secretary of State was the office that was the logical one for anyone to seek in the event he wanted to be President.

You will all remember that Jefferson was Washington's Secretary of State. Madison was Jefferson's Secretary of State. Monroe was Madison's Secretary of State. John Quincy Adams was Monroe's Secretary of State. And Martin Van Buren was Jackson's first Secretary of State.

In fact, the tradition continued and I found ended in the passing of the office from President Polk to President Buchanan. President

¹ Made in the Department of State Auditorium on Jan. 29 (White House press release).

Buchanan was the last who had been Secretary of State who became President of the United States. Now, whether that tells us something or not as to why it has not happened since, I do not know.

President Buchanan, as some of you may recall—if you were following me on inaugural night—was one who came to the Presidency at a time that he thought was much too late for that honor to be accorded him. As he was riding down from the White House to the Capitol, he turned to a friend and said that he didn't feel particularly happy about becoming President at this late stage in his political career because he found that all of his friends that he wanted to reward had now died. And he said all of his enemies that he hated and wanted to punish were now his friends.

Now, of course, we have Secretary Rogers.

I should point out that there is another way that he can go up if he would like. He has been the Attorney General of the United States and consequently could qualify for the Chief Justiceship. I am not suggesting that, incidentally, he will be Earl Warren's successor—not right now.

But you will recall that the first Chief Justice of the United States, John Jay, started as Secretary to the Confederation before the United States became the Government that it was under the Constitution. And John Marshall had served as Secretary of State, too, as did Charles Evans Hughes. That is a great tradition.

All that I am suggesting to you by these opening remarks is that those of you who may plan to be Secretary of State can look forward possibly to being either President of the United States or Chief Justice.

I will only add one further thought, however: that in each body, any House Member, naturally, who heard what I said could see himself becoming President someday, any Member of the Senate could see that if things worked out he might become President, and, of course, any person in this audience, with your foreign policy background and your futures, could see yourself becoming President.

Which is the best way? I think perhaps the best answer I have for that is in a favorite anecdote. An Episcopal priest was asked by a young parishioner who was very troubled about all of the theology he had heard about, asked that question that I am sure all leaders in religious thought are often asked.

The young parishioner said, "Father, is the Episcopal Church the only true path to salvation?" The priest smiled and answered. He said, "No, son, there are other ways, but no gentleman would choose them."

I am sure the Secretary would say that there may be other ways to the Presidency than the Secretary of State but no gentleman would choose them.

Now, may I speak to you quite directly about the work that you do and my association with it and what I hope would be our association in the future.

As I look at this front row here, I see men whom I met 20 years ago when I first went to Europe with the Herter Committee. I can see in rows way back there people who have briefed me on my trips abroad during the period I was a Congressman, a Senator, the 8 years I was Vice President, and then in the period of 7 or 8 years when I was out of Government.

During that time, I have visited over 60 countries. I always prided myself on trying to be well briefed before I made those visits, and consequently I became well acquainted with the career men and women in the State Department.

Not just because I stand before you today but because I believe this—and I have often said it publicly and privately—I do think we have the best career service in the world. I think that was the case based on what I have seen, what I have heard, and on the advice that I have received.

I think it is vitally important to the future of this country that the morale of that career service be kept at its highest level possible and that those who make the foreign policy of this country have the best possible advice that we can get from those who serve in the career service.

That is one of the reasons why, when Secretary Rogers assumed his position and when the Under Secretaries as well as the Assistant Secretaries talked to me, I set forth a policy, a policy that I want followed throughout this administration, somewhat different from some of the policies of the past.

Each President must work differently, of course, in developing his foreign policy decisions. That policy is this: I consider the Secretary of State to be my chief foreign policy adviser; and when we have a difficult decision and I ask him what should we do, I do not want him to come in and say, "You could do this or you could do that." I want him to say "You

could do this or you could do that," but I want him to give me his advice on what we *should* do.

I have also told him, and as I understand it he has informed you, that where there is a strong minority view or where there may be two other viewpoints or more held by responsible people, I want to see that view, too. The reason I want to see the minority views as well as the majority views as well as his advice—which may be either one or the other, because he may not agree with the majority view, even in the Department—is that I have the conviction that a policy is improved by having the decisionmaker consider the options and consider the alternatives; even if he decides to reject one point of view that is strongly urged, he may develop from considering that point of view a more effective and stronger position in the position which he eventually considers to be the preferable one.

I say that, because as I have traveled throughout the world I have sometimes been concerned that people in the career service in various posts develop a sense of frustration that they have ideas with regard to the conduct of foreign policy that are quite relevant that ought to be considered, but there is some way they will never get to the top in the bureaucracy.

Now, I recognize in the huge responsibilities we have around the world, and all the cables that come pouring in here, that every idea that anybody has in the world cannot always come to the President of the United States or even to the Secretary of State or even to the Under Secretaries or the Assistant Secretaries. But I do want to urge everyone here who has a responsibility for preparing any materials that come to my office, that I am interested in, and want to see, points of view that may differ from those that eventually become the policy of this country.

I think the more that we have that kind of dialogue, that kind of sometimes debate, of consideration, which is not simply papering over differences, negotiating them out—and I know you are very skilled in that, too, you have to be—but I think when we have that kind of dialogue we can improve our policies.

It will certainly be of very good assistance to me. I say that, too, because I realize that in this Department are so many who have varied backgrounds, who have done a great deal of thinking—a great deal more than I will ever

have the opportunity to do—on special problems and special areas.

I will, therefore, appreciate the best that you can present, and I can assure you that to the extent my time permits those viewpoints will be considered.

Finally, as you may have noted if you read or heard my first press conference on Monday—I was glad the Secretary had read it, incidentally—you will note that I pointed out when one of the questioners said "What is the most important decision that you have to make? What is the greatest problem that you have to confront?" I pointed out what is the fact, and that is that it is difficult to try to select priorities among the many problems that confront this nation at home and abroad, but I do know that there are certain decisions in foreign policy that only the President of the United States can make. It is here that he must devote that extra effort—if there is any extra effort he can devote to it—because if he makes a mistake in this area, it is a mistake that no one else is going to be able to correct.

For that reason, I asked that the Secretary arrange this meeting, that I come here to say to those who have worked in the field—many of you I have met around the world, many of you I hope to meet during the course of my service in the present Office that I hold—to say to you that I appreciate what you have done. I respect the members of this Department, the career service, for the contribution you have made and are making to the foreign policy of this country.

I hope that when this administration completes its service in Washington we will have made real progress toward settling differences between nations, toward bringing the peace that we all want in the world.

I know that if that comes, it will come only because of the quality of our State Department personnel. I know that I have to count on you. I can only say that as I stand here today, as I see you, I believe that I, as the chief executive officer of this nation, have the best advice of any chief executive officer of any nation in the world.

Thank you.

Before Mr. Rogers responds, I should say that in giving that little history I can also tell you about the last Attorney General who became Secretary of State. I am sure some of the

veterans may remember it was President Taft's Secretary of State, Philander Knox. He was famous for a reason that I hope Mr. Rogers does not become famous for. He was a man who loved the good life. He used to arrive in the office about 10 o'clock to look over the cables. At 11:30 he would leave and go to the best club in town for a leisurely two-martini lunch. Then in the afternoon, if it was a good day, he would go out to Chevy Chase and play golf and that evening attend a diplomatic reception. I understand that things have changed, but that was one of your predecessors.

U.S. Delegation Named to OECD Ministerial Meeting

The Department of State announced on February 7 (press release 29) that Under Secretary Elliot L. Richardson would head the U.S. delegation to the ministerial meeting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development at Paris February 13-14.

This annual meeting of the top foreign and economic policy officials of the 22 member nations of the OECD will be devoted to a review of major economic issues facing the member countries.

The OECD, whose membership comprises the industrialized countries of Western Europe and North America, as well as Japan, has three major goals:

1. To promote the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of living in its member countries;
2. To contribute to the sound economic expansion of member nations and of nonmember nations which are in the process of development; and
3. To further the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, nondiscriminatory basis in accordance with international obligations.

The Under Secretary was assisted by Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs Paul Volcker, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs William Chartner, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Joseph Greenwald, and U.S. Permanent Representative to the OECD Philip H. Trezise.

TREATY INFORMATION

Science Cooperation Agreement Concluded With Republic of China

Press release 10 dated January 23

An agreement for a cooperative program in science and technology was effected on January 23 through an exchange of notes between the United States and the Republic of China in Taipei.

Under the program the two countries will seek new ways of increasing direct contacts and cooperation between scientists, engineers, and scholars and between institutions of research and higher education. The exchange of information, ideas, skills, and techniques in areas of common interest will be promoted, and special facilities will be made available by each nation to scientists of the other in joint research programs.

In scope the program will cover all branches of science and technology, including the social sciences. It will involve institutional cooperation, the exchange of personnel and information, the pursuit of joint research projects, consultations, and the planning of cooperative activities.

The agreement provides that each country will normally bear its own costs under joint programs, subject to the availability of funds. Each Government is to designate an "Executive Agency" to coordinate the implementation of the joint programs and to conduct a periodic review. For the United States, the National Science Foundation will carry out this function, and the National Science Council will be the counterpart agency for the Chinese side. The agreement is effective for a period of 6 years, with the possibility of extension by mutual consent.

This agreement with the Republic of China is the most recent of a series of bilateral arrangements with other countries with the objective of the general advancement of science and the consequent strengthening of policy relationships.

The text of the agreement was formalized in

an exchange between the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Republic of China, Wei Tao-ming, and U.S. Ambassador to China Walter P. McCaughy.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention on offenses and certain other acts committed on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo September 14, 1963.¹

Signature: Colombia, November 8, 1968.

Grains

International grains arrangement, 1967, with annexes. Open for signature at Washington October 15 through November 30, 1967. Entered into force July 1, 1968. TIAS 6537.

Accession to the Wheat Trade Convention deposited: Costa Rica, January 28, 1969.

Judicial Procedures

Convention on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters. Done at The Hague November 15, 1965. Entered into force February 10, 1969. TIAS 6638.

Signature: Denmark, January 7, 1969.

Nuclear Weapons-Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968.¹

Ratifications deposited at Washington: Finland, Norway, February 5, 1969.

Oil Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, with annexes, as amended (TIAS 6109). Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900.

Acceptance deposited: Syrian Arab Republic, December 24, 1968.

¹ Not in force.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.

Acceptance deposited: Syrian Arab Republic, December 24, 1968.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a global commercial communications satellite system. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.

Accession deposited: Jamaica, February 4, 1969.

Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.

Signature: Cable and Wireless (West Indies) Limited for Jamaica, February 4, 1969.

BILATERAL

China

Agreement relating to cooperation in science and technology. Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei January 23, 1969. Entered into force January 23, 1969.

Guinea

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of October 18, 1967 (TIAS 6381). Signed at Washington February 3, 1969. Entered into force February 3, 1969.

Indonesia

Memorandum of agreement regarding the second rescheduling of payments under the surplus property agreement of May 28, 1947, with annexes (TIAS 1750). Signed at Djakarta December 20, 1968. Entered into force December 20, 1968.

Memorandum of agreement regarding debt rescheduling under the agricultural commodities agreement of June 28, 1966 (TIAS 6044), with annexes. Signed at Djakarta December 20, 1968. Entered into force December 20, 1968.

Memorandum of agreement regarding debt rescheduling under the agricultural commodities agreement of April 18, 1966, as amended (TIAS 6016, 6033), with annexes. Signed at Djakarta December 20, 1968. Entered into force December 20, 1968.

Viet-Nam

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of March 13, 1967 (TIAS 6271). Signed at Saigon January 14, 1969. Entered into force January 14, 1969.

Asia. Under Secretary To Supervise Prisoner of War Matters 162

Atomic Energy. President Nixon Urges Senate Action on Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 162

Belgium. President Nixon To Visit Western Europe (statement by the President) 158

China
President Nixon's News Conference of February 6 (excerpts) 157
Science Cooperation Agreement Concluded With Republic of China 171

Congress. President Nixon Urges Senate Action on Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 162

Czechoslovakia. President Nixon's News Conference of February 6 (excerpts) 157

Department and Foreign Service
The National Security Council System: Responsibilities of the Department of State (White House announcement, Secretary Rogers' message, text of circular) 163
President Nixon Visits the Department of State (remarks to key officials) 168
Under Secretary To Supervise Prisoner of War Matters 162

Disarmament
President Nixon's News Conference of February 6 (excerpts) 157
President Nixon Urges Senate Action on Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 162

Economic Affairs. U.S. Delegation Named to OECD Ministerial Meeting 171

Europe. President Nixon's News Conference of February 6 (excerpts) 157

France
President Nixon To Visit Western Europe (statement by the President) 158
United States Agrees in Principle to Four-Power Talks on Middle East (Department statement) 161

Germany. President Nixon To Visit Western Europe (statement by the President) 158

Government Organization. The National Security Council System: Responsibilities of the Department of State (White House announcement, Secretary Rogers' message, text of circular) 163

International Organizations. U.S. Delegation Named to OECD Ministerial Meeting 171

Italy. President Nixon To Visit Western Europe (statement by the President) 158

Latin America. President Nixon's News Conference of February 6 (excerpts) 157

Near East
President Nixon's News Conference of February 6 (excerpts) 157
United States Agrees in Principle to Four-Power Talks on Middle East (Department statement) 161

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. President Nixon's News Conference of February 6 (excerpts) 157

Presidential Documents
President Nixon's News Conference of February 6 (excerpts) 157
President Nixon To Visit Western Europe 158
President Nixon Urges Senate Action on Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 162
President Nixon Visits the Department of State 168

Science. Science Cooperation Agreement Concluded With Republic of China 171

Trade. President Nixon's News Conference of February 6 (excerpts) 157

Treaty Information
Current Actions 172
President Nixon Urges Senate Action on Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 162
Science Cooperation Agreement Concluded With Republic of China 171

U.S.S.R. President Nixon's News Conference of February 6 (excerpts) 157

United Kingdom. President Nixon To Visit Western Europe (statement by the President) 158

United Nations
United States Agrees in Principle to Four-Power Talks on Middle East (Department statement) 161
White House Announces Appointments to U.N. Commissions 167

Viet-Nam
President Nixon's News Conference of February 6 (excerpts) 157
Third Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris (Lodge) 166
Under Secretary To Supervise Prisoner of War Matters 162

Name Index

Hauser, Mrs. Rita 167
Koontz, Mrs. Elizabeth Duncan 167
Lodge, Henry Cabot 166
Nixon, President 157, 158, 162, 168
Rogers, Secretary 163

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: February 3-9

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to February 3 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 10 of January 23.

No.	Date	Subject
*21	2/4	Jamaica becomes 64th member of Global Commercial Communications System.
22	2/4	Under Secretary Richardson to coordinate actions on prisoners of war in Southeast Asia.
†23	2/6	U.S. and Australia to study feasibility of using nuclear explosions in harbor development project.
24	2/6	Lodge: third plenary session on Viet-Nam at Paris.
25	2/7	Rogers: responsibilities of Department of State.
26	2/7	Lodge: preliminary remarks at Paris session.
*27	2/7	Regional foreign policy conference, Columbia, S.C., March 5.
*28	2/7	Regional foreign policy conference, Charlotte, N.C., March 6.
29	2/7	OECD ministerial meeting, Paris, February 13-14 (U.S. delegation) (rewrite).

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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March 3, 1969

THE INTERNATIONAL ATOM—A NEW APPRAISAL
THE PAST AND THE PROMISE

The Rosenfeld Lecture (Part I)

Delivered at Grinnell College

by

Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 173

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

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Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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The International Atom—A New Appraisal

The Past and the Promise

by Glenn T. Seaborg
Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission

Among my many speaking engagements during the year—and in recent years they have averaged about one a week—few give me as much satisfaction as my talks to college audiences. I'm particularly pleased that you have invited me to give the Rosenfield Lecture here at Grinnell College, because it provides me with an opportunity to discuss with you a matter which is vital to your future, to the future of the world: the development of nuclear energy and its relationship to international affairs.

In spite of all that has been written and said about the atom, it is a subject that still generates more heat than light. And it is one that needs more understanding on the part of the citizen if he is to properly influence his fellow citizens and his Government to follow the right path in these days of decisions often based on complex scientific and technical knowledge. In line with this, I find that many audiences I speak to about the activities and responsibilities of the Atomic Energy Commission are amazed at the scope of its work, the extent of its involvement with other Government programs, and the many areas of people's lives that are directly or indirectly affected by it.

In the international field, the AEC has a surprisingly broad range of activities, intertwined with those of other Government departments and agencies. It has an almost day-to-day involvement—in concert with the White House, the Department of State and its embassies throughout the world, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Agency for International Development, the Export-Import Bank—with innumerable foreign governments and several international organizations. While I will not be reviewing all this work in these talks, I hope to touch on enough of it to give you an

idea of what we are doing and perhaps whet your interest enough to have you look further into those aspects of the nuclear age which do not make the daily headlines.

A little over a quarter century ago, the birth of the nuclear age was announced by the cryptic message: "The Italian navigator has landed in the New World." On that now-historic date, December 2, 1942, Enrico Fermi and his co-workers first succeeded in releasing and controlling the energy in the nucleus of the atom. This newly released energy was first applied for military purposes, but the United States has sought to give meaning to the prophecy of Isaiah: "And they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruninghooks." This will be the theme of these lectures. This age-old hope of mankind—in its broadest sense, of course—was given dramatic reemphasis just 9 days ago, when it was chosen by President Nixon as the passage to which his Bible was opened upon his swearing-in as President of the United States.

Today nuclear energy has extended its influence to almost all fields of man's endeavor. Last year over 70 power reactors in the United States and the rest of the world had a combined installed capacity of over 10 million kilowatts of

• *Dr. Seaborg delivered the Rosenfield Lecture at Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa. Printed here is part I of the lecture, delivered on January 29. Part II, "On Keeping the Peaceful Atom Peaceful," will appear in the March 10 issue of the Bulletin.*

electric power, and projections indicate that by 1980 the figure will reach 300 million kilowatts. Literally thousands of medical institutions and doctors are using radioisotopes to diagnose and treat disease. Radiation is being applied in countless ways to produce better crops and livestock, to improve industrial products, to preserve food, and to eradicate harmful insect pests. Scientists of many countries are standing on the threshold of perhaps even more far-reaching developments in nuclear energy, such as economically competitive dual-purpose plants to produce electricity and to desalt water and nuclear reactors to supply energy in space.

Scientists from many countries over a period of 50 years contributed to Fermi's remarkable achievement. It is only natural, therefore, that the listing of the transuranium elements curium, einsteinium, fermium, lawrencium, mendelevium, and nobelium reads like a roster of the towering figures of international science. It was United States initiative, however, that set in motion the program for international cooperation known as the Atoms for Peace program. History may well view this initiative, which resulted in unprecedented dissemination of scientific and technical information across national boundaries, as one of the greatest contributions the United States has made for the promotion of peace and the betterment of mankind.

It was just 15 years ago last month, in December 1953, that President Eisenhower made his historic address "Atomic Power for Peace" before the General Assembly of the United Nations, proposing an Atoms for Peace program and establishment of an international agency to promote peaceful applications of nuclear energy. On that occasion the President said:¹

I would be prepared to submit to the Congress of the United States, and with every expectation of approval, any . . . plan (for international cooperation) that would:

First—encourage worldwide investigation into the most effective peacetime uses of fissionable material, and with the certainty that they had all the material needed for the conduct of all experiments that were appropriate;

Second—begin to diminish the potential destructive power of the world's atomic stockpiles;

Third—allow all peoples of all nations to see that, in this enlightened age, the great powers of the earth, both of the East and of the West, are interested in human aspirations first, rather than in building up the armaments of war;

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 21, 1953, p. 847.

Fourth—open up a new channel for peaceful discussion, and initiate at least a new approach to the many difficult problems that must be solved in both private and public conversations, if the world is to shake off the inertia imposed by fear, and is to make positive progress toward peace.

Against the dark background of the atomic bomb, the United States does not wish merely to present strength, but also the desire and the hope for peace.

The coming months will be fraught with fateful decisions. In this Assembly; in the capitals and military headquarters of the world; in the hearts of men everywhere, be they governors or governed, may they be the decisions which will lead this world out of fear and into peace.

To the making of these fateful decisions, the United States pledges before you—and therefore before the world—its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma—to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.

The response to President Eisenhower's proposals, which received bipartisan support in the United States, was overwhelming; and discussions were begun that ultimately culminated in establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1957. I am certain that history will record this initiative as one of the principal successes of postwar foreign policy. Many men of vision and foresight in both the executive and legislative branches of government shared in the conception and elaboration of these proposals. They are too numerous to list in this brief account, but surely history will record the roles of Lewis L. Strauss, then Chairman of the AEC, Congressman W. Sterling Cole, then chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

Meanwhile, in order to initiate the U.S. Atoms for Peace program, President Eisenhower submitted recommendations in February 1954 for amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which had severely limited United States cooperation with other nations in development of peaceful uses of the atom. At that time, the President noted that the recommended revisions of the Atomic Energy Act would enable "American atomic energy development, public and private, to play a full and effective part in leading mankind into a new era of progress and peace."²

The Congress shared the administration's views that the atom had moved into a new era of peaceful significance and enacted the Atomic

² For President Eisenhower's message to the Congress on Feb. 17, 1954, see BULLETIN of Mar. 1, 1954, p. 303.

Energy Act of 1954, which authorized broad domestic and international programs of peaceful nuclear development. On August 30 of that year the President stated: ³

As I sign this bill, I am confident that it will advance both public and private development of atomic energy, that it will thus lead to greater national strength, and that programs undertaken as a result of this new law will help us progress more rapidly to the time when this new source of energy will be wholly devoted to the constructive purposes of man.

The following month the ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly was convened. In line with the President's 1953 proposals, the United States submitted to the Assembly's consideration a resolution looking to the development of an international cooperative program in the nuclear energy field. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated in an address before the Assembly on September 23: ⁴

The United States is proposing an agenda item which will enable us to report on our efforts to explore and develop the vast possibilities for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. These efforts have been and will be directed primarily toward the following ends:

(1) The creation of an international agency, whose initial membership will include nations from all regions of the world. It is hoped that such an agency will start its work as early as next year.

(2) The calling of an international scientific conference to consider this whole vast subject, to meet in the spring of 1955, under the auspices of the United Nations.

(3) The opening early next year, in the United States, of a reactor training school where students from abroad may learn the working principles of atomic energy with specific regard to its peacetime uses.

(4) The invitation to a substantial number of medical and surgical experts from abroad to participate in the work of our cancer hospitals—in which atomic energy techniques are among the most hopeful approaches to controlling this menace to mankind.

In November 1954 our Ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, gave a report to the United Nations on United States efforts to develop international cooperation in the nuclear field.⁵ He discussed at length the United States proposals to establish a reactor training school, to provide courses in safety and other constructive applications of the atom, and to offer technical information and Atoms for Peace libraries to other countries. Ambassador

Lodge noted that there were 10 such libraries available. That number has grown manyfold, as more and more countries have moved into the atomic age. At present such libraries, regularly supplied with the vast outpouring of information on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, are located in more than 60 countries. But more of this later.

Ambassador Lodge also referred to the United States interest in convening an international conference on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which I shall also discuss later.

The interest in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the early years of the Atoms for Peace program led to a situation in which expectations sometimes exceeded technical capabilities. Ambassador Morehead Patterson [U.S. representative for IAEA negotiations] took note of this when he addressed the first class at the opening of the School for Nuclear Science and Engineering at the Argonne National Laboratory in March 1955: ⁶

Freer exchange of scientific information between our countries—as represented by this school—will hasten the time of success. But we must all realize that great human and material effort must still be exerted before we can tap the atom's full potential. Even when we have succeeded, it will not be the answer to every problem in every corner of the earth. The Sahara Desert just cannot be made to bloom next year. The Siberian rivers will not flow south the year after that. The North Pole need have no fear that man will be able, through the atom, to melt the icebergs of the Arctic Circle in 1958. Before we can run, we must learn to walk.

Agreements for Cooperation

The new Atomic Energy Act which President Eisenhower signed on August 30 of 1954 declared as one of its purposes: “. . . a program of international cooperation to promote the common defense and security and to make available to cooperating nations the benefits of peaceful applications of atomic energy as widely as expanding technology and considerations of the common defense and security will permit.”

Early in 1955 the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission began negotiating bilateral agreements for cooperation under the new act. By the end of 1955 some 25 such agreements had been negotiated. These agreements were undertaken to increase the worldwide level of peaceful nuclear energy activities, to provide an opportunity or a vehicle for mak-

³ BULLETIN of Sept. 13, 1954, p. 365.

⁴ BULLETIN of Oct. 4, 1954, p. 471.

⁵ For background, see BULLETIN of Nov. 15, 1954, p. 742.

⁶ BULLETIN of Apr. 4, 1955, p. 553.

ing available assistance to other countries, and to speed peaceful nuclear applications in friendly countries to strengthen these countries economically and technologically.

The first agreement was negotiated with Turkey, an indication that the program was intended from the start not just for our technologically advanced partners in Europe but for nations all over the world which saw in science and technology one means to better the lot of their people. At one time, these agreements were in effect with more than 40 individual countries. With the development of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), however, some of our bilateral partners agreed to let the bilateral agreements expire and to obtain the benefits available under the agreements from these two international organizations. Today we have 33 agreements with 29 nations, and with the IAEA and Euratom. Under the terms of these agreements, we have made available to our partners nuclear research tools, including research reactors, and nuclear fuels for both research and power reactors and, of course, information on the various peaceful applications.

We divide these agreements into two types: The research agreements are so named because they provide for the supply of nuclear materials, especially enriched uranium, for research reactors. The amount of nuclear material supplied under these agreements is rather limited, and the term of the agreement is usually only 5 to 10 years.

The power agreements authorize a broad exchange of unclassified technical information on power reactor technology and the application of nuclear energy to peaceful uses. These agreements, of duration up to 30 years, also provide for the sale of thousands of kilograms of uranium-235 for use in power reactors. At the present time we have committed under these agreements over 500,000 kilograms of uranium-235 to provide fuel for reactors constructed overseas.

It is an important feature of both of these types of agreements that they include unique safeguards provisions against the diversion of this fissionable material to military uses. The importance of these safeguards is so great that I will devote much of my second lecture to this subject.

We have not negotiated a statutory bilateral agreement for cooperation with the Soviet

Union. However, we have concluded three less formal Memoranda on Cooperation in the Field of Utilization of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes.

My predecessor, Chairman John A. McCone, and his Soviet counterpart, V. S. Emelyanov, signed the first such memorandum on cooperation in November 1959. This memorandum provided for reciprocal exchanges of visits and information in several unclassified fields of peaceful applications of nuclear energy. The McCone-Emelyanov memorandum became an addendum to the 1960-61 overall U.S.-U.S.S.R. exchanges agreement. Following conclusion of the memorandum, Chairman McCone and Professor Emelyanov led groups on reciprocal tours of nuclear energy laboratories and powerplants in the U.S.S.R. and United States, respectively. These were followed by more detailed exchanges of visits by scientists in the fields of high-energy physics and controlled thermonuclear reactions.

On May 21, 1963, during my visit to the U.S.S.R. to tour Soviet nuclear energy facilities, I and my Soviet counterpart, Andronik M. Petrosyants, signed the second memorandum on cooperation. This memorandum was later annexed to the 1964-65 overall agreement and provided for exchanges in eight unclassified fields of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Under its terms, we completed a number of successful exchanges with the U.S.S.R. involving delegation visits, research assignments, and the transmittal of unclassified scientific and technical documents. It is an interesting historical footnote that the return visit to the United States of Chairman Petrosyants and his delegation was in progress at the time of the tragic assassination of President Kennedy. During their stop in Washington, only a few days after the President's burial, the Soviet delegation asked for and received permission to visit his grave in Arlington National Cemetery. The grief which they felt on the loss of President Kennedy was quite apparent on this occasion.

A new memorandum on cooperation was signed in July 1968. However, its implementation is being restricted because of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

My visit to the Soviet Union in 1963 confirmed my belief that science can successfully serve as a common meeting ground for East and West. The arrangements we have carried out in the past, I believe, have facilitated the freer exchange of information and ideas. I hope that the future will allow subsequent exchanges of

delegations and information and that these will lead to further contributions to the development of the peaceful atom as well as to a better understanding between our two countries.

Research Reactor Grants

In June 1955 at Pennsylvania State University, President Eisenhower announced two new programs to implement the Atoms for Peace program. At that time he said:⁷

First: We propose to offer research reactors to the people of free nations who can use them effectively for the acquisition of the skills and understanding essential to peaceful atomic progress. The United States, in the spirit of partnership that moves us, will contribute half the cost. We will also furnish the acquiring nation the nuclear material needed to fuel the reactor.

Second: Within prudent security considerations, we propose to make available to the peoples of such friendly nations as are prepared to invest their own funds in power reactors, access to and training in the technological processes of construction and operation for peaceful purposes.

If the technical and material resources of a single nation should not appear adequate to make effective use of a research reactor, we would support a voluntary grouping of the resources of several nations within a single region to acquire and operate it together.

Under this program, the United States offered half the cost of research reactors, up to \$350,000, for one research reactor in each qualified country. Research reactor grants were made to 26 nations under this program.

To aid developing countries in making effective use of their research reactors built with the help of U.S. grants, we have devised laboratory-to-laboratory cooperative arrangements. Referred to as "sister laboratory" arrangements, the system works by placing a United States laboratory such as the Brookhaven National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, or Oak Ridge National Laboratory in direct contact with the other country's laboratory. The United States laboratory gives advice and small items of equipment and generally guides its sister laboratory's work into productive lines of activity. There are now four such arrangements in effect.

Of course, it was easier for the more technically advanced countries in Western Europe to develop their own impressive nuclear research centers, such as those in Ispra, Italy; Mol, Belgium; Petten, in the Netherlands; and Karlsruhe, Germany. But in some respects it is even more impressive, however, to see how

countries such as Thailand, Korea, and the Republic of China have built institutions around these grant reactors.

On my trips to more than 40 countries abroad I have been impressed with the way that research reactor facilities have become focal points for diverse scientific activity and how they serve to stimulate and to strengthen the general level of scientific activity.

The lesson which this program teaches us, I believe, is primarily that we should not underestimate the need for supporting science in the developing countries. We often hear people argue that it is a waste of money and effort to support nuclear scientists in countries which seem in such dire need of the most basic things, such as more food, better roads, more schools. But while this argument may seem persuasive on the surface, it is shortsighted. If these struggling nations are ever to fully enter the mainstream of 20th century development, they must have a core of competent scientists from which to build for their future needs. If these scientists do not have support and encouragement they may well leave the country—become part of the "brain drain"—and thus rob the emerging nation of its chances to someday take its place among the more advanced communities of the world. A valuable research tool such as a reactor can do much to bolster the morale as well as the scientific knowledge of a small country and to keep badly needed scientific talent at home.

Equipment Grants

In our program, however, it was recognized that not every country could use a research reactor. Therefore, we have over a period of years provided a series of equipment grants to a number of organizations and countries. These equipment grants have not been limited to those countries with which we have agreements for cooperation. Since 1962, moreover, we have made such grants to the IAEA for use in Agency-approved projects. These grants have varied from two mobile radioisotope laboratories provided the Agency, to small electronic devices, to complete laboratories and subcritical assemblies.

While I have spoken first of the aspects of our program in its early stages which involved modest financial assistance by the United States, I want to emphasize that the Atoms for Peace program has not been fundamentally one of financial aid. Rather, it has emphasized the shar-

⁷ BULLETIN of June 27, 1955, p. 1027.

ing of important assets already available to the U.S. AEC as a result of our domestic needs. These assets were of two kinds: first, the capability to produce important nuclear materials, especially enriched uranium and heavy water, and second, the vast and rapidly growing body of information on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Supply of Materials Abroad

The nuclear materials which we are committed to provide under our agreements for co-operation are provided under sale in the case of power reactors but may be leased in the case of research reactors. The cornerstone of our supply policy has been the assurance of long-term supply of enriched uranium fuel and on the same terms as those accorded domestic reactor operators. As a result of amendments of the Atomic Energy Act in 1964, we have instituted the mechanism of "toll enrichment." This is simply the process of converting privately owned natural uranium into a product containing an increased concentration of uranium-235 through the utilization of U. S. Government facilities. Nine toll enrichment supply contracts with foreign countries have already been signed, and seven more are being negotiated at this time.

These materials which have been and will be provided and the equipment which has been sold, leased, or loaned are all subject to safeguards to assure against any diversion from peaceful to military purposes. As I indicated, I shall go into the safeguards situation more in my next address.

Some have questioned the wisdom of distributing materials to other nations and providing other forms of help which may be employed for nuclear weapons or which can be used for the production of weapons material. This school of thought overlooks the fact that today many nations can embark on nuclear energy programs entirely on their own efforts or through help from countries other than the United States. By providing U.S. materials under careful safeguards against diversion to military purposes we help direct the inevitable nuclear interests of other nations into peaceful channels and at the same time achieve other important benefits for the United States.

I was gratified by the public recognition of this important principle when in 1965 in connection with the International Cooperation Year activities the Citizens' Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy noted that:

... the United States should continue to promote the sale and construction of power reactors abroad to help provide economical and abundant sources of electrical energy to peoples everywhere, to aid in the conservation of reserves of conventional fuels, to aid the United States balance of payments position, and to assure that these reactors and the nuclear materials they produce will be subjected to appropriate safeguards.

At the end of fiscal year 1968 (June 30, 1968), the AEC had distributed abroad, through sale, lease, and deferred payment sales, special nuclear and other materials valued at approximately \$310 million, resulting in revenues to the United States so far of \$220 million.

Exchange of Technology

Technical Libraries

In the foregoing remarks I have frequently mentioned the exchange and provision of information. Since Ambassador Lodge made his announcement at the United Nations in 1954, numerous depositories or technical libraries have been assigned to other countries. These libraries have been continuously updated, and at the present time they contain several tens of thousands of documents.

Conferences

Another means by which we have provided great amounts of information to other countries is through conferences. Naturally, as in other fields of science, many different types of conferences are employed, depending on the scope of the subject matter and how widespread the interest in it is. However, the Atoms for Peace program pioneered a particular form of international conference of such significance that it deserves special mention. Early in 1954 Chairman Lewis L. Strauss announced:⁸

... I am privileged to state that it is the President's intention to ... convene an international conference of scientists at a later date this year. This conference, which it is hoped will be largely attended and will include the outstanding men in their professions from all over the world, will be devoted to the exploration of the benign and peaceful uses of atomic energy. It will be the first time that any such body has been convoked, and its purpose, also in the words of the President, will be "to hasten the day when the fear of the atom will begin to disappear from the minds of people, and the governments of the East and of the West."

As a result of this United States initiative,

⁸ For background, see BULLETIN of May 3, 1954, p. 659.

the General Assembly approved the convening of the first United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy at Geneva in August 1955. Subsequent international conferences of this type were convened in 1958 and 1964. As you may know, the recently concluded 23d United Nations General Assembly approved the convening of a fourth such conference, to be held in 1971.

The first conference was successful beyond all expectations. It was, at that time, the largest meeting that had been convened under the auspices of the United Nations. Thirty-eight nations were represented. Over 1,000 papers were submitted, and over 2,700 participants attended. It was a dramatic conference, wide in scope, and a significant step in opening many international doors previously closed to the scientific know-how of the relatively new nuclear technology. Both the United States and the U.S.S.R. made substantial contributions to the success of this conference by their exhibits and papers presented.

In his assessment of the first conference, Professor Walter G. Whitman, conference Secretary General, said:

To laymen everywhere, the knowledge that the world's scientific elite was exchanging information and ideas about nuclear energy, with the purpose of developing its potential benefits to mankind, was most heartening. Here was long-delayed evidence of international cooperation.

The second conference in 1958 was even more dramatic and wider in scope than the first. Forty-six nations and six international organizations were represented. Over 2,000 papers were submitted, and over 6,000 participants attended. This conference helped break down even further some of the formidable barriers to the open exchange of nuclear technology between nations. Dr. Sigvard Eklund, Secretary General of the 1958 conference and presently Director General of the IAEA, said:

Such a big international meeting held under the auspices of the United Nations was effective in a manner different from that of smaller meetings in that it stimulated governments to release and review material which otherwise might have remained undigested or buried in sometimes inaccessible reports and documents.

I commented as follows on both the 1955 and 1958 conferences:

Participants generally agreed that giant strides had been taken in both conferences toward informing people throughout the world of the many benefits to be derived from the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

The First Conference, in 1955, dropped the shrouds of secrecy from many aspects of nuclear energy, and began a renewal of the channels of communication between nuclear scientists and engineers of the world. In the Second Conference, communications and international cooperation were further expanded, and fusion research was removed from the pale of secrecy.

I had the privilege of heading the U.S. delegation to the third international conference in 1964 and of preparing and presenting the summing up on behalf of all delegations at the conclusion of the conference.

I reported to Secretary of State Rusk at the conclusion of the third conference that:

The Conference was successful in many ways, the most important of which was that it presented a comprehensive record of progress made in the development and use of nuclear power since the last Conference held in 1958. The major conclusion with regard to progress since 1958 and, in my opinion, the most significant reservation of reserves of conventional fuels, to aid the clear power had indeed come of age in many areas of the world.

Exhibits

In the field of international information dissemination we have also built and co-operated "Atoms in Action" Nuclear Science Demonstration Centers. These centers have been unique in their contribution to the dissemination of information on nuclear energy and nuclear science. They go far beyond the typical exhibit in that they also serve as temporary schools and training centers for the host country. They are, in fact, small working nuclear energy centers.

Since their primary objective is the stimulation of interest in and understanding of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, they are tailored to the interests, needs, and capabilities of the country where the exhibit is being shown. Local nuclear energy, university, scientific, and educational officials work side by side with American officials in the preparation of demonstrations, presentation of seminars, and experimentation. Classes are held for local high school students in special classrooms right in the center building. The centers are equipped with gamma irradiation facilities; and with the cooperation of the center staff, local scientists irradiate seeds, live tissue, insects, meat, vegetables, and fish, and items of specific interest to their own research efforts. Another facility of the center is a technical information reference room which contains a comprehensive collection of books, periodicals, and reports. These are available to all interested professional personnel and students. These "Atoms in Action" Nu-

clear Science Demonstration Centers have been shown in 31 countries and have been viewed and visited by over 6,800,000 people.

Education and Training

A great many individual training and research assignments have been and are being arranged at AEC facilities to meet the particular needs of foreign scientists. Over 4,500 individual assignments and assignments to formal courses at AEC facilities have been arranged to date. You may recall that I mentioned earlier the establishment of the School for Nuclear Science and Engineering at the Argonne National Laboratory. Courses were also given in reactor operations and the evaluation of reactor hazards at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. As other countries developed their own programs, and as both United States and foreign universities established centers to provide nuclear training, the need for formal courses offered by the United States has diminished, and the international schools at Argonne and Oak Ridge were closed in 1965. Courses in the use of radioisotopes are still offered at the Oak Ridge Associated Universities, however; and more comprehensive courses continue to be offered at the Puerto Rico Nuclear Center, which is operated at the University of Puerto Rico under contract with the AEC.

The Puerto Rico Nuclear Center is of particular interest because of its regional importance. Its creation resulted in part from a proposal advanced by President Eisenhower at the conference of chiefs of state of the American Republics held in Panama in July 1956 to the effect that efforts be made to hasten the development of beneficial uses of nuclear energy throughout the hemisphere. By the end of 1957 a contract had been negotiated for the operation of this center, the objective of which was the development of a comprehensive program for research and training available to students throughout Latin America. The center, which has facilities at both the San Juan and Mayagüez Campuses of the University of Puerto Rico, provides a spectrum of training opportunities for our Latin American neighbors.

European Atomic Energy Community

A specific example of how the Atoms for Peace program has helped advance other important foreign policy objectives of the United States is found in our cooperation with the European Atomic Energy Community (Eur-

atom). Following the signing of the U.S.-Euratom Agreement for Cooperation in 1958, the U.S.-Euratom Joint Power Reactor Program and the U.S.-Euratom Joint Research and Development Program were initiated.

The technical purpose of the joint reactor program was to bring into operation within the Community large-scale powerplants using reactors which had been developed to an advanced stage in the United States. Such a cooperative program would also serve to strengthen Euratom, one of the important institutions designed to further the goal of European integration as well as advance Europe technologically and economically. Three reactors were built under this program in Europe. The Joint Research and Development Program envisaged a 10-year research and development program keyed to the reactors built under the Joint Power Reactor Program. To date, the United States and Euratom have spent about \$25 million and \$26 million respectively on the Joint Research and Development Program.

The United States and Euratom also have arrangements to exchange information on fast reactor programs and in certain other fields. United States supplies of special nuclear materials for both commercial power programs and research projects have been made available through Euratom under lease, sale, and toll enrichment arrangements.

International Atomic Energy Agency

We consider that one of our most important activities in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy has been our support of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA, an agency of the U.N., provides the best mechanism through which all nations can avail themselves of the benefits of the peaceful atom. It allows them to share scientific and technical knowledge and nuclear materials and do so openly, under international agreements and safeguards. It acts as a world forum on nuclear knowledge and operates, among other things, its own radioisotope laboratory and institute of theoretical physics. First proposed by President Eisenhower in 1953, the Agency was established in 1957 with headquarters in Vienna and now has 100 members.

United States support of the Agency has continued through both Democratic and Republican administrations. In his message to the tenth general conference, held in 1966, President Johnson said:

I should like to emphasize to you my country's dedication to three principles which are of particular relevance to this organization. We are deeply committed to the principle of international cooperation for peace in every field of human endeavor. We believe strongly in sharing the benefits of scientific progress, and we have consistently acted on this belief. And we have worked, and will continue to work, toward the economic development of the world's less developed countries.

Over the years, the Agency has been involved in many areas, ranging from radiation applications in medicine, industry, and agriculture to promotion of the effective use of research reactors, desalting studies, and establishment of international standards in the transport of irradiated materials.

In the field of nuclear power, the Agency has sponsored the exchange of information on a global basis. Conferences organized by the Agency have been devoted to such important subjects as containment and siting of nuclear power plants, safety problems related to fast reactors, comparison of nuclear power costs, and the use of plutonium as a reactor fuel, to mention only a few.

We have strongly supported the Agency through financial contributions, providing fellowships, experts, equipment grants, technical information, special nuclear materials, and assistance in developing a safeguards inspection system.

Since the beginning of the Atoms for Peace program, the United States has realized that the success of the program was dependent upon reasonable guarantees that the nuclear technology and nuclear material to be shared with other countries would not be diverted to any military purpose. Guarantees were needed so that none of this material or assistance would ever be a threat to international security. We also recognized that a multilateral control system would be more efficient and objective than bilateral safeguards and that it could contribute to the evolution of a broader system of arms limitation. Pending the establishment of such a system, we insisted, as I have stated previously, that in our bilateral agreements for cooperation the other government involved provides assurances that U.S.-supplied nuclear equipment, materials, and their products would be used only for peaceful purposes. The agreements also gave the United States the right of actual onsite inspection so that it could assure itself that this provision was being carried out. We have always considered these bilateral safeguards arrangements as a prelude to an international system which would

be needed as additional nations embarked on nuclear programs.

The growth of an international system has been gradual but has kept pace with developments in the nuclear field. As a first step, reactors smaller than 100 thermal megawatts, mostly research, training, and test reactors, were covered by the Agency's safeguards system. Then the system was broadened to include those reactors larger than 100 thermal megawatts and last year was expanded to include conversion, fabrication, and reprocessing plants.

To encourage the development of the Agency's safeguards, the United States in 1962 voluntarily placed four of its civilian prototype power and research reactors under the Agency's system. In 1964 we included a large privately owned power reactor to assist the IAEA in developing and demonstrating the effectiveness of its inspection techniques for larger reactors. In 1966 we made a commercial plant for the chemical reprocessing of irradiated fuel available for IAEA inspection. Finally, in 1968 safeguards procedures were developed for fuel fabrication plants, thus completing the development of procedures for all segments of the fuel cycle except enrichment plants.

Peaceful Applications

Before concluding this first talk let me review briefly the various peaceful applications of the atom, which should reemphasize why there is such a wide international interest in this source of energy.

Probably the most significant use of nuclear energy, in terms of the greatest number of people directly affected, is the generation of electricity by nuclear power plants. In this country the growth of nuclear power in recent years has been nothing less than phenomenal. This has been due not only to the fact that nuclear reactors have proved to be safe, clean, and efficient sources of power but to the realization by electric utilities that nuclear stations in large sizes are economically competitive with powerplants burning coal, oil, or gas. As a result we now have in operation, under construction, and planned in this country a total of 100 nuclear power plants with a combined capacity of more than 70 million kilowatts. Almost all of these plants will be in operation by the mid-1970's. By 1980 we should see a nuclear generating capacity of 150 million kilowatts in this country. And we project that that figure will rise to more than 700 million kilowatts by the year 2000.

While these figures represent nuclear power growth in the United States, I should point out that many nations are very involved in their own nuclear power programs. Canada, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Italy, and Sweden are heavily committed to nuclear power. The Soviet Union and several East European countries have a strong interest in this source of power. The same is true of several Latin American countries and Australia; and in Asia, Japan and India are making important strides in nuclear power.

Now, why this sudden interest in nuclear power—what are its advantages and where will it lead us? I mentioned that nuclear power is clean. Since they do not release any combustion products to the atmosphere, nuclear plants, as they take over much of the burden of generating our electricity from our fossil fuel plants during the coming decades, will also limit the burden of pollution in our atmosphere. Eventually they will also release more of our coal and oil, which are valuable and limited sources of hydrocarbons, to our chemical industries.

There are also tremendous economic advantages ahead in the use of nuclear power, advantages which will have a widespread effect in many areas of our lives. As larger and newer types of reactors are developed, the cost of nuclear power can be dramatically decreased. And cheaper power can have important effects on our industry, the use of our natural resources, and our control of waste—in short, on our total economy and the way we live. For example, we are already developing large dual-purpose nuclear plants which will both generate electricity and desalt considerable amounts of sea water or brackish water, possibly hundreds of millions of gallons per day. Such plants can prove extremely useful in many areas of the world.

Since 1964, the United States and Israel have been jointly studying the engineering feasibility and economics of building and operating a large dual-purpose desalting and electric power plant in Israel. The studies have indicated that a dual-purpose nuclear plant producing 100 million gallons of water per day and 300 electrical megawatts would be an attractive and feasible means of meeting a portion of Israel's projected water and power needs.

As you may recall, former President Eisenhower and Lewis Strauss have advanced a noteworthy plan for a large international dual-purpose nuclear plant to be built in the Middle East to help alleviate the water problem in that

area and hence cool some of the political differences existing there. Throughout history access to sources of fresh water has always been a cause of conflict in some areas of the world. In addition to the Middle East, experts from Mexico, the United States, and the IAEA are studying the feasibility of constructing a large nuclear power/desalting plant that would supply fresh water for California and Arizona in the United States and the States of Sonora and Baja California in Mexico.

Nuclear energy may add still another feature that could make it desirable in certain desert areas. This would be the use of nuclear power to manufacture ammonia fertilizer from the hydrogen in water and the nitrogen in the air. And with the possibility of combining power, desalted water, and fertilizer, scientists and engineers have conceived of the idea of placing large nuclear-powered complexes on those coastal desert areas of the world where the soil and climate could support crops if the necessary combination of fresh water and fertilizer were made available.

Based on this concept, an extensive study has been made at the AEC's Oak Ridge National Laboratory to analyze the scientific, technological, and economic feasibility of building and operating such a nuclear-powered agro-industrial complex, in conjunction with a highly scientific farm or "food factory," at a coastal desert site. The results of this study show that such an energy-supported agricultural center could grow, on previously unproductive land, enough food to feed millions of people and possibly manufacture additional fertilizer as well as process other useful chemicals, some of which would be extracted from the sea brine.

A further study on the possibility of locating nuclear complexes of this type in the Middle East is now underway. Naturally, in considering such a project, the political complexities can be as great as the technological ones. But I feel that eventually we will see these centers built and proven as highly worthwhile endeavors.

Beyond this point, when very large "breeder" reactor systems can be put into operation to produce abundant, cheap electricity and process heat we can see other important uses for nuclear energy. I have often speculated on what might be accomplished by planning large industrial complexes built around an energy center of such nuclear power systems. In addition to supplying electricity, fresh water, and space heat, such a

center might produce a large number of chemicals and materials economically, be used to manufacture new products, and possibly help to reprocess much of our solid waste back into useful resources.

