


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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXXIII • No. 1880 • July 7, 1975

THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN IN A CHANGING WORLD

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VOL. LXXIII, No. 1880

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.*

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## The United States and Japan in a Changing World

*Address by Secretary Kissinger<sup>1</sup>*

America's ties with Japan are strong, close, and full of promise. Tonight I want to describe the importance of this relationship—for America, for Asia, and for the world. This occasion comes as a welcome opportunity. The tragic end of our involvement in Indochina has stimulated questions, among Asians as well as Americans, about the future of U.S. foreign policy. But paradoxically, these events have also driven home the recognition, among Asians as well as Americans, of how essential a strong and purposeful United States is to global peace and progress.

As we and Japan seek to shape the future together, we face a world profoundly different from that in which our relationship was forged.

The bipolar world of the 1950's and 1960's has disappeared. The reemergence of Europe and Japan, the rivalry among the Communist powers, the growth of military technologies, the rise and increasing diversity of the so-called Third World, have created a new international environment—a world of multiple centers of power, of ideological differences both old and new, clouded by nuclear peril and marked by the new imperatives of interdependence.

American policy has sought to shape out of this a new international structure based on equilibrium rather than domination, negotiation rather than confrontation, and a consciousness of global interdependence as the basis of the ultimate fulfillment of national objectives.

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Japan Society at New York on June 18 (text from press release 338).

As the members of this society have long recognized, the relationship between the United States and Japan is crucial to this design. It is central to the continued stability, progress, and prosperity of the international community, and it is fundamental to American policy in Asia.

—Our Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security reflects an enduring sense of common interest in the peace of Asia. Through many changes in conditions and alignments, our ties have proven their continuing and indispensable validity for our two countries and for global stability.

—As maritime trading nations with complementary economies, the United States and Japan account for 52 percent of the production and 26 percent of the trade of the entire non-Communist industrialized world. We possess the world's most dynamic economies. As economic superpowers, our respective policies profoundly affect each other and the world at large.

—Our nations share an enduring commitment to the political values of free societies and an abiding concern for the well-being of our fellow men.

Japan's evolution over the last 30 years into a major factor on the world scene inevitably has brought changes in the style of our relations even as the community of our mutual interests has grown. Adjustments in U.S. economic policies and a new policy toward China in 1971 led to painful but transitory misunderstandings to which—let us be frank—our own tactics contributed. We have learned from experience; these strains are behind us; our policies are mov-

ing in harmony in these areas; our consultations on all major issues are now close, frequent, and frank.

U.S.-Japanese bilateral relations, I am pleased to say, have never been better in 30 years.

It is a fitting symbol, therefore, that in his first trip abroad as chief of state, President Ford visited Japan last November. We look forward to the visit of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor, whose presence will lend further dignity and strength to the ties between us. And before the Emperor's arrival, Prime Minister Miki will come to Washington for consultations on the foreign policy and economic issues facing our two countries.

I cannot refer to this series of consultations without paying tribute to Eisaku Sato, a great leader of Japan, a great champion of Japanese-American friendship, and one of the world's great statesmen. I sought his counsel on each of my five visits to Japan, even after he had left office. I was privileged to know him as a colleague and a personal friend. I shall miss him greatly.

### **The Foundations of Our Partnership**

Japan and the United States have known each other for a century and a quarter. Our relationship has passed through an incredible range: from curiosity to competition, conflict, occupation, reconciliation, to alliance and mutual dependence. This long, complicated, and varied experience has taught us that our close association is more essential than ever and that the dramatic differences in national styles and situations are a strength to be husbanded rather than a weakness to be overcome.

We Americans are a disparate people—heterogeneous in our origins, constantly striving to redefine what we have in common. Japan, on the other hand, is a country of unusual cohesiveness and homogeneity. For Americans, contracts and laws are prime guarantors of social peace. The Japanese depend less on legal and formal rules to preserve social harmony than on the quality of human relationships and on un-

stated patterns of consensus and obligation.

Our language is designed for categorization. It invites logical distinctions and value judgments. The Japanese have lived together for so long and shared so many experiences that they frequently communicate through intuition and indirection, occasionally without need of words. The Japanese prize form and mood as well as content. We honor content above all and frequently exhibit impatience with emphasis on style.

The United States is blessed with vast land and ample resources; abundance is taken for granted. Japan is a great industrial power, but its prosperity is more recent and—because of the dependence of its industry on imported food, energy, raw materials, and external markets—more vulnerable.

In foreign policy, the United States has assumed global security responsibilities. Japan has devoted its energies to the growth of its economy and commerce, while—alone among the world's great powers—forswearing large military forces or assertive diplomacy.

Communication between cultures is always difficult. But the United States and Japan have achieved an increasing sensitivity, sometimes fascination, with our national differences. Our two nations supremely demonstrate the possibility of close and enduring association between two different cultures and two distant continents. It is an extraordinary achievement, and we too often take it for granted.

We formed a political alliance and security relationship in a period of Japanese dependence. War had shattered her economy and political system. Japan accepted American leadership in that difficult period and only gradually began to reassert an autonomous diplomacy and active political involvement in the world around her.

Japan's emergence as a major economic power and international force has substantially transformed our relations in recent years.

The reversion of Okinawa eliminated the last major vestige of the war from our



bilateral agenda. We have made significant progress in removing the trade imbalance which was so often an irritant in our relations. In response to Japanese concerns, the United States has reaffirmed its specific commitments as supplier and purchaser of important goods and materials.

Our relationship, which was forged by the necessities of security, has flourished as well on the other contemporary challenges: improving relations with the Communist countries, advancing the prosperity of the industrial democracies, and building a new era of cooperation among all nations.

Our most immediate shared interest, naturally, is in Asia.

### **The United States and Asia**

The security interests of all the great world powers intersect in Asia, particularly in Northeast Asia. China comprises the heartland of the continent. The Soviet Far East spreads across the top of Asia. The Japanese islands span 2,000 miles of ocean off the mainland. America's Pacific presence encompasses the entire region. Western Europe has important economic links with Asia and feels indirectly the effects of any disturbance of the equilibrium in the area.

Asia's share of the world's population and resources is immense. In the last two decades, the Asian-Pacific economy has experienced more rapid growth than any other region. It is here that the United States has its largest and fastest growing overseas commerce. We have as vital an interest in access to Asia's raw materials as Asia has to our markets and technology.

The ties between Asia and America have a deeper philosophical and human dimension. The influence of America and the West stimulated the transformation of much of Asia during the past 100 years. From the days of the New England transcendentalists to the modern period, Asian culture and ideas have significantly touched American intellectual life, thereby reflecting the universality of human aspirations.

The role of Asia, then, is potentially deci-

sive for the solution of the contemporary agenda of peace and progress and the quality of life.

This is why, in spite of recent events, the United States will not turn away from Asia or focus our attention on Europe to the detriment of Asia. Our relationships with Europe and Japan are equally vital; each is essential to global peace and security. In the modern world the problems and opportunities of each area overlap and are inseparable from those of the other. Our fidelity to our commitments will be as strong in one part of the globe as in the other.

Nor can we confine our Asian policy to Japan without destroying the underpinnings of the U.S.-Japanese relationship. The interests that bind Japan to Asia are no less vital than those binding it to America and the other nations of the West. The value of our political and security relationship depends on its contribution to a broad balance of security in Asia. This is decisive for Japan as well as for us.

The basic principles of America's foreign policy find their reflection and necessity in Asia:

—First, peace depends on a stable global equilibrium.

While an effective foreign policy must reach beyond the problem of security, without security there can be no effective foreign policy. A world where some nations survive only at the mercy of others is a world of dependence, insecurity, and despotism. This is why the United States will continue to oppose the efforts of any country or group of countries to impose their will on Asia by a preponderance of power or blackmail.

We have learned important lessons from the tragedy of Indochina—most importantly that outside effort can only supplement, but not create, local efforts and local will to resist. But in applying these lessons we must take care not to undermine stability in Asia and, ultimately, world peace.

We will permit no question to arise about the firmness of our treaty commitments. Allies who seek our support will find us constant. At the same time, if any partner

seeks to modify these commitments, we will be prepared to accommodate that desire.

In fulfilling our commitments we will look to our allies to assume the primary responsibility for maintaining their own defense, especially in manpower. And there is no question that popular will and social justice are, in the last analysis, the essential underpinning of resistance to subversion and external challenge. But our support and assistance will be available where it has been promised.

Specifically, we are resolved to maintain the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula, for this is of crucial importance to Japan and to all of Asia. We will assist South Korea to strengthen her economy and defense. But we shall also seek all honorable ways to reduce tensions and confrontation.

We place the highest value on our relationship with our ANZUS partners, Australia and New Zealand, and on our historic relationship with the Philippines. We will maintain our treaty obligations throughout Asia and the Pacific. And we welcome the growing influence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations—Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines, and Thailand—as a force for self-reliance, stability, and progress in the region.

—A second basic principle of our foreign policy is that peace depends ultimately on reconciliation among nations.

All of us, friends, neutrals, or adversaries, exist on a small planet threatened with extinction. The ultimate aim of our alliances has always been to ease, not intensify, divisions and tensions. We will continue our effort to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China in the spirit of the Shanghai communique.

Similarly, we will continue our effort to regularize and improve our relations with the Soviet Union and to make further progress in the control of arms, especially strategic arms.

We have no illusions. We recognize that our values and social systems are not compatible with those of the Communist powers and may never be. But in the thermonuclear age, when the existence of mankind is at

stake, there is no decent alternative to the easing of tensions. Should these efforts fail, at least our peoples will know that we had no choice but to resist pressure or blackmail. There can be no conciliation without strength and security, but we would be reckless if we forget that strength without a spirit of conciliation can invite holocaust.

New regimes have come to power in Asia in the last few months. They have flouted international agreements and flagrantly violated accepted international standards, and that we cannot ignore. But we are prepared to look to the future. Our attitude toward them will be influenced by their conduct toward their neighbors and their attitude toward us.

—Finally, peace depends upon a structure of economic cooperation which reflects the aspirations of all peoples.

The problems of the world economy—in-  
suring adequate supplies of food, energy, and raw materials to consumers and markets and stable income to producers—require global economic arrangements that accommodate the interests of developed and developing, consumers and producers. We have consistently taken the view that a necessary first step is close cooperation among the industrialized countries. On the basis of unity and mutual support, we welcome a dialogue with the developing countries in a spirit of sympathy, realism, and cooperation.

These are the principles which guide America's actions in the world and in Asia.

Japan's role and the U.S.-Japanese relationship can be decisive.

## **The United States and Japan**

### *The Challenge of Peace and Security*

Japan's contribution to a peaceful world is unique. Despite its industrial prowess Japan elected to forgo the military attributes of great-power status, limiting itself to modest conventional self-defense forces and relying for its security on the support of the United States and the good will of others.

In this framework, Japan has thrived. Its security has been assured; its democratic institutions have flourished. Its economy has

achieved unparalleled growth, partly because through much of this period Japan enjoyed assured access to imported raw materials and food at reasonable prices. Japan has been able to develop constructive economic and political relations with its neighbors, thereby contributing to regional stability and growth.

The events of recent years have transformed this relatively simple universe. The interaction among the major powers has become much more complex than in the fifties or early sixties. The oil crisis of 1973 confronted Japan with its economic vulnerability. Today suppliers of raw materials are presenting a variety of new demands that are not easily accommodated in the context of existing world trade and monetary structures.

These changing circumstances have required both Japan and the United States to rethink old premises and devise new, creative approaches. By their nature, these problems require collaborative, not separate responses. Japan and the United States must relate national security to international reconciliation and national growth to international cooperation.

### *The Challenge of Reconciliation*

Both our countries seek to move the world beyond equilibrium toward reconciliation. The United States has attempted to normalize and improve its relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Japan has made the same effort. For some time the Japanese Government has pursued what it has described as "peace diplomacy," a diplomacy designed to ease Asian confrontations.

Japan normalized its relations with the Soviet Union in 1956; recently it has been intensifying its economic relations with that country. Japan has been a trading partner of the People's Republic of China for decades. In 1972 Japan granted full recognition to Peking and since then has been broadening her bilateral relations. We have welcomed these developments.

As each of us engages in this more complex interplay among the major powers, we

have faced a common problem: How to preserve a sense of priority among our international relationships? This government has stated on many occasions—and I will state again—that we make a clear distinction between our allies and our adversaries. "Equidistant diplomacy" is a myth. For us, Japan is not an occasional interlocutor, but a permanent friend—a partner in building a world of progress.

Of course, we do not expect to pursue identical policies—toward China, toward the Soviet Union, or toward all Asian issues. But we should seek to maintain compatible approaches. In our bilateral relations we should recognize a higher standard of mutual concern than normally obtains between states—accepting a greater obligation to consult, to inform, and to harmonize domestic and external policies that impinge on the interests of the other.

We believe that both our countries share this approach. To implement it, we have jointly developed channels for more intensive consultation and used them with growing frequency and frankness. The United States intends to propose a semiannual review of policies at the foreign ministers level, alternately in Washington and Tokyo, to assess the present and to chart the future.

### *The Challenge of Economic Cooperation*

The prosperity which Japan and America have achieved in the course of the past three decades is one of the great successes of the postwar world. The economic power we possess as a result imposes on us special responsibility for the health of the global economy and for its ability to satisfy the thrust of human aspirations. Today that responsibility is under severe challenge. A major recession, an energy crisis, global food shortages, unprecedented inflation, and a trend toward politicizing economic issues have subjected the world economy to serious stress.

We have three major objectives:

—We must spur the stable growth of our economies.

—We must strengthen cooperation among the industrialized countries.

—We must respond to the aspirations of the developing world.

All our objectives—domestic well-being, security, unity, relations with the Communist world and the developing nations—require economic strength and growth. Few can be realized by stagnating economies. The stability of our institutions and the self-assurance of our societies will benefit from the earliest possible recovery of sustained and noninflationary economic growth.

In the global economy, no nation can hope to achieve sustained growth by its own efforts alone. In a world of interdependence, the experience of 30 years has shown that the industrialized nations prosper or suffer together. Coordination of effort is essential for any economic objective—whether it be growth, energy, food, or raw materials—and also to maintain the conditions of well-being that underpin our political and security cohesion.

It is encouraging that over the last year the United States and its major partners are beginning to harmonize their national policies to combat recession and promote expansion. This was a central topic of the President's discussions in Tokyo last November. These consultations should be continued systematically and deal particularly with a common analysis of the requirements of global economic growth.

We have no reason to apologize for the economic system we have built since the war. It has spread progress far beyond the industrialized world; in fact, it has contributed to the political evolution and diffusion of economic power that have now brought that system under challenge. Nevertheless it is important to recognize that no set of economic relationships can flourish unless its benefits are widely shared; it must be perceived as just.

It is in the self-interest of the advanced industrialized countries that global economic arrangements embrace the aspirations of the majority of mankind. Reality makes us a global community; if world order breaks down over economic conflicts, we face the specter of chronic global civil war.

The Japanese Government, acutely sensi-

tive to this problem, has made an imaginative proposal to the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]—that the industrialized democracies undertake a joint long-range examination of how the progress of the advanced societies can be pursued to foster the progress of the developing countries. We welcome this initiative and have supported it; it is a subject of profound importance. We will work closely with the Japanese Government as the study proceeds.

Let me now turn briefly to a number of crucial economic issues, first in terms of Japanese-U.S. relations and then in terms of their impact on the global order.

Our two nations have a special concern and responsibility in *trade*. We have succeeded in resolving most of the bilateral problems in our trading relationship; we must now turn our attention to what we can jointly do to improve the global trading system which has nourished the world's prosperity for a generation.

The current round of the multilateral trade negotiations is called, appropriately, the Tokyo Round; for Japan's extraordinary dependence on commerce gives it a unique stake in the outcome. Our purpose in those talks must be to reach agreement on a reduction of tariffs, the removal of nontariff barriers, assuring more reliable access to supplies as well as markets, the renunciation of the use of restrictive trade measures to cover deficits brought about by recent economic difficulties. We must pay special attention, as well, to the needs of the developing countries for improved trade opportunities. With respect to all of these issues, we will proceed on the basis of close consultation with Japan.

*Energy* is a key element in the structure of global interdependence. Each industrialized country has a choice: to permit increasing vulnerability to arbitrary price rises and political pressures or to impose conservation and spur the development of alternative supplies. But individual efforts are almost certain to be ineffective. To reduce dependence, the major consumers must pool their efforts.

This is why Japan and the United States

have joined other industrialized countries in common programs to transform the energy market through the International Energy Agency (IEA). Together we are working to protect against new embargoes, to maintain financial solidarity, to conserve energy, and to develop new sources. Japan's dependence on energy imports means that it cannot end its energy vulnerability by conservation alone. It has a major stake, therefore, in research and development of new sources.

For the next 10 years nuclear energy will be increasingly important. The United States has pioneered the development of uranium enrichment processes for nuclear energy; Japan has been our largest market. As Japan's use of and dependence on nuclear energy expands, so too does our obligation to be a reliable supplier of fuel. The United States therefore pledges to continue to provide nuclear fuel, appropriately safeguarded, under long-term contracts. We will shortly add enrichment capacity to insure adequate supplies to meet domestic and foreign needs.

Over the long term, more exotic energy sources must be emphasized. Our two countries are in a unique position to focus capital, skill, and the most advanced technology in their development. We are ready to begin a large-scale energy research and development effort with Japan. Japanese capital is welcome to participate and will receive in turn a proportional share of our expanded production of conventional and synthetic fuels.

But energy, of course, is not simply a technical issue. It goes to the heart of our political relationship with the developing world. Japan has been insistent that we must proceed by cooperation rather than confrontation, a view which we share. We and Japan together with the other members of the IEA are prepared to resume the dialogue with the energy producers and search for cooperative solutions of mutual benefit.

Japan and the United States both recognize the desire of raw material producers for a dialogue that goes beyond the issue of energy. Together with our other partners in the IEA, we have expressed our readiness to discuss these concerns. We and Japan and other importing nations have an interest in

reliable supplies. The producers need long-term stability of incomes for their development programs. It is in the joint interest of producers and consumers to discuss how drastic price fluctuations can be alleviated in order to encourage timely investment in the development of new supplies and to give reality to the development plans of producers. Both Japan and the United States have a political stake in promoting a healthy commodities trade which serves the interests of both producers and consumers.

No issue on the economic agenda is more vital than *food*. It is a dramatic example of the links between bilateral and global issues and between relations with our allies and relations with the developing world.

Japan is our largest market for agricultural exports, and we are Japan's principal external provider of food. The world's dependence on the United States for foodstuffs imposes upon us an obligation to be a reliable supplier. The United States therefore pledges that in times of tight markets it will take account of the needs of our longtime customers, such as Japan. We will seek to prevent a repetition of the unfortunate experience of 1973 when we were forced suddenly to restrict the export of soybeans to Japan and other countries.

In a broader context, the United States and Japan bear a special responsibility because they are among the world's largest producers and consumers of agricultural goods. We both are in a position to apply technical innovation and skill to the expansion of food production in developing countries. And as a hedge against the feast-and-famine cycle of global harvests, we should both help in creating an international system of nationally held grain reserves by the end of this year.

These areas do not by any means exhaust our joint agenda. We attach great importance to our *scientific and technical* exchanges. This fall we expect to conclude a comprehensive joint review of all our exchanges. We will then be able to plan our efforts more efficiently and identify new areas for cooperation.

As two of the most advanced industrial

nations, we have a special awareness of what progress has done to the *environment*. The bilateral accord we are about to conclude for environmental protection is therefore of great potential importance not only for us but for others in the process of industrialization.

The talents and joint efforts of our two gifted peoples will surely be a unique contribution to the wider world community. To strengthen this bond, the United States intends to augment our *cultural relations* with Japan—an endeavor in which the work of this society, and through it, the U.S.-Japan Cultural Conference, has been crucial. The Administration will seek to integrate and obtain approval this year of proposals now before the Congress to establish a Japan-U.S. friendship fund which would make substantial new funds available for cross-cultural programs between our two countries.

The great Japanese writer Saikaku, who lived in another era when the old order was breaking down and the shape of things to come was not yet clear, said that to experience “this modern age, this mixture of good and ill, and yet to steer through life on an honest course to the splendors of success—this is a feat reserved for paragons.”

Our times demand as much of us. We may not be paragons, but our assets are great. No two nations are so different yet so close; none have a more direct and wide experience of the best and the worst which the modern age offers; and none have constructed a more intensive and effective relationship of consultation and cooperation. Our mutual interest has brought us together, but our mutual understanding has enabled our

friendship to thrive to a degree which would have been unimaginable two decades ago.

Americans and Japanese can take pride in what we have achieved and use it as a point of departure for greater efforts still. We are seeking the crucial balance between diversity and common purpose that is the best hope for building a creative, just, and productive international community. With the good will and good sense, the high hopes and hard work which have so far marked our journey, we will continue to strengthen our relations—for ourselves and for mankind.

### United States Mourns Death of Eisaku Sato

*Eisaku Sato, Prime Minister of Japan from 1964 to 1972, died at Tokyo on June 2. Following is a statement by President Ford issued on June 3 at Rome.*

White House press release (Rome, Italy) dated June 3

I was deeply saddened to learn of the death of Eisaku Sato. The passing of this great statesman, Nobel laureate, who did so much for his nation and for the cause of peace, is a loss to the world. His service as Prime Minister of Japan won the respect of all nations; his counsel was sought and valued. He was a close friend of the American people and devoted his life to strengthening the ties of understanding and friendship between the United States and Japan. I speak on behalf of all Americans in expressing our deepest sympathy to Mrs. Sato and the Japanese people.

## Prime Minister Rabin of Israel Visits Washington

*Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of the State of Israel made an official visit to Washington June 10-13. Following are remarks made by Prime Minister Rabin and Secretary Kissinger upon the Prime Minister's arrival at Andrews Air Force Base on June 10, an exchange of toasts between President Ford and Prime Minister Rabin at a dinner at the White House on June 11, and the transcript of a news conference held by Secretary Kissinger at the White House on June 12.*

### REMARKS UPON PRIME MINISTER RABIN'S ARRIVAL, JUNE 10

Press release 326 dated June 10

#### Secretary Kissinger

Mr. Prime Minister, Mrs. Rabin: On behalf of President Ford and his Administration I would like to welcome you to the United States. You are among friends here. We have many problems to discuss, including the problem of progress toward peace in the Middle East and our bilateral relations. For two countries whose destiny has been closely intertwined for decades, these talks will be important, and they will be conducted in the spirit of friendship and cordiality and confidence that has marked our relationship.

As I have said before, you are among friends. Welcome.

#### Prime Minister Rabin

Mr. Secretary, ladies and gentlemen: I am very pleased to come back to visit the United States. I am very glad that President Ford has invited me to take a part in the talks that I am looking forward to.

I believe that Israel is interested in par-

ticipating in every effort to move toward peace and will do whatever is possible to participate with the United States and the countries of the area in the movement toward peace.

I come here, as the Secretary said, knowing the deep ties and the special relations between our two countries. And I am really looking forward to the talks that will take place with the President and the Secretary. Thank you very much.

### TOASTS AT WHITE HOUSE DINNER, JUNE 11

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 16

#### President Ford

Mr. Prime Minister: I am very delighted to have you here and to welcome you back to Washington.

You have been here a number of times, plus your long service as a member of the diplomatic corps, and we are delighted to have you here on this occasion. I think it also gives to all of us an opportunity to thank you for your very generous hospitality on behalf of many Members of the Congress and others, as well as many Americans, who have visited Israel. I thank you on their behalf.

I think your visit comes at a very important moment in the history of both of our countries. As Americans, we face our nation's 200th anniversary and, in the process, of course, we are reviewing the past in search of some of the fundamental human values which characterize, as I see it, the very best in America.

The most basic of this, of course, is the desire for freedom and the desire for independence and the right of each individual to live in peace. Fortunately, Israel shares this

view with us. It is this sharing which is the basis of our fundamental relationship—of the United States strong and continuing support of the State of Israel and Israel's understanding of the essential interests of the United States.

Mr. Prime Minister, when we met in Washington nine months ago, at the very outset of my Administration, we jointly reaffirmed the need to continue our intensive efforts for peace. We then recognized the importance of maintaining the momentum of negotiations toward this end.

Having admired you as an Ambassador, we found it easy, I think, to establish a good working relationship. We agreed that it was in our mutual interest that these efforts succeed and it would be a tragedy if they failed. I think we recognize that stagnation would be most unfortunate in our work for peace.

We met today to insure that this does not occur, to seek progress toward a truly just and durable peace, a settlement that is in the best interest of all of us, in the Middle East. I consider the meeting this morning very constructive and our conversations here tonight equally so. I think with perseverance we can be successful.

Gentlemen, let me ask that you join me in a toast to the success in these efforts to obtain a just and durable peace in the Middle East, to the close relationship between our two countries, and to an individual of dedication and courage in the service of his country, the Prime Minister of Israel: Mr. Prime Minister.

#### **Prime Minister Rabin**

Mr. President, Members of the Congress, members of the Administration: Mr. President, I would like to thank you very much for inviting me to Washington in the efforts to do whatever is possible to move toward peace in the Middle East. I believe that your interest, your determination to do whatever is possible and to explore all the possibilities that will lead these complex conflicts in the area toward peace are a sign of the great

leadership of you and a few great countries in the free world.

I would like to assure you in the name of my country and my people, that if there is something that we are really eager to achieve, it is a real peace in the area. We have tried for 27 years to do whatever is possible, or was possible, to achieve peace. Unfortunately, peace has not been achieved.

But we believe that peace must be reached in the area. It is in the interests of all the people who live there and will serve to their interests. And therefore whatever is done to move toward peace is more than appreciated by us, by the people of Israel.

I am sure that in the course of the talks that we have had and we will have, we will try to find what are the best ways in which we can cooperate with you, Mr. President, with the U.S. Government, to move toward peace.

But allow me to say that peace, a real one, can achieve only by understanding—can be achieved by compromise, but must be achieved when the two sides that are involved in the conflict would decide to put an end to it and to establish the structure of peace.

The United States has served—and I am very pleased and grateful to you that you are determined to continue to play—a major role in the achievement of peace. Israel has learned to admire, to appreciate the United States and American people. In the last 27 years, we have gained the support, the understanding of the American people, and we are more than thankful for what has been done by the United States in supporting Israel and helping the cause of peace.

I would like to thank you, Mr. President, very much, for your understanding of the problems of Israel and the need—the urgency—to move toward peace. And I hope that through your efforts we would achieve what has not been achieved by now, a real move toward a real peace.

Therefore allow me to raise my glass to you: To the President of the United States and to the friendship between our two people.



**SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE  
AT THE WHITE HOUSE, JUNE 12**

Press release 332 dated June 12

*Secretary Kissinger:* I really don't have a very long statement to make. As we pointed out after the meeting between President Sadat [of Egypt] and the President, the purpose of these meetings is not to reach any definitive conclusions or to engage in any detailed negotiations but, rather, to enable the President to establish a personal contact with the principal leaders in the area, to review the alternatives, and to clarify the positions.

The meeting between the Prime Minister and the President was conducted in a very cordial and friendly atmosphere. We evaluate the results as very constructive. I think the alternatives have been brought into sharper focus, the implications of the various roads that can be pursued are seen more clearly.

We will now continue consultations with other interested parties. As you know, the Foreign Minister of Syria is coming here next week. And we will of course be in touch with other parties in the area. We will stay in close touch with the Government of Israel. And we hope that within the next few weeks we can reach a final clarification of the best course that could be pursued, on the basis of consensus among all the parties concerned.

Now I will take some questions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, are you saying that the President does not yet know enough to go forward with his policy statement as he said he would?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think the President is not likely to make a policy statement within the next week or two. But I do believe that the meetings that have just concluded mark a considerable step forward, and we evaluate them in a positive manner.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, how would you evaluate the chances for a resumption of negotiations between Israel and Egypt on another partial settlement in the Sinai?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think there are

chances, but we cannot yet make a final decision.

*Q. The tendency seems to be becoming aware that an interim settlement is a preferred solution, rather than a return to Geneva. Is that correct?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. As I pointed out at Salzburg [on June 2], the United States is not pushing any one particular approach. The United States is committed to progress in the negotiations. The United States believes that a stalemate in the diplomatic process in the Middle East would not be in the interest of any of the parties or in the interest of world peace.

We have found in the talks that this conviction is shared by all of the principals, and it is clearly and emphatically shared by the Prime Minister of Israel.

So, we are not pushing any particular approach, but we will support whichever approach seems most promising.

*Q. Have you found in your talks with the Egyptian and Israeli leaders any signs that either or both are willing to adjust their positions that existed at the end of March?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have told both sides that if an interim agreement is to be reached, both sides would have to modify their positions.

I call your attention to the decision of the Israeli Cabinet last Sunday in which the Israeli Cabinet pointed out the Israeli willingness to modify their position if Egypt were prepared to modify its own position.

We have the impression that therefore there is a certain parallel approach on both sides. What remains to be seen now is when one goes into the details, whether that permits a sufficient concreteness.

*Q. You really haven't gotten into the details yet?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have gone into the parameters, but not into the details.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, when you speak of touching base with other representatives, other groups, do you include the Palestinians?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, were you able to assure Mr. Rabin that the United States will continue its military and economic aid to Israel?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There has never been any question about the United States continuing economic and military aid to Israel. The question has been within the framework of the very large request that we have before us, how to relate it to all the other considerations.

So, about the principle of economic and military aid, there is no debate at all. But there were some discussions on that issue, and I will continue them at lunch, if you let me get there.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* This will keep the Israeli journalists from asking questions. [Laughter.]

*Q. There has been a reported holdup of deliveries of certain military equipment, including the Lance missiles, and I think the F-15. Has the decision been made to go forward?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. The F-15 was a question of a technical evaluation team coming over here. It had not been a question of holding up any equipment. But the point is, it has always been clear that these particular items were related to the whole process of a free assessment. And as this process is coming to a conclusion, these decisions will be made with respect to these items.

*Q. Will you make another trip to the area before the reassessment is completed, or how soon do you plan another trip to the area?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Whether I make another trip to the area depends on which of the approaches that are open to us is going to be pursued. But a trip is not excluded.

*Q. Do you have any opinion, Dr. Kissinger, as to what they would prefer? Do you get a feeling from either one or both that they would prefer you to start shuttle diplomacy again?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think it is too soon to say this precisely, but I would say

that nothing that has happened in the discussions between President Sadat and President Ford, and between Prime Minister Rabin and President Ford, has made the prospect less likely, and much that has happened has made it perhaps more possible.

*Q. So you sort of expect to resume sometime?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That would be premature to say. But certainly neither side has precluded a reexamination of the interim approach.

*Q. How will you get into details—through diplomatic channels, or do you have to go out there yourself?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think through both, if we go beyond a certain— We will start through diplomatic channels, and at that point we will decide whether—

*Q. You just want to know whether there is enough for agreement before you go out, so you have to know the details?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That is correct. As I pointed out, we will now stay in close consultation with the Government of Israel, and we will also be in close touch with the other interested parties. And after we have all their views, we will then be in a position to make the decision whether they are close enough for me to take a trip to the area.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what are the other parties that you have been talking about that you are going to consult with before you make a decision?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, as I said before, the Foreign Minister of Syria is coming here next week. We are obviously going to be in touch with the Government of Egypt. And we will be talking to other Arab countries.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you know very well what the particular issues were that held up the March agreement. Are you really—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* After I read a lot about it, I didn't know any more whether I knew. [Laughter.]

*Q. Are you really telling us you are no further along on understanding whether*

*either side has changed its position to make an agreement possible?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. I am saying that obviously there has been an evolution in the thinking of both sides. I am saying that we are not yet at a sufficient degree of detail for me to be able to say whether an agreement is possible and that we have not been engaged in an actual detailed process of negotiation. Neither side has been asked to put forward a specific position at this moment.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the President has stated that he was going to make a definitive statement or a statement about this when the reassessment is complete. Could you tell us how definitive that is likely to be, how long? Does it include reexamination of the whole question?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think it depends in part on which of the options before him, of those that he has described, he is likely to pursue. And I think obviously when the President states the direction in which we are going, he will do it with sufficient concreteness to explain what we hope to achieve and where it is likely to take us.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the President made reference to the desirability of Israel being more flexible. I have asked several times at the White House and can get no definition of any specific of how Israel could be more flexible. I was wondering if this request that it be more flexible means that Israel should give up Mitla and Giddi in exchange for nothing but Egyptian words, not even guarantees of shipping in the canal or diplomatic recognition.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, you are way ahead of me in the precision of the negotiation. I don't believe that the President has said that Israel should be more flexible. There was one reference to his evaluation of the March negotiations.

I don't think that it would serve any purpose now to apply adjectives to the various positions of the parties. The issues that led to the breakdown, as Mr. Kalb [Marvin Kalb, CBS News] said, are clearly under-

stood. I think the two sides know in which area the major concerns of the other are. We have done our best to explain the positions of each side to the other as we understand it. We have found a general receptivity to looking at the prospects for making progress. And I can assure you, as someone who has negotiated with Israeli negotiating teams, the danger of their giving away something for nothing is extremely remote.

Mr. Koppel [Ted Koppel, ABC News].

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I can understand why it was necessary for President Ford to establish some kind of personal contact with Mr. Sadat, whom he had never met before. I'm a little harder pressed to understand why it is necessary with Mr. Rabin, who he knows quite well. Is it then a fact that this is the only need for that meeting, to establish personal contact?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. The need for this meeting was the necessity of reviewing the positions and options of all sides in the Middle East and of the American relationship to it.

Since this involves rather fateful decisions for Israel and very crucial decisions for the United States, it was imperative for the Prime Minister and the President to meet, not just to exchange ideas on technical details but to gain an understanding of their perception of the Middle East situation. I think the meeting was extremely important from that point of view as well as from others. And I don't believe either of these two leaders would have been prepared to make the decisions that need to be made without having a full opportunity to understand not only the technical but also the intangible aspects of the other side.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the President said the other night that if step-by-step does not work, he would have a comprehensive plan of his own to present possibly at Geneva. Did he reveal to Mr. Rabin what the outlines of that comprehensive plan would be?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The two leaders had an extremely frank and detailed review. The President's habit is always to put forward

his thinking as fully as he can, and he did put before the Prime Minister his best judgment of the situation in some detail, yes.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, following the breakdown there was a widespread impression—and I can understand your unwillingness to engage in use of adjectives—there was a widespread impression left as a result of official statements on the record and background record, that the Israelis were stubborn and arch and were responsible for the breakdown. As a result of today's meeting, is that impression not justified any more? Has that been wiped off?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, an Israeli friend of mine has once defined objectivity as a hundred percent approval of the Israeli point of view. And maybe some of these impressions that you describe arose from that particular definition of objectivity. Be that as it may, we are now looking to the future; and we believe, as I pointed out before, that all the parties with whom we have talked are interested in making progress toward peace.

As the Prime Minister pointed out in his toast last evening, no country can have a greater interest in peace than Israel. Therefore we will work with the parties concerned with the attitude of seeing how we can help ease tensions and help them to achieve what is above all in their overwhelming interest.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you have spoken to both sides now, and it has been made public by the Israelis that they would like an agreement of long duration, defined as three to five years. Now that you have spoken to both sides, is this a likely prospect?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I don't want to go into any of the details of the various aspects. But as I pointed out, from what I have seen

of the positions of the parties, the possibility of progress is by no means precluded.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, one last question. When will the aid program be presented to the Congress on the Middle East?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We don't have a precise date yet, but I have stated our general view with respect to aid.

## **Secretary Names Five to Board of Governors for East-West Center**

The Department of State announced on June 13 (press release 334) the appointment by the Secretary of five prominent Americans to the newly created Board of Governors of the East-West Center in Hawaii.

Named to the Board of the corporation to administer the Center were former Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas; Edgar F. Kaiser, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Kaiser Industries Corporation, Oakland, Calif.; John K. MacIver, attorney and civic leader of Milwaukee, Wis.; Lucian W. Pye, Ford Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, Mass.; and Eleanor H. B. Sheldon, President of the Social Science Research Council of New York City. (For additional biographic data and information about the East-West Center corporation, see press release 334.)

The full Board of the new corporation will be comprised of 18 persons. The Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Governor of Hawaii, and the President of the University of Hawaii are ex officio members. The Governor of Hawaii is to appoint five members, and the remaining five seats will be filled by election of the board.

## Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for U.S. News and World Report

*Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Kissinger which was published in the June 23 issue of U.S. News and World Report.*

Press release 335 dated June 16

*Q. Mr. Secretary, a year ago everyone was hailing American foreign policy as a great success story. Now everything seems to be coming apart at the seams. What's gone wrong?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First of all, I don't think everything is "coming apart at the seams." Our foreign policy is, I believe, effective and strong.

Our relations with Western Europe and Japan have never been better. Our relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are essentially on course. With respect to the Third World, we have developed new initiatives at the recent meetings of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] and the IEA [International Energy Agency] in Paris. We have had a temporary setback in the Middle East, but I expect that momentum will soon be restored. Further interim discussions or some form of overall discussions are inevitable. What has been done previously has laid the basis for what is being done now.

The collapse of Indochina was, of course, both a setback and a tragedy—and, we believe, an unnecessary one. But it has nothing to do with the architecture of our foreign policy.

*Q. How then do you explain the widespread criticism of American foreign policy?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I believe that many of these criticisms reflect a turmoil in our domestic situation and not the reality of our

foreign policy. I have consistently said that you cannot have foreign policy without authority and that to the extent that the central authority is undermined for whatever reason—even if it's the fault of the central authority—it will ultimately affect the conduct of foreign policy.

Curiously enough, the price we paid during Watergate, while harmful, was not extreme. While Watergate was going on, debate on foreign policy was muted. But then, after Watergate was over, there suddenly was an orgy of criticism. Pent-up concerns about Chile, Turkey, and Viet-Nam all crystallized into extremely controversial issues. All of them, coming together, produced a serious multiplier effect.

I have the sense that this phase was terminated with the collapse of Viet-Nam. While Congress is now not in an uncritically accepting mood, it is also not in an uncritically contentious mood. The position of the Presidency—which is, after all, the central element in foreign policy—has been considerably strengthened in recent weeks. The dialogue between the executive and the Congress is now on a healthier basis. Therefore the effectiveness of our foreign policy is on a healthier basis.

*Q. Why did the collapse in Viet-Nam bring that change in Congress?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First of all, because no one can debate anymore that there was a "domino effect." This is self-evident. Secondly, no one can deny that it has had a shocking impact even where there was no domino effect. Thirdly, I believe that the American public is not in a mood to see the country's world position decline. Whatever the public's reaction was to the merits of our involvement in Viet-Nam, the public reaction to its aftermath is that the United

States should not be seen to be retreating in the world.

The support for the handling of the *Mayaguez* incident and the general public attitude, which are reflected in the votes on the defense bill, seem to indicate that the American public now feels that the period of turmoil—of the Viet-Nam debate, of the Watergate debate—should be ended.

*Q. As you see it, are the American people still prepared to accept the defense burden and other sacrifices necessary to support a world role for this country?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Yes. That is my impression. I think our biggest asset is widespread public support—which was never as weak as the noise level in Washington would have indicated.

*Q. What effect has the Viet-Nam collapse had in the rest of the world?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think the sudden collapse of Viet-Nam brought home to a lot of countries the central role of America and its foreign policy. It led to a profound concern in many countries about the conclusions we might draw from that event.

Basically, what happened in the NATO meeting [summit conference in Brussels May 29–30] was what we were hoping to achieve in the Year of Europe in 1973. Our basic argument then—in 1973—was that security, political, and economic factors are all related, and that the Atlantic nations, together with Japan, had to deal with them simultaneously and with a concept of what kind of future we wanted for ourselves and our children.

Frankly, our allies were not ready for this approach in 1973. But in 1975—at Brussels—Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada put forward as his own idea, and without any previous discussion with us, exactly this proposal. And all heads of government present accepted it, with France, which was not represented by the head of government, being the only exception.

So I think that in this sense the events in Indochina have brought things into perspective.

*Q. Do you expect that our allies, as a re-*

*sult of this, will now do more to keep America involved around the world?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First, the allies have understood they cannot necessarily take America for granted and that there is a point beyond which disappointment could push us into a more isolationist position.

Secondly, the central importance of the American role for both peace and progress has been brought home to them in no uncertain terms.

And thirdly, I think that the President's calm and strong leadership has had a very positive effect.

*Q. As you look to the future, what lies ahead for the United States?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We are moving into a new world. The kind of world that emerged in the immediate post-World War II period had substantially eroded by the late sixties and early seventies. We are in a period of adjusting the American role in the world to a new environment. Today's world is marked by multipolarity among countries, divisions in the Communist world, growth of Europe and Japan, and greater assertiveness of the underdeveloped countries. All this fragmentation has occurred at the same time that economic interrelationships are demonstrating the interdependence of the world.

So you have confrontation on a political level, and on an economic level the need for cooperation. You have on the political level continued ideological hostility, but you have on the nuclear level the realization that there is no alternative to peace.

*Q. What does that mean as far as American foreign policy is concerned?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We had to design a much more complex strategy than the one that characterized the immediate postwar period. We are trying to design a policy that is not a response to crisis, but to the realities of the present and the hopes of the future, a policy that looks at the evolution of history and the American contribution to it. While any policy has imperfections, I think we are clearly moving in the right direction.

On the other hand, the architecture is not completed; many issues remain unresolved. There is still an unfinished agenda. But I would like to point out that if you interview a Secretary of State three years from now he, too, should have an unfinished agenda. It is an American illusion to believe that foreign policy ought to lead to a solution to all problems. Foreign policy cannot do that; it is always a dynamic process.

### Relations With the Soviet Union

*Q. Turning to Soviet-American détente: How do you answer the criticism that is so often heard that this is a one-way street that benefits only Russia?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am certain that in Moscow whatever opponents of détente there may be are making exactly the same argument. What you get, as the result of three years of détente, is that people like all the benefits of détente, plus all the psychic satisfaction of a tough posture. There is no question that the American public prefers peace to war and anti-Communism to Communism. So the question is—and it's not an easy one—how do you bring these two into balance with each other.

Détente has not been a one-way street. The agreements we have made with the Soviet Union have been based on reciprocity; both sides have benefited. Some of the events that have happened in the world that have been against our interests have been caused by the Soviets; others have not. Some have been caused by our failure to take adequate unilateral actions—for those we have no one but ourselves to blame.

Détente is not a substitute for American action. Détente is a means of controlling the conflict with the Soviet Union.

Détente is not a substitute for American strength. But it can enable us to reduce the risks that we will ever have to make use of that strength.

*Q. Do you mean that under the rules of détente, one side is free to exploit a local situation to gain an advantage?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Of course not. I am

saying that the minimum objective of détente must be to reduce the dangers of general nuclear war. That we have certainly done with some success.

The second objective is to reduce direct conflict in areas of vital importance to both countries, such as Central Europe. That we have done remarkably well.

The third objective is to create links that will provide incentives for moderation. Progress here has been uneven, and we have been weakened by the Trade Act.

The fourth objective is to reduce conflict in peripheral areas. And here, to be frank, we have not made as much progress as we should.

*Q. You mentioned the Trade Act, which made economic concessions to Russia contingent on more liberal Soviet emigration policies. How has that weakened the policy of détente?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Relations with the Soviet Union must have incentives for moderation and penalties for intransigence.

The penalties for intransigence are supplied mostly by our defense budget and by our foreign policy. I think that is going reasonably well.

As for incentives for moderation, the Trade Act was one of the elements we had hoped to have available. We have always held the view that to inject the emigration issue into it hurt our relations with the Soviet Union, hurt us economically and—most tragically of all—hurt the people it was supposed to help.

*Q. How can you reconcile what the Russians have done in Viet-Nam, the Mideast, and Portugal with détente?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Let's discuss each of these. First, Viet-Nam was not caused by the Russians. Viet-Nam had its own dynamics. Secondly, the Soviet aid level in Viet-Nam remained relatively constant. But our aid level dropped—by 50 percent in each of two successive years—to the point where no equipment and very few spare parts were delivered in Viet-Nam after May 1974. The GVN [Government of Viet-Nam] even reached the point where ammunition had to

be rationed for the Vietnamese forces. Therefore, what happened had many causes, of which Soviet actions were only a part.

The situation in Portugal was not caused by the Soviets. It was caused by the internal dynamics of Portugal itself. If we have not assisted the democratic forces adequately, the reasons lie far more in our own domestic debates than with the Soviets.

*Q. And the Middle East?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* In the Middle East, I would not be surprised if in Moscow they made the same argument and said that we have been using détente to improve our position. At any rate it is not evident to me—in contrast to our own position—that the Soviet Union has improved its position in the Middle East in the last two years. The opposite seems to me to be the case.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, are you satisfied that the Russians are not cheating on the strategic arms limitation agreement that was signed in 1972?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* When you have strategic forces on both sides in the present state of technical complexity and in the process of modernization, it is inevitable that questionable actions will emerge.

The Soviets have worried us in several areas. We have taken those up in the Soviet-American Standing Commission which is designed to deal with such complaints. With respect to a number of these issues we have received answers which—while not fully satisfactory—are moving in the right direction. One or two issues are still unsettled, but they do not go to the heart of the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agreement. But we will pursue them nevertheless. One or two issues that have been reported in the newspapers seem to me mischievous and special pleading.

*Q. What about SALT Two? Is there going to be an agreement this fall?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The issues of principle with respect to SALT have been more or less settled. What now remains to be worked out is the technical implementation of issues that are very complicated. I should

think that the chances are better than even that we will have a SALT Two in the fall. But we could fail, either because we just can't solve the technical issues or because political tensions rise.

*Q. Is a visit to Washington by Soviet leader Brezhnev in the fall firmly set, or will that depend on a SALT agreement?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That will depend on SALT.

*Q. In other words—no SALT agreement, no Brezhnev visit?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I would think that Brezhnev, too, would prefer to mark his visit with some significant result.

### **The Middle East**

*Q. President Ford recently spoke of the Middle East as the most dangerous problem in the world today. What are the prospects now of making progress toward a settlement of the conflict there?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Logically, the conditions should be there, either on an interim or an overall basis. As the President has said, we are determined to make progress. If we cannot get it on an interim basis, we will promote an overall settlement. We will not permit the situation simply to fester.

*Q. How do you prevent it from festering?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* By engaging in active diplomacy and using our influence, which, after all, is not inconsiderable in that area, to encourage progress.

*Q. What has resulted from President Ford's meetings with President Sadat [of Egypt] and Prime Minister Rabin [of Israel] that will open the way to new negotiations for a Middle East settlement?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The meetings with President Sadat and Prime Minister Rabin have been extremely important in helping to crystallize our thinking on how best to proceed. They have helped us understand the views of both on how they think the negotiating process might be renewed. They were both constructive, though neither meeting



was an occasion for coming to detailed decisions.

We, as well as the two governments concerned, are now reflecting on the best course to follow. We will be following up with both Israel and Egypt through diplomatic channels, as well as talking with Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam here in the coming days. We will also stay in close touch with other interested governments.

From all of these consultations we hope a decision can be taken on how to move toward the negotiated settlement we all seek.

*Q. Is it feasible to go for an overall settlement if you can't get Egypt and Israel to agree even on a limited settlement in the Sinai?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That remains to be seen. It probably won't be an extremely rapid process.

*Q. Can you count on any help from the Russians in promoting a settlement—or are they mainly interested in perpetuating a conflict that they can exploit?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* On the one hand, you can argue that they like the tension in the area because it creates a chance for enhanced influence. On the other hand, it can be argued that tensions which force a country to take positions which it then cannot implement do not, in the long run, enhance its influence.

So I would think that as a result of the events of recent years, the Soviet Union could come to the view that it is running risks disproportionate to what it is getting out of it. And if that is true, perhaps conditions for a more constructive relationship will develop. Certainly in recent months the Soviet Union has not been as aggressive about the Middle East as they might have been.

*Q. How is your negotiating position in the Middle East affected by the fact that 76 Senators have signed a letter in support of Israel?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I did not recommend the letter be sent. But we will take it into account. We will study it.

*Q. Six Presidents have declared a commitment to the survival and security of Israel. In practical terms, what does that really mean?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have a historic commitment to the survival and the well-being of Israel. This is a basic national policy reaffirmed by every Administration. But we are in no way committed to the status quo. Israel itself has said that it does not insist on the existing territorial arrangement for a final peace.

The art of our foreign policy is to reconcile as many of America's interests as we can, and not to emphasize one to the exclusion of all of the others. We have many interests that need to be accommodated: we have an interest in good relations with the Arab countries; we have an interest in the economic well-being and security of Western Europe and Japan; and we have an interest in not having unnecessary confrontations with the Soviet Union. We believe all these interests can be reconciled with our traditional friendship for Israel.

*Q. What do you think of suggestions that an Israeli withdrawal to its pre-1967 borders would tend to lower oil prices?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think it would be extremely dangerous for the United States to let its foreign policy be determined by oil price manipulation. We have refused to discuss our political objectives in relation to the price of oil and will continue to do so.

### The Energy Problem

*Q. More generally on the oil problem: Can we live with another \$4-a-barrel increase that's being talked about for the fall?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I do not know that there will be a \$4 increase in the price of oil. That would be an increase of over 30 percent. We are strongly opposed to an increase. We believe that the increases of '73 and '74 have been so inflationary and so disruptive of the world economy that another rise is clearly not justified. To impose a \$4 increase on top of the present precarious world situation is not even in the interest

of the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] countries. We would certainly strongly oppose it.

*Q. But what can we do to oppose any increase that OPEC chooses to make?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Basically we cannot fight unilateral increases effectively until we create the objective conditions which will transform the market forces. It is another area where it is easy to strike a tough verbal stance. But a tough verbal stance unrelated to objective factors is not going to do us any good.

We are attempting in the International Energy Agency to create the objective conditions which will transform power in the marketplace by reducing consumption and developing alternative energy sources. At the same time, the capacity of OPEC to cut production in order to sustain prices will diminish as development programs in other countries grow and the producers' need for real resources mounts. Therefore, some point inevitably will be reached where the market must shift. How quickly it is reached depends on the decisiveness with which the industrialized consumer countries cooperate. This is the effort in which we are now deeply—and reasonably successfully—engaged.

*Q. A year ago the Administration was talking about getting the price of oil down. Now you're talking about keeping the price from going up. Why has the objective changed?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The policy has not changed. But policy and rhetoric need to be kept separate. We would like prices to come down. But we cannot get them down until after we have succeeded in keeping them from going up. At a time when OPEC is threatening to increase prices, it's senseless to talk about getting them down. We are opposed to the current prices. We are even more opposed to higher prices. We will work with determination to bring about conditions in which this cannot continue.

If OPEC insists on raising its prices, I have no doubt that it will lead to increased consumer solidarity and a speeded-up program to shift market conditions. This is

our policy—to change market conditions—and I think it will succeed.

We are pursuing the only sensible policy available to bring about a price cut. You can talk about embargoes and counterembargoes. But when you analyze them you will find they usually hit the countries that politically give us the strongest support and whose role may not be decisive. Furthermore, these measures generally would not be backed by the other consuming countries. So if we pursued them we would be putting ourselves at a political and probably economic disadvantage. But we are determined to bring about an improvement in the market conditions of oil.

*Q. Why is it so difficult to get the industrial consuming countries to cooperate on the kind of joint policy that you advocate?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Because none of the consumer countries want to risk a confrontation. Therefore, to some extent the producer countries can blackmail at least some of the consumer nations. Another reason is that independence requires difficult domestic efforts. Consumption cuts are unpleasant and occasionally painful. So, many countries—including ours—are using the fact that there is a recession which imposes oil conservation as an excuse to avoid policy-induced conservation.

*Q. How much will the success or failure of this whole program depend on action by Congress?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The role of the Congress is absolutely pivotal. The United States consumes 50 percent of the world's energy; many of the resources for alternative programs must come from American technology. Without a major American program, there can be no effective policy among consumer nations.

*Q. Is the energy program that Congress appears likely to approve sufficient to do the job?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It is sufficient to make a start on the policy. It is not, however, adequate to do the whole job.

*Q. Have you been surprised at the ability*

*of the OPEC countries to cut production as deeply as they have to maintain their price?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. I think they are beginning to approach a point where production cuts will become more and more painful.

*Q. But isn't pressure on OPEC countries to cut production going to ease as we get economic recovery here as well as in Europe and Japan?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It is going to be a very serious problem. The recovery will increase our need for oil, but it will not affect the ability of the OPEC countries to make further production cuts.

*Q. Do you anticipate another oil embargo by the Arabs?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think it would be a very rash action, and—outside the context of a Middle East war—I would not anticipate it.

#### **Asia Policy**

*Q. Getting back for a moment to the aftermath of Viet-Nam: We keep hearing that China wants the United States to stay in Asia. Is that based on any direct assurance you've had?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It is based not on assurances, but on fairly hard evidence—that is, on what Chinese leaders have told Asian leaders and some of our leaders.

*Q. Why do they now want us to stay after agitating for so many years to get us out of Asia?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The Chinese are extremely realistic. They realize that their security depends on a world equilibrium. They understand that the United States must inevitably be a major part of such an equilibrium. For this reason, they do not want to open up Asia to the aspirations of other countries whose intentions toward them might be less benevolent.

*Q. In that connection, is there any truth to reports that China has tried to dissuade North Korea from going to war against the South?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I cannot confirm those reports. But our general impression is that the People's Republic of China is not interested in an exacerbation of tensions in Asia.

*Q. What, in your judgment, are the chances of war in Korea?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* In the immediate aftermath of Viet-Nam, we were profoundly concerned that the leaders in North Korea should not misread the American position. We were also concerned that a collapse of South Korea would have a disastrous impact on Japan.

The events of recent weeks are beginning to make clear that the United States is prepared to defend its interests in the world and that it would be a wildly rash adventure to use military force in Korea. Many of the problems that existed with respect to Viet-Nam do not exist with respect to Korea.

*Q. Because the United States has a mutual security treaty with South Korea?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That's right.

*Q. In view of the Viet-Nam debacle, is President Ford still planning to go to China this fall?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That is still the plan.

*Q. Is it possible for him to go without discussing the Taiwan situation?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, but it is possible for him to go without bringing that situation to a conclusion.

*Q. Will the United States be obliged to change its relations with Taiwan?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Not in order for the President to go to China.

*Q. Looking a bit further ahead: Do you expect the triangular Soviet-American-Chinese relationship to survive after Mao Tse-tung and Leonid Brezhnev are gone?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The problem in foreign policy is to be able to discern the realities of the situation and not to tie it to personalities. The realities could shift to some extent—and all foreign policy is subject to change. The reality of Asia is the geopolitical

impact on each other of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, plus the memory of what has happened.

We are not exploiting this. We are not encouraging it, and we didn't create it.

To some extent the reality will continue. There may be shifting accents that will affect us, and we must be aware of these. It is also important not to be so obsessed with immediate threats that one forgets long-term threats. But the essential architecture of our foreign policy is sound and will be seen to be sound. The fact that it has survived some of the shocks of this past year proves that it is sound.

### Western Europe

*Q. A final point concerning Europe: Why is it left to this country to deal with major problems in Europe while Europeans turn their backs—such problems as Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It is left to the United States because fate has put us in the position where we are the only non-Communist country that is strong enough and domestically cohesive enough to play a world role. Therefore, if certain things are not done by us, they will not be done by anyone. And while it might be fairer if somebody else took some of the responsibility, the fact is that a catastrophe is no less real for having been brought about by attempts to shift responsibility to others.

Portugal, of course, is primarily a Portuguese problem. Many of the European countries are extremely active with respect to Portugal. However, as the strongest country in the alliance, we have to state a position with respect to Portugal and particularly its relationship to NATO. This is all we have done, in addition to some economic aid which we have given.

With respect to Spain, we are the only Western country that has a defense relationship with Spain. For some European countries there is a domestic problem with respect to dealings with Spain. But it is also clear that if Spain is left totally isolated, the evolution there could take very traumatic

forms, and this is what we are attempting to deal with.

Greece, Turkey—again, we have a problem of the eastern end of the Mediterranean, of the domestic evolution in both of these countries, and of the world equilibrium. We were perhaps projected into it somewhat more dramatically than we might have desired by certain domestic events in the United States, and we have been forced to stake more on this than might have been thought desirable from an abstract consideration of foreign policy.

But we do have an interest in retaining both of these friendly countries in NATO, in maintaining our traditional friendships with both countries and not have the eastern end of the Mediterranean turn into uncontrolled chaos—or, for that matter, controlled chaos.

*Q. Why does the United States seem so much more concerned about the Communist influence in Portugal than the Europeans?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* All we are saying is that at some point the evolution in Portugal will have reached a stage where we will have to make a decision whether this is still an allied government or a neutralist government. At that point, we will have to consider the implications of our actions for Italy, Spain, and the other European countries.

We have told our European allies that this is not something to be determined in the abstract. We are continuing our economic aid program to Portugal for the time being. But we do not believe that we have to delude ourselves about what is going on there.

*Q. Outside Portugal, do you get the feeling that neutralism is spreading in Western Europe?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, I have the sense that with the present governments, the awareness of the importance of the Atlantic alliance is increasing. However, in many of the European countries neutralist forces are growing—not in the governments, but in political life. And that is a worrisome phenomenon for the middle and longer term. It is one of the factors we are keeping in mind with relation to Portugal.

*Q. All in all, Mr. Secretary, are you optimistic about the future?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I'd like to repeat: We're moving into a new world, and I think that we are moving in the right direction. There will always be unfinished business, and the more effective you are the more unfinished business you will have.

## **President Ford's News Conference of June 9**

*Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Ford in the Rose Garden at the White House on June 9.<sup>1</sup>*

*Q. Mr. President, at a recent news conference you said that you had learned the lessons of Viet-Nam. Since then, I have received a letter from Mrs. Catherine Litchfield of Dedham, Mass. She lost a son in Viet-Nam; and on her behalf and on behalf of many, many parents with her plight, I would like to ask you, what are those lessons you learned from the Viet-Nam experience?*

*President Ford:* I think, Miss Thomas [Helen Thomas, United Press International], there are a number of lessons that we can learn from Viet-Nam. One, that we have to work with other governments that feel as we do—that freedom is vitally important. We cannot, however, fight their battles for them. Those countries who believe in freedom as we do must carry the burden. We can help them, not with U.S. military personnel but with arms and economic aid, so that they can protect their own national interest and protect the freedom of their citizens.

I think we also may have learned some lessons concerning how we would conduct a military operation. There was, of course, from the period of 1961 or 1962 through the end of our military involvement in Viet-Nam, a great deal of controversy whether the mili-

tary operations in Viet-Nam were carried out in the proper way. Some dispute between civilian and military leaders as to the proper prosecution of a military engagement—I think we can learn something from those differences and, if we ever become engaged in any military operation in the future—and I hope we don't—I trust we've learned something about how we should handle such an operation.

*Q. Does that mean that you would not conduct a limited war again with a certain amount of restraint on the part of our bombers and so forth?*

*President Ford:* I wouldn't want to pass judgment at this time on any hypothetical situation. I simply am indicating that from that unfortunate experience in Viet-Nam, we ought to be able to be in a better position to judge how we should conduct ourselves in the future.

*Q. I wonder if I can change the subject to Europe and the future. There are reports in Europe, sir, that both the United States and the Soviet Union seem to be less and less interested in the Security Conference that is due up this year. Could you tell me something about the future timetable, when that might come up, how SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] is doing, when you might be seeing Mr. Brezhnev, and so forth? There seems to be some slippage in this.*

*President Ford:* While I was in Europe, I discussed with many European leaders the status of the European Security Conference, their views. It appears that there are some compromises being made on both sides between the Warsaw Pact nations and European nations, including ourselves, that will potentially bring the European Security Conference to a conclusion. Those final compromises have not been made, but it's getting closer and closer.

I hope that there will be sufficient understanding on both sides to bring about an ending to this long, long negotiation. If it does, in the near future we probably would have a summit in Helsinki.

<sup>1</sup>For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 16.

The negotiations on SALT Two are progressing, I think constructively. The technicians are now working on the problems of verification and other matters that are very important but can be better outlined and put together by the technicians.

I'm optimistic that we can have a SALT Two agreement. But I can assure you, as I have others, that we are going to make sure, make certain, that our national security interest is very, very adequately protected. And I think it can be, as I look at the overall picture.

*Q. To follow up, sir, when do you think Mr. Brezhnev might be coming here? Would you give a ballpark guess on that?*

*President Ford:* I would hope, if negotiations go the way they are, sometime in the fall of 1975.

*Q. Mr. President, to follow on Helen's question, sir, do you believe that the language of our mutual defense treaty with South Korea requires the presence of American troops there, or can the United States fulfill its commitment short of that?*

*President Ford:* I believe it is highly desirable under our mutual defense treaty with South Korea to maintain a U.S. military contingent in South Korea. We have now roughly 38,000 U.S. military personnel in South Korea. I think it's keeping the peace in Korea, and I think it's important for the maintenance of peace in the Korean Peninsula that that force stay in South Korea.

*Q. Are you thinking of keeping them there indefinitely, or do you hope to review that question next year?*

*President Ford:* It's constantly under review.

*Q. The Prime Minister of Israel is coming on Wednesday, I believe, and you met with Egyptian President Sadat a week ago. As you go into this next phase of consultations, are you any more prepared to give Israel stronger guarantees?*

*President Ford:* Well, my meeting with

Prime Minister Rabin of Israel, which is to be held on Wednesday and Thursday of this week, will be a meeting where I will get his personal assessment of the overall situation in the Middle East.

We will discuss the options that I see as possible: either a resumption of the suspended step-by-step negotiations, or a comprehensive recommendation that I would make to probably reconvene the Geneva Conference, or a step-by-step process under the umbrella of the Geneva Conference.

I'm going to go into these alternatives or these options in depth with Prime Minister Rabin; and when we have concluded our discussions, I'll be in a better position to know how our government should proceed in trying to achieve a broader peace, a more permanent peace, with fairness and equity in the Middle East.

*Q. Mr. President, when you were in Salzburg, you appeared to be especially friendly with Egyptian President Sadat. Was this public display of friendliness with him designed in any way to pressure Israel to make new concessions toward a Middle East settlement?*

*President Ford:* I did enjoy my opportunity to get acquainted with President Sadat. And I not only enjoyed his company, but I benefited from his analysis of the Middle East and related matters. But I have the same relationship with Prime Minister Rabin. I have known him longer; and this will be the second or third opportunity that I've had a chance to meet with him, plus my opportunities when he was the Israeli Ambassador here.

I think I can be benefited immeasurably by meeting face-to-face with people like Prime Minister Rabin and President Sadat. This judgment by our government in this area is a major decision, and we have to get the broadest possible information to make the best judgment. And in both instances, as well as others, I am glad to have the help and assistance of those who come from that area of the world.

## Secretary Kissinger's Remarks at PBS Luncheon

*Following is an excerpt from Secretary Kissinger's remarks at a Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) luncheon honoring the British Broadcasting Corporation at Washington on June 16.<sup>1</sup>*

At this time, when the policies of all nations, and especially the experiences of our nation, are undergoing such a revolutionary change, it is difficult to present to the public the nature of the problem and the essence of the answers. The news reports, in the nature of things, emphasize the spectacular and the tactical. They emphasize the urgent very often rather than the important. What is badly needed is what PBS and other programs around the world are attempting to do—to explain the context of events, to have some analysis of their significance not necessarily geared to the headlines of the moment.

I had some discussion with Mr. Gunn about this many months ago concerning how to conduct foreign policy in an environment in which the real issues can very often not be discussed on some of the media because of pressures of time and the nature of the medium.

I would like to say that what PBS has done in many of your programs is a major contribution to the understanding of international affairs, and therefore I am glad to accept this opportunity to come and meet with you. Now I think we can proceed most usefully if I answer your questions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, my question is: Will the United States use troops to defend South Korea if it is invaded by the North Koreans?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There are American

troops in South Korea, and an attack on South Korea would be barely possible that did not involve American forces. And we have a security treaty. Of course we would follow constitutional procedures and the provisions of the War Powers Act, but we are bound by international obligations that have been ratified by the Congress to come to the assistance of South Korea.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, would you tell us the differences, as you see them, between serving as Secretary of State under President Ford as compared to serving as Secretary of State under former President Nixon?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think this is not a question that I should now answer, or perhaps should ever answer. Obviously each President has his own style and has his own intellectual cast. I think that both have made a major contribution to American foreign policy.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I have a question from President Ford's home town for you. Would you please comment on the role of Congress and the President in international affairs—how much should its members be informed; how much is your personal diplomacy; how much of it is the domain of Congress and the President?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There are several parts to that question. First, should the Congress be informed? Secondly, of what should it be informed? And third, who shall be informed?

Now, I have always believed—and of course President Ford as a longtime member of the Congress feels this equally strongly—that it is essential to keep the Congress informed of the nature of our foreign policy. The issue is not only of keeping the Congress informed but what information it should be

<sup>1</sup> For remarks by Hartford N. Gunn, president of PBS, introducing Secretary Kissinger and the opening paragraphs of the Secretary's remarks, see press release 337 dated June 16.

given and who can handle that information.

The Congress, in our view, should be consulted on all the main lines of American foreign policy; that is, the major decisions and those that effect changes of course or fundamental commitments. The Congress is in a poor position to handle the day-by-day details of American foreign policy—although, of course, of those, too, they should be informed in a general way. But if you consider the mass of information that comes into the Department day after day, there is no staff in the Congress that could possibly absorb all this information.

The third problem is, who in the Congress should be informed. When I started out as Secretary of State, I established a very close relationship with the leadership of the House and the Senate, and with the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and what is now called the International Relations Committee in the House. In the last two years, however, there has been a revolution in the Congress, especially in the House, so that the traditional leadership can no longer speak for the members as it did in the past. And the traditional committees that concerned themselves with international relations no longer represent the group that is primarily or that is exclusively concerned with foreign policy. So that the requirements of briefing now become enormous. I must say I spend at least 25 percent of my time on the Congress, and my associates spend more. One of the problems we face is to identify a leadership group in the Congress which we can keep informed and with which we would share all relevant information.

So the problem of informing the Congress is soluble if the Congress can organize itself to receive it.

The next question is the degree of congressional supervision in the conduct of policy. Again, I believe that the main lines of policy should be developed on the basis of the closest consultation between the Congress and the executive. But again, even though the line cannot be clearly drawn, for the Congress to get into the tactical issues is likely to be extremely counterproductive. We have seen it with the Trade Act, which hurt relations

between the Soviet Union and the United States and hurt the very people it was supposed to help. We have seen it with respect to the cutoff of military aid to Turkey, which could have very serious repercussions. And we have seen it in a number of other instances.

On the other hand, we are prepared to take into account congressional concerns and to set up a system of consultation so that legislative actions don't become necessary.

I recognize that some of this is a reaction to what is conceived in the Congress as excesses of executive authority, and some of those congressional concerns are quite justified. We will do our best to meet them.

Indeed, I must say that in recent weeks, in fact in recent months, the problem which seemed so acute earlier this year has improved enormously, and the cooperation between the executive and the legislative branches is now going along much more smoothly than earlier.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think the CIA is important to the conduct of our foreign policy, or do you think it has damaged our foreign policy?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think the CIA is important to the conduct of our foreign policy, and I do not believe that it has damaged the conduct of our foreign policy. I believe, at least in my experience, the CIA has acted within Presidential authority.

I think it is essential for the United States to have a first-rate intelligence organization under strict control by the political leadership and under such controls as the Congress can now establish. There obviously have been some abuses that have been described in the Rockefeller report and others that may come out in the reports of the various congressional committees. But I consider the CIA essential for the conduct of our foreign policy, and I hope that it will not be damaged by these various investigations.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think you can really get the Middle East situation calmed down permanently without further full-scale wars?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, the Middle East



has been torn by tensions throughout most of its history and certainly through the last generation. Therefore it would be a rash man to say that it can be calmed down permanently. We will make a major effort to make progress toward a peace settlement, either in the form of an interim agreement or in the form of an overall agreement.

I am hopeful that it can be done without war. I think another Middle East war would be a catastrophe for all of the parties. It would settle none of the issues that are now before them, and at the end of it they would be exactly at the point they have reached now, which is how to negotiate progress toward a lasting peace.

I think we can make progress, and we are working very hard to promote some progress. I think it is imperative that it be done without war.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, California is a region of the country where many of the recent Vietnamese refugees, now immigrants to the United States, are being concentrated. Many of our citizens out there are asking what can the Federal Government do, what can the Ford Administration do, to ameliorate the economic impact on our region from this group of new immigrants.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, of course I am not an expert on the domestic economy, as my colleagues would be eager to tell you. I can't make that point emphatically enough. So quite frankly, I don't know what specific steps we can take to ameliorate the impact of refugees in various communities.

My impression has been that the number was relatively small in terms of the overall labor market; that the number in any one location would not be decisive. I am sure that an effort will be made to ease it. But I cannot give you an answer, because I don't know what these efforts are. It is not in the province of my Department, and everyone knows how meticulous I am not to step over that boundary.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, it has recently been alleged that the strength of the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] oil cartel is due in some part to your*

*Middle Eastern policy of conciliation of both the Arabs and Israelis. If there is any substance to this allegation, is peace in the Middle East worth the price that we must now pay for oil—that is, world inflation?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I don't agree with the allegation. It is easy to take a verbally tough stance.

First of all, conciliation of the Israelis, which is not what I have been accused of in the last few months, has nothing to do with the oil price.

Secondly, with respect to the oil price, it will not come down by a tough declaration. It will come down only when the objective conditions are created which shift the forces of the market or which create political incentives to reduce the price.

This is what we are working on with great energy. We have created over the last year the International Energy Agency, which brings together all of the consuming countries in joint programs of conservation, in developing alternative sources, and in joint research and development programs. It will take some time to take full effect.

But even today the market forces have already shifted somewhat in favor of the consumers, though not yet in a decisive manner. Until they have moved in a more clear-cut manner, no amount of verbal tough talk is going to change this; all the more so since the victims of this are usually the countries that will not join an oil embargo—which we have to keep in mind, in view of Middle East tensions—and that have otherwise cooperated with us.

So I believe that the policies we are pursuing are designed to bring the oil price down and that they cannot be described as conciliating those who want to bring the price up.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, your policies obviously are based on your perceptions of the world we live in today and were formed, I think, as we heard, nearly 20 years ago. I wanted to know if they are still valid or have they really in fact changed?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* My views?

*Q. Yes, sir.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Since they were elaborated 20 years ago? I'll tell you, I have not read anything that I have written since I came down here. And there is good reason for that, because there is a British reviewer who wrote about one of my books, "I don't know whether Mr. Kissinger is a great writer, but anyone who finishes this book is a great reader."

I think it is possible—at least I leave open the theoretical possibility—that I might have changed my mind on something in my life, but don't press me too hard.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the United States has been recently accused of buying the friendship of other countries with gifts, which kind of resulted in a loss of credibility. I was wondering how we are going to counteract that.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I don't believe it would be a valid criticism to say that we are trying to purchase the good will of other countries with gifts.

*Q. I don't believe so, either. But it seems like other people think that.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think basically relations between countries have to be based on their perception of common objectives and their perception of parallel interests.

Through the immediate postwar period, when the United States was economically and militarily the dominant country all over the world and when other countries were either just getting started or were in disarray, it is true that the United States material contribution was quite essential and that this might have created some of the atmosphere that you describe. I don't think this is the situation today.

Today the big problem is to bring the nations of the world together in a recognition of the fact of interdependence and to deal in a cooperative manner with the issues of energy, raw materials, food, that none of them can solve by themselves—that no nation can solve for any other—and that require a cooperative effort. This, I would say, is our big problem. And to the extent that there are vestiges of the previous state of affairs, we are trying to overcome them.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, how have the recent accusations of CIA meddling in policies of foreign countries affected our foreign policy?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There is no other country in the world in which an intelligence agency would be exposed to the public scrutiny that has been the case here in the last six months. In some parts of the world these accusations of meddling have been able to be used as propaganda against our foreign policy.

I think it is safe to say that in most parts of the world, leaders do not consider the substance of the charge as unusual as some Americans do or are not as shocked by these accusations as we like to think—or some of us like to think. I think these reports have been on the whole not helpful to our foreign policy. They have above all not been helpful to the conduct of intelligence operations abroad. But they have not been a major impediment to the conduct of foreign policy.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, does the recent rash of press criticism against you bother you?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Totally unjustified.

*Q. Do you feel they are unfair?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Do I think they are unfair?

*Q. The recent criticism of you in the press.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, of course, unless there was some hope for a terminal date to my efforts, the morale of my associates would disintegrate completely. Are those some of my associates applauding?

I think there was a period where, for understandable reasons, when everything seemed to be disintegrating domestically, praise for me was excessive. This was then balanced by another period in which perhaps criticism was excessive. I tend to think any criticism of me is excessive. I don't think it was unfair.

I have to say this about criticism. One way I keep the press here in control is that my father keeps a scrapbook of anything that is written about me. And he has, I think, 34 volumes. Every author is given

two chances. After he has written two unfavorable articles, he becomes a non-person and is eliminated from the scrapbook. There are few journalists willing to take that risk.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what would you consider positive steps that Castro would have to take before the United States started to change our policy toward Cuba?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have indicated that we would respond to the positive moves that Castro might take. And he has recently moderated the tone of Cuban propaganda and even taken some limited steps. I don't want to give a precise list of our requirements, because I think we should discuss those first through private channels.

But we are prepared to reciprocate Cuban moves, and we do not consider that an animosity toward Cuba is an essential aspect of our foreign policy.

## **World Environment Day Marked by President Ford**

*Statement by President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

On this day, the third anniversary of the opening of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, it is appropriate that we join our neighbors throughout the world to reflect upon efforts being made to improve the quality of our global environment.

Today there is growing recognition of mankind's interdependence, of our relationship with nature's other handiworks, and of the danger to our planet which environmental degradation poses.

An active concern for the environment is the first essential step toward restoration

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<sup>1</sup> Issued on June 5 (text from White House press release).

and preservation of environmental quality. We in the United States, and the citizens of many other countries, have taken that first giant step, but we have far to go.

Through local, national, and international efforts, we have already begun to redeem the works of destruction which man has visited upon the earth for generations.

We recognize that these efforts can succeed on a global scale only if every nation becomes involved. Since participating in the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment at Stockholm in 1972, the United States has joined in international efforts to implement the recommendations formulated by that conference and adopted by the United Nations.

The United States has strongly supported the United Nations Environment Program. We have participated in the development of international conventions to protect the planet, its settlements, and its species. We have entered into bilateral environmental agreements with other countries.

As the United States approaches the beginning of its third century, our desire to maintain and enhance the quality of life in this country and throughout the world remains undiminished. This nation is committed to striving for an environment that not only sustains life but also enriches the lives of people everywhere—harmonizing the works of man and nature. This commitment has recently been reinforced by my proclamation, pursuant to a joint resolution of the Congress, designating March 21, 1975, as Earth Day, and asking that special attention be given to educational efforts directed toward protecting and enhancing our lifegiving environment.

In support of the action of the United Nations General Assembly, I am happy on this day, World Environment Day, to express the dedication and deep concern of Americans for the goal of achieving a better world environment.

## Department Discusses U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

*Statement by William D. Rogers  
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

Mr. Chairman [Representative Jonathan B. Bingham, chairman, Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce]: I welcome this opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce and the Subcommittee on International Organizations.

You have asked for the views of the Department on H.R. 6382, introduced by yourself, a bill that would lift the embargo on U.S. trade with Cuba by removing the legislative authority for it. You also asked for a report on recent developments within the Organization of American States with respect to the Cuban question and a statement on current U.S. policy. I shall cover these questions first. I will then turn to certain others that directly affect U.S.-Cuban relations and which have been commented upon earlier during the joint hearings of your subcommittees, including Cuba's economy, the problem of compensation for expropriated properties, and human rights.

First, I would like to say a word about Cuba in the context of our overall interests in Latin America. Cuba is the subject of intense media interest and in the U.S. Congress. Several members of this body have visited the island recently.

I should not like to be understood as being

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Subcommittees on International Organizations and on International Trade and Commerce of the House Committee on International Affairs on June 11. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

uncomfortable with congressional study visits anywhere in Latin America. Nor am I concerned that the press should focus such lively attention on this part of the Caribbean. But, as Assistant Secretary in charge of our relations with the entire hemisphere, I cannot begin a discussion of Cuba without emphasizing that there is a great deal more to Latin America—a great deal which likewise deserves the most serious attention of the American press, the Congress, and the public.

Cuba should not distract us from the fact that there are some two dozen other nations in this Western Hemisphere, with over 200 million people. The nations of this part of the world share with ours a common Western tradition and culture and a common origin in the struggle for liberty from European colonialism. All are developing. Many share a truly firm commitment to the open society—to the right of political dissent and political competition and to the free creative spirit. Such nations as Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Mexico, democracies all, are just a few examples of other nations in the same region which deserve the sympathetic interest of this Congress and the American people.

Economically, the Latin American nations are generally more advanced than other developing countries. Policies to deal with hemisphere issues are becoming more complex. Raw materials, investments, technology transfer, upgrading of articles in our bilateral trade—these familiar issues must be thought through again as the environment in the hemisphere evolves. They are mammoth issues which will require the best thinking

of our people in the executive and in Congress.

I like to hope that as we move toward more normal relations with Cuba the attention of the American people, of the press, and of the Congress will be drawn more strongly to the struggling democracies of this hemisphere, with whom we share such strong traditions and interests.

Let me now turn to the process of normalization.

#### **Multilateral Character of Trade Constraints**

The problem is, in the first instance, a multilateral problem.

You will recall that a resolution adopted by a two-thirds vote at the meeting of the Organ of Consultation of the Organization of American States in 1964 mandated that the member states of the OAS should terminate diplomatic and commercial relations with Cuba. Our denial program antedated that resolution. But the 1964 resolution, in effect, made it a matter of international law that we not reinstate trade or diplomatic relations with the island until the resolution is changed.

The issue whether to reinstitute trade is therefore for the moment a multilateral issue. For us to resume bilateral commerce now, while the 1964 resolution is still on the books, would be to violate a resolution of the OAS. We take the resolution seriously. A number of other OAS countries have resumed relations, of course. But we consider that the United States has a particular responsibility to honor international legal commitments and that a breach by us would have particularly grave consequences for the integrity and legitimacy of the general peace-keeping structure of the Rio Treaty.

The difficulty with the multilateral character of the present constraints on trade with Cuba is that the other nations of the hemisphere are not of one mind. Some strongly favor a repeal of the 1964 measures. Others oppose. The split within the hemisphere was reflected at the abortive meeting at Quito, Ecuador, last November, where an Organ of Consultation proposal to lift the multilateral measures got 12 votes—not the

necessary two-thirds. The United States adopted a neutral attitude at Quito.

Since then, however, as the Secretary has said, we have been searching with the member states for a solution to this divisive issue which could commend itself to an effective majority.

The Cuban measures must be dealt with under the procedures established in the Rio Treaty itself. Cuba was therefore not on the OAS General Assembly agenda last month. The Rio Treaty functions through the Organ of Consultation. However, the matter did move forward.

As part of the effort to speed the process of OAS reform and modernization, the May General Assembly agreed to convene a Conference of Plenipotentiaries in San José, Costa Rica, from July 16 to 28 to refine the OAS Special Committee's recommendations on a protocol of amendment to the Rio Treaty, approve and open this protocol for signature. The work is far advanced. We expect the conference will reach agreement on a number of useful reforms, including the change in the voting requirement to lift sanctions from two-thirds to a majority. As you know, the United States has supported the change in the voting requirement. We are confident this change will be in the protocol of amendment.

Once a protocol of amendment is approved, it is likely there will be an effort to end the mandatory OAS sanctions. As the Secretary indicated at Houston, the United States stands ready to cooperate in reaching a generally acceptable solution.<sup>2</sup> We are continuing our consultations with other members of the OAS on how to handle the issue. There is considerable sentiment among the member states that a way should be found to implement the principle of majority rule, which will be in the revised treaty, with respect to the existing measures against Cuba and without waiting for the lengthy process of ratification to run its course. If the members can translate that view into a resolution, we can anticipate action at the meeting at San José which will finally and

<sup>2</sup> For Secretary Kissinger's address at Houston on Mar. 1, see BULLETIN of Mar. 24, 1975, p. 361.

effectively take Cuba off the multilateral agenda and leave each nation free to decide for itself whether or not to conduct trade and diplomatic relations with Cuba.

A related development at last month's OAS General Assembly has some bearing on the question of Cuba sanctions. Mexico sponsored a declaration—best described as something akin to a sense-of-Congress resolution—which stated that the members, once a protocol of amendment to the Rio Treaty had been approved, would proceed to leave the sanctions without effect.

The resolution has no legal effect. It passed, but without the vote of enough parties to make a similar move effective under the Rio Treaty. We abstained, along with a number of other countries, on the sound juridical grounds that this particular resolution was improper for the General Assembly since it did not accord with the procedures of the Rio Treaty. In abstaining, we made clear our desire to reach a generally acceptable solution. The indecisive result on the Mexican resolution illustrates the divided views among the OAS members and the importance of moving carefully within the OAS to construct a solid consensus at San José.

In all this, a principal objective has been to find a way to clear the multilateral decks of this issue in a manner that helps restore the integrity of the Rio Treaty. The treaty, we think, is a useful mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes, particularly in respect of conflicts within the hemisphere. It serves as a deterrent to aggression from beyond the seas as well. We want to preserve and nurture it, as do the other countries of the hemisphere. Hence, our efforts not to permit the transient Cuban question to threaten the Rio Treaty system.

#### **Resolving Issues Through Diplomatic Process**

As for future bilateral U.S. policy, Secretary Kissinger has made clear that we do not favor perpetual antagonism with Cuba. We have noted forthcoming and conciliatory statements by high Cuban Government officials recently. There is a change of mood

in Havana toward Washington.

By the same token, the United States has made several gestures on its part toward Cuba recently. These include, for example, the permission for Cuban diplomats accredited to the United Nations to travel 250 miles from New York. Cuba has not reciprocated these gestures. Nevertheless, as the Secretary has said, "We have made clear to Cuba that we are prepared to improve our relations."<sup>3</sup>

The several recent unofficial visitors to Cuba have not attempted to, and could not, substitute for the process of conventional diplomatic negotiation. We do not consider them, or the public media of TV or newspapers, as a method of communication to and from Cuba. The process of improving and normalizing relations, in the case of Cuba as in other instances, is first and foremost a process of negotiation. That negotiation can only be conducted by direct contacts between representatives of the two governments concerned. It cannot be done indirectly through third-party intermediaries, or through public statements to the press.

As to our policy, when and if the multilateral measures against Cuba are repealed by the OAS, there are a considerable number of issues on both sides. Trade is one. We are also concerned with the question of family visits in both directions; we are concerned with prisoners now in Cuban jails; we are concerned with the return of aircraft-hijack ransom money which found its way to Cuba and which Cuba has retained; we are concerned with the question of compensation for expropriated U.S. property; we are concerned with Cuba's attitude about Puerto Rico; and we are concerned whether Cuba is prepared to follow a clear practice of nonintervention everywhere in the hemisphere.

Cuba, on the other hand, is interested not only in resuming trade. It is also concerned with the reinstatement of diplomatic relationships; it is concerned with Guantanamo; and it is concerned with expanding athletic

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<sup>3</sup> For an interview with Secretary Kissinger broadcast on the NBC-TV "Today" show on May 7, see BULLETIN of May 26, 1975, p. 671.

and cultural relations among other things.

This agenda of interrelated and sensitive national interest issues can only be addressed through a diplomatic process which can deal with the total agenda coherently. That process, at best, will be long and intricate. For the Congress to concentrate on one issue only, to mandate the premature dismantlement of the present ban on Cuban trade and to open the U.S. market to Cuban imports and permit quite free export from the United States to Cuba without regard to the other circumstances of our complex relationship, would be a mistake. It would take away an important element of executive discretion in the conduct of our foreign relations. This should further complicate the task of putting relations with Cuba on a solid and mutually satisfactory basis. Congress should speak to the rules of the game. But it should not try to play each hand. For this reason we would not support H.R. 6382.

#### **Cuba's Economic Performance**

I now turn to Cuba's economic performance and trade prospects. These subjects will be covered more thoroughly, I understand, by Deputy Assistant Secretary [Arthur T.] Downey of the Commerce Department. I do wish to make some comments particularly as they bear on foreign policy and possibilities for normalizing relations with Cuba.

Cuba's economic performance after 1959 was largely shaped by two circumstances: the economic denial policy and ineffective and inconsistent economic planning. Our percentage of Cuba's total foreign trade dropped from 66 percent in 1959 to 2 percent in 1961 and zero in 1962, creating obvious adjustment consequences. At the same time, indecision and false starts in market and production planning, perhaps best illustrated by the early decision to diversify out of sugar and the later impractical target of output of 10 million tons in 1970—the consequence was limited growth in product.

From a review of this experience stemmed reorganization and the beginning of better performance. Material incentives were substituted for moral ones. Improved national

planning was instituted, and cost accounting techniques were adopted. Even before the price of sugar soared in 1974, the Cuban economy had entered into a period of more rapid growth. Then the bonanza of soaring sugar prices in 1974 brought Cuba its first trade surplus under Castro.

Although sugar prices already have come down, it is likely they will remain at levels higher than in the 1960's, owing to a steadily growing demand for sugar throughout the world, particularly on the part of developing countries. To some extent this will be offset by increased planting of cane and beets and the development of substitutes. But some stabilization of sugar prices is a possibility.

Cuba's other exports are minerals (mainly nickel), citrus fruits, rum, tobacco, and seafood. Cuba is trying to increase these exports to lessen its heavy dependence on sugar as a foreign exchange earner.

Development of tourism is another potential source of foreign exchange. Although there has been some ambiguity in the past in Cuba about welcoming large numbers of tourists from the rest of the hemisphere, recent indications point to a cautious move in the direction of refurbishing hotels to attract a share of the sunshine tourist trade.

Our estimate is that the Cuban economy will continue its recent growth. Internally, diversification is proceeding. Externally, Cuba is in the process of shifting part of its trade from the Communist world to the industrialized countries of the West and Japan. If it proves possible to achieve normalization of U.S.-Cuban bilateral relations, some share of this trade would probably be diverted to the United States.

#### **Considerations Affecting Trade Prospects**

With the above in mind, I would like to devote a few words to prospects for U.S. trade with Cuba. More than 100 U.S. companies have asked us about the prospects for trade relations with Cuba. To our knowledge there have been few if any surveys by business of the potential. Most companies tell us they do not know the prospects but they do not wish to be the last to enter an opening market.

Our reading of the situation leads us to caution on the immediate prospects. The legacy of over a decade of antagonism and diversion of trade relations elsewhere, together with the complex question of Cuba's attitude toward and respect for private enterprise and private property, as reflected in the vexed issue of compensation for claims, will restrain any great expansion of business.

I believe a number of witnesses here have also advised to avoid extravagant expectations. In the long run, there may be greater opportunities, perhaps in yet-to-be-developed industries and mining processes. Indications now, however, are that the Cubans are uncertain how to face the prospect of American tourists and businessmen, notwithstanding a respect for American advanced technology and familiarity with an industrial infrastructure largely of American origin.

An additional consideration of importance to us is that since our economic sanctions against Cuba were instituted we have developed other trade relationships. As some Cuban leaders have said, geography dictates that there should be trade between the United States and Cuba. In principle we agree. But if relations are normalized, trade with Cuba would have to be phased so as not to disrupt our trade relationships with countries from which we have been buying sugar and cigars for the past decade. And we would imagine that Cuba would have similar concerns about its trading partners.

#### **Condition of Human Rights in Cuba**

I would now like to address briefly the other subject of these hearings: the question of human rights in Cuba.

During the OAS General Assembly last month, I made a statement in the context of Chile. I said that no issue is more fundamental to the business of the hemisphere than the humane tradition which is common to us all—the sustenance of human freedom and individual dignity. If we are concerned about human rights in Chile and elsewhere in the hemisphere, we should be no less so about human rights in nextdoor Cuba. As the Deputy Secretary of State wrote to

Chairman Morgan on June 27, 1974: <sup>4</sup>

No matter where in the world violations of human rights occur, they trouble and concern us and we make our best efforts to ascertain the facts and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

We do not regard human rights as an exclusively domestic concern. The OAS member states have subscribed to international standards in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man signed in Bogotá in 1948. The present Cuban Government has never renounced the standards established in the American Declaration although, as you know, Cuba has been excluded from participation in the Organization of American States since 1962.

Three reports by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission issued in 1963, 1967, and 1970 detail the cases, and incidents brought before the Commission and additional denunciations are contained in the Commission's annual reports. The Commission has addressed the Government of Cuba on numerous occasions requesting information on the events denounced. In view of the silence of the Cuban Government, the Commission, in accordance with its procedures and on the basis of other factors, concluded in its 1970 report:

1. That there are many persons in Cuba, including women and children, who have been jailed for political reasons and executed without prior trial or after a trial in which the accused did not enjoy the guarantees of due process.

2. That the situation of the political prisoners in Cuba sentenced to imprisonment after having been arbitrarily arrested and subjected to trials in which the guarantees of due process have not been observed, continues to have extremely serious characteristics incompatible with the principles set forth in the Charter of the OAS, the American Convention of Human Rights, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

We condemn violations of human rights anywhere, including in Cuba. We regret the failure of the Cuban Government to cooperate with the Commission.

<sup>4</sup> For text of the letter, see BULLETIN of Aug. 26, 1974, p. 310.



Mr. Chairman, two questions have arisen in these hearings: the current status of human rights in Cuba and the relationship between the human rights problem and U.S. policy toward Cuba.

Previous witnesses before your subcommittees have estimated that there are between 100,000 and 200,000 political prisoners incarcerated in Cuba. The U.S. Government does not have a definite number, and we are not able to confirm these estimates. Cuban leaders have been reticent about this subject both publicly and in private discussions with visiting Americans.

The only occasion we are aware of when a Cuban leader cited a number publicly came in 1965 when Prime Minister Castro told Lee Lockwood, a journalist, that there were 20,000 political prisoners. In his October 1974 interview with CBS television, Mr. Castro said that 80 percent of Cuban political prisoners had been released. These are the only public references by Cuban leaders that have come to our attention.

If the numbers are unclear, what is certain is that there continue to be political prisoners in Cuba. They include eight U.S. citizens serving 20-to-30-year sentences.

Parenthetically, I might add that there are also 765 American citizens and 1,177 Cuban-national relatives of our citizens presumably still seeking to leave Cuba and registered with the Swiss Embassy in Havana. Cuba claims that of these only 89 are American citizens. The Cuban Government states that the other 1,853 who registered to leave are Cuban-national and dual-national relatives. Only a handful of these persons has been permitted to leave Cuba annually since termination of repatriation flights.

Let me turn now to the key question of our policy and human rights in Cuba. Since the break in diplomatic relations between our two countries 14 years ago, mutual antagonism characterized our official attitudes until recently. Nonetheless two understandings were reached by our governments. One established the airlift which enabled 265,000 Cubans to come to our country. The other contributed to the near-elimination of hijackings of U.S. passenger aircraft—a

measure which, incidentally, we regard as a major step forward and which represented, in our view, a significant gesture on the part of the Government of Cuba.

The airlift is our major achievement in the general area of human rights during this entire period. In fact, it could be argued, as it has by some scholars, that the policy of international hostility increased the propensity of the Cuban Government to internal repression. For example, thousands were arrested in the wake of the Bay of Pigs.

It has been suggested in these hearings by some that reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba could have the effect of ameliorating human rights problems in Cuba or at least of providing a channel for the better expression of our concern. Others have suggested that resumption of diplomatic and commercial relations would countenance the human rights practices of the present Cuban administration and thus violate all moral principles.

With regard to the first view, I would only say that the policy of hostility and of seeking Cuba's isolation had, so far as we can ascertain, no significant positive impact on Cuba's record in the human rights field.

With regard to the second suggestion, I note that the United States has diplomatic and commercial relations with many countries whose forms of government are contrary to the democratic principles which guide our own nation. Senate Resolution 205, passed in 1969, states that the recognition by the United States of a foreign government and exchange of diplomatic representations does not imply that the United States approves the form, ideology, or policies of that government. We share this view and would emphasize that maintenance of relations does not imply either moral approval or condemnation of its governmental practices.

In conclusion, we continue to be concerned with the condition of human rights in Cuba and to have a humanitarian interest in seeing families reunited. You may be assured that in any future negotiations with Cuba this concern and interest on our part will be conveyed.

## Department Summarizes U.S. Policy Toward Namibia

*Statement by Nathaniel Davis  
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

I am happy to have the opportunity to represent the Department of State before this subcommittee which is examining U.S. policy toward Namibia. The recently concluded U.N. Security Council meeting on Namibia has focused international attention on the Namibian question and on the policy of a number of countries, including the United States, toward the territory.

I would begin by stating that the past year has seen no change in basic U.S. policy toward Namibia. We have reiterated publicly our support for U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2145 of October 1966, which terminated South Africa's mandate over Namibia, and for the conclusions of the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion of 1971.

We have made clear to the South African Government our deep concern over violations of human rights in the territory and have emphasized our position that although the mandate has been revoked, South Africa continues to have obligations to insure the observance of basic human rights.

One example of our concrete concern in the human rights area was our persistent effort during the first half of 1974 to seek information from the South African Government on the detention of some 15 SWAPO [South West Africa People's Organization] and SWAPO Youth League members arrested in late January and early February 1974.

Efforts by our Embassy in South Africa to obtain particulars on these detentions, such as charges and planned charges, the legal basis of detention, access to counsel,

places of detention, et cetera, began on February 22, 1974. After repeated oral and written inquiries on our part, the South African Department of Foreign Affairs replied on June 25 by supplying us with the answers to some but not all of our questions.

Our efforts to obtain further information continued until all of the 15 detainees were either released without being charged or brought to trial. Officers from our Embassy in South Africa attended all three trials which were eventually held, involving five detainees. One detainee was found not guilty; two detainees, including SWAPO National Chairman David Meroro, were found guilty but received light suspended sentences. The remaining two detainees, David Taopopi and Joseph Kashea, were found guilty of attempting to incite people "to commit murder or to cause public violence or malicious damage to property in South West Africa" and sentenced to five years with three years suspended.

Our Embassy in South Africa also made strong representations to the South African Government in November 1973 and again in April 1974 when we became aware of press reports that people in Ovamboland, northern Namibia, were being publicly flogged because of their political opposition to the South African administration of Namibia. On both occasions our Ambassador to South Africa made clear to high South African Department of Foreign Affairs officials our deep concern over these reported floggings and emphasized the ultimate responsibility which the South African Government bore for the actions of tribal authorities in Namibia. Since that time the appellate division of the South African Supreme Court, on February 24, 1975, has enjoined such political floggings in Ovamboland.

Regarding U.S. investment in and trade with Namibia, we continue to inform prospective U.S. investors in Namibia who come to our attention by letter, and in some cases orally, of our policy of discouraging investment in the territory. They are also informed that the U.S. Government will not undertake to protect investments made on the basis of rights acquired from the South

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Subcommittee on International Resources, Food, and Energy of the House Committee on International Relations on June 10. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

African Government following the 1966 termination of the mandate against the claims of a future lawful government in Namibia. In addition, Export-Import Bank facilities are not made available for trade with Namibia. U.S. firms having investments in Namibia are informed by letter of U.S. support for U.N. Security Council Resolution 310 (1972) and of our hope that they will seek to conform their employment practices to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

We have also sent to all U.S. companies having interests in Namibia a pamphlet prepared by the Department of State in February 1973 entitled "Employment Practices of U.S. Firms in South Africa." This pamphlet describes the initiatives taken by various firms in South Africa to improve the employment conditions of non-white workers and urges other countries to follow suit. In addition these U.S. firms have received a September 1974 statement in which we call upon U.S. firms to persist in their efforts to insure that their employees and their families have the means available to lead decent and productive lives.

We are encouraged by Newmont Mining Corporation's public statement in its 1974 annual report of its policy to adhere to fair employment principles and to seek application of these principles by its subsidiaries and affiliates. The annual report also states that the Tsumeb Corporation in Namibia, mostly owned by Newmont and another U.S. firm, American Metal Climax, Inc., has received permission from the de facto authorities to build an initial 100 houses for black workers and their families.

We believe that our present policy on investment reflects our concern over South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and our desire that the people be permitted to exercise their right of self-determination. We would hope that our investment policy, together with our efforts to encourage U.S. firms in Namibia to utilize enlightened employment practices, would result in a future lawful Namibian government being favorably disposed toward U.S. investment. However, at this stage, it is difficult to predict

what position such a government would take regarding U.S. investment.

At this point I wish to reiterate the Department's position on the granting of tax credits for U.S. firms doing business in Namibia. While the U.S. Government regards South Africa as illegally occupying Namibia and considers the official actions of the South African Government to be invalid, the Treasury Department has determined that these factors are not governing in determining whether payments to the South African Government are creditable under section 901 of the Internal Revenue Code; thus tax credits are granted. In the Treasury view, the current law provides for a credit in the event of any payment of taxes upon income to a governing power without regard to its legality. We do not consider the granting of the tax credit to imply any recognition by the U.S. Government of the legality of the taxing power, in this case the South African Government.

The U.N. Council for Namibia decree of September 27, 1974, for the protection of the natural resources of Namibia has generated considerable interest. This decree asserts that no person or corporate body may explore, process, or export any Namibian natural resources without the permission of the U.N. Council for Namibia and declares that concessions granted by the South African Government in Namibia are null and void. Furthermore, under the decree, natural resources taken from Namibia without the consent of the U.N. Council for Namibia, and the ships carrying them, are subject to seizure by or on behalf of the U.N. Council for Namibia, and persons and corporations contravening the decree may be liable for damages by a future independent Namibian government. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3295 of December 13, 1974, inter alia, requested all states to insure full compliance with the provisions of the decree. The United States abstained on the resolution, essentially because it contained a veiled call for chapter VII action by the Security Council. The Department of State takes the position that enforcement jurisdiction regarding this decree rests not with the executive branch

but rather with the courts and parties involved.

U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2248 of May 19, 1967, which established the Council for Namibia, directed the Council to proceed immediately to Namibia and granted it broad administrative powers, all of which were "to be discharged in the territory." We have interpreted this provision to mean that the Council can exercise its administrative powers only after it gains admission to the territory. However, we cannot judge what position the courts would take should the Council seek legal recourse to enforce the decree.

The Department of State periodically reviews the question of U.S. membership on the U.N. Council for Namibia. The United States abstained on U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2248, which established the Council, because we believed the stated functions of the Council, such as traveling to Namibia to take over the administration of the territory from the South African Government, were beyond the U.N.'s available means to achieve. We therefore declined to serve on the Council and have maintained this position ever since.

Mr. Chairman, you have also requested the U.S. position on support for the U.N. Fund for Namibia and the Institute for Namibia. In 1974 the United States made a voluntary contribution of \$50,000 to the U.N. Fund for Namibia. In making this contribution, we stated that further U.S. contributions to the Fund would be conditional upon the cessation of allocations from the regular U.N. budget to the Fund. The 29th U.N. General Assembly in December 1974 authorized the appropriation of \$200,000 from the U.N.'s general budget for the Fund for Namibia. Therefore we have not proposed to make a voluntary contribution to the Fund in 1975. However, on March 21, 1975, the United States pledged, subject to congressional approval, \$50,000 to the U.N. Education and Training Program for Southern Africa to be earmarked for the training of Namibians.

With regard to the Institute for Namibia to be established in Lusaka, we agree in principle with the purpose of its creation.

We are awaiting further details, particularly budgetary, regarding its establishment and functions. We will then be in a position to decide what concrete assistance, if any, we are prepared to offer.

Regarding the future of Namibia, we hold the following views:

a. All Namibians should, within a short time, be given the opportunity to express their views freely and under U.N. supervision on the political future and constitutional structure of the territory;

b. All Namibian political groups should be allowed to campaign for their views and to participate without hindrance in peaceful political activities in the course of the process of self-determination;

c. The territory should not be split up in accordance with apartheid policy; and

d. The future of Namibia should be determined by the freely expressed choice of its inhabitants.

Over the past year the U.S. Government has made known its views on the future of Namibia both directly and indirectly to the South African Government. In late November and early December 1974, we conveyed to the South African Government our belief that South Africa should make plans in consultation with the U.N. Secretary General for speedy self-determination within the whole territory and issue a specific statement of its intentions toward the territory. On December 17, 1974, we joined in the unanimous adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 366, which demanded that South Africa take a number of actions including the necessary steps to transfer power to the people of Namibia with U.N. assistance. On April 22 we joined with the British and French in a tripartite approach to the South African Government to express our views on the future of Namibia.

The South African Government issued virtually identical responses to the April 22 tripartite approach and to Security Council Resolution 366 on May 27. In these responses the South African Government emphasized its standing policies on Namibia. It did state that unitary independence was one of the

options open to the inhabitants of the territory who would determine freely their own political and constitutional future and that it would administer the territory "only as long as the inhabitants so wish."

The South African Government asserted that while it ruled out U.N. supervision of Namibia, it expressed Prime Minister Vorster's willingness to discuss the Namibian situation with a mutually acceptable representative of the U.N. Secretary General, African leaders, the President of the U.N. Council for Namibia and the OAU [Organization of African Unity] Special Committee on Namibia (composed of the seven African members of the U.N. Council for Namibia). These responses did not indicate that South Africa was willing to withdraw from Namibia in accordance with U.N. resolutions, nor did they give significant details for proceeding to self-determination along lines stipulated by these U.N. resolutions.

The U.S. Government approached last week's Security Council debate on Namibia believing that there had been some forward movement in the Namibian situation over the preceding six months, but clearly not enough. We were disappointed at the pace of movement toward genuine self-determination.

However, in order to deal realistically with the present situation, we believe that South Africa's offer to resume a dialogue with a representative of the U.N. Secretary General and to hold discussions with various African leaders, the President of the U.N. Council for Namibia, and the OAU Special Committee on Namibia should be explored and South Africa should be induced to move from general statements of purpose to specific implementing action. We reiterate our belief that U.N. supervision of the self-determination process is necessary to assure the international community that Namibians will be able to choose freely their political future.

Efforts to negotiate an acceptable resolution in the Security Council debate were unsuccessful. As I have said, we condemn South Africa's continued and illegal occu-

pation of Namibia, and we made this clear during our participation in the Council's debates. However, we believe that the most effective way to bring about the genuine exercise of the right of self-determination for all Namibians is through continued efforts to induce South Africa to move more quickly to implement its agreement to such a right. There were serious and good-faith efforts to work out a meaningful compromise text during the negotiations at the United Nations last week, but in the end the African group decided to press for a vote on its text. We shall continue to work through the U.N. and with interested parties for the implementation of U.N. resolutions regarding Namibia.

## **Corporate Payments Abroad Discussed by Department**

*Statement by Mark B. Feldman  
Deputy Legal Adviser<sup>1</sup>*

In recent weeks, the media have carried a number of stories dealing with reported political contributions and other payments by U.S. firms to foreign government officials. Such payments and their disclosure can have important ramifications for our foreign relations and economic interests. It would not be appropriate for the Department of State to comment on the details of individual cases which are currently under investigation by other U.S. Government agencies; I would, however, like to discuss with you the effects some of these developments have had on our foreign relations, and what the State Department believes the U.S. Government should do about it.

At the outset, I want to make clear that the Department of State cannot and does not

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<sup>1</sup> Made before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy of the House Committee on International Relations on June 5. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

condone illegal activities by American firms operating in other countries. We condemn such actions in the strongest terms. Illicit contributions and their disclosure can adversely affect governments, unfairly tarnish the reputation of responsible American businessmen, and make it more difficult for the U.S. Government to assist U.S. firms in the lawful pursuit of their legitimate business interests abroad.

Let me give a few examples of events related to the disclosures of the last weeks which have impacted on our foreign relations:

—The head of a friendly government has been removed from office and other friendly leaders have come under political attack.

—Both multinational enterprises and U.S. Government agencies have been accused of attempting to subvert foreign governments.

—A firm linked with payments in one country has had property in another country expropriated, not because of any alleged improprieties in that country, but simply on the grounds that it was an "undesirable firm."

—Several governments have presented firms suspected of making payments with ultimatums of economic retaliation or criminal prosecution.

These are certainly disturbing developments. They underscore the reason that the U.S. Government urges our enterprises to respect the laws of all the nations in which they operate and to conduct themselves as good corporate citizens of those nations. Yet companies cannot operate in a vacuum, and it is the responsibility of host governments to set out the rules under which firms and public officials deal with each other.

Regrettably, governments, as well as firms, have not always exercised their responsibilities in this area. Investors frequently find themselves in countries where the laws dealing with political contributions, agents' fees, or other payments are unclear or unenforced. In countries where small payments are a necessity for getting things done at the lowest echelons of the bureaucracy, larger payments may be solicited or de-

manded by high-level officials. It should also be noted that these problems are not confined to American enterprises. Foreign competition frequently contributes to these pressures.

By describing such conditions, I am not trying to excuse improper activities by U.S. firms. Far from it. Corruption weakens the fabric of government, erodes popular support, and jeopardizes the important interests we share with our friends abroad.

The free enterprise system is a vital factor in world economic growth upon which social progress, economic justice, and perhaps world peace depends. There are many opponents eager to restrict free enterprise, and every American businessman who invests or sells abroad holds an important trust for the integrity of the system.

What, then, should be done?

First, it is important that all U.S. investors and foreign governments clearly understand that we condemn payments to foreign government officials and that any investor who makes them cannot look to the Department of State to protect him from legitimate law enforcement actions by the responsible authorities of either the host country or the United States.

Second, the U.S. agencies investigating these cases should cooperate with responsible foreign authorities seeking information consistent with the requirements of our laws and procedural fairness. However, these agencies cannot act on the basis of rumor or speculation.

Third, the U.S. Government will provide appropriate diplomatic protection to American nationals abroad who are not treated fairly in accordance with international law. We are concerned at threats of extrajudicial sanctions which may be disproportionate to the offense and based on unproved allegations. We do not believe that economic retaliation is an appropriate response to payments which, although controversial, are either lawful under the foreign law concerned, or if unlawful, are subject to specific civil or criminal penalties prescribed by that law.

Beyond these clear statements of policy,

however, I believe that we need to move carefully. Some have suggested that we should enact legislation making it a criminal act for U.S. companies to engage abroad in what we regard as improper activities here at home, such as corporate political contributions. Although investors operating in foreign lands would be wise to avoid even the appearance of impropriety in those countries, we believe it would not be advisable for the United States to try to legislate the limits of permissible conduct by our firms abroad. It would be not only presumptuous but counterproductive to seek to impose our specific standards in countries with differing histories and cultures. Moreover, enforcement of such legislation would involve surveillance of the activities of foreign officials as well as U.S. businessmen and would be widely resented abroad.

Extraterritorial application of U.S. law, which is what such legislation would entail, has often been viewed by other governments as a sign of U.S. arrogance or even as interference in their internal affairs. U.S. penal laws are normally based on territorial jurisdictions, and with rare exceptions, we believe that is sound policy.

There are other actions that can be taken, however. The Securities and Exchange Commission and other regulatory agencies have the authority to protect specific American interests in foreign transactions, such as the disclosure of material information necessary to protect the investment of shareholders in public companies. The SEC has demonstrated that it is prepared to act forcefully in these cases, and that demonstration should have a positive effect on U.S. businessmen and on those they deal with abroad.

In addition, the executive agencies responsible for administering programs abroad which may provide temptations for such activities need to review their procedures to see whether additional measures might be effective. The Department of State and the Defense Department have begun such a review of the foreign military sales program, and we expect improved procedures to result that should be helpful.

Another possible approach could be to

reflect our position in a code of conduct concerning multinational corporations (MNC's). The U.S. Government has indicated in a number of international fora that it is willing to examine the possibility of development of guidelines relative to MNC's, provided that such guidelines take into account the responsibilities of host states as well as those of enterprises. If other governments are agreeable, such a code might include a specific provision to the effect that foreign investors should neither make nor be solicited to make payments to government officials or contributions to political parties or candidates. This would be a modest step, but international acceptance of this principle might help to relieve pressures for questionable payments.

I am sure, Mr. Chairman, that all of the members of this committee appreciate the complexities of this problem. Corruption of friendly foreign governments undermines the most important objectives of our foreign relations. But experience shows the United States cannot police foreign societies. In the final analysis the only solution to corruption lies in the societies concerned.

## **Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy**

### **94th Congress, 1st Session**

Granting an Alien Child Adopted by an Unmarried United States Citizen the Same Immigrant Status as an Alien Child Adopted by a United States Citizen and His Spouse. Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary to accompany H.R. 568. H. Rept. 94-121. March 26, 1975. 7 pp.

Foreign Service Buildings Act, 1926. Report of the House Committee on International Relations to accompany H.R. 5810. H. Rept. 94-140. April 10, 1975. 6 pp.

Congress and Foreign Policy: 1974. Prepared for the House Committee on International Relations by the Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. April 15, 1975. 72 pp.

Vietnam Contingency Act of 1975. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, together with individual views, to accompany S. 1484. S. Rept. 94-88. April 18, 1975. 26 pp.

Ending the Conflict in Vietnam. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. Res. 133. S. Rept. 94-89. April 18, 1975. 2 pp.

## U.S. Vetoes Resolution on Namibia in U.N. Security Council

*Following are statements made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative John Scali on June 3 and June 6, together with the text of a draft resolution which was vetoed by the United States and two other permanent members of the Council on June 6.*

### STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR SCALI

#### Statement of June 3

USUN press release 63 dated June 3

Last December the United States supported Security Council Resolution 366. We voted "yes" in the belief that the text, though imperfect in some ways, adequately reflected our view that South Africa should act quickly and decisively to end its illegal occupation of Namibia. We believe, moreover, that the Security Council rightly placed its views and recommendations before the South African Government and urged it to move promptly along the path indicated.

During the last six months, there has been some forward movement in the Namibian situation, but not enough. It is clear, however, that regardless of how disappointed we are at the pace of steps toward genuine self-determination, we must move carefully lest we worsen rather than improve the outlook for justice and freedom.

In this connection we hear calls for an arms embargo. The record of the U.S. Government in this respect is one of which the American people can be proud. For 12 years the U.S. Government has voluntarily refused to allow shipments of American arms and military equipment to South Africa. Our government has done this as a matter of principle. We do so out of con-

viction and not because we are required to do so by an international forum. If others wish, they can join us in such a voluntary policy, and we earnestly invite them to do so.

As the Security Council considers what constructive steps it can take for the future of Namibia, there are four fundamental questions as we see them:

—Whether there is a commitment by South Africa to a course of self-determination for all the people of Namibia and to respect for their rights;

—The timing of steps toward self-determination once that principle is accepted by South Africa;

—The question whether all Namibians, of whatever color, political affiliation, or social origin, would have their voices heard in determining the future of the territory; and

—The U.N.'s role in the process of self-determination for all the people of Namibia.

The South African Government made public its position on Namibia in a letter from Foreign Minister Muller to Secretary General Waldheim on May 27. In this letter, the South African Foreign Minister restated many positions already put forward by his government.

My delegation believes we should explore South Africa's offer to resume a dialogue with a representative of the U.N. Secretary General and to enter into discussions with African leaders, with the Chairman of the United Nations Council for Namibia, and with the Special Committee of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). We fully recognize the past difficulties in such dialogues and note the restrictive terms of South Africa's present offer. Nonetheless, in our view, it is important that new efforts be made to determine whether, in fact, a genuine discussion can now be initiated in these channels.

We also note that the letter of May 27,



in discussing the future of the territory, states that all options are open, including "independence as one state." We have also noted that this letter reiterates South Africa's recognition of the international status of the territory and states that it is the South African Government's wish that a constitutional conference take place in as short a time as possible.

Mr. Muller's words go somewhat beyond the assurances he gave the Secretary General in April 1973. They may reflect a more realistic appraisal of the situation in southern Africa. Ambiguities remain, and South Africa should provide clarification of its intent. We wish to know more precisely when and in what manner the planned constitutional convention will be conducted and who exactly will participate.

During the Council's debate on December 17, 1974, I called unequivocally for precision and detail in South African planning for Namibia's future. Coupled with positive action. Such clarity is called for to insure a peaceful and realistic settlement of the territory's future. Mr. Muller's most recent statements may offer hope that South Africa will allow a truly fair exercise of self-determination in Namibia.

South Africa must now move from general statements of purpose to specific implementing action. Can South Africa be in any doubt that the international community wants these steps to define Namibia's separate status and the timetable for carrying them out, and these to be stated in unambiguous terms?

At its meeting in Dar es Salaam in April, the OAU Council of Ministers reviewed the situation in Namibia and adopted a comprehensive declaration on the territory aimed at overcoming South Africa's recalcitrance. Members of the Security Council, including the United States, have also been active in seeking to encourage South Africa to move forward decisively in Namibia to allow the Namibian people to express their views freely on the political future and the constitutional structure of the territory.

The United Nations, and this Council especially, have a unique and grave responsibility

for Namibia and its future. South Africa has now given us some reason to expect that it acknowledges the interest of the international community in Namibia even though it still has not accepted U.N. participation in the process of self-determination for Namibia. Once again we declare to South Africa that it is our considered view that without a role for the United Nations in the self-determination process, the international community cannot judge progress objectively and therefore cannot be satisfied that the people of Namibia will be able to exercise a democratic choice as to their future.

The United States, for its part, remains committed to the view (a) that all the people of Namibia should within a short time be given the opportunity to express their views freely and under U.N. supervision on the political future and constitutional structure of the territory; (b) that all Namibian political groups should be allowed to campaign for their views and to participate without hindrance in peaceful political activities in the course of the process of self-determination; (c) that the territory should not be split up in accordance with the policy of apartheid; and (d) that the future of Namibia should be determined by the freely expressed choice of its inhabitants.

As we continue to press for these goals, the United States will sustain its present policies with regard to the territory. We will continue to discourage U.S. investment in Namibia and to deny Export-Import Bank guarantees and other facilities for trade with Namibia. We will continue to withhold U.S. Government protection of U.S. investments made on the basis of rights acquired through the South African Government after 1966 against the claims of a future lawful government of Namibia. This policy reflects our strongly held belief that South Africa should act in the immediate future to end its illegal occupation of Namibia.

Mr. President, the obligation of this Council is to foster a peaceful and just settlement. Our agreed goal is the exercise by the people of Namibia of their right to self-determination. As a responsible delibera-

tive body, it is our duty to encourage all the parties concerned and to explore every possible opportunity for launching the process of timely self-determination.

In view of the facts of the Namibian situation, it is difficult to find that a threat to international peace and security exists within the meaning of the charter. The party seen by some as causing the threat has agreed on some of the objectives desired by the international community and has offered to exchange views on the means of achieving them. This clearly does not add up to a crisis, peace-and-war situation at this time.

Thus, in our view, it would not be appropriate to invoke mandatory sanctions which specifically are reserved for threats to the peace. We believe the Council, in collaboration with other African states, should insist that South Africa give concrete effect to its words, give firm assurances about the issues on which it has not yet declared its position, and move forward with dispatch toward a new environment of freedom in southern Africa.

#### Statement of June 6

USUN press release 64 dated June 6

On behalf of my government, I have voted "no" on draft resolution S/11713 with grave reluctance and concern.

The power of the permanent members of the Security Council to cast a veto is a right that must be exercised after the most careful and solemn consideration. Indeed, this occasion marks only the seventh time in the 29-year history of the United Nations that the United States has found it necessary to do so. But my government believes that the situation in Namibia, however illegal, however unacceptable to the international community, does not constitute a threat to international peace and security.

We recognize that many of the states represented around the Security Council table have a different view. But we are obliged to make our own careful estimate of the conditions which we believe to exist

and to act accordingly within the Charter of the United Nations, which all of us have pledged to uphold.

As I said on behalf of the United States in my opening statement June 3, we cannot accept the view that there exists a threat to the peace in Namibia in a situation where the wrongdoer, South Africa, has offered, even if on terms not entirely to our liking, to enter into discussions with the organized international community on the objective of self-determination for Namibia.

The United States wishes to draw attention to the praiseworthy efforts of several members of the Council in seeking to draft a resolution which all members could have supported. These delegations sought over many hours to point the way for this Council to adopt practical measures to advance the struggle for freedom and justice in Namibia. The goal of a resolution which, unhappily, never was tabled could, in our view, have led to visible progress rather than a debate ending in dispute and deadlock. My delegation is gravely disappointed that these serious efforts to find an acceptable middle way have failed.

In this situation we feel compelled to ask: Who will benefit from the inability of the Council to take the effective action which would have been possible today? Once again, in contrast to the usefulness of the Council's unanimity in the case of Resolution 366, we have today yielded to the lure of rhetoric, which should never be mistaken for effective action in the real world.

Who will find comfort in the failure of this Council? Certainly not the United States, which has a long record of working for universal recognition that Namibia is a serious, solemn international responsibility.

As I said in my speech on Tuesday, the United States for 12 long years has followed a policy of banning all arms and military supplies to South Africa. We have done so voluntarily as a matter of principle—deliberately—to avoid encouraging Pretoria to think the United States will sacrifice national principle for military or financial

gain. We will continue to uphold principle. We pray we have not lost momentum in the struggle for freedom and justice in southern Africa.

#### TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION<sup>1</sup>

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, which terminated South Africa's mandate over the Territory of Namibia, and resolution 2248 (S-V), of 19 May 1967, which established the United Nations Council for Namibia, as well as all other subsequent resolutions on Namibia, in particular resolution 3295 (XXIX) of 13 December 1974,

*Recalling* Security Council resolution 245 (1968) of 25 January and 246 (1968) of 15 March 1968, 264 (1969) of 12 August 1969, 276 (1970) of 30 January, 282 (1970) of 23 July, 283 (1970) and 284 (1970) of 29 July 1970, 390 (1971) of 12 October and 301 (1971) of 20 October 1971, 310 (1972) of 4 February 1972 and 366 (1974) of 17 December 1974, which confirmed General Assembly decisions,

*Recalling* the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 that South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its presence from the Territory,

*Taking note* of the letter dated 27 May 1975, addressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa to the Secretary-General (S/11701),

*Having heard* the statement by the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia,

*Having considered* the statement by Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO),

*Gravely concerned* about South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia and its persistent refusal to comply with resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971,

*Gravely concerned* at South Africa's brutal repression of the Namibian people and its persistent violations of their human rights, as well as its efforts to destroy the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia,

*Reaffirming* the inalienable and imprescriptible rights of the people of Namibia to self-determina-

tion, national independence and the preservation of their territorial integrity,

*Noting with concern* that South Africa has not made the declaration demanded in paragraph 3 of resolution 366 (1974) of the Security Council,

*Further noting* with the deepest concern that the demands in paragraphs 4 and 5 in the aforementioned resolution have been totally ignored by South Africa,

1. *Condemns* South Africa's failure to comply with terms of Security Council resolution 366 (1974) of 17 December 1974;

2. *Condemns once again* the continued illegal occupation of the Territory of Namibia by South Africa;

3. *Further condemns* the illegal and arbitrary application by South Africa of racially discriminatory and repressive laws and practices in Namibia;

4. *Demands* that South Africa put an end forthwith to its policy of bantustans and the so-called homelands aimed at violating the national unity and the territorial integrity of Namibia;

5. *Further demands* that South Africa proceed urgently with the necessary steps to withdraw from Namibia and, to that end, to implement the measures stipulated in resolution 366 (1974);

6. *Reaffirms* the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia and demands that South Africa take appropriate measures to enable the United Nations Council for Namibia to establish its presence in the Territory with a view to facilitating the transfer of power to the people of Namibia;

7. *Declares* that in order for the people of Namibia to freely determine their own future it is imperative that free elections be organized under the supervision and control of the United Nations as soon as possible and, in any case, not later than 1 July 1976;

8. *Affirms* its support for the struggle of the People of Namibia for self-determination and independence;

9. *Acting* under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,

(a) *Determines* that the illegal occupation of the Territory of Namibia by South Africa constitutes a threat to international peace and security;

(b) *Decides* that all States shall prevent:

(i) Any supply of arms and ammunition to South Africa;

(ii) Any supply of aircraft, vehicles and military equipment for use of the armed forces and paramilitary organizations of South Africa;

(iii) Any supply of spare parts for arms, vehicles and military equipment used by the armed forces and paramilitary organization of South Africa;

(iv) Any activities in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the supply of

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. S/11713; the draft resolution was not adopted owing to the negative vote of three permanent members of the Council, the vote being 10 in favor, 3 against (U.S., France, U.K.), with 2 abstentions (Italy, Japan).

arms, ammunition, military aircraft and military vehicles to South Africa and equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in South Africa and Namibia;

10. *Decides* that all States shall give effect to the decision set out in paragraph 9 (b) of this resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or licence granted before the date of this resolution, and that they notify the Secretary-General of the measures they have taken to comply with the aforementioned provision;

11. *Decides* that provisions of paragraph 9 (b) shall remain in effect until it has been established, to the satisfaction of the Security Council, that the illegal occupation of the Territory of Namibia by South Africa has been brought to an end;

12. *Requests* the Secretary-General, for the purpose of the effective implementation of this resolution, to arrange for the collection and systematic study of all available data concerning international trade in the items which should not be supplied to South Africa under paragraph 9 (b) above;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council concerning the implementation of paragraph 7 and other provisions of this resolution;

14. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter and to meet on or before 30 September 1975 for the purpose of reviewing South Africa's compliance with the terms of the relevant paragraphs of this resolution, and in the event of non-compliance by South Africa to taking further appropriate measures under the Charter.

## U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in Israel-Syria Sector Extended

*Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative John Scali on May 28, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council that day.*

### STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI

USUN press release 53 dated May 28

I welcome the opportunity today to participate in the decision of the Security Council to renew for an additional six months the mandate of the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force. We believe this Force is important to the maintenance of the disengage-

ment agreements between Syria and Israel.

On behalf of the United States, I express once again our appreciation for all the efforts of the Secretary General and his associates in maintaining UNDOF in accordance with the wishes of this Council. We particularly commend those governments which contribute officers and troops to UNDOF, the men who serve there, and the Officer in Charge, Col. Hannes Philipp. We are especially pleased that the Secretary General is able to report that both parties have generally complied with the agreement on disengagement and that the cease-fire has been maintained. This is a job well done.

I congratulate you, Mr. President, for your efforts in working out this resolution for presentation to the Council and assuring its prompt adoption. All concerned are to be warmly congratulated on this constructive step.

### TEXT OF RESOLUTION <sup>1</sup>

*The Security Council,*

*Having considered* the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/11694),

*Having noted* the efforts made to establish a durable and just peace in the Middle East area and the developments in the situation in the area,

*Expressing concern* over the prevailing state of tension in the area,

*Reaffirming* that the two Agreements on disengagement of forces are only a step towards the implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973),

*Decides:*

(a) To call upon the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973);

(b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for another period of six months;

(c) To request the Secretary-General to submit at the end of this period a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973).

<sup>1</sup>U.N. doc. S/RES/369 (1975); adopted by the Council on May 28 by a vote of 13 (U.S.) to 0, with the People's Republic of China and Iraq not participating in the vote.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Agriculture

International agreement for the creation at Paris of an International Office for Epizootics, with annex. Done at Paris January 25, 1924. Entered into force January 17, 1925.<sup>1</sup>

*Instrument of accession signed by the President:* June 9, 1975.

##### Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972. Entered into force March 26, 1975. *Ratifications deposited:* Lebanon, June 13, 1975; Malta, April 7, 1975; Qatar, April 17, 1975.

##### Coffee

Protocol for the continuation in force of the international coffee agreement 1968, as amended and extended (TIAS 6584, 7809), with annex. Approved by the International Coffee Council at London September 26, 1974.<sup>2</sup>

*Approval deposited:* France, May 9, 1975.

##### Cultural Property

Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export, and transfer of ownership of cultural property. Adopted at Paris November 14, 1970. Entered into force April 24, 1972.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Iran, January 27, 1975.

*Ratification deposited:* Tunisia, March 10, 1975.

##### Energy

Agreement amending the agreement of November 18, 1974, on an international energy program. Done at Paris February 5, 1975. Entered into force March 21, 1975.

##### Health

Amendment to articles 24 and 25 of the constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 23, 1967. Entered into force May 21, 1975.

*Acceptance deposited:* Nepal, May 20, 1975.

##### Patents

Strasbourg agreement concerning the international patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March 24, 1971. Enters into force October 7, 1975.

*Notifications from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratifications deposited:* Finland, May 16, 1975; Monaco, June 13, 1975.

#### Property—Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923.

*Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification deposited:* France, May 12, 1975.

*Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that accession deposited:* Upper Volta, June 2, 1975.

Nice agreement concerning the international classification of goods and services for the purposes of the registration of marks of June 15, 1957, as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967. Entered into force March 18, 1970; for the United States May 25, 1972. TIAS 7419.

*Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification deposited:* France, May 12, 1975.

Locarno agreement establishing an international classification for industrial designs, with annex. Done at Locarno October 8, 1968. Entered into force April 27, 1971; for the United States May 25, 1972. TIAS 7420.

*Notifications from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratifications deposited:* France, June 13, 1975; Italy, May 12, 1975.

#### Property—Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.

*Accession deposited:* Upper Volta, May 23, 1975.

#### Wheat

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1974, with respect to other provisions.

*Ratification deposited:* Tunisia, June 18, 1975.

*Declaration of provisional application deposited:* Iran, June 17, 1975.

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions.

*Ratifications deposited:* Australia, June 13, 1975;

Canada, June 18, 1975; Egypt, June 17, 1975;

Korea, June 18, 1975; Pakistan, June 17, 1975;

<sup>1</sup> Not in force for the United States.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force.

Sweden, June 16, 1975; Vatican City State, June 16, 1975.

*Approval deposited:* Norway, June 18, 1975.

*Declarations of provisional application deposited:* Finland, June 16, 1975; Iran, Kenya, Syrian Arab Republic, June 17, 1975; Belgium,<sup>3</sup> Brazil, European Economic Community,<sup>3</sup> France,<sup>3</sup> Federal Republic of Germany,<sup>3</sup> Guatemala, Ireland,<sup>3</sup> Israel, Italy,<sup>3</sup> Japan,<sup>3</sup> Libya, Luxembourg,<sup>3</sup> Morocco, Netherlands,<sup>3,4</sup> United States,<sup>3</sup> June 18, 1975.

*Accessions deposited:* Lebanon, June 13, 1975; Panama, June 16, 1975; Denmark,<sup>3</sup> Greece, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom,<sup>3,5</sup> June 18, 1975.

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. *Ratifications deposited:* Australia, June 13, 1975;

Canada, June 18, 1975; Sweden, June 16, 1975.

*Declarations of provisional application deposited:* Finland, June 16, 1975; Belgium, European Economic Community, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan,<sup>3</sup> Luxembourg, Netherlands, United States,<sup>3</sup> June 18, 1975.

*Accessions deposited:* Denmark, United Kingdom, June 18, 1975.

## BILATERAL

### Australia

Agreement relating to the reciprocal acceptance of airworthiness certifications. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington December 24, 1974, and June 11, 1975. Entered into force June 11, 1975.

Agreement for the reciprocal acceptance of certificates of airworthiness for imported aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington November 20, 1959. Entered into force November 20, 1959. TIAS 4358.

*Terminated:* June 11, 1975.

### Republic of China

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and apparel products, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 21, 1975. Entered into force May 21, 1975; effective January 1, 1975.

<sup>3</sup> With a statement.

<sup>4</sup> With respect to the Kingdom in Europe and to Surinam.

<sup>5</sup> Applicable to Dominica, Saint Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla, Saint Vincent, Bailiwick of Guernsey, Isle of Man, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Gibraltar, Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony, Hong Kong, Montserrat, Saint Helena and Dependencies, and Seychelles.

### Egypt

Agreement relating to cooperation in the areas of technology, research and development. Signed at Washington June 6, 1975. Entered into force provisionally, June 6, 1975; definitively, on the date of receipt of the later of the two notes whereby the contracting parties inform each other that the constitutional procedures required to give effect to the agreement have been fulfilled.

### Guinea

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Conakry May 8, 1975. Entered into force May 8, 1975.

### Indonesia

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, with agreed minutes. Signed at Jakarta May 30, 1975. Entered into force May 30, 1975.

### New Zealand

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports from New Zealand of fresh, chilled or frozen meat of cattle, goats, and sheep, except lambs, during calendar year 1975. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 14 and June 9, 1975. Entered into force June 9, 1975.

### Pakistan

Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 6, 1975. Entered into force May 6, 1975; effective July 1, 1974.

Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles, with exchange of letters, as amended and extended. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 6, 1970. Entered into force May 6, 1970; effective July 1, 1970. TIAS 6882, 7369, 7598, 7640, 7724. *Terminated:* July 1, 1974.

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of November 23, 1974 (TIAS 7971). Effected by exchange of notes at Islamabad May 27, 1975. Entered into force May 27, 1975.

### Panama

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports from Panama of fresh, chilled or frozen meat of cattle, goats, and sheep, except lambs, during calendar year 1975. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama April 21 and June 6, 1975. Entered into force June 6, 1975.

### Singapore

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and apparel products, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 21, 1975. Entered into force May 21, 1975; effective January 1, 1975.

### Tanzania

Agreement for the sale of agricultural commodities. Signed at Dar es Salaam May 23, 1975. Entered into force May 23, 1975.

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*340	6/19	Study Group 7 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCIR, July 17.
†341	6/19	U.S.-Spain joint communique.

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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*The Department of State BULLETIN a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

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## Constancy and Change in American Foreign Policy

*Address by Secretary Kissinger*<sup>1</sup>

We meet at a time when America, as so often before in its history, is turning a time of testing into a period of renewal.

Less than three months ago, under the impact of our disappointments in Indochina, some were questioning the very nature of our involvement in world affairs. The executive and the Congress seemed to be heading for a stalemate on foreign policy. But paradoxically, our setbacks have brought home to us—as well as the rest of the world—how essential America is to the peace and prosperity of mankind. And at home the dialogue between our two coequal branches of government is taking place in a more constructive atmosphere.

We have every reason to face our future with confidence. The United States still stands as the greatest democracy the world has ever known. Our institutions have withstood extraordinary turmoil and dissension and have emerged vital and strong. Whatever our disappointments, we have reason for pride in our achievements. If there is peace in the world today, our sacrifice has been decisive; if there is to be progress, our contribution will be essential.

We have learned irrevocably the central fact of the modern world: our security, our well-being, our very existence, are intimately bound up with the kind of international environment we shall succeed in building. If the weakness of free peoples tempts aggression, the lives of Americans will be in danger. If the disunity of free peoples invites

economic chaos, the well-being of Americans will be in jeopardy. As the energy crisis surely has taught us, we live in an interdependent world—a world in which words such as “isolation” and “withdrawal” grow ever more anachronistic.

Thus we are not about to reverse the course of the last 30 years, retreat from our commitments, and leave our friends and allies to fend for themselves in the vacuum our actions would inevitably create. We shall not invite chaos. On the contrary, before us is a new opportunity to achieve peace and progress greater than even in our recent past.

Since the end of World War II, the United States has undertaken a role of world leadership which has had the support of both parties and all Administrations. That policy has preserved peace and freedom; it has sustained global stability and the global economy. Indeed, it is our very accomplishments that have created the new conditions, and problems, which we must now face.

—America’s assistance to the postwar recovery of Western Europe and Japan, and our defensive shield, promoted the resurgence of those allies as strong and independent pillars of the free world.

—The international economic system, the trading and monetary relationships created by American leadership at Bretton Woods in 1944, has fostered economic progress not only in the industrial democracies but in every quarter of the globe.

—The inexorable process of decolonization, which we encouraged, and our pioneering efforts in technical and economic assistance for development have helped scores of

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Southern Council on International and Public Affairs and the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce at Atlanta, Ga., on June 23 (text from press release 342).

new nations launch their own national progress.

Foreign policy is a process. It knows no plateaus. What does not become a point of departure for a new advance soon turns first into stagnation and then into retreat. Thus the achievements of the past generation have created the agenda for the next decades:

—The growing strength and self-confidence of our allies requires the adaptation of our alliances from American tutelage to equal partnership.

—The growing destructiveness of nuclear weapons requires an alternative to policies of confrontation and an easing of international tensions.

—The interdependence of the world economy must lead to increased cooperation among the industrialized nations and a greater recognition of the concerns of the developing countries.

This agenda is vast. But there are not many periods of history when man can see clearly the outline of his own future and shape it to his ends. We have it in our power to lay the foundation of a new international structure in which nations no longer fear domination, in which negotiation replaces confrontation, and in which the fulfillment of basic human needs becomes a central concern on the agenda of international diplomacy.

A world of over 140 nations is a world of unimagined diversity and complexity. But it is also a world of enormous potential. A world of pluralism, of spreading ideas, of independent states free to choose their destiny, is a world of hope and an opportunity for fresh creation.

And the United States will always be mindful of its responsibilities. We have learned our limits, but we have not forgotten our possibilities. We are the world's largest democratic nation; we are the greatest single concentration of economic and military power; we are the nation with the most experience in organizing international cooperation; we are the major influence in global communication. If we do

not lead, no other nation that stands for what we believe in can take our place.

### The Elements of America's Strength

What, then, is required of us? What are the elements of our strength?

*First of all*, we must maintain the bedrock of our security. While foreign policy must reach beyond military concerns, there can be no substitute for maintaining our own defenses and the objective conditions of our security. An equilibrium of power is essential to any stable international order. A world in which the survival of nations is at the mercy of others is a world of insecurity, instability, and oppression.

America's military strength has always been used to defend, never to oppress. At home, we have already adapted our defense budget to accord with our national priorities. In terms of its portion of the Federal budget and of the gross national product, our defense spending is at the lowest level in 25 years. Yet the trend of military programs of our potential adversaries is in the direction of expansion. Therefore there is an irreducible minimum below which we cannot go without allowing important interests of the United States and its allies to be endangered. We will seek prudent measures of arms control to enhance our security. But this Administration is determined never to allow the military defenses of the United States to be dismantled.

We strive to create the conditions for accommodation and reconciliation of differences with adversaries. But conciliation must not flow from weakness; flexibility is a virtue only in those who are thought to have an alternative.

*Secondly*, we have also learned that all our objectives—our security, our well-being, the cohesion of our alliances, and the health of the international environment—depend to a remarkable degree on the health of the American economy. This is, rightly, an immediate concern of every American; it is also the engine of economic growth worldwide and therefore an international responsibility.

The recession and inflation of the last two years have had ominous international consequences—which now we are on the way to remedying. Recession and inflation eat away at the well-being and hopes of groups on the margin of prosperity. They breed disunity at home, drain the energies of nations away from international concerns, and complicate the harmony of international relations. At home, they undermine social peace, confidence in government, and the vitality of democratic processes. Abroad, economic strains tempt the governments of the industrial nations into protectionism or measures of rivalry and threaten an era of bloc economic warfare between rich nations and poor.

Yet no government acting alone has a possibility of correcting the fundamental economic conditions that beset it. In the modern world, our economies are tied together; we prosper or decline together. The restoration of growth offers our best hope of accommodating the aspirations of all who compete for betterment of their own future. It frees resources for meeting all national needs. It restores faith in democratic institutions and democratic leaders.

The position of the American economy is central. As the President said in his state of the Union address in January:

A resurgent American economy would do more to restore the confidence of the world in its own future than anything else we can do.

We shall do what is required.

*Finally*, our national strength depends on our unity as a people. There is no limit to what free men can accomplish acting together.

In the last quarter of this century, we are no longer preponderant. We can no longer overwhelm our problems with our resources; the diversity and complexity of the world no longer offer moral simplicity. We are therefore called upon, as never before, to how purpose, coherence, flexibility, and imagination in the conduct of our foreign affairs.

We must be one nation, one government.

Our institutions must moderate special interests in the definition of a national interest. We must have the self-discipline to shape our domestic debates into a positive, not a destructive, process. We must attack our problems, and not each other. We can no longer afford disunity, disarray, or disruption in the conduct of our foreign affairs.

The consensus which sustained an enlightened involvement in foreign affairs for more than a generation is one of our most precious national resources. We are on the way to restoring our unity and therefore our capacity to act as a confident nation. We shall spare no effort to continue this process so that we will face our third century and its challenges as a united people.

Let me now turn to our agenda and describe the design of our policy.

#### Alliances

Our allies and friends remain our first international priority.

What unites us and our allies are not simply the treaties signed a generation ago but the inescapable necessities of the present world. In recent weeks we have reaffirmed our commitment to our alliances. We have made clear that the United States will stand by its obligations in Asia as well as in Europe. But what gives life to our alliances is not verbal reaffirmation, but the reality of common action in response to common problems. We must find common purpose in challenges beyond the necessities of military defense.

This is why last week I outlined, on behalf of the President, the agenda for our close relationship with Japan and Asia. This is why on his trip to Europe the President outlined the issues facing all the nations of the Western alliance. The tasks which the President set before the NATO summit could serve as the agenda for all our alliances:

—We must maintain a strong, modern, and credible defense; an alliance that does not have the vigor and dedication to defend itself fails in its primary purpose.

—We must improve the quality and integrity of our political relations; participation and responsibility must be unqualified if they are to be credible.

—We must improve our political consultation to develop common policies to deal with common problems.

—We must work together in setting a productive and realistic agenda for the easing of tensions.

—We must look to the health of our democratic institutions.

—We must understand that the industrialized societies hold the key to the world's new problems of population, food, energy development, raw materials.

Urgent, cooperative action is needed on all these issues. Alliances must be adjusted to changing security requirements, or they will disintegrate. They must reflect common political objectives and a common strategy for attaining them, or their defensive capability will lack a sense of purpose. Therefore we attach great importance to improved political consultations. And we must never forget that strong domestic institutions ultimately provide the best protection against subversion as well as the sinews for defense against aggression.

Progress has been made, but much work remains. On the central problem of economic growth, allied leaders have begun to coordinate national economic policies to an unprecedented degree.

On the vital subject of energy, the industrial nations created the International Energy Agency to pool the efforts of the major consumers. We have agreed on safeguards against new oil emergencies; we have established a \$25 billion solidarity fund to insure against monetary dislocations due to the massive payments imbalances caused by energy costs; we have launched new programs of conservation of existing supplies and the development of alternative sources. We are building the foundation for a constructive dialogue with the energy producers looking toward a fair and equitable long-term economic relationship.

This remains a priority concern. We are determined to end our vulnerability to ex-

ternal decisions or external pressures. As the economies of the industrialized nations begin again to expand, the necessity for energy conservation and development of new energy sources becomes more urgent. Without determined efforts now, the expansion of demand will give free rein to the producers' ability to maintain or raise the price of oil or to use the supply of energy for political purposes.

The national interest demands a comprehensive and effective energy program. The President will work with the Congress to obtain it, but if that effort fails he will exercise the authority he has to reduce our dependence on foreign energy sources.

In our political relations, we and our allies both have an obligation to a common interest. We do not assist others in their defense as an act of charity, but in our mutual interest. For us to terminate military assistance or even sales to an ally is basically self-defeating. We weaken the political ties, endanger our collective defense, and also fail to achieve whatever purpose the aid restriction was meant to serve. For this reason, the President has strongly opposed the congressional cutoff of military aid to Turkey and is now working hard with the Congress to bring about its immediate restoration.

By the same token, no country should imagine that it is doing us a favor by remaining in an alliance with us. Any ally whose perception of its national interest changes will find us prepared to adapt or end our treaty relationship. No ally can pressure us by a threat of termination; we will not accept that its security is more important to us than it is to itself.

We assume that our friends regard their ties to us as serving their own national purposes, not as privileges to be granted and withdrawn as means of pressure. Where this is not the mutual perception, then clearly it is time for change. Where it is the common view, the United States will remain a steady friend. We regard our alliances as the cornerstone of our foreign policy and the essential pillars of the structure of international stability.

## Easing of Tensions

However fundamental our alliances, we recognize that a peace that rests solely on a balance of forces and offsetting blocs is fragile and sterile. We are committed, therefore, to continue the effort to improve relations with the Communist powers. In the thermonuclear age, there is no alternative to a serious effort to ease tensions on a reliable and reciprocal basis.

Therefore in the past few years we have taken a number of practical steps to regularize our relations with the Soviet Union. The objective has been, in our own interest, to reduce the danger of war and to encourage new patterns of relations and international conduct.

This process proceeds on several levels. We have negotiated balanced and effective agreements to limit strategic weapons on both sides and in other areas of arms control.

In our bilateral relations, we have reached a number of agreements for economic and technical cooperation, agreements that provide benefits to both sides and give both sides a stake in the continuation of a positive relationship.

In resolving political conflicts in vital areas where we are both engaged directly, such as Europe, we have reached an agreement, in 1971, to make Berlin more secure. We are now engaged in comprehensive negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions and on the broader questions of security and cooperation in Europe.

In other areas of the world, such as the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, the course of U.S.-Soviet relations has been uneven. There have been cases where tensions have, in our view, been exacerbated needlessly. Thus, while we have made significant progress in our relations with the Soviet Union over the past six years, we have done so without illusion. The U.S.S.R. remains our ideological and political rival. Should it seek to use détente as a device for selective exploitation of strategic opportunities, the entire fabric of our evolving relationship will be brought into question.

At the same time, it is vital to maintain our perspective. We must never lose sight

of the fact that war between nuclear superpowers risks the extinction of mankind. We are ideological opponents; technology drives our competition; political conflict around the world pulls us into rivalry. If humanity is not to live constantly at the edge of an abyss and eventually to be consumed by its technology, we must take care to nurture mutual restraint which has been so painfully built up, guarding against the tendency to use our improving relationship with the U.S.S.R. as the whipping boy for our frustrations.

Détente can never be a substitute for our own efforts; where our own efforts flag, we should not blame the resultant setbacks on our adversaries. International events in a turbulent world, and domestic conditions in many countries, are sufficient explanation for many problems. We should not exaggerate Soviet influence by blaming all difficulties on them.

The experience of Indochina should have taught us that it is easier to start confrontations than to sustain them. Tough rhetoric is not the same as sustained strong action. We will defend our vital interests and those of our allies uncompromisingly. But we can do so effectively over an extended period of time only if our people know that we have first pursued untiringly all conceivable alternatives to confrontation.

The principal item on the U.S.-Soviet agenda today is SALT, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. We are actively engaged in working out a new agreement based on the principles already agreed by the President and General Secretary Brezhnev in Vladivostok last November. If we can resolve the issues that still remain between us—and I believe we can—we will for the first time in history have placed a ceiling on the nuclear arms race.

Our new relationship with the People's Republic of China is now a durable feature of the world scene. It serves our respective interests and the broader interests of peace and stability in Asia and around the world. No stable international order is conceivable without the participation of this one-quarter of the human race. As you know, President Ford plans to visit China, thereby confirm-

ing the durability of our relationship and further advancing the ties between our two countries on the basis of the Shanghai communique.

### The Middle East

Our present agenda necessarily includes those areas of crisis which pose a danger of wider conflagration. To help moderate conflicts where our good offices are desired is an American tradition that goes back at least to the beginning of this century. History has shown that the breakdown of peace around the globe can touch our lives directly, and there are some disputes for which we have a special responsibility, such as the Middle East crisis.

That troubled area still poses grave dangers of war and of worldwide economic dislocation. The mistrust of decades is not easy to overcome. The international implications of chronic crisis in the area and the moral and strategic commitments of outside powers compound the basic intractability. They also require continued movement toward a lasting settlement. An active American role is imperative:

—Because of our historical and moral commitment to the survival and well-being of Israel;

—Because of our important interests in the Arab world, an area of more than 150 million people sitting astride the world's largest oil reserves;

—Because the eruption of crisis in the Middle East would severely strain our relations with our allies in Europe, and Japan;

—Because continuing instability risks a new international crisis over oil and a new setback to the world's hopes for economic recovery, threatening the well-being not only of the industrial world but of most nations of the globe; and

—Because a crisis in the Middle East poses an inevitable risk of direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation and has done so with increasing danger in every crisis since the beginning.

We can never lose sight of the fact that U.S. foreign policy must do its utmost to

protect *all* its interests in the Middle East. Given our inescapable involvement—economic, political, and military—there is no alternative to the full and active engagement of the United States in the diplomacy of peace in the Middle East.

Since October 1973 we have made major efforts to help the warring parties to resolve their differences. Unprecedented progress has been made. Disengagement agreements have been negotiated between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Syria which have been carried out by all sides. While deep suspicions remain, these agreements may have demonstrated to the parties that there is an alternative to war. We welcome the opening of the Suez Canal; we believe the Syrian decision to extend the U.N. mandate for six months was helpful; and the recent decision of the Israeli Government to thin out and withdraw some of its forces and equipment in the Sinai is a constructive move.

But we must not be lulled into inaction by the relative quiet of recent weeks; the fundamental issues remain unresolved. It would be imprudent to view recent steps—valuable as they are—as an indication that further progress is no longer urgent. Events have been calmed in the last few months in considerable part by the expectation, and our pledge, that the American effort would resume. We are now at a point where there must be a turn either toward peace or toward new crises.

We consider diplomatic stagnation an invitation to confrontation. We will not be deflected from our course by temporary disappointments or strong passions. The President has stated repeatedly that the United States will not accept stalemate or stagnation. We urge all parties to take seriously these words which were carefully chosen.

In recent weeks President Ford has held important consultations with King Hussein [of Jordan], President Sadat [of Egypt], Prime Minister Rabin [of Israel], and Deputy Prime Minister Khaddam of Syria. We expect to come to an early judgment on how best to proceed.

The United States will pursue whichever course seems most promising. We are open-



mindful whether interim agreements or an early convening of the Geneva Conference offers the best method. Each course has its recognized advantages and pitfalls and risks. We are not committed to a particular approach; we are committed to progress.

Our ultimate goal is clear: to find solutions that will take into account the territorial integrity and right to live in security and peace of all states and peoples in the area. To reach that goal will require concessions by all parties. We are determined to persevere in pursuit of what we consider the fundamental national interest of the United States: the security and economic well-being of our country, of our allies, and above all, of the peoples in the area that demand it.

### **The Developing Nations**

In recent years, the problems of the new nations of the developing world have grown more urgent.

The strength of the dollar, the expansion of trade, the free flow of investment, the supply and price of energy, food, and other vital raw materials all depend on the vitality of the international economic system. But no economic system can be stable if scores of nations consider themselves outside of and hostile to it. The present global economic system is large enough to encompass the well-being of consumers and producers, rich and poor. But if it does not, we face a generation of economic warfare. The United States is prepared to work, with understanding and imagination, for change. But there must be a process of mutual accommodation that safeguards the interests of all nations. We will not submit to blackmail, bloc pressures, or ideological rhetoric. We will defend our interests. But we will listen to reasoned debate and consider carefully productive suggestions for reform.

The United States has already taken the lead with new proposals on a range of issues vital to the developing world:

—To fight the scourge of hunger, this government, recognizing that America's food aid cannot provide a long-term solution to

the global food problem, called for the World Food Conference which met last November in Rome. At that conference we engaged other nations in a multilateral commitment to raise food production, to improve agricultural financing and distribution, and to establish an international system of nationally held grain reserves.

—Some 140 nations are now engaged in an unprecedented negotiation on a comprehensive new law of the sea. At stake are the reach of territorial sovereignty, the safety of the shipping lanes, and access to vast resources. Success in these negotiations would represent an unprecedented achievement in international cooperation affecting three-quarters of the surface of our planet and enormous mineral and other wealth. The United States will make a major effort to bring it to a successful conclusion at the final session next March.

—On the broader question of raw materials, the developing countries seek a stable and fair income from commodities which are central to their development programs. We in turn seek reliability of supply for our industries. The United States has therefore proposed new international rules and procedures on access to supplies and markets, discussions on new arrangements for commodity trade on a case-by-case basis, and new ways of financing commodity development in producing countries.

All these issues will be raised at a special session of the U.N. General Assembly this September. Working closely with Congress, we are now preparing concrete, detailed, and—we hope—creative proposals for that session. We intend, while fully protecting our nation's interests, to deal with controversial issues with realism, imagination, and understanding. We hope that others will meet us in the same spirit.

### **Challenge at Home**

We have before us a vast agenda. The peace and prosperity of future generations depend on decisions we make now. The choice is relatively straightforward: either we use our strength and opportunities for

good, or others will surely use their own strength for ends incompatible with our values. The problems we face are of such magnitude, their answers so complex—and the opportunities so far-reaching—that the last quarter of the 20th century will either be remembered as another period of American leadership and creativity or as a time of growing chaos and despair. Therefore it is time to put an end to the self-doubt and cynicism which have marked, and marred, American life for so much of the past decade. It is time to remind ourselves that America has accomplished great things in the past and that there are still greater things to be accomplished.

In our pluralistic society, national action depends on the support of citizens everywhere—not only in government but in the professions, in business and labor, in the universities, in the cities and on the farms all over America. These people, in their millions, have supported an enlightened international involvement for more than a generation; for they knew in their hearts that the greatest nation on earth could no longer remain isolated from the world around it. Again today, at another time of decision, it will be the American people who will decide, as they should, the direction their country will take.

There can be no doubt about the outcome. The American people will decide to keep their country the pillar of stability and the vision of hope that it has been for two centuries. They will support our leadership in the search for a new, lasting, just and peaceful international order.

Throughout our history America has proved capable of renewal and greatness. The colonists who came to the shores of a wilderness, the Founding Fathers who created the world's only revolution that never declined into tyranny, the pioneers whose eyes never left the horizon, the men of enterprise who made American productivity and efficiency the world's standard, the soldiers and statesmen of our century who built a world power both great and constructive, and the creative minds of a democratic society

who have given the breath and inspiration of freedom of men and women everywhere—these are the foundations on which we build and the traditions we seek to emulate.

“Equal and exact justice to all men”—this was how Thomas Jefferson defined the goal of our national destiny, at home and abroad. And he added, “. . . should we wander . . . in moments of error or alarm, let us hasten to retrace our steps and to regain the road which alone leads to peace, liberty, and safety.” We are at one of those moments. We will not miss our road.

## Questions and Answers Following the Secretary's Address at Atlanta

Press release 342B dated June 23

*The chairman [Ivan Allen III, president, Atlanta Chamber of Commerce]: Mr. Secretary, we have several questions from the audience, and if it meets your pleasure, I am prepared to give them to you if you would like to respond.*

*The first question is this: If Israel is to concede occupied territory to Egypt, should not Egypt provide the means for common civilian access between the two countries so that a common understanding can be achieved?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There are basically two ways for going at the peace settlement, or the prospects of peace in the Middle East. One is to attempt to make a final peace. The other is to take a series of individual steps.

Under conditions of final peace, the totality of the issues must be settled, and the end process must be that the relations between Israel and its neighbors will be as normal as the relations between countries at peace generally are. In that case, there should of course be free movement of people between Israel and its neighbors.

If, however, it proves too difficult to negotiate a final peace settlement all at once, then the best approach is to take a series of individual steps in which less than total peace is balanced against less than total

Israeli withdrawal. Under those conditions, at any one step total peace will not have been achieved.

Each of these approaches, as I said in my speech, has its advantages and its risks. We had in the past favored the step-by-step approach because it enabled the problem to be divided into individual elements and because these elements seemed more manageable than an overall settlement.

But the United States is prepared to support any approach that leads to a solution, and we will not push one if it proves to be unworkable.

*The chairman: With the transfer of significant amounts of tangible wealth to the Arab countries, does this economic disruption pose a problem of social disruption that will tip the balance of power to the Communist countries?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I am not sure whether that question refers to the balance in the Arab countries or the balance in the countries which are transferring the wealth. But in either case, I do not believe that the transfer of wealth by itself will tip the balance toward the Communist countries. The transfer of wealth on the scale in which it occurs places sudden and very large resources into the hands of countries which heretofore did not have it and therefore gives them a capacity for disruption, even unintentionally, that requires the closer cooperation of the industrial world.

Secondly, the monopoly on energy by the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] countries gives them a capacity to manipulate prices and to bring political pressure that over an extended period of time should be our effort to end. The energy policy of the United States is designed to bring about conditions in which this monopoly can no longer be exercised. This is why we are so strongly supporting the energy program within the United States and the cooperation among energy-consuming countries.

*The chairman: In view of the recent developments in Portugal and the Italian re-*

*gional elections, what do you think that the future holds for the North Atlantic alliance and the democratic governments on the continent of Europe?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The domestic situation in Portugal creates a serious problem if present trends continue. If Portugal slides in the direction of a neutralist or even Communist-dominated government, we will face the problem of how that can be compatible with an alliance designed to prevent Communist aggression or of how you can have the most confidential talks and the frankest consultations when one of the governments has such close association with the potential adversary.

This is why we have called the attention of our allies to these events and why we shall be watching them carefully. We do not believe that this point has yet been reached. But the tendencies are disquieting.

With respect to Italy and other countries, the electoral results, of course, reflect the public judgments on essentially domestic issues. And again, we hope that the conditions which have produced the dissatisfaction can be overcome, because a democracy in which the opposition parties are all essentially non-democratic is one that is very vulnerable to shifts in the public mood.

*The chairman: I think this is a Chamber of Commerce question. Atlanta is the second busiest airport in the United States. Do you anticipate international connections between Atlanta and Europe, and if so, are bilateral treaties being negotiated now? [Laughter.]*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I was going to ask the Mayor after this meeting why he praised the airport for people wanting to go someplace else than Atlanta. [Laughter and applause.] But the negotiation of international air routes is outside of my direct responsibility. [Laughter.]

I think I'll blame Ambassador Reinhardt [John E. Reinhardt, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs] for that, too.

*The chairman: For détente to work in the long run, must the Soviet Union become a more free society?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There is a certain paradox in the situation that it is the ideological rivalry that creates the tensions but it is paradoxically also the ideological rivalry that makes efforts at relaxing tensions so important.

What creates the necessity for this effort is that war with modern weapons will have consequences for which there is no historical precedent. No leader has ever faced the prospect that tens of millions of people could be annihilated in a matter of days. And therefore the question of war and peace between the two great nuclear powers, regardless of ideology, must be a preoccupation and indeed has been a preoccupation of every President, of whatever party, however different their personalities and, I may say, whatever their views before they entered the Presidency.

So if the domestic structures were more compatible, there would be less of an urgency. But also, since our domestic structures are not compatible, there is still a great need to make these efforts.

*The chairman:* There has recently been an increased expression of concern over North Korea emanating from various government officials. Can you comment on the basis for this increased concern, and how real is a threat from North Korea at the present time?

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, North Korea belongs to a small and select group of the most aggressive regimes in the world, and it is an extremely nationalistic and, at least vocally, a very bellicose government.

The collapse of the American effort in Indochina undoubtedly contributed an element of insecurity among all our allies who have depended on our support. And we have been concerned lest it create the wrong impression on the part of potential aggressors, particularly of countries like North Korea, which constantly affirm that they are going to unify their country, if necessary by force.

We do not believe that North Korea can now be under any misapprehension about the determination of the U.S. Government to honor the treaty commitments which were

ratified by the Congress and have been reaffirmed in every Administration since 1954. And as long as we can maintain this conviction, we believe there is no immediate danger of attack.

*The chairman:* Mr. Secretary, we have two more questions. Is the United States likely to use its strength as a food-producing nation in negotiations with other nations relying on their natural resources as their basis of strength and power?

*Secretary Kissinger:* We believe that the model we have put forward on how food should be organized and how surplus food should be shared should be a model for how other nations that have scarce resources should dispose of them within the international community.

*The chairman:* And after your response to this question, we will call on Mr. [Dean] Rusk to close the evening.

*In light of Africa's increasing political and economic influence throughout the world and the Third World community more specifically, can we anticipate a more open effort at cooperation with the newly liberated and emerging countries? And is our policy taking into consideration that over one-third of the untapped mineral natural resources are there?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We are attempting to give greater emphasis to our African policy. There is, however, a perplexity on how this can best be done, because most of the African governments, while they welcome increased American interest, also are very concerned with maintaining their independence of decision and very concerned not to be involved too much in great-power rivalry emanating from outside of Africa.

Our new Assistant Secretary for African Affairs is at this moment traveling in east Africa and has just completed a trip in west Africa. And we are trying to define a basis for a creative relationship with Africa. We have a mission in Zaïre at this very moment.

But I must be honest to say that we have not yet found all the approaches that we think will be needed in the years ahead.

## Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Atlanta June 24

Press release 344 dated June 24

*Mr. Richard Miles, president of the Atlanta chapter of Sigma Delta Chi: Thank you for coming here this morning for this news conference. Before we begin the press conference, in recognition of his fine-honed news ability—that ability to travel around the world to find any story, to chase any story—we of the Atlanta Society of Professional Journalists would like to honor the Secretary of State with an honorary membership in our organization and to present him a symbol of our profession: a green eyeshade. [Applause.]*

*Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Miles, the only thing that is lacking in this picture are some electric wipers for my glasses, which somebody gave me for my birthday.*

I am very flattered to receive this award and to join the only remaining profession in the United States that can still protect its sources of information. [Laughter.] And with this, why don't I take your questions?

*Q. Mr. Secretary, last night—*

*Secretary Kissinger: Who is this ringer here? [Laughter.]*

*Q. Last night in your speech you advised our allies that we will not be subjected to pressure and, indeed, treaties are two-way streets and if they have other interests, so be it. This was taken by some people as a warning, particularly to Turkey. Is that accurate, or is it a more general warning—perhaps including Greece and a lot of Asian countries as well?*

*Secretary Kissinger: It was intended as a general observation to all of our allies. It was not directed at any one particular country.*

We have reaffirmed in recent weeks—the President, the Secretary of Defense, and I—

our commitment to our allies. But I think it is important to understand that these alliances have to be two-way streets, that they must reflect a common interest, and that they cannot be used as pressure against the United States. It was not directed at any one particular country, but it was a general observation.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke last night about the treaty relationships, but you also spoke about the Middle East. Are you planning a new trip through the area at any time in the near future?*

*Secretary Kissinger: We have not made any precise decision as to which method would most serve progress toward peace in the Middle East.*

At the moment we are engaged in diplomatic exchanges with all of the interested parties. After these diplomatic exchanges are somewhat further advanced, we can make a decision whether there is enough promise in any particular interim approach or whether we should attempt to promote an overall solution. That decision has not yet been made.

Yes, sir.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, it is said by some local observers that you are doing this trip to Atlanta not only just because you like our city but because you are trying to help the President's image in "George Wallace country." What is your feeling about this? What is the purpose of this mission?*

*Secretary Kissinger: Well, there's one thing to be said. No one will consider my accent a Yankee accent. [Laughter.]*

I am taking these trips for a number of reasons. One was that a few months ago I made a speech in Washington in which I pointed out that the heartland of America,

in my judgment, supported American foreign policy. So when I got through, one of these cynical Washington newsmen—a type that does not exist here, I am sure [laughter]—came up to me and said, “When were you last in the heartland of America?”—which was not a bad question. So I decided to go around the country and find out for myself.

But more seriously, the purpose of these trips is to bring to various parts of the United States a description of our foreign policy—a discussion of where we are going—and at the same time to meet with local groups to hear what concerns them. The foreign policy problems we now face are so complex and the challenges before us are so grave that only with a strong public support, on a bipartisan basis, can we hope to master what is ahead of us.

I want to make absolutely clear that I do not consider, nor does the President consider, foreign policy a partisan issue and we have no intention of making it a partisan issue. The great periods of American foreign policy have had nonpartisan support. That is what I am aiming for in these trips.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could I follow that up just a moment? The President has announced that he will be a candidate for President next year, and I wonder if that is likely to change the working relationship between you and him. Is he likely to be under pressures to make decisions in foreign policy for political reasons rather than reasons which you think may not be in the best interests of foreign policy?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* My impression is that he has not quite announced it yet, and I have never seen an announcement shaved into so many little pieces. But my impression is that he is very seriously considering running—to put it mildly.

When he does announce his candidacy, I am certain it will not change our working relationship. I know that he considers the national security of the United States beyond partisan politics, and I am convinced—in fact, I know—that he will conduct his office for the best interests of the country, and that in our relationship we will not dis-

cuss what helps him as a candidate, but what helps the nation.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the U.S. position on Russia's proposal to make Indochina a neutral zone and remove all military bases?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I must tell you the truth: I am not familiar with a formal Russian proposal to remove all military bases from Indochina, because there are no foreign military bases. I am familiar with the Asian security scheme of the Soviet Union.

Well, our view is that Asia—Southeast Asia—should be kept as free as possible of great-power rivalry. As far as we are concerned, we have withdrawn from Indochina. We have no interest in achieving bases there or having any military influence in Indochina. And therefore it is not an issue on which we need to take a position. We have no diplomatic relations with Cambodia and Viet-Nam, and our diplomatic presence in Laos is being harassed. So this is really not something addressed to us.

Yes, sir.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in recent weeks there have been reports of clashes in Cambodia and along the Cambodian borders, and today there are reports again of fighting within Cambodia between the Khmer Rouge and the rightwing Cambodians led by an uncle of Prince Sihanouk. Do we know what's happening in Cambodia since we pulled out?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We know much less what is happening in Cambodia than, obviously, we did before. No foreign country has any diplomatic missions in Cambodia today, so all of our information is second-hand or it comes from intelligence sources.

We do know that there has been a rather terrible toll of civilians that was inflicted on the Cambodian people when the population of all the towns was evacuated into a countryside that will not have a harvest until November; and the death toll, according to all estimates that we have heard, is very great.

We have also had rather firm reports of clashes between the South Vietnamese and the Cambodians along the border and on some of the offshore islands—including the

island near which the *Mayaguez* was originally captured.

I have not seen any hard evidence of fighting within Cambodia, and therefore I cannot confirm that.

Yes.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there is increasing speculation that we are near some kind of official change in our relationship with Cuba. And Premier Castro's return of \$2 million to Southern Airways, of course, heightened that kind of speculation. Is there any definitive kind of change that we can expect in the near future—let's say, two or three months?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Our policy toward Cuba is that we are prepared to improve our relationship, depending on what steps Cuba is prepared to take. And, of course, ultimately Cuba will have to negotiate this with the U.S. Government and not with individual legislators that may be invited to Cuba.

There have been some gestures on the part of Cuba, such as the return of the \$2 million, which we welcome. And we are prepared to conduct a dialogue with a positive attitude. We have no fixed timetable when improvement can take place, and of course, the Organization of American States is meeting next month on the general issue of the sanctions. So the conditions exist in which a discussion can take place.

Yes.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in this last year, with the fall of South Viet-Nam and the failure of the Mideast talks, and just recently a high-level staff member of yours resigned criticizing the State Department, do you have any intention of reorganizing the State Department in any way to make it more efficient? Do you plan to delegate some of the work that you are currently doing to any other officials?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, there are several myths in Washington which I will not be able to eliminate, no matter what I do. One of them is that I do not delegate enough responsibility.

Now, it is true I am not the most retiring

Secretary of State that has existed. But I am sure that most of the Assistant Secretaries in the Department—and especially their wives—would be astonished to find out that responsibility is not being delegated, because if it is not, they are working 15 hours a day for nothing.

I feel that the Department of State today is staffed in its top levels by the ablest, the most dedicated group that has been there in many years. The decisions are being taken on the basis of very close consultation between the Assistant Secretaries and myself. Of course, it is the responsibility of the Secretary of State to provide the leadership and the sense of direction, and that is a function I do intend and attempt to exercise. But it is not fair to the really dedicated and extraordinarily able group of top officials to imply that they are not given major responsibilities—and I think more responsibility than has been the case in a very long time.

Now, it always happens that there are some individuals who feel that their talents are not sufficiently recognized. And it may even be true, because in this vast spectrum of decisions that have to be taken, it is sometimes not possible to give equal priority to all of the issues.

I have very high regard for Dixy Lee Ray, and I wish her well. But I do not think one can make a generalization from one particular case to what has, after all, been a very stable group of Assistant Secretaries who have worked with great dedication and in a very collegial atmosphere.

But in addition, though, you asked a question—am I planning any changes? I am planning some changes in the organization of the overall management structure of the Department of State and also in the selection and training programs of the Foreign Service in order to push the ablest people to the top more rapidly, to make sure the ablest people are being selected, and to make sure there is greater flexibility as between the various regional bureaus.

We have already required that people have to be transferred between regional areas in order to develop a broader perspective. And

we will announce these changes within the next two weeks.

Yes.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in your address last night, you made the statement that our national strength depends on our unity as a people. How can you expect Americans to be unified in support of the government when a substantial number of Americans still look on the government with suspicion and sometimes even fear? What plans does the Administration have to clear up these suspicions?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, of course, I am not sure I completely agree with you that a substantial number of Americans look on their government with suspicion—and even less do I agree with you that a substantial number of Americans look at their government with fear.

I do believe, however, that the government has a responsibility to the public to explain itself as fully and as honestly and with as much description of the underlying trends as it possibly can. We have an obligation to have a serious dialogue so that the public feels that when their lives and well-being are involved the decisions reflected a serious democratic process.

That is what we are trying to do—partly, in a limited way, by these trips such as I am taking now, partly by inviting leaders from various parts of the country to Washington, and by sending officials of the Department of State into the country.

The President is making a major effort himself—not only in the foreign field but in the domestic field—to explain our position. And I believe, as I said in my speech yesterday—I believe that we have gone through a tragic decade. I have the sense that we are coming out of it and that we are going—that we are on the way to recovering our unity. I think that the problem which I mentioned yesterday is on the way to solution.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you said recently that the United States may have to issue assurances to Israel in order to achieve a Middle East settlement. Can you get a little more*

*specific about that? Are you talking about assurances that would require congressional approval or would these kinds of assurances win the support of the public today?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I was speaking in the context of a final settlement and in a final settlement which will have to address such issues as boundaries, refugees, the Palestinian issue, the future of Jerusalem, and the Arab peace obligations—that is, specific Arab commitments as to the content of these. This whole package will undoubtedly require for its reinforcement some international and—in my view, very probably—some American guarantees.

Now, these guarantees cannot be effective unless they have congressional support. It is very hard to say now whether the Congress would support them when the outline of a settlement is not clear yet and when one cannot say what it is that the Congress is being asked to support. But I believe that the importance of peace in the Middle East is so great that the Congress would look very seriously at the recommendations of an Administration that thought that its guarantee might be the necessary element to bring about a final settlement. But we are not anywhere near that point yet.

Yes, sir.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, with all the attention that is being paid to Southeast Asia and the Middle East in recent weeks and years, it seems that our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere have sort of been ignored. Have our relations with our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere improved or deteriorated since you became Secretary of State in 1973?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think that relations within the Western Hemisphere have improved in recent years. We have paid more attention to the Western Hemisphere. I think I have met with more Foreign Ministers of the Western Hemisphere than any of my predecessors. And we consider Western Hemisphere relations as absolutely crucial.

If we cannot establish close relationships with countries that stand somewhere between the developing and the developed part of the world—countries with a similar his-



tory and a comparable culture—then the whole relationship between the industrialized and the developing world will be problematical.

Of course, since Latin America is itself in a state of transition, this relationship is bound to be uneven, and this process of transition is bound to create occasional tensions and the inevitable problems of adjustment. But I think we are on a good course in the relationship with the Western Hemisphere.

The recent meeting of the General Assembly of the OAS was conducted in the least polemical way, in the most constructive manner, that any observer can recall. I believe we are on the way to solving some of the outstanding problems in the Western Hemisphere, and we plan to go on to some constructive achievements.

## Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for CBS-TV Evening News

*Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Kissinger by Walter Cronkite broadcast on the CBS television Evening News on June 19.*

*Mr. Cronkite: A current question, Mr. Secretary, on the day's news regarding the Middle East. There is a story out of Israel that the majority party is sticking by a map or at least its plans, which make clear that it has no intention of giving up the Golan Heights or the Gaza Strip—an old position, but it has been restated today. Have they stated that that is a nonnegotiable position?*

*Secretary Kissinger: Of course we are dealing with the Government of Israel and not with a party. The Government of Israel, when Prime Minister Rabin was here, indicated flexibility with respect to negotiations. We did not attempt to draw any final lines. But we did have the impression that they were ready to negotiate in a flexible manner.*

*Mr. Cronkite: President Ford told the Minneapolis Tribune that the drift is still toward war in the Middle East, a statement*

*made after the meetings with Rabin, and, of course, with Sadat in Europe. Do you agree?*

*Secretary Kissinger: I think you are trying to get me into trouble, Walter. I think that the President was trying to emphasize that, as long as there is no progress either toward an interim settlement or an overall settlement, there will be a drift toward war and that this drift must be arrested. We believe that there are possibilities of negotiations, but until they have been achieved, the drift toward war will continue.*

*Mr. Cronkite: What are the prospects now for reversal of that drift?*

*Secretary Kissinger: I think we have a chance to reverse that drift.*

*Mr. Cronkite: Could you give us a timetable?*

*Secretary Kissinger: I can't give a timetable, but I think we are trying to do it within the next months.*

*Mr. Cronkite: The Secretary of State, in addressing the Japan Society in New York last night, seemed to further define U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the sticky area of military support for nondemocratic regimes. He said the lesson of Viet-Nam was that outside military support was not enough—that there was not a popular will to resist. Nonetheless, he added, the United States, in the interest of peace and security, will meet treaty obligations to support governments that do not reflect the "popular will" and social justice. I asked him if that meant that American foreign policy put expediency above principle.*

*Secretary Kissinger: That is a very extreme statement. There are situations in which the collapse of a country could have drastic consequences for world peace. For example, in World War II, the United States and Great Britain supported the Soviet Union even though we had fundamental disagreements with their internal system. On the other hand, wherever the United States can do so, and to the maximum extent possible, we must support democratic institutions, humane governments; and before*

there are pressures, we should use and intend to use our influence in that direction.

*Mr. Cronkite:* You mentioned specifically Korea last night, and obviously this is what you had in mind in much of this discussion. Are you saying that we will keep our treaty commitment even if we know from the Vietnamese experience that popular will is lacking and we therefore are likely to lose the ball game in the end anyway?

*Secretary Kissinger:* I don't think that the judgment is correct that we will lose the ball game in the end in Korea or that a willingness to defend against attack from North Korea is lacking. There are some disputes regarding the internal situation in South Korea, and the United States basically supports a liberal evolution toward democratic forms. But the will to resist certainly exists in Korea; and it does not have to be created, as was the case in Viet-Nam.

*Mr. Cronkite:* On another point from last night's speech, sir, you said that our attitude toward the new regimes in Indochina—and I assume you mean South Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and I suppose Laos along with that—"will be influenced by their conduct toward their neighbors and their attitude toward us." I wonder what specific signs you are going to be looking for that would signal the possibility of détente with those Communist nations of Southeast Asia.

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, of course, as far as Laos is concerned, we still have diplomatic relations with it. With respect to Viet-Nam and Cambodia, we would look for particularly the implementation of the Paris agreement, especially with respect to the

missing in action; and we would expect that they maintain peaceful relations without pressure or subversion with their neighbors. Under those conditions, we would be willing to consider our relationships to them.

*Mr. Cronkite:* How long a time do they have to prove themselves—that they will not have aggressive intentions toward their neighbors? That could be a long time in proof, wouldn't it?

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, but I think one can determine over the next months or year what the basic pattern of their behavior is going to be. And I think we'd be openminded looking for signals.

*Mr. Cronkite:* A story that has just crossed our desk from Zaïre—that the U.S. Ambassador has been declared *persona non grata*, at least has been asked to leave the country, presumably over the allegation that Americans were involved in a plot against President Mobutu's life. Have you any reaction to that?

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, these allegations are totally unfounded, and we regret that this decision has been taken. We do consider Zaïre one of the key countries of Africa with which we would like to maintain cordial relations. And the action was based on totally wrong information that fell into the hands of the Government of Zaïre, probably as a result of forgery.

*Mr. Cronkite:* As a result of what, sir?

*Secretary Kissinger:* It must have been forgery, because we had absolutely no connection with any plot, nor did we know there was a plot.

## President Walter Scheel of the Federal Republic of Germany Makes State Visit to the United States

*President Walter Scheel of the Federal Republic of Germany made a state visit to the United States June 15-20. He met with President Ford and other government officials at Washington June 16-17. Following are an exchange of greetings between President Ford and President Scheel at a welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House on June 16, their exchange of toasts at a dinner at the White House that evening, and an address made by President Scheel before a joint session of the Congress on June 17.*

### EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS, JUNE 16

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 23

#### President Ford

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: It is a very great honor and a personal pleasure, Mr. President, to welcome you here on behalf of the American people. Although this is your first visit as a Federal President, you have been welcomed to our country on many previous occasions. I therefore greet you not only as Federal President but also as an old and very dear friend of America.

Over 17 years have passed since your distinguished predecessor, Theodor Heuss, paid us a state visit. In that year, 1958, the Federal Republic was in the early stages of a remarkable economic recovery and growth which can now be seen as an economic miracle.

The Federal Republic was on its way to becoming one of our strongest allies, one of our most important trading partners and closest of friends.

We have seen many, many changes since the late 1950's. Mr. President, today we face

new challenges of unparalleled complexity, including those of energy and international economics. Yet the basic principles of our foreign policies and of our relationship remain sound and constant.

We are as strongly committed as we were 17 years ago to safeguarding the freedom of the West. We have remained committed to the freedom and security of Berlin. We see the peace and security of Central Europe as a true test of the process known as détente.

Only a few days ago I made my first visit to Europe as President of the United States. In Brussels, the heads of government of the North Atlantic nations met and reaffirmed the continuing solidarity of our alliance and the continuing strength of our commitment to the goals that unite our peoples.

In the era now before us, I can say with confidence that Americans are committed to this alliance with renewed dedication, vision, and purpose.

It is my intention, Mr. President, to work in close concert with you to serve our peoples' common objectives. Together, our strong, free, and prosperous nations can achieve much for our own peoples and for mankind.

Your visit, Mr. President, bears eloquent testimony to the friendship and partnership of the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States. In this spirit, I bid you a most cordial welcome on this occasion, and I look forward to our discussions of the problems of mutual interest and concern.

#### President Scheel

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford: My wife and I should like to express our sincere thanks for your friendly words of welcome.

Today, I come to the White House for the first time as President of the Federal Republic of Germany. What is, after all, the purpose of such a state visit?

Firstly, by its very character, it is intended to mirror the state of mutual relations. These relations are—I know of no doubt about it—excellent. We are showing people both at home and abroad how close are the ties which unite us.

This is a good thing, and important, too. It is something the world should, indeed must, know.

Such a visit also enables us to take stock. We look back at the past.

The bicentenary of the founding of the United States is near at hand. The 30th anniversary of the end of the war in Europe is just over. Both anniversaries play an important part in our relations.

The U.S. Constitution gave birth to modern democracy based on freedom and thus to the democratic family of nations, to which the Federal Republic also belongs.

For us Germans, the 30th anniversary of the end of the war calls forth ambivalent feelings, but it also reminds us of the debt of gratitude we owe to the people of the United States for the generous help they afforded their former enemy. I need not press the point that this help will never be forgotten.

But we must not only dwell on the past; we must also face up to the present. No one, Mr. President, has a clearer picture than you and the government you lead of the problems of worldwide dimensions which confront us today.

The free Western world has taken up this historic challenge. I am convinced it has enough courage, perception, imagination, and initiative to solve the pending problems.

Of course, this cannot be done unless we join forces. Alone, everyone for himself, we shall not succeed. This means that we need European unification. We need the Atlantic partnership between a united Europe and the United States of America.

This Atlantic partnership must comprise not only our common security policy, which will continue to be vital, but also all political

spheres of importance for both sides. In particular, it must include a common approach to the crucial economic and monetary problems facing the world today.

Every step toward more solidarity, I believe, is a step to strengthening our free democratic system.

Your impressive visit to Europe underlined once more these fundamental truths. The countries joined in the Atlantic partnership do not cut themselves off from the outside world. Indeed, one of the reasons for uniting has been to contribute with our combined strengths toward a solution of the global social problem of our time—that of development.

The chances for the survival of democracy are, as I see it, crucially dependent on the forces of freedom all over the world finding the right answer to this problem.

Mr. President, I am pleased to feel that I am a welcome guest in your country. Let me say here and now that you, too, would be a highly welcome guest in our country. I do hope that I will be able in the not too distant future to welcome you in Bonn as the guest of the Federal Republic of Germany. But right now, Mr. President, I am looking forward to my talks with you.

**President Ford**

Thank you very much. I look forward to coming there.

#### EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, JUNE 16

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 23

**President Ford**

Mr. President, Mrs. Scheel, ladies and gentlemen: On your first visit to Washington as President of the Federal Republic of Germany, we extend, Mrs. Ford and myself, our heartiest welcome.

Your first year on the job has shown you have brought to the highest office of your land the same energy and the same dedication that you displayed throughout your long career in the parliament of your country.

You are no stranger, Mr. President, to our

American officials. You served with great distinction as Foreign Minister. You have shown a remarkable breadth and expertise in economics, as well as in politics, and you have a very firm grasp—and we are most grateful—in the Third World as well as in our industrial communities.

We have also noted, Mr. President, your rise to stardom in another important field—popular music—and I refer specifically to a piece that you recently recorded, which became a smash hit, as we call it, throughout your country.

Your musical success contributes to your overall accomplishments as you seek harmony at home and in concert with Germany's neighbors, both West as well as East. You have dedicated yourself, Mr. President, to the cause of European unity, as we discussed this morning, as well as Atlantic solidarity. I know these goals are vital to you, as well as to your country.

At the same time, your contribution to better East-West relations has been most significant. Recent experience has demonstrated there can be no domestic tranquillity or stability and prosperity in any country without cooperation with other nations.

My Administration has been extremely proud to work closely with the Federal Republic on important international problems facing both of us in today's world. Your country has made an important contribution to international peace, Mr. President, not only through its steadfast cooperation with its friends as well as its allies but also in the example set by your government and your people in meeting the new challenges of the modern world.

The Federal Republic today is in many, many ways a model of the development of the modern industrial state—thriving in freedom as well as in democracy, earning its role of eminence by hard work of its people, and finding its successes in common endeavors within the European Community and with its allies.

This is the real challenge for the leaders of the West. I am inspired, Mr. President, by the determination that I sense in the Federal Republic and its leaders not to let

our democratic way of life be undermined.

I continue to be impressed by your nation's ability to meet the tasks of today's world—whether in the fields of economics, trade, energy, national defense, or East-West relations—through the effective democratic government and creative diplomacy.

This tradition, Mr. President, is the most encouraging aspect of our friendship today. We cooperate very closely on the practical problems facing us, sharing the conviction that these solutions will mean nothing if our political and social institutions are not simultaneously preserved. A confident role in the world depends upon confidence in ourselves.

Mr. President, earlier today it was a pleasure to participate with you in the ceremony creating the John J. McCloy Fund,<sup>1</sup> a fund established through a very generous contribution from the Federal Republic to our Bicentennial celebration, a fund which will be used to further German-American exchanges, conferences, contacts across the broad spectrum of our relations. I think this fund symbolizes anew the very close relationship between our peoples.

In this spirit, Mr. President, I raise my glass and welcome you to our country: Mr. President.

#### President Scheel<sup>2</sup>

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: I am glad to be visiting the United States just at a time when the whole country is preparing for the great jubilee of its history, the Bicentennial.

One could reflect at length on whether the United States is an old or a young country. It is no secret that there is a rather uncritical school of thought in Europe that arrogantly thinks it can dismiss the United States, despite its 200 years, as a "country without a history." True, in my country, too, we have cities and towns that were a thousand years old when America gained

<sup>1</sup> For remarks made at the ceremony by President Scheel, President Ford, and Mr. McCloy, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 23, 1974, p. 635.

<sup>2</sup> President Scheel spoke in German.

its independence, but there is no merit in age alone. The tortoise reaches a ripe old age, but it is not the most noble of creatures. And how old is the Federal Republic of Germany? It is 26.

And this brings me to the main point: The United States is not simply 200 years old. In an unbroken historical tradition, it has been a liberal republic from its very beginning. Two hundred years of uninterrupted republican democratic tradition—where else in the world is there a republic which for two centuries has made liberty and equality for all citizens its law of life, which has not even shirked a civil war in order to remain true to the ideals upon which it entered world history? And those ideals are today still the most important, the most topical, and the most vital of all. Europe is, who would doubt it, the mother of the United States, but the United States is, and who could doubt that, the mother of European democracy.

Over the centuries, many German immigrants have come to this country. We Germans were gratified at the result of a public opinion survey carried out by your Bureau of the Census. Of the 205 million questioned, 30 million said their heritage was Anglo-Saxon, but 25 million, the next largest group, said their heritage was German. They had left their native country because they wanted to escape religious oppression, because economic necessity left them no choice, because the accelerating process of industrialization had uprooted them, or because they were persecuted on political grounds.

Well, they all quickly became Americans, even though many of them still cherished their native country. But their loyalty they gave unshakably to the land whose citizens they were proud to be.

Many of them returned to our country as American soldiers after the war and brought with them, together with their fellow citizens, the message of the free America. We hungrily threw ourselves upon everything that came from the other side of the Atlantic. Our writers were inspired by William Faulkner and Ernest Hemingway, our young architects stood in awe at the tremendous strides made in the meantime by architecture in America,

our newspapers modeled themselves upon their American counterparts, and young Germans fell for jazz. In short, one cannot imagine the cultural life of our country without the stimuli it received from this country.

Today, Mr. President, our two countries are closely linked with each other, but those ties are based not only on the identity of our political, economic, and security interests but on the interplay of cultural and historical developments that have been of such great importance to both countries. History shows us the way to each other.

And that is why the American President's appeal to us to join in the celebrations has met with a broad-based response in the Federal Republic of Germany. It gives me great pleasure, Mr. President, to be able to announce on this festive occasion some of the contributions the Federal Government will be making on the occasion of your jubilee year.

Those contributions are intended to symbolize the close relationship between our two countries, to help make both peoples even more conscious of its many facets.

We have therefore established a fund which will be known as the John J. McCloy Fund for German-American Exchanges. The fund will enable young politicians, journalists, and representatives of trade unions and employers organizations to undertake information trips and participate in German-American seminars. There was hardly any need to search for a name of the fund, because John J. McCloy, whom I am delighted to see with us here tonight, has become a symbol of German-American friendship and cooperation over the past 30 years.

In the purely academic sphere, the New School for Social Research in New York will be endowed by the Federal Government with a new chair. The New School is a university founded by German emigrants, and the years of close cooperation with the school have shown that by dint of mutual effort it has been possible to bridge a dark chapter of the past.

At Georgetown University here in Washington, D.C., a guest professorship will be created with a view to deepening the close

relations between the university and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The new Air and Space Museum in the Smithsonian Institution is to have a large-scale projection apparatus for the planetarium to be known as the Einstein Spacearium. That great physicist, who was director of the most outstanding research establishment in his field, the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Physics in Berlin, was expelled from Germany on racial grounds. The dedication of the Einstein Spacearium on 4 July 1976 will again link his name, which belongs to both countries, with Germany. One of the best known modern composers of my country, Karl Heinz Stockhausen, will be composing special electronic music for the occasion.

I have mentioned some of the contributions that will be made by the Federal Government. But the *Länder* of the Federal Republic of Germany and many cities and organizations, too, are making preparation to mark the bicentenary of German-American ties. All this adds up to a token of gratitude to a nation which refuses to be excelled where generosity is concerned. We Germans have every reason to remember this, and I can assure you that we shall never forget it.

As the President of a parliamentary democracy who was himself for many years a member of the German Bundestag, I wish on this occasion to convey another kind of thanks to the American people—the thanks of the German parliamentarians for the generous hospitality they have received in America when they came here to get to know the parliamentary work of this country and to see for themselves what life here was really like. I myself was in the first group of members of the state parliament of North-Rhine Westphalia which visited your country in 1951. The friendly and generous reception we were given then, so soon after the war, had a profound effect on my view of America, I will not deny it. And all my colleagues at that time had the same experience.

When the independence of the United States of America was proclaimed, men whose daring matched their circumspection demonstrated to the world that internal and external freedom require each other. Free-

dom can only be preserved if it is linked with the readiness to defend it both internally and externally.

Precisely that is the purpose of the alliance in which we are united, the purpose of Atlantic partnership, to which we again committed ourselves during your visit to Brussels a few weeks ago, Mr. President.

But we should not content ourselves with defending our own freedom, our own prosperity. We cannot tolerate a situation in which the dignity of man is the privilege of but a few nations whilst the majority sink in hunger and misery.

In the year 2000, the world population will be 7,000 million. Even now agricultural production can hardly keep pace with population growth. And as the population grows, so too do the import requirements of the developing countries, very many of whom are the poorest nations on earth. If social development in the Third World is not to get completely out of control, some 300 million new jobs will have to be created there by 1980. But these countries have not the resources to be able to achieve this by themselves. They have to be helped. But this objective can only be attained through sacrifices and imagination.

This is where the members of the Atlantic alliance are called upon to make a big joint effort. If anything can fill us with the courage to face this problem squarely and coolheadedly, it is that belief in the inalienable dignity and freedom of man which inspired the founders of this mighty Republic 200 years ago.

For the American democracy is old, but its message is eternally young and great—like this country, the United States of America.

#### ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT SCHEEL BEFORE THE CONGRESS, JUNE 17<sup>3</sup>

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker: You have invited me to address you. I appreciate this special gesture. I respond by expressing the deep respect which every democrat owes to this outstanding assembly. I am glad of this opportunity to express some thoughts

<sup>3</sup> Reprinted from the *Congressional Record*, June 17, p. H 5578.

on questions that are of concern to all people in the free world.

The world is fraught with unrest and problems, and I am grateful to be able to discuss them with you.

Today all governments with a sense of responsibility unavoidably find themselves competing to save mankind from misery and anarchy. The leaders in that contest are not automatically the powerful ones, but rather those who can come up with convincing answers to the problems of modern society.

We have had to learn that not only the individual is mortal but the whole of mankind. It can perish in a few days through arms of destruction. It can perish in a few generations through environmental pollution and the wasteful exploitation of its natural resources.

The words of St. Matthew still hold true for the whole of mankind: No town, no household that is divided against itself can stand. The community in this situation has nothing more to fear than the passions of egotism. It needs nothing more than the voice of reason which reconciles the different elements and forges them into a whole.

That voice has often been raised on this side of the Atlantic. When Europe began to break up the old feudal systems with new democratic ideas, the American Revolution turned the theory of democracy into practice.

When the nations of Europe picked themselves up from the debris in 1945, it was the United States who through its inspired leadership galvanized the forces of the old continent into a coordinated recovery operation.

That action was perhaps the most generous in the history of mankind. It will be associated forever with the name of Secretary of State George Marshall.

My country was included in it as early as 1947. Indeed in 1946 already a great American statesman, Secretary of State James Byrnes, in his historic speech in Stuttgart held out a hand to the former enemy. The tests and dangers we had withstood together let this understanding grow into a well-tried political partnership. That partnership has rendered us capable of great achievements. It has made our *ostpolitik* possible and has enabled us to defuse the complex and dangerous Berlin problem.

But the freedom of Berlin is not based on international agreements alone. Berlin remains free by virtue of deeds ever since American citizens risked, indeed, sacrificed, their lives during the airlift. It remained free by virtue of the words by which President Kennedy called himself a "Berliner." That city remains a decisive hinge of East-West relations in Europe. Here the strengths of any policy of *détente* and our alliance are put to the test day by day.

It is true, I speak to you as the representative of a divided nation. We have not succeeded in overcoming the artificial and unnatural division of Ger-

many by peaceful means. Other than peaceful means have never been thought up, nor will they be. No one will understand better than you, Senators and Congressmen, that a nation can never forgo its unity as a political goal.

The first essential is this: If a rational and sincere policy of *détente* is to have any meaning for us, it must surely be to make it easier for the people in divided Germany to live together.

After the darkest years in our history, the United States gave us generous support. But let me also say that nothing of what you have done for us since has been in vain. You have gained a good ally who makes its full contribution toward the defense capability of the alliance, a contribution that is second to none but that of the United States—an ally for democracy, a partner for the efforts which Europe and America will have to make together in order to enable all people to live in conditions worthy of man.

But the partners of the Atlantic alliance, who include the oldest democracies on Earth, must not shirk the question, "Can our democratic way of life survive?" Has it not already been overtaken by the accelerating rate of change in the world? Do we still have the moral strength to find for ourselves and others the way through the uncertain?

These questions lead us back to the ideas of which our democracies were born.

I am convinced that they will stand scrutiny. They make us alive to the reliable, the constant elements of our policy: the Atlantic alliance, on which our freedom and our freedom of action rests, and the common values in which our partnership is rooted.

The meeting of the NATO Council in Brussels and the prominent role which President Ford played there have confirmed that these are joint beliefs and vital links. The political responsibility of the world power America extends beyond the Atlantic area. Wherever world peace is threatened, this country places its enormous weight on the scales of peace. And at this present time as well the world hopes that the courage and perseverance of its political leaders will give them the strength to forge peace in the Middle East bit by bit. For what use are the dignity and freedom of man if they lack the ground of peace in which to grow?

Belief in these very values, the dignity and freedom of man, has inspired our best political minds for over two centuries. When my own generation entered upon the political scene, we considered the model offered by America as proof that the concept of Western democracy was a fitting basis from which to cope with the problems of this, the most difficult of all worlds.

I realize that for 12 years those ideals were treated with shocking contempt in Germany, and yet freedom ultimately prevailed. Exactly 22 years ago today, on the 17th of June 1953, it showed its elemental strength when East Berlin workers, heedless of the risks to life and limb, hoisted the black,



red, and gold flag on the Brandenburg Gate.

Totalitarianism may use arbitrary means; yet in the end freedom will triumph. Nevertheless, freedom can preserve its strength only if each generation anew makes it its own. In the European Community democratic forces openly vie with one another and with the Communists, but we have learned that our idea of freedom will be cogent only as long as it is the motive force of social change. If this is not so, it remains a hollow word.

The catchword of our time is "détente." It is a fundamental objective of our foreign policy. It is a great hope of our nation. But the peaceful existence side by side of East and West knows of no cease-fire on the ideological front. And the fronts in this ideological battle run right through the German nation, which has been divided for decades. We shall be the losers in that struggle unless we see why Communist ideologies are effective in Europe or in the Third World. We see communism succeed where injustice and misery predominate, and we have to sharpen our conscience.

It is my belief that political freedom cannot prevail where the social conscience remains silent. In our two countries we have been able to humanize working conditions without revolution and bloodshed.

Our political leaders have rated human dignity and freedom higher than the rights of the powerful in the free market. They know that political freedom becomes a farce unless the individual has the material means of self-realization. Freedom and social justice go together. Social peace is the prerequisite for a nation's inner strength. Without that inner strength it has no strength internationally.

Our Constitution upholds the concept of ownership as the basis of a free economic order. But at the same time, it postulates the social obligation inherent in ownership. That is what our Constitution, the basic law of the Federal Republic of Germany, prescribes, and this has been the approach of all governments of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Ten million refugees from the lost regions of eastern Germany found a new homeland in the destroyed and overpopulated western part of our country. Generous legislation and the sacrifices made by the people gave those expellees equal opportunities. My country is proud of that achievement.

Today we are trying to achieve a balance of interests and opportunities on a much larger scale. The entire world economic order must be given the chance to develop further, but in the process, nothing should be given up that has proved its value.

We are called upon to share responsibility for answering vital questions from five continents: Tomorrow's grain and rice deficit, the interplay of population pressure and economic development, the mounting cost of military security. The starving in many parts of the world still need our help. Young nations who hoped to achieve industrial prosperity overnight with the aid of our capital and technology are disappointed and put the blame on us.

The industrialized countries can only meet these challenges if their economic constitution is sound.

This means for our countries we must continue along the paths we have taken in fighting unemployment and worldwide recession. Our economic policies must give sufficient impulses to domestic demand.

One thing is certain: Only through close cooperation between North America and Europe and by harmonizing interests have we any prospect of mastering such tasks. It is certain that our combined energies will not provide the solution without the contributions of other nations. And it is certain also that we would be betraying the old fundamental ideas of democracy if we were always to be found on the side of those who defend property and privilege against social demands, demands born of hunger and distress.

It is our task to find evolutionary solutions, but this is no easy matter. The welfare of our peoples which we have to guard did not come to us overnight. We owe it to the hard work and privations of whole generations. It would be politically meaningless and economically impossible just to transfer our assets and our social achievements to others, as some developing countries would like it.

Our aim is not to maintain the status quo, but to seek harmonization of interests. The readiness to accept change is the prerequisite for the pursuit of happiness, and in that context it is the spirit we adopt in our relations with the partners from other camps that will be decisive.

Our diplomatic tools shall not include threats and intimidation. In a spirit of partnership without mental reservation, it is possible to reconcile even sharply conflicting interests. In everything we do we must start from the fact that in the decades ahead there is only one rational course open to us, that of cooperation.

The nine European states have, with much good will, worked out an overall modus of economic cooperation with the nations of Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean. In protracted negotiations, sharply differing points of view and interests of many sovereign partners have been harmonized. Here we have a promising example of multilateral cooperation with the Third World. It also shows that the European Community can have a stabilizing influence on the world economy.

At the same time, it becomes clear that the European Community is capable of helping to ease the burden of the United States, once it finds its way to joint action. The European union to which we have committed ourselves has not yet been completed, and to be frank, in this respect we are still a long way behind our hopes and our promises. But Europe is needed, and we shall build it, and in so doing, we need the understanding of the United States.

We need long-term European-American cooperation. It must be based on mutual trust. It must be candid. It must not again make the mistake of

emphasizing divergent secondary interests at the expense of primary common interests.

We need not only the willpower and the technical capability of the United States which President Ford referred to in Brussels but also, to quote him again, "its spiritual drive and steadiness of purpose."

Not as some may have feared and others may have hoped, recent developments have not loosened the ties of European-American solidarity. On the contrary, more energies have been set free for the alliance which will be concentrated on its tasks. The awareness of our interdependence is deeper than ever. It has above all become clear to us that it is the common fundamental democratic beliefs which distinguished the alliance from others and which nourished its strength in each member state.

I believe in a Europe committed to the human rights that were embodied for the first time in the constitution of Massachusetts, a Europe which fills these principles with a sense of social justice of our generation. Only with a deeper understanding of our spiritual heritage will the democracies on either side of the North Atlantic be able to assert themselves and thus effectively serve the cause of world peace.

Together with you, we shall recall the concepts and ideals of the American Revolution. May our age find us as resolved, as realistic, but also as idealistic as those men and women who made this great country.

## **U.S. Grants Egypt \$40 Million for Suez Canal Area Reconstruction**

AID press release 75-47 dated May 30

The Agency for International Development is providing two additional grants to Egypt totaling \$40 million for reconstruction projects in the Suez Canal area. One grant for \$30 million will finance electrical equipment, materials, and related services to help the Egyptian Government reconstruct the electrical distribution systems in Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez City. The other grant of \$10 million will finance heavy equipment, spare parts, and related materials for the reconstruction of roads, city streets, and structures in the Suez Canal area.

The grant agreements were signed in Cairo May 28 by U.S. Ambassador Hermann F. Eilts and Egyptian Minister of Economy and Economic Cooperation Muhammad Zaki Shafa'i.

Last February, AID signed an \$80 million loan to Egypt to finance imports of agricultural and industrial equipment, spare parts, and other essential commodities to aid the Egyptian economy. In addition, AID provided a \$14 million grant to help clear the 103-mile-long Suez Canal of sunken ships, wreckage, and explosives and a \$2 million grant for technical assistance.

The AID loans and grants are part of the \$250 million economic assistance program approved by the U.S. Congress for fiscal year 1975. The U.S. Government also donated about \$5 million for Food for Peace commodities in fiscal year 1975.

## **U.S. Gives Views on Use of Funds by UNICEF for Indochina Program**

*Following is a statement by Michael N. Seelsi, U.S. Representative on the Executive Board of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), made in the program committee of the board on May 27.*

USUN press release 52 (corr. 1) dated May 27

The U.S. delegation does not believe additional funds from the general resources budget should be committed to the Indochina Program in view of the limited resources and needs in other parts of the world. There is ample opportunity for countries wishing to expand UNICEF assistance to Indochina to do so by contributing to the Secretary General's special appeal.

The U.S. delegation wants it explicitly noted in the records of this committee that it has reservations with regard to this proposal.

## U.S. Policy in the Area of the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula

*Statement by Joseph J. Sisco  
Under Secretary for Political Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Chairman [Representative Lee H. Hamilton]: My statement will address itself to U.S. policy in the area of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula—an area of major importance to the United States in political, economic, and strategic terms.

It is timely to take another comprehensive look at this region, and I want to commend the chairman and the members of the committee for having launched this useful review and dialogue in 1972—a dialogue which has been carried on with regularity since then. Our policies impact on both regional and global interests, and I hope to show that our military sales program, in which I know you have a special interest, is an integral part of that overall policy, pursued carefully and with balance, with a view to promoting the interests of the United States.

In the Persian Gulf-Arabian Peninsula area are 10 countries which are related geographically, religiously, and for the most part, ethnically, but which present sharp and distinctive economic and political contrasts. Some have long histories as independent nations with established interests and influence in and beyond the area, while others have achieved independence as recently as 1971. All have strong economic ties with the outside world. Several are among the

world's wealthiest in terms of per capita GNP, while others are still among the poorest. Their political systems range from absolute monarchy based on Koranic law through gradations of parliamentary democracy to a Marxist-Leninist-style People's Republic. Except for the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, where we have had no diplomatic relations and no official presence since October 1969, and Iraq, where despite the absence of diplomatic relations we maintain a small U.S. Interests Section in the Belgian Embassy, our relations with all the countries in this region are good. With many of these countries, the depth and variety of our relationship have grown significantly in recent years.

It remains an area where a spectacular transition is underway:

—Where new political institutions have been formed and tested and where traditional values are subject to modern social change;

—Where there has been a dramatic evolution in relationships between international oil companies and oil producer states;

—Where a technology transfer is being greatly accelerated as the oil-exporting countries seek help from the developed countries to diversify and industrialize their economies; and

—Where concerns for security and stability have loomed large since Britain's termination in 1971 of its protective treaty relationships with a number of gulf states and as the countries in the area have moved toward greater regional cooperation.

<sup>1</sup> Submitted to the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on International Relations on June 10. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

It also remains an area where developments affect the relationships among and policies of major world powers. With the shift in world oil market power from consumer nations to the producer countries, the application in 1973 of the oil embargo, and the quadrupling of oil prices, the global strategic equation has been affected by what happens in the gulf. The increasing world focus on the gulf has been marked by a growing Soviet presence in its periphery as the Soviets have sought to increase their position and military presence in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Somalia, and Iraq. Since 1967 and particularly since the October 1973 war, the major Arab oil producers in the peninsula have become the principal financial support for the Arab states more directly involved in the Middle East conflict. While they are not directly part of the process of reaching a Middle East settlement, their views are very important, and they are regularly consulted by the Arab parties to the negotiations as well as by the Palestinians.

#### Current Overview

Before examining our policy, it is important to look briefly at where we were in the area four years ago—when there was uncertainty about the region's future stability with Britain relinquishing its security responsibilities in the gulf and small newly independent states in the region about to emerge.

Just four years ago, we were concerned about whether any federation of small gulf states could hold together, about the numerous unresolved boundary disputes, about the impact of the growing Communist-supported insurgency in Oman's Dhofar Province, and finally about the dearth of technicians and nation-building institutions needed for the area's development. In short, only four years ago there were real concerns as to how and indeed whether the area would be able to benefit from rapid change without falling prey to the instability inherent in such change.

While the rapid political and social transition now underway still leaves a number of

uncertainties, there has been a substantial degree of progress and stability. Recently, we have seen the smooth succession of power in Saudi Arabia. The seven-member United Arab Emirates has solidified and is building up its federal structure. The wealthy gulf riparians are attracting a growing number of foreign technicians and companies to help with their development. The significant rise in the price of oil has made several gulf states capital-surplus nations, enabling them to increase sharply their level of foreign assistance and to become attractive markets for our goods and services as they seek to accelerate their own development.

At the same time, there has been a perceptible trend toward greater regional cooperation. For these countries, the gulf remains the key communications link to the outside world for most of their imports and exports, and this circumstance has required them to deal with each other in seeking to resolve issues contributing to area tensions. The Shah's recent visit to Saudi Arabia has highlighted the closer cooperation among the two principal gulf riparians.

Progress has been made on a number of boundary issues. Iran has settled its boundary dispute with Iraq. Iraq in turn has reached a preliminary boundary settlement with Saudi Arabia. The United Arab Emirates has settled its boundary problem with Saudi Arabia and negotiated a median line in the gulf with Iran.

In the poorest but most populous state on the peninsula, North Yemen, we have seen strong Saudi financial support for a new government which is earnestly trying to put centuries of tribalism and factionalism behind it and to get on with the business of development and progress for its people. The insurgency in Dhofar supported by the radical South Yemen regime has failed to gain its objective, and one of the principal reasons has been the military and economic assistance Oman has received from friendly regional states.

Finally, the reopening of the Suez Canal provides opportunities and incentives to the South Yemen regime to moderate its ideological bent if it plans to put Aden's unique

bunkering facilities to use once again for world shipping. Whether it will perceive its interests in this light, of course, remains to be seen.

### **Objectives of U.S. Policy**

Our main policy objectives for the gulf and Arabian Peninsula region, which we have set forth before to the committee, have remained constant since we developed a comprehensive policy framework in anticipation of the termination of the special British role there in 1971. They are:

—Support for collective security and stability in the region by encouraging indigenous regional cooperative efforts and orderly economic progress. Being responsive to requests from the regional states for advice regarding the types and quantities of military equipment and services they need to meet their defense and internal security needs as they perceive them, and responding on a case-by-case basis to their requests to purchase such equipment and services from us, have served this purpose;

—Continued access to the region's oil supplies at reasonable prices and in sufficient quantities to meet our needs and those of our allies;

—Encouraging the states in the area to resolve by peaceful means territorial and other disputes between them and widening the channels of communication between them;

—Expanding our diplomatic, cultural, technical, commercial, and financial presence and activities; and

—Assisting oil exporters to employ their rapidly growing incomes in a constructive way, supportive of the international financial system.

### **Regional Security**

Mr. Chairman, we must remember that the nations in the gulf region have a primary interest in stability and orderly progress. The littoral states of the gulf are aware that they sit on what is probably the world's most valuable energy asset, valued at something over \$4.5 trillion at today's oil and gas prices.

They know there is little in history to suggest that resources of this magnitude, of such critical importance to every nation of the world, will go unmolested very long unless there is a degree of collective security. They know that any implicit big-power guarantees that they feel might have existed in the past have now disappeared with the British relinquishing their former protective role in the gulf and the gulf states themselves acquiring control and ownership of their own petroleum resources.

It is our view that the major burden for assuring security in the region must be borne by the gulf states themselves and in particular by the major nations of the region, Iran and Saudi Arabia. We have had a long tradition of military cooperation with those nations through the provision of training and furnishing of military equipment which dates back to World War II. When the British announced in 1968 they would end their protective treaty relationships in the gulf, we carefully reviewed our policy. We decided on an approach which incorporated the following guidelines:

—To continue to promote regional cooperation by encouraging the two strongest riparian states, Iran and Saudi Arabia, to assume increasing responsibilities for the collective security of the region;

—To establish direct U.S. relationships with the new political entities in the area where they had not existed before, including the establishment of diplomatic representation in the lower gulf states; and

—To develop plans for technical and educational assistance and cultural exchange, through private as well as public programs, for the purpose of promoting orderly development.

This approach recognizes the role which the British will continue to play as adviser on security and economic development, but it is a course which has relied increasingly on a varied mix and growing nexus of relationships—in which military supply for regional security is one aspect. It is a policy approach which we have since periodically reexamined in our review of the most desirable basis for

maintaining stability in the area of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula.

The execution of a regional policy based on these general guidelines has required that our actions be tailored to the specific country concerned, taking into account its human resources, size and geography, degree of development, and the security threats which it believes it faces. There are in the gulf at least four entities that need to be addressed separately.

### **Iran's Security and Development Programs**

Iran shares a lengthy border with the Soviet Union. While seeking cooperation with the powerful northern neighbor, any prudent Iranian leader has to remain concerned about long-term Soviet intentions. Looking east and west, he can see substantial Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq; to the south he sees growing Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean. Possessing half of the shoreline of the Persian Gulf, a waterway of vital importance to its burgeoning economy and oil exports, Iran has a natural strategic interest in maintaining free passage through the gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, through which pass all of Iran's and two-thirds of the world's oil exports, and the Indian Ocean, through which the gulf is reached.

Iran's size, harsh terrain, relatively limited transportation network, and great distance from foreign suppliers of military equipment have required it to develop comprehensive defense plans which correspond to these conditions. The result has been a concept that keeps the standing armed forces relatively small in number (about 350,000) while providing advanced equipment for air, naval, and armored forces and the means to move ground forces by air rapidly from one location to another.

While using a portion of its oil wealth to equip itself for its defense, Iran has sought to develop a cooperative approach to regional security among states. It has recently been able to settle a longstanding territorial dispute with Iraq. At the same time, it has of-

ferred support to its gulf neighbors in dealing with radical threats. Iranian units are presently in Oman to help the Sultan end the insurgency in Dhofar, which has its sanctuary and base in the Soviet-backed People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

The size of Iran's population, coupled with its rapid social and economic development, gives it a capability to exercise leadership in the gulf. The United States has welcomed Iran's taking on greater security responsibilities. We have agreed to sell it a substantial quantity of defense material, especially aircraft and naval craft. The progress which Iran has made in improving its military capability has given Iran a credible deterrent, enabled it to play a more active role in protecting the vital trade routes of the gulf, and was undoubtedly a factor in the recent decision of the Iraqi and Iranian leadership to resolve a major bilateral dispute by negotiation. I would note it is only recently that Iran's armed forces have drawn level with Iraq's military capabilities and strength.

Much has been said regarding the resources which the Iranian Government is putting into building its defense military capacity. But too little has been said about the impressive strides which the government has made in economic development and in improving the welfare of its people. Iran's domestic investment program is more than twice what it spends on defense. The Iranian five-year plan (1973-78) calls for the expenditure of roughly \$70 billion in the civilian sector. A substantial portion is for industrial growth, but \$19 billion is earmarked for housing, free education, urban and rural development, and a massive increase in medical facilities.

### **Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Lower Gulf States**

Saudi Arabia is also greatly concerned about its security. It, too, covers a vast land area, almost as big as the United States east of the Mississippi, with 2,000 miles of coastline. On its southern perimeter, it sees a continuing insurgency festering in western

Oman supported by the radical South Yemen regime and to the north an Iraq with significant ideological differences. We tend to forget that Saudi towns were bombed by Egyptian aircraft in 1963 and South Yemen forces struck Saudi outposts in 1969 and 1973. Lightly populated, with military and paramilitary forces of only about 80,000, Saudi Arabia has much to protect but relatively little to protect it with.

In the security and defense field, we have conducted for the Saudis comprehensive surveys of their military requirements on two occasions in recent years, taking into account the threat they perceive to their national security and their limited manpower resources. Our cooperative effort has been to assist the Saudis to achieve several objectives which they see as critical to their own defense and stability in the Arabian Peninsula: Development of a credible air defense system, modernization and training of their ordnance corps, upgrading of their air force through acquisition of F-5E aircraft, building a small force of naval patrol craft, modernizing elements of the National Guard to improve its capabilities to protect key installations, and construction of military infrastructure facilities.

Our programs have been clearly related to Saudi Arabia's capacity to absorb the equipment it purchases. Because training, maintenance, and the construction of the physical plant to use the equipment are such a major portion of our defense-related activities in Saudi Arabia, and because these programs are stretched out over a period of many years, the cost figures involved are often many times higher than would be the case in a purchase of hardware.

Kuwait's primary concern has been the absence of any acceptance by Iraq of the present boundary between the two countries. Kuwait has made a reasoned analysis of what it can do with its limited territory and its small army to take the steps necessary to equip itself with a modest defense against air and armor attack. After a survey which they asked us to make in early 1972 and after sev-

eral years of discussion, marked by several Iraqi border incursions and the continued Iraqi occupation of some Kuwaiti territory, Kuwait recently contracted for the purchase of a number of Hawk air defense missiles, A-4 aircraft, and TOW antitank missiles. These weapons systems have been purchased by Kuwait for the purpose of reinforcing its defense in order to have sufficient force to slow down an aggressor long enough for either friendly regional forces or diplomacy to come to its aid and bring an end to the fighting.

Except for Oman, which is faced with an active insurgency, weapons requirements for the lower gulf states have been small. What little they have purchased from us has been mainly from commercial sources. Other than the recent sale of a small number of TOW's to Oman to defend against the possible use by South Yemen of Soviet-supplied tanks (Oman itself has no armor) and some anti-personnel mines, our foreign military sales to lower gulf states have been limited thus far to training courses. These states have continued to meet their more limited requirements from other friendly sources.

While we are prepared to make available on a sales basis modest amounts of training or equipment as may be appropriate to their real internal security needs, we have no intention of encouraging an arms race among these smaller states. Instead, we have encouraged them to cooperate closely among themselves and to look for their security in a regional context by cooperating with their larger neighbors.

#### **Military Programs and Overall Objectives**

Given our mutuality of interests, it is reasonable and sensible for us to support the policy goals of these friendly countries where such goals parallel our own. Their concerns are in the political, economic, cultural, as well as defense fields: political, in a desire for cooperative and friendly relations with us; economic, in a desire for us to play a role in helping them carry out their plans for eco-

conomic development and diversification which also brings benefits to us; cultural, in a desire for U.S. cooperation in rapidly building their educational resource bases in technological and other fields; and defense, in a desire that we assist them to train and equip the forces necessary to insure their own security and that of the gulf area.

These elements of policy are closely linked, and an effective policy cannot be realistically pursued by divorcing the defense-related aspect of our policy from other aspects. This is true because the leaders of the gulf states do perceive threats to their stability and well-being and see cooperation in defense matters as part of the totality of our relationship. They would consider any U.S. policy which purported to be helpful and cooperative but which ignored their security needs to be unrealistic and irrelevant to one of their principal preoccupations.

Therefore we see no practical way to separate the military and defense aspects of our policies from the diplomatic, political, economic, and other ties we maintain. We cannot claim friendship and interest in one breath and deny goods or services which have life-or-death importance with the next.

### **Nonmilitary Aspects of Relations**

The impression that our military relationships with the gulf nations have dominated all other aspects of our relations is as erroneous as it seems to be persistent. It persists, I suppose, because the sale of military hardware and services is highly visible and generally carries a large price tag. It is erroneous because we have carried out a vigorous and effective program of broadening our ties to the gulf states in a number of fields, in specific and conscious execution of the policies we have decided to pursue. Our growing diplomatic, trade, and financial ties, our growing technical assistance and educational and cultural exchange, bear witness to the importance of the nonmilitary aspects of our relationships. In the case of Saudi Arabia and Iran, these have further been widened

through the recent creation of Joint Commissions which are establishing a more systematic framework for our long-term relationships in many fields of common interest.

Under the auspices of the Iranian Joint Commission, we expect to stimulate a substantial increase in trade—over \$20 billion in non-oil, nonmilitary items from now until 1981—and are currently discussing a variety of projects in the fields of agriculture, fertilizer uses and production, manpower training, and housing and urban development, all of which could result in the sending to Iran of scores of technical specialists on a totally reimbursable basis.

In Saudi Arabia, the Joint Commission office has recently gone into operation. Within the next year, we expect the Joint Commission will be responsible for more than 100 U.S. experts in Saudi Arabia in the fields of agriculture, science and technology, statistics, education, and manpower utilization. These are the priority areas established in almost a year of planning and discussion of Joint Commission goals between ourselves and the Saudis.

All of this activity will be funded by the Saudi Government, primarily via an innovative technical cooperation agreement which we concluded with the Saudis earlier this year. That agreement provides, in effect, for a massive aid program for Saudi Arabia—but an aid program financed by the recipient. In short, the Saudi Joint Commission promises to become a major element in our relations, an important new channel for cooperation between the United States and Saudi Arabia, and a significant factor in the development and industrialization of that country.

### **Diplomatic Actions**

As I mentioned above, one specific decision which flowed from our policy review in the late sixties was that as the lower gulf countries became responsible for the conduct of their foreign policy we should establish full diplomatic relations with them. Late in



1971, we began to open Embassies in these countries and in the past year have assigned resident Ambassadors who are Arabic-language qualified—an accomplishment, I might add, which was made easier by your strong support, Mr. Chairman. Let me emphasize that in the lower gulf, we have lean, hard-working, “shirtsleeve” Embassies, staffed with some of the best young talent we have, whose mission is to represent the United States to nations and peoples who know little of us firsthand. One of their primary goals is to promote trade with those nations, and as I will mention later, the commercial opportunities are attractive and fast growing.

Another responsibility of our Ambassadors is to maintain a direct dialogue with the leaders and people of the lower gulf on such matters of vital interest to us as peace in the Middle East, the continuing supply of oil, and producer-consumer cooperation. This they are doing. They are helping to expand the horizons both of our interests in these nations and of these nations’ perceptions of the United States. And they are only just getting started. Contrast that to the situation only four years ago, when we had no resident representatives at all in the sheikhdoms, and you will readily see that we have come a long way in a short time.

### Trade and Finance

There are exceptional market opportunities for the United States in the area of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. Most of these countries have to import practically everything they consume as well as the capital goods to carry out their ambitious development plans. In 1973, their imports totaled \$8.7 billion. This total is based on the import figures of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and North and South Yemen. Preliminary estimates are that their imports rose to over \$13.5 billion in 1974 (about 15 percent of which was security-related equipment), making the area the fastest growing market for our goods and services

in the world. By 1980, imports by gulf countries could well reach \$50 billion.

As I mentioned, one of the primary tasks of our Embassies is to facilitate access to this market for U.S. business. In a number of cases, we have to overcome longstanding traditions of reliance by these countries on European suppliers. The Department of State, on a daily basis, is directly involved in advising and assisting U.S. businessmen interested in the area. The Commerce Department, which has primary responsibility for trade promotion, has established a special action group which each day helps U.S. businessmen seeking to do business in the Near East. Also, on any given day, hundreds of American businessmen are in the gulf states actively exploring the possibilities.

The policies of the gulf states themselves, being by and large free market in nature, encourage expanded trade relations with the most favorable suppliers. We believe we are on the threshold of a major expansion in this area. Our market share in the region has grown to 25 percent in the last two years, with \$3.4 billion in exports in 1974. We believe that with appropriate effort and support American businesses will be able to further increase our market share.

The financial reserves of the gulf states today total about \$50 billion; by 1980, they may be several times this figure. Obviously, the sheer weight of these resources involves a potential for disruption of international monetary and financial systems. By the same token, these resources cannot be of value to the nations which hold them unless they have access to investment opportunities in the industrialized world and unless that world also prospers.

So there is a very definite common interest between the United States and the industrialized economies of Western Europe and Japan on the one hand, and the gulf states on the other, in promoting the productive and profitable placement of gulf moneys abroad. It is widely acknowledged that the gulf nations have by and large used their emerging enormous financial power with prudence and

responsibility, making it clear that they recognize both its potential for good and its potential for damage. We have developed close and mutually advantageous relations in this critical area with most of the gulf nations.

#### **Cultural Exchanges and Technical Assistance**

The scale of activities in educational and cultural exchange has grown rapidly in the last few years. A new aspect of life in many American universities is the growing number of students from the gulf countries. Iranian students alone are now estimated to number 13,500, and the Iranian Government has instituted a new scholarship program which could double this figure.

The number of students from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait has doubled since 1970, now totaling 1,400 and 900 respectively, and both governments have had to expand their official support staff here for these students. Although the number of students from the lower gulf states is still small (about 210), it was virtually zero only four years ago. These countries have sought and are receiving educational counsel from American private organizations and consultant firms. They are entering into university-to-university relationships (there are 12 with Iran alone) and are embarking on a major upgrading of their own institutions of higher learning through faculty development programs.

For our part, we have measurably expanded our cultural and informational activities in these states. We have, for example, an English Language Center in Riyadh (which is financed by Saudi Arabia) and another in Jidda. We hope to have one soon in Abu Dhabi. In Iran, there are six binational centers which we have established in collaboration with Iranian authorities. In Kuwait and the lower gulf, we have mounted an active USIA-sponsored speaker and cultural program. We have tripled the number of persons coming from the smaller gulf states under the educational exchange program administered by the State Department's Educational and Cultural Affairs Bureau. The number of independent travelers from

the region is rising even faster. In short, we are seeing a rapidly growing human interchange. We put a high value on this increasing exposure to American customs, education, and technology, and we believe it should facilitate U.S. cooperation with these countries over the longer term.

The gulf states are striving to convert their principal natural resource—oil—into a complex of financial, industrial, commercial, and other assets which will outlast their petroleum supplies and promise a secure and prosperous future. To do so, they will be indeed heavily dependent on the technical expertise of the developed nations, and they are keenly aware of this.

We have taken a number of steps to provide the kind of assistance they need, because it is entirely consistent with our policy of promoting friendly and cooperative relations and because it helps to promote U.S. business opportunities. As I noted above, in Saudi Arabia and Iran, we have in recent months concluded agreements to promote the provision of technical expertise in development-related fields on a fully reimbursable basis. In Bahrain, whose oil income is relatively modest and whose reserves are limited, we expect to have a jointly funded technical assistance program. Elsewhere in the gulf, we are also providing reimbursable experts in a variety of fields.

As in the commercial field, the opportunities for reimbursable technical assistance are tremendous, and we are pursuing them as actively as the situation permits.

#### **Mutuality of Interests**

Mr. Chairman, I know of the concerns in the Congress and of your personal concerns about our arms supply programs in the gulf region, and I believe it is important to get these concerns out on the table and discuss them. These are valid questions for Americans who are troubled at seeing their country in the arms supply business. The image of the "merchant of death" dies hard.

I hope I have been able to put this issue into proper and realistic perspective and to demonstrate that we are dealing with it in

the context of an overall and carefully developed policy concept. The fact is that foreign relations are a whole piece. We cannot pick up elements with which we feel comfortable and ignore others. For every country in the world, its ability to defend itself is the most important thing to its national survival. If we do not take this into account in our relations with that country, the totality of our relationship with that country will suffer, as will our political and economic objectives.

In the gulf, we have developed over the years meaningful relationships with most of the states of the region. The importance of the region's energy resources and its growing financial wealth dictate an American interest in the security as well as the political and economic progress of the states located therein. They in turn recognize a community of interests with us and with other Western industrialized states, and they want to build on that relationship without outside intervention in their affairs. Our relationship therefore has been one based on a mutuality of interests. We stand ready to provide advice and technology where needed and wanted, to expand our trading relationship, and to support regional efforts at cooperation.

We believe that these states have the will, financial resources, and growing capability to assure their security, and we feel that this aspect of our relationship should remain one geared to encouraging regional security. To this end, we are convinced that we should continue to provide military equipment and training. The success of these countries in achieving a degree of cooperation and in maintaining the tranquillity that has prevailed in recent years is serving broader U.S. interests in world peace and a relaxation in world tensions.

Our close relationships with most of these countries also facilitate our efforts to play an influential role in pursuing new paths toward a resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict. In the final analysis, a resolution of that conflict which will be seen as just and equitable by all the states and peoples of the area is es-

sential both to the well-being of the entire region and to the maintenance of cooperative, mutually beneficial relations between that strategic region and the United States.