Use of Radioactive Isotopes

A very important group of applications of the peaceful atom, which does not attract the same attention as nuclear power yet nevertheless is proving of great value, lies in the use of radioactive isotopes. These radioisotopes are today performing many vital services in medicine, agriculture, industry, in the humanities and arts, in crime detection, and in areas of research ranging from archaeology to zoology.

In medicine thousands of physicians and medical institutions throughout the world are using more than 30 radioisotopes in a variety of ways to diagnose—and in some cases also to treat—thyroid disorders, kidney and liver ailments, metabolic diseases, heart and circulatory conditions, and many types of tumors. Millions of doses of radioisotope and radioisotope-labeled compounds are administered annually—a half million of iodine-131 alone in the United States each year—and new applications are continually being found and successfully used. All these applications are made known in the international literature and shared by the medical profession all over the world.

In worldwide agriculture, radioisotopes continue to play an important role in growing and developing better crops and healthier livestock. They help fight insect pests which ravage food while it is growing, in transit, or in storage. They help to breed new varieties of crops more resistant to certain diseases and bad weather.

Radioisotopes serve industry through their use in process-control instruments which automatically analyze and gauge materials and make adjustments to assure the uniformity, quality, and safety of many products. Radiation itself is used to change the molecular structure of substances to make essentially new materials. And radioisotopes serve as industrial research tools to help companies improve their products. All this saves industry around the world hundreds of millions of dollars annually and brings the consumer better things at reasonable costs.

Among the numerous other applications of radioisotopes is their use in dating ancient materials such as the Dead Sea scrolls, geological

samples which give valuable clues to age-old mysteries about the earth—perhaps the movement of glaciers or entire continents—and the bones and artifacts of prehistoric man. Techniques involving radioisotopes are used to analyze art masterpieces and validate coins and jewelry, thus detecting their possible forgery. They are also used to study the migratory habits and life cycles of animals, birds, and fish; to detect minerals; and in international studies of hydrology—of our rainfall, waterways, and underground water resources. I could go on and on about all the applications of radioisotopes but that would take more than one lecture—perhaps a year's course.

Two other applications of nuclear energy which are being developed and show tremendous promise for the future are the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives and the use of nuclear power in space. Under the AEC's Plowshare program we have been developing the technology for using nuclear explosives for massive excavation projects such as the construction of harbors, mountain passes, and canals. We have also been working on the use of underground nuclear explosions as a means of increasing the availability of our natural gas reserves, of extracting minerals economically from low-grade ores, or producing oil from enormous deposits of oil shale, and as a way to create large underground cavities for the storage of gas and water. The potential of these projects has a significance that countries all over the world are beginning to appreciate. I will have something further to say on this subject in my talk tomorrow when I discuss the Nonproliferation Treaty.

The application of nuclear power in space seems all the more exciting now because of the success of Apollo 8. To advance substantially beyond the Apollo program, to send heavy payloads—manned and unmanned missions—to the planets, will require nuclear-powered rockets. Such nuclear systems are already well under development in the AEC-NASA NERVA program (NERVA stands for Nuclear Engine for Rocket Vehicle Application) and we have in fact already ground-tested a nuclear-propulsion engine for longer than the time required for its use in a round trip to Mars. We are also developing Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power—which we refer to as SNAP—that will provide electric power in space to operate equipment ranging from communications and control electronics to systems to recycle waste in the space capsule to provide the astronauts with

fresh water, in addition to giving them heat and light for journeys that may take weeks or months. Then there are the uses of nuclear energy necessary to explore and perhaps colonize the moon—but if I continued on this subject and others I have not even touched on, I would be speaking to you for more than the 2 days I have been invited. So I'll bring this first talk to a conclusion now.

From what I have said today I think you can see that the peaceful atom has an enormous potential to serve mankind. We in this country have worked hard to develop that potential and to share the constructive applications of nuclear energy with other nations. Contrary to what some might say, these programs were not motivated by selfish or cynical considerations—unless a desire for human survival is included in this category. From the beginning of these programs it has been our belief that promoting Atoms for Peace would reduce the chances that the atom would be used destructively. We have felt that if the atom could contribute in any way to the lessening of human deprivation and suffering, if it could better the condition of man, to that extent would it reduce human conflict and further turn men's efforts toward peace and progress.

U.S. Expresses Concern to Peru Over Fishing-Boat Incident

*Department Statement*¹

At 2:30 [February 14] Secretary Rogers called in Peruvian Ambassador Fernando Berckemeyer to express serious concern over an incident this morning in which one United States fishing boat was damaged by Peruvian naval gunfire and another American fishing boat was seized.

The Secretary added that the Government of the United States knows of no justification in international law for the attack made on these unarmed fishing vessels. The location of the incident was at least 50 miles from the coast of Peru, according to reports received by the Department, in waters which the United States

¹Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey on February 14.

and the world community in general consider to be the high seas.

While there is a difference between the views of the United States and Peru concerning the jurisdictional status of the waters in question, the Secretary made clear that armed attacks against United States-flag fishing vessels are wholly unjustified and make resolving the difference of opinion on the juridical question most difficult.

The Secretary conveyed to the Ambassador a request that Peru release the seized vessel and that adequate action be taken to prevent a recurrence of the armed attacks against American fishing vessels.

Lastly, the Secretary emphasized that this latest incident more than ever indicates the urgent need of sitting down together and attempting to find a solution of this longstanding problem. It is quite obvious to the United States that some way must be found which protects the position of both countries and at the same time eliminates the possibility of serious incidents such as the one which has occurred today.

Fourth Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris

Following is an opening statement made by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, head of the U.S. delegation, at the fourth plenary session of the new meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on February 13.

Press release 34 dated February 13

Ladies and gentlemen: A number of the statements and allegations made by your side during our first three meetings indicate a lack of understanding of the goals of the United States both here and in Viet-Nam. Your side has also asked a number of questions about our position. For the sake of better understanding, I wish today to restate certain elements of U.S. policy as regards Viet-Nam.

At the outset, I do not accept the allegation that the United States is pursuing a policy of neocolonialism. Such a charge is baseless. Indeed, the record shows that the United States has no wish to dominate South Viet-Nam or North Viet-Nam or to dominate any other country.

The United States conducts its relations with

other countries, whether they be newly independent or older states, on the basis of equality between nations and mutual respect for sovereignty. This is true of our relations with the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, as it is with all others with whom we have relations.

To be more specific, the United States recognizes the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam as the legal and legitimate government of that country. No undertaking of importance can be carried out with regard to South Viet-Nam without the approval of that Government. As a practical matter it is very much of a going concern.

We welcome the progress that the Republic of Viet-Nam has made in developing constitutional and representative government and in promoting the social and economic welfare of its people. That progress is all the more remarkable in that it has been achieved in the face of the concentrated efforts by your side to disrupt the countryside and to undermine both the elections and the institutions which they created.

You cannot expect to achieve in these negotiations what you have failed to achieve in South Viet-Nam. You cannot nullify the reality of the legal, constitutional, and factual existence of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

The policy of the United States is aimed at finding a stable and lasting peace in Viet-Nam and in Southeast Asia. The kind of peace we seek is one in which the South Vietnamese people will be assured their fundamental national right of self-determination without external interference or coercion. We believe the essential elements of the Geneva accords of 1954 provide a basis for peace in Viet-Nam.

South Viet-Nam is the victim of aggression from North Viet-Nam, which has been sending subversive forces into the South for the past decade. Organized units of the regular North Vietnamese Army have been in the South since 1964.

The war is not what you have tried to picture it to be: a struggle against the U.S. presence in South Viet-Nam. Rather it is a carefully planned and conducted campaign of conquest directed by Hanoi, in violation of international practice and international agreement.

To help meet this aggression, the legitimate government of the Republic of Viet-Nam asked for assistance from the United States and others. The United States and five other Pacific nations responded to that request with military

forces. These are not forces of aggression. They are present in Viet-Nam only to help the people of that country defend themselves against aggression. They are there to help preserve for the South Vietnamese the right to self-determination, a right which your words claim to support but which your actions would destroy.

It is difficult to foresee any political settlement on Viet-Nam based on genuine self-determination in an environment of violence caused by the massive presence and actions of outside forces. That is why we believe that if the South Vietnamese are to have a chance to shape their own destiny free from outside interference, we must arrange for the mutual withdrawal of all external forces from South Viet-Nam. That means that all military and subversive forces of North Viet-Nam must be withdrawn into North Viet-Nam; as that is happening, the withdrawal of American and other Allied forces will commence.

The United States has no desire or intention to try to impose a political solution on South Viet-Nam. Nor does it believe that such a solution should be imposed by Hanoi or anyone else. We recognize the importance of political issues in any lasting settlement. We will support any political settlement that is arrived at freely among the South Vietnamese themselves.

The United States does not seek any permanent military presence in South Viet-Nam. We seek no permanent military bases. We ask no special privileges or influence. We will support the reunification of Viet-Nam through the free decision of the people of North Viet-Nam and the people of South Viet-Nam. The foreign policy of the South Vietnamese people, today and in the future, is a matter for them and their elected representatives to determine.

Ladies and gentlemen: The kind of South Viet-Nam, indeed the kind of Southeast Asia, that we would like to see can only be built in conditions of peace. As a first step on the road to peace, we should try to find ways to separate the contending forces and arrange for the withdrawal of external elements.

In an effort to begin creating that kind of atmosphere, we have made concrete proposals regarding the demilitarized zone, mutual withdrawal of external forces, and prisoners of war.

I hope your response will be positive. For that would mean that we could begin promptly to move toward a peaceful settlement, which is the purpose of these meetings and the hope of the world.

U.S., U.K., and France Reaffirm Right of Access to Berlin

Following is the text of a tripartite statement issued at Bonn on February 10 by the U.S., U.K., and French Governments after an East German announcement of new measures, effective February 15, which would ban travel through East Germany by delegates and staff of the Federal Assembly, members of the West German armed forces, and members of the Parliamentary Defense Committee.

With regard to the East German announcement of February 8, the Governments of France, the United States, and the United Kingdom wish to point out that the Bundesversammlung [presidential election convention] has already taken place in Berlin on three previous occasions without causing any difficulties. The German decision to hold this year's Bundesversammlung in Berlin was taken after due consultation with the three powers within the framework of their responsibilities for Berlin. The three Governments consequently hold that there is no justification for the East German announcement of February 8.

This announcement is, moreover, inconsistent with the fact that the Soviet Union, not East Germany, is responsible for free and unhindered access of persons and goods to Berlin. The three Governments have in the past reminded the Soviet Union of this responsibility. Their position has not changed.

U.S., Australia To Study Feasibility of Nuclear Excavations for Harbor

*Department Announcement*¹

The United States Government has formally agreed to a request from the Government of Australia to join in a study on the technical and economic feasibility of employing nuclear explosions to develop a harbor at Cape Kerandren on the northwest coast of Australia.

The Department of State welcomed the proposal as pointing toward a possible peaceful ap-

¹ Issued on Feb. 6 (press release 23).

plication of nuclear technology which might contribute to progress for the potential benefit of many nations. In performing the feasibility study which is a necessary first step, the United States Atomic Energy Commission will work directly with the Australian Atomic Energy Commission.

No judgment has yet been made as to the possibility of U.S. participation in the project itself, since this decision must await the findings of the feasibility study. The feasibility study will be directed to technical, safety, and economic aspects and will not address itself to political and legal questions.

IJC Issues Interim Report on Great Lakes Water Levels

The Department of State announced on January 30 (press release 17) that an interim report on Great Lakes levels by the International Joint Commission, the body responsible to this Government and the Government of Canada for the supervision of boundary waters, had been released by the U.S. Government that day.¹ The same document was made public simultaneously in Ottawa.

This study was undertaken in cooperation with State, Provincial, and local agencies pursuant to a joint reference from both Governments in October 1964 following a period of critically low levels in the lakes. The final report to the Commission by its International Great Lakes Levels Board is scheduled for completion in 1972 at a cost exceeding \$2 million. This final report to the Commission by the Board will be made available as a basis for public hearings. As soon as practicable after these hearings the Commission will make its findings and recommendations to the Governments of the United States and Canada. With the data from this study the two Governments will be in a position to determine what regulatory works, if any, should be constructed to control the flow of the waters for the benefit of more than 40 million people who inhabit the Great Lakes region.

¹ Single copies of the July 1968 Interim Report on the Regulation of Great Lakes Levels (21 pages, maps and charts) are available on request from the International Joint Commission, 1711 New York Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20440.

U.S. and Soviet Union Sign New Agreements on Fisheries

Press release 20 dated January 31

Representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union on January 31 concluded discussions on northeastern Pacific fishery problems with the signing of new agreements on various matters relating to the fisheries of both countries off the coasts of Alaska, Washington, Oregon, and California. The agreements were signed for the United States by Donald L. McKernan, Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife to the Secretary of State, and for the Soviet Union by M. N. Sukhoruchenko, Deputy Minister of Fisheries of the U.S.S.R.

The new agreements extend for 2 years, with modifications, three existing agreements having to do with the king crab fisheries in the eastern Bering Sea and the fisheries for various other species off the U.S. Pacific coast. Both delegations considered the new agreements to be a further positive step in the development of cooperation between the two countries in the fisheries field, looking to the rational use of the sea's resources.

In the case of the king crab fisheries, it was agreed that the annual Soviet catch quota in the eastern Bering Sea will be reduced to 52,000 cases of canned crab in order to meet conservation needs. The new agreement also provides, for the first time, for a quota on the Soviet catch of tanner crab, a creature of the continental shelf. In addition, the area in which only crab pots (or traps) may be used is enlarged, and the area will now be closed to trawling by the countries concerned in order to avoid conflicts arising from the use of stationary as opposed to mobile fishing gear.

In other aspects, the new agreements provide improved protection for stationary fishing gear by changing to conform to the current king crab fishing season the period of closure to mobile fishing gear of certain areas near Kodiak Island, Alaska. A new area south of Unimak Island, known as Davidson Bank, is also closed to trawling during the crab fishing season. In

order to lessen the risks of gear conflicts between trawl fishermen and halibut fishermen, special measures are provided for two main halibut fishing grounds in the eastern Bering Sea, including a closure to mobile fishing gear during the first half of the halibut fishing season.

Off Washington, Oregon, and California, for purposes of conservation of Pacific Ocean perch and other rockfish, it was agreed that bottom trawling would not be permitted during the winter months in areas where the major winter concentrations of ocean perch and other rockfish occur and that other measures would be taken to afford protection to these species during the remainder of the year.

The new agreements provide additional areas for Soviet fishing within the contiguous fishing zone off the Aleutians in certain periods of the year. The areas within the contiguous zone designated for use by Soviet fishing vessels as cargo transfer points have been adjusted in number and geographic location.

The agreements continue to provide for cooperation in scientific research, exchange of scientific data and personnel, and general procedures for reducing gear conflicts.

The U.S. delegation included, in addition to U.S. Government officials, advisers from the State fishery agencies and commercial and sports fisheries of Alaska, Washington, Oregon, and California.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention on offenses and certain other acts committed on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo September 14, 1963.¹

Signatures: Belgium, December 20, 1968; Mexico, December 24, 1968.

Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of the convention on international civil aviation, Chicago, 1944, as amended (TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170), with annex. Done at Buenos Aires September 24, 1968. Entered into force October 24, 1968. TIAS 6605.

Signatures: Australia, February 12, 1969; Federal Republic of Germany, February 14, 1969.

Customs

Customs convention on the ATA carnet for the temporary admission of goods, with annex. Done at Brussels December 6, 1961. Entered into force July 30, 1963; for the United States March 3, 1969. TIAS 6631.

Extended to: Gibraltar, December 2, 1968.

¹ Not in force.

Judicial Procedures

Convention on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters. Done at The Hague November 15, 1965. Entered into force February 10, 1969. TIAS 6638.
Signature: Sweden, February 4, 1969.

Load Lines

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331.
Acceptances deposited: Belgium, January 22, 1969; Bulgaria, December 30, 1968.

Postal Matters

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union, with final protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and convention with final protocol and regulations of execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881.
Adherence: Qatar, January 31, 1969.

Safety at Sea

Amendments to the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London October 25, 1967.¹
Acceptance deposited: France, January 14, 1969.²

Satellite Communications System

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a global commercial communications satellite system. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.
Accessions deposited: Ivory Coast, February 10, 1969; ³ Nicaragua, February 11, 1969.
Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.
Signature: Dirección General de Comunicaciones for Nicaragua, February 11, 1969.

Space

Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return of astronauts, and the return of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow April 22, 1968. Entered into force December 3, 1968. TIAS 6599.
Ratifications deposited at Washington: Malagasy Republic, February 11, 1969; Poland, February 14, 1969.

Trade

Fifth procès-verbal extending the declaration on the provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 12, 1959 (TIAS 4498). Done at Geneva November 19, 1968. Entered into force December 17, 1968.⁴
Acceptances: Netherlands, January 30, 1969; Pakistan, January 22, 1969.
Fourth procès-verbal extending the declaration on the

provisional accession of the United Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 13, 1962 (TIAS 5309). Done at Geneva November 19, 1968.¹
Acceptances: Netherlands, January 30, 1969; Pakistan, January 22, 1969.

BILATERAL

Afghanistan

Agreement extending the technical cooperation program agreement of June 30, 1953, as extended (TIAS 2856, 4670, 4979, 5243, 5477, 5714, 5807, 5901, 5993, 6123, 6253, 6321, 6468, 6552). Effected by exchange of notes at Kabul December 24, 1968, and January 25, 1969. Entered into force January 25, 1969.

Canada

Agreement amending the agreement of March 31 and June 12, 1967 (TIAS 6268), relating to presunrise operation of certain standard (AM) radio broadcasting stations. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa April 18, 1968, and January 31, 1969. Entered into force January 31, 1969.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on February 7 confirmed the following nominations:

Samuel DePalma to be an Assistant Secretary of State. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 33 dated February 11.)

Martin J. Hillenbrand to be an Assistant Secretary of State. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 40 dated February 20.)

U. Alexis Johnson to be Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 30 dated February 10.)

Albert W. Sherer, Jr., now Ambassador to the Republic of Togo, to serve concurrently as Ambassador to the Republic of Equatorial Guinea.

Joseph John Sisco to be an Assistant Secretary of State. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 31 dated February 11.)

Designations

Parker T. Hart as the Director of the Foreign Service Institute, effective February 5. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release dated February 6.)

¹ Not in force.

² Acceptance does not cover amendments contained in annex III of IMCO Assembly Resolution A.122(V).

³ Not in force for the Ivory Coast until the special agreement has been signed.

⁴ Not in force for the United States.

Asia. Sisco confirmed as Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 188

Atomic Energy
The International Atom—A New Appraisal: Part I, The Past and the Promise (Seaborg) 173

U.S., Australia To Study Feasibility of Nuclear Excavations for Harbor 186

Australia. U.S., Australia To Study Feasibility of Nuclear Excavations for Harbor 186

Canada. IJC Issues Interim Report on Great Lakes Water Levels 186

Congress. Confirmations (DePalma, Hillenbrand, Johnson, Sherer, Sisco) 188

Department and Foreign Service
Confirmations (DePalma, Hillenbrand, Johnson, Sherer, Sisco) 188

Designations (Hart) 188

Economic Affairs
IJC Issues Interim Report on Great Lakes Water Levels 186

U.S. and Soviet Union Sign New Agreements on Fisheries 187

Equatorial Guinea. Sherer confirmed as Ambassador 188

Europe. Hillenbrand confirmed as Assistant Secretary for European Affairs 188

France. U.S., U.K., and France Reaffirm Right of Access to Berlin (tripartite statement) 186

Germany. U.S., U.K., and France Reaffirm Right of Access to Berlin (tripartite statement) 186

International Organizations and Conferences.
DePalma confirmed as Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs 188

Near East. Sisco confirmed as Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 188

Peru. U.S. Expresses Concern to Peru Over Fishing-Boat Incident 184

Treaty Information
Current Actions 187

U.S. and Soviet Union Sign New Agreements on Fisheries 187

U.S.S.R. U.S. and Soviet Union Sign New Agreements on Fisheries 187

United Kingdom. U.S., U.K., and France Reaffirm Right of Access to Berlin (tripartite statement) 186

Viet-Nam. Fourth Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris (Lodge) 184

Name Index

DePalma, Samuel 188

Hart, Parker T 188

Hillenbrand, Martin J 188

Johnson, U. Alexis 188

Lodge, Henry Cabot 184

Seaborg, Glenn T 173

Sherer, Albert W., Jr 188

Sisco, Joseph John 188

**Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: February 10–16**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to February 10 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 17 of January 30, 20 of January 31, and 23 of February 6.

No.	Date	Subject
*30	2/10	Johnson sworn in as Under Secretary for Political Affairs (biographic details).
*31	2/11	Sisco sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (biographic details).
*32	2/11	Nicaragua becomes 65th member of global commercial communications satellite system.
*33	2/11	DePalma sworn in as Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs (biographic details).
34	2/13	Lodge: fourth plenary session on Viet-Nam at Paris.
†35	2/14	Richardson: OECD ministerial meeting, Paris, February 13.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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DEPARTMENT EMPHASIZES THE IMPORTANCE
OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

Statement by Secretary Rogers 189

OECD MINISTERIAL COUNCIL MEETS AT PARIS

Statements by Under Secretary Richardson and Text of Communiqué 193

THE INTERNATIONAL ATOM—A NEW APPRAISAL:
ON KEEPING THE PEACEFUL ATOM PEACEFUL

*The Rosenfeld Lecture (Part II)
by Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 199*

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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March 10, 1969

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Department Emphasizes the Importance of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

*Statement by Secretary Rogers*¹

I am happy to appear before your committee to express the administration's support for the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.² The policy of the administration was set forth by President Nixon in his letter of February 5 to the Senate, and I quote:³

I believe that ratification of the Treaty at this time would advance this Administration's policy of negotiation rather than confrontation with the USSR. . . .

Consonant with my purpose to "strengthen the structure of peace," therefore, I urge the Senate's prompt consideration and positive action on this Treaty.

Of course, as the committee knows, the treaty, which has now been signed by 87 countries and ratified by nine, is the culmination of many years of effort in both Republican and Democratic administrations. Beginning with the Baruch plan and the McMahon Act in 1946, the United States has searched for ways to curb the spread of nuclear weapons. President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace plan and the resulting International Atomic Energy Agency helped to lay the foundations on which a realistic and verifiable nonproliferation treaty could be built. Now, after long, patient negotiations by William C. Foster, Adrian Fisher, and a very able team, during the administrations of both President Kennedy and President Johnson, we have before us a carefully drafted and carefully balanced international agreement which can contribute to this country's nonproliferation goal.

In his press conference of February 6,⁴ President Nixon stated that, in asking the Senate to approve the treaty, "I did not gloss over the

fact that we still very strongly disapproved of what the Soviet Union had done in Czechoslovakia and what it still is doing. But on balance, I considered that this was the time to move forward on the treaty and have done so."

But the invasion of Czechoslovakia was not the sole cause of concern to President Nixon in his consideration of the Nonproliferation Treaty. He also wanted an opportunity to address the concerns of our allies, with whom we expect to have further discussions next week during the deliberations of the Senate.

In this connection, I want to reiterate that the Nonproliferation Treaty will not adversely affect our existing defense alliances.

As Secretary Rusk noted during the July hearings before this committee,⁵ we provided our NATO allies during the negotiation of the treaty with answers to questions they had raised concerning articles I and II. They are set forth in Executive H [90th Cong., 2d sess.]. I want to confirm at this time this administration's complete concurrence in those answers. We stand by them and will continue to do so.

With respect to the broader question of security assurances, I wish to make clear that the Nonproliferation Treaty does not create any new security commitment by the United States abroad and that it does not broaden or modify

¹ Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Feb. 18 (press release 38).

² For text of the treaty, see BULLETIN of July 1, 1968, p. 9.

³ BULLETIN of Feb. 24, 1969, p. 162.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

⁵ BULLETIN of July 29, 1968, p. 131.

any existing security commitments abroad. My understanding of the effect and significance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 255 (1968)⁶ and the related U.S. declaration⁷ is in complete accord with that expressed in the committee's report on the treaty last September.

With respect to the safeguards article of the treaty (article III), I would like to stress the fact that this article was included at the insistence of the United States, following intensive consultation with our allies. We believe it should make an important contribution to the U.S. objective of safeguarding against diversion to nuclear weapons of the vast quantities of plutonium becoming available throughout the world as a byproduct of the operation of peaceful nuclear reactors. Moreover, we believe that the three guiding principles enunciated by the United States (set forth at pages IX and X of Executive II) constitute important and useful guidelines for the successful implementation of article III.

The fact that I have explicitly referred to certain prior United States statements this morning but not to others should, of course, not be taken as in any way altering or denying the positions reflected in such other statements. This administration has considered the many technical issues raised by this treaty, and we find ourselves in agreement with the positions previously taken by the United States. In this connection, I request that there be included in the record of these hearings the letter dated January 17, 1969, and accompanying memorandum from my predecessor, Dean Rusk,⁸ relating to the issues raised in the minority views of this committee.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that the United States has for many years been in the forefront of the many countries which realize the awesome insecurity that could result from the spread of nuclear weapons. There is no effort of greater importance than the endeavor to prevent such an eventuality. Thus I sincerely hope that this committee will again report favorably on this treaty and that the Senate will give its advice and consent to ratification as soon as it reasonably can, in the light of the treaty's importance.

⁶ BULLETIN of July 8, 1968, p. 58.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

⁸ Not printed here.

Fifth Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris

Following is the opening statement made by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, head of the U.S. delegation, at the fifth plenary session of the new meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on February 20.

Press release 41 (revised) dated February 20

Ladies and gentlemen: The United States has come to the Paris meetings to negotiate a just and lasting settlement of the war in Viet-Nam. The process of negotiation is a process of each side setting forth specific proposals which the other can examine. It is a search for common ground.

In an earnest effort to find a starting place, our side has offered specific proposals. We have sought to identify common ground upon which the structure of peace in Viet-Nam could be built. However, your side has rejected this approach. You have offered no concrete proposals in return. You have even, it seems, rejected the fundamental objective of negotiations—which is to find common ground. Moreover, in our last meeting here, your side spoke only in the language of unconditional and sweeping demands. That is not the language of negotiation.

How, then, does your side propose that we proceed in these meetings? Are we to approach negotiations in the time-honored way of discussing specific proposals and of seeking common ground? Or are we to say, as your side has done, that there cannot be common ground?

In the search for a negotiated solution, we suggest that our attention focus on the 1954 Geneva accords.¹ The United States believes that the essential elements of the 1954 accords, which we have all said we support as a basis for a future settlement, provide common ground on which to build the structure of peace in Viet-Nam. We therefore believe it important to state more fully our understanding of those essential elements.

First, the 1954 Geneva accords established a provisional military demarcation line at the 17th parallel and created, on either side of it,

¹ For text of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam, July 20, 1954, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents* (Department of State publication 6446), vol. I, p. 750.

a demilitarized zone as a temporary buffer between North and South Viet-Nam. The demarcation line was not a permanent boundary. This line and the demilitarized zone were to be respected pending the peaceful reunification of Viet-Nam through the free decision of the people of North Viet-Nam and the people of South Viet-Nam. The United States has called for full respect for the demilitarized zone and has made specific proposals for its restoration. The United States also supports the reunification of Viet-Nam through the free decision of the people of North Viet-Nam and the people of South Viet-Nam.

Second, the 1954 accords provided for the disengagement of opposing military forces in Viet-Nam and for the cessation of hostilities. Viet Minh forces in the South were to be regrouped and withdrawn to North Viet-Nam, while French Union forces were to withdraw to the South. The United States supports the principles of military disengagement and withdrawal of external forces.

Third, the 1954 Geneva accords, particularly in articles 19 and 24, provided for nonintervention and nonaggression by one zone of Viet-Nam against the other. We firmly support these essential principles.

Fourth, the accords provided for impartial international supervision of the implementation of the agreements by the parties. The United States supports the principle of effective international supervision.

Your side has referred to other principles of the 1954 Geneva accords. You have spoken of the prohibition against foreign military bases, the limitations on foreign military forces, and the principle of respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Viet-Nam. We have repeatedly said that the United States seeks no permanent military forces in Viet-Nam. We seek no permanent military bases. We support the principles of sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity.

In our last meeting a spokesman for your side said that our respective positions on the 1954 Geneva accords are diametrically opposed. Let

me ask you to study what I have just said concerning the Geneva accords to see whether common ground does not exist.

The United States believes the essential principles of the Geneva accords do provide common ground for bringing the conflict in Viet-Nam to an end. Our task in these meetings should be to examine concrete proposals to carry out these basic principles. In this spirit, the United States has put forward proposals regarding the demilitarized zone and the withdrawal of external forces.

Your side obviously recognizes that the solution of military issues is an absolutely essential first step for the creation of conditions in which the political problems can be resolved. For example, at the last plenary session, a spokesman for your side demanded that Allied forces be withdrawn completely and unconditionally from South Viet-Nam and that American military bases be liquidated. He said this would permit the South Vietnamese people to settle for themselves their own internal affairs. He described the withdrawal of Allied troops as a "fundamental" question.

Thus your side and our side seem to agree that military issues, and particularly the question of withdrawal of military forces, are of key importance to an overall settlement.

The withdrawal of forces, however, like other issues involved in this negotiation, is not a subject which should be advanced in terms of unconditional demands. Rather, it is a matter for serious discussion leading to agreement on mutual action. As we have said, we believe that all external forces should be withdrawn from South Viet-Nam. That means that all military and subversive forces of North Viet-Nam must be withdrawn into North Viet-Nam. As that is happening, the withdrawal of American and Allied forces will commence. We are prepared to work toward the objective of such mutual withdrawal.

I again ask your side to examine the specific proposals that we have made on restoration of the demilitarized zone, the withdrawal of external forces, and the exchange of prisoners of war.

OECD Ministerial Council Meets at Paris

The Ministerial Council of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development met at Paris February 13-14. Following are statements made on February 13 and 14 by Under Secretary Elliot L. Richardson, who was head of the U.S. delegation, together with the text of a communique issued at the close of the meeting on February 14.

STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 13

Press release 35 dated February 14

I am happy to join this distinguished group and to restate the fundamental interest of my Government in this Organization. As the representative of a new administration, I am reminded that President Eisenhower was one of the four national leaders at whose initiative the OECD was established. I am also glad to join with other governments in welcoming Finland to this table. It is a particular pleasure to do so in this very handsome chamber.

There should be no doubt that the United States continues to subscribe to the objectives of the OECD; that is, to the highest sustainable growth and employment with rising standards of living, while maintaining financial stability; to sound economic expansion in the developing countries; and to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral and nondiscriminatory basis.

There should be no doubt either that the United States intends to pursue these objectives in close cooperation with the member countries of the OECD and with other nations. We are acutely aware that the facts of international life link us together.

In the field of public health it took two major epidemics in the late 19th century to call into being cooperative efforts to control the spread of contagious disease among our countries. One might say with equal truth that it took two great wars to persuade us that the health of each of our economies depends on cooperation among us all. In the 1930's, when most of us tried to go our separate ways, we managed to achieve high

rates of unemployment and low levels of well-being. Since the war, imperfect as our institutions for cooperation undoubtedly have been, our accomplishments have been without historical parallel. There has never been recorded a like period of economic growth.

Our successes have been impressive indeed. Yet we are continuously being reminded that the interdependence of our economies is growing faster than the capacities of our institutions. We saw in 1968 some of our mechanisms placed under great strain. The fact that trade, travel, and investment among us have reached unprecedented levels makes it all the more urgent that we should develop and strengthen the procedures and mechanisms we have for coordinated action.

I take this opportunity to express my appreciation and admiration for the excellent report of Secretary General Kristensen. I shall refer to it from time to time in the course of my remarks.

During these remarks I shall touch briefly, first, on economic prospects in the United States, second, on the state of the American balance of payments, and third, on certain aspects of international economic policy which seem to me closely related to the future activities of the OECD.

In 1968, as you know, the United States had a rate of economic expansion which proved to be inconsistent with reasonably stable prices. The gross national product rose by more than 6 percent in the first half and by slightly less than 5 percent in the second half. The cost of living index for the 12 months rose by almost 5 percent. This is an unacceptable rate of inflation, both in terms of the domestic economy and our balance of payments.

We intend to intensify our efforts to restore price stability, and to go about it promptly. It is a basic objective of the new administration to regain control of the price and wage situation in the United States. To this end we shall hold to a sound budgetary position. The budget submitted to the Congress shows a small surplus in

the coming fiscal year. Combining fiscal policy with a suitable degree of monetary restraint, we shall then be in a position gradually to bring about balance in the overall economy.

Our balance of payments last year appears to have been in surplus by a small amount. However, its structure was clearly unsatisfactory. The balance on trade account was unacceptably small. Although there were some encouraging capital inflows which appear to represent a welcome basic trend, other gains were potentially transient. Also, outflows of capital were under controls which we are reviewing and want to relax as soon as possible.

If the United States is to discharge its responsibilities in the world, we must have a sizable surplus on goods and services sufficient to offset the expenditures for security, for capital investment, and for other payments that the rest of the world needs and desires from the United States.

Long-term equilibrium in American external payments must, of course, rest on a domestic economy which displays both healthy growth and price stability. I have already spoken of our resolve to bring this about.

Nevertheless, as the Secretary General has told us, no single nation can itself bring about an adjustment within a healthy world economy without close coordination with other nations. Interdependence is a fact of economic life. If we are to continue to expand and prosper, there must be continued and improved cooperation and coordination among us.

If we are to promote a better structure of international payments and to maintain optimum levels of economic growth, existing obstacles to trade must be reduced and tariff discrimination must be eliminated. Efficient producers must not be shut out of markets by tax measures designed to protect particular products from import competition.

I would emphasize in the first instance the importance of closer coordination in order to keep up the momentum toward a more open system of world trade. We have now completed 40 percent of the cuts negotiated during the Kennedy Round. It is time that we concerned ourselves, as a matter of urgency, with nontariff barriers to trade, with the residual quantitative restrictions that are illegal under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, with the rising and dangerous tide of agricultural protectionism, and with the threat of new discriminatory arrangements in world trade. Difficult problems

exist, but through cooperation we should be able to find pragmatic solutions consistent with the objectives of liberal trade policies.

The United States will continue to cooperate with other countries on these matters under the General Agreement, or in some cases in the OECD, or bilaterally.

We have all noted in recent years the occasions when member governments have turned to special measures affecting the trade account as a means of effecting balance-of-payments adjustments. Within the past few months, indeed, three of the major trading nations in this Organization have chosen to operate on their trade accounts for balance-of-payments reasons. This is not surprising. The trade account bulks very large in the payments position of most countries.

Nevertheless, such trade measures have an impact on other nations; and unless every member of the trading community is to be free to go his own way—with the obvious risks this entails—we must develop greater international agreement on the appropriateness of various trade measures and the rights and obligations of each trading nation. Surely, here is a field for international deliberation. This Organization should contribute to this process by examining recent experience in the use of trade measures for balance-of-payments purposes.

The report of the Secretary General refers to the recent strains in the international adjustment process and suggests the need for international reflection on these developments and on their implications for the future.

Perhaps we should crystallize our concern and coordinate our reflection. The major trading and investing nations—all of whom are represented in this room—need to examine further the consistency of their balance-of-payments aims and the implications for the adjustment process; that is, the manner in which balance-of-payments deficits and surpluses are corrected.

In this connection, I would remind you that we have through long and difficult cooperative efforts reached agreement in the International Monetary Fund on special drawing rights as a supplementary means for meeting the shifting needs for international liquidity. My Government looks forward to the implementation and the activation of this facility at an early date.

Within our Organization, Working Party 3 of the Economic Policy Committee has done pioneering work through its 1965-66 study of the adjustment process and its continuing discussions on this subject. Nevertheless, as my col-

league from Belgium and other delegations have emphasized, events have given new importance to these questions, and I am glad that Working Party 3 is giving high priority to the adjustment process and to the better meshing of national policies which bear upon it. And let us remember that the reason for seeking a more smoothly functioning system—and an improved adjustment process—is not merely to assure that the system does not break down. The procedures of adjustment from excessive or persistent deficit or surplus need to be of a kind that will permit us to dismantle barriers to trade and capital flows throughout the world.

Having said this, let me associate myself as emphatically as possible with the Secretary General's judgment that there are no shortcut solutions to be found. The existing international monetary system has served us all extraordinarily well. For verification, I need only recall to you the trends in trade and output among the member countries of this Organization over the past 20 years. We must seek further improvements with deliberation and in cooperation with each other.

I will close on this note. The architects of the OECD believed that there were important reasons why this particular group of countries should have the means for close and continuing cooperation in economic affairs. Everything that has happened since has gone to confirm their judgment. If we needed an OECD in 1961, we need it even more compellingly now.

STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 14

Press release 36 dated February 17

I wish to express my admiration to the Secretary General for his wisdom in entitling item 2 of the agenda "Problems of the Modern Society."

With the limited time available to us in these annual ministerial meetings, it might seem that we unintentionally slight those activities of the OECD that do not readily fit into the categories of economic policy or aid to developing countries.

But as the Secretary General implied in choosing this agenda heading, there are questions in the fields of agriculture, industry, manpower and social affairs, science and technology that deserve—demand—our attention and on which the OECD has taken important initiatives.

I will limit my remarks to two areas of OECD activity that are of special significance to the

future work of the Organization: urban and environmental problems and education.

I will turn to the latter first. No one looking at the events of 1968 can fail to recognize the gravity and immediacy of the difficulties facing our universities. Few countries have been spared the confrontations and conflicts which have swept through institutions of higher learning around the world. The causes for this widespread student unrest doubtless included many factors related chiefly to local situations. A common factor, however, was the unprecedented strain on facilities and staff that has accompanied the explosive increase in university enrollments over the past decade.

In the United States between 1955 and 1965, the numbers in colleges and universities more than doubled. We expect another 50-percent increase in the decade ahead. Other member nations have had similar growth. Nowhere have we been able to provide either the physical facilities or the teaching techniques needed to accommodate adequately to these new numbers.

Another issue that deeply concerns us is the need to improve educational opportunities for the socially disadvantaged, the goal of providing equivalent educational opportunities for all members of our societies.

American educators and the American Government are struggling with these and similar problems. We look with much interest on the contributions which the OECD is making and can make to their solution. The creation in 1968 of the Center for Educational Research and Innovation, through the generous donations of the Ford Foundation and the Royal Dutch Shell Company, expresses the wide public and private concern that exists over these matters. In its brief life, the center has already shown its willingness to step into some of the complex questions which are at the forefront of today's educational dilemmas. The Conference on Education for the Socially Disadvantaged, held in New York City in January, and the center's planned activities on the role of students in the university represent the kind of efforts which we would like to see continued and expanded.

As for environmental problems, we are all aware of the great economic growth achieved in the OECD area during the past decade. Income and living standards of our people have risen sharply. Yet it is becoming clear that economic gains, along with their evident advantages, often have counterparts in the form of new threats to human welfare.

Pesticides that rid us of harmful insects and weeds also may kill birds, fish, and flowering trees; industrial installations that create new employment and wealth frequently pollute water and air; the automobile, which has radically changed and broadened our lives, has become a source of pollution and a major cause of accidental and unnecessary deaths.

It is clear that many problems vitally affecting our way of life demand investigation and solution—problems that are appearing to an increasing degree in all our countries—problems of the city, of transportation, of the environment.

As examples, I will just mention two:

(a) We are all becoming increasingly urbanized. In the United States almost 75 percent of the people live on 1 percent of the land. The drift to the cities continues. Most of our cities grew up unplanned, spreading haphazardly, increasingly unprepared and unable to meet the challenges of today. The results are seen in our urban dilemma: too many students for the schools, too much waste for the sewers, too many cars for the roads, too many commuters for the transport system, too many sick for the hospitals. Tomorrow's cities will be unable to meet the demands that will be placed upon them without radical and, it is hardly necessary to say, expensive transformation.

(b) Everyone agrees that it is desirable and even essential that we control environmental pollution. Tremendous investments of capital will be necessary if the task is to be performed properly. But at this time, it is not even clear which pollutants of air, water, and food are really significant. The acute and immediate effects of environmental pollution can readily be recognized. We are far less knowledgeable about cumulative, delayed, or indirect pollution, whose effects may be of equal, if not greater, importance.

Priorities for the control of environmental pollution cannot be established rationally until such knowledge is available.

I was struck by one of the comments of our astronauts during the eventful space journey to the moon and back—a comment that was magnificently reinforced by the remarkable color photographs of the earth rising over the moon's landscape. There we saw the distant planet earth, with its oceans, continents, and cloud cover, contrasting with the nearby forbidding and desolate expanse of the moon. From his perspective, Captain Lovell said: "The earth

from here is a grand oasis in the vastness of space."

I should hope that we shall learn this one crucial lesson from these early space adventures: that the earth is an oasis. It is alone among the planets we know in possessing the incredible balance of environmental conditions needed to support life. This balance and these conditions, as we now see, can be altered and perhaps destroyed by the works of man.

At this moment, no one of us knows how best to conserve and improve our environment. What is certain is that we shall all have to spend increasing amounts of money in the search for answers. It would be wasteful in the extreme for us to go our separate ways in this search. Pollution does not respect national boundaries. Problems of the environment, moreover, exceed by far the capacities and skills of any of our nations.

Where else can we more usefully pool and harmonize our efforts? We can parcel out the research tasks, we can assure that our findings are standardized and widely usable, and we can spread them widely among the countries concerned. The economies of cooperation are evident. The promises of multiplying the results are bright.

The OECD was the first international organization seriously to be aware of these possibilities. I am confident that it will continue to provide crucial leadership in the future, both in stimulating national recognition of key problems and by encouraging concerted and cooperative actions designed to help us maintain a permanently habitable planet.

We look forward to the completion of the study being undertaken by the Secretary General of possible alternative administrative arrangements for strengthening cooperation in the application of science to the environment. No task within the OECD deserves higher priority.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE

1. The Council of the OECD met at Ministerial level in Paris on 13th and 14th February, 1969, under the Chairmanship of Dr. Karl Schiller, Federal Minister of Economic Affairs (Germany). Ministers first noted with satisfaction the accession of Finland to the OECD Convention and welcomed the Finnish Minister, Mr. Jussi Linnamo.

They then reviewed the work of the Organisation in the light of the current economic situation and future prospects, the changes being brought about in the structure of modern economy and society, and the needs of the developing countries.

2. Economic growth was faster than expected in the OECD area in 1968, partly because the high level of demand which persisted in the United States and the United Kingdom indirectly supported expansion in other countries. Because of measures taken to restrain demand in these two countries and in France, a certain slowing down has now started. Total expansion for the OECD area, which was above 5 per cent in 1968, may therefore be somewhat lower in 1969.

3. High rates of growth in production in 1968 were accompanied by strains in the monetary field. These strains were partly due to differences in the level of demand in various countries and were characterised by exceptionally large capital movements and rising interest rates.

In 1969 the measures taken should cause a substantial improvement in the current balance of the United Kingdom and the United States as well as a reduction in the large German surplus. The Italian surplus had remained large, but, thanks to the measures taken, should begin to diminish. Current transactions should on the whole move towards a more balanced position and short-term capital movements should be less disturbing than last year.

Having in mind the work done by the OECD on the development of capital markets, Ministers noted the expansion of international capital markets in 1968 and welcomed this development.

4. Ministers felt that a major objective of the OECD countries should be improved cooperation with respect to economic policies. They recalled the commitment of member governments to promote the highest sustainable growth of their economies, with financial stability, and they noted that this required harmonization of national policies. To this end, they asked the Organisation to review, and if possible improve, the effectiveness of its consultative procedures.

Particular attention was given to the need for a timely application of domestic policies to regulate demand. Experience in 1968 showed once again that demand management measures need time to take effect. The rising trend of interest rates in the OECD area stresses the need for balance between fiscal and monetary measures in demand management. Ministers felt that the OECD study on fiscal policy was a useful basis for further action in this field. There was also general agreement that overall demand management must be supplemented by measures of structural policy aimed at correcting regional or sectoral imbalances. Such measures, among which active manpower policies play an important role, would enable Member countries to approach full resource utilisation without the reappearance of inflationary price and cost increases.

Prompt and balanced demand management measures will have a beneficial influence on international capital flows. Ministers recognised that other factors may also influence capital movements and agreed that national authorities should co-operate to counteract disequilibrating capital flows.

Ministers recalled the OECD's continuing concern with the balance of payments adjustment process and the basic report on this subject in 1966. They instructed the Organisation to intensify its efforts, in consultation with other bodies, to ensure the effective functioning of the adjustment process.

5. Problems relating to international trade and invisible transactions, including tourism, were reviewed. Ministers referred to various measures, including those exceptional measures taken recently with a view to helping to improve certain balance of payments situations. They considered it desirable that disturbances likely to hamper the expansion of foreign trade and other transactions should wherever possible be avoided. Substantial advances in the liberalisation of trade have been achieved in recent years. These advances should be maintained and carried to completion, thus making it possible to undertake new efforts in the same direction at the appropriate time. Ministers agreed that new developments in these fields and problems resulting therefrom should be studied by the Organisation.

6. The rapid rate of technological progress is transforming the social and economic structures of highly industrialised societies. The effects of this transformation extend into agriculture, industry, education, and the human environment. Although it has brought an unprecedented rise in national and personal wealth and well-being, it has created new problems which have national as well as international consequences, and has modified some of the conditions under which general economic policies operate.

Many of these matters have been the subject of consultations and valuable exchanges of experience in the OECD, both at meetings at ministerial level on science and agriculture and in the competent committees of the Organisation dealing with education, air and water pollution and other aspects of the environment, as well as various branches of industry. Ministers stressed the importance of this work and asked the Organisation to pursue its efforts, taking into account the work of other organisations in these fields.

7. Ministers noted that the problem of aid and trade relationships between the developed and the developing countries were being reassessed, both by international agencies and by individual governments, and expressed the hope that these reviews would contribute to more effective national and international policies and actions.

Ministers received a progress report on the work of the Organisation on preferential tariff treatment for exports of developing countries. They instructed the Organisation to bring this work to the stage needed in time for the consultations to be held with developing countries.

Ministers had in mind the need to expand the volume of aid as steadily as possible towards the target fixed by the UNCTAD Conference in New Delhi in 1968 while avoiding placing excessive debt burdens on the developing countries which might hamper the progress of their efforts for economic development. Some Ministers considered that medium-term planning of development aid expenditure would be useful in this respect. They reaffirmed the importance of aid programmes addressed to the problem of meeting educational and agricultural requirements in developing countries.

8. Ministers expressed their deep gratitude for the eminent services rendered to the Organisation by its first Secretary-General, Mr. Thorkil Kristensen, and appointed Mr. Emile van Lennep his successor with effect from 30th September, 1969.

U.S. Regrets Communist China's Cancellation of Warsaw Meeting

Statement by Secretary Rogers¹

We are disappointed that the Chinese Communists canceled the meeting scheduled in Warsaw for Thursday [February 20]. We especially regret this action inasmuch as our representative had been instructed to make or renew constructive suggestions. These suggestions included consideration of an agreement on peaceful coexistence consistent with our treaty obligations in the area, the subjects of exchange of reporters, scholars, scientists, and scientific information, the regularization of postal and telecommunications problems.

We continue to stand ready to meet with the Chinese Communists at any time. The charges made by the Chinese Communists that the United States had engineered the defection of Liao Ho-shu are untrue.

U.S. Calls for International Action To Safeguard Civilian Aviation

Following are Department statements read to news correspondents by Department press spokesmen on February 18 and 19, together with the text of a letter dated February 19 from Charles W. Yost, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to the President of the U.N. Security Council.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENTS

February 18

The United States deeply regrets and deploras today's senseless attack upon an El Al airliner in Zurich.

We are concerned by press reports of possible injury and loss of life and by the threat to the safety and freedom of international civil aviation that this and other such recent acts represent.

¹ Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey on Feb. 18.

Today's attack lends new urgency to international efforts to safeguard international civil aviation against all acts of unlawful interference.

February 19

As we said yesterday, attacks on international civilian airliners are deplorable and senseless. The threat to life and safety and the freedom of international civilian aviation posed by such attacks is grave and requires prompt international effort to safeguard air commerce against all acts of unlawful interference.

The Secretary General, U Thant, has expressed similar views, with which we are in complete agreement. Such provocative attacks only add to tensions in the Middle East, where restraint is essential if efforts to achieve peace are to have any prospect of success.

Ambassador Yost is being requested to circulate our views on this matter to the members of the Security Council for their information.