## OECD Financial Support Fund Legislation Sent to Congress

*Following is the text of identical letters sent by President Ford on June 6 to Speaker of the House Carl Albert and President of the Senate Nelson A. Rockefeller.*

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 9

JUNE 6, 1975.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: (DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:) I am today transmitting legislation to authorize participation by the United States in a new, \$25 billion Financial Support Fund. This Fund would be available for a period of two years to provide short- to medium-term financing to participating members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) which may be faced with extraordinary financing needs.

The proposal for a Financial Support Fund originated in suggestions put forward independently by the United States and the Secretary General of the OECD as part of a comprehensive response to the economic and financial problems posed by severe increases in oil prices. Establishment of the Support Fund has been agreed upon, subject to necessary legislative approval, by all members of the OECD except Turkey, which has not yet signed the Agreement. The Support Fund represents, in my view, a practical, cooperative and efficient means of dealing with serious economic and financial problems faced by the major oil-importing nations.

A Special Report on the Fund, prepared by the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies, accompanies this legislation.<sup>1</sup> I fully endorse

<sup>1</sup> The texts of the draft legislation and the special report of the Advisory Council are printed in H. Doc. 94-178, 94th Cong., 1st sess.

the Council's strong recommendation for U.S. participation in the Fund, and I urge prompt Congressional action to authorize that participation.

The financial problems arising from the oil price increases are expected to be transitional, although the real costs imposed by those price increases will remain. These financial problems do not reflect the inability of oil-importing nations as a group to obtain needed financing, because the investable surpluses of the oil-exporting nations are available to them in the aggregate. Rather, the problems arise from the possibility that despite satisfactory operation of the system as a whole, an individual nation will not be able to obtain, on reasonable terms, the external financing it needs to maintain appropriate levels of domestic economic activity. This inability might also lead to imposition of inappropriately restrictive policies on international trade and capital movements. If permitted to begin, recourse to such policies could spread quickly, severely disrupting the world economy and threatening the cooperation of oil-importing nations on energy matters and broader economic issues.

The private financial markets and other existing sources of financing are expected to continue to perform well, and it is our hope that these potential dangers will never materialize. However, this risk remains. It is common to all countries, and it must be faced. The Support Fund is designed to encourage cooperation among the major countries in energy and general economic policies, and to protect against this common risk by assuring fund participants that needed financing will be available on reasonable terms.

In essence, the Financial Support Fund represents an arrangement under which all participants agree to join in assisting one of their members if an extreme need develops. As such, the Financial Support Fund will serve as an insurance mechanism or financial "safety net," backstopping and thus strengthening other sources of financing. Its objective is to provide assurance that financing will be available in a situation of extraor-

dinary need, rather than to supplant other financing channels or to provide financing on generous terms.

Participants must make the fullest appropriate use of other sources before turning to the Support Fund. Loans by the Support Fund will be made on market-related terms and will require specific policy conditions in the energy and general economic areas. Support Fund loans will thus contribute directly to cooperative energy policy and to correction of the borrower's external financial difficulties. A further provision, of major importance in such a mutual support arrangement, requires that all risk involved in loans by the Support Fund will be shared equitably by all participants on the basis of pre-determined quotas, as will all rights and obligations of members with respect to the Fund. The terms of the Financial Support Fund therefore assure it will not become a regular operating part of the world's financial machinery or be used as a foreign aid device.

The proposed United States quota in the Support Fund—which will determine U.S. borrowing rights, financial obligations, and voting power in the Fund—is 5,560 million Special Drawing Rights (SDR), or approximately \$6.9 billion. This quota represents 27.8 percent of total quotas in the Fund. The legislation I am proposing today will permit the United States to participate in the Fund up to its SDR quota, by authorizing the issuance of guarantees by the Secretary of the Treasury. It is intended that any United States contributions will be primarily, if not exclusively, in the form of guarantees to permit the Support Fund to borrow in world capital markets as necessary to meet its lending needs. Most other members also intend to use this guarantee technique. This approach removes the need for the \$7 billion in 1976 appropriations for the Support Fund, as proposed in the budget, and will also reduce outlays by \$1 billion.

Only if a borrower from the Support Fund failed to meet the payments on its obligations would the United States be required to transfer funds as a result of its guaran-

tees. In that unlikely event, the resources of the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) would be used to fulfill the requirements of immediate payment on the guarantees. Should it appear desirable, in light of economic and other conditions, for the United States to make direct loans to the Support Fund, these could also be provided from the ESF in accordance with existing statutory authority. This new legislation provides for appropriations to be used to replenish ESF resources to the extent the Stabilization Fund is used for these purposes. In no event will U.S. financial obligations to the Support Fund exceed the dollar value of its quota.

The Financial Support Fund Agreement was signed on April 9. OECD member countries are now seeking legislative and other authority needed to enable them to participate. While the problems the Support Fund is designed to deal with are temporary, the need for the Fund is nonetheless real and immediate. I urge the Congress to act promptly to enable the United States to join in this major instrument of international financial cooperation.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972. Entered into force March 26, 1975. TIAS 8062.

*Ratification deposited:* Ethiopia, June 26, 1975.

##### Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April

24, 1964; for the United States December 13, 1972. TIAS 7502.

*Notification of succession:* Zambia, June 16, 1975.

### Energy

Memorandum of understanding concerning cooperative information exchange relating to the development of solar heating and cooling systems in buildings. Formulated at Odeillo, France, October 1-4, 1974. Entered into force July 1, 1975, with respect to those signatories which have signed the memorandum of understanding on or before that date.

*Signatures:* United States, May 13, 1975; Greece, May 30, 1975.

### Finance

Articles of agreement establishing the Asian Development Bank, with annexes. Done at Manila December 4, 1965. Entered into force August 22, 1966. TIAS 6103.

*Admission to membership:* Gilbert and Ellice Islands, May 28, 1974.

### Health

Amendment of articles 24 and 25 of the constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 23, 1967. Entered into force May 21, 1975.

*Acceptances deposited:* Chile, Cuba, June 17, 1975.

### Load Lines

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331.

*Extended by United Kingdom to:* Bermuda, April 1, 1975.

### Oil Pollution

International convention relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. Entered into force May 6, 1975.

*Accession deposited:* Lebanon, June 5, 1975.

### Privileges and Immunities

Convention on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations. Done at New York February 13, 1946. Entered into force September 17, 1946; for the United States April 29, 1970. TIAS 6900.

*Notification of succession:* Zambia, June 16, 1975.

### Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.

*Extended by United Kingdom to:* Bermuda, April 1, 1975.

International regulations for preventing collisions at sea. Approved by the International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea at London May 17 to June 17, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965. TIAS 5813.

*Acceptance deposited:* Republic of China (with a reservation), June 2, 1975.

## Seabed Disarmament

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow February 11, 1971. Entered into force May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337.

*Accession deposited:* Portugal, June 24, 1975.

## Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at New York January 14, 1975.<sup>1</sup>

*Signature:* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, June 17, 1975.

## Tonnage Measurement

International convention on tonnage measurement of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London June 23, 1969.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Belgium, June 2, 1975.

*Accession deposited:* Hungary (with a statement), May 23, 1975.

## Women—Political Rights

Convention on the political rights of women. Done at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force July 7, 1954.<sup>2</sup>

*Accession deposited:* Tanzania, June 19, 1975.

## BILATERAL

### Bangladesh

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 4, 1974 (TIAS 7949). Effected by exchange of notes at Dacca June 5, 1975. Entered into force June 5, 1975.

### France

Agreement concerning settlement of U.S. claims in connection with the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel, supplies, and equipment from French territory following decisions of the French Government in 1966, with related letter. Effected by exchange of notes at Paris June 12, 1975. Entered into force June 12, 1975.

### India

Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to the U.S. Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Washington May 2, 1975.

*Entered into force:* June 13, 1975.

### Saudi Arabia

Technical cooperation agreement. Signed at Riyadh February 13, 1975.

*Entered into force:* May 12, 1975.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force for the United States.

## PUBLICATIONS

### GPO Sales Publications

*Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.*

**Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements—Texts and History of Negotiations.** A compilation of texts of agreements and lists of signatories, including the most recent agreements and introductions providing background and context. Pub. 77. 159 pp. \$1.80. (Stock No. 044-000-01565).

**Energy and International Cooperation.** This pamphlet is based on a speech delivered by Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State, before the annual combined luncheon of the Yale-Harvard-Princeton Clubs at Washington, D.C., February 13, 1975. Pub. 8804. 8 pp. 35¢ (Cat. No. S1.71:8804).

**Memorandum to: U.S. Business Community From: Department of State Subject: Assistance in International Trade.** This booklet briefly describes services and sources of information which the Department offers the American businessman, and provides some information on Department activities which help U.S. citizens in general. Pub. 8807. 16 pp. 40¢. (Cat. No. S1.2:T67/5).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Bangladesh amending the agreement of October 4, 1974, as amended. TIAS 7973. 2 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7973).

**Mutual Defense Assistance.** Agreement with Norway amending Annex C to the agreement of January 27, 1950, as amended. TIAS 7975. 3 pp. 25¢ (Cat. No. S9.10:7975).

**Military Assistance—Payments Under Foreign Assistance Act of 1973.** Agreement with El Salvador. TIAS 7979. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7979).

**Fisheries—Shrimp.** Agreement with Brazil modifying and extending the agreement of May 9, 1972, as extended. TIAS 7980. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7980).

**Fisheries.** Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics extending the agreement of February 21, 1973, and of June 21, 1973. TIAS 7981. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7981).

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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
342	6/23	Kissinger: Southern Council on International and Public Affairs; Atlanta Chamber of Commerce.
*342A	6/23	Kissinger: introductory remarks preceding Atlanta address.
342B	6/23	Kissinger: questions and answers following Atlanta address.
*343	6/24	Steigman sworn in as Ambassador to Gabon (biographic data).
344	6/24	Kissinger: news conference, Atlanta.
†345	6/25	Possible oil exchanges between U.S. and Canada.
*346	6/25	Ocean Affairs Advisory Committee, July 23-24.
†347	6/26	U.S. appoints members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (biographic information).
†349	6/27	Kissinger: remarks to Foreign Service officer class.
†350	6/27	"Foreign Relations," 1948, vol. I, General; United Nations, part 1, released.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXXIII • No. 1882 • July 21, 1975

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LXXIII, No. 1882

July 21, 1975

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

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## Secretary Kissinger Announces New Steps for Improvement of Department's Resource Allocation and Personnel Systems

*Following are remarks by Secretary Kissinger made on June 27 at the swearing-in ceremony for the 119th Foreign Service officer class.*

Press release 349 dated June 27

I have come here today to congratulate you on your choice of career, and the Department of State for its wisdom in selecting you. It will be, I know, the beginning of a long and fruitful association.

Six years of experience in Washington have convinced me that you are joining the most able, the most dedicated group of professionals with whom it has been my privilege to be associated. You are joining an institution with a great tradition—and tradition, even today, is not something lightly to be put aside. This Department and the people in it have, you will find, a unique sense of pride in their purpose and a deep sense of dedication to the national interest.

But with all these qualities, one of the tests of any profession or institution is its ability to overcome the tendency to fight new problems with outmoded concepts and an obsolete structure.

Some of the functions of diplomacy have not changed over the centuries. The representation of our country's interests abroad remains at the heart of your profession. But in today's interdependent world the scope of diplomacy has broadened dramatically and continues to do so every year. In the contemporary world as never before, events and policies in one country have unprecedented effect on the lives of millions elsewhere around the globe.

It is not enough in today's world for the Foreign Service to report on foreign devel-

opments and their relationship to our national interests. That, important as it is, is a passive function. Today what is needed is a Foreign Service that understands our goals as a nation, is capable of formulating a strategy for reaching those goals, and possesses the tactical skill necessary to implement that strategy.

At home as well, the context of diplomacy has changed. No longer is it the esoteric art of an elite separated from the people and the political process it serves. Today the Congress has a decisive role to play in the formulation and execution of our foreign policy; today the American people must be convinced of the wisdom of the course we espouse. In a speech [before the International Platform Association at Washington on August 2, 1973] I gave shortly before becoming Secretary of State, I said that no foreign policy could survive in a democracy if it were born in the minds of a few and carried in the hearts of none. I believe that today even more deeply than I did two years ago.

In short, while the objectives of diplomacy may not have changed, its scope most certainly has. And so have the responsibilities of the Department of State. In a time of massive and continuous change, this Department must, as a matter of course, constantly reexamine the assumptions it has made, the strategies it has espoused, and the objectives it seeks to serve.

What is the purpose of the Department? In its broadest sense, it is to preserve the peace, the security, and the well-being of the United States and—since America cannot live in isolation—to contribute to just international arrangements for all mankind.

It is to bring to the formulation and execution of our foreign policy a vision of the future and a sense of direction.

This concept of the Department's role defines the focus of our work. The crucial test of the Department's relevance will lie in our sense of history and historical perspective. And it will lie in our ability to integrate and to synthesize the national interests of the United States, the global concerns that affect it, the tactical issues of the moment, and the isolated events of the day into a conceptual whole which gives meaning to events and purpose to our decisions. If the Department of State serves the President with these qualities, it will stand at the center of the foreign policy process, not because an organization chart says it should, but because its courage, its intellectual strength, and its strategic grasp have put it there.

What you are entering today is not the Foreign Service of the State Department, but the Foreign Service of the United States. Foreign Service officers should not think that their natural base is overseas, with Washington tours the painful interruption in an otherwise interesting career. They should look forward to Washington assignments and cultivate the skills necessary for such work. In the field, where our principal purpose is the execution of foreign policy, compromise and negotiation are the natural tools of diplomacy. But in Washington, where it is the formulation of foreign policy that should most concern us, our purpose must often be an unrelenting drive to clarify purposes and discover alternatives so that the policymaker will know the depth and dimension of the issues he has before him for decision.

After nearly two years in this Department I am convinced that the dedication and native ability of the Foreign Service mark it as a unique and great institution. Individually we are professionally as good as the best the country has to offer. But the product of our collective effort is sometimes less than the sum of our individual abilities.

I, like every Secretary of State before me, hope that when I take my leave this

Department will be a more effective instrument than when I came. I want the Foreign Service and the Department to have a better appreciation of their own value and worth; I want them to be less concerned with status and more concerned with substance. I believe we have already made great strides:

—The principle of putting the ablest where their talents can best be used is well established, as demonstrated by the number of Ambassadors and Assistant Secretaries appointed solely on the basis of merit and without regard to age or rank. We have shown that even an FSO-4 can have an Ambassador's baton in his knapsack.

—We have reformed the assignment process that allowed, or forced, an officer to return to the same geographic area repeatedly. As a result, Foreign Service officers are gaining a broader perspective and a deeper sense of the range and complexity of the challenges we face as a nation.

—We have moved to compensate for the rigidities of specialization by encouraging officers to take assignments outside their area of functional expertise. While I recognize that the establishment of the cone system was in response to the need for greater emphasis on specialization, we must not permit compartmentalization to deter us from providing the breadth of experience necessary for positions of high responsibility.

—Our analytical and conceptual capabilities have been greatly enhanced by giving the Policy Planning Staff a central position in the organization and by staffing it with the best available talent. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, too, has been brought into a dynamic and intimate relationship with policymaking and policymakers.

These steps were primarily designed to improve the Department's product by focusing greater attention on a precise definition of our mission and by encouraging a more analytical, more strategic approach to the issues of foreign policy. This is the essential first phase of institutionalization. Now it is time to turn our attention to the development of a departmental structure that is

more responsive both to the needs of its members and the demands of an increasingly interdependent world.

### Resource Allocation

Our first and most critical task is to find a more effective means than we now possess to link resources and policy objectives. Over the years—and especially over the past decade—our policy priorities have undergone substantial change. Yet our resources—people and money—have, because of institutional inflexibility, remained focused on the familiar problems of the past.

The Department lacks an effective system for addressing or deciding priorities among areas or specialties. What is needed, therefore, is a new approach—a mechanism for coordinating resources and goals and for reprogramming existing resources from less important functions to areas that deserve priority attention.

I have therefore recently established a Priorities Policy Group whose principal task will be to provide the mechanism for linking decisions on resource allocation to the broader considerations of foreign policy. The Group will have the following functions:

- a. It will play the central role in formulating the Department's annual budget.
- b. It will review the present allocation of all positions on a regular basis.
- c. It will examine all significant requests for additional resources, both in Washington and overseas.
- d. It will employ whatever instruments it deems necessary, including expanded use of the Foreign Service Inspection Corps, to identify and correct the inefficient use of our resources.

The Group will be headed by the Deputy Under Secretary for Management and will include as members the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, the Director General, the Inspector General, the Counselor, the Assistant Secretary for Administration, and the Director of Management Operations.

I have directed the Deputy Under Secretary for Management to use this new mechanism to bring our budget process under

central management control. This will mean change in some of our current budgetary practices, and a reduction in the degree of autonomy the bureaus now enjoy in the management of their funds. But it will also mean that the Department as a whole will have an important new capacity to bring its resources into relationship with its problems.

### Personnel

Our greatest resource in this Department is people. How well we serve the national interest will depend on the kinds of people we recruit, how well we train them, how demanding we are of superior performance, and how well we reward those who perform with excellence. And so, in consultation with the American Foreign Service Association as appropriate, I am directing new departures to improve the recruitment, evaluation, assignment, and career development of our professional service.

### Recruitment

Our country has every right to expect a corps of foreign affairs professionals which is expert in politics, economics, science, the oceans, military strategy, and other disciplines. These people must be capable of drawing together the widely divergent interests of our society and government, synthesizing this array of forces, tapping available expertise in and outside of government, and advising our political leadership on how best to pursue our national objectives.

In the area of recruitment our major problem rests in the need for a clearer definition of our requirements and the need for systematic standards for appointment. I have therefore instructed the Director General:

—First, to adjust examination standards for FSO's to relate our selection more closely to our needs, without at the same time forcing the officer to choose a specialty even before he has begun his career. I personally am doubtful that either the Department or the individual concerned is well served by a system that requires the selection of a functional cone at the time of examination.

—Second, to define and develop exacting standards and procedures for recruiting professionals outside the Foreign Service Officer Corps. With the right training and experience, Foreign Service officers will be able to perform many of the tasks requiring both expertise and specialization. But there will be a continuing need for highly expert, specialized professional talent which cannot necessarily be found in a closed career system. The Department must be free to hire the best talent our society can offer and to guarantee those it hires fair treatment and adequate reward. The career system, on the other hand, has a right to expect that the Department will not abuse its right to hire and promote outside the career service as a device for circumventing the system.

—Third, to institute a program aimed at recruiting top-quality women and representatives of minority groups. Our record as an equal opportunity employer must be improved; I intend to see that it is.

#### **Evaluation**

Virtually everyone agrees that our system of performance evaluation is badly in need of improvement. Regular efficiency reports will continue to be essential in identifying those officers deserving of promotion. But there has been a growing tendency for rating officers to avoid the hard and critical judgments that an effective merit system requires.

We need to place more emphasis on effective methods for evaluating officers at critical points in their careers. We have, for some time now, experimented with the concept of a junior "threshold"—a system that would permit the Department stringently to examine a junior officer's performance, abilities, and potential for growth before any final decision to promote him to the intermediate ranks. It is now time to move from the experimental stage to implementation of this threshold concept as an integral part of the career process. I have instructed the Director General to take the steps necessary to accomplish this. I have also asked her to develop for my early consideration plans

for the institution of a senior threshold which would apply to officers about to enter the executive levels of the Foreign Service.

#### **Assignments**

Central to the quality of our service is the assignment process. The system today is too decentralized, too much characterized by bargaining between bureaus. It is neither rational nor servicewide in its approach. In order to correct this weakness, I have instructed the Director General to establish a more open, centrally directed assignment process. While the new procedures will take into account the legitimate interests of the individual, the bureaus, and the posts abroad, they can only be fair and orderly if they drastically limit the right of an Assistant Secretary or Ambassador to veto assignments and if it is clear that every member of the Service must accept an assignment once made.

#### **Professional Development**

As in all other professional fields today, the range and complexity of foreign affairs issues are heavily affected by the expanding horizons of knowledge and technology. If the professional service is to provide relevant leadership in a wide range of technical subjects, it must be intellectually equipped, as a part of the career process, to take these complexities into account in framing foreign policy. But our present training programs—except in the field of languages, where we have an outstanding program—vary widely in quality and relevance.

As a first step toward correcting this situation, I have ordered the establishment of a Board of Professional Development. It will have the following functions:

—To formulate a comprehensive training program.

—To oversee its implementation.

—To assure that changes in that policy are made as the needs of the Department change.

—To correct current failings in the system.

It will also have oversight responsibility

for details to other agencies and branches of government and assignments to universities.

The members of this Board will be the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, the Director General of the Foreign Service, the Director of the Foreign Service Institute, and other senior officers of the Department on a rotating basis. The Board should, from its inception, seek advice from universities, business, and other appropriate institutions with experience in advanced training techniques.

The Department must also give greater attention to other forms of professional development. I have, for example, instructed that an expanded Junior Officer Rotational Training Program be established. This program will give more entering officers on-the-job experience during their first assignment in all of the principal areas of Foreign Service work—administration and consular, economic, and political affairs. I would hope that we can have this program established in time for at least some of you to take part in it.

We also need to redress our neglect of training in such areas as administration and for those most critically important people, our secretaries. I have directed that these areas be given priority attention.

Finally, details to other agencies, assignments to state and local governments and to the Congress will be substantially expanded. In this regard, I welcome the recent efforts in Congress to make it possible for the Department to detail a greater number of its officers to the Congress and to state and local governments throughout the country. Such assignments would offer enviable experience and should, in some cases, provide excellent managerial training. And most important—now that foreign and domestic policies are virtually inseparable—these assignments will make us more sensitive to the values, interests, and priorities of the country we represent.

In order to relate all these forms of professional development to the key steps in an officer's career, I have asked the Director General to make a year of training or a special detail outside the Department a part of the threshold process. Such assignments

should be looked upon as at least as important to an officer's career as an assignment to a bureau or a post abroad.

### Responsibilities and Obligations

Ladies and gentlemen, I recognize that some of the institutional changes I have announced today may not, at least at first, meet with universal popularity. Reforms seldom do. But I am convinced that they will, over time, be seen as a creative strengthening of the Department and the Foreign Service and that they will mean a more challenging and exciting career for all of you. Yet, in the last analysis, it will be the mutual sense of responsibility and obligation that you feel for the Department of State and that the Department feels toward you that will be important. As you go on in your careers, it will be the Department's responsibility, as well as your own, to encourage the fresh approach, the new initiative; it will be the Department's obligation to permit you to argue what you believe deeply, however unorthodox, and to question old assumptions.

But the reverse side of that coin is that you have an obligation to support decisions once made. "Loyalty" has become an archaic term, but ultimately it means professional self-discipline and as such is the pride and strength of any professional service and a prerequisite to its self-respect.

If, over the many years ahead, you and the Department can maintain a mutual sense of esteem and devotion because each has met its obligation to the other and both have fulfilled their duty to the nation, you will have achieved such a standard of excellence that the question of which agency is the President's principal tool in the conduct of American foreign policy will not need to be asked. You and your colleagues will already have given the answer.

But having a central place in the policy process is only a means to an end. Your ultimate objective must be to serve your country with all your heart and mind, no matter how onerous the task, no matter how difficult your position. Your job, as

junior officers no less than when you reach the senior levels, will often require undramatic, persevering, laborious effort. But if you do your best, I believe you will always find it exhilarating.

I know that I speak for the Director General and all your other colleagues here in the Department and abroad when I extend to you best wishes for a long and productive career. You stand at the threshold of an exciting time, in a world poised between great danger and unprecedented promise. Whether we succumb to the dangers or realize the promise will, in large measure, depend on you.

## Secretary Kissinger Interviewed on ABC Saturday News

*Following is a transcript of an interview with Secretary Kissinger by Ted Koppel recorded for broadcast on the ABC television Saturday News on July 5.*

Press release 355 dated July 5

*Mr. Koppel: And in Washington, earlier today, an interview with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.*

*Mr. Secretary, the Israelis are obviously nervous. Tomorrow they have a Cabinet meeting, and these rumors of the past week while you have been away have got them terribly upset, privately and semipublicly. To what extent is the United States still committed to Israel? To what extent is there a drifting apart?*

*Secretary Kissinger: The United States is committed to the survival and security of Israel, and nothing in the current discussions changes that situation. We also believe, however, that the security of Israel is best assured through a process of peace in the Middle East. In fact, we believe that if there is no progress toward peace in the Middle East, another war sooner or later will be inevitable with disastrous consequences for all of the peoples in the Middle East as well as for Western Europe, Japan, and serious conse-*

*quences for the United States in terms of a possible confrontation with the Soviet Union.*

*For all these reasons, we feel that there should be progress toward peace in the Middle East. In fact, we feel there must be progress.*

*Mr. Koppel: So in that sense, it is not really unfair to suggest that the United States is pushing very hard for a peace settlement.*

*Secretary Kissinger: The United States has publicly stated that it urges progress toward peace in the Middle East. But the United States also remains committed to the survival and security of Israel.*

*Mr. Koppel: Now, the question is, is the United States pushing President Sadat and the Egyptians with equal vigor? Are you looking for concessions from the Egyptians as much as you are from the Israelis?*

*Secretary Kissinger: I think it is fair to say that all of the concessions, or many of the concessions, that President Sadat has offered have been the result of American urging. So the United States is attempting to find a formula in which both sides, making concessions, take a step toward peace.*

*Israel does have a problem in the sense that it is giving up territory while it is getting in return some assurances. But this fact has been known for a year. The United States has asked nothing of Israel in recent weeks that it did not make clear that it felt was necessary for the last 10 months.*

*Mr. Koppel: Well, now, as the Israeli Cabinet goes into session tomorrow, if you were addressing yourself to the Israeli people directly, what would you tell them?*

*Secretary Kissinger: I would say that whatever decision they make is going to have problems; that it is not going to be a question of one road being easy and the other road being difficult. All roads are difficult. We understand their dilemmas. We understand their fears. But we also feel that they must take a chance on making progress toward peace, because any other approach is going to lead to a war sooner or later which*



is going to have serious consequences, above all for the people of Israel. But the United States will stand behind them in conditions in which we can reasonably say to our people that progress is being made.

*Mr. Koppel: Now, Mr. Secretary, over the past few months both you and the President have always finessed the question of which route to take. And yet it seems behind the scenes that the United States is pushing for another interim agreement. Everything that is happening over the past few weeks seems to indicate another interim agreement. Is that inaccurate?*

*Secretary Kissinger: The United States has always believed that an interim agreement is a step that can most easily be taken. If that does not prove possible, then the United States will have to pursue an overall agreement.*

It is certain, however, that on the road toward an overall agreement we will very soon find exactly the same dilemmas, and this time on all fronts and on all issues that have produced the difficulties now.

*Mr. Koppel: Next Saturday you and Prime Minister Rabin [of Israel] will be in Bonn at the same time. Isn't it inevitable that the two of you will meet and talk?*

*Secretary Kissinger: No. As I understand it, Prime Minister Rabin's tentative plan is to leave Bonn on Friday. We have left open the possibility that we might meet, depending on the Cabinet decision tomorrow and whether there are any further clarifications that may be needed. At this moment, there is no fixed plan to meet, but there is a geographic proximity that makes it possible for us to meet if it should be necessary.*

*Mr. Koppel: On another subject—since you have been gone, Prime Minister Gandhi of India has revoked essentially all the democratic processes in India, in what we have always rather proudly referred to as the world's largest democracy. We have received word that you came down rather hard on all your people here and said, "Button up. I don't want to hear anything." Is it possible for*

*you now to say anything, and is it possible for the United States not to say anything when something like this is going on?*

*Secretary Kissinger: The fixed policy of the Department of State is not to comment on the internal developments in other countries. The American preference for democratic forms is clear. But we do not think that it would help the situation at this moment for us to make daily comments on the situation in India. Our preference for democratic procedures is clear.*

*Mr. Koppel: How does this affect U.S. foreign policy in that part of the world? Does this make it more difficult? Do you see Mrs. Gandhi now moving even closer into the Soviet orbit?*

*Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have noticed that Mrs. Gandhi last week made some friendlier references to the United States than has been the case previously. The United States considers India an important country. We have said this during periods of difficulties with Indian foreign policy, and we have to say this now. We were not asked about these domestic events that are taking place in India, and we do not think it is appropriate for us to make official comments on these.*

*Mr. Koppel: Also while you were gone—a great deal has happened while you have been away—the Murphy Commission [Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy] issued its findings, and one of the points they made was that in the future they do not believe that any man should simultaneously hold the positions of Secretary of State and head of the National Security Council. If it is possible for you to take an objective view of that, how would you feel in the future? Do you think anyone should ever again hold these dual positions?*

*Secretary Kissinger: I think that the President ought to have the flexibility. It depends entirely on his chemistry with the people concerned and on the qualities of the people concerned. And therefore I don't think there should be any legislative action that*

constricts the President's freedom of choice.

I think the Murphy Commission has a point that under normal circumstances it would be more usual to keep the two jobs split. But I think that the President, if he finds somebody with whom he can work in this manner, and depending on the circumstances, should have the flexibility to make that decision.

*Mr. Koppel: Well, if you will permit my phrasing it this way, what is the abnormality of the current situation? Are you the abnormality?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. The situation is that I was Assistant to the President when I was appointed Secretary of State, so I had in fact been carrying out—I had been in fact active in both jobs.

Secondly, that the President obviously has believed that I can perform both jobs simultaneously, and I have no question that this can happen again. When Acheson was Secretary of State, and when Dulles was Secretary of State, they in fact carried out both jobs, though they didn't have the title. The position of the Assistant to the President at that time was a purely technical administrative function.

And therefore, when you have a strong Secretary of State who has a close relationship with the President, in fact the tendency is that he will carry out both of these jobs. It is not such an unusual event.

*Mr. Koppel: You don't, then, regard this as a personal slap at you.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. In fact, they specifically exempted me.

## Sixth Round of U.S.-Spain Talks Held in Washington

*Joint U.S.-Spain Communique*<sup>1</sup>

The sixth round of negotiations between the Spanish and the United States delegations took place in Washington from June 16 to June 19. The Spanish delegation was chaired by the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Juan Jose Rovira, and the American delegation was headed by Ambassador-at-Large Robert J. McCloskey.

The two delegations continued the discussion on the key aspects of the defense relationship between the two countries and noted the progress being made in defining areas of mutual agreement.

The discussions included an examination of the subject of the Spanish facilities which are used by American forces, and Spanish military defense needs.

The two delegations agreed to set up a steering committee which would establish guidelines and supervise working groups which would study specific technical problems.

As a result of their decision to accelerate the pace of work, the two delegations agreed to hold the seventh round in Madrid during the week beginning June 30th.

The Spanish Ambassador offered a dinner in honor of the two delegations, and Ambassador McCloskey reciprocated with a luncheon in the State Department in honor of Under Secretary Rovira.

<sup>1</sup> Issued on June 19 (text from press release 341).

## President Ford's News Conference of June 25

*Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Ford on the South Grounds at the White House on June 25.<sup>1</sup>*

*Q. Mr. President, the United States, as a matter of policy, has consistently disavowed the first use of nuclear weapons. Is that still our policy in view of recent developments?*

*President Ford:* Well, the United States has a policy that means that we have the maximum flexibility for the determination of what is in our own national interest. We had a change of some degree about a year and a half ago.

When I took office, or since I have taken office, I have discussed this change to maximize our flexibility and to give us the greatest opportunity for our own national security with Secretary Schlesinger [Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger], and I can assure you that it is a good policy, and it is a policy that I think will help to deter war and preserve the peace.

*Q. Well, may I follow up, sir?*

*President Ford:* Sure.

*Q. You haven't said whether you will use the first strike, in terms of tactical or strategic, and don't you think the American people should know?*

*President Ford:* I don't think it is appropriate for me to discuss at a press conference what our utilization will be of our tactical or strategic weapons. This is a matter that has to be determined if and when there are any requirements for our national interests. And I don't believe under these circumstances

that I should discuss how, when, or what kind of weapons should be used.

Mr. Cormier [Frank Cormier, Associated Press].

*Q. Mr. President, like your formal declaration of candidacy, the completion of the Middle East reassessment is getting closer every day. I wonder how close is it now, and does it look more like a return to step-by-step diplomacy or a move to Geneva?*

*President Ford:* The reassessment that we are undertaking in regard to the Middle East has not been concluded. We have met with a number of heads of government in the Middle East. We have discussed the alternatives and options with a number of other people who are knowledgeable in this area. But I cannot give you a date as to when that reassessment will be concluded.

Obviously, it is getting closer and closer—because we must not permit, to the degree that we can affect it, a stalemate or stagnation, because the longer we have no movement toward peace in the Middle East, the more likely we are to have war and all of its ill ramifications.

I can only say we are working on the problem with countries in the Middle East and with others and that the reassessment will be concluded in an appropriate time and it will provide for movement, as far as we are concerned.

Yes, Mr. Cormier.

*Q. Is it more likely to be in the direction of Geneva or more shuttle diplomacy?*

*President Ford:* The options are still open. Yes, Mr. Barnes [Fred Barnes, Washington Star].

*Q. Mr. President, your popularity in the public opinion polls has risen rather dra-*

<sup>1</sup>For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 30.

*matically recently, and I know you have discussed this matter with pollster Louis Harris. To what do you attribute your improvement in the public opinion polls recently?*

*President Ford:* Naturally, I am pleased that the polls have shown improvement. I think this is a reflection of the fact that we have had a consistently strong policy, domestically, aimed at doing something affirmatively about inflation and showing our concern and compassion in the field of finding a remedy to the recession.

I think it also reflects some of the hard decisions we had to make in the area of foreign policy. Obviously, the *Mayaguez* incident and the way it was handled has had a good reaction, but we have done other things in foreign policy. The trip to Europe, I think, was effective in that it showed the alliance is strong and we are committed to the alliance. And, of course, the alliance has contained aggression and maintained peace in Western Europe.

So there is a whole series of things that, in my judgment, have been good for the country. And when something is good for the nation, people who have something to do with it do benefit to some extent.

*Q. Mr. President, on the subject of foreign policy, Secretary Kissinger spoke in Atlanta the other night, and he had something to say about our alliances, that no country should imagine that it is doing us a favor by remaining in an alliance with us. Is this a signal of a new attitude toward our allies?*

*President Ford:* I don't think it is a signal of a new attitude. Any bilateral agreement is in the mutual interest of both parties, and any alliance, such as the North Atlantic alliance, is also in the mutual interest of all of the participants.

Now, occasionally, I suspect, some partner gets the impression that his country is getting less out of an alliance than another. We think it is important to keep them on a mutual basis, and we intend to do so. But there was nothing in Secretary Kissinger's comments in Atlanta the other night that was aimed at any one country or any one alliance.

*Q. Well, if he might have had Turkey in*

*mind as one country, I am just wondering if this is a diplomatic thing to say at this time when our bases are at stake and the welfare of NATO?*

*President Ford:* Secretary Kissinger's comment, as I said a moment ago, was not aimed at any one country or any one alliance. We are concerned about the conflict in the Mediterranean, which has resulted from the Cyprus difficulty of about 18 months or more ago, which has resulted in differences between Turkey and Greece.

I can assure you that we are going to work as we have in the past to try and find an answer to that problem. But I don't think the Secretary's comment in Atlanta was aimed at either Greece or Turkey or any particular alliance.

*Q. Mr. President, the congressional budget office is concerned that if the Middle East oil producers raise the price of oil this fall as they have threatened to do, it will prolong the American recession and delay the recovery. If the Middle East oil producers do, in fact, increase the price of oil, would you expect the American people to just swallow that increase or would you have a definitive Administration response to an increase from the Middle East, and if you do, what would it be?*

*President Ford:* First, any increase in foreign oil would be, in my judgment, very disruptive and totally unacceptable.

As you know, I have been trying to get the Congress to pass an energy program that would make us less vulnerable to any price increase by foreign oil sources. Unfortunately, the Congress has done nothing, but we are going to continue pressing the Congress to act.

Now, our program, which I hope the Congress will pass eventually, would produce more domestic oil and make us less dependent on foreign oil. In the meantime, we have to work with our allies the oil-consuming nations to bring our policies closer together so we can act in negotiations with the oil-producing countries. And the International Energy Agency, which was formed by the oil-consuming nations, has made some progress

in this area. I hope that through this organization and our domestic energy program, we can meet the challenge, or the prospective or possible challenge, of the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] nations.

*Q. Is that what you mean when you say that an increase from the Middle East would be unacceptable, or do you have something else in mind, and could you spell that out? What does unacceptable mean?*

*President Ford:* It means that it is unacceptable in the sense that we as a nation individually and we as a nation in conjunction with our allies are going to find some answers other than OPEC oil.

Yes, Mr. Schieffer [Bob Schieffer, CBS News].

*Q. Mr. President, in response to your comments to Helen [Helen Thomas, United Press International] at the beginning of the news conference, let me just ask you this question pointblank: If North Korea attacked South Korea, would you use nuclear weapons to stop that?*

*President Ford:* I don't think, Mr. Schieffer, that I ought to, in a news conference like this, discuss what I might or would do under the circumstances you describe. We have a strong deterrent force, strategically and tactically, and of course those forces will be used in a flexible way in our own national interest, but I do not believe it is in our national interest to discuss how or when they would be used under the circumstances—

*Q. You are flatly not ruling it out, though?*

*President Ford:* I am not either confirming it or denying it. I am saying we have the forces and they will be used in our national interest, as they should be.

Mr. Lisagor [Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News].

*Q. Mr. President, your old sidekick, the former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, has written in a magazine article that the Russians have repeatedly violated the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agreement and have mocked détente, and he also*

*has some things to say about what they are doing in Portugal and the Middle East. How concerned are you about these charges?*

*President Ford:* I have investigated the allegations that the Soviet Union has violated the SALT agreements, that they have used loopholes to do certain things that were intended not to be done under the agreement.

I have found that they have not violated the SALT agreement, they have not used any loopholes. And in order to determine whether they have or they have not, there is a standing consultative group that is an organization for the purpose of deciding after investigation whether there have been any violations. And that group, after looking into the allegations, came to the conclusion there had been no violations.

Now, as I indicated in Brussels at a press conference, we are concerned about developments in Portugal. We do not believe that a Communist-dominated government in Portugal is compatible with NATO.

Now, it has not reached that stage yet, and we are hopeful that it will not, and some of the developments in the last several days are somewhat encouraging. We certainly have a concern and a care and a great friendship for the Portuguese people. And we will do what we can in a legitimate, proper way to make sure that the rights of the Portuguese people are protected.

*Q. Can I also ask you in connection with this, do you then see that the European Security Conference is likely to come off as the Russians would like to have it come off, in late July, in Helsinki?*

*President Ford:* There have been rather protracted negotiations involving the European Security Conference. It didn't look a few months ago that there would be any conclusion this summer. But there have been some compromises made, and there may be some others achieved that would permit a summit this summer in Helsinki. But it has not yet reached the stage where I could say there will be a summit, because the compromises have not been finally achieved.

*Q. Mr. President, I would like to ask you, sir, you said that if the Arabs hike their oil prices or there were another embargo, it would be very disruptive for the economy. You have also said recently that the recession has bottomed out or is bottoming out. May I ask you what will happen to your predictions that the recession is bottoming out if the oil-producing nations hike the price of oil by \$2 to \$4 a barrel as they are threatening to do this October?*

*President Ford:* If such an oil price were put into effect, it would have an impact on our economy. It would undoubtedly have a much more significant impact on the economies of Western Europe, Japan, and probably an even more adverse impact on the economies of the developing nations. It would have an adverse impact worldwide.

I think it would be very unwise for OPEC to raise their prices under these circumstances, because an unhealthy economy in the United States and worldwide is not in their best interest.

*Q. Mr. President, are you making any current efforts to persuade the oil-producing nations not to increase their prices this autumn as they have threatened, and are you meeting with any success?*

*President Ford:* We are seeking to solidify our consumer-nation organization so that we act in concert when we have to meet with the producing nations.

And equally importantly, I am trying to get the United States Congress to do something affirmatively in the field of energy so we don't have to worry about OPEC price increases.

*Q. Mr. President, the Rockefeller Commission was told about extensive electronic surveillance by Soviet intelligence agents and American ability to piggyback on to that monitoring. Can you tell us how long that has been going on and what is being done about it?*

*President Ford:* I don't think that I should comment on a matter of that kind. I can say

very emphatically that we have an expert intelligence-gathering community in our Federal Government and we have a first-class counterintelligence organization in the United States Government. I have full faith in their responsibilities in any field, such as that that you mention.

## **U.S. Contributes \$10.9 Million for Cyprus Relief**

*AID Announcement, June 3<sup>1</sup>*

The United States is contributing \$10.9 million to two international agencies for the relief effort in Cyprus, bringing total donations for the 1975 fiscal year to \$25 million. The new contributions, made by the Agency for International Development (AID), consist of \$9.9 million to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and \$1 million to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to continue their assistance to Greek and Turkish Cypriots displaced from their homes in 1974. The present grants bring the total U.S. assistance to Cyprus to \$20.8 million to the UNHCR and \$4.2 million to the ICRC. The United States has provided about half of the total contributions from more than 40 governments and private donors in 20 countries.

Part of the AID contribution will be used by UNHCR to buy imported food and local fresh fruits and vegetables to support the relief feeding program. In addition, the AID funds will be used to purchase about \$3.5 million worth of blankets and sheets in the United States for distribution to victims of the civil strife. The immediate needs of shelter for displaced persons have been met, and the main requirements are now food and work. The remaining AID funds will finance small projects developed by local authorities to provide work relief to fill the direct needs of displaced persons.

<sup>1</sup> Text from AID press release 75-49 dated June 3.

The \$1 million AID donation to the ICRC will be used to help that relief agency protect civilians, provide medical and relief assistance, and trace missing persons. Under its relief assistance program, the ICRC has made regular deliveries of meat, baby foods, and powdered milk to about 140,000 persons and has distributed food to some 5,000 Turkish Cypriots in unsundered villages. An ICRC tracing agency collects information concerning missing persons on both sides and has carried more than a million messages between families and friends separated by the civil strife.

### **People's Republic of Mozambique Recognized by United States**

*Following is the text of a letter dated June 25 from President Ford to Samora Moises Machel, President of the People's Republic of Mozambique.*

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 30

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am pleased to inform you that the United States Government extends recognition to Mozambique. It is our hope, with your agreement, that diplomatic relations can soon be established between our two countries.

We congratulate your leaders and their Portuguese colleagues on the wise statesmanship that has led to Mozambique's independence.

The American people share with the people of Mozambique the knowledge that hard-won individual liberty and national independence can be preserved only by unremitting labor and sacrifice.

As we strengthen and multiply our bonds of mutual friendship, I am confident of a future in which our two peoples will work together in the freedom, peace and security of all mankind.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, June 25, 1975.

### **Secretary Designates U.S. Members of Permanent Court of Arbitration**

The Department of State announced on June 26 (press release 347) that the Secretary of State has designated four U.S. members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. They are William W. Bishop of Ann Arbor, Mich., Herbert Brownell of New York, N.Y., Monroe Leigh of Washington, D.C., and John R. Stevenson of New York, N.Y. (For biographic data, see press release 347.) Messrs. Brownell and Stevenson are being appointed to a second consecutive term. Members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration serve in their personal capacities and not as officers of the United States. They are appointed for terms of six years.

Under the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration nominate persons for election by the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly as judges of the International Court of Justice. The Statute recommends that each national group of Permanent Court members "consult its highest court of justice, its legal faculties and schools of law, and its national academies and national sections of international academies devoted to the study of law" before making these nominations. Five vacancies will occur on the International Court of Justice this year.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration was created by the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes "with the object of facilitating an immediate recourse to arbitration for international differences, which it has not been possible to settle by diplomacy." In accordance with the two Hague Conventions, each signatory power selects four persons as members of the Court. The Hague Conventions provide that when any contracting powers desire to seek recourse to the Permanent Court of Arbitration for the settlement of a difference that has arisen between them, the tribunal to decide the difference shall be chosen from the general list of the members of the Court.

## Department Discusses Policy on the Sale of U.S. Military Articles and Services

*Statement by Thomas Stern*

*Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

I would like to address myself today to U.S. foreign military sales policy considerations, in particular our purposes and goals in selling defense articles and services and general infrastructure to governments with which we maintain close security ties as well as those with which we share common political and economic interests.

I hope that today's session represents the continuation of a dialogue between the Congress and the executive branch on this important subject. Our policies support the regional and global interests of the United States, and I hope to show the manner in which our interests are supported. I also hope to demonstrate that our policies and program are carefully constructed and pursued with prudence and balance. You will note that I do not use the phrase "arms transfers"; for to do so would obscure the fact that many foreign military sales orders include funds for training, maintenance, and construction of facilities which have both military as well as civilian uses.

The most fundamental reason for security assistance and military sales is to be found in American history and the growing realization in this country that, in the 20th century, we could not isolate ourselves from the mainstream of major forces and events

abroad. The view that aggression should not be permitted to succeed had, after our experience in World War II, assumed a certain moral force. The emergence of new threats in the late 1940's, toward Greece and Turkey, Europe, and then Korea, were clear challenges to our own security.

As the leading proponent of collective security and international organization, we looked to the newly formed United Nations to respond. Where it could not, we created regional collective security organizations. Where required and appropriate, we also entered into special bilateral arrangements. Throughout this immediate postwar period, the United States saw the danger to its interests as both military and ideological, i.e., as a threat to the beliefs, values, and institutions of the Western world.

In a world that was divided along bipolar lines, the U.S. role as a major supplier was clear and straightforward: we sold or gave military materiel and services to countries that were closely associated with us in opposition to the Soviet Union and Communist China. While the legislative and executive branches sometimes debated the specifics of our security assistance program, there existed a consensus on the relationship of our program to our security, and it was generally supported.

More recently, however, changes in the international scene have made security relationships a much more complex subject.

The rigid bipolar world of the 1950's and early 1960's no longer exists. Our painful

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance and Economic Policy of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on June 18. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.



involvement in Viet-Nam is ended. And power no longer is measured today in purely military terms. The post-bipolar period is an era of increasing interdependence in the fields of international trade, international security, and in development, trade, and shared environmental concerns.

Despite this interdependence, this is a world of nations, whose number is constantly growing. The total now approaches 150. All have some kind of armed force, and few judge themselves capable of insuring internal order or of maintaining the integrity of their territory without external sources of military supply. Furthermore, no government can be indifferent to its security, however it defines it; and security requirements will compete with economic and social development for a share of whatever resources are available.

Not surprisingly, then, this is also a world in which the level and quantity of military transactions between nations will be substantial. Most of the world's almost 150 nations have no arms industries. Their equipment and related services must be acquired from the more industrialized nations on a cash, credit, or grant basis.

In the early 1950's the United States and the United Kingdom were the dominant suppliers of major weapons systems. The Soviet Union is now very active, and France has equaled and at times surpassed Britain as a major weapons supplier. Nine nations were the source of 97 percent of world military exports over the period 1964-73. The United States delivered 51 percent, the Soviet Union 27 percent, the United Kingdom, France, and China 10 percent, and Czechoslovakia, Poland, Canada, and West Germany 8.5 percent. These trends all point toward the growth in size and complexity of the international military trade.

Today, those who purchase from the United States vary widely in their security concerns and political orientations. There are, of course, the traditional U.S. allies, such as the NATO countries of Western Europe. In addition, we sell military items to Israel, Korea, Jordan, the Philippines, and Thailand—countries with which we maintain

special ties and connections. Within the past three years, a substantial proportion of our military sales has shifted to the Persian Gulf area. This is an area where a spectacular transition is in progress in terms of the balance of economic power, the emergence of new political institutions, and the transfer of technology from industrialized nations to states in the region. It is also an area where concerns for security and stability have loomed large since Britain's termination in 1971 of its protective presence. Because the forces at work in the Persian Gulf could have a profound influence on the world balance of power, the U.S. Government has developed a special relationship with a number of states in the area.

#### **Organization of Review Process**

I wish to turn next to how the U.S. Government functions in the military sales field.

In developing and implementing its policy, the U.S. Government has developed in recent years a well-structured review process that passes on all requests for military materiel and services within the framework of the Foreign Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Acts. This process may be familiar to you, but I would like to recapitulate briefly its main features.

The normal review channel for military equipment transfers which involve appropriated funds is the Security Assistance Program Review Committee chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance and consisting of representatives from State, Defense, Treasury, OMB, NSC, AID, and ACDA [Office of Management and Budget, National Security Council, Agency for International Development, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency]. The committee reviews both the level and the content of each country program.

In cases of cash sales through government channels or commercial sales, the procedures vary somewhat depending on type of case. All cases are processed within policy guidelines established by the Department. Furthermore, all major cases must be approved by senior officials in the Department.

Within the State Department cases are reviewed by the regional bureau involved and the Politico-Military Bureau. In very important cases of whatever type, the President or the Secretary of State may make the decision.

Although the views of Defense Department officials are fully taken into account in the decisionmaking process, it should be emphasized that the Defense Department does not make policy with respect to military sales or transfers. The prime responsibility of the Defense Department is to implement national policy. This is clearly understood within the executive branch but may not be so clearly understood elsewhere.

Procedures in and of themselves, of course, cannot insure that sales, or any other activity, support the national interest. Decisions are made by men, not organizational and staffing arrangements. But procedures can help insure that the relevant information, analysis, and perspectives are brought to bear on the issue for decision.

#### **Factors Affecting Transfer Decisions**

There is a large range of considerations that we normally take into account when judging whether to enter into a military supply relationship and—when that decision is positive—determining what kinds and quantities of materiel and services we will provide. Each case is unique and handled as such. There are, however, some fairly consistent yardsticks that we do apply, and I would like to sketch these briefly for you.

On the political side we assess:

—The role the country plays in its surroundings and what interests it has in common with the United States and where our interests diverge.

—Whether the transactions further U.S. objectives more on balance than other economic or political measures.

—The position of influence that sales might help support, including the potential restraint that can be applied in conflict situations.

—Whether a particular sale would set a precedent which could lead to further re-

quests for arms or similar requests from other countries.

—The current internal stability of the recipient country, its capacity to maintain that stability, and its attitude toward human rights.

—The disadvantages of not selling to a government with which we enjoy good relations.

—The options available to the recipient country. Will a refusal result in the country's turning to other sources of supply? What sources? What will be the political, military, and economic implications of this? If a country has options that it will unhesitatingly employ, by refusing to sell might we forfeit opportunities of maintaining a close relationship that could better enable us to develop or maintain parallel interests and objectives?

There are also important economic questions:

—Whether the proposed sale is consistent with the country's development goals or our economic assistance program, if there is one.

—Whether the sale might strain the country's ability to manage its debt obligation or entail operations and maintenance costs that might make excessive claims on future budgets.

—The economic benefits to the United States from the sale or coproduction of arms, especially to the oil-rich states. As significant as these benefits may be, however, they remain secondary and certainly would never decide an issue.

And finally, there are military aspects to be taken into account:

—The threat the military capability is supposed to counter or deter, whether we agree on the nature of the threat, and how it relates to our own security. During a period when the United States and some other major powers are transferring some security responsibilities, we must attempt to understand the security concerns of smaller countries. To us their concerns may seem exaggerated, but to them their concerns are usually very real.

—How the proposed transfer affects the

regional military balance, regional military tensions, or the military buildup plans of another country.

—Whether the recipient country has the capability to absorb and utilize the arms effectively.

—What other military interests—for example, overflight rights or access to facilities—would be supported by the transaction.

—The impact on our readiness. At least since the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, we have had to assess the impact of sales on the readiness posture of our own forces.

—Whether a substantial physical dependence on U.S. sources of supply could enable us to better control conflict under some circumstances.

—Finally, except in special circumstances we do not sell or otherwise transfer certain sensitive items such as hand-transportable surface-to-air missiles and weapons which are primarily designed for use against crowds.

The basic issue is to make the best possible systematic judgment in light of the totality of U.S. interests just as we do in other international political judgments. And this is a critical point: security relationships are an element of foreign policy and thus neither more nor less subject to uncertainties than any other tool of policy. Like any other tool it could theoretically be dispensed with. But in an age when we need to exploit our capabilities to the maximum, it would be pointless to forgo the use of any tool that, when wisely used, promises substantial benefit at acceptable cost and risk.

#### Various Rationales for Transfers

I believe it would be important in this context to consider why the United States is, for many countries, the supplier of choice.

At the simplest level, others prefer our products because they are of high quality. Like other American manufactured goods, our hardware is well designed, well made, and dependable. Our supporting systems—training and logistics—are second to none.

Of equal importance, many nations want to buy from us because they want to be

associated with the United States on other matters of mutual interest, and they may wish to avoid relations with other exporting countries whose intentions are open to question. Military assistance and, most recently, military sales have been supporting elements in relationships with friends and allies over the years. I would like to reiterate what Under Secretary Sisco recently stated during a discussion of our transfer policies:<sup>2</sup>

These are valid questions for Americans who are troubled at seeing their country in the arms supply business. The image of the “merchant of death” dies hard.

I hope I have been able to . . . demonstrate that we are dealing with it in the context of an overall and carefully developed policy concept. The fact is that foreign relations are a whole piece. We cannot pick up elements with which we feel comfortable and ignore others. For every country in the world, its ability to defend itself is the most important thing to its national survival. If we do not take this into account in our relations with that country, the totality of our relationships with that country will suffer, as will our political and economic objectives.

Even nations not under immediate threat find it prudent to maintain a certain level of military capability to meet unforeseen foreign or domestic contingencies, much as we did through long periods of our own history. Also, a military establishment is almost an inevitable symbol of national sovereignty, especially in new countries that are developing a national identity and pride. One may have reservations about this, but it is a fact of life.

Obviously it is not in our interest to cater to extreme expectations, and we practice maximum restraint in dealing with countries under these circumstances. But refusal to sell any military articles and services would be in some cases interpreted as a signal by the United States that we do not support the security concerns of the countries involved or do not consider them mature enough to be trusted with some types of military equipment. There may be cases in which we in fact make such judgments in light of our interests and as a result will refuse the sale

<sup>2</sup> For a statement by Under Secretary Sisco made before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on International Relations on June 10, see BULLETIN of July 14, 1975. p. 73.

of sought-after equipment. However, we must recognize the sensitivity of these problems and make careful judgments in a context of trying to foster maturity and responsibility.

It has been argued that relationships involving military exports harbor hidden dangers. Based primarily on our Viet-Nam experience, some think that these transactions, whatever our intentions, can draw us into quarrels among nations, or within nations.

It is true that military transfers by their nature are not as politically neutral as non-military trade or economic assistance, especially when the supplier is a nation, such as the United States or the U.S.S.R., that is recognized as having global interests and responsibilities. Moreover, as I indicated earlier, military assistance and sales are by design supportive of bilateral relationships and broader foreign policy interests.

However, a distinction can be made between these transfers, whether grant or sales, that support a recognized security commitment and others which support a more general relationship. In the latter case, commitments are not entailed; in the former, transfers only support a commitment already made. Moreover, to the extent military transfers strengthen the ability of states to defend themselves, they can diminish the excessive dependence on the United States which has so often led to pressures for direct U.S. military involvement in the past.

Finally, it is my own view that those who argue that our military assistance and sales policies are intrinsically destabilizing and eventually lead to conflict assume a narrow view of history. In contrast, I would suggest that an arms balance in areas of tension has, in most cases, inhibited the occurrence of conflict. Further, I suggest that a good case can and should be made that the risk of war is increased in situations when a power imbalance exists, where the stronger power is tempted to take advantage of the weaker or where one power or the other attempts to markedly alter the power relationship.

## Repeal Urged of Byrd Amendment on Chrome From Southern Rhodesia

*Following is a statement by Charles A. James, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations, on June 19.<sup>1</sup>*

Thank you for this opportunity to testify on the draft amendment to H.R. 1287. As the committee is aware, the Department of State has already expressed its strong support for H.R. 1287, which would restore the United States to full compliance with the U.N. economic sanctions against the Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia. Early passage of H.R. 1287 has become even more urgent in the light of recent developments in Southern Africa.

As was noted by Deputy Assistant Secretary [for African Affairs James J.] Blake when he appeared before you in February, it is now no longer a question of whether there will be majority rule in Rhodesia but, rather, a question of when. There are continuing indications that the final chapters of the so-called Rhodesian problem are now being written. In Salisbury itself, there seems to be a growing perception that their present course can only lead to violent tragedy, and on-again-off-again talks between the Smith regime and Rhodesian nationalists are underway; in Lusaka, Dar es Salaam, and Gaborone there are continuing efforts to support and encourage a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia; in Pretoria, leaders of the Republic of South Africa are continuing to urge the Smith regime to reach an acceptable settlement with the majority of the Rhodesian people; in London, the British Government announced last week that it was sending an emissary to Salisbury to discuss with the

<sup>1</sup>The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Smith regime and with African nationalist leaders the timing and modalities of a constitutional conference; in Kingston [Jamaica], the leaders of the Commonwealth countries agreed to provide special financial assistance to Mozambique to help that country to apply U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia; and in Lourenço Marques, the imminent independence of Mozambique on June 25 and the prospect of the closing of its border to Rhodesian trade will add still greater physical and psychological pressure on the Smith regime to come to accommodation.

It would be a tragedy, Mr. Chairman, and an injustice to our own heritage if this country, the United States of America, is depicted in these chapters not as protagonist for liberty, freedom, and justice, but as the last remaining prop of an illegal and repressive regime.

Our primary objective has always been the repeal of the Byrd amendment. It is in this context that we support the objectives of the proposed amendment to H.R. 1287. The proposed amendment could make the sanctions program more effective by encouraging stricter compliance on the part of other countries. We do not believe that our trade or commerce with other nations would be unduly affected by this amendment, since the nations who will be required to provide certificates of origin all support the U.N. sanctions program against the Smith regime in Rhodesia.

The requirement that a certificate of origin issued by the foreign government or its designee with respect to shipments of steelmill products to the United States be filed with the Secretary of Treasury appears to us to be a reasonable method of assuring that chrome of Rhodesian origin is effectively barred from the United States. It would follow of course that if the Secretary is called upon to make a determination as to the adequacy of such a certificate, he should have the discretionary authority to establish procedures to ascertain that such certificates do indeed contain accurate information.

In closing, I would like to emphasize again

that repeal may be "now or never"—that in the near future we may find ourselves confronted with a successor government to the Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia which will base its political and trade relations with other nations on the degree of support provided for self-determination and majority rule in Rhodesia. Indeed, during their visit to Washington in early May, the president of the Rhodesian African National Council, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, and other ANC officials, specifically made this point. In this sense then, repeal of the Byrd Amendment now may be vital in assuring long-range access to Zimbabwe chrome and other minerals for American companies.

## Department Testifies on U.S. Policy Toward Mozambique

*Statement by Nathaniel Davis  
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

I welcome this opportunity to meet with the subcommittee for the first time since my appointment as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. I would like to begin by saying that I look forward to frank and constructive exchanges with you on all aspects of our relations with the nations of Africa. In dealing with the many complex issues involved in our relations with these nations, I shall hope for your advice and cooperation.

This is a particularly opportune time for us to discuss Mozambique, which will become independent in less than two weeks' time.

I would first like to submit for the record the following brief summary of economic data. During the course of my remarks, I will touch briefly on the economic development of Mozambique and on the role that the

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<sup>1</sup> Made before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on June 13. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

United States could play in assisting that development. Mr. Dennis Conroy, from the Agency for International Development, is with me here today.

U.S. policy toward Mozambique has been predicated on the principles of self-determination and majority rule. It has also been our policy to encourage the achievement of these goals by peaceful means. Therefore the United States established an embargo on arms shipments to both sides in the Portuguese colonial wars after the outbreak of hostilities in Angola in 1961, two years before the U.N. called for a similar embargo. We also began at that time asking for and receiving assurances from the Portuguese that any military equipment supplied them would not be used outside the NATO area, an area which has not included their African colonial territories.

It was in accordance with our hope for peaceful resolution of southern African problems that we, along with the rest of the world, heartily welcomed Portugal's decision after April 1974 to recognize the right of self-determination in Mozambique and in the other Portuguese territories in Africa.

In Mozambique, the process of negotiation led the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO)—the group representing the peoples of Mozambique—and Portugal on September 7, 1974, to sign an agreement setting June 25, 1975, as the date for Mozambican independence. The same agreement provided for a provisional government to lay the groundwork for that independence and to administer the country in the interim. We immediately sent a letter of congratulations to the provisional government, made up of both FRELIMO and Portuguese representatives, to mark this dramatic development in the decolonization effort.

President Ford stated our government's policy toward Mozambican independence in his toast to Zambia's President Kaunda on April 19. Speaking of all the former Portuguese colonies, President Ford said:

. . . we have been following developments in southern Africa with great, great interest. For many years the United States has supported self-

determination for the peoples of that area, and we continue to do so today.

We view the coming independence of Mozambique, Angola, and the island territories with great satisfaction, just as we viewed the independence of Guinea-Bissau just last year.

. . . America stands ready to help the emerging countries . . . and to provide what assistance we can . . .

In the spirit of the President's remarks, we are now looking forward to a cooperative relationship with the new Mozambique. It is a country of dynamism and potential. Its leaders are already participating in efforts to seek a solution to the problem of Rhodesia. The United States will recognize this new nation on its independence and seek a mutually beneficial relationship.

We are aware of the major administrative and development challenges which face Mozambique. It is basically an agrarian nation—with 85 percent of its population living in rural areas—and its new leaders have indicated that they will concentrate their efforts on rural development and the agricultural sector. Mozambique's development plans will also emphasize other areas, in particular health care but also education and training.

We are ready to give a prompt and sympathetic response to an expression of interest in U.S. assistance and cooperation in these areas. We are also ready to consider balance-of-payments support and P.L. 480 assistance, subject to congressional authorization and appropriation. The United States has discussed these questions with FRELIMO's President, Samora Machel. My predecessor met with President Machel in October 1974 and indicated our willingness, within our means, to assist the new nation. In January, we offered to send an economic survey team to study developmental problems and assistance potential. We are hopeful that a date will be set for consultations with Mozambique on this subject before or soon after independence.

As a further indication of our attitude, I would like to mention that the United States has contributed \$275,000 in disaster relief funds over the past year, to aid victims of the September disturbances in Lou-

renço Marques and to aid victims of flooding in the Limpopo Valley area; we indicated that we were prepared to consider a request for P.L. 480 assistance from Mozambique; the Export-Import Bank approved both a \$4.5 million credit and equivalent guarantee for the purchase of locomotives by Mozambique; and we are now considering a contribution to a U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) appeal for a refugee resettlement program.

In more general terms, the Congress has demonstrated its interest in the former Portuguese territories by appropriating funds under the Foreign Assistance Act for the specific purpose of aid to these areas. The fiscal year 1975 appropriation was for \$25 million for Portugal and the territories, not less than \$5 million of which would go to Cape Verde and not less than \$5 million for Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Angola. Under this appropriation \$400,000 has been obligated for a development-oriented training program for nationals of Portuguese-speaking Africa. \$1 million has been granted to the UNHCR for resettlement of refugees in Guinea-Bissau, and we hope to sign a \$1 million grant and a \$3 million loan with the Cape Verde islands this month. We also hope to add another \$1 million grant to Cape Verde early in FY76, but this will require special authorization under the continuing resolution.

I believe these actions illustrate U.S. interest and concern for all the Portuguese-speaking African nations in general and for the new nation of Mozambique in particular. The role that they will play and the effect they will have on stability and progress in southern Africa, with its many problems—some of which will be subject of later hearings by this committee—make their peaceful and successful transition to independence of great concern and importance to all nations which favor peace with justice in southern Africa.

The United States numbers itself among nations that take this approach. We look forward to the evolution of stable and prosperous nations in southern Africa—under principles of human dignity and self-deter-

mination. We believe that Mozambique will play a major role in the achievement of these objectives. Therefore we offer our congratulations and extend the hand of friendship to the Government and people of Mozambique.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### U.S. To Launch Satellites for Japan

The Department of State announced on May 27 (press release 300) that the United States and the Government of Japan have entered into an agreement under which NASA will launch satellites on a reimbursable basis for the National Space Development Agency of Japan.

These satellites—the geostationary meteorological satellite, the medium-capacity geostationary communications satellite for experimental purpose, and the medium-scale broadcasting satellite for experimental purpose—will be launched from the Kennedy Space Center, the first launch scheduled two years from now.

Notes concluding the agreement were signed by Dr. Dixy Lee Ray, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, and Takeshi Yasukawa, Ambassador of Japan, on May 23. (For text of the Japanese note, see press release 300.) The agreement was concluded pursuant to the launch policy announced by the President October 9, 1972. That policy is designed to promote international cooperation in the peaceful use of outer space and to make the capabilities of space available to all mankind.

The satellites are being built in the United States and will be launched by Delta launch vehicles. A memorandum of understanding between NASA and the Science Technology Agency will be signed shortly which establishes the general responsibilities for each

side in connection with preparation for and conduct of these launchings. Further, an agreement will be signed between NASA and the National Space Development Agency of Japan with the detailed arrangements for each launch.

Previous reimbursable launches have been conducted for Canada, the United Kingdom, the European Space Research Organization, France and Germany, and further launches are planned for Canada, Italy, Indonesia, and ESRO.

## **U.S. and Poland Conclude Fisheries Agreements**

### **MIDDLE ATLANTIC COASTAL FISHERIES**

Press release 309 dated May 30

Representatives of the United States and Poland signed on May 29 an agreement aimed at providing improved conservation for certain species of fish, such as river herring, which are found off the U.S. Atlantic coast and increased protection for some shellfish and other creatures, such as lobsters, found upon the U.S. east coast continental shelf.

The new agreement, the latest in a series which began in 1969, places additional and much-needed restrictions upon Poland's fishing effort in waters of the western region of the Middle Atlantic. These waters, heavily fished by foreign fleets, contain once-rich stocks of fish such as flounders, hake, and black sea bass which are particularly desired by U.S. consumers and which are of great importance to U.S. fishermen.

The new restrictions include both additional reductions in the geographic area in which the Poles may fish and reductions in the amount of the Polish catch. For example, Poland agreed not to direct any fishing effort toward river herring and to avoid fishing at times and in places where concentrations of such fish occur.

As is the case with all such agreements concluded recently, the new arrangements provide for a number of practical measures that are to be taken to avoid catching or otherwise harming the fishery resources of the U.S. continental shelf, such as lobsters and some crabs. In order to help insure that these and other provisions in the agreement are strictly adhered to, additional arrangements permit the use of observers upon Polish fishing vessels and allow for on-board inspection of catches and gear.

Practical measures to minimize the possibility of conflict between different types of fishing gear have been included within the agreement; and should such conflicts nevertheless occur, the new agreement continues the existing U.S.-Polish Fisheries Board, a mechanism aimed at providing for settlement of claims for damage from gear conflicts and consideration of other fisheries problems arising from the agreement.

In return for the many measures resulting in a reduction of the Polish fishery to protect resources of special interest to U.S. fishermen, the agreement continues to allow Polish vessels to conduct loading operations in the contiguous fisheries zone between 3 and 12 miles off the U.S. coast in three localities and to make limited port calls as before. A new provision permits Polish vessels a limited opportunity to exchange their crews in the Port of New York only.

The agreement will enter into force July 1, 1975, and extend to June 30, 1976, and if agreed at that time, may extend for another year. At the request of either government, it can be terminated upon two months' notice at any time during the period of force of the agreement.

The U.S. delegation to the deliberations was headed by William L. Sullivan, Jr., Coordinator of Oceans and Fisheries in the Department of State, and included a number of representatives of the east coast fishing community. The Polish delegation was led by Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade and Maritime Affairs Romuald Pietraszek.



## NORTH PACIFIC COASTAL FISHERIES

Press release 311 dated June 2

The Governments of the United States and Poland on May 30 concluded a short-term fisheries agreement effective from June 15 to December 31, 1975, relating to the fisheries of the North Pacific area extending from California north to Alaska. This is the first such agreement concluded between the two countries on Pacific coast fisheries.

Poland, which is a relative newcomer to the North Pacific fisheries, agreed to maintain the level of her fishing effort in 1975 to not more than 15 vessels, of which not more than 11 vessels would fish at the same time. The 11 vessels will be dispersed in a manner designed to avoid a concentration of vessels in one locality.

Poland agreed to refrain from fishing for salmon and halibut and will not conduct specialized fisheries for other species of special importance to the United States. These species include rockfish, black cod, flounders, soles, anchovy, Pacific mackerel, and shrimp. At the same time, Polish vessels will, during the period of the agreement, begin to switch from bottom trawling to pelagic trawling, thereby minimizing the chances of catching bottom species which U.S. fishermen primarily seek. In addition, Poland has agreed to abide by the conservation provisions of the agreements concluded between the United States and other countries fishing in the North Pacific. Furthermore, Poland agreed to refrain from fishing in a new closed area off northern California where U.S. fishermen fish with fixed gear so as to prevent damaging the U.S. gear.

Both governments agreed to expand their research on species of interest to both sides and to exchange biostatistical data on a timely basis. Both governments also agreed to initiate a program whereby fisheries experts from one side could board vessels of the other side to observe their operations and collect data. In this regard, the Polish side also agreed to permit duly authorized U.S.

Federal and state officials to board and conduct inspections of their vessels.

The new agreement also spells out measures which the Polish fishermen will take to avoid taking U.S. continental shelf resources, such as king and tanner crabs. In return for the cooperation extended by the Polish side in agreeing to observe existing conservation arrangements in the North Pacific, the United States will permit Polish vessels to conduct loading operations in two localities in the U.S. contiguous fishery zone (3-12 miles).

The negotiations between the two delegations were conducted in a cordial and friendly atmosphere. The U.S. delegation, which included representatives from the Departments of State and Commerce, state agencies, and the fishing industry, was headed by William L. Sullivan, Jr., Coordinator of Oceans and Fisheries in the Department of State. The Polish delegation was led by Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade and Maritime Affairs Romuald Pietraszek.

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Health

Amendments to articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 23, 1967. Entered into force May 21, 1975.

*Acceptances deposited:* Bahrain, June 25, 1975; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, June 10, 1975.

Amendments to articles 35 and 55 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptances deposited:* Bahrain, June 25, 1975; Cyprus, June 20, 1975; Syrian Arab Republic, June 18, 1975.

#### Telecommunications

Radio regulations, with appendices. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1,

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4893.

*Notification of approval:* Mauritius, April 24, 1975.

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 7435), to establish a new frequency allotment plan for high-frequency radiotelephone coast stations, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva June 8, 1974.<sup>1</sup>

*Notification of approval:* Mauritius, April 24, 1975.

International telecommunication convention with annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1975.<sup>2</sup>

*Ratifications deposited:* Jamaica,<sup>3</sup> Tunisia, April 25, 1975.

*Accession deposited:* Jordan, May 28, 1975.

## Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. *Declaration of provisional application deposited:* Iraq, June 27, 1975.

## BILATERAL

### Republic of China

Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles, with annex, as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington December 30, 1971. Entered into force December 30, 1971; effective January 1, 1971. TIAS 7249, 7468, 7590.

*Terminated:* January 1, 1975.

Agreement concerning trade in wool and manmade fiber textile products, with annexes, as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington December 30, 1971. Entered into force December 30, 1971; effective October 1, 1971. TIAS 7498, 7591.

*Terminated:* January 1, 1975.

### Colombia

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá May 28, 1975. Entered into force May 28, 1975; effective July 1, 1975.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force for the United States.

<sup>3</sup> With reservations contained in final protocol.

### Jamaica

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of April 16, 1975. Effected by exchange of notes at Kingston June 9, 1975. Entered into force June 9, 1975.

### Mexico

Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles with related exchange of notes, as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 29, 1971. Entered into force June 29, 1971; effective May 1, 1971. TIAS 7152, 7732.

*Terminated:* May 1, 1975.

## PUBLICATIONS

### First 1949 "Foreign Relations" Volume on Far East and Australasia Released

Press release 324 dated June 10 (for release June 17)

The Department of State released on June 17 volume VII, part 1, in the series "Foreign Relations of the United States" for the year 1949. This volume is entitled "The Far East and Australasia."

One of the two volumes on China for the year 1949 (volume IX) was released in January. The companion volume on China (volume VIII) and part 2 of volume VII, containing documentation on Japan, Korea, and regional matters, will be released subsequently to complete the issuance in the series of material on the Far East for 1949.

Volume VII, part 1, contains 600 pages of previously unpublished documentation on many important topics, with principal emphasis on U.S. interest in nationalist opposition to the restoration of French rule in Indochina and Netherlands rule in the East Indies (Indonesia).

This volume was prepared by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs. Copies of volume VII, part 1 (Department of State publication 8797, GPO cat. no. S1.1:949/v. VII, 1), may be obtained for \$8.75 (domestic postpaid). Checks or money orders should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents and sent to the U.S. Government Book Store, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

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†354	7/2	U.S. and U.K. establish fellowships in creative and performing arts to mark Bicentennial.
355	7/5	Kissinger: interview with Ted Koppel, ABC Saturday News.

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† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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## Military Assistance and Sales to Turkey

*Following are texts of a letter dated July 9 from President Ford to Speaker of the House Carl Albert and a statement by Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, made before the House Committee on International Relations on July 10.<sup>1</sup>*

### TEXT OF LETTER FROM PRESIDENT FORD TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE <sup>2</sup>

JULY 9, 1975.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: I wish to share with you my concern about a complex foreign policy problem that relates to the deteriorating situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, the threat to our North Atlantic Alliance relationships, the plight of the people of Cyprus and the role of the United States. Both the Congress and the Executive Branch share a responsibility to reexamine this critical situation with care. This is not a partisan matter or one where the rights and wrongs of a decades-old dispute can easily be judged—particularly by outsiders. Our overriding objective must be to help in the peaceful settlement of a problem that involves two valued Allies and a people whose history as an independent nation has been riven by strife.

The strategic situation must also be weighed. At a time of uncertainty in the Middle East, we should consider carefully any action which could add to the tensions that already exist. Our facilities in Turkey and our mutual defense arrangements have

played and continue to play a vital role in the security of the area and, more directly, in the security of our own forces. Mutual defense links that have stood us well for thirty years should not be lightly cast aside.

I have spent much time studying these issues and have talked in Brussels with the leaders of Turkey and Greece. I am convinced that U.S. and Western security interests require the urgent passage by the House of legislation enabling the resumption of our long-standing security relationship with Turkey. The Senate has already acted favorably on a bill to accomplish this purpose.

Existing legislation passed by Congress last December 18, with an effective date of February 5, 1975, has been in force for nearly five months. This action has: (1) called into question the ability of an Ally to continue to fulfill its essential NATO responsibilities, thus undermining NATO's strength in the Eastern Mediterranean; (2) jeopardized vital common defense installations which Turkey and the U.S. jointly maintain; (3) contributed to tensions which are not helpful to Greece; and (4) reduced American influence to move the Cyprus negotiations toward a peaceful conclusion acceptable to all parties.

The legislation voted against Turkey last December is sweeping in its effect. It is more extensive than similar legislation enacted in October, 1974, with which the Administration was in full compliance. The December legislation provides for not only a total embargo on grant military assistance, and cash and credit sales of defense items by the U.S. Government, but prohibits as well the issuance of licenses to permit the export of military equipment purchased from American firms. Practically all nations of the world can purchase in this country at least some

<sup>1</sup> The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

<sup>2</sup> Reprinted from the *Congressional Record*, July 9, p. H 6473.

items that are forbidden to Turkey. It is now impossible for Turkey to procure most items produced in third countries under U.S. license; nor can Turkey even take possession of merchandise in the U.S. which it paid for prior to February 5 and which is now ready for shipment. The result is that a relationship of trust and confidence with this important NATO Ally, built up over many years, has been seriously eroded. Continuation of the embargo risks further deterioration, jeopardizing our security interests throughout the Eastern Mediterranean area.

For all these reasons, it is my strong view that the Administration and the Congress must join in legislative action that will remedy the present situation. The form that legislation should take to achieve this end is for Congress itself to decide, but it is clear that only legislation can produce the actions which are necessary in this case.

I know that in the minds of many in the Congress there remains the issue of how American-supplied arms were used last summer. The Cyprus problem is one where neither moral nor legal judgments, on the arms issue or any other, can be easily or lightly made. Yet, the effect of the embargo is to ascribe blame totally to one of the parties in a dispute that has its roots in centuries of animosity and for which both sides must share some responsibility.

Where we can all agree, and where I believe we must all act together, is in our sense of anxiety and concern over the Cyprus problem and in a consensus that the only way to achieve what we all seek—a just and broadly acceptable settlement—is through negotiations in which we maintain maximum flexibility with all the parties. Unless some progress is made in the negotiations, the humanitarian plight facing the people of Cyprus, including particularly the refugee problem, cannot be solved.

The United States will continue to work, as it has done continuously since last July, as hard and as determinedly as possible to move the parties of the Cyprus conflict toward a negotiated settlement. Recent U.S. diplomatic activity in Ankara, Athens and Brussels has contributed to the start of a Greek-

Turkish dialogue which has defused the tense situation and hopefully laid the groundwork for Greek-Turkish cooperation.

As we pursue our efforts, we want the continued friendship of both Greece and Turkey, and our sympathy and concern extend to all the people of Cyprus. We want an end to human suffering and misery, and the rebuilding of an island where all can live in freedom and security.

At present, our ability to urge this view persuasively is compromised by the erosion of our influence. I ask the Congress' cooperation and assistance, therefore, in enacting legislation which will assure that America's influence is not further weakened and U.S. interests further threatened at this time of critical concern in Cyprus and throughout the Eastern Mediterranean.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

#### STATEMENT BY UNDER SECRETARY SISCO

Press release 361 dated July 10

Mr. Chairman [Representative Thomas E. Morgan] and members of the committee: I come before you today to enlist your support in preserving our vital security relationship with our NATO ally Turkey and in strengthening our close ties with an equally important NATO ally, Greece. You have already seen the message from the President in which he explained his concern about the deteriorating situation in the eastern Mediterranean, the threat to our military facilities in Turkey, and the plight of the peoples of Cyprus.

As the President emphasized in his message, prohibiting military assistance and sales to Turkey has had damaging effects in four areas: (1) It has weakened the ability of our Turkish ally to continue to fulfill its essential NATO responsibilities, thereby further debilitating the southern flank of NATO; (2) it has jeopardized common defense installations which Turkey and the United States jointly maintain and which serve vital interests of the United States and NATO; (3) it has contributed to ten-



sions which are not helpful to any of the parties, including Greece; and (4) it has severely reduced American influence to move the Cyprus negotiations toward a peaceful settlement acceptable to all parties.

Throughout the world, we face changing relationships with a number of our friends and allies. The reasons for these changes are complex, and in some cases where they adversely affect our interests, there is little we ourselves can do to reverse them. In the case of Turkey, however, something can be done. And in our judgment, it must be done quickly.

We maintain alliances and provide military supplies—both sales and assistance—to a variety of friends around the world not as a favor to a particular country or as a unilateral gesture of good will but because we believe such relationships are in the mutual interests of both the United States and our partners. That has been the case for almost 30 years, through successive American Administrations, in our alliance relationship with Turkey.

We are deeply interested—and I want to put particular stress on this—in improving our relations with Greece. Greece is a country whose security and prosperity are of particular and longstanding importance to the United States. We can look back with pride and a sense of achievement at what the Greek people have accomplished with our help since World War II. When we began our economic and military aid to the Greeks in 1947, Greece was in the grip of a cruel and ruinous civil war. We worked with the Greeks to restore that country's economy and to shore up its security. We are as devoted as ever to the well-being of the Greek people. We are gratified that the Greek people have a democratic government.

As you know, we are already providing cash and credit military sales to Greece in response to specific requests from the Greek Government. We are also examining sympathetically requests for economic assistance as well. Moreover, we plan to continue to work closely with the Greek Government with a view to helping in every meaningful way we can in the reconciliation of outstand-

ing differences between Greece and Turkey not only regarding Cyprus but also with respect to issues in dispute between them in the Aegean. It is for all these reasons that we welcome the expressions of continued support for Greece contained in H.R. 8454, which was introduced yesterday by Chairman Morgan and other members of the committee.

#### **Lifting of Ban on Arms Shipments to Turkey**

The Administration is committed to working together with the Congress on this vital issue. Our relationship to our Greek and Turkish allies is not a partisan matter. It is one which requires common understanding and cooperation between us.

As you know, the Administration has requested and the Senate has adopted the Scott-Mansfield bill which would restore grant assistance as well as cash and credit sales to Turkey. This remains the legislative action preferred by the Administration. However, as the President said yesterday, and reflecting the dialogue and cooperation we seek with the Congress on this issue, we are prepared to accept the compromise legislation (H.R. 8454) now before you.

Let me now deal directly with the main arguments against a restoration of sales and assistance to Turkey we have heard from some members of Congress and from concerned Americans.

First there is the assertion that Turkey, during the crisis of last year, violated the agreement required under our law by using U.S.-provided equipment in ways not envisaged in the Foreign Assistance Act. We understand and respect this point of view. At the same time I have also heard the view expressed that the Congress should not now remove the ban it has enacted against arms shipments to Turkey because otherwise it will appear to approve, or at least condone, the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus.

This is not the case. The prohibition against arms shipments to Turkey has now been in effect for more than five months. It has demonstrated to Turkey the strong feelings of many in this country over the mili-

tary action taken by Turkey last year. This period of time has also afforded both the executive branch and the Congress an opportunity to assess the probable consequences of continuation of the present prohibition on arms shipments. A lifting of the prohibition at this time based upon considerations of what is in the best interests of the United States cannot be construed as an endorsement of Turkey's military action last summer. Congress has made this point absolutely clear by adopting the embargo legislation.

Action by Congress to rectify the situation, rather than condone the Turkish action, would remove the impairment to our ability to promote an early negotiated settlement on Cyprus, to maintain good bilateral relations with both Greece and Turkey, to restore the solidarity of NATO, and to preserve important U.S. security interests in the eastern Mediterranean. I can assure the Congress that the executive branch will not represent action rectifying the present situation as condoning Turkish military action.

#### **U.S. Efforts Toward Cyprus Settlement**

Moreover, with regard to Cyprus, the situation is not one where there is a monopoly of right or wrong on either side. There is a long history of deep divisions between the ethnic communities on Cyprus and of resulting international tensions. Efforts have been made to devise ways to protect the interests of the two population groups under a system of government that would allow Cyprus to function as an independent nation. However, the 1960 Constitution and treaty of guarantee failed to resolve the mistrust and animosity existing between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

Twice before the crisis of last summer, Turkey had been on the brink of military intervention because of repressive acts against the Turkish minority. When the Greek junta suddenly intervened last year and overthrew the government of Archbishop Makarios, replacing it with one led by Nicos Sampson, a foremost exponent of terror tactics and *enosis* with Greece, Tur-

key became alarmed and fearful of the consequences for the Turkish Cypriots. This act started the unfortunate chain of events we have seen this past year in the eastern Mediterranean.

There are also some who say we have not worked hard enough or imaginatively enough since last summer in trying to bring about a Cyprus settlement. I think a brief look at the record will demonstrate that this allegation is false.

In the first instance, vigorous efforts were made by the United States to find a way to avoid military intervention in Cyprus. Once it became clear that the guarantor powers could not agree on restoring the *status quo ante*, there was unfortunately no way that armed intervention by Turkey could have been prevented short of active military intervention by the United States—a course which would not have been approved by the American people.

Since those tragic events, the Administration has been continuously and intensely involved in encouraging and assisting the parties to find a solution to the Cyprus problem which would restore both peace on the island and harmony in relations between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. Our task has obviously not been easy. In the weeks and early months after the hostilities, the suspicions and passions were so deep that it was impossible at times even to bring the parties to the negotiating table—not to speak of producing progress toward a solution of the problem.

There have been other factors, extraneous to Cyprus, particularly political uncertainty in Turkey, which have impeded progress. We had reason to expect last fall that the Egevit government would undertake important gestures relating to Turkish troop reductions, troop pullbacks, and Greek Cypriot refugees which would have improved the negotiating atmosphere and the prospects for a Cyprus settlement. But the Turkish Government fell at that time, thereby ending our hopes for early progress. Turkey then entered a long period of political stalemate under a caretaker government, and it was only recently that a political government

under Prime Minister Demirel was established, with only a narrow majority in the Turkish National Assembly.

Nevertheless, throughout this period we continued our efforts with Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot leaders to create the groundwork for the negotiation of a Cyprus settlement. As a consequence of Secretary Kissinger's meetings in Brussels in December with the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers, intercommunal talks were resumed in January. The strategy throughout was, and is, to encourage and support the negotiating process. We have repeatedly made clear to all the parties that the ultimate solution should include agreement on constitutional arrangements along federal lines, territorial concessions, and an easing of the refugee situation. We have also expressed our view that Cyprus must remain a sovereign and independent state.

This spring, Secretary Kissinger made two special trips to Ankara to reinforce our efforts to find a solution and also to express our concern over the deteriorating situation in the Aegean area. These talks were later followed by meetings in Brussels between President Ford and Prime Ministers Caramanlis [of Greece] and Demirel.

It was partly as a result of our diplomatic efforts that a direct Greek-Turkish dialogue has been established. This dialogue can help to defuse the tense situation in the Aegean and should help to maintain a positive climate within which Turkey and Greece can continue efforts to help achieve a Cyprus settlement. Meanwhile, we have continued actively to support the intercommunal talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots which began under the auspices of U.N. Secretary General Waldheim in May and which will be reconvened in Vienna later this month.

In our judgment, however, our role in promoting either these talks or the Greek-Turkish dialogue is seriously circumscribed as long as we maintain a policy of total denial of U.S. military equipment to Turkey. We can understand the reasons which led the Congress to impose this ban and the view that Turkey had violated agreements with

the United States when it used U.S. military equipment without our permission to conduct its military operations in Cyprus last summer. We believe, however, that it is clearly not in the U.S. national interest to maintain an embargo that weakens our influence, jeopardizes our NATO defenses by depriving our Turkish ally of the military equipment it needs to discharge its alliance responsibilities, and impedes progress in the Cyprus negotiations.

#### Other Questions of Concern

I have dealt at length with these matters because I believe they are central to your concerns. But there are other questions which have been raised which deserve direct answers.

There are those who argue that lifting the Turkish embargo could be construed as an anti-Greek move. It seems to me that this is an argument based on a false premise. The maintenance of an alliance relationship with Turkey, now more than a generation old, is certainly not directed against Greece. Greece has a vital stake in having Turkey a part of the Western alliance system, and in the last analysis, stability in the eastern Mediterranean is largely dependent upon the cooperation of our two close allies Greece and Turkey.

Some have also asked why the Turks could not do something—make concessions, pledge secretly to make concessions at some later date, or make some gesture in the humanitarian field before the Congress itself undertakes new legislative action. Simple answers to these questions do not exist. The Turkish Government has made clear that it cannot and will not make advance concessions, which would be considered by the Turkish people to be capitulation to outside pressure. It is our judgment that pressure for prior concessions relating to the embargo will only further harden the Turkish stance, both on Cyprus and with respect to facilities in Turkey.

The question has been asked whether once the House passes legislation the Turks will in fact then be ready to be more conciliatory

at the negotiating table. Frankly, I cannot give you categorical assurances. Flexibility, of course, will be required on both sides.

Both the President and the Secretary of State are determined to use U.S. influence in bringing about constructive results, because our interests, those of the parties, and of NATO require no less than a maximum effort. Failure on the part of Turkey to adopt a flexible and constructive position in the aftermath of the lifting of the embargo would go to the heart of the American-Turkish relationship.

Finally, let me also say a word about the opium issue, which is a matter of deep concern to all Americans. In July of last year the Turks did, indeed, lift their total ban on the cultivation of the opium poppy. But the government also announced its intention of meeting its obligation to the world community to prevent the poppy harvest in Turkey from being diverted into illicit channels.

Since then Turkey has outlawed completely the hard-to-control "bleeding" of the poppies by the farmers in the field. It has put into effect measures to enforce this ban. Farmers, under the law, have to sell their poppy straw to the government at a fixed price, which is backed by a U.N. standby compensation fund. The objective, through the combination of a government price high enough to make sales to the government attractive and a strengthened control mechanism, is to try to keep the product of the opium poppy in government hands and out of the illegal market.

The first harvest under this new procedure is now underway. Preliminary reports on the harvesting and control process are good. Both U.S. and U.N. personnel are watching this matter very closely. We believe the Turkish Government is heavily committed to making the system work.

To sum up, Mr. Chairman, before taking the committee's questions, I would like to repeat that the Administration solicits the bipartisan understanding, support, and cooperation of the Congress in helping to ameliorate a serious foreign policy problem of many dimensions and great complexity.

We seek to preserve our friendship and

vital alliance relationships with both Greece and Turkey. At the same time, we earnestly seek a negotiated and durable Cyprus solution which would restore tranquillity to that troubled island and, by enabling Greece and Turkey to put the Cyprus problem behind them, resolve other outstanding issues and restore stability to their region.

We hope the Congress will act speedily on the compromise bill submitted yesterday.

## President Ford Outlines U.S. Goals in the United Nations

*Following is an excerpt from remarks made by President Ford on June 30 at the swearing-in ceremony for Daniel P. Moynihan as U.S. Representative to the United Nations.<sup>1</sup>*

The United States was the chief architect of the United Nations. We joined with others during the dreadful suffering of World War II to conceive an organization for peace and to serve all mankind.

We have been determined supporters of the United Nations, and we will continue to be so in the future. There is no other course, as I see it, consistent with our advocacy of peace and justice for all humanity.

As the need for worldwide cooperation developed, so did the inherent difficulty in finding practical solutions which must advance the enlightened self-interest of the United States as well as the interests of others.

We face not only the fundamental task of maintaining international peace and security but also entirely new problems for world economic interdependence.

We must deal with new political problems as developing nations press forward vigorously to correct what they see as injustices. In this developing situation, we will concentrate on practical and mutually beneficial

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<sup>1</sup> For the complete text of President Ford's remarks and Ambassador Moynihan's reply, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 7, p. 693.

projects and we will strive for universal cooperation.

We will engage at the United Nations in a dialogue of candor and directness and of understanding and respect for the concerns of all member nations. We will seek concrete achievement. We will work with firmness and with patience in a determined effort to foster mutually beneficial relations with the developing world.

At the same time, we will firmly resist efforts by any group of countries to exploit the machinery of the United Nations for narrow political interests or for parliamentary manipulation.

Ambassador Moynihhan takes on this very serious responsibility at a time when a vast and vital agenda is before the world—the realization of agreed goals in the area of food and population, the resolution of international conflicts, the strengthening of peacekeeping forces, and a new law of the sea treaty, and, of course, economic prosperity for all.

## **President Suharto of Indonesia Meets With President Ford**

*General Suharto, President of the Republic of Indonesia, met with President Ford and other government officials at Camp David, Md., on July 5. Following is an exchange of toasts between President Ford and President Suharto at a luncheon at Camp David that day.*

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 14

### **PRESIDENT FORD**

Mr. President: I am greatly honored to have the opportunity of welcoming you on your visit to the United States as a part of your world tour.

You visited the United States last, as I understand it, in 1970, and we all recognize, of course, that through the years you have been a very wise and valued friend of the United States.

I recognize, as all of us do here from the United States, that you have achieved a great deal for your country in the period during your Presidency. The Indonesian people, we recognize, have developed a solid foundation to deal with your nation's very complex challenges and the very difficult road, but in the process of development great progress has been made.

Admiring you, President Suharto, and your country as I do, I have wanted to meet with you and discuss with you the many issues that concern both of our nations. And I have found today in our discussions that your observations concerning Southeast Asia and the Pacific have been extremely meaningful and very constructive. I hope that this exchange of views will be mutually beneficial to both countries as we face our problems in the years ahead.

We do attach, in the United States, a great deal of importance to our relations with you. You have been a source of strength in Southeast Asia and in Asia as a whole, and we respect you for this part that you have played in the area as well as the leadership that you have given to your own country in the process of development in the last five to ten years.

We look forward to the opportunity of working with you in the future. The fact that we had a recent tragedy in Indochina actually should redouble, and does, our interest in the stability of Southeast Asia. Your assessment there, as I indicated, is most helpful to us as we plan and look to the future.

Let me say that the American people have great respect for your people, as we do for you and those in your government. I was delighted this morning to reaffirm our nation's solid support for Indonesia's development efforts, and we look forward to working with you in economic matters and the strengthening of your country in its major role in Southeast Asia.

Mr. President, in the months and years ahead, it seems to me that your country can provide continuing leadership in that part of the world, working with other nations that have a like philosophical—ideological—

view. Let me assure you that we will be most anxious to work with you and those other nations.

Today has been most enjoyable, most pleasant, and I think most constructive. I hope that you will return to the United States very soon and for a much longer and more extended visit to the United States.

It is a pleasure for me to ask all of you to raise your glasses to the good health and sustained success of the leader of Indonesia—His Excellency President Suharto.

#### PRESIDENT SUHARTO <sup>1</sup>

Mr. President, Excellencies, distinguished guests: May I first of all convey our highest appreciation and heartfelt thanks on behalf of my wife as well as my delegation for the opportunity given me to accept the kind invitation of you, Mr. President, to be here in the United States, and may I also, on behalf of—the Indonesian people and Government convey their profound gratitude for this opportunity provided us.

As part of the nature of this very short visit—I'd say only for several hours—but I would like very much to take this valuable opportunity, an opportunity which is very valuable for us, to enable us to be able to conduct exchanges of views in our common efforts and in the discharge of my duty to further strengthen these relations and friendly cooperation between the United States and Indonesia and also to have the opportunity to discuss with you, Mr. President, and conduct exchanges, open and frank exchanges of views, relating not only to bilateral relations and problems concerning our two countries but also on the international situations as well.

I believe entirely—and I am also fully confident—of the sincerity of the U.S. Government, Mr. President, for the pledge and the assistance that the U.S. Government will

<sup>1</sup> President Suharto spoke in Indonesian.

provide not only to Indonesia but also to other Southeast Asian countries, but particularly to Indonesia, an Indonesia which is presently busily engaged in carrying out economic development efforts to create or to establish a just and prosperous society, a just and prosperous society which calls for its development, of course, for a lending helping hand from other able countries who are really able to assist and help us in our development efforts.

In view of the fast-changing developments which have happened recently in Southeast Asia, particularly in the Indochinese Peninsula, Mr. President, we are now striving very hard to consolidate what we call the national resilience and also to strengthen our national ideology, a national ideology which is based on our own principles, national ideology which should be strengthened in the effort of the development efforts—we would like very much to accelerate that effort—the national ideology which should be strengthened in a way that the confidence of the people in this ideology will be such that this will not corrode and the confidence will bolster the unity of the nation, national ideology which becomes the most important aspect of our national resilience to enable us to face any eventualities which could endanger our independence and territorial integrity in the future.

May I also, on this occasion, once again reiterate our heartfelt thanks and gratitude for the pledge and the assistance and support that the United States has so far provided and will continue to support in this respect and gain our heartfelt appreciation.

In our common efforts of furthering or enhancing the friendly cooperation between the two countries, I see the great importance of having this reciprocal visit, a mutual visit by the heads of government.

And in this spirit, Mr. President, I would kindly invite Your Excellency to visit Indonesia and see for yourself, be the witness of what is going on in Indonesia and what are really the efforts of the Indonesian people

and Government at the present state of our economic development.

May I, in conclusion, Mr. President, invite kindly Your Excellencies and distinguished guests to raise your glasses and join me in a toast to the health and happiness of His Excellency the President of the United States.

## AID Makes \$114 Million Loans To Assist Egyptian Economy

AID press release 64 dated July 1

Two loans to Egypt totaling \$114,275,000 are being made by the Agency for International Development to assist that country to expand existing industrial enterprises and to increase agricultural production as well as to modernize port facilities for grain handling.

A loan of \$70 million to finance imports from the United States of agricultural and industrial machinery, equipment, and spare parts and other essential commodities will assist Egypt to more fully utilize existing industrial capacity and to insure availability of agricultural inputs essential to increase agricultural production.

A loan of \$44,275,000 will finance the foreign exchange costs of goods and services required in the design and construction of two grain silo facilities at Alexandria and Cairo and ship-unloading equipment at Alexandria.

These loans will bring the total of U.S. official assistance to Egypt during the fiscal year 1975 to \$250 million.

The \$70 million commodity imports loan will be the second such loan Egypt received in FY75. In February 1975 the United States and Egypt executed a \$80 million commodity imports loan agreement for the financing of goods from the United States.

AID anticipates these loans will enable U.S. suppliers and exporters to reestablish old trade relationships and to create new ones for industrial raw materials and ma-

chinery and commodities essential for increased agricultural production. Egypt will repay these loans in dollars in 40 years after the first disbursement, including a 10-year grace period. Interest during the grace period will be 2 percent and thereafter 3 percent annually.

The grain silo loan of \$44,275,000 will help finance a \$84,075,000 modernization program the Egyptian Government is undertaking to speed handling of grain imports and provide greater and more efficient storage facilities to replace those now used. Egypt currently imports approximately 75 percent of its food grain needs, with grain imports expected to reach 4.5 million tons by 1980 compared to 3.5 million tons in 1974.

The modernization project consists of the construction of a 100,000-ton silo at Alexandria port together with new 1,000-ton-per-hour pneumatic ship-unloading equipment which transports bulk grain directly to the silo for short-term storage, also a 100,000-ton silo facility at Cairo for storage and redistribution. The ultimate benefits are expected to be reduced costs of bread and other grain products.

This loan will be repaid in dollars over 40 years, also including a grace period of 10 years. The interest rate during the grace period will be 2 percent and 3 percent thereafter.

AID assistance programs to Egypt during FY75 were:

Suez Canal clearance .....	\$ 14 million
Technology transfer & manpower development .....	1 million
Feasibility studies .....	1 million
Electric distribution system (Suez)....	30 million
Heavy equipment .....	10 million
Grain storage .....	44 million
	<hr/>
Total .....	100 million
Basic import & production loan (I) .....	80 million
Basic import & production loan (II) .....	70 million
	<hr/>
Total .....	150 million
Total FY75 Assistance .....	\$250 million

## Department Urges Congressional Approval of Trade Agreement With Romania

*Statement by Arthur A. Hartman  
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

I am very pleased to have the opportunity to testify on behalf of the trade agreement that we have negotiated with Romania.<sup>2</sup>

This agreement is a major step forward in our relations with Romania. It places our bilateral trade on a basis beneficial to the economic interests of both countries. Further, it brings our commercial relations into accord with our very satisfactory political ties.

Improvement of U.S.-Romanian relations serves the foreign policy interests of both countries. The dominant theme of Romania's foreign policy is the desire to maintain a high degree of independence. More than any other Eastern European country, Romania has pursued friendly relations with countries of differing political and economic systems—with the United States, the People's Republic of China, the developing world, and with Israel as well as Arab countries. Romania participates actively in a number of international organizations. It is the only COMECON [Council of Mutual Economic Assistance] country which is a member of the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and the World Bank. Romania has acceded to the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]. It leads the COMECON countries in the proportion of its trade with the West.

We wish to encourage Romania's independent policy orientation through the expansion and improvement of bilateral relations. We believe this approach also furthers our policy of détente as we seek to develop a pattern of interacting interests and political restraint in our relations with the Communist world. Accordingly, in recent years there have been visits by the heads of state of the two countries, and various steps have been taken to develop cultural, scientific, and economic ties.

Measures to improve economic relations include extension of credits and guarantees of the Export-Import Bank for our exports and making guarantees of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation available to American private investment there. These facilities were withdrawn as required under section 402 of the Trade Act of 1974; but they will be fully restored, as permitted under the President's Executive order of April 24, when congressional approval of the trade agreement is assured. In December 1973, Presidents Nixon and Ceaușescu issued a Joint Statement on Economic, Industrial, and Technological Cooperation, which set out a framework for bilateral economic relations. It established the American-Romanian Economic Commission, which provides a Cabinet-level forum for annual review of our economic relations. At the same time the U.S.-Romanian Economic Council was established by the U.S. and Romanian Chambers of Commerce to facilitate increased contact between American companies and Romanian

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Senate Committee on Finance on July 8. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

<sup>2</sup> For text of the agreement, see BULLETIN of May 19, 1975, p. 655.



enterprises and economic organizations. A very recent development is the negotiation of a final settlement between the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council and Romania on defaulted bonds. This agreement was signed on June 24.

Recent trade trends reflect the development of closer bilateral economic relations. Two-way commerce has grown from \$22 million in 1968 to over \$400 million last year. Our exports to Romania have been exceeding imports by over 2 to 1. This favorable ratio indicates the strong Romanian demand over the years for U.S. agricultural goods and capital equipment, despite the fact that Romania has not enjoyed MFN [most-favored-nation] treatment. Our principal import is petroleum products, which Romania continued to supply during the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] embargo. If we now do not remove discriminatory treatment of Romanian goods we could not expect this favorable trade situation to continue. But with nondiscriminatory tariff treatment we are confident that the target in the agreement of at least a threefold increase in trade during the period of the agreement in comparison with the period 1972-74 will be met and that a favorable trade balance will continue.

In negotiating this agreement we have attempted, I think successfully, to establish a framework that will encourage continued growth of trade along lines consistent with our economic interests. We considered it essential that this framework take account of Romania's centrally planned economy in two general respects:

—First, we wished to obtain arrangements that would provide a measure of equivalence to the free access to our domestic market that we assure through extension of nondiscriminatory tariff treatment.

—Second, we wished to obtain arrangements that would insure Romanian cooperation in dealing with any threat of injury to our industries caused by disruptive imports, while maintaining the right to take unilaterally what steps might be called for to deal with such a situation.

Negotiation of the trade agreement was undertaken in the latter half of January in Bucharest by an interagency team under the leadership of Ambassador Harry Barnes [U.S. Ambassador to Romania]. Ambassador Dent [Frederick B. Dent, Special Representative of the President for Trade Negotiations] and Under Secretary Tabor [John K. Tabor, Under Secretary of Commerce] have reviewed for you many of the provisions of the agreement from the perspective of their responsibilities. You have, in addition, a statement provided by Secretary Simon [William E. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury]. I would like myself to make the following general points:

—Following the mandate of section 405 of the Trade Act, concerning provision of rights and assurances for American businessmen carrying out commercial activities in the other country, we have set out basic ground rules here that will facilitate the activities of American businessmen, supported as appropriate by our Embassy.

—Also without precedent is the inclusion of commitments by both countries to maintain a balance of concessions over the lifetime of the agreement. Further, the two countries agree to reciprocate each other's concessions in the multilateral trade negotiations, taking into account their different levels of development. These are conditions set out in the Trade Act for renewal of bilateral agreements. A reference was included to the special commitment offered by Romania as a state-trading country when it joined the GATT, in order to make clear that we do not consider that mutual tariff reductions would suffice to assure a balance of benefits.

—Safeguards against market disruption have been included which rigorously follow and in some respects exceed the requirements of the Trade Act. We doubt that disruption by imports from Romania is a serious potential problem. The preponderance of our imports from Romania consists of petroleum products, which strengthen rather than compete with American industry. Also, in one sensitive area, textiles, we have recently negotiated a new bilateral agreement that

will protect our interests. Nonetheless, we believe that with a state-trading country there are special reasons for concern regarding possible injury from imports, as well as special opportunities for dealing with such situations on a basis of mutual cooperation. Accordingly, we have included safeguard arrangements calling for close consultation on the governmental level. They also require action by Romania to insure that its exports conform to restrictions deemed by us to be necessary, and they reserve our right to take appropriate steps unilaterally. These safeguards give the fullest protection to American firms against injury from imports.

These and the other provisions designed to protect our interests, together with the responsiveness to many of our requirements that the Romanian Government demonstrated during the negotiations, give us every reason to believe that the agreement will give further impetus to our trade with Romania and that this trade will be conducted on terms favorable to our commercial interests.

Turning to the emigration aspect of this agreement, we are very mindful of the interest of the Congress as a whole in this important matter and of the concern of individual Members of Congress in specific emigration cases. Let me say that we welcome this interest and will continue to consult closely with you on how to deal with these cases and with the emigration problem in general. While the Administration has reservations about linking trade with emigration by legislation, we recognize and accept the necessity to meet the requirements of the Trade Act. From the beginning of our discussions in Bucharest we emphasized that we needed more than just agreement on a commercial document alone, and we also made plain that our concerns went beyond the few hundred Romanians wishing to move permanently to the United States. Also, we drew upon the numerous strong expressions by Members of the Congress to underscore with the Romanians the importance of this question.

These requirements obviously posed serious problems for the Romanians, especially following refusal by the U.S.S.R. and other

Eastern European countries to accept them as a basis for negotiations. We discussed the matter in considerable detail and on numerous occasions, and we believe we and the Romanians understood each other entirely on the practical meaning and implementation of the language appearing in the President's waiver report and in other documents required by the act. As far as that language itself is concerned, it fully satisfies, in our judgment, both the letter and spirit of the act and will contribute to the achievement of the objectives of section 402. At the same time it takes account of legitimate Romanian concerns.

We fully understand the wish of some Members for more details on our discussions of this subject with the Romanians. I would only emphasize their sensitivity and the consequences to both countries' interests if they should become subject to public debate. Meanwhile I would urge the Congress to judge Romanian emigration practices by future deeds in addition to the words of the President's report waiving section 402 of the Trade Act. It will be on this basis that the President himself will decide whether to seek further extension of the waiver next year.

I would be less than candid if I were to try to gloss over the relatively poor performance of the Romanians during the early months of this year. I refer to emigration to both the United States and to Israel. We do not know what factors lay behind this disappointing situation, but I would urge the Congress to view it in context of several important considerations. One is the relatively small scale of the emigration problem in Romania; there are only a few hundred cases of divided-family members and dual nationals who have indicated a desire to come permanently to the United States. Secondly, the Romanian Government has applied a liberal policy on Jewish emigration over recent years. Under this policy well over 300,000 Jews have been permitted to move to Israel and other countries.

Since this trade agreement was sent to the Congress we have seen encouraging signs that the Romanians are seeking earnestly to solve the family reunification problems that concern us. They have approved the passport

applications of a substantial portion of the several hundred people I referred to earlier who want to join their families in the United States. There has been a similar improvement in approvals of divided-family members wishing to go to Israel. Although there are both personal and official arrangements to be made to translate these approvals into actual departures, we believe this will occur and that the Romanian Government will do its part to speed up the process. We therefore recommend that the Congress approve this trade agreement, understanding that both the executive and the legislative branches will reexamine carefully the question of a further extension less than 12 months from now.

Both we and the Romanians have an important political as well as economic stake in the continued improvement of our bilateral relations. For Romania to continue its policy of independence in foreign affairs is clearly something we should encourage, and we see this trade agreement as fostering that objective. Beyond that, if the Congress approves this agreement, we can confidently expect a sizable increase in U.S. exports to Romania. At the same time, we will make a significant stride toward the free movement of peoples which both the legislative and executive branches of this government greatly desire. Rejection of this agreement, on the other hand, could forfeit all these worthwhile objectives, to the detriment of both the U.S. and Romanian peoples.

## **U.S. and Finland Agree on Draft of New Extradition Treaty**

Press release 353 dated July 1

Representatives of the United States and Finland reached agreement on July 1 on the text of a new draft treaty on extradition. The new treaty, expected to be signed in the near future, will significantly modernize extradition relations between the two countries. It will include provisions to assist in obtaining extradition of narcotics offenders as well as airline hijackers.

## **Department Discusses Issue of Syrian Jewish Community**

*Following is a statement by Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, made before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on International Relations on June 25 during a hearing on H. Con. Res. 312, a concurrent resolution disapproving the obligation of Middle East special requirements funds for certain projects in Syria.<sup>1</sup>*

The executive branch of the government shares the concern of this committee over the well-being of the Syrian Jewish community. We neither condone nor support repressive measures taken by other governments against their citizens or against others. The U.S. Government is deeply concerned about human rights generally, reflecting our own traditions as well as an appreciation that human rights and respect for such rights are valid foreign policy objectives in themselves.

This situation must be seen in the context of the wider pattern of relationships in the Middle East, and that is the context in which we have considered how the U.S. Government can best address this question.

There are two ways in which Americans can approach an issue of this kind:

—One is to seek to alleviate the problem by the means we judge most effective, which in this case involves the use of quiet diplomacy to help create conditions within which the policies in question can change.

—The other is to create a confrontation between our two governments on the issue.

We have chosen the former course because we judge that a confrontation would produce results that are the opposite of those desired. Experience has shown this, and our discussions with those most intimately concerned with the situation seem to us to in-

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<sup>1</sup>The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

dicate that they share the view that a public airing and confrontation can only harm those who have most at stake.

The long-range approach to the future of Syrian Jews is through a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. As you know, we are bending every effort to bring this about through a process of negotiation. We all recognize that unless this process continues—unless progress is made toward a settlement—not only will we fail in our goal of achieving a settlement but we will probably at some point see the outbreak of further hostilities, with all the dangers and uncertainties this will bring to all the people involved.

Syria is one of the key states in this negotiation. Under the leadership of President Asad and, in part, in response to efforts of the United States, Syria has taken an increasingly positive stance toward the search for peace. The Syrian-Israeli disengagement of May 1974 was of course the key step in this direction. Most recently the Syrian Government has taken another such step in renewing for six months the mandate of the U.N. Force stationed along the disengagement lines.

The Syrian Government naturally determines its own policies and actions in this respect. The role that the United States is playing in the search for peace, however, gives a particular and continuing importance to the relationship between the United States and Syria. It is fair to say that trust and confidence in this relationship will materially enhance the capacity of the United States to play a positive part in the negotiating effort.

The Syrians are putting increasing emphasis on their economic development and are interested in having U.S. technical cooperation and capital participation. The

proposed aid to Syria will demonstrate to the Syrians that the United States is serious about sustaining and strengthening our cooperation in all areas of mutual concern.