Additionally, we intend to raise this general matter in the ICAO [International Civil Aviation Organization] Council in Montreal, which opens Monday.

The United States is also exchanging views with other governments on this matter.

TEXT OF AMBASSADOR YOST'S LETTER

U.S./U.N. press release 12 dated February 19

FEBRUARY 19, 1969

His Excellency
M. ARMAND BERARD,
President of the Security Council

EXCELLENCY: On the instructions of my Government, I have the honor to convey to you our grave concern at the attack on an El Al airliner in Zurich airport February 18. This attack, which my Government deploras as a reckless and wanton interference with peaceful air transport, is only the most recent of a number of incidents growing out of the Arab-Israeli dispute and involving safety of civilian air transport.

The United States has made clear in the Security Council on past occasions its view that armed intervention that disrupts the movement of civilian air transport represents an outrageous disregard for the laws of nations and an

intolerable interference with the safety of civilian passengers. It has also emphasized the importance that it attaches to perfecting and strengthening rules of international law that will safeguard international civilian aviation against acts of unlawful interference. This latest incident gives added urgency to efforts in appropriate international bodies to provide such vital protection.

The concern of the United States arises as well from the fact that the February 18 attack represents a continuation of the tragic cycle of violence that has come to characterize the Middle East situation and which in itself is so obstructive to the search for peace. This latest incident demonstrates once again how urgent it is that all concerned exercise restraint and prevent actions which increase tensions and impede efforts toward peace.

I have the honor to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

CHARLES W. YOST

President Names Nelson Rockefeller for Special Mission to Latin America

Statement by President Nixon¹

Because of my deep belief in the importance of the special relationship that exists between the United States and the other American Republics, I am happy to announce today that Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller will undertake a Presidential mission to ascertain the views of the leaders in the Latin American nations.

The purpose of this Presidential mission is to listen to the leaders and to consult with them concerning the development of common goals and joint programs of action which will strengthen Western Hemisphere unity and accelerate the pace of economic and social development.

¹ Issued on Feb. 17 (White House press release).

Geography, history, and common aspirations have contributed to a very special friendship between the peoples and countries of the Americas. It is because of the importance of this relationship that I have chosen Governor Rockefeller, a distinguished North American who is knowledgeable in government as well as economic and social problems and who has a longtime friendship and association with the peoples of the Latin American Republics.

Governor Rockefeller will visit the individual Latin American countries in a series of trips beginning in April. In the interim, the Governor will bring together a staff for intensive preparation relating to the special potentialities and problems of each country in the economic, social, and other fields.

Upon completing his visits, the Governor will report to me personally on his consultations and make recommendations as to how the United States can improve its policies and increase the effectiveness of its cooperation and support of common objectives.

I want to emphasize that the Governor's trips will be working trips and not ceremonial visits. Governor Rockefeller is going to the individual countries to listen to the Latin American leaders and get their views and ideas.

The Presidential mission will include top advisers in various fields. The schedules for the visits will be worked out through diplomatic consultation with the Latin American countries to be visited. On each week-long journey the mission will hold discussions in four to six countries.

Prime Minister Gorton of Australia To Visit Washington in March

The White House announced on February 11 that Prime Minister John G. Gorton of Australia has accepted President Nixon's invitation to visit Washington on March 31.

The visit will provide an opportunity for discussions on matters of interest to both Australia and the United States. Prime Minister Gorton last visited Washington May 27-28, 1968.

The International Atom—A New Appraisal On Keeping the Peaceful Atom Peaceful

by Glenn T. Seaborg
Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission¹

In my talk yesterday, I described the many steps the United States has taken to share with other countries its accomplishments in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. That effort—called the Atoms for Peace program—was unprecedented in a number of ways: First of all it was remarkable in that it made available to the world great quantities of information dealing with applied science and technology, as distinct from basic scientific information, which is generally available on an international basis.

That technological and applied scientific information had been acquired at considerable effort and expense and, most important, had great potential value for providing material benefits to mankind. It therefore had enormous economic value for other countries who could put the information to use directly or who could use it as a foundation for further development and improvement of the technology, even at times in competition with U.S. industry. That result was foreseen; and it has, in fact, occurred, without serious adverse consequences for U.S. industry. In fact, the U.S. nuclear power industry has become the world leader and competes most successfully with British, French, German, Swedish, and other power reactor manufacturers. The international trade in nuclear power reactors, nuclear fuel, and associated services and materials has already become very important; and enormous growth is foreseen to meet the dramatic increases in the need for energy throughout the world in the years ahead.

¹The Rosenfield Lecture, part II, delivered on Jan. 30 at Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa. Part I, "The Past and the Promise," appeared in the BULLETIN of Mar. 3, 1969, p. 173.

Another possible result was foreseen by those who formulated the Atoms for Peace program and those who were charged with its implementation. They knew very well that nuclear reactors for the commercial production of heat or electrical energy unavoidably produce fissionable material, such as plutonium, which could be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. They knew also that a country which increases its capabilities to develop and exploit the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by training people, or by building up its scientific and industrial capacity, inescapably increases its *potential* ability to develop and manufacture nuclear weapons.

The planners of the U.S. Atoms for Peace program thus confronted a dilemma which appears to have been classical in its dimensions: how to provide the enormous benefits of peaceful nuclear science and technology to mankind without at the same time increasing the risks of mankind's destruction from the misuse of the skills, the techniques, and the materials inherent in that effort.

In my talk yesterday, I mentioned some of the steps deliberately taken in designing and implementing the Atoms for Peace program in order to attempt to resolve that classical dilemma. The important point to note is that the people involved in that program in the executive branch and the Congress were not immobilized by intellectual fascination with that dilemma. They could not and did not accept the easy conclusion that the risk of harmful consequences was so overwhelming that mankind had to be denied the benefits. Rather, they carefully and deliberately evaluated the alternatives on the

basis of all the information available and charted new courses in international relations in order to reduce the risks to reasonable and manageable levels to permit an attempt to achieve the high purposes of the Atoms for Peace program.

Let us take a look at the development of U.S. policy in dealing with the dilemma posed in making the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy available to mankind.

The future development and control of nuclear energy was a popular topic of conversation among informed people, primarily physical scientists, long before the end of World War II. As early as the summer of 1944, many scientists had begun to visualize definite postwar problems, goals, and possibilities. An important focal point of this thinking was the Metallurgical Laboratory at the University of Chicago, and I had the opportunity to be a part of it. During this time I was also one of the group of nuclear scientists whose urgent concern over the proposed use of nuclear weapons led them to sign the Franck report, a memorandum urging that the power of a nuclear bomb be demonstrated to possibly forestall its actual destructive use over Japan. But to debate today what might have happened had this petition been followed is a rather fruitless exercise.

The first governmental declaration concerning nuclear arms control took place on November 15, 1945, in Washington, at a time when the United States alone possessed a nuclear weapon. On that date President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee, and Prime Minister King issued a joint declaration stressing the willingness of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, the three nations which had cooperated in developing the bomb, to join with other nations in sharing, on a reciprocal basis, information on nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.² The declaration recommended the creation of a special U.N. commission to prepare recommendations on the international control of nuclear energy.

Since 1946, American foreign policy concerning international control of the atom and cooperation for its peaceful development has gone through two distinct phases. The first phase lasted from 1946 to 1954. We can describe that

² For text of the declaration, see BULLETIN of Nov. 18, 1945, p. 781.

era as a period of embargo and secrecy when the United States vigorously sought to preserve its monopoly of nuclear weapons on the one hand and to establish the most comprehensive form of international control over the atom on the other.

During this comparatively brief and disillusioning period, two significant actions were taken by the United States. In the first instance the United States passed the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, whose provisions not only created a civilian agency, the AEC, but also placed an embargo on the export of nuclear information and materials from the United States. On the international front during that period, we offered some very sweeping and important proposals concerning international control of nuclear energy, which were presented to the United Nations by Bernard Baruch, the United States Representative to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission.³ These proposals, developed by a committee of United States scientific, legal, and industrial leaders under Mr. Baruch's direction and in consultation with the United States Congress, were based on the Acheson-Lilienthal report on international control of atomic energy.⁴ This report, published on March 28, 1946, provided the basis for informed public discussion in the United States of some of the military implications of the nuclear age.

The Baruch Plan

The Baruch plan, as the United States proposals came to be known, contemplated establishment of an international atomic development authority, whose functions would include:

1. Control or ownership of all nuclear energy activities potentially dangerous to world security.
2. Control, inspection, and licensing of all other nuclear activities.
3. Fostering of the beneficial uses of nuclear energy.
4. Research and development activities intended to put the authority in the forefront of scientific and technical knowledge of nuclear energy, thus enabling it to comprehend, and

³ For background, see BULLETIN of June 23, 1946, p. 1057.

⁴ For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 7, 1946, p. 553.

therefore detect, any misuse of the atom.

5. Power to control nuclear raw materials and primary nuclear production plants.

Operation of the system would have been by an international civil service, and "immediate, swift, and sure punishment" was to be provided for violators.

Under the Baruch plan, the manufacture of nuclear weapons, for which, at that time, only the United States had the capability, would have ceased. All existing weapons, then held only by the United States, would have been destroyed as weapons and the useful nuclear material transferred to the international agency for peaceful purposes.

This United States offer, if accepted and universally adhered to, would have meant the removal of the threat of nuclear weapons at the very outset. It would have allowed the nations of the world to enter the nuclear age in a joint and peaceful endeavor. The proposal was rejected by the Soviet Union.

By 1953 it became apparent that the United States no longer had a monopoly of nuclear technology either for military or for peaceful purposes. Several countries had developed substantial nuclear programs of their own. The U.S.S.R. had developed a nuclear weapon utilizing fission, and then a thermonuclear weapon. No significant progress was being made in the field of arms control or disarmament through negotiations at the United Nations. Progress was being made by scientists, however, in exploring the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The reports of such constructive uses stimulated a growing interest in the benign uses of the atom both in the United States and abroad.

These considerations led to a new and significant phase in our thinking, a phase which has continued without interruption to the present day. In brief, it appeared to the Eisenhower administration in 1953 that the American people should be informed in frank and realistic terms of the then ominous consequences of the impasse on nuclear arms control. At the same time, however, it was thought desirable to place some new and constructive proposals in the nuclear field before the world with the aim of converting the then dismal climate to one of cautious optimism. It was hoped that in the process a new channel of communication could be developed between the United States and the Soviet Union. This was the background of President Eisenhower's

famous speech of 1953, which I summarized in my first lecture and which served to inaugurate the Atoms for Peace program.

Atoms for Peace and International Safeguards

With the Eisenhower proposals, the United States embarked upon a new course. Domestically, under the provisions of new legislation, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the AEC launched a significant research and development program devoted to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. United States industry was encouraged to join in this effort. In the international field, we undertook a massive program of sharing our peaceful nuclear technology with other countries, and we worked diligently toward the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which was finally established in 1957.

Throughout the history of our Atoms for Peace program, there have been, as I have noted, some critics who have felt that this program itself has added to the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons by enhancing the nuclear capabilities of many countries throughout the world. Many of these critics have felt that we could somehow hold back the hands of time, not cooperate with other countries, and thus forestall the spread of nuclear weapons. These critics have overlooked the fact that it is impossible to keep science under lock and key for an extended period of time.

Before 1950 we realized that we no longer had a monopoly of nuclear technology or of the brainpower to exploit this new field. I believe that it will be to the everlasting credit of the United States that we recognized our responsibility to perfect and share these promising benefits with other nations rather than to stand aloof in a posture of splendid isolation. Besides, we realized that it might only be a matter of a few years before some other country or countries would be willing to provide nuclear materials and technology to others and to do so without firm assurances that such assistance would be used solely for peaceful purposes.

I regard our Atoms for Peace program as one of our principal tools in the fight against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, since it has been an important vehicle for us to extend our influence and to help orient foreign efforts to the peaceful rather than the military uses of nuclear energy.

As an integral part of the Atoms for Peace program, we devised a new concept that has since become fundamental to achieving some international security in the nuclear age. We conceived the unprecedented idea of applying safeguards internationally to certain nuclear materials to assure they would not be diverted to the production of nuclear weapons. Those safeguards involve a system of controls, including inspections, designed to inhibit or detect the diversion to a military purpose of materials committed to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Parenthetically, I should explain that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 does not require that inspections or any other type of safeguards have to be applied to nuclear materials as a precondition to export. The act does stipulate that the government of a country with whom we enter into an agreement for cooperation concerning peaceful uses must guarantee that any assistance given by the United States under the agreement will not be used for nuclear weapons or any other military purposes.

The decision to apply safeguards, to permit verification by the United States that the sovereign guarantee given by the recipient government was being fulfilled, was a policy decision taken by the executive branch after very extensive consideration. It is a policy that has been strongly supported by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and by every Congress since its inception. It is a policy, moreover, that has achieved almost universal endorsement.

Safeguards provide a warning light that a diversion has occurred or may be occurring. They normally include three basic elements: the maintenance and review of records concerning the utilization of nuclear materials, the performance of onsite inspections, and the technical security measures to prevent the loss or theft of materials in the course of their processing, their use, or during storage or in transit.

Safeguards are not foolproof, nor should we develop a complacency that they are all we need to prevent or detect nuclear weapons programs being carried on secretly in violation of treaty commitments. They have to be supplemented by political and legal restraints, and, quite frankly, by national intelligence means. They represent, however, the best political and technical method we have yet devised to meet the problem of verifying compliance with the solemn pledges of additional countries not to develop nuclear weapons.

I am proud of the progress we have been able to achieve in this area of safeguards. I am also especially proud of the role of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in this field. From the earliest days, the U.S. AEC has been the principal exponent within the executive branch of the U.S. Government of the necessity of applying effective safeguards on nuclear materials to detect and, hopefully, prevent their diversion from peaceful to military uses. We also have been the agency in the U.S. Government primarily concerned with the detailed technical elaboration of these measures and with supporting research and development in the field.

You may have been somewhat surprised from my first lecture to learn about the AEC's very extensive involvement in foreign affairs through positive programs of cooperation with other countries. You probably would be even more surprised if you knew of the very extensive role the AEC has played in the fight against proliferation of nuclear weapons and the continuing efforts we are making in this direction. This is a good example of how necessary it is for scientific and technical enterprises to develop an appreciation of and a competency in the conduct of affairs between governments, in addition to the traditional international communication between individual scientists or laboratories. It also underscores the need for developing or employing scientific administrators with an appreciation of foreign affairs, as well as diplomats with an appreciation of scientific and technical complexities. Fortunately, in the development of our program, our country has had available the services of some highly dedicated and competent individuals, in several Federal departments and agencies, who have been able to fulfill these requirements.

At the outset of our international program in 1954, we had no alternative but to apply safeguards ourselves, using U.S. citizens as inspectors, since the IAEA was not a going concern until 1957. Thus, various safeguards rights were incorporated in our bilateral agreements with individual governments for cooperation pertaining to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

We recognized, however, that the maximum effect of safeguards could be achieved only if they were carried out by an international organization with broad political membership. This recognition was based on a fairly elemental

analysis. We appreciated the fact that if the sole objective of safeguards was to assure the United States alone that the assistance it provided was not diverted to military purposes, then this objective could be met effectively by having only United States inspectors perform the job. We also knew that really credible assurances could only be offered to the world at large by having the safeguards performed by an international organization of broad membership whose findings could not be suspected as being self-serving or biased. Impeccable as they might be, bilateral safeguards arrangements between friends are open to suspicion. International safeguards, however, administered by a body comprised of many states, some adverse to each other, and with inspectors drawn from the general membership, would be more plausible—more believable.

IAEA and Euratom Safeguards Systems

It was this recognition, among others, that prompted us to work diligently in the 1950's to establish the International Atomic Energy Agency and to accord the Agency in its statute the necessary authority to apply safeguards on a multinational basis. It was this consideration also that prompted us to seek to assist the Agency in establishing an effective safeguards system and organization. It also has been this objective that has prompted us to transfer to the IAEA the responsibility of applying safeguards to activities covered by our bilateral agreements for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As of this date, the IAEA has already assumed the responsibility for applying safeguards to 19 of our agreements for cooperation, and negotiations are underway to have the IAEA apply safeguards under additional U.S. bilateral agreements.

As a result of steady progress through the years, the IAEA now has in operation an effective safeguards system that is suitable for application to a wide variety of peaceful nuclear activities. Moreover, as a result of our efforts, a growing, albeit still incomplete, acceptance of the principle of IAEA safeguards has developed among most nations of the world.

I should mention that, concurrently with the evolution of the IAEA safeguards system, the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) developed a broad and effective regional safeguards system governing the peaceful

nuclear energy activities of Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The Euratom system also has been an important element in the evolution of multinational safeguards, since it covers a large number and variety of nuclear activities and includes within its membership nations that have been historic rivals. The safeguards procedures that the Euratom system employs are quite similar to, and have been patterned in large part after, those adopted by the IAEA.

As a result of all these developments, international safeguards are now actively being applied on a daily basis. Far more than 1,000 inspections have actually been conducted, either on a bilateral, regional, or international basis. In the overwhelming proportion of cases, these safeguards have worked smoothly and to the satisfaction of the parties directly concerned. Thus, they have done more than simply serve their immediate purpose of assuring that particular peaceful nuclear activities are not being used for military purposes. They have demonstrated that the techniques of international inspection are feasible and effective and that they need not be considered an unacceptable invasion of national sovereignty. They have also stimulated the development of an institutional framework and a cadre of properly trained people to be used in implementing any broader agreements in the future. In so doing they have created much of the foundation upon which the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons has been structured.

In the past 15 years, we have witnessed the conclusion of unprecedented safeguards arrangements under which sovereign nations have agreed to admit outside inspectors, having broad powers of access and investigation, to verify and thus enforce solemn international understandings. We have demonstrated the feasibility of establishing an international mechanism in this field. When you stop to think about this development, it is quite remarkable. It has a significance going far beyond the field of nuclear energy—for we have seen sovereignty and old concepts of national prerogatives give way to the broader interest of international cooperation and security.

I firmly believe that the development of safeguards has resulted in the creation of the institutions, the techniques, and a climate which can one day lead to the acceptance of arms control

and disarmament measures of even broader significance. Perhaps man, if he is ever able to live in a secure world founded on the rule of law, may look upon these activities in retrospect as fundamental pioneering steps on the road to true international stability.

But we must remember that the success of the United States in introducing novel forms and innovations in international relations, such as the concept of international safeguards, was due in large part to the primary rank of U.S. science and industry in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. What U.S. science and industry had to offer in this glamorous and exciting technological field was so substantial in both quality and quantity that other countries were willing to give up a measure of that most precious of all commodities in relations among nations—national sovereignty—to take advantage of the benefits of U.S. cooperation. As other countries become less dependent upon U.S. science and industry in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, we shall have to face and overcome the fact that they may very well become less willing to surrender even that small measure of national sovereignty, let alone surrender more. That sobering thought leads us to the discussion of the general subject of “proliferation.”

Possibility of Nuclear Proliferation

For many years it has been apparent to a number of observers that the progress that was being achieved in the application of safeguards to international cooperation in peaceful uses would not in itself be sufficient to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It was recognized that the possession of their own nuclear weapons might appear attractive to a number of countries for a variety of reasons and in a variety of circumstances. In the years since our early monopoly, the U.K., the U.S.S.R., France, and Communist China have developed and tested nuclear weapons. Moreover, the general capability of additional nations to acquire their own weapons has been growing steadily.

There are a number of reasons why some nations might feel that acquiring their own nuclear arms would be to their advantage. Nuclear weapons, unfortunately, have been identified in the minds of many observers with the achievement of big-power status. Some countries may believe that they must acquire a nuclear arsenal

for prestige purposes. Some countries might feel that their security or their political influence might be enhanced by acquiring nuclear weapons. Some might seek to achieve a short-term military or strategic advantage over a neighboring state. Others might be generally concerned about future threats to their national security should they share a common boundary with an aggressive, expansionist, or just plain hostile nation possessing nuclear arms. Other states might be interested in nuclear weapons as an insurance device to preserve their traditional neutrality.

I mention these possible reasons why a country might choose to acquire nuclear weapons to underscore the point that the risk of proliferation, while real, is based on a variety of political circumstances and should not be the subject of sweeping generalities. The fortunate thing is that the overwhelming number of states in the world have recognized to date that to seek their own nuclear weapons would serve eventually to diminish rather than enhance their security. They have recognized that their acquisition of nuclear weapons would inevitably be followed by similar acquisitions by their supposed adversaries, with the result being no improvement in their own military posture, plus a terrible new risk to their stability and survival. Most have seemed to adopt the view expressed by Secretary of State Rusk on February 23, 1966. At that time the Secretary said:⁵

Nuclear weapons in the hands of more countries could have consequences for world security which no one can foresee. Every additional country having nuclear weapons, no matter how responsibly governed—and may I inject that not all countries are always responsibly governed—is an additional center of independent decisionmaking on the use of nuclear weapons. International relations are thereby made more complex and more dangerous. And the risk that one of such centers could fall into irresponsible hands is increased.

The risk of proliferation remains great. We must face the reality, therefore, that quite a few nations not now members of the “nuclear club” have the technical capability to join the “club” if they so desire; it is only a question of time until even more countries are in that position.

There are, of course, several ways in which a non-nuclear-weapon state could acquire nuclear

⁵ For the prepared text of Secretary Rusk's statement before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, see BULLETIN of Mar. 14, 1966, p. 406.

weapons. First, it could try to steal them from a nuclear power. I do not regard this as a serious threat, however, since it is a reasonable assumption that the nuclear-weapon powers keep their nuclear weapons under the closest control. A non-nuclear-weapon state, however, might try to persuade a nuclear-weapon nation to provide it with some weapons. There is now no international obligation on nuclear-weapon states to refrain from engaging in such transfers, although the Atomic Energy Act prohibits the United States from doing so.

A non-nuclear-weapon state could undertake a program to produce nuclear weapons, including the special fissionable material required. It could also undertake to acquire nuclear weapons, either on a covert or overt basis, using the fissionable materials produced through its peaceful nuclear power programs. In my judgment these possibilities represent the options that nations desiring to acquire nuclear weapons are most likely to exercise.

Nuclear Weapons Technology

It should be understood that the basic chemical element required for a nuclear weapons program, namely, uranium, is widely distributed in the earth's crust and is readily available to most countries, albeit over a range of costs for its extraction. If a nation really should wish to achieve an independent weapons capability, it could build plants for enriching natural uranium to uranium-235 or acquire reactors to transmute uranium-238 to plutonium-239, or both. Either of these is a suitable ingredient for a nuclear weapon. The nuclear-weapon countries to date have produced both highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes. It is not necessary, however, for a country to follow both routes to acquire a nuclear arsenal, although the use of both routes gives the weapons designers a greater flexibility. If a country had limited resources, it might elect to choose only one path to a nuclear arsenal. At the present state of technology, I believe that most countries generally would favor the route of plutonium production. However, the situation could change if uranium enrichment technology became more widely known and more readily available.

During the past year or two, there has been considerable speculation and discussion in the

press and within the nuclear energy community of the possibility that new processes might come into commercial use for producing enriched uranium for use as fuel in nuclear power reactors. At present the major portion, if not all, of the enriched uranium in the world is produced by the gaseous diffusion process. That process requires highly specialized technology, the plants are costly to build because they must be large in order to produce the product at an acceptable unit cost, and they consume large amounts of electricity to produce significant quantities of enriched uranium at acceptable costs. Because of those characteristics, gaseous diffusion plants have been constructed only by nuclear-weapon countries and, in fact, for the original purpose of supplying enriched uranium for use in weapons. For this reason, moreover, those few countries have each treated the technological information concerning the gaseous diffusion process with virtually the same secrecy applied to weapons information itself. The large size and large electric power consumption of such plants seem to preclude clandestine construction and operation.

Since enriched uranium has come into demand for use as fuel in nuclear power reactors, non-nuclear-weapon countries have shown considerable interest in other uranium enrichment processes, particularly those whose technology and construction cost would be within their means and whose operation would produce enriched uranium fuel for power reactors at acceptable costs. One process which a number of countries are looking at seriously is the gas centrifuge process. The centrifuge, of course, is a very old machine, but to apply its principles to effect a separation of uranium isotopes—and to do so economically—presents a number of very difficult engineering problems. If the process is developed, however, and the technology made public, it could very well open the way to the construction of such plants in non-nuclear-weapon countries—either for legitimate use to supply fuel for nuclear reactors or for providing material for nuclear weapons. Although the unit cost of product probably will be higher than that of the gaseous diffusion process, the centrifuge plant has the characteristics that it can be built in small incremental sizes and is a relatively small consumer of electric power. Thus, the centrifuge process, if developed, would lend itself to the establishment

of clandestine plants having no external indications of their existence.

If a country should elect to follow the plutonium route, it would first have to refine natural uranium to a pure chemical form of either oxide or metal. The processes here are relatively well known and the equipment is not particularly difficult to make. It would then place this natural uranium in a reactor. This also would be relatively simple, since the technology of nuclear reactors is now widely known. The reactor could be designed solely for producing plutonium, or it could be designed to produce both plutonium and usable energy in the form of heat or electricity. The first alternative is very much simpler; but since it does not produce electric power whose value can compensate for the cost of building and operating the reactor, it produces plutonium at much higher cost. After production of the plutonium in the reactor, the nation would also need a plant to process the irradiated fuel elements discharged from the reactor so as to separate out the plutonium into a pure chemical form. Here, too, the technology is generally well known and a nation with a reasonably competent chemical industry could develop the capacity.

Following production of the pure plutonium, the country concerned would then obviously need a plant to fabricate the material into suitable forms and shapes in accordance with the specifications of its weapon designers. It would also need a capability in the field of electronics and access to chemical explosive components. Ideally, the country also would need to have a capability to test its weapons (although this would not be absolutely necessary) as well as a capability to manufacture delivery systems.

I believe that a word of explanation on the relationship of the limited test ban treaty⁶ to the question of proliferation of nuclear weapons would be in order at this point. Our country's role in the drafting and ratification of this important treaty was one of the outstanding accomplishments of the administration under John F. Kennedy's inspiring leadership. The limited test ban treaty has been adhered to by more than 100 nations, including several who unfortunately have indicated that they are unlikely initially to become parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty.

The limited test ban treaty does not, of course, in and of itself prevent a non-nuclear-weapon nation from developing its own nuclear weapons. However, it does require such a nation, if it is a party to the treaty, to carry out any test which it considers necessary underground. While underground testing is not likely to be beyond the capability of a nation able to develop its own nuclear weapon, it is more difficult than atmospheric testing, and until a considerable degree of sophistication in underground testing is achieved, it makes the collection of the data from the tests much more difficult. Finally, underground testing could constitute a less dramatic demonstration that a particular nation had in fact achieved a workable nuclear explosive than would atmospheric testing. Of course, whether a particular country would feel that any test was necessary is a question that would depend upon its specific objectives and the degree of confidence in its scientists and engineers. One can imagine situations where a country would prefer to conceal the fact that it had acquired a nuclear weapon until it had some number on hand and therefore would forgo testing, at least for a time. Thus, the limited test ban treaty has some effect in discouraging proliferation, although it is by no means a complete legal or scientific bar.

The complexity of all these requirements would depend very much on the weapon capability that the state wished to achieve. The manufacture of a crude nuclear weapon or device would require only a modest force of trained people and only a relatively modest plant investment. The development, however, of a more comprehensive arsenal with a sophisticated delivery capability would require, naturally, a greater investment.

Those among you who are interested in this problem of proliferation may wish to refer to the July 1968 hearings on the Nonproliferation Treaty before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. At that time I estimated in a memorandum to the committee that at least seven additional nations—Australia, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Italy, Japan, and Sweden—had the capability to manufacture a sizable number of reasonably sophisticated nuclear weapons and systems for their delivery within 5 to 10 years following a national decision to do so. I also estimated that several additional states could achieve this status in a longer period of time. These states include

⁶ For text of the treaty, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Israel, Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia.

Ironically, it has become something of a status symbol in this business as to whether a nation is or is not characterized as having the capability to make nuclear weapons. Indeed, I have been criticized on occasion by representatives of some foreign governments for not characterizing their nations as having the capability, albeit not the intent, to manufacture nuclear weapons.

Our concern over proliferation has been intensified by the growth of nuclear power, which will increase enormously the amount of plutonium in existence in the world. Plutonium, as I have indicated, is one of the two fissionable materials that can most readily be used to make nuclear weapons. It is an element that also will have many constructive uses. As I have indicated, plutonium can be produced in nuclear power reactors as a byproduct of the generation of electricity. As a result of anticipated growth of nuclear power, it is estimated that roughly 300,000 to 450,000 kilograms will be accumulated in the world by 1980. Much of this material will be produced in, and hence be available to, nations that do not now produce nuclear weapons. By that time the plutonium production rates will be sufficient to permit the production of thousands of weapons each year, enough to level most of the major cities and metropolitan areas throughout the world. This would be a great perversion in the use of a remarkable new element, since plutonium, used in "breeder" reactors, can and will be the nuclear fuel of the future—one that may be our major source of energy for centuries to come. The critical problem, however, is to make sure that plutonium is used only for this constructive and peaceful purpose.

Another concern relates to the existing scope of the international safeguards and arrangements that have been in force to guard against such diversions. As encouraging as our progress has been, IAEA safeguards have been applied to date only to projects receiving Agency assistance or to projects (including bilateral agreements) voluntarily placed under IAEA controls. They have not covered the entire nuclear programs of the countries concerned. Most non-nuclear-weapon nations have not given up, through treaty commitment, the right to make nuclear weapons. Similarly, nuclear-weapon

states have not given up the right, through treaty obligation, to help non-nuclear-weapon states acquire nuclear weapons.

The Nonproliferation Treaty

These various considerations and concerns led to the conception and negotiation of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.⁷ Many hours, months, and years went into the negotiation of this great and historic document. Our country was well served in this important endeavor by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, under the able leadership of its first Director, William C. Foster, and Deputy Director Adrian S. Fisher, and with the continuous and determined support of President Johnson. There were many difficulties in the drafting of the Nonproliferation Treaty and at times the outcome was unclear. An agreed-upon text was finally developed. It was commended by a vote of 95 to 4 by a special session of the U.N. General Assembly last June. Although ratifications of the treaty have been delayed, over 80 nations, including the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the U.K., have signed it. The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate reported favorably on the treaty last September.

The tragedy of events in Czechoslovakia prevented the Senate from giving the President its advice and consent on the treaty during the Senate's last session.

There have, of course, been other criticisms or concerns expressed about the Nonproliferation Treaty—apart from Czechoslovakia. Some nations, having unique problems of national security, have questioned whether they should give up their option to make nuclear weapons, even though they have no intention of embarking on any such weapons programs in the near future. Others have refused to sign because a rival state has not yet done so. Some feel the need for a more specific guarantee that a nuclear power will come to their aid in the event they are threatened with nuclear attack. I can appreciate the difficulties a few countries face. I would hope, however, that these nations will come to appreciate that their true security and the security of the world at large will be better served if they adhere to the Nonproliferation Treaty. I hope that such nations will exercise the long-

⁷ For text of the treaty, see BULLETIN of July 1, 1968, p. 9.

range wisdom that this world now needs by signing the NPT.

Another problem that proved difficult in the negotiations relates to the incorporation of safeguards provisions (article III of the treaty). This manifested itself in several significant ways. Some industrialized non-nuclear-weapon countries expressed apprehensions as to whether they would be placed at a disadvantage commercially if their nuclear programs were placed under IAEA safeguards while comparable programs in the nuclear-weapon states were not. For example, they have expressed a concern, which has been widely publicized, that their industrial secrets might be discovered and compromised by the IAEA inspectors, putting them at a disadvantage in comparison with the nuclear-weapon states. We have sought to assuage these worries, which we believe are groundless. We have sought to remind these states that the IAEA inspectors are placed under the strictest injunctions not to reveal to unauthorized parties the information they obtain. More importantly, we have stressed that the information an inspector normally requires is no more sensitive than that available in the public domain. Furthermore, under IAEA procedures, no country is required to accept a particular inspector; rather, the procedures require that the host country agree on each inspector.

We have also stressed that we are not asking nations to accept safeguards that we are not prepared to accept ourselves. In fact, a large private power reactor in the United States, at the Yankee Atomic Power Station at Rowe, Massachusetts, has been subject to inspection by the IAEA since 1964. To date the Yankee experience has disclosed no unduly burdensome problems; i.e., interferences with operations, increased costs, or disclosure of company confidential information. On December 2, 1967, the 25th anniversary of the nuclear age, President Johnson announced that the United States would be prepared to permit the IAEA to apply its safeguards to all of the nuclear activities in the United States, excepting only those that have a direct national security significance, when such safeguards are applied throughout the world under the NPT.⁸

We also have stressed that we are prepared to work diligently with the IAEA and others to

develop new techniques for making safeguards even less intrusive. For example, in fiscal year 1969, the U.S. AEC plans to spend approximately \$2.4 million on research and development for this purpose. It is our objective to improve and simplify safeguards procedures whenever simplifications can be technically justified and will not impair the overall effectiveness of the system.

The most serious safeguards problem that materialized in the NPT negotiations concerned the safeguards relationships of the IAEA to the European Atomic Energy Community. The text of the treaty is worded in such a way as to leave the details of this relationship open for negotiation between the IAEA and the Euratom countries, within certain principles intended to guide the negotiation of all the safeguards agreements called for by the treaty. Those principles specify that each such agreement must enable the IAEA to carry out its responsibility of providing assurance to all parties to the treaty that diversion is not taking place but that, in doing so, the IAEA should make appropriate use of existing records and safeguards. These guidelines should permit an arrangement between the IAEA and Euratom which will be consistent with the objectives of both the Non-proliferation Treaty and the Treaty of Rome, which established Euratom. I am confident that an arrangement will result which will be acceptable to all parties. I do not believe, however, that we should underestimate the difficulties. The solution will require flexibility and imagination on both sides.

Apart from the problems already mentioned, we shall have to face some additional problems in getting the NPT effectively implemented. These problems are, I believe, soluble. Some individuals have expressed concern whether the IAEA safeguards staff, which is still very modest in size, will be able to recruit the requisite number of people to administer the safeguards called for by the treaty. Some have expressed grave concern about the costs likely to be involved in administering a comprehensive international safeguards system. We know that a major increase in the size of the Agency's staff will be required to meet the new responsibilities placed upon it by the treaty. We do not underestimate the difficulty of the problem. Given the growth of the nuclear industry and associated training opportunities, we are con-

⁸ For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 25, 1967, p. 862.

fidant that the IAEA will be able to recruit the necessary number of people to perform this function.

The IAEA's total expenditures for administering these safeguards obviously will have to increase over the modest amounts that the Agency spends from funds now being drawn from the assessed contributions from the various IAEA member states. We believe, however, that these costs will represent no more than a fraction of 1 percent of the cost of the electricity produced in nuclear power plants. Almost every industrial activity in today's complex society entails certain risks which must be contained by suitable measures. Overcoming these risks often involves the development of additional technologies and certain additional costs. The development of nuclear power is a foremost example of this. But we believe that it will not be difficult to find the necessary funds and an appropriate mechanism to cover the costs of safeguards against the intolerable risk of nuclear proliferation.

Sharing Benefits of the Peaceful Atom

In the course of the negotiation of the NPT, a number of countries expressed the view that neither their renunciation of nuclear weapons nor the concomitant safeguards provisions should prejudice their opportunity to share in the peaceful atom. The NPT not only satisfies this condition but should actually enhance progress in the future development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by its signatories. I have in mind specifically articles IV and V of the treaty.

In brief, article IV provides that nothing in the treaty will be interpreted as affecting the right of all parties, without discrimination, to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This article also contains an undertaking by all parties to facilitate, and affirms their right to participate in, the exchange of scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Finally, it requires those parties in a position to do so to cooperate in contributing to the further development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon states and with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article V provides assurance that the non-

nuclear-weapon states party to the treaty will not be deprived of the potential benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. It also is designed to make it completely clear that there would be no economic incentive for them to try to develop their own nuclear explosive devices for such purposes. Specifically, the parties to the treaty undertake to take appropriate measures to insure that the potential benefits of such peaceful applications will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon parties on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such parties for the explosive devices will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. The article requires that such benefits shall be made available in accordance with the treaty, which would preclude non-nuclear-weapon states from acquiring the nuclear explosive devices themselves or control over them. Thus, the devices would remain under the custody and control of a nuclear-weapon state, which would, in effect, provide a nuclear explosion service.

In the course of my visit to South America in 1967, I sought to counteract again the frequently expressed fears by the non-nuclear-weapon countries that they would be deprived of the possible benefits from peaceful nuclear explosions. In July 1967, I stated in a speech in Rio de Janeiro:

I am aware of the concern that has been expressed in Brazil that the procurement of peaceful nuclear explosion services from an outside source might have an adverse effect on economic development in the nation. I believe that this concern is needless. As you know, the United States has indicated its readiness to enter into international arrangements to furnish peaceful nuclear explosion services which can be safely undertaken, whenever appropriate devices and technology are available. These services would be supplied on a nondiscriminatory basis, on attractive terms identical for both United States and overseas customers. Moreover, when those devices and their applications become feasible, there will be no scarcity of the necessary units and all proper uses can be accommodated without delay.

Our belief that arrangements such as these represent the best approach to the provision of peaceful nuclear explosions is based on the fact that any nuclear explosive device is capable of use as a nuclear weapon. Moreover, the development of the technology for producing peaceful nuclear explosives follows the same path as development of technology required for the production of weapons. Because of this fact, it is our profound conviction that halting the spread of nuclear weapons, which our two nations so strongly support, could not be achieved if the manufacture of peaceful nuclear explosive devices were to be undertaken by

nations other than those having nuclear weapons programs before the cutoff date of the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Fortunately, this is a case when essential political objectives, which I believe we share, can be met without any sacrifice of economic advantages. I can assure you, on the basis of our experience in the development of nuclear explosives for both peaceful and defense purposes, that the development of these devices by another nation exclusively for peaceful purposes would be prohibitively more costly—both in money and time—than the procurement of services under the type of arrangement I have outlined.

On many occasions officials of the United States Government have stressed the importance we attach to the obligations in articles IV and V of the NPT. We also have emphasized that we believe the treaty should facilitate greater cooperation among its adherents. Our record of international cooperation establishes our sincerity and should provide confidence for the future. This does not mean, of course, that we shall have a limitless capacity to meet all requests for financial assistance; nor could we be expected to interpret the provisions of article IV in a fashion that jeopardizes the purposes of the treaty, our national security, or the security of our allies. It does mean, however, that we will discharge our obligations in good faith and that we intend to view article IV as a living provision to be adapted and expanded to meet changing conditions and circumstances.

Beyond the Nonproliferation Treaty

While the Nonproliferation Treaty represents an extremely important element in our continuing effort to resolve the dilemma of making available to all mankind the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while reducing the risks of additional countries acquiring nuclear weapons, that treaty will not solve all the problems presented by the existence of nuclear weapons. That treaty will not, in any way, directly affect the existing arsenals in the five countries which already have their own nuclear weapons. Nor will that treaty affect the continued development and production of nuclear weapons in those five countries. As difficult as it has been for some non-nuclear-weapon countries to forswear the acquisition of nuclear weapons by becoming party to the Nonproliferation Treaty, it will be much more difficult to limit the extension of nuclear weapons in the hands of those nations which already have them.

But it will be even more difficult to achieve such limitations unless a line is drawn by the Nonproliferation Treaty so that the scope and dimension of the problem can be defined. Conversely, of course, we cannot expect a Nonproliferation Treaty to endure—and it may not even achieve the broadest possible adherence—unless the nuclear-weapon powers show some progress in limiting their own nuclear weapons. Article VI of the treaty in fact contains an undertaking that the parties pursue negotiations in good faith on measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race.

In order for progress to be made in reaching agreement among the nuclear-weapon countries concerning limitations of their weapons, there must be a mutuality of interest. In fact, each party must conclude that the elements of such an agreement will at least not result in a decrease of its national security. Where a situation exists, as between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., in which mutual deterrence is provided by their respective nuclear weapons, the construction of such an agreement is likely to be complex and difficult and time-consuming.

Just as in the case of dealing with the dilemma of fostering Atoms for Peace while minimizing the risk of nuclear proliferation, imaginative and novel solutions will be necessary to arrive at mutually satisfactory arrangements for agreed limitations on nuclear weapons in the hands of the nuclear-weapon countries. This will not be possible if the negotiators and the planners indulge in the luxury of despair or cynicism. What will be required is an intellectual exercise of the highest order to arrive at a solution acceptable not only to the other negotiators but to the citizens of the nations they represent and to the world.

I hope that with patience, perseverance, and the ever-present knowledge that we are acting in the interest of all mankind we will pursue this long, hard road of nonproliferation, arms limitation and control—and eventually of disarmament—successfully to world peace. And as we do this, perhaps the further development and sharing of the peaceful atom will help men and nations see the folly of strife and distrust in a world that can now promise so much.

I hope that my talks of these 2 days have given you some new information and insight into the complex social and political problems we face today in dealing successfully with the atom.

Of all the issues that our science and technology bring into focus today none is more sharply defined than that posed by our knowledge and use of the atom. Nuclear energy, the greatest force that man has yet acquired on this earth, amplifies man's potential for good or evil a millionfold. But I also think that its power can bring restraint and maturity. And perhaps all this will help us to reach a new level of wisdom. We must achieve and exercise such wisdom soon. I believe we can.

President Hails 10th Anniversary of Economic Commission for Africa

Following is the text of a message from President Nixon transmitted on February 3 to Robert Gardiner, Executive Secretary General of the Economic Commission for Africa, on the occasion of the Commission's 10th anniversary meeting at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

White House press release dated February 4

The United States sends warm congratulations on this tenth anniversary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. We join in celebrating the solid achievements of the Commission. We wish it continued success.

Through a decade of hard work and dedication, the Commission has pioneered in promoting international efforts to developing Africa. It has inspired fruitful new cooperation both within the Continent and between Africa and other regions. It has helped African Govern-

ments approach the challenges of growth with confidence and careful planning. And it has encouraged the translation of plan to practice that builds the progress we all seek.

I have seen at first hand Africa's remarkable potential. The Commission, under the able leadership of its Executive Secretary, has certainly brought that potential nearer to reality. I know it will continue to point the way in African development.

As we look ahead to the next decade, all of us have high hopes for the future of the Continent. The United States is proud to be associated with the common quest for a better life. You have my very best wishes as you meet to chart the goals of the Commission for the years of promise ahead.

Frank J. Shakespeare Confirmed as Director of USIA

The Senate on February 7 confirmed the nomination of Frank J. Shakespeare, Jr., to be Director of the U.S. Information Agency.

Gerard C. Smith To Direct ACDA

The Senate on February 7 confirmed the nomination of Gerard C. Smith to be Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Department Reviews Problem of Aircraft Hijacking and Proposals for International Action

Statement by Frank E. Loy

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for Transportation and Telecommunications*¹

I appreciate the opportunity to come before this committee and discuss the efforts being made by the Department of State to deal with the problem of aircraft hijacking, which is one of the major parts of your present inquiry. I have with me and would like to introduce Mr. Knute E. Malmberg, Assistant Legal Adviser, Security and Consular Affairs, and Mr. John F. Fitzgerald, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs.

Several agencies in the Government are working in coordination on the hijacking problem, each in its particular area of competence. You will receive later testimony from the Federal Aviation Agency concerning its efforts. The Department, for its part, has been trying to deal with this problem in two basic ways. First, we are engaged in a general effort to establish, by international convention or otherwise, an internationally accepted code or standard for nations to follow in an effort to control hijacking. Second, we have made a number of specific proposals, including some to the Government of Cuba, that, hopefully, will diminish the scope of the problem.

Trying to get internationally accepted standards of conduct with respect to hijacking may seem like a long-term, rather roundabout way of dealing with a very immediate and serious threat to international aviation. It is. But we believe it is an important approach for several reasons. The problem of making air transport

safe from armed intervention, including hijacking, involves not only U.S. aircraft but also aircraft of other countries and operations in other parts of the world. More important perhaps, one of the ways in which problems of safety have been dealt with, particularly in shipping and in aviation, and one of the ways in which we have achieved high safety standards in air transport, is by devising and getting acceptance of international standards or regulations.

Our hope is that several premises will be internationally accepted:

First, that hijacking is a serious crime threatening many lives; it is not a joke to be tolerated nor an act that should have political protection.

Second, that the airplane involved should be returned promptly to the country of its registry and the passengers and crew should be permitted to depart promptly and continue their journey.

Third—and this follows from the first—that the hijacker should be punished.

I would like to describe our efforts in some greater detail. Last September the President sent to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification the Convention on Crimes and Certain Other Offences Committed Aboard Aircraft, otherwise known as the Tokyo convention.² That convention is now before the Senate.

¹Made before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Feb. 5.

²For President Johnson's message to the Senate dated Sept. 25, 1968, see BULLETIN of Oct. 21, 1968, p. 425.

Ratification by 12 states is necessary to bring the convention into effect. It has been ratified by eight.

Although the Tokyo convention was designed principally to deal with other subjects, article 11 deals with hijacking. In essence, article 11 requires member states to take all appropriate measures for returning a hijacked aircraft to the control of its commander and to facilitate the onward passage of the aircraft, crew, and passengers. Article 11 thus undertakes to assure the safety of the aircraft, crew, and passengers after the hijacked aircraft has landed. For this reason alone, the Tokyo convention would make a substantial contribution to the international law of the air.

At the 16th Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization in Buenos Aires last September, the United States was largely responsible for a unanimous resolution which called upon all member states to enforce article 11 of the Tokyo convention now, as if it were already in effect. ICAO is a specialized agency of the United Nations with cognizance over international civil aviation matters.

That same resolution condemned hijacking generally and requested the Council of ICAO (the permanent body which sits in Montreal) to undertake a study of measures for dealing with hijacking other than the Tokyo convention. It is worth noting that the Cubans voted for this resolution.

In the hijackings that involved United States aircraft we have in fact been very fortunate that the aircraft, the passengers, and the crew have been permitted to return in each case without undue delay. We believe, however, that the principles of article 11 of the Tokyo convention should be established as an internationally accepted norm.

The Tokyo convention, however, neither compels the return of the hijacker to the state where the act of hijacking took place or where the flight in question began, nor does it require punishment for the hijacking. As we look about us, it becomes clear that the failure of some countries to have stiff laws making hijacking a crime, or failure to punish hijackers, is an important gap in our efforts to deter future hijackers. For this reason, we propose to introduce in ICAO on February 10 a protocol to the Tokyo convention that would make hijacking of commercial aircraft carrying passen-

gers for hire a crime and would require the return of persons committing that crime to the state of registration of the hijacked aircraft.

For this protocol to be a really effective deterrent, a potential hijacker must know that there are no loopholes. In our extradition treaties—and this is true for treaties of other countries as well—we traditionally have not accepted an obligation to return fugitives accused of common crimes whom we determined to be fleeing from political persecution. We have taken a hard look at this traditional policy in the light of the increasing danger to innocent persons from hijacking of commercial aircraft, and of the importance of an effective deterrent; and we have concluded that the hijacker of a commercial aircraft carrying passengers for hire should be returned regardless of any claim that he was fleeing political persecution. Our protocol would provide, however, that he could be tried and punished *only* for the aircraft hijacking, not for any other offense. Under United States law, a hijacker faces a minimum penalty of 20 years; but obviously the penalty alone is no deterrent if the hijacker thinks he can avoid return for trial by persuading a foreign government to refuse to return him on the ground that he is really fleeing from political oppression. We do not propose to change in any way our general policy on political asylum; but we think the risks involved in the hijacking of commercial aircraft are great enough so that neither we nor others should treat hijackers—whatever their motivation—as simple political offenders.

The protocol would be supplementary to, but separate from, the Tokyo convention itself. Thus, the ratification of the Tokyo convention would not be held up by efforts to draft a new international convention.

There are a number of additional proposals for ICAO action which we are exploring with a view to possible action at the ICAO Council when it meets in March 1969. Some of them stem from ideas recommended to us by several U.S. airlines with the support of the Director General of the International Air Transport Association, which is the international body composed of most of the scheduled airlines of the world.

One proposal would have the Council authorize the President of ICAO to appoint an *ad hoc* committee to investigate any instance of armed intervention involving aircraft and to report its

findings to the Council. The Council would publish the reports.

Another proposal would have the Council request the United Nations General Assembly to adopt a resolution condemning as serious offenses all acts of unlawful intervention involving aircraft—including but not limited to hijacking—and calling upon member states to pass adequate laws to deal with such acts.