While a peace settlement is the most complete answer to the problem we are considering today, there are things we can do and are doing short of that, which we believe can also be beneficial. These lie in the realm of quiet diplomacy, and hence they too depend heavily on the creation and maintenance of a broad relationship of confidence between ourselves and the Syrians.

The situation of the Syrian Jewish community has, we believe, improved in the recent past. This has been confirmed by information from a variety of sources, but it would not be appropriate to discuss the details in public session. Much as we might like to see a definitive solution to the question, it would neither be reasonable in itself nor fair to the Syrian Jews to ignore the value of such relative improvements in the conditions under which the community lives.

We thus have two trends, both of which offer some hope. To take the action being considered by this committee could only harm the relationship between the United States and Syria and jeopardize these hopeful trends. It would be an exaggeration to say that cutting off aid to Syria would be fatal to our hopes, but to take this step when developments appear to be moving in the right direction, however slowly, would surely be a step from which we could expect only negative results.

Particularly so long as our present approach appears to be bearing fruit in the more general setting as well as in the particular issue, we should do all we can to develop it, not hampering it with actions that offer no hope in themselves for achieving what we are trying to achieve.

## Department Discusses Status of Human Rights in the Republic of Korea and the Republic of the Philippines

*Statement by Philip C. Habib*

*Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee to testify on U.S. policy toward Korea and the Philippines in the context of developments affecting human rights in those countries.

In his testimony before you on July 30, 1974, the then Acting Assistant Secretary, Mr. Arthur Hummel, gave a clear statement on our general policy of human rights matters as well as an accurate, forthright summary of the situation in South Korea at that time.<sup>2</sup> Therefore I need not take up the time of this committee by restating what is already on the record. However, I do believe that before I get into the current situation a few introductory remarks are in order.

The U.S. Government is genuinely and deeply concerned about human rights matters. This concern reflects both our own traditions as well as a realization that human rights, and respect for them, are valid foreign policy objectives in their own right. Moreover, we recognize the importance of human rights in the conduct of our foreign policy as well as the clear intent of the Congress that human rights questions be addressed in the formulation of our policies.

We neither condone nor support repressive

measures taken by other governments against their citizens or against others. Indeed, many of our basic policies are designed to create an international environment in which political and economic development can proceed in an atmosphere of security and personal freedom. Within the U.N. framework, we have taken the lead in supporting initiatives on such matters as elimination of religious intolerance, racial discrimination, and other infringements of human rights. We continue to press for broader international support on these fundamental issues.

We are, as you know, in continuing contact at every level of the Department of State with American groups interested in human rights matters. Even where there is serious disagreement with our policies, we have, and certainly plan to continue, this dialogue. Also, as further evidence of our concern for human rights we have, as you know, institutionalized this concern as part of the foreign policy process. We have designated Mr. James Wilson as Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs in the office of the Deputy Secretary. We have also appointed Human Rights Officers in each of the regional bureaus and an Assistant Legal Adviser for Human Rights Affairs.

Further, in those cases where we can be effective, we do quietly express to other governments our views on human rights matters and assure that they clearly understand the strongly held views, not only in the Congress

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations on June 24. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 26, 1974, p. 305.

but certainly among the American people, on human rights matters. We have done this both in Korea and the Philippines.

At the same time, Mr. Chairman, we must recognize that we are dealing with sovereign countries with different political systems. We can neither determine the course of internal change nor be certain as to what the outcome will be in situations where there are internal tensions. Further, our policies toward individual countries represent a mix of interests, objectives, and relationships differing in almost every case. We know that neglect of human rights may well adversely affect the achievement of other important objectives. We also know that internal popular support is essential to long-term political stability. As the Secretary of State said in his address to the Japan Society on June 18:

... there is no question that popular will and social justice are, in the last analysis, the essential underpinnings of resistance to subversion and external challenge.

#### **Situation in the Philippines**

With these introductory remarks, I will now turn to the Republic of the Philippines. Mr. Chairman, I am submitting separately to your committee more detailed replies to some of the questions you raised on human rights in the Philippines in your letter of June 10 to the Department. I would like to take a few moments here to comment on the human rights situation in the Philippines as we see it and to explain the rationale for our military assistance to the Philippines.

The Department of State recognizes that the consequences of martial law in the Philippines have included the suspension of certain democratic processes and human rights. Specifically, as pointed out by Ambassador Mutuc [Amelito R. Mutuc, former Philippine Ambassador to the United States] in testimony before this committee, there have been wide-ranging arrests since the commencement of martial law, and a number of these people have been held for over two years without trial. In addition, freedom of the press has been curtailed, and under martial law, freedom of assembly and the entire spectrum of democratic processes have

been strictly regulated. Several referenda have taken place, but were held under conditions of martial law.

In regard to the question of mistreatment or torture of prisoners, we have heard charges that this has occurred. We do not, however, have any evidence that mistreatment of prisoners or torture is either a policy of the Government of the Philippines or a general practice. The Philippine Government has acknowledged that some abuses have occurred, particularly in more remote areas, and has taken steps to punish the offenders and to better regulate the system as a whole. We have been advised in this regard that the Government of the Philippines has agreed to accept a mission of the International Commission of Jurists and to afford its fullest cooperation in every aspect of its investigation.

While we support the Philippine Government's avowed intention to promote improvement in the social, economic, and administrative areas and think that there has been measurable progress in some of these, we do not believe that the ends justify or require the curtailment of human rights.

Having said this, I believe it is important to mention the fact that the Philippines has had a long association with the United States: first as a colony, then as the Philippine Commonwealth, and since 1946 as a close and valued ally.

The democratic form of government that was in effect in the Philippines until the introduction of martial law in September 1972 was patterned after our own, and we, of course, would have preferred to see that form of government continue. However, we feel strongly that the future of the Philippines and that of its form of government are for the Philippine people to determine, not us. Regarding the question of human rights and fundamental freedoms, we can only express our concerns, as we have, and hope that governments will realize that free people inevitably come down on the side of that which is good for the country as a whole.

I might note that the United States had no advance notification nor did we expect the actual declaration of martial law in

September 1972, despite some earlier rumors that it was being considered. However, as some of your witnesses have pointed out, most of the Philippine people appeared to accept martial law at the time it was declared and, indeed, some aspects of martial law were clearly welcomed (for example, the marked improvement in law and order and in government administration). Since the establishment of martial law in September 1972, we have continued to maintain friendly relations with the Philippine Government while avoiding any comment either in condemnation or support of the declaration or continuation of martial law.

### **Military Assistance to the Philippines**

In security matters the Philippines has traditionally been one of our closest and most important treaty allies in East Asia. The defense commitments and mutual security interests of both countries are formally embodied in longstanding agreements. We have military bases in the Philippines, the existence of which is important both for Philippine defense and for broader security interests of the United States. We have long considered it important that the Philippine Armed Forces be well prepared, and it is to these ends that our military assistance has been directed since 1946.

Since the late 1940's, the United States has supplied a wide variety of military equipment to the Philippine Armed Forces. At least one of the purposes of this assistance has been to help the Philippine Army develop a capability for maintaining internal security. Our military assistance is a long-established component of our security relationship with the Philippines; it long predates the Moslem and Communist insurgencies. We are aware that U.S. military equipment is being used to counter Moslem insurgency in the southern Philippines as well as the smaller threat posed by Communist guerrillas in the north and central Philippines. We keep our military units strictly out of the Moslem areas, and we screen our assistance program in terms of equipment provided. It has been U.S. policy

and practice to stay out of Philippine efforts to suppress both of these domestic insurgencies.

Our small U.S. Military Advisory Group is not involved in combat operations of any kind. JUSMAG [Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group] Philippines is assigned a military assistance role only at the national level. U.S. Army personnel do not perform direct advisory functions below the level of the Department of Defense, the Armed Forces of the Philippines General Headquarters, or service headquarters, all of which are located in the Manila area. These advisory efforts do not directly support operations of the Philippine Armed Forces but are limited to military procurement, distribution, utilization, maintenance, and the like.

### **Human Rights in Korea**

When we turn to the Republic of Korea, the issue of human rights is a matter of continuing concern. Since last year's hearing, there have been a series of further domestic events impacting on the human rights situation. In this connection, I have prepared the attached statement on certain specific questions you have raised in dealing with political prisoners, due process procedures, and other questions.

Since the hearings last year, the original four emergency measures have been lifted. A total of 203 persons were tried under these emergency measures. Subsequently all but 35 were released, although the prominent poet Kim Chi Ha has since been arrested on other charges. Further, of the 35 persons whose sentences were not suspended, eight reported members of the People's Revolutionary Party were executed on April 9 after the Supreme Court confirmed their original sentence.

On May 13 a new Emergency Measure No. 9 was instituted by President Park and continues in force. The provisions of this measure are broad in their terms and significantly inhibit political expression, including advocating constitutional revision; they further prohibit political activities on the part of students and form the basis for

severely restricting press coverage of certain major domestic political issues. The measure provides for minimum sentences of one year although, unlike the earlier measures, trial is in the civil court, not by court martial. In addition, any Korean criticizing the government or constitution to foreigners in Korea or abroad could be subject to the antislander law passed in March of this year.

The Korean Government has justified its latest emergency measure by the threat from the North, which it believes is accentuated in the post-Viet-Nam situation. Such North Korean activities as the tunnels under the DMZ [demilitarized zone] have had a significant effect on the Republic of Korea. The government acknowledges that the emergency measure inhibits political rights, although activities within the National Assembly itself are excluded from the emergency measure. The Korean Government believes that South Korea is still freer than North Korea. The initial reaction to the latest emergency measure in the Republic of Korea has been muted. Although the measure is recognized by the government's critics as infringing on political rights, the political opposition has continued to cooperate with the government parties in the National Assembly, in part recognizing, in the post-Viet-Nam situation, the need for focusing national efforts on the country's external security threat.

In describing the Korean situation, I wish to make it clear that the U.S. Government is neither involved nor associated with the Korean Government's internal actions. My remarks are a description, not a justification, of the Korean Government's domestic policies. In the case of the execution of the eight reported members of the People's Revolutionary Party, we publicly expressed our regret at this action. We continue to assure that the Korean Government is aware of the public impact within the United States of certain of its actions. While I believe this may have some limited effect, the Korean Government views its domestic policies as internal matters not subject to consultation with other governments.

#### U.S.-Korea Security Relationship

At the same time, we do have close relationships with the Republic of Korea extending over the 27 years of its life. These close ties encompass a continuing concern in the development of functioning representative institutions within a framework of respect for human rights. Beyond that, we also have a direct and vital interest in the maintenance of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. We have a Mutual Defense Treaty obligation, and our military presence and military assistance have been essential elements in maintaining the military balance on the peninsula. This is in our own interest as well as that of the Republic of Korea and of its people. Very obviously our security relationship contributes importantly to the peace and security of Northeast Asia and is so recognized by our allies, including Japan.

I would further point out that, whatever their criticisms of the Korean Government, President Park's domestic opponents and critics view the security relationship with the United States as being essential. Within Korea our military presence and programs, particularly in this post-Viet-Nam period, are not the focus of criticism and debate. Rather, as you know, the Korean Government's political opponents have joined it in emphasizing the importance of our security commitments and wish them to continue.

We should not misjudge the determination of the people of South Korea to resist North Korean aggression nor the internal cohesion of the nation on this issue. What is most important to the Koreans, whatever their view of their own government, is the preservation of their military security and integrity. The continuation of our bilateral relations is essential to that objective.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would stress again the importance with which we view human rights matters and assure you that we recognize the clear interest of Congress in this issue. We neither associate ourselves with, nor justify, internal repressive actions and will continue to make clear our concern and that of the American people over the protection and preservation of human rights. At the same time, we will



continue our security policies which serve the interest of Korea, the region as a whole, and the United States. The preservation of peace on the peninsula remains the essential prerequisite for political development and the exercise of human rights in Korea.

I am sure you will agree that we must often strike a balance between our interests and objectives in a particular nation. At the present time in East Asia, the area about which you are most concerned, there are very clear valid concerns about security and about the future direction of the United States policy in the aftermath of the Indochina tragedy. In this part of the world, particularly the Republic of Korea, there is a broad public recognition that the issues of war and peace and the nation's security in the face of external threat are of overriding importance and must weigh heavily in the balance.

## **Jordan Receives \$10 Million Loan for Highway Construction Project**

AID press release 67 dated July 3

The Agency for International Development has made a \$10 million loan to Jordan to help finance the construction of 44 miles of new road to remove a bottleneck in the highway from Amman, the capital, to Aqaba, the country's only port.

Jordan is investing \$4.2 million. The project involves realignment of the highway between the townships of Ma'an and Quweria. The Aqaba-Amman road is a vital communications link for transporting goods and people from the population centers in the north to the port in the south. Jordan is landlocked except at its southern extremity, where about 16 miles of shoreline of the Gulf of Aqaba gives access to the Red Sea. Jordan has a population of about 2.6 million.

The loan agreement was signed in Amman June 28. The loan is to be repaid in dollars in 40 years, with an initial grace period of 10 years. Interest is payable at 2 percent annually during the grace period and 3 percent thereafter.

Funds for the loan come from a special requirements fund of \$100 million for assistance to the Middle East appropriated by Congress in December 1974.

## **Syria Receives Development Loans of \$58 Million From United States**

AID press release 64 dated June 30

The Agency for International Development is providing two loans to Syria totaling \$58 million to help that country improve its economic development.

A loan of \$48 million will assist Syria in its three-part \$150 million program to expand and modernize the entire water supply system in Damascus. The AID loan will finance the foreign exchange costs of construction and installation of about 222 miles of new pipes and related construction services in the newer areas of Damascus. Other international resources will finance similar work in the old part of the city. The water distribution project is expected to benefit about 1 million people. Aim of the expansion program is to avert a serious water shortage and reduce water-related illness.

Another loan of \$10 million will help Syria increase its agricultural production and accelerate general economic development. Syria is increasing the acreage of land being placed under irrigation so as to achieve greater production of such crops as rice and cereals.

Syria also plans a livestock project to produce meat and dairy animals supported by the development of 250,000 acres of reclaimed Euphrates Valley land which will be planted to fodder crops, primarily oats and hay.

The funds will be used to buy materials needed for agricultural development, such as plows, harrows, harvesters, irrigation equipment, earthmoving machinery, and insecticides. Both loans will be used to buy American machinery, equipment, and services.

The loans are to be repaid in dollars in 40 years, with an initial grace period of 10 years. Interest is payable at 2 percent annually during the grace period and 3 percent

thereafter. The loan agreements were signed June 30 in Damascus by U.S. Ambassador Richard W. Murphy and Syria's Deputy Minister of State for Planning Affairs Mohammed Issam Hilou.

Last February AID made a grant of \$4 million to Syria for technical services and feasibility studies in agricultural production, irrigation, processing of agricultural products, mechanization of agriculture, and other fields. AID also made available a \$1 million grant to train Syrian graduate students in the United States in such fields as agriculture, engineering, medicine, geology, and irrigation management.

Funds for the loan and grants come from a special requirements fund of \$100 million for assistance to the Middle East appropriated by Congress in December 1974.

## **United States and Israel Plan Joint Desalting Project**

*AID press release 59 dated June 27*

The Governments of the United States and Israel have signed a joint agreement to construct a desalting plant that will daily produce 10 million gallons of potable water from seawater. For this project, the United States will provide a grant of \$20 million and Israel will invest about \$35 million. The plant will be constructed near the city of Ashdod located on the Mediterranean coast about 25 miles south of Tel Aviv.

The proposed desalting plant is considered to be a prototype because of the nature of the evaporation process developed by the Israel Desalination Engineering, Ltd., which is known as the horizontal multiple-effect, aluminum tube, spray film evaporator.

The project agreement calls for the design, construction, supporting research, testing,

and operation and maintenance of a 10-million-gallon-a-day (MMGD) dual-purpose power-generating/desalting plant. Construction of the plant is expected to take four and a half years.

The U.S. and Israeli funds will help finance the cost of machinery, equipment, materials, services, operation, and maintenance. U.S. funds will be used for purchases in the United States and Israel.

The U.S. and Israel will share in the technology derived from the construction and operation of the 10 MMGD plant, which will also be made available to other interested nations, particularly to water-short arid and semiarid lands. Patents and know-how developed from this project will be made available to private U.S. companies on a non-exclusive, nondiscriminatory, reasonable royalty basis for use anywhere in the world.

AID will enter into a participating agency services agreement with the Office of Water Research and Technology, Department of Interior, to provide two experts in desalting processes and engineering who will serve on the staff of the Israeli project manager.

Israel's demand for water is growing steadily, and conventional water resources are nearing their limits. Exploitation of the natural water sources in Israel has now reached 85 percent of the potential and is forecast to approach full potential by the late 1970's. Israeli scientists say the establishment of large-scale seawater desalting plants is the only practical means to meet the country's need for water.

The grant agreement was signed at the U.S. Department of State by Daniel Parker, Administrator of the Agency for International Development, for the United States, and Israeli Ambassador to the United States Simcha Dinitz, representing the State of Israel.

## Department Outlines Comprehensive Approach to Commodity Policy

*Statement by Julius L. Katz*

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

I welcome this opportunity to appear before your committee to discuss international commodity policy. This subject has attracted wide attention recently, and it will be high on the agenda of a number of international conferences in the coming months and throughout the next year. These hearings thus come at an opportune moment when we are in the process of developing the U.S. approach to commodity policy.

Interest in the functioning of international commodity markets is not a new phenomenon. In each of the last several decades, interest and concern has been aroused by some aspect of commodity supply, most often the question of price. It is in the nature of commodity trade that prices are often regarded as being too low or too high, and with some commodities, prices can reach both exaggerated low and high points in a relatively short space of time. In the past three years, we have seen exceptionally great price volatility, with prices of many commodities increasing by 100 percent or more and then falling sharply to levels at or near the original point of ascendancy.

But concern over extreme price volatility is only one of the causes for the current interest in commodity policy. The recent example of action by a number of governments to restrict exports, whether for eco-

nomie or political reasons, and the specter of possible resource limitations has raised serious concern about the question of security of supply. Moreover, the example of OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] and evidences of producer associations for several other commodities have suggested the possibility of a widespread tendency toward producer cartels. Finally, the demands of the so-called Third World for a redistribution of the world's wealth through commodity pricing has served to focus attention on the question of commodity policy, although not on the most useful or constructive aspects of this question.

Against this background, I would like to outline briefly our views on commodity policy, to indicate what concerns us and what doesn't concern us, to describe what we propose to do and what we propose not to do.

First, we are not concerned in any practical sense about the physical limitation of resources. Unquestionably, the search for mineral resources must increasingly rely upon lower grade ores or resources in more remote areas of the world. But the real limiting factor is capital investment rather than the depletion of physical resources. And here I have in mind not only the raising of capital but the process of organizing exploration, development, and marketing of resources, including the provision of technological and managerial skills.

Second, given the increasingly unfavorable and unstable political environment facing private investment throughout the world, the question arises whether there are likely to take place the levels of investment necessary to meet growing demands for new produc-

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<sup>1</sup> Made before the Subcommittee on International Trade, Investment, and Monetary Policy of the House Committee on Banking, Currency, and Housing on July 9. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

tive capacity in the decades ahead. This, in our view, is a matter for genuine concern.

Third, despite superficial evidences to the contrary, stirred to somewhat hysterical proportions by some popular writers, there is little reason to be concerned about the so-called threat of producer cartels. Simple analogies are misleading, and the projection of the OPEC model to other commodities is simplistic and wrongheaded. Nonetheless, when productive capacity is inadequate to meet peak demand and supplies are consequently tight, it is likely that governments will resort to various means of export restriction or of supply allocation. Thus the question of security of supply is a matter of legitimate concern.

Fourth, excessive price fluctuations are costly both to producers and consumers. The effects are harmful to the development efforts of poor countries and, as we have seen, can be destabilizing in developed countries. The exaggerated price swings of the 1972-75 period have been attributed largely to the synchronized boom of the major industrialized countries in 1972-73 followed by the recession of 1974-75. It is an unsettled question whether this phenomenon was unusual or whether the pattern is likely to be repeated in the future. A continuation of synchronized business cycles in the major economies of the world implies greater stress in commodity markets and much greater price volatility, unless adequate productive capacity is developed to deal with peak demand. This, of course, implies idle capacity in slack times. Alternatively, larger reserve stocks accumulated in periods of low demand can substitute for excess productive capacity.

Fifth, we do not support proposals to establish high fixed prices for commodities and to maintain their real value through indexation. Such a policy would seriously distort patterns of investment and result in a misallocation of resources. Even if a workable system of indexation could be developed—an assumption open to serious question—it would redistribute income contrary to the manner intended. It would take from the poorest countries, which tend to be net importers of raw materials, in favor of the

richer developed countries (Canada, Australia, the United States, South Africa, and the U.S.S.R.) which are major net exporters of raw materials.

In sum then, we are not overly concerned about producer cartels or a physical limitation of resources. There is, however, an evident problem arising from the poor prospects for investment in new productive capacity, and we believe that this problem increases the risk of supply limitations in times of shortage. We believe that excessive price volatility is inherently undesirable. At the same time we believe that attempts to fix and index prices at arbitrarily high levels are bad policy, which we reject.

How, then, do we propose to deal with these problems and concerns? Clearly, there is no simple answer to the problems of commodity trade. The circumstances of particular commodities differ, and the solutions to the problems of individual commodities will vary. Secretary Kissinger in his May 28, 1975, speech to the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] Ministers meeting at Paris laid out a series of proposals that we believe represent a comprehensive approach to the general problem of commodity policy.

First, he proposed that new rules and procedures for access to markets and supplies be negotiated in the multilateral trade negotiations now underway in Geneva. What we have in mind here basically is to exchange bindings or assurances on supply access as we have previously exchanged bindings on market access. We would also expect to have elaborated more precise rules governing the resort to export restraints, much along the lines of rules governing use of import restraints. A further issue for resolution in the trade negotiations concerns the objective of providing opportunities to developing countries to market their raw materials in a higher stage of processing. The obstacle to such exports frequently results from "tariff escalation," the practice of levying progressively higher duties on processed goods than on the raw material itself. This situation can be a significant barrier to industrialization, and progress toward tariff

de-escalation can be of genuine benefit to developing countries while improving the efficiency of the world economy.

Second, Secretary Kissinger indicated a readiness to discuss new arrangements for individual commodities on a case-by-case basis. Let me say directly and emphatically that this is not intended to introduce a policy of cartelizing the world's commodity markets. While we are prepared to consider traditional international commodity agreements where such agreements are feasible and appropriate, we believe that the number of such cases is in fact very limited.

What we have in mind is to examine commodity problems in an analytical manner and to consider broadly based solutions not excluding but certainly not limited to price stabilization measures. For a number of commodities the problem in fact is not excessive price volatility, but low returns to producers. Stabilization agreements are not suitable to cope with such problems. Rather the solution might better be found in diversification providing lower cost production techniques, better marketing, or opportunities for marketing more processed forms of the material. The basic point here is that we are prepared to examine individual commodity problems in a serious way to find pragmatic solutions.

Third, as I have indicated earlier, we regard capital investment as the most serious limiting factor in resource availability. If the growing needs of the world for raw materials are to be met, new forms of investment will need to be found to overcome the disincentives to investment which exist at the present time.

Secretary Kissinger proposed that the World Bank increase its financing of resource investments and explore new ways of combining its financing with private management, skills, technology, and capital. We believe that the World Bank, with its associated institutions, the International Finance Corporation and the International Development Association, is uniquely suited to undertake this role. It has the capacity to analyze investment requirements for particular commodities; it can provide capital; it can mobilize private capital through joint

financing; and it can draw on the unique skills of private enterprise while diminishing the major risks that private capital might face going it alone.

Finally, Secretary Kissinger indicated our readiness to join in the examination of proposals to improve mechanisms for the stabilization of earnings, notably those of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to protect the developing countries against excessive fluctuations in export income.

The IMF facilities provide exporters of primary products with additional access to the Fund's resources to meet balance-of-payments difficulties arising from temporary export shortfalls resulting from circumstances beyond the member's control. In mid-June of this year, the United States proposed a substantial liberalization of this facility. We are participating in a study by the IMF Executive Directors to determine exactly what form the liberalization should take.

In addition to the IMF facility, the European Community recently negotiated with its associated developing countries a somewhat different approach to earnings stabilization as part of the Lomé Convention. This convention, signed in January of this year, covers all aspects of economic relations between the Community and the 46 developing countries and establishes a stabilization fund known as STABEX. This fund takes a commodity-by-commodity approach rather than concentrating on fluctuations in overall export earnings as in the IMF scheme.

The advantage earnings stabilization mechanisms have, whatever the approach chosen, is that they meet certain critical financial problems of producing countries arising from commodity price instability without the need to interfere with the operation of commodity markets.

These, then, Mr. Chairman, are the basic directions we propose to move in with respect to commodity policy—supply and market access assurances, investment, case-by-case examination of individual commodity problems, and earnings stabilization. It is a comprehensive approach. It is pragmatic and, we believe, it offers the promise of tangible and realistic results.

## U.S.-Brazil Agreement on Shrimp Transmitted to the Senate

*Message From President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Senate of the United States:*

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil concerning Shrimp. Also enclosed are an Agreed Minute, a related exchange of notes concerning compensation, an exchange of notes concerning interim undertakings, and translations of the Brazilian notes. These documents were signed at Brasilia on March 14, 1975.

The Agreement establishes a basis for regulating the conduct of shrimp fishing in a defined area off the coast of Brazil. Such regulation will help to conserve shrimp resources and will provide an interim solution to problems which have arisen over jurisdiction over those resources.

The measures prescribed in the Agreement will safeguard the economic interests of the shrimp industries of both countries and protect from prejudice their respective legal positions on the extent of coastal state jurisdiction over ocean fisheries under international law. The interim nature of the Agreement reflects the expectation that this underlying question may in the near future be settled by general international agreement on the law of the sea.

A more detailed explanation of the Agreement is contained in the report of the Department of State which also accompanies this message.

This Agreement will contribute to maintaining and strengthening the friendship and cooperation which have long charac-

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on June 11 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. D, 94th Cong., 1st sess., which includes the texts of the agreement and related documents and the report of the Department of State.

terized relations between the United States and Brazil. I recommend that the Senate give it early and favorable consideration.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, June 11, 1975.

## Claims Against the German Democratic Republic

*Department Announcement, May 28*

Press release 303 dated May 28

The Department of State and the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission wish to advise American citizens who have claims against the Government of the German Democratic Republic for confiscation of property located in East Germany that less than six weeks remain in which to register their claims. The deadline for all such registrations is July 1.

The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, the official agency of the U.S. Government which will ultimately adjudicate all such claims, mailed registration forms to over 7,000 individuals and organizations since February 1, 1975, and has received only about 700 claim registrations.

Information obtained from such registrations will form the basis for the negotiation of an equitable settlement of American property losses between the United States and the German Democratic Republic. The Department of State plans to initiate talks aimed at negotiating a settlement of these property losses following their registration and tabulation by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.

Potential claimants are urged to promptly file their claim registration forms. Claimants who do not have such forms are invited to contact the Office of the General Counsel, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, 1111 20th Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20579, or call the Commission on 202-382-7700.

## Report of Interagency Task Force on Indochina Refugees Transmitted to the Congress

*On June 23 President Ford transmitted to the Congress a report of the Interagency Task Force on Indochina Refugees and a Department of Defense-AID report on retrieval of assistance funds to Cambodia and South Viet-Nam. Following are texts of a letter dated June 23 from President Ford to six congressional committee chairmen, a letter dated June 18 to President Ford from Julia Vadala Taft, Director of the interagency task force, and the text of the task force report.<sup>1</sup>*

### PRESIDENT FORD'S LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL TO COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN

White House press release dated June 23

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 requires that I transmit within thirty days after its enactment a report to six committees of the Congress describing the status of refugees from Cambodia and South Vietnam.

In response to that requirement, I am forwarding a report prepared by the acting director of the interagency task force for Indochina. It sets forth current progress in receiving and resettling the refugees.

Progress to date has been good when con-

<sup>1</sup> Identical letters were sent to James O. Eastland, chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary; Peter W. Rodino, chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary; John J. Sparkman, chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; Thomas E. Morgan, chairman, House Committee on International Relations; John L. McClellan, chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations; and George H. Mahon, chairman, House Committee on Appropriations. The Department of Defense-AID report and the annexes to the task force report are not printed here.

sidered in the context of the magnitude of the refugee situation—the large numbers and great distances—and the short period of time available to deal with it. The cooperation and sacrifices made by private individuals and organizations, by Members of the Congress, by Federal, State and local officials, and by military personnel have been exemplary. I compliment all of them, and I ask that as many more people as possible contribute their efforts toward complete resettlement.

I am also transmitting a report regarding retrieval of assistance funds to Cambodia and South Vietnam by the Department of Defense and the Agency for International Development as required by section 4(b)(3) of the Act.

I anticipate that the subsequent supplementary reports required by the Act will provide the committees additional information on these activities.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

### LETTER FROM TASK FORCE DIRECTOR TO PRESIDENT FORD

JUNE 18, 1975.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 requires that you transmit to the Congress a report describing the status of the refugees from Cambodia and South Vietnam not more than thirty days after the enactment of the Act. Attached is a report on the activities of the Interagency Task Force during the past two months for inclusion in your report to the Congress.

I have attempted to make an open and

forthright statement about our activities and have attached a lengthy set of annexes with additional statistical material, detailed descriptions of various aspects of our programs and policy guidelines.

A report of this kind tends to omit the human dimension of the problems we have faced transporting more than 130,000 evacuees halfway around the world, setting up small cities where the refugees can be housed temporarily and processed while they await the opportunity to move to their new homes, and establishing a broad spectrum of programs which will enable these new residents of our country to integrate themselves quickly into our society. In addition, the report does not give full credit to the wide ranging support we have received from the voluntary agencies, state and local governments, citizen's groups and private individuals who have joined in the national resettlement effort.

The Task Force has had tremendous cooperation in this undertaking from all levels of the Executive Branch in setting up and administering this program and from the Congress in providing prompt and effective legislative support. I believe that the Government and the American people have responded to the plight of the Indochina refugees in the best tradition of our country and that we should all be proud of the progress during these past eight weeks. Yet the job is not over. There are still several problems ahead as outlined in the report which we believe can be overcome through the continuing cooperation among all levels of the United States Government and the support of the American people.

Sincerely,

JULIA VADALA TAFT

*Director, Interagency Task Force*

## TEXT OF TASK FORCE REPORT

INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON INDOCHINA REFUGEES  
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS  
JUNE 15, 1975

### *Introduction*

On June 16, the Interagency Task Force on Indochina refugees had been in operation for 60 days.

Events have moved quickly during this brief time. In the first days after the Task Force was established on April 18, the world was witness to the collapse of the armed forces of Vietnam, a dramatic air and helicopter evacuation from Saigon, the fleeing of tens of thousands of refugees from their homelands, and the installation of new regimes in Vietnam and Cambodia. The President assigned to the Interagency Task Force, with representatives from almost every cabinet level agency in the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government, the responsibility for the coordination of the evacuation effort and the refugee and resettlement problems relating to the Vietnam and Cambodia conflicts.

The activities of the Task Force during the two months of its existence have included:

—the coordination of the evacuation of 86,000 U.S. citizens and South Vietnamese by air and sea in U.S. military or chartered craft;

—the establishment, supply, and staffing of staging centers at Guam and Wake for the care and preliminary processing of the refugees and other reception centers at Camp Pendleton, Fort Chaffee, Eglin Air Force Base, and Fort Indiantown Gap for the final processing of the refugees prior to their resettlement in the United States;

—the reception into these camps of 131,399 evacuees as of June 15;

—the organization and coordination of health, social security, and security check procedures to facilitate the departure of refugees from the centers. As of June 15, 32,321 of the evacuees had left the centers for new places of residence in the United States;

—testimony which led to the passage of "The Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975" to fund the refugee program which the President signed into law on May 24, nineteen days after the first of nine appearances by Task Force members before Congressional Committees and Subcommittees;

—the promotion of international resettlement efforts through initiatives to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Intergovernmental Committee on European Migration (ICEM) and through direct contact with third countries which has resulted in the departure to date from U.S. territory of 3,756 refugees for resettlement elsewhere; in addition, several thousand refugees who fled elsewhere have been accepted for resettlement in third countries. In Western Europe and Canada, over ten thousand Vietnamese and Cambodians stranded by the sudden outcome of the wars have been allowed to stay indefinitely.

—the negotiation of contracts with nine voluntary agencies to support their resettlement programs in the United States;

—negotiations with interested state and local governments for special resettlement programs in their communities;



—organizing special programs with private American business organizations to provide jobs and housing, or commodity support for refugees;

—the establishment of guidelines for the States which explained the nature of Federal Government financial support in the fields of health and medical services, education, and welfare services.

#### Statistical Summary

As of June 15, a total of 131,399 evacuees had entered the U.S. system of control, of whom 36,188 were in Western Pacific reception centers, 58,654 in continental U.S. reception centers, 480 en route to centers, 32,321 had been released from the centers for resettlement in the United States and 3,756 for resettlement in other countries. An analysis of refugee status for June 15 by reception center reveals the following [Table 1]:

TABLE 1

Reception center	Capacity <sup>1</sup> at center	Number of evacuees released	Number of evacuees released in U.S.	Number of refugees released to third countries
Guam, Wake and other Western Pacific Sites	56,286	36,188	762	2,178
Travis <sup>2</sup>	0		5,750	
Pendleton	18,500	17,077	15,737	899
Chaffee	25,000	22,525	7,054	577
Eglin	5,000	4,251	2,691	102
Indiantown Gap	17,000	14,801	327	0
		94,842	32,321	3,756

<sup>1</sup> Capacity figures in the continental U.S. reflect surge capacity for period of June 15 to July 15.

<sup>2</sup> Initial continental U.S. processing center no longer in use.

A survey of 99,580 refugees who were within the care of the United States Government on June 10 showed 19,619 heads of household, 79,929 family members attached to the households and 32 orphans. A total of 15,134 of the 99,580 refugees have U.S. citizen or permanent resident relatives or sponsors. (As of that date, the Immigration and Naturalization Service listed 1,885 orphans who had entered under "Operation Babylift" and had been placed for adoption.)

Upon their release from the reception centers, the refugees have been located in all parts of the country, although the principal destinations are clustered on the Pacific coast, the highly urbanized centers on the East Coast, Florida, and Texas. As of June 10, the States which led as destinations for refugees were:

1. California	8,135	7. Florida	939
2. Virginia	1,614	8. Maryland	918
3. New York	1,604	9. Washington	651
4. Texas	1,246	10. Pennsylvania	562
5. D.C.	1,202	11. Illinois	514
6. Hawaii	1,075	12. Ohio	504

#### Reception Center Processing and Preparation for Initial Resettlement

At the reception centers on Guam and Wake, the refugees receive basic health care and begin processing for entry into the United States, which includes the initiation of the security clearance. Representatives from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Intergovernmental Committee on European Migration (ICEM), the International Red Cross (ICRC) and some third countries (Canada and Australia at times) have been present on Guam to assist refugees who wish to go to third countries or return home. The other Western Pacific refugee centers—in the Philippines and Thailand—serve as temporary holding areas for refugees awaiting transportation to Guam and Wake. Of special concern at the Western Pacific sites has been the possibility after May 1 of a typhoon on Guam which is the largest of the reception centers and has a capacity for 50,000 refugees. Tropical typhoons would seriously threaten many of the temporary shelters. The number of refugees on Guam had been decreased from 43,939 on June 1 to 26,447 on June 15. An order was issued on June 13 to reduce the refugee population on Guam to the level capable of being housed in other than tent quarters no later than June 24. By that date all tent quarters should be dismantled.

The major activities at the four reception centers in the continental United States are:

—the provision of food, shelter, clothing and other necessities;

—processing by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), including interviewing, fingerprinting, photographing, creating of an alien file, security clearance verification, completion of parole document, authorization of employment, and granting of parole;

—processing by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, including medical screening, assignment of a social security number, initiating action to reunite split families, explaining voluntary agency and sponsorship role to the refugees, and determining resources for travel;

—providing employment counseling through the Department of Labor, including identification of skills, analysis of sponsor-related job offers, and information on skill demand and excesses by location;

—language training and cultural orientation which are presently being provided by volunteer agencies, individual volunteers, and State and Federal personnel;

—recreational activities, generally under the aegis of the YMCA and other volunteer organizations;

—arranging sponsorship through the voluntary resettlement organizations in most cases but also directly through State and local governments in some instances.

During the middle part of May, the principal

delay in resettlement resulted from the requirement to complete clearances for all refugees prior to their departure from reception centers. Normal INS security procedures require clearance for entry into the United States by INS, the CIA, the FBI, and the Department of State. At the request of the House Judiciary Subcommittee, the Task Force also instituted clearance with the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Department of Defense. To expedite the new security clearance process, the records of the individual agencies were assembled in Washington and in several instances computerized, the collection point for the cleared statements was centralized at INS headquarters in Washington where it could be cabled to the respective camp, and the initiating request for the security clearance was begun on Guam rather than waiting for the refugees to arrive in the United States. At the present time, many security clearances are completed in a matter of hours.

Sponsorship—placing the refugee with an individual or organization willing and able to assume responsibility for assisting in the refugee's integration into the American economy and society on a self-sufficient basis—will continue to be the key element in the resettlement of the Indochinese refugees. Offers of sponsorship from the public are being solicited by the voluntary resettlement agencies, public and private organizations and by the Task Force itself. Each of the voluntary agencies works in its own way to develop sponsorships: religious groups generally through local churches and non-sectarian organizations through a network of community groups who have supported them in the past. Officials in the State of Washington, the cities of Cincinnati and Honolulu and other communities around the country have expressed interest in developing local programs for the resettlement of refugees. In response to an outpouring of public interest in providing assistance, the Task Force established a toll-free telephone number on May 5 to receive and record such offers. As of June 15, the Task Force had received more than 20,000 calls in addition to hundreds of letters containing other offers of assistance.

The sponsorship offers received by the Task Force as well as the personal data collected about the refugee upon arrival in the United States have been placed in a central computer bank. Printouts of sponsorship offers are being made available to the voluntary agencies. Computer terminals have been installed at each voluntary agency headquarters and at each of the reception centers to provide instant access to the information which has been stored in the computer. This information is available to supplement the voluntary agencies' normal sources of support.

Verifications of the sponsorship offer from other than those groups which the voluntary agency has had regular contacts with is one of the most im-

portant and, at the same time, most difficult elements in the entire resettlement process. Since the Federal Government is not the proper agent to evaluate whether the offering party has the means, good-will and follow-up ability to provide continuing support for the refugee, the voluntary agencies have agreed to attempt verification of the sponsorship offers which have been generated by the toll-free number.

After the assurance of sponsorship has been obtained and the security check has been completed, the refugee is ready for release from the reception center. Transportation to a point near the sponsor's community is arranged by the center. If it is determined that the refugee or sponsor cannot afford all or part of these transportation costs, transportation is provided under the resettlement program.

#### *Resettlement*

The resettlement of the refugee in American society is a cooperative effort involving the sponsor and his community, the voluntary agency, and the Federal Government. Sponsorship involves a moral commitment to provide food, shelter, clothing, pocket money, ordinary medical costs and assistance in finding employment to enable the refugee to become self-sufficient. While one family group is usually designated as the sponsor of each refugee family, the voluntary agencies have usually contacted a community group, church or civic organization to provide supplementary assistance in kind and advice to the sponsor and the refugee. Resettlement is a long-term proposition. Family problems may develop, the first job might prove unsatisfactory, or economic conditions may alter the sponsor's ability to be of assistance. Since the resettlement process often involves a difficult cultural adjustment for the refugee family, requiring more assistance than for an American newcomer to the community, the community group designated to support the sponsor plays an essential role in the assimilation process.

If the sponsor and his community fail to provide the adjustment assistance or personal difficulties develop, the responsibility for a second attempt rests with the voluntary agency. The Task Force has been encouraging each of the voluntary agencies to ensure that every refugee under its aegis knows whom to contact if the sponsorship breaks down. The voluntary agency may attempt a second resettlement effort in the same or a nearby community or move the refugee family to a different part of the country. Recently, occasional stories in the press have reported that refugees have gone on welfare shortly after arriving in a community. In most cases, these are refugees who arrived in the United States and left the reception centers before the voluntary agencies were actively involved in resettlement or refugees whose American-resident relatives were unable to provide sufficient assistance.

The responsibilities of the Federal Government are both residual—in cases of total breakdown of sponsorship—and direct—to provide initial support

for the refugees through the sponsorship program and to the communities in which the refugees have settled.

The Social and Rehabilitation Service (SRS) of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, working through State welfare agencies, is responsible for the provision of financial assistance, medical assistance, and social services to Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees, as the need arises, after their resettlement in communities throughout the nation. Federal funds under the SRS refugee assistance program will be utilized to reimburse the States 100% for such assistance and services so that a refugee will not become an extra burden on State or local resources if the resettlement plan breaks down. The following are the principal provisions of the program to provide financial assistance, medical assistance, and social services to needy refugees:

—Needy individuals and families will be assisted regardless of family composition.

—State welfare agencies are required to verify with the sponsors of refugees that the resettlement has broken down before assistance can be granted.

—Financial assistance to refugees will be based on the same standards of need and the same payment levels as apply in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program.

—Medical assistance will be provided to meet health needs of needy refugees and to help keep sponsorships from breaking down if major medical costs arise.

—Social services will be provided in accordance with a State's approved plan for service programs so that refugees are eligible for the same range of services as other residents of the communities in which they settle.

Other Federal programs are designed to assist the refugee become integrated into American society:

—Negotiations are under way to develop language and orientation materials and provide technical assistance to school districts.

—Plans are being developed to implement a grant program to school districts.

—Refugees have been declared eligible for HEW's direct student aid programs for post-secondary students.

—The Department of Labor, in cooperation with State and local employment agency representatives, is presently identifying occupational skills of refugees and providing counseling about employment and training possibilities in areas where they are resettling.

The Interagency Task Force has promulgated two general guidelines in an effort to influence areas of resettlement: (1) to avoid resettlement in areas of high unemployment; and (2) to avoid high concentrations of refugees in any specific community. The Department of Labor's counseling program at

each of the camps provides assistance to the refugees and to the voluntary agencies in avoiding areas of high unemployment or areas where the refugee's skills are already in excess. As a matter of fact, the voluntary agencies generally have received fewer offers of assistance, especially job-related, from communities with high unemployment rates. The voluntary agencies have also shown general understanding of the importance of avoiding the concentration of large numbers of refugees in any single community. Refugees are presently resettling in all parts of the country. Since any resident of the United States is free to move and to settle in any location, it is nevertheless possible that clusters of Vietnamese may assemble in selected parts of the country at a future date.

#### *Repatriation*

On May 8 the Task Force sent the following message to all U.S. diplomatic posts and to U.S. refugee camps:

1. The following provides official USG policy for those refugees who wish to return to Indochina, whether they are in third countries or the United States.

2. The United States will not repeat not interfere with their effort to return to their country of origin. All cases which come to the attention of the USG will be promptly referred to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees who will assume responsibility for screening, care and maintenance if necessary, and onward transportation under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Committee on European Migration or through other means if required . . .

Civil coordinators at the camps were then directed to post notices and circulate information in camp newspapers that persons desiring repatriation were free to do so and should indicate their wishes to specified members of camp staffs.

At the same time, discussions were held with the UNHCR, who agreed that assistance to persons wishing repatriation was within his mandate. The UNHCR then spoke with the Vietnamese authorities who agreed to its proposed role in the organization of repatriation. UNHCR representatives at Guam, Chaffee, Camp Pendleton, Eglin Air Force Base, and Indiantown Gap, as well as UNHCR representatives in other countries, have been interviewing applicants for repatriation, using a questionnaire developed jointly between the UNHCR and the Vietnamese authorities. At the request of the UNHCR, the American Red Cross (ARC) is assisting the program in the United States. If refugees outside the camps indicate a desire to go home, the UNHCR and the Red Cross are informed and arrangements are made to interview the applicants.

Completed questionnaires are forwarded by the UNHCR representative to his headquarters in

Geneva and from there to the Vietnamese authorities for their consideration.

Repatriation to Cambodia is not yet as well planned as return to Vietnam. Arrangements similar to those for Vietnamese repatriation are being worked out by the UNHCR to accommodate those Cambodians who wish to be repatriated. (On May 29 and June 1 about 340 Khmer armed forces personnel returned from Thailand to Cambodia under arrangements between the Thai Supreme Command and the Khmer local authorities at the border without reference to the UNHCR.)

The United States Government will pay the costs of movements back to home countries from the money appropriated for resettlement outside the United States.

As of June 15, a total of 1,917 Indochina refugees under U.S. administration had indicated a desire for repatriation.

The speed and form of the repatriation effort now are essentially in the hands of the present authorities in Saigon who will accept or reject the applicants for repatriation.

### *Third-Country Resettlement*

From the beginning, we have made every effort to internationalize Indochina refugee resettlement. On April 10, Department of State officials met with John Thomas, Director of ICEM, who agreed to take up with his Executive Committee the need for the full machinery and expertise of his agency as a matter of urgency. On April 12, before the fall of the Khmer Republic, the State Department instructed its Geneva Mission to request assistance from the UNHCR and ICEM in resettling Khmer refugees throughout the world. A similar instruction pertaining to Vietnamese refugees went out on April 17. Because of our desire to take no action which would precipitate the collapse of the Khmer and Vietnam governments, these approaches were made privately but they focused the attention of the international agencies on the problem and stimulated preparations for worldwide resettlement.

At the ICEM Executive Committee meeting, April 28-29, John Thomas formally advised delegates of the 32 member governments that the United States had requested ICEM to assist in the resettlement of Indochina refugees. In the absence of objections, he proposed to undertake the task.

On May 8 and 9, the UNHCR sent an appeal for resettlement opportunities to some 40 governments and a second appeal went out on May 29. Meanwhile, both ICEM and the UNHCR placed representatives on Guam, strengthened their staffs elsewhere, and began registering refugees for third-country resettlement.

Earlier, on April 27, acting through the State Department, the Task Force had instructed American Ambassadors in most countries around the world to ask the governments to which they were

accredited to share the burden of refugee resettlement. The instruction noted that this bilateral appeal paralleled those which ICEM and the UNHCR would soon be making.

There have been many positive responses to the U.S. and international approaches. Canada has agreed to take 3,000, plus those who have relatives in Canada and those who had been issued visa letters prior to the fall of Saigon. More than 3,000 refugees have already arrived in that country. Germany has indicated willingness to accept students who are already there and their families. The total could reach several thousand. France, which has for over a century had close ties with Indochina, is accepting those with relatives already in the country, students who are in France and others. Other countries in Western Europe, Latin America and Africa have agreed to take smaller numbers. ICEM is presently selecting refugees with special skills for resettlement in Latin American countries.

By June 15, the number of Indochina refugees released to third countries from U.S. reception centers had reached 3,756. Approximately 4,000 other refugees in U.S. centers have also requested resettlement elsewhere and are now awaiting approval. A number of initial asylum countries have permitted refugees to remain and many thousands more have traveled to resettlement countries from countries of initial asylum. ICEM reports that as of May 31, there were also 2,545 Indochina refugees in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Thailand who were being processed for resettlement in third countries.

### *Estimated Expenses*

The Indochina Evacuation and Resettlement Program has a total budget of \$508 million. As of June 6, 1975, total obligations were \$181 million. The largest portions have been obligated as follows: the Department of Defense for facilities and daily maintenance at the reception centers (\$64.5 million), the Department of Defense for the airlift (\$63.1 million), and contracts with the voluntary agencies (\$34.32 million). An analysis of the source of funds and their obligations follows [Table 2].

### *Issues for the Future*

The Interagency Task Force has been involved in a wide range of issues over the past eight weeks. There are also many problems which must be solved to carry out successfully the resettlement program. The principal issue is that of sponsorship. Given time, the traditional voluntary agency system of settlement should permit the absorption of the Indochinese refugees as it has permitted the resettlement of over 1½ million refugees from Europe and other parts of the world since World War II. Time is of great importance for this resettlement program. While there is little doubt that the legislative program goal of resettling refugees by June

TABLE 2

Source	Total available	Total obligations as of 6/6/75	Amount available
AID funded by Presidential Determination	\$ 5,000,000	\$ 2,678,892	\$ 2,321,108
AID funded by Indochina Post-war Reconstruction Program	98,000,000	98,000,000	000
State portion of Refugee Act of 1975 (includes DOD & INS portions) <sup>1</sup>	305,000,000	79,733,000	225,267,000
HEW portion of Refugee Act of 1975 <sup>1</sup>	100,000,000	669,884	99,330,116
Total	\$508,000,000	\$181,081,776	\$326,918,224

<sup>1</sup> Represents amount appropriated in P.L. 94-24. This appropriation does not include the additional \$50 million which was authorized by Congress in P.L. 94-23.

30, 1976, can be met, the Task Force hopes to be able to move more rapidly to prevent unacceptably high human and financial costs. The traditional resettlement systems are not able to adapt easily to processing the desired numbers within the time frame we are imposing.

A second and related issue is the breakdown of the sponsorships. Many of the first refugees to arrive in this country moved directly to the communities of their relatives and friends without the benefit of sponsorship verification through the voluntary resettlement agencies. Inadequate housing and unemployment have forced some of these refugees on welfare. The voluntary agencies have in the past been effective in resettling refugees in a way that few become long-term charges on the welfare system or become impossible to assimilate into American life. The Task Force will be evaluating breakdown cases to determine what steps might be taken to assist those refugees who have already sought government support to become self-sufficient and to prevent future breakdowns. At the same time, when considering any broadened system of sponsorship, the valuable role which the resettlement agencies play in preventing breakdown must not be overlooked.

The Task Force is further concerned that all refugees who are cleared for entry into this country find homes in America. Obviously, some refugees and their families—possibly the less educated and unskilled—will take longer to be assimilated into American society than others. Early identification of such refugees is currently in progress and intensive language training and orientation will be provided beginning in early July. The resettlement organizations are committed to the resettlement of all of these refugees.

In addition, the United States Government will have to find homes outside this country for those refugees at Western Pacific locations who might be determined as ineligible for entry here. The number is expected to be small. A plan for this group will be formulated as the dimension of the problem becomes more apparent.

The Task Force has undertaken to expand the traditional sponsorship system by seeking the involvement of a broader range of labor, business, civic and social service organizations. In addition, the Task Force is also expanding initiatives with State and local governments in identifying sponsors and assisting in resettlement.

One of the key problems related to sponsorship has been the effective use of offers which have come forward. The Task Force is developing an identification service which will be contacting individuals who called on the toll-free number to verify their continuing interest in sponsorship and to ensure appropriate consideration of each offer by a voluntary agency. In addition the identification service will be used to search the computer system for information about the location of Vietnamese who have entered the United States. While attempting to make available all information which will aid resettlement, the Task Force is mindful of the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of the personal history data which might be acquired about the refugees. The Red Cross agreed to establish an international family locator service for Indochina refugees, using the facilities of the Central Tracing Agency of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva.

The Task Force has been looking ahead to the time when all of the staging areas in the Western Pacific area and the reception centers in the United States can be closed, but definite dates have not yet been established. Some original estimates indicated that all of the centers might be closed in three months. Eglin Air Force Base in Florida will have the shortest use, possibly being phased out by the end of July. With the continual refinement of the processing procedures at the centers, which should speed up the outflow, the Task Force hopes that all but one or two of the centers will be closed in September.

Resettlement of the refugees from Indochina will take time, not only to move the refugees from the reception centers into communities around the country, but also to assist them in the difficult process of adjustment to a new way of life. Many dramatic events have occurred during the past eight weeks. The future will be less dramatic, but much work lies ahead to achieve the successful assimilation of the Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees into American society.

## U.N. Outer Space Committee Meets at New York

*The U.N. Outer Space Committee met at New York June 9-20. Following are statements made in the committee by U.S. Representative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., on June 11 and by U.S. Alternate Representative Ronald F. Stowe on June 17.*

### STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BENNETT

USUN press release 65 dated June 11

The past year has been an active one both in space exploration and in the work of this committee and its subcommittees. The brevity of our agenda conceals a myriad of complex and significant questions which will require a great deal of hard work to resolve. Happily, the reports of the Legal Subcommittee and of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee<sup>1</sup> reflect that efforts of those two bodies during the past year have been fruitful in a number of areas.

Also on a positive note, we in the United States have had a most successful year in our national program for the continued exploration and use of outer space. Two examples in particular are worthy of note here: Pioneer 10, which last December swept past Jupiter and headed for a rendezvous with Saturn in 1979, and Landsat 2, an earth resources technology satellite, which was launched into orbit in January. The American efforts have focused both on the scientific and technical challenges of the exploration of the farthest reaches of the solar system and on concerns that significantly affect the quality of everyday lives.

One of the useful functions of the Outer Space Committee's annual review of space

activities is to identify and encourage international cooperation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.

With regard to the U.S. international cooperative programs, I would briefly note the following events which have taken place since this committee's last session.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has launched four cooperative satellites, one each with the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. In these projects, in which we have a strong program interest, we furnish the booster and launch services, while our cooperating partners take responsibility for the spacecraft.

NASA has launched three satellites on a reimbursable basis: one for Canada, one for the Federal Republic of Germany, and one—the Symphonie communications satellite—for France and West Germany. Early last month NASA agreed to launch an Indonesian domestic communications satellite.

Both NASA and the new European Space Agency are actively engaged in coordinated planning for the use of Spacelab, the manned orbital laboratory which Europe is building as an integral part of the NASA Space Shuttle. The prime development contract was awarded just one year ago, and the project has proceeded on schedule in Europe. This integrated contribution to the future exploration and use of space represents a new dimension in international cooperation. Spacelab will provide, for the first time, opportunities for U.S. and foreign scientists and engineers to accompany their experiments into space. It will facilitate many joint-use programs.

The members of this committee are already

<sup>1</sup> U.N. docs. A/AC.105/147 and A/AC.105/150.

well aware of the ATS-6 [Advanced Technology Satellite] television broadcasting experiments we have undertaken. The importance of the potential of such community broadcasting is emphasized by our own national experiments in this area.

Even though the United States has a highly developed domestic communications system, we have many areas remote from metropolitan centers that lack many of the services and facilities which these centers provide for their populations. We are experimenting with space applications to provide improved medical, education, and communication services to these areas; and ATS-6 has been used here to conduct the Health/Education/Telecommunications experiment in Alaska, the Rocky Mountains, and the Appalachian area since its launch in May 1974. This experiment is designed to determine whether satellite systems offer an effective way of providing high-quality educational programs and health services to people in remote areas.

These experiments could open new opportunities for the benefit and advancement of students and doctors and their patients in the United States and, we hope, perhaps be even more valuable to countries without an already extensive ground communications system.

The ATS-6 has recently been moved from its position over the Galapagos Islands eastward to a station over Lake Victoria in central Africa. From this location it will be made available to the Government of India for four to six hours a day for about a year to conduct the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment. India will use the satellite to relay Indian instructional broadcasts to augmented receivers in more than 2,000 remote Indian villages and to some 3,000 additional villages via conventional ground relay systems.

The Indian Space Research Organization is responsible for television programming and for designing, manufacturing, and maintaining services, associated ground equipment, and antennas. Its programming will be directed toward improved agricultural techniques and family planning, hygiene, and school instruc-

tions. The results of this practical applications experiment should give us all a better understanding of the potential of broadcast satellites as a tool for development. Brazil is already using ATS-6 in an educational television experiment.

Landsat 2, like the first earth resources technology satellite, is serving as a focus for international cooperation. Investigators from 45 countries and five international organizations have been selected to conduct studies with data it obtains. More than one-third of the member states on this committee are working with us in expanding the practical uses of remote sensing by satellite.

Some countries have established their own data acquisition, processing, and dissemination facilities. Stations in Canada and Brazil are now operating, and stations in Italy, Iran, and Zaïre are expected to become operational during the coming year. These stations help assure the reception of global data in event of tape-recorder failures, and as the report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee makes clear, they can facilitate the emergence of regional arrangements.

Finally, I wish to mention the progress of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. This project marks the crossing of a major threshold in international space cooperation on both the political and technical levels. On May 22, senior officials of NASA and the Soviet Academy conducted a joint flight-readiness review and concluded that the mission was ready for on-schedule launchings July 15. We look forward to the Apollo-Soyuz mission and to reporting on its operations at the next session of the committee.

Although we may comment in more detail later during our session on the contents of the reports of our two subcommittees, I would like to make a few general remarks on the course of their work this year.

The Legal Subcommittee, in our view, took positive and constructive steps in continuing to try to clarify the legal implications of both direct television broadcasting and remote sensing from satellites. We support the thorough and responsible approach which has thus far characterized the Legal Subcom-

mittee's examination of these two extremely complicated areas.

The drafting exercise to develop principles relating to direct television broadcasting by satellite has been useful in identifying those areas of general agreement and in helping clarify the views of countries on the issues on which there are substantially different opinions. Although the latter are of considerable significance—and I must admit that my delegation does not immediately see how they are to be reconciled—we recognize that the Legal Subcommittee has faced difficult issues frequently in its work, and we have confidence that with determination, patience, and good will on all sides we will again in good time find appropriate and acceptable solutions to the problems we are addressing.

The Legal Subcommittee also began a serious thorough examination of the legal implications of remote sensing of the earth from satellites for the first time since this item has been on its agenda. An increased number of delegations have expressed their views on the legal implications of remote sensing, and we look forward to hearing from the remaining members of the subcommittee when it meets again next year.

The U.S. delegation introduced a working paper at the last session of the Legal Subcommittee with the intention of spelling out our views regarding the direction which any further development of legal principles in this area should take.<sup>2</sup> From the starting point of the freedom of exploration and use of outer space reflected in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, we strongly believe that the international community should encourage the broadest possible cooperation and exchange of information so that all countries, not just the space powers, can share in the benefits which we believe can be derived from programs such as the Landsat experiments.

There obviously are different points of view regarding where the greatest interests of the members of the international community lie. Those differences have been reflected to some extent in the several drafts

which have been put forward and in the comments which a number of delegations have made during our debates so far.

More than anything else, the discussions about remote sensing in the Legal Subcommittee have begun to point out how extremely complex the legal implications of such activities are. The one week which the Legal Subcommittee devoted to remote sensing proved useful in beginning to identify the issues which must be addressed but also demonstrated that we have considerable work to do even to reach agreement on the very complex and difficult questions to be asked.

For example, the U.S. delegation felt rather strongly that an early issue to be faced is the definition of the activities the legal implications of which we are trying to assess. Although it is only one of numerous issues which must be further examined, attempts to rush into drafting precise language even before agreement on the scope of the remote sensing activities we are talking about seem ill advised.

Another important example of an issue which needs considerably more attention is the likelihood that application of a restrictive dissemination policy would result in the loss of remote sensing data for many countries which do not have their own programs, including the space segments. Although the United States is not concerned about its ability to conduct such programs for its own benefit, we would consider it most unfortunate if nations, except for the small handful of space powers, were to cut themselves out, perhaps inadvertently, from sharing in these exciting programs and directly obtaining their own national benefits. This consequence cannot simply be dismissed. For those countries who depend on others for data, it should be very, very carefully studied before attempts are made to reach agreement on precise language for guidelines on this matter.

I also wish to note that a considerable amount of time and effort was devoted by many delegations to attempting to reconcile the remaining issues in the draft moon treaty. Obviously the key remaining obstacle

<sup>2</sup> For text of the working paper, see BULLETIN of Mar. 31, 1975, p. 423.



to completion of this treaty centers on the question of natural resources of the moon and other celestial bodies.

In spite of the extensive efforts made, it seems that we are prevented from completing this treaty because of factors not directly related to the exploration and use of outer space. There are a number of elements valuable to all countries in the already agreed provisions of this draft treaty, such as the proposed measures to protect the environment of the moon and other celestial bodies, the publication of greater amounts of information derived from exploration of celestial bodies, and the endorsement of enhanced cooperation among the countries undertaking such exploration.

Because the unmanned exploration of the planets is in fact continuing even now, whereas the possibilities for commercial exploitation of resources still seem in the distant future, my delegation would consider it unnecessary to delay completion of the moon treaty just because of provisions which would not realistically have significance for some time to come. We would hope that delegations may find it possible to reconcile their views in the near future.

We look forward to continuing our constructive discussions of the legal implications of these and other issues related to remote sensing at the next session of the Legal Subcommittee.

With regard to the report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, we are pleased by the progress which was made, particularly in the examination of organizational aspects of remote sensing. Our delegation has been among those which have attempted to insure that the political and legal assessments of remote sensing did not outrun the assessment of what was actually practicable and desirable. The parallel approach adopted in the past year has in our view been beneficial to both subcommittees and has kept the deliberations on the legal implications from becoming irrelevant to actual progress in the field.

We note with much favor the focus of

attention on the desirability of using extant or planned ground stations as the nuclei of regional centers for receiving and processing remote sensing data of different areas of the world. The studies which have been requested can be most useful in the subcommittee's future deliberations on what particular type of international facilities and functions in the remote sensing area we wish to develop. We look forward to their completion.

The United States is also supportive of the growing number of seminars and symposia which are being held to acquaint scientists and potential users with the characteristics of current remote sensing experiments. In fact, at this very time, the week of June 8 through 13, NASA is sponsoring a major Earth Resources Symposium at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas. More than 1,500 persons from a wide variety of fields are focusing on the practical applications of earth resources survey data gathered by satellites and aircraft. The results of Landsat experiments and of Skylab earth resources programs and the need for new data systems are being discussed.

This has been another important year in the exploration and use of outer space and in our deliberations on the wide variety of questions which those activities generate. The United Nations, through its specialized bodies such as this committee and through its Secretariat experts and staff, has again done much constructive and valuable work. The United States continues to view the Outer Space Committee and its subcommittees as examples of some of the best aspects and best hopes for multilateral diplomacy. We are looking at highly complex questions with practical applications both now and in the distant future. We are working in a field of exploration into hitherto unknown areas and are developing new and sophisticated disciplines. Most of all, we are working to apply the benefits of these activities to improve the lives of all peoples. It is therefore with considerable pleasure that my delegation looks forward to our continued work and future progress.

## STATEMENT BY MR. STOWE

Although it was not originally the intention of my delegation to address the substance of the remote sensing debates which have taken place in our subcommittees, we have heard recently, and in particular this morning, a number of assertions which we feel must be responded to.

First, we believe that there has been an effective and constructive effort underway to deal with the extremely complex issues involved in remote sensing. We disagree with those who claim that no progress has been made. Substantial work is now in progress, and it should be recognized.

A very important aspect of current remote sensing activities is that they involve and are being pursued under programs and projects of international cooperation. We have heard apparent distress from at least one delegation about what was called the unilateral nature of present activities. This is somewhat remarkable. Under the Landsat program—and I refer to that program because it is the only one which is making data available—data collected by satellite are received by earth stations in four separate countries, and others are now building substations. Scientific and research projects are in process or are completed using these data in 55 countries, and we know of at least five major international organizations which are using the available data in scientific studies. This does not appear to be a classic definition of a unilateral program. Major progress is being made in the use and application of remotely sensed data, and much of it is of substantial benefit to many countries.

If, on the other hand, this concern is that data are available from only one source, then I suggest that complaints such as we heard this morning about reliance on the good will of the data provider are quite ill considered. If it had not been for the good will of this space power for the last 15 years, there would be remarkably little data at all publicly available. The international community has not received data from anyone else.

Furthermore, we are not the ones who wish to restrict data availability. On the one hand we hear concern about the reliability of data availability; on the other hand, we hear from the same parties proposals which in fact could go quite far toward reducing the benefits which all but space powers could derive.

We are mindful of the concerns expressed by many states about how data are to be controlled, distributed, or used. It is clear, of course, to the representatives here that raw sensed data coming from a satellite have relatively little intrinsic value. To be of use they must be processed, interpreted, and combined with other data of a corroborative nature.

Maximum use of the remotely sensed data requires an environment of cooperation. It assumes availability of trained scientists and specialists, and it produces information that can help finance and sustain the professionals necessary to use the data. Restriction of the collection and dissemination of data would be strongly in favor of the countries with a satellite operational capability and strongly adverse to the interests of developing countries.

Several countries today possess the capability to build and launch remote sensing satellites. We believe that by 1980 the number could be doubled or trebled. Few countries who may develop the capability to conduct such sensing could reasonably be expected to become party to a treaty which would deny this right, a right which is guaranteed by the Outer Space Treaty of 1967.

Therefore, to insure that data collected are not to be held or unilaterally employed by a sensing state to its exclusive advantage, it is our view that this committee and the international community should endorse recommendations that data collected must be made available on nondiscriminatory terms to anyone wishing to use them. Any alternative structure that we have seen proposed would result in unilateral control of data by sensing states, putting all others potentially

at a disadvantage. We believe that any other approach invites exclusion, discrimination, and reduced timeliness of data, and in some cases, perhaps eventual denial of access completely.

If one or a selected number of earth stations are built in a system wherein data are controlled, each earth station operator would be in a highly privileged role. On the other hand, if each country must establish its own station, costs multiply enormously. Administrative problems arise, and restrictions generate hostility and friction, which in our view constitute greater dangers than those posed by access to the data.

We strenuously urge those delegations which are promoting restrictive systems of dissemination based on prior consent to reexamine the long-range practical consequences of such an approach. As I said, it appears to us that no nation with the capability is likely to voluntarily forgo its right to conduct peaceful uses and scientific research using remotely sensed data from satellites. We believe that such uses are clearly within the scope of the legal principles of the 1967 treaty.

Suggestions have been made here that there is a juridical vacuum in place of any legal norms for the conduct of remote sensing. These suggestions overlook the provisions of several existing international agreements, most notably the Outer Space Treaty itself. The very first article of that treaty states that "There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space," and provides that ". . . States shall facilitate and encourage international cooperation in such investigations." Remote sensing is surely within the scope of such investigation, with the evidence accumulating day by day of its scientific contribution, and it is as surely a peaceful use of outer space.

My delegation views the proposals to impose new, restrictive rules as retrogressive and counter to our aims of securing the benefits of the peaceful activities in which 55 states are now participating.

It is because of these significant differ-

ences of view that my delegation has urged that the Legal Subcommittee concentrate on detailed, precise analysis of the implications of remote sensing before beginning a drafting exercise. We would consider it irresponsible to do otherwise. This does not preclude us from attempting to draft provisions on areas which have been clarified, and we would have no interest in opposing such efforts.

Our position is not one of wishing to preclude drafting; it is one of attempting to avoid reversing a logical chain of events. First we should understand generally what we wish to do, and then we should attempt to codify those goals. I do believe, on the basis of informal consultations, that a compromise can be worked out with regard to the mandate for next year's session of the Legal Subcommittee.

## **U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus Extended for Six Months**

*Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., on June 13, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council that day.*

### **STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BENNETT**

USUN press release 66 dated June 13

We have today unmistakably affirmed the conviction of this Council that those concerned must commit themselves to rapid progress toward a negotiated settlement on Cyprus. Our responsibilities under the U.N. Charter, together with the prolonged suffering of all the Cypriot people, make this an urgent requirement.

The United States welcomes the recent agreement of the parties concerned to resume the Vienna discussions on July 24. We thank the Secretary General for the great skill and patience he has shown in helping to advance these talks and in preserving

their momentum. His objective, thoughtful report emphasizes not only the hopeful start which has been made but also the patient efforts, good faith, and mutual understanding which are still required to achieve a settlement. The continued skillful assistance of the Secretary General will be essential to the success of this process.

The U.N. Force in Cyprus, whose mandate we have just extended, has continued to make an outstanding contribution to the safety and welfare of all the people of Cyprus. In so doing, it has also significantly assisted the negotiating process. The Secretary General's Representative on Cyprus, the Commander of the U.N. Force, and his staff and men have continued to demonstrate the professional ability and sensitive understanding the world has come to expect of them. We earnestly hope that all parties will make every effort to assist, and to safeguard, the men of the Force as they carry out their demanding tasks.

My government fully supports the action which the Council has just taken. The President of the United States and the Secretary of State have in recent days directly urged the parties to recognize the paramount importance of reaching a settlement through free negotiations among themselves and to make effective use of the assistance to them which the Council has provided in the personal auspices of the Secretary General. We join this Council and the world community in emphasizing that progress must be made toward permanent peace on Cyprus—and it must be made now.

#### TEXT OF RESOLUTION <sup>1</sup>

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* from the report of the Secretary-General of 9 June 1975 (S/11717) that in existing circumstances the presence of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed to perform

the tasks it is currently undertaking if the ceasefire is to be maintained in the island and the search for a peaceful settlement facilitated,

*Noting* from the report the conditions prevailing in the island,

*Noting further* that, in paragraphs 67 and 68 of his report, the Secretary-General has expressed the view, in connexion with the talks in Vienna between the representatives of the two communities held pursuant to resolution 367 (1975) of 12 March 1975, that the negotiating process should be maintained and, if possible, accelerated and that its success would require from all parties determination, understanding and a willingness to make reciprocal gestures,

*Noting also* the statement by the Secretary-General contained in paragraph 69 of his report that the parties concerned had signified their concurrence in his recommendation that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

*Noting* that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 June 1975,

1. *Reaffirms* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, as well as subsequent resolutions and decisions on the establishment and maintenance of UNFICYP and on other aspects of the situation in Cyprus;

2. *Reaffirms once again* its resolution 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974, by which it endorsed General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), adopted unanimously on 1 November 1974, and calls for their urgent and effective implementation and that of its resolution 367 (1975);

3. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to continue and accelerate determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council;

4. *Extends once more* the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 December 1975 in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force;

5. *Appeals again* to all parties concerned to extend their full co-operation to the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in its continuing performance of its duties;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue the mission of good offices entrusted to him by paragraph 6 of resolution 367 (1975), to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made, and to submit an interim report by 15 September 1975 and a definitive report not later than 15 December 1975.

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. S/RES/370 (1975); adopted by the Council on June 13 by a vote of 14 to 0, with the People's Republic of China not participating in the vote.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### U.S. and Peru Reach Agreement on Airline Services

The Department of State announced on July 8 (press release 359) that diplomatic notes had been exchanged on July 7 at Lima bringing into effect an understanding between the United States and Peru which will govern airline services between the two countries for a three-year period. Ambassador Robert W. Dean signed the U.S. notes and Foreign Minister Miguel Angel de la Flor signed for Peru. (For texts of the understanding and the exchanges of notes, see press release 359).

The understanding allows Braniff Airways, the designated U.S. airline serving Peru, to operate 15 roundtrip flights per week between U.S. points and Lima via intermediate points. Ten of these flights may operate beyond Lima to Santiago, La Paz, Asunción, Buenos Aires, São Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro. The Peruvian designated airline, AeroPeru, will be allowed to operate air services between Lima and Los Angeles, Miami, and New York via intermediate points at certain specified frequency levels.

The two governments also agreed in a separate exchange of notes on steps each country would take to allow the airlines to implement the rights accorded in the understanding. Services previously operated by the airlines may be restored immediately up to the levels specified in the understanding, and each government will use its best efforts to issue new or amended operating permits to the airlines by mid-September.

This new agreement, which supplements the U.S.-Peru Air Transport Agreement of 1946, resolves through negotiation the civil aviation issues which arose between the governments earlier this year.

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Coffee

Protocol for the continuation in force of the international coffee agreement 1968, as amended and extended, with annex. Approved by the International Coffee Council at London September 26, 1974.<sup>1</sup>  
*Ratification deposited:* Nicaragua, July 2, 1975.

#### Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at New York January 14, 1975.<sup>1</sup>

*Signature:* Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, June 30, 1975.

#### Terrorism—Protection of Diplomats

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratifications deposited:* Czechoslovakia, June 30, 1975; Denmark, Sweden, July 1, 1975.

#### Wheat

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971. Done at Washington April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1974, with respect to other provisions. TIAS 7988.

*Accession deposited:* Guatemala, June 12, 1975.

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions.  
*Accession deposited:* Peru, July 9, 1975.

#### Women—Political Rights

Convention on the political rights of women. Done at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force July 7, 1954.<sup>2</sup>

*Accession deposited:* Peru, July 1, 1975.

### BILATERAL

#### Israel

Joint statement of the U.S.-Israel Joint Committee for Investment and Trade relating to expansion of economic cooperation. Signed at Washington May 13, 1975. Entered into force May 13, 1975.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force for the United States.

## Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement extending the agreements of February 21, 1973, as extended (TIAS 7573, 7572, 7571, 7981, 8020), relating to certain fisheries problems in the northeastern part of the Pacific Ocean off the coast of the United States, fishing operations in the northeastern Pacific Ocean, and fishing for king and tanner crab. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 30, 1975. Entered into force June 30, 1975.

### PUBLICATIONS

## 1949 "Foreign Relations" Volume on Western Europe Released

Press release 314 dated June 4 (for release June 10)

The Department of State released on June 10 "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949," volume IV, "Western Europe." This volume is the latest in a series which has been published continuously since 1861 as the official record of American foreign policy. The volume now released is the third of a projected nine volumes documenting American foreign policy during the year 1949. Previously two volumes were published—one concerned with policy toward Austria and Germany and the other, with China.

This volume of 854 pages presents documentation—hitherto unpublished and of the highest classification—on such major issues as the participation by the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the interest of the United States in the economic recovery of Western Europe, the future of the Free Territory of Trieste, and the disposition of the former Italian colonies in Africa. A selective but comprehensive outline of the relations of the United States with the countries of Western Europe (exclusive of Austria and Germany) is documented with particularly significant bodies of papers on relations with France, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Prominent personages who figure importantly in the pages of this volume include President Truman, Secretary of State Acheson, Under Secretary of State Webb, British Foreign Secretary Bevin, French Foreign Minister Schuman, W. Averell Harriman, and Paul Hoffman.

The "Foreign Relations" volumes are prepared by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs. Volume IV (listed as Department of State publica-

tion 8791; GPO cat. no. S1.1:949/v. IV) may be purchased for \$11.15 (domestic postpaid). Checks or money orders should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents and sent to the U.S. Government Book Store, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

## GPO Sales Publications

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**1974 Report of the Visa Office.** This report by the Department of State's Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs shows in graphs and charts the nature and volume of visa activity for fiscal year 1974. Pub. 8810. Department and Foreign Service Series 150. 84 pp. \$1.70. (Cat. No. S1.69:8810).

**Narcotic Drugs—Provision of Helicopters and Related Assistance.** Agreement with Mexico amending the agreement of June 24, 1974. TIAS 7983. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7983).

**Fisheries—Certain Fisheries Off the United States Coast, Salmon Fisheries, King and Tanner Crab.** Agreements with Japan. TIAS 7986. 86 pp. 85¢ (Cat. No. S9.10:7986).

**International Labor Organization—Amendment of the Constitution.** Instrument of amendment adopted by the General Conference of the International Labor Organization, at the fifty-seventh session, Geneva, June 22, 1972. 8 pp. 30¢ (Cat. No. S9.10:7987).

**Mutual Defense Assistance—Cash Contribution by Japan.** Arrangement with Japan relating to the agreement of March 8, 1954. TIAS 7989. 6 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7989).

### Correction

The editor of the BULLETIN wishes to call attention to the following error which appears in the July 7 issue:

*p. 43, col. 1:* The second sentence of the second full paragraph should read: "Coupled with positive action, such clarity is called for to insure a peaceful and realistic settlement of the territory's future."

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†369	7/11	U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint communique.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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## The Global Challenge and International Cooperation

*Address by Secretary Kissinger<sup>1</sup>*

Ten days ago our nation entered its 200th year. We begin our Bicentennial with justifiable pride in our past, a recognition of the challenges of the present, and great hope for the future.

The world in which we live is poised uneasily between an era of great enterprise and creativity or an age of chaos and despair. We have, on the one hand, developed weapons that could destroy us and our civilization; we have, on the other, created a world economy that could—for the first time in history—eradicate poverty, hunger, and human suffering.

This complex of unprecedented opportunity and unparalleled danger is at the heart of the great challenge that has faced the United States with increasing urgency since the close of World War II. And it is our generation that must make the choices which will determine success or failure. It is a burden that we can shoulder with fortitude or ignore with peril—but it is a burden we cannot shed.

Our nation has come to symbolize man's capacity to master his destiny. It is a proud legacy that has given hope and inspiration to the millions who have looked to us over the past two centuries as a beacon of liberty and justice.

Today's generation of Americans must be as true to its duty as earlier generations were to theirs. When weapons span continents in

minutes, our security is bound up with world peace. When our factories, farms, and financial strength are deeply affected by decisions taken in foreign lands, our prosperity is linked to world prosperity. The peace of the world and our own security, the world's progress and our own prosperity, are indivisible.

### **The Structure of Peace**

We have a proud foundation on which to build. We have maintained stability in the world, insured the security and independence of scores of nations, and expended blood and treasure in the defense of freedom. Our economic support helped our major allies regain their strength; we contributed to a global trading and monetary system which has sustained and spread prosperity throughout the world. With our encouragement, the new nations took their place in the international community and set out on the path of economic development. At our initiative many longstanding disputes were settled by peaceful means. Conflicts were contained and global war was avoided.

We have provided more economic assistance than any other nation in history. We have contributed more food, educated more people from other lands, and welcomed more immigrants and refugees. We have done so because we are a generous people—for which we need not apologize—and because we have understood that our self-interest is bound up with the fate of all mankind.

These successes have brought great change. The rigidities of the cold war period have

<sup>1</sup> Made before a dinner meeting sponsored by the University of Wisconsin Institute of World Affairs and other organizations at Milwaukee, Wis., on July 14 (text from press release 370).

fragmented. Power and wealth, ideology and purpose, have become diffused and have transformed the international scene. The reemergence of Europe and Japan, the rivalry among the Communist powers, the growth of military technologies, the rise and increasing diversity of the developing nations have produced a new global environment—a world of many centers of power, of persistent ideological differences, clouded by nuclear peril and struggling for economic security and advance. The central focus of U.S. foreign policy is to help shape from this environment a new international structure based on equilibrium rather than confrontation, linking nations to each other by practices of cooperation that reflect the reality of global interdependence.

Our task begins at home. To be strong and effective abroad, we must be strong and purposeful at home. To preserve peace, our military strength must be beyond challenge. To promote global prosperity, our domestic economy must prosper. To carry forward our international efforts, we must be a united people, sure in our purposes and determined to build on the great achievements of our national heritage.

Our first responsibility abroad is to the great industrial democracies with whom we share our history, our prosperity, and our political ideals. Our alliances across the Atlantic and with Japan are the cornerstone of our foreign policy. Today they are more than responses to military threat; they are instrumentalities of social and economic cooperation as well.

The ultimate objective of our alliances has always been to ease, not to freeze, the divisions of the world. In the past few years the United States has taken a number of steps to resolve concrete problems with the Soviet Union and lay the basis for more positive endeavors. We have also forged a new relationship with the People's Republic of China. There can be no lasting international stability unless the major powers learn habits of restraint and feel a stake in international peace; all our hopes for a better world require that they use their power for the benefit of mankind.

The scores of new nations that have become independent since the Second World War are now major actors on the world scene. In their quest for their own progress, they present a challenge to the rest of the world—to demonstrate that the international structure can give them a role, a fair share, dignity, and responsibility.

All of us—allies and adversaries, new nations and old, rich and poor—are part of a world community. Our interdependence on this planet is becoming the central fact of our diplomacy. Energy, resources, environment, population, the uses of space and the seas—these are problems whose benefits and burdens transcend national boundaries. They carry the seeds of political conflict over the coming generation; they challenge the capacities of the international community with new requirements for vision and statesmanship.

Much of our current agenda is therefore global in nature and must be dealt with on a global basis. Within a few weeks there will be two major meetings of the most prominent international organization, the United Nations. A special session of the General Assembly will be devoted to economic issues, and the 30th regular session of the General Assembly will address the broad range of international problems.

Therefore I would like to use this occasion to place before you and our fellow members of the United Nations a candid assessment of how the U.S. Government views the contemporary United Nations—its capacities and its limitations, its promise and the trends which threaten future progress.

### **The Record of the United Nations**

Thirty years after the founding of the United Nations, its achievements have been substantial, and its promise is great. Most of the world is at peace. Beyond the absence of armed conflict, there has been a transition from a preoccupation with security to a new concern for the economic and social progress of all mankind. Yet, at the very time when interdependence impels international cooperation and when the membership of the

United Nations is most universal, the international organization is being tested by a new clash of ideologies and interests and by insistent tactics of confrontation. Such tendencies diminish the prospect for further achievement and threaten the very institution itself.

Let me place these tendencies in historical perspective.

The end of the Second World War brought on a period of idealism and hope. Victory in war against tyrannical regimes—by nations united for that purpose—seemed as much a triumph for liberty as for peace. The end of the colonial era was shortly to begin and was clearly in prospect. The awesome power of nuclear weapons, ironically, gave hope that the imperatives of collective security and peaceful settlement of disputes would at last impress themselves on mankind. The League of Nations had failed, but the cost of another failure now seemed so overwhelming that it was possible to hope that the nations of the world would be obliged to make the United Nations succeed.

No nation embraced this hope more genuinely than the United States. No country more seriously looked for the United Nations to replace force and domination with cooperation. No government more earnestly sought to create a world organization with a capacity to act. It is worth recalling that a year after the San Francisco Conference, when the United States was the sole possessor of nuclear weapons, we offered to turn this entire technology over to the United Nations.

Even then American spokesmen were careful to insist that there were realistic limits to the scope of the new organization. Of these limits the most important, even if perhaps the easiest to overlook, is that the United Nations is not a world government; it is an organization of sovereign states. It is not an entity apart from its membership. It reflects the world context in which it operates—its diversity, its imperfections, its many centers of power and initiative, its competing values, its worldly compound of nobility and tragedy.

The founders' hope for peace rested not on

a naive belief in the perfectibility of man but on the hope that the major powers, given a dominant role in the Security Council, would be able to concert together to keep the peace. This hope, of course, proved stillborn when the United Nations became an arena for the confrontations of the cold war.

A generation later, its record in maintaining the peace shows both success and failure. There have been local wars; yet there has been no general war. More than once, small conflicts which could have led in the past to great ones have been contained through the efforts of the United Nations.

Time and again—in the eastern Mediterranean, in the Middle East, in the Congo, in Kashmir—the peacekeeping role of the United Nations has proved indispensable for settlement, guarantees, and prevention of major-power intervention. While a far cry from the concept of collective security originally envisioned, these operations have proven valuable and increasingly indispensable. They represent the most advanced manifestations of international cooperation for security yet achieved.

The United Nations has understood the principle that peace is not the same as the *status quo*, but must embrace procedures for peaceful change. Whether by special commissions or mediators or through the expanded role of the Secretary General within his broad responsibilities under article 99 of the charter, the United Nations has offered a flexible instrument of pacific settlement on a score of occasions since its founding.

The United Nations has provided a forum for debate and negotiation on regional or global problems and for multilateral efforts for arms control and disarmament. The talks provide a safety valve and a sounding board; in the corridors, quiet progress is often being made.

We found early on that there were limits to U.N. action on behalf of peace and security. Its writ can run no further than the agreement of its members. And on the sweeping issues of war and peace, it is the great powers, by virtue of their size, military strength, economic power, and political in-

fluence, who bear the principal responsibility for world stability and security. Of late, as the great powers are learning the practices of coexistence, there is hope that the United Nations can find renewed possibilities for effective action in accordance with the vision of its founders.

The United Nations, originally concerned primarily with issues of peace and security, has been the focus of increasing attention to economic and social issues. The U.N. Charter contains a commitment "to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples." Today, roughly nine-tenths of expenditures within the U.N. system relate to economic and social cooperation. We welcome this evolution and have contributed generously to it.

Indeed, it is in these fields that the work of the United Nations has been most successful and yet the most unheralded. Its specialized agencies have been effectively involved with countless areas of human and international concern—speeding decolonization; spreading education, science, and technology; organizing global cooperation to combat hunger and disease, to protect the environment, and to limit population growth; regulating international transport and communication and peaceful nuclear power; advancing human rights and expanding international law among nations and in outer space and on the seas; preserving the priceless cultural heritage of mankind. It is striking, and of great importance for the future, that the United Nations has been able to respond creatively to so many of the challenges of the modern age.

Thus the United Nations is of considerable importance for the world's future. It has accommodated our traditional security and political concerns to the new conditions of international diplomacy; it has extended its reach—even before most nations did—toward the new agenda that now confronts the world community. The United Nations is both a symbol of our interdependence and our most universal instrument for common progress.

In this connection, I want to pay tribute

to the outstanding leadership given to the United Nations by its Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim. He is tireless and totally dedicated to peace, fairness, and the future of the United Nations. The rapidity and efficiency with which he organized and dispatched peacekeeping forces to the Middle East in late 1973 was but one example of the many services he has rendered the organization and the international community.

#### **The United States and the United Nations**

Yet with all these achievements, the future of the United Nations is clouded. Much that has transpired at the United Nations in recent years gives us pause. At the very moment when great-power confrontations are waning, troubling trends have appeared in the General Assembly and some of its specialized agencies. Ideological confrontation, bloc voting, and new attempts to manipulate the charter to achieve unilateral ends threaten to turn the United Nations into a weapon of political warfare rather than a healer of political conflict and a promoter of human welfare.

The United Nations naturally mirrors the evolution of its composition. In its first phase it reflected the ideological struggle between the West and the East; during that period the United Nations generally followed the American lead. Time and again in those days there were some 50 votes in support of our position and only a handful of Communist-bloc members against.

Ten years later, when membership had grown to more than 80, our dominance in the General Assembly no longer was assured. Neither East nor West was able to prevail. In the Security Council the American position was still sustained, while the Soviet Union was required to cast veto after veto in order to protect what it considered to be its vital interests.

But with the quantum leap to the present membership of 138, the past tendencies of bloc politics have become more pronounced and more serious. The new nations, for understandable reasons, turned to the General

Assembly, in which they predominated, in a quest for power that simply does not reside there. The Assembly cannot take compulsory legal decisions. Yet numerical majorities have insisted on their will and objectives even when in population and financial contributions they were a small proportion of the membership.

In the process, a forum for accommodation has been transformed into a setting for confrontation. The moral influence which the General Assembly should exercise has been jeopardized and could be destroyed if governments—particularly those who are its main financial supporters—should lose confidence in the organization because of the imposition of a mechanical and increasingly arbitrary will.

It is an irony that at the moment the United States has accepted nonalignment and the value of diversity, those nations which originally chose this stance to preserve their sovereign independence from powerful military alliances are forming a rigid grouping of their own. The most solid bloc in the world today is, paradoxically, the alignment of the nonaligned. This divides the world into categories of North and South, developing and developed, imperial and colonial, at the very moment in history when such categories have become irrelevant and misleading.

Never before has the world been more in need of cooperative solutions. Never before have the industrial nations been more ready to deal with the problems of development in a constructive spirit. Yet lopsided, loaded voting, biased results, and arbitrary tactics threaten to destroy these possibilities. The utility of the General Assembly both as a safety valve and as an instrument of international cooperation is being undermined. Tragically, the principal victims will be the countries who seek to extort what substantially could be theirs if they proceeded cooperatively.

An equally deplorable development is the trend in the specialized agencies to focus on political issues and thereby deflect the significant work of these agencies. UNESCO [U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural

Organization], designed for cultural matters, and the International Labor Organization have been heavily politicized. An egregious recent case came in the World Food Council in Rome, where the very nations who desperately need, and would most benefit from, food assistance threatened to abort its work by disruptive tactics unworthy of an international organization. This Council grew out of the American initiatives at the World Food Conference last year. It reflects our deepest humanitarian concerns; it represents a serious effort on our part to eliminate hunger and malnutrition. Abuse by those whom we are trying to help, attacks on our motives by the beneficiaries of our efforts, threaten to undermine the very fabric of cooperation in a field of crucial long-range importance to mankind.

We realize that those of us who wish to surmount the current crisis must show some understanding of its origins. The major powers have hardly always set a consistent example of altruistic or benevolent behavior. The nations which would seek to coerce the industrialized countries have themselves been coerced in the past. History haunts us all. But it is precisely to transcend that history that the United Nations was founded. And it is precisely to arrest such trends that the United States is calling attention to them today.

The process is surely self-defeating. According to the rules of the General Assembly, the coerced are under no compulsion to submit. To the contrary, they are given all too many incentives simply to depart the scene, to have done with the pretense. Such incentives are ominously enhanced when the General Assembly and specialized agencies expel member nations which for one reason or another do not meet with their approval.

Our concern has nothing to do with our attitude toward the practices or policies of the particular governments against which action is being taken. Our position is constitutional. If the United Nations begins to depart from its charter, where suspension and expulsion are clearly specified prerogatives of the Security Council, we fear for

the integrity and the survival of the General Assembly itself, and no less for that of the specialized agencies. Those who seek to manipulate U.N. membership by procedural abuse may well inherit an empty shell.

We are determined to oppose tendencies which, in our view, will undermine irreparably the effectiveness of the United Nations. It is the smaller members of the organization who would lose the most. They are more in need of the United Nations than the larger powers such as the United States which can prosper within or outside the institution.

Ways must be found for power and responsibility in the Assembly and in the specialized agencies to be more accurately reflective of the realities of the world. The United States has been by far the largest financial supporter of the United Nations; but the support of the American people, which has been the lifeblood of the organization, will be profoundly alienated unless fair play predominates and the numerical majority respects the views of the minority. The American people are understandably tired of the inflammatory rhetoric against us, the all-or-nothing stance accompanied by demands for *our* sacrifice which too frequently dominate the meeting halls of the United Nations.

The United States, despite these trends, intends to do everything in our power to support and strengthen the United Nations in its positive endeavors. With all its limitations and imperfections the world body remains an urgent necessity. We are eager to cooperate, but we are also determined to insist on orderly procedures and adherence to the charter. The United Nations was never intended as an organization of like-minded states but, rather, an arena to accommodate and respect different policies and different interests. The world needs cooperative, not arbitrary, action; joint efforts, not imposed solutions. In this spirit the United States will do what it can to make the United Nations a vital hope for a better future.

## The Agenda Before Us

This, then, is the promise and the problem of the United Nations. We must insure that the promise prevails, because the agenda we face makes the institution more necessary than ever before.

The United Nations, first, faces continuing and increasing responsibilities in its mission, in the famous words of the U.N. Charter, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

One of the central issues of our time is the Middle East conflict, and the U.N. Security Council continues to play a vital role in the quest for a solution. Resolution 338 of 1973 launched a negotiating process which has borne fruit and proved durable. Secretary General Waldheim convened and addressed the first session of the Geneva Conference. Resolution 242 of 1967 stated general principles for a comprehensive peace. The stationing of U.N. Forces was an indispensable element of the recent disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Syria in 1974.

But despite these and other real achievements, the global perils of local conflict continue to loom large. The world has dealt with them as if it were possible to contain conflict perpetually. But such tolerance tempts conflagration. That is how the first two World Wars began. We must not have a third; with modern weapons there would not be a fourth. It is not enough to contain the crises that occur; we must eradicate their causes. President Ford is therefore determined to help bring about a negotiated solution in the Middle East, in Cyprus, and in other areas of dispute. And peacekeeping and peacemaking must be a top priority on the U.N. agenda.

Another problem of peace which the world community must urgently address is the spread of nuclear weapons. Their awesomeness has chained these weapons for almost three decades; their sophistication and expense have long helped limit the number of nations which could possess them. But now political inhibitions are crumbling. Nuclear



catastrophe—whether by plan or mistake, accident, theft, or blackmail—is no longer implausible.

It is imperative to contain—and reverse—the nuclear arms race among the major powers. We are now engaged in translating the principles agreed to in Vladivostok between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev into a new accord between the United States and the Soviet Union that will for the first time place a long-term ceiling on the strategic weapons of both sides.

As we strive to slow the spiral of nuclear arms, we must work as well to halt their spread. This requires both political and technical measures. In these areas the work of the United Nations has been important and could be crucial.

The Nonproliferation Treaty of 1970 was an important beginning. The recent conference held under U.N. auspices to review the treaty, and the adherence of additional countries to its provisions, have been valuable further steps.

The priority now is to strengthen the safeguards on the export of nuclear materials for peaceful uses. The oil crisis adds fresh urgency to this task because it has made the development of nuclear energy essential for an increasing number of nations. This means wider availability of materials, such as plutonium, and of equipment which might be used to develop nuclear explosives.

Future generations have a right to expect of us that commercial competition among the industrial exporting countries will not be so reckless and irresponsible that it accelerates the spread of nuclear weapons and thereby increases the risks of a nuclear holocaust.

Therefore the United States has begun confidential discussions with other nuclear-exporting countries to develop stronger and generally accepted safeguards. In this task, the role and work of the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency is vital. As peaceful nuclear programs grow in size and complexity it is crucial that supplier and user

nations agree on firm and clear export standards and strengthened IAEA safeguards. An effective world safeguards system will minimize nuclear risks while fostering the development of peaceful nuclear energy. The control of nuclear weapons is one of the most critical tests of this generation. The United Nations can crucially help decide whether we will meet this test.

### **The Problem of Interdependence**

In the last few years the world economy has undergone a series of shocks and strains:

—Nations have suffered both severe inflation and deep recession on a worldwide scale.

—The price of the world's most essential commodity, petroleum, has been precipitously and arbitrarily increased, burdening the economies of all consuming nations and imposing the most serious hardships on the poorest countries.

—The world's food reserves have dwindled alarmingly in only a few short years. Unless massive efforts are mounted, the gap between population growth and food production could reach disastrous proportions.

—The pursuit of economic growth is complicated by the fact of interdependence; it can no longer be pursued by national efforts, but requires coordinated global actions.

This September's special session of the General Assembly will focus on the new global economic concerns. It will be an early and important test: Will the rich nations and poor nations identify common goals and solve problems together, or will they exacerbate their differences? Can we turn our energies from rhetorical battles to practical cooperation? Will nations strive for empty parliamentary victories or concrete progress?

The United States has made its choice. We believe strongly in a cooperative approach. We believe that the time has come to put the technological and economic genius of mankind into the service of progress for all. We will approach the special session with determination to make progress; we intend to

make concrete and constructive proposals for action across a broad spectrum of international economic activities such as trade and commodities, world food production, and international financial measures.

The session will also consider structural changes to improve the U.N.'s capabilities in the field of economic development. A group of experts appointed by Secretary General Waldheim has just completed a study of this subject. We will offer specific comments on these recommendations during the Assembly debate.

In this spirit, let me speak directly to the new nations who have pressed their claims with increasing fervor. We have heard and have begun to understand your concerns. We want to be responsive. We are prepared to undertake joint efforts to alleviate your economic problems. Clearly this requires a posture of cooperation. If nations deal with each other with respect and understanding, the two sessions this fall could mark the beginning of a new era in which the realities of an interdependent world economy generate a global effort to bring about peaceful and substantial change.

At the same time we are obliged to speak plainly to the question of what works and what does not. We believe that economic development is in the first instance an internal process. Either societies create the conditions for saving and investment, for innovation and ingenuity, and for enterprise and industry which ultimately lead to self-sustaining economic growth, or they do not. There is no magical shortcut and no rhetorical substitute. And to claim otherwise suggests a need for permanent dependence on others.

In this quest for development, experience must count for something and ideology is an unreliable guide. At a minimum, we know which economies have worked and which have failed; we have a record of what societies have progressed economically and which have stagnated. We know from our own experience that investment from abroad can be an important spur to development. We know also that it is now in short supply. In the future, as in the past, there will be

competition to attract capital; therefore those who do not wish investment from abroad can be confident that they will not receive it. By the same token those countries which are eager to industrialize must also be ready to create the conditions that will attract large-scale investment.

The voting records of the blocs in the General Assembly simply do not reflect economic reality. The family of less developed countries includes both producers and consumers of energy, importers and exporters of raw materials, and nations which can feed their populations as well as those which face the specter of famine. These divergent interests must be accommodated and reflected in practical measures; they cannot be resolved from the unreality of bloc positions.

At the same time, the industrial world must adapt its own attitudes to the new reality of scores of new nations. At bottom the challenge is political, not economic—whether the interests and weight of the less developed nations can be accommodated in the international order. Their political objectives often represent legitimate claims. Yet at the same time the new nations must not expect us to make *only* political decisions, with *no* thought for economic consequences. If they want truly to serve their peoples, there must be practical concern for effective results.

If the industrial world wants to overcome the attitude of confrontation between nations, it must offer equitable solutions for the problems of the less fortunate parts of the world. Just as we are rightly concerned about the economic impact of exorbitant oil prices, so we should show understanding for the concerns of producers of other raw materials whose incomes fluctuate radically.

As for the operation of our companies abroad, we consider it in our interest, as well as in the common interest, to promote an environment of mutual benefit in which our international businesses can continue to be both profitable and beneficial to the countries in which they operate. We will address this issue more fully at the special session.

Above all, the industrialized countries must recognize that many developing coun-

tries have had frustratingly slow rates of growth. Rather than a comfortable margin of progress, they face an abundance of obstacles and a surplus of despair. The future of international politics over the next generation—the kind of world our children will inherit—will be determined by what actions governments take now on this spectrum of economic issues.

### **The Central Role of the United Nations**

Dag Hammarskjöld once predicted that the day would come when people would see the United Nations for what it really is—not the abstract painting of some artist, but a drawing done by the peoples of the world. And so it is—not the perfect institution of the dreamers who saw it as the only true road to world harmony and not the evil instrument of world domination that the isolationists once made it out to be.

Rather it is, like so many human institutions before it, an imperfect instrument—but one of great hope nonetheless. The United States remains dedicated to the principles upon which the United Nations was founded. We continue to believe it can be a mighty and effective vehicle for preserving the peace and bridging the gap between the world's rich and poor. We will do all we can to make it so.

The past decade, and particularly the past several years, have been a difficult time for America. We have known the agony of internal dissension and political turmoil and the bitter costs of a lengthy war. But our nation has come through all this and its most difficult constitutional crisis since the Civil War with our institutions intact and our people resilient. And we have seen that the world still looks to us for leadership in preserving the peace and promoting economic advance for all mankind.

But the past decade has also surely shown that—strong and prosperous as we are—we cannot remake the world alone. Others must do their part and bear their responsibility for building the better world we all seek for the generations that will come after us.

In this endeavor, the United Nations plays a central role. It is there that each nation,

large or small, rich or poor, can—if it will—make its contribution to the betterment of all. It is there that nations must realize that restraint is the only principle that can save the world from chaos and that our destinies are truly intertwined on this small planet. It is there that we will see whether men and nations have the wisdom and courage to make a reality of the ideals of the charter and, in the end, to turn the Parliament of Man into a true expression of the conscience of humanity.

### **Questions and Answers Following the Secretary's Milwaukee Address**

Press release 370B dated July 14

*Q. Has the United States recently shifted its position toward developing a first-strike nuclear capability?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Before I answer any questions, I wanted to make one remark about some of the people at the head table here.

For those of us in the executive branch, close relations between the executive and the legislative have always been crucially important, and I wanted to take the occasion to pay tribute to the senior ranking Democrat on the International Relations Committee after the chairman, your Congressman from Milwaukee, Clem Zablocki, who has been of enormous assistance in helping us put forward what we consider useful foreign policy initiatives, and who has not, I must point out, hesitated to harass us when he wrongly thought we were wrong. [Laughter and applause.]

And I would also like to say a word for one of that rare breed, the few Republicans that are left in the House of Representatives, Mr. Kasten, on my right, who—and when any member of the executive branch says anything friendly about a freshman these days, it is an accident. [Laughter.] But in his brief tenure in Washington, I have known him as a supporter of enlightened foreign policies who has not hesitated, I regret to say, to criticize us. But we will teach him. [Laughter

and applause.] You notice I did not say that about Zablocki. [Laughter.]

Now, with respect to your question: I do not believe that the United States has changed its basic policy with respect to first strike. It has always been the United States policy that in certain extreme circumstances, if the national survival was at stake or if the survival of our close allies, especially Europe, were at stake, and if no other means were available, that the United States might have to be the first to resort to nuclear weapons.

If you look at the statements of Presidents and Secretaries of Defense since the fifties, this has been a settled American doctrine. It has recently been stated more elegantly than in the past and therefore has attracted new attention. But it is not a new American policy.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what importance, other than ceremonial, do you attach to the coming July 30 East-West summit conference in Helsinki?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The European Security Conference has been in progress for several years. And in that period, it has attempted to establish a balance between the concerns of the East, which dealt primarily with the acceptance of frontiers, and the concerns of the West, which concerned primarily a recognition that peaceful change was not precluded by the existing circumstances and that an easing of human contacts with the East was in prospect.

I believe that the final document that has been negotiated achieves a balance between these two objectives. The meeting at the summit in Helsinki will symbolize this and will give an opportunity for the various heads of government to exchange ideas on many other problems going far beyond the Security Conference.

The Security Conference should not be overestimated as marking a decisive turn. It is one step in a progress toward the easing of tensions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, will you explain the differences between your plan to disengage the Arabs and Israelis and the U.N. Resolution 242 signed by the big powers the war before*

*last, and do you believe the two sides prefer your plan to the U.N. 242?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, it is hard for me to imagine that anyone would not prefer my plan. [Laughter and applause.]

But the two approaches are not inconsistent with each other.

There are two general ways one can get at the solution of the Middle East problem. One is to attempt in one grand negotiation to settle all issues simultaneously—frontiers, Palestinians, guarantees, obligations of peace, and so forth. This would be the most desirable route, but it is also the most complicated, because the most extreme elements may dominate the debate and because outside powers may also bring pressure on the discussion.

The other approach is to try to isolate individual issues, deal with them one at a time until one has reached a point where this so-called step-by-step approach could no longer be feasible, and then attempt to have the overall negotiation.

We have believed that the distrust among the countries was so great, the issues so complicated, that to deal with them all simultaneously had an unacceptable risk to produce a stalemate and therefore an unacceptable risk of a Middle East war. And in a way, the complexity of even a single negotiation tends to support this.

On the other hand, if we should succeed in the negotiations now going on, it is highly probable that the next phase will deal with an overall settlement.

So what I have been doing up to now should be looked at as a preparatory phase to the overall settlement that was foreseen by Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

*Q. Mr. Chairman, given the threat of the Soviet base in Somalia, do you believe this fact will give Congress added impetus to approve funds for a naval base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The visits by two congressional committees to Somalia seem to support the proposition that there is a Soviet facility in Somalia. And therefore it would be my impression that it would tend to strengthen the case for the base at Diego

Garcia that the Administration has proposed.

I would like to add, however, that the case for the base at Diego Garcia rests not only on the Soviet facility in Somalia, but it rests also on the general necessities of American strategy on a global basis and therefore has more justification than simply the base in Somalia, even though that is a contributing factor.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in the event of another Middle East war, would you support direct American military involvement to support Israel?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Israel has never asked for direct American military involvement and has always asked to be given sufficient arms to take care of itself. Therefore we do not believe that this issue will arise in another Middle East war. Nevertheless another Middle East war is something that we have every incentive to avoid, because it would create unacceptable pressures on our relations with Western Europe and Japan and high risk of confrontation with the Soviet Union.

The United States has taken the position that we would resist outside intervention in the area. But we have also taken the position that the best way to avoid these contingencies is to make steady progress toward peace.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what are the minimum demands of President Sadat in order to renew the U.N. peacekeeping agreement?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, the Egyptian position has been to tie a renewal of the U.N. mandate to progress in the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations. That decision will have to be made by July 24. And no one can survive who makes a prediction in the Middle East which can be proved right or wrong in such a short period.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, some of us in the United States feel that power and force is no longer the best means to solve world problems, even as the U.N.'s framers felt. What can the ordinary citizen do to assure that our government will begin to use the best minds and best hopes to solve these very complex problems? Could we not seek out a dozen of the*

*best minds in each state to pool their wisdom to aid in the support of peaceful means within the realm of the United Nations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I agree with you that under contemporary conditions force is not an adequate means for settling international disputes. But I think it is also unfortunately true that as long as other countries maintain strong forces, the only way this can be achieved is by the United States maintaining its own strength.

Now, is it possible to avoid this threat by some comprehensive approach to the problem, either through government or by bringing in outside minds. As a former professor, I find it tempting to think that somewhere out there are 12 people in each country who, if they could only be consulted, would solve our problems. I frankly do not think that is the case. I do not doubt that there are outstanding people in the world who are not being sufficiently consulted. But I think the problem of war and peace and the elimination of war and the reduction of the reliance on force require a slow, patient, persevering effort. And I do not believe that it can be achieved in one grand solution written by a group of outsiders, however brilliant they are. I won't have that view, though, after I have left this position. [Laughter and applause.]

*Q. We just want to help you along a little bit.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Dr. Baumann [Carol Baumann, Director, Institute of World Affairs of the University of Wisconsin] says I will take one more question from the floor and then one from the head table. All right—please; whoever is next.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, how long will it be until we reestablish diplomatic ties with Cuba?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* How long will it be? We have publicly stated that hostility to Cuba is not an organic aspect of our foreign policy and that we are prepared to have serious exchanges with Cuba on the basis of reciprocity. We have made some gestures. Recently Cuba has made some gestures in our direction. But they have so far mostly

concerned atmospherics. We are prepared to begin a dialogue with Cuba; and once that is in progress, we can judge better what the possibilities are for improving our relationships.

*Dr. Baumann: I'm sorry, but we are at the limit of our time. One of the prerogatives of the chair is to change the format. And there was a very good question that I would like to ask Dr. Kissinger which came from the head table.*

*Having responded to the many concerns over crisis areas this evening, could you perhaps close this informative session with an optimistic note reflecting the brighter areas and some of the accomplishments that influence the present U.S. position and our future?*

*Secretary Kissinger: I think it is important to understand that the world right now is in the process of transition from the post-war period, in which Western Europe and Japan were impotent as a result of the war, in which communism was monolithic, to a period in which Western Europe and Japan, largely as a result of our own efforts, of our own contribution—or to a considerable extent as a result of our own contribution—have recovered their strength and self-confidence to a considerable extent and in which the Communist world has fragmented itself into competing centers. And also that we are living in a world, as I said in my speech, that is growing ever more interdependent. So the commotion we are witnessing is the birth of a new international system, in which, on the whole, considerable progress is being made. America's relations*

with Western Europe and Japan have never been better—and not just on issues of common defense but also in relationship to the issues of energy, raw materials, and improvement of the human condition.

Our relationship with the Soviet Union is still an adversary relationship. Nevertheless we have for the first time begun to limit strategic arms; and we hope by the end of this year, or certainly in the near future, we will conclude a comprehensive agreement which for the first time will put a ceiling on strategic weapons and therefore substantially reduce the possibilities of nuclear conflagration.

We have established relationships with the People's Republic of China.

With all the debates that are now going on, we think there is a great opportunity to work out together with the new nations a new approach to international development which will for the first time create a true world community. So I believe that our foreign policy is basically making progress and that we can look back to this period as one in which tensions were eased and a new international system was being created amidst much turmoil, with many frustrations, but on the whole one that will create a safer and better world for future generations. [Applause.]

*Dr. Baumann: Mr. Secretary, that enthusiastic applause is but a small indication of our appreciation for the candor with which you share your thoughts with us, the sparkle of your wit, and the time you so generously spent in answering our questions. On behalf of everyone here, our sincere thanks.*

## The Moral Foundations of Foreign Policy

*Address by Secretary Kissinger*<sup>1</sup>

I have long looked forward to coming to Minnesota because it is the home of a man I admire enormously, the one man who likes to talk almost as much as I do—Senator Humphrey. At the hearings on my nomination as Secretary of State, Senator Humphrey instructed me with much wisdom on the difficult job ahead. His advice was right on the mark and has been ever since. He is a good friend and a great statesman. Minnesotans can be proud that he represents them in the U.S. Senate, for he is an example of the spirit of our country—its decency, its humanity, and its strength.

America has now entered upon its 200th year as a free nation. In those two centuries our country has grown from a small agricultural nation with very few responsibilities beyond its borders to a world power with global responsibilities. Yet, while the range of interests has changed massively, our commitment to the values that gave birth to our nation has remained unaltered.

These are the aspects of our national experience I would like to address today: the pursuit of America's values as a humane and just example to others, and the furthering of America's interests in a world where power remains the ultimate arbiter. How do we reconcile and advance both aspects of our national purpose? What, in our time, is the significance of the age-old quandary of the relationship between principle and power?

Through the greater part of our history

we have been able to avoid the issue. A fortunate margin of safety and an unexplored continent produced the impression that principle and power automatically coalesced, that no choice was necessary, or that only one choice was possible.

But now for nearly a decade our nation has been weighed down by uncertainty and discord. We have found ourselves doubtful of our virtue and uncertain of our direction largely because we have suddenly realized that, like other nations before us, we must now reconcile our principles with our necessities. Amid frustration, many Americans questioned the validity of our involvement in the international arena; in the wake of our disappointments, some abroad now doubt our resolve.

We are, I believe, emerging from this period with a renewed sense of confidence. Recent events have brought home to us—and to the rest of the world—that a purposeful, strong, and involved America is essential to peace and progress. These same events have also reminded us of the contribution this country made in the 30 years since World War II and what is at stake in the next 30 years.

The United States can look back on an extraordinary generation of achievement. We have maintained a stable balance of power in the world. We have preserved peace and fostered the growth of the industrial democracies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan. We helped shape the international trade and monetary system which has nourished global prosperity. We promoted decolonization and pioneered in

<sup>1</sup>Made at a luncheon meeting sponsored by the Upper Midwest Council and other organizations at Bloomington (Minneapolis), Minn., on July 15 (text from press release 372).

development assistance for the new nations. We have taken major initiatives to forge more reliable and positive relationships with the major Communist powers.

In a planet shrunk by communications and technology, in a world either devastated by war or struggling in the first steps of nationhood, in an international system not of empire but of scores of independent states, the global contribution of one nation—the United States—has been without precedent in human history. Only a nation of strong conviction and great idealism could have accomplished these efforts.

We shall not turn our backs on this legacy.

### **The Modern Agenda**

Today we face a new agenda. Our accomplishments over the past generation have changed the world and defined our tasks for the coming decades:

—Our allies, the major industrial democracies, have recovered their vigor and influence. We are transforming our alliances into more equal partnerships. We shall act in harmony with friends whose security and prosperity is indispensable to our own and whose cooperation is essential for progress and justice.

—The incredible destructiveness of modern weapons has transformed international politics. We must maintain our military strength. But we have an obligation, in our own interest as well as the world's, to work with other nations to control both the growth and the spread of nuclear weapons.

—In our relations with the Communist powers we must never lose sight of the fact that in the thermonuclear age general war would be disastrous to mankind. We have an obligation to seek a more productive and stable relationship despite the basic antagonism of our values.

—Thirty years of economic and political evolution have brought about a new diffusion of power and initiative. At the same time, interdependence imposes upon all nations the reality that they must prosper together or suffer together. The destinies of the world's

nations have become inevitably intertwined. Thus, the capacity of any one nation to shape events is more limited, and consequently our own choices are more difficult and complex.

### **The Legacy of Our Past**

To deal with this agenda we require strength of purpose and conviction. A nation unsure of its values cannot shape its future. A people confused about its direction will miss the opportunity to build a better and more peaceful world. This is why perhaps our deepest challenge is our willingness to face the increasing ambiguity of the problem of ends and means.

We start with strong assets. Throughout our history, we have sought to define and justify our foreign policy in terms of principle. We have never seen ourselves as just another nation-state pursuing selfish aims. We have always stood for something beyond ourselves—a beacon to the oppressed from other lands, from the first settlers to the recent refugees from Indochina. This conviction of our uniqueness contributed to our unity, gave focus to our priorities, and sustained our confidence in ourselves. It has been, and is, a powerful force.

But the emphasis on principle has also produced a characteristic American ambivalence. Relations with a world of nations falling short of our ideal has always presented us with dilemmas. As a people, we have oscillated between insistence on our uniqueness and the quest for broad acceptance of our values, between trying to influence international developments and seeking to isolate ourselves from them, between expecting too much of our power and being ashamed of it, between optimistic exuberance and frustration with the constraints practicality imposes.

Through most of our history, we have sought to shield our country and hemisphere from outside intrusion, to shun involvement in balance-of-power politics. Soldiers and diplomats—the practitioners of power—have always been looked upon with suspicion. We considered generosity in relief efforts, the encouragement of free international trade,



and the protection of our economic interests abroad as the only wholesome forms of international involvement.

Our Founding Fathers were sophisticated men who understood the European balance of power and knew how to profit from it. For the succeeding century and a half, our security was assured by favorable circumstances over which we had little influence. Shielded by two oceans and enriched by a bountiful nature, we proclaimed our special situation as universally valid to nations whose narrower margin of survival meant that their range of choices was far more limited than our own.

Indeed, the concern of other nations for security reinforced our sense of uniqueness. We were a haven for millions, a place where the injustices, inequities, privations, and abridgements of human dignity which the immigrants had suffered were absent or amenable to rapid redress.

As our strength and size expanded, we remained uncomfortable with the uses and responsibilities of power and involvement in day-to-day diplomacy. At the turn of the century, for example, there were soul-searching debates over the Spanish-American War and our first acquisition of noncontiguous territories. While many saw our policies as dictated by our interests, others considered them our entrance into a morally questionable world.

Our tradition of law encouraged repeated attempts to legislate solutions to international conflicts. Arbitration, conciliation, international legal arrangements, neutrality legislation, collective security systems—all these were invoked to banish the reality of power. And when our involvement in conflict became unavoidable in 1917, Woodrow Wilson translated our geopolitical interest in preventing any nation's hegemony in Europe into a universal moral objective; we fought to "make the world safe for democracy."

The inevitable disillusionment with an imperfect outcome led to a tide of isolationist sentiment. The Great Depression drew our energies further inward, as we sought to deal with the problems of our own society—

even as that same depression simultaneously generated real dangers abroad.

We were stirred from isolation only by external attack, and we sustained our effort because of the obvious totalitarian evil. We had opposed all-out war, and total victory further strengthened our sense of moral rectitude—and ill prepared us for the aftermath. Of all the nations involved, we alone emerged essentially unscathed from the ravages of conflict, our military power, economic strength, and political confidence intact. And in the postwar bipolar world of cold war confrontation, we believed we faced a reincarnation of the just-defeated foe—an apparently monolithic and hostile ideological empire whose ambitions and values were antithetical to our own.

Our success and the preeminent position it brought convinced us that we could shape the globe according to American design. Our preponderant power gave us a broad margin for error, so we believed that we could overwhelm problems through the sheer weight of resources. No other nation possessed so much insurance against so many contingencies; we could afford to be imprecise in the definition of our interests. Indeed, we often imagined that we had nothing so selfish as interests, only obligations and responsibilities. In a period of seemingly clear-cut black-and-white divisions, we harbored few doubts about the validity of our cause.

### **America's Role**

We no longer live in so simple a world. We remain the strongest nation and the largest single factor in international affairs. Our leadership is perhaps even more essential than before. But our strategic superiority has given way to nuclear balance. Our political and economic predominance has diminished as others have grown in strength, and our dependence on the world economy has increased. Our margin of safety has shrunk.

Today we find that—like most other nations in history—we can neither escape from the world nor dominate it. Today, we must

conduct diplomacy with subtlety, flexibility, maneuver, and imagination in the pursuit of our interests. We must be thoughtful in defining our interests. We must prepare against the worst contingency and not plan only for the best. We must pursue limited objectives and many objectives simultaneously. In this effort, the last decade has taught us:

—That our power will not always bring preferred solutions; but we are still strong enough to influence events, often decisively.

—That we cannot remedy all the world's ills; but we can help build an international structure that will foster the initiative and cooperation of others.

—That we can no longer expect that moral judgments expressed in absolute terms will command broad acceptance; but as the richest and most powerful nation, we still have a special responsibility to look beyond narrow definitions of our national interests and to serve as a sponsor of world order.

—That we cannot banish power politics from international affairs; but we can promote new and wider communities of interest among nations; we can mute the use and threat of force; we can help establish incentives for restraint and penalties for its absence; we can encourage the resolution of disputes through negotiation; and we can help construct a more equitable pattern of relations between developed and developing nations.

This new complexity has produced in some a rebellion against contemporary foreign policy. We are told that our foreign policy is excessively pragmatic, that it sacrifices virtue in the mechanical pursuit of stability. Once attacked as cold-war-oriented, we are now criticized by some as insensitive to moral values. Once regarded as naive in the use of power, we are now alleged to rely too much on the efficacy of force. Once viewed as the most generous of nations, we now stand accused by some of resisting a more equitable international economic system.

It is time to face the reality of our situation. Our choice is not between morality and pragmatism. We cannot escape either, nor are they incompatible. This nation must be

true to its own beliefs, or it will lose its bearings in the world. But at the same time it must survive in a world of sovereign nations and competing wills.

We need moral strength to select among often agonizing choices and a sense of purpose to navigate between the shoals of difficult decisions. But we need as well a mature sense of means lest we substitute wishful thinking for the requirements of survival.

Clearly we are in need of perspective. Let me state some basic principles:

—*Foreign policy must start with security.* A nation's survival is its first and ultimate responsibility; it cannot be compromised or put to risk. There can be no security for us or for others unless the strength of the free countries is in balance with that of potential adversaries, and no stability in power relationships is conceivable without America's active participation in world affairs.

The choices in foreign policy are often difficult and the margins are frequently narrow; imperfect solutions are sometimes unavoidable. In the Second World War, for example, we joined forces with countries whose values we did not share, in order to accomplish the morally worthy objective of defeating nazism. Today we cooperate with many nations for the purpose of regional stability and global security, even though we disapprove of some of their internal practices. These choices are made consciously and are based on our best assessment of what is necessary.

—*At the same time, security is a means, not an end.* The purpose of security is to safeguard the values of our free society. And our survival is not always at stake in international issues. Many of our decisions are not imposed on us by events. Where we have latitude, we must seize the moral opportunity for humanitarian purposes.

Our assistance to developing nations, for example, serves both foreign policy and humanitarian ends. It strengthens political ties to other nations. It contributes to expanded trade; close to 90 percent of our foreign assistance is eventually spent in this country. And our assistance reflects our

values as a people, because we cannot close our eyes to the suffering of others. Because of history and moral tradition, we cannot live with ourselves as an island of plenty in a world of deprivation.

In the whole field of foreign aid, and particularly in food aid, America's record is unsurpassed. We and the world owe much to leaders with vision and compassion like Senator Humphrey who drafted the Food for Peace legislation some 20 years ago.

—*Finally, our values link the American people and their government.* In a democracy, the conduct of foreign policy is possible only with public support. Therefore your government owes you an articulation of the purposes which its policies are designed to serve—to make clear our premises, to contribute to enlightened debate, and to explain how our policies serve the American people's objectives. And those principles—freedom, the dignity of the individual, the sanctity of law—are at the heart of our policy; they are also the foundation of our most basic and natural partnerships with the great industrial democracies, which are essential to our safety and well-being.

### Morality and Policy

The relation of morality to policy is thus not an abstract philosophical issue. It applies to many topics of the current debate. It applies to relations with the Communist powers, where we must manage a conflict of moral purposes and interests in the shadow of nuclear peril; and it applies in our political ties with nations whose domestic practices are inconsistent with our own.

Our relationship with the Communist powers has raised difficult questions for Americans since the Bolshevik Revolution. It was understood very early that the Communist system and ideology were in conflict with our own principles. Sixteen years passed before President Franklin Roosevelt extended diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Government. He did so in the belief, as he put it, that "through the resumption of normal relations the prospects of peace over all the world are greatly strengthened."

Today again courageous voices remind us of the nature of the Soviet system and of our duty to defend freedom. About this there is no disagreement.

There is, however, a clear conflict between two moral imperatives which is at the heart of the problem. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the world's fears of holocaust and its hopes for a better future have both hinged on the relationship between the two superpowers. In an era of strategic nuclear balance—when both sides have the capacity to destroy civilized life—there is no alternative to coexistence.

In such conditions the necessity of peace is itself a moral imperative. As President Kennedy pointed out:<sup>2</sup>

... in the final analysis our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all moral.

It is said, correctly, that the Soviet perception of "peaceful coexistence" is not the same as ours, that Soviet policies aim at the furthering of Soviet objectives. In a world of nuclear weapons capable of destroying mankind, in a century which has seen resort to brutal force on an unprecedented scale and intensity, in an age of ideology which turns the domestic policies of nations into issues of international contention, the problem of peace takes on a profound moral and practical difficulty. But the issue, surely, is not whether peace and stability serve Soviet purposes, but whether they also serve our own. Constructive actions in Soviet policy are desirable whatever the Soviet motives.

This government has stated clearly and constantly the principles which we believe must guide U.S.-Soviet relations and international conduct and which are consistent with both our values and our interests:

—We will maintain a strong and flexible military posture to preserve our security. We will as a matter of principle and national interest oppose attempts by any country to achieve global or regional predominance.

<sup>2</sup> For President Kennedy's address at American University, Washington, D.C., on June 10, 1963, see *Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy, 1963*, p. 459.

—We will judge the state of U.S.-Soviet relations not by atmospherics, but by whether concrete problems are successfully resolved.

—All negotiations will be a two-way street, based on reciprocity of benefit and reliable observance of agreements.

—We will insist, as we always have, that progress in U.S.-Soviet economic relations must reflect progress toward stable political relationships.

—We will never abandon our ideals or our friends. We will not negotiate over the heads of, or against the interests of, other nations.

—We will respond firmly to attempts to achieve unilateral advantage or to apply the relaxation of tensions selectively.

Beyond the necessities of coexistence there is the hope of a more positive relationship. The American people will never be satisfied with simply reducing tension and easing the danger of nuclear holocaust. Over the longer term, we hope that firmness in the face of pressure and the creation of incentives for cooperative action may bring about a more durable pattern of stability and responsible conduct.

Today's joint manned mission in space—an area in which 15 years ago we saw ourselves in almost mortal rivalry—is symbolic of the distance we have traveled. Practical progress has been made on a wide range of problems. Berlin has been removed as a source of conflict between East and West; crises have been dampened; the frequency of U.S.-Soviet consultation on bilateral and multilateral problems is unprecedented; the scope of bilateral exchanges and cooperation in many fields is in dramatic contrast to the state of affairs ten, even five, years ago. The agreements already achieved to limit strategic armament programs—the central weapons of our respective military arsenals—are unparalleled in the history of diplomacy. Your Senator Mondale is a strong and constructive advocate of such strategic arms control efforts.

Our immediate focus is on the international actions of the Soviet Union not because it is our only moral concern, but

because it is the sphere of action that we can most directly and confidently affect. As a consequence of improved foreign policy relationships, we have successfully used our influence to promote human rights. But we have done so quietly, keeping in mind the delicacy of the problem and stressing results rather than public confrontation.

Therefore critics of détente must answer: What is the alternative that they propose? What precise policies do they want us to change? Are they prepared for a prolonged situation of dramatically increased international danger? Do they wish to return to the constant crises and high arms budgets of the cold war? Does détente encourage repression—or is it détente that has generated the ferment and the demands for openness that we are now witnessing? Can we ask our people to support confrontation unless they know that every reasonable alternative has been explored?

In our relations with the Soviet Union, the United States will maintain its strength, defend its interests, and support its friends with determination and without illusion. We will speak up for our beliefs with vigor and without self-deception. We consider détente a means to regulate a competitive relationship—not a substitute for our own efforts in building the strength of the free world. We will continue on the course on which we are embarked, because it offers hope to our children of a more secure and a more just world.

These considerations raise a more general question: To what extent are we able to affect the internal policies of other governments and to what extent is it desirable?

There are some 150 nations in the world, and barely a score of them are democracies in any real sense. The rest are nations whose ideology or political practices are inconsistent with our own. Yet we have political relations and often alliances with some of these countries in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Europe.

Congressman Fraser has raised this issue with great integrity and concern, and I have profited from many discussions with him. We do not and will not condone repressive practices. This is not only dictated by our values

but is also a reflection of the reality that regimes which lack legitimacy or moral authority are inherently vulnerable. There will therefore be limits to the degree to which such regimes can be congenial partners. We have used, and we will use, our influence against repressive practices. Our traditions and our interests demand it.

But truth compels also a recognition of our limits. The question is whether we promote human rights more effectively by counsel and friendly relations where this serves our interest or by confrontational propaganda and discriminatory legislation. And we must also assess the domestic performance of foreign governments in relation to their history and to the threats they face. We must have some understanding for the dilemmas of countries adjoining powerful, hostile, and irreconcilable totalitarian regimes.

Our alliances and political relationships serve mutual ends; they contribute to regional and world security and thus support the broader welfare. They are not favors to other governments, but reflect a recognition of mutual interests. They should be withdrawn only when our interests change and not as a punishment for some act with which we do not agree.

In many countries, whatever the internal structure, the populations are unified in seeking our protection against outside aggression. In many countries our foreign policy relationships have proved to be no obstacle to the forces of change. And in many countries, especially in Asia, it is the process of American disengagement that has eroded the sense of security and created a perceived need for greater internal discipline—and at the same time diminished our ability to influence domestic practices.

The attempt to deal with those practices by restrictive American legislation raises a serious problem not because of the moral view it expresses—which we share—but because of the mistaken impression it creates that our security ties are acts of charity. And beyond that, such acts—because they are too public, too inflexible, and too much a stimulus to nationalistic resentment—are almost inevitably doomed to fail.

There are no simple answers. Painful experience should have taught us that we ought not exaggerate our capacity to foresee, let alone to shape, social and political change in other societies. Therefore let me state the principles that will guide our action:

—Human rights are a legitimate international concern and have been so defined in international agreements for more than a generation.

—The United States will speak up for human rights in appropriate international forums and in exchanges with other governments.

—We will be mindful of the limits of our reach; we will be conscious of the difference between public postures that satisfy our self-esteem and policies that bring positive results.

—We will not lose sight of either the requirements of global security or what we stand for as a nation.

#### The Domestic Dimension

For Americans, then, the question is not whether our values should affect our foreign policy, but how. The issue is whether we have the courage to face complexity and the inner conviction to deal with ambiguity, whether we will look behind easy slogans and recognize that our great goals can only be reached by patience and in imperfect stages.

The question is also whether we will use our moral convictions to escape reality or as a source of courage and self-confidence. We hear too often assertions that were a feature of our isolationist period: that a balance of power is a cynical game; that secret conspiratorial intentions lurk behind open public policies; that weapons are themselves the sources of conflict; that intelligence activities are wicked; that humanitarian assistance and participation in the economic order are an adequate substitute for political engagement.

These are the counsels of despair. I refuse to accept the premise that our moral values and policy objectives are irreconcilable. The ends we seek in our foreign policy must have

validity in the framework of our beliefs, or we have no meaningful foreign policy. The maintenance of peace is a moral as well as a practical objective; measures to limit armaments serve a moral as well as practical end; the cohesion of our alliances with the great industrial democracies makes our way of life and our principles more secure; cooperation to improve the world economic system enhances the well-being of peoples; policies to reconcile the rich nations and the poor, and to enhance the progress of both, serve a humane as well as a political end.

We live in a secular age which prides itself on its realism. Modern society is impersonal and bureaucratized. The young, who in every generation crave a sense of purpose, are too often offered cynicism and escapism instead of a faith that truly inspires. All modern democracies are beset by problems beyond the margin of government's ability to control. Debunking of authority further drains democratic government of the ability to address the problems that beset it. A world of turmoil and danger cries out for structure and leadership. The opportunities that we face as a nation to help shape a more just international order depend more than ever on a steady, resolute, and self-assured America.

This requires confidence—the leaders' confidence in their values, the public's confidence in its government, and the nation's collective confidence in the worth of its objectives.

Thus, for this nation to contribute truly to peace in the world it must make peace with itself. It is time to put aside the cynicism and distrust that have marked—and marred—our political life for the better part of the past decade. It is time to remind ourselves that, while we may disagree about means, as Americans we all have the same ultimate objective—the peace, prosperity, and tranquility of our country and of the world.

And most of all, it is time we recognized that as the greatest democracy the world has ever known, we are a living reminder that there is an alternative to tyranny and oppression. The revolution that we began 200 years ago goes on, for most of the world still lives without the freedom that has for so long been ours. To them we remain a

beacon of hope and an example to be emulated.

So let us come together for the tasks that our time demands. We have before us an opportunity to bring peace to a world that awaits our leadership.

## Questions and Answers Following the Secretary's Minneapolis Address

Press release 372B dated July 17

*Donald R. Grangaard, president, Upper Midwest Council: Mr. Secretary, for the great Upper Midwest, a portion of this nation which has long been concerned with principles and ideals and their execution, you have brought a great message, and we again are deeply grateful. Thanks, most sincerely. [Applause.]*

*As was suggested earlier in the day, we will now spend a profitable period imposing on Secretary Kissinger to respond to questions which have been submitted by the audience. I am going to follow on the order of questioning which has been selected by our World Affairs Panel. With your permission, Mr. Secretary, I would like to read the question, and the name of the person who has authored it, and invite you to come to the podium to respond to it, please.*

*The first question is from Mr. Nathan Berman of Minneapolis. Do you feel that pressuring Israel to make concessions without equal pressure being applied to Egypt is morally defensible?*

*Secretary Kissinger: Let me answer this question, and then there were a few questions submitted orally earlier [laughter], which I would also like to deal with.*

First of all, it is not correct that we are pressuring Israel to make concessions or that the advice that we may give to one side is not matched by advice which we give to the other side.

It is worthwhile to remember that all our efforts in trying to promote peace in the Middle East have been carried out at the request of both parties. It is also worthwhile to remember that the consequences of

another war in the Middle East would be extremely grave for Israel, extremely grave for the industrial world, and raise a high risk of confrontation with the Soviet Union. Therefore we have an obligation to attempt to see whether it can be avoided.

But any settlement that may be reached between Israel and Egypt will be the result of American efforts which have been exerted equally on both parties. The difference is that when we make a proposal to Israel, it has to be discussed in its Cabinet, which speaks almost as much to the press as our Cabinet does, and therefore there is a slightly greater consciousness in the public press of what we say to Israel than what we say to Egypt.

If there should be an agreement, and when it is possible to compare the starting position of both sides with what is finally achieved, I am certain that everybody will agree that both sides will have made significant concessions, because without that, no meaningful agreement is possible.

Now, if I could perhaps address one or two of the questions that I heard earlier. One was, "Why do we not recognize Cambodia, or why do we not have diplomatic relations with Cambodia and Viet-Nam?"

With respect to Cambodia, we are dealing with a government that at this moment is engaged in one of the most barbaric practices that we have seen, in which 3 million people that lived in cities were told in a matter of minutes to go out into the countryside—a countryside that will not have a crop until November, and in which thousands, probably tens of thousands, are going to die from starvation and disease. It is a government, moreover, that has refused to establish diplomatic relations with all of the countries that have offered to have diplomatic relations with it. And therefore the question of diplomatic relations with Cambodia has never come up in any concrete way.

With respect to Viet-Nam, I have stated publicly, and I repeat here, that the United States is willing to look to the future and to gear its policies toward Viet-Nam to the policies which it pursues toward us and toward its neighbors.

With respect to the economic and military aid and its relationship—and the relationship between them, the question of military aid depends on whether it is given to countries whose security is in our interests and whether we share their conception of their security needs. It goes through detailed congressional scrutiny in each year and has substantially declined in each year and is substantially below the level of our foreign economic aid.

The foreign economic aid is not all we would like it to be. But we owe a great debt of gratitude to Senator Humphrey for his enlightened management of our foreign aid legislation, which relates us to other countries in the world and which contributes to establishing an economic and political structure that reflects the interdependence of mankind, and therefore we consider that both economic aid and declining military aid are in the national interests.

*Mr. Grangard: The next question submitted in the usual way is from Mr. Gelatis of Red Wing. Mr. Secretary, would you give us your thoughts on the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation and on the prospects for limitation and control?*

*Secretary Kissinger: The problem of weapons proliferation has two aspects—one, the development of nuclear weapons by countries that have industrial capacity to do so today, such as, for example, a country with the industrial capacity of Japan; and secondly, the danger of nuclear proliferation that derives from the spread of nuclear technology.*

With respect to the first problem, the United States and a number of other countries in 1970 signed the Nonproliferation Treaty, which was designed to put a limit—actually the Nonproliferation Treaty was signed before 1970 and ratified then—which was designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons by putting safeguards on certain types of explosives and on the spread of nuclear technology. However, not all countries in the world have signed the Nonproliferation Treaty.

We face today, as a result of the energy

crisis, a much greater incentive for the spread of nuclear technology because nuclear energy has now become commercially profitable and in fact, in many countries, economically necessary. We are deeply concerned about the impact of the spread of nuclear technology because it will give an increasing number of countries the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons of their own.

There is the danger that in the pursuit of commercial interests, the countries exporting nuclear technology may begin to compete in easing safeguards. Therefore the United States is at this moment engaged in negotiations with exporters of nuclear technology to see whether we could all agree to strengthening the existing safeguards under preferably United Nations IAEA—International Atomic Energy Agency—safeguards in order to avoid the tragedy that commercial competition and the pressures of the energy crisis produce a situation where 10 to 15 years from now people will ask themselves: "What did the leaders in the 1970's think of when they permitted this nuclear technology to spread unchained?"

These decisions will have to be made within the next year or the proliferation of nuclear technology may really raise grave difficulties in other decades.

*Mr. Grangaard: Mr. Secretary, this question is from Mr. Dietz of St. Paul. What is State Department policy with respect to whether American overseas business should conform to local custom or follow on U.S. standards of business morality in the host country? [Laughter.]*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I don't know which of the two criteria are more painful. [Laughter.]

I think that the relationship of American corporations, or of multinational corporations, to the host country is one of the problems that requires a great deal of attention. On the one hand, private capital is more readily available right now for development than much of government capital. Therefore

it is in our interests to encourage the investment abroad of American capital.

On the other hand, these American enterprises must conform to local conditions, and we must see whether the local requirements can be put into some international framework so that there is some pattern that gives assurances to the host government against undue interference and to American business some guarantee of stability.

We are inviting to the State Department in the next few weeks a number of executives from our leading corporations to see whether they could think up, or work with us in developing some criteria that they could live with and at the same time could be internationally acceptable that would deal with the problem that is raised by this question, which we could then take up with potential host countries to see whether one can get some international framework of acceptable conduct by both host governments and foreign corporations.

*Mr. Grangaard: Mr. Secretary, this question is from Mr. Cameron of Pryor Lake. How strong do you feel the trend in the United States is toward returning to a policy of isolationism?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, the curious thing that is happening in America right now is that the trend toward isolationism is strongest in those parts of the country which used to carry the international policies—in many parts of the East, among many intellectuals. The support for foreign policy is most active in those parts of the country that used to be isolationist, like the Middle West and many parts of the country away from the eastern seacoast—which is an interesting phenomenon of the contemporary period.

I believe, however, that with the end of the war in Indochina, America is coming together again and that there is an increasing recognition of our importance to peace and progress in the world and also a greater understanding that we cannot do everything and that we must work more cooperatively. So I think our most difficult period in



this sense is behind us and that we can work together on a nonpartisan basis in the pursuit of our foreign policy.

*Mr. Grangaard: This from Mr. Stewart Hunter of Northfield. What are the prospects and the means for an effective international peacekeeping body such as a good, effective United Nations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, yesterday in Milwaukee, I pointed out the concerns the United States has with the present procedures, the conduct of some countries in the United Nations.

The United States continues to believe that many problems, including the problem of peacekeeping, can only be settled—solved—on a global basis. The nature of nuclear technology, the nature of the energy and food and raw materials problems, all require global solutions. But also we must face the fact that many nations have organized themselves into blocs and are pursuing bloc tactics of confrontation.

What I intended yesterday with my speech in Milwaukee—if I may mention that city here [laughter]—is to point out that we have a great opportunity for international cooperation, in fact, an unprecedented opportunity, but that requires a sense of responsibility by all of the countries and that it requires an attitude of cooperation which has not always been reflected in the recent sessions of the General Assembly or its specialized agencies.

*Mr. Grangaard: And this question from Mr. Brown, Mr. Rich Brown, of St. Paul. What is your reaction to the concept that détente with the Russians helps the U.S.S.R. more than the United States?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I reject this concept. Détente is in the mutual interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States. Both countries have a great interest in preserving the peace. Both countries sooner or later, if not in this decade then in the next decade, must solve the problem that the globe is now too small for the kind of confrontation that was natural in the relationship among na-

tions even a generation ago.

If we look at what has actually been negotiated between the two countries, every settlement has been in the mutual interest. A limitation of strategic arms is in our mutual interest. A settlement of the Berlin crisis is in the mutual interest. The easing of tensions is in our mutual interest.

We, however, must not use détente as a cure-all for everything. Détente is not a substitute for our own efforts. Détente must not be used as an alibi when things go wrong anywhere in the world of blaming it on somebody else, because very often it is to our own actions. And those who raise this question should ask themselves this: "What exactly is it they want us to do as an alternative to this policy? Do they want us to create tension? Do they want us to raise the level of international conflict?" Can we really ask the American people to face the risks of war unless we can demonstrate to them that their government has explored every reasonable alternative?

I believe that any Administration, of whatever party, whatever may be said in the abstract, will be driven to the realization that the problem of peace is the dominant problem of our time, and that it cannot be conceived as a unilateral benefit to anybody.

*Mr. Grangaard: Mr. Secretary, this question from Mr. Robert Provost of Minneapolis. How do you see the Korean problem being resolved?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I frankly do not see that the Korean problem has a permanent solution in the foreseeable future.

What we have on the Korean Peninsula is two governments, the South Korean Government and the North Korean Government, which have irreconcilable objectives. What we must attempt to do for this period is to prevent the outbreak of war, to create conditions in which these two governments can resume the process of negotiation which they started some years ago, and to look toward a general easing of world tensions within which the Korean problem can also in time be solved. But it has no short-term solution.

## Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Minneapolis July 15

*Following is the transcript of a news conference held by Secretary Kissinger at the Radisson South Hotel in Bloomington (Minneapolis), Minn., on July 15.*

Press release 374 dated July 17

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could tell us what progress, if any, the State Department is making on negotiating with the Canadian Government on maintaining the flow of oil to this country. It gets kind of cold here in the wintertime.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I was asked this question this morning in an off-the-record meeting, and I did not know the answer then. I really do not have the answer to that question.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you know, where I live in Minnesota the farmers don't care very much for the idea of a lot of government-held grain reserves hanging over the market price. Are you going to be coming along one of these days and telling them that is a sacrifice they should accept in the national interest?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, the farmers have no objection to the purchases that are involved in building up the grain reserves. They are concerned that the grain reserves will be used to depress prices in inflationary periods and that the government will use grain reserves to depress prices. And secondly, they are not very much for government storage of grain reserves.

Now, the grain reserve program that we have put forward first of all calls for privately held grain reserves. Secondly, the basic reason for our position on grain reserves is that, if there are catastrophes that could have been foreseen by governments that were not dealt with, it shakes confidence in governments all over the world. The margin by which food is now being produced

in relation to needs is very narrow indeed. And at that point, if there is a major shortfall, the demand on the American supplies will be so enormous that things could get completely out of control.

So we are looking for the grain reserves not in order to affect domestic prices, but so that we have a cushion in case of emergencies and so that we can get other governments also to hold reserves, many of which would be purchased from the United States.

But we believe that when the agricultural community understands the nature of our grain reserve proposal they will substantially support it. They are seeing it in terms of some of the older schemes that have existed. Basically our idea is that the American reserves should be privately held, and secondly, that the international reserves would be up to each country to create, which would enable us to establish some priority among claimants on our own food. And it is not relevant to an attempt to reduce the prices in this country.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you comment on the FBI's report that foreign embassies have been broken into over the course of the past several years?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have not seen this report yet. I have just seen some fragmentary press accounts. And therefore I cannot really comment on it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the Egyptians say that they are not going to renew the U.N. mandate in the Sinai next week. What does this do to your Middle East peace efforts?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, it underlines the problem to which we have been calling attention. Has it been officially stated?

*Q. A letter from the Egyptian Government to Waldheim [Kurt Waldheim, U.N. Secretary General].*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think it calls attention to the urgency of the problem and to the need of working out some new interim solutions. We will have to study the implications—whether they will in fact ask for the removal of these forces, which I doubt. I think they may simply not renew the mandate. But I will have to study precisely what it means.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I realize that you are not looking for apple pie answers and questions. And I'm from the Heartline KDHL Radio in upper Minnesota. And I have a resolution here from the American Legion, the whole State of California, that states that the Council on Foreign Relations, 68th Street, New York City, is a subversive organization. And it has already been passed in a resolution. Now, these are a thousand of Legionnaires; and I am speaking as a Legionnaire myself, as well as a reporter. Now, I understand that you are a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. And if the American Legion considers this subversive, then why are you a part of it, sir?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, first of all, with all due respect for the American Legion, I think that its judgment of whether the Council on Foreign Relations is subversive may be based on insufficient information. After all, the Council on Foreign Relations has in its membership almost every—in fact, every Cabinet member who has dealt with foreign policy or defense policy, or every senior official—

*Q. Well, sir, don't you believe that the American Legion, who has fought for our country—and there are many laying out in foreign lands—are capable enough of investigating and their investigating should be just as positive as this jerky Congress we have now?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I must say I—

*Q. I mean, you are talking about the American Legion now. And I want you to answer in that vein; if they are stupid enough not to know what the CFR is—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* You are talking about one American Legion post.

*Q. This is thousands of—this is the whole chapter of California, sir. I don't believe they are stupid, and I don't believe they like to be called stupid.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am not saying they are stupid. But I must say, with all due respect to the American Legion in California, if you look at the membership of the Council on Foreign Relations and consider it subversive, then the country is really in bad shape, because it contains every major—

*Q. You don't suppose it is in good shape, do you, Mr. Secretary, with the unemployment and all this junk, and the educational system? You don't believe that we are not having a little problem?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I do not think that the subversion in this country will be led by the Council on Foreign Relations.

*Q. Well, I hope that the news media here this evening, if they have got any guts at all, can bring this out to the American Legion as to your answer to this. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.*

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could I ask you to be more specific about your speech last night about the United Nations and your reference again today. Specifically, if the General Assembly should vote to exclude Israel in the coming General Assembly session, is this the sort of thing that might cause the United States to withdraw from the General Assembly?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, we have not said exactly what we will do if the Charter of the United Nations is violated, in our view. We believe that the expulsion of member states by the General Assembly, which is a responsibility under the charter of the Security Council, would be an act which would affect American participation in the activities of that body. To what degree and in what manner remains to be determined. But we believe that the charter should be strictly observed and should not be used for punitive purposes that are incompatible with it.

*Q. If I could just follow that up. You say*

*it would affect American participation. Are you referring to the reaction that probably would occur in Congress or are you talking about action by the executive branch?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The executive branch would undoubtedly take some actions. But what these actions would be I am not now prepared to say. But above all we are trying to prevent that situation from arising.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, you mentioned in response to an earlier question today that what the United States says to Israel is in the press more than what the United States says to Egypt. Is there anything that the United States has said to Egypt that hasn't made the news as of yet?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The individual steps by which the negotiation proceeds are, in the nature of the governmental system in Israel, likely to be more public. The basic point that I made was that the United States attempts to advance the negotiating process and it makes its best judgment to each side as to what is needed to make progress. And we have done this with Egypt. As the negotiations come to a conclusion, if they come to a conclusion, then it will be apparent what each side has conceded.

But the United States cannot, as an intermediary, announce on its part what each side is going to say or what it says to each side at each stage along the way.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, along those lines, the conduct of foreign policy in a democracy has been compared to playing stud poker with the hole card turned up. Leaving abuses in the past aside, should security leaks—breaches of whatever nature—occur again, would you participate in wiretapping or other surveillance methods similarly covert?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, you know, the subject of wiretapping has been discussed at inordinate length in recent years, however confined usually only to one administration.

The problem of security in a democracy, the problem of what things should be made public and what things threaten national security, is a very serious one. There are

certain secrets that anybody concerned with the conduct of foreign policy must want to safeguard because if they are jeopardized they will threaten the national security of the United States.

Your question is very hard to answer in the abstract. But any government, any administration, has to protect some of its secrets. Now, whether that is carried too far, whether the effort to protect it is carried too far, that is a question of legitimate inquiry.

And I would also say that, of course, the legal position—the Supreme Court has taken a position on wiretapping that every administration should—must—observe and will observe.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, Agriculture Secretary Butz said yesterday that he thought that President Ford was unbeatable in 1976. Do you concur with that assessment?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am responsible for foreign policy. I think foreign policy is a nonpartisan effort. And I will not get into partisan activities or make any political prediction.

*Q. How do you view today's space flight, Mr. Secretary?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think it is a positive indication of the relationships between the Soviet Union and the United States. It is the sort of cooperative effort which brings home to both peoples, on both sides, that we are living on a small planet, that we can do constructive things together, and that we must try to coexist. I therefore view it as a very positive thing.

*Q. Could you please advise on foreign countries' current needs for American agricultural products and what importance they play in your negotiations with: one, the OPEC countries [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] and two, Russia?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The agricultural productivity of the United States is one of the most important factors in the world economy today, and it is one of our great assets. The United States produces the largest surpluses.

It contributes more food aid than all of the rest of the world combined. Its technological skill can contribute enormously to closing the gap between production and need, in which the ultimate solution of the food problem resides.

Now, the way we can use this in concrete negotiations is affected by two things: first, by the negotiation itself; and secondly, by the kind of world that we want to create. Because after all, it is in our interests and in the interests of the world to show that a commodity in which we have a special advantage, used responsibly, can set a pattern for how commodities in which other countries have a special advantage can also be used responsibly.

So in negotiations with the Soviet Union, we have the problem that our sales are conducted by private companies, and of course our foreign policy is not yet conducted by private companies. So we have to gear some of the actions of these private companies, maybe, to our requirements in foreign policy; and that does not mesh with great precision.

We are trying to keep in mind that we should not sell so much that it will later bring enormous pressures on our own economy or deprive us of the food for our other international needs and yet sell enough so that the American farmer can get rid of his production.

We have worked out an informal system which has worked rather well and which we will apply in this present situation on sales.

*Q. The other half of that was the OPEC countries.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Yes. With respect to the OPEC countries, a great deal depends on what actions they will take and what general framework can be created for all kinds of commodities; and this we will know a little better at the end of this year.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, in your speech you apparently said that no stability in power relationships is conceivable without America's active participation in world affairs. And my question is how actively do you feel*

*the United States must participate in world affairs in order to achieve stability in power relationships, for instance, in Korea or in the Middle East?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That is a difficult question to answer in the abstract. In many parts of the world no stability is possible without an American effort. On the other hand, the situation of the United States has changed as compared to the immediate post-war period, in which all the efforts had to be carried out almost exclusively by the United States. Other parts of the world have now developed some strength and self-confidence and can assume larger responsibilities.

As a general rule, the United States is reluctant to undertake new commitments for the long-term stationing of military forces abroad and looks rather for the local capacity to defend itself if necessary and, if we think it is in our own interests, with our support.

In the Middle East we are in the position that we are the only country that both parties can talk to or have been willing to talk to. And also we are the country that has been the major source of support for Israel. Therefore we have an obligation to see what we can do to bring the parties closer together and to see whether some momentum can be created for peace.

In Korea we have a mutual security treaty which obliges us to the common defense, which is also in our interest because of the importance Japan and other countries attach to it.

So I would say our role is changing. It is less direct than it was in the past, and it is less military than it has been in the past. But it still has to be significant.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of your outstanding diplomatic contributions, I was wondering: first of all, why it seems to be that you pour so much into your work and work so rigorously; and secondly, what you do to relax and get away from things of the Department of State?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* What I do to get away from the Department of State? Travel.

*Q. First of all, why do you work so rigorously in diplomatic relations and what you do to relax and just unwind?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, the first question requires, I suppose, a psychological analysis which I may not be in the best position to make. But I think for somebody who has seen in his life the consequences of what can happen if societies collapse and the consequences of war, there is an interest and an incentive to do what one can for domestic tranquillity and above all for international peace. And perhaps for somebody who has come to this country as an immigrant, one can understand better how important this country is to the rest of the world than people who have perhaps not exactly the standard of comparison.

As far as relaxing is concerned, this job does not lend itself to too many free periods. But I have been given a dog for my birthday, and I have to walk him now. [Laughter.]

*Q. Mr. Secretary, three of the recommendations of the Murphy Commission were that the CIA be reorganized into a new agency, the Foreign Intelligence Agency; that the paramilitary operations of the CIA be shifted to the Department of Defense (DOD); and that the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs should not ordinarily hold a Cabinet position, as you currently do. What plans are there to implement these recommendations, and if there are no such plans, why not?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, the Murphy Commission recommendations are now being studied by the executive branch, and therefore I cannot tell you which of them are going to be implemented and which of them are not going to be implemented.

The proposition that the Assistant to the President should not ordinarily be a Cabinet member is one with which it is hard to disagree. I would agree with those who hold the view that the President should have the right to make that decision himself. All the more so as the influence of any person with the President does not depend on the hierarchical position that he may have. The fact that I hold two positions does not give me

any additional influence with the President. And therefore I think it depends on the judgment that the President makes in each case. Some other recommendations of the Murphy Commission will no doubt be implemented. Maybe this one will be implemented, too. It is a little early to say.

*Q. Specifically, do you see any advantages to shifting the paramilitary operations of the CIA to Defense Intelligence Agency in the DOD?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, frankly, not particularly, because you can make a case for the proposition that we should not engage in paramilitary operations. But there is no way that the Defense Department can conduct paramilitary operations in the same way. The reason for having them in the Intelligence Agency was to permit a degree of dissociation from overt military operations and to prevent there being a direct engagement of American military power.

So I think one could have the argument one should not have paramilitary operations. But this is one that I have some question about.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you confirm for us absolutely rumors that there is going to be a major Soviet-U.S. grain deal this year; and if so, tell us how large it is going to be.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, there is no U.S.-Soviet grain deal of the kind of 1972, in which there were some governmental credits involved. We have had reports that the Soviet Union is interested in substantial purchases of American grain. And there have been some informal discussions in which they have tried to determine the amount that could be purchased without disrupting our market so completely that it might lead to a reaction such as occurred last year when an informal limit had to be put on. These informal discussions have taken place. But what the exact limit is has not yet been finally established. But I have the impression there will be Soviet grain purchases.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what area, in your estimation, poses the greatest threat to our U.S. security today?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, without answering the question of what is a threat to U.S. security, obviously the greatest immediate threat of war is in the Middle East.

The action to which my attention was called, which I have not officially heard yet, of the nonrenewal of the UNEF [U.N. Emergency Force] mandate in the Sinai is just one example of the precariousness of the situation in the Middle East if no progress is made toward a peace settlement. If there is a war in the Middle East, it is bound to have consequences outside of the Middle East. I think that is the area that is most complicated.

Of course, the nature of modern weapons is such that there are always dangers of technological breakthroughs and of one side getting ahead of the other, which is one reason why we attach so much importance to the strategic arms negotiations.

But the single most complicated area in the world and the single area most likely to produce a conflict, if no progress is made, is the Middle East.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, your talk today in a sense was a basic review of American foreign policy over 200 years. The question is, did the time and place of the talk have anything to do with the choice of the subject?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have felt for a long time that I should talk about the relationship of principles to practice in foreign policy. And I generally do not try to invent talks for particular audiences. That is to say, I thought this was an important subject on which to talk. I do believe, however, that particularly in Minnesota, with its idealistic tradition, with its Senators and Congressmen who have paid such particular attention to the range of problems that I discussed today, that this was an appropriate subject for this area.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, if U.S. troops are committed as a buffer in the Sinai, need we be afraid that that might be a military foot in the door that will be hard to extract, as the foot in Viet-Nam was hard to extract many years ago?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There is no possi-

bility of committing American forces as a buffer. And whatever may be done in the Sinai will not be to involve the United States in any possible military operation.

Now, I have seen some of the newspaper speculation on what might or might not be done. But I want to make clear that nothing that is being considered or even generally talked about involves a possibility of an American military involvement in any military conflict in the Middle East.

We are now conducting reconnaissance flights for both of the parties.

The issue that has been informally raised is whether some of these functions that are performed occasionally by reconnaissance flights could be done on a more permanent basis; that is to say, warning and so forth. But that would be done for both sides. It would not be done for the United States, and it would not involve any possibility of military combat.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, please, sir, in light of the recent and ever-continuing terrorist acts in Israel, is it a vital step still that Israel must negotiate with the Palestinians en route to the Geneva Conference?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The United States has never recommended that Israel negotiate with the Palestinians. The U.S. position is that the question of any negotiation between Palestinians and Israel presupposes the acceptance by the Palestinians of the State of Israel and of the relevant Security Council resolutions, neither of which has yet been done by the Palestinians. So we have never taken the position which you have described.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, first, we are very happy that you are here. Second, why do you insist on Israel to pull back; and if they do not, you say that you will not sell them any armaments?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, both of these propositions are incorrect.

We believe that progress toward peace in the Middle East is essential. It is essential in the interests of Israel; it is in the interests of the other countries; it is in the interests of the United States.

As long as the United States is in the

position in which it finds itself in the Middle East, we cannot escape the consequences of either a stalemate or of an explosion. And therefore we, having been first invited by both of the parties to participate in the negotiations, have given our own judgment as to what is required to make progress.

There has never been any question of embargoing arms to Israel. The questions have been the normal discussion of the scale of the support and some items of a particular kind of technology which are rather long-lead-time items.

So the two basic assumptions in your question are not correct.

But the United States believes—the President has repeatedly said it, and I have repeatedly said it—that a stalemate in the Middle East will in time have consequences that will be extremely unfortunate for all of the parties.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like you to comment on the negotiations for a Panama Canal treaty.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The United States signed about 18 months ago a declaration of principles with the Government of Panama in which we committed ourselves to continue in good faith the negotiations that were started in 1964, looking toward a new arrangement for the Panama Canal. The importance of this negotiation resides in the fact that Panama could become, in certain circumstances, a focal point for the kind of nationalistic guerrilla type of operation that we have not yet seen in the Western Hemisphere directed against the United States and might unify all of Latin America against the United States. Therefore the United States has negotiated in good faith to see what can be achieved that would give the United States a guarantee with respect to the defense of the canal and a substantial period of operation of the canal, but which would remove some of the particularly grating aspects of the present situation in Panama.

The United States will continue these negotiations. We do not yet know whether they can be concluded. We will stay in the

closest contact with the Congress on this at each stage and consult intimately with the Congress about the negotiations. But we are continuing the negotiations.

## United States and Canada Discuss Possible Oil Exchanges

Press release 345 dated June 25

Following a meeting in Ottawa on June 18, U.S. and Canadian officials have concluded that oil exchanges between U.S. and Canadian refineries could contribute to reducing supply and transportation costs, helping consumers in both countries.

Officials at the meeting discussed several alternatives for oil exchanges between U.S. and Canadian refiners, including possible longer term arrangements for the exchange of Alaskan oil.

U.S. and Canadian officials agreed to consider adjusting or removing legal, fiscal, and administrative impediments to commercially workable and mutually beneficial oil exchanges consistent with their respective national policies.

The Federal Energy Administration (FEA) will shortly contact U.S. refineries historically dependent on Canadian oil imports to advise them of the results of the discussions.

An exchange involves the supply by one company of oil to another company's refinery offset by the second company's returning oil to the first company's refinery at another location. The exchange results in transportation and other savings for both companies.

The Ottawa meeting was held between officials of the Department of State and the Federal Energy Administration and the Canadian Ministries of External Affairs and Energy, Mines and Resources.

In a related activity, the FEA is considering establishing a system for allocation of Canadian crude oil imports. However, such action, if implemented, cannot be expected to provide more than short-term relief to U.S. refiners dependent on Canadian oil.



## Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Milwaukee July 16

Press release 375 dated July 17

*Q. Mr. Secretary, does the Egyptian threat to terminate the U.N. peacekeeping-force mandate signal a snag in the Middle East negotiations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We are not yet fully clear about what is intended with the Egyptian letter to the Security Council. There is some implication in that letter, which we are attempting to clarify, that the UNEF [U.N. Emergency Force] can be extended by the Security Council and that they were primarily concerned with the surrounding circumstances. We believe that the timing of this letter, at this delicate moment, is extremely unfortunate and complicates things.

Of course, the United States has an interest in progress in the negotiations in the Middle East, and the United States is making every effort it can to promote progress in the Middle East. But ultimately, progress depends on the willingness of all parties to be conciliatory and to make the moves that are necessary. The U.S. effort cannot substitute for the effort of the parties concerned.

*Q. When you say, Mr. Secretary, "the surrounding circumstances," what are you referring to?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I do not want to speculate on something that we are attempting to clarify. But the possibility exists that the letter is intended to stimulate a general negotiating process and to call attention to—the objection was to the stalemate in the negotiations more than to the existence of the Force.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, also on the Mideast, there is a report that 40 Arab-bloc Foreign Ministers are meeting in Jidda today and voted to exclude Israel from the U.N. General Assembly this autumn. Is this the sort*

*of thing that you have in mind that could trigger an American reaction?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The U.S. position was stated by me in Milwaukee here two evenings ago. The United States strongly objects to the use of exclusion from the General Assembly as a method of conducting the diplomacy of any area. Exclusions from the United Nations or any of its organs have been by the charter assigned to the Security Council. And the United States cannot be indifferent to the abuse of the charter if that should be attempted.

I have not seen an official report of the action to which you have referred. But if this should be a proposition, the United States would resist it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in addition to the Egyptian letter, there have been demonstrations in Israel by people who oppose what they suspect is an agreement, coming agreement, by the government there. What do you see in view of these are the prospects now for an interim—another interim Israeli-Egyptian agreement?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I can only repeat what I have said previously. The progress toward peace in the Middle East is going to be difficult, and it is going to require sacrifices by all parties concerned. And inevitably, therefore, it is going to have painful elements for any of the parties.

The United States cannot substitute its efforts for the good will, for the willingness to cooperate, for the readiness to relate the immediate to the long-term interests of the parties involved. Therefore what I have said earlier is addressed to all of the parties: that the United States can help the parties; it cannot substitute for them.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the Israelis seem to feel that they are the ones—the only ones being*

asked to make sacrifices for a peace which would benefit both sides. What sacrifices are the Egyptians and the Arab side being asked to make?

*Secretary Kissinger:* I do not believe that it is helpful for the United States, which is trying to act as an intermediary at the request of the parties, to list the concessions that either side is willing to make. None of the stories of what either side has been willing to do or has been asked to do has come from the United States.

I am confident that if an agreement is reached, that when any fair-minded person compares the publicly stated starting position of the two sides with the final agreement, it will be self-evident that both sides have made concessions.

With respect to the question earlier that I have not fully answered, I believe that there are possibilities for achieving agreement. I stated last weekend that progress had been made. I still maintain this. I believe there is a possibility for making an agreement if everybody keeps in mind that the consequences of a breakdown of negotiations will transcend in significance any of the difficulties that will be produced by the negotiation itself. And under those conditions, I think the progress that has already been made can be consolidated and extended.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you see the role of the United States being vis-a-vis struggles for majority rule in southern Africa during the 1970's, especially in light of the heavy U.S. business interests in that area?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The United States has made clear its position that it favors respect for human rights and respect for the rights of all the populations in southern Africa. The United States has expressed also the strong hope, in the interests of all of the peoples concerned, that this process take place by peaceful means and through negotiation. And there have been some encouraging developments in this direction. So the United States will support an evolution in the direction of an extension of humane values, and it will support this evolution by peaceful means.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you think the consequences would be of the withdrawal of UNEF from the Sinai Desert?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, the consequences of the withdrawal of UNEF from the Sinai Desert would be to complicate enormously the negotiating possibilities and to raise serious doubts about the possibilities of such negotiating efforts. It would undoubtedly contribute to an increased state of tension. It would not necessarily mean an end of all the agreements that have been reached, but it would certainly compound an already difficult situation.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, former Governor Jimmy Carter of Georgia has criticized your policy position as being neglectful of the smaller developing countries. Do you plan at any time soon to make a visit to Africa to assure these countries that they are not being neglected?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, first, I understand the problems that Governor Carter has, and I do not want to be uncooperative. But if you read the public statements of the U.S. Government and the many speeches that I have given on the subject in recent months, the whole thrust of our approach is to insist that some arrangements must be negotiated.

Keep in mind the concerns of these developing countries. Our dispute with the developing countries is not about their aspirations, but about their methods. What I attempted to say here the other evening, what I said at the OECD [Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development] meeting in Paris, what I have said in Kansas City, is that the United States is prepared to have a dialogue on development with the new countries and to discuss with them their concerns with respect to raw materials, with respect to development, with respect to transnational corporations and other issues. And I have stated that we will put before this special session of the General Assembly our program of how to deal with it.

With all due respect to Governor Carter, I do not agree with him about the lack of concern. It is one of the big themes in our foreign policy.

Now, on the specific question, whether I plan to go to Africa. I have had the intention of going to Africa and have not been able to set a date because there were always some immediate crises that kept me here. But I would say my physical presence in Africa should not be confused with the basic direction of our policy, because the basic direction of our policy will be along the lines that I have described here.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you consider the recent statements in this country by Alexander Solzhenitsyn a threat to détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, and also, do you think that this Administration should minimize its contact with Mr. Solzhenitsyn?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I consider Solzhenitsyn one of the greatest writers of this period. In my present position, I seem to read only classified papers. Solzhenitsyn is one of the few unclassified documents that I have been reading. So I have enormous respect and admiration for Solzhenitsyn as a writer.

Secondly, I think this country can well afford to listen to a man of his distinction without worrying about what effect it will have on the foreign policy interests of the United States.

As for seeing senior officials, this can be considered from the foreign policy aspect. From the point of view of foreign policy the symbolic effect of that can be disadvantageous—which has nothing to do with a respect either for the man or for his message.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did you advise President Ford not to see Solzhenitsyn, and if you did, doesn't this kind of weakness convey to the world perhaps that the United States is not willing to stand up for its ideals?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think it is a very bad idea for White House advisers to engage in this constant series of leaks on who advised or who did not advise the President on what should be done.

In issues of this kind, the President solicits the opinion of many advisers, including foreign policy advisers. I myself happened to be out of the city when that

particular decision came up, but my office was asked, and I gave my opinion, and my opinion is the one that I have stated here, which is to distinguish between the man and the foreign policy implications of such a symbolic gesture.

I stand behind that view, which I do not consider a view of weakness, and which would have to be considered also in terms of other actions. But the President makes up his own mind, and I do not go into debates of who specifically recommends what at any moment, and I do not consider these—

*Q. If I could follow up for a moment. In what kind of light do you take his warnings that détente is a trap?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I take his warnings—if I understand the message of Solzhenitsyn, it is not only that détente is a threat but that the United States should pursue an aggressive policy to overthrow the Soviet system.

I believe that Solzhenitsyn is a man whose suffering entitles him to be heard and who has stood with great anguish for his views. But I do believe that if his views became the national policy of the United States, we would be confronting a considerable threat of military conflict. Therefore, for those who are responsible for the foreign policy of the United States, his views can be listened to with respect, but they cannot guide our actions, much as we admire his writings.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there are reports at the White House that the President may now see Solzhenitsyn.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The schedule of the President is not made in the State Department. As I said, when I am asked for the foreign policy implications, I will give them. As to the composition of the President's schedule, I think that should be asked by White House correspondents. That is not my responsibility.

*Q. You said that Solzhenitsyn, as you understand it, would pursue an aggressive policy to overthrow—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* My understanding of the message of Solzhenitsyn is that the

United States should seek to overthrow the Soviet system. And I believe that under modern conditions, with modern weapons, this has consequences that will not be acceptable to the American people or to the world. But this is no reflection on the literary greatness of Solzhenitsyn or on the importance of some of his messages.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on a related topic, what will the U.S. position be on the status of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The U.S. position on these subjects is unchanged by recent events, and we have no need to take a new position.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did the Egyptian move not to renew the U.N. mandate come as a surprise to the American Government, or was it predicted as part of the stalemate that—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have warned for months that a continuation of the stalemate would lead to serious consequences. We did not expect the move on the day on which it occurred. But we have predicted a move like that as the inevitable consequence of a continued stalemate. Therefore, in a strategic sense, we are not surprised. As far as the particular timing is concerned and the day on which it occurred, I have expressed my views.

*Q. To clarify, Mr. Secretary—is it your view that the withdrawal of the U.N. Force would lead to a breakdown of the negotiations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I do not want to say that. I would say without any question the withdrawal of the U.N. Force would complicate the negotiations.

*Q. Is it possible, sir, for the U.N. Force to stay on without a mandate?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* This is the sort of question that will have to be explored over the next few days. And of course one has to consult the views of the Secretary General of the United Nations and of legal authorities on this subject. Whether this is a possibility or whether it is possible for the Security Council to extend the mandate in

the absence of a direct request—these are questions that will have to be looked into.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is the solution to the Middle East a two-way one, a separate one for Jerusalem and a separate one for the other areas? And secondly, do you think the Pope could have any role in the solution?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There have been two general approaches to the Middle East negotiation, and these approaches are not incompatible but would inevitably merge at some point. One is whether all issues should be negotiated simultaneously between all of the parties on all of the topics—whether all of the countries and parties that have an interest should be participating from the very beginning and whether frontiers, Arab peace obligations, guarantees, Palestinian rights or interests, Jerusalem, and all the surrounding circumstances—whether all of these should be negotiated simultaneously or whether one should go as far as possible by taking individual steps between two of the parties concerned and go on from there to the final settlement.

Up to now, the United States has had the view that if the parties agree, it would be better to take the individual steps first, to create a climate of confidence and to make the general negotiation take place under conditions in which there is less of a danger of explosion because there would be less of an immediate urgency. If, however, that is not possible, the President has stated repeatedly that we, under those circumstances, would have to pursue, with some energy, an overall approach and try to bring about an overall solution.

In any event, it is our view that the interim process or the step-by-step process cannot be carried on for an indefinite period of time and that somewhere along the road, and in our judgment very soon along the road, a return to an overall approach would be inevitable.

So I do not think that the problem is to be segmented into so many individual parts.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the last time you visited this particular region of the country, there was somewhat of a diversion, the Cambodian*

*crisis involving the U.S. merchant ship Mayaguez. How do you gauge the response to your particular ideas—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I was trying to figure out what you meant by this region of the country. When I was in St. Louis, yes.

*Q. When you were in St. Louis and Kansas City. How do you gauge the response in this particular area, now that you have had a chance to travel about, to the Administration's foreign policy views, and how do you see the politics of that situation affecting the Administration?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, let me take the second question first. I have believed strongly that the foreign policy of the United States is a nonpartisan effort. It has been carried out with the support of both parties. And I do not consider it my obligation—and I do not have the slightest intention of participating in any partisan effort.

The major progress that has been made in American foreign policy has had the support of both parties, and it has had the support of Democrats and Republicans, including the elected representatives from this state. So I am not taking these trips in order to have any impact on the political situation.

With respect to the first question, I think it is an interesting phenomenon that the formerly isolationist part of the United States is now the part of the country that most strongly supports an active and responsible involvement of the United States in international affairs. I consider that one of the most heartening developments of the last generation and one of the sources of strength for our foreign policy.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke a great deal about interdependence in your speech.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Yes.

*Q. Is it your view and position that the U.N. Charter should be implemented in all of the nations who are member nations of the United Nations, superseding the constitutions of the individual nations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The U.N. Charter is based on the proposition that the United Nations is composed of a group of sovereign

states, and therefore the United Nations has never been intended as a world government superseding the sovereign governments.

When I speak of interdependence, I do not speak of world government. I speak of cooperation among sovereign nations based on their recognition that they are now living on a small planet under conditions in which they cannot maintain the peace or achieve economic progress except by cooperative efforts. The difficulty is that for sovereign nations it is inherently more difficult to cooperate.

This is the problem that our period must solve, and it cannot be solved by world government.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give your assessment of the situation in Portugal following the decision of the Socialist Party to pull out of the government?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, the evolution in Portugal has been increasingly in the direction of a state in which political parties play a less and less significant role; in which the final decisions are made by the Armed Forces Movement, as it is called, which has its own definitions of democracy, which are different from the definitions that have been historically accepted.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, during these trips you have been having private sessions with community leaders. Do you find in talking to them that they have any urgent considerations or any insights? In other words, educationally, what are you learning in talks with them out here? Do you find anything, any insights that you don't get back in Washington?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* For the benefit of the local press, the Washington contingent that is here is trying to get me to say something that will make great news in Washington—namely, an admission by me that I can learn something from anybody [laughter], which would be a historic event. [Laughter.]

But to answer your question seriously, I find these meetings with the leadership groups in the various cities extremely helpful. They give me an opportunity to respond to their concerns. They also give me an op-

portunity to find out what serious and interested people are thinking about the direction of their country in foreign policy in various parts of the United States. And since these are the leaders that can and will influence opinion in their communities, it is important for me and for the President to know what issues are of greatest concern to them. So I have been very grateful for the opportunity to exchange ideas.

I do not make any presentation at these meetings. It is a very free give-and-take. I have found them extremely helpful, and I am very grateful to the local sponsors who have arranged them.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the South Koreans appear to be somewhat paranoid about a possible invasion from the North. Do you share their fears, and if so, would you anticipate that the United States would get involved again in Korea?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The concern about Korea developed most strongly in the aftermath of Indochina. There was a justifiable concern that a government which has in a way excluded itself from contacts at least with the Western world might suffer the misapprehension that events in Indochina would be permitted to repeat themselves in Korea. Therefore it was judged important for the United States to make clear its position before any such impression developed.

Secondly, the United States has a treaty of mutual assistance with South Korea, which has been ratified by the Congress and which spells out the legal obligations of the United States in case of aggression. And the President, the Secretary of Defense, and I have all pointed out that we would maintain our obligations.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with the previous question, do you see these trips as a means, perhaps, to get around Congress and to get your views across without being filtered through the Washington press?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Absolutely not. I believe that foreign policy must be carried out in the closest consultation between the

Congress and the executive. These trips are not designed to get around the Congress, because on every concrete issue the Congress will still have to support us. There has been no reduction in the intensity of briefings of Congressmen and Senators. In fact, it has been increased with the fragmentation of authority within the Congress and with the many new centers of power that have developed within the Congress.

But we think we have an obligation, in a democratic government, to put the issues to the Congress as well as to the people. And I think anybody who has attended any of my meetings in addition to, of course, the public record, will look in vain for any attempt to urge anybody to use any particular influence with the Congress. In fact, most of the issues that are being discussed are not controversial between the Congress and the executive.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the leaders yesterday whom you conferred with before your speech indicated that at a private meeting you sounded them out on the use of U.S. civilian technicians operating some sort of electronic buffer zone between the Egyptians and the Israelis in the Sinai. Why did you sound them out on that, and what reaction do you have to that sort of idea?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I did not initiate the discussion. The discussion arose out of questions that were asked me, which were generated in turn by press reports, and therefore I [asked] them that if these press reports ever became a reality—which they have not at this point—what their reaction would be to such propositions. And this is one of the functions that I believe these meetings serve in giving us an insight into what people think on these issues.

In any event, if such an issue arose, that is to say if the parties ever asked us to do this, we would certainly submit it to the Congress for the Congress' view before we got American technicians, whether military or civilian, involved in the Middle East.

*The press: Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.*

## Secretary Kissinger Meets With Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and With Israeli Prime Minister Rabin During European Trip

*Secretary Kissinger left Washington July 9 for a visit to Paris (July 9-10), Geneva July (10-11), Bonn (July 11-12), and London (July 12). He met with French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues at Paris; with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko at Geneva; with Federal German President Walter Scheel, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin at Bonn; and with British Foreign Secretary James A. Callaghan at London. Following are remarks by Secretary Kissinger, Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues, and Prime Minister Rabin, together with the text of a joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. statement issued at Geneva July 11.*

### DEPARTURE, ANDREWS AFB, JULY 9

Press release 360 dated July 9

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am leaving for consultations with our European allies and also to meet with the Soviet Foreign Minister to review Soviet-American relations, and particularly to discuss the situation in the Middle East. And of course we attach great importance to the meeting with Prime Minister Rabin, all of which is part of our effort to encourage the process of peace in the Middle East.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there's been some talk of additional U.S. assurances, commitments, guarantees for Israel. Are there any additional assurances?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Any progress toward peace in the Middle East has two elements—the negotiations between the parties in the Middle East and what the United States can

contribute in the way of any assurances, or acting as a transmitter of assurances of the two sides to each other. And whatever it is humanly possible to do, the United States will do to promote progress.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there are reports that an agreement is already wrapped up between Israel and Egypt.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Totally wrong.

*Q. But is it approaching the point?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. We are not anywhere near that point. But all sides, Israel and Egypt, are working seriously. And of course the United States has repeatedly expressed its interest in promoting peace on a basis just to all.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there's been a report that the President and some leaders in the House have worked out a tentative compromise on resuming aid to Turkey.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, they discussed this morning possible ways by which aid to Turkey can be resumed. Hearings will be held in the Foreign Affairs Committee—or the International Relations Committee—tomorrow, and we are hopeful that something can be done.

### REMARKS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER SAUVAGNARGUES, JULY 10

#### Remarks to the Press Following Meeting With President Valery Giscard d'Estaing

Press release 363 dated July 10

*Q. Who took the initiative for this meeting?*

*Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues:* We are in constant contact with the Secretary of

State, and it had at first been agreed that I would meet with him in Washington. But the Secretary of State's schedule and the meetings he is to have in Bonn led him to modify his plans and to come to Paris. I thank him for this while nevertheless hoping to see him again, probably in Washington on the occasion of the U.N. meeting. The Secretary of State is going to tell you personally that we had a long private conversation this morning and that we decided to go together and report it to the President of the Republic.

*Q. On what subjects, Mr. Foreign Minister?*

*Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues:* We spoke of the resumption of the dialogue; we spoke of Cyprus; we spoke of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and we discussed in a general way— The Secretary of State referred to the Middle East problem— This was a very thorough exchange of views and, I believe, a very constructive one.

*Q.—the European cooperation conference?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First, let me say that I agree completely with what my colleague has said. We've had very constructive talks, and we reviewed most of the outstanding issues in the spirit of friendship and cooperation which characterizes our relationship. We discussed the resumption of the dialogue between consumers and producers, and I believe we have made very good progress toward establishing a framework for the resumption of this dialogue. And we had fruitful exchanges on a range of other subjects.

With respect to the European Security Conference, I believe that both our countries are of the view that it should be brought to a conclusion as rapidly as possible and that both our delegations are working in that sense at Geneva.

*Q. What did you tell the President about the prospects for another settlement in the Middle East, Mr. Secretary?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We had a full discussion of the situation in the Middle East,

and I told him we cannot really judge until I have had a chance to talk with the Israeli Prime Minister and until the views of the Israeli Government will then have been formally communicated to the Egyptian Government for their reaction.

*Q. About President Giscard d'Estaing's proposal for a monetary conference next autumn?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, we have not had a formal suggestion to that effect, but we take the views of the French Government on the monetary situation seriously, and we recognize that this is one of the big outstanding issues about which we will remain in very close contact.

*Q. Have you agreed on a tentative date for the resumption of the oil dialogue?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We haven't agreed on a date, but I think we are making progress toward establishing a framework which should enable us to propose dates within a reasonable future.

*Q. About the renewal of the dialogue before the special session of the United Nations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We are working in that direction.

#### **Remarks to the Press Following Meeting at the French Foreign Ministry**

Press release 366 dated July 11

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did you envisage anything to end the deadlock between producers and consumers?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We talked at some length about the producer-consumer dialogue and how to resume it. And I think that we have made good progress which gives us hope that the dialogue can be resumed in the relatively near future.

*Q. Have you discussed the situation in the Middle East?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We had a discussion about the situation in the Middle East also, yes.



*Q. What are the main obstacles, according to you?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, as you know, some rather delicate negotiations are now going on, and I will be meeting the Israeli Prime Minister in Bonn, and we are in close touch with the Egyptian Government as well as with other Arab governments. So I don't think it would be proper for me to characterize the state of the negotiations while they are in progress.

*Q. About the reaction of the developing countries to the resumption of the dialogue between oil producers and oil consumers?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* My impression is that the ideas that were discussed this morning by the Foreign Minister, the President, and myself offer a basis on which the developing countries will also agree to resume the dialogue.

*Q. On the basis proposed by the Energy Agency?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I don't want to go into the details. But the ideas that have been commonly discussed will undoubtedly be incorporated.

*Q. A comment about the lifting of the arms embargo to Turkey?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* As you know, the Administration strongly favors the lifting of the arms embargo and has made specific proposals to the Congress to that effect. The Senate has already approved it. The President and I met with the leaders of the House of Representatives yesterday, who promised us they would take urgent action, and they are now considering our proposals.

*Q. And what about negotiating the bases in Turkey?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, we are assuming that on the basis of the action that we have proposed to the House of Representatives that the climate for the discussion with respect to our bases in Turkey will be greatly improved.

*Q. On which international question have*

*you and Mr. Kissinger made the best progress?*

*Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues:* Well, we have found to have a fairly broad convergence of views on most of the major international problems. Since we have really covered all the major problems that currently confront the world, I don't think I can point out any single problem. Lastly, I think that we have reached a solid base for progress in those areas which call for the joint action of the United States and of France.

*Q. Which problems?*

*Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues:* Especially on the dialogue, especially on the international monetary problems that have to be approached. And there is a whole series of things on which general opinions were exchanged.

*Q. And on the Conference of European Security?*

*Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues:* On the European Security Conference, the United States and France are of the opinion that this conference, which is now in its final stage, should be brought to its conclusion as fast as possible. And we hope that the final stage in Helsinki can take place either by the end of July or, at the latest, by the end of August.

*Q. Mr. Minister, did you discuss Mr. Giscard d'Estaing's proposal for a monetary conference?*

*Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues:* Mr. Giscard d'Estaing did in fact speak of it. There is no proposal as yet. Only the ideas were exchanged.

Coming out of the Elysée we have already told you the essentials about what we discussed this morning. We do not have to repeat it. I believe one may say that the exchanges of views that we have had with the American Secretary of State and the conversation we have had with the President of the Republic were entirely useful and have reflected, as one could expect, the excellent climate of relations between the United States and France.

## ARRIVAL, GENEVA, JULY 10

Press release 367 dated July 11

I am glad to be back in Geneva for an opportunity to continue an exchange of views with Foreign Minister Gromyko. As you know, we believe that the United States and the Soviet Union have a particular responsibility to do all they can to lessen international tension and contribute to the solution of outstanding problems. It is in this spirit that we will review a number of bilateral issues and a number of issues of world peace with Foreign Minister Gromyko, and I hope we will make some contribution toward the solution of these issues.

I would like to express my appreciation to the Swiss Government for making this meeting possible and for the hospitality they have extended.

Thank you.

## REMARKS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER TO THE PRESS, GENEVA, JULY 10<sup>1</sup>

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, we had very extensive talks, very constructive, and conducted in a cordial atmosphere. We concentrated on the European Security Conference and mostly on SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]. With respect to the European Security Conference, the United States supports the consensus that has developed that the last stage of the conference should take place on July 30 as proposed by Canada, and we are prepared to bring this to as rapid a conclusion as possible in order to permit the Finnish hosts to make their preparations. With respect to SALT we had extensive discussions, which will be continued tomorrow, and progress was made.

Thank you.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, have you heard anything from Malta? Since the meeting is still on, they are still waiting down there.*

<sup>1</sup> Made following a meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko at the Soviet Mission (text from press release 368).

*Secretary Kissinger:* I understand that the only country that has not yet joined the consensus is Malta and that they are waiting to hear from them either tonight or tomorrow morning.

*Q. Did Mr. Gromyko give you anything resembling a new proposal on verification that would help reach agreement?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I cannot go into the details of a discussion that is still going on, but as I pointed out progress has been made.

*Q. The Middle East?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The Middle East will be discussed tomorrow. We have not yet discussed the Middle East. Tomorrow we will continue our discussions on SALT, and then we will turn to the Middle East. We will meet here at 10:30. We have been meeting off and on with the Ambassadors to the European Security Conference.

## U.S.-U.S.S.R. JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED AT GENEVA JULY 11

Press release 369 dated July 11

In accordance with an earlier agreement, a meeting was held on July 10-11 in Geneva between the Secretary of State of the United States and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Henry A. Kissinger, and Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., Andrei A. Gromyko.

In furtherance of the conversations held previously, they continued their exchange of views on matters of bilateral US-Soviet relations. Particular attention was given to issues related to working out a new long-term agreement on the further limitation of strategic offensive arms on the basis of the understanding reached between President Gerald R. Ford and General Secretary of the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, at their meeting in Vladivostok in November, 1974.

In reviewing the international issues of interest to both sides, they held a thorough

discussion, in particular, on questions concerning the holding of the final stage of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe at the summit level in Helsinki. They also continued their exchange of views on matters of achieving a just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East, including the question of resuming the Geneva Peace Conference.

The talks were conducted in a friendly atmosphere and both sides believe that the exchange of views was constructive and useful from the standpoint of further developing US-Soviet relations in conformity with the course they have embarked on together and the concrete agreements reached during the US-Soviet summit meetings.

#### REMARKS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER RABIN, BONN, JULY 12 <sup>2</sup>

*Prime Minister Rabin:* Well, Mr. Secretary, ladies and gentlemen, I am very thankful to the Federal Republic of Germany for making it possible to use my visit for another purpose, not just visiting the Federal Republic. I thank the Secretary, who found the time to have this meeting with me. In the meeting we have discussed in the way that normally we discuss between Israel and the United States—in a friendly atmosphere—the problems we face today.

We discussed various elements and aspects of the interim agreement with Egypt. We received—the Israeli part has received—certain clarifications. With these clarifications I am going tonight to Israel. We will have to discuss it there, and the Ambassador of Israel to the United States will bring our reaction to what we have heard and we have discussed in this meeting.

I am still hopeful that an interim agreement will be reached, but we have to overcome certain difficulties in the road to its achievement. Thank you very much.

<sup>2</sup> Made to the press at the conclusion of talks at Schloss Gymnich (text from press release 373 dated July 15).

*Secretary Kissinger:* I also would like to express the appreciation of the U.S. Government to the Federal Republic for making this meeting possible. The Prime Minister and I had a very friendly and very constructive talk. We reviewed all the elements of a possible interim agreement, and we attempted to answer the questions that Israel had put to us earlier in the week and additional questions that the Prime Minister raised this morning.

I believe that we have made progress in achieving understanding of the elements that are needed, and the Prime Minister will now return to Israel and communicate with us through his Ambassador later in the week. But from our point of view, I consider the talks constructive, and the atmosphere was friendly and warm as befits the relationship between our two countries.

*Q. Mr. Prime Minister, what are the major difficulties you referred to?*

*Prime Minister Rabin:* I am not going to elaborate about details. I believe for the time being the statements that have been made are enough. You are going on the plane; you'll get an opportunity to— [Laughter.]

*Secretary Kissinger:* It may produce a senior official familiar with the Middle East. [Laughter.]

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think an interim agreement is closer now than it was prior to your meeting with the Prime Minister?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I always believe that some progress in clarifying issues was made, and this can only be helpful. But, of course, it depends on all of the parties, and we will have to see later on in the week.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, [inaudible] do you plan a trip to the Middle East now?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I said the next event will be the return of the Israeli Ambassador to Washington, and after that, we will make the decisions of how to carry the process forward.

## President Ford's News Conference at Chicago July 12

*Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Ford at Chicago on July 12.<sup>1</sup>*

*President Ford:* Good morning. Won't you all please sit down.

I have one short announcement, a very important announcement.

I am deeply relieved at the report of the safe release of Colonel [Ernest R.] Morgan. Since his abduction on the 29th of June, the U.S. Government, with the close cooperation of the Government of Lebanon, has been trying to secure Colonel Morgan's return, and we are extremely glad to report that that has occurred.

At the same time, the United States is greatly appreciative of the extraordinary efforts of the Government of Lebanon in obtaining Colonel Morgan's release and for the assistance of others who have worked toward this end.

*Q. Mr. President, can you tell us what was negotiated in order to obtain the release of Colonel Morgan?*

*President Ford:* Our representatives in Lebanon worked very closely with the Government of Lebanon and with other elements in order to make sure that Colonel Morgan was returned. We have a policy—and I think it is the right policy—that we will not as a government pay ransom, and as far as I know it was not done in this case by our government. But by working closely and firmly with all parties, we were, thank goodness, able to return Colonel Morgan safely.

*Q. Mr. President, the United States is apparently prepared to approve negotiations of a multiterm wheat and grain sale with the Soviet Union. Other countries are facing drought and may ask for sales, too.*

*My questions are: How much can we sell*

<sup>1</sup>For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 21.

*without dipping in too much into our harvest this year; and won't this increase costs of bread and food later this year to our consumers?*

*President Ford:* First, we should thank the farmers of this country for their tremendous productivity. We are fortunate in America to be the breadbasket of the world. Our farmers do a tremendous job in the production of food for us and for the world as a whole.

We are anticipating the largest corn crop, the largest wheat crop in the history of the United States, but there are some uncertainties.

We hope that there will be a sale to the Soviet Union. It will be helpful to the American farmer and will be a reward for his productivity. We hope that there will be ample supplies of corn and wheat and feed grains so that we can help other nations around the world through our Food for Peace program.

And if there is this sizable crop in the variety of areas, it will mean that we can expand our Food for Peace program and act in a humanitarian way to the less fortunate.

I have no idea at this point what the amount will be of the sale to the Soviet Union, if it does materialize.

But I think the fact that we can make one is a blessing, and I hope we do make one. But I want to assure you, as I do the American consumer, that we are alert to the danger of too big a sale or too much shipment overseas because the American consumer has a stake in this problem as well.

So we have to find a careful line to tread, of selling all we can, but protecting the rights of the American consumer and utilizing the productivity of the American farmer to help our balance of payments, to improve our humanitarian efforts overseas, and to indirectly help us in our relations with other countries.

*Q. But a sale of any substantial size would mean some increase in a loaf of bread here, wouldn't it?*

*President Ford:* I don't think I am in a

position—or anyone else is in a position—to define what a substantial sale is. A big sale with big wheat and feed grain and corn production would have a minimal effect on consumer prices in the United States.

I can only assure you and the American people that we are watching all aspects of this problem, and we will keep alert to any pitfalls or dangers that might result.

## **Security Assistance Program Discussed by Department**

*Statement by Carlyle E. Maw  
Under Secretary for Security Assistance*<sup>1</sup>

I welcome this opportunity to meet with the subcommittee today and to testify with respect to the status of our security assistance program.

Security assistance has been an important instrument of our foreign policy for more than a quarter of a century. It began with special programs of military aid to the Philippines in 1946 and Greece and Turkey in 1947 and was expanded in the 1950's and 1960's to include nations in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America.

Security assistance is provided for several basic reasons: to assist allies and other states with the means to defend themselves, to obtain bases and other military access rights, and to support political objectives that are deemed essential to the U.S. Government. In pursuit of these objectives, we have over the years provided military assistance to more than 75 countries, made military instruction available to almost 500,000 foreign military personnel, and recently provided on a non-reimbursable basis an annual average of \$4 billion in military equipment and related sup-

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on July 10. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

port to countries in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere.

Today the situation is different. As the subcommittee is aware, recent events in Southeast Asia have necessitated an extensive review of our policies in Asia. At the same time, we are engaged in a major effort to bring peace to the Middle East through a negotiated settlement of Arab-Israeli differences. Concomitantly, we have underway a reassessment of our Middle Eastern policies as well as a study of the types of programs needed to achieve our objectives in this region.

In early February 1975, the President transmitted to Congress his recommended foreign assistance legislation for fiscal year 1976. He made it clear that the sums he had recommended for security assistance—\$790 million for grant military assistance, and \$560 million for foreign military sales credits to finance a \$1.021 billion program—were contingent in nature. He pointed out at the time that:

Due to the largely fluid situations in Indochina and the current reassessments of our Middle East policy, the military assistance programs are now under review.

I wish to stress at this juncture that what is at stake in this policy review is not the arithmetic of appropriations, but the nature of future American relations with nations in the Middle East and Asia. Until the Middle East review is completed, we will not be in a position to provide Congress with a complete presentation of our security assistance funding requirements for FY76. The countries that will be omitted include Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. On the other hand, our Asian policy assessment is fully underway, and we should be in a position to provide to the subcommittee the Administration's proposed security assistance program for countries in this region within the next few weeks.

At the same time, we will be in a position to report to the Congress on security assistance and human rights as required under section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (amended) [Public Law 93-559, approved Dec. 30, 1974].

The U.S. Government is genuinely and

deeply concerned about human rights matters. This concern reflects both our own traditions as well as a realization that human rights, and respect for them, are valid foreign policy objectives in their own right. Moreover, we recognize the importance of human rights in the conduct of our foreign policy as well as the clear intent of the Congress that human rights questions be addressed in the formulation of our policies.

At the same time, we must recognize that we are dealing with sovereign countries with differing political systems. There is also a very finite limit to the proper role of an outside government in internal developments and affairs. We can neither determine the course of internal change nor be certain as to what the outcome will be in situations where there are internal tensions.

Further, our policies toward individual countries represent a mix of interests, objectives, and relationships different in almost every case. We know that neglect of human rights may well adversely affect the achievement of other important objectives. We also know that internal popular support is essential to long-term political stability. As the Secretary of State said in his address to the Japan Society on June 18:

... there is no question that popular will and social justice are, in the last analysis, the essential underpinnings of resistance to subversion and external challenge.

In the State Department, we have strengthened our capacity to deal with human rights matters. We have within the last year directed each of our Embassies to report in detail on the status of human rights in its country. Over the past three months, we have directed a comprehensive review of the human rights situation preparatory to transmittal of a report to the Congress as required under section 502B.

The Administration has been active in complying with other congressional requirements. For example, section 51 of the Foreign Assistance Act urges new initiatives in the area of international controls over the transfer of arms and calls for a report to the Congress by the President "setting forth the steps he has taken to carry out" the provi-

sions of section 51. This report is in preparation and should be received by the Congress within the next few days.

Over the past several months, we have also embarked on a serious effort to meet the provisions of section 17(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act, which directs the President to submit to the first session of the 94th Congress a "detailed plan for the reduction and eventual elimination of the present military assistance program." We expect that we will be in a position to submit a report on this subject by the third quarter of 1975.

At the same time, we are attempting to deal with a number of other equally important questions as we develop a revised FY76 security assistance program for presentation to the Congress. Our future relations with Turkey is one such question. The total U.S. embargo on grant assistance, credit, and commercial sales of military equipment to Turkey, so sweeping that members of the Warsaw Pact can purchase items now forbidden to Turkey, is subjecting our security relationship with this important NATO ally to an intolerable burden. A relationship of trust and confidence built up over many years has already been seriously and adversely affected. Continuation of the embargo risks further deterioration that could jeopardize our security interests throughout the eastern Mediterranean area.

While the Administration strongly believes that the embargo should be rescinded, it is for Congress itself to decide what form the legislation should take. The Senate has already adopted the Scott-Mansfield bill, which would restore grant assistance as well as cash and credit sales. In any case, it is important that the Congress act as expeditiously as possible. As a result of the February 5 embargo, Turkey has recently informed us it wishes to begin negotiations in mid-July on the future of U.S. facilities. The Government of Turkey has not linked the facilities negotiations to progress toward lifting the embargo, but it is clear that the scope of the negotiations will be affected by congressional action.

The downward spiral in U.S.-Turkish relations that would result from a prolongation

of the embargo is contrary to U.S. and Turkish interests. It would also deal a heavy blow to the NATO alliance at a time when other major unresolved problems exist in the Mediterranean region. Diminution of the Western position in Turkey is also likely to have adverse implications for our standing in the Middle East.

As the subcommittee is aware, we are engaged in base rights negotiations with the Government of Spain, and we are also about to embark on discussions with the Government of the Philippines on our bases in that country. The outcome of these negotiations could have a significant impact on our security assistance funding needs.

Gentlemen, we continue to believe that political and economic development can only take place in a more secure world. Thus security assistance is a necessary complement to our efforts to assist development.

As you know, we have greatly modified our security assistance programs in the past five years to encourage nations to bear the primary burden for their own defense. In specific situations, grant assistance must continue to play a major role; where we decrease grant assistance we should provide adequate credit to our friends and allies to enable them to purchase the arms they require. The foreign military sales program promotes the self-sufficiency we seek and our partners are pursuing.

Whatever the outcome of the Middle East and Asia reviews now in progress, the program that is presented to the Congress will substantially contribute to the following goals:

—Creating a lasting peace in the Middle East.

—Building the capacity of the nations of East Asia to determine their own destiny.

—Establishing the foundations for countries in Latin America and elsewhere to meet pressing internal security and self-defense problems.

—Lowering the burden on the United States to play a dominant security role with our own armed forces.

We in the United States cannot alone un-

derwrite the success of the quest to resolve old issues or alone persevere in the face of continuing obstacles to peace. Nor can we assure that the imperative to cooperation will overcome the temptation of nations to pursue short-term advantage. But it is equally clear that hopes for a peaceful, cooperative, and just international order can only be realized with the strong participation of this nation. Our security assistance program is a crucial vehicle for that participation.

I believe that this is a time of transition and of testing in our relations with other nations. It is also a time when we must move prudently and patiently in fashioning new policies and constructing programs to aid other nations. I hope that the subcommittee will appreciate what we are attempting to accomplish and will bear with us as we develop a coherent and effective security assistance program for FY76.

## **U.S. Interpretive Statement on NPT Review Conference Declaration**

*The final declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was adopted by consensus on May 30 at Geneva.<sup>1</sup> Following is the U.S. interpretive statement on the declaration, which was made before the conference that day by David Klein, U.S. Alternate Representative to the conference.*

My delegation is pleased to have joined in the adoption of the final declaration of this, the first NPT Review Conference. We believe that by reaching agreement on the conference declaration, which is the culmination of our efforts over the last four weeks, we have taken an important step forward.

The declaration is a realistic document, containing recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the treaty's operation and, most important, of the nonproliferation

<sup>1</sup> For a statement by U.S. Representative Fred C. Iklé made before the conference on May 6 and the text of the final declaration, see BULLETIN of June 30, 1975, p. 921.

regime generally. Some ideas—including those relating to international cooperation on physical security, to improvements of safeguards on exports, and to regional solutions to fuel-cycle needs—are innovative and are receiving broad international endorsement for the first time. In addition, the conference declaration strongly underlines the need for determined and timely efforts to achieve widely shared objectives. Taken as a whole, the final declaration establishes a practical and comprehensive course of action for strengthening the nonproliferation regime. It shows clearly that we all have a shared and overriding interest in the success of efforts to curb nuclear proliferation, which is a continuing and complicated process.

We recognize that no delegation can give unqualified support to each of the conclusions and recommendations contained in the declaration. Some may have reservations about particular ideas expressed in the document; others may regret that some of their suggestions were not included or were given less emphasis than they would have preferred. This is as true of our delegation as it is of others.

I would like to take this opportunity to briefly state for the record our views on some of the issues covered in the final declaration.

First, I would like to reiterate that we look forward, as soon as possible after the conclusion of the agreement outlined at Vladivostok, to the commencement of follow-on negotiations on further limitations and reductions in the level of strategic arms.

Second, with respect to the question of restraints on nuclear testing, my government joins in affirming the determination of participants of this conference to achieve the discontinuance of all explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. The final declaration notes that a number of delegations at the conference expressed the desire that the nuclear-weapon states parties enter as soon as possible into an agreement to halt all nuclear-weapon tests for a specified period of time. Our view is that any treaty or agree-

ment on nuclear-weapons testing must contain provisions for adequate verification and must solve the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions. It would not be realistic to assume that an agreement banning all nuclear-weapons testing, whether by nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT or by all testing powers, could be concluded before solutions to these problems are found.

With reference to nuclear-free zones, we believe that the creation of such zones could effectively complement the NPT as a means of preventing the spread of nuclear-explosive capabilities. We have emphasized that, to be effective, regional arrangements should meet the following criteria:

The initiative should be taken by the states in the region concerned. The zone should preferably include all states in the area whose participation is deemed important. The creation of the zone should not disturb necessary security arrangements, and provision must be made for adequate verification. Finally, we do not believe that the objective of nonproliferation would be served if a nuclear-free-zone arrangement permitted the indigenous development of nuclear explosives for any purpose; no effort to achieve nonproliferation could succeed if it permitted such indigenous development of nuclear explosives by non-nuclear-weapon states or failed to safeguard against diversion of nuclear materials to such use.

A number of delegations at the conference urged that nuclear-weapon states provide, in an appropriate manner, binding security assurances to those states which became fully bound by the provisions of a regional arrangement. My government adhered to protocol II of the Latin American Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty, which contains such a binding security assurance, after determining that that treaty met the criteria noted above. However, we believe that each nuclear-free-zone proposal must be judged on its own merits to determine whether the provision of specific security assurances would be likely to have a favorable effect. Moreover, we do not believe it would be realistic to expect nuclear-weapon states to



make implied commitments to provide such assurances before the scope and content of any nuclear-free-zone arrangement are worked out.

I ask that this written statement be incorporated in annex II of the final document.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Coffee

Agreement amending and extending the international coffee agreement, 1968. Approved by the International Coffee Council at London April 14, 1973. Entered into force October 1, 1973. TIAS 7809.

*Accession deposited:* Ireland, July 8, 1975.

##### Health

Amendments to articles 35 and 55 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptances deposited:* Federal Republic of Germany, July 9, 1975; Malaysia, July 3, 1975.

##### Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

*Acceptance deposited:* Ethiopia, July 3, 1975.

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948 on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Done at London October 17, 1974.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptances deposited:* Barbados, June 30, 1975; Bulgaria, April 16, 1975; People's Republic of China, April 28, 1975; France, March 24, 1975; Iran, July 8, 1975; Norway, April 28, 1975; Panama, May 23, 1975; Spain, March 24, 1975; Sweden, May 5, 1975; Trinidad and Tobago, May 16, 1975; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, April 28, 1975; United Kingdom, June 26, 1975.

Inter-American convention on facilitation of international waterborne transportation, with annex. Done at Mar del Plata June 7, 1963.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force for the United States.

<sup>3</sup> Applicable to Berlin (West).

*Ratification deposited:* Chile (with reservation and statement), June 16, 1975.

##### Oil Pollution

International convention on civil liability for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. Entered into force June 19, 1975.<sup>2</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Federal Republic of Germany, May 20, 1975.<sup>3</sup>

##### Patents

Strasbourg agreement concerning the international patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March 24, 1971. Enters into force October 7, 1975.

*Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification deposited:* Belgium (with a declaration), July 4, 1975.

##### Property—Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923.

*Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification deposited:* Monaco, July 4, 1975.

Nice agreement concerning the international classification of goods and services for the purposes of the registration of marks of June 15, 1957, as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967. Entered into force March 18, 1970; for the United States May 25, 1972. TIAS 7419.

*Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification deposited:* Monaco, July 4, 1975.

Trademark registration treaty, with regulations. Done at Vienna June 12, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Accession deposited:* Upper Volta, May 23, 1975.

#### BILATERAL

##### Egypt

Agreement extending the term of the task force assisting Egypt in the clearance of the Suez Canal. Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo June 16 and 29, 1975. Entered into force June 29, 1975.

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of June 7, 1974 (TIAS 7855). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo June 30, 1975. Entered into force June 30, 1975.

##### Korea

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of April 12, 1973 (TIAS 7610). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul May 27, 1975. Entered into force May 27, 1975.

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of April 12, 1973 (TIAS 7610). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul July 1, 1975. Entered into force July 1, 1975.

## Mexico

Agreement amending the agreement of December 11, 1974, as amended, relating to cooperative arrangements to support Mexican efforts to curb the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico March 20, 1975. Entered into force March 20, 1975.

Agreement relating to the provision of equipment and training by the United States to support U.S.-Mexican efforts to curb illegal narcotics traffic. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico May 29, 1975. Entered into force May 29, 1975.

Agreement relating to the provision of equipment and training by the United States to support U.S.-Mexican efforts to curb illegal narcotics traffic. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico June 25, 1975. Entered into force June 25, 1975.

## Peru

Understanding relating to the air transport agreement of December 27, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1587, 4050, 6080), with related notes. Effected by exchange of notes at Lima July 7, 1975. Entered into force July 7, 1975.

## Portugal

Agreement relating to payment to the United States of the net proceeds from the sale of defense articles by Portugal. Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon May 30, 1974 and June 30, 1975. Entered into force June 30, 1975; effective July 1, 1974.

## United Arab Emirates

Agreement relating to the sale of defense articles and services to the United Arab Emirates. Effected by exchange of notes at Abu Dhabi June 15 and 21, 1975. Entered into force June 21, 1975.

## United Kingdom

Agreement extending the agreement of March 30, 1973, as amended and extended, relating to implementation and enforcement of civil aviation advance charter rules, and the related letter of March 29, 1974 (TIAS 7594, 7832, 8047). Effected by exchange of notes at London June 4, 1975. Entered into force June 4, 1975.

Agreement concerning an exchange program of Bicentennial fellowships in the creative and performed arts. Effected by exchange of notes at London July 2, 1975. Entered into force July 2, 1975.

## United Nations

Agreement amending the grant agreement of November 7, 1973, as amended, concerning assistance

to economic and social development programs in Africa. Signed at New York June 3, 1975. Entered into force June 3, 1975.

## Check List of Department of State

### Press Releases: July 14-20

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

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370	7/14	Kissinger: Institute of World Affairs, Milwaukee, Wis.
*370A	7/14	Governor Lucey of Wisconsin: introductory remarks.
370B	7/14	Kissinger: questions and answers following address.
*371	7/14	Holdridge sworn in as Ambassador to Singapore (biographic data).
372	7/15	Kissinger: Upper Midwest Council, Bloomington (Minneapolis), Minn.
*372A	7/15	Donald Grangaard, Senator Humphrey, Governor Anderson of Minnesota: introductory remarks.
372B	7/15	Kissinger: question and answers following address.
373	7/15	Kissinger, Rabin: remarks at Bonn, July 12.
374	7/17	Kissinger: news conference, Bloomington (Minneapolis), Minn., July 15.
375	7/17	Kissinger: news conference, Milwaukee, Wis., July 16.
*376	7/17	Study Group 2 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCITT, Sept. 11.
*377	7/17	Study Group 8 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCIR, Aug. 27.
*378	7/18	Advisory Committee on the U.N. Conference on Human Settlements, July 31.
*379	7/18	Study Group 5 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCITT, Aug. 8.
*380	7/18	Andrew Wyeth to visit U.S.S.R.
†381	7/18	U.S. and U.S.S.R. sign North Pacific fisheries agreement.
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\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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*The Department of State BULLETIN a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

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## Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of July 25

*Following is the transcript of a news conference held by Secretary Kissinger at the White House on July 25.*

Press release 387 dated July 25

*Ronald H. Nessen, Press Secretary to President Ford:* This is all on the record, for immediate release and quotation. Maybe the best way to go at this would be to have 20 minutes or so of questions on the trip, which begins tomorrow, and 15 minutes or so, if there are other matters that interest you. The Secretary has a crowded schedule today, and we would like to try to hold this to somewhere between 30 and 35 minutes.

*Secretary Kissinger:* Barry [Barry Schweid, Associated Press], I understand you have the first question.

*Q. I was going to ask a Middle East question. There is a statement here that the White House has put out on the trip.<sup>1</sup> In it, the President says the Helsinki declaration will further the aspirations of the people of Eastern Europe, and he restates our commitment to the peaceful changes. In a specific way, can you tell us how somehow this will further the aspirations of the people now locked into the Soviet sphere?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First of all, one has to analyze what the phrase "locked into the Soviet sphere" means.

*Q. Lithuania, Latvia, and part of the Soviet Union.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* In those countries, the existing situation in Europe reflects, among other things, a balance of forces and a state of affairs that has continued for a generation. It was not created by a docu-

ment, and it will not, as such, be changed by a document.

Therefore, the question that has had to be answered in the entire postwar period and has been answered in different ways at different times is, what is more helpful for a humane evolution, a policy of confrontation or a policy of easing tensions; whether peoples can realize their aspirations better under conditions in which there is political, and a threat of military, conflict or under conditions in which the two sides are attempting to settle their disputes and ease tensions.

The judgment that has been made—and it is important to remember that it is not only that of the United States but of all West European countries—is that a policy in which an attempt is made to settle political conflicts will help the humane values that they espouse.

This was the basis for Chancellor [of the Federal Republic of Germany Willy] Brandt's Ostpolitik in 1969, in which he faced within his country the question of whether the objectives that he sought were best achieved by a policy of political confrontation or by a policy of easing tensions.

He gave the answer; he made the decisions as far as the Federal Republic and the German question was concerned, which in turn was at the heart of the European problem.

The agreement by the United States to attend the European Security Conference was in fact made conditional on progress on the German question and particularly on the solution of the Berlin issue.

So, therefore, it is, I believe, that the easing of tensions in the world and easing of tensions in Europe will help ease the lives of people and may contribute to an evolution in which the problems that produced the cold

<sup>1</sup> See p. 204.

war can be dealt with more effectively.

No document is going to change the existing balance of power on the Continent, and therefore there are limits to what any agreement can achieve, but this is the sense in which the President used that paragraph.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you foresee as being the consequences of yesterday's House vote on the Turkish arms embargo? Do you see any progress in—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I would like to answer that in the second part of the press conference.

*Q. Question please.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The question was the consequences of the House vote on the Turkish aid embargo, and I would prefer to answer this—if we could keep the first 20 minutes on the trip and the implications of the trip and the second 20 minutes on general foreign policy questions—

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the President will be meeting with Secretary Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] twice. Can you describe what will be discussed in those talks and how far apart and how difficult to narrow is the gap on the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] negotiations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Of course, every time the President and the General Secretary meet, there is a general review of the world situation. But I would think that the three subjects that will receive most attention will be primarily SALT, then the further evolution of European negotiations such as MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions], and finally, undoubtedly there will be a discussion about the Middle East.

With respect to the SALT negotiations, Foreign Minister [of the U.S.S.R. Andrei A.] Gromyko gave us some replies to the American position on SALT while we met in Geneva. On several important categories, these represented distinct progress.

In other categories, there is still a gap. The issues on which a gap remains are substantially fewer in number than was the case

a few weeks ago. So, what the President and the General Secretary will attempt to do is to see whether the issues on which progress has been made—how to turn them over to Geneva, and on the issues on which progress still remains to be made, whether they can narrow the differences.

It is our view that a SALT agreement is possible and that the issues on which the compromises have to be made are now quite clearly defined, and therefore it depends on political decisions in both countries.

*Q. Mr. Kissinger, since the United States is going to go into the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] summit with absolutely no economic policy whatsoever except massive austerity and triage, which is backed up by the kind of international terrorisms that you are now personally implicated in, in the Colt arms deal and Black September and various other things, New Solidarity would like to know what you are going to tell us will be the American response to the Soviet alternative to all of this, which is increasing trade arrangements with the Third World and Western Europe based on a transfer of rubles which would undercut the existing dollar debt structure—*

*Q. Question?*

*Q. What was the question, Dr. Kissinger? [Laughter.]*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The question was almost as complicated as my answers tend to be and probably a little more comprehensible. But if I understand the question it was, has the United States an economic policy—I am leaving out the various personal allusions—

*Q. No, what would your response be to the Soviet policy which has now been made clear?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think we have to make clear that at the European Security Conference the Soviet Union is not likely to put forward an integrated economic policy to which we have to respond, because the European Security Conference really is primarily concerned with ratifying the agreements that have been reached in stage



two and to permit each of the leaders to make a policy statement.

However, at the side there will be many bilateral discussions. The United States—leaving aside the various comments about Soviet economic policy—the United States requires a foreign economic policy for an extremely rapidly changing world and one which it is quite possible the Soviet Union may attempt to enter over the next five to ten years, but I do not believe that that issue will come up at Helsinki.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, why do you think the Russians seem so interested in having such a conference? What do they get out of it?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I would like to stress that our policy has to be made in terms of our purposes. We should not gear our policy to preventing something that the Soviets may have a motive for doing. We have to assess whether it also serves our own purposes.

Now, the European Security Conference has been a part of Soviet policy since 1953 and 1954. At that time, it had a totally different purpose. At that time, it was designed to keep the Federal Republic from entering NATO.

It has been resurrected at periodic intervals by the Soviet Union. It was rejected for a long time by all the European nations as well as the United States.

In the 1960's an increasing number of West European nations moved toward acceptance of the idea of a European Security Conference. And then, in the late 1960's, with the beginning of the change in German policy, it gained a momentum in which the United States decided that it was wiser to participate in that process rather than to attempt to block it.

However, the conditions have changed importantly since this process was initiated, and I would say that for the Soviet Union it was started at one time to prevent the Federal Republic from entering NATO.

In the 1960's it may have been conceived as a kind of a substitute peace treaty, but then as the 1960's developed, many of the issues which originally could have been dis-

cussed at the European Security Conference were settled in a series of bilateral agreements which the Soviet Union made with every West European country and the United States, so now the focus of the European Security Conference has drifted more to a general statement of principles rather than the character it had then.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has continued to attach great importance to it, perhaps in part because, like other governments, when something has been such a cardinal aim, once it is achieved, even if some of the original assumptions have somewhat altered, it still retains its importance as an achievement, as a long-held goal.

But as far as the United States is concerned, we see the significance of the Security Conference as a useful step in a general pattern of the improvement of relations between the East and West. We do not consider it an additional ratification of any existing arrangement. We consider these principles of conduct that repeat what has already been stated in many bilateral arrangements and add to it certain principles of peaceful change and improved human contact, which we consider useful progress but which we will confine to the words "useful progress."

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the United States initially came to the position of participating in the conference in the belief that also some parallel progress should be made in MBFR. Can you tell us now what progress is being made in MBFR?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, that is not a correct description of what the U.S. position has been. The United States linked the opening of the European Security Conference to the opening of the MBFR discussion. During the course of it, it was never the position of the United States, and certainly never the position of our West European allies, that progress in both of these negotiations should be linked, and indeed on the one or two occasions that we explored the possibility of this link with our West European allies, they rejected the concept that the force reduction negotiations should be conducted in step with the European Security Conference.

So the fact that they are not linked together is primarily due to discussions within the West, and it has never been a condition that the United States made.

The question is, where do we stand on the force reduction negotiations? The United States attaches importance to the force reduction negotiations. Without question, the President will raise this in his discussion with the General Secretary.

These negotiations are now in recess. They have followed the procedures and the general atmosphere that occur in the general course of these negotiations, which is that they go through a long discussion of technical phases in which the positions of the two sides are not frequently compatible.

They are now at a point where some decisions have to be made on both sides. Some decisions have to be made on both sides modifying the positions that exist.

The positions that have been taken up to now, while they have been irreconcilable, have nevertheless enabled both sides to study the technical implications of a number of reduction proposals that have been put forward. We are now at a phase where this requires a decision—which has happened also in the SALT negotiations—to move things into a stage of more detailed negotiations.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, one criticism of this conference is that its purposes are so modest that it does not seem to warrant engaging the presence of the President of the United States and 34 other heads of government, to sign these papers. How do you respond to that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The position that the United States took throughout the conference was that we would attend the conference at the highest level if this was the judgment of the other participants and if sufficient progress were made to justify it.

That "sufficient progress" was defined during the conference as progress in the so-called Basket 3 on human rights and progress on the military provisions of the advance notification of maneuvers and, finally, on the clause with respect to peaceful change

in Basket 1 on the statement of principles. These objectives were substantially attained.

Nevertheless, the United States did not agree to the summit level until all the major West European countries had previously agreed to it, and it was our view that nuances that might separate one in one's assessment of this did not warrant breaking allied unity on the subject.

Secondly, the conference will give a very useful opportunity, of course, for the meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev and also with other leaders for the President to exchange views and to make progress on outstanding issues.

So on the whole we consider the content of the conference useful, and the visit will also make a significant contribution in a number of areas.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on the meeting with Brezhnev, you had talked about SALT a little bit, but can you be more specific? Has there been progress on the verification issue, and has the Soviet Union accepted American proposals on the counting of MIRV's [multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles] or have they come up with a viable substitute?*

*And two, are you seeking Soviet forbearance for an interim agreement or for American presence, as technicians, in the Middle East? What do you want to talk about on the Middle East?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* With respect to SALT, I have no question that within the next weeks it will seep out of various elements in the government, uncharacteristically, but in summer our standards relax a little.

But I have promised Foreign Minister Gromyko that until the negotiations were somewhat further advanced not to go into a detailed description of the proposal.

I can only repeat what I have said before, that in some areas some significant progress has been made. In other areas, considerable differences remain. And, of course, the United States has attached importance to the verification issue, but I don't want to go

into where the differences remain and where the progress has been made.

With respect to the Middle East, to say the United States asked for Soviet forbearance is to imply a state of affairs that may not correspond to facts. We naturally, as cochairmen of the Geneva Conference, periodically review the Middle East situation with the Soviet Union. We have also always held the view that no final settlement could be made in the Middle East that excluded Soviet participation.

So what we have to discuss with the Soviet Union is where down the road and in what manner the approaches to a final settlement will be made.

With respect to negotiations now in progress, it is not correct to say we are seeking Soviet forbearance, so, of course, the restraint of all of the parties as well as outside countries in that process, is of utility.

*Mr. Nessen:* Let's open it up now for more general questions, for 15 minutes.

*Q. I would like to ask this question to bridge the two subjects. Mr. Secretary, the Administration is encountering extraordinary criticism here of the President's trip to Helsinki. Simultaneously, the Administration suffered a major setback in Congress yesterday on the Turkish vote and also in committee on the Jordanian Hawk missiles. Can it be the Administration is seriously misjudging the Congress and the public in terms of what their views are of what the traffic will bear on foreign policy?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* One of the benefits of détente is that you can criticize détente; and if we did not have it, we would be criticized for missing opportunities for peace.

Is it true? Is the Administration misjudging what the temper of the country is? We believe that in the basic direction of East-West relations, the Administration is in no way misjudging the temper of the country.

In any event, the Administration has an obligation to put before the country and to put before the Congress its best judgment of what is required for peace or progress

toward peace in certain areas, even if it should get defeated on the issues.

First, on the East-West relations, we do not believe we are misjudging the temper of the country, and we ought to keep in perspective the nature of the criticism, the depth of the criticism, and we ought to be aware of the fact that what makes the criticism possible at all is that we are not living under conditions of crisis.

So there is a temptation to have all the benefits of peace, as well as all the benefits of looking tough.

With respect to the Turkish aid vote, I believe this is a result of a special congressional situation that existed before last year and of considerable pressures that were mounted.

We offered a compromise between the total cutoff and the total restoration, which we favored. We believe that it is a very unfortunate decision. We had no choice except to request a change in a congressional decision which is unfortunate for Greece, unfortunate for Turkey, unfortunate for the possibilities of a settlement in Cyprus, and unfortunate for the security of the eastern Mediterranean.

I think it is a tragic evolution, and I hope that when this subject continues to be discussed, it will not be seen in terms of a conflict between the executive and the legislative and not trying to prove who was right to begin with, but trying to see it in terms of the fundamental interests of the United States and the basic requirements of peace.

It is in that spirit that we will try to live with the decision and we will try to do the best we can. We will have to come back to the Congress with our best judgment later on.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, Texas Senator Lloyd Bentsen says a CIA spokesman told him the Soviets are pumping about \$10 million a month into Portugal to finance a Communist takeover of that country.*

*Senator Bentsen says the State Department tells him there are unconfirmed reports of \$2 million a month. Can you tell us what you know about how the Soviets are inter-*

*vening in the internal affairs of Portugal? Is this intervention not a violation of the European security agreement, and if it is a violation, why are we signing the agreement?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First of all, with respect to the CIA estimates, we may have reached a point where the CIA estimates to nongovernmental personnel have a greater degree of precision than the CIA estimates which we received.

We have not been given that figure, but that is not the point. I have not seen any confirmed reports of any particular figure, \$10 million, \$2 million, or any other figure. What I have seen makes \$10 million seem high, but that is not the issue which you are raising.

With respect to Portugal, it is important to remember a number of things.

First, the original change in Portugal had nothing to do with the Communist Party of Portugal or with the Soviet Union. That resulted from the colonial war and the inefficiency and lack of popular base of the previous authoritarian government.

Secondly, when the change occurred, the evolution it took also was largely due to internal Portuguese trends, including the fact that the dominant Armed Forces Movement had been serving in African colonial wars for a long time and had not perhaps been in the mainstream of Western European liberal democratic thought.

Thirdly, in assessing what outside powers did, it is important to assess not only what one side did do but what the Western countries, for a variety of reasons, did not do. In making a fair assessment of the evolution in Portugal, both of these factors have to be taken into account.

Fourthly, to the extent that the Soviet Union is active in Portugal, we consider it incompatible with the spirit of relaxation of tensions, and we will bring it to the attention of the Soviet leaders when we meet with them, as we already have brought it to their attention.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow that question, what do they say?*

*Q. What do they say when you bring it to their attention?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The question is, first of all, what is the degree of their intervention?

I will not go into the details of the diplomatic discussions. We have brought it to their attention. If there is any result from our approaches, the result is more likely to be reflected in actions—if there is any result—than in a long exchange, because governments are not in the habit of confirming this kind of activity.

I would like to stress, however, again, it is an easy way out for us to blame everything that goes against our interests on Soviet machinations. We have also to consider the failures of the West to do what it can do.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you say now or give any indication how close you believe Egypt and Israel are to reaching a new interim agreement and whether you believe another shuttle will be required?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Egypt and Israel, in my view, are now both making serious efforts. These efforts still have left considerable gaps between the two positions. Nevertheless, if the two sides can survive each other's public statements—which is not yet self-evident to me—I believe that they are beginning now to talk about the same range of issues in a negotiable manner.

Whether there will in fact be an agreement is premature to say. If we should get close to an agreement and if the success is probable, then I would think that a shuttle will be necessary to work out the language and the final details.

We are not yet at the point where we can make that decision; but basically there has been a serious effort by both sides which has led to a narrowing of the differences, which in several key areas, however, are still quite wide.

*Q. Can I follow that up, Mr. Secretary?*

*Are you prepared at this point to offer any suggestion of your own in order to bridge the gap between the two sides?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* In the mediating process in which we are engaged we obviously, when we receive ideas from either side, occasionally indicate what in our view the traffic will bear and occasionally make suggestions of the direction in which we believe progress can be made.

We have not thought, up to now, that the difference between the two sides was sufficiently narrow for us to put forward an integrated American plan, and we still do not think we have reached that point and, moreover, it is not necessary as long as there is not any total deadlock, and we don't believe there is a deadlock now.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been reports that the CIA plotted to overthrow the Allende regime in Chile. In one instance, the plot included the kidnapping of a ranking military officer of that country. Is this indeed the case, and were you aware of it, and did you do anything about it?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I do not believe that any purpose is served by discussing fragmentary reports that leak out of this or that office. All the documents on all the covert activities that have ever been planned or carried out in Chile have been submitted to the Church committee [Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities].

The Church committee therefore will be able to make a report based on all the documents in everybody's file, and it will be able to distinguish between things that may have been talked about and things that were actually done in a way that the press does not always do in reporting about it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I am just interested in your answer to Murrey Marder a while ago on this criticism, where you said one of the things we have to do is keep in perspective the nature and depth of the criticism. What does that mean? Does that mean the criticism is invalid in some ways?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, it does not mean that even remotely. The criticism is put forward by serious people with serious concerns, but I believe also that it does not necessarily reflect the majority of the American people.