The thinking behind these resolutions is that it would be useful to obtain the moral authority of a U.N. General Assembly resolution in the matter of interference with international civil aviation, including hijacking, but that at the same time it would be desirable and appropriate to turn to ICAO—an international organization devoted to safe air transport—to find the means to deal with incidents of this kind. We would hope that publication by ICAO of the results of its work would exert some pressure on governments to act responsibly.

In addition to the efforts that I have described, we have taken up several aspects of the hijacking situation with the Cuban Government through the Swiss Embassy in Havana. Our current problem on hijacking, of course, revolves around Cuba. I would not like to discuss our efforts in this regard in detail, because our efforts represent a current and continuing activity and because a public discussion would be likely to prejudice the chances of success. There are some aspects, however, which I would like to touch on.

We are encouraged by recent indications that the Cuban Government regards the hijacking problem as a serious one and that it neither encourages nor condones hijacking. We are now trying to work out with them some of the practical problems relating to the handling of planes, crews, and passengers once a hijacking takes place and have reason to believe that from now on the return of passengers, for example, may be carried out more simply and expeditiously than heretofore. With regard to the larger problem of deterring future hijackings, so far we have not been able to effect a bilateral arrangement for return of hijackers for prosecution, but there are indications that if hijackings continue on the present scale the Cuban Government may adopt measures of its own.

Although Cuban citizens have constituted only a minority of hijackers so far, Cuban refu-

gees now living in the United States who wish to return to Cuba could constitute one of the possible areas of danger. There are two problems affecting this: First, there is the matter of how they can get back to Cuba, and second, the Cuban Government must give its consent to their return. Some time ago we proposed that the refugee airlift be used to transport back to Cuba any Cuban citizens now resident in the United States who wished to return. There seems to be rather widespread misunderstanding about this proposal in the press and other news media, principally on the point of why we had to seek Cuban consent to it, as opposed to just doing it. With your indulgence, Mr. Chairman, I would like to try to set the record straight.

The refugee airlift is operated by the U.S. Government through a contract carrier, currently Airlift International, Inc. It is operated in and out of Cuba pursuant to a formal agreement between the United States and Cuba negotiated on our behalf by the Swiss. Insofar as it is relevant here, that agreement provides only for the northbound passage of Cubans from Cuba to the United States. In order to carry Cubans from the United States to Cuba on the airlift plane, the refugee airlift agreement would have to be modified, either formally or informally. For this reason alone, we would have to seek Cuban consent and could not unilaterally undertake the return of these persons. Another reason is that the Cuban Government is the sole judge of whom it will allow to enter Cuba. We cannot force the Cubans to accept any individual merely on the basis of his stated desire to return.

Of course, there are ways to get to Cuba other than the return leg of the refugee airlift, such as via Mexico. With this in mind, we have since last fall compiled lists of Cuban residents of the United States who wished to return to Cuba. We submitted these to the Czechoslovakian Embassy in Washington for onward transmission to the Cuban Government with the query as to whether any or all of these people would be allowed to enter Cuba. We will continue to furnish such lists as other persons come forward.

It now seems clear that the Cuban Government is not prepared to accept the general principle of readmitting all Cubans who may wish

to return, particularly if they left Cuba without authorization, but it may be willing to admit some on a more limited, case-by-case basis.

May I just say this in closing, Mr. Chairman. We consider aircraft hijacking to be a most serious problem. It is dangerous to the safety of air transport. It certainly makes air transport less reliable than it should be, and the possibility of some international incident can by no means be excluded. We are in almost daily contact with other Government agencies working on the problem, with the air carriers, with the Air Transport Association, and the International Air Transport Association, exchanging ideas and reaching for new ones. We would welcome any suggestion that any member of this committee might have. We have explored every avenue that we believe would be productive, and you have our assurance that we shall continue to do this.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Coffee

International Coffee Agreement, 1968, with annexes. Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, New York, March 18 through March 31, 1968. Entered into force provisionally October 1, 1968. TIAS 6584.

Ratifications deposited: Bolivia, December 30, 1968; Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), December 20, 1968; Congo (Kinshasa), December 12, 1968; Costa Rica, December 30, 1968; Ecuador, El Salvador, December 16, 1968; Finland, December 30, 1968; Ghana, December 23, 1968; Guinea, December 30, 1968; Honduras, December 16, 1968; India, December 31, 1968; Kenya, December 10, 1968; Mexico, December 13, 1968; Netherlands (Kingdom in Europe), December 30, 1968;¹ Norway, December 23, 1968; Paraguay, December 27, 1968; Rwanda, December 31, 1968; Sierra Leone, December 11, 1968; Togo, November 29, 1968; Venezuela, December 18, 1968.

Accession deposited: Panama, December 21, 1968.
Entered into force definitively: December 30, 1968.

Customs

Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation Council, with annex. Opened for signature at Brussels December 15, 1950. Entered into force November 4, 1952.²

Adherence deposited: Romania (with declarations), January 15, 1969.

Grains

International grains arrangement, 1967, with annexes. Open for signature at Washington October 15 through November 30, 1967. Entered into force July 1, 1968. TIAS 6537.

Accession to the Wheat Trade Convention deposited: Iran, February 18, 1969.

Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization, as amended. Done at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force April 7, 1948; for the United States, June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643.

Acceptance deposited: Mauritius, December 9, 1968.

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the poppy plant, the production of, international and wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Done at New York June 23, 1953. Entered into force March 8, 1963. TIAS 5273.

Denunciation deposited: New Zealand (including Cook Islands, Niue, and the Tokelau Islands), December 17, 1968.

Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Adopted at New York December 21, 1965.³

Signature: Guyana, December 11, 1968.

Salvage

Protocol to amend the convention for the unification of certain rules of law relating to assistance and salvage at sea signed at Brussels September 23, 1910 (37 Stat. 1658). Done at Brussels May 27, 1967.³

Signature: Austria, January 22, 1969.

Slavery

Convention to suppress the slave trade and slavery, as amended (TIAS 3532). Concluded at Geneva September 25, 1926. Entered into force March 9, 1927; for the United States, March 21, 1929. 46 Stat. 2183.

Accession deposited: Mongolia, December 20, 1968.

Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade and institutions and practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva September 7, 1956. TIAS 6418.

Accession deposited: Mongolia, December 20, 1968.

Space

Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return of astronauts, and the return of objects launched into

¹ With a statement.

² Not in force for the United States.

³ Not in force.

outer space. Opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow April 22, 1968. Entered into force December 3, 1968.

Ratification deposited at Washington: Czechoslovakia, February 18, 1969.

BILATERAL

Australia

Agreement relating to the establishment and operation of a receiving station on Norfolk Island to study ionospheric propagation in relation to long-range radio paths. Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra January 13, 1969. Entered into force January 13, 1969.

Canada

Agreement relating to the application of safeguards by the United States to natural uranium transferred to Canada. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington January 28 and 30, 1969. Entered into force January 30, 1969.

Agreement relating to the release of certain leased areas at Goose Bay, Newfoundland, to Canada for the extension of Churchill Dam Road, with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington January 31, 1969. Entered into force January 31, 1969.

Turkey

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454, as amended; 7 U.S.C. 1691-1736D), with annex. Signed at Ankara February 6, 1969. Entered into force February 6, 1969.

Viet-Nam

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of March 13, 1967 (TIAS 6271). Signed at Saigon February 5, 1969. Entered into force February 5, 1969.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders.

Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and, in some cases, a selected bibliography. Those listed below are available at 10¢ each.

Algeria	Pub. 7821	5 pp.
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British Honduras	Pub. 8332	3 pp.
Costa Rica	Pub. 7768	4 pp.
Cuba	Pub. 8347	6 pp.
Dominican Republic	Pub. 7759	6 pp.
French Territory of Afars and Issas	Pub. 8429	4 pp.
Haiti	Pub. 8287	4 pp.
Jamaica	Pub. 8080	4 pp.
Panama	Pub. 7903	4 pp.
Peru	Pub. 7799	5 pp.
Philippines	Pub. 7750	6 pp.
Swaziland	Pub. 8174	5 pp.
Yugoslavia	Pub. 7773	8 pp.

Maritime Matters—Deployment of U.S.S. *Everglades* to Malta. Agreement with Malta. TIAS 6565. 5 pp. 10¢.

Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with Ireland. TIAS 6566. 3 pp. 10¢.

Africa. President Hails 10th Anniversary of Economic Commission for Africa 211

Atomic Energy. The International Atom—A New Appraisal: Part II, On Keeping the Peaceful Atom Peaceful (Seaborg) 199

Australia. Prime Minister Gorton of Australia To Visit Washington in March 198

Aviation
 Department Reviews Problem of Aircraft Hijacking and Proposals for International Action (Loy) 212
 U.S. Calls for International Action To Safeguard Civilian Aviation (Department statements, U.S. letter to President of U.N. Security Council) 197

China. U.S. Regrets Communist China's Cancellation of Warsaw Meeting (Rogers) 197

Congress
 Department Emphasizes the Importance of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (Rogers) 189
 Department Reviews Problem of Aircraft Hijacking and Proposals for International Action (Loy) 212
 Frank J. Shakespeare Confirmed as Director of USIA 211
 Gerard C. Smith To Direct ACDA 211

Cuba. Department Reviews Problem of Aircraft Hijacking and Proposals for International Action (Loy) 212

Disarmament
 Department Emphasizes the Importance of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (Rogers) 189
 The International Atom—A New Appraisal: Part II, On Keeping the Peaceful Atom Peaceful (Seaborg) 199
 Gerard C. Smith To Direct ACDA 211

Economic Affairs. OECD Ministerial Council Meets at Paris (Richardson, text of communique) 192

International Organizations and Conferences. OECD Ministerial Council Meets at Paris (Richardson, text of communique) 192

Israel. U.S. Calls for International Action To Safeguard Civilian Aviation (Department statements, U.S. letter to President of U.N. Security Council) 197

Latin America. President Names Nelson Rockefeller for Special Mission to Latin America 198

Presidential Documents
 President Hails 10th Anniversary of Economic Commission for Africa 211
 President Names Nelson Rockefeller for Special Mission to Latin America 198

Publications. Recent Releases 216

Treaty Information
 Current Actions 215
 Department Emphasizes the Importance of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (Rogers) 189

United Nations
 President Hails 10th Anniversary of Economic Commission for Africa 211
 U.S. Calls for International Action To Safeguard Civilian Aviation (Department statements, U.S. letter to President of U.N. Security Council) 197
 Viet-Nam. Fifth Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris (Lodge) 190

Name Index

Gorton, John G 198
 Lodge, Henry Cabot 190
 Loy, Frank E 212
 Nixon, President 198, 211
 Richardson, Elliot L 192
 Rogers, Secretary 189, 197
 Seaborg, Glenn T 199
 Shakespeare, Frank J., Jr 211
 Smith, Gerard C 211
 Yost, Charles W 197

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: February 17–23

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to February 17 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 35 of February 14.

No.	Date	Subject
36	2/17	Richardson: OECD ministerial meeting, Paris, February 14.
†37	2/18	<i>Treaties in Force . . . 1969</i> released.
38	2/18	Rogers: Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
†39	2/18	Thomas assumes duties as Director of ICEM (rewrite).
*40	2/20	Hillenbrand sworn in as Assistant Secretary for European Affairs (biographic details).
41	2/20	Lodge: fifth plenary session on (revised) Viet-Nam at Paris.
†42	2/20	Intelsat conference to open at Washington, February 24.
*43	2/21	Department represented at marine science conference.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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OF
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BULLETIN

Vol. LX, No. 1551



March 17, 1969

PRESIDENT NIXON DISCUSSES THE OBJECTIVES OF HIS EUROPEAN TRIP

Remarks to News Correspondents 217

THE INTELSAT CONFERENCE

*Press Briefing by Ambassador Leonard H. Marks,
Chairman of the U.S. Delegation, February 20 224*

*Welcoming Remarks by Acting Secretary Elliot L. Richardson
and Ambassador Marks at Opening Session, February 24 231*

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LX, No. 1551

March 17, 1969

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

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President Nixon Discusses the Objectives of His European Trip

Following are excerpts from remarks made by President Nixon at the White House on February 21 before members of the press scheduled to accompany him on his trip to Western Europe.

White House press release dated February 21 for release February 22

This looks like a rather sizable number of people who are going on this trip.

As [White House Press Secretary] Ron Ziegler has already indicated to you, I thought it might be helpful if I were to talk to you on the record for Sunday release about some of the logistical aspects of the trip which he may not have covered. At least I will elaborate on them and also give you some indications of what I think may be accomplished by the trip and what may not be accomplished by it, beyond what I indicated in my press conference a couple of weeks ago.¹

Let me begin by one assertion that will put it in context as far as those who have the responsibility of covering this kind of trip.

I am keenly aware of the fact that you have a very difficult problem insofar as the daily news flow is concerned. . . . This trip will be difficult in that respect because there will be no formal communiqués. We are not going for the purpose of negotiating any outstanding differences, and so there won't be any spectacular news in that respect.

On the other side of the coin, the trip will be short on that kind of protocol excitement that you usually associate with a trip. There will be, of course, the honors that are usually rendered for a foreign head of state and all that sort of thing. But you will not have as much of the color and all the other things that sometimes substitute for the hard news.

However, I will do everything that I can during the course of the trip to see that those who go with us from the State Department,

¹ For excerpts from President Nixon's news conference of Feb. 6, see BULLETIN of Feb. 24, 1969, p. 157.

from my own staff, brief you on anything of substance that can appropriately be covered. You must have in mind—and I know you all will have in mind—the fact that, in the conversations that I have with heads of government or heads of state, it will not be possible to cover those conversations except in the broadest terms insofar as the subjects that were covered, because the very purpose of that kind of discussion would be destroyed if there were substantial news coverage afterward of what was discussed. There may be some exceptions that will develop. But that will depend upon conversations that I have.

There are three general categories that should be mentioned.

First, I would expect to discuss all bilateral matters of substance which the other government may want to bring up and also those which we might think would be appropriate.

Second, it would be my intention to discuss also multilateral matters, particularly those that involve the alliance and our relations with other countries in Europe. In each of those countries that we will be visiting we will be bringing up some multilateral matters.

Third, there will be a substantial amount of time spent on subjects that are neither bilateral or multilateral or relating only to Europe. There will be a substantial amount of discussion, from the indications that I have received from the heads of government and heads of state abroad, on general subjects in the field of foreign affairs, in which I will be extremely interested in getting the advice and the best thinking of the leaders abroad on those subjects—East-West relations, for example, arms control.

I have already indicated that there will be discussions with our European friends on the possibility and the desirability of having discussions with the Soviet Union on various subjects; discussions of our relations—not only our

relations but theirs—with underdeveloped countries, aid programs, for example; discussions also with regard to other areas of the world—Latin America, Africa, and Asia—in which we may have a common interest.

On this latter point, I should emphasize a conviction that has been mine for many years, based on what I have learned from previous trips. I have found that it is very valuable for anyone on the American scene in Government to go abroad and talk to leaders abroad, not only in Europe but all over the world, to talk to them with a very broad agenda not limited to the bilateral matters of hard substance which usually come up. I think this is particularly important now.

We hear it said that the United States is the leader of the free world; and because of our wealth and because of our military strength, we would have to be described very objectively as being in that position.

But free-world leadership, in my view, does not mean dictatorship to the free world. It means consultation with the free world and developing from the leaders of the free world the best possible thinking that we can develop for attacking our common problems.

There may be, for example, instances in which the United States alone must make decisions which can affect the peace of the world. I want to get the best advice of the European leaders on those decisions.

I can say from experience—and I don't say this simply because I happen to be going to visit these men very shortly—that in previous years I have found there is a great well of knowledge, wisdom, and experience among our European friends, that it is very valuable for an American to go abroad and tap that knowledge, wisdom, and experience.

Consequently, I was delighted to find that when they suggested the agenda items, they were not limited to the bilateral subjects and not limited to the alliance and their relations to it, but that they were keenly interested in discussing a broad variety of subjects involving world policy—world policy where the United States might have the primary responsibility but where they, even though they did not have a substantial responsibility, at least might be able to make a contribution, a contribution in thinking as to how the problem could be solved.

As far as the subjects are concerned, there are

some, of course, that will be quite generally brought up.

I should begin with the subject of the Mideast. The Mideast will be brought up in all of the visits that I have. I put a high priority on this subject—as on many others, but particularly on this one—because after we complete this trip, it will then be, it seems to me, appropriate for the United States to make a determination as to how talks should go forward on the Mideast.

As you know, preliminary talks are now going forward in the U.N. on the four-power basis, bilaterally first, with the possibility of four-power talks later coming up.

What I want to do is to have direct discussions with all of the European leaders, but particularly with the British and the French on this subject, so that we may be able to find some common principles that will make these talks which will be coming up more effective than they otherwise might be and that will move them along at a faster pace.

I should leave here one thought that I have mentioned before, but I emphasize it again now: This is not with the thought that the four powers are going to dictate a settlement in the Mideast. It is with the thought, however, that if the four powers are going to contribute to a settlement, it will be most useful at this time to have these direct discussions; and that subject is on the agenda. We have prepared it very carefully. We know positions that we are prepared to discuss, and we will be expecting to discuss that with them.

I use that as an example.

Now, in addition, other matters that will come up in every country are trade and monetary matters in the broadest sense. We will be prepared to discuss such matters. There will be some differences of views there as well as on the Mideast and other subjects. Of course they vary, as all of you are aware, depending upon the country which we may be visiting. The problems of the alliance we will be prepared to discuss in depth and, beyond that, a number of bilateral subjects that I have already indicated in the East-West relations.

One further thought that perhaps is worth mentioning is that as I go to Europe for this trip, I am reminded of the fact that it was 22 years ago that I first went as a freshman Congressman, as a member of the Herter committee.

As I was preparing to come down to meet with you today, I was thinking of how much things had changed in that 22 years.

Twenty-two years ago when we took off for Europe, I remember—with Christian Herter, chairman of the committee, later, as you will recall, our Secretary of State—we went there with the United States in a preeminent position both economically and militarily in the world and, as far as the Europeans were concerned, preeminent in the world—militarily because we then had a monopoly on atomic weapons, and economically, the United States was infinitely stronger.

The Europeans, of course, economically, militarily, and—many of them—spiritually were on their backs. I recall then that we went to Europe for the purpose of attempting to indicate to them what we would do, what we thought they should do. And they welcomed our leadership. They wanted our leadership. They needed our leadership because they were neither militarily, economically, nor politically strong enough to provide it.

I think it was a high act of statesmanship on our part and on theirs that we were able to work out a multilateral arrangement on the aid programs which was effective, as it was.

But today the situation, I am keenly aware, has changed, and all of you who have studied it, of course, are perhaps even as much aware of it, if not more.

Today, from an economic standpoint, we go to a Europe with some variations, of course: that is, economically infinitely stronger than it was then; and in some instances they are in a stronger position with their currency than perhaps we might be—or at least that has been the case sometimes in recent years.

We find a Europe that from a political standpoint has regained political stability and therefore speaks with more independence than was the case previously.

We find, also, that insofar as the military situation is concerned, the world has changed, and as the world has changed the problems in Europe have changed, not only because of the acquisition of nuclear weapons on the part of the Soviet Union but because of the development of NATO—of course, that was not there at that time.

What this requires us to do now, I think, is to recognize that the United States could make

perhaps no greater mistake now than to treat the situation that we find there as it was then.

I am not suggesting that that is a mistake that has been made, but it is one that could be made. That is why I have emphasized that I am not going to Europe for the purpose of lecturing the Europeans, of telling them that we know best, and of telling them to follow us.

We are going there to listen to them, to exchange views, to get their best information and their best advice as to how their problems should be solved and how world problems should be solved. We need their advice, and we are going there very honestly trying to seek it.

I think in that spirit we will be able to accomplish several objectives. I said at the outset that you should not expect spectacular news from this trip. I do say, however, that it will be solid news—solid in the sense that as a result of this trip there will be a new spirit of consultation which will result in a new spirit of confidence among our European friends and ourselves.

I believe that this first discussion will lead to others. I believe that the foreign ministers conference that will be held here on the 20th anniversary of NATO will be a more productive conference, looking toward purpose, as I have indicated at my press conference a couple of weeks ago.

I believe also that the meetings that I will expect to have—probably in the United States with the various leaders that I will be seeing in Europe on this occasion—will be far more useful, now that we have started on this kind of basis with my going to Europe first, talking to them, and having long discussions face to face, without feeling the pressure of having to make some kind of settlement of an outstanding crisis problem that comes upon us.

What I am really, perhaps, hoping for most out of this trip is that, as a result of it, the United States interest in and the United States support of the European-American relationship has never been stronger and has never been more needed if we are going to have a peaceful world. Second, that there will be a new era of consultation—and I mean real give-and-take consultation between the leaders of the European-American community. We need it, I want it, and I was very happy to find that our colleagues in Europe also want it and need it. I am looking forward to that.

Sixth Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris

Following are the opening statement and additional remarks made by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, head of the U.S. delegation, at the sixth plenary session of the new meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on February 27.

OPENING STATEMENT

Press release 47 dated February 27

Ladies and gentlemen: Today's meeting is overshadowed by the tragedy created by the indiscriminate attacks against population centers which have occurred in South Viet-Nam. Helpless civilians, including women and children, have been killed and maimed. In Saigon alone, 10 rockets, fired into the first, second, fourth, and ninth precincts on February 23, killed seven civilians and wounded 41. There were similar attacks by rockets and mortars in other heavily populated areas, with innocent civilians as the targets. These people have done no wrong. Yet they are the victims of your wanton violence.

The indiscriminate shelling which was launched upon the civilians of Saigon and other cities clearly complicates our task. Such attacks bring you no military advantage. They bring down upon you universal condemnation and disappoint the world's hopes for peace.

At today's meeting, the United States calls attention to these deplorable occurrences.

The consequences of these attacks are your responsibility. They clearly raise a question as to your side's true desire to work toward a peaceful settlement of this conflict.

Having said that, I will now present our considered view on the proper way to go about the task of making peace.

Five weeks have gone by since these meetings began. It seems useful to us to compare our respective statements and see where we stand. We hope that such a comparison will contribute to the progress of these negotiations. Let us, then, examine these statements one by one and see where they lead us as we take stock of where we are.

First, you have called for the United States and Allied troops in South Viet-Nam to "withdraw completely and unconditionally."

Our comment on this is that the United States is prepared to seek peace through mutual action freely negotiated and agreed upon. We have proposed starting this mutual action in the demilitarized zone. We have made specific proposals for the immediate restoration of the demilitarized status of that zone. We have also called for the withdrawal of all external forces from South Viet-Nam. That means that all military and subversive forces of North Viet-Nam must be withdrawn into North Viet-Nam. As that is happening, the withdrawal of American and Allied forces will commence.

Second, you have said that the United States "must liquidate all United States bases."

The United States has no desire to maintain military forces permanently in South Viet-Nam. We seek no permanent military bases in South Viet-Nam.

Third, you have said that "the aggression of the United States is the deep origin and the immediate cause of the present serious situation in Viet-Nam."

It is well for us to take a few minutes to elucidate this crucial point by simply citing a few dates. In deciding the issue of who has committed an aggression, the question of what happened first is crucial.

The dates show that it was during the latter part of the 1950's that North Viet-Nam began organizing a full-blown campaign of violence and terror directed against the people and the Government in South Viet-Nam. This is covert aggression.

By 1964, regular units of the North Vietnamese Army began appearing in the South, and today such personnel make up the majority of the military forces of your side in South Viet-Nam. This is overt aggression.

In contrast, American combat units were not dispatched to South Viet-Nam until early 1965—many months after regular North Vietnamese military units began appearing in the South. They were not sent clandestinely, but at the request of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam exercising the legitimate right of collective self-defense.

As recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, every state has an inherent right of self-defense against armed attack and a right to seek and obtain assistance in that defense.

Indeed, the explicit provisions of article 19 of the 1954 Geneva agreements provide that the

territory of North Viet-Nam is not to be used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy. Even more precisely, in article 24 you solemnly undertook to respect the demilitarized zone and the territory of South Viet-Nam and to commit no act and to undertake no operation against South Viet-Nam.

It is the violation of all these undertakings by North Viet-Nam which constitutes aggression. The U.S. presence in South Viet-Nam is a direct response to that fact, as the chronological order of events shows.

Fourth, you have said that we must allow the South Vietnamese people to settle their own affairs in keeping with your own political program and without interference.

We say to this that we seek to preserve the right of the South Vietnamese people to determine their own future without outside interference or coercion. This is different from your insistence that the political future of South Viet-Nam be determined only in accordance with your own so-called political program. We have said that the political affairs of South Viet-Nam should be settled by the people of South Viet-Nam themselves—peacefully and free from external interference. This means a program voluntarily accepted by the people of South Viet-Nam, not a program imposed upon them from Hanoi or from Washington.

You have also openly called for the overthrow of the legitimate government of the Republic of Viet-Nam as a precondition to successful negotiations. I repeat what I have said before: The United States recognizes the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam as the legal and legitimate government of that country. As a practical matter, no undertaking of importance can be carried out with regard to South Viet-Nam without the approval of that Government.

Fifth, you have said that “reunification of the country must be brought about by the people of the two zones themselves, without outside interference.”

We support the reunification of Viet-Nam through the free decision of the people of North Viet-Nam and of the people of South Viet-Nam. We have also said that we support the principles of sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity.

But we do not accept the implication of your position that the only way these principles can

be achieved is for the forces of the United States and its allies to withdraw, while the forces of North Viet-Nam remain in South Viet-Nam.

Sixth is your statement that agreement on the military question is “fundamental.”

We agree with this point that agreement on the military question is “fundamental.” This is the right word. Let us, then, start conversation on “fundamental” military matters.

Such, then, are some of the principal areas which have been touched upon by our two sides in our first five meetings. In addition, we have called for discussions leading to the prompt release of prisoners of war. This is a matter to which we attach utmost importance and which we are prepared to discuss in detail at any time.

We should be able to solve problems and meet issues even though we cannot resolve our differing views of history or of political ideology. We are here to negotiate a settlement. Such settlement must be based upon discussion of concrete issues.

Accordingly, we urge your side to review the record of our meetings to date, as we have done. You may find some interesting things, just as we have. We believe it would serve the interest of peace if we would both now take stock to see where we stand and to seek a common departure point in our search for peace in Viet-Nam.

ADDITIONAL REMARKS

Press release 48 dated February 27

You have referred to a statement by the spokesman of the Department of State on the question of cessation of bombing.¹ I wish to make the following points very clear:

1. There is no question that the understanding which was made clear to the North Viet-

¹At his press and radio news briefing on Feb. 24 Department spokesman Carl Bartsch was asked whether the United States considered that North Viet-Nam's violations of the demilitarized zone and shelling of cities in the South were in violation of the understanding of Oct. 31. He replied:

“The terms of the understanding remain the same. But this question is still under continuing and careful review. . . . Now, I might add that attacks on population centers clearly raise a question as to the other side's true desire to work toward a peaceful settlement of the conflict.”

name representatives prior to the stopping of the bombing on October 31 remains in force.

2. Attacks on population centers clearly raise a question as to your side's true desire to work toward a peaceful solution to the conflict. Those are the two points I wish to make.

You have spoken of U.S. action in North Viet-Nam since the cessation of bombing on November 1. I wish to make a few comments in this regard.

First, on October 31 the United States stopped all bombardment and all other acts involving the use of force against the entire territory of North Viet-Nam.

Second, each case of further use of force in North Viet-Nam since then was initiated by the armed forces of North Viet-Nam, not by those of the United States; and the Government of North Viet-Nam must accordingly bear the responsibility.

Third, any action we have taken in the DMZ, of which you have spoken, was a direct response to North Vietnamese violation of that zone, including firing on United States forces.

The facts are that the United States carried out its undertaking to stop bombardment and all acts involving the use of force in North Viet-Nam. We said we would stop. We did stop. We have kept our word. So I repeat: The understanding which was made clear to North Vietnamese representatives prior to the stopping of bombing on October 31 remains in force.

Letters of Credence

Brazil

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Brazil, Mario Gibson Barboza, presented his credentials to President Nixon on February 21. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated February 21.

Panama

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Panama, Roberto Ramon Aleman, presented his credentials to President Nixon on February 21. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated February 21.

Special U.S. Coordinator Appointed for Nigerian Relief Efforts

*Statement by President Nixon*¹

I know that I speak for all Americans in expressing this nation's deep anguish for the terrible human suffering in the Nigerian civil war. It is tragic enough to watch a military conflict between peoples who once lived together in peace and developing prosperity. But that tragedy has been compounded, and the conscience of the world engaged, by the starvation threatening millions of innocent civilians on both sides of the battle.

Immediately after taking office, I directed an urgent and comprehensive review of the relief situation. The purpose was to examine every possibility to enlarge and expedite the flow of relief. This very complex problem will require continuing study. I am announcing, however, the following initial conclusions of the review:

1. The Red Cross and the voluntary agencies are now feeding nearly 1 million people in areas of the war zone controlled by the Federal Military Government of Nigeria. They fully expect the numbers will grow in magnitude over the coming months. This, therefore, will require additional support for the international relief effort from donor countries and, of course, the continued cooperation of Federal authorities.

2. There is widely conflicting information on future food requirements within the Biafran-controlled area, where the relief operation is feeding an estimated 2 million persons. The United States Government therefore is urgently seeking a comprehensive internationally conducted survey of food needs in that area.

3. Whatever the results of such a survey, it is already clear that the present relief effort is inadequate to the need in the Biafran-controlled area. The major obstacle to expanded relief is neither money, food, nor means of transport. The main problem is the absence of relief arrangements acceptable to the two sides which would overcome the limitations posed by the present hazardous and inadequate nighttime airlift.

4. The efforts of outside governments to expand relief are greatly complicated by the polit-

¹ Issued on Feb. 22 (White House press release).

ical and military issues that divide the contestants. Unfortunately, the humanitarian urge to feed the starving has become enmeshed in those issues and stands in danger of interpretation by the parties as a form of intervention. But surely it is within the conscience and ability of man to give effect to his humanitarianism without involving himself in the politics of the dispute.

5. It is in this spirit that U.S. policy will draw a sharp distinction between carrying out our moral obligations to respond effectively to humanitarian needs and involving ourselves in the political affairs of others. The United States will not shrink from this humanitarian challenge but, in cooperation with those of like mind, will seek to meet it.

With the above conclusions in view, I am pleased to announce that Secretary of State Rogers has today [February 22] appointed Mr. Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., a distinguished American civic leader and professor of law at Rutgers University, as Special Coordinator on relief to civilian victims of the Nigerian civil war. He will be charged with assuring that the U.S. contributions to the international relief effort are responsive to increased needs to the maximum extent possible and that they are effectively utilized. In so doing, he will give particular attention to ways and means by which the flow of relief can be increased to the suffering on both sides of the battleline. He will, of course, work closely with the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] and other international relief agencies, the Organization of African Unity, donor governments, and with the parties to the conflict.

The Special Coordinator will not seek and

will not accept a charge to negotiate issues other than those directly relevant to relief. Nevertheless, the United States earnestly hopes for an early negotiated end to the conflict and a settlement that will assure the protection and peaceful development of all the people involved.

Mr. Thomas Assumes Duties as Director of ICEM

The Department of State announced on February 18 (press release 39) that John Frederick Thomas would depart that day for Geneva to assume his duties as Director of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. (For biographic details, see press release 39.) Mr. Thomas was elected Director of ICEM in November 1968. The ICEM is sponsored by 31 nations, including the United States, and has been responsible for the resettlement of more than 1½ million Europeans, both nationals and refugees, in new homelands during the past 18 years.

President Appoints Mrs. Picker to U.N. Social Commission

The White House announced on February 20 that President Nixon would appoint Mrs. Jean Picker as Representative of the United States on the Social Commission of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

Ambassador Marks Holds Press Briefing on the Intelsat Conference

Following is the transcript of a press briefing held at the Department of State on February 20 by Leonard H. Marks, chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Conference on Definitive Arrangements for the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (Intelsat), which convened at Washington on February 24.

OPENING STATEMENT

I thought it might be useful if I gave you some general information about this conference so that you would be able to evaluate the developments as they take place.

In 1962 Congress passed the Communications Satellite Act, which created the Comsat Corporation, a purely private organization to be financed by sale of stock to the public. In passing that act Congress said, "It is the policy of the United States to develop a single global communications satellite system." With that injunction, the Comsat Corporation and Government agencies—Department of State, Federal Communications Commission, and others—were told to carry out this intention.

In 1964 we met with nine interested governments to form the nucleus of this global system. Every government of the world was invited to participate; nine countries did join in the invitation, and from that was formed a Consortium known as Intelsat. The Consortium agreed to launch a satellite over the Atlantic Ocean which would thereby provide facilities for telephone, telegraph, radio, and television or any type of electronic impulse between the United States and the European countries. The first satellite launched in 1965, Early Bird, had 240 circuits. This doubled the number of channels available for communications between the United States and Europe, all the other channels being submarine or radio communications.

For the first time, satellite communications opened up the way for television programs.

The '64 agreement provided for an interim arrangement.¹ It was contemplated at the end of a 5-year period that permanent or definitive arrangements would be made and a conference would be called at the beginning of 1969 for that purpose. This conference, opening Monday, is being held pursuant to that agreement. The original 10 countries in the Consortium have grown to 65. And the 65 countries gathered here in conference represent 95 percent of the world's international communications traffic.² From the simple Early Bird satellite with 240 circuits there have come in succession improvements so that the current satellite being launched, Intelsat III, has 1,200 circuits, and the Intelsat IV series, now in the construction phase, to be launched in late '70 or '71, will have over 5,000 circuits each. At present, there are two satellites functioning over the Atlantic, over the Pacific two satellites, and within the next 60 days there will be launched a satellite over the Indian Ocean, thus completing in 5 years the congressional intent that there be a single global communications satellite system.

In calling this meeting, the United States issued notice to all other members but, consistent with the intent that I referred to, sent a notice to every nation that belongs to the United Nations or the International Telecommunication Union, informing them that this meeting would be held. We suggested to non-members that if they have a serious interest in joining the system, they come as observers.

We have had responses from 15 countries who will be here as observers. They include:

¹ For text of the agreement, see BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 281.

² Before the conference opened on Feb. 24, two additional countries acceded to the agreement: Luxembourg on Feb. 24, and the Republic of Viet-Nam on Feb. 21.

the largest, the Soviet Union; the Eastern European countries—Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria; also Afghanistan and Mongolia are included in the 15 countries. They will participate as observers and will have the opportunity of seeing firsthand how the system and the organization function. We hope that they will find it possible to join the system.

The conference will review the arrangements entered into in 1964. In that agreement there was created a Board of Governors, which was charged with the responsibility of carrying out the plans of its members. The Board of Governors consists of 18 members, each representing countries who have contributed 1.5 percent or a greater percentage of the total investment. If a country did not contribute 1.5 percent, it could be represented on the Board by joining with other countries so that the total would comprise the 1.5 percent. The 18-member Board of Governors thus represents 48 of the 65 members. The policies of Intelsat have been established by this Board and have been carried out by a manager selected by the Board: Comsat Corporation.

At issue at this meeting will be the continuation of that arrangement and the possibility of providing an assembly of members which will permit each nation, regardless of its percentage of investment, to be represented in a general assembly that will meet periodically to discuss the Consortium's activities. The Board of Governors at present has an agreement to carry out the functions of the system in the field of public communications: That means telephone, telegraph, radio, and television. Some of the members desire to enlarge that responsibility so that satellites can be launched for the aviation industry, permitting planes to communicate with other planes and with ground-based terminals. In addition, the maritime industry seeks the use of satellites for similar communications purposes for ships at sea and port facilities.

Another question that will be presented to the conference will be procurement policy. Because the United States had the highest development in the space industry, the satellites that have been launched have been designed and built primarily by American manufacturers. Over a period of time, through subcontracts, manufacturers in other countries have been permitted to participate, and in Intelsat IV, which is now being constructed, 35 percent

of the procurement is being done by non-U.S. companies.

In some instances this procurement outside of the United States has resulted in a greater expense. The smaller countries in the Consortium have raised the question of whether this is a wise policy and whether they should be called upon in effect to subsidize the development of aerospace industries outside the United States. This will be a topic for discussion. It's the United States position, and has been, that we believe in obtaining the best product at the lowest price. However, we have gone along with subcontracts outside of the United States in the interest of working with other countries who are represented in the Consortium.

The meetings here will last for no more than 4 weeks. There is a practical reason for that—the facilities will not be available after March 21. Moreover, many of those participating in the conference will find it impossible to be away from their home posts for a longer period. The work of the conference will be done in committees. We will divide into two main committees of the whole. Each member will have the right to participate in the committee discussions. The main committees will divide into subcommittees and working groups. It is our hope and expectation that during this 4-week period substantial progress can be made toward resolving the questions that are presented by the members.

There is a basic document from which the conference will work. It is a report prepared over many months of deliberation by the 18-man Board of Governors. The report reflects all viewpoints; it does not make specific recommendations but does indicate which proposals had substantial support and which did not. This report will be referred to committees for their action. It is my hope and expectation that by the time the conference ends, we will have resolved some, if not all, of the questions.

In the event all of the questions have not been resolved, the existing arrangements entered into in 1964 continue indefinitely; and so there will be no disruption in the service being rendered by the Consortium or in the plan for launching additional satellites. In that event, the conference will recess until a later date, when the conferees will be able to get together and resume their deliberations.

I believe that describes the general work that we anticipate will take place, and I am now willing to answer your questions.

Q. To what extent will the observers participate in the conference?

A. The chairman of each committee will determine the manner in which observers can participate. It is likely that they will be able to have their views heard on significant topics.

Q. Mr. Marks, can you tell us some of the main countries that are participating in the supplying of equipment?

A. Primarily the European countries and Japan.

Q. What European—Britain, Japan?

A. Britain, France, and Germany, I think, are the principal suppliers.

Q. Is that document you spoke of that the Board of Governors prepared a public document?

A. It was produced by the Board of Governors and on Monday they will determine whether to release it.

Q. Is there any change in the status of the U.S. common carriers and their participation perhaps as observers in this meeting?

A. No. Only countries are observers. The U.S. common carrier industry has been briefed by the U.S. delegation and I have met with them periodically to keep them informed and to learn their views and to receive their recommendations. They are, of course, not directly involved, but they have an indirect relationship since they buy the circuits in the satellite through the Comsat Corporation.

Q. What sort of a vote will be needed to approve any of the recommendations that are put forward?

A. Two-thirds is proposed in the rules in order to bring about changes.

But you have reminded me that I should mention that under the existing arrangements, the Board of Governors adopts its policies by virtue of the following formula: U.S. plus 12½ percent, in order to arrive at any affirmative action. The United States originally had a 61 percent investment use. As new countries come in and receive a percentage, that investment use percentage goes down for the United States, and at the present time it is 53 percent.

So the Board of Governors acts if they receive approval of 53 percent plus 12½ percent. In actual practice this has been academic, because the great preponderance of actions have been taken by unanimous action, and in the instances where there have been differences of opinion the action usually has been supported by 90 percent.

Q. Have there been any attempts between 1964 and the present conference to arrive at a permanent agreement?

A. No, this conference is for that purpose. The 18-man Board has met over many, many months to come up with proposals for consideration, but this meeting is the meeting to arrive at what you're saying will be the permanent agreement.

Q. In this interim period do you have reason to believe that you will arrive at a permanent agreement?

A. We're hopeful that we will make great progress; but you can't tell, because it depends upon how long people want to talk.

Q. Who is seeking to change the present arrangement?

A. A number of countries in Europe. But the United States also has suggestions. We propose the creation of the assembly. Other countries have supported that, too, where every country can have a seat. Some Europeans propose the creation of an international secretariat to act as manager. These are some of the proposals that have been made in the management field.

Q. Well, the two proposals, I gather—or at least the one of creation of an international secretariat to be the manager, is being opposed by the United States?

A. It is.

Q. Who is—which are the countries, the principal countries, that are proposing this idea?

A. I think that the proposal was supported in differing degrees. Some countries had one suggestion, others had different suggestions, but the general concept of an internationalization of the management role comes from the European countries.

Q. All of them?

A. Most of them.

Q. Could you be specific?

A. I can't. I just don't know. Because you see, in the discussion there were so many different varieties of ideas; but generally I would say the principal European countries have advanced this idea.

Q. Why does the U.S. oppose it?

A. The United States takes the position that the only competent agency available to run this system is the Comsat Corporation. No one would dispute the great success that this organization has had in launching satellites, in achieving the highest degree of reliability, in having developed engineering ingenuity in some of the most advanced forms of communication. There is, and I think everybody would agree, no other organization ready anywhere else in the world to take the place of the Comsat Corporation. And so we feel that if you are going to have the same kind of an efficient worldwide system that we have so well developed in 5 years, there must be a continuation of the Comsat Corporation as manager.

Q. What is your understanding of the European objections to the Comsat operation?

A. The European objection is that there should be an international secretariat, in which all types of representatives would participate. Perhaps one country would offer a systems operations manager, another country would advance a financial expert, somebody else would have a personnel manager. Now, I do want to point out that the Comsat Corporation has brought into management people of other nationalities who are undertaking some of the management functions. But the general direction and planning comes from Comsat itself.

Q. And you want to maintain the exclusivity of Comsat in this organization?

A. We want to maintain Comsat as manager under the formula that I described, with the responsibility being lodged in it and others being brought in from other countries to work under the general aegis of the Comsat.

Q. What sort of damage do you foresee if Comsat is not retained as manager?

A. Well, I can't foresee that would happen, because everyone that is knowledgeable here agrees that there's no immediate alternative. What they're talking about is over a period of years, a replacement of Comsat with the international secretariat formula.

Q. Mr. Marks, what is the Soviet Union's attitude insofar as joining the Consortium?

A. We have had no indication of the Soviet Union's attitude. They have accepted the terms of our invitation. The delegation that is coming here is composed of rather high-level communications and Foreign Office representatives. I am hopeful that they will find it possible and in their interest, as well as in the interest of other nations of the world, to join with the 65 countries who represent 95 percent of the world's communications traffic. I want to emphasize that the satellite has no political personality. It does not make any distinction between those who speak in Russian, Bulgarian, Czechoslovakian, or English, French, German, or Swahili. It makes no distinction between those who are talking with loved ones or relatives and those who are transacting a large business deal. It is an absolutely nonpolitical technological development. And so, if all nations participate, there can be efficient and reliable communications. If there are competing systems, then there cannot be communications between those who belong. Let me give you an illustration: If in Washington, D.C., we had two telephone companies and only the subscribers to the same company could talk with each other, we would obviously be divided. That used to exist in the United States. So that's the reason for a single system.

Q. Mr. Marks, can you envisage Soviet citizens working within Comsat as some kind of a compromise on the internationalization of the manager?

A. We are willing to consider any arrangement that will facilitate effective worldwide communications. The citizens of 65 countries have managed to get together in a very workable arrangement, and I would assume that could be extended to include every nation that has communications facilities and desires to communicate with its neighbors or anybody else in the world.

Q. Mr. Marks, to refresh my memory, isn't the willingness to send an observer to this conference already indicative of a change of heart on their part? It seems to me, about a year ago they made a flat-out statement that they wanted nothing to do with Intelsat and would go after—would shoot for their own system.

A. You are quite correct that the previous statements of the Soviet Union have been in opposition to the Intelsat formula.

Q. Could the Intersputnik nations join with Intelsat while they are here?

A. I don't know.

Q. Could it be done that quickly—I mean could they sign up right here?

A. Yes, they could sign up. I'm sure everything could be arranged. There would be a few details to be worked out. You see, every nation that belongs gets an investment percentage based upon its anticipated use of the system. That quota would have to be worked out, and it may take a little while; but there are no insuperable obstacles. I can't tell you whether it could happen that fast.

Q. And is that quota, that anticipated use, determined by the Board of Governors or by Comsat?

A. It's determined by the Board of Governors.

Q. Does that determine how much money that country will put into the Consortium?

A. That's right, it does.

Q. And what that country's voting power will be?

A. That's right.

Q. Can you give dollar figures? What's the total investment of the Consortium so far, and what is the U.S. share?

A. It's about a hundred million that's been invested to date on the satellite program. I think that's about the closest I can approximate at the present time.

Q. And the U.S. has put in 53 percent of that?

A. We may have put in a little bit more because our percentage was a little higher at the outset, but it's in that range.

Q. What is your assessment, Mr. Marks, of the chances of completing this within the prescribed 30 days, or before March 21st, and of maintaining the secretariat largely as it now is?

A. Now, that's like saying, "How long will a session of Congress last?" You just can't answer.

Q. But you're the expert. Do you have any ideas at all?

A. No, I'm not able to predict how long each

delegation will wish to talk. I am unable to predict how many proposals will be advanced during the course of the meeting. I think we can make substantial progress—let's put it that way. But nobody can tell you whether we can do it in the 4 weeks or a longer period of time.

Q. Do you expect anybody from the Hill, like Senator Pastore, to join your delegation?

A. No, I don't expect Senator Pastore to physically join our delegation, but there will be representatives of both the House and Senate attached to the U.S. delegation and sitting in on conference committee work.

Q. Who?

A. I don't know the names yet.

Q. Mr. Marks, what conceivably would happen—let's assume that you didn't finish your work by the 21st?

A. I thought I had covered that. We would recess until a later date, at which time the conference would reconvene.

Q. It seems to me that with the U.S. having all the voting leverage there isn't any question of the outcome of the proposal for an international secretariat unless the U.S. is willing to change its position, and you've indicated that the U.S. is not. Now, doesn't that make the de facto outcome pretty obvious?

A. Well, we are willing to listen to any proposal; but our position is that at this juncture the welfare of the system depends upon the abilities of its manager, and the Comsat is an indispensable part of that management proposal.

Q. Sir, then you would like a status quo to continue and simply to see more countries falling in behind American leadership?

A. I don't like the words "status quo." We are willing to consider changes, improvements, and the like. And we are flexible in being willing to give consideration to any proposal that might make any sense. But you have to regard this as a functioning organization, and it has had a demonstrated success. We don't want to do anything that would jeopardize future success comparable to its past operation.

Q. I'm a little confused on the vote in this conference. Is the vote in this conference the same as it would be in normal Intelsat meetings?

A. No.

Q. It's one delegation, one vote?

A. Yes, it is one delegation, one vote.

Q. There's no weighted vote for the U.S., then?

A. That's correct. But it's one nation, one delegation, one vote in this conference.

Q. But you have a veto power now, don't you?

A. In the Board of Governors. That's quite different from the conference itself.

Q. And what if the other countries demand that you give up this veto power? What will your reaction be?

A. That will be discussed, and we'll listen to all the arguments. We have no closed mind on any issue, because no relationship can be a sound and practical one if one side is not willing to listen to the other. So we will listen, but I have stated our basic position to you.

Mr. Loy: Could I add one thing to that, if I might. It's incorrect to assume that the United States is entirely alone in its feeling that Comsat ought to remain as manager. We've been talking about some views on the part of Europeans—or most Europeans—to the contrary, and that's quite correct. But there are other countries, in terms of the use of this system, terribly important, whose opinions either are similar to ours or at least who haven't yet spoken up at all.

Ambassador Marks: I'm glad you have mentioned that. This is Mr. Loy, who is vice chairman of our delegation and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, who has been in charge of these negotiations and preparatory work for many months. Yes, the great majority of nations who belong to this system are delighted with its success and its efficiency in carrying out its operations, and we shouldn't let that factor be obscured by the fact that some would like a change. But no one, to my knowledge, has complained that Comsat has not done its job and done it well.

Q. Are there any specific charges of discrimination, something like that, that they advance in seeking it?

A. No, sir.

Q. In that connection, I'm still not clear on why Europeans are proposing an alternative form.

A. You'll have to ask them.

Q. Certainly they have communicated to you their dissatisfaction with the present setup?

A. Well, they feel that an international organization should have an international secretariat.

Q. Mr. Marks, this idea of the assembly with one vote for each one country—isn't that similar to the Intersputnik idea? Would that, if it came into effect, replace the 18-man Board?

A. No. The assembly would be a basic discussion group, and the Intelsat organization would still have a Board of Governors with the power of determining policy, and then a third tier of a manager to carry out the policy. No, it would not be a replacement of the Board of Governors.

Mr. Loy: May I add one other thing on that, too. The assembly idea was first proposed not by others, but by us.

Ambassador Marks: Oh, I thought I had made that clear.