It is inevitable when you conduct a policy across as wide a range of issues as are involved in moving toward a less tense relation with the East European countries and the Soviet Union, that there are many aspects of it that will be objected to by this or that group.

Our point is that one has to look at the evolution; and secondly, one has to look at the alternative, and one has to ask oneself what the alternative policy is that is being proposed.

We respect the views of the critics. We take them seriously; but we have to assess that criticism on its merits, and we have to assess also its threats.

*Q. Would you answer a question on CSCE vis-a-vis the matter of human rights, which there has been skepticism raised about? How far are the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries willing to go on the matter of respecting the human rights embodied in the CSCE document, and how optimistic are you that the Soviet Government and the Eastern European bloc will liberalize to that extent?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* On the so-called Basket 3, which contains the human rights provisions, the outcome of the conference was substantially a Soviet acceptance of a joint Western proposal that was made as a final agreed position in early May. So if all of these provisions are carried out, we believe it would be a substantial step forward.

At the same time, of course, we cannot assert that this document is without legal force with respect to us, but is of legal force with respect to the other side. Therefore a great deal depends on the general atmosphere that exists in the world on whether these guidelines and principles will in fact be implemented.

What the so-called Basket 3 does is to enable the West and the United States to ap-

peal to agreed documents as a guide for conduct, and this is what we will do. And we will also hope to bring about a further improvement of East-West relations that would accelerate the process and improve the atmosphere. It is not absolutely binding, but it is a step forward, to have Communist agreement with these principles; and we will do our utmost to hold them to it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what reaction do you anticipate the Turkish Government will take in response to what Congress has done? Will they now cause us to have to give up, leave, or otherwise terminate some of our bases there?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have learned one thing in recent months, which is that if what you predict happens, you are blamed for having caused the result which you foresee by your prediction; and therefore I am not going to make a prediction which we will then be accused of having encouraged the Turkish Government to take.

We believe that it was a very unfortunate and sad decision that was taken yesterday because it helped nobody, including those who passionately urged it. But we have made this case now.

We have been told by the Turkish Government on innumerable occasions that there would be some reaction. We are now engaged in talking to the Turkish Government—I had a telephone conversation with Prime Minister Demirel this morning; the President sent him a message yesterday—in trying to urge restraint and moderation on the Turkish Government, because the basic values that are involved in our joint defense and that affect issues far beyond Turkish-American relations have not changed as a result of this vote.

So we are hoping that Turkey will not take any precipitous action and give everybody an opportunity to see whether progress can be made on the issues that have produced this in the first place, so I would not want to make a prediction. I do not know what the Turkish reaction to our appeals will be.

## European Security Conference Discussed by President Ford

*Statement by President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

I am glad to have this opportunity, before taking off for Europe tomorrow, to discuss with you frankly how I feel about the forthcoming European Security Conference in Helsinki.

I know there are some honest doubts and disagreements among good Americans about this meeting with the leaders of Eastern and Western European countries and Canada—35 nations altogether.

There are those who fear the conference will put a seal of approval on the political division of Europe that has existed since the Soviet Union incorporated the Baltic nations and set new boundaries elsewhere in Europe by military action in World War II. These critics contend that participation by the United States in the Helsinki understandings amounts to tacit recognition of a status quo which favors the Soviet Union and perpetuates its control over countries allied with it.

On the other extreme there are critics who say the meeting is a meaningless exercise because the Helsinki declarations are merely statements of principles and good intentions which are neither legally binding nor enforceable and cannot be depended upon. They express concern, however, that the result will be to make the free governments of Western Europe and North America less wary and lead to a letting down of NATO's political guard and military defenses.

If I seriously shared these reservations I would not be going, but I certainly understand the historical reasons for them and, especially, the anxiety of Americans whose ancestral homelands, families, and friends have been and still are profoundly affected

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<sup>1</sup> Made on July 25 at a meeting at the White House with seven Members of Congress and representatives of Eastern European ethnic groups (text from White House press release).

by East-West political developments in Europe.

I would emphasize that the document I will sign is neither a treaty nor is it legally binding on any participating state. The Helsinki documents involve political and moral commitments aimed at lessening tensions and opening further the lines of communication between the peoples of East and West.

It is the policy of the United States, and it has been my policy ever since I entered public life, to support the aspirations for freedom and national independence of the peoples of Eastern Europe—with whom we have close ties of culture and blood—by every proper and peaceful means. I believe the outcome of this European Security Conference will be a step—how long a step remains to be tested—in that direction. I hope my visits to Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia will again demonstrate our continuing friendship and interest in the welfare and progress of the fine people of Eastern Europe.

To keep the Helsinki Conference in perspective, we must remember that it is not simply another summit between the superpowers. On the contrary, it is primarily a political dialogue among the Europeans, East, West, and neutral, with primary emphasis on European relationships rather than global differences. The United States has taken part, along with Canada, to maintain the solidarity of the Atlantic alliance and because our absence would have caused a serious imbalance for the West.

We have acted in concert with our free and democratic partners to preserve our interests in Berlin and Germany and have obtained the public commitment of the Warsaw Pact governments to the possibility of peaceful adjustment of frontiers—a major concession which runs quite contrary to the allegation that present borders are being permanently frozen.

The Warsaw Pact nations met important Western preconditions—the Berlin Agreement of 1971, the force reduction talks now

underway in Vienna—before our agreement to go to Helsinki.

Specifically addressing the understandable concern about the effect of the Helsinki declarations on the Baltic nations, I can assure you as one who has long been interested in this question that the United States has never recognized the Soviet incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and is not doing so now. Our official policy of nonrecognition is not affected by the results of the European Security Conference.

There is included in the declaration of principles on territorial integrity the provision that no occupation or acquisition of territory in violation of international law will be recognized as legal. This is not to raise the hope that there will be any immediate change in the map of Europe, but the United States has not abandoned and will not compromise this longstanding principle.

The question has been asked: What have we given up in these negotiations and what have we obtained in return from the other side? I have studied the negotiations and declarations carefully and will discuss them even more intensely with other leaders in Helsinki. In my judgment, the United States and the open countries of the West already practice what the Helsinki accords preach and have no intention of doing what they prohibit—such as using force or restricting freedoms. We are not committing ourselves to anything beyond what we are already committed to by our own moral and legal standards and by more formal treaty agreements such as the United Nations Charter and Declaration of Human Rights.

We are getting a public commitment by the leaders of the more closed and controlled countries to a greater measure of freedom and movement for individuals, information, and ideas than has existed there in the past and establishing a yardstick by which the world can measure how well they live up to these stated intentions. It is a step in the direction of a greater degree of European community, of expanding East-West con-

tacts, of more normal and healthier relations in an area where we have the closest historic ties. Surely this is the best interest of the United States and of peace in the world.

I think we are all agreed that our world cannot be changed for the better by war; that in the thermonuclear age our primary task is to reduce the danger of unprecedented destruction. This we are doing through continuing Strategic Arms Limitations Talks with the Soviet Union and the talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe. This European Security Conference in Helsinki, while it contains some military understandings such as advance notice of maneuvers, should not be confused with either the SALT or MBFR negotiations. The Helsinki summit is linked with our overall policy of working to reduce East-West tensions and pursuing peace, but it is a much more general and modest undertaking.

Its success or failure depends not alone on the United States and the Soviet Union but primarily upon its 33 European signatories, East, West, and neutral. The fact that each of them, large and small, can have their voices heard is itself a good sign. The fact that these very different governments can agree, even on paper, to such principles as greater human contacts and exchanges, improved conditions for journalists, reunification of families and international marriages, a freer flow of information and publications, and increased tourism and travel seems to me a development well worthy of positive and public encouragement by the United States. If it all fails, Europe will be no worse off than it is now. If even a part of it succeeds, the lot of the people in Eastern Europe will be that much better, and the cause of freedom will advance at least that far.

I saw an editorial the other day entitled "Jerry, Don't Go."

But I would rather read that than headlines all over Europe saying "United States Boycotts Peace Hopes."

So I am going, and I hope your support goes with me.

## Department Stresses Importance of Economic Assistance Programs

*Statement by Robert S. Ingersoll  
Deputy Secretary<sup>1</sup>*

It is with pleasure that I appear before this committee this morning. The Administration greatly welcomes the consideration your committee is and will be giving toward one of the most essential elements in our framework of international cooperation; namely, our economic assistance program.

Our country, about to enter the third century of its existence as a nation, faces problems of enormous complexity which go beyond the political and economic techniques devised in response to needs of an earlier, simpler time. Today, when change is constant and accelerating, when the fates of so many societies are closely interwoven, the essential conditions of our international cooperation need to be strong and well considered, and they must enjoy the support of the American Congress and people.

Since the beginning of this decade many new factors have transformed the international scene. Japan and Europe have emerged as major economic forces. There has been some muting of East-West tensions along with the concurrent growth in complexity and destructiveness of military power. In the postcolonial era, the number and diversity of developing nations have increased. These countries represent 70 percent of the world's population. Their underdevelopment, poverty, and scarce managerial skills are a detriment to themselves and to stable international conditions.

The people who comprise the southern part of the globe face problems of hunger and malnutrition, of inadequate health services, poor education, and unemployment. They

<sup>1</sup>Made before the House Committee on International Relations on July 14. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.



need help from the United States and other industrialized countries in their efforts to improve the quality of their lives. One significant way to approach this goal is through an aid program designed to help meet the basic needs of the majority of these countries.

This committee, two years ago, took the initiative to give new emphasis to our assistance programs by addressing the problems of food and nutrition and of population and health. It also took the initiative to stress an AID [Agency for International Development] program design which, to the extent possible, directly aids the poor in less developed countries (LDC's). Seventy-two percent of the development assistance program for fiscal year 1976, which you are considering today, will go to countries with a per capita income of less than \$275 per annum. The U.S. emphasis on this assistance to the poorest elements is echoed by the other international development institutions. Similarly, American innovations in the sectors of food production and education have served as models for such institutions—the World Bank, for instance.

Our record in the past has been a good one. Indeed, one of the more important achievements over the past decade has been the success of our efforts in helping the poor countries achieve a commendable level of economic growth, although all poor countries have not shared in this. We have also engaged other donor countries in increasing the flow of assistance to the less developed. For every dollar of U.S. economic aid we now provide, other donors are providing two dollars of assistance.

In effect, we have participated with others in creating an international system of assistance-giving that is unprecedented in the history of mankind. We must continue to contribute our fair share along with European nations and Japan while at the same time encouraging the oil-rich countries to increase their portion of the assistance burden. Despite their current economic difficulties, other countries are maintaining and

many are increasing their contributions.

We do well to preserve and to maintain a role which represents an essential continuity in our foreign policy. We have been a generous donor in the past. The United States has been in the forefront of those countries who have shared their bounty with others less developed, although, expressed in real terms, the volume of official development assistance over the past decade has remained relatively the same. Yet our bilateral aid programs are the vital means whereby we remain active partners in the difficult long-term process of working with other nations to foster a less chaotic world through economic growth and an enhancing of the human condition.

To fail to deal with these problems can lead to economic-bloc confrontation and breakdown in the world economic system. To fail to respond effectively to the basic economic and social issues will have an effect on our own economic order and ultimately on our own security. To falter in our aid because of current domestic economic problems would be a form of beggar-thy-neighbor policy that would be taken as a signal of U.S. indifference to the problems of the world's poor.

The United States recognizes the responsibilities that accompany its political, economic, and military power. And we recognize our own self-interest in promoting cooperative approaches.

Our relations with the less developed countries embrace a network of important economic, political, and defense agreements. In the economic sphere alone we depend on some of them both to supply critical raw materials and to absorb many of our exports.

Last year, the LDC's purchased approximately one-third of our exports. Our balance-of-trade surplus with non-oil-producing LDC's was approximately \$5.5 billion. This never would have occurred in the absence of current interlocking network of development assistance programs by all the industrialized nations. U.S. investment in LDC's has grown to over \$28 billion as of last year. These statistics indicate that the U.S. relationship

with LDC's is not one-sided, with all the benefits flowing in one direction.

Growing worldwide economic interdependence and the increasing impact of events abroad on our domestic policies requires the United States to play an active economic role on the world stage. There is mutuality of interest in expanding trade and investment, in monetary stability, in equitable access to raw materials, and in the protection of the environment.

We are convinced that an international system whose paramount characteristic is rivalry between blocs will result in instability and confrontation. The outcome of such a situation would be disastrous, especially for the less developed countries. The international order will be stable only so long as its economic benefits are widely shared and its arrangements are perceived as just.

The United States cannot prosper as an island of plenty in a world of deprivation. A foreign aid program becomes an essential instrument of U.S. foreign policy aimed at:

—Making it possible for cooperation rather than confrontation to become the way the North-South dialogue is conducted.

—Engaging the ingenuity, creativity, and technical competence of our nation to cope with the problems of hunger, disease, illiteracy, and poverty which characterize the lot of most of the rest of the world.

—Assisting in the expansion of the world's trade and more productive employment for all nations.

If our foreign policy fulfills what is best in America, the world will not remain always divided between the permanently poor and the permanently rich.

## Responsibility for Indochina Refugee Task Force Transferred to HEW

*Statement by President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

I am today formally announcing the transfer of principal operational responsibility of the Interagency Task Force for the resettlement of refugees from Indochina from the Department of State to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

Since I formed the task force in April, the resettlement of refugees has become primarily a domestic rather than foreign affairs concern. A great deal has been accomplished in evacuating, caring for, and resettling refugees from Indochina. However, much remains to be done. I ask all Americans to open their hearts to these refugees as we have to others throughout our history.

Mrs. Julia Taft, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, who has been acting as Director of the Task Force since the departure of Ambassador Dean Brown, will continue as Director. All decisions and activities regarding the domestic and international resettlement of refugees from Indochina will be coordinated by her. She will act under my direction and in close coordination with the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and the President's Advisory Committee on Refugees. Mrs. Taft's responsibilities will continue to involve numerous governmental departments, and I am directing each of them to offer her their full cooperation and support in this important task.

<sup>1</sup> Issued on July 21 (text from White House press release).

## Department Discusses Situation in Southern Rhodesia

*Following are statements by Nathaniel Davis, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, and William B. Buffum, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, made before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 10.<sup>1</sup>*

### STATEMENT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY DAVIS

I welcome this opportunity to meet with the subcommittee again—this time for an exchange of views on the situation in Southern Rhodesia. Ambassador William B. Buffum, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, is here with me today.

As you know, Rhodesia is technically a self-governing British colony in revolt against the British Government. Its unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) of 1965 has not been formally recognized by any country. The regime of Ian Smith, representing less than 5 percent of the total Rhodesian population, has since 1965 taken steps to perpetuate white minority rule and to exclude the African majority from meaningful participation in the political and economic life of the country.

For the better part of 10 years the Rhodesian problem has evaded every solution despite repeated efforts of the British Government, supported by the United Nations, which imposed mandatory economic sanc-

tions against Rhodesia in 1966 and 1968.

Since the accession of Mozambique to independence, the situation in southern Africa, including Rhodesia, has changed. As you know, Mozambique, a nation with a 700-mile common border with Rhodesia, became independent just two weeks ago. The independence of Mozambique and the possibility of the closing of its borders to Rhodesian trade has placed additional pressure on the Smith regime. (It is estimated that some 80 percent of Rhodesian exports and imports go through Mozambique.)

There are some indications of an increased perception within the minority regime that its present course can only lead to further violence and tragedy and that it would be preferable to enter into serious negotiations with representatives of the African majority on the future of Rhodesia. Leaders of the neighboring states of Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Botswana, and South Africa are seeking to exert influence toward the promotion of peaceful solution in Rhodesia. Preliminary talks between the Smith regime and the Rhodesian nationalists, who formally united in December under the African National Council, are continuing, despite deadlocks, interruptions, and procedural difficulties. The formal unification of Rhodesian nationalists is a significant development, encouraged by Presidents Kaunda [of Zambia], Seretse Khama [of Botswana], Nyerere [of Tanzania], and Machel [of Mozambique]. The preliminary talks, which resulted from the December agreement in Lusaka, are designed to pave the way for a full-fledged constitutional conference.

Thus, there are some encouraging signs—

<sup>1</sup> The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

including the fact that the United Kingdom sent an emissary to Salisbury late in June to discuss with the Smith regime and with Rhodesian nationalist leaders the timing and modalities of a possible constitutional conference. Nonetheless, Mr. Chairman, I think it would be a mistake to be overly optimistic. A Rhodesian settlement is still far from accomplishment at this point, and there is every likelihood that there will be a period of hard negotiations ahead.

The main lines of our policy toward Rhodesia have followed from the illegal Rhodesian UDI based on minority rule. In brief, we do not recognize the Rhodesian regime's claim to independence; we continue to regard the British Crown as the lawful sovereign in Rhodesia; we support the United Nations and the United Kingdom in their efforts to influence the Rhodesian regime to negotiate a peaceful settlement based on the principles of self-determination and eventual majority rule in Rhodesia. To this end we voted for and support the U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia.

I might add, Mr. Chairman, that while our record of sanctions enforcement has been good, there is a major gap in this enforcement created by the Byrd amendment allowing the importation of chrome and certain other materials from Rhodesia. In addition to providing the regime in Salisbury with much-needed foreign exchange, the Byrd amendment has also provided moral and psychological support to that regime. I would like to stress again the Administration's support for legislation repealing the Byrd amendment (H.R. 1287) currently being considered by the Congress. We are very encouraged by the progress of the repeal bill, voted out of the House International Relations Committee yesterday. Early repeal not only would enable the United States to comply fully with its international obligations but, we hope, would add an important increment of influence on the Smith regime to move into serious negotiations regarding Rhodesia's future.

Mr. Chairman, we strongly support self-determination for the people of Rhodesia

and hope that current efforts to arrive at a settlement acceptable to the population of Rhodesia as a whole will be successful.

#### STATEMENT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BUFFUM

I should like to review briefly for this committee the nature of the U.N.'s concerns with Rhodesia and the U.S. position with regard to those concerns.

As you know, the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence from Great Britain on November 11, 1965. Great Britain, interested in granting independence to a multiracial state governed by majority rule, requested U.N. assistance in dealing with the Smith regime's persistent illegal claim to independence. The Security Council decided on November 12 and 20, 1965, to set in motion a program of voluntary economic sanctions directed at Southern Rhodesia at the request of the United Kingdom, calling on all states to refrain from assisting the illegal Smith regime and to do their utmost to break all economic relations with it, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products.

Early in April 1966 attempts were made to circumvent the voluntary oil embargo. On the grounds that such action, specifically the arrival of the oil tanker *Joanna V* at the port of Beira, Mozambique, could lead to a collapse of the entire sanctions program against Southern Rhodesia, the United Kingdom urgently requested a meeting of the Security Council on April 7, 1966. The British submitted a resolution before the Security Council describing the situation in Southern Rhodesia as "a threat to the peace," and it was adopted on April 9. The United States had participated in the voluntary sanctions, and if you wish I can supply this committee with a brief chronology of U.S. actions taken during 1965 and 1966.

The U.N. Security Council responded again to British requests for a meeting in December of 1966, and on December 16 again decided that the Rhodesian situation constituted a threat to the peace. The United

States concurred in these Security Council findings because we believed that a U.N. policy of passivity in the face of the Rhodesian rebellion would sharpen existing tensions in the southern half of Africa, encourage extremism on the part of both black and white communities in African states, and make possible exploitation of the situation by extremists of the left and right.

At the request of the United Kingdom, members of the U.N. Security Council concluded that selective mandatory sanctions should be applied against the Rhodesian regime. The prevailing hope was that the sanctions would induce the leaders in Rhodesia to agree to majority rule, a step which would clearly reduce the potential for violence in a very sensitive area of the African Continent. It was the first time that the Security Council had decided in favor of mandatory sanctions. While it was uncertain at the time what the actual effect of mandatory sanctions on the Smith regime might be, the U.S. support of this decision was based on the hope that the mandatory sanctions would assist the United Kingdom in its effort to create a more equitable political situation in the British territory.

The issue of sanctions is not without limits. In March of 1970, the United States first exercised its veto on a proposal to include further mandatory provisions to the effect that all states should sever all ties with the Smith regime, including means of transportation, postal service, and all forms of communication. The U.S. Representative, Ambassador Yost, pointed out that his government shared the desire to achieve an equitable solution to this problem, but that:

The question . . . arises whether these more extreme measures which have been suggested would be sufficiently supported by the international community, especially those most directly concerned, to make them in fact effective . . . .

He further pointed out that the United States has consistently attached great significance to the maintenance of communications even where relations were strained, since we would view most seriously the prospect of leaving U.S. citizens anywhere

in the world without the means to travel and communicate.

As to the U.S. actions pursuant to the Security Council decisions, on January 5, 1967, President Johnson issued Executive Order 11322, which implemented for the United States the Security Council's Resolution 232 of December 16, 1966.

The Security Council reconvened on the question of Southern Rhodesia, and on May 29, 1968, unanimously adopted Resolution 253, which reaffirmed the 1966 resolution, expanded the scope of the sanctions, and in addition, established a committee of the Security Council (commonly referred to as the Sanctions Committee) to monitor the implementation of the sanctions. The United States has been and is an active member of the Sanctions Committee, and we submit quarterly reports regarding trade (medical and educational materials are permitted) and investigations of possible violations. To date there are 237 cases of alleged sanctions violations by various states. Thirty-three of those cases involve U.S. importation of Rhodesian chrome.

The status of the Byrd amendment and its repeal are inextricably a part of U.S. participation in the Sanctions Committee. In November 1971, President Nixon signed into law the Military Procurement Authorization Act, of which section 503 was the Byrd amendment. The Byrd amendment permits the importation into the United States of certain strategic and critical materials, including those from Rhodesia. A key item included in this category is chrome.

This legislation had as a stated objective the lessening of U.S. dependence on the Soviet Union as a source of chromium imports. During the period before 1972, the United States had imported from the Soviet Union about one-half of its metallurgical-grade chromite. We imported virtually no chrome ore from Rhodesia from 1968 through 1971 inclusive, and no ferrochrome before 1972. Since 1972, our metallurgical-grade chromite imports from Rhodesia have remained steady at approximately 10 percent of total U.S. imports of this material.

However, imports of Rhodesian chromite seem to have replaced declining purchases from other countries rather than to have displaced imports from the Soviet Union. In general, importation of this material from areas other than Soviet Union has fallen, while the Soviet Union has maintained its relative percentage of total U.S. imports.

A few days after assuming the Presidency, President Ford stated his full commitment to the repeal of the Byrd amendment. Secretary Kissinger has declared [in a letter to Representative John Buchanan dated February 8, 1974] that he is personally convinced that the Byrd amendment is "not essential to our national security, brings us no real economic advantages, and is costly to the national interest of the United States in our conduct of foreign relations." His statement is particularly pertinent to the U.S. posture in the United Nations and the Security Council's Sanctions Committee. I hope that the Senate will see its way clear to repeal the Byrd amendment.

## Department Discusses Situation in Angola

*Statement by Nathaniel Davis  
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

I welcome this opportunity to meet with the subcommittee for an exchange of views on the situation in Angola.

Angola, as you know, will be the last of Portugal's African colonies to attain its independence, which is scheduled for November 11 of this year. Unlike the situation in the other territories, where a single liberation movement existed when Portugal embarked on its policy of decolonization last year, three major liberation groups have existed in Angola for some years. In addition

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 14. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

to agreement with Portugal, the three groups had to agree among themselves on the modalities for independence. This was done last January, and a transitional government composed of representatives of the three movements and of Portugal was installed on January 31.

The basic problem posed by the separate identities of the three groups and the strong competition between them for ultimate leadership of Angola was not resolved; and as you know, there have been recurring serious outbreaks of violence since January. The three movements, divided by ethnic, ideological, and personal differences, have made several efforts to reach political accommodation and to insure a peaceful transition to independence; but fighting among them has continued. A second "summit" meeting between leaders of the three groups took place in Nakuru, Kenya, June 16-21, under the sponsorship of President Kenyatta. We sincerely hope that the three leaders—Agostinho Neto of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), Holden Roberto of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and Jonas Savimbi of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)—will continue to make serious efforts to resolve their differences through negotiations. The agreement reached on June 21 pledged each of them to sharing in the preparations for independence without additional bloodshed. Fighting between MPLA and FNLA broke out again late last week, however.

Our own position toward the future independent Angola was started by President Ford at the White House dinner for President Kaunda of Zambia on April 19, when he said:

... we have been following developments in southern Africa with great, great interest. For many years the United States has supported self-determination for the peoples of that area, and we continue to do so today.

We view the coming independence of Mozambique, Angola, and the island territories with great satisfaction, just as we viewed the independence of Guinea-Bissau just last year.

. . . America stands ready to help the emerging countries . . . and to provide what assistance we can . . . .

I would add that we hope to enter into mutually beneficial relations with independent Angola at the appropriate time.

Although the problems now facing Angola and its leaders are profound, the country has a great potential which can only be realized if peace and order prevail. Angola's natural and human resources will, in the long term, make it a politically important and economically viable member of the family of nations. We look forward to welcoming Angola into the international community and wish the leaders success in reaching a peaceful resolution of their differences.

## United States Extends Recognition to Republic of Cape Verde

*Following is the text of a letter dated July 5 from President Ford to President Aristedes Pereira of the Republic of Cape Verde, which was released on July 14.*

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 21

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The American people join me in extending congratulations and best wishes to you and the people of the Republic of Cape Verde on the occasion of your independence. In this regard, I am pleased to inform you that the United States Government extends recognition to Cape Verde.

I am aware of the serious drought which has affected the islands for the past eight years. I know that this situation must be a matter of great concern as your government assumes the responsibilities for the well-being of your people. I am hopeful that the steps already taken by the United States to provide humanitarian aid and technical assistance to Cape Verde will help alleviate the current hardship and provide a base for economic development and future prosperity.

As the historic ties of friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the United States and Cape Verde grow and strengthen,

I look forward to the opportunity for our two nations to work together in the cause of peace, freedom and the welfare of mankind.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, July 5, 1975.

## Department Urges U.S. Participation in African Development Fund

*Statement by Nathaniel Davis  
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

I am very pleased to have this opportunity to testify on behalf of the proposed U.S. membership in the African Development Fund. The statement of my colleague Assistant Secretary Cooper [Charles A. Cooper, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs] has already provided you with a background analysis of the Fund and its financial operations. I would like to add to Assistant Secretary Cooper's statement and underline the importance of this legislation in our general relations with Africa.

The African Development Fund is the African Development Bank's affiliate institution for providing concessional assistance to Bank members. The Fund's membership includes the Bank, representing its member states, and non-African donors. We are proposing that the U.S. Government join and contribute to the Fund, the appropriate vehicle for American financial participation in the joint regional development activities of the two institutions. We do not consider the provisions of the Bank's charter which exclude non-African members to be detrimental to our interests nor an argument against our belonging to the Fund.

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Subcommittee on International Development Institutions and Finance of the House Committee on Banking, Currency, and Housing on July 15. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Our primary purpose in seeking to join the African Development Fund is to take our place with other donors in providing the financial resources required by an institution already proven effective in the African development effort. It is the clear sense of the Congress that our assistance should be directed to the needs of the poorest nations. Africa, despite progress made in recent years, remains one of the poorest regions of the world. Sixteen of the world's twenty-five least developed countries are in Africa. The resources of the African Development Fund have been largely directed to these 16 states. Thus, American membership in the Fund is entirely consistent with our own policies in encouraging African economic development.

Our growing economic stake in Africa also argues for U.S. participation in the African Development Fund. Assistant Secretary Cooper has noted the quintupling—from \$1 billion to \$5 billion—of American private investment in Africa over the last decade. U.S. trade with Africa doubled in value during 1974. The value of U.S. exports to Africa increased by 58 percent in 1974 although the doubling of trade largely reflects increased petroleum imports from Nigeria, now our first supplier of imported oil. The combined long-term trade and investment figures show a clear trend toward greatly increased interest by American business in African countries, both as suppliers and as purchasers of goods and services in our international trade.

This growth in our trade and investment relations with Africa has also involved a significant shift in geographic emphasis. Until the 1960's, when the majority of black African nations achieved independence, the American economic stake in the Republic of South Africa was almost as important as our economic involvement in the rest of Africa combined. However, when Angola becomes independent this year, 73 percent of direct American investment in Africa south of the Sahara and over three-fourths of our trade with that area will be with independent black African countries. Thus, our interest in those countries belonging to

the African Development Bank has grown substantially.

Generally speaking, regional development finance institutions have two major advantages:

—Greater familiarity with and focus on regional development problems.

—Ability to provide a training ground in sound principles of development finance for regional nationals.

These merits are particularly valid in the case of the African Development Bank and Fund.

*The application of local expertise* by the Fund has been reflected in the institution's rightfully directing its major efforts toward rural infrastructure in the poorest African countries. Compared with other parts of the developing world, infrastructure deficiencies in Africa are relatively more important and intimately related to problems of rural development and self-sufficiency in food production.

Local confidence in the African Development Bank stems from the Bank's status as a unique example of self-help within the developing world. The African decision to restrict Bank membership to African states meant substantially reduced prospects for capital resources. Nevertheless, the Africans, on the basis of their colonial experience, were determined to establish an institution with full commitment to African interests. The African Development Fund was established as a separate affiliated institution to permit developed country participation in the African development effort without diluting the African character of the Bank. The African oil producers (Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, and Gabon) have recently increased their combined capital subscriptions to the Bank by \$78 million. In addition, the Africans have asked Arab donors to use the Bank and Fund as vehicles for transferring Arab oil-producer resources into Africa. Finally, Algeria has turned over its \$20 million contribution to the Arab-African solidarity fund to the Bank for administration.

*Training in development finance* for Africans within the Bank's operations is partic-



ularly effective not only because the Bank enjoys the confidence of African governments but also because the trainees are exposed to the expertise of the technical assistance staff provided separately by all major Fund donors. I would like strongly to endorse Assistant Secretary Cooper's support for continued AID-funded [Agency for International Development] American technical assistance to the Bank following our membership in the Fund. This formula of a Treasury-sponsored contribution to the Fund coupled with separate AID-funded technical assistance to the Bank is the most appropriate way for the United States to participate in the two institutions.

Assistant Secretary Cooper has described the growing financial importance of both the African Development Bank and Fund. These institutions are now recognized by the international financial community as vigorous and effective participants in the African development process. Participant donors have already begun the process of increasing their contributions to the Fund. Fund procurement is growing rapidly. Since procurement is limited to firms whose governments are members of the Bank and Fund, American companies will not have access to the business opportunities arising from that increased Fund procurement until we have made our contribution.

American membership in the African Development Fund is consistent with our contributions to the concessional loan facilities of other regional financial institutions in Asia and Latin America. Conversely, a refusal to participate might be construed as a discriminatory act and cast doubt on the U.S. commitment to African development. During my recent consultations with officials of the African Development Bank, it was made clear to me that our participation in the Fund has become a matter of considerable importance to them. African participants expressed similar views during the symposium on "Changing Vistas in U.S.-African Economic Relations" which Chairman Diggs [Representative Charles C. Diggs, Jr.], sponsored here last March. The African keynote speaker, the representative of

the Organization for African Unity, and the representative of the African Development Bank urged the United States to join the African Development Fund.

We seek a cooperative basis for our growing economic interdependence with the developing world. We seek to emphasize to African and other developing nations that we must have pragmatic dialogue on the specific problems of the developing world and joint efforts to develop solutions in which we can actively participate. Most important to African nations will be a demonstration on our part that we are committed to assisting them in their own objective of achieving a better life for their peoples. Membership in the African Development Fund is entirely consistent with this approach.

President Ford, in his September 1974 legislative goals message to the Congress, urged early authorization of American membership in the Fund. I can only reiterate to this committee his appeal for favorable action on the pending authorization request.

## **U.S. Provides Assistance to Cape Verde**

AID press release 65 dated July 2

The new island Government of Cape Verde, a former Portuguese possession, will receive a \$3 million agricultural-sector support loan and grants totaling \$2 million from the Agency for International Development to assist it in its early days of independence.

Cape Verde, with a population estimated at 300,000, obtained its independence on July 5. A Constituent Assembly, which was elected June 30, is empowered to draft a constitution and select a President. The Cape Verde Archipelago has been governed since December 1974 by the Transitional Government of Cape Verde.

Cape Verde obtains its independence at a time when the 10 islands are suffering from an eight-year drought related to the Sahelian drought in continental Africa. The drought has reduced agricultural output, particularly

maize and livestock, to about one-fourth of its normal level and has made the economy heavily dependent on imported food for subsistence. Portugal, which has been providing assistance up to \$30 million annually, announced it would no longer continue large-scale assistance after independence.

The transitional government appealed to the U.N. agencies and to bilateral donors for assistance both in meeting its immediate need for food and in development programs to foster the newly independent country's economic development.

Assistance is being given Cape Verde at a time when there is estimated to be only one month's supply of basic foods in the islands. A \$1 million grant which was signed on June 30 will be used for the procurement of food from the United States for distribution to the needy and to assist food-for-work projects. An amendment adding an additional \$1 million is planned in July. The transitional government has estimated food requirements for 1975 at about 70,000 tons, including 40,000 tons of maize, 8,000 tons of beans, 8,000 tons of maize and cassava flour, and 4,500 tons of milk powder.

The \$3 million agricultural loan, also signed June 30, will provide financing for foreign exchange and local costs to support labor-intensive rural works projects, including land clearing, construction of access roads, conservation works, and small-scale irrigation facilities. Project activities will be organized by the Ministry of Economic Coordination and Labor. The soil and water conservation works would be located primarily on Santo Antão island, which has the greatest agricultural potential, as well as on São Vicente, Fogo, Brava, and Santiago. These would include building dikes in valley areas to catch alluvial soils washed from the mountainsides, erection of retaining walls to prevent further erosion of soils into valley areas used for crop production, and construction of stone and concrete aqueducts to permit irrigation of valley areas through the diking system.

The overall project goal is to increase production of agricultural products and increase small-farmer income as well as reducing Cape

Verde's dependence on imported food commodities. The loan will be repaid in dollars within 40 years from the first disbursement, including a grace period not to exceed 10 years.

## **U.S.-U.K. Creative Arts Fellowships Established To Mark Bicentennial**

Press release 354 dated July 2

As part of the celebration of the American Revolution Bicentennial the Government of the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom announced on July 1 a program of fellowships in the creative and performing arts. The exchange of notes establishing the program, which will be jointly funded, took place in London between the U.S. Ambassador, Elliot Richardson, and the British Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan.

Under the new program, up to five fellowships will be awarded each year for a period of five years in such fields as drama, opera, ballet, music, cinema, television, graphics, design, painting, sculpture, and architecture, or any other field of activity considered by the selection committees to be in the spirit of the fellowships. The fellowships will be open to men and women already established in their fields who show a clear potential to become prominent members of their professions.

Fellowships for American participants, which will be funded by the Department of State and by the National Endowment for the Arts, will be administered by the Endowment. In the United Kingdom the program will be administered by the British Council.

Thomas L. Hughes, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former American Minister at London, has agreed to serve as chairman of the American selection committee. Others on the committee will be Nancy Hanks, Chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts; John Richardson, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs; and George Sanderson, Educational Attaché of the British Embassy in Washington.

## Department Discusses Status of International Energy Program

*Statement by Thomas O. Enders*

*Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

The energy crisis is not only a crisis in our economy; it is a fundamental challenge to our security as a nation and to our role in the world. At present, the element in our economy most critical to employment and prosperity is subject to manipulation both as to price and as to supply by countries that do not necessarily have an interest in our well-being and success.

Just as we are vulnerable, so are the other main industrial countries. Most of them are far more dependent on oil imports than we are; most have fewer energy resources to develop.

And the industrial countries have a strong interest in cooperation with each other to overcome their vulnerability. Alone, no single country can, through conservation and the creation of alternative sources, create a new balance in the world market for oil and thus bring the price down. In the next few years no country can successfully defend alone against a new embargo or massive shifts in petrodollars. Finally, no single country can alone carry out all the research and development (R. & D.) or provide all the capital required for replacing fossil fuels when they are exhausted.

But it is equally true that the industrial countries would all suffer if they failed to restore competitive conditions to the oil market. A degree of national freedom would

permanently be lost. It would be far more difficult to restore sustained growth. The industrial world would begin to split as each country offered political and economic concessions in an effort to make a separate peace with the oil producers. The future balance of power in the Middle East might be irreparably compromised.

It was this sense of shared interest that led to the U.S. initiative to convene the Washington Energy Conference in February 1974. As a consequence, the International Energy Agency was founded in November 1974. Eighteen countries now belong to it. The IEA's objectives are:

—To provide security against a new oil embargo by a coordinated program to build oil stocks and to share available oil in an emergency;

—To share equitably among industrial countries the burden of conservation; and

—To coordinate our measures to stimulate the development of alternative sources.

### Current Situation

That is what we are aiming at. What has so far been accomplished?

First, emergency planning. On the basis of the detailed agreement signed in November, the IEA now has the necessary planning and machinery in a good state of readiness, should we be confronted with a new embargo situation. In order to back them up, each country must have authority to implement quick-acting conservation measures on a coordinated basis, and we need decisions to

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Senate Committee on Finance on July 14. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

raise emergency oil stocks in all countries from the present minimum of 60 days of imports to the agreed level of 90 days.

In contrast to some other IEA members, the United States has lagged in developing the needed emergency authorities. On the other hand, congressional action to create a 90-day petroleum reserve will put us ahead of our partners in this critical area. However, both emergency powers and more storage are necessary for an effective response to a new embargo. It is clear that instability in the Middle East creates a very real potential for a new interruption in oil supplies.

Second, conservation. However necessary, it is painful and costly to restrain demand for oil. And as a matter of simple politics, few other industrialized countries will be willing to sustain a strong conservation program over time unless others join them, and there is thus the possibility of changing market conditions and eventually bringing oil prices down. For this reason we proposed and the IEA adopted the goal of saving 2 million barrels per day (MMBD) of oil by the end of 1975 and distributed the target among countries according to their oil consumption. Since we have half the oil consumption of the group, our target was 1 MMBD by the end of the year.

Nearly all the other members of the IEA have taken action to decrease oil demand, by passing through increased crude costs to the end user, by new taxation, by such specific conservation measures as fuel switching and lighting and heating regulations.

In contrast, the United States has lagged. So far the only major conservation measure with immediate effect that this country has taken is the oil import fees. Decontrol of old oil over the phased schedule the President will recommend will add very substantially to our conservation effort, bringing us up to the level where other countries are already.

The lagging performance of the United States can be seen in comparisons with other countries' results. Between the first quarter of 1973 and the first quarter of this year Germany's oil consumption fell by 14 per-

cent, Italy's by 8 percent, Japan's by 8 percent, Britain's by 18 percent, ours by 6 percent. And yet of all these countries the recession, which of course has reduced demand for oil, was far more severe here than elsewhere. We have the world's highest per capita consumption of energy—twice Germany's—but we have not been doing our part.

H.R. 6860 [A Bill To Provide a Comprehensive Energy Conservation and Conversion Program] would save us an estimated 314,000 barrels per day in 1977—not much more than the program Britain has already undertaken with an economy one-tenth the size of ours.

Third, alternative sources. The basic actions to stimulate the development of new energy must of course be national: the provision of subsidies to high-cost or untested energy developments; tax incentives; adequate domestic pricing policies; the removal of unnecessary or undesirable legal obstructions. But there are important contributions to be made internationally:

—By finding a way to cooperate in R. & D. without jeopardizing proprietary rights. No country has a monopoly on scientific imagination and innovation. Even the United States, with its major public and private industry commitment to energy R. & D., has much to gain through avoiding duplication and sharing costs and through scientific cross-fertilization.

—By encouraging the flow of foreign capital into areas of energy development where it is needed and wanted. All of us have capital-short economies; with perhaps a trillion dollars of new capital needed in the energy sector in IEA countries over the next 10 years, we have an interest in finding ways to encourage foreign investment without jeopardizing the achievement of the national energy policy goal of independence.

—By assuring that countries that contribute to the welfare of the whole group by developing higher cost energy sources are protected against possible predatory pricing by OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] and are not penalized

if for other reasons prices fall on the international oil market. This is the purpose of the minimum safeguard price concept, in which each country in the IEA, by means of its own choosing, applies a comparable level of border protection to energy investment. Contrary to what is often suggested, this mechanism would not assure a minimum price to OPEC; it is a guarantee only to our own investors that they will not face competition from imported oil below a minimum preestablished level well below current world prices.

IEA countries agreed in principle on these three points in March. They are now being elaborated within the Agency with the objective of having a complete package ready for adoption by year's end.

### **Future Action**

Domestically and internationally, we have just begun on conservation and alternative sources. The question we must ask is how far we must go, how fast.

The answer must come, in part, from analysis of the staying power of the oil cartel. In May OPEC produced 26 MMBD as against 32.8 MMBD in September 1973, just before the crisis. Despite the soft market, the OPEC price structure has come through largely intact, although quality differentials have been reduced or eliminated and credit terms lengthened. Now demand will firm, as we go into the winter and out of the recession. In the absence of additional conservation measures, the OPEC market may rise to preembargo levels by the end of 1977. In the late 1970's it may begin to fall again as North Sea, Alaskan, Mexican, and Chinese oil comes on the market in large quantities.

Even if there are no new conservation measures, and if OPEC succeeds in raising prices to offset any increased costs of its imports, some oil-exporting countries will already have gone into balance-of-payments deficit during the period 1975-77. Algeria is in deficit now; so is Libya; Venezuela and Iran may follow. These pressures will intensify in the late 1970's as the OPEC

market shrinks, when most producers other than Saudi Arabia and Kuwait may go into deficit.

A serious program of conservation—the 2 MMBD the President proposed for the United States by the end of 1977, matched by other IEA members to make 4 MMBD—would greatly intensify the pressures on the cartel.

Given the cohesion the cartel has shown this year during the recession, it is not certain that such a conservation program would suffice. To be sure that the cartel loses its exclusive capacity to set oil prices and does not regain it, we probably would have to compress the OPEC market to somewhat over 20 MMBD. In the next decade, this can only be done by a large-scale program of developing fossil fuels. For the United States this would imply an import level of 3 to 5 MMBD in the mid-1980's, as proposed by the President.

To see the meaning of this, consider the possible price increase OPEC now threatens us with. Each additional dollar on the price of oil might reduce demand by one-half to 1 MMBD, out of a market of a little more than 25 MMBD. OPEC can now absorb cuts like that without excessive difficulty. But if we had the President's program in place, the scope for such price increases would be greatly reduced or eliminated in the next three years. Not only would they be unjustified, as now; they would be infeasible.

### **Consumer-Producer Dialogue**

In parallel with our effort to develop effective programs of consumer cooperation, we are also seeking to establish a basis for productive dialogue between consuming and producing nations. The first formal attempt to launch a multilateral energy dialogue in Paris this past April did not succeed.

In May Secretary Kissinger proposed a new approach to the launching of a dialogue, broadening it to include the whole range of relations between industrial and developing countries. This would involve the establishment of three separate commissions: one to cover energy, one for raw materials, and one

to consider problems of economic development. The reaction to Secretary Kissinger's proposals has been generally positive, and we are optimistic that sufficient consensus can be reached along those lines over the next several weeks to permit agreement to reconvene the Paris meeting in early fall to prepare for the creation of the commissions.

The purpose of this dialogue is broader than energy; it is to find a realistic and equitable basis on which decisions affecting the main elements of the world economy can be shared between industrial and developing countries. The oil producers must understand that unilateral exercise of their power to raise prices at this time would not be consistent with this purpose.

For two years we have all been trying, in the United States and among industrial countries, to build agreement around the tougher energy policies we must all adopt. We have so far achieved far less than we require. But it would be wrong to judge what now can be done by what has been done. It has always been true that the great democracies are extraordinarily difficult to get moving. But when they do, they go very far. I think both our friends and our adversaries should keep that in mind, Mr. Chairman. So should we, for it is high time that we get on with it.

## **U.S. Rejects Fisheries Regulations Proposed by ICNAF**

Press release 382 dated July 18

The United States on July 18 rejected a proposal from the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) which would regulate the over-all fishing off the U.S. coast from Maine to North Carolina in 1976.

Under the proposal, the total catch would be reduced to 650,000 metric tons in 1976 from the allowable catch of 850,000 metric tons in 1975, but squid would be excluded from the quota—which was not the case in

previous years. Quotas on squid will allow a catch of 74,000 tons of that species in 1976, up from 71,000 tons in 1974. The United States and Canada voted against the proposal at the ICNAF annual meeting which was held in Edinburgh, Scotland, from June 10 to 20, 1975.

At the catch level of 650,000 tons plus the squid, scientists estimate that a full decade would be required for stock recovery. In addition, there is an associated probability of approximately 30 percent that recovery will not begin in 1976 at this catch level, and hence a longer period of recovery may be required.

The United States had proposed a quota of 550,000 tons, including squid, which would have meant a five-year recovery period with a 90 percent probability of recovery, starting in 1976. That proposal, along with others ranging up to 800,000 tons (13-year recovery, 59 percent chance of success), was rejected by the Commission before the 650,000 level was agreed upon unanimously. A later proposal to exclude squid from the total was carried by a majority vote over U.S. objections.

In announcing the official objection, which will exclude the United States from applicability of the proposal if it becomes effective for others, Ambassador Thomas A. Clingan, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs, called the situation "intolerable."

"The United States has been watching massive overfishing off its coasts for some years now," the Ambassador said. "This kind of situation cannot be allowed to continue. Nor can we any longer afford the luxury of a leisurely approach to fisheries problems. The resources have been too badly depleted, and the American fishermen have suffered too much, to avoid the hard decisions which are required now by all fishing nations."

The chief U.S. representative to ICNAF, David H. Wallace, Associate Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce, said that the ICNAF decision to increase the

U.S. quota from 211,600 tons in 1975 to 230,000 tons in 1976 had not persuaded the U.S. delegation to vote for the proposal or the U.S. Government to accept it after it was adopted by majority vote.

"We attach as much importance to the conservation and protection of the valuable natural resources as we do to the protection of the American fishermen," Wallace declared. "Starting to give the fishermen a real opportunity to produce an adequate supply of fish for the American market, as they were once able to do, is not enough. We must also restore the productivity of the stocks. Virtually every species off our Atlantic coast has been overfished, some very severely. The only way to correct the situation is by a drastic cutback in catch and fishing effort, and this is what the United States is insisting upon."

The question of the overall allowable catch and the exclusion of squid from it will be taken up again at a special meeting of ICNAF in Montreal. A decision had already been made to schedule the meeting to discuss various matters, mostly related to the Canadian coast, which had not been resolved at the annual meeting. The United States has put the quota and squid issue on the agenda for the special meeting, which will be held September 22-27.

Each individual species or stock is the subject of a separate quota and national allocation. These were adopted by ICNAF in June and do not appear to be in question. The overall quota is less than the sum of the individual quotas and is designed to focus fishing effort as precisely as possible on target species.

One reason the stocks are so depleted off the U.S. coast is that there is an unusually high species mix, with the result that many fish are taken as a bycatch, or incidental to the target species. Such fish are often simply discarded at sea or made into fishmeal.

The basis for this "two-tier" quota system was laid at a special ICNAF meeting in Ottawa in October 1973 after the 1973 annual meeting had ended in complete failure. At that time the United States was seriously

considering withdrawing from the Commission but acceded to the pleas of other members to enter into the special negotiations. They produced an agreement that the catch would be reduced to 923,900 tons in 1974 and 850,000 tons in 1975 from the over 1.1 million tons it had reached in 1972 and 1973.

The agreement also specified that the catch would be further reduced in 1976 to the "amount which will allow the biomass to recover to a level which will produce the maximum sustainable yield." However, the agreement did not specify how long the recovery period was to be. That led to the present difficulty.

Three other U.S. proposals will be taken up at the Montreal meeting:

1. To close a large area on Georges Bank, off New England, to fishing with bottom gear all year round in order to protect the seriously depleted groundfish stocks in the area, such as haddock.

2. To license fishing vessels from all ICNAF members in the Northwest Atlantic. At the present time some members do not know where their vessels are or what they are fishing for.

3. To simplify and clarify the allowable exemptions in the ICNAF trawl regulations, which allow for a bycatch which is too high.

The second and third proposals were added to the agenda of the Montreal meeting at the request of the United States. These subjects had been discussed at the June and earlier meetings, but agreement was not reached on them in ICNAF. The Georges Bank closure proposal had already been referred to the special meeting. Progress had been made on it in Edinburgh, but time did not permit conclusion of the discussions on some major details.

Members of ICNAF are Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, German Democratic Republic, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, and the United States. In addition, Cuba has indicated it might join ICNAF after discussions at the Montreal meeting.

Vessels from most of these countries fish off the U.S. coast, but a few nations normally fish only in the ICNAF areas off Canada or Greenland.

## Report on World Weather Program Transmitted to Congress

*Message From President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Congress of the United States:*

People everywhere recognize that weather influences day-to-day activities. People are also mindful that weather, sometimes violent, breeds storms that take lives and destroy property. Coupled with these traditional concerns, there is now a new awareness of the cumulative effects of weather. The impact of climate and climatic fluctuations upon global energy, food and water resources poses a potential threat to the quality of life everywhere.

The World Weather Program helps man cope with his atmosphere. We must continue to rely upon and to strengthen this vital international program as these atmospheric challenges—both old and new—confront us in the future.

I am pleased to report significant progress in furthering the goals of the World Weather Program. This past year has recorded these accomplishments:

—The United States began near-continuous viewing of weather and storms over most of North and South America and adjacent waters through the use of two geostationary satellites.

—The U.S.S.R., Japan, and the European Space Research Organization have taken steps to join with the United States in extending this weather watch to include five geostationary satellites around the globe.

—Computer power devoted to operational weather services and to atmospheric research has been increased appreciably. This

leads to immediate gains in weather prediction and to long-term gains in extending the time, range and scope of weather predictions and in assessing the consequences of climatic fluctuations upon man and of man's activities upon climate.

—During the summer of 1974, an unprecedented event in international science occurred with the successful conduct of an experiment in the tropical Atlantic. More than one-third of the earth's tropical belt was placed under intensive observation by 69 nations using a network of hundreds of land stations, 39 research ships, 13 specially instrumented aircraft and 7 meteorological satellites. The results of this experiment are expected to permit a sound understanding of the role of the tropics as the heat source for the global atmosphere and to provide new insight into the origin of tropical storms and hurricanes.

Senate Concurrent Resolution 67 of the 90th Congress declared the intention of the United States to participate fully in the World Weather Program. It is in accordance with this Resolution that I transmit this annual report describing current and planned Federal activities that contribute, in part, to this international program from which all nations benefit.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *June 10, 1975.*

## U.S.-Japan Committee on Cultural and Educational Cooperation

*Following is the text of a communique issued at the conclusion of the meeting of the Joint Committee on U.S.-Japan Cultural and Educational Cooperation June 21-23.*

Press release 351 dated June 30

The Joint Committee on United States-Japan Cultural and Educational Cooperation met in Hawaii, June 21-23, 1975.

The Committee took special note of the growing importance of the cultural and educational factors

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on June 10 (text from White House press release).



in achieving mutual understanding between Japan and the United States. It recognized the increased importance of improved communication between the two countries in a world drawn together by interdependence. Both countries were seen to share numerous societal problems brought on by rapid technological innovation, especially the information explosion.

In this atmosphere, the Committee reviewed progress made in carrying forward the recommendations of CULCON VII [Seventh United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange] which met in Tokyo in June 1974. These included cooperative projects and activities in the fields of American studies, education, Japanese studies, journalist exchange, museum, and television.

The Committee was gratified to note that there has been a marked increase in private participation on both sides, thus highlighting the unique feature of CULCON, which is the cooperation between government and private representatives to further mutual understanding. Greater activity by the subcommittees of CULCON suggests the possibility of increased cooperation among them.

The organization of the Joint Committee was discussed, and it was agreed to ask the panel chairmen to consider what modifications might be recommended to CULCON VIII.

The Committee welcomed the June 18th announcement by Secretary of State Kissinger that the U.S. Administration would seek to integrate and obtain approval this year of proposals before the U.S. Congress to establish a Japan-U.S. Friendship Fund for the expansion of cultural and educational activities between both nations.

In reviewing activities related to CULCON, the Committee particularly noted:

1. The Conference of Asian and Pacific American Studies Specialists to be held in September 1975 in Japan and the Bicentennial World Conference on American Studies to be held in Washington, D.C. in September 1976,
2. The work in the field of education for international understanding to develop educational materials on each other's country for elementary and secondary schools,
3. The increased efforts by Japanese government and private organizations to publish books and articles on Japan translated into English,
4. The increased importance of exchanging journalists as a means of narrowing the communication gap,
5. Plans for exchanging museum exhibitions and other related programs in the coming years,
6. The prospect of new cooperation in cultural and educational television in both countries,

7. The need for a library subcommittee and separate subcommittees for television and print media and recommended their establishment to CULCON VIII.

#### A. AMERICAN STUDIES

The Committee received with satisfaction the Japanese Association of American Studies' report, "Current Status of the Study of America in Japanese Universities," an extensive accumulation of data sponsored by the Fulbright Commission in Japan, and noted the progress of American Studies in Japan.

The Hawaii meeting influenced the subcommittee by directing attention outside the field of higher education and research toward public and adult education, professional internships, the teaching of English, and public information. The opportunity to contribute to the discussion of the concerns of other subcommittees, including the proposed subcommittee on libraries, is viewed with anticipation.

It was reported that the Asia and Pacific Regional Conference of American Studies Specialists will be held on 4-7 September at the Institute of International Studies and Training Center in Fujinomiya City with the participation of fourteen nations. Approximately fifty people will attend the conference from abroad and roughly the same number from Japan. The subjects to be discussed are: (1) American Revolution, (2) Influence of American civilization on other countries, and (3) Problems relating to American Studies in the participating countries.

#### *Recommendations:*

1. Taking advantage of the Regional Conference, at which most of the subcommittee members will be in attendance, there should be a joint subcommittee meeting in Tokyo on September 8, 1975.
2. The Committee recommends the following agenda for the joint meeting: (a) Report on Hawaii meeting; (b) Role and scope of American Studies Subcommittee; (c) Evaluation of Asian Bicentennial Conference; (d) Report on Washington Bicentennial Conference for 1976; (e) Response to "Current Status of the Study of America in Japanese Universities"; (f) Future of Kyoto American Studies Seminar; (g) CULCON VIII; (h) Progress reports on translations, book orders, teacher orientation, student exchange, counseling and accreditation, financing: public and private, joint and cooperative research and bibliographies, faculty and scholarly exchange, and cooperation with the United Nations University.

#### B. EDUCATION

The meeting concerned with education for international understanding discussed the final arrangements for the opening of the joint seminar which is

scheduled to begin three weeks hence at the East-West Center.

The new Office of Education publication, *Film Resources on Japan*, was presented at the meeting. It inventories more than 550 films and filmstrips about Japan available in the United States, which can be used for multiple educational purposes.

Finally, the Committee noted with approval the U.S. Office of Education decision to assist four new East Asian Studies centers in American colleges and universities located in regions not currently well served by the existing USOE centers. One center is in North Carolina and an important part of that Center's program is collaboration with the North Carolina State Department of Education and the CULCON project on education for mutual understanding in elementary and secondary education.

#### *Recommendations:*

A variety of possible activities for future consideration by the joint subcommittee was considered. Some of these might be initiated during the coming year and some could be undertaken following the completion of the present project. Among the possibilities for building bridges for understanding between educators and educational systems in the two countries are:

1. Expanding and improving links between elementary and secondary schools and teacher education institutions in both countries.

2. Establishing and/or strengthening facilities and service in both countries to assist visiting teachers from the other country with their study interests, including the development of curriculum materials.

3. Increasing access to reliable, up-to-date information about the educational system, issues, and developments in the other country. To help expand the dialogue between Japanese and American educators across language barriers, various possibilities for publishing articles in English by Japanese educators about education in Japan were considered. For example, occasional issues of specialized existing journals might be devoted to U.S.-Japan educational subjects. The reverse need was also considered—helping the Japanese side to select particularly significant articles from the wide collection of writing on education in American professional journals for translation into Japanese.

#### C. JAPANESE STUDIES

The Committee expressed its appreciation for the efforts of the Japan Foundation and the Expo '70 Foundation to strengthen Japanese language training and improve library resources in the U.S. to disseminate the results of Japanese scholarship to an international audience. It noted, as well, progress in integrating the study of Japan into teaching and research by social scientists outside of Japan and in expanding Japanese studies at the undergraduate

level in the United States. The Japan Foundation's *Introductory Bibliography for Japanese Studies and Books on Japan* were well received. The work of the newly established Japanese Language Division of the Natural Research Institute on the Japanese Language also was noted with appreciation.

#### *Recommendations:*

1. Precise, up-to-date data about institutions, scholars and activities in Japanese studies should be compiled through the efforts of both sides for presentation to CULCON VIII.

2. More specialists from Japan should teach in American universities.

3. Joint research projects in Japanese studies need more solid American financing.

4. The quality and quantity of English abstracts and translations of Japanese scholarly works need improving (and the Committee will give special priority to this problem).

5. A Japanese mission to survey Japanese studies in the U.S. should be sent to the U.S., possibly in the spring of 1976, and an American mission to survey facilities for Americans to study in Japan should be considered.

#### D. JOURNALIST EXCHANGE

Substantial time was devoted to a discussion of the exchange of journalists between the U.S. and Japan. Recognition was given to another of the International Press Institute's bilateral seminars for newspapermen which will be held in Racine, Wisconsin this coming November. The changing roles of the two nations in Asia will be explored during the seminar discussions.

It was reemphasized that one of the important and effective ways to fill the communication gap between Japan and the U.S.A. and to deepen the understanding of the general public in both countries is the exchange of mass-media people, including publishers, editorial writers, columnists, journalists, and magazine writers.

#### *Recommendation:*

1. Details of the respective exchange or grant-type programs should be widely disseminated among the individual professional organizations concerned with management, editorial or reporting responsibilities. As an example, attention should be given to making the Fulbright program for working newsmen more widely known throughout the profession.

#### E. LIBRARY

##### *Recommendations:*

1. It was recommended to establish a Library Subcommittee with the following suggested objective and activities:

- a. The primary objective of the subcommittee would be to improve access of Japanese to American material and American access to Japanese materials.

b. A number of possible activities that the subcommittee may wish to explore would include the interchange and training of personnel, interchange of publications, inter-library cooperation, the establishment of documentation centers especially in the social sciences, and the need for specialized bibliographies.

2. The committee expressed the view that the proposed Library Subcommittee, when officially established, should maintain close liaison with other subcommittees of CULCON, especially the Japanese Studies, American Studies and Education Subcommittees as it formulates and implements its programs.

3. Establishment of this subcommittee should be at an early date and that a preparatory meeting be held in Tokyo or Kyoto before or after the Third Japan-U.S. Conference on Libraries and Information Science in Higher Education to be held in Kyoto in October 1975 to work out a plan of activities for the future.

#### F. MUSEUM EXCHANGE

In the field of museum exchange, details were discussed concerning the exhibition "Collected Masterworks from Art Museums of the United States" which will be held in Tokyo and Kyoto during 1976 to celebrate the U.S. Bicentennial. Other exhibitions including the Shinto Exhibition, Chinese Ceramics from Japanese collections and Kamakura Sculpture were also discussed.

##### *Recommendations:*

1. With regard to future exchanges, it was agreed that the following should be discussed further:

a. The appropriate interval between major Japanese exhibitions to be sent to the United States.

b. Use of the museum subcommittee as an information center among American museums for the planning of art exhibitions to and from Japan.

c. Better balance in the exchange of exhibitions between the United States and Japan.

d. Financial guidelines for the sharing of expenses between the sender and recipient of exhibitions.

#### G. TELEVISION

The Committee considered the next T.V. Program Festival with a view to promoting the program exchange more effectively. It noted the important role of PBS [Public Broadcasting Service] in this area. Further, providing United States cultural and educational television programs to Japan and showing Japanese produced magazine television programs over PBS stations in the United States was discussed.

The establishment of an American Subcommittee was noted with appreciation in view of the need for continuity on the U.S. side.

The Committee discussed Sister Station affiliations and expressed satisfaction regarding progress in this area.

##### *Recommendations:*

1. Considering that the most promising opportunity for Japanese educational and cultural programs to be viewed by the most American people would be on PBS stations, it is recommended that consideration be given to holding the 3rd Television Program Festival at the National Association of Educational Broadcasting (NAEB) Meeting in mid-November 1975 or in 1976. In the case of the 1975 NAEB Meeting, the Japanese program entries would come mainly from the group of programs in custody of the Japan Society in New York. Final decision on this issue will be made after consultation with the Broadcast Programming center of Japan (BPJC).

2. Information should continue to be exchanged on type and subject of programs to be exchanged considering other country's program needs.

3. To further the exchange of information regarding Sister Station activities a newsletter could be developed by the BPJC and the Japan Society.

#### H. CULCON VIII

The Committee recommended that CULCON VIII be held in Washington, D.C. in May 1976. In view of the celebration of the American Bicentennial in 1976, it was also recommended that private organizations be invited to sponsor and organize, in consultation with CULCON, a special symposium on a major theme of common interest to both countries to be held in conjunction with CULCON VIII.

## U.S. Discusses Approach to the Seventh Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly

*Statement by Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr.*

*U.S. Representative in the U.N. Economic and Social Council*<sup>1</sup>

Just a few days ago we marked the 30th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. It is therefore appropriate that this, the 59th session of the Economic and Social Council, should be the first major U.N. session following our recent celebration. This fortuitous appropriateness symbolizes the fundamental importance of global economic and social health to the well-being of mankind.

The founders of the United Nations recognized this when they assigned to the organization as one of its purposes: "To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character . . ." But for many reasons, in the intervening years political and security problems have been the central focus of U.N. deliberations. These remain serious problems. Problems of security and political coexistence, however, do not exist as isolated phenomena. They are not detachable coupons from the main bond of the human condition. As our Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, said in a recent speech:<sup>2</sup>

The paramount necessity of our time is the preservation of peace. But history has shown that international political stability requires international economic stability. Order cannot survive if economic

arrangements are constantly buffeted by crisis or if they fail to meet the aspirations of nations and peoples for progress.

The 59th ECOSOC is also an important link in a series of past and future conferences dedicated to the resolution of urgent economic problems, particularly those of developing countries. We convene here at a particularly critical time. A scintilla of evidence suggests that the world's economy could be at a stage of turning from slowdown and contraction to new growth and expansion.

But for many national economies, time is relative. Some are yet to experience the throes others have survived. We meet at a time when many countries, having experienced the most severe economic strains, are reviewing long-held economic policies and seeking new openings for economic and social cooperation. And our convocation occurs at a time when we perceive more clearly the shortfalls of the global economy and sense more keenly the need to render economic justice rather than to adjudge guilt for real or imagined past deeds.

It has been a bit more than one year since the General Assembly devoted itself, in its sixth special session, to the overwhelming issue of the nature and shape of global economic interdependence. While in that session many issues divided us, and some of those issues still retain their divisive potential, nonetheless that session marked the beginning of our preoccupation with the global economic crisis.

<sup>1</sup> Made before the 59th session of the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) at Geneva on July 4 (text from USUN press release 75 dated July 7).

<sup>2</sup> For Secretary Kissinger's address at Kansas City, Mo., on May 13, see BULLETIN of June 2, 1975, p. 713.

The word "crisis" has become such common currency in our commentaries and exchanges as to risk a devaluation of the meaning through overuse. Nonetheless a survey of global economic problems, imbalances, and injustices fully warrants the denomination "crisis" as descriptive of the current state of the global economy.

But crisis also connotes opportunity. Rarely in the more than a quarter century since the end of World War II have so many opportunities been presented to address the fundamentals of the global economic system. Indeed, it may very well be that this is the first opportunity to work out the implications of global interdependence in the full realization that it is indeed interdependence, consciously perceived, that is the organizing principle of our labors.

A central concern over the last year has been the nomenclature of that which we seek to achieve. There has indeed been divisiveness on this issue. Whether in our labors we have been about the design of a new international economic order or whether we have been about the task of fundamental reform of the existing order has needlessly consumed all too much time and effort.

Our Secretary of State has called for an end to this theoretical confrontation. Indeed, we hope that this essentially theological debate will come to an end. My government has sought and now seeks to make clear that this problem of nomenclature should be set aside in the interest of resolving some of those crucial issues which need the urgent attention of not only this body but the entire U.N. system. These problems exist by virtue of their own imperatives. And their solutions will commend themselves to the global community not on the basis of labels but, rather, because of their intrinsic justice.

For our part, the United States recognizes the declaration and program of action as articulated policy goals of a substantial number of states within the United Nations.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> For texts of the Declaration and Program of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order adopted by the sixth special session of the U.N. General Assembly on May 1, 1974, see BULLETIN of May 27, 1974, p. 569.

Many of these articulated goals are radical in the truest sense of the word. On the other hand, we should hope that the mutuality of respect for differing opinions would extend to those views espoused by my government, derived from our principled beliefs as shaped by our national experience.

The theoretical—and at times even theological—differences need not require that we resolve questions of philosophy before addressing what we all recognize as problems which simply must be urgently addressed lest the human condition sustain irremediable injury in a generation of economic warfare.

It is, then, in the spirit of addressing those issues which appear to be ripe for resolution that my government has sought cooperation rather than confrontation in this body and elsewhere.

The first implication of global economic interdependence is that all on this globe are involved in, and affected by, that condition. It would seem to follow that all those involved and affected have the right—even the duty—to participate in the process of identifying and resolving those problems which so urgently require solution. It is too late in the day to accept that any single state or any bloc of states can arrogate unto itself all wisdom and all power in the ordering of our economic system. It is indeed much too late in the day to forget that judgments and opinions can be wrong as well as being right. My government is most happy to join with all those other governments who hold to the belief that true consensus regarding solutions is the only viable outcome of our deliberations. We are prepared to join the quest for *consensus veritas*.

#### The General Assembly and Economic Reform

Mr. Chairman, of overriding concern is the impending seventh special session and, more immediately, preparations for that Assembly in this session of ECOSOC. The seventh special session is included on our formal agenda. Perhaps of more importance is the fact that that session of the General Assembly will be a subject for informal consultations in accordance with the recommendation

of the second preparatory conference recently concluded in New York.

Although most important decisions regarding the seventh special session remain to be taken, our efforts thus far have not been in vain. A general consensus seems to be emerging—that we will focus on a limited number of items of high priority and that we will seek meaningful positive action.

It remains to build on this emerging consensus in agreeing to an agenda and perhaps a general outline of the form of action to be taken by the seventh special General Assembly.

I believe it will be helpful to review the relative roles which various forums in the international system—the General Assembly, the specialized agencies, and other bodies—can best play in making progress toward concrete achievement. The U.N. General Assembly has not been much experienced in the world of global economics. Expounding the reasons for this lack need not detain us now.

It does seem necessary, however, to state explicitly what to us seems to be the obvious. The General Assembly as it is constituted—and given its history over the last 29 years—does not seem to be the institution best designed to actually fashion the necessary remedies, to negotiate the required commitments, and to administer those processes that might be brought into being.

Of necessity, these tasks must be performed elsewhere and with a different type of representative from those of us who people the General Assembly. On the other hand, in this dawning era of global economic interdependence, only the General Assembly comes near to that ideal of a representative body of the entire globe. The General Assembly does have the capability for the true expression of that perfect consensus, or nearly perfect consensus, of all mankind.

It is the view of my government that the true role and function of the General Assembly is to give expression to the broad consensus as to priorities, to give general guidance, and to keep itself apprised of developments in the global economy. We, for

ourselves, are certain that no one contemplates that it will be the General Assembly which itself negotiates commodity arrangements reflecting a general consensus, or that the General Assembly itself will undertake to negotiate trade reform or monetary reform, or that the General Assembly will itself undertake to fashion arrangements to assure the feeding of the world.

Its basic responsibilities are clear—to observe and keep under review the state of international cooperation and to draw attention of member states to conditions requiring international cooperation in the solution of problems. In this, it is neither a passive observer nor a technical negotiating body. We might therefore envisage the seventh special session of the General Assembly as identifying areas of priority interest, as establishing guidelines for international cooperation in those areas and continuing its normal process for monitoring the activities of the various bodies charged with actual negotiations.

#### **U.S. Proposals for Seventh Special Session**

The general approach of my government to the seventh special session has been enunciated in the recent speeches of Secretary Kissinger. This positive approach is buttressed by a serious and thorough review of our policies at the highest levels of the U.S. Government.

As our varied positions emerge, we will be prepared to engage in the dialogue and negotiations we all contemplate. I hope, however, that it is clear now that our effort is to identify: first, policies which are responsive in particular to the needs of developing countries; second, policies which are susceptible to meaningful cooperative action; and third, policies to which the United States can make a real contribution. These are the parameters of our own review.

Speaking of the seventh special session, Secretary Kissinger stated on June 23:

Working closely with Congress, we are now preparing concrete, detailed, and—we hope—creative proposals for that session. We intend, while fully protecting our nation's interests, to deal with con-

troversial issues with realism, imagination, and understanding. We hope that others will meet us in the same spirit.

Without going into details, I would like to note that my government has circulated its proposals regarding the agenda for the seventh special session. While differing in some respects, we believe that in general they are in keeping with the proposals advanced by the Group of 77. We have suggested two additional topics—"International Food Needs" and "The Problems of the Poorer Developing Countries." We believe that they fit into the criteria of being of priority interest and of a potential for effective international action.

In any event, we look forward to consultations during this session to refine our collective thinking. I would emphasize, however, that we approach the issue of the agenda not in terms of substantive agreement but in terms of identifying areas appropriate for intensive consideration by the seventh special session.

#### **Meeting International Food Needs**

Among the suggestions for the agenda of the seventh special session proposed by my government is the addition of an item on "International Food Needs." Formation of a sound global agricultural economy requires effective action in a number of critical areas. First, world food production must be increased significantly, with primary emphasis on raising average yields in developing countries. Until this increase is attained, food needs of developing countries must be met, at least in part, by dependable food-aid programs. In addition, we support an international system of nationally held grain reserves as the best means to achieve world food security through enhancing the assurance of availability of adequate supplies.

The long-range needs for food require further action on preliminary agreements reached at the World Food Conference. My government believes that meeting international food needs is of prime concern to the U.N. system. The U.N. General Assembly

should take note of the World Food Conference resolutions and progress on their implementation, taking into account the report of the World Food Council, and should request the World Food Council to periodically inform the General Assembly of its proceedings and recommendations.

#### **Global Economic and Social Issues**

If I have dealt at length with preparations for the seventh special session, it was not to denigrate other agenda items before us. Appropriate to the purpose of the Economic and Social Council, they cover a wide range of genuine economic and social concerns and could by themselves fully occupy us over the next four weeks. My delegation will, as appropriate, be commenting in detail on these items as they arise, but a few general comments may be in order.

Both national economies and the global economy have been through a trying period. We are particularly aware of the strains placed on most developing countries facing the multiple problems of international inflation and recession.

Looking at the United States, most economists both within and without the government believe that we are bottoming out and can now anticipate a period of general economic recovery with, hopefully, further declension in the rate of inflation. Perhaps we should draw two major conclusions from our recent national experience. First, of course, is the fact of the interdependence of our national economies, and second is the realization of the importance and effectiveness of cooperative action among nations in dealing with global economic problems.

President Ford spelled this out in transmitting his report on the international economy to the U.S. Congress when he said:

The United States firmly believes that our own problems, and those of the rest of the world, can be dealt with most effectively through international cooperation . . . our motivating principles, our standards of conduct and the guidelines we set for the conduct of international economic development are ever more crucial to our national well-being, and that of the world.

Mr. Chairman, the World Conference of the International Women's Year recently concluded its session in Mexico City, and we look forward to reviewing the results. As in other instances, my government's delegation to that conference had reservations concerning some of the resolutions discussed. We fully support, however, the underlying purpose of the conference—to seek to insure that a person who happens to be a woman will not be consigned to a life of deprivation or, in some instances, a life of misery solely because of the accident of sex.

Issues of relief and assistance, of national resources and environment, of industrial development, of freedom from colonialism—in fact all of the items on the agenda deserve our serious attention. And we will be commenting on them later.

Mr. Chairman, I opened by referring to the 30th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. I would like to refer to another anniversary, today: the 199th anniversary of our Declaration of Independence from a colonial yoke. And, Mr. Chairman, I beg your indulgence for a personal note. As I am preparing to take leave of you and my colleagues on the Economic and Social Council, I eagerly seize this occasion to say to you all that I consider myself to have been privileged to have labored with you in our joint endeavor to better the human condition.

## **U.S. Contributes \$17 Million to U.N. Forces in Middle East**

USUN press release 72 dated July 3

The United States on July 3 transmitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations a check in the amount of \$17,278,413. This payment covers the U.S. contribution toward the apportioned costs of the U.N. Emergency Force (including the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force) through the period ending April 24, 1975. It represents a total of \$34,614,613 contributed toward the total UNEF costs of \$119.8 million for the period October 24, 1973–April 24, 1975.

## **U.S. Completes Contribution to UNFICYP for Fiscal 1975**

USUN press release 74 dated July 3

The United States on July 3 presented to the Secretary General of the United Nations a check in the amount of \$4.8 million. This payment, which completes the U.S. contribution to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for fiscal year 1975, brings the cumulative total of U.S. support for UNFICYP to \$76.1 million.

### **TREATY INFORMATION**

## **U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreement on North Pacific Fisheries**

Press release 381 dated July 18

The Governments of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concluded on July 18 at Washington an agreement relating to the fisheries of the North Pacific area, extending from California north to Alaska. This is the fifth such agreement concluded between the two governments on Pacific coast fisheries. The new agreement covers the period August 1, 1975, through December 31, 1976. A 30-day-notice reopening clause is provided, should the situation in the fisheries change greatly during that period.

Under the new agreement, the Soviet Union is required to place additional and extensive restrictions on its Pacific fishery off the U.S. coast. These restrictions include the closing-off of large areas to the Soviet fleets, either on a year-round basis or during periods when Soviet fishing could be harmful to stocks of fish such as halibut, rockfish, and crabs that are of particular interest to U.S. fishermen.

Limitations on Soviet catches are provided for such species as pollock, hake, and rockfish. These catch quotas, in combination



with the extensive area-time closures, are expected to provide considerable protection for species of special interest to U.S. fishermen.

As has been the case in all such agreements recently concluded by the United States with foreign countries fishing off its shores, the new agreement contains measures to prevent fishing-gear conflicts, protect the species which inhabit the U.S. continental shelf, and provide for observation and enforcement of the agreement's provisions. Cooperative research and exchange of information on species of joint interest are also provided for.

The U.S. delegation, which included representatives from the Departments of State and Commerce, state agencies, and the fishing industry, was headed by Ambassador Thomas A. Clingan, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs. The Soviet delegation was led by Deputy Minister of Fisheries Vladimir M. Kamentsev.

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Aviation

Convention on offenses and certain other acts committed on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo September 14, 1963. Entered into force December 4, 1969. TIAS 6768.

*Accession deposited:* Tunisia, February 25, 1975.

*Notification of succession:* Bahamas, effective July 10, 1973.

#### Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Done at London October 17, 1974.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Canada, July 16, 1975.

#### Narcotic Drugs

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.

*Accession deposited:* Singapore, July 9, 1975.

*Entered into force:* August 8, 1975.

#### Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with an-

nexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Guatemala, July 14, 1975.

#### Property—Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923, 7727.

*Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification of articles 1 through 12 deposited:* Japan, June 27, 1975 (effective from October 1, 1975).

*Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that accession to articles 1 through 12 deposited:* Australia, June 27, 1975.

#### Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780, 6284.

*Acceptance deposited:* Ecuador, June 30, 1975.

International regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960.

Entered into force September 1, 1965. TIAS 5813.

*Acceptance deposited:* Ecuador, June 30, 1975.

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London November 1, 1974.<sup>1</sup>

*Signatures:* People's Republic of China, June 20, 1975;<sup>2</sup> Norway, June 24, 1975.<sup>2</sup>

#### Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at New York January 14, 1975.<sup>1</sup>

*Signature:* Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, July 11, 1975.

#### Telecommunications

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex, and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973.

Entered into force September 1, 1974.<sup>3</sup>

*Notification of approval:* Pakistan, May 15, 1975.

Telephone regulations, with appendices and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.<sup>3</sup>

*Notification of approval:* Pakistan, May 15, 1975.

International telecommunication convention with annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1975.<sup>3</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Israel, May 28, 1975.

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 7435), to establish a new frequency allotment plan for high-frequency radiotelephone coast stations, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva June 8, 1974.<sup>1</sup>

*Notifications of approval:* Australia, May 30, 1975; Singapore, May 10, 1975.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Subject to ratification.

<sup>3</sup> Not in force for the United States.

## World Meteorological Organization

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.  
*Accession deposited:* Democratic Republic of Vietnam (with reservation), July 8, 1975.

## BILATERAL

### Costa Rica

Agreement relating to the provision of assistance by the United States to support Costa Rican efforts to curb the production and traffic in illegal narcotics. Effected by exchange of notes at San José May 29 and June 2, 1975. Entered into force June 2, 1975.

### Luxembourg

Agreement amending annex B of the mutual defense assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 2014). Effected by exchange of notes at Luxembourg June 27 and July 4, 1975.

### Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement regarding fisheries in the northeastern Pacific Ocean off the coast of the United States, with related letters. Signed at Washington July 18, 1975. Entered into force August 1, 1975.

Agreement relating to fishing for king and tanner crab, with related letter and statement. Signed at Washington July 18, 1975. Entered into force August 1, 1975.

## PUBLICATIONS

### 1948 "Foreign Relations" Volume on the United Nations Released

Press release 350 dated June 27

The Department of State on June 27 released volume I, part 1, in the series "Foreign Relations of the United States" for the year 1948. This volume is entitled "General; The United Nations."

Part 1 includes documentation on U.S. policies with regard to the United Nations as an institution, including matters related to implementation of the Headquarters Agreement of 1947; elections to certain organs, commissions, and committees of the United Nations; elections of new members to the United Nations; voting procedures; and budget. Part 1 also includes material on non-self-governing territories outside the U.N. trusteeship system; the human rights question; the U.N. conference at Geneva on freedom of information; U.S. policy at

the United Nations with respect to regulation of armaments and collective security; international control of atomic energy; and efforts toward agreements placing armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council.

Part 2, to be published subsequently, will contain documentation on national security policy, atomic energy, foreign economic policy, and Antarctica.

This volume was prepared by the Historical Office Bureau of Public Affairs. Copies of volume I, part 1 (Department of State publication 8805; GPO cat no. S1.1:948/v. I, 1) may be obtained for \$8.10 (domestic postpaid). Checks or money orders should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents and should be sent to the U.S. Government Book Store, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520

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**United States Foreign Policy.** This pamphlet in the General Foreign Policy series is an overview of current U.S. foreign policy. Pub. 8814. 40 pp. 75¢ (Cat. No. S1.71:8814).

**Assistance for Children and Mothers.** Agreement with the United Nations Children's Fund. TIAS 7970. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7970).

**Military Assistance—Payments Under Foreign Assistance Act of 1973.** Agreement with Panama. TIAS 7977. 5 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7977).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Israel. TIAS 7978. 15 pp. 40¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7978).

**Protection of Birds and Their Environment.** Convention with Japan. TIAS 7990. 54 pp. 70¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7990).

**Peace Corps.** Agreement with the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. TIAS 7991. 4 pp. 25¢ (Cat. No. S9.10:7991).

**Peace Corps.** Agreement with Rwanda. TIAS 7992. 7 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7992).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Chile. TIAS 7993. 36 pp. 50¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7993).

**Launching of French-German Symphonie Communications Satellites.** Agreement with France and the Federal Republic of Germany. TIAS 7994. 7 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7994).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Jordan. TIAS 7995. 25 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7995).

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*384	7/21	Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Advisory Committee, Aug. 7.
†385	7/23	U.S.-Spain joint communique.
*386	7/23	Robert V. Keeley appointed Deputy Director of Inter-Agency Task Force for Indochinese Refugees (biographic data).
387	7/25	Kissinger: news conference, July 25.
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\* Not printed.  
 † Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXXIII • No. 1886 • August 18, 1975

U.N. WORLD CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S YEAR  
HELD AT MEXICO CITY

*Statements by U.S. Representative Patricia Hutar,  
Texts of U.S.-Sponsored Resolutions, and  
Text of World Plan of Action 233*

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

*For index see inside back cover*

# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LXXIII, No. 1886

August 18, 1975

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## U.N. World Conference of the International Women's Year Held at Mexico City

*The United Nations World Conference of the International Women's Year was held at Mexico City June 19–July 2. Following are statements made in plenary sessions of the conference on June 20 and July 2 by U.S. Representative Patricia Hutar,<sup>1</sup> together with the texts of resolutions sponsored or co-sponsored by the United States and the text of the World Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Objectives of the International Women's Year adopted by the conference on July 2.*

### STATEMENT BY MRS. HUTAR, JUNE 20

I wish to extend my congratulations to President Ojeda Paullada [Pedro Ojeda Paullada, Attorney General of Mexico] on his unanimous election to head the international conference.

Ladies and gentlemen: I would like to begin by bringing you the personal greetings from the First Lady of the United States, Betty Ford:

As I am unable to be with you in Mexico City, I send my cordial greetings to President Echeverría and Mrs. Echeverría, to President of the Conference Ojeda Paullada, to Secretary General Waldheim, Secretary General of the Conference Mrs. Sipilä [U.N. Assistant Secretary General Helvi Sipilä], and to all who are attending this historic conference.

I wish you to know that the people and Government of the United States are firmly committed to the goals of the conference and to the work that must follow it if these goals are to be reached.

The high purpose of International Women's Year

<sup>1</sup> Mrs. Hutar, who is U.S. Representative on the Commission on the Status of Women of the U.N. Economic and Social Council, was co-head of the U.S. delegation, with Daniel Parker, Administrator, Agency for International Development, from June 19 to 21 and thereafter was head of the delegation. For names of other members of the U.S. delegation, see press release 281 dated May 22.

—to promote the equality of women—truly enhances the equality of us all. As my husband said on the occasion of announcing our own National Commission for the Observance of International Women's Year, the search to secure rights for women frees both sexes from restrictive stereotypes. Liberation of the spirit opens new possibilities for the future of all individuals and of all nations. I am awed by the task you face. I am inspired by the opportunity you have for progress.

I know that the leaders of the U.S. delegation will work unceasingly with you in a spirit of cooperation to make the Conference on International Women's Year a landmark in the history of women's affairs and of humanity's search for peace and understanding.

We are deeply grateful to President Echeverría for gracing our deliberation this afternoon and to the Government of Mexico for its generosity in volunteering to host this international conference. We thank the Government of Mexico for all the work it has done in making arrangements for us. The vibrance and beauty of this capital city are a stimulus to achievement. The hospitality of the Mexican people enhances our enjoyment of our brief time among them. We also wish to praise the extraordinary competence of those members of the U.N. Secretariat at all levels who completed the enormous task of preparing for a world conference of this magnitude in an unprecedentedly short period of time.

The representatives of the United States of America come to this conference with a deep sense of empathy and solidarity with women in all parts of the world. We desire to work together on the many concerns that are common to us all.

Discrimination based on sex is the most widely known kind of discrimination. It is found in all developed and developing societies, either openly or covertly, and it is manifested in diverse forms. The time is long

overdue for women to eliminate discrimination based on sex. No rhetoric, however attractive it may be, should postpone the achievement of equal rights and responsibilities for women.

We in the United States had long felt the need for all countries of the world to come together to discuss the most important problems that affect over half the world's population, the women of the world. Therefore, with the cosponsorship of nine developing nations, we introduced a U.N. resolution to establish a World Conference for International Women's Year. We all are aware that declarations and statements of principle enunciated by the United Nations, though of great value, were not enough. There was a need to focus worldwide attention to dramatize the problems faced by women.

We will work with the other delegations to produce a plan of action that will impact on national governments for the implementation of the principles of International Women's Year—equality, development, and peace. But plans are not enough. Mechanisms need to be established to insure that real progress is made.

We in the United States expect to learn much from the accomplishments of our sisters around the world. In exchange, we offer to share with you the substantial progress made in the United States to further women's rights and responsibilities.

Much has been done, but there is much more that needs to be done to overcome the limitations and discriminatory practices of the past, reinforced by centuries of laws, traditions, and customs. We are proud in the United States of the legislation and government action that has been taken in the past several years to prohibit employment discrimination based on sex. Such legislation provides for equal pay for work of equal value, nondiscrimination in hiring, in discharging, and in compensation. Another piece of important legislation prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in educational programs or activities.

These antidiscrimination laws and other social change have come about in our country through the joint efforts of voluntary organi-

zations and the government. Traditionally the Government of the United States does not plan social change in the sense that some other governments do—it responds to the demands for reform made by citizens and/or voluntary associations and works with them in charting the mechanisms of social change.

We are also proud of the fact that we have established various national machinery to continue to monitor and implement nondiscrimination on the basis of sex. Some of these include a Special Assistant to the President of the United States for Women and an Office of Women's Programs in the White House; the Women's Bureau in our Department of Labor, established in 1920; a Women's Action Program in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; and a Federal Women's Program Coordinator to monitor employment practices in every governmental body. We also have citizens actively involved in this machinery, including a President's Advisory Council on the Status of Women, Advisory Councils to the Secretaries of Labor, Defense, and Health, Education, and Welfare.

#### **Equality and Integration in Development**

Though many general economic, political, and social changes are modifying the basic situation of women throughout the world—both in those countries now undergoing arduous processes of development and those which have already experienced the impact of industrialization—these changes will not automatically redress the balance. It requires positive efforts to identify and cope with the many factors which limit women and stand in the way of their full integration in development. I need mention only the lack of access to employment, education, and political integration to make the point that women are prevented from making their full and responsible contribution to the life of their societies and their full contribution to their families, their communities, and their nations.

International Women's Year has chosen as two of its basic goals equality for women and their integration in development. These



goals are inextricably interrelated. Each is indispensable to the other.

Equality without development means shared misery and frustration. Development without equality may mean a worsened situation for many women, both those who are homemakers and those who are in the labor force. Similarly, achieving one of the goals helps achieve the other. Development creates new situations and changes which make it possible for women to win a new and more equal status. And the full, equal participation of women in the development process can make the difference between success and failure of development itself.

The U.S. Government is prepared to introduce at this conference a draft declaration on equality and development that embraces these two basic goals of the Year, which I have stated are intertwined.

But women cannot wait, with arms folded, for men to achieve a new order before women can achieve equality. On the contrary, women must continue their work, already begun, to achieve a truly equal partnership. Women must be in decisionmaking positions in the power structure along with men to build a more just world order.

Women have a strong sense of social responsibility and are searching for opportunities to share their vision of a new society free of hunger and poverty. We must have, though, the understanding and commitment of men to reach the goal of equality. We have heard pledges of such commitment already in this conference in our opening session. We welcome this pledge of partnership.

### **Increasing Participation in Decisionmaking**

The third goal of International Women's Year is to strengthen the role of women in establishing world peace. To achieve it, women must mobilize their potential political power to assure that governments actively pursue the goal of disarmament.

The United States believes that disarmament negotiations should be directed toward general and complete disarmament under strict international control. It is our pro-

found hope that women will not only use their influence to keep governments working toward this end but we believe also that women must equip themselves for and assert their right to serve in agencies of government and on international delegations that are responsible for arms control and disarmament.

Basically, the issue and challenge which we face is to develop and utilize the untapped potential of over half the world's population. There is a great scarcity of women in policymaking positions in the world. Women remain significantly absent from high-level posts in governments, in international affairs, in the professions, and in business.

Women want to share with men the responsibilities and the duties involved in decisions affecting peace and development as well as in decisions that affect their lives. But unless they are able to move into the top positions in their fields, their impact in national and world affairs will be negligible and the possibilities of helping other women to move ahead in their roles will be nil.

Women's presence must be felt if we want the policies of the public and the private sector to be altered so as to be more equitable for women and men. This is one of the major areas of concern and focus of our U.S. National Commission on the Observance of International Women's Year.

At this conference we must insist that the United Nations and its specialized agencies provide opportunities for women to rise to the highest levels.

During the last General Assembly the U.S. delegation introduced a resolution, inspired by Senator Charles Percy, designed to assure that priority is given to projects within the U.N. Development Program that integrate women into the development process. This is a step in the right direction; our responsibility now, though, is to assure that this resolution is carried out.

At the initiative of the U.S. delegation, too, the U.N. Secretariat has set up a personnel committee to make sure that there shall be no discrimination against women in

hiring or promotion within the U.N. Secretariat. The next step is to secure the establishment of other personnel committees throughout the entire U.N. system.

### Developing Strategies for Change

Action by national governments will have a still broader effect upon the status of women than the international actions proposed above. A majority of governments have committed themselves to the principles of equality and of integrating women in development through their adherence to U.N. conventions and resolutions on these subjects.

This conference must build a plan of action that includes specific national measures for translating principles into action. Upon leaving this conference, participants must assume the responsibility for assuring that each of their governments puts into action the policy recommendations and provides the necessary resources to adopt the measures called for by the plan of action.

The U.S. delegation and the National Commission on the Observance of International Women's Year have held several meetings with our nongovernmental leaders to discuss the implementation of the World Plan of Action. We have a commitment to work together to insure the full implementation of the plan of action in our country upon our return from Mexico City.

I am pleased that so many nongovernmental leaders from around the world have assembled here in Mexico City to attend this conference and also the International Women's Year Tribune. I think that one of the strongest assets of the world conference is the interest of the nongovernmental organizations and the input they will provide the delegations to this U.N. conference.

In order to escalate the process of equality for women and for integration in development, we must devise strategies to change attitudes and behavior that have resulted from cultural conditioning. We cannot accomplish this by institutional change alone. Escalating strategies directed at attitudinal change involves not only the way men see

women but also how women see themselves

Women are learning that to compete is all right, for they are looking at themselves in a new light. They are learning that women must build support systems within existing structures—whether business, government, political, academic, or agriculture. Women must develop support systems to change the degrading sex-role stereotype and images of women in the mass media which perpetuate false depictions of women.

A myth prevails that women are not competitive—that they seem to lack motivation to progress and to participate in all phases of society.

However, we must keep in mind why this is perceived to be the case. We must remember the impact that conditioning has had on women. From the moment they are born, women's role in society has been dictated by culture and tradition. This affects the way their role is perceived by men, by the society, and by themselves.

We must examine and reassess old myths that society holds about the capacities, potential, and lifestyles of girls and women. Self-images for women are beginning to change, but the inaccurate and destructive sexist image projected must be rooted out.

We must make changes in the portrayal of women in program content and commercials in mass media—radio, television, newspapers. Educational materials in the schools—textbooks, visual aids, curricula—all need to be reexamined and changed to reflect the changing role of women and men in the society and to eliminate sex-role stereotyping.

To effect change in any area of life, women must seek and achieve leadership roles in management and public administration. Change will be accelerated when women serve in program planning, policymaking and decisionmaking roles in society.

Under the office of the Assistant Secretary for Education, the highest ranking official of education in the United States—currently a woman and a member of our delegation, I am proud to say—has developed programs based on special women's research being conducted at the National Institute of

Education on changing sex roles in American culture, female role ideology, and educational aspiration, to mention a few.

Finally, this conference should serve as a stimulus to men as well as to women throughout the world. We hope that from this conference men will gain a vision of a more just society in which an equality for women and participation by them will mean a more varied and equitable sharing, to the benefit of men as well as women. It is the conviction of women globally that the goals of International Women's Year—of equality, development, and peace—are not goals for *women* but serious goals for a world society and that men no less than women stand to gain. It should be the objective of the conference to make this conviction take root and grow.

#### STATEMENT BY MRS. HUTAR, JULY 2

The U.S. delegation regrets that this conference must conclude with a declaration which remains unacceptable to a number of countries.<sup>2</sup>

There are, to be sure, many paragraphs and ideas in the declaration which we strongly support. Many of these paragraphs—dealing with the problems and concerns of women for which this conference was convened—are very similar to those in the draft declaration which we cosponsored. We believe this illustrates the closeness of our views on the women's issues and the solidarity of our efforts here to gain full and equal participation of women as decision-makers in the economic, political, and social life of their countries and to eliminate sexism.

My delegation, along with the delegations of the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, made repeated efforts

to enter into serious negotiations about other political and economic points in the Group of 77's draft on which there was disagreement. However, there was no opportunity to pursue such negotiations. We deeply regret, therefore, there was no chance to work out language on those parts of the draft declaration which we could not accept.

We find this all the more disappointing because we share the deep concern expressed at this conference for the role of women in the developing countries. We have joined in supporting resolutions designed to improve their status and assure their participation in society on an equal basis with men.

The draft declaration of principles before the conference today also contains certain formulations and references to certain U.N. documents which the United States has consistently opposed. For this reason, the United States voted against operative paragraphs 18 and 19 when the draft was considered in the First Committee. The United States remains willing to enter into serious negotiations to narrow the remaining differences where they exist on specific economic issues, but we obviously cannot do so at this conference.

An additional reason for our position today is the inclusion of four paragraphs which unnecessarily encumber the declaration with specific political viewpoints not shared by many delegations. References to "Zionism" appear to associate this conference with a campaign against the State of Israel, and carry the implication that the State of Israel should be eliminated. The United States strongly opposes any provisions of this nature directed against one member of the United Nations.

In conclusion, Mr. President, my delegation has been guided throughout this conference by the belief that this was a meeting of all nations of the world to promote the status and the role of women throughout the world. We believe we should fairly reflect, therefore, the concerns of all those represented here. We should try to reach conclusions with which we can all agree.

We have been able to do so to a considerable extent at this conference. However,

<sup>2</sup> The Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and Their Contribution to Development and Peace was adopted by the conference on July 2 by a vote of 89 to 3 (U.S.), with 18 abstentions. A draft declaration sponsored by the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States was not pressed to a vote in the First Committee.

differences do remain. What they do, and on matters of importance, my delegation must register clearly its disagreement.

Accordingly, Mr. President, my delegation voted against the declaration. In doing so, I also wish to reiterate the intention of the U.S. delegation and women throughout the United States to work with determination and good will to implement the World Plan of Action, the only major document unanimously adopted.

## RESOLUTIONS SPONSORED OR COSPONSORED BY THE UNITED STATES<sup>3</sup>

### Women in the Employ of the U.N.<sup>4</sup>

#### 8. *The situation of women in the employ of the United Nations and specialized agencies*

*The World Conference of the International Women's Year,*

*Recognizing* that several elements of the United Nations system have in the last several years studied the whole range of problems affecting the situation of women throughout the United Nations and its specialized agencies,

*Noting* that the study "The situation of women in the United Nations", issued by UNITAR [United Nations Institute for Training and Research] in 1973, is a compilation of data which confirms the widely known fact that, in comparison to men, the conditions under which women enter the service of the United Nations, work in it, achieve promotion and enjoy its benefits are by no means as equitable as the Charter of the United Nations requires,

*Noting* that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has set up a Standing Committee on the Employment of Women in the Secretariat, which reports to the Joint Advisory Committee on Personnel, to assist in eliminating discriminatory measures against women employees of the United Nations and to increase the recruitment of qualified women,

*Recalling* that the *Ad Hoc* Group on Equal Rights for Women prepared a draft plan of action concerning long-term goals, and presented a petition to the Secretary-General on 7 March 1975 making specific suggestions for promoting equality of treatment of women employees of the United Nations,

1. *Recommends* that the United Nations, its specialized agencies and all its subsidiary bodies

<sup>3</sup> Texts from U.N. doc. E/5725, report of the World Conference of the International Women's Year (in provisional form).

<sup>4</sup> Adopted by the conference on July 2 without a vote.

recognize their responsibilities to set an example to Member States in employment and personnel practices and to give priority attention, in the shortest possible time, to the recommendations of the Standing Committee of the Joint Advisory Committee and to the petition of the *Ad Hoc* Group on Equal Rights for Women;

2. *Recommends* that efforts be made to bridge the gap in the recruitment of staff, including women, in the Secretariat of the United Nations between the over-represented and under-represented countries, in accordance with the principle of equitable geographical distribution contained in the Charter of the United Nations.

### Family Planning and Integration of Women in Development<sup>5</sup>

#### 15. *Family planning and the full integration of women in development*

*The World Conference of the International Women's Year,*

*Considering* that the full integration of women in development cannot be achieved without improvement in health, education and training for employment,

*Recognizing* the necessity, in the process of integrating women in development, of providing women with the information and means to enable them to determine the number and spacing of their children,

*Noting* that the findings of the Special Rapporteur on the Interrelationship of the Status of Women and Family Planning, as endorsed by the Commission on the Status of Women and the Economic and Social Council, stressed the interrelationship between the promotion of family planning and social welfare and the role and status of women in the context, *inter alia*, of national development,

*Recognizing also* that the importance of the overall development process, the status and role of women, and population factors were explicitly recognized by the seminars held in the regions of Africa and of Asia and the Pacific on the subject of the integration of women in development with special reference to population factors,

*Aware* that women in many parts of the world are demanding access to advice on family health services and the spacing of their children and that lack of access to such services has caused hardship and suffering to women and their families and has given rise to substantial social cost, including the adverse effect it has on the health of the woman and her child,

*Considering* that the expansion of the activities

<sup>5</sup> Sponsored by Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States; adopted by the conference on July 2 by a vote of 77 (U.S.) to 4.

of the organizations of the United Nations family in the form of projects that benefit women and ventures designed to remedy the situation of disadvantaged groups would benefit women all over the world, especially those in the poorest countries,

*Endorsing* the view that population is but one factor in the development process and must therefore be considered equally with other economic, social and environmental factors,

1. *Calls on* Governments, the specialized agencies and the organizations within the United Nations system to implement the World Population Plan of Action;

2. *Calls on* Governments consistent with their national policy as far as possible:

(a) To provide adequate facilities for formal and non-formal education for women and girls, especially those in rural areas, to ensure that full advantage shall be taken of family health services;

(b) To make available to nursing mothers and their children the necessary health services within easy reach, coupled with programmes of education in maternal health and child welfare as an integral part of health programmes;

(c) To make available to all persons the necessary information and advice and adequate facilities and services within easy reach to enable women who so desire to decide on the number and spacing of their children, and, furthermore, to prepare young people for responsible parenthood;

(d) To include women on all boards and policy-making bodies at all levels in relation to the numbers of men, especially in socio-economic development plans and population policies;

3. *Requests* the Executive Director of the United Nations Fund for Population Activities and the Administrator of the United Nations Fund for International Women's Year to co-ordinate their activities to ensure the optimum utilization of existing resources;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to invite the Commission on the Status of Women and the Population Commission to consider measures to achieve the fuller integration of women in the development process and to submit such recommendations for consideration by the Economic and Social Council at its sixty-second session.

## Education and Training<sup>6</sup>

### 24. Education and training

*The World Conference of the International Women's Year,*

<sup>6</sup> Sponsored by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Greece, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela; adopted by the conference on July 2 without a vote.

*Convinced* that the expansion of education is essential in order to meet the increasing intensity of challenges to the welfare and even the existence of humanity, to reduce the gaps between socio-economic groups and to eliminate prejudice against women,

*Convinced also* that the advantages of education should by right be equally available to all people, regardless of sex, age, race, religion or ethnic origin,

*Further convinced* that education should be a life-long activity that reinforces the personal and vocational development of the individual,

*Recognizing* that historical and cultural perspectives regarding the role of women at all levels of education have too often been obstacles to the full participation of women in society,

*Further recognizing* that only if a woman is given equality of educational opportunity can she make and exercise a free choice as to what her role in society will be,

*Aware* that equality of educational opportunity enables a woman to enhance her economic status and to enrich the contribution that she can make to the quality of her own life and that of her family,

#### 1. *Affirms:*

(a) That fundamental education, including functional literacy, basic skills, science and technology, and civic education should be provided for all as soon as possible;

(b) That, as far as resources permit, all educational programmes should be free to people of all ages and that primary and secondary education should, within the limits of each country's resources, be compulsory and free as soon as possible so as to ensure equal opportunities for girls and boys;

(c) That women should be given equal access to formal and non-formal educational opportunities, including technical education;

(d) That educational programmes should be relevant to the needs and resources of particular individuals, communities, cultures and countries;

(e) That life-long education should be accessible to women and men of all ages;

(f) That co-education should be provided at all levels in order that girls and boys may have access to identical curricula and resources at every level so that they may be able to form a more realistic picture of each other;

(g) That all curricula should be free of sex bias, and should include a critical analysis of sex-role stereotyping;

#### 2. *Recommends* to Governments:

(a) That genuine reforms should be carried out in all educational systems, beginning with early childhood education, so that girls and boys will consider each other as equals;

(b) That training for teaching, counselling and administration should be without sex bias or dis-

criminary attitudes and should heighten teachers' awareness of the full range of abilities in both sexes;

(c) That at all levels of teaching and administration men and women should be given equal opportunities;

(d) That all forms of mass communication and technology should be used to expand the educational opportunities for women as well as men;

(e) That all teaching media and materials should be free of sex bias and should be directed towards changing discriminatory attitudes;

(f) That all skills and human resources of the community should be identified, and that full use should be made of these skills and resources in the educational process, with particular emphasis upon the contribution of women;

(g) That training and promotion centres for women should be established, in the form of community or co-operative enterprises, in rural and urban areas where the need is greatest;

(h) That there should be continuing economic and social research and evaluation of education programmes as they affect girls and women and as they bring about changes in attitudes and roles for women and men;

3. *Urges* that structures and strategies be evolved and implemented to these ends on a massive scale;

4. *Calls upon* non-governmental organizations to assist Governments in such programmes;

5. *Requests* the United Nations system, in particular the United Nations Children's Fund, the International Labour Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, as well as other international agencies, to assist Governments, at their request, in the planning and implementation of such programmes;

6. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to give priority, in the allocation of finances from the Fund for International Women's Year, to literacy and education programmes for women.

### Research and Training Institute <sup>7</sup>

#### *26. International Research and Training Institute for the Promotion of Women*

*The World Conference of the International Women's Year,*

*Recalling* General Assembly resolution 3010 (XXVII) of 18 December 1972, in which the Assembly proclaimed 1975 as the International Women's Year to be devoted to intensified action to ensure the full integration of women in the total development effort,

*Taking into account* General Assembly resolution

<sup>7</sup> Sponsored by Egypt, Iran, Jamaica, Mexico, Pakistan, Senegal, and the United States; adopted by the conference on July 2 without a vote.

3342 (XXIX), in which the Assembly called upon the United Nations system to provide increased assistance to those programmes, projects and activities that would encourage and promote the further integration of women into national, regional and interregional economic development activities,

*Noting* that the inadequacy of research, data and information is an impediment to the formulation of development strategies and programmes for furthering the advancement of women,

*Deeply conscious* of the need to provide training opportunities to enhance the effective participation of women,

1. *Decides* to recommend the establishment, under the auspices of the United Nations, of an International Training and Research Institute for the Promotion of Women, financed through voluntary contributions, which in collaboration with appropriate national, regional and interregional economic and social research institutes and the specialized agencies of the United Nations, would:

(a) Undertake research and the collection and dissemination of information as the basis for the formulation of programmes and policies for the effective participation of women;

(b) Assist in the design of research for the monitoring of changes in the situation of women and the impact on their lives of economic, social and technological changes;

(c) Develop, adapt and provide training programmes for women, in particular those of the developing countries, which would enable them to undertake national research, to assume leadership roles within their own societies and to increase their earning possibilities;

2. *Invites* the Secretary-General to appoint, with due consideration to the principle of equitable geographical distribution, a group of experts to assist him in the establishment of this institute and to draw up its terms of reference;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report, on the basis of the recommendations of the group of experts, to the Economic and Social Council at its sixtieth session.

### Measures for the Integration of Women in Development <sup>8</sup>

#### *27. Measures for the integration of women in development*

*The World Conference of the International Women's Year,*

*Recalling* that General Assembly resolution 2626 (XXV) of 24 October 1970 set forth the Interna-

<sup>8</sup> Sponsored by Austria, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, New Zealand, Norway, Sierra Leone, and the United States; adopted by the conference on July 2 without a vote.

tional Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, which included among its objectives the full integration of women in the total development effort,

*Recalling also* that in resolutions 3010 (XXVII) of 18 December 1972 and 3275 (XXIX) of 10 December 1974 the General Assembly proclaimed that International Women's Year 1975 should be devoted to intensified action, *inter alia*, to ensure the full integration of women in the total development effort,

*Recalling further* that the General Assembly, in its resolution 3342 (XXIX), called upon the United Nations system to provide increased assistance to those programmes, projects and activities that would encourage and promote the further integration of women into national, regional and interregional economic development activities; and recommended to all organizations concerned within the United Nations system to review their work and personnel programmes in order to assess their impact on the further participation of women in development,

*Noting* that in its resolution XII the United Nations World Population Conference requested United Nations organs and the specialized agencies to give special consideration to the impact of development efforts and programmes on the improvement of the status of women, especially in connexion with the review and appraisal of the Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade and in the deliberations of the General Assembly at its special session in 1975,

*Noting also* that in its resolutions II, V and VIII, the United Nations World Food Conference urged priority consideration of women in every stage of the design, planning, implementation and evaluation of development programmes and projects,

*Noting further* that the Governing Council of the United Nations Development Programme at its nineteenth session requested that the integration of women in development should be a continuing consideration in the formulation, design and implementation of the projects and programmes of the United Nations Development Programme,

*Bearing in mind* that the Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 1942 (LVIII) of 6 May 1975, requested United Nations bodies to pay particular attention to the evolving status of women, keeping in mind the mutual interaction among population factors, social and economic development and the status of women, and called for monitoring of the progress of short-term and long-term programmes,

*Bearing in mind also* that the recent resolutions and actions of United Nations specialized agencies are designed to further the integration of women in development,

1. *Recommends* that all organs of the United Nations development system, specialized agencies, and other international technical and financial assistance programmes and agencies:

(a) Give sustained attention to those initiatives that integrate women in the development process;

(b) Incorporate in their development plans, programme and sector analyses, and programme documents an impact statement of how such proposed programmes will affect women as participants and beneficiaries, in consultation with the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women;

(c) Establish a review and appraisal system and undertake to serve in the design, implementation and evaluation of programmes and to use social and economic indicators as a means of measuring progress in the integration of women in the development process;

(d) Ensure that women shall participate on an equitable basis with men on all levels of decision-making that govern the planning and implementation of these programmes, keeping in mind the principle of geographical distribution;

2. *Invites* the Governments of all States Members of the United Nations and private organizations engaged in development programmes to adopt the above recommendations in their programming processes.

#### Participation in International Conferences<sup>9</sup>

##### 31. *Women's contribution to world peace through participation in international conferences*

*The World Conference of the International Women's Year,*

*Noting* that less than 10 per cent of the delegations to sessions of the General Assembly and to most United Nations conferences are women,

*Noting* that less than 5 per cent of the representatives are women,

*Noting also* that the achievement of the goals of International Women's Year requires that more women should hold positions of policy and decision-making in their own Governments in order to make a greater contribution towards international peace,

1. *Recommends* that in the current year Governments of Member States should seek to increase substantially the number of women in their delegations to meetings held under United Nations auspices; particularly the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly and the thirtieth regular session of the General Assembly,

2. *Further recommends* that Governments of Member States should not only maintain this increase in the representation of women but should seek to improve upon it in subsequent years;

3. *Further recommends* that the Governments of

<sup>9</sup> Sponsored by Austria, Barbados, Gambia, Tanzania, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States; adopted by the conference on July 2 without a vote.

Member States should not limit the representation of women to the Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly but should appoint women to serve on all Main Committees of the General Assembly.

## TEXT OF WORLD PLAN OF ACTION<sup>10</sup>

### WORLD PLAN OF ACTION FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S YEAR

#### INTRODUCTION

1. In subscribing to the Charter, the peoples of the United Nations undertook specific commitments: "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war . . . to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and . . . to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom".

2. The greatest and most significant achievement during recent decades has been the liberation of a large number of peoples and nations from alien colonial domination, which has permitted them to become members of the community of free peoples. Technological progress has also been achieved in all spheres of economic activity during the past three decades, thus offering substantial possibilities for improving the well-being of all peoples. However, the last vestiges of alien and colonial domination, foreign occupation, racial discrimination, *apartheid* and neo-colonialism in all its forms are still among the greatest obstacles to the full emancipation and progress of developing countries and of all the peoples concerned. The benefits of technological progress are not shared equitably by all members of the international community. The developing countries, which account for 70 per cent of the population of the world, receive only 30 per cent of world income. It has proved impossible to achieve uniform and balanced development of the international community under the present economic order, and, for this reason, it is urgent to implement a new international economic order in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3201 (S-VI).

3. Conventions, declarations, formal recommendations and other instruments have been adopted since

the Charter came into force<sup>11</sup> with a view to reinforcing, elaborating and implementing these fundamental principles and objectives. Some of them seek to safeguard and promote the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all persons without discrimination of any kind. Others deal with promotion of economic and social progress and development and the need to eliminate all forms of alien domination, dependence, neo-colonialism, and include international strategies, programmes and plans of action. Some have the more specific purpose of eliminating discrimination on the ground of sex and promoting the equal rights of men and women. These documents reflect the ever-increasing awareness in the international community of the uneven development of peoples, and of the tragedy of all forms of discrimination be it on the ground of race, sex or any other ground, and the evident will to promote progress and development in conditions of peace, equity and justice.

4. In these various instruments the international community has proclaimed that the full and complete development of a country, the welfare of the world and the cause of peace require the maximum participation of women as well as men in all fields. It has declared that all human beings without distinction have the right to enjoy the fruits of social and economic progress and should, on their part, contribute to it. It has condemned sex discrimination as fundamentally unjust, an offence against human dignity and an infringement of human rights. It has included the full integration of women in the total development effort as a stated objective of the International Development Strategy for the decade of the 1970s.

5. Despite these solemn pronouncements and notwithstanding the work accomplished in particular by the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women and the specialized agencies concerned, progress in translating these principles into practical reality is proving slow and uneven. The difficulties encountered in the preparation and implementation of these many instruments are attributable to the complexities created by the considerable differences between countries, regions, etc.

6. History has attested the active role which women played, together with men, in accelerating the material and spiritual progress of peoples and in the process of the progressive renewal of society; in our times, women's role will increasingly emerge as a powerful revolutionary social force.

7. There are significant differences in the status of women in different countries and regions of the world which are rooted in the political, economic and social structure, the cultural framework and the level of development of each country, and in the

<sup>10</sup> Adopted by the conference on July 2 without a vote (text from U.N. doc. E/5725, report of the World Conference of the International Women's Year, provisional). The conference adopted two resolutions providing for implementation of the plan, entitled "International co-operation under projects designed to achieve the objectives of the World Plan of Action" and "Role of the United Nations system in implementing the World Plan of Action."

<sup>11</sup> See appendix I to the Plan [footnote in original]. Appendix II, statements made by participants on the World Plan of Action, is not printed here.



social category of women within a given country. However basic similarities unite women to fight differences wherever they exist in the legal, economic, social, political and cultural status of women and men.

8. As a result of the uneven development which prevails in the international economic relations, three quarters of humanity is faced with urgent and pressing social and economic problems. The women among them are even more affected by such problems and the new measures taken to improve their situation as well as their role in the process of development must be an integral part of the global project for the establishment of a new economic order.

9. In many countries women form a large part of the agricultural work force. Because of this and because of their important role in agricultural production and in the preparation, processing and marketing of food, they constitute a substantial economic resource. Nevertheless, if the rural worker's lack of technical equipment, education and training is taken into account, it will be seen that in many countries the status of women in this sector is doubly disadvantaged.

10. While industrialization provides jobs for women and constitutes one of the main means for the integration of women in the process of development, women workers are disadvantaged in many respects because of the fact that the technological structure of production in general has been oriented towards man and his requirements. Therefore special attention must be paid to the situation of the woman worker in industry and in services. Women workers feel painfully the effects of the present economic crisis, the growth of unemployment, inflation, mass poverty, lack of resources for education and medical care, unexpected and unwanted side-effects of urbanization and other migration, etc.

11. Scientific and technological developments have had both positive and negative repercussions on the situation of women in many countries. Political, economic and social factors are important in overcoming any adverse effects of such developments.

12. During the last decades women's movements and millions of women together with other progressive forces acting in many countries have focused public opinion at the national and international levels on all these problems.

13. However, that public opinion often overlooks the many women of regions under alien domination, particularly those subjected to *apartheid* who experience daily the terror of repression and who struggle tirelessly for the recovery of the most elementary rights of the human person.

14. The reality of the problems which women still meet in their daily life in many countries of the world in their efforts to participate in the economic and social activities in the decision-making process and the political administration of their countries,

and the loss represented by the under-utilization of the potentialities of approximately 50 per cent of the world's adult population, have prompted the United Nations to proclaim 1975 as International Women's Year, and to call for intensified action to ensure the full integration of women in the total development effort, and to involve women widely in international co-operation and strengthening of world peace on the basis of equal rights, opportunities, and responsibilities of women and men. The objective of International Women's Year is to define a society in which women participate in a real and full sense in economic, social and political life and to devise strategies whereby such societies could develop.

15. This Plan of Action is intended to strengthen the implementation of the instruments and programmes which have been adopted concerning the status of women, and to broaden and place them in a more timely context. Its purpose is mainly to stimulate national and international action to solve the problems of underdevelopment and of the socio-economic structure which places women in an inferior position, in order to achieve the goals of International Women's Year.

16. The achievement of equality between men and women implies that they should have equal rights, opportunities and responsibilities to enable them to develop their talents and capabilities for their own personal fulfilment and the benefit of society. To that end a reassessment of the functions and roles traditionally allotted to each sex within the family and the community at large is essential. The necessity of a change in the traditional role of men as well as of women must be recognized. In order to allow for women's equal (fuller) participation in all societal activities, socially organized services should be established and maintained to lighten household chores, and especially services for children should be provided. All efforts should be made to change social attitudes—based mainly on education—in order to bring about the acceptance of shared responsibilities for home and children by both men and women.

17. In order to promote equality between women and men Governments should ensure for both women and men equality before the law, the provision of facilities for equality of educational opportunities and training, equality in conditions of employment, including remuneration and adequate social security. Governments should recognize and undertake measures to implement men's and women's right to employment on equal conditions, regardless of marital status and their access to the whole range of economic activities. The State has also the responsibility to create conditions that promote the implementation of legal norms providing for equality of men and women and in particular the opportunity for all individuals to receive free general and primary education, and eventually compulsory general second-

ary education, equality in conditions of employment, and maternity protection.

18. Governments should strive to ameliorate the hard working conditions and unreasonably heavy work load, especially that fall upon large groups of women in many countries and particularly among underprivileged social groups. Governments should ensure improved access to health services, better nutrition and other social services that are essential to the improvement of the condition of women and their full participation in development on an equal basis with men.

19. Individuals and couples have the right freely and responsibly to determine the number and spacing of their children and to have the information and the means to do so. The exercise of this right is basic to the attainment of any real equality between the sexes and without its achievement women are disadvantaged in their attempt to benefit from other reforms.

20. Child-care centres and other child-minding facilities are means to supplement the training and care that the children get at home. At the same time they are of vital importance in promoting equality between men and women. Governments have therefore a responsibility to see to it that such centres and facilities are available in the first place for those children, whose parents or parent are employed, in self-employment and particularly in agriculture for rural women, in training or in education or wish to take up employment, training or education.

21. The primary objective of development being to bring about sustained improvement in the well-being of the individual and of society and to bestow benefits on all, development should be seen not only as a desirable goal in itself but also as the most important means for furthering equality of the sexes and the maintenance of peace.

22. The integration of women in development will necessitate widening their activities to embrace all aspects of social, economic, political and cultural life. They must be provided with the necessary technical training to make their contribution more effective in terms of production, and to ensure their greater participation in decision-making, planning and implementation of all programmes and projects. Full integration also implies that women receive their fair share of the benefits of development, thereby helping to ensure a more equitable distribution of income among all sectors of the population.

23. The promotion and protection of human rights for all is one of the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter whose achievement is the goal of all people. An essential element for securing the protection of human rights and full equality between men and women throughout the world is sustained international co-operation based on peace, justice and equity for all and the elimination of all sources of conflict. True international co-operation

must be based, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, on fully equal rights, the observance of national independence and sovereignty including sovereignty over natural resources and the right of their exploitation, non-interference in internal affairs, the right of peoples to defend their territorial integrity, and the inadmissibility of acquisition or attempts to acquire territory by force, mutual advantage, the avoidance of the use or the threat of force, and the promotion and maintenance of a new just world economic order, which is the basic purpose of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.<sup>12</sup> International co-operation and peace requires national liberation and political and economic independence, the elimination of colonialism and neo-colonialism, fascism and other similar ideologies, foreign occupation and *apartheid*, racism and discrimination in all its forms as well as recognition of the dignity of the individual and appreciation of the human person and his or her self-determination. To this end, the Plan calls for the full participation of women in all efforts to promote and maintain peace. True peace cannot be achieved unless women share with men the responsibility for establishing a new international economic order.

24. It is the aim of the Plan to ensure that the original and multidimensional contribution—both actual and potential—of women is not overlooked in existing concepts for development action programmes and an improved world economic equilibrium. Recommendations for national and international action are proposed with the aim of accelerating the necessary changes in all areas, and particularly in those where women have been especially disadvantaged.

25. Since the integral development of the personality of the woman as a human being is directly connected with her participation in the development process as mother, worker and citizen, policies should be developed to promote the co-ordination of these different roles of the woman so as to give the most favourable conditions for the harmonious development of her personality—an aim which is equally relevant to the development of man.

#### I. NATIONAL ACTION

26. This Plan provides guidelines for national action over the 10-year period from 1975 to 1985 as part of a sustained, long-term effort to achieve the objectives of the International Women's Year. The recommendations are not exhaustive, and should be considered in addition to the other existing international instruments and resolutions of the United Nations bodies which deal with the condition of

<sup>12</sup> During the World Conference of the International Women's Year some representatives stated that reference to the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States should not be interpreted as indicating a change in the positions of delegations on the Charter as stated at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly. [Footnote in original.]

women and the quality of life. They constitute rather the main areas for priority action within the decade.

27. The recommendations for national action in this Plan are addressed primarily to Governments, and to all public and private institutions, women's and youth organizations, employers, trade unions, mass communications media, non-governmental organizations, political parties and other groups.

28. Since there are wide divergencies in the situation of women in various societies, cultures and regions, reflected in differing needs and problems, each country should decide upon its own national strategy, and identify its own targets and priorities within the present World Plan. Given the changing conditions of society today, operative mechanism for assessment should be established and targets should be linked to those set out, in particular, in the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, and in the World Population Plan of Action.

29. Changes in social and economic structures should be promoted which would make possible the full equality of women and their free access to all types of development, without discrimination of any kind, and to all types of education and employment.

30. There should be a clear commitment at all levels of government to take appropriate action to implement these targets and priorities. Commitment on the part of Governments to the ideals of equality and integration of women in society cannot be fully effective outside the larger context of commitment to transform fundamental relationships within a society in order to ensure a system that excludes the possibility of exploitation.

31. In elaborating national strategies and development plans in which women should participate, measures should be adopted to ensure that the set targets and priorities take fully into account women's interests and needs, and make adequate provision to improve their situation and increase their contribution to the development process. There should be equitable representation of women at all levels of policy- and decision-making. Appropriate national machinery and procedures should be established if they do not already exist.

32. National plans and strategies for the implementation of this Plan should be sensitive to the needs and problems of different categories of women and of women of different age groups. However, Governments should pay special attention to improving the situation of women in areas where they have been most disadvantaged and especially of women in rural and urban areas.

33. While integrated programmes for the benefit of all members of society should be the basis for action in implementing this Plan, special measures on behalf of women whose status is the result of particularly discriminatory attitudes will be necessary.

34. The establishment of interdisciplinary and mul-

tisectoral machinery within government, such as national commissions, women's bureaux and other bodies, with adequate staff and budget, can be an effective transitional measure for accelerating the achievement of equal opportunity for women and their full integration in national life. The membership of such bodies should include both women and men, representative of all groups of society responsible for making and implementing policy decisions in the public sector. Government ministries and departments (especially those responsible for education, health, labour, justice, communications and information, culture, industry, trade, agriculture, rural development, social welfare, finance and planning), as well as appropriate private and public agencies should be represented on them.

35. Such bodies should investigate the situation of women in all fields and at all levels and make recommendations for needed legislation, policies and programmes establishing priorities. Follow-up programmes should be maintained to monitor and evaluate the progress achieved within the country to assess the implementation of the present Plan in national plans.

36. These national bodies should also co-operate in the co-ordination of similar regional and international activities, as well as those undertaken by non-governmental organizations, and self-help programmes devised by women themselves.

37. Constitutional and legislative guarantees of the principle of non-discrimination on the ground of sex and of equal rights and responsibilities of women and men are essential. Therefore, general acceptance of the principles embodied in such legislation and a change of attitude with regard to them should be encouraged. It is also essential to ensure that the adoption and enforcement of such legislation can in itself be a significant means of influencing and changing public and private attitudes and values.

38. Governments should review their legislation affecting the status of women in the light of human rights principles and internationally accepted standards. Wherever necessary, legislation should be enacted or updated to bring national laws into conformity with the relevant international instruments. Adequate provision should also be made for the enforcement of such legislation, especially in each of the areas dealt with in chapter II of the Plan. Where they have not already done so, Governments should take steps to ratify the relevant international conventions and fully implement their provisions. It should be noted that there are States whose national legislation guarantees women certain rights which go beyond those embodied in the relevant international instruments.

39. Appropriate bodies should be specifically entrusted with the responsibility of modernizing, changing or repealing outdated national laws and regulations, keeping them under constant review, and ensuring that their provisions are applied with-

out discrimination. These bodies could include, for example, law commissions, human rights commissions, civil liberties unions, appeals boards, legal advisory boards and the office of *ombudsman*. Such bodies should have full governmental support to enable them to carry out their functions effectively. Non-governmental organizations could also play an important role in ensuring that relevant legislation is adequate, up to date and applied without discrimination.

40. Appropriate measures should be taken to inform and advise women of their rights and to provide them with every other type of assistance. Accordingly, the awareness of the mass communication media should be heightened so that they may offer their broad co-operation through public education programmes. Non-governmental organizations can and/or should be encouraged to play similar roles with regard to women. In this context, special attention should be paid to the women of rural areas, whose problem is most acute.

41. Efforts to widen opportunities for women to participate in development and to eliminate discrimination against them will require a variety of measures and action by society at large through its governmental machinery and other institutions.

42. While some of the measures suggested could be carried out at minimum cost, implementation of this Plan will require a redefinition of certain priorities and a change in the pattern of government expenditure. In order to ensure adequate allocation of funds, Governments should explore all available sources of support, which are acceptable to Governments and in accordance with Governments' goals.

43. Special measures should also be envisaged to assist Governments whose resources are limited in carrying out specific projects or programmes. The Fund for International Women's Year established under Economic and Social Council resolution 1851 (LVI), in addition to multilateral and bilateral assistance which is vital for the purpose, should be extended provisionally pending further consideration as to its ultimate disposition in order to assist Governments whose resources are limited in carrying out specific programmes or projects. Women in countries holding special financial responsibilities entrusted by the United Nations and its specialized agencies with a view to assisting developing countries are called upon to make their contribution to the implementation of the goals set in connexion with the governmental assistance earmarked for improving the status of women especially of those in the under-developed States.

44. It is recognized that some of the objectives of this Plan have already been achieved in some countries, while in others they may only be accomplished progressively. Moreover, some measures by their very nature will take longer to implement than others. Governments are therefore urged to estab-

lish short-, medium- and long-term targets and objectives to implement the Plan.

45. On the basis of this World Plan of Action the United Nations Secretariat should elaborate a two-year plan of its own, containing several most important objectives, aiming at the implementation of the World Plan of Action under the current control of the Commission on the Status of Women, and the over-all control of the General Assembly.

46. By the end of the first five-year period (1975-1980) the achievement of the following should be envisaged as a minimum:

(a) Marked increase in literacy and civic education of women, especially in rural areas;

(b) The extension of co-educational technical and vocational training in basic skills to women and men in the industrial and agricultural sectors;

(c) Equal access at every level of education, compulsory primary school education and the measures necessary to prevent school drop-outs;

(d) Increased employment opportunities for women, reduction of unemployment and increased efforts to eliminate discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment;

(e) The establishment and increase of the infra-structural services required in both rural and urban areas;

(f) The enactment of legislation on voting and eligibility for election on equal terms with men and equal opportunity and conditions of employment including remuneration and on equality in legal capacity and the exercise thereof;

(g) To encourage a greater participation of women in policy-making positions at the local, national and international levels;

(h) Increased provision for comprehensive measures for health education and services, sanitation, nutrition, family education, family planning and other welfare services;

(i) Provision for parity in the exercise of civil, social and political rights such as those pertaining to marriage, citizenship and commerce;

(j) Recognition of the economic value of women's work in the home in domestic food production and marketing and voluntary activities not traditionally remunerated;

(k) To direct formal, non-formal and life-long education towards the re-evaluation of the man and woman, in order to ensure their full realization as an individual in the family and in society;

(l) The promotion of women's organizations as an interim measure within workers' organizations and educational, economic and professional institutions;

(m) The development of modern rural technology, cottage industry, pre-school day centres, time and energy saving devices so as to help reduce the heavy work load of women, particularly those living in rural sectors and for the urban poor and thus

facilitate the full participation of women in community, national and international affairs;

(n) The establishment of an inter-disciplinary and multi-sectoral machinery within the government for accelerating the achievement of equal opportunities for women and their full integration into national life.

47. These minimum objectives should be developed in more specific terms in regional plans of action.

48. The active involvement of non-governmental women's organizations in the achievement of the goals of the 10-year World Plan of Action at every level and especially by the effective utilization of volunteer experts and in setting up and in running of institutions and projects for the welfare of women and the dissemination of information for their advancement.

## II. SPECIFIC AREAS FOR NATIONAL ACTION

49. The specific areas included in this chapter of the Plan have been selected because they are considered to be key areas for national action. They should not be viewed in isolation, however, as they are all closely interrelated and the guidelines proposed should be implemented within the framework of integrated strategies and programmes.

### A. *International co-operation and the strengthening of international peace*

50. An essential condition for the maintenance and strengthening of international co-operation and peace is the promotion and protection of human rights for all in conditions of equity among and within nations. In order to involve more women in the promotion of international co-operation, the development of friendly relations among nations, the strengthening of international peace and disarmament, and in the combating of colonialism, neo-colonialism, foreign domination and alien subjugation, *apartheid* and racial discrimination, the peace efforts of women as individuals and in groups, and in national and international organizations should be recognized and encouraged.

51. Women of all countries of the world should proclaim their solidarity in support of the elimination of gross violations of human rights condemned by the United Nations and contrary to its principles involving acts against the moral and physical integrity of individuals or groups of individuals for political or ideological reasons.

52. The efforts of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations having as their aim the strengthening of international security and peace and the development of friendly relations among nations and the promotion of active co-operation among States should be supported, and women should be given every encouragement to participate actively in the endeavours of those organizations.

53. The United Nations should proclaim a special

day to be devoted to international peace and celebrated every year, nationally and internationally. Meetings and seminars should be organized for this purpose by interested individuals and groups, with wide coverage in the press and other communication media. Women should lend their full support to these objectives and explore, as co-equals with men, ways to overcome existing obstacles to international co-operation, the development of friendly relations among nations, and the strengthening of international peace. However, it must be emphasized that peace is a matter for constant vigilance and not only for a one-day observance.

54. The free flow of information and ideas among countries should be facilitated, with due regard for national sovereignty and the principles of international law; the exchange of visits between women of different countries to study common problems should be promoted. Educational, cultural, scientific and other exchange programmes should be expanded and new forms developed in order to facilitate mutual understanding among peoples, particularly the young, and develop friendly relations and active co-operation among States. For these purposes the mass communications media should be utilized fully.

55. Women and men should be encouraged to instil in their children the values of mutual respect and understanding for all nations and all peoples, racial equality, sexual equality, the right of every nation to self-determination and the desire to maintain international co-operation, peace and security in the world.

56. Women should have equal opportunity with men to represent their countries in all international forums where the above questions are discussed, and in particular at meetings of the organizations of the United Nations system, including the Security Council and all conferences on disarmament and international peace, and other regional bodies.

### B. *Political participation*

57. Despite the fact that, numerically, women constitute half the population of the world, in the vast majority of countries only a small percentage of them are in positions of leadership in the various branches of government. Consequently, women are not involved in the decision-making and their views and needs are often overlooked in planning for development. As the majority of women do not participate in the formulation of development plans and programmes they are frequently unaware of their implications and less inclined to support their implementation and the changes the programmes seek to bring about. Many women also lack the education, training, civic awareness and self-confidence to participate effectively in political life.

58. A major objective of this Plan is to ensure that women shall have, in law and in fact, equal rights and opportunities with men to vote and to

participate in public and political life at the national, local and community levels, and that they shall be made aware of their responsibilities as citizens and of the problems affecting society and affecting them directly as women.

59. Participation in political life implies participation as voters, lobbyists, elected representatives, trade unionists and public officials in the various branches of government, including the judiciary.

60. Where legislation does not exist guaranteeing women the right to vote, to be eligible for election and to hold all public offices and exercise public functions on equal terms with men, every effort should be made to enact it by 1978.

61. Where special qualifications for holding public office are required, they should apply to both sexes equally and should relate only to the expertise necessary for performing the specific functions of the office.

62. Governments should establish goals, strategies and time-tables for increasing within the decade 1975-1985 the number of women in elective and appointive public offices and public functions at all levels.

63. Special efforts to achieve these objectives could include:

(a) The reaffirmation of, and wide publicity for, the official policy concerning the equal political participation of women;

(b) The issuance of special governmental instructions for achieving an equitable representation of women in public office, and the compilation of periodic reports on the number of women in the public service, and levels of responsibility in the areas of their work;

(c) The organization of studies to establish the levels of economic, social and political competence of the female compared to the male population for recruitment, nomination and promotion;

(d) The undertaking of special activities for the recruitment, nomination and promotion of women especially to fill important positions, until equitable representation of the sexes is achieved.

64. Special efforts and campaigns should be initiated to enlighten the female electorate on political issues and on the need for their active participation in public affairs, including political parties and other political organizations such as pressure groups.

65. Educational and informational activities should also be undertaken to enlighten the public at large on the indispensable role of women in the political processes, and on the need to promote their greater political participation and leadership.

66. Special drives should be undertaken to encourage the increased participation of women and girls in rural, community and youth development programmes, and in political activities, and to facilitate their access to training for leadership in such programmes.

### C. Education and training

67. Access to education and training is not only a basic human right recognized in many international instruments, it is also a key factor for social progress and in reducing the gaps between socio-economic groups and between the sexes. In many countries girls and women are at a marked disadvantage. This not only constitutes a serious initial handicap for them as individuals and for their future position in society; it also seriously impedes the effectiveness of their contribution to development programmes and the development process itself.

68. Illiteracy and lack of education and training in basic skills are some of the causes of the vicious circle of underdevelopment, low productivity and poor conditions of health and welfare. In a great many countries illiteracy is much more widespread among women than among men, and the rates are generally higher in rural than in urban areas.

69. In most countries female enrolment at all levels of education is considerably below that of men. Girls tend to drop out of school earlier than boys. Boys are given precedence over girls when parents have to make a choice if education is not free. There is often discrimination in the nature and content of the education provided and in the options offered. Girls' choices of areas of study are dominated by conventional attitudes, concepts and notions concerning the respective roles of men and women in society.

70. As long as women remain illiterate and are subject to discrimination in education and training, the motivation for change so badly needed to improve the quality of life for all will fail, for in most societies it is the mother who is responsible for the training of her children during the formative years of their lives.

71. Governments should provide equal opportunities for both sexes at all levels of education and training within the context of lifelong education, and on a formal and non-formal basis, according to national needs.

72. The measures taken should conform to the existing international standards and, in particular, to the Convention and Recommendations against Discrimination in Education, 1960, and to the revised Recommendation on Technical and Vocational Education, 1974, of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

73. Educational, training and employment strategies should be co-ordinated and based on population projections. The content and structure of education should be such as to ensure its relevance to the present and future needs of the communities concerned, taking into account their own culture and the advances made through technical and scientific developments. It should also seek to prepare the individual adequately for an active civic and family life and for responsible parenthood.

74. Target dates should be established for the eradication of illiteracy and high priority given to programmes for women and girls between the ages of 16 and 25 years.

75. The acquisition of literacy should be promoted as an integral part of other kinds of learning activities of direct interest and value to the daily lives of the people. Parallel with the efforts of Governments, all social institutions, such as co-operatives, voluntary organizations and enterprises, should be fully utilized to overcome illiteracy.

76. Voluntary task forces, especially of young persons, could be established to teach literacy, numbers, nutrition and methods of food preservation during vacations or periods of national service. Such task forces should include both women and men with expertise in the skills needed. The volunteers could also train local personnel to become trainers, thus expanding the available task forces.

77. Integrated or special training programmes should be developed for girls and women in rural areas to enable them to participate fully and productively in economic and social development and to take advantage of technological advances and thereby reduce the drudgery of their daily lives. Such programmes should include training in modern methods of agriculture and use of equipment, co-operatives, entrepreneurship, commerce, marketing, animal husbandry and fisheries, and in health, nutrition, family planning and education.

78. Free and compulsory primary education for girls and boys without discrimination should be provided and effectively enforced as quickly as possible. Every effort should also be made to provide textbooks, school lunches, transport and other essentials, wherever possible free of charge.

79. In order to assist in overcoming high drop-out rates among school-age girls and to enable women to participate in literacy and basic skills, programmes, inexpensive child-care and other arrangements should be organized to coincide with school or training hours to free women and girls from confining domestic work.

80. Special programmes for continuing education on a part-time basis should be arranged to ensure retention of what has been learned at school and to assist women in their family, vocational and professional activities.

81. Programmes, curricula and standards of education and training should be the same for males and females. Courses for both sexes, in addition to general subjects, should include industrial and agricultural technology, politics, economics, current problems of society, responsible parenthood, family life, nutrition and health.

82. Textbooks and other teaching materials should be re-evaluated and, where necessary, rewritten to ensure that they reflect an image of women in positive and participatory roles in society. Teaching

methods should be revised, wherever necessary, to ensure that they are adapted to national needs and promote changes in discriminatory attitudes.

83. Research activities should be promoted to identify discriminatory practices in education and training and to ensure educational equality. New teaching techniques should be encouraged, especially audio-visual techniques.

84. Co-education and mixed training groups should be actively encouraged and should provide special guidance to both sexes in orienting them towards new occupations and changing roles.

85. Widely diversified existing and new vocational programmes of all types should be equally accessible to both sexes, enabling girls and boys to have a wide choice of employment opportunities, including those which require higher skills, and to match national needs with job opportunities. Both sexes should have equal opportunities to receive scholarships and study grants. Special measures should be developed to assist women who wish to return to work after a comparatively long absence, owing in particular to family responsibilities. Multipurpose training centres could be established in rural and urban areas to provide education and training in various techniques and disciplines and to encourage a self-reliant approach to life.

86. Girls and boys alike should be encouraged through vocational and career guidance programmes to choose a career according to their real aptitudes and abilities rather than on the basis of deeply ingrained sex stereotypes. They should also be made aware of the education and training required to take full advantage of the employment opportunities available.

87. Informational and formal and non-formal educational programmes should be launched to make the general public, parents, teachers, counsellors and others aware of the need to provide girls with a solid initial education and adequate training for occupational life and ample opportunities for further education and training. Maximum use should be made of the mass communications media both as a tool for education and as a means for effecting changes in community attitudes.

#### *D. Employment and related economic roles*

88. This Plan seeks to achieve equality of opportunity and treatment for women workers and their integration in the labour force in accordance with the accepted international standards recognizing the right to work, to equal pay for equal work, to equal conditions of work and to advancement.

89. Available data show that women constitute more than a third of the world's economically active population and approximately 46 per cent of women of working age (15 to 64 years) are in the labour force. Of these, an estimated 65 per cent are to be found in the developing countries and 35 per cent in

the more developed regions. These data, together with the many economic activities of women that are not now included in the official statistics (see chap. III, below), demonstrate that women's contribution to the national economy and development is substantial and has not been fully recognized. Further, the occupations in which most women workers are concentrated are not the same as those in which most men are employed. The vast majority of women are concentrated in a limited number of occupations at lower levels of skill, responsibility and remuneration. Women frequently experience discrimination in pay, promotion, working conditions and hiring practices. Cultural constraints and family responsibilities further restrict their employment opportunities. Where job opportunities are severely limited and widespread unemployment exists, women's chances of obtaining wage-earning employment are in practice further reduced, even where policies of non-discrimination have been laid down.

90. Governments should formulate policies and action programmes expressly directed towards equality of opportunity and treatment for women workers and the guarantee of their right to equal pay for equal work. Such policies and programmes should be in conformity with the standards elaborated by the United Nations and the International Labour Organisation. They should include legislation stipulating the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of sex or marital status, guidelines for implementing the principles, appeals procedures, and effective targets and machinery for implementation.

91. Special efforts should be made to foster positive attitudes towards the employment of women, irrespective of marital status, among employers and workers and among women and men in society at large, and to eliminate obstacles based on sex-typed divisions of labour.

92. In attempting to achieve gainful employment for women and to deal with problems of unemployment and underemployment, special efforts should be made to create a variety of economic roles and to encourage and support self-employment and self-help activities, especially in rural areas. Existing self-help activities should be encouraged and strengthened through the participation of women.

93. Governments should seek new sources of self-help activities, such as training programmes in community development and entrepreneurial skills, which should be open on an equal basis to both sexes.

94. In order to extend women's range of economic roles, co-operatives and small-scale industries could be developed and encouraged with the necessary help and support of government. Where co-operatives already exist, women should be encouraged to take an active part in them. New co-operatives, and,

where appropriate, women's co-operatives, should be organized, especially in areas where women play a major role, such as food production, marketing, housing, nutrition and health. Co-operatives may also be the most appropriate and feasible arrangement for child-care and could also provide employment opportunities.

95. Essential to the effective implementation of such programmes is the provision of adequate training in co-operatives and entrepreneurial skills, access to credit and necessary seed capital for improved tools, assistance with marketing, the provision of adequate rural social services and amenities, decentralized development of towns in rural areas and basic infrastructural arrangements, such as child-care arrangements, transportation and conveniently situated water supplies.

96. Special efforts should be made to increase the participation of rural women in the formulation of national plans for integrated rural development. Policies and programmes for rural development should take into account the creation of employment opportunities along with other essential related components, such as projects for diversification, import substitution and expansion of rural activities for farming, forestry, fisheries, animal husbandry and agro-industries.

97. Specific target dates should be established for achieving a substantial increase in the number of qualified women employed in skilled and technical work.

98. Special efforts should also be made to increase the number of women in management and policy-making in commerce, industry and trade.

99. Access to skills and the provision of institutional and on-the-job training should be open to women in the same way and on the same conditions as to men so as to make them equally eligible for promotion.

100. Governments, employers and trade unions should ensure to all women workers the right to maternity protection including maternity leave with a guarantee of returning to their former employment and to nursing breaks, in keeping with the principles laid down in the International Labour Organisation's Maternity Protection Convention (Revised) and Recommendation, 1952. Provisions relating to maternity protection should not be regarded as unequal treatment of the sexes.

101. Special attention should be given to the need for multilateral approaches to facilitate the combination of family and work responsibilities. These could include: a general reduction and/or staggering of working hours; flexible working hours; part-time work for women and men; child-care facilities and child-care leave systems to assist parents to take care of their children; communal kitchens; and



various kinds of facilities to help them discharge household tasks more easily. Governments and trade unions should ensure that the economic and social rights of part-time workers are fully protected.

102. Protective legislation applying to women only should be reviewed in the light of scientific and technological knowledge and should be revised, repealed or extended to all workers as necessary.

103. Minimum wages, which play an important role in the improvement of working conditions of women, should be enforced and made applicable to cottage industries and domestic work.

104. Special measures should also be taken to eliminate the exploitation of female labour, in particular that of young girls, wherever it exists.

105. Discriminatory treatment of women in national social security schemes should be eliminated to the maximum possible extent. Women workers should be covered equally with men by all aspects of such schemes.

106. Governments should encourage and stimulate concerted efforts, in particular on the part of employers' and workers' organizations, to bring about a marked improvement in the position of women in employment and should co-operate with all voluntary organizations concerned with the status of women workers in economic life and in society as a whole.

107. Trade unions should adopt policies to increase the participation of women in their work at every level, including the higher echelons. They should have special programmes to promote equality of opportunity for jobs and training for women workers and leadership training for women. They should play a leading role in developing new and constructive approaches to problems faced by workers, paying special attention to the problems of women workers.

#### *E. Health and nutrition*

108. While everyone has an undeniable right to health, conditions in many countries, and especially in rural areas, have often precluded the actual enjoyment by women of this right equally with men. The situation becomes more accentuated in societies with considerable shortages of health personnel and facilities and constitutes a high cost to the family, society and development by impairing the productivity of women. Women also need special care during pregnancy, delivery and lactation.

109. Adequate nutrition is of fundamental importance for the full physical and mental development of the individual, and women have a vital role to play in this area in the production, preparation, processing and consumption of food. When food is scarce women often experience more malnutrition than men, either because they deprive themselves for the sake of their families or because society places a lesser value on women.

110. Improved access to health, nutrition and other social services is essential to the full participation of women in development activities, to the strengthening of family life, and to a general improvement in the quality of life. To be fully effective these services should be integrated into over-all development programmes with priority being given to rural areas.

111. Governments should ensure adequate investments in public health programmes, especially in rural areas.

112. Comprehensive simple community health services could be developed in which the community identifies its own health needs, takes part in decisions on delivery of health care in different socio-economic contexts, and develops primary health care services that are easily accessible to every member of the community. Women themselves, especially in rural areas, should be encouraged through adequate training programmes, to provide such health care services to their communities. Provision should be made to ensure that women have the same access to that care as men. Travelling clinics and medical teams should make periodic visits to all communities.

113. Within the context of general health services, Governments should pay particular attention to women's special health needs by provision of: pre-natal and post-natal and delivery services; gynaecological and family planning services during the reproductive years; comprehensive and continuous health services directed to all infant, pre-school children and school children, without prejudice on grounds of sex; specific care for pre-adolescent and adolescent girls and for the post-reproductive years and old age, and research into the special health problems of women. Basic health services should be reinforced by the use of qualified medical and paramedical personnel.

114. Programmes should be formulated for the reduction of infant, child and maternal mortality by means of improved nutrition, sanitation, maternal and child health care and maternal education.

115. Education programmes should be developed to overcome prejudices, taboos and superstitions that prevent women from using existing health facilities. Special efforts should be made to inform the urban poor and rural women about existing medical facilities.

116. Within the context of a massive programme of health education and services, courses in health education, maternal and child care could be organized in rural and urban neighbourhoods, and women should be actively encouraged to participate. These classes should be advertised by the communication media and by all existing social networks. They should include information about what medical facilities are available, and how to reach them.

Physicians should periodically conduct physical examinations of the participants in as many of these classes as possible.

117. In view of the importance of women not only as users but as providers of health care, steps should be taken to incorporate them as fully informed and active participants in the health planning and decision-making process at all levels and in all phases. Efforts should be made to encourage women to participate actively in community efforts to provide primary health care and improve coverage. Women should also be trained as paramedics and encouraged to organize health co-operatives and self-help programmes. Recruitment and training should be undertaken at the village level to prepare villagers as health workers to provide basic health services for their community.

118. Women should have the same right of access as men to any training establishment or course for any health profession and to continue to the highest levels. Practices which exclude women from certain health professions on traditional, religious or cultural grounds should be abolished.

119. Improved, easily accessible, safe water supplies (including wells, dams, catchments, piping etc.), sewage disposal and other sanitation measures should be provided both to improve health conditions of families and to reduce the burden of carrying water which falls mainly on women and children.

120. In national food and nutrition policies Governments should give priority to the consumption by the most vulnerable groups in the population (adolescent girls, pregnant and lactating women, and young children) of certain types of food produce, such as milk and milk products, and especially nutritious foods. The practice of breast feeding and good feeding practices for the weaning period should be encouraged. Supplementary food programmes for mothers and children at imminent risk of malnutrition should be introduced. Nutritional deficiencies should be prevented through fortification of staples or other widely consumed foods or by direct distribution of the deficient nutrients.

121. Techniques and equipment for food processing, preservation and conservation at the local village level should be improved and made available to rural women. Co-operatives for the production, quality improvement and distribution of food should be organized to give impetus to this effort and, where appropriate, campaigns to educate the consumer should be organized.

122. Opportunities should be created for women to contribute more efficiently to the production of proper types of food through vegetable gardens in rural and urban areas and through the provision of better tools, seeds and fertilizer. Girls and boys should also be encouraged to grow food in school gardens to supplement daily school meal programmes.

123. Campaigns on nutrition education should be

launched through the communications media to explore the most effective techniques for introducing previously unacceptable nutritious foods into the daily diets of people. These campaigns should also inform women how to use the family income most economically towards the purchase of more nutritious foods and to eliminate wastage of food. The exchange of experience on effective nutrition programmes through seminars, informal visits and publications should be arranged.

#### F. *The family in modern society*

124. The institution of the family, which is changing in its economic, social and cultural functions, should ensure the dignity, equality and security of each of its members, and provide conditions conducive to the balanced development of the child as an individual and as a social being.

125. In the total development process the role of women, along with men, needs to be considered in terms of their contribution to the family as well as to society and the national economy. Higher status for this role in the home—as a parent, spouse and homemaker—can only enhance the personal dignity of a man and a woman. Household activities that are necessary for family life have generally been perceived as having a low economic and social prestige. All societies should, however, place a higher value on these activities, if they wish the family group to be maintained and to fulfill its basic functions of the procreation and education of children.

126. The family is also an important agent of social, political and cultural change. If women are to enjoy equal rights, opportunities and responsibilities, and contribute on equal terms with men to the development process, the functions and roles traditionally allotted to each sex within the family will require continual re-examination and reassessment in the light of changing conditions.

127. The rights of women in all the various forms of the family, including the nuclear family, the extended family, consensual union and the single-parent family should be protected by appropriate legislation and policy.

128. Legislation relating to marriage should be in conformity with international standards. In particular it should ensure that women and men have the same right to free choice of a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent. A minimum age for marriage should be fixed by law and be such as to provide a sufficient period of education for girls and boys, but particularly girls, to enable them to complete their education and develop their potentialities prior to marriage. Official registration of marriages should be made compulsory.

129. All institutions and practices which infringe upon these rights should be abolished, in particular, child marriage and the inheritance of widows.

130. Legislative and other measures should be taken to ensure that men and women shall enjoy full legal capacity and the exercise thereof relating to their personal and property rights, including the right to acquire, administer, enjoy, dispose of and inherit property (including property acquired during marriage). Limitations, where such exist, should apply to both partners alike. During marriage the principle of equal rights and responsibilities would mean that both partners should perform an active role in the home, taking into account the importance of combining home and work responsibilities, and share jointly decision-making on matters affecting the family and children. At the dissolution of marriage, this principle would imply that procedures and grounds of dissolution of marriage should be liberalized and apply equally to both spouses; assets acquired during marriage should be shared on an equitable basis; appropriate provisions should be made for the social security and pension coverage of the work contributed by the homemaker; and decisions relating to the custody of children should be taken in consideration of their best interests.

131. In order to assist in the solution of conflicts arising among members of the family, adequate family counselling services should be set up wherever possible and the establishment of family courts staffed with personnel, including women, trained in law as well as in various other relevant disciplines should be considered.

132. Programmes of education for personal relationships, marriage and family life, health, including psycho-sexual development, should be integrated into all school curricula at appropriate levels and into programmes for out-of-school education, to prepare young people of both sexes for responsible marriage and parenthood. These programmes should be based on the ideals of mutual respect and shared rights and responsibilities in the family and in society. Child-rearing practices within each society should be examined with a view to eliminating customs that encourage and perpetuate ideas about superiority or inferiority on the basis of sex.

133. In recognition of the growing number of single-parent families, additional assistance and benefits, wherever possible, should be provided for them. The unmarried mother should be granted full-fledged status as a parent, and children born out of wedlock should have the same rights and obligations as children born in wedlock. Special nursing homes and hostels should be established for married and unmarried mothers, before and after delivery.

134. Social security programmes should, to the maximum extent possible, include children and family allowances in order to strengthen the economic stability of family members. Cross-cultural studies might be undertaken of the influence upon the condition of women in the family and in society of family and children's allowances and benefits, motherhood awards and similar measures.

135. Social, economic and demographic factors are closely interrelated, and change in one or more invariably involves changes in others. The status of women is both a determinant and a consequence of these various factors. It is inextricably linked with both the development process and the various components of demographic change: fertility, mortality, and migration (international and internal and the latter's concomitant, urbanization).

136. The status of women and, in particular, their educational level, whether or not they are gainfully employed, the nature of their employment, and their position within the family are all factors which have been found to influence family size. Conversely, the right of women to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the information and means to enable them to exercise that right has a decisive impact on their ability to take advantage of educational and employment opportunities and to participate fully in community life as responsible citizens.

137. The exercise of this right and the full participation of women in all aspects of national life are closely interrelated with such crucial demographic variables as age at marriage, age at birth of first child, the length of interval between births, age at termination of child-bearing, and total number of children born.

138. The hazards of child-bearing, characterized by too many pregnancies, pregnancies at too early or too late an age and at too close intervals, inadequate pre-natal, delivery and postnatal care and resort to illegally induced abortions, result in high rates of maternal mortality and maternal-related morbidity. Where levels of infant and early childhood mortality as well as of foetal mortality are high, their reduction—a desirable end in itself—may also be a prerequisite for the limitation of the number of pregnancies that the average woman will experience, and for the society's adoption of a smaller ideal family size where this is a desired goal. Fewer pregnancies may be more easily achieved when there is a reasonable expectation that children born will survive to adulthood.

139. In some parts of the world, urbanization involves mainly a migration of young men; in other parts, young women constitute the major component in the rural-to-urban migratory stream. Such situations partly reflect differences in women's opportunities to work in either urban or rural occupations, and these are related to cultural variations in the acceptance of women in diverse roles. While differences in women's social status are among the causes of diverse sex selections in the migration to cities and towns, the consequences of such selective migration are to be found in resulting sex imbalances, in both the urban and rural population. These population imbalances can be detrimental to individual and family welfare and to the stability

of either urban or rural residence. Just over half of the total female population of the world currently resides in rural areas of developing countries. In the light of the particular demographic, economic and social problems of rural communities in these regions, special development efforts are required.

140. This Plan endorses the recommendations of the World Population Plan of Action, especially those relating to the status of women.

141. In the elaboration and execution of population policies and programmes, within the framework of over-all development, Governments are urged to pay particular attention to measures designed to improve the situation of women, especially with regard to their educational and employment opportunities, conditions of work, and the establishment and enforcement of an appropriately high minimum age at marriage.

142. While States have a sovereign right to determine their own population policies, individuals and couples should have access, through an institutionalized system, to the information and means that will enable them to determine freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to overcome sterility. All legal, social or financial obstacles to the dissemination of family planning knowledge, means and services should be removed. Every effort should be made to improve knowledge and identification of the causes of involuntary sterility, subfecundity and congenital birth defects and to secure their reduction.

143. Family planning programmes should direct communication and recruitment efforts towards women and men equally, since successful fertility regulation requires their mutual understanding and co-operation. This policy would enable women to exercise equally with men their right to decide how many children they will bear and the timing of the births. Attainment of these goals requires the development of means of contraception and birth control that will be both efficient and compatible with cultural values prevailing in different societies. Family planning programmes should be integrated and co-ordinated with health, nutrition and other services designed to raise the quality of family life.

144. Governments should make concerted efforts systematically to ameliorate conditions of mortality and morbidity as part of the development process, and pay particular attention to the reduction of those risks that especially affect the health of women.

145. Policies and programmes to improve the status of women and to enable them to contribute fully to social and economic development must take into account migration and the ways in which it affects the family and working lives of women.

146. Both the causes and the consequences of varied modes of urbanization should be examined carefully, so as to yield the information needed to

devise appropriate social policies, especially those designed to meet the varying needs of women.

147. Rural development programmes, including the creation of suitable industrial and employment opportunities, should be initiated or expanded to reduce the migration to urban areas and its attendant problems. Decentralization of education and health facilities to rural areas should also be promoted, as an aid to lowering rural rates of illiteracy, mortality and fertility, which have traditionally been higher than those in urban communities. These measures would bring rural women into greater contact with the mainstream of national life and release opportunities for their contribution to the progress and prosperity of their country.

#### H. Housing and related facilities

148. The majority of women still spend more of their time in and around the house than do men; thus, the improvement of the house, its related facilities and its neighborhood will bring about a direct improvement in their daily lives. In addition to the considerations of health and comfort, well-designed and suitably furnished houses and related facilities, as well as neighbourhoods, offer comparative relief from monotony and drudgery, making easier the pursuit of other interests and activities, and bringing women's lives closer to the demands of human dignity.

149. Legislative and other measures should be taken to guarantee that the views and needs of women are taken into account in the planning and design of urban and housing development as well as human settlements.

150. The design of the house should take into account the needs of the entire family, especially the women and children. Use of the following should be encouraged: (a) building materials that require minimal or no maintenance; (b) equipment and appliances that do not present safety hazards; (c) labour-saving interior finishes and surfaces conducive to comfort and hygiene; (d) furniture that is movable, storable and easily replaceable; and (e) where feasible and appropriate, an area for women to undertake activities such as reading, sewing, weaving (in some societies this may be a communal space to increase social cohesion).

151. In the projection of the house into a neighbourhood, designs should provide for services and utilities and neighbourhood facilities that respond, *inter alia*, to the expressed needs of women, and reduce labour as well as travel for vital needs such as water, food, fuel and other necessities.

152. In the design of a network of neighbourhoods, consideration should be given to accessibility of neighbourhood centres for the women and children.

153. Training and orientation courses should be organized in the use of new facilities made available to women, as well as in various aspects of home ownership and maintenance.

### I. Other social questions

154. Social services play a crucial role in anticipating social problems deriving from rapid modernization and industrialization and in reducing the need for remedial measures at a later stage. Women are usually affected by these social problems to a greater extent than men, especially in the initial stages of the development process.

155. Governments should therefore encourage the development of social services as a useful tool in mobilizing human and technical resources for the benefit of all marginal and social groups, bearing in mind the contribution that non-governmental organizations can offer.

156. Special efforts should be made to provide for the needs of migrant women whether from rural areas or from abroad, and for women workers and their families who live in urban slums and squatter settlements. Training, job counselling, child-care facilities, financial aid and, where necessary, language training and other forms of assistance should be provided.

157. Special attention should also be given to the needs of elderly women, who frequently receive less protection and assistance than men. They predominate numerically in the age group of 50 years and over, and many are indigent and in need of special care.

158. In the area of the prevention of crime and treatment of offenders, special attention should be paid to female criminality, which is increasing in many parts of the world, and to the rehabilitation of female offenders, including juvenile delinquents and recidivists. Research in this field should include study of the relationship between female criminality and other social problems brought about by rapid social change.

159. Specific legislative and other measures should be taken to combat prostitution and the illicit traffic in women, especially young girls. Special programmes, including pilot projects, should be developed in co-operation with international bodies and non-governmental organizations to prevent such practices and rehabilitate the victims.

160. Governments which have not already done so should ratify or accede to the United Nations Conventions for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (1949).

### III. RESEARCH, DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

161. This Plan gives high priority to national, regional and international research activities, and to data collection and analysis on all aspects of the situation of women, since adequate data and information are essential in formulating policies and evaluating progress and in effecting attitudinal and basic social and economic change.

162. A major difficulty in assessing the economic contribution of women at the present time is lack

of, or incomplete data and indicators to measure their situation as it affects the process of development and is in turn affected by it.

163. Many women are automatically excluded from the economically active population in national statistics because they are homemakers only and homemaking is nowhere considered to be an economic activity. Another large group of women are erroneously classified as homemakers only because it is assumed that women have no economic activity and their status is therefore not carefully investigated. This occurs particularly in relation to women who, in addition to their homemaking activities, are also self-employed handicraft and other home industry workers or unpaid family workers in subsistence agriculture. Further, statistics on unemployment often present an inaccurate picture of the situation because they omit women who are not recognized as part of the economically active population (e.g., women classified as homemakers or housewives). They may, however, in fact be in need of and available for employment.

164. Among other data biased by preconceptions are those on heads of households or families, when it is assumed that a woman can be the head only in the absence of a man. Many households actually headed by women are therefore erroneously classified as having male heads.

165. Differences in these and other national statistical practices also make cross-country comparisons of data very difficult. In the non-market sector, for example, the distinction between economic and non-economic activities is seldom clear and the criteria used are often arbitrary and vary from country to country.

166. A scientific and reliable data base should be established and suitable economic and social indicators urgently developed which are sensitive to the particular situation and needs of women as an integral part of national and international programmes of statistics.

167. All census and survey data relating to characteristics of individuals (e.g., urban/rural residence, age, marital status, including consensual unions, literacy, education, income, level of skills and participation in both modern and traditional economic activities) and to household and family composition should be reported and analysed by sex.

168. In the collection of such data special efforts should be made to measure:

(a) The participation of women in local and national planning and policy-making in all sectors of national life;

(b) The extent of women's activities in food production (cash crop and subsistence agriculture), in water and fuel supply, in marketing, and in transportation;

(c) The economic and social contribution of housework and other domestic chores, handicrafts and other home-based economic activities;

(d) The effect on the national economy of women's activities as consumers of goods and services;

(e) The relative time spent on economic and household activities and on leisure by girls and women compared to boys and men;

(f) The quality of life (e.g., job satisfaction, income situation, family characteristics and use of leisure time).

169. The United Nations system should extend the scope of its standards for data collection, tabulation and analysis to take the above recommendations into account. National statistical offices should adhere to the standards established by the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

170. The United Nations should prepare an inventory of social and economic indicators relevant to the analysis of the status of women as soon as possible and not later than 1980, in co-operation with the interested specialized agencies, the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, the regional commissions and other relevant bodies.

171. This Plan gives high priority also to cross-cultural studies, especially of the causes of discriminatory customs, practices, attitudes and beliefs, which impede women's contribution to the development process, and of the mechanisms of change.

172. Research oriented towards specific country and regional problems should be made by competent women and men acquainted with specific national and regional conditions.

173. The wide exchange of information and research findings should be promoted and maximum use made of existing national and regional research institutes and universities, including the United Nations University, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development and the United Nations Social Defence Institute. A network of such institutes and universities should be built up to facilitate the regular exchange of information and knowledge in co-operation with the United Nations.

#### IV. MASS COMMUNICATION MEDIA

174. A major obstacle in improving the status of women lies in public attitudes and values regarding women's roles in society. The mass communication media have great potential as a vehicle for social change and could exercise a significant influence in helping to remove prejudices and stereotypes, accelerating the acceptance of women's new and expanding roles in society, and promoting their integration into the development process as equal partners.

175. At the present time, the media tend to reinforce traditional attitudes, often portraying an image of women that is degrading and humiliating, and fail to reflect the changing roles of the sexes. They may also have harmful effects in imposing alien cultures upon different societies.

176. Mass communication media should be understood as encompassing not only radio, television, cinema, press (newspapers, periodicals, comic strips and cartoons), advertising, and public meetings and similar forums but also traditional types of entertainment such as drama, story telling, songs and puppet shows, which are essential for reaching the rural areas of many countries.

177. Governmental and non-governmental organizations should encourage and support national, regional and international research to determine the image of women and men portrayed by the media; and the negative and positive influences exercised by them in their various roles as conveyors of information, entertainers, educators and advertisers.

178. Governmental and non-governmental organizations should also take steps to ensure that information shall be provided on the current situation of women in various countries, with particular emphasis on the changing roles of both sexes.

179. Those in control of the media should seek to raise public consciousness with respect to these changing roles, and the serious concern that both women and men have about important issues that affect their families, communities and society at large. They should be urged to project a more dynamic image of women (as well as of men) and to take into account the diversity of women's roles and their actual and potential contribution to society.

180. They should depict the roles and achievements of women from all walks of life throughout history, including women in the rural areas and women of minority groups. They should also seek to develop in women confidence in themselves and in other women, and a sense of their own value and importance as human beings.

181. Women should be appointed in greater numbers in media management decision-making and other capacities, as editors, columnists, reporters, producers and the like, and should encourage the critical review, within the media, of the image of women projected.

#### V. INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ACTION

##### A. *Global action*

182. The United Nations should proclaim the decade 1975-1985 as the United Nations Decade for Women and Development in order to ensure that national and international action shall be sustained throughout the period.

183. The decade and this Plan of Action call for a clear commitment on the part of the international community to accord importance and priority to measures to improve the situation of women, both as a means of achieving the goals of social progress and development and as an end in itself. The Plan envisages that all organizations of the United Nations system should take separate and joint action to implement its recommendations, including the

relevant United Nations organs and bodies, especially the regional commissions, the United Nations Children's Fund, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, and the specialized agencies. Their activities should be properly co-ordinated through the existing machinery, especially the Economic and Social Council and the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination. Each organization should evaluate what it has done to improve the status of women and enhance their contribution to development and identify the measures needed to implement this Plan.

184. International and regional intergovernmental organizations outside the United Nations system are also urged to develop programmes to implement this Plan and achieve the objectives of International Women's Year during the proposed decade.

185. International non-governmental organizations and their national affiliates should also act jointly and separately, within their particular spheres of interest, to give effect to the recommendations of the Plan within the 10-year period.

186. The Plan endorses programmes and strategies setting forth similar or related objectives; in particular, the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, the Programme of Concerted International Action for the Advancement of Women, the Programme for the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, the World Population Plan of Action, the recommendations of the World Food Conference, and the regional plans of action for the integration of women in development, adopted in 1974 for the regions of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific and the Economic Commission for Africa.

187. Women should be fully involved in policy-making at the international level as well as the national level. Governments should make sure that they are equitably represented among the principal delegates to all international bodies, conferences and committees, including those dealing with political and legal questions, economic and social development, disarmament, planning, administration and finance, science and technology, the environment and population. The secretariats of the international organizations should set an example by eliminating any provisions or practices in their employment policies that may be discriminatory against women. They should also take all necessary measures to ensure that an equitable balance between men and women staff members shall be achieved before the end of the Second United Nations Development Decade, and establish goals, strategies and time-tables to achieve this end. The equitable balance should apply to all substantive areas, and to field posts where

operational programmes are initiated and carried out.

188. International organizations should review the implications of the Plan in the context of their own existing and new programmes, and should make appropriate recommendations to their governing bodies on any revisions of their financial and administrative arrangements that may be required to implement the Plan.

189. International action should support existing programmes and expand their scope in the following main areas: (a) research, data collection and analysis (see chap. III above); (b) technical co-operation, training and advisory services including co-ordination with national and regional activities of organizations within the United Nations system; (c) elaboration and ongoing review of international standards; (d) dissemination and exchange of information and liaison with non-governmental organizations and other groups; (e) review and appraisal including monitoring of progress made in achieving the aims and objectives of the Plan; and (f) executive and management functions including over-all co-ordination with all the organizations of the United Nations system, and with the national and regional machinery referred to in the Plan.

#### *1. Operational activities for technical co-operation*

190. The United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, the United Nations Environment Programme, the United Nations specialized agencies, including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund, the regional commissions, intergovernmental organizations, bilateral assistance agencies and foundations, and international and regional development banks and other international financial institutions, all carry out their work through projects that are highly specific in terms of the objectives to be reached, the resources to be employed, and the target areas and populations for which they are intended. Given the scope and diversity of the world-wide system of assistance agencies, action can be initiated in a large number of areas without delay once the needs are understood and diffused throughout the United Nations system.

191. A deliberate and large-scale effort should therefore be made to ensure that high priority and attention shall be given by Governments and the international community to programmes, projects and activities that give women the skills, training and opportunities necessary to improve their situation and enable them to participate fully and effectively in the total development effort.

192. Field surveys should be undertaken in each region to assist Governments and the international community by establishing the necessary data base to develop projects which will implement the objectives of the Plan.

193. All existing plans and projects should be scrutinized with a view to extending their sphere of activities to include women. New and innovative projects should also be developed to include women.

194. The following areas are of special importance:

(a) Integrated rural development. Special attention should be given to women's role as producers, processors and vendors of food, stressing the need for training women and girls. Training is especially needed in modern methods of farming, marketing, purchasing and sales techniques; basic accounting and organizational methods; fundamentals of hygiene and nutrition; training in crafts and co-operatives;

(b) Health, reproduction and growth and development, including family health and child health, family planning, nutrition and health education;

(c) Education and training at all levels and in all sectors related to the creation of employment opportunities so that women can play an economic role;

(d) Youth projects, which should be examined to ensure that they include adequate emphasis on the participation of young women;

(e) Public administration, with the aim of preparing women to participate in development planning and policy-making, especially in middle- and higher-level posts.

195. The resident representatives of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) should play a key role in helping Governments to formulate requests for such assistance within the framework of country programming. Advisory services provided by the specialized agencies in the form of special consultants or task forces could also render assistance in the formulation of project requests. Periodic reviews should be initiated to suggest crucial areas where special support might be needed. Projects should be constantly reviewed and evaluated to determine their impact and success in improving the position of women.

196. Women should participate fully in planning and implementing UNDP country programmes and regional, interregional and global projects under the auspices of the United Nations and other international agencies. Governments should bear in mind the importance of including, in national planning organizations and other bodies responsible for public policy-making and management, persons with special competence in the subject of women's integration in development.

## 2. *Formulation and implementation of international standards*

197. The preparation of international conventions, declarations and formal recommendations, and the development of reporting systems and other pro-

cedures for their implementation are important elements of international programmes and should be continued.

198. High priority should be given to the preparation and adoption of the convention on the elimination of discrimination against women, with effective procedures for its implementation.

199. Studies should be undertaken by the appropriate organizations of the effectiveness of the implementation of existing instruments and periodic reviews made to determine their adequacy in the light of changing conditions in the modern world, and of experience gained since their adoption.

200. The need for the development of new standards in new fields of concern to women should be kept constantly under review in relation to the implementation of the present Plan. Appropriate research and studies should be undertaken to determine the need for such new standards.

### 3. *Exchange of information and experience*

201. The exchange of information and experience at the international level is an effective means of stimulating progress and encouraging the adoption of measures to eliminate discrimination against women and encourage their wider participation in all sectors of national life. Countries with different political, economic and social systems and cultures and at differing stages of development have benefited from the common knowledge of problems, difficulties and achievements and from solutions worked out jointly.

202. Effective international machinery should be established or existing bodies, such as the Commission on the Status of Women, utilized to afford women in all regions of the world the opportunity to support one another in mutual understanding of their national and local problems and fight for the elimination of all forms of discrimination and oppression.

203. Meetings and seminars, including those organized under the United Nations technical cooperation programme, which have proved to be most valuable in providing a regional and international exchange of information and experience, should be continued.

204. Educational and informational programmes supported by the international community should be developed and extended to make all sectors of the population aware of the international norms established. The goals and objectives of this Plan of Action, and the findings of research and data envisaged under the relevant chapter of the Plan.

205. Material documenting the situation of women in specific countries in the world should also be prepared and widely distributed. It should be issued in the form of a yearbook or almanac containing facts which should be maintained and kept up to date. Material should also be prepared and widely



publicized on methods and techniques that have proved useful in promoting the status of women and integrating them into the process of development.

206. International organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, should strengthen their efforts to distribute information on women and related matters. This could be done through periodic publications on the situation of women, their changing roles and their integration into the development effort through the planning and implementation of policies, as well as through the utilization of communication media and aids, and the wide distribution of newsletters, pamphlets, visual charts and similar material on women.

#### *B. Regional action*

207. The regional commissions for Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, Latin America and Western Asia should stimulate interest in the Plan and provide national Governments and non-governmental organizations with the technical and informational support they require to develop and implement effective strategies to further the objectives of the Plan in the regions. Where they have not already done so, the regional commissions should establish appropriate machinery for the purpose. This might include a regional standing committee of experts from countries of the region to advise the commission on its activities directed towards the integration of women in development in relation to those of Governments and other agencies in the region. The committee's functions could include the following:

(a) To initiate country studies and assist national institutions to identify the types of information needed for a proper understanding of the situation of women and the factors facilitating or limiting their advancement;

(b) To assist with the design and implementation of surveys for collection of data and other information;

(c) To give leadership in the methods of reporting on the situation of women and in the development of indicators for assessing the progress made towards the goals of this Plan in conjunction with regional statistical bodies and international efforts to this end;

(d) To provide a clearing-house for the exchange of information which would facilitate co-ordination and mutual support between programmes for the advancement of women at various levels, and for the sharing of relevant experience among the countries of the region.

208. States members of the regional commissions, in requesting technical and financial assistance, should endeavour to raise the priority accorded to projects to enhance opportunities for women and increase recognition of the importance of these projects for over-all development in consultation with regional offices of the United Nations Development Programme.

209. The regional commissions should provide assistance to governmental and non-governmental organizations to identify needed action, develop policies, strategies and programmes for strengthening women's role in national development, and formulate requests for technical and financial assistance for such programmes. They should encourage training institutions in the region to expand their curricula to encompass topics related to the integration of women in development, and assist in the development of training programmes, particularly those whose initial aim is to increase women's potential for leadership and develop the cadres for formulating the programmes and implementing the activities indicated by this Plan.

210. The regional commissions should also promote technical co-operation between the countries of the region, utilizing the existing talent available. Trained women could, for example, offer short-term assistance to women in countries other than their own on a voluntary basis, or as part of a special task force. Special advisers should be attached to the regional field offices in order to strengthen the regional field structure and carry out more effectively the functions and aims described above. They could also seek to stimulate increased contributions of funds for financing programmes for the advancement of women from existing sources of multilateral and bilateral assistance, and to secure new sources of funds, including the establishment of revolving funds at the national and local levels.

211. In implementing the Plan, special efforts should be made by the commissions and other United Nations bodies having regional offices to co-ordinate their programmes with those of existing United Nations and other regional centres whose fields of competence relate to the aims of the Plan, such as centres for research and training in development planning, literacy, social welfare, social defence, employment, health and nutrition and community development.

212. Regional development banks such as the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank as well as subregional banks, such as the Central American Bank for Economic Integration and the East African Development Bank, and bilateral funding agencies should be urged to accord high priority in their development assistance to projects that include the integration of women into the development effort and the achievement of equality. Such assistance would stimulate national support for innovative national and local programmes, including self-help activities.

#### VI. REVIEW AND APPRAISAL

213. A comprehensive and thorough review and appraisal of progress made in meeting the goals of

this Plan should be undertaken at regular intervals by the United Nations system. Such an exercise should be part of the procedures for the review and appraisal of progress made under the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, and closely co-ordinated with any new international development strategy that may be formulated.

214. The General Assembly has already made provision in its resolution 3276 (XXIX) of 10 December 1974 to consider relevant recommendations of the World Conference of the International Women's Year at its seventh special session and at its thirtieth session in 1975. The Plan should also be considered at the sixtieth session of the Economic and Social Council in the spring of 1976. The Secretary-General should be invited to make appropriate arrangements for the first biennial review of progress in 1978, in co-operation with Governments and taking into account the existing structure and resources of the United Nations system. The Economic and Social Council should review the findings of such a systematic evaluation with the object of making, whenever necessary, appropriate modifications to the goals and recommendations of the Plan.

215. The monitoring of trends and policies relating to women and relevant to this Plan of Action should be undertaken continuously as a specialized activity of the United Nations. They should be reviewed biennially by the appropriate bodies of the United Nations system, beginning in 1978. Because of the shortness of the intervals, such monitoring would necessarily be selective and focus mainly on new and emerging trends and policies.

216. The Plan of Action should also be considered by the regional commissions, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Children's Fund, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, the relevant specialized agencies and other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations at their meetings following the World Conference. The discussions and decisions of these bodies concerning the Plan should be submitted to the Economic and Social Council and its relevant functional commissions and advisory bodies (the Commission on the Status of Women, the Commission for Social Development, the Population Commission, the Statistical Commission, the Committee for Development Planning, and the Committee on Review and Appraisal) at their sessions in 1976 and 1977. An item on action on the implementation of the Plan should be included in the agenda of the sessions of all these bodies at intervals of no longer than two years.

217. At the regional level, the regional commissions should assume responsibility for monitoring

progress towards the greater and more effective participation of women in all aspects of development efforts. Such monitoring should be carried out within the framework of the review and appraisal of the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade. The commissions should include information on the integration of women in development in their reports to the Economic and Social Council on the social and economic situation in the regions. They should also discuss at appropriate intervals (such as every two years) the progress made towards achieving the aims of this Plan of Action. They should encourage Governments to provide equal opportunities for women to be represented on their delegations to the sessions of the commissions and to other relevant meetings.

218. At the national level, Governments are encouraged to undertake their own regular review and appraisal of progress made to achieve the goals and objectives of the Plan and to report on its implementation to the Economic and Social Council in conjunction, where necessary, with other existing reporting systems (e.g., those of the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, the World Population Plan of Action, the recommendations of the World Food Conference, and the implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, and of the Programme of Concerted International Action for the Advancement of Women).

219. Governments should, in the context of their own development plans, evaluate the implications of this Plan and make any necessary financial and administrative arrangements for its implementation.

## APPENDIX I

### RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS

#### A. *United Nations instruments*

##### 1. *General instruments*

- Charter of the United Nations
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)
- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol (1966)
- Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (1949)
- Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (1956)
- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. (1965)

Declaration on Social Progress and Development (1969)

International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade (1970)

World Population Plan of Action (1974)

Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (1974)

Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (1974)

2. *Instrumentts relating specifically to the status of women*

Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1952)

Convention on the Nationality of Married Women (1957)

Convention and Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages (1962 and 1965)

Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (1967)

Programme of Concerted International Action for the Advancement of Women (1970)

*B. Specialized agency instruments*

1. *International Labour Organisation*

Underground Work (Women) Convention, No. 45, 1935

Night Work (Women) Convention (Revised), No. 89, 1948

Equal Remuneration Convention, No. 100, 1951, and Equal Remuneration Recommendation, No. 90, 1951

Maternity Protection Convention (Revised), No. 103, 1952, and Maternity Protection Recommendation, No. 95, 1952

Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, No. 102, 1952

Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, No. 111, 1958, and Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Recommendation, No. 111, 1958

Vocational Training Recommendation, No. 117, 1962

Employment Policy Convention, No. 122, 1964, and Employment Policy Recommendation, No. 122, 1964

Employment (Women with Family Responsibilities) Recommendation, No. 123, 1965

2. *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization*

Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960)

Protocol instituting a Conciliation and Good Offices Commission to be responsible for seeking a settlement of any disputes which may arise between States Parties to the Convention against Discrimination in Education (1962)

## **Apollo and Soyuz Crews Commended by President Ford Before Liftoffs**

*Following is the text of a message from President Ford on July 15 to Apollo crew members Brig. Gen. Thomas P. Stafford, Donald K. Slayton, and Vance D. Brand and Soyuz crew members Aleksei A. Leonov and Valery N. Kubasov prior to the launching of their spacecraft.*

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 21

### *To the Soyuz and Apollo Crews:*

In a few short hours, you will be opening a new era in the exploration of space. Although others have gone before you, you will be blazing a new trail of international space cooperation. Never before have representatives of two countries lived and worked together in space. It is an historic occasion. I know you are proud to be playing such an important part in it.

As you make your final preparations for launching, I cannot help but think how far we have gone in space in such a short period of time. Less than two decades ago, Huriy Gagarin and then John Glenn orbited the earth, realizing the dreams of [Konstantin E.] Tsiolkovsky, [Robert H.] Goddard, and others who believed firmly that man could fly in space. Six years ago next Sunday, Apollo 11 brought the first men to the moon. This mission was followed by that of the Soviet automatic vehicle Lunokhod. Both brought back samples of the moon's surface, as a result of which our knowledge of earth's closest neighbor has expanded considerably.

Your flight represents another stage in man's efforts to further his understanding of his environment. It has already demonstrated something else—that the United States and the Soviet Union can cooperate in such an important endeavor. Since the Apollo-Soyuz project was agreed to three years ago, crews, scientists, and specialists of both countries have worked diligently and productively and in a spirit of cooperation to bring us to where we are today. I am heartened by the example

of dedication and cooperation you have displayed. I am confident your efforts and example will lead to further cooperation between our two countries.

The peoples of the world will be following your flight and epic joint mission with interest and enthusiasm. On behalf of the American people, I commend you for your courage and vision and wish you Godspeed and good luck.

## Portugal To Receive U.S. Aid for Low-Cost Housing Program

AID press release 62 dated June 30

Portugal and the United States have signed a \$13.25 million housing development loan. The United States, through the Agency for International Development, is also making available a \$20 million housing development investment guaranty. The Portuguese Government is investing \$150 million.

Low-income families in various parts of Portugal, now living in inadequate slum housing, are expected to benefit from the jointly financed program. About 10,000 housing units for low-income families will be constructed over the next two years in the cities of Almada, Oeiras-Zambujal, Aveiro, and Porto-Viso. Most of the new housing will consist of multistory walkup buildings with apartments of various sizes. Included in the plans is provision for recreational areas and space for educational and community services.

The Government of Portugal estimates that 500,000 new housing units are needed to insure that all families are adequately housed. In Lisbon, a city of nearly 800,000, it is estimated 40,000 to 50,000 units are needed.

The AID development loan agreement was signed on June 30 at the Foreign Ministry in Lisbon by Herbert S. Okun, U.S. Chargé d'Affaires, and the Portuguese Minister of Finance, Jose J. Fragoso. Minister of Foreign Affairs Ernesto Melo Antunes attended the ceremony.

The housing investment guaranty is part

of an AID program under which about \$700 million worth of housing has been financed using U.S. Government guaranties of loans from commercial sources.

The AID housing development loan is repayable in 25 years, with an initial grace period of five years. The interest rate is 5 percent throughout the life of the loan.

Last February AID and the Portuguese Government signed an agreement for \$1.75 million to finance technical assistance and training in a variety of development fields.

## Oil Pollution Liability Legislation Transmitted to the Congress

*Message From President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Congress of the United States:*

I am transmitting today proposed legislation entitled the "Comprehensive Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act of 1975."

This legislation would establish a comprehensive and uniform system for fixing liability and settling claims for oil pollution damages in U.S. waters and coastlines. The proposal would also implement two international conventions dealing with oil pollution caused by tankers on the high seas.

I consider this legislation to be of high national importance as we seek to meet our energy needs in an environmentally sound manner. Those energy needs require accelerated development of our offshore oil and gas resources and the increased use of tankers and deep water ports. This proposal would provide a broad range of protection against the potential oil spills necessarily associated with these activities.

In recent years, we have taken significant steps to limit and control oil pollution in the waters of the United States. Yet, in 1973 alone, there were 13,328 reported oil spills totalling more than 24 million gallons. One-third of the oil spilled is from unidentified sources, where compensation cannot be ob-

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on July 9 (text from White House press release).

tained under existing law. The ability of claimants damaged by spills to seek and recover full compensation is further hampered by widely inconsistent Federal and State laws. Various compensation funds have been established or proposed, resulting in unnecessary duplication in administration and in fee payments by producers and consumers.

This legislation would help protect our environment by establishing strict liability for all oil pollution damages from identifiable sources and providing strong economic incentives for operators to prevent spills. Equally important, the bill will provide relief for many oil-related environmental damages which in the past went uncompensated. For example, State and local governments will be able to claim compensation for damages to natural resources under their jurisdiction.

This legislation would replace a patchwork of overlapping and sometimes conflicting Federal and State laws. In addition to defining liability for oil spills, it would establish a uniform system for settling claims and assure that none will go uncompensated, such as in cases where it is impossible to identify the source of the spill. The legislation provides for a fund of up to \$200 million derived from a small fee on oil transported or stored on or near navigable waters.

This legislation would also implement two international conventions—signed in 1969 and 1971—which provide remedies for oil pollution damage from ships. These conventions provide remedies for U.S. citizens under many circumstances where a ship discharging oil that reaches our shores might not otherwise be subject to our laws and courts. Protection of the international marine environment is basically an international problem since the waters, currents, and winds that spread and carry ocean pollution transcend all national boundaries.

In proposing implementation of the conventions, I am mindful of the fact that the Senate has not yet given its advice and consent to either of them. I urge such action without further delay. The 1969 convention came into force internationally on June 19, 1975, without our adherence, and the con-

tinuing failure of the United States to act on such initiatives may weaken or destroy the prospects of adequate international responses to marine pollution problems.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *July 9, 1975.*

## **Tax Convention With Iceland Transmitted to the Senate**

*Message From President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Senate of the United States:*

I transmit herewith, for Senate advice and consent to ratification, the Convention signed at Reykjavik on May 7, 1975 between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Iceland for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital.

There is no convention on this subject presently in force between the United States and Iceland.

The Convention follows generally the form and content of most conventions of this type recently concluded by this government. Its primary purpose is to clearly identify the tax interests of the two countries so as to avoid double taxation and make difficult the illegal evasion of taxation.

I also transmit, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Department of State with respect to the Convention.

Conventions such as this one are an important element in promoting closer economic cooperation between the United States and other countries. I urge the Senate to act favorably on this Convention at an early date and give its advice and consent to ratification.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *July 8, 1975.*

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on July 8 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. E, 94th Cong., 1st sess., which includes the text of the convention and the report of the Department of State.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Cultural Property

Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property. Adopted at Paris November 14, 1970. Entered into force April 24, 1972.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Syrian Arab Republic, February 21, 1975.

##### Energy

Memorandum of understanding concerning cooperative information exchange relating to the development of solar heating and cooling systems in buildings. Formulated at Odeillo, France October 1-4, 1974. Entered into force July 1, 1975.

*Signatures:* Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization of Australia, July 2, 1975; Julich Nuclear Research Facility, Ltd., of Federal Republic of Germany, June 30, 1975; National Council for Research and Development of Israel, June 26, 1975.

##### Health

Amendment to articles 34 and 55 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.<sup>2</sup>

*Acceptances deposited:* Kuwait, July 17, 1975; Venezuela, July 23, 1975.

##### Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948 on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Done at London October 17, 1974.<sup>2</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Maldives, July 21, 1975.

##### Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna February 21, 1971.<sup>2</sup>

*Accession deposited:* Norway, July 18, 1975.

##### Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat

agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. *Ratification deposited:* Libya, July 28, 1975. *Accession deposited:* Spain, July 15, 1975.

#### World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris November 16, 1972.<sup>2</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Iran, February 26, 1975.

#### BILATERAL

##### Belgium

Agreement amending annex B of the mutual defense assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 2010). Effected by exchange of notes at Brussels June 12 and 27, 1975. Entered into force June 27, 1975.

##### Republic of China

Agreement extending the agreement of April 9, 1965, as amended and extended (TIAS 5782, 6451, 6906), concerning disposition of the New Taiwan dollars generated as a consequence of economic assistance furnished to China. Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei, June 30, 1975. Entered into force June 30, 1975.

##### Italy

Agreement between the U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration and the Italian Ente Nazionale per l'Energia Elettrica on cooperation in the field of geothermal energy research and development. Signed at Rome June 3, 1975. Entered into force June 3, 1975.

##### Japan

Agreement providing for Japan's financial contribution for U.S. administrative and related expenses for the Japanese fiscal year 1975 pursuant to the mutual defense assistance agreement of March 8, 1954 (TIAS 2975). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo July 8, 1975. Entered into force July 8, 1975.

##### Niger

Agreement to provide certain social security benefits for certain employees of the United States of America in the Republic of Niger. Signed at Niamey July 21, 1975. Entered into force July 21, 1975; effective January 1, 1974.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force for the United States.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force.

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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
†389	7/30	"Foreign Relations," 1949, vol. II, U.N.; Western Hemisphere, released.
†390	7/31	Kissinger; news conference, Helsinki, July 30.
†391	7/31	U.S.-Japan environmental agreement to be signed Aug. 5.
†392	8/1	Kissinger; news conference, Helsinki, July 31.
*393	7/31	Study group 7 of U.S. National Committee for the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR), Aug. 21–22.
*394	7/31	Study group 5 of U.S. National Committee for CCIR, Clarksburg, Md., Aug. 22.
*395	7/31	Study group 1 of U.S. National Committee for CCIR, Sept. 11–12.
*396	8/1	Program for Japanese Prime Minister Miki's visit to U.S., Aug. 2–10.
*397	8/1	Spiro sworn in as Ambassador to Cameroon and to Equatorial Guinea (biographic data).
*398	8/1	Phase-Out plans for refugee centers announced.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LXXIII, No. 1887

August 25, 1975

*The Department of State BULLETIN is a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issues by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the function of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

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## Department Urges Authorization of U.S. Participation in the Financial Support Fund of the OECD

*Statement by Charles W. Robinson  
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

I welcome this opportunity to testify in support of the President's request for legislation to authorize U.S. participation in the Financial Support Fund.<sup>2</sup>

The Financial Support Fund is an integral part of our overall strategy to deal with the economic consequences of the severe oil price increases. As such, it is a milestone of international economic cooperation.

As you know, Secretary [of the Treasury William E.] Simon signed the Financial Support Fund Agreement on April 9 in Paris after several months of intensive negotiations. The Fund is designed to provide balance-of-payments support to participating members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) who may be faced with needs which cannot adequately be met through the use of normal means of financing. Each participating member has a quota which determines its right to borrow, its financial obligations, and its voting power. Subject to the conditions of the Fund, any eventual loans would be made on market-related terms out of funds obtained either through direct loans or through guarantees of loans by other participants.

The Treasury Department took the lead-

ership in working out the financial arrangements for the Fund with our partners abroad. Secretary Simon is therefore the best source of advice on the financial aspects. I wish to concentrate on the importance of the Financial Support Fund to our foreign policy objectives and, in particular, to our overall strategy in dealing with the international energy problem.

The steep oil price increases in late 1973 and early 1974 were a severe economic shock to the world's economy. They substantially reduced the real income of the oil-importing countries, drained away purchasing power thus contributing to world recession, exacerbated already serious worldwide inflation, and greatly magnified the problems of international payments imbalance. In so doing, they challenged the wisdom and ingenuity of our economic policymaking to minimize the shortrun damage done to the world economy and to set in train economic policies that would help meet the longer term adjustment problems that had been created.

However, these arbitrary and sudden price increases also presented a broader challenge to the industrialized countries allied in the OECD. These countries as a whole had become highly dependent on imported oil, largely from a few major oil exporters. Now they were faced with a sudden shock to their economies and a rapid transfer of financial power to the oil-exporting countries. The challenge then arose: Would these allied countries be able to maintain the political and economic cooperation that had been the

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 30. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

<sup>2</sup> For President Ford's letter of June 6 transmitting the legislation, see BULLETIN of July 14, 1975, p. 81.

foundation of their remarkable record of stability and rising standards of living in the post-World War II years? Or would they yield to the temptation to try to meet their economic problems at the expense of each other and in ways which would undermine their economic and political cohesion?

For if economic cooperation was an important foundation of postwar economic prosperity, greatly intensified cooperation is an indispensable precondition to a successful economic response to the oil crisis. And I need remind no one on this committee that the world's current international political problems are such that any weakening of Western political cohesion would have serious consequences.

### Redistribution of Oil Revenues

For countries under severe balance-of-payments pressure, the temptations not to cooperate are great. The industrialized countries, accustomed to running a significant surplus on current transactions, have collectively been thrust into large deficit as a result of the higher costs for imported oil. In 1974, the OECD countries ran a current account deficit of nearly \$35 billion. In 1975, the amount will be lower, largely as a result of the recession, but still large.

For the oil-consuming countries as a whole, there is no problem of obtaining financing for these deficits. The counterpart financial surpluses of the OPEC countries [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] must return as capital flows to the rest of the world. There is no alternative.

For individual countries, however, the problems for financing can be severe. Surplus oil revenues will be invested in countries and currencies according to OPEC financial (and perhaps political) preferences. The resulting pattern will not correspond to the financing needs of the individual countries. For a number of countries as well, these new oil-related deficits have occurred on top of already weak balance-of-payments positions.

In the main, the problems of redistribut-

ing these funds can be left to the private financial markets. These markets have shown a remarkable resiliency and adaptability in efficiently dealing with the surge of new funds, distributing them to the countries in accordance with their balance-of-payments needs. Also very important has been the more flexible exchange rate arrangements that were in place when the oil shock occurred.

Although these market arrangements have handled the problem so far, we cannot be confident that this will continue to be the case as OPEC's financial surplus mounts or under all possible political and economic contingencies. We cannot be sure that countries will be able to obtain funds in adequate amounts and on reasonable terms. In particular, the market may, in the case of some countries, feel that it has become overexposed in terms of lending to an individual borrower. And the market may not be able to cope with sudden shifts in OPEC investment preferences. Should we not guard against these risks we could suffer the following consequences:

—Countries may try to adjust their payments positions through restrictions on their trade and payments, thus shifting the burden elsewhere and reducing trade and employment.

—Countries may alternatively feel forced to take draconian action to deflate their economies, creating high levels of unemployment and consequent political instability at home and trade and employment losses for others as well.

—Countries may feel forced to go to oil-exporting countries for emergency financial assistance. Not only might economic terms tend to be unfavorable, but political conditions might well be attached, relating, for example, to support for terms of settlement in the Middle East situation.

—Finally, countries dependent on OPEC countries for financial assistance may feel unable to participate fully in cooperative energy programs, particularly if these are viewed as "confrontational" by the oil producers.

None of these risks need be realized if the OECD countries undertake now to cooperate in case of severe financial need.

### **Objectives of the Fund**

Therefore we see an urgent requirement for the Financial Support Fund to achieve the following fundamental objectives:

1. To assure that countries will not be driven to unilateral restrictive measures that would be destructive of the international economic system and habits of cooperation that have been so painstakingly built up over the past 30 years.

2. To promote appropriate domestic and international economic policies fundamental to economic prosperity and thus to political stability and good relations.

3. To encourage full international cooperation in energy policies to reduce our vulnerability to foreign supply interruptions, to conserve energy, and to develop alternative energy sources. Such policies are essential to reduce our future vulnerability and preserve maximum independence for foreign policy decisions. They offer the best hope for obtaining reasonable oil prices. They are also essential to serve as a basis for proceeding to a productive dialogue with the oil-exporting countries.

4. To instill the confidence that will promote a smoothly working international financial system free from fears of financial collapse or artificial payments restrictions.

5. Finally, to reinforce the structure of economic and political cooperation, which is both an objective in itself and an essential precondition to an effective foreign policy.

### **Basic Features of the Fund**

We believe that the basic features of the Financial Support Fund are the right ones for these objectives in the present situation:

—It is a temporary facility designed to meet a temporary need. Its lending authority will lapse two years after it comes into existence although it could of course be extended by mutual agreement if deemed necessary. The need is temporary because the

large balance-of-payments surpluses of the oil exporters, which are the source of the problem, are temporary—although we cannot be sure how long they will exist. High energy prices and government policies will encourage conservation and increased energy production elsewhere, which will cut into oil-exporting revenues. Simultaneously, the oil-exporting countries will be rapidly expanding their demands for foreign goods and technology, increasing their payments abroad. We expect the cumulative OPEC surplus to grow more slowly and perhaps level off by the early 1980's at \$200–\$250 billion in 1974 dollars.

—The Financial Support Fund does not attempt to replace the private market or other existing official mechanisms. Rather, it provides a valuable supplement to them. In fact, we expect that the existence of the Fund will help to bolster the confidence of private markets and thereby could conceivably make recourse to the Fund unnecessary. The IMF [International Monetary Fund] will continue to play an important role in balance-of-payments finance in the present situation and, as the principal permanent institution for international financial cooperation, long after the end of the current exceptional need. The central bank swap network will continue to provide short-term support for exchange operations. Regional facilities such as the EC [European Community] medium-term borrowing facility can make a useful contribution. Before the Financial Support Fund would be drawn upon, other appropriate sources would be tapped to the maximum reasonable extent.

—The Financial Support Fund does not rely on the good will or cooperation of outside countries such as the oil-exporting cartel. Since these countries must in any case place their excess revenues in Western capital markets, these can be tapped at the option of the participating countries.

—The Fund requires countries to avoid restrictive trade and payments measures, and a country facing foreign exchange pressures must take appropriate domestic measures to correct its financial problems. Thus it can not and will not be used to finance

countries following imprudent or wasteful policies. I can assure you that we intend to make this provision of the agreement effective.

—The Financial Support Fund specifically sets forth among its purposes the promotion of policies to promote increased production and conservation of energy and requires that any member receiving assistance through the Fund be following policies consistent with these purposes. Therefore it offers positive incentive to participation in international cooperative energy efforts.

—It is not a concessional or aid-type program. It is a mutual support facility, with every member having the possibility of receiving support. Loans will be provided only on terms which reflect borrowing costs in the market. There is no subsidy involved aside from the assumption of risk.

—Finally, the Financial Support Fund provides an equitable means of sharing financing burdens and risks among the participating countries, all of whom have a large stake in the achievement of the objectives of the Fund.

#### **The Fund and the OECD**

It is particularly appropriate that the Financial Support Fund is to be associated with the OECD in Paris. The OECD has its roots in the organization set up just after World War II to coordinate European recovery efforts with the help of U.S. assistance provided through the Marshall plan. The OECD has had long and fruitful experience as an important instrument of economic cooperation among the Western

industrialized countries. It is now being called upon to meet current critical challenges just as its predecessor met those of the postwar years. The OECD launched the new International Energy Agency, and now the proposed Financial Support Fund, which its Secretary General independently proposed along with Secretaries Kissinger and Simon.

Mr. Chairman, it may be that the international financial system, bolstered by the Financial Support Fund, will work so smoothly that we will never have to use the Fund. We all hope so. But this does not mean that the Fund would have been unnecessary. And if the need does arise, we will be very grateful that we had the foresight to establish it. For if this need were to arise and not be met, the consequences could be disastrous. It may be that we could meet the challenge in an ad hoc fashion. But the conditions surrounding such an ad hoc solution would not be so effective or so equitable. And it is possible that we could fail to avert the consequences that we fear.

On the other hand, when the Financial Support Fund is in place, we will have strengthened the confidence in private markets and economic stability and made possible an effective cooperative international energy policy; and we will have strengthened the cooperation among allied countries that will surely be required as we move on to meet other economic and political challenges.

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I hope that you will join us in seeking prompt congressional action to authorize U.S. participation in the Financial Support Fund.

## Department Discusses Situation in South Africa and Namibia

*Following are statements by Nathaniel Davis, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, and William B. Buffum, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, made before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 24.<sup>1</sup>*

### STATEMENT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY DAVIS

I am pleased to join with Assistant Secretary Buffum in representing the Department of State before the subcommittee which today is considering U.S. policy toward South Africa and Namibia. We consider that South Africa and Namibia are separate, although related, issues; and therefore I propose to discuss first South Africa and then Namibia.

The United States strongly disapproves of the South African Government's policy of apartheid, or "separate development," and seeks to encourage the South African Government to end it and establish the basis for a just society and government. Our policy derives from our heritage as a multi-racial society, our interests elsewhere in Africa, and our efforts to promote respect for human dignity throughout the world. The United States has adopted a policy toward South Africa of imposing restraints in our bilateral relations and communicating with its government and people, making clear our nonacceptance of apartheid.

Foremost among the restraints has been our careful adherence over the past 12 years to a comprehensive arms embargo, encom-

passing all military equipment. In addition, since 1967 we have banned visits by U.S. Navy ships to South African ports, except in cases of emergency.

Other restraints in our relations concern U.S. investment and trade. We neither encourage nor discourage private American investment. We seek to insure that prospective U.S. investors are fully aware of the political, economic, and social problems relating to investment in South Africa. We do not engage in the full range of trade promotion activities in South Africa that we undertake in other countries. Only limited Export-Import Bank facilities are available for trade with South Africa, and direct loans are specifically prohibited.

In implementation of our policy of communication without acceptance, we maintain our diplomatic mission in South Africa; we engage in systematic contacts with all elements of South Africa's population; we carry on an active cultural and educational exchange-of-persons program; and we encourage American firms located in South Africa to adopt enlightened employment practices for all of their employees.

Within South Africa there is at present much talk of significant changes taking place in the apartheid system. The recent opening of the Nico Malan Theater in Cape Town to all races, government plans to permit certain blacks to buy their own homes—but not land—in the black townships near urban centers, and the participation of blacks in some international sporting events are cited as examples of change. Certain aspects of what is called petty apartheid are being abolished, but we do not see substantial evidence that the South African Government has changed or intends to change the

<sup>1</sup> The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

fundamentals of apartheid. Prime Minister Vorster has declared that the whites will continue to rule South Africa and that separate development (apartheid) will remain the bedrock of his government's racial policy.

Since South African leaders intend to maintain their basic policies, it is our view that the possibility of future racial conflict in southern Africa remains real. We therefore believe that our present policy of restraints and communication without acceptance of apartheid should be maintained and that it offers the most effective means at our disposal to approach the problems of southern Africa.

Turning to Namibia, U.S. policy toward that international territory is based upon our belief that the people of Namibia should be allowed to exercise freely their right of self-determination. Given our support for U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2145 of October 27, 1966, which terminated South Africa's League of Nations mandate over Namibia, and for the conclusions of the 1971 International Court of Justice advisory opinion regarding Namibia, which upheld the legality of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2145, we take the view that South Africa is illegally administering Namibia and should withdraw from the territory, which is properly the responsibility of the United Nations.

We have repeatedly made clear to the South African Government our deep concern over violations of human rights in the territory. For example, last month we sought to persuade the South African Government to revoke or stay the expulsion from Namibia of the Anglican Suffragan Bishop of Damaraland, Richard J. Wood, and his U.S.-citizen wife. We also expressed our displeasure to the South African Government when Mrs. Wood was evicted from the territory when she refused to obey the expulsion order.

Because of South Africa's illegal administration of Namibia and South Africa's refusal to acknowledge U.N. responsibility for this international territory, the U.S. Government has, since May 1970, officially discouraged private American investment in the

territory and has denied Export-Import Bank guarantees and other facilities for trade with Namibia. Since May 1970, we have also warned potential U.S. investors that we would withhold U.S. Government protection of U.S. investments made on the basis of rights acquired through the South African Government after the 1966 termination of the mandate against the claims of a future lawful government in Namibia. We have encouraged the few American firms with investments in Namibia to conform their employment practices to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Since the Portuguese coup in April 1974, there appears to have been some movement away from political deadlock in Namibia. South African leaders have repeatedly asserted that South African Government policy in Namibia is aimed at preparing the people of the territory to exercise their right of self-determination. However, the South African Government has not stated when and under what conditions the exercise of self-determination will take place. It maintains that the peoples of Namibia, and not South Africa nor the United Nations, must determine their own future and that all options, including unitary independence, will be open to them.

The South African Government, acting through the ruling white National Party of South-West Africa, called in September 1974 for the leaders of the various ethnic and tribal groups to meet together to discuss the future of Namibia. These constitutional talks have not yet been held, as efforts to persuade all the various groups to take part have apparently not been successful so far. However, there are strong indications that the talks will begin in September. Political party leaders who are not also ethnic and tribal group leaders will not be permitted to take part in the talks. Therefore political parties, including the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), recognized by the OAU [Organization of African Unity] and the United Nations as the legitimate representative of the Namibian people, will be excluded from the talks.

At present black opposition to South Afri-



can rule in Namibia is somewhat divided on some issues. SWAPO leaders and other more militant black nationalists favor the immediate establishment of a majority-rule unitary state and reject participation in the constitutional talks unless a number of conditions, such as the release of Namibian political prisoners, are met. Some leaders of minority ethnic and tribal groups are concerned at the possibility of domination of an independent Namibia by the numerically superior Ovambo tribe from which SWAPO draws its support.

Regarding the future of Namibia, we hold the following views:

a. All Namibians should within a short time be given the opportunity to express their views freely and under U.N. supervision on the political future and constitutional structure of the territory;

b. All Namibian political groups should be allowed to campaign for their views and to participate without hindrance in peaceful political activities in the course of self-determination;

c. The territory should not be fragmented in accordance with apartheid policy contrary to the wishes of its people; and

d. The future of Namibia should be determined by the freely expressed choice of its inhabitants.

We have expressed these views to the South African Government, and we are now considering what further actions we might usefully take to persuade the South Africans that it is in their own best interest to move rapidly to resolve in a satisfactory manner the Namibian issue. Assistant Secretary Buffum will discuss the U.N. aspects of the South African and Namibian issues.

#### **STATEMENT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BUFFUM**

I should like to review briefly for this committee events in the United Nations regarding South Africa and Namibia and the U.S. position with respect to those events.

Two policies pursued by the Government of South Africa have involved that nation

in a series of confrontations with the United Nations. The first of these policies is of course apartheid, which has been mentioned by Ambassador Davis at some length. The other is the South African administration of the mandated territory of Namibia, which has also been mentioned. While the United Nations has had a consistent position of condemning the South African Government for these policies over a long period, the tempo of U.N. considerations has been accelerated in recent years by the active interest of the new African members.

The failure of the South African Government to heed numerous U.N. resolutions and the opinions of the International Court of Justice led to a sense of frustration among many of the members and eventually to the rejection of the South African delegation's credentials at the 29th General Assembly. Rejection of those credentials in effect deprived South Africa of a fundamental right and privilege of membership, namely, participation in the General Assembly, and was effected in a manner which we consider violates the U.N. Charter and the General Assembly Rules of Procedure. I believe it worthwhile to provide the committee with some of the background.

Each year from 1970 to 1973 the U.N. General Assembly has voted to amend the report of its Credentials Committee in order to reject the South African delegation's credentials. In each instance, the Assembly President ruled that the vote constituted a severe condemnation of and warning to South Africa but that the South African delegation could continue to participate in the General Assembly since their credentials were technically in order.

In 1974 the Credentials Committee itself rejected the South African credentials. The 29th General Assembly President, [Foreign Minister Abdelaziz] Bouteflika, of Algeria, departed from the past rulings and instead ruled that the rejection required the exclusion of South Africa's participation from the remainder of the General Assembly session. The United States opposed this decision because we thought it not in accordance with the Assembly's Rules of Procedure,

which provide only that the credentials must be signed by the head of state or government or the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In our view, the credentials review process is a technical one, designed to verify that persons claiming to represent a government have been authorized by that government.

In addition, the U.N. Charter provides that the Security Council must recommend suspension or expulsion before the Assembly may act. Suspension of membership rights through the rejection of credentials is clearly contrary to the charter provisions. On September 30, 1974, the General Assembly approved the Credentials Committee report recommending the rejection of South African credentials and called on the Security Council "to review the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa . . . ." In carrying out the instructions of the General Assembly, the Security Council met and reviewed a resolution calling for the expulsion of South Africa. On October 30, 1974, that resolution was rejected when France, the United Kingdom, and the United States joined in the first triple veto in the history of the United Nations. On November 12 the General Assembly upheld Mr. Bouteflika's ruling to suspend South Africa.

The reasoning behind these efforts to exclude South Africa appears to rest on the objection to two basic South African policies. The first is clearly the policy of racial segregation known as apartheid in which the majority of South Africa's population remains unrepresented in South African delegations. The United Nations has established a special committee which reviews the question of apartheid and reports findings and recommendations to the General Assembly. The General Assembly with significant U.S. support has adopted resolutions condemning the policy of apartheid. The second is the South African policy of continued illegal occupation of and extension of the policy of apartheid to the former German colony of South-West Africa, now known as Namibia.

As you probably know, the League of Nations in 1920 granted South Africa a mandate over the territory of South-West

Africa. The provisions of the mandate were aimed at respecting the separate international status of the territory of South-West Africa while authorizing South Africa to administer the internal arrangements of the territory. Such administrative arrangements were intended under the mandate system to be a means to political, economic, and social development of the territory to facilitate ultimate self-determination. The U.N. General Assembly, as the League's successor, holds the authority to review conditions in the territory of Namibia and its progress toward self-determination.

From its earliest days as administrator, South Africa came under attack for its exploitation of Namibia and its treatment of its nonwhite population. South Africa's racial policy of apartheid had been severely criticized by the League of Nations. The League's successor, the United Nations, has also criticized repeatedly and severely South Africa's administration of Namibia and policy of apartheid. In October 1966, the U.N. General Assembly, with U.S. support, decided that South Africa had violated its mandate. The General Assembly in Resolution 2145 declared the mandate terminated and stated that henceforth Namibia was to be the direct responsibility of the United Nations.

On June 21, 1971, the International Court of Justice gave an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of South Africa's continued presence in the territory and ruled in effect that the South African mandate was legally terminated by the United Nations. However, U.N. efforts to exercise its responsibility have been of little avail because of South Africa's refusal to cooperate.

On December 17, 1974, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 366, which demanded that South Africa make a statement that it will comply with U.N. resolutions on Namibia and that it withdraw from the territory and transfer power to the people of the territory. That resolution was entirely consistent with the established U.S. view that South Africa's presence in the territory has been illegal since the General Assembly Resolution 2145 in 1966 revoked South Africa's mandate.

In Resolution 366 the Security Council also decided to meet before May 30, 1975, to review South Africa's compliance with the resolution's provisions. On May 27, Prime Minister Vorster delineated South Africa's position:

1. South Africa could not accept U.N. supervision with respect to Namibia.

2. South Africa was prepared to negotiate with a mutually acceptable representative of the U.N. Secretary General.

3. The South African Government was prepared to welcome African leaders who may wish to visit Namibia.

4. The South African Government was open to meet with the African chairmen of the U.N. Council for Namibia and the Organization of African Unity and to aid true leaders of the territory to meet with them as well.

In execution of Resolution 366, the Security Council met the first week in June of this year to review the question of South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia. The resolution before the Security Council determined that the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa constituted a threat to international peace and security and therefore called for the institution of a mandatory arms embargo as provided for under chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter. France, the United Kingdom, and the United States joined to veto the resolution. This marked the seventh time the United States had exercised its veto in the Security Council.

The United States believes that mandatory sanctions provided for under chapter 7 of the charter are not required by the existing situation in Namibia. Deplorable and illegal though South Africa's occupation of Namibia

may be, we do not believe that the situation justifies a call for obligatory action by U.N. member states. There appears to be no danger of imminent attack by Namibia on any of its neighbors, nor does an attack by South Africa or its neighbors on Namibia appear imminent.

The U.S. Government has unilaterally refused to allow shipments of American arms and military equipment to South Africa for the last 12 years. We have taken this action to make clear our strong disapproval of apartheid and to assist in a peaceful resolution of the serious racial situation in southern Africa. We invite other countries to join us in our voluntary arms embargo policy. We do not, however, believe that the current situation justifies making that embargo a mandatory one or calling for other sanctions which under the charter are designed to deal with threats to peace.

As a further commitment to southern Africans under minority rule, the U.S. Government has participated in voluntary humanitarian and educational U.N. programs. The United States has contributed since 1968 to the U.N. Fund for Namibia and U.N. Educational and Training Program for Southern Africa. Our contributions are contingent upon voluntary contributions of other countries and the absence of allocations from the regular U.N. budget. The goal of these programs is to provide assistance for education and vocational training to students from the minority-ruled territories of Africa denied educational opportunities in their own countries. All training is conducted outside of the minority-ruled countries. For the last fiscal year we contributed approximately \$50,000 to these programs.

## Department Discusses Developments Affecting World Sugar Trade

*Statement by Julius L. Katz*

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before your committee to discuss the sugar situation. There have been a number of significant developments affecting world sugar trade since the defeat in the House of Representatives last year of the bill to renew the U.S. Sugar Act. As your committee considers the question of U.S. sugar policy, it is appropriate to review these developments. In my statement, Mr. Chairman, I propose to examine:

- The course of prices over the past year;
- Recent import performance;
- Production and consumption trends in the world;
- Changes in sugar policies of other major importing countries;
- The status of the International Sugar Agreement; and
- Efforts at cooperation among producing countries.

Sugar prices in the past year have been extremely volatile. In November the spot price for domestic raw sugar reached a peak of 64.5 cents per pound. By June 18, prices had fallen to 14.25 cents per pound. In the past 22 days, prices have again risen to 20.2 cents per pound. World market prices have followed a similar course.

There are a number of reasons for the sharp runup of prices last year:

- For several years before 1974, world

consumption had outrun production with a resultant drawdown of stocks; in the United States, for example, stocks at the end of the 1974/75 crop year were at the lowest level since the 1956/57 crop year.

—Weather conditions were unusually bad in Europe and in the U.S.S.R.

—As prices began to increase, there was evident panic buying as well as withholding of supplies at critical moments by major producing countries.

Since the peak reached in November, prices tumbled as consumption fell in a number of major importing nations not controlling or subsidizing prices, including the United States, Japan, and Canada.

Throughout this period, the United States has had adequate supplies of sugar. Through the operation of the old Sugar Act, quotas were increased sharply as prices went through the price corridor. There are some experts who believe that the large demands put on the world market by the United States Sugar Act in fact contributed to the rapid escalation of price. Be that as it may, imports into the United States increased by 7.3 percent in 1974 over 1973, reaching 5.75 million short tons.

Notwithstanding knowledge of the likely expiration of the Sugar Act at the end of 1975, foreign suppliers shipped 545,000 short tons more in 1974 than the total initial quota and came within a million tons of the final quota, in some cases shorting their other preferential markets. Uncertainty about the future of the United States Sugar Act may have contributed to this high performance since foreign suppliers may have wished to

<sup>1</sup> Made before the House Committee on Agriculture on July 14. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

demonstrate high performance in the event a new sugar program was enacted.

The import pattern for 1975 appears to be heading for a significant change. On the basis of evidence to date, it seems that our imports will be down to some 3.6 million to 4 million short tons (compared to imports of 5.75 million tons in 1974). The change in the import level this year is due to two major factors. With high world prices abroad as well as in the United States, and the diminished likelihood of U.S. sugar legislation this year, this incentive to ship to the United States has been somewhat lessened. The second factor has to do with a change in the production pattern.

### **Current Production and Consumption Trends**

In response to current high prices, there has been a dramatic increase in beet sugar production. In the United States there has been a 27 percent increase in acreage planted in sugar beets which, it is estimated, should result in a 600,000-ton increase in the 3 million short tons of sugar produced last year. The combined acreage increase in Western and Eastern Europe rose 8 percent this year from last year. Based on average yields, this should result in about 5 million additional tons of production in the current (1975/76) crop year. This estimate, of course, assumes normal weather and could be reduced should the drought in some parts of Europe continue.

World sugar consumption increased steadily throughout the 1960's and early 1970's. High prices in the past year have adversely affected demand throughout the world. The growth of demand in 1974 was below trend, and data for 1975 so far indicate an actual reduction in consumption in 1975. This situation, combined with increased production, should permit a gradual rebuilding of world sugar stocks to more normal levels of about 25 percent of world production, compared to the low point of 15.8 percent reached in 1974.

A major new factor in our sugar market is high-fructose corn syrup. It has been estimated that 25 to 50 percent of the sugar

used industrially may eventually be replaced by high-fructose corn syrup. This type of corn syrup can be used as a substitute for liquid sugar in beverages, canned fruit, frozen fruit, preserves, ice cream, or generally in products where moisture is a desirable characteristic. The high-fructose-sweetener industry is likely to provide significant competition to the sugar industry, but currently lack of capacity has limited supplies and put distribution on an allocation basis. Several new plants are expected to come into production in the next several years, but capacity may not catch up with demand until 1978 or 1980, when some predictions are that high-fructose corn syrup will supply us with the equivalent of 3 million tons of sugar.

Published material indicates that at a sugar price of 10 cents per pound and a corn price of below \$2.00 per bushel, or a sugar price of 15 cents per pound and a corn price of less than \$3.75 per bushel, the high-fructose corn syrup industry can operate profitably.

The advent of high-fructose corn syrup clearly adds a new dimension to U.S. sugar policy. Projected increases in production capacity are expected to equal or exceed the growth of demand in the United States. This new product will offer competition not only to traditional beet and corn sugar production in the United States but to imports as well.

### **European Community Sugar Arrangements**

The dramatic price increases of last year probably served as a catalytic factor in the negotiation of the new arrangements between the European Community and its associated states. These arrangements replace both the old Commonwealth Sugar Agreement and the Community's own prior sugar policy.

In order to understand this agreement, I will first outline the rather complex European Community sugar scheme. The EC sugar common agricultural policy provides for threshold, target, and intervention prices for white and raw sugar. Intervention agen-

cies must buy sugar offered to them at the intervention price. These agencies are generally EC government organs. The threshold price is fixed annually and is equal to the target price plus the cost of transport to the most deficit EC area. The target price is what EC producers are theoretically supposed to receive. In reality, it is the intervention price which they usually receive.

Current prices are: target price for white sugar, 18.7 cents per pound; intervention prices for white sugar, 18.2 cents per pound; threshold price for white sugar, 20.2 cents per pound.

Production is controlled through quotas. The three types of quotas are:

*A quota sugar:* Basic assigned quota for each country, then allocated to sugar-manufacturing firms. These are set high for 1975/76 to encourage production.

*B quota sugar:* Assigned to each firm at 45 percent of the A quota. A and B will remain at 1975/76 levels through 1979/80.

*C quota sugar:* Production outside the maximum A and B quotas, at no guaranteed price.

Import levies are applied when import prices are below the EC threshold price. When world market prices are above the threshold price, a levy on EC exports can be imposed. Subsidies can also be paid on imports under these conditions. Subsidies can be paid on EC sugar exports. Processors have to maintain stocks at 10 percent of the firm's production.

Under the agreement with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries, the EC has undertaken to import yearly 1.4 million tons of sugar and the ACP supplying countries have undertaken to make that amount available. Within the limits of the amount agreed, the EC guarantees a minimum price to be negotiated annually, taking account of the Community price as well as other economic factors. The price paid after the first year is likely to be the same as that paid European farmers for A and B quota sugar, in the 18-to-20-cents-per-pound range, with a discount for the fact that the imports are raw sugar.

The agreement is valid for an indefinite period, but any party is permitted to renounce participation after five years, with withdrawal effective after two more years. During 1975 the price received is to be about \$575 per metric ton (about 27 cents per pound). The difference between this price and the EC intervention price is to be made up by the United Kingdom in the form of an import subsidy during 1975, since the United Kingdom is the principal EC sugar importer.

### **Cuban Trade Arrangements**

In addition to the European Community's arrangement with its associated states, the other major preferential import arrangement is between the U.S.S.R. and Cuba. The Cuban-U.S.S.R. preferential arrangement differs from that just concluded between the EC and ACP countries. So far as we are aware, there is no long-term agreement between Cuba and the U.S.S.R. on sugar deliveries. The amount supplied each year is agreed upon annually as part of the annual trade protocol. The U.S.S.R. takes less in short crop years so as to allow a constant Cuban supply to the world market in order to secure foreign exchange. In years of bumper crops, the U.S.S.R. takes more, thus relieving Cuba of the need to carry the stock. Cuban shipments to the U.S.S.R. ranged from 1.1 million to 3.1 million metric tons between 1967 and 1973; 1974 shipments were somewhat over 1.85 million metric tons, according to trade sources.

The details of Cuba's trade arrangement involving approximately 500,000 tons to Far Eastern Communist areas are not fully known.

In your invitation to these hearings, Mr. Chairman, you raised the question of the effect on the U.S. sugar market if diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba are resumed. I am not prepared at this time to speculate on when relations with Cuba might be resumed. I believe it is safe to say, however, that a reentry of Cuban sugar to the U.S. market should not have a significant

effect, other than the rearrangement of certain supplying relationships. Cuban sales to the United States would in all likelihood displace imports from other foreign sources. At the same time, Cuba would be likely to vacate certain markets which could be filled by the suppliers displaced from the U.S. market. What would occur therefore would be a kind of musical chairs arrangement, with perhaps a more rational trading pattern but with little other economic impact.

### **Trend Toward Long-Term Contracting**

With the changes in the old preferential arrangements such as the U.S. Sugar Act and the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, there is a noticeable trend in the direction of long-term contracting between sugar exporters and private or governmental importers. Australia has been the most active exporter seeking such arrangements, although Thailand, Brazil, Taiwan, Trinidad and Tobago, South Africa, and others have also shown an interest. If all contracts being discussed by Australia are consummated, about 55 percent of 1975 Australian exports could come under long-term contract. Japan has been the most active importer and may serve around 2 million metric tons of its import needs with such arrangements. The People's Republic of China, South Korea, and Iran are among other importers entering into such arrangements.

There are indications that some private U.S. buyers of raw sugar are interested in similar long-term contracts with foreign exporters. We have not been informed that any contracts have yet been concluded, however.

Some of the contracts appear to be on a fixed-price basis, but most seem to have variable-price clauses tied to the world market price or a sharing of benefits above a fixed price range. Most exporters seem to want a minimum price included in such contracts to insure a minimum level of earnings from sugar exports, but at the same time they seem willing to forgo returns at price peaks to achieve stability of earnings for planning purposes.

### **Status of International Sugar Agreement**

The International Sugar Agreement (ISA) has existed continuously since 1937. The agreement has attempted to regulate trade in the small residual "free market," representing about 12 percent of world production and about 50 percent of the world trade. There have been lengthy periods when the agreement has lacked quotas and other economic provisions, including the period 1961-68. The United States was a member of the ISA from 1937 until December 31, 1968, when the current agreement entered into force. The United States continues to cooperate with the International Sugar Organization by providing statistical data and by sending observers to meetings of the Sugar Council. There are currently 55 members of the ISA, 22 importers and 33 exporters.

The sugar agreement is designed to operate primarily with minimum and maximum prices regulated by quotas distributed among exporting members of the agreement. The agreed price range in the 1968 agreement was 3.25 cents per pound to 5.25 cents per pound. The 1968 agreement also provided for a supply-commitment price. Exporting countries committed themselves to supply importing members with a specified amount of sugar, at a fixed price, when "free market" quotations rose above that price. The supply-commitment price negotiated in 1968 was 6.5 cents per pound, free on board and stowed at Greater Caribbean ports. This price was twice adjusted upward during the period of the agreement, and in 1973 was 7.6 cents per pound.

Negotiations in 1973 to extend the agreement, however, failed over the inability of exporters and importers to agree on a price range. Discussion on the supply-commitment price also led to the breakdown, with importers insisting on a level no higher than 8.25 cents while exporters wanted 11 cents.

The International Sugar Council met in May to consider the necessity for renegotiation of the agreement. It was decided at that meeting to postpone a decision on renegotiation until November 1975 and to con-

sider the necessity for extending the current agreement in its skeletal form without economic provisions such as quotas and price range until December 31, 1976, from its present expiration date of December 31, 1975.

Although the United States had been a member of sugar agreements dating as far back as 1937, we did not choose to participate in the 1968 agreement. Since all U.S. sugar imports were covered by special arrangement, they would have, in any case, been exempt from the regulation of the 1968 agreement. Thus U.S. participation in the agreement was not necessary either to support the operation of the agreement or to protect the U.S. market. With the end of the Sugar Act, U.S. participation in an international sugar agreement would become more meaningful.