Mr. Loy: By us. And that also relates to the proposition that what we are aiming for is the status quo, because that isn't so. We felt that there was a function for the assembly; but the difference is between an assembly that is the Board of Directors, which we think won't work, and an assembly which discusses certain basic, broad questions, which is more our idea. That is the difference that really relates to your question.

Q. Well, you are in favor of it then?

Mr. Loy: Yes, we are in favor of the assembly.

Ambassador Marks: Yes, we proposed it.

Q. Doesn't this parallel the Intersputnik idea?

A. No, it does not.

Q. But what powers would this assembly have?

A. That would be discussed at the conference. The extent of the powers of the assembly will be discussed, the extent of the powers of the Board of Governors will be discussed.

Q. Well, how much power does the United States want the assembly to have?

A. We will be willing to discuss ideas, but basically we feel that the Board of Governors must maintain the policy control and the direc-

tion of this organization. You cannot have an efficient operation by a large group that will meet annually or every 2 years.

Q. Mr. Marks, do you see the possibility that Europeans might go home mad and set up their own systems?

A. I don't think that's ever been suggested by anybody. There is no possibility of that. Please don't misunderstand. The Europeans are quite happy with the success of this system, and what we are talking about are refinements in the structure. There is no deep cleavage, there are no deep feelings of distrust or unhappiness. There is complete support for the principle of Intelsat, and there is complete support for the efficiency with which its manager has conducted these 5 years of operation.

Q. Mr. Marks, can we get this voting business absolutely clear again: In the Board of Governors, the U.S. has 53 percent of the vote. At this meeting, starting on Monday, the U.S. will have 1/65th of the vote; and so two-thirds of the members, not two-thirds of the ownership or investment, is required to change the system of organization?

A. You have summarized it well.

Q. OK.

Q. Mr. Ambassador, what do you say is the position of Communist China in relationship to Intelsat?

A. I don't know. I never heard anything about it.

Q. They are not a member of the International Telecommunication Union?

A. They are not.

Q. So no invitation was extended to them?

A. That's right.

Q. If such a system were set up, would they be eligible to buy into it?

A. Would they be eligible? Under present arrangements, no, because they are not a member of the ITU. It's for members of the ITU, and they are not at this time.

Q. But what if they joined the ITU in coming years, they would be eligible?

A. That's right.

Q. But that's all—

A. That's a long, that's a double "if."

Q. Is the Board of Governors constrained to accept whatever this conference does?

A. Well, the members here have the power to adopt regulations for the future operations including the power of the Board of Governors. So the members here have the opportunity of fashioning an organization and determining how it will function in the future.

Q. Is the United States doing anything to attract the Soviet Union to join the group? In other words, for example, the United States is really the only power which can put a satellite into orbit, but the Soviet Union, if it joined this, could. Would the United States be willing to have Comsat or the manager subcontract launching to the Soviet Union, for example?

A. That hasn't been discussed, and I think that will not be within this conference. This conference is designed to determine the structure, as I have outlined it. Questions about the future operation and relationships between members will not be considered here.

Q. Is the United States, as a participant of the conference, going to propose anything that the conference might do to induce the Soviet Union, along with its satellites, to come into the group?

A. Well, I don't know what that would be. It's up to those who are observers to decide whether they want to come into the system. We've had no other proposals. This conference will, I hope, receive some. And if they are possible, they'll be carried out. If it's not possible for observers to join, they'll remain out of it.

Q. Thank you, sir.

A. OK. Thank you.

Q. Can the conference change the voting power of the Board of Governors? Can it change the percentages?

A. Yes.

Q. And reduce the U.S. from 53 percent to something else?

A. The conference can do anything to create a new structure.

Intelsat Conference Opens at Washington

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Department of State announced on February 20 (press release 42) that the Conference on Definitive Arrangements for the International Telecommunications Consortium (Intelsat) would open February 24 at Washington. The conference will end not later than March 21.

The conference brings together delegations of the 67 member nations of Intelsat, plus a number of observer nations, to fashion a permanent agreement for a single global commercial telecommunications satellite system, which would supersede the interim arrangements negotiated in 1964. The conference will be the largest international gathering of its kind ever held in Washington, with about 80 nations expected to attend.

Ambassador Leonard H. Marks, chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Intelsat Conference, said it is the United States hope that the conference can conclude its work within the 4 weeks allotted for the meeting. Failure to reach agreement would not affect the present Intelsat system, as the 1964 interim agreement continues until superseded by a permanent one.

The conference will consider the report of Intelsat's 18-member governing body, the Interim Communications Satellite Committee (ICSC). The report was submitted to Intelsat member governments on December 31, 1968, and sets forth ICSC's recommendations and alternative proposals on the organization and operational principles for the permanent system.

Intelsat was created by two international agreements which were opened for signature in August 1964 in Washington.¹ The intergovernmental agreement, called the interim agreement, set forth Intelsat's basic objectives and organized the framework in which these objectives were to be reached. The agreement called for international cooperation in "the design, development, construction, establishment, maintenance

and operation of the space segment of the global commercial communications satellite system."

The actual participants in Intelsat are the public or private entities designated by member nations. These entities are signatories to the second agreement, known as the special agreement, which establishes mechanisms for carrying out the objectives of Intelsat.

Under the interim agreement the Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat), which is the United States entity in Intelsat, acts as manager on behalf of the Consortium.

WELCOMING REMARKS, FEBRUARY 24

Acting Secretary Elliot L. Richardson

It is an honor to welcome you to Washington and to open this most significant and portentous meeting. I am pleased to see among you today not only the distinguished delegates from Intelsat member nations but also observers from other countries.

Though this conference is made possible by the complex technology of the 20th century, its goals are essentially simple and even ancient: the improvement of communications among the peoples of this planet.

A universal communications system open to all men and all nations has—within the space of a few years—been transformed by technological advance from a dream in men's minds to an enterprise both feasible and practical. Only a decade ago communications satellites were still a laboratory experiment. Today they are a reality touching the lives of millions on every continent.

The products of scientific achievement often lie dormant while men quarrel about their use. This, happily, has not been the case with communications satellites. And much of the credit can be ascribed directly to the constructive accomplishments of the Intelsat organization.

¹ For texts, see BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 281.

The record made by Intelsat in the 5 short years of its existence tells the story:

—The organization has grown from 11 member nations in 1964 to 67 today. Member countries are responsible for 95 percent of all international communications through satellites, cables, and other means.

—The organization's satellites have already dramatically increased the number of international communications circuits. The first Early Bird satellite over the Atlantic Ocean had only 240 circuits, yet it increased by half the circuits between North America and Europe. The Intelsat III satellites, now going into operation, each have 1,200 circuits. And sometime within the next 2 years, the Intelsat IV series will provide up to 6,000 circuits in each satellite.

—Intelsat is now well on its way toward achieving a worldwide system. Satellites already provide telephone, telegraph, and television service over the vast Atlantic and Pacific Ocean Basins. With the placing of another satellite over the Indian Ocean in April or May of this year, the system will be truly global.

—Finally, and perhaps most important, Intelsat, as the first cooperative organization to be owned by a majority of the world's nations, has pioneered a significant new form of international cooperation. Participating nations share its costs, its services, and its benefits on an equitable, businesslike basis. As a case study in how to get things done, Intelsat teaches important lessons for other areas of international cooperation.

Its impressive record forms a solid foundation for your present assignment: developing permanent arrangements under which it can continue to grow and flourish. We want to build a system that will bring the benefits of low-cost, efficient communications to every part of the earth as quickly as possible. We would like to build a system that will work for everyone.

Such a system has special meaning for the developing areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America: for there the lack of communications facilities has most severely hampered and restricted economic growth and social development. Helping to narrow this particular communications gap in itself represents a major achievement for the satellites.

We also hope that as a result of the presence

here of distinguished observers from nonmember nations, their countries will decide to work alongside us in making Intelsat a more completely universal bond.

On behalf of President Nixon, Secretary Rogers, and the American people, I wish you a most successful and productive conference. We shall be watching your work with deep interest and you can count on our full cooperation and support.

Ambassador Leonard H. Marks

I am pleased to have this opportunity to welcome you to Washington and the Intelsat Conference.

Five years ago the representatives of a handful of countries gathered to match a new technology with a new concept of international cooperation. The technology was the then experimental communications satellite. The new concept was a partnership of the world's nations to bring the benefits of this great technology to the service of all men. The result of their meeting was the Intelsat Consortium.

Those of us who took part in those early discussions had high hopes, of course. But even in our most extravagant moods, none of us, I am sure, would have dared to predict the accomplishments of the past 5 years. These accomplishments are reflected in this gathering of 67 nations who are now members of Intelsat.

We have with us, also, observer delegations from other nations who have indicated by their presence here an interest in our organization and its future.

Those of us gathered here represent countries which are widespread geographically as well as in economic status and political beliefs. But it is what unites us that has brought us together here. And what unites us is the mutual recognition that the future for us all—as individual nations and as members of the world community—is tied to our ability to communicate effectively with one another.

Better communications are the very foundation of world peace. Without them we cannot hope to dissolve suspicions that divide us or to build the works of peace. The more we know about what is common to us all, the less likely we are to fight over the issues which may set us apart.

We are meeting because a new technology offers us the promise of universal, low-cost,

rapid communications. A decade ago communication satellites were a laboratory experiment. Today they are a reality affecting millions of men and women on every continent. In the near future they can reach every nation, no matter how small, whether remote or near.

It is this prospect which brings us together. It was this prospect 5 years ago which encouraged us to build upon the hopes we had then and to accomplish what we did. It is useful to recall these accomplishments:

—We are an organization of 67 countries who generate some 95 percent of the world's international communications.

—We are on the threshold of a worldwide communications system capable of providing telephone, telegraph, facsimile, television, radio, and other services to all areas of the earth. The great Atlantic and Pacific Ocean Basins are already served by the satellite system. Soon, a satellite over the Indian Ocean will complete the worldwide system.

—We have installed 23 earth stations throughout the world, which service the satellites daily. There are 20 more earth stations in construction, and another 20 are in the planning stage. Within the next 2 years, most of our countries will be connected to the satellite system.

—Finally, Intelsat is a significant new form of international cooperation. It is the first commercial organization to be owned by a majority of the world's nations. Our countries have shared its costs, its services, and its benefits and responsibilities on an equitable, businesslike basis.

A great deal of the credit for this goes to the able men who have served on the Interim Communications Satellite Committee, which has served as our policymaking body for the last 4 years.

Credit is also due to the Communications Satellite Corporation, which has managed the system so effectively.

But credit, too, must be given to the willingness of the nations represented in Intelsat to dare to pioneer new forms of cooperation for the common good. They have exhibited the greatest confidence in the future of communications satellites, as shown by the ICSC decision last year to authorize the great new Intelsat IV series of satellites. These satellites, containing as many as 10,000 circuits, will bring us truly

into the era of high-capacity, reliable, low-cost global communications.

The purpose of this conference is to see that this happens as quickly and as efficiently as possible. We need to look at what we have done over the past 5 years and what we need to do in the future. We need to examine what we should keep and what we should change.

In approaching this task, we have the guidance provided by the ICSC in its report issued last December, outlining the views of its members on the future of the Intelsat system. These views reflected unanimity on many points, and concerns on some others. The report represents over a year of study, reflecting all shades of opinion. It is not based on abstract ideas but on the experience we have all shared in the past 5 years in building the Intelsat system.

Now the time for study is over. We have done our homework, and the time for active decision-making has begun. We should give this as much time and attention as is necessary—but we should not forget our goal. The quicker we can agree on permanent arrangements for the Intelsat system, the better off we all will be.

This is especially true for the developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Here the deficit in good communications is an urgent problem. Here is where communications must be harnessed to the aspirations of half the world's populations for a better life.

The satellites can help in this effort to catch up. They can help move the communications timetable a generation ahead for Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans.

At one level, satellites can substantially improve the present communications between the industrialized Northern countries and the developing countries of the South, opening new vistas of trade, commerce, and social exchange.

But even more significantly, they can create a communications system where it has never existed before. This is communication among developing countries. Until now, Asians have not been able to talk directly to Africans, nor Africans directly to Latin Americans. The satellites have broken this anachronistic barrier. For the first time, we now have it within our power to communicate through all means of technology with our fellow men in any part of the world. With a permanent system, we can move ahead confidently to the full realization of these potentialities.

I am sure I share with every delegate here the desire to get on with this job.

The satellites now, and in the future will, provide public communications services.

We accept as a matter of course the transmission by satellite of television programs from faraway places. Yesterday the American audience witnessed the arrival of President Nixon in Brussels, and later this week the whole world will watch the launching of Apollo 9 from Cape Kennedy, where some of us will be present in person.

They are also capable of providing additional services limited only by man's ingenuity. Recently there has been considerable discussion of using satellites for aeronautical and maritime communications. These are subjects which I think this conference can and should consider.

They can be part of a global knowledge network, servicing libraries and computers in schools and research institutes in every nation. The cultural and scientific riches of East and West, of North and South, can, for the first time in human history, be opened to every man.

They can service a worldwide medical information network, bringing diagnostic information to all doctors.

These are some of the longer range possibilities, reaching to the day when other, newer systems such as laser beams are developed. The Intelsat system should be flexible enough to expand and change with these developments.

Finally, I want to welcome to Washington those delegates who are attending as observers for countries who are not now members of Intelsat. In establishing Intelsat the hope has been expressed that all nations would join in a truly universal communications satellite system. I want to reaffirm that hope today.

I can think of no more important first step we can take toward reducing world tensions than that of broadening the communications links between powerful nations representing different political systems. We should not rely just on a few "hot lines." We will all be better off when we have thousands of cool lines linking us—the big and the small, the rich and the poor, the powerful and the weak.

Today our satellites look down on earth from a distance of 22,000 miles. They see the earth as it truly is—the green-blue globe that is the home of us all. They see a world where no national boundaries are visible, no divisive lines between men of differing races, or economic circumstances, or ideologies. The map may show hard lines dividing neighboring countries, but the satellite erases all of these artificial boundaries and sees no oceans, mountains, or man-

made barriers. By rising above both geographical and manmade divisions, they can serve us all in building the works of peace.

This is what we must all keep in mind as we gather to lay out the future course of our system.

IJC Holds Meetings on Pollution of Great Lakes Connecting Channels

Press release 44 dated February 25

Department Announcement

The Department of State on February 25 released the report of the International Joint Commission, a joint United States-Canada body charged with supervision of boundary waters, on its international public meetings on January 21 and 22 which dealt with the pollution of certain connecting channels of the Great Lakes. A similar report was released simultaneously in Ottawa.

These public meetings, held in Sault Ste. Marie, Mich., and Windsor, Ontario, revealed that water quality standards adopted by the respective State and Provincial governments for the St. Marys, St. Clair, and Detroit Rivers have not been achieved. The sources of excessive pollution are identified in the report. The International Joint Commission emphasized its intent to exercise close supervision over the remedial programs designed to clean up existing pollution in these waters.

Text of Report

31 JANUARY 1969

HONORABLE WILLIAM P. ROGERS
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

IJC Docket #54-#55

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Last week the Commission conducted two public international meetings on pollution in the Connecting Channels of the Great Lakes, concerning which it maintains continuing supervision as authorized in 1951 by the Governments of Canada and the United States. The first meeting was held on January 21st at Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, in relation to the St. Marys River; the second on January 22nd at Windsor, Ontario, with respect to the St. Clair and Detroit Rivers.

Both meetings were very well attended, not only by federal, provincial, state and municipal officials but also by representatives of industry and the public at large. Each meeting occupied a full day and a great

deal of testimony was given and a great many briefs filed by public authorities and private persons. You may have noticed, too, that a good deal of attention was paid to these proceedings by the newspapers, television and radio.

These most recent meetings were similar to those held last year on the Niagara River and on the St. Croix River. The purposes were also the same, namely, to bring clearly into the open the current state of pollution, to ascertain why the water quality objectives recommended by the Commission and approved by the Governments concerned were not being met, and to have provincial, state and federal authorities having responsibility set forth categorically their current programs for meeting these objectives.

We believe that it is important that the two Governments be informed without delay of the Commission's appreciation of the current condition of these rivers based upon the latest information made available at these meetings:

(1) The situation in the *St. Marys River* continues to be unsatisfactory because of the discharge of waste materials (particularly oils, phenols, wood chips and iron) from two large Canadian industries, namely, the Algoma Steel Corporation Limited and Abitibi Paper Company Limited. However, both companies, for the first time, have submitted specific programs of corrective action which, with other measures already taken by the border municipalities, give good prospects for bringing the river into conformity with the IJC objectives in the next year or so, provided the programs are carried out in accordance with the companies' expressed intentions.

(2) Although considerable improvements have been made in the *St. Clair River*, the position in the area of Sarnia, Ontario, continues to cause concern. Of the eleven major industries on the Canadian side discharging waste waters to the river, the effluents from five comply with the objectives of the Ontario Water Resources Commission. The remaining six industries have abatement programs under way or plans under discussion with the OWRC to achieve the same result. The OWRC believes that within the next year or two the Canadian industries responsible for the continuing pollution will be in compliance with the IJC objectives.

(3) *The Detroit River* remains the chief problem in the Connecting Channels, mainly because of the heavy concentration of population and industry and consequently of pollutants on the United States side. However, many of the industrial establishments concerned are now in compliance with the effluent standards established by the Michigan Water Resources Commission. Others have completed installation of the abatement facilities required but are encountering operational problems in meeting these standards. These and the remaining industries are in discussion with the MWRC regarding additional measures and programs necessary for compliance. The MWRC testified that it expected substantial improvement in 1969 and conformity with the IJC water quality objectives by November 1970. The municipal situation on the United States side also has necessitated large and costly programs of development which, on the basis of MWRC evidence, should so reduce pollution flowing from the Detroit and Wayne County sewerage systems that the IJC objectives will be met by November 1970.

While the volume of municipal sewage discharged to

the Detroit River on the Canadian side is a great deal less than on the United States side, much of it at present is untreated. This situation will be corrected with the completion this summer of Windsor's primary treatment plant and trunk sewers. Expansion of the treatment facilities and a higher degree of treatment are now under consideration with the OWRC. Of the industrial establishments discharging wastes on the Canadian side of the river all but two are in essential compliance with the OWRC effluent objectives or are actively pursuing approved programs to achieve compliance. The two plants whose programs are not presently satisfactory are in discussion with OWRC officials.

The Commission has taken some encouragement from these meetings. They have served to concentrate public attention upon the facts of the situation and upon the programs of the authorities for dealing with them. We believe also that these meetings have had the effect of strengthening the hands of those responsible for abatement control and enforcement and that they have stimulated and directed public opinion of both countries in constructive support of such endeavors.

Nevertheless, as you will note from this report, continued progress toward our objectives depends upon engagements as yet unfulfilled. In this connection, these public meetings provided an opportunity for the Commission, emphasizing the international aspects of the problem, to make it clear to all concerned that it was and is the intention of the IJC to exercise close supervision over remedial programs, and to bring promptly to the attention of governments, federal and local, with appropriate recommendations, any conduct likely to impede or prevent the early attainment of the water quality objectives determined for these rivers.

We will be writing you further as soon as we have had an opportunity of examining the transcript of the voluminous evidence submitted and the many briefs received.

My colleague, the Chairman of the Canadian Section of the Commission, is sending a similar letter to the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Sincerely yours,

MATTHEW E. WELSH
Chairman
United States Section

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

90th Congress, 2d Session

Air Piracy in the Caribbean Area. Report of the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. December 10, 1968. 27 pp. [Committee print.]

91st Congress, 1st Session

Fifty-second Annual Report of the United States Tariff Commission. Fiscal year ended June 30, 1968. H. Doc. 26. 30 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of the convention on international civil aviation, Chicago, 1944, as amended (TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170), with annex. Done at Buenos Aires September 24, 1968. Entered into force October 24, 1968. TIAS 6605.

Acceptance deposited: France, February 19, 1969.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964.¹

Accession deposited: Peru, December 18, 1968.

Postal Matters

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union, with final protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and convention with final protocol and regulations of execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881.

Ratifications deposited: Cameroon, December 23, 1968; Yemen Arab Republic, January 10, 1969.

Convention, final protocol, and regulations of execution of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, and rules and regulations of the International Office

of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain and the transfer office;

Money order agreement and final protocol of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain;

Parcel post agreement, final protocol, and regulations of execution of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain.

Done at Mexico City July 16, 1966. Entered into force March 1, 1967. TIAS 6354, 6355, 6356.

Ratification deposited: Paraguay, January 27, 1969.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.

Acceptance deposited: Venezuela, January 23, 1969.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a global commercial communications satellite system. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.

Accessions deposited: Luxembourg, February 24, 1969; Republic of Viet-Nam, February 21, 1969.

Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.

Signatures: Luxembourg, February 24, 1969; Republic of Viet-Nam, February 21, 1969.

BILATERAL

Mexico

Agreement concerning radio broadcasting in the standard band (535-1605 kHz), with annexes. Signed at Mexico December 11, 1968. Enters into force on the date of exchange of instruments of ratification.

Agreement concerning the operation of broadcasting stations in the standard broadcast band (535-1605 kHz) during a limited period prior to sunrise ("pre-sunrise") and after sunset ("postsunset"), with annexes. Signed at Mexico December 11, 1968. Enters into force on the date of exchange of instruments of ratification.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

Brazil. Letters of Credence (Gibson Barboza) 222

Canada. IJC Holds Meetings on Pollution of Great Lakes Connecting Channels 234

Communications

Intelsat Conference Opens at Washington (Marks, Richardson) 231

Ambassador Marks Holds Press Briefing on the Intelsat Conference (transcript) 224

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy 235

Economic Affairs. IJC Holds Meetings on Pollution of Great Lakes Connecting Channels 234

Europe. President Nixon Discusses the Objectives of His European Trip 217

International Organizations and Conferences

Intelsat Conference Opens at Washington (Marks, Richardson) 231

Ambassador Marks Holds Press Briefing on the Intelsat Conference (transcript) 224

Mr. Thomas Assumes Duties as Director of ICEM 223

Nigeria. Special U.S. Coordinator Appointed for Nigerian Relief Efforts (Nixon) 222

Panama. Letters of Credence (Aleman) 222

Presidential Documents

President Nixon Discusses the Objectives of His European Trip 217

Special U.S. Coordinator Appointed for Nigerian Relief Efforts 222

Refugees. Mr. Thomas Assumes Duties as Director of ICEM 223

Science

Intelsat Conference Opens at Washington (Marks, Richardson) 231

Ambassador Marks Holds Press Briefing on the Intelsat Conference (transcript) 224

Treaty Information. Current Actions 236

United Nations. President Appoints Mrs. Picker to U.N. Social Commission 223

Viet-Nam. Sixth Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris (Lodge) 220

Name Index

Aleman, Roberto Ramon 222

Ferguson, Clarence Clyde, Jr 222

Gibson Barboza, Mario 222

Lodge, Henry Cabot 220

Marks, Leonard H 224, 231

Nixon, President 217, 222

Picker, Mrs. Jean 223

Richardson, Elliot L 231

Thomas, John Frederick 223

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Feb. 24-Mar. 2

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to February 24 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 42 of February 20.

No.	Date	Subject
44	2/25	IJC report on pollution of connecting channels of Great Lakes.
*45	2/26	Ferguson sworn in as Special Coordinator on relief to civilian victims of the Nigerian civil war (biographic details).
*46	2/26	National foreign policy conference for editors and broadcasters, Washington, D.C., March 26-27.
47	2/27	Lodge: sixth plenary session on Viet-Nam at Paris.
48	2/27	Lodge: additional remarks.
†49	2/28	U.S.-Czechoslovakia air transport agreement.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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Vol. LX, No. 1552



March 24, 1969

PRESIDENT NIXON'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF MARCH 4 237

PRESIDENT NIXON MAKES 8-DAY VISIT TO WESTERN EUROPE

Remarks on Various Occasions 249

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LX, No. 1552

March 24, 1969

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

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President Nixon's News Conference of March 4

Following is the transcript of a news conference held by President Nixon in the East Room of the White House on March 4.

OPENING STATEMENT

Ladies and gentlemen, as you know, the purpose of this unusually long press conference is to report to the American people on my trip to Europe.

Because I realize that there will probably be a number of questions, some of which may require some rather lengthy answers, I am going to make my opening statement quite brief.

A word about the purpose and also the limitations of a trip like this: I believe all of us in this room have no illusions about the limits of personal diplomacy in settling great differences between nations. A smile or handshake or an exchange of toasts or gifts or visits will not by themselves have effect where vital interests are concerned and where there are great differences.

On the other hand, I have learned that there is an intangible factor which does affect the relations between nations. I think it was perhaps best described by two on our visits—those with whom I was talking. One was in the case of Prime Minister Wilson. He used the term "mutual trust" when he welcomed me. The other, President de Gaulle, when he came to the American Embassy, used the term *confiance*—trust.

When there is trust between men who are leaders of nations, there is a better chance to settle differences than when there is not trust. I think that one of the accomplishments of this trip is that we have established between the United States of America and the major nations of Europe—and, I trust, other nations of Europe as well—a new relationship of trust and confidence that did not exist before.

For example, as we look at the relations with France, they are different today than they were a week ago. How different they are, only time will tell. But that they are different and im-

proved, I think, would be a fair assessment of that situation.

We can also say that, as a result of this trip, the United States has indicated its continuing support of the alliance—the Atlantic alliance—and that we have also indicated our support of the concept and ideal of European unity.

In addition, we have indicated that we recognize our limitations insofar as European unity is concerned. Americans cannot unify Europe. Europeans must do so. And we should not become involved in differences among Europeans in which our vital interests are not involved.

Finally, a word that I think all of the American people will be gratified to hear: Sometimes we become rather disillusioned with our aid programs around the world, and we look back on our relations with Europe, particularly, and wonder if it was really worth all that we did immediately after World War II in terms of the Marshall Plan and other programs.

Anyone who saw Europe as I did in that period of devastation after World War II—when I visited all the countries, except Belgium at that time, that I visited on this trip—and then saw it today would realize that it was worth doing, because today a strong, prosperous, free Europe stands there, partly a result of our aid.

It could not have happened without our aid. It also, of course, could not have happened without their great efforts on their own behalf. And so, with that recognition, we now realize that this alliance deserves our attention, should be the center of our concern, should not be taken for granted. It will not be. That will be a major objective of this administration.

Now, as we go to your questions, I will take questions not only on the European trip but any area of foreign policy—because on the trip I discussed with the leaders of Europe all areas of foreign policy, which was their desire and mine as well.

There will be only one ground rule. I know there will be great interest in what each of the leaders said to me and what I said to them. I

will not divulge the content of these personal conversations because, if we are going to build confidence, we can't build confidence by breaking confidences.

We will go to the questions.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. Mr. President, we got the impression traveling with you that there was some relationship between your tour and a possible East-West summit at some future time. Could you relate the two?

The President: Mr. Cormier [Frank Cormier, Associated Press], this tour was a condition precedent to an East-West summit at a later time. I have always indicated that before we had talks with those who have opposed us in the world, it was essential that we had clear understandings with our allies and friends.

I think at times in the past we have not had that kind of consultation. It was essential to have it on this trip. In every visit that I had, I discussed East-West relations with the leaders involved—discussed not only what our plans were and what our policies might be but got their views and their advice as to what programs they thought we should handle in any bilateral discussions we had with the Soviet Union.

Q. Mr. President, during the trip, and as recently as the conclusion of the trip Sunday night, you spoke of hoping that with greater unity with our allies, you would be able to develop new understanding with those who have opposed us on the other side of the world. To follow up on Mr. Cormier's question, of whom are you speaking, sir? We assume the Russians. Are you thinking, for instance, you may be able to reach a better understanding with Red China?

The President: Looking further down the road, we could think in terms of a better understanding with Red China. But being very realistic, in view of Red China's breaking off the rather limited Warsaw talks that were planned, I do not think that we should hold out any great optimism for any breakthroughs in that direction at this time.

Certainly you are correct in assuming that in referring to those who have opposed us in the world, I was referring primarily to the Soviet Union and to the talks that the United States

would be having with the Soviet Union in a number of areas.

Europeans, I found, were greatly concerned by what they called the possibility of a U.S.-Soviet condominium, in which at the highest levels the two superpowers would make decisions affecting their future without consulting them.

In fact, one statesman used the term "Yalta." He said, "We don't want another Yalta on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union." Whether his assessment was correct about Yalta or not is immaterial.

The point is that Europeans are highly sensitive about the United States and the Soviet Union making decisions that affect their future without their consultation. And that will not happen as a result of this trip.

The Situation in West Berlin

Q. Mr. President, would you assess for us, sir, the situation in West Berlin on the eve of the election—how you see it? Do you think it has reached a crisis point?

The President: The situation in West Berlin at the moment seems to have leveled off. I haven't seen the latest reports. I will have to look at the morning papers to see whether my projection at this point is correct, because it has changed from hour to hour.

I believe that we have made our position quite clear to all the parties involved, as we should. We have made it clear to the West German Government that if they went ahead with the election, we would support them in that decision, or if they decided that they could gain concessions that they considered significant which would lead them to changing the place for the elections, we would support them in that move.

It is their decision, and we are not trying to affect it one way or another. They have a right to have the elections there if they want. Also, we have indicated to the Soviets—to the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Dobrynin—both Mr. Rogers and I have pointed out that any harassment in West Berlin could jeopardize the progress that we see possible in other areas.

I have reported previously in a press conference that I felt that the Soviet Union did not want to see the West Berlin situation become a cause or even a pretext for any move which would be in retrogression insofar as our bilateral relations are concerned.

At this moment, based on the conversations that I have had myself with various European leaders and also the conversations that I and others have had with the representatives of the Soviet Union, I believe that the Soviet Union does not want to have the situation in West Berlin heated up to the point that it would jeopardize some—what they consider to be—more important negotiations at the highest level with the United States. And because those negotiations, in effect, are in the wings, I think I could predict that the Soviet Union will use its influence to cool off the West Berlin situation, rather than to heat it up.

Q. Do you think, sir, that, from your talks with Pope Paul at the Vatican, there is any possibility that the United States might send an envoy to the Vatican as a permanent representative?

The President: That possibility has been considered by the State Department and by me, because we have been concerned that we should have the very closest consultation and discussion with the Vatican. I found, for example, my conversation with Pope Paul extremely helpful. It was far ranging, and I received information and also counsel that I considered to be very important. I want that line of communication kept open. Whether we can have it kept open based on the present facilities that are available, I have not yet determined. The matter is still under study. But what is important is that the United States have with the Vatican close consultation on foreign policy matters in which the Vatican has a very great interest and very great influence.

Communist Offensive in Viet-Nam

Q. Mr. President, the Communist offensive in Viet-Nam has aroused speculation that your administration is being tested, particularly as to the understanding that was reached last November 1, which led to the bombing halt. Would you give us your opinion of this, please?

The President: Well, in speaking of the Communist offensive, I think it is important, first, to analyze what it is and what its purposes are, compare it with the offensive last year, and then see what that offensive means in terms of the violation of the understanding last October 31—or prior to October 31—at the time of the bombing halt.

When we look at the offensive, we find that in terms of the frequency of attacks it is approximately the same as the offensive of last year. In terms of intensity of attacks, it is less than that of last year. As far as the targets are concerned, it is primarily directed toward military targets, but there are also some very significant civilian targets. As far as the purposes are concerned, we can only guess; but three have been suggested: that it might be directed against the Government of South Viet-Nam to break its morale and its back; that it might be directed against public opinion in the United States to put more pressure on the administration to move more in the direction of North Viet-Nam's position at the Paris peace talks; or that it might be directed toward a military victory of sorts, if a military victory of sorts could be accomplished in South Viet-Nam by the North Vietnamese against our forces there.

Now, this offensive has failed in all three of these areas. It has failed to achieve any significant military breakthrough. It has failed to break the back of the Government of South Viet-Nam. Far from that, as a matter of fact, in terms of the pacification program, 700,000 were displaced by the Tet offensive last year and only 25,000 have been displaced by this one. As far as this offensive affecting the United States and its negotiating position in Paris, it could have exactly the opposite effect.

I think that, therefore, we must now analyze the offensive in terms of the understanding of October 31. That understanding was to the effect that continued shelling of or attacks on the cities—the major cities of South Viet-Nam—would be inconsistent with talks toward peace which would be productive in Paris.

Now, we are examining this particular offensive, examining it very carefully, to see whether its magnitude is in violation of that understanding. Technically, it could be said that it is in violation. Whether we reach the conclusion that the violation is so significant that it requires action on our part is a decision we will be reaching very soon if those attacks continue at their present magnitude.

As you know, Secretary [of Defense Melvin R.] Laird is going to South Viet-Nam tomorrow, and I have asked him to look into the situation and to give me a report after he has been there.

One other factor should be mentioned. I do not want to discount by this analysis the seriousness of these attacks, because the American

casualty rate, I note, has doubled during the period of these attacks. Therefore, it is necessary for the American President, in analyzing the attacks, to think not only of the understanding with regard to the attacks on the cities, but also of his obligation to defend American fighting men in Viet-Nam.

We have not moved in a precipitate fashion, but the fact that we have shown patience and forbearance should not be considered as a sign of weakness. We will not tolerate a continuation of a violation of an understanding. But more than that, we will not tolerate attacks which result in heavier casualties to our men at a time that we are honestly trying to seek peace at the conference table in Paris. An appropriate response to these attacks will be made if they continue.

Q. Mr. President, can you tell me if you, after your consultations overseas, have any reservations or have found any reservations on whether we should deploy an ABM [anti-ballistic-missile] system and whether you share any of the scientific reservations that have been expressed in this country?

The President: The ABM system was not discussed in any detail in my conversations abroad. As far as the decision is concerned, there will be a meeting of the National Security Council tomorrow, which will be entirely devoted to an assessment of that system.

Then, during the balance of the week, I shall make some additional studies on my own, involving the Defense Department and other experts whose opinions I value. I will make a decision and announce a decision on ABM at the first of next week.

Q. Mr. President, there have already been reports that you are already considering another trip abroad, maybe to Latin America or Israel. Would you tell us what your plans are?

The President: I have no plans for any foreign travel at this time. I have noted that several other travelers have committed me to various trips abroad. I would like very much at an appropriate time to travel to Latin America again. I was there on a well-publicized trip with some of you in 1958. I was back there again on a less publicized one but with a much more friendly welcome in 1967.

Such a trip, I think, would be valuable at a later time. But, as you know, Governor Rockefeller is going to Latin America to make an

intensive study of our Alliance for Progress programs;¹ a study which is vital, because I think we need some changes in our Latin American policy.

Progress Made Toward Middle East Talks

Q. Can you tell us whether or not, as a result of your talks with President de Gaulle and other government leaders in Europe, you are now encouraged about prospects for maintaining peaceful conditions in the Middle East?

The President: One of the tangible results that came out of this trip was substantial progress on the Middle East. Now, what that progress will be and whether it reaches an eventual settlement—that is too early to predict.

But I know that when I met with you ladies and gentlemen of the press at an earlier time, the question was raised as to the four-power talks, and there were some who thought that I—this administration was dragging its feet on going into four-power talks.

Frankly, I do not believe that the United States should go into any talks where the deck might be stacked against us. Now, as a result of the consultations that we had on this trip, the positions of our European friends—the British and the French—are now closer to ours than was the case before. We have a better understanding of their position; they have a better understanding of ours.

And also, we have had encouraging talks with the Soviet Ambassador. The Secretary of State and I have both talked with the Soviet Ambassador with regard to the Mideast. We will continue these bilateral consultations; and if they continue at their present rate of progress, it seems likely that there will be four-power discussions in the United Nations on the Mideast.

Now, I should indicate also the limitations of such discussions and what can come out of them. The four powers—the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and France—cannot dictate a settlement in the Middle East. The time has passed in which great nations can dictate to small nations their future where their vital interests are involved. This kind of settlement that we are talking about, and the contribution that can be made to it, is limited in this respect.

¹For background, see BULLETIN of Mar. 10, 1969, p. 198.

The four powers can indicate those areas where they believe the parties directly involved in the Mideast could have profitable discussions. At the present time they are having no discussions at all.

Second—and this is even the more important part of it—from the four-power conference can come an absolute essential to any kind of peaceful settlement in the Mideast, and that is a major-power guarantee of the settlement; because we cannot expect the nation of Israel or the other nations in the area who think their major interests might be involved—we cannot expect them to agree to a settlement unless they think there is a better chance that it will be guaranteed in the future than has been the case in the past.

On this score, then, we think we have made considerable progress during the past week. We are cautiously hopeful that we can make more progress and move to the four-power talks very soon.

Q. Mr. President, have you considered an appropriate response if the attacks continue in South Viet-Nam? Would an appropriate response include resumption of the bombing in the North?

The President: Mr. Wilson [Richard L. Wilson, Des Moines Register and Tribune], that question is one that I have given thought to, but it is one which I think should not be answered in this forum.

I believe that it is far more effective in international policy to use deeds, rather than words threatening deeds, in order to accomplish objectives.

I will only say in answer to that question that the United States has a number of options that we could exercise to respond. We have several contingency plans that can be put into effect.

I am considering all of those plans. We shall use whatever plan we consider is appropriate to the action on the other side. I will not indicate in advance, and I am not going to indicate publicly, and I am not going to threaten—I don't think that would be helpful—that we are going to start bombing the North or anything else.

I will only indicate that we will not tolerate a continuation of this kind of attack without some response that will be appropriate.

Q. Mr. President, mindful of your ground rule against revealing contents of your conversations with leaders, I ask you this question:

Did the atmosphere of mutual trust generated in your long conversations with General de Gaulle give you any fresh indication, any fresh hope, that France could be helpful in the future of NATO and/or France could be helpful in settling the war in Viet-Nam, either directly or indirectly?

The President: Well, on the first point, General de Gaulle said publicly, as you will note, what he has said in the past: that he supported the alliance. He has withdrawn France's forces from the military side of the alliance; but he supports the alliance, and he in his conversations backed that up very vigorously.

With regard to whether or not there is a possibility that France could move back into NATO in its military complex, I would not hold out at this time any hope that that might happen. I would hold out, however, some hope that as our conversations continue, we can find a number of areas for mutual cooperation and consultation on the military side as well as in other respects.

I think that beyond that, it would not be appropriate to indicate what General de Gaulle's position is.

As far as Viet-Nam is concerned, we did discuss it, and whether it was Viet-Nam or whether it was the Mideast or whether it was U.S. relations with other countries where the French might be helpful, I received from General de Gaulle very encouraging indications that they would like to be helpful where we thought they could be helpful.

I wouldn't go beyond that, but I was very encouraged with the General's attitude. It was one of helpfulness in every respect on all of the major issues.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

Q. Mr. President, in your conversations with Chancellor Kiesinger, do you believe that you convinced him that his Government's reservations against joining in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty were not valid and that joining in the treaty would be in West Germany's best interests?

The President: I think it would be appropriate to say that the German Government has considerable difficulties with regard to ratification of the treaty—difficulties which we need to understand, even though we may not agree with their position.

Their attitude as far as we are concerned is quite well known. They know that I have sent

the treaty to the Senate, that the Senate will probably give its advice and consent, and that we will ratify.

They know, too, my position: that it is not only in the interests of the United States but that I believe it is in the interests of all governments, including the West German Government, to ratify.

I did not put pressure on them publicly or privately, and I will not put pressure on them publicly or privately. But I believe that—since it is in their interests to ratify the treaty—that after consideration without pressure the West German Government will at an appropriate time ratify the treaty.

Soviet Union and the Viet-Nam Conflict

Q. Mr. President, you said in the recent past that you thought the United States might put some pressure, or use the Soviet Union, or seek to enlist the Soviet Union's help in Viet-Nam. I wonder whether, since you have become President, you have moved in that respect, trying to get them to alleviate the situation or help solve it?

The President: Mr. Lisagor [Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News], as you know, the Soviet Union is in a very delicate and sensitive position as far as Viet-Nam is concerned. I do not divulge any confidences from the Soviet Ambassador in indicating that that is the case. You ladies and gentlemen have written it and you are correct, because here you have Communist China aiding North Viet-Nam, you also have the Soviet Union aiding North Viet-Nam—each vying for power in the Communist world. And therefore what the Soviet Union does in the Vietnamese conflict is a very difficult decision for them as related to that objective—the objective of leadership in the Communist world.

On the other hand, it is well known that the Soviet Union was helpful in terms of getting the Paris peace talks started, that the Soviet Union was helpful in working out the arrangement for the shape of the table; and I think I could say that, based on the conversations that the Secretary of State and I have had with the Soviet Ambassador, I believe at this time that the Soviet Union shares the concern of many other nations in the world about the extension of the war in Viet-Nam, its continuing. They recognize that if it continues over a long period of time, the possibility of escalation increases. And I believe the Soviet Union would like to use what

influence it could appropriately to help bring the war to a conclusion.

What it can do, however, is something that only the Soviet Union would be able to answer to, and it would probably have to answer privately, not publicly.

International Trade Issues

Q. Mr. President, can you tell us what international trade issues came up in your meetings in Europe; also, specifically, could you tell us whether you discussed the problems of textile and steel imports into this country?

The President: All international trade issues came up, and I discussed the problem of textile and steel imports in all the countries involved. The Europeans are concerned about some of what they think are our restrictions in the trade area. For example, they talk about the American Selling Price, and they talk about the Buy American programs. I pointed out that many of our congressional people, as well as American businessmen, were concerned about border taxes and other devices which we thought presented a problem.

I also pointed out in our conversations that there were 93 bills in the last session of the Senate alone which were introduced that would have called for quotas in the various products that you mentioned, and others as well, and that unless some voluntary restrictions or restraints were worked out, on textiles particularly, the pressure for legislative quotas would be immense.

I also indicated that I favored freer trade rather than restrictions on trade but that it would be very difficult to resist that kind of pressure in the event that some action were not taken to deal with the problem.

A final note in this respect: As we look at the whole trade pattern, I think we have to realize that we cannot anticipate in the near future another big round of reductions of tariff barriers. We are going to do well if we can digest what we have on the plate. This is my view, and I found that was the view of our major European friends. I believe that we can make considerable progress in that area. Secretary [of Commerce Maurice H.] Stans is going to Europe next month for the specific purpose of discussing trade problems with all of our European friends, with the hope that we can work out some of these differences.

Q. Mr. President, sir, I wonder if you think that the Soviets are anxious to bring the war to

an end, or at least not prolong it? I wonder if you have asked them if they will cut off their supplies to Hanoi?

The President: We have had discussions, as I have already indicated, with the Soviet Ambassador. I do not think it would be appropriate, however, to disclose our discussions with him, any more than it is appropriate to disclose our discussions with others that we have dealt with that are supposed to be confidential in nature. I am sure that the Soviet Union is keenly aware of the fact that we would be greatly gratified by anything that they could do that could pull some of the support away from the Government of North Viet-Nam. You could probably just guess as to what our conversations were, but I will not indicate what they were.

Paris Negotiations on Viet-Nam

Q. Mr. President, Vice President Ky, after meeting with you in Paris, said you told him that you had new approaches to the war in Viet-Nam. Is that correct? And if so, do you think it inappropriate to tell the American people about it at this time?

The President: What I think Vice President Ky was referring to was new approaches not so much in the military field, but in terms of the diplomatic initiative. In our discussions with him, and also in our discussions with the American negotiating team, we discussed the approaches that might be made that would break the deadlock.

Now, with regard to the Paris negotiations, I think we can now say that we have neared the end of phase 1, in which both parties have set out their positions in public forums. Those positions having been set out, we now come to phase 2, in which we will have hard bargaining on the major points of difference. Our negotiating team has been given some instructions and will be given more with regard to a variety of approaches, approaches which, in some instances, will also be taken by the Government of South Viet-Nam.

One point, incidentally, that I was very encouraged by was that Vice President Ky, speaking for his delegation, was most cooperative in indicating his desire to attempt to find and explore new approaches at the conference table, rather than simply resign ourselves to a military decision.

Q. Mr. President, you mentioned earlier that the offensive against Saigon might have as its

objective an adverse effect upon American public opinion. In light of the experiences of your predecessor, do you feel that you could keep American public opinion in line if this war were to go on for months or even years?

The President: Well, I trust that I am not confronted with that problem, when you speak of years. Our objective is to get this war over as soon as we can on a basis that will not leave the seeds of another war there to plague us in the future. We have made, we think, some progress. We think that we are going to make some more.

As far as American public opinion is concerned, I think that the American people will support a President if they are told by the President why we are there, what our objectives are, what the costs will be, and what the consequences would be if we took another course of action. It will not be easy. The American people, I can say from having campaigned the country, are terribly frustrated about this war. They would welcome any initiative that they thought could appropriately bring it to an end on some responsible basis.

On the other hand, it is the responsibility of a President to examine all of the options that we have, and then if he finds that the course he has to take is one that is not popular, he has to explain it to the American people and gain their support. I think I can perhaps be somewhat effective in explaining why we are there and also in keeping the American people informed as negotiations go on. I intend to do so.

Q. Mr. President, President Thieu of South Viet-Nam has spoken publicly, sir, of the possibility of his expectation of withdrawing up to about 50,000 American troops from South Viet-Nam this year. Do you see this possibility of a stage-by-stage withdrawal as a practicality?

The President: The possibility of withdrawing troops is something that we have, as you know, been considering for some time. There are no plans to withdraw any troops at this time or in the near future.

On the other hand, I have asked for a reexamination of our whole troop level in South Viet-Nam, and particularly a reexamination of the South Vietnamese effort and the training program of South Vietnamese forces. To the extent that South Vietnamese forces are able to take over a greater burden of the fighting, and to the extent, too, that the level of the fighting may decrease, it may be possible to withdraw.

I do not, however, want to indicate at this time that we are going to withdraw 50,000 troops in the near future. I prefer to create the conditions, if we can, where withdrawal can take place and then announce it, rather than to hold up the promise and let people down when it doesn't happen.

Q. Mr. President, on the basis of your conversations, can you foresee a condition under which the Israelis and the Arabs could sit at a negotiating table?

The President: Not at this time, no. I think we have to recognize that we are far away from the time when the Arabs and the Israelis can sit at a negotiating table. But I believe that by the time we very carefully go down this road of bilateral consultations first, four-power consultations—and incidentally, we are going to consult with the Israelis when they come here—Mr. Eban [Abba Eban, Foreign Minister of Israel] is going to be here—there will be, I am sure, consultations on the other side as well—I think when we complete our course of action and come up, if we can, with a four-power recommendation for proceeding, that then it might be possible to bring both sides to a conference table. That is our hope.

Mr. Scali [John Scali, ABC News]?

Discussions With the Soviet Union

Q. Mr. President, we were told during the trip that at the appropriate moment you were prepared to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on a broad front and that these negotiations would include not only disarmament but other, possibly political, areas. What problems do you see as ripe for discussion with the Soviets?

The President: I should first indicate that talks already are going on with the Soviet Union in one sense. The discussions that the Secretary of State and I have had with Ambassador Dobrynin have been substantive and have been talks, in effect, with the Soviet Government, because he had consulted with his own Government before he had his talk with me and with the Secretary of State.

The talks on the Mideast would be the first subject in which bilateral as well as multilateral discussions could take place.

The possibility, also, of discussions on strategic arms—this is a possibility for the future.

Let me indicate where it stands now. We have completed our discussions with some of our European friends. We will have more discussions with them as we get our own position developed. We are going forward with the analysis of the American position—of our strategic arms capabilities, of our conventional arms capabilities—so that when we have before us the decision as to whether we go into talks, we will know what our position will be.

Assuming that those studies go forward on schedule, and assuming that we make progress on some of these political areas, like the Mideast, then there is a possibility, a good possibility, that talks could go forward in that area.

I can see those as two areas, and there are others which could develop as well.

Q. Mr. President, I believe you have said, although I couldn't give you the direct quote, but the general assumption is that the Soviet Union is interested in peace in the Middle East. But how can this be reconciled with the fact that they have very quickly rearmed and fully rearmed the Arabs? What evidence do we have, what proof do we have, that the Soviet Union is in fact interested in peace in the Middle East?

The President: The Soviet Union's policy in the Mideast and Viet-Nam—and your question is quite perceptive from that standpoint—is ambivalent.

On the one hand, in Viet-Nam, they are heating up the war. They furnish 80 percent to 85 percent of the sophisticated military equipment for the North Vietnamese forces; without that assistance, North Viet-Nam would not have the capability to wage the major war they are against the United States. In the Mideast, without what the Soviet Union has done in rearming Israel's neighbors, there would be no crisis there that would require our concern.

On the other hand, at the same time that the Soviet Union has gone forward in providing arms for potential belligerents—potential belligerents in the one area and actual belligerents in the other—the Soviet Union recognizes that if these peripheral areas get out of control, the result could be a confrontation with the United States. And the Soviet Union does not want a confrontation with the United States, any more than we want one with them, because each of us knows what a confrontation would mean.

I think it is that overwhelming fact—the fact that if the situation in the Mideast and Viet-Nam is allowed to escalate, it is that fact that it

might lead to a confrontation—that is giving the Soviet Union second thoughts and leads me to what I would say the cautious conclusion at this point: that the Soviet Union will play possibly a peacemaking role in the Mideast and even possibly in Viet-Nam.

I say a cautious conclusion because I base this only on talks that have taken place up to this time. But we are going to explore that road all the way that we can, because—let's face it—without the Soviet Union's cooperation the Mideast is going to continue to be a terribly dangerous area, if you continue to pour fuel on those fires of hatred that exist on the borders of Israel. And without the Soviet Union's cooperation it may be difficult to move as fast as we would like in settling the war in Viet-Nam.

Relations With Peru

Q. Mr. President, you mentioned earlier the deeds rather than words in our international relations. In our relations with Peru and our problems there, is the United States prepared to take action should Peru not respond to our protests over the seizure of the oil company and the attacks on fishing vessels?

The President: What Peru has done, as you know, in the seizure of our oil company is that under international law they have the right to expropriate a company but they also have the obligation to pay a fair amount for that expropriation.

It is the second point that is at issue, not the right to expropriate. Now, if they do not take appropriate steps to provide for that payment, then under the law—the Hickenlooper amendment, as you know—we will have to take appropriate action with regard to the sugar quota and also with regard to aid programs.

I hope that is not necessary because that would have a domino effect—if I can be permitted to use what is supposed to be an outworn term—a domino effect all over Latin America.

I feel, in my studies in recent days, that we are making some progress in attempting to get some steps taken by the Peruvian Government to deal with the expropriation matter in a fair way. If they do so, then we do not have to go down that road.

Q. Mr. President, there are some people who think you were a little more fulsome in your praise of General de Gaulle than you were of the other European leaders. Were you conscious of

that? Do you have any background you can give us on that?

The President: I try to have a policy of even-handedness. I suppose that is a bad word, too—well, it is in the Mideast. In any event, I have the highest regard for all the leaders that I met. I tried to speak of General de Gaulle with the proper respect that an individual with my background should have speaking to one with his.

After all, of the leaders of Europe, whether we agree or disagree with him, he is the giant, not only in his physical size but in his background and his great influence.

He deserved, I think, the words that I spoke about him. But I can assure you that in speaking of Prime Minister Wilson, Dr. Kiesinger, President Saragat, and Prime Minister Rumor, I intended to speak of all of them with the same feeling, the same affection.

Q. You demonstrated a great deal of interest, Mr. President, in young people in your discussions both public and private abroad. Do you feel that those discussions have given you a better understanding of young people abroad, and are their problems similar to the problems of young people in this country?

The President: Well, the problems differ, of course, in the different countries. I think they are the same in one respect. The young people abroad, it seems, have somewhat the same problem as many young people here. They know what they are against, but they find difficulty in knowing what they are for. This is not unusual, because this is perhaps something that is common to young people generally, except that when we look to the revolutions of the past, the revolutionary movements, usually there has been—whether we agreed with those movements or not—there was something, a philosophy, that the young people who supported the revolutions were for. All over Europe this seems to be the case—a young generation against the established institution, against the way the universities are run, and yet not having a sense of purpose, a sense of direction, a sense of idealism.

I feel that that is part of the problem here in the United States, and I think that much of the responsibility rests not on the young people for not knowing what they are for, but on older people for not giving them the vision and the sense of purpose and the idealism that they should have.

In talking—and I talked with every leader

about this, every one—all of us are concerned about it. All of us feel that we must find for this great Western family of ours a new sense of purpose and idealism—one that young people will understand, that they can be for.

That is not a satisfactory answer, because I am not able to describe it yet, but, believe me, we are searching for it.

Q. Mr. President, there has been some concern in Congress about reports that a general in the Pentagon took the initiative in arranging for the United States to recognize a threat to Spain from North Africa. In your opinion, is this concern merited, and what is the policy of your administration about the carving out of new commitments to other countries by the United States?

The President: Well, I think as far as commitments are concerned, the United States has a full plate. I first do not believe that we should make new commitments around the world unless our national interests are very vitally involved. Second, I do not believe we should become involved in the quarrels of nations in other parts of the world unless we are asked to become involved and unless also we are vitally involved. I referred earlier to even the quarrels and divisions in Western Europe. I stayed out of most of those up to this point, and I intend to in the future.

As far as this report is concerned with regard to the general on the Spanish bases, I have checked into it, and no commitment has been made. My view is that none should be made. We will, of course, analyze it at the time to see whether our national, vital interests might require me to reassess it.

European Unity and European Identity

Q. Mr. President, there were some interpretations some weeks ago about some of General de Gaulle's actions as his wanting to have Western Europe free of American influence. Did he address himself to this in talking with you? Did you get any deeper understanding of this?

The President: I think, Mr. Kaplow [Herbert Kaplow, NBC News], it would be not divulging a confidence to indicate that President de Gaulle completely disassociated his views, which he expressed in great detail to us, on the European alliance and France's relation to it from any anti-American position.

He believes that Europe should have an independent position in its own right. And, frankly, I believe that, too. I think most Europeans believe that. I think the time when it served our interests to have the United States as the dominant partner in an alliance—that that time is gone. We will be dominant because of our immense nuclear power and also because of our economic wealth.

But on the other hand, the world will be a much safer place and, from our standpoint, a much healthier place economically, militarily, and politically, if there were a strong European community to be a balance, basically a balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, rather than to have this polarization of forces in one part of the world or another.

Now, as far as President de Gaulle's position is concerned, as I understand it, he has talked very eloquently on his desire to have European unity and a separate European identity. He has disagreed, however, with the proposals that currently are supported by most of the other European countries. He believes that it could better be worked out, as he indicated publicly and he also indicated to me privately, through the major powers reaching an understanding rather than having it done through basically a convention or caucus of all the powers of Europe.

Q. Mr. President, some of us have been under the impression that you attached important preconditions to summit talks with the Soviets, specifically some prior evidence or showing on their part that they were doing something to improve conditions in either the Middle East or Viet-Nam. Have those impressions been false, or has something happened to your own thinking in this area very recently?

The President: No, I did not intend to leave the impression that we say to the Soviet Union that unless they do this we will not have talks that they want on strategic arms.

What I have, however, clearly indicated is that I think their interests and ours would not be served by simply going down the road on strategic arms talks without at the same time making progress on resolving these political differences that could explode. Even assuming our strategic arms talks were successful, freezing arms at their present level, we could have a very devastating war. It is that point that I have been making.

Seventh Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris

Following is the opening statement made by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, head of the U.S. delegation, at the seventh plenary session of the new meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on March 6.

Press release 51 dated March 6

Ladies and gentlemen: Once more we meet with the news of your side's attacks upon the civilians of Saigon fresh in our minds. On the morning of Monday, March 3, three rockets were fired by your side into Saigon. On the morning of Thursday, March 6, at least seven more rockets were fired by your side into Saigon.

Ladies and gentlemen, this is indiscriminate shelling of the city of Saigon.

These two attacks killed at least 34 civilians, wounded at least another 63, and destroyed 47 houses. One of the rockets fell on the grounds of the Grall Hospital, a humanitarian institution if ever there was one—which deserves to be helped and supported, and not to be fired upon.

The consequences of these attacks are your responsibility. They clearly raise a question as to your side's true desire to work toward a peaceful settlement of this conflict. As I said last week, the understanding which was made clear to the North Vietnamese representatives prior to the stopping of the bombing remains in force.

The war does go on in South Viet-Nam—that is true. The civilian population, however, is not a legitimate military target. Your attacks against civilians throughout South Viet-Nam can bring you no military advantage. They result only in more losses and suffering by your own forces as well as by the people of South Viet-Nam.

As the President said on March 4: ¹

We will not tolerate a continuation of a violation of an understanding. But more than that, we will not tolerate attacks which result in heavier casualties to our men at a time that we are honestly trying to seek peace at the conference table in Paris. An appropriate response to these attacks will be made if they continue.

Throughout these meetings the United States has proposed a course of negotiations which can lead to a just and early peace. We have done so in spite of your invective and misstatements of

I should also emphasize that I made this point to every European leader that I talked to; and every one of them—and I do not commit them to the position—every one of them understands the position, because the Europeans have a great sense of history. All of them recognize that most wars have come not from arms races, although sometimes arms races can produce a war, but they have come from political explosions.

Therefore, they want progress, for example, on Berlin, they want progress on the Mideast, they want progress on Viet-Nam, at the same time that they want progress on strategic arms talks.

So our attitude toward the Soviet is not a highhanded one of trying to tell them: "You do this or we won't talk." Our attitude is very conciliatory; and I must say that in our talks with the Soviet Ambassador, I think that they are thinking along this line now, too.

If they are, we can make progress on several roads toward a mutual objective.

The press: Thank you.

U.S. Condemns Rocket Attacks on South Vietnamese Cities

Statement by Secretary Rogers¹

The report received this morning of a third rocket attack on the city of Saigon in 9 days is a renewed reminder of the callous attitude with which the enemy regards the lives of innocent noncombatants in the Viet-Nam war. One of the 122-mm. rockets which fell in Saigon this morning apparently landed within only a few feet of a hospital containing 72 children. Now, this indiscriminate shelling of Saigon and other cities is costing additional severe casualties to the enemy, obtains for them no military advantage, and will not succeed—if that is the enemy's intention—in putting any additional pressure on us in the Paris negotiations. The consequences of these attacks are the responsibility of the other side, and they clearly raise a question as to its true desire to work toward a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

¹Read to news correspondents by Department press spokesman Robert J. McCloskey on Mar. 3.

¹ See p. 237.

history. Your side has consistently rejected every concrete proposal which has been made here. And now come your unjustified attacks upon innocent civilians.

In the interest of completeness, let me sum up our proposals as follows:

—The United States has proposed the restoration of the demilitarized zone.

—The United States has said that it seeks neither permanent military bases nor permanent military forces in Viet-Nam.

—The United States has accepted your statement that the withdrawal of external armed forces from Viet-Nam is fundamental to any solution of the present hostilities. We are ready, and have been since the first session, to discuss the ways and means of mutual withdrawal of all external forces from South Viet-Nam.

—The United States supports the essential principles of sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity for Viet-Nam.

—The United States has made clear that it supports the reunification of Viet-Nam through the free decision of the people of North Viet-Nam and the people of South Viet-Nam.

—The United States completely supports the principle of self-determination for the people of South Viet-Nam.

—The United States has advanced as a basis for finding peace the essential principles of the Geneva accords. Although our views of the history of those accords may differ, their essential principles at least present a subject for discussion as a basis for a future settlement.

We ask once again that you cease speaking in terms of demands based upon a military victory which you have not achieved and that you advance proposals for the negotiation of a peace which is not based on an illusion of a victory which you cannot achieve.

We urge once again that you eliminate, as a tactic designed to affect the outcome of these negotiations, indiscriminate attacks upon city populations, upon innocent women and children. You appear not to have grasped the spirit of President Nixon's inaugural address when you close your eyes to the true meaning of his appeal for peace—as you did at last week's meeting. I recall to you again that on January 20 the President said:²

. . . the peace we seek to win is not victory over any other people but the peace that comes with "healing in

its wings"; with compassion for those who have suffered . . . with the opportunity for all the peoples of this earth to choose their own destiny.

Please ponder those words if you are really trying to understand where the United States stands on the issue of peace.

Soviet Charges Concerning Berlin Rejected by U.S., U.K., and France

Following is the text of a tripartite statement issued at Bonn on March 1 by the French, U.K., and U.S. Governments, together with a White House announcement issued at Paris that day.

TRIPARTITE STATEMENT

Recent Soviet statements have made claims concerning Federal German military activities in Berlin. The three Governments reject as groundless the allegations contained in these statements.

The three Governments are mindful of their responsibilities for preventing any resurgence of militarism in Berlin and have done so in their Sectors. It is only in the Eastern Sector of Berlin that organized German military activity has taken place.

The three Governments hope that these Soviet charges are not intended to create international tensions. It is not the desire of the three Governments to see such an increase in tension occur.

The three Governments reaffirm their determination to maintain a viable Berlin with free access.

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

White House press release (Paris, France) dated March 1

The Secretary of State of the United States and Sigismund von Braun, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany in Paris, met this evening in Paris at the latter's request to discuss the latest developments in Berlin.

They took note of the public statement issued earlier today by the French, U.S., and U.K. Governments regarding unfounded allegations contained in recent Soviet statements concerning German military activities in Berlin.

Ambassador von Braun was assured that the U.S. Government will fulfill its responsibilities as one of the occupying powers in Berlin.

² BULLETIN of Feb. 10, 1969, p. 121.

President Nixon Makes 8-Day Visit to Western Europe

Following are texts of remarks made on various occasions during President Nixon's trip to Europe, February 23-March 2.

REMARKS ON DEPARTURE, ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE, FEBRUARY 23

White House press release dated February 23

I want all of you to know how grateful I am that on this rainy Sunday morning at such an early hour you have come to send me off on this trip to Europe. And as I leave, I know that this trip is one which has created a great deal of interest, both in the United States and Europe.

It is a trip, I wish to emphasize, which is not intended to and will not settle all of the problems we have in the world. The problems we face are too complex and too difficult to be settled by what I would call the "showboat diplomacy." On the other hand, before we can make progress with the problems with which we have differences with our opponents, it is necessary to consult with our friends. And we are going to have real consultation, because we seek not only their support but their advice and their counsel on the grave problems that we face in the world—the problems of Viet-Nam, of the Middle-east, monetary problems, all the others that may cause difficulties between nations.

One note I would like to leave with this group before we take off: I have found that many who have written me have expressed concern about the possibility of demonstrations abroad. And my answer was eloquently given by a letter I received from a friend in Berlin. He said that 95 percent of the people in Berlin were glad that we were coming and 5 percent of the people did not want us to come. And so it is in the world today. The fact that there are demonstrations or the possibility of demonstrations cannot deter anyone who goes abroad to seek new solutions to the problems that block peace in the world.

And I can assure all of our friends abroad

that we look forward to their welcome. We will not be deterred by the fact that a few do not want us to come. We will remember that the great majority of the people here in the United States, as indicated by this bipartisan sendoff, and the great majority of people in Europe and in the world want peace—and they want the statesmen of the world to do everything they can to seek peace.

This is the first step in what we hope will be a long series of steps that will take us down the road toward better understanding between nations. Thank you.

THE VISIT TO BRUSSELS

Exchange of Remarks on Arrival, Brussels National Airport, February 23

White House press release (Brussels, Belgium) dated February 23

King Baudouin

Mr. President, Belgium is glad to be the first country this side of the Atlantic to receive you on the occasion of the journey by which you have chosen to begin the great task that is involving you in world affairs.

You have come to a free and ancient land which is happy to be the host country of important international organizations, the European Community and NATO.

I have pleasure in welcoming you in Belgium and on our continent. We are delighted at the initiative you are taking, since it aims at coordinating for joint action in the cause of peace the views of the United States of America and those of Europe, which, despite the difficulties accumulated by history, is advancing on the road to unity.

During this year, which will perhaps be that of man's first landing on the moon, we are more than ever conscious of the gulf between the wonderful possibilities open to us and the

obligations which burden the world because of war, want, injustice, and inequality.

May your journey and your interviews provide an opportunity for friendly nations better to combine their efforts to solve their problems, on which the very future of mankind depends.

May they also make easier a sincere dialogue and sound agreement with those who are governed by other political systems and who share the awe-inspiring responsibility for world peace.

If so, a prayer will be granted.

President Nixon

Your Majesty, I am most grateful for your very gracious welcome. We in the United States well recall that Your Majesty's first official trip to another country after ascending the throne was made to our country. I am especially pleased, therefore, that my own first trip abroad as President begins in your country.

It was exactly half a century ago this year, in 1919, that one of America's greatest Presidents made a historic postwar visit to what was then a devastated Belgium. That was the last occasion on which an American President set foot on Belgian soil.

Speaking then to the Belgian Parliament, Woodrow Wilson declared on that occasion:

Belgium's cause has linked the governments of the civilized world together. They have realized their common duty. They have drawn together as if instinctively into a league of right. They have put the whole power of organized manhood behind this conception of justice which is common to mankind. That (he said) is the significance of the League of Nations.

Woodrow Wilson's dream collapsed and the League failed—the people of Belgium know all too tragically. But the search goes on for a durable peace, one that symbolizes and embodies what Wilson then called “this conception of justice which is common to mankind”—or, as I heard Your Majesty describe it so eloquently just 10 years ago in addressing the United States Congress: “Peace is the tranquillity of order. Mere tranquillity can be cold war, but the tranquillity of order implies justice.”

The search for that peace is what brings me now to Europe to begin the process of consulting with America's allies and gathering their judgment.

It seems altogether appropriate that the first stop on such a trip should be Belgium. Belgium maintains, despite the tragic events of 1914 and

1940, its remarkable spirit and rebounded from each ordeal with the vigor and resilience of what Your Majesty has just referred to as “a free and ancient land”—and not least, a nation that has played so creative a role during the past 20 years in developing the institutions that give substance to the concept of an Atlantic community.

The peoples of our two countries have shared many things. We have been allies in war and partners in peace. But even more important, as we look to the future, are the common ideals that inspire us and that have made the friendship of our peoples so warm and so lasting.

I look forward with great pleasure to the prospect of working in the coming years with Your Majesty, with your Government, and with your Belgian people, as we together press forward toward that peace with justice we all so earnestly seek.

Your Majesty, as I stand here, I feel that I stand on hallowed ground for millions of Americans as well as Belgians. This is the soil that twice in 50 years has been devastated by war. Therefore, it is altogether appropriate that this new search for the peace that will avoid that kind of devastation should begin on this soil. I am proud to be here and to be welcomed by you so graciously. I am confident that at the beginning of this journey the fact that we start on this soil is a good omen for the future.

The President's Remarks to the North Atlantic Council, February 24

White House press release (Brussels, Belgium) dated February 24

Mr. Chairman and members of the North Atlantic Council: I thank you for your very thoughtful and generous words of welcome to this Council, and it is indeed a very great pleasure for me to be here.

This Council is both the symbol and the substance of the tie that has joined us as an Atlantic alliance for nearly 20 years.

On this first trip abroad as President of the United States, I find myself thinking back to my first visit to Europe. That was in 1947, in my first year in Congress—my first year, in fact, in public life. I came here then as a member of the Herter committee, which studied Europe's postwar economic needs in order to help lay the foundations for the Marshall Plan. Although I have been back many times, those first impressions remain valid; for 1947 was the

starting point of our journey together. What we have built in the past 22 years is a testimony to what can be achieved through common will and a spirit of partnership.

The years since I first visited Western Europe have further confirmed my commitment to the concept of Atlantic partnership. I should like to take a few minutes today to share with you some of my thoughts about that partnership.

First, as all of us in this room know, partners are not expected always to agree. But they are expected to consult.

I know there have been rumblings of discontent in Europe—a feeling that too often the United States talked at its partners instead of with them or merely informed them of decisions after they were made instead of consulting with them before deciding.

The United States is determined to listen with a new attentiveness to its NATO partners, not only because they have a right to be heard but because we want their ideas. I believe we have a right to expect that consultation shall be a two-way street.

This point is at the heart of one of the vital problems facing the alliance. Consultation simply as a means of getting agreement for unilateral action is demoralizing. What we need is genuine consultation, a new spirit of cooperation before the fact.

In the course of my campaign last fall, I said:

If our ideals of Atlantic interdependence are to mean anything in practice, it's time we began lecturing our European partners less and listening to them more. What we need is not more proclamations and declarations, but a greater attention to what our allies think.

This I deeply believe. That is why I am here. My visits to some of your capitals—and I wish it could be all of them—and to this Council are in the nature of a search. I have come for work, not for ceremony; to inquire, not to insist; to consult, not to convince; to listen and learn and to begin what I hope will be a continuing interchange of ideas and insights.

After 20 years, the Atlantic alliance must adapt to the conditions brought on by its success. It must pool not only its arms but also its brains.

One of the greatest values of having an alliance is the chance it provides to share ideas, to broaden the horizons of our thinking, to multiply the resources of experience and perspective we can bring to our problems not only in our own immediate areas but throughout the world.

Surely one thing we have learned from these difficult years is that no one nation has a monopoly on wisdom.

We also have learned that no great nation, and no great group of nations, can view the problems of its own community in isolation.

We are all “riders on the earth together”—fellow citizens of a world community.

In today's world what kind of an alliance shall we strive to build?

As I see it, an alliance is not the temporary pooling of selfish interests; it is a continuing process of cooperation, “a ship on its passage out, and not a voyage complete.”

The purpose of this trip is to help encourage that process, to seek ways to keep the relationship between America and Europe in tune with the times.

A modern alliance must be a living thing, capable of growth, able to adapt to changing circumstances.

To keep the alliance abreast of the times, we must, I believe, today ask ourselves some hard questions.

NATO was brought into being by the threat from the Soviet Union. What is the nature of that threat today?

When NATO was founded, Europe's economies were still shattered by war. Now they are flourishing. How should this be reflected by changed relationships among the NATO partners?

We are all grappling with problems of a modern environment which are the byproducts of our advanced technologies, problems such as the pollution of air and water and the congestion in our cities. Together we can dramatically advance our mastery of these. By what means can we best cooperate to bring this about?

And most fundamental of all, the one thing certain about the next 20 years is that they will be different from the last 20. What do we expect from our alliance in these next 20 years? How shall we adapt our structure to advance our purpose?

The answers to these great questions will not be decided in a week. They deal with the vast sweep of history, they need the most thorough deliberations. But the questions are with us; we cannot evade them; and the fact that we have begun this process of soul-searching is a good augury.

I have said before that we are ending a period of confrontation and entering an era of negotiation. In due course and with proper preparation,

the United States will enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union on a wide range of issues, some of which will affect our European allies. We will do so on the basis of full consultation and cooperation with our allies, because we recognize that the chances for successful negotiations depend on our unity.

I realize that this course has not always been followed adequately in the past. But I pledge to you today that in any negotiations affecting the interests of the NATO nations, there will be full and genuine consultation before and during those negotiations.

Beyond consulting on those negotiations, and beyond consulting on other policies that directly affect the NATO nations themselves, I intend to consult on a broad range of other matters. I shall not only welcome but actively seek the counsel of America's NATO partners on the questions that may affect the peace and stability of the world, whatever the part of the world in which they arise.

The nations of NATO are rich in physical resources—but they are even richer in their accumulated wisdom and their experience of the world today. In fashioning America's policies we need the benefit of that wisdom and that experience.

As NATO enters its third decade, I see for it an opportunity to be more than it ever has been before: a bulwark of peace, the architect of new means of partnership, and an invigorated forum for new ideas and new technologies to enrich the lives of our peoples.

In creating new policymaking machinery in Washington, one of my principal aims has been to shift the focus of American policy from crisis management to crisis prevention. That is one of the reasons why I value NATO so highly. NATO was established as a preventive force; and NATO can be credited with the fact that, while Europe has endured its share of crises in these past 20 years, the ultimate crisis that would have provoked a nuclear war has been prevented. Those nations that were free 20 years ago are still free today.

Thus, in its original purpose NATO has been a resounding success: Europe and America, the Old World and the New working together, have proved that the dream of collective security can be made a reality.

But we cannot rest on our laurels; there is no real security in stagnation. The successful strategies of the past two decades are inadequate to the decades ahead.

The tie that binds Europe and America is not the contemplation of danger, to be stretched or tightened by the fluctuations of fear.

The ties that bind our continents are the common tradition of freedom, the common desire for progress, the common passion for peace.

In that more constructive spirit let us look at new situations with new eyes and, in so doing, set an example for the world.

Exchange of Toasts at a Luncheon at the Royal Palace, February 24

White House press release (Brussels, Belgium) dated February 24

King Baudouin

I ask you to join me in raising my glass and raising your glass to the health of the President of the United States and also to Mrs. Nixon and to the old and lasting friendship between our two countries.

President Nixon

In responding to the very gracious toast by His Majesty, I would like to be permitted just a little more length than that, if he will permit me, because I did not want here to be received so graciously and so generously by Your Majesty and Your Majesty the Queen without indicating what is in the hearts of all of us who come here from the United States on this occasion.

I spoke to that point last night at the airport. I would like to speak, if I might, in more personal terms at this time.

When I met His Majesty 10 years ago, I had a very good chance to talk to him, to know him, and to appreciate him for not only the fact that he was a king but that he was a man who had a deep sensitivity about the great forces that move the world and a deep concern for his fellow man, in the true tradition of the great kings.

As I meet him again on this occasion, I have had the opportunity again to know him, to talk to him, and to hear not only his understanding of those peoples in the world who will never sit at a table like this and his feeling for them which is in his heart, but also his understanding of a great tide in the affairs of nations which affects us all, the search of our young people for a new idealism, a new principle.

It is this kind of thinking, this depth of concern—clearly apart from the very substantive

talks that I have had today with our friends from NATO and that I will be having in the balance of this trip—it is this kind of thinking coming from the head of this state, for whom the people of the United States have such a strong feeling, that makes this trip worth while, apart from anything else.

And having said that, Your Majesty, I am so delighted that, while 10 years ago we met only you, today we meet also Her Majesty the Queen.

We look forward to the time when the two of you will visit us in Washington.

I understand that you will be coming not primarily for that visit but perhaps to see an Apollo shot. But as you come to see men who may go to the moon, we will look forward to talking to you again in depth about those problems—which you can discuss so eloquently—of those of us who live on earth.

Finally, I would say that as I stand here in this country, a country that we feel so close to in the United States because of what we have shared together in war and in peace, I am deeply grateful for your hospitality, for your generous remarks last night; and as I raise my glass in this magnificent hall which reminds us of the past, I am reminded of the fact that a king—an office that often has been considered to be no longer relevant to the great issues of today—that a king in the person of Your Majesty thinks as deeply, with more vision, and with more concern than most of the leaders of the world with whom I have talked.

It is in that spirit, in the spirit of our common affection for the people of your country, of our respect for those people and for all of those at this table, and of our personal respect for you and your gracious Queen that I raise my glass to His Majesty the King.

President Nixon's Remarks on Departure From Brussels, February 24

White House press release (Brussels, Belgium) dated February 24

I leave Belgium with great regret. This has been much too short a visit, from my standpoint, but a very pleasant and a very productive one.

I leave more convinced than ever that there at the center of the Western alliance stands a stouthearted and illustrious people—worthy descendants of those early Celts who gave Caesar's legions no small amount of trouble.

What is certainly one of my most vivid impressions of Belgium is epitomized by your sov-

ereign: an impression of a nation young in spirit. His Majesty's keen interest in space, his desire to involve young people in the revitalizing of society—these are concerns of the future, and concerns that we share.

I have been greatly pleased, also, by my conversations at NATO Headquarters. Under the wise leadership of Secretary General Brosio, our allied representatives are giving careful and intelligent attention to the future of the alliance and to the opportunities that can be opened to make it a more effective instrument for peace as it enters its third decade. I might add that my visit persuaded me of another thing: that NATO is indeed fortunate to have its headquarters here, in so delightful and so cosmopolitan a capital.

Brussels was my first stop on this trip, and I have other capitals yet to visit. But I feel encouraged already in my belief that America can work with its European partners in increasing harmony. My talks with President Rey and the Commission of the European Communities have strengthened my convictions as to the high purpose and indispensability of European economic integration. And in all the talks I have had, from all the people I have met, from the vigor and the energy and the graciousness I have seen displayed here in Brussels, I have drawn increased confidence that free people who work together have a right to be optimists about the future.

THE VISIT TO LONDON

Exchange of Remarks on Arrival, Heathrow Airport, February 24

White House press release (London, England) dated February 24

Prime Minister Wilson

Mr. President, it is a great pleasure on behalf of Her Majesty's Government to welcome you to Britain. Equally, my colleagues join with me in welcoming the Secretary of State and your other distinguished colleagues.

You have said, Mr. President, that your purpose in visiting Europe is to work, to observe, and to discuss. For that reason I do not intend, by lengthening my own words of welcome, to defer for more than a few minutes the job that we are to do together while you are our guests.

The weather is cool still, but your welcome

from all of those I have the honor to represent is warm. We welcome you personally—a pleasure a number of us have had before. We welcome you as a newly elected President of a great country, our friend and ally. In particular, we welcome your decision, within days after your inauguration, to turn into reality those moving words in your inaugural speech by coming to discuss in this informal way with European heads of government not only the problems of Europe but our mutual hopes and desires for the alliance to which we both belong—not Europe only, not the Atlantic alliance only, but the problems of the wider world.

There have been those in perhaps both our countries who have been tempted to take these facts of our common purpose and our common alliance too easily for granted because of its success in creating the conditions it set out to create. For those to whom security leads to complacency, the events of last summer represent a call to renewed vigilance, to still stronger solidarity and cohesion.

But equally, Mr. President, on what all of us here in Europe will feel to have been an historic mission, it is right also that our talks should be directed beyond the achieving of security to the most positive ends of the alliance and our common purposes together. The aim: that from strength on our side we can give on the other side a degree of good will corresponding to that which we are prepared to hold out, moving progressively to a feeling of security, into the path of cooperation and peace.

But, Mr. President, this is not the only lesson that we in Europe drew from the events of last summer. What those events also underlined was a need for still greater unity within Europe, designed not to weaken or disrupt the alliance but to strengthen it: a unity which will enable Europe and each of us as a European country to develop together the great potential of industrial strength and skills which we have, all of us here in Europe; a unity in political and economic terms which will reject narrow, inward-looking attitudes in favor of the wider world concept which you, Mr. President, and we are committed to advance.

For as grows Europe's strength so grows the strength of the alliance and the thrust of our purposes throughout the world.

Mr. President, you especially asked that, with working time so precious, the ceremony and the honors which in other circumstances would be entirely right and fitting for the head of

state of your country should be reduced to a minimum. Regard, then, this restricted official welcome as a token only of the welcome which Crown, Parliament, the estates of the realm, including industry and labor, and above all, the whole British people, hold out to you—hold out because they feel it in their hearts.

The platform is yours, Mr. President, so that not only those friends but all in whose name we speak can hear from you—and then to work.

President Nixon

Mr. Prime Minister, I express to you my very deep appreciation for those eloquent remarks and also for the spirit which was exemplified by your statement that the protocol of this occasion was limited so that we could have more opportunity for the discussions to which we both look forward.

I only know from my previous visits to your country that here the welcome, whether it is one which is filled with protocol or one which is primarily devoted to talk, is one that I have always appreciated; and—going back over 22 years I have had the opportunity to meet with British statesmen, with you—in every instance I have profited by those meetings.

The purpose of this visit, as you have so very accurately indicated, is to discuss our common problems but, beyond that, to discuss the problems of the alliance of which we are a part.

I would add one further dimension: to discuss the problems of the world in which we may not have a direct interest in one country or the other but in which both of us have responsibility to adopt those policies which will promote a better way to peace in the world.

On that score, Mr. Prime Minister, I noted with interest the great success of a recent meeting you had with the Commonwealth ministers. In my travels abroad—going back over those 22 years, when I first came here as a young Congressman—I have had the opportunity not only to visit this country many times but to visit every one of the countries of the Commonwealth and to visit other nations no longer in the Commonwealth, but nations which—like the United States of America—share the language, the same great traditions, that we in the United States share with the United Kingdom.

I know the contribution, therefore, the contribution in ideals, the contribution in institution, the contribution that has been made in so many respects by this nation around the world.

That is why I am looking forward to discus-

sions, not only bilaterally and multilaterally as they affect our common alliance but on the problems of the whole world, because I know the wisdom that you and your colleagues can provide—wisdom which is essential for all of us as we attempt to find the solutions to those problems. I believe that the purpose of my visit was perhaps explained, in a different context, best by Woodrow Wilson, who was the first American President to visit this country. This is what he told the citizens of Manchester in 1918:

Friendship must have a machinery. If I cannot correspond with you, if I cannot learn your minds, if I cannot cooperate with you, I cannot be your friend, and if the world is to remain a body of friends, it must have the means of friendship, the means of constant friendly intercourse, the means for constant watchfulness over the common interests.

Winston Churchill called ours a special relationship. He was not referring to legal obligations but to human intangibles. He was referring to the means of communication to which Woodrow Wilson had referred to 50 years ago. And no two nations in the world more commonly and more closely share the means of communication than do the United States and the United Kingdom. We share a common language. We share the common law. We share the great institutions of the parliament. We share other institutions.

Because we share those institutions we enjoy a means of communication which gives us a special relationship. It means, too, that we share something else: a common commitment to a peace that transcends national boundaries. And because we are partners in the quest for peace we know that our relationship—that special relationship that we have—is not exclusive, because that peace that we seek, the two of us, will be secure only when all nations enjoy the relationship of trust and confidence that unites us.

I believe, as I stand here today, that we can bring about a durable peace in our time. But it cannot come to those who seek it frantically with overnight deals or dramatic gestures. It cannot come to those who pursue it casually, without real hope or genuine idealism.

As those in this nation know better than those in our nation—because of your longer experience—peace will come, I believe, step by step, measured and deliberate, continuing to pursue the goal we seek despite setbacks and disappointments. It is that sense of history that you have, that sense of history that all of us in our country respect and that we seek to emulate. It

is from that that we can learn. And so we shall strive on this visit and many others that we shall have over the years I will be in office—we shall strive for a mutual trust between our nations and other nations, the kind of trust that already exists between your nation and mine.

Exchange of Remarks on Departure, Heathrow Airport, February 26

White House press release (London, England) dated February 26

Prime Minister Wilson

Mr. President, as we take our leave of you after this visit, my first thought is to wish you Godspeed as you continue on this mission which you conceived and to which, I have said to you on your arrival here, future commentators may well ascribe the phrase “historic.”

I told you when you arrived here about 36 hours ago how much we welcomed your decision within days of your inauguration to visit our European Continent.

Allowing for the minimum of sleep which nature requires, I would not have believed that so much constructive discussion could have been crowded into so few hours. The problems of our alliance, the problems of unity in Europe, the problems of a wider world—all these we have discussed against the background of our common purpose, the common purpose of our own society.

These views we have discussed and otherwise examined, not with the idea of reaching firm decisions but with the idea of assuring that they shall be continuously examined in depth, that they shall be examined together.

Together we have given the necessary instructions to insure that what your visit has done will continue. We have established a close relationship, and above all, we have established a process of consultation on world affairs.

But as you said on your arrival here, neither of us regards this as an exclusive process, for what views we have discussed must become part of the currency of consultations with all our partners, and this process will continue as you carry forward your discussions with our friends in Germany, in Italy, and in France and subsequently with our other European partners.

Equally I have in mind—and I doubt if you will forget—that unprecedented uninhibited exchange of views when last night you sat down with the British Cabinet around the Cabinet

table, when we discussed the internal social problems of a modern society—yours, ours, the societies of other countries you will be visiting—problems of urban explosion, problems of race and color, problems of regional participation, and above all, the problems of youth—youth, not only of the articulate, even demonstrative, minority of a nation's youth but the problems of the hard-working and no less sincere sort of our young people seeking to express themselves, seeking the cause, seeking, above all, an ideal.

I am glad that we have been able together to give instructions that there will be established fuller consultation between governments and that we have been able to agree that there shall be established equally, insofar as it is in our power to do so, full consultation between Parliament and Congress, indeed between our two societies, on all of these problems.

What we have begun here in London I know you will want to extend in all the other centers you will be visiting—and, I believe, instill more widely.

Mr. President, here at Heathrow less than 2 days ago, we both proclaimed our conceptions of the objectives of this visit. Our talks have widened those conceptions and given reality to them.

This is a start and, we both realize, only a start. Both of us look forward to building on what we have begun.

Mr. President, from the British Government and the British people, I wish you Godspeed on your mission of hope.

President Nixon

Mr. Prime Minister, this has indeed been a very eventful and rewarding visit for me. Our time together was short, but, in Kipling's words, we filled "the unforgiving minute with sixty seconds' worth of distance run."

We received the typically warm and generous welcome of the British people; we were received by your gracious Queen and Prince Philip; and in the most frank and open manner were given the opportunity to exchange views with your leaders of government.

I shall always remember the events of yesterday. At Westminster Abbey I was reminded of the splendor of your traditions, the greatness of your history. And I shared the gratitude which General Pershing must have felt when he presented the Congressional Medal of Honor to Britain's Unknown Soldier.

Yesterday, for the first time in history, a man occupying the Office of President of the United States visited a session of the House of Commons. It was an inspiring and compelling experience, one for which I am deeply grateful. And it was an experience from which I came away with a deep appreciation and respect for the ability of the British Parliamentarian to stand up during the question period and answer so effectively.

I believe that your question period is much more of an ordeal than our press conference.

It was a moment which no man who has served in the Congress of the United States can forget, for it was here that representative government was born and it was here that men such as Pitt, Disraeli, Gladstone, and Churchill turned their genius and eloquence to the challenges of social reform and the defense of freedom.

Yesterday, too, an American President in office was given the opportunity of exchanging views with a representative cross section of the citizens in the nongovernmental sector. This, too, was a very rewarding experience for me and one that I hope may establish a new precedent in visits of this type that will be made by heads of government and heads of state.

Then, too, as you remarked, the opportunity, an historic opportunity, to meet with members of the British Cabinet not only on a point of mutual interest, bilateral, but more on those subjects that draw together from the beginning time of our history and of yours where we have been, where we are, where we are going—this discussion is one that will stay in our memories for all of our lives, because it is centered on how we can best pursue our common purposes—the cause of peace, prosperity, a better life for our young people and for all mankind.

I have never been more certain—and that certainty has been buttressed by my visit here—that the strength of our ideals and purposes, and the collective force that Europe and America have built to safeguard them, are the necessary cornerstones of the lasting peace we both seek.

Let us, Great Britain and America, remember that "united" is our common first name. The United Kingdom, the United States—we know the real meaning of unity, not the unity of the monolith but the unity that gains strength by encouraging the diversity which is the hallmark of freedom, a diversity that I saw in

action around your Cabinet table and that I see in action around mine.

That is the kind of unity we seek within the Western alliance—a unity creative in its contrasts, flexible in its form, but, above all, powerful in its purpose.

THE VISIT TO GERMANY

President Nixon's Remarks Upon Arrival, Wahn Airport, Cologne, February 26

White House press release (Bonn, Germany) dated February 26

Mr. Chancellor, I wish to express my deep appreciation for that very gracious and eloquent welcome. I in return express to you and to the people of your country our admiration and our respect for what you have accomplished in the years since I first visited this country 22 years ago.

When I first came to this country at that time, 22 years ago, I visited Berlin, Essen, Frankfurt, and the other great cities of this nation, and I saw them leveled and broken. But one thing was not broken, and that was the spirit of the German people.

You have spoken generously of the assistance that the United States has provided for the German recovery; but without the spirit of the German people, without the industry of the German people, there would not have been the miracle—which the whole world has admired—of the strong German nation that we see today.

Like so many of my countrymen, I share some of that tradition of the German people. My wife's mother was born in this country—and she has that spirit, and my two daughters also have that spirit.

But as we speak of the things that have changed over these last 22 years—the miracle of German recovery among them—there are some things that have not changed.

One thing that has not changed is our devotion and dedication to the goal that the German people will again be united. One thing that has not changed is our mutual dedication to the principle of independence and freedom for all of the peoples of Western Europe. And one thing that has not changed is our devotion to the great alliance of which we are a part.

I trust that my visit here and the conversations that I look forward to having with you and members of your Government will not only strengthen the relations between our two coun-

tries but also will further strengthen the great alliance of which we are a part.

We stand here together today, heads of our two Governments, heads of two great peoples devoted to the cause of peace, devoted to the cause of freedom—and we will work toward that cause in the talks that we have.

President Nixon's Remarks Before the German Bundestag, Bonn, February 26

White House press release (Bonn, Germany) dated February 26

Mr. President, Mr. Chancellor, Your Excellencies, Members of the Parliament: It is a very great honor for me to appear before this legislative body and to respond to the very generous words of welcome that I have just heard from the presiding officer of this body.

At the outset, I regret that I find it necessary to have a translator. I do say, though, having heard his translation, he had every word right—every word.

Mr. President, you have spoken of some of the great items that bind our two nations and our two peoples together. I spoke at the airport this morning of the fact that we in the United States owe so much to our German heritage. And I can speak personally on that point because the grandmother of my two daughters on their mother's side was born in Germany.

I would like to speak of those principles and ideals that will continue to bind us together in the years ahead.

First, the great alliance of which we are a part: This alliance is strong today and must be maintained in strength in the years ahead.

The success of this alliance is indicated by the fact that in the 20 years that it has existed, we have had peace as far as this part of the world is concerned, and every one of the nations in the alliance that was free 20 years ago is free today, including the free city of Berlin.

We are bound together, too, by the economic factors that two great and productive peoples have produced in our two countries. And we know that a strong and productive German economy is essential for a strong free-world economy, just as is a strong economy in the United States.

We are bound together, too, by a common dedication to the cause of peace, peace not only for ourselves but for all mankind.

As we enter what I have described as a period of negotiations with those who have been our opponents, we recognize that for those negotia-

tions to succeed it is essential that we maintain the strength that made negotiations possible.

But having spoken of the bonds of national heritage and background, the alliance of the economic factors—those bonds that bring us together—I would add, finally, one that is demonstrated by my presence in this Chamber today. We believe, both of our countries and our peoples, in representative government, in free and vigorous debate, and in free and vigorous elections. And having just been through the ordeal of an election campaign, I wish all of you well in your campaigns. That, as I am sure you will understand, is the international language of politics, being on both sides of the same issue.

Finally, as I stand before this parliamentary body, I realize that we share so many common traditions, and it is to me a very moving experience to report to you that since becoming President of the United States I have not yet had the opportunity to appear before our own Congress, and I have not yet appeared before a legislative body in any other country. In other words, as I stand here today before this Parliament, this is the first time that I, as President of the United States, have appeared before any legislative body in the whole world.

Mr. President, I will have many honors during the period that I will hold office, but I can assure you that, as one who began his political career as a Congressman and served in that post for 4 years and who then served in our Senate for 2 years and then served as Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate—in the chair where you sit—for 8 years, there will be no honor greater than the one I have today, to address my fellow legislators.

Exchange of Remarks on Arrival, Tempelhof Airport, West Berlin, February 27

White House press release (Berlin, Germany) dated February 27

*Mayor Klaus Schütz*¹

Mr. President, we Berliners are happy to have you here today and to have you with us. The supreme representative of this nation, when coming to Berlin, always comes with friends. We have acquired this friendship in the most difficult situations—during the barricade, during the airlift, during the crucial ultimatum and after that period.

This friendship goes to the American peo-

¹ Mayor Schütz spoke in German.

ple, but today, Mr. President, it goes very particularly to you. You know this city in East and West. You know the truly indivisible Berlin. Feel at home here, because although you are far away from the White House and the 50 United States of America, an American President, and you, President Nixon, are always at home in this city.

President Nixon

Mr. Mayor, Mr. Chancellor, it is a great honor for me to be welcomed into this great city in such eloquent and generous terms. I respond to this welcome not only for myself but for all the people of the United States of America and for all of the people of the free world.

Berlin is known as a four-power city. But there is a fifth power in Berlin. That fifth power is the determination of the free people of Berlin to remain free and the determination of free people everywhere to stand by those who desire to remain free. I stand here today as a symbol of that fifth power—the power which will not be intimidated by any threat, by any pressure from any direction.

A few days ago Mayor Brandt—former Mayor Brandt, now Vice Chancellor—introduced General Lucius Clay at a dinner in New York. He referred to the Berlin airlift as the “cradle of American-German friendship.” For 20 years that friendship has grown and flourished.

Today, I declare again that we, the people of the United States, stand with you in the defense of freedom.

That fifth power to which I am referring, the power which is represented by the determination of free men to remain free, is stronger than any other power. It will prevail.

I appreciate the opportunity of visiting Berlin and particularly this special privilege that I am asked to review this magnificent contingent of our armed forces in Berlin. As I speak to you, I only wish that time permitted that I could shake hands with each of you to express the appreciation of your country and my own appreciation for your service to the country, here in this post and others around the world.

As I am sure you have noted, there have been some changes in Washington in recent months. . . .

There is one thing that I want to assure you has not changed—and this has been true in terms of other Presidents and it is true in the terms of this President—that is our pride in

the men of our armed services here in Berlin and Western Europe, around the world, Vietnam. I have seen the men in our armed services. I know them. I know that whatever we may from time to time read and hear at home about divisions on policy, there is no question about the dedication, the patriotism, the morale of the men who defend the cause of freedom, as you defend it by your presence here.

As I speak to you today, I add one other thought: You are here, it is true, in a land far away from home, but you are also here in a land and in a city which welcomes you and wants you. You are not here as an occupying force. You are not here because the United States of America has designs on any other nation or any other territory. You are here because of our desire, shared by the people of this country and of this city, to defend their right to be free—and that is the American destiny in the world today.

We are a great power. We have obligations around the world. But because of the great changes that have occurred in history, the American mission is different from that of some other countries who have arisen in greatness in their role in the world. We seek no territory. We seek no concessions. All that we want is the right for others that we have for ourselves: the right to be free, the right to choose our own leaders, the right to disagree, and the right to settle our disagreements in a peaceful way.

As I stand here today on one of the first occasions—as a matter of fact, the first occasion—as the new President of the United States and as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, to review an armed force abroad, I want you to know that I have never been so proud—proud of you, proud of my country and its role in the world, and humble in the duty that I have to see that the policies that we develop to bring peace are worthy of your dedication to defend peace as demonstrated by your presence here.

Exchange of Remarks Upon Signing the Golden Book, West Berlin, February 27

White House press release (Berlin, Germany) dated February 27

*Mayor Klaus Schütz*²

Thank you very much, Mr. President and Mr. Chancellor, for coming to Berlin on your first trip after your election—to Berlin, the place

where two political worlds look face to face.

You have come here to form your own opinion of the situation. The United States of America is more important to Berlin than to any other city in Europe. They are one of the three protective powers, and that is a very weighty thing.

You said this morning, Mr. President, that Berlin, in your opinion, has been the cradle of German-American friendship after the Second World War. This is where the relationships of our peoples have found a special expression, and this is where their friendship and solidarity springs to the eye and where we find that we can rely on each other.

Six years ago, Mr. President, John F. Kennedy was in this city and, like you, he showed where the American people stand. You, Mr. President, yourself were Vice President when the Honorable Dwight D. Eisenhower and the United States Government helped to overcome and master a very great crisis.

I am glad we have here today among us someone who was then Governing Mayor of Berlin, my friend Willy Brandt. He, as all Berliners, realized and continues to realize, as we all do, that without the help and support of the American Government, Berlin could not live nor could it live in the future.

We have followed with great attention and sympathy your efforts for peace, Mr. President. You really must know what it is worth to safeguard peace, and we are prepared to make our own convincing contribution to an all-European peace.

Berlin has been and is an advance post for freedom. It has been and wants to be an advance post of peace. You know how shamefully this city is divided, Mr. President, and you will certainly understand when I say that we here in West Berlin, at this very moment, think very intensively of our fellow citizens in the other part of this city.

Mr. President, this is not an easy place to live, but we are not living at an easy time, either; and the solutions to the problems won't be easy, I suppose.

We are against those who try to propose a simple formula and empty phrases, because we know that these easy-sounding proposals do not solve the problems but rather postpone their solutions.

We are prepared, through hard work, to go all the way. We think we have the right to pre-

² Mayor Schütz spoke in German.

serve our freedom, and we want to overcome tensions and safeguard peace.

Mr. President, we are very grateful for the statements you have made about Berlin, and we know and appreciate their value. But let me tell you that Berlin has not waited for new guarantees or new promises from the United States, because we know where you stand, as you know where we stand.

Thank you again, very cordially, for coming to visit us; and will you please now give us the honor of signing the Golden Book of the City of Berlin.

President Nixon

Mr. Mayor, Mr. Chancellor, Mr. Vice Chancellor, Mr. Secretary of State, all of the distinguished guests who are here in this room: I speak to you at a time when I have experienced a very moving occasion. We have traveled through this city and realize again what Berlin means to all of the people of the world.

We have seen here a wall. A wall can divide a city, but a wall can never divide a people. A wall can divide physically, but it cannot divide Berlin spiritually—because the spirit of freedom that I saw on the faces of thousands of Berliners today is the spirit that will continue to survive and will continue to receive support by those who are free throughout the world.

As I went through the city, too, I realized that those who have indicated that this city was a dying city were wrong, because I saw the young faces, the children, and the workers, smiling. They are people who realize that this city does have hope, that it does have a future.

Finally, Mr. Mayor, as one who has traveled to many cities in the world and many in the United States, I am somewhat of an expert in looking at crowds and also an expert in the signs that people in the crowds carry.

In some cities in the world and in some cities in the United States I have seen signs that say "Nixon Come Back" and other signs that say "Nixon Go Home." But here in Berlin most of the signs that really have meaning, the expressions on the faces of people, said: "Welcome. We stand with you. We stand for peace. We stand for freedom."

And I well recall that as we were riding in the car the Mayor and the Chancellor translated some of the signs, and one in particular seemed

to repeat over and over again: *Viel Glück!* So I say to the people of Berlin: Good luck!

The President's Remarks at the Siemens Factory, West Berlin, February 27

White House press release (Berlin, Germany) dated February 27

I first apologize for the fact that we have kept you waiting. But as we came through the city, the crowds were so large that we were unable to keep on our schedule.

So the reason we are here is a demonstration of the truth of what the Mayor has just said: that the people of Berlin are free and that, despite a wall, this is one city and one people and one nation.

I saw many signs as we came through the streets of the city—some were in English, most were in German. The ones in German, of course, I could not understand. But there was one sign that was a combination that made me feel very much at home.

I first came to this city 22 years ago. At that time most of those that I see here—or many of those—were not yet born; and to many who came here then, Berlin seemed to be a city without hope and without a future. But the pessimists at that period, over 20 years ago, did not know the people of Berlin.

There is no more remarkable story in human history than the creation of this island of freedom and prosperity, of courage and determination, in the center of postwar Europe.

And it is you who have done it.

It is you who have rebuilt this great city; it is you who have stood the shock of crises; it is you who have kept the faith in yourselves and in your allies.

Berlin may look lonely on the map. But it is a vital part of the world that believes in the capacity of man to govern himself with responsibility and to shape his destiny in dignity.

If this is an age of symbols, one of the great symbols of the age is this city. And what you do here is done for free men everywhere throughout the world. You stand for a cause much bigger than yourself, and this is the greatest destiny that a man or a woman can have—because your will to remain free strengthens the will to freedom of all men; your courage in the face of deliberate and constant challenge fortifies the courage of all those who love liberty.

The presence of an American President in Berlin, following a recent visit by a British Prime Minister, is another kind of symbol. It is a way of demonstrating unmistakably our longstanding commitment to the people of West Berlin.

Let there be no miscalculation: No unilateral move, no illegal act, no form of pressure from any source will shake the resolve of the Western nations to defend their rightful status as protectors of the people of free Berlin.

All the world admires bravery. But there are different kinds of bravery. Bravery in crisis is expected of those who love freedom; what is much more difficult, much more rare, is bravery day by day—the steady fortitude that resists remorseless pressures and refuses to permit the slow erosion of liberties. That is the remarkable bravery of the Berliner, and it stands as a shining example for everyone throughout the world.

The partnership between our two peoples was forged back in the dark days of the blockade, when men like Lucius Clay and Ernst Reuter personified our determination to survive as free men. It is appropriate, 20 years after the end of that blockade, that we pay tribute to all who suffered for the ideal of freedom in those days of physical privation and spiritual triumph. As I viewed the progress of this vital city today, I knew that that sacrifice was not in vain.

And to all the people of Berlin today, I bring this message from the heart of America: You have justified the support and the commitment of your friends, and as a result, no city in the world has more friends, more devoted friends, than has the city of Berlin.

The American responsibility here is derived from the most solemn international agreements. But what we have gone through together in those 24 years has given those agreements a special meaning. Four Presidents before me have held to this principle, and I tell you at this time and in this place that I, too, hold fast to this principle: Berlin must be free.

I do not say this in any spirit of bravado or belligerence. I am simply stating an irrevocable fact of international life.

Our commitment to the freedom of Berlin has never been more steady, never more firm, than it is today. For more than a generation we have pledged American lives to an ideal and a reality: that Berlin shall be free and that Berlin shall live. For its part, Berlin has remained stead-

fast. So have we; and steadfast we shall stay.

No one should doubt the determination of the United States to live up to its obligations. The question before the world is not whether we shall rise to the challenge of defending Berlin—we have already demonstrated that we shall. The question now is how best to end the challenge and clear the way for a peaceful solution to the problem of a divided Germany.

When we say that we reject any unilateral alteration of the status quo in Berlin, we do not mean that we consider the status quo to be satisfactory. Nobody benefits in a stalemate, least of all the people of Berlin.

Let us set behind us the stereotype of Berlin as a “provocation.” Let us, all of us, view the situation in Berlin as an invocation, a call to end the tension of the past age here and everywhere.

Our common attitude can best be expressed in a motto of Goethe: Without haste, but without rest. That is, step by step we shall strive together to construct a durable peace.

There were times in the past when Berlin had to stand its ground in defiance of horrible forces that threatened to overwhelm it. Your determination in those times of danger demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt that threats of force would never succeed. Your determination in those times of danger demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt that the threats and coercion could never succeed. By your fortitude you have created conditions which may in time permit another kind of determination—a determination that we shall, by negotiation among governments and reconciliation among men, bring an end to the division of this city, this nation, and this continent, and this planet.

By your faith in the future you have inspired renewed faith in the hearts of all men. The men of the past thought in terms of blockades and walls; the men of the future will think in terms of open channels. The men of the past were trapped in the gray overcast of cold war; the men of the future—a future toward which we will all work—if only they remember the tragedy and triumph of Berlin, will be free to walk in the warm sunlight of a just peace.

And now one final message from the hearts of the people of America to the people of Berlin: Sometimes you must feel that you are very much alone. But always remember we are with you, and always remember that people who are

free and who want to be free around the world are with you. In the sense that the people of Berlin stand for freedom and peace, all the people of the world are truly Berliners.

President Nixon's Remarks on Departure, Tegel Airport, West Berlin, February 27

White House press release (Berlin, Germany) dated February 27

Mr. Chancellor, I am deeply grateful for the eloquent words that you have expressed as I leave your country—and leave this city which is such a vitally important part of your country.

This brief visit that I made to your country has been valuable in several respects: first, because it allowed me, as the new President of the United States, to develop a basis for very close consultation and cooperation with the members of your Government. Cooperation between the German and American Governments is vital and essential if we are to defend the freedom which we both cherish and if we are to achieve the peace which we both seek.

I know now that we have established in this brief visit the basis for that consultation and cooperation which will be so valuable and constructive in seeking our common purposes in the years ahead. This visit also will be memorable to me because it provided my first opportunity to speak before a legislative body at the highest level, and I am proud to have been received as the first foreign visitor to appear before the Bundestag. I am also proud that my first appearance was before your Parliament.

Mr. Chancellor, you and I, as political leaders, know that it is essential that the leaders at the top with the executive power, and the legislators who work with them, must have an understanding and communication if two nations and two peoples are to work together.

But even more important than Presidents and Chancellors getting along together, and Members of Parliament and Members of Congress understanding each other, is that the people of two nations share a common spirit and have a common understanding.

We are different people, with different languages and different backgrounds, but in a sense we are one people—one people in our dedication to peace and in our dedication to freedom. Because we are one people in that spirit, we, as leaders of the people, will be able to achieve our goal of a new world in which peoples in nations, in continents, and in the world may live together in peace and in friendship.

THE VISIT TO ROME

Exchange of Remarks on Arrival, Ciampino Military Airport, February 27

White House press release (Rome, Italy) dated February 27

*President Saragat*³

Mr. President, on behalf of the Italian people and on my own behalf it gives me great pleasure to extend my warmest welcome to you and to the distinguished personalities who accompany you.

Your visit confirms the cordiality of the Italo-American relations which has its roots in the common civilization and in the many ties linking our two peoples through the migration of millions of Italians to your great country.

Italy is aware, like the other European countries, of the commitment of the United States, our friend and ally, to search for conditions that could guarantee a just and lasting peace among all peoples of the world.

Your journey, Mr. President, is therefore of great importance for the future of the relations between the member countries of the Atlantic alliance and as a basis for the negotiations you will undertake with the Soviet Union.

Europe, however, will be in a position to make a decisive contribution to this great dialogue of peace between East and West only if it finds, through unity, the necessary dimension to master its destiny.

The awareness of sharing the same ideals and same objectives with the American nation makes us confident of the talks we will have with you, in the certainty that they will not only contribute to the strengthening of collaboration within the Western World but also to build on stronger bases peace and security for all nations.

It is with this hope that I wish to extend to you our most friendly welcome to our city, this ancient site and symbol of a civilization based on the highest values which are common to all of us.

President Nixon

Mr. President, I am most grateful for the generous remarks that you have expressed in welcoming me and the members of my party to your country.

As I stand here I think back to 22 years ago when I first visited this country and had the opportunity to know the Italian people. For 2 weeks at that period, as a new, young Congressman, I traveled through this country studying

³ President Saragat spoke in Italian.

the needs of this nation for the Marshall Plan. I visited Rome, Naples, Milan, Turin, and Trieste.

I had the opportunity to see a nation then in deep economic troubles, a nation which many thought would be unable to recover from those troubles and regain its economic and political strength.

But when I returned to the United States and, along with my colleagues, reported to the Congress, I was confident of the future of Italy because, first, I had seen a great Italian leader, De Gasperi, and I knew he would provide, with his colleagues, the leadership that this country needed.

I also reported with great confidence, because I had seen a remarkable people; a people who in adversity had very great strength, a people who had contributed so much to our country and who now, in this land, were to contribute so much to its recovery—the recovery of Italy, economically and politically—so that it now ranks among the first nations of the world, so that it now stands as one of the strong allies of the Western alliance.

That recovery is due both to its leaders and to its peoples, and I pay tribute to both as I stand here today. Now we look to the future. We look to the future with the new leaders, the leaders that you will provide in your Government and that we will provide in ours.

As we look to the future we will look to the new purpose of our alliance and our association together. As I think of that purpose I think of the words of another American President who visited this nation just 50 years ago. His words were spoken before their time, but now their time has come.

Listen to the words of Woodrow Wilson, spoken in Rome in 1919—50 years ago:

Our task is to set up a new international psychology, to have a new, real atmosphere where what men once considered theoretical and idealistic turns out to be practical and necessary.

Mr. President, the contribution that you personally and that your people have made to the strength of NATO has helped to turn the ideal of collective security into a practical reality.

Now, as we seek a new international atmosphere, the strength of the Western alliance has never been more necessary. A good ally listens to her partners.

As you pointed out in your remarks, we shall be having discussions with the Soviet Union. But before we have such discussions with the

other side, we will have discussions and consultations with our allies on this side.

That is the road that leads to Rome today. That is why I appreciate this opportunity to consult with the leaders of your Government.

I come here to seek your advice, and I am sure I will leave with that—and yet with something more, because we know that great lessons can be learned from people from whom humanity and tolerance are, in truth, a way of life.

That is why our discussion will not be limited to matters just between our two nations. Our talks will extend throughout the structure of our alliance and deal with the great problems of the world.

As an Atlantic partner and as a member of the European Community, Italy is playing a vital and constructive role in world affairs. That is why I am particularly grateful for the opportunity to visit your country at this time, to have the wise counsel of your leaders, and to reaffirm our steadfast friendship and to seek together ways of achieving our high purpose.

Exchange of Toasts at a Dinner at the Quirinale Palace, February 27

White House press release (Rome, Italy) dated February 27

President Saragat ⁴

Mr. President, it is with a feeling of deep satisfaction and great pleasure that we welcome you to Rome, only a few months after your election as President of the United States of America.

Addressing myself to you, the leader of the American nation, to which we are bound by ties of friendship and alliance, it is gratifying for me to speak first of all of your great country, remembering the hospitality I received there less than 2 years ago and the unforgettable images it has left in my mind.

The Italian Government and the Italian people are indeed keenly aware of the significance of your journey, which finds us deeply and spontaneously responsive. Italy, particularly alive and open to the motivations which prompted it and to the message it conveys, welcomes it, therefore, as a singularly felicitous omen for the future of the relations between the old and the new continent and for the dialogue of peace between East and West.

The Atlantic alliance unites us in a commitment for defense which guarantees our security,

⁴ President Saragat spoke in Italian.

and it foreshadows the European-American community envisaged by the late President Kennedy and outlined recently by you. To the extent to which defense problems are matched by constant initiatives toward *détente* and peace, we are indeed profoundly convinced that the consolidation and development of such fruitful and freely contracted ties among the peoples who have joined the Atlantic alliance, far from running counter to the parallel efforts of our countries in order to improve the atmosphere of international relations, and particularly with the East, are a prerequisite for their success. Both, indeed, are complementary factors of a single strategy for peace.

You know well how my country has constantly aimed at a united Europe. We have relentlessly striven and continue to strive toward it, and we do not allow the inevitable obstacles to discourage us in our pursuit.

European unity represents an ever more pressing need in a world where the dimensions and the structures of the past fall short of the demands of the future. Only a united Europe can provide the peoples of our continent with that institution and framework which is indispensable if they are effectively to master their own destiny.

The people of Europe expect to find the friendly American nation by their side on this road to unity, just as it was by their side in the first hard years following the war, when the United States, with generous impulse in the social and economic field and acute political foresight, enabled Europe to rise rapidly from the ruins in which war had plunged it.

In your inaugural address, Mr. President, you have pointed out that after a period of confrontation we are entering an era of negotiations. This statement cannot but find the full support of my country, whose action has always aimed at making this development easier.

We gave a clear proof of this just recently when we signed the Nonproliferation Treaty, prompted by the fervent hope that this decision would contribute to the consolidation of peace, to the reduction of the existing causes for tension, and to the strengthening of mutual trust among nations.

We are firmly committed to make also in the near future every endeavor so that this trust, which implies strict respect by one and all for the territorial integrity and the independence of each, shall find new sources of encouragement in a renewed effort on the part of all of us, so

that this community of nations may proceed on a course leading to the ban of the use of force and armaments from international political life.

This is an aim which can be reached only by giving authority and strength to the organization of the United Nations.

Mr. President, we know you are a true friend of Italy, and we know you have had the opportunity of visiting it. We feel sure that returning today to our country you will have readily recognized the face of a nation who in recent years has come through profound changes but has consistently maintained its loyalty to the ideals of liberty, democracy, and social justice indelibly engraved in its political and social structures.

They are the very same ideals which have always inspired the great American nation—those which it has defended, as history shows, with generous impulse, those of which America and Europe, in harmonious collaboration, are the prominent bearers in the world today.

The fruitful friendship between the United States and Italy, which has its roots in the bonds of common origin and civilization—of which the existence of 20 million American citizens of Italian extraction is one eloquent proof—is a pledge and a guarantee that this historic duty will not be eschewed and its accomplishment will blossom into prosperity and peace for all the nations of the world.

In this belief and with this wish I raise my glass to the success of your mission of peace, to your personal well-being, to that of your family, and of the distinguished personalities who accompany you and to the good fortunes of the noble American nation and to the future of the friendship between our two peoples.

President Nixon

Mr. President, Your Excellencies: It is a very great honor for me to be in this magnificent room and to be received in such an eloquent way by the President of this nation.

I should like to respond to your remarks in both personal terms and then also in the broader terms that you have used in describing the relationship between our two nations.

It was 22 years ago when I first came to this country as a freshman Congressman—and freshmen Congressmen are seldom listened to and seldom survive. I learned much on that journey about this country and our relationship. And when I returned in 1957 as Vice President of the

United States, I spoke to you then in the capacity you held as Vice Premier of this country.

When I returned again to this country in 1963, you were President of the Republic and I was a private citizen. And so it seemed to me, since you had set the example of going from Vice Premier to President, that I should do likewise.

Mr. President, our relationship and my relationship with the other distinguished guests at this table, many of whom I have met on my previous visits, goes far beyond these personal recollections. It is traditional when an American comes to this country, and particularly when an American President comes and is honored as I am being honored tonight, to speak as you have of what contribution—the magnificent contribution—has been made to the American nation by the Americans of Italian descent.

We are proud of that tradition: the fact that 20 million Americans are proud to claim their Italian background. And we are proud that, going clear back to the days of the American Revolution, the Americans of Italian descent have played a very significant part in our history.

It would also be appropriate on an occasion like this for an American President to refer, as I do refer now, to the great debt we owe to this nation and to this people for the history that we feel in this room in which we now meet.

Not just this Eternal City but other cities in this country have an historical background that has a meaning far beyond the relationship between our two countries and which deeply enriches our culture.

But I do not speak today primarily of those usual gracious terms and references that are always appropriate—of our common ties in blood, insofar as our national heritage is concerned, of history and our culture. I speak, as you do, of not just the past but primarily of what we can do together in the future.

You have spoken very eloquently, Mr. President, about the dream of a united Europe, a dream which many of us in the United States have also supported.

And while we know that this country, as its productivity increases, is now producing approximately \$70 billion in gross national product per year, we also realize that the 300 million people who live in Western Europe produce a total of over \$500 billion per year.

We stand here, in other words, in one of the most productive areas of the entire world. But as we think of that and as I declare again—as

I did in my earlier meetings with you and with members of this Government—our adherence to and our support of NATO and the Atlantic alliance, let us also look to how we can further strengthen not only that alliance but strengthen the cause of peace in which we are all interested.

There are several pillars in the Temple of Peace which we are now constructing. The first is to maintain the strength of the NATO alliance; the second is to work toward greater unity, not only in military but in other ways for Europe; and third, we recognize that in this era in which we are now entering, it will be necessary for the United States of America to conduct bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union, negotiations that will have a massive effect on whether peace survives in the world.

We will enter into those negotiations whenever we think it is appropriate and whenever we think they will serve the cause of peace. But we will remember that before we talk to the other side, it is essential that we consult with and get the advice of our friends on our side.

I indicated, as you pointed out, in my inaugural address that we were entering a new era of negotiation rather than confrontation.

What this trip that I have taken only 6 weeks after being inaugurated as President of the United States means is that we are also entering a new era of full consultation with our allies on all of the matters that may affect the peace of the world.

And I say that, Mr. President, for this reason: We admire this nation and this people for its magnificent cultural background and tradition. We admire this nation for its tremendous economic progress. We admire this nation because of the contribution you have made to our nation in terms of those Americans of Italian descent who have done so much for us.

But there is another reason that we admire and respect this nation. It is one that I can speak personally about, because of my own personal experience going back over 22 years.

I have talked to Italian statesmen—to De Gasperi and those who have followed him—and to the men here at this table, not only you, Mr. President, but President Gronchi before you and the many others who are represented around this table. And I value what each of you has been able to contribute in terms of your experience and background and judgment with regard to the great issues with which the world is confronted.

Speaking quite candidly, Mr. President, it is

true that the United States in the free world is the strongest of the free nations. It is true that we are the richest of the free nations. But I would be the last to claim that the United States had a monopoly on brains and wisdom in the free nations.

And so I do not visualize an era in which the leader of the United States, with his advisers, alone makes the great decisions that determine the future of Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America; but I envision an era in which the leader of the United States talking with, consulting with, getting the best advice of the other leaders in our great alliance, will develop the decisions that will serve our common purpose.

And so, Mr. President, I ask all of your guests tonight to rise and raise their glasses with me, not only to Italian-American friendship but to the Western civilization which we share together and to the good health of the President of this Republic and what he symbolizes in terms of world leadership and cooperation with the United States in the years ahead.

Exchange of Remarks on Departure, Ciampino Military Airport, February 28

White House press release (Rome, Italy) dated February 28

President Nixon

Mr. Prime Minister and Your Excellencies: As we leave Rome I want you to know how deeply grateful I am for the hospitality that has been extended to us on our visit and how reassured I am by our conversations, Mr. President, with you and with the members of your Government with regard to the future relations between the United States and Italy and also with regard to the great possibilities for constructive mutual action on the part of both of our peoples for the cause of peace in the years ahead.

We discussed the whole range of world problems—the problems of East-West relations, the problems of the Mideast and Mediterranean, financial problems, and trade problems, as well as many others.

It has been very helpful to me to get the counsel and the suggestions that you and the members of your Government have with regard to the position the United States should take on these problems, as well as getting your views on our bilateral relationships.

I realized, before I came to this city, that there had been complaints in the past that there has not been enough consultation by the Government of the United States with your Government on

matters that involve our future peace and security.

Whatever the validity of that complaint may have been in the past, I can assure you that there will be no problem in that respect in the future, because we have established, by this meeting: one, consultation on all the major issues with which we are concerned; and second, a pattern for conferences in the future involving our finance ministers, our trade ministers, the Prime Minister, the President, whereby on a continuing and regular basis we will discuss the major issues and be sure that we move together toward our common objectives.

As always on my visits to Rome, the climate has been good, the hospitality has been superb, but most important, the substance has been solid and we have now developed a new pattern of consultation and progress for the future.

*President Saragat*⁵

Mr. President, as you are leaving Italy, it gives me great pleasure to convey to you the very warmest farewell of the Italian people, of the people, of the Government, as well as my own. We are aware of the importance and the significance of your visit to Europe undertaken at the beginning of your mandate—which confirms the common ideals and objectives of freedom and peace binding the United States to the free countries of Europe.

Your visit to our country in particular has once again shown the firmness of the ties of friendship which have for long united the United States and Italy in every field and which are at the basis of our alliance, which remains an essential point of reference of Italian foreign policy.

Moreover, you have been able to realize, Mr. President, that another fundamental basis of this foreign policy is the untiring activity of the Italian Government in the construction of that European unity which will consent to Europe itself, to undertake a more decisive and determining role in the solutions of those problems which harass mankind.

Your visit has also emphasized the importance of ever-closer cooperation between friendly countries and allies so as to strengthen and consolidate that Western solidarity which is one of the fundamental conditions for the enhancement and the acceleration of a pursuit of a *détente* policy.

The discussions which you, Mr. President,

⁵ President Saragat spoke in Italian.

propose to hold with the Soviet Union will be a great contribution toward this end, and for the settlement of the problems which trouble the life of the people, and for the construction of a more stable and peaceful international order.

The conversations and the exchange of views which we have had with you and your collaborators represent a further contribution toward our common action which is directed toward reaching ever more effectively the consolidation of peace in freedom and in justice.

This is, in fact, our first objective, for the achievement of which we propose to act, as we have always done, in the conviction that we shall fulfill the highest duty of all those men who are conscious of the future of mankind.

The knowledge that in pursuing this difficult task we can count on the full cooperation of the United States is for us a source of great satisfaction and confidence that all our efforts will bear positive results. It is in the spirit of frankness and friendship that has characterized our meetings that I renew to you, Mr. President, and to the great American nation, our warmest farewell.

I am happy to add my sincerest wish that your important mission will always be accompanied by every success, in the interest of the American people and the people of the friendly countries, and of peace in the world.

THE VISIT TO PARIS

Exchange of Remarks on Arrival, Orly Airport, February 28

*President de Gaulle*⁶

Mr. President, we are delighted to have you visit Paris. It is indeed a visit which in your person the United States of America is cordially paying to France.

For, in the last 200 years, during which everything happened, nothing has ever been able to make our country cease to feel the friend of yours. Moreover, you are coming to see us in order that we may define for you our thoughts and our intentions regarding world affairs, and in order that you may enlighten us as to your own views and plans. How could we not attribute the greatest interest and the utmost importance to these exchanges!

⁶ Translation from French furnished by the French Embassy.

Lastly, Mr. President, it is you whom we are welcoming. Allow me to tell you that it is a joy and an honor for us, due to the great esteem that our nation has for the statesman your country has just placed at its head—an esteem to which, on my side, is added, for you, an already tried friendship.

Long live the United States of America.

President Nixon

White House press release (Paris, France) dated February 28

Mr. President, Your Excellencies: It is a great honor for me to stand here on the soil of the nation that is America's oldest ally and America's oldest friend.

Mr. President, you have spoken eloquently of the relationship that our two countries have had over 200 years. I come here at the conclusion of my European journey for the purpose of underlining our dedication to that relationship and for the purpose of finding those areas in which we can continue to work together in the future.

The problems of the world in which we live are too difficult to repeat the old slogans or discuss the old quarrels. What we seek is to find those new roads which will lead to cooperation and to peace and freedom for all the people of the world.

It is in that spirit that I look forward to the discussions that I shall have with you, Mr. President, and with the members of your Government.

Speaking in a personal sense, I look forward to the opportunity to receive from you your judgment, your counsel, not only on the relations between our two countries but even more on the great problems that divide the world, and your judgment as to how the United States can best fill its role in helping to solve those problems.

We have often talked before, and I have always benefited from the wisdom and the experience that you have in such great degree. There has never been a period in the world's history when we need not unilateral decisions on the part of one great power but when we need the very best wisdom that we can find in finding the policies that will save freedom and maintain peace in the world.

If I could be permitted one personal word as an American coming to France again after many previous visits: We have known this nation as a brave ally in time of war and as a loyal companion in searching the ways of peace. But everyone who has had the privilege of knowing this nation from visiting it, as I have

on many occasions, would share the sentiment expressed by Benjamin Franklin years ago when he said that every American has two homes, France and his own.

It is in that sentiment, Mr. President, that deep from my heart I say, *Vive la France*.

Exchange of Toasts at a Dinner in Honor of President Nixon, February 28

*President de Gaulle*⁷

Mr. President, you did very well to come, at all events, it will have been very pleasant and very useful for us. But it so happens that, at this very moment, the tremendous change accomplished by our universe in one generation and those that undoubtedly await it urgently engage the responsibility of the states once each one of them intends to assume its own responsibility. It happens, also, that this is especially true for America, due to the present extent of its power and to the fact that, alone of all the major nations, it has emerged from the two terrible World Wars without major wounds. So, nothing is more natural and more satisfactory than the visits you are paying to several European capitals and, notably, to Paris.

So here you are in the process of exchanging your views with ours in order to serve what we want, you and we, I mean progress and peace. This is being done—is it not true?—in the frankest manner. But that is indeed the manner which is necessary between two countries naturally different in their situation, size, and interests, but which are ever drawn together by a two-centuries-old friendship, as well as by the profound community of a certain human ideal whose flame has often spread more light and warmth in both our countries than anywhere else on our earth.

This means that France, for her part, thanks you warmly for being here.

I raise my glass in honor of Mr. Richard Nixon, President of the United States of America, in honor of the dignitaries accompanying him, in honor of their country, which is always dear to the heart of ours.

President Nixon

White House press release (Paris, France) dated February 28

Mr. President, on behalf of all of us who are your guests this evening, I express my deep appreciation for your very gracious hospitality and for your eloquent remarks.

As I stand here in this place of honor in this magnificent room in the presence of this company, I realize that I stand here at a time in history which will long be remembered. I realize that it was just a few years ago that you entertained another American President, a young man against whom I had run for office and one who came here and sat in the office that I now occupy. We were members of different parties. We disagreed on some issues. But we were completely agreed on what was important.

We were completely agreed, for example, in the importance of French-American friendship. And we were completely agreed in our dedication to the ideals, the ideals which your country stands for, the ideals that we share with you: ideals of freedom, of equality, of peace and justice for all nations.

And so I speak not just for myself, or for my party, but for the whole American people when I salute you, Mr. President, and your people and when I say with regard to you that with reference to the fact that the United States is a powerful nation militarily and rich economically, we also recognize that there are other sources of great leadership. And that greatness of leadership can be seen in the character of a great man.

That character can be measured in three ways: the quality of courage, the quality of the ability to convince others of their point of view, and the quality of being able to bring a nation back after that nation has fallen on difficult days.

Mr. President, your life has been an example to millions of European countrymen and to millions throughout the world—an epic of courage, an epic also of leadership seldom equaled in the history of the world, leadership which now has brought this great nation to the rightful place that it should have in the family of nations.

And then there is one other quality we have found always in our visits with you and which we seek now and are finding now, and that is the quality of wisdom and vision—the vision that sees beyond the crisis of the moment, that sees the great forces that are at play in the world and therefore is able to have the perspective that leaders need to make the right decisions, the decisions that will stand well in history and not just in the headlines of tomorrow.

And so I ask all of you to raise your glasses

⁷ Translation from French furnished by the French Embassy.

to a nation and a people with whom the United States has had the longest uninterrupted friendship—200 years—of any nation in the world and to a leader who has become a giant among men because he had courage, because he had vision, and because he had the wisdom that the world now seeks to solve its difficult problems.

Exchange of Toasts at a Dinner in Honor of President de Gaulle, March 1

President Nixon

White House press release (Paris, France) dated March 1

Mr. President and Madame de Gaulle and Your Excellencies: It is a very great honor for us to have here in the American Embassy Residence the President of the French Republic and Madame de Gaulle and the other representatives of the French Government.

On this occasion we would remind the President that we have tried to expose him as much as possible to the products of our country. He will have observed that during the course of the evening we have had several evidences of that type.

For example, we have an American Air Force jazz combo which flew in from Wiesbaden for the occasion. And on the menu tonight we had cheese from Wisconsin, asparagus from California, and beef from Kansas City. But there was one very unusual combination: For the first time I have seen on one plate together plain American baked potato and Russian caviar. There may be some significance in the fact that it took a French chef to bring the two together.

Mr. President, we are deeply grateful for the hospitality that you have extended to all of our party—to the Secretary of State and to me and to the rest of us on this occasion. We are deeply grateful, too, in a broader sense, for the very warm welcome that we have received from the French people.

Before I came to this country I had been reading accounts in our press to the effect that there was an anti-American sentiment among the French people. If ever the answer was needed, we saw it in the faces of thousands of French people in the last 2 days.

But most of all, we are in your debt for a gift which is the most precious: the gift of your time. The hours that we have spent together in which we have discussed the great problems that we face together in the world have been most helpful to all of us, and we shall

always be grateful for the time you have given to that cause.

So, tonight, I feel that this marks, in a sense, the end of one journey and the beginning of another one—the end of a journey that has taken us in a very brief time to the major capitals of Europe and the beginning of another journey, another journey in which our two people will be going forward together toward the same destination, sometimes on different roads, but always in the same direction and motivated by the same ideas and purposes.

I look forward, Mr. President, with great anticipation to working with you and with your country and with your Government for the cause to which you have dedicated your life: the cause of freedom and dignity for nations and for men and for peace and brotherhood for all people.

I ask you to rise and raise your glasses to French-American friendship and to President and Madame de Gaulle.

*President de Gaulle*⁸

Mr. President, if it is not quite true that one learns at every age, it is true that at every age one can see what one knows be confirmed. In thanking you, on behalf of my wife, myself, and all those who accompany us, for your very gracious hospitality, allow me to tell you what has happened to me personally on the occasion of your visit. Yesterday we were saying publicly that the world is undergoing far-reaching changes. But I have been able to note once again, as I have already noted on several memorable occasions throughout my life, that there is one thing that never changes—our French-American friendship.

I have always noted that, when will exists, however difficult the problems that arise before you and before us, Americans and French, we can settle them not only in a climate of frankness and cordiality, but also of mutual confidence.

Another thing that I have been able to confirm, thanks to your visit, is the very deep consideration that I have for you. As I am learning to know you better—and by this visit you have given me that opportunity which I consider historic—I appreciate more the statesman and the man that you are.

⁸Translation from French furnished by the French Embassy.

**Exchange of Remarks on Departure,
Orly Airport, March 2**

President Nixon

White House press release (Paris, France) dated March 2

Mr. President, I want to express on behalf of all the members of our party our deep gratitude again for the great hospitality you have extended to us and that we have received from the French people.

On this occasion, as I leave this country and go back to Rome, I am very pleased to announce that President de Gaulle has accepted an invitation to visit the United States. He will visit Washington sometime in January or February at a time that is mutually convenient for our two schedules.

We look forward to seeing him there. Again, I am delighted that he was able to work this visit into his schedule.

*President de Gaulle*⁹

Mr. President, we are delighted to have had your visit. It is a success, I think, for our two countries, and it is a success for yourself, and we are all pleased by that success.

So, if you wish, until next year.

**EXCHANGE OF REMARKS WITH POPE PAUL VI,
VATICAN CITY, MARCH 2**

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents

Pope Paul VI

Mr. President, we are very happy and deeply grateful, too, that your courtesy has made this visit possible at the close of your strenuous working journey through Europe.

In the past we have already had the honor of visits from you, but now you come to us in another capacity, with the heavy responsibilities of the President of the United States of America.

It is as such that we greet you, giving expression immediately to a warm and spontaneous wish: May you in your administration experience the deep satisfaction of making a real contribution to the total cessation of those conflicts now unfortunately in progress, and of putting an even more effective stop to the outbreak of new armed struggles, by following the sure way toward a lasting peace and promoting

⁹Translation from French furnished by the French Embassy.

true prosperity by means of a widely based and fruitful understanding.

This is the mission which your great nation, Mr. President, along with the other members of the international community, is called upon to fulfill: a mission of peace, a mission of noble-hearted collaboration with all peoples, and particularly with the developing peoples, in mutual esteem, with respect for the fundamental freedoms of men and of nations, and in the promotion of genuine human values.

All peoples are closely bound together, now more than ever before, in a common destiny: the great worldwide effort to build on solid foundations the earthly city in which each individual lives and works.

An exalting and difficult task, this—it is one that calls for foresight, in order that while uncovering the immensity of mankind's needs, it may also realize the no less immense possibilities offered today, especially by science and technology employed in the service of man.

It is also a task that requires good, constructive, and generous ideas, noble desires, moral energy, a clear vision of reality, firm decision, courage to make choices, and persevering constancy in the way that is chosen.

It is therefore a task which has need of an assistance that cannot be physically measured, yet is absolutely indispensable; for "Unless the Lord builds the house, those who build it will labor in vain," Psalm 126: 1.

To construct this earthly city in unity, prosperity, wisdom, and concord, the Catholic Church, inspired by the Gospel message, will unfailingly continue to offer her disinterested and active contribution of moral energy and support.

That the serene vision of peace may ever shine in your mind and heart, Mr. President, to inspire and sustain your valiant efforts, our repeated good wishes go with you, and our heartfelt prayer accompanies you, as we invoke upon you and upon the people of the United States of America, who are so dear to us, abundant divine blessings.

President Nixon

Your Holiness, we are most honored to hear those eloquent words in behalf of our country. And I express my personal appreciation for the time that I have had to talk with you about some of the great issues which divide the world, but issues which, with leadership both by the temporal leaders and the spiritual leaders of

the world, we may be able to resolve—and resolve them in an atmosphere of peace.

We all remember in the United States your visit, and we remember your coming to the United Nations and your appearance before thousands of Americans in Yankee Stadium and millions on television. It left a memory that we will always carry very close to our hearts. We know, as we sit here and consider the difficult and material problems that we will have to deal with when we return to our own country, that what the world needs today is the spiritual and moral leadership which Your Holiness has stood for—stood for here in the Vatican and in your arduous travels to other nations in the world.

Your words have inspired us. The fact that we have your prayers will sustain us in the years ahead. We are confident that as we move forward we shall be able to find those answers that will bring the world to which you have dedicated your life—that world which will be one of peace and also one of freedom and justice for all people.

ARRIVAL CEREMONY, ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE, MARCH 2

White House press release dated March 2

Vice President Agnew

Mr. President, it is a distinct honor to welcome you back from a very successful trip on behalf of all of your fellow countrymen.

You have carried the real message of America to our friends on the European Continent and in Great Britain. I think the success of your trip is borne out by the warmth of the reception you received, not just from the foreign dignitaries but from people of all types in every country you visited.

Mr. President, you listened—you listened not just to respond to what was said to you—but you listened to learn, and this came through very graphically to the people who saw you and heard you.

It has been a great privilege for America to have you there. I think that we see a new maturity in American diplomacy coming into being because of your ability to listen and to show compassion and understanding of other peoples. The prayers of literally millions of Americans have been answered by your safe return. We are delighted to have you back.

President Nixon

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, all of the distinguished Members of the House, the Senate, and the Cabinet who have come to the airport today: Over the past week we have had some splendid receptions in the great capitals of Europe, but I can assure you that none means more than to have such a warm welcome on such a cold night as we return to Washington, D.C.

I am most grateful for your words, which were so generous.

I can only respond at this time by giving you one overall impression of this trip. Later in the week I will be meeting the press and responding in greater detail.

That one impression is, I think, summed up by the word "trust." I sensed as I traveled to the capitals of Europe that there is a new trust on the part of the Europeans in themselves, growing out of the fact that they have had a remarkable recovery economically and politically, as well as in their military strength, since the devastation of World War II.

Also, I think I sensed a new trust in the United States, growing out of the fact that they feel that there are open channels of communication with the United States, and a new sense of consultation with the United States.

Finally, I think there is developing a new trust in the future, not only on the part of the people of Europe and their leaders but on the part of the people of the United States—confidence based on the fact that together we are going to be able to develop some new understandings with those who in the past have opposed us on the other side of the world.

I would not want this opportunity to pass without mentioning that while this was a working trip, with most of it devoted to conferences and very few public appearances, there were times as I rode through the streets of the great capitals of Europe that I felt that the American people, all of the American people, in the person of their President, were being greeted by the people of Europe.

If you could have been with me as I rode through the streets of Berlin on a snowy, cold day and had seen the thousands of happy and hopeful faces in those crowds on the streets, you would have been proud that America did meet her world responsibilities and has met her world responsibilities in helping others defend their freedom. You would have been proud to be an American at this time in our history.

Thank you very much.

U.S. Extends Condolences on Death of Prime Minister Eshkol of Israel

Prime Minister Levi Eshkol of the State of Israel died February 26. Following are texts of messages sent that day by President Nixon to President Zalmar Shazar of Israel and by Acting Secretary Elliot L. Richardson to Abba Eban, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Message From President Nixon to President Shazar

White House press release dated February 27

All Americans join me in sending you and the people of Israel our deepest sympathy for your tragic loss. Levi Eshkol was a man of great compassion and a true servant of his people. We shall all be the poorer for his passing.

Message From Acting Secretary Richardson to Foreign Minister Eban

The American people have been profoundly moved by news of the death of Prime Minister Levi Eshkol. He was well known to us as a defender of freedom. I express sincere condolences on my personal behalf as well as on behalf of my colleagues.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

North Atlantic Treaty—Military Headquarters

Agreement regarding status of personnel of sending states attached to an International Military Headquarters of NATO in the Federal Republic of Germany. Done at Bonn February 7, 1969. Enters into force 30 days after the date on which the Federal Republic of Germany and at least one other signatory state have deposited their instruments of ratification or approval, but not before the protocol has entered into force for the Federal Republic of Germany.

Signatures: Belgium, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and United States, February 7, 1969.

Agreement regarding the making available by armed forces of the United Kingdom and the United States, of accommodation to International Military Headquarters of NATO in the Federal Republic of Ger-

many. Done at Bonn February 7, 1969. Enters into force 30 days after the Federal Republic of Germany and one other signatory state have deposited their instruments of ratification or approval, but not before entry into force of the protocol for the Federal Republic of Germany.

Signatures: Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom, United States, February 7, 1969.

Property

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967.¹

Ratification deposited: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (with a declaration), February 12, 1969.

Refugees

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York January 31, 1967. Entered into force October 4, 1967; for the United States November 1, 1968. TIAS 6577.

Accession deposited: Botswana (with reservations), January 6, 1969.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a global commercial communications satellite system. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.

Accession deposited: Guatemala, March 7, 1969.

Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.

Signature: Empresa Guatemalteca de Telecomunicaciones Internacionales for Guatemala, March 7, 1969.

Space

Treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. Opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow January 27, 1967. Entered into force October 10, 1967. TIAS 6347.

Ratification deposited at Washington: Brazil, March 5, 1969.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement concerning the special operating program for Canadian storage pursuant to the Columbia River Basin treaty of January 17, 1961 (TIAS 5638). Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa December 30, 1968, and February 26, 1969. Entered into force February 26, 1969, effective April 1, 1968.

Czechoslovakia

Air transport agreement. Signed at Praha January 3, 1946. Entered into force June 17, 1946. TIAS 1560. *Terminated:* February 28, 1969.

Air transport agreement, with schedule. Signed at Prague February 28, 1969. Entered into force February 28, 1969.

Korea

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreements of March 25, 1967 (TIAS 6272), and October 23, 1968 (TIAS 5695). Signed at Seoul February 26, 1969. Entered into force February 26, 1969.

¹ Not in force.

Belgium. President Nixon Makes 8-Day Visit to Western Europe (exchanges of remarks with King Baudouin; remarks before NATO Council) 249

China. President Nixon's News Conference of March 4 237

Disarmament. President Nixon's News Conference of March 4 237

Europe. President Nixon's News Conference of March 4 237

France
 President Nixon Makes 8-Day Visit to Western Europe (exchanges of remarks with President de Gaulle) 267
 President Nixon's News Conference of March 4 237
 Soviet Charges Concerning Berlin Rejected by U.S., U.K., and France (tripartite statement, White House announcement) 248

Germany
 President Nixon Makes 8-Day Visit to Western Europe (remarks on various occasions; exchanges of remarks with Mayor Schütz of Berlin) 257
 President Nixon's News Conference of March 4 237
 Soviet Charges Concerning Berlin Rejected by U.S., U.K., and France (tripartite statement, White House announcement) 248

Israel. U.S. Extends Condolences on Death of Prime Minister Eshkol of Israel (Nixon, Richardson) 272

Italy. President Nixon Makes 8-Day Visit to Western Europe (exchanges of remarks with President Saragat) 262

Latin America. President Nixon's News Conference of March 4 237

Near East. President Nixon's News Conference of March 4 237

North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 President Nixon Makes 8-Day Visit to Western Europe (remarks before NATO Council, Brussels) 250
 President Nixon's News Conference of March 4 237

Peru. President Nixon's News Conference of March 4 237

Presidential Documents
 President Nixon Makes 8-Day Visit to Western Europe (remarks on various occasions) 249
 President Nixon's News Conference of March 4 237
 U.S. Extends Condolences on Death of Prime Minister Eshkol of Israel 272

Trade. President Nixon's News Conference of March 4 237

Treaty Information. Current Actions 272

U.S.S.R.
 President Nixon's News Conference of March 4 237
 Soviet Charges Concerning Berlin Rejected by U.S., U.K., and France (tripartite statement, White House announcement) 248

United Kingdom
 President Nixon Makes 8-Day Visit to Western Europe (exchanges of remarks with Prime Minister Wilson) 253
 Soviet Charges Concerning Berlin Rejected by U.S., U.K., and France (tripartite statement, White House announcement) 248

Vatican City. President Nixon Makes 8-Day Visit to Western Europe (exchange of remarks with Pope Paul VI) 270

Viet-Nam
 President Nixon's News Conference of March 4 237
 Seventh Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris (Lodge) 247
 U.S. Condemns Rocket Attacks on South Vietnamese Cities (Rogers) 247

Name Index

Agnew, Vice President 271
 King Baudouin 249
 De Gaulle, Charles 267
 Lodge, Henry Cabot 247
 Nixon, President 237, 249, 272
 Pope Paul VI 270
 Richardson, Elliot L 272
 Rogers, Secretary 247
 Saragat, Giuseppe 262
 Schütz, Klaus 258
 Wilson, Harold 253

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: March 3-9

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
†50	3/3	Arbitration panel issues report on Brazilian soluble coffee exports.
51	3/6	Lodge: seventh plenary session on Viet-Nam at Paris.
*52	3/7	Guatemala becomes 68th member of global commercial communications satellite system.

*Not printed.
 †Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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**THE
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Vol. LX, No. 1553



March 31, 1969

PRESIDENT NIXON MODIFIES BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

Text of Statement 273

PRESIDENT NIXON'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF MARCH 14 (*Excerpts*) 275

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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March 31, 1969

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

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President Nixon Modifies Ballistic Missile Defense System

Statement by President Nixon¹

Immediately after assuming office, I requested the Secretary of Defense to review the program initiated by the last administration to deploy the Sentinel ballistic missile defense system.

The Department of Defense presented a full statement of the alternatives at the last two meetings of the National Security Council. These alternatives were reviewed there in the light of the security requirements of the United States and of their probable impact on East-West relations, with particular reference to the prospects for strategic arms negotiations.

After carefully considering the alternatives, I have reached the following conclusions: (1) the concept on which the Sentinel program of the previous administration was based should be substantially modified; (2) the safety of our country requires that we should proceed now with the development and construction of the new system in a carefully phased program; (3) this program will be reviewed annually from the point of view of (a) technical developments, (b) the threat, (c) the diplomatic context, including any talks on arms limitation.

The modified system has been designed so that its defensive intent is unmistakable. It will be implemented not according to some fixed, theoretical schedule but in a manner clearly related to our periodic analysis of the threat. The first deployment covers two missile sites; the first of these will not be completed before 1973. Any further delay would set this date back by at least 2 additional years. The program for fiscal year 1970 is the minimum necessary to maintain the security of our nation.

This measured deployment is designed to fulfill three objectives:

1. Protection of our land-based retaliatory forces against a direct attack by the Soviet Union;

2. Defense of the American people against the kind of nuclear attack which Communist China is likely to be able to mount within the decade;

3. Protection against the possibility of accidental attacks from any source.

In the review leading up to this decision, we considered three possible options in addition to this program: A deployment which would attempt to defend U.S. cities against an attack by the Soviet Union; a continuation of the Sentinel program approved by the previous administration; an indefinite postponement of deployment while continuing research and development.

I rejected these options for the following reasons:

Although every instinct motivates me to provide the American people with complete protection against a major nuclear attack, it is not now within our power to do so. The heaviest defense system we considered, one designed to protect our major cities, still could not prevent a catastrophic level of U.S. fatalities from a deliberate all-out Soviet attack. And it might look to an opponent like the prelude to an offensive strategy threatening the Soviet deterrent.

The Sentinel system approved by the previous administration provided more capabilities for the defense of cities than the program I am recommending, but it did not provide protection against some threats to our retaliatory forces which have developed subsequently. Also, the Sentinel system had the disadvantage that it could be misinterpreted as the first step toward the construction of a heavy system.

Giving up all construction of missile defense poses too many risks. Research and development does not supply the answer to many technical issues that only operational experience can

¹ Issued on Mar. 14 (White House press release).

provide. The Soviet Union has engaged in a buildup of its strategic forces larger than was envisaged in 1967, when the decision to deploy Sentinel was made. The following is illustrative of recent Soviet activity:

1. The Soviets have already deployed an ABM [anti-ballistic-missile] system which protects to some degree a wide area centered around Moscow. We will not have a comparable capability for over 4 years. We believe the Soviet Union is continuing their ABM development, directed either toward improving this initial system or, more likely, making substantially better second-generation ABM components.

2. The Soviet Union is continuing the deployment of very large missiles with warheads capable of destroying our hardened Minuteman forces.

3. The Soviet Union has also been substantially increasing the size of their submarine-launched ballistic missile force.

4. The Soviets appear to be developing a senior orbital nuclear weapon system.

In addition to these developments, the Chinese threat against our population, as well as the danger of an accidental attack, cannot be ignored. By approving this system, it is possible to reduce U.S. fatalities to a minimal level in the event of a Chinese nuclear attack in the 1970's, or in an accidental attack from any source. No President with the responsibility for the lives and security of the American people could fail to provide this protection.

The gravest responsibility which I bear as President of the United States is for the security of the Nation. Our nuclear forces defend not only ourselves but our allies as well. The imperative that our nuclear deterrent remain secure beyond any possible doubt requires that the United States must take steps now to insure that our strategic retaliatory forces will not become vulnerable to a Soviet attack.

Modern technology provides several choices in seeking to insure the survival of our retaliatory forces.

First, we could increase the number of sea- and land-based missiles and bombers. I have ruled out this course because it provides only marginal improvement of our deterrent, while it could be misinterpreted by the Soviets as an attempt to threaten their deterrent. It would therefore stimulate an arms race.

A second option is to harden further our ballistic missile forces by putting them in more strongly reinforced underground silos. But our

studies show that hardening by itself is not adequate protection against foreseeable advances in the accuracy of Soviet offensive forces.

The third option was to begin a measured construction on an active defense of our retaliatory forces.

I have chosen the third option.

The system will use components previously developed for the Sentinel system. However, the deployment will be changed to reflect the new concept. We will provide for local defense of selected Minuteman missile sites and an area defense designed to protect our bomber bases and our command and control authorities. In addition, this new system will provide a defense of the continental United States against an accidental attack and will provide substantial protection against the kind of attack which the Chinese Communists may be capable of launching throughout the 1970's. This deployment will not require us to place missile and radar sites close to our major cities.

The present estimate is that the total cost of installing this system will be \$6-\$7 billion. However, because of the deliberate pace of the deployment, budgetary requests for the coming year can be substantially less—by about one-half—than those asked for by the previous administration for the Sentinel system.

In making this decision, I have been mindful of my pledge to make every effort to move from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation. The program I am recommending is based on a careful assessment of the developing Soviet and Chinese threats. I have directed the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board—a non-partisan group of distinguished private citizens—to make a yearly assessment of the threat, which will supplement our regular intelligence assessment. Each phase of the deployment will be reviewed to insure that we are doing as much as necessary but no more than that required by the threat existing at that time. Moreover, we will take maximum advantage of the information gathered from the initial deployment in designing the later phases of the program.

Since our deployment is to be closely related to the threat, it is subject to modification as the threat changes, either through negotiations or through unilateral actions by the Soviet Union or Communist China.

The program is not provocative. The Soviet retaliatory capability is not affected by our decision. The capability for surprise attack against our strategic forces is reduced. In other words, our program provides an incentive for a

responsible Soviet weapons policy and for the avoidance of spiraling U.S. and Soviet strategic arms budgets.

I have taken cognizance of the view that beginning construction of a U.S. ballistic missile defense would complicate an agreement on strategic arms with the Soviet Union.

I do not believe that the evidence of the recent past bears out this contention. The Soviet interest in strategic talks was not deterred by the decision of the previous administration to deploy the Sentinel ABM system—in fact, it was formally announced shortly afterward. I believe that the modifications we have made in the previous program will give the Soviet Union even less reason to view our defense effort as an obstacle to talks. Moreover, I wish to emphasize that in any arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union, the United States will be fully prepared to discuss limitations on defensive as well as offensive weapons systems.

The question of ABM involves a complex combination of many factors:

—numerous, highly technical, often conflicting judgments;

—the costs;

—the relationship to prospects for reaching an agreement on limiting nuclear arms;

—the moral implications the deployment of a ballistic missile defense system has for many Americans;

—the impact of the decision on the security of the United States in this perilous age of nuclear arms.

I have weighed all these factors. I am deeply sympathetic to the concerns of private citizens and Members of Congress that we do only that which is necessary for national security. This is why I am recommending a minimum program essential for our security. It is my duty as President to make certain that we do no less.

President Nixon's News Conference of March 14

Following are excerpts from the transcript of a news conference held by President Nixon in the East Room of the White House on March 14.

OPENING STATEMENT

Ladies and gentlemen, today I am announcing a decision which I believe is vital for the security and defense of the United States, and also in the interest of peace throughout the world.

Last year a program, the Sentinel anti-ballistic-missile program, was adopted. That program, as all listeners on television and radio and readers of newspapers know, has been the subject of very strong debate and controversy over the past few months.

After long study of all of the options available, I have concluded that the Sentinel program previously adopted should be substantially modified. The new program that I have recommended this morning to the leaders, and that I announce today, is one that perhaps best can be described as a safeguard program.

It is a safeguard against any attack by the

Chinese Communists that we can foresee over the next 10 years.

It is a safeguard of our deterrent system, which is increasingly vulnerable due to the advances that have been made by the Soviet Union since the year 1967, when the Sentinel program was first laid out.

It is a safeguard also against any irrational or accidental attack that might occur of less than massive magnitude which might be launched from the Soviet Union.

The program also does *not* do some things, which should be clearly understood. It does not provide defense for our cities, and for that reason the sites have been moved away from our major cities. I have made the decision with regard to this particular point because I found that there is no way, even if we were to expand the limited Sentinel system which was planned for some of our cities to a so-called heavy, or thick, system—there is no way that we can adequately defend our cities, without an unacceptable loss of life.

The only way that I have concluded that we can save lives—which is the primary purpose of

our defense system—is to prevent war; and that is why the emphasis of this system is on protecting our deterrent, which is the best preventive for war.

The system differs from the previous Sentinel system in another major respect. The Sentinel system called for a fixed deployment schedule. I believe that because of a number of reasons we should have a phase system. That is why, on an annual basis, the new safeguard system will be reviewed, and the review may bring about changes in the system based on our evaluation of three major points:

First, what our intelligence shows us with regard to the magnitude of the threat, whether from the Soviet Union or from the Chinese; and

Second, in terms of what our evaluation is of any talks that we are having by that time, or may be having, with regard to arms control; and

Finally, because we believe that since this is a new system, we should constantly examine what progress has been made in the development of the technique to see if changes in the system should be made.

I should admit at this point that this decision has not been an easy one. None of the great decisions made by a President are easy. But it is one that I have made after considering all of the options; and I would indicate, before going to your questions, two major options that I have overruled.

One is moving to a massive city defense. I have already indicated why I do not believe that is, first, feasible—and there is another reason: Moving to a massive city defense system, even starting with a thin system and then going to a heavy system, tends to be more provocative in terms of making credible a first-strike capability against the Soviet Union. I want no provocation which might deter arms talks.

The other alternative, at the other extreme, was to do nothing; or to delay for 6 or 12 months, which would be the equivalent, really, of doing nothing; or, for example, going the road only of research and development.

I have examined those options. I have ruled them out because I have concluded that the first deployment of this system, which will not occur until 1973—that that first deployment is essential by that date if we are to meet the threat that our present intelligence indicates will exist by 1973.

In other words, we must begin now. If we delay a year, for example, it means that that first

deployment will be delayed until 1975. That might be too late.

It is the responsibility of the President of the United States, above all other responsibilities, to think first of the security of the United States. I believe that this system is the best step that we can take to provide for that security.

There are, of course, other possibilities that have been strongly urged by some of the leaders this morning: for example, that we could increase our offensive capability, our submarine force, or even our Minuteman force or our bomber force. That I would consider to be, however, the wrong road because it would be provocative to the Soviet Union and might escalate an arms race.

This system is truly a safeguard system, a defensive system only. It safeguards our deterrent and under those circumstances can in no way, in my opinion, delay the progress which I hope will continue to be made toward arms talks, which will limit arms, not only this kind of system but particularly offensive systems.

We will now go to your questions.

Mr. Smith [Merriman Smith, United Press International]?

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. Mr. President, the war in Viet-Nam has been intensifying recently; and if there has been any notable progress in Paris, it has not been detectable publicly. Is your patience growing a little thin with these continued attacks, particularly such as came out of the DMZ [demilitarized zone] today?

The President: Mr. Smith, you may recall that on March 4, when I received a similar question at an earlier stage of the attacks, I issued what was interpreted widely as a warning.¹ It will be my policy as President to issue a warning only once, and I will not repeat it now. Anything in the future that is done will be done. There will be no additional warning.

As far as the Paris talks are concerned, I have noted the speculation in the press with regard to whether we will have or should have or are, for example, approving private talks going forward. I will not discuss that subject. I trust there will be private talks.

¹ For the transcript of President Nixon's news conference of Mar. 4, see BULLETIN of Mar. 24, 1969, p. 237.

I think that is where this war will be settled—in private rather than in public. This is in the best interest of both sides; but public discussion of what I think is significant progress which is being made along the lines of private talks, I will not indulge in.

Q. Mr. President, there has been a great deal of criticism in Congress against deployment of any type of antimissile defense system. What kind of reception do you think your proposal this morning will receive there?

The President: It will be a very spirited debate, and it will be a very close vote. Debates in the field of national defense are often spirited, and the votes are often close. Many of my friends in Congress who were there before I was there remarked that the vote on extending the draft in 1941 won by only one vote.

This might be that close. I think, however, that after the Members of the House and the Senate consider this program, which is a minimum program—and which particularly provides options to change in other directions if we find the threat is changed or that the art has changed, our evaluation of the technique has changed—I think that we have a good chance of getting approval. We will, of course, express our views, and we hope that we will get support from the country.

Protection of Minuteman Sites

Q. Mr. President, I understand that your first construction or deployment of antimissile systems would be around two Minuteman retaliatory operations. Do you think that deploying around these two provides enough deterrent that would be effective?

The President: Let me explain the difference between deploying around two Minuteman bases and deploying around, say, 10 cities.

Where you are looking toward a city defense, it needs to be a perfect or near perfect system to be credible because, as I examined the possibility of even a thick defense of cities, I found that even the most optimistic projections, considering the highest development of the art, would mean that we would still lose 30 million to 40 million lives. That would be less—half of what we would otherwise lose. But we would still lose 30 million to 40 million.

When you are talking about protecting your

deterrent, it need not be perfect. It is necessary only to protect enough of the deterrent that the retaliatory second strike will be of such magnitude that the enemy would think twice before launching a first strike.

It has been my conclusion that by protecting two Minuteman sites, we will preserve that deterrent as a credible deterrent and that that will be decisive and could be decisive insofar as the enemy considering the possibility of a first strike.

Response to North Vietnamese Offensive

Q. Mr. President, there have been charges from Capitol Hill that you have stepped up the war in Viet-Nam. Have you?

The President: I have not stepped up the war in Viet-Nam. I actually have examined not only the charges, but also examined the record. I discussed it at great length yesterday with Secretary [of Defense Melvin R.] Laird.

What has happened is this: For the past 6 months, the forces on the other side have been planning for an offensive; and for the past 6 months they not only have planned for an offensive, but they have been able, as a result of that planning, to have mounted a rather substantial offensive.

Under those circumstances, we had no other choice but to try to blunt the offensive. Had General Abrams [Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Viet-Nam] not responded in this way, we would have suffered far more casualties than we have suffered—and we have suffered more than, of course, any of us would have liked to have seen.

The answer is that any escalation of the war in Viet-Nam has been the responsibility of the enemy. If the enemy deescalates its attacks, ours will go down. We are not trying to step it up. We are trying to do everything that we can in the conduct of our war in Viet-Nam to see that we can go forward toward peace in Paris.

That is why my response has been measured, deliberate, and, some think, too cautious. But it will continue to be that way, because I am thinking of those peace talks every time I think of a military option in Viet-Nam.

Q. Mr. President, last week you said that in the matter of Viet-Nam you would not tolerate heavier casualties and a continuation of the

violation of the understanding without making an appropriate response. Is what we are doing now in Viet-Nam in a military way that response of which you were speaking?

The President: This is a very close decision on our part, one that I not only discussed with Secretary Laird yesterday but that we will discuss more fully in the Security Council tomorrow.

I took no comfort out of the stories that I saw in the papers this morning to the effect that our casualties for the immediate past week went from 400 down to 300. That is still much too high. What our response should be must be measured in terms of the effect on the negotiations in Paris. I will only respond as I did earlier to Mr. Smith's question. We have issued a warning. I will not warn again. If we conclude that the level of casualties is higher than we should tolerate, action will take place.

Soviet Interpretation of ABM Decision

Q. Mr. President, do you have reason to believe that the Russians will interpret your ABM decision today as not being an escalating move in the arms race?

The President: As a matter of fact, Mr. Kaplow [Herbert Kaplow, NBC News], I have reason to believe, based on the past record, that they would interpret it just the other way around.

First, when they deployed their own ABM system—and, as you know, they have 67 missile ABM sites deployed around Moscow—they rejected the idea that it escalated the arms race on the ground that it was defensive solely in character; and second, when the United States last year went forward on the Sentinel system, 4 days later the Soviet Union initiated the opportunity to have arms limitation talks.

I think the Soviet Union recognizes very clearly the difference between a defensive posture and an offensive posture.

I would also point this out—an interesting thing about Soviet military and diplomatic history: They have always thought in defensive terms, and if you read not only their political leaders but their military leaders, the emphasis is on defense.

I think that since this system now, as a result of moving the city defense out of it and the possibility of that city defense growing into a thick defense, I think this makes it so clearly defensive in character that the Soviet Union cannot interpret this as escalating the arms race.

Q. Mr. President, last week at your press conference you mentioned negotiations with the Russians at the highest level being in the wind. Could you tell us if since then we have moved any closer to such a summit meeting?

The President: I should distinguish between negotiations at what you call the highest level—and what I said was the highest level—and talks. Talks with the Soviet Union are going on at a number of levels at this time, on a number of subjects.

However, those talks have not yet reached the point where I have concluded, or where I believe they have concluded, that a discussion at the summit level would be useful. Whenever those talks, preliminary talks, do reach that point, I anticipate that a summit meeting would take place.

I do not think one will take place in the near future, but I think encouraging progress is being made toward the time when a summit talk may take place.

Q. Mr. President, on your recent European trip, did you find any willingness on the part of our allies to increase their military and financial contribution to the alliance?

The President: Well, that matter was discussed with all of our allies, and particularly will be a subject for discussion when we have the 20th anniversary meeting of NATO here in April.

I think it might be potentially embarrassing to allies to suggest that we are urging them, any one specifically, to do one thing or another in this field. I think it is best for me to leave it in these terms:

Our allies do recognize the necessity to maintain NATO's conventional forces. They do recognize that they must carry their share or the United States, and particularly our Congress representing our people, will have much less incentive to carry our share. I believe they will do their share, but I think we are going to do it best through quiet conversation rather than public declaration.

Yes, sir?

Q. In any talks with the Soviet Union, would you be willing to consider abandoning the ABM program altogether if the Soviets showed a similar willingness or, indeed, if they showed a readiness to place limitations on offensive weapons?

The President: Mr. Scali [John Scali, ABC

News], I am prepared, in the event that we go into arms talks, to consider both offensive and defensive weapons. As you know, the arms talks that at least preliminarily have been discussed do not involve limitation or reduction. They involve only freezing where we are.

Your question goes to abandoning. On that particular point, I think it would take two, naturally, to make the agreement. Let's look at the Soviet Union's position with its defensive deployment of ABM's. Previously, that deployment was aimed only toward the United States. Today their radars, from our intelligence, are also directed toward Communist China.

I would imagine that the Soviet Union would be just as reluctant as we would be to leave their country naked against a potential Chinese Communist threat. So the abandoning of the entire system, particularly as long as the Chinese threat is there, I think neither country would look upon with much favor.

Q. Mr. President, do you think the deployment of the ABM system by both the Soviet Union and the United States is compatible with the aims of the NPT [Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons]?

The President: I considered that problem, and I believe that they are compatible with the NPT. We discussed that in the leaders' meeting this morning, and I pointed out that as we consider this kind of defensive system, which enables the United States of America to make its deterrent capability credible, that that will have an enormous effect in reducing the pressure on other countries who might want to acquire nuclear weapons.

That is the key point. If a country doesn't feel that the major country that has a nuclear capability has a credible deterrent, then they would move in that direction.

One other point, I wish to make an announcement with regard to the NPT—I was delighted to see the Senate's confirmation or consent to the treaty—and this announcement: I hope President Johnson is looking; I haven't talked to him on the phone. I am going to invite President Johnson, if his schedule permits, to attend the ceremony when we will have the ratification of the treaty, because he started it in his administration and I think he should participate when we ratify it.

Mr. Semple [Robert B. Semple, Jr., New York Times]?

Q. To follow up Mr. Day's question on Viet-Nam earlier, is there any evidence that your measured response to the enemy attacks in South Viet-Nam has produced or yielded any results in Paris or in the attitudes of the North Vietnamese leaders in Hanoi?

The President: Our measured response has not had the effect of discouraging the progress—and it is very limited progress—toward talks in Paris. That is the negative side, in answering your question.

As to whether or not a different response would either discourage those talks or might have the effect of even encouraging them is the decision that we now have to make.

No Present Prospect for U.S. Troop Withdrawal

Q. Mr. President, on Viet-Nam, in connection with Secretary Laird's visit, we have heard for some time predictions that American troop levels could be cut as the South Vietnamese capabilities improve; and again last week, while he was in Viet-Nam, we were getting similar reports from Saigon, despite the high level of the fighting that is going on now. Do you see any prospect for withdrawing American troops in any numbers soon?

The President: Mr. Bailey [Charles W. Bailey 2d, Minneapolis Star and Tribune], in view of the current offensive on the part of the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, there is no prospect for a reduction of American forces in the foreseeable future.

When we are able to reduce forces as a result of a combination of circumstances—the ability of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves in areas where we now are defending them, the progress of the talks in Paris, or the level of enemy activity—when that occurs, I will make an announcement. But at this time there is no foreseeable prospect.

Mr. Theis [J. William Theis, United Press International]?

Q. What effect, if any, will your safeguard program have on the shelter program? Can you tell us anything about your long-range plans?

The President: Congressman Holifield, in the meeting this morning, strongly urged that the administration look over the shelter program, and he made the point that he thought it had fallen somewhat into disarray due to lack of attention over the past few years.

I have directed that General Lincoln, the

head of the Office of Emergency Preparedness—I had directed him previously to conduct such a survey. We are going to look at the shelter program to see what we can do there in order to minimize American casualties.

Q. Mr. President, if I recall correctly, at the last press conference when you were discussing the meeting with General de Gaulle and the Middle East situation, you said you were encouraged by what he told you, because he was moving closer to our position. I wonder if you can tell us what our position is in the Middle East, and if it has changed significantly in the last year?

The President: We have had bilateral talks, not only with the French but also with the Soviet Union and with the British, preparatory to the possibility of four-power talks. I would not like to leave the impression that we are completely together at this point.

We are closer together than we were, but we still have a lot of yardage to cover. And until we make further progress in developing a common position, I would prefer not to lay out what our position is. I don't think that would be helpful in bringing them to the position that we think is the right position.

The press: Thank you.

Eighth Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris

Following is the opening statement made by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, head of the U.S. delegation, at the eighth plenary session of the new meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on March 13.

Press release 55 dated March 13

Ladies and gentlemen: The United States is determined to search for a just and enduring settlement of the war in Viet-Nam. It is tragic that the conflict continues, when we in this room could help bring it to an end.

Our side has made specific and concrete proposals which we believe could reduce the violence in Viet-Nam and open the road to peace. We have suggested the discussion of mutual withdrawals and the restoration of the demilitarized zone.

Your response has been to reject our proposals. North Vietnamese armed personnel have continued to infiltrate South Viet-Nam in large numbers. In launching a series of attacks across South Viet-Nam, your forces have once again brought suffering and sadness to many innocent Vietnamese. Thousands of families have again been made homeless. Men—and even women and children—are still forced to serve against their will with Viet Cong units.

As you well know, you treat the civilian population as a target. Your troops, therefore, mine highways and railroads. They kill and maim innocent passengers on civilian buses and trains. They assassinate Government officials so as to undermine the Government presence and the local forces, whose purpose it is to keep order. They seek to terrorize the civilian population into submission. For this purpose, they fire mortars and rockets into cities and towns. Your troops fire deliberately from villages and hamlets in order to draw fire upon innocent civilians. On March 10, your forces indiscriminately shelled Hue. Eleven rockets hit Hue, killing two civilians, wounding five more, and destroying four buildings which had no military purpose. All of these are your tactics, not ours.

These things are an old story to the people of South Viet-Nam. They have known for many years that those seeking the overthrow of their Government, knowing that they cannot expect support at the ballot box, use terror, sabotage, coercion, and intimidation as their methods. The victims of these tactics are the people of South Viet-Nam.

Thus civilians die, and hospitals and schools are destroyed, because your side remains committed to achieve its objectives through such illegal, undemocratic, and violent means.

We continue to seek peace. We are prepared to look for ways to end the hostilities. In the seven plenary sessions to date, we have made specific and concrete proposals. They are all on the record, readily available to you, and I shall therefore not repeat them. We urge you to join us in a discussion of any of these proposals. We might then open a path toward peace.

We also recognize the importance of the political, as distinguished from the military, issues. We have made it clear that the political future of South Viet-Nam must be decided by the South Vietnamese themselves. We will support any political settlement which is arrived at freely by the South Vietnamese.

We have no desire or intention to try to im-

pose a political solution of any sort on South Viet-Nam. Nor do we believe that such a solution should be imposed from without. The people of South Viet-Nam must be allowed to determine their own destiny without external coercion or intimidation.

The legal government of South Viet-Nam is the genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people and is recognized as such by scores of nations throughout the world. We support this government. You should deal seriously with the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam. Our side is willing to work toward a peaceful settlement of the war in Viet-Nam. We hope you will join us in the search for peace.

U.S. Pledges Additional \$6 Million to ICRC for Nigerian Relief

Press release 56 dated March 13

C. Clyde Ferguson, Jr., Special Coordinator on relief to the victims of the Nigerian civil war, announced in a press conference at Geneva on March 13 the intention of the U.S. Government to contribute an additional \$6 million in funds toward the operating budget of the International Committee of the Red Cross for its relief work on both sides of the battlelines in the Nigerian civil war. In doing so, Mr. Ferguson said:

"I have the pleasure to announce on behalf of the United States Government its pledge of the sum of \$6 million to the International Committee of the Red Cross as its share of the March through May funding requirements of the committee. This action of my Government further represents its deep humanitarian concern for the victims of the Nigerian civil war. The United States hopes that other governments will continue and, if possible, increase their support of the ICRC.

"Over the past 2 days, I have engaged in extensive conversations with President Freymond of the ICRC and other officials on his staff. I am very pleased to note that great progress is being made in the efforts to increase the delivery of foods and medicines to both sides of the battlelines in Nigeria. Within the coming months, it is quite clear that the urgency of the demands on the committee and other relief organizations will require even greater effort and

even greater ingenuity in managing the relief operation.

"I shall be departing Saturday for Nigeria for the purpose of making a personal appraisal of the relief operations. In addition, I shall be discussing with the interested parties some concrete proposals designed to increase both the magnitude and efficiency of the relief operation.

"As I said upon leaving Washington, it is on the success of this humanitarian effort in which so many people are involved that the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocent human beings may rest. This mission will continue with a sense of urgency and with the personal recognition of President Nixon's personal concern for the many suffering victims of this cruel conflict."

This announced contribution brings the total of U.S. Government contributions to the ICRC to \$12,520,000.

In addition, the Government has supplied or earmarked \$17,429,100 in Public Law 480 food contributions to the several private relief agencies (UNICEF, Catholic Relief Services, Church World Service, and the World Food Program), as well as contributing \$1,215,000 for voluntary agency transport costs and an additional \$285,000 for general relief items. This brings U.S. Government contributions to the victims on both sides of the civil war to a grand total of \$31,449,100.

It is estimated that private U.S. contributions amount to more than \$8 million.

U.S. Expresses Concern to Nigeria Over Reported Attacks on Civilians

Following is a statement read to news correspondents by Department press spokesman Robert J. McCloskey on March 7.

Yesterday we were asked the question about what the U.S. Government may have done in connection with reports of air raids by Nigerian Air Force planes in Biafra.

Our Ambassador in Lagos has expressed to the Federal Military Government our deep concern over repeated press reports in recent days of bombings of markets, hospitals, and clinics in Biafra by Nigerian aircraft. We have also raised the matter with the Nigerian Ambassador here.

The Nigerian Government has assured us

that it is not the policy or the intent of that Government to attack civilian populations, although there may be instances where civilian casualties will unavoidably result from attacks on what they say are legitimate military targets.

Lastly, we are informed that the Federal Military Government is investigating such reports and that measures will be taken to improve control and coordination of its military air operations.

President Appoints John N. Irwin as Special Emissary to Peru

President Nixon announced on March 11 (White House press release) the appointment of John N. Irwin II, New York attorney and former Defense Department official, as a special emissary to discuss this country's current relations with Peru.

In announcing this appointment, the President said that "I have known Mr. Irwin for many years. My high regard for his intelligence, candor, and ability has led to my personal selection of Mr. Irwin for this important mission."

Mr. Irwin, who will carry the title of Personal Representative of the President with the personal rank of Ambassador, will leave later this week for Lima to explore with General Juan Velasco, President of Peru, and other Peruvian officials, current issues between our two countries. Mr. Irwin's mission is the result of an agreement between the Governments of Peru and the United States to hold wide-ranging talks regarding the relations between the two countries.

Mr. Irwin will explore with the Peruvian Government all factors that could lead to mutually agreeable resolution of differences that may have arisen over such current issues as the expropriation of the International Petroleum Company and incidents connected with U.S. tuna boats fishing in international waters claimed by Peru.

Mr. Irwin's most recent Government mission

was his service during 1965-67 as one of the two United States negotiators dealing with Panama in the drafting of a new treaty covering the Panama Canal. At that time he held the title of Special Ambassador. (For further biographic details, see White House press release dated March 11.)

U.S. Concerned by Circumstances of Trials and Executions in Iraq

Following is a statement read to news correspondents by Department press spokesman Carl Bartch on March 3.

We have noted reports that there are to be additional executions in Baghdad in connection with an alleged espionage plot. We have no confirmation of these reports, and we hope they prove unfounded.

As we made clear on two recent occasions,¹ we are concerned on humanitarian grounds by the circumstances of these trials and the executions. We have kept in touch with the United Nations on these developments.

Senate Confirms Treasury Secretary to IBRD, IMF, IDB, and ADB Posts

The Senate on March 13 confirmed the nominations of David M. Kennedy to be:

U.S. Governor of the International Monetary Fund for a term of 5 years;

U.S. Governor of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for a term of 5 years;

A Governor of the Inter-American Development Bank for a term of 5 years and until his successor has been appointed; and

U.S. Governor of the Asian Development Bank.

¹For background, see BULLETIN of Feb. 17, 1969, p. 144.

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. and Czechoslovakia Sign Air Transport Agreement

Press release 49 dated February 28

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

An air transport agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was signed on February 28 at Prague. The agreement, which provides for commercial air links between the two countries, was signed on behalf of the United States Government by Ambassador Jacob D. Beam, and on behalf of the Czechoslovak Government by Martin Murin, Chief of the Civil Aviation Administration. The document supersedes the air transport agreement between the United States and the Czechoslovak Republic of January 3, 1946.¹

Under the new agreement, airlines of each country may operate over agreed routes connecting the United States and Czechoslovakia. Prior to this agreement, U.S. airline services to Czechoslovakia have been on the basis of permits issued by the Czechoslovak Government to the U.S. carrier, while Czechoslovak airlines have not yet begun service to the United States.

AGREEMENT AND RELATED LETTER

Text of Agreement

AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic,

Desiring to conclude an agreement for the purpose of promoting air transport relations between the United States of America and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic,

Have agreed as follows:

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1560.

ARTICLE I

Each Contracting Party grants to the other Contracting Party the following rights necessary for the operation of air services by the designated airlines of the other Contracting Party: The right of transit; the right to land for non-traffic purposes; and the right to take on and discharge international traffic in passengers, cargo, and mail, separately or in combination, at the points in its territory named on each of the routes specified in the appropriate paragraph of the Schedule of this Agreement.

ARTICLE II

Air service on a route specified in the Schedule of this Agreement may be inaugurated by an airline or airlines of one Contracting Party at any time after that Contracting Party has designated such airline or airlines for that route and the appropriate authorities of the other Contracting Party have given the necessary permission. Subject to the provisions of Article III of this Agreement, such authorities shall give this permission with a minimum of procedural delay.

ARTICLE III

(1) Each Contracting Party reserves the right to withhold, revoke or impose conditions on the operating permission of the airline or airlines designated by the other Contracting Party in the following circumstances:

(a) In the event of failure by such airline to qualify before the aeronautical authorities of that Contracting Party under the laws and regulations normally applied by these authorities to the operation of international air services;

(b) In the event of failure by such airline to comply with the laws and regulations referred to in Article IV of this Agreement; or

(c) In any case where the aeronautical authorities of that Contracting Party are not satisfied that substantial ownership and effective control of such airline are vested in the Contracting Party designating the airline or in nationals of that Contracting Party or, in the event of a consortium of airlines, in the Government or nationals of the States whose airlines comprise that consortium; provided that, with respect to a consortium, air transport agreements providing for the air service in question are in force between the Contracting Party from which operating permission is being sought and each of the States whose airlines comprise the consortium.

(2) Unless immediate action to withhold or revoke operating permission is essential to prevent further infringement of the laws and regulations referred to in Article IV of this Agreement, the right to withhold or revoke such permission under the present Article shall be exercised only after consultation with the appropriate authorities of the other Contracting Party.

ARTICLE IV

(1) The laws and regulations of one Contracting Party relating to the admission to or departure from its territory of aircraft engaged in international air navigation, or to the operation and navigation of such aircraft while within its territory, shall be applied to the aircraft of the airline or airlines designated by the other Contracting Party and shall be complied with by such aircraft upon entrance into or departure from and while within the territory of the first Contracting Party.

(2) The laws and regulations of one Contracting Party relating to the admission to or departure from its territory of passengers, crew or cargo of aircraft, including regulations relating to entry, clearance, immigration, passports, customs, and quarantine, shall be complied with by or on behalf of such passengers, crew or cargo of the airline or airlines of the other Contracting Party upon entrance into or departure from and while within the territory of the first Contracting Party.

ARTICLE V

Certificates of airworthiness, certificates of competency, and licenses, issued or rendered valid by one Contracting Party and still in force, shall be recognized as valid by the other Contracting Party for the purpose of operating the routes and services provided for in this Agreement, provided that the requirements under which such certificates or licenses were issued or rendered valid are equal to or above the minimum standards which may be established pursuant to the Convention. Each Contracting Party reserves the right, however, to refuse to recognize, for the purpose of flight above its own territory, certificates of competency and licenses granted to its own nationals by the other Contracting Party.

ARTICLE VI

Each Contracting Party may impose or permit to be imposed just and reasonable charges for the use of airports and other facilities under its control. Such charges shall not be higher than the charges imposed for use by its national aircraft engaged in similar international services.

ARTICLE VII

(1) Each Contracting Party shall exempt the designated airlines of the other Contracting Party on a basis of reciprocity and to the fullest extent possible under its laws and regulations from import restrictions, customs duties, excise taxes, inspection fees, and other national duties and charges on fuel, lubricating oils, consumable technical supplies, spare parts including engines, regular equipment, ground equipment, stores, and other items intended for use solely in connection with the operation or servicing of air-

craft of the airlines of such other Contracting Party in international air service.

(2) The exemptions granted by this Article shall apply to items:

(a) Introduced into the territory of one Contracting Party by the designated airlines of the other Contracting Party;

(b) Retained on aircraft of the designated airlines of one Contracting Party upon arriving in or leaving the territory of the other Contracting Party; or

(c) Taken on board aircraft of the designated airlines of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other and intended for use in international air service; whether or not such items are used or consumed wholly within the territory of the Contracting Party granting the exemption.

(3) With the consent of the appropriate customs authorities and upon payment of any customs duty if required, items exempted in accordance with paragraph (2) (a) may be used for purposes other than those specified in paragraph (1).

ARTICLE VIII

(1) There shall be a fair and equal opportunity for the airlines of each Contracting Party to operate on any route covered by this Agreement.

(2) In the operation by the airlines of either Contracting Party of the air services described in this Agreement, the interest of the airlines of the other Contracting Party shall be taken into consideration so as not to affect unduly the services which the latter provide on all or part of the same route.

(3) The air services made available to the public by the airlines operating under this Agreement shall bear a close relationship to the requirements of the public for such services.

(4) Services provided by a designated airline under this Agreement shall retain as their primary objective the provision of capacity adequate to the traffic demands between the country of which such airline is a national and the countries of ultimate destination of the traffic. The right to embark or disembark on such services international traffic destined for and coming from third countries at a point or points on the routes specified in this Agreement shall be exercised in accordance with the general principles of orderly development to which both Contracting Parties subscribe and shall be subject to the general principle that capacity should be related to:

(a) Traffic requirements between the country of origin and the countries of ultimate destination of the traffic;

(b) The requirements of through airline operations; and

(c) The traffic requirements of the area through which the airline passes after taking account of local and regional services.

(5) Neither Contracting Party shall restrict the airline or airlines of the other Contracting Party with respect to capacity, frequency, scheduling or type of aircraft employed in connection with services over any of the routes specified in the Schedule of this Agreement. In the event that one of the Contracting Parties believes that the operations conducted by an airline

of the other Contracting Party have been inconsistent with the standards and principles set forth in paragraphs (1), (2), (3) or (4) of this Article, it may request consultations pursuant to Article XI of this Agreement for the purpose of reviewing the operations in question to determine whether they are in conformity with said standards and principles.

ARTICLE IX

(1) All rates to be charged by an airline of one Contracting Party to or from points in the territory of the other Contracting Party shall be established at reasonable levels, due regard being paid to all relevant factors, such as costs of operation, reasonable profit, and the rates charged by any other airline, as well as the characteristics of each service. Such rates shall be subject to the approval of the aeronautical authorities of the Contracting Parties, who shall act in accordance with their obligations under this Agreement, within the limits of their legal powers.

(2) Any rate proposed to be charged by an airline of either Contracting Party for carriage to or from the territory of the other Contracting Party, shall, if so required, be filed by such airline with the aeronautical authorities of the other Contracting Party at least thirty (30) days before the proposed date of introduction unless the Contracting Party with whom the filing is to be made permits filing on shorter notice. The aeronautical authorities of each Contracting Party shall use their best efforts to insure that the rates charged and collected conform to the rates filed with either Contracting Party and that no carrier rebates any portion of such rates by any means, directly or indirectly.

(3) It is recognized by both Contracting Parties that during any period for which the aeronautical authorities of either Contracting Party have approved the traffic conference procedures of the International Air Transport Association or other associations of international air carriers, any rate agreements concluded through these procedures and involving airlines of that Contracting Party will be subject to the approval of the aeronautical authorities of that Contracting Party.

(4) If a Contracting Party, on receipt of the notification referred to in paragraph (2) of this Article, is dissatisfied with the rate proposed, it shall so inform the other Contracting Party at least fifteen (15) days prior to the date that such rate would otherwise become effective, and the aeronautical authorities of both Contracting Parties shall endeavor to reach agreement on the appropriate rate.

(5) If a Contracting Party, upon review of an existing rate charged for carriage to or from its territory by an airline of the other Contracting Party is dissatisfied with that rate, it shall so notify the other Contracting Party and the aeronautical authorities of both Contracting Parties shall endeavor to reach agreement on the appropriate rate.

(6) In the event that an agreement is reached pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (4) or (5) of this Article, each Contracting Party will exercise its best efforts to put such rate into effect.

(7) (a) If under the circumstances set forth in paragraph (4) no agreement can be reached prior to the date that such rate would otherwise become effective, or

(b) If under the circumstances set forth in paragraph (5) no agreement can be reached prior to the expiry of sixty (60) days from the date of notification:

then the Contracting Party raising the objection to the rate may take such steps as it may consider necessary to prevent the inauguration or the continuation of the service in question at the rate complained of, provided, however, that the Contracting Party raising the objection shall not require the charging of a rate higher than the lowest rate charged by its own airline or airlines for comparable service between the same pair of points.

(8) When in any case under paragraphs (4) and (5) of this Article the aeronautical authorities of the two Contracting Parties cannot agree within a reasonable time upon the appropriate rate after consultation initiated by the complaint of one Contracting Party concerning the proposed rate or an existing rate of the airline or airlines of the other Contracting Party, upon the request of either, the appropriate provisions of Article XII of this Agreement shall apply. In rendering its decision or award, the arbitral tribunal shall be guided by the principles laid down in this Article.

ARTICLE X

Subject to further understandings incorporated in the exchange of letters attached to this Agreement, the following provisions shall govern the commercial operations and opportunities of the designated airlines of each Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party:

(a) Each designated airline has the right to engage in the sale of air transportation in the territory of the other Contracting Party either directly or, in its discretion, through approved agents. Such airline shall have the right to sell such transportation, and any person shall be free to purchase such transportation, in the currency of that territory or in freely convertible currencies of other countries.

(b) Any rate specified in terms of the national currency of one of the Contracting Parties shall be established in an amount which reflects the effective exchange rate (including all exchange fees or other charges) at which the airlines of both Parties can convert and remit the revenues from their transport operations into the national currency of the other Party.

(c) Each designated airline has the right to convert and remit to its country surplus earnings in excess of sums locally disbursed resulting from revenues in the territory of the other Contracting Party. Conversion and remittance of such surplus earnings shall be at the official rate of exchange in effect for the sale of transportation at the time such surplus is presented for conversion and remittance. The transferred earnings shall be exempted from taxation or any other restriction and the conversion and remittances shall be permitted promptly.

ARTICLE XI

Either Contracting Party may at any time request consultations with the appropriate authorities of the other Contracting Party on questions concerning the

Interpretation, application or amendment of this Agreement. Such consultations shall begin within a period of sixty (60) days from the date the other Contracting Party receives the request, unless otherwise agreed by the Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE XII

(1) If any dispute arises between the Contracting Parties with respect to matters covered by this Agreement or any amendment thereto, the Contracting Parties shall use their best efforts to settle such dispute in the first instance through the consultations provided for in Article XI. Any dispute not satisfactorily adjusted through such consultations shall, upon request of either Party, be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the procedure set forth herein.

(2) Arbitration shall be by a tribunal of three arbitrators constituted as follows:

(a) One arbitrator shall be named by each Contracting Party within 60 days of the date of delivery by either Contracting Party to the other of a request for arbitration. Within 30 days after such period of 60 days, the two arbitrators so designated shall by agreement designate a third arbitrator, who shall not be a national of either Contracting Party.

(b) If the third arbitrator cannot be agreed on in accordance with paragraph (a), the Contracting Parties shall, within 30 days following the 30-day period provided for in paragraph (a), agree that either the President of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization or the Director General of the International Air Transport Association shall select the third arbitrator. In no case shall such third arbitrator be a national of either Contracting Party.

(3) Each Contracting Party shall use its best efforts consistent with its national law to put into effect any decision or award of the arbitral tribunal.

(4) The expenses of the arbitral tribunal, including the fees and expenses of the arbitrators, shall be shared equally by the Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE XIII

This Agreement and all amendments thereto shall be registered with the International Civil Aviation Organization.

ARTICLE XIV

Either Contracting Party may at any time notify the other Contracting Party of its intention to terminate this Agreement. Such notice shall be sent simultaneously to the International Civil Aviation Organization. The Agreement shall terminate six months after the date of receipt of the notice of intention to terminate, unless by agreement between the Contracting Parties such notice is withdrawn before the expiration of that time.

ARTICLE XV

This Agreement shall supersede the Air Transport Agreement between the United States of America and the Czechoslovak Republic signed at Prague on January 3, 1946.

ARTICLE XVI

(1) "Agreement" shall mean this Agreement and the Schedule attached thereto and any amendments thereof.

(2) "Aeronautical authorities" shall mean, in the case of the United States of America, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and in the case of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Ministry of Transport, Civil Aviation Administration, or, in both cases, any person or agency authorized to perform the functions exercised at the present time by those authorities.

(3) "Designated airline" shall mean an airline that one Contracting Party has notified the other Contracting Party, in writing, to be the airline which will operate a specific route or routes listed in the Schedule of this Agreement.

(4) "Convention" means the Convention on International Civil Aviation opened for signature at Chicago December 7, 1944.

(5) The terms "Territory," "air service," "international air service," and "stop for non-traffic purposes" shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in Articles 2 and 96 of the Convention.

ARTICLE XVII

This Agreement shall enter into force on the day it is signed.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE in duplicate, in the English and Czech languages, both texts being equally authentic, at Prague, Czechoslovakia, this twenty-eighth day of February, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-nine.

For the Government of the United States of America:

JACOB D. BEAM

For the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic:

M. MURIN

SCHEDULE

A. An airline or airlines designated by the Government of the United States shall be entitled to operate air services on the route specified, in both directions, and to make scheduled landings in Czechoslovakia, at points specified in this paragraph:

From the United States via points in Ireland, the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Belgium, and the Federal Republic of Germany to Prague and beyond via intermediate points to India and beyond to the United States in both directions.

With respect to beyond points between Prague and India, the designated U.S. airline(s) may make four (4) traffic stops in the following countries:

Austria
Yugoslavia
Turkey
Lebanon
Iran
Pakistan

With respect to beyond points between India and the United States, the designated U.S. airline(s) may make six (6) traffic stops in the following countries:

Thailand
Viet Nam

Malaysia
Singapore²
Indonesia
The Philippines
Hong Kong
Japan²

The Government of the United States shall have the right to substitute for any country initially selected another of the countries listed in the same group of countries. Such right may be exercised at six (6) month intervals with 30 days' advance notice to the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

B. An airline or airlines designated by the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic shall be entitled to operate air services on the route specified, in both directions, and to make scheduled landings in the United States of America at the points specified in this paragraph:

From Czechoslovakia via a point in the Federal Republic of Germany, or France, or the United Kingdom, points in Luxembourg, Belgium, The Netherlands and Denmark to Montreal, Canada and New York.

Montreal may be served both as a point intermediate to and beyond New York.

With respect to its selection of a point in the Federal Republic of Germany, or France, or the United Kingdom, the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic shall have the right to substitute for the point initially selected a point in either of the other two countries. Such right may be exercised at six (6) month intervals with 30 days' advance notice to the Government of the United States.

C. Points on any of the specified routes may, at the option of each designated airline, be omitted on any or all flights.

Letter Concerning Article X

FEBRUARY 28, 1969

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I refer to the Air Transport Agreement which was signed in Prague on this date. During the negotiation which resulted in the conclusion of that Agreement, the delegations representing our respective Governments discussed the conduct of commercial airline activities related to the marketing of air services on the agreed routes. The understandings which were achieved with regard to such activities are set forth herein:

With respect to the provisions of Article X of the Agreement, each Government intends to use its best efforts, consistent with its national policies, to assure that, at the earliest practical time, the airline or airlines of the other Contracting Party are accorded substantial reciprocity in the conduct of their commercial activities. In the meantime, the designated airlines of one country shall enjoy the right to conduct commercial activities in the other country on a basis no less favorable than that enjoyed by any airline of any third country.

At a time no later than twenty-two months after

² Rights to both these countries will not be utilized at the same time. [Footnote in original.]

the Czechoslovak designated airline inaugurates scheduled services to the United States, both Contracting Parties will consult for the purpose of confirming that mutually acceptable conditions have been achieved for the airlines of each Contracting Party to conduct their business activities in the territory of the other Contracting Party on the basis of implementation of Article X to a mutually acceptable extent. If the consultations do not establish to the satisfaction of both Contracting Parties that mutually acceptable conditions have been achieved, and unless a further understanding is concluded, the Air Transport Agreement will expire automatically, without regard to the requirements of Article XIV, twenty-four months after the Czechoslovak designated airline inaugurates scheduled services to the United States.

I am pleased to confirm the foregoing understandings on behalf of my Government and would appreciate receiving your acknowledgment² that they likewise are confirmed by the Government of the United States of America.

Sincerely yours,

M. MURIN
*President of the Delegation
of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic*

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Genocide

Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at Paris December 9, 1948. Entered into force January 12, 1951.¹
Accession deposited: Nepal, January 17, 1969.

Labor

Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the International Labor Organization. Dated at Montreal October 9, 1946. Entered into force April 20, 1948. TIAS 1868.
Admission to membership: Cambodia, February 24, 1969.

Load Lines

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331.
Accession deposited: Cuba, February 6, 1969.

Maritime Matters

Convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965. Entered into force March 5, 1967; for the United States May 16, 1967. TIAS 6251.
Accession deposited: Tunisia, January 27, 1969.

² Not printed here.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

Narcotic Drugs

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December 13, 1964; for the United States June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298.

Accession deposited: Cyprus, January 30, 1969.

Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968.²

Senate advice and consent to ratification: March 13, 1969.

Ratification deposited at Washington: Ecuador, March 7, 1969.

Space

Treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. Opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow January 27, 1967. Entered into force October 10, 1967. TIAS 6347.

Ratification deposited at Washington: Ecuador, March 7, 1969.

Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return of astronauts, and the return of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow April 22, 1968. Entered into force December 3, 1968. TIAS 6599.

Ratifications deposited at Washington: Ecuador, March 7, 1969; Mexico, March 11, 1969.

Trade

Protocol amending the preamble and parts II and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955. Entered into force October 7, 1957. TIAS 3930.

Acceptance: Uruguay, February 7, 1969.

Protocol of rectification to the French text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 15, 1955. Entered into force October 24, 1956. TIAS 3677.

Acceptance: Uruguay, February 7, 1969.

Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955.²

Acceptance: Uruguay, February 7, 1969.

Procès-verbal of rectification concerning the protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the protocol amending the preamble and parts II and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the protocol of organizational amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955. Section B entered into force October 7, 1957. TIAS 6452.

Acceptance: Uruguay, February 7, 1969.

Sixth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 11, 1957.¹

Acceptance: Uruguay, February 7, 1969.

Seventh protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 30, 1957.²

Acceptance: Uruguay, February 7, 1969.

Protocol relating to negotiations for the establishment of new schedule III—Brazil—to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 31, 1958.²

Acceptance: Uruguay, February 7, 1969.

Eighth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva February 18, 1959.²

Acceptance: Uruguay, February 7, 1969.

Ninth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva August 17, 1959.²

Acceptance: Uruguay, February 7, 1969.

Protocol amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and development, and to amend annex I. Done at Geneva February 8, 1965. Entered into force June 27, 1966. TIAS 6139.

Ratification deposited: Uruguay, February 7, 1969.

Agreement on implementation of article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 30, 1967. Entered into force July 1, 1968. TIAS 6431.

Ratification deposited: Netherlands, February 5, 1969.

Fifth procès-verbal extending the declaration on the provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 12, 1959 (TIAS 4498). Done at Geneva November 19, 1968. Entered into force December 17, 1968.¹

Acceptances: France, February 10, 1969; Turkey, February 7, 1969.

Fourth procès-verbal extending the declaration on the provisional accession of the United Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 13, 1962 (TIAS 5309). Done at Geneva November 19, 1968.²

Acceptances: France, February 10, 1969; Turkey, February 7, 1969.

Women—Political Rights

Convention on the political rights of women. Done at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force July 7, 1954.¹

Ratification deposited: Ethiopia, January 21, 1969.

BILATERAL

Morocco

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of April 20, 1967 (TIAS 6256), with annex. Signed at Rabat February 25, 1969. Entered into force February 25, 1969.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

Aviation. U.S. and Czechoslovakia Sign Air Transport Agreement (text of agreement) . . . 283

China
 President Nixon Modifies Ballistic Missile Defense System (statement) . . . 273
 President Nixon's News Conference of March 14 (excerpts) . . . 275

Congress. Senate Confirms Treasury Secretary to IBRD, IMF, IDB, and ADB Posts . . . 282

Czechoslovakia. U.S. and Czechoslovakia Sign Air Transport Agreement (text of agreement) . . . 283

Disarmament. President Nixon's News Conference of March 14 (excerpts) . . . 275

Economic Affairs. Senate Confirms Treasury Secretary to IBRD, IMF, IDB, and ADB Posts . . . 282

International Organizations and Conferences. Senate Confirms Treasury Secretary to IBRD, IMF, IDB, and ADB Posts . . . 282

Iraq. U.S. Concerned by Circumstances of Trials and Executions in Iraq (statement by Department press spokesman) . . . 282

Military Affairs
 President Nixon Modifies Ballistic Missile Defense System (statement) . . . 273
 President Nixon's News Conference of March 14 (excerpts) . . . 275

Near East. President Nixon's News Conference of March 14 (excerpts) . . . 275

Nigeria
 U.S. Expresses Concern to Nigeria Over Reported Attacks on Civilians (statement by Department press spokesman) . . . 281
 U.S. Pledges Additional \$6 Million to ICRC for Nigerian Relief (Ferguson) . . . 281

Peru. President Appoints John N. Irwin as Special Emissary to Peru . . . 282

Presidential Documents
 President Nixon Modifies Ballistic Missile Defense System . . . 273
 President Nixon's News Conference of March 14 (excerpts) . . . 275

Treaty Information
 Current Actions . . . 287
 U.S. and Czechoslovakia Sign Air Transport Agreement (text of agreement) . . . 283

U.S.S.R.
 President Nixon Modifies Ballistic Missile Defense System (statement) . . . 273
 President Nixon's News Conference of March 14 (excerpts) . . . 275

Viet-Nam
 Eighth Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris (Lodge) . . . 280
 President Nixon's News Conference of March 14 (excerpts) . . . 275

Name Index

Ferguson, C. Clyde, Jr . . . 281
 Irwin, John N., II . . . 282
 Kennedy, David M . . . 282
 Lodge, Henry Cabot . . . 280
 Nixon, President . . . 273, 275

**Check List of Department of State
 Press Releases: March 10-16**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to March 10 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 49 of February 28.

No.	Date	Subject
*53	3/10	Mr. Ferguson leaves for Geneva for consultations on relief efforts for Nigeria.
†54	3/12	Department publishes <i>American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966</i> .
55	3/13	Lodge: eighth plenary session on Viet-Nam at Paris.
56	3/13	U.S. contributes additional \$6 million to ICRC for Nigerian relief.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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