Should the International Sugar Council decide to open negotiations for a new sugar agreement later this year or next, it would be our intention to participate actively in the negotiations. Whether we will be a member of any new agreement will, however, depend on a number of considerations, including our evaluation of the agreement negotiated and the future course of U.S. sugar policy.

#### **Consultations Among Producing Countries**

The collapse of sugar prices last winter and the uncertainty about putting the International Sugar Agreement back into operation has, not unexpectedly, led various foreign sugar-producing countries to consult about the sugar market.

Latin American sugar producers have met twice to discuss the sugar situation. The first meeting, held in Cozumel, Mexico, last November, was the outgrowth of an agreement reached in July 1974 between Mexico and Argentina to undertake governmental and industrial interchange of technical knowledge and cooperation in the external marketing of sugar, defend the interests of their respective sugar industries in the international market, concert the two countries' positions in international organizations, and

propose to other Latin American countries that they create a mechanism for consultation in the area of sugar.

At this meeting, agreement reportedly was reached to institutionalize regular meetings which would encourage cooperation and consultation among Latin American sugar producers, exchange information and statistical data on the supply and demand for sugar and its price, and maintain unity among Latin American and Caribbean sugar producers for meetings of the International Sugar Organization in London.

The second meeting, in Puerto Plata, Dominican Republic, included representatives from 22 countries. On the basis of press reports and other information we received, it appears that the meeting was largely an exchange of technical information and a coordination of positions for the May 1975 meetings of the International Sugar Organization. The group decided to meet again in Lima in September 1975.

The question has been raised whether the absence of a sugar agreement or a U.S. Sugar Act is likely to lead to a sugar cartel among foreign producers. In my view the threat of cartel action in sugar is not serious. This is not to say that producers will not seek to consult among themselves, to coordinate their policies, and even to concert their price policies. I seriously question, however, whether any group of producers can without consumer cooperation succeed in regulating price for any significant period of time. Cartel arrangements are inherently unstable and can endure only so long as it takes for a supply response to undermine the cartel. For sugar, unlike petroleum, the supply response would not be long in coming.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that this review of developments affecting world production, consumption, and trade in sugar will be of use to your committee in its deliberations. I can assure you that we will listen with attention and interest to the testimony presented in these hearings as we in the executive branch conduct our own studies on U.S. sugar policy.



## Department Urges U.S. Participation in IDB Replenishment

*Following is a statement by William D. Rogers, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, made before the Subcommittee on International Development Institutions and Finance of the House Committee on Banking, Currency, and Housing on July 29.<sup>1</sup>*

The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), since its establishment in 1959, has been a principal component of our Latin American policy. It is a key symbol and living expression of continuing hemispheric cooperation for a better life for the peoples of the Americas. Over the years the nature of that cooperation has accommodated to the increasing maturity and efforts at self-help of Latin America, and the IDB has accurately reflected that changing relationship within the hemisphere.

Whereas a decade ago bilateral official assistance from the United States was the largest source of resource transfer to Latin America, in fiscal year 1974 the IDB provided more official financing to Latin America than any other institution. Its loans are today indispensable to the continuing economic and social development in a part of the world of special interest to the United States. As Latin America has sustained and accelerated its growth in the last decade and a half, the expanding role of the IDB has required increased sharing by all member governments in the financing of development programs. Such an evolution has paralleled our changing political relations with Latin American countries on a basis of greater equality.

Our willingness to continue our support for the IDB, on terms reflecting greater Latin American participation than ever before, is a test of the seriousness of our hemispheric foreign policy. For while Latin

America has enjoyed increasing prosperity, it also has not been immune from the dislocations that have wracked the world economy. In this uncertain environment, sustained financial flows to Latin America assume special importance.

A central tenet of our policy in the region has been the mutuality of the benefits of economic development in Latin America. Now, more than in recent years, that development has been rendered precarious, not by internal policy, but by external events. Our prompt adoption of this legislation<sup>2</sup> will eliminate any uncertainty about where the United States stands in its commitment to help Latin America help itself. And it will make much easier the needed flow of private funds to satisfy Latin American demands.

Action is essential now. In calendar year 1974, the IDB extended \$1.103 billion in development loans. Without replenishment, the Bank will exhaust its ordinary capital commitment authority by the end of 1975 and the convertible currency resources of the Fund for Special Operations by the end of 1976. This replenishment will permit the Bank's lending operations to increase at a rate of about 7 percent a year in real terms.

These flows are necessary to continue to cushion the impact of the crises of energy, food, and fertilizer on the poorest nations and on the lowest income segments of the population. You are familiar with the kinds of assistance the IDB has provided to Latin America. Loans have been made in the major economic sectors of development, principally agriculture and electric power, with a significant portion of IDB's resources also supportive of transportation and communications, industry, and mining. Farm-to-market roads in most countries have aided agricultural credit and crop production projects. IDB's livestock credits have included foot-and-mouth disease control programs

<sup>1</sup>The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

<sup>2</sup>H.R. 8905, a bill to provide for increased participation by the United States in the Inter-American Development Bank, and to provide for the entry of nonregional members and the Bahamas and Guyana, in the Inter-American Development Bank, and for other purposes.

throughout Latin America. In addition to participation in massive electric power generation projects covering, for example, the industrializing parts of Brazil or north-east Argentina and all of Uruguay, the Bank has participated in several Colombian projects that have doubled that nation's electric power capacity. These investments provide the infrastructure for an economic development in which all segments of the population can share.

Despite impressive progress, continuing financing is necessary to permit Latin America, matching the inflows with resources predominantly its own, to maintain the heartening material gains of the last decade. Such growth, I must add, contributes to international economic stability as well as to immediate U.S. investment and trade objectives. In our interdependent world, our national interest is served by development that reaches all nations.

There is no better illustration of such interdependence than our economic relations with Latin America. Over several recent years, about 13 percent of our exports, or \$8.9 billion annually, have been sold in Latin American markets, making up more than a third of their total imports. In turn, we have imported tropical products and raw materials from Latin America whose cost would be greater if secured outside the hemisphere. Our balance of trade with the region has traditionally been favorable, a measure of the high level of demand for the intermediate and capital goods inputs absorbed by the region as it grows.

Our private sector, of course, benefits from these transactions in goods. It also gains from the investment opportunities fostered by a rapidly growing Latin America. There is mutual advantage to the Latin American recipients of our direct investment: they acquire the managerial skills and technology essential for continuing development in the modern world.

The IDB has underwritten this mutually beneficial process of hemispheric economic development in impressive fashion since its

founding. It has demonstrated an increasing capacity to use funds wisely and well and shown a responsiveness to those most in need of help. And with this replenishment, it will have demonstrated its ability to rely much less upon the United States than in the past. For although we will again be the largest single contributor to the Bank, the other nations of the Americas will be more prominent than ever before.

The larger Latin American countries have taken a major step in the direction of increased burden sharing. Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela have agreed to cease borrowing convertible currencies from the Bank's concessional window, the Fund for Special Operations, during this replenishment period. They have also indicated willingness to make parts of their own FSO contributions convertible—as they have not done since the Bank was founded.

Paralleling this heartening development has been expansion of the membership of the Bank to incorporate nonregional participation. Such diversification reflects our view that a strong Latin America with ties to the rest of the world as well as to ourselves is the best guarantee of good hemispheric relations. We have worked with Bank management over several years to make this objective a reality.

The separate proposal for nonregional membership will permit 10 European nations, Japan, and Israel to join the Bank and to bring with them total contributions of \$745 million. About half of this amount will be subscribed to new interregional capital which will increase the Bank's ability to borrow in international capital markets, beyond the U.S. callable capital base of the ordinary capital window. The creation of this new capital is a major step in broadening the Bank's resources.

I also wish to speak in favor of the authorization of IDB lending to the Caribbean Development Bank, and membership for the Bahamas and Guyana. These newly independent nations are not members of the Organization of American States as the IDB

charter now requires. But these newly independent states are very much part of the region and should be granted access to membership as part of their legitimate aspirations.

We also support the proposal to amend the IDB Agreement to enable IDB lending to the Caribbean Development Bank for re-lending to countries not members of the IDB. The Caribbean Bank, through its familiarity with the problems of the many small and poor nations in the subregion, is a far better agency for channeling finance than simple expansion of IDB membership. We see such an arrangement as an imaginative innovation permitting the IDB to serve the hemisphere more effectively.

In sum, the details of this replenishment confirm the basic premises upon which our Latin American policy is founded. There could be no better proof of the increased self-reliance and economic development of the hemisphere than the greater participation of our Latin American neighbors in the Bank. There could be no clearer evidence of the global projection of the hemisphere than the addition of the nonregional members. And there could be no more appropriate test of our willingness to continue to cooperate with the region in its heartening progress than prompt approval of the legislation before you.

## Letters of Credence

### *Argentina*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Argentine Republic, Rafael Maximiano Vazquez, presented his credentials to President Ford on July 14.<sup>1</sup>

### *Canada*

The newly appointed Ambassador of Canada, Jack Hamilton Warren, presented his credentials to President Ford on July 14.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated July 14.

### *Hungary*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Hungarian People's Republic, Ferenc Esztergalyos, presented his credentials to President Ford on July 14.<sup>1</sup>

### *Italy*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Italian Republic, Roberto Gaja, presented his credentials to President Ford on July 14.<sup>1</sup>

### *Kuwait*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the State of Kuwait, Khalid Muhammad Jaffar, presented his credentials to President Ford on July 14.<sup>1</sup>

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 94th Congress 1st Session

The Role of Advisory Committees in U.S. Foreign Policy. Prepared for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on International Relations by the Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. April 1975. 135 pp.

Congress and Foreign Policy: 1974. Prepared for the House Committee on International Relations by the Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. April 15, 1975. 72 pp.

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Assistance to the Republic of South Vietnam for 1975. Report of the House Committee on Appropriations to accompany H.J. Res. 407. H. Rept. 94-166. April 22, 1975. 3 pp.

The War Powers Resolution. Relevant Documents, Correspondence, Reports. Prepared for the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs House Committee on International Relations. April 23, 1975. 42 pp.

U.N. Peacekeeping in the Middle East. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. 818. S. Rept. 94-93. April 24, 1975. 2 pp.

World Food Conference of 1976 in Ames, Iowa. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. Con. Res. 19. S. Rept. 94-94. April 24, 1975. 2 pp.

Authorizing Appropriations for Tourist Travel Promotion. Report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce to accompany H.R. 5357. H. Rept. 94-177. April 28, 1975. 11 pp.

## U.S. Presents Initiative in Disarmament Committee on Limitation of Military Expenditures

*Following is a statement made before the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) at Geneva by U.S. Representative Joseph J. Martin, Jr., on July 24.*

Today I would like to address some issues raised in the Secretary General's 1974 report on the reduction of military budgets<sup>1</sup> and to table a working paper suggesting some practical steps that this committee could take toward the goal of creating conditions under which the limitation of military expenditures might be achieved.

We are all conscious of the vast economic resources that are now devoted to maintaining and strengthening the world's military establishments. According to estimates made by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the world's military expenditures, after allowing for price changes, rose at an average rate of 2.6 percent per year in the decade following 1963, and in 1973 amounted to approximately \$275 billion. These can only be rough estimates, in view of the uncertainties in the data, but it is clear that the burden of these high levels of military expenditure is felt by virtually all countries, both developed and developing.

These levels have understandably occasioned widespread concern. Many have deplored the diversion of important resources to military programs when there are so many pressing economic and social needs which

require attention. No one can be satisfied with this situation. But merely to deplore it is not enough, and to underestimate the difficulties that must be overcome if the situation is to be changed would be self-deceiving. The world would clearly benefit if security could be achieved at less cost and resources could thus be freed for other purposes. But recognizing that such benefits might occur does not make it any less difficult to achieve agreement on limitations. Moreover, until the difficulties are resolved, it would be premature to consider such questions as the disposition of funds that might be saved through military expenditure limitations.

Military expenditures reflect each nation's perception of the effort it must make to provide for its own security and to contribute to international stability. Arms control negotiations have generally recognized this fact and have accordingly focused on the objects of military expenditures—forces, weapons, activities, and systems—rather than on the expenditures themselves. This focus has characterized, for example, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations in Europe, and the multilateral negotiations in this committee.

The United States continues to believe that, under present circumstances, agreements directly limiting military expenditures themselves are not practicable. It cannot be expected that any government could undertake to limit or reduce its military expenditures as an arms control measure unless it was

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. A/9770; report of the Secretary General of the United Nations incorporating the report of the Group of Consultant Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets appointed in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 3093 B (XXVIII).

confident that doing so would not detract from its security. Any agreed limitations or reductions would have to provide assurance that no one country is disadvantaged and that destabilizing imbalances that could adversely affect international security are prevented.

To set forth these requirements, however, is not to say that agreed limitations have no conceivable utility. Under certain conditions, agreed expenditure limitations, either as supplements to physical limitations or as independent measures, might make a valuable contribution to arms control efforts. But before their potential can be seriously evaluated, a number of basic questions must be answered. Many of these questions involve conceptual and technical problems that have not yet been resolved. In fact, until recently many of them had not even been clearly identified and their existence was not widely recognized, at least in international bodies concerned with arms control and disarmament.

This necessary first step of identifying these problems has, however, now been taken. I am referring to the report on the reduction of military budgets completed last year by a group of experts appointed by the Secretary General of the United Nations. That report addresses the essential characteristics of military expenditure limitations in a disarmament context. In addition, it examines a number of alternative approaches to such limitations. The report notes that these different approaches would have "different requirements, different possible effects on security and, indeed, different consequences for the release of resources for development aid." In examining these various implications, the report adds a significant new dimension to previous U.N. reports that have dealt with military expenditures and their consequences in more general terms. Moreover, the report, which was unanimously approved by experts from a wide cross-section of countries, provides a clear exposition of the problems involved in military expenditure limitations and suggests the areas in which more thor-

ough consideration is needed if they are to become a real possibility.

The basic questions identified by the experts fall into three general areas. First, how can one measure the military spending of different countries, with their different currencies, different fiscal and financial practices, and different kinds of armed forces, so as to permit effective comparisons among them? Second, how can limitations be formulated and applied so that no country need feel that its security interests could be endangered by an agreement? Third, how can compliance with a limitation agreement be assured and verified with sufficient confidence?

The experts' report, understandably, was not able to provide comprehensive answers to these questions. It has nonetheless made an important contribution by formulating them and pointing out the technical issues they involve. The experts agreed that:

The various technical issues involved in an agreement to reduce military expenditures are sufficiently complex to suggest that it might be reasonable to make a step-by-step approach.

Last fall the General Assembly adopted Resolution 3254 (XXIX), which requested that states convey their views on the experts' report to the Secretary General. The response of my government commended the report, especially for its survey of conceptual and technical issues. It also noted that the report provided a sound basis for further work on the subject and suggested that such work be conducted under U.N. or CCD auspices. The United States informed the Secretary General of its willingness to engage in serious efforts to resolve the conceptual and technical problems involved in achieving agreements on military expenditure limitations that would be responsive to the security needs of the participants.

We believe that this committee would be an appropriate body in which to undertake such efforts, particularly since all 11 of the countries that provided the experts for the Secretary General's report are now represented here. I would suggest, specifically, that

the CCD begin by focusing on the first, and most basic, of the three areas identified by the experts; that is, the question of definition and measurement of military expenditures.

The U.S. working paper tabled today offers our views on how the CCD could examine four major components of this question. These elements are, first, the definition of military expenditures; second, the valuation of resources in the military sector; third, the deflation of current price data; and fourth, the making of international value comparisons.

A study of the definition of military expenditures is, in our view, an essential first step. As the experts said:

A prerequisite for negotiating the reduction of military budgets in two or more countries is agreement on what is and what is not to be included in military budgets. The problem of defining the scope and content . . . is critical where a State's decision on allocations to national security and international development assistance will depend directly on the measure of comparative military budget levels.

Unfortunately, there is no accepted conceptual standard of the definition and coverage of the military sectors of the economy taking account of possibilities in some areas for substituting civilian for military activities and considering the links in the chain of production leading to the military sector. Varieties of usage among nations should be examined, and alternative structural classifications of military expenditures should be considered. This examination may look on the military sector as an activity consuming inputs, or kinds of resources, or as an activity providing outputs, such as types of forces, functions, or programs.

In discussing the second basic element, the valuation of resources in the military sector, the experts noted that:

Negotiators attempting to agree on equivalent reductions in military budgets will be concerned to ensure, as far as possible, that these cuts do represent equivalent reductions in military power. It cannot be automatically assumed that this will be so.

A study of valuation would begin by assessing alternative output measurements for

the military sector as well as measurements of resource costs. It would evaluate the measurement of resource costs based on the value of nonmilitary opportunities forgone and the applicability of such valuations in an arms control context. This would include the links between military inputs and outputs and their relation to military power and national security. Reaching agreement on appropriate valuation criteria would call for an examination of theoretical and actual standards for both centrally planned and market-oriented economies.

The inflation that has been experienced by many economies in recent years has underscored the importance of finding appropriate means to deflate military expenditures for comparative purposes. A significant problem in this connection would involve determining ways to differentiate between expenditures reflecting qualitative improvements in military products and those simply reflecting price changes. The various methods of payment or other compensation to military personnel constitute another problem.

Finally, it would be necessary to explore means of making international value comparisons. In some ways the problems in this area—that is, price comparisons among countries—are analogous to those in the area of price deflation, or price comparisons in one country over time. International comparisons of military expenditures appear to require purchasing-power parities, or rates of transformation from one currency to another in which relative prices between countries are averaged in some manner that takes account of patterns of expenditure. The use of opportunity-cost valuations might be helpful in dealing with this problem.

We believe that real progress toward a common understanding of the measurement and comparison of military expenditures could be made through careful examination of these questions. In doing this, I might add, it would not be necessary to have specific new statistical data about any country's military spending.

My delegation would welcome specific sug-

gestions concerning procedures for organizing work along these lines. We suggest as one possibility an informal meeting with experts, perhaps early in our next session, to work toward solutions of the conceptual problems I have mentioned. An alternative approach would be to organize a study by an ad hoc group of governmental experts under CCD auspices. Such a group could be charged with preparing proposals for resolving some of the problems and recommending a course of future action.

The approach of the group might be structured along the following lines. First, it would be important to search out and analyze the studies and reports published in various countries. In addition to the report of the U.N. experts, extensive work which may still be relevant was done by the League of Nations, for example. There is also a 1973 SIPRI [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute] report on "The Meaning and Measurement of Military Expenditure."

Secondly, experts might submit detailed technical working papers on such topics as: (a) the purpose and objectives of the study; (b) basic approaches to technical problems such as classification criteria and index number formulae; (c) the formulation of tentative models and standards; and (d) the evaluation of tentative models in the light of national conditions and policies. This last topic would take account of such factors as a nation's system of statistics and accounts, financial and pricing practices, and economic principles.

Finally, proceeding from an examination of the various technical problems, the group should make, where possible, recommendations on how we might best measure and compare the military spending of various countries. This objective should be a realistic one in this basic and relatively tractable aspect of studying military expenditure limitations. On other issues, the recommendations might point out ways by which further progress can be made. Success in this effort would form a basis for proceeding to similar efforts on the other major issues involved.

## U.N. Force in Israel-Egypt Sector Extended Through October

*Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative Daniel P. Moynihan on July 24, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council that day.*

### STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN

USUN press release 81 dated July 24

Mr. President [Eugenio Plaja, of Italy]: I should like first to express my gratitude for your warm words of welcome to me and to state the sense of honor which I feel to have begun my service on the Security Council under your Presidency, sir. I should like to particularly express admiration and gratitude for your extraordinary leadership and that of your deputy that has brought us through delicate and important consultations to this agreement today on the extension of the UNEF [United Nations Emergency Force] mandate. There is no need for me to underline the importance my government attaches to the continued operation of this Force. We consider UNEF is essential not only on the ground in the Middle East but also for what it contributes to the atmosphere in which further negotiations are proceeding.

I would like also to express the admiration of the United States for those who serve in UNEF and those who lead it. We are pleased to note in the latest report of the Secretary General that the area of UNEF has remained quiet and there have been no significant violations of the agreements by either party. This is a tribute to the desire of the parties concerned, Israel and Egypt, to persevere in their search for peace and to those who are responsible for the maintenance and functioning of the Force—the Secretary General and his staff. The action of the Council today enables us to continue our efforts, on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, toward the just

and lasting peace in the Middle East to which we are all committed.

It remains to be noted that the finest leadership and the most selfless willingness to serve, as important as these are, require at the same time positive attitudes on the part of the parties in seeking peace. My government wishes to express its appreciation to President Sadat [of Egypt] and Prime Minister Rabin [of Israel] for the affirmative actions which have made possible the renewal of the mandate of UNEF—a force which serves the mutual interests of both sides.

#### TEXT OF RESOLUTION <sup>1</sup>

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 338 (1973), 340 (1973), 341 (1973), 346 (1974), 362 (1974) and 368 (1975),

*Taking into account* the letter dated 14 July 1975 addressed by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the Secretary-General (S/11757),

*Bearing in mind* the appeal addressed by the President of the Security Council to the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt on 21 July 1975 (S/11771) and expressing satisfaction for the reply of the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt thereto (S/11771),

*Having considered* the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force of 16 July 1975 (S/11758),

*Expressing concern* at the continued state of tension in the area and the lack of progress towards the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

1. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973);

2. *Decides* to renew the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force for a period of three months, that is, until 24 October 1975;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit at the end of this period or at any time in the intervening period a report on the situation in the Middle East and the steps taken to implement resolution 338 (1973).

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. S/RES/371 (1975); adopted by the Council on July 24 by a vote of 13 to 0, with the People's Republic of China and Iraq not participating in the vote.

## U.S. Makes Special Contribution to UNRWA

*Following is a statement by W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., U.S. Deputy Representative to the United Nations, upon presenting a check for \$6 million as a special U.S. contribution to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to Jan van Wijk, Director, New York Liaison Office, UNRWA, on July 11.*

USUN press release 78 dated July 11

This \$6 million completes the donation by the United States of \$16 million in special contributions to UNRWA in 1975. These amounts, which are in addition to the regular \$23.2 million U.S. contribution to UNRWA for 1975, were authorized by the U.S. Congress at its own initiative in response to testimony before its committees by the State Department on UNRWA's critical financial deficit. That deficit was reduced by 40 percent, from \$40 million to \$24 million, by these contributions.

The United States believes that UNRWA's humanitarian work, although amply justified by its very nature, is also essential to the search for peace in the Middle East. In support of this conviction, the United States has contributed, from the establishment of UNRWA through June 30, 1974, a total of almost \$581 million, or about 58 percent of all contributions made by governments in that period.

UNRWA has carried out its program for 25 years with remarkable administrative austerity and great efficiency. It has, however, inescapably felt the effects of worldwide inflation. The pressing human need for UNRWA's services remains; UNRWA stands ready to meet these needs with its characteristic skill and efficiency if the necessary funds can be found.

The United States urges other countries who have not yet contributed in proportion to their resources to join it in providing those funds for that vital work.



## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Astronauts

Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return of astronauts, and the return of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow April 22, 1968. Entered into force December 3, 1968. TIAS 6599. *Ratification deposited:* Greece, July 7, 1975.

##### Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 7192. *Ratification deposited:* Sierra Leone, November 13, 1974.

##### Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972. Entered into force March 26, 1975. TIAS 8062. *Ratification deposited:* Nicaragua, August 7, 1975.

##### Conservation

Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. Done at Washington March 3, 1973. Entered into force July 1, 1975. *Ratifications deposited:* Peru, June 27, 1975; Costa Rica, June 30, 1975; South Africa, July 15, 1975. *Accession deposited:* Nepal, June 18, 1975.

##### Health

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.<sup>1</sup> *Acceptance deposited:* Mexico, July 25, 1975.

##### Hydrographic Organization

Convention on the International Hydrographic Organization, with annexes. Done at Monaco May 3, 1967. Entered into force September 22, 1970. TIAS 6933. *Accession deposited:* Malaysia, July 3, 1975.

##### Judicial Procedure

Convention on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters. Done at The Hague November 15, 1965. Entered into force February 10, 1969. TIAS 6638. *Ratification deposited:* Luxembourg (with declarations), July 9, 1975.

##### Maritime Matters

Convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965. Entered into force March 5, 1967; for the United States May 16, 1967. TIAS 6251. *Accession deposited:* Austria, June 20, 1975.

##### Oil Pollution

International convention on civil liability for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. Entered into force June 19, 1975.<sup>2</sup> *Accession deposited:* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (with reservation and statement), June 24, 1975.

##### Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. *Declaration of provisional application deposited:* Ecuador, July 30, 1975.

##### World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris November 16, 1972.<sup>1</sup> *Ratification deposited:* Tunisia, March 10, 1975.

#### BILATERAL

##### Indonesia

Understandings concerning the assignment of a Drug Enforcement Administration representative to the American Embassy in Jakarta to advance the U.S.-Indonesian common interest in preventing illegal traffic in narcotic drugs, with annex. Effected by exchange of letters at Jakarta April 1, 1975. Entered into force April 1, 1975.

##### Israel

Joint agreement for the design, construction, testing and operation of a large-scale prototype desalting plant in Israel. Signed at Washington June 27, 1975. Entered into force June 27, 1975.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force for the United States.

## Japan

Agreement on cooperation in the field of environmental protection, with agreed minutes. Signed at Washington August 5, 1975. Entered into force August 5, 1975.

## Romania

Agreement on trade relations. Signed at Bucharest April 2, 1975.

*Acceptances exchanged:* August 3, 1975.

*Entered into force:* August 3, 1975.

## PUBLICATIONS

### 1949 "Foreign Relations" Volume on U.N.; Western Hemisphere Released

Press release 389 dated July 30 (for release August 6)

The Department of State released on August 6 "Foreign Relations of the United States," 1949, volume II, "The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere." This volume is the latest in the "Foreign Relations" series, which has been published continuously since 1861 as the official record of American foreign policy. The volume now released is the fifth of nine projected volumes documenting American foreign policy during the year 1949.

This volume of 801 pages presents previously unpublished documentation on participation by the United States in the United Nations as well as on relations with Canada and the countries of Central and South America and the Caribbean. Of particular interest are the sections on the East-West conflict in the U.N. setting; problems resulting from the establishment of the seat of the United Nations in the United States; American policy regarding elections to various U.N. organs; efforts in support of inter-American collective action for the peaceful settlement of disputes in the Caribbean area; relations with the regime of President Juan Perón of Argentina; and events leading to recognition by the United States of the government of Arnulfo Arias in Panama.

The "Foreign Relations" volumes are prepared by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs. Volume II (listed as Department of State publication 8789; GPO cat. no. S1.1:949/v. II) may be purchased for \$10.40 (domestic postpaid). Checks or money orders should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents and sent to the U.S. Government Book Store, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

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**Background Notes:** Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—\$21.80; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—\$23.10; plastic binder—\$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 30¢ each.

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**Reimbursement of Income Taxes.** Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. TIAS 7996. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7996).

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**Trade in Cotton Textiles.** Agreement with Portugal extending the agreement of November 17, 1970, as amended. TIAS 8003. 5 pp. 25¢ (Cat. No. S9.10:8003).

**Trade in Cotton Textiles.** Agreement with Egypt extending the agreement of May 10, 1974. TIAS 8004. 3 pp. 25¢ (Cat. No. S9.10:8004).

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*400	8/5	U.S. National Committee for Prevention of Marine Pollution, Aug. 28.
*401	8/5	Government Advisory Committee on International Book and Library Programs, Sept. 11.
*402	8/5	Advisory Committee to U.S. Section, International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, Sept. 29.
†403	8/6	1948 Foreign Relations volume V, part 1, Near East, South Asia, and Africa, released.
†404	8/6	Kissinger, Miyazawa: remarks upon signing U.S.-Japan Environmental Agreement, Aug. 5.
*405	8/7	Shipping Coordinating Committee Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea meeting canceled.
*406	8/7	Government Advisory Committee on International Book and Library Programs, Sept. 24.
*407	8/8	Shipping Coordinating Committee Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, Aug. 29.

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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September 1, 1975

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

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## President Ford Attends Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Visits Federal Republic of Germany and Eastern Europe

*President Ford attended the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) at Helsinki July 30–August 1. En route he visited the Federal Republic of Germany (July 26–28) and Poland (July 28–29); after the conference he visited Romania (August 2–3) and Yugoslavia (August 3–4).*

*Following are remarks by President Ford and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and President Walter Scheel of the Federal Republic of Germany; remarks by President Ford and Edward Gierek, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party, and texts of a joint statement signed at Warsaw and a joint communique issued at Krakow; remarks by President Ford and Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at Helsinki; remarks by President Ford and Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel of Turkey at Helsinki; President Ford's address to the conference; and excerpts from a question-and-answer session with the press aboard Air Force One en route from Helsinki to Bucharest.<sup>1</sup>*

### DEPARTURE, ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE, JULY 26

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated August 4

Good morning. Mr. Vice President, Mr. Secretary of State: We leave today on a mission of peace and progress on behalf of all Americans. Tomorrow I will meet with our valued friends and allies in the Federal Republic of Germany. Later I will visit Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia to assure the peoples there of America's continuing affection and to seek additional improvement in our relations. And I will pursue increased cooperation and stability between the East as well as the West.

During my first trip to Europe as President, the Atlantic alliance—I vigorously

<sup>1</sup> Remarks and joint statements in Romania and Yugoslavia will be printed in the BULLETIN of Sept. 8.

reaffirmed our solidarity with them and our purposes with them.

On this journey, I will meet in Helsinki with the leaders of 34 other nations. We will sign the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This conference represents useful progress in our continuing efforts to achieve a more stable and productive East-West relationship.

The provisions of the Helsinki declaration represent political as well as moral, not legal, commitments. U.S. policy supports, as I have supported through my entire public life, the aspirations for freedom and national independence of peoples everywhere. The results of this European Security Conference will be a step in that direction. The outcome of this Helsinki Conference remains to be tested; but whether it is a long stride or a short step, it is at least a forward step for freedom.

This conference aims at expanding East-West contacts—more normal and healthier relations. This is in the best interest of the United States and of world peace.

If honored by all the signatories, the Helsinki declaration holds great promise. It can promote wider cooperation and greater security across the entire continent of Europe. This is of great importance to the United States and to all peoples. It is in this spirit and with these objectives that we take off.

#### REMARKS BY PRESIDENT FORD AND FEDERAL GERMAN CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT, JULY 27<sup>2</sup>

##### Chancellor Schmidt

Ladies and gentlemen: I would like to repeat here how extremely thankful the German Federal Government is—and I believe that one can say the same for all our citizens—that the American President and the American Secretary of State are visiting us here on their way to Helsinki and to other European capitals. The visit is not yet over, and for that reason I can only report at the moment on our talks up to this point.

The two chiefs of government and the two foreign ministers spoke this morning about political problems of a general nature, which will also be discussed in Helsinki. Then in a somewhat larger group, in which, on the German side, the Federal Minister for Economics took part, we turned to problems of the world economy. We are convinced of the necessity of cooperation in the areas of economic policy, credit policy, and currency policy, since we are aware that the entire Western world's economy has come into severe difficulties as a result of the current recession.

The American President is somewhat more optimistic regarding the development of the American political economy than he

<sup>2</sup> Made to the press following a meeting at Bonn on July 27; Chancellor Schmidt spoke in German (texts from White House press releases (Bonn)).

was when we last had the opportunity to speak with each other. But I assume that he will tell you that himself.

##### President Ford

Mr. Chancellor, ladies and gentlemen: Let me express on behalf of Mrs. Ford and myself our great gratitude for the warm reception that we have received from you and Mrs. Schmidt and from the German people.

It is a great privilege and pleasure for Mrs. Ford and myself, as well as my colleagues, to be in Germany, and I have appreciated very greatly the opportunity to meet with you this morning and to discuss with you and your associates the problems that you mentioned: the general political situation and the economic circumstances both in Europe as well as in the United States.

Let me say with great emphasis that all of us in the United States are deeply grateful for the wonderful contribution that people from your country have made in the history books of my country, and I should say that all of us, as we approach our Bicentennial in the United States, are most appreciative of the very generous gift given to the United States when President Scheel was in my country a few weeks ago.

The importance of discussions on the economic field, of course, are very, very vital. We in the United States are making a turn toward a healthier economy. We have bottomed out, as they say in the United States, and are slowly beginning an upturn in our economy.

We fully recognize that the economy of the United States is an integral part of the economy throughout the world, and particularly that of Western Europe. It is my intention, on behalf of the United States, to work very, very closely with you in Germany and the other European countries to make sure that the progress we are making is also progress that can come in Europe as well as the rest of the world.

We, of course, are on our way to the meet-



ing in Helsinki where 35 nations will get together on the CSCE arrangements or agreements.

I believe that the Helsinki meeting can and will be a further step in achieving what we all want—the betterment of relations between East and West.

I am optimistic that the results achieved in Helsinki will be for the better. I look forward to my participation as a result of the long negotiations that have taken place.

Let me conclude my observations by saying that in the field of energy, in the economic field, in the political field, in the defense field, the policies of the United States will be closely aligned with those of your government, Mr. Chancellor, and I look forward to the further discussions that I will have with you here, as well as in Helsinki, so that your country and mine and the rest of the world will be the beneficiaries.

Thank you very, very much.

#### Questions and Answers

*Q. What made the first meeting run a half hour past the scheduled time?*

*President Ford:* The question was, what made the first meeting run 30 minutes past the scheduled time?

I guess the best answer is that we got so intrigued with the discussions on the various important matters that we forgot to look at the clock.

*Chancellor Schmidt:* Or the coffee was that good.

*Q. Did you discuss the Turkey situation?*

*President Ford:* Yes, I did bring the Chancellor up to date on the very unfortunate development in the House of Representatives last week. I indicated to the Chancellor that we were deeply disappointed and that we were working with some of the leaders in the House of Representatives trying to see whether or not it would be possible in this coming week for the House of Representa-

tives to reconsider the action that it took last week.

We have not come to any conclusion in that regard but we, of course—the Secretary of State and myself—are not only disappointed with the action, but I believe the American people will now see the net result of that action with the closing of the American bases in Turkey and with the Cyprus negotiations probably set back.

I am deeply disturbed and we will maximize our effort, as I told the Chancellor, to try and get a change in the House of Representatives.

*Q. What action are you hoping to get?*

*President Ford:* We have not come to any conclusion on that, because we haven't firmed up any course of action with the Democratic leadership in the House of Representatives; and of course they are crucial in this situation.

*Q. Did the Chancellor make any specific recommendation in the economic field?*

*President Ford:* The question is, did the Chancellor make any recommendations in the economic field? The Chancellor and I agreed that it was vitally important that the economic policies of Germany and the European Community be integrated with our own economic policies.

We will further discuss in the meetings that are coming up more of the specifics, but we did exchange information as to the circumstances not only in the United States but in Germany, and later today we will probably talk about what we might do for the further improvement of reciprocal efforts in this area.

*Chancellor Schmidt:* Mr. President, may I add a footnote to that one, please.

The President and I, as well as President Giscard [of France] and Prime Minister Wilson [of the United Kingdom], will have the opportunity in Helsinki to hold a special meeting with foreign ministers of these four countries; and the discussions of the last

few days, especially this morning's discussion, have been particularly useful, serving among other things to prepare for that meeting. And at every opportunity cooperation in overcoming the world economic recession will play a central role.

We European nations and the governments of these European nations know that the world economic recession can only be overcome if it is overcome on an international basis in the same manner by all participants—above all, when it is tackled in the same way by the industrial countries of the world. And that means that the economy of the United States of America—by far the largest, the most efficient and, as far as world trade is concerned, one of the most important economies, and as far as the finance and currency system of the world is concerned, by far the most important—that overcoming this worldwide recession is only possible if this most important economy of the Western world leads the way.

The overview which the American President has personally given us in regard to the latest developments in the American economy is one of the brightest aspects of the future development. But we don't, by any means, want to exaggerate our hope and our optimism; rather, we are both conscious of the fact that we—together with our other partners—will still have considerable difficulties to overcome.

*Q. Mr. President, are you discussing offset during these talks?*

*President Ford:* The question is, are we discussing offset?

I am sure that we will, but we haven't come to that point as yet.

*Q. Mr. President, you have expressed your satisfaction with the result of the CSCE talks in Helsinki. Will you push forward now to get results at last in Vienna in the MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions] talks?*

*President Ford:* The MBFR talks in Vienna have been stalled for the last few months. I think once the CSCE meeting has been held in Helsinki we can now concentrate on

the MBFR talks. And of course in my discussions with Chancellor Schmidt we will see how we can coordinate our efforts in this very important area.

#### REMARKS TO MILITARY PERSONNEL, KIRSCHGOENS, JULY 27 (EXCERPT)<sup>3</sup>

I deeply appreciate the very high standards of performance and morale of our NATO forces as represented by the Germans and Americans here today, and I thank the Federal Republic and the State of Hesse for the warm, warm hospitality extended to me and to all Americans who are stationed here.

There is a very deep satisfaction for me in this meeting with all of you today. It is most rewarding to see firsthand this evidence of our two countries cooperating within NATO and for the common defense. It is you, together with the other forces of the alliance, who are making our collective security a reality.

As we pursue peace together, I am aware that not all of the problems in Europe and the world have been solved, and I am convinced that under present circumstances the best guarantee for peace is a very, very strong defense.

As President, speaking here in the presence of our allies, I affirm today that I will not allow our armed forces to be weakened under any circumstances. You deserve the best. You deserve the very best of equipment. And you deserve the strongest support of the citizens that you defend.

Chancellor Schmidt and myself will travel to Helsinki in the next few days to attend the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It is not by accident, let me assure you, that I stopped here first to consult with our allies, nor that I now affirm our commitment to Berlin.

<sup>3</sup> Made by President Ford at the annual picnic sponsored by the 1st Brigade, 3d Armored Division, and the German 13th Panzer Brigade; for the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Aug. 4, 1975, p. 792.

I assure the people of Berlin from this military base, which you soldiers call "The Rock," that I stand behind this rock and behind our commitment to the freedom of Berlin.

Secretary Kissinger spoke for me when he affirmed our policy on his recent visit to Berlin. And our national unity and determination in this regard were voiced there earlier this year by Senators Humphrey and Scott.

Soldiers, of course, do not underestimate the importance of your mission and its meaning for the entire world. You are the defenders of peace, and you have my full and unqualified support and respect.

#### TOASTS BY PRESIDENT FORD AND FEDERAL GERMAN PRESIDENT SCHEEL, JULY 27<sup>4</sup>

##### President Scheel

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford, ladies and gentlemen: A few weeks ago at the splendid reception before the White House in Washington, I expressed the wish to soon be able to greet you here in Germany. To my delight, the international conference calendar has helped to make this wish come true so soon.

Today you are here. I bid you, Mrs. Ford, and your associates a warm welcome. You do know that you are highly appreciated and highly welcome guests in our country.

We know, ladies and gentlemen, that wherever the President of the United States goes in the world, his office follows him—the White House. My house has the color in common with yours. It is white, undoubtedly. However, it is too small to accommodate a festive party in your honor. This is why I invited you to this white boat.

Outside the banks are gliding by; things are in motion like the river. We may have

been cruising against the current. We have just turned around. At any rate, the further we go together on this truly European stream, the brighter the views.

This corresponds to a political hope and to a political goal. It is our hope, it is our goal, to create a solidly founded, strong Europe which, together with the United States of America, will secure a future of peace and freedom. The closer we come to Europe, the brighter the prospects.

Much has been achieved. The British people have clearly and for good decided in favor of Europe. European political cooperation has pointed up new possibilities to develop Europe institutionally. Yet much remains to be done.

All Western countries are struggling with economic problems at the present. But more and more, the view is gaining ground that individual countries by themselves cannot master these difficulties.

The talks which the Federal Government has conducted in the course of these past days make it clear that the willingness to make common efforts is on the rise.

Europe is moving in the direction of coordinating its different economic policies. This is another important step toward progress. Out of these very difficulties we gain insights and strengths to overcome these difficulties.

Europe by itself will not be able to master the economic problems of today. We can only be successful if we coordinate our efforts with those of the United States of America, and this cannot but strengthen the awareness of the benefits and the purpose of the Atlantic partnership on both sides of the Atlantic.

From the beginning, Atlantic cooperation was a requirement, as we all realize, for our security policy. Today, it is just as well, and in particular, a requirement for our economic policy.

Mr. President, you have come to our country at a very significant time. In a few days in Helsinki, the final phase of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe will open. The negotiations in Geneva have

<sup>4</sup> Given at a dinner hosted by President Scheel on board the M.S. *Drachenfels*; President Scheel spoke in German (text from White House press release (Bonn)).

set an example of the opportunities for constructive Western cooperation.

The negotiations have also shown—and your presence in Helsinki, Mr. President, will impressively demonstrate to the entire world—that America and Europe are inseparably linked, that one cannot talk about security and cooperation in Europe without including the United States. The Atlantic alliance is part and parcel of Western Europe.

The Helsinki Conference should constitute another step toward détente. The documents to be signed provide a frame which needs to be filled in the future by agreements and concrete behavior. Each signatory state will then be able to demonstrate what it understands by détente.

This is the yardstick by which it will be measured. Nobody could wish more fervently than the Germans that the hopes tied to the conference may be fulfilled.

Yet it is clear to us that no conference can guarantee our security. The Atlantic alliance remains the foundation of our security.

Mr. President, you have already visited with your compatriots in the Federal Republic. The presence of the American soldiers in the Federal Republic and in Berlin is the clearest and the most important expression of the fact that the security of the United States and of Europe do belong together inseparably.

For the West, there is only one security. The Federal Republic contributes to the best of its ability to safeguard the common security. The American contribution, however, is irreplaceable and will remain so. Even a comprehensive European union, which is the goal of the member states of the European Community, cannot do without this transatlantic link.

We owe thanks to the American Government for having held fast to this policy unwaveringly. This is why over 400,000 American citizens live among us as soldiers, civilian employees, and families.

You can be sure, Mr. President, that we, citizens and authorities alike, do what we can to make your compatriots feel at home

with us. They are our friends; they are our guests and the good comrades of the German soldiers.

Nevertheless they do live in a different country with a different language, and different customs, and over the long run that is not easy.

Therefore, permit me, Mr. President, to say to you, the highest representative of the American people, and to all Americans who are here in Germany for reasons of our common security, very simply and very warmly, thank you.

Mr. President, as you can see, we have many reasons to be glad about your visit. It makes us happy. Once again, a cordial welcome to the white boat.

#### **President Ford**

President Scheel and distinguished guests: Mr. President, you have spoken most generously and most farsightedly, as well as most eloquently, and I am pleased and honored to respond to such a gracious Rhineland on this beautiful river, which has witnessed the growth of German-American cooperation.

I think there is something especially significant that an American President is on this wonderful river that includes from the headwaters in Switzerland, to France, to Germany, the Netherlands, and to the Atlantic.

There is something that seems to bind us all together, and I could not help but notice during the day, and as we have been sailing here tonight, many passing ships, some bearing flags of different nations, that this great river, as a result, symbolizes our hope for expanding the flow of peaceful commerce and the exchange throughout the world.

Just as many solid bridges span the majestic Rhine, strong links of friendship unite our two nations. I experienced today, Mr. President, this friendship anew when I met with Chancellor Schmidt and his associates, the distinguished leaders of your government, and received the very warm welcome of so many citizens of your great country.

As we all know, our relationship is based

upon a tradition that is as old as the United States itself, which now approaches its 200th year of freedom and democracy.

Every American schoolchild knows how General von Steuben came to help George Washington win the American Revolution. All Americans are extremely proud of the infusion of German talents throughout the years into America, a nation of immigrants.

Today I had the privilege, as you mentioned, to visit the military forces of our country and of yours, working in partnership, playing in partnership, and enjoying a family relationship in partnership.

It was an inspiring afternoon for me to meet the officers, the men, on both sides, the German as well as the American. It is encouraging to me that they are working with a common zeal for a common purpose.

The commitment and the endeavor are very fundamental, as we know, to the security of the United States, to the Federal Republic and to Berlin, and to the entire Atlantic alliance.

I thank you for the very, very warm welcome which the German people have extended to me, to Mrs. Ford, and to our son Jack, but also to every American stationed here in the German Republic and their families.

Few people are more united than Americans and Germans in their support of the principles of independence, freedom, and self-determination.

Today we speak of both the East as well as the West with new emphasis on a common future. Much effort has gone into increasing contacts and cooperation among the peoples of Europe. We have made some significant advances.

The forthcoming meeting, as you have mentioned, in Helsinki offers hope for future progress. Obviously, we have much further to go.

Americans do look forward to continued cooperation, not only with the Federal Republic but with the peoples of Europe as a whole.

Mr. President, a little more than a month has passed since we enjoyed you and Mrs.

Scheel being in Washington and visiting us at the White House. The spirit prevailing among us today strongly reaffirms the genuine and continuing friendly relationship, the close relationship between our countries, our peoples, and our government.

If you will raise your glass with me, I would like to propose a particularly cordial *prosit* to President Scheel and to the Federal Republic of Germany.

## ARRIVAL, WARSAW, JULY 28

White House press release (Warsaw) dated July 28

### First Secretary Gierek <sup>5</sup>

The Right Honorable Mr. President, Madame Ford, ladies and gentlemen: On behalf of the highest authorities of the Polish People's Republic, in the name of our people, I wish to welcome you, Mr. President, on the Polish soil. We are extending to you a welcome of most genuine cordiality, while I myself am particularly satisfied over our meeting again.

We are pleased to be able to play host to Mrs. Ford and persons accompanying you, and among them the Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger. The doors of Warsaw and of the entire country of ours stay wide open for you with traditional Polish hospitality.

This is not your first visit to Poland, but it is for the first time that you are visiting us as President of the United States of America, as a leader of the nation which for over two centuries our people have been linked to with numerous and strong ties, mutual friendship, and respect.

In your person, Mr. President, we welcome and extend greetings to the American people, with whom we desire to develop cooperation and share the happiness of peace.

During my visit to the United States, which indeed has left indelible memories of the hospitality accorded to me there, I found that desire shared on both sides, and that you, sir, are personally the advocate of

<sup>5</sup> First Secretary Gierek spoke in Polish.

friendly cooperation of our peoples and states. Your present visit to Poland is about the most eloquent testimony of that.

We are glad that while in this country you will be able to acquaint yourself with the great record of achievement of the Polish People's Republic, with her dynamic development, with our plans for the near and more distant future.

I am sure you will find, Mr. President, that the Polish people, who have rebuilt their country from the ravages of war with toil and self-sacrifice, are working perseveringly to build a strong, modern, and prosperous country worthy of both its best traditions and of its Socialist ideals and aspirations of today.

I am sure you will find also, Mr. President, that the most profound desire of our people is peace. You will see no ruins of Warsaw, which 30 years ago proved to be such a shocking experience to one of your predecessors, General Eisenhower.

Our capital has been restored to life, beautiful and modern. Yet the memory of the immensity of sacrifice and suffering remains, as does the desire impressed upon the hearts and minds—no more war.

Our people—and according to their will, also the authorities of the Polish People's Republic—conceive of the establishment of lasting peace as of the most important and supreme cause.

We are pleased that we are receiving you, Mr. President, on the eve of the final phase of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and only soon after the Soviet-American cooperation, one of paramount importance to the world peace, has been reaffirmed and the joint Soyuz-Apollo project crowned as it was with such a magnificent success.

You are arriving in Poland, Mr. President, at a time when the process of international détente is acquiring new dimensions, a process which our country, along with her Socialist allies and friends, deem to be one of great importance.

We are greeting you as a leader of the great nation which plays its important role in the world of today, and we trust it will be

making an even greater contribution to the cause of strengthening peace.

We are happy to see you in Poland, Mr. President. We are happy to see Mrs. Ford in Poland.

#### **President Ford**

Mr. First Secretary, Mrs. Gierek, Mr. Chairman of the Council of State, Mr. Prime Minister, distinguished hosts: Mrs. Ford and I are deeply grateful for your very cordial words of welcome. It is a great privilege and pleasure for me to return to Poland. Mrs. Ford and I had the privilege and honor of being here a number of years ago and spent some 11 days in Warsaw and in Poland, and we have fond memories of that wonderful experience.

During the 16 years since my first visit to your country, the friendly ties between our peoples have developed in a way that should provide us much mutual encouragement.

Building on a foundation laid nearly 200 years ago, when courageous Poles came to our shores and helped make American independence a reality, we have worked hard to broaden the scope of our common interests.

I am deeply gratified by the expansion of contacts between our two countries, by the rapid growth in trade, and by the new forms of bilateral cooperation which have been able to develop between our two nations.

During your visit to Washington last October, Mr. First Secretary, we signed the joint agreements of principles of U.S.-Polish relations, the joint statement of the development of economic and industrial cooperation, and our two countries, Mr. Secretary, entered into agreements on coal research, health, environmental protection, the avoidance of double taxation, and the cooperation in science and technology.

These agreements are the latest evidence, Mr. Secretary, of our ability to work together to improve the lives of our peoples, and I hope that we can achieve even greater cooperation during this visit.

I look forward to our discussions, Mr. Secretary. I am confident that in reviewing our relationships we can strengthen the tradition-

al friendship between our two peoples and improve the prospects for world peace.

I am also very anxious to share our thoughts about the future and to hear your views, Mr. Secretary, as we both prepare to participate in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki.

I believe that we will find areas in which both our countries can further contribute to the achievement of lasting peace and progress among all nations.

In conclusion, let me express the greetings I bring with me from all Americans, including the millions of our citizens who are so proud of their Polish background and their Polish heritage.

*Niech żyje Polska.* [Long Live Poland!]

#### TOASTS BY PRESIDENT FORD AND FIRST SECRETARY GIEREK, JULY 28<sup>6</sup>

##### First Secretary Gierek

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary of State, and ladies and gentlemen: Ten months ago when taking leave of you, Mr. President, in the Capital of the United States, I said that while retaining in my grateful memory our Washington meeting and talks, I would be looking forward to having your visit to Warsaw.

Today I am both honored and pleased to receive you in my country. Our people regard your visit, Mr. President, as a confirmation of the traditional friendly attitude of the American people toward Poland and the inaugural of further development of cooperation between our two countries.

The people of Poland see in it, also, an evidence of your personal involvement in the strengthening of Polish-American ties. Poles do appreciate it—of which they have given an expression in the welcome accorded to you.

It is with utmost pleasure that we are receiving Mrs. Ford in Poland. We are happy to have you here, Mr. Secretary of State,

<sup>6</sup> Given at a luncheon hosted by First Secretary Gierek at Warsaw; First Secretary Gierek spoke in Polish (text from White House press release (Warsaw)).

Dr. Kissinger. Your outstanding role in the American foreign policy is well known to us. We are glad, Mr. President, to be able to play host to all your collaborators who have come on this visit.

Mr. President, you are paying your visit to Poland just before a great event in the life of Europe—before the final decisive phase of the Conference on Security and Cooperation. Indeed, it is of symptomatic significance.

It was Poland that some years ago put forward the idea of such a meeting and jointly with her allies in the political and defensive Warsaw Treaty launched an initiative to convene it.

These days, we are about to leave for Helsinki to approve and sign the decisions of the conference which is the common achievement and success of all the participating states of our continent, of the United States and Canada. The decisions of the conference shall be of paramount importance for the consolidation of peace in Europe, which rests on the foundation of the inviolability of the political and territorial order established as a result of the victory of nations over nazism, of the historic Potsdam decisions and post-war development.

The guiding idea of those decisions is strengthening of the feeling of security and development of international cooperation embracing all fields of life.

Europe has had a long and stormy history in which peaceful development interwove with acute conflicts and conquests of other continents. The two World Wars were unleashed on its territory. Today, both a historic necessity and an invaluable chance have emerged to establish lasting peace and make an active contribution of the whole of Europe to constructing universal peace.

That task lies in the vital and supreme interest of all European nations. Each of them can and should make its own contribution to the cause of peace and cooperation.

A particular role in this regard is played by our ally the Soviet Union. Whereas 30 years ago it carried the heaviest burden of struggle against nazism, today it spares no

effort to promote development of the process of détente and consolidate international security.

Likewise, the contribution of the United States is of great importance. Your country, Mr. President, lent its assistance to the peoples of Europe in their struggle against forces of aggression and barbarity. Today it can do much for the establishment of lasting peace on our continent.

We are fully appreciative of the engagement of the American Government in securing the success of the European conference. We are aware of the great weight of cooperation of the Soviet Union and the United States to save mankind from a new world war, to successfully shape the international situation.

We rejoice at the constructive dialogue between you, Mr. President, and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Leonid Brezhnev.

A turn for détente represents an outstanding beneficial change for all nations in their international relations. It is with the later process, with its permanent continuation, that we link our great hopes and growing optimism for the future of Europe and the world at large.

We also link it, Mr. President, with our plans for the further dynamic development of Poland, the implementation of which requires peace and broader cooperation—notable in the economic field—with other countries.

Mr. President, the people of Poland have had a long and very difficult history. Over the last two centuries, its chapters have been covered with heroic struggle for the right to independent existence.

In World War II, in which you too served, sir, showing your patriotism and battlefield gallantry, we lost over 6 million citizens and over 40 percent of our national property. It has been through the self-sacrificial toil of our own people and with the assistance of our unfailing friends, above all, of the Soviet Union, that we raised this country from ruins and have created for Poland a chance for

lasting security development and social progress.

Within her just and inviolable frontiers, linked as she is by the unbreakable alliance with her Socialist friends, Poland is looking forward to the future with confidence and optimism.

We would sincerely wish that our nation, so often harassed by wars and so many a time having to start life anew, could enjoy the blessings of a period of lasting peace. That is precisely what the Polish People's Republic views as her supreme objective of her activities in the international forum.

My country has made its important contribution to creating genuine conditions of security in Europe and to strengthening Europe's peaceful order. It contributed and continues to contribute its share to the process of international détente. Therefore it is with particular satisfaction that we shall welcome the Helsinki charter of European peace and shall actively pursue the implementation of its principles.

Mr. President, our common desire is the further expansion of Polish-American relations. We assess favorably their present state and dynamic growth.

The decisions and agreements which we arrived at in Washington last year have laid down good grounds for expansion of cooperation between our two countries, especially in the economic field. We regard it as a valuable element of the development of our own country and we trust it is likewise beneficial to the United States. Thus there exist favorable circumstances to go still further in its programming in the future.

Mr. President, in 1976 the United States will observe its Bicentennial. A significant contribution to the making and growth of the United States has been made by Poles. The memory of our two peoples is well aligned with dignified figures of Tadeusz Kosciuszko, who fought for the independence of both Poland and the United States.

In later times, hundreds of thousands of Poles who immigrated in search for their work and bread participated in laying the foundations of the American economic po-



tential. Numerous Polish names have permanently entered the history of American sciences and culture.

Today, millions of Americans of Polish extraction, as good citizens of the United States, work for its development and also maintain their emotional ties with the country of their forefathers. We take great satisfaction that ever more frequently they visit Poland and take pride in her accomplishments. They are surely glad with the present development of Polish-American relations, which you, Mr. President, promote with all your heart and determination.

I wish to raise this toast to your good health, Mr. President, to the good health of Mrs. Ford, to the good health of the Secretary of State, to the good health of all persons accompanying you, for the further successful development of Polish-American relations, to the success of the Helsinki Conference, to the successes in consolidating détente and peace.

#### **President Ford**

Mr. First Secretary, Mrs. Gierek, ladies and gentlemen: I am delighted on this occasion to be your guest, along with my son, and we regret that unfortunately Mrs. Ford could not be here, but she will, I am sure, be joining us later.

It is a great pleasure for me to return to this very great country in the center of Europe, a country which is so rich in tradition and so important to the contemporary world. I welcome this opportunity to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to friendship with Poland. And I am determined to strengthen that friendship.

When we met in Washington last October, Mr. Secretary, you and I pledged our countries to acquire a better knowledge of their respective achievements and values. Both nations can take great satisfaction in progress toward that goal. We have made vitally important advances in our bilateral relations.

This is in keeping with the spirit of the documents that we signed during the First Secretary's visit, and I am pleased to cite the

continuing efforts of both sides to increase trade and commerce, the visits and exchanges between our scientists, industrial and mining specialists, and agricultural experts, and the educational and cultural programs which each year enable more Poles and more Americans to know each other and to exchange ideas.

The United States recently presented the World of Franklin and Jefferson Bicentennial Exhibition in Warsaw. It vividly depicted America's past and Poland's long and close association with us.

You may remember one of Benjamin Franklin's remarks featured in the exhibition. According to Benjamin Franklin, human felicity is produced not so much by great pieces of good fortune that seldom happen as by little advantages that occur every day.

We have men and women of great vision in Poland and in America, but we realize that real progress in the relations between countries really comes from the millions who give form as well as substance to the aspirations of their governments.

Distinguished host, ladies and gentlemen, I ask you to join me in a toast to all Polish and American citizens, scholars, scientists, workers, farmers, writers, musicians, and others, who day by day are striving to develop the little advantages so important to the growing friendship between our countries.

At this time, may I offer a toast to you, Mr. Secretary, and to the Polish people.

#### **JOINT STATEMENT SIGNED AT WARSAW JULY 28**

White House press release (Warsaw) dated July 28

As a result of the conversations held by the President of the United States of America, Gerald R. Ford, and the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, Edward Gierek, both sides agreed to the following Joint Statement.

#### **I.**

The President of the United States of America and the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party reaffirm their determination to make their contribution to the

consolidation of détente, to the strengthening of international security, and to the development of bilateral relations to their mutual advantage, as defined in the course of their previous meetings and in accordance with the Joint Statement of Principles of United States-Polish Relations of 1974, as well as other agreements concluded by the two countries in recent years.

The President and the First Secretary welcome with satisfaction the convocation of the final stage of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on July 30th of this year in Helsinki. Both sides consider the convocation of the Conference a positive contribution to the continuing process of international détente and express their hope that it will be regarded as an historic event.

Both sides expressed their will to do all they can so that the results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, contained in the final document, become a genuine and strong stimulus for positively shaping relations among the participant states. They expressed their confidence that the implementation of the decisions by all the participants of the Conference would contribute to the further strengthening of peace in Europe and developing ever broader, all-round cooperation among them. Both sides are in full agreement that security in Europe is indivisible and that it remains closely linked with peace and security in the world as a whole.

Both sides note that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe will be followed up by further meetings at the level of representatives appointed by the ministers for foreign affairs of participant states.

In the course of their exchange of views, both sides fully agreed that efforts to strengthen political détente in Europe should be supplemented by a process of military détente. In this context, the United States of America and the Polish People's Republic attach significant importance to the Vienna talks on the Mutual Reduction of Armed Forces and Armament in Central Europe and Associated Measures and expressed their will to achieve progress in these talks.

The Polish side expressed its full support for the dialogue and development of relations between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.—the two states which bear special responsibility for world peace. The Polish side voiced its belief that in particular the talks and the agreements concerning strategic arms limitation strengthen world peace and provide a sound basis for further limitations and reduction of strategic arms.

Both sides presented their respective views on the effectiveness of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and were in agreement as to the

fundamental importance of the Treaty for preventing the danger of proliferation of these weapons.

They also considered that the Conference on the Law of the Sea was very important for all countries of the world. Both sides expressed themselves in favor of making all possible efforts to bring this Conference to a successful conclusion next year, keeping in mind the just interests of all states.

They also reviewed matters related to the growing need to develop cooperation among states, notably in the field of raw materials, energy, and food. They reaffirmed their will to act, each side according to its own possibilities and priorities, toward alleviating and solving the existing problems. The two sides agreed that as a result of their bilateral cooperation in selected fields of energy, they can considerably contribute to the solution of these problems to the benefit of their own and other peoples.

The President and the First Secretary expressed themselves in favor of continuing, on all levels, efforts to promote international economic cooperation and to remove barriers and obstacles.

Both sides intend to work toward broadening international scientific cooperation. In this respect, the Polish side pointed to the significance of the Apollo-Soyuz program, seeing in it a symbol of the opportunities arising from joint efforts of nations for the good of all mankind in the era of international détente.

The President and the First Secretary confirmed their support for the United Nations and for the objectives and principles set out in its Charter.

The two sides reaffirmed the usefulness of their contacts and consultations to date and reaffirm their readiness to continue them on various levels and in various forums.

## II.

During the talks, the President and the First Secretary reviewed US-Polish bilateral relations, noting with satisfaction the progress achieved, which corresponds to the interests of both nations and is in conformity with the long and rich traditions linking the peoples of the United States and Poland.

The two sides were unanimous in their judgment that the Statements signed on October 8, 1974, during the visit of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, Edward Gierek, to the United States, constitute a solid foundation for the further strengthening of peaceful and friendly cooperation between the United States and Poland and they were happy to note the successful implementation of the respective economic agreements.

Attaching particular weight to the growth of trade exchanges, both leaders considered a further

substantial increase in trade turnover between their two countries to be a feasible, realistic, and desirable goal. Both sides expressed their intention to act jointly in removing difficulties that may arise. They will lend particular support in this respect to the activities of the Joint US-Polish Trade Commission.

Both sides noted the further successful development of financial cooperation between the two countries and recognized its impact on the pace and scope of industrial co-production. They are resolved to encourage further cooperation between the firms and enterprises of both sides.

Emphasizing the great role of scientific and technical cooperation, both sides appraised positively the work done so far in putting into effect the Agreement on Funding of Cooperation in Science and Technology. They also expressed their support for its further expansion, especially in such fields as coal mining and coal processing, the protection of the environment, and transportation.

The two leaders also attached importance to the longstanding tradition of cooperation in the field of health protection, drugs, and biological materials. Under the program, joint research will be continued, including such fields as oncology, health problems related to food and drugs, and planning, delivery, and evaluation of health services, especially those to mothers and children.

The two sides believe that there exist broad possibilities that the traditional field of cooperation between both countries—trade in agricultural products—be broadened and supplemented by scientific and technical cooperation in agriculture, particularly in stockbreeding, production of fodders, technology of food preservation, and production of high-quality varieties of protein.

Mindful of the importance of the rational use of the food resources of the oceans, both sides will continue to cooperate in the field of fishing and maritime economy.

In seeking to broaden relations and contacts between the peoples of the United States and Poland, both sides shall continue to encourage tourism between them. They expressed their interest in further facilitating and developing air transportation between the two countries.

Both sides will encourage and facilitate all exchanges of people between the two nations in order that they may contribute to broader relations and better understanding. They will continue to promote cultural exchanges and will encourage further contacts and cooperation between civic, scientific, sports, and youth organizations, as well as between cities of both countries.

Both sides stressed the significance of historical traditions for the strengthening of friendship be-

tween the two nations. They pointed to the positive role played by Americans of Polish extraction in the enrichment of relations between the United States and Poland.

Both sides agreed that, in the spirit of the traditional friendship between the two nations, they will continue their efforts to solve humanitarian problems affecting their citizens.

### III.

The President of the United States and the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party expressed their profound satisfaction with the conversations they held and voiced their conviction that the results of these talks will be of great significance for further American-Polish cooperation.

WARSAW, July 28, 1975.

GERALD FORD

*President of the United States of America*

EDWARD GIEREK

*First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party*

## JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT KRAKOW JULY 29

White House press release (Krakow) dated July 29

1. The President of the United States of America, Gerald R. Ford, and Mrs. Ford made an official visit to Poland July 28-29, 1975, at the invitation of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, Edward Gierek, issued on behalf of the highest authorities of the Polish People's Republic. The President was accompanied by the Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Henry A. Kissinger.

2. During the visit, the President held talks with First Secretary Gierek.

3. Plenary talks were also held with the participation of:

From the American side: The President of the United States of America, Gerald R. Ford; the Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Henry A. Kissinger; Ambassador of the United States of America in Warsaw Richard T. Davies; Deputy Assistant to the President Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft; Counselor of the Department of State Helmut Sonnenfeldt; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Arthur A. Hartman; Senior Staff Member of the National Security Council A. Denis Clift, and Di-

rector Nicholas G. Andrews of the Office of Eastern European Affairs of the Department of State.

From the Polish side: The First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, Edward Gierek; the Chairman of the Council of State, Henryk Jablonski; the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Piotr Jaroszewicz; the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stefan Olszowski; Member of the Secretariat and Head of the Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party Ryszard Frelek; Director of the Chancellery of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party Jerzy Waszczuk; First Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission of the Council of Ministers Kazimierz Secomski; Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Romuald Spasowski; Undersecretary of State in the Office of the Council of Ministers and press spokesman of the Government Włodzimierz Janiurek; Ambassador of the Polish People's Republic in Washington Witold Trampeczynski; Director of Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Jan Kinast.

4. The Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Henry A. Kissinger, held talks with Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Olszowski.

5. President Ford and the persons accompanying him viewed Warsaw and acquainted themselves with its reconstruction and development. The President of the City, Jerzy Majowski, accompanied them.

6. On the second day of the visit, the President of the United States of America went to Oswiecim (Auschwitz), where he laid a wreath at the International Monument and signed the Memorial Book.

7. President Ford visited Krakow. He was greeted in the central marketplace by the President of the City of Krakow, Jerzy Pekala. The President of the United States made a short speech to the assembled citizens. The President also visited the American Children's Hospital in Poland, at Prokocim near Krakow, which was built with the support of American funds.

8. The discussions and meetings which were held between the President and the First Secretary and their advisers took place in a friendly and constructive atmosphere and were characterized by mutual striving further to develop and strengthen relations between the United States and Poland. They reviewed U.S.-Polish relations and discussed international matters of mutual interest.

9. As a result of their talks, the President of the United States of America, Gerald R. Ford, and the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, Edward Gierek, signed a Joint Statement on July 28.

10. President and Mrs. Ford expressed their gratitude to First Secretary and Mrs. Gierek for the cordial hospitality arranged for them. They

were grateful to all the Poles who gave them such a warm reception, traditional in Poland.

11. The President and the First Secretary expressed their conviction and desire for future visits at the highest level between the leaders of the two countries which would strengthen U.S.-Polish relations still more. It was agreed that specific arrangements would be made through diplomatic channels.

12. Warsaw, July 29, 1975.

GERALD FORD

*President of the United States of America*

EDWARD GIEREK

*First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party*

## ARRIVAL, HELSINKI, JULY 29

White House press release (Helsinki) dated July 29

President Kekkonen, ladies and gentlemen: Mrs. Ford and our son Jack join me in expressing our very great pleasure in being in Finland on this occasion. I extend to the Finnish Government and to the Finnish people the warm friendship and the warm admiration of the United States and all Americans.

Finland is a most appropriate host for this final stage of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. I join the other participants so that together we will take another step in the building of a peaceful, cooperative, and mutually beneficial relationship among all of the countries of Europe.

This meeting in Helsinki can give new impetus to the process of détente. The provisions of the document we will sign must be translated into policies and actions by the participating states if we are to realize the promises of greater security and cooperation in Europe.

The United States will participate fully in this process. American security and well-being are tied to the security and to the stability of Europe.

While our agenda for the next few days will be full, Mr. President, I look forward with pleasure to seeing you and enjoying the renowned hospitality of Helsinki and Finland.

Thank you very much.

**REMARKS BY PRESIDENT FORD AND GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV, JULY 30<sup>7</sup>**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what were your talks about?*

*General Secretary Brezhnev:* Our relations with America. You know, we have different kinds of relations—commercial, political. We centered our attention on the questions of strategic disarmament. We had very little time, so we had not enough time to finish the talks.

On the whole, our talks took place in a businesslike, friendly atmosphere.

*Q. Mr. President, what were you talking with the General Secretary?*

*President Ford:* I felt the bilateral discussions, the discussions concerning strategic arms limitation, the total atmosphere, was very constructive. It was businesslike, very friendly, and I am sure that when we meet again on Saturday further progress will materialize.

*Q. Mr. General Secretary, you seem to be in an unusually good mood. Are you pleased to see the Security Conference beginning today?*

*General Secretary Brezhnev:* What do you think?

*Q. What do you think this conference will accomplish for the world?*

*General Secretary Brezhnev:* What would you like it to accomplish, madam?

*Q. I asked you the question. It is not fair to turn the question around.*

*General Secretary Brezhnev:* I want peace and tranquillity to reign in Europe. I want all the nations of Europe to live at peace with each other, not to interfere in each other's domestic affairs where the sovereignty of each nation of Europe is assured. Is that a little achievement?

*Q. You think there will be no interference with borders after this?*

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<sup>7</sup> Made to the press following a meeting at the U.S. Embassy residence at Helsinki; General Secretary Brezhnev spoke in Russian (text from White House press release (Helsinki)).

*General Secretary Brezhnev:* I think so, yes.

*Q. Mr. President, what are you wanting from this Helsinki Conference?*

*President Ford:* I believe that the peace in Europe will be enhanced. I believe that the overall peace of the world will be encouraged and broadened. And it is my judgment that progress will be the net result.

*The press:* Thank you, Mr. President.

**REMARKS BY PRESIDENT FORD AND TURKISH PRIME MINISTER DEMIREL, JULY 31<sup>8</sup>**

*Prime Minister Demirel:* We have reviewed our relations with the United States, Turkish-U.S. relations, and as far as Turkey is concerned, these relations are very valuable and we will do our best not to spoil these relations.

*President Ford:* Let me reemphasize that I will continue my efforts to remove any roadblocks between the United States and Turkey because we feel good relations with Turkey are of utmost importance to Turkey and the United States and to the free world, to the world as a whole.

*Q. What are the possibilities of keeping the monitoring equipment going in the bases in Turkey, the American radio?*

*Prime Minister Demirel:* For the time being, we have stopped the activities, as you know.

*Q. What are the possibilities of starting them again?*

*Prime Minister Demirel:* We will see.

*Q. What does it depend upon?*

*Prime Minister Demirel:* I cannot tell you right now.

*President Ford:* Good luck this morning.

*The press:* Thank you, sir.

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<sup>8</sup> Made to the press following a breakfast meeting at the U.S. Embassy residence (text from White House press release (Helsinki)).

## ADDRESS TO THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, AUGUST 1

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated August 11

Mr. Chairman [Walter Kieber, Head of Government of Liechtenstein], my distinguished colleagues: May I begin by expressing to the Governments of Finland and Switzerland, which have been superb hosts for the several phases of this conference, my gratitude and that of my associates for their efficiency and hospitality.

Particularly to you, President Kekkonen, I must convey to the people of the Republic of Finland, on behalf of the 214 million people of the United States of America, a reaffirmation of the longstanding affection and admiration which all my countrymen hold for your brave and beautiful land.

We are bound together by the most powerful of all ties, our fervent love for freedom and independence, which knows no homeland but the human heart. It is a sentiment as enduring as the granite rock on which this city stands and as moving as the music of Sibelius. Our visit here, though short, has brought us a deeper appreciation of the pride, industry, and friendliness which Americans always associate with the Finnish nation.

The nations assembled here have kept the general peace in Europe for 30 years. Yet there have been too many narrow escapes from major conflict. There remains, to this day, the urgent issue of how to construct a just and lasting peace for all peoples.

I have not come across the Atlantic to say what all of us already know—that nations now have the capacity to destroy civilization and therefore all our foreign policies must have as their one supreme objective the prevention of a thermonuclear war. Nor have I come to dwell upon the hard realities of continuing ideological differences, political rivalries, and military competition that persist among us.

I have come to Helsinki as a spokesman for a nation whose vision has always been forward, whose people have always demanded that the future be brighter than the past, and whose united will and purpose at

this hour is to work diligently to promote peace and progress not only for ourselves but for all mankind.

I am simply here to say to my colleagues: We owe it to our children, to the children of all continents, not to miss any opportunity, not to mangle for one minute, not to spare ourselves or allow others to shirk in the monumental task of building a better and a safer world.

The American people, like the people of Europe, know well that mere assertions of good will, passing changes in the political mood of governments, laudable declarations of principles, are not enough. But if we proceed with care, with commitment to real progress, there is now an opportunity to turn our peoples' hopes into realities.

In recent years, nations represented here have sought to ease potential conflicts. But much more remains to be done before we prematurely congratulate ourselves.

Military competition must be controlled. Political competition must be restrained. Crises must not be manipulated or exploited for unilateral advantages that could lead us again to the brink of war. The process of negotiation must be sustained, not at a snail's pace, but with demonstrated enthusiasm and visible progress.

Nowhere are the challenges and the opportunities greater and more evident than in Europe. That is why this conference brings us all together. Conflict in Europe shakes the world. Twice in this century we have paid dearly for this lesson; at other times, we have come perilously close to calamity. We dare not forget the tragedy and the terror of those times.

Peace is not a piece of paper.

But lasting peace is at least possible today because we have learned from the experiences of the last 30 years that peace is a process requiring mutual restraint and practical arrangements.

This conference is a part of that process—a challenge, not a conclusion. We face unresolved problems of military security in Europe; we face them with very real differences in values and in aims. But if we deal with them with careful preparation, if we

focus on concrete issues, if we maintain forward movement, we have the right to expect real progress.

The era of confrontation that has divided Europe since the end of the Second World War may now be ending. There is a new perception and a shared perception of a change for the better, away from confrontation and toward new possibilities for secure and mutually beneficial cooperation. That is what we all have been saying here. I welcome and I share these hopes for the future.

The postwar policy of the United States has been consistently directed toward the rebuilding of Europe and the rebirth of Europe's historic identity. The nations of the West have worked together for peace and progress throughout Europe. From the very start, we have taken the initiative by stating clear goals and areas for negotiation.

We have sought a structure of European relations tempering rivalry with restraint, power with moderation, building upon the traditional bonds that link us with old friends, and reaching out to forge new ties with former and potential adversaries.

In recent years, there have been some substantial achievements.

We see the Four-Power agreement on Berlin of 1971 as the end of a perennial crisis that on at least three occasions brought the world to the brink of doom.

The agreements between the Federal Republic of Germany and the states of Eastern Europe and the related intra-German accords enable Central Europe and the world to breathe easier.

The start of East-West talks on mutual and balanced force reductions demonstrate a determination to deal with military security problems of the Continent.

The 1972 treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union to limit antiballistic missiles and the interim agreement limiting strategic offensive arms were the first solid breakthroughs in what must be a continuing long-term process of limiting strategic nuclear arsenals.

I profoundly hope that this conference will spur further practical and concrete results. It affords a welcome opportunity to widen

the circle of those countries involved in easing tensions between East and West.

Participation in the work of détente and participation in the benefits of détente must be everybody's business, in Europe and elsewhere. But détente can succeed only if everybody understands what détente actually is:

*First*, détente is an evolutionary process, not a static condition. Many formidable challenges yet remain.

*Second*, the success of détente, of the process of détente, depends on new behavior patterns that give life to all our solemn declarations. The goals we are stating today are the yardstick by which our performance will be measured.

The people of all Europe—and, I assure you, the people of North America—are thoroughly tired of having their hopes raised and then shattered by empty words and unfulfilled pledges. We had better say what we mean and mean what we say, or we will have the anger of our citizens to answer.

While we must not expect miracles, we can, and we do, expect steady progress that comes in steps—steps that are related to each other, that link our actions with words in various areas of our relations.

*Finally*, there must be an acceptance of mutual obligation. Détente, as I have often said, must be a two-way street. Tensions cannot be eased by one side alone. Both sides must want détente and work to achieve it. Both sides must benefit from it.

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues, this extraordinary gathering in Helsinki proves that all our peoples share a concern for Europe's future and for a better and more peaceful world. But what else does it prove? How shall we assess the results?

Our delegations have worked long and hard to produce documents which restate noble and praiseworthy political principles. They spell out guidelines for national behavior and international cooperation.

But every signatory should know that if these are to be more than the latest chapter in a long and sorry volume of unfulfilled declarations, every party must be dedicated to making them come true.

These documents which we will sign rep-

resent another step—how long or short a step only time will tell—in the process of détente and reconciliation in Europe. Our peoples will be watching and measuring our progress. They will ask how these noble sentiments are being translated into actions that bring about a more secure and just order in the daily lives of each of our nations and its citizens.

The documents produced here represent compromises, like all international negotiations, but these principles we have agreed upon are more than the lowest common denominator of governmental positions:

—They affirm the most fundamental human rights: liberty of thought, conscience, and faith; the exercise of civil and political rights; the rights of minorities.

—They call for a freer flow of information, ideas, and people; greater scope for the press; cultural and educational exchange; family reunification; the right to travel and to marriage between nationals of different states; and for the protection of the priceless heritage of our diverse cultures.

—They offer wide areas for greater cooperation: trade, industrial production, science and technology, the environment, transportation, health, space, and the oceans.

—They reaffirm the basic principles of relations between states: nonintervention, sovereign equality, self-determination, territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers, and the possibility of change by peaceful means.

The United States gladly subscribes to this document because we subscribe to every one of these principles.

Almost 200 years ago, the United States of America was born as a free and independent nation. The descendants of Europeans who proclaimed their independence in America expressed in that declaration a decent respect for the opinions of mankind and asserted not only that all men are created equal but they are endowed with inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

The founders of my country did not

merely say that all Americans should have these rights, but all men everywhere should have these rights. And these principles have guided the United States of America throughout its two centuries of nationhood. They have given hopes to millions in Europe and on every continent.

I have been asked why I am here today.

I am here because I believe, and my countrymen believe, in the interdependence of Europe and North America, indeed in the interdependence of the entire family of man.

I am here because the leaders of 34 other governments are here—the states of Europe and of our good neighbor Canada, with whom we share an open border of 5,526 miles along which there stands not a single armed soldier and across which our two peoples have moved in friendship and mutual respect for 160 years.

I can say without fear of contradiction that there is not a single people represented here whose blood does not flow in the veins of Americans and whose culture and traditions have not enriched the heritage which we Americans prize so highly.

When two centuries ago the United States of America issued a declaration of high principles, the cynics and doubters of that day jeered and scoffed. Yet, 11 long years later our independence was won and the stability of our Republic was really achieved through the incorporation of the same principles in our Constitution.

But those principles, though they are still being perfected, remain the guiding lights of an American policy. And the American people are still dedicated, as they were then, to a decent respect for the opinions of mankind and to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness for all peoples everywhere.

*To our fellow participants in this conference:* My presence here symbolizes my country's vital interest in Europe's future. Our future is bound with yours. Our economic well-being, as well as our security, is linked increasingly with yours. The distance of geography is bridged by our common heritage and our common destiny. The United States therefore intends to participate fully



in the affairs of Europe and in turning the results of this conference into a living reality.

*To America's allies:* We in the West must vigorously pursue the course upon which we have embarked together, reinforced by one another's strength and mutual confidence. Stability in Europe requires equilibrium in Europe. Therefore I assure you that my country will continue to be a concerned and reliable partner. Our partnership is far more than a matter of formal agreements. It is a reflection of beliefs, traditions, and ties that are of deep significance to the American people. We are proud that these values are expressed in this document.

*To the countries of the East:* The United States considers that the principles on which this conference has agreed are part of the great heritage of European civilization, which we all hold in trust for all mankind. To my country, they are not clichés or empty phrases. We take this work and these words very seriously. We will spare no effort to ease tensions and to solve problems between us, but it is important that you recognize the deep devotion of the American people and their government to human rights and fundamental freedoms and thus to the pledges that this conference has made regarding the freer movement of people, ideas, information.

In building a political relationship between East and West, we face many challenges.

Berlin has a special significance. It has been a flashpoint of confrontation in the past. It can provide an example of peaceful settlement in the future. The United States regards it as a test of détente and of the principles of this conference. We welcome the fact that, subject to Four-Power rights and responsibilities, the results of CSCE apply to Berlin, as they do throughout Europe.

Military stability in Europe has kept the peace. While maintaining that stability, it is now time to reduce substantially the high levels of military forces on both sides. Negotiations now underway in Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions so far have not produced the results for which I had hoped.

The United States stands ready to demonstrate flexibility in moving these negotiations forward, if others will do the same. An agreement that enhances mutual security is feasible—and essential.

The United States also intends to pursue vigorously a further agreement on strategic arms limitations with the Soviet Union. This remains a priority of American policy. General Secretary Brezhnev and I agreed last November in Vladivostok on the essentials of a new accord limiting strategic offensive weapons for the next 10 years. We are moving forward in our bilateral discussions here in Helsinki.

The world faces an unprecedented danger in the spread of nuclear weapons technology. The nations of Europe share a great responsibility for an international solution to this problem. The benefits of peaceful nuclear energy are becoming more and more important. We must find ways to spread these benefits while safeguarding the world against the menace of weapons proliferation.

*To the other nations of Europe represented at this conference:* We value the work you have done here to help bring all of Europe together. Your right to live in peace and independence is one of the major goals of our effort. Your continuing contribution will be indispensable.

*To those nations not participating and to all the peoples of the world:* The solemn obligation undertaken in these documents to promote fundamental rights, economic and social progress, and well-being applies ultimately to all peoples.

Can we truly speak of peace and security without addressing the spread of nuclear weapons in the world or the creation of more sophisticated forms of warfare? Can peace be divisible between areas of tranquillity and regions of conflict?

Can Europe truly flourish if we do not all address ourselves to the evil of hunger in countries less fortunate than we; to the new dimensions of economic and energy issues that underline our own progress; to the dialogue between producers and consumers, between exporters and importers, between in-

dustrial countries and less developed ones? And can there be stability and progress in the absence of justice and fundamental freedoms?

Our people want a better future. Their expectations have been raised by the very real steps that have already been taken—in arms control, political negotiations, and expansion of contacts and economic relations. Our presence here offers them further hope. We must not let them down.

If the Soviet Union and the United States can reach agreement so that our astronauts can fit together the most intricate scientific equipment, work together, and shake hands 137 miles out in space, we as statesmen have an obligation to do as well on earth.

History will judge this conference not by what we say here today, but by what we do tomorrow—not by the promises we make, but by the promises we keep.

#### QUESTION-AND-ANSWER SESSION ABOARD AIR FORCE ONE, AUGUST 2 (EXCERPTS)<sup>9</sup>

*Q. Mr. President, can you tell us where you made progress on SALT, and do you think that we will have a SALT agreement by the end of the year?*

*President Ford:* I don't think I should get into the details of where we made progress, but the two sessions with Mr. Brezhnev and myself resulted in progress. We have referred to the technicians in Geneva our areas of agreement, and they are going to work out the details.

I am encouraged—it was constructive and friendly—and our plans are no different today for any subsequent meetings than they were before.

*Q. Mr. President, "progress" is a bit of a vague term. Can you characterize it as significant progress, minor progress, and specifically do you still hope for an agreement*

<sup>9</sup> Held by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger with the press pool aboard Air Force One en route from Helsinki to Bucharest; for the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Aug. 11, 1975, p. 815.

*to be signed by the end of this year?*

*President Ford:* I would say the progress was encouraging, and that is also a word that could be qualified, but it was encouraging.

It is very difficult, these negotiations, where it requires mutual give-and-take, so if we want the end result, which is peace, a reduction of the arms burden, it requires some understanding on the part of the Soviet Union and its people, myself and our people. So, when I say "encouraging," I think we are edging toward that mutual objective.

*Q. By the end of the year?*

*President Ford:* Hopefully.

*Q. Sir, you say you are sending the technicians to Geneva to complete the areas of agreement. What about the areas in which you have not yet reached agreement? What do you do with them?*

*President Ford:* It is anticipated that Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Gromyko will have at least two meetings where the areas of disagreement can be more clearly refined so that Mr. Brezhnev and myself, when we sit down at a final meeting, in case there has to be a resolution of the hard and final decisions, they will be clear cut and understandable.

*Q. We have been told in the past of three basic areas of disagreement. One was verification, one was cruise missiles, and one was the Backfire bomber. Can you give us a rundown on where now you're making progress and where you still don't have agreement?*

*President Ford:* Those are very important areas, but I think it would be unwise for me to try to identify the particular areas of dispute in those instances. They are very precarious and are crucial points, and this is where Mr. Gromyko and Dr. Kissinger will try to more fully identify the differing positions and give us an opportunity, Mr. Brezhnev and myself, to achieve some kind of an honorable settlement.

*Q. Mr. President, you mentioned the give-and-take of negotiations. At Helsinki, did*

*the Russians demonstrate a willingness to give as much as to take?*

*President Ford:* Yes, I think they, by past performance and the discussions of several days ago as well as today, indicated a forthcoming attitude. They, of course, have the same problem I have. They have to convince their people, as I have to convince the American people, that there is an area which is secure for all of us. So I would indicate that their attitude was forthcoming within their limits and responsibilities.

*Q. Mr. President, are you satisfied that if the bases in Turkey remain closed down that you could still police the SALT One agreement? Are you talking about a new agreement, one that is going to make it much more difficult to police?*

*President Ford:* The closing of the bases in Turkey by the congressional action makes it more difficult for us to adequately gather the necessary intelligence, which involves our security. There are, to some extent, alternative bases; but they would cost a great deal of money, and they would involve some other negotiations between other parties.

I just don't think the Congress understands the problem. They want to close the bases, they want it to cost more money, they want to handicap our capability, and it makes no sense at all.

*Q. Well, you are going to propose building some new bases? Is that what they have to do, give these bases?*

*President Ford:* No, I am going to continue my determined fight to remove the arms embargo, solve the Cyprus question, get our intelligence bases in Turkey reopened in full operation so that our security in the future is as good as it was in the past.

*Q. Mr. President, do you find the Russians are prepared to talk now about negotiating reductions of arms in Europe, conventional arms, as well as nuclear; in other words, the negotiations known as mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR)?*

*President Ford:* I have read and listened to Mr. Brezhnev's speech. I was impressed

with speeches that were made by many others during the CSCE meetings. I am convinced that we can, now that the European Security Conference is over, that we can make more meaningful progress in MBFR.

*Q. Did you discuss that in your conversations with him the second time?*

*President Ford:* We discussed it in a very limited way because we concentrated on our SALT negotiations.

*Q. Mr. President, you said earlier that you have to convince your people, as the Russians have to convince their people, of the wisdom of the SALT talks. Do you think that the American people need much convincing about SALT?*

*President Ford:* I am convinced the American people want their President, their government, to make responsible and safe agreements. On the other hand, I do not believe the American people want their President to give more than he gets.

So, that is the basic problem in our negotiating process. I can assure you that we will not give more than we get, but I still feel that in the process of negotiations, compromise, we can end up with what is good for both peoples.

*Q. Do the Soviets raise specific objections to some of the criticisms by Senator Jackson of the SALT agreements and the SALT negotiations when you are having these talks with them?*

*President Ford:* We never discuss personalities. We discuss the issues. We discuss the facts. We discuss our security, the objective of peace, and obviously they discuss their security. We don't get into personalities on the American scene, or otherwise.

*Q. Mr. President, at the conclusion of today's talks, you wished Secretary General Brezhnev good health. You negotiated with him over a period of five hours or more. How do you think his health is?*

*President Ford:* I thought he looked very well this morning. In fact, I said it sincerely

because I did feel that he looked better—active and strong.

*Q. Better than he did the last time that you saw him?*

*President Ford:* I hate to compare, but I can only say that I thought he looked well and he acted strong and it was a very good face-to-face negotiation.

*Q. Based on what happened today, do you expect the General Secretary will be in Washington this fall, as you intended all along?*

*President Ford:* There is no change in our overall plan in this regard. We have not talked about details. The plan still is in effect.

*Q. Is there anything new on the Middle East in terms of the possibility of an agreement between Israel and Egypt?*

*President Ford:* I am very cautious, very cautious, more optimistic today than I was a few days ago, but I don't want to go any further than that.

*Q. Would you say why you are more optimistic?*

*President Ford:* No, I would not want to go into any specifics.

Henry, would you like to add anything on that?

*Secretary Kissinger:* We will have to wait. We will see Ambassador Eilts [Hermann F. Eilts, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt], who is meeting us in Belgrade, and we will then get a full report of the Egyptian reaction.

The mere fact that the dialogue is going on and is not being broken off gives us some hope that we can move it forward, but we have not yet had a formal Egyptian reply, which we will get tomorrow night, and then Eilts is coming back to Washington with us to wait for the Israeli reply to whatever it is that the Egyptians have. But we have not seen yet what the Egyptians have.

*Q. Mr. President, in Washington a former Agriculture Department official testified that another big grain sale to the Soviet Union is going to drive up food prices by 10 per-*

*cent next year. I was wondering if that was a topic in your discussion with Mr. Brezhnev in Helsinki and exactly where the sale of U.S. grain to the Soviet Union now may stand?*

*President Ford:* I noticed that Mr. [John A.] Schnittker had testified. I believe the sale of roughly 10 million tons of American agricultural commodities have been made, and I think this is good for the farmer.

I don't believe there will be any increase in food prices as a result. I think it is good from our point of view in the balance of trade. I think it is a tribute to the great productivity of the American farmer.

In the future, we have to be very alert to the weather conditions that happen in the next month. Every indication is we will have a bountiful harvest in America. If that happens, we are in a very good position: one, to make additional sales; number two, to protect the consumer; number three, to help our balance of payments.

But for the next month, I think we have to be very alert, and I will personally keep my finger on the situation. I will welcome recommendations of other people in my Administration. This is a matter that involves the farmer, the consumer, our foreign relations, and it is a matter that the President himself must watch very carefully.

*Q. Sir, there is some feeling in Europe that the United States was not going along with any eagerness in this effort to get some sort of monetary or economic talks going. Were the Europeans trying to drag us into some sort of arrangement which, in order to help their economic recovery, might affect the way in which the United States is recovering?*

*President Ford:* I am not going to discuss whether there will or won't be an economic conference. There was agreement that the recovery of Europe and the recovery of the United States were very closely intertwined. I was very happy to point out that our recovery was coming more quickly than theirs.

They were most interested in how we had

achieved this. They wanted us—and I agreed—to recognize that there was this interrelationship, this interdependence, and in the months ahead, we will keep a very close liaison because economic recovery for the free world—this includes more than the four countries—is vitally important to the political stability of the free world.

*Q. What was your personal reaction to Mr. Brezhnev's speech, especially the controversial part where he talked about no country has a right to tell another country how to manage its internal affairs?*

*President Ford:* Overall, I thought Mr. Brezhnev's speech was very moderate. I did notice that part of the speech. I thought, as he said that, that I as President or any other President would not want some other country telling us how to manage our domestic affairs.

I think each country has a certain sanctity of internal operations—we do, other countries do. I understand it. They can try to be suggestive, maybe persuasive, but I don't think we can assume the stature of telling another country what they should or should not do internally. I don't think they would want us to do it.

*Q. Did you notice the section of President Ceaușescu's speech in which he complained about Radio Free Europe, and do you have any reaction to it?*

*President Ford:* I listened very carefully to that part of the speech. He didn't complain, as I recollect, about Radio Free Europe.

*Q. He didn't name it.*

*President Ford:* But he said, and I noted it very carefully, other countries' radio activities are involved in other countries. We do have Radio Free Europe; we do have the Voice of America. But I understand that other countries, including neighboring Communist countries, also have radio signals that go into Romania, so I am not sure he was talking only about us.

*Q. Mr. President, do you think the world is better today because you signed, or all*

*these nations signed, this document?*

*President Ford:* Helen [Helen Thomas, United Press International], I am absolutely confident, I am totally convinced, that because of 35 nations participating in the Conference on European Security and Cooperation, Europe and the world are all better off.

I will know better two years from now whether our promises have been kept, but I detect very strongly a feeling and an attitude on the part of the leaders of these countries that the promises they made will be maintained.

*Q. When you talked to the Embassy this morning, you talked about making sure that these promises were fulfilled. How do we go about enforcing CSCE?*

*President Ford:* Persuasion, example. I believe that some of the unfortunate things that have happened in the last 20 years in Europe will not happen again because of the signing of the CSCE and the speeches that were made there. Those kinds of unfortunate events can be avoided in the future. CSCE was a great plus.

*Q. Mr. President, do you feel at all defensive in a forum like this because of the problems of the Western alliance which are highly visible—Portugal's problems, the economic situation, the Greek-Turkish problem, all of which affect the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in one way or another—do you feel you are operating at a disadvantage as leader of the free world in that respect?*

*President Ford:* I recognize we have problems, but look back at the problems of another era. Are they any worse than the economic problems in the 1950's? Are they any worse than the conflicts among Eastern European countries in the 1950's and 1960's? Are the problems today any more serious than the problems of the past?

I don't think so. They are different, but they are not worse, and when you now have the Conference on European Security and Cooperation there is a bulwark. I think it gives us strength to meet those problems.

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## Secretary Kissinger's News Conferences at Helsinki July 30 and 31

### NEWS CONFERENCE OF JULY 30

Press release 390 dated July 31

*Secretary Kissinger:* Let me make a few comments about today's events, and then I will open it for questions.

With respect to the Security Conference, you ladies and gentlemen can draw your own conclusions from the tone of the speeches that have so far been delivered.

It is our view that they reflect the attitude with which we, too, came to Helsinki, which is that in the progress toward easing tensions, the establishment of certain principles of conduct can play an extremely useful role.

We believe that the fate of human beings is more likely to be under conditions of relaxation of tension than under conditions of the cold war. So, while we do not look at the Security Conference as the end of the process but, rather, as the beginning of a relationship in which these principles will have to be applied and whose validity will be tested to the degree to which they are applied, we believe that the Security Conference represents a useful step on the road toward easing tensions and toward prevention of war, which must be one of the cardinal goals of all contemporary statesmanship.

In addition to the Security Conference, the President met today with Prime Minister Wilson [of the United Kingdom], with General Secretary [of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid I.] Brezhnev and with Prime Minister Karamanlis [of Greece].

Our relationships with Great Britain have been close and based on very intimate confidence for decades. Therefore the President and the Prime Minister reviewed the international agenda, problems of the eastern

Mediterranean, the Middle East, of the economic conditions of the industrialized world, and exchanged ideas on what can be done jointly in these areas or else to keep each other informed of them.

The meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev was the first of two that will take place. The next one will be Saturday morning at 9 o'clock. In any assessment of the contemporary period, as speaker after speaker from East and West pointed out this afternoon and as we all believe, the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union is central for the maintenance of peace; and the restraint with which they handle their relationships, the ability to deal with the problems of armaments, as well as of political conflict, will determine whether progress is being made on the present agenda.

Subjects that were discussed today were primarily SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks], the Middle East, and bilateral relations, including trade relations.

With respect to SALT, we have pointed out that the Soviet Union submitted to us, when Foreign Minister Gromyko and I met in Geneva some two weeks ago, its considerations on the issues outstanding in SALT, and we indicated that in our judgment progress was made at that meeting, especially in the area of verification. We have conveyed our considerations in response to the Soviet ideas, and the discussions will be continued on Saturday, hopefully leading to an agreement to implement the Vladivostok decisions.

With respect to the Middle East, it is clear that no final settlement can be achieved by either of the countries by itself, and it is, therefore, natural that periodically we exchange ideas and also, as cochairmen of the Geneva Conference, that we exchange ideas as to the appropriate time when that con-

ference might be reconvened and what procedures it might follow.

Of course we have a long list of bilateral issues. These and other topics will be discussed again when the President and the General Secretary meet on Saturday.

The meeting with Prime Minister Karamanlis brought us together with one of the outstanding leaders of our period. We have the highest regard for what Prime Minister Karamanlis faces and what he has accomplished. We wish the democratic Government of Greece well, and we will do what we can to strengthen it.

We of course believe, as the President has repeatedly stated, that domestic developments in the United States have complicated our ability to play a useful role. However, within these constraints, to the best of our ability, we will respond to the wishes of the parties with respect to a Cyprus settlement.

Of course, we are prepared to be helpful to Greece's attempts to develop its economy and other areas of its national life to the best of our abilities. It was a useful meeting which, as with the meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev, was conducted in a very friendly atmosphere.

We cannot assess what may be possible on Cyprus until we have also talked to the Turkish Prime Minister, which will take place at breakfast tomorrow.

Now, these are the major events of the day and our assessment of them. Now why don't I take your questions.

Helen [Helen Thomas, United Press International].

*Q. Mr. Secretary, President Ford indicated there was progress today, and we assumed it was SALT, maybe even other subjects, and that further progress would be made on Saturday. Specifically, what was that progress, and does that mean that President Ford and Brezhnev may reach some sort of agreement on Saturday which would lead to a summit meeting in the fall in Washington?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think it would be incorrect to claim any particular achievement today. It was a very useful discussion, but it was not designed to lead to any specific

conclusion. It was rather, in the area of SALT, a further elaboration of our response to the Soviet ideas which were given to me in Geneva. It was more in the nature of a general assessment, and it had always been understood that the meeting today would be of a kind to put the positions, each side's position before the other, rather than one in which conclusions would be reached.

Secondly, I do not know whether the discussion of SALT now lends itself to a particular announcement, even on Saturday, from which one could deduce that an agreement will certainly be reached.

Progress has been made. If that progress continues, and we hope it will be, we think the chances are good that an agreement can be reached, but when I said progress has been made, I am speaking over the last months, not necessarily today.

The fact that I don't claim progress for today is not something from which you should draw conclusions, because the discussion was not of a nature that would lend itself to a decision today.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, have you given up hope now of the House reversing its action on the Turkish aid problem?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think I have amply demonstrated my inability to predict the actions of the House. It is my understanding that there is an attempt being made today to see whether perhaps a modified version of the bill we submitted last week could be added on as an amendment to some other bill.

It would then have to pass the Senate, after which the House. I have not had a report as of the time that I left the office about where this stood. This was the plan last evening, and it seemed to be a rather chancy procedure because it required that certain rules be waived in both Houses and that it would move through both Houses with a rather rush procedure, so I really don't know any more what is the situation.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, may I follow up on Helen's question about the possibility of Brezhnev's visit to Washington in October. Has that been finally decided on?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It has not yet been finally decided, but we are proceeding on the assumption that a visit by the General Secretary will take place this year and all the discussions this morning took place in that framework, but no specific date has been set. Of course it depends somewhat on how we are proceeding on the SALT discussions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, are the Russians content to allow the United States to continue its step-by-step effort?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* My impression of the discussions this morning is that while the Soviet Union has indicated certain reservations about the possibility that the step-by-step approach can reach a final conclusion, it is not actively opposing the efforts that are now going forward.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on SALT you have repeated several times that progress was made in Geneva and other parts of the world. In that case, why was there no briefing at NATO after the last Geneva meeting with the explanation that there was not enough to brief about, as was usually the case?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have received certain Soviet ideas on how to proceed. These ideas had to be analyzed by us first. As soon as they are being negotiated in a concrete way in Geneva and before any positions are put forward in Geneva there will be a briefing of NATO, and there has been an informal briefing of several of our allies.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, how would you consider the chances of MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions] after the Helsinki Conference is over and the documents have been accepted?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The United States has always attached importance to success in the MBFR negotiations, how we considered both SALT and MBFR of great importance, in finally, getting under control the spiral of arms.

In deference to the views of several of our allies, we have not linked the CSCE and the MBFR negotiations, but now that the CSCE negotiations are out of the way we share the

views of Prime Minister Wilson—that we should now make a very determined effort to make progress on MBFR.

I noted that in some of the speeches that were held from the Eastern side this afternoon that reference was made to MBFR as one of the important items on the agenda.

It is too early to tell what progress will in fact be made.

We have, in my view, completed the stage of technical explorations and what is needed now is some political decisions to move it forward.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of your skepticism about the House vote, what appeal will you make to Mr. Demirel to not move in on the American bases?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I don't know whether "skepticism" is the right word. I just have no clear judgment of what the situation in the House is, but events last week proved that I didn't have a clear judgment of what the situation in the House was then; so I don't think that judgment is decisive. All I have is a general account of what is going to be attempted, and I just don't want to claim anything for it.

Now, what can we offer Prime Minister Demirel? As I have stated before, the security arrangements between the United States and another country are presumably ultimately in the mutual interest of both countries. I did not believe that it was wise to cut off arms to Turkey, because it created the wrong impression about the nature of the relationship.

Equally, I believe that the closing of our bases in Turkey also gives the wrong impression—as if the bases were there for the unilateral benefit of the United States—and the United States cannot be in a position of pleading to be able to defend its allies even if this or that base is in the general interest.

Nevertheless we will discuss with the Prime Minister of Turkey what can be done to maintain the close relationship between Turkey and the United States, which is based on common interests, which is in the interests of the entire eastern Mediterranean; and



we will also make an effort to see whether we can be of any assistance in moving the Cyprus issue forward, keeping in mind that all these issues in some way affect each other.

So it is hard to predict what will come out of this meeting at this point. We have had no high-level exchange with the Turkish leaders since their decision to close the bases. We hope that the fundamental common interests of both sides will be understood, and we will see what we can do that will help Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I have a followup question. Will you offer Demirel anything, or will you explore with him a new plan which may then be submitted to the House?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I don't really think that the President of the United States should negotiate with a foreign leader as to how he should handle or how he should deal with the American Congress. What we can do is to talk about the common problems we have. From that, the President may distill an approach to the House, but we will not work out a joint approach with Turkey to the House.

At this moment, I do not expect that out of that meeting something will emerge, in addition to what I have already told you, that could be submitted to the House, but if I am wrong we will of course inform you of it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been different information about the nature of the four-power European meeting that is going to take place. Some have expressed concern that economic problems will be discussed and the possibility of the creation of a four- or five-power economic directorate established. Today Italian spokesmen denied this. They said the United States has communicated to them that economic subjects will not be touched at all. Can you state what is the situation exactly?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The situation is that the four powers which have a special responsibility for Berlin that meet regularly at every NATO meeting decided to use their presence at the European Security Conference to meet on that issue. While they meet,

it is of course possible that other issues will also be discussed, and I would consider it possible—in fact, likely—that one of the several topics that will come up will concern economic matters; but basically it is an informal meeting of the four countries that have a special responsibility for Berlin and it was that symbolically and substantively important that these four countries meet.

I consider it extremely unlikely—in fact, I consider it impossible—that there will be an announcement of a directorate that will be set up for economic matters and, indeed, there is no intention of setting up a directorate for economic matters.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, if I can go back to Turkey for a minute, is there anything specifically that you will be asking the Turkish Prime Minister to do? Will you, for example, be asking him to go back on their decision to close the bases, or will you be asking him to reach a compromise decision that would somehow allow us to continue to operate? What specifically can you tell us about what we are going to ask them?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The Turkish Government took the decision to close our bases knowing very well that we wanted to keep them open. Therefore it was not our failure to ask them to keep the bases open that made them close it; but indeed, on the day the decision was announced I, on behalf of the President, called Prime Minister Demirel urging restraint. So I think the issue of our bases in Turkey is not so simple as a formal American request to undo a decision that in itself had complicated causes both in our actions and in the domestic situation in Turkey.

What we would like to do is to discuss the sort of measures that might make it possible to put our relationship to Turkey on a new basis, and that in turn might make it easier for the Turkish Government to accede to what they know very well we are interested in in the common defense—namely, the re-opening of all or at least some of our essential bases in Turkey—but that in turn requires that we look at all of the issues that led to this state of affairs to see whether we

can bring about a radical solution rather than a stopgap one.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, didn't Portugal come up in talks between President Ford and Secretary Brezhnev today, and is there any possibility of President Ford meeting Prime Minister Gonçaves on Saturday?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The issue of Portugal did not come up directly in the talks, but in a general way about the principles that each side should carry out.

Now, as I have pointed out already in a press conference in Washington, I think we should keep in mind that détente cannot be used as a means of asking the Soviet Union to take care of all of our problems on our side of the line and a correct analysis of the situation in Portugal should emphasize, or will emphasize, that many of the problems in Portugal have indigenous roots and others have to do with Western countries.

But I repeat what I have said previously—that a substantial activity by any outside country in Portugal would be considered inconsistent with the spirit and, indeed, the letter of the CSCE declarations.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned a modification of the embargo legislation. What is that modification?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I believe it is substantially the same as the one that was submitted last week with a proviso that a joint resolution of the Congress can veto sales above a certain figure. I believe it is \$25 million, but you have to check this. This is the compromise that was being talked about which would make it consistent with all the other new legislation about military sales, but it would give Congress the sense that it could get another crack at sales through a joint resolution.

*Q. Did you advise the Greek Prime Minister of that arrangement at your meeting today, and what was his reaction?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There have been a series of absolutely misleading reports that we are attempting to ask the approval of the Greek Government. It should be clear that the Greek Government cannot approve, nor

should it be asked to approve, American domestic legislation, and it is clear also that for a Greek Prime Minister the question of selling arms to Turkey is not something that one can ask him for his approval.

At no time during the discussions, despite many reports that have been printed, did the Administration make this claim to any Congressman and, of course, at no time today did we ask Prime Minister Karamanlis to approve the lifting of the embargo on Turkey.

It is our view, the view of the U.S. Government—not the view of the Greek Government, necessarily—it is the view of the U.S. Government that the course we have recommended to the Congress is the best means of preserving the security in the eastern Mediterranean, in which both Greece and Turkey should be interested, and to make progress on Cyprus.

We do not say that this judgment is necessarily shared by other governments, but we are responsible for giving our judgment to the Congress, and the Greek Government deals with the U.S. Government, not with the U.S. Congress.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did Mr. Brezhnev indicate any interest in compromise on the issues of trade and immigration, and if so, what might be the general direction of such a compromise?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, we reviewed the discussions that the group of Senators had had in the Soviet Union, and we pointed out our judgment of what is required with respect to the trade legislation.

We have also had the view that progress in this field is more effective if it does not become a formal government-to-government matter but, rather, if it is understood by each side what the necessities are and that then decisions are made independently on that basis. So I think the requirements of progress in the Congress have been made clear by our Senators and have been confirmed by us.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, if I could follow that up, the Senators, when they came back from Moscow, talked about a compromise under*

which the credit ceiling of \$300 million would be lifted and there would be a period of several months under which Soviet behavior—

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, my impression in talking to the Senators is that there is an understanding that both of these issues should be dealt with simultaneously, but there is no possibility of doing it now until Congress returns, and it will be the intention of the Administration to work at it not as a contest with the Congress but in a cooperative manner. And so there are several months in which each side can look at their— Did I hear somebody say thank you?

*The press:* Thank you.

### NEWS CONFERENCE OF JULY 31

Press release 392 dated August 1

*Secretary Kissinger:* Let me talk briefly about some of the meetings that took place today, and I will group them by subject.

We talked first about the breakfast of the President with Prime Minister Demirel [of Turkey], and then I had a brief meeting in the afternoon with Foreign Minister Bitsios [of Greece]. As you know, I had two meetings—a meeting with the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, a meeting with the Foreign Minister of Bulgaria—and then of course there was the four-power lunch [France, Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom, United States]. I will talk about them in this order, and then I will take your questions.

The meeting with the Prime Minister of Turkey—the President reviewed all aspects of the relationship between Turkey and the United States. Of course, also, they discussed in some detail the Cyprus question and possible means of negotiating a solution.

The relationship between the United States and Turkey, and the whole complex of issues involving Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and the United States, is taking on the aspect of a Greek tragedy in the sense that each of the main actors, following perfectly understandable reasons and the laws of his

own nature, is bringing on consequences he cannot possibly intend.

We, as I pointed out yesterday, believe strongly that the security of the eastern Mediterranean requires good American relations with both Turkey and Greece. We believe, also, therefore, that a solution of the Cyprus problem is important. Indeed, it is crucial to this.

At the same time, the legislative actions that have been taken in the House of Representatives are reducing our influence and are making it more difficult in addition to jeopardizing, as the Secretary of Defense pointed out yesterday, the national security of the United States.

We reviewed the situation. We discussed those possibilities that are open to us under existing legislation, as well as various measures that are now before the Congress. I don't believe that a significant change in the situation was registered, except that both of the leaders—both President Ford and Prime Minister Demirel—expressed their strong desire to maintain the traditional friendship between Turkey and the United States and to restore the security relationship to the situation that existed before events of last week.

I reviewed in a bilateral meeting I had with Foreign Minister Bitsios the state of Cyprus negotiations. I expressed to him the U.S. willingness to be as helpful as we could, regardless of American legislative decisions. Also, we tried to assess what real possibilities existed.

I had a meeting with the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia and the Foreign Minister of Bulgaria, and I expressed to both countries, both Foreign Ministers, that the United States has no—there is no obstacle on the U.S. side to an improvement in relations.

They expressed their strong desire to make progress in improving relations between the United States and their countries. We decided to start talks on scientific and technical exchanges and other subjects that might lead gradually to an improvement of our relationships.

With respect to the four-power lunch, the

atmosphere could not have been warmer and more constructive. And we think it is a very significant result of the many meetings that President Ford has had with these various leaders bilaterally and, of course, of their many contacts with each other, that an atmosphere of cordiality and confidence exists that goes back to the very best days of allied relationships.

We had a review of the European situation, particularly as it affected the status of Berlin. There was a discussion of the Middle East and prospects for negotiations in the Middle East, as well as the position the various countries might consider taking, with respect to issues that might come up at the United Nations affecting the Middle East. On these subjects we will have to have a further exchange of views.

The subject of Portugal was discussed, and I think the unanimous view was dismay at the prospects for pluralistic democracy in Portugal. There was a brief discussion of economic issues in which some of our friends pointed out to us their concern as to American interest rates. But most of the discussion really concerned the relationship between the economic situation and the political situation; that is to say, how the industrial democracies could convince their people that they were in control of their economic destinies.

No conclusions were reached. No decisions were taken. It was a discussion of the problem at the end of the general discussion which I have outlined. These were the major meetings that took place today in which the United States was involved, and now I will take your questions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the German press officer briefing this afternoon said the Big Four meeting had reached conclusions on opposing any move to limit or expel Israel's role, or expel Israel from the United Nations; that you agreed to hold a conference in 1976 on currency problems and to prepare a conference including Japan, on interest rates. You say no conclusions were reached?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have listed the topics that were discussed. With respect to the United Nations, each of the countries

represented has stated its view that it would oppose the expulsion or suspension of Israel from the United Nations or the expulsion or suspension of any other member for political reasons contrary to the charter. But no conclusions were reached as to the particular measures that will be taken, and the four countries decided to be in touch with each other. With respect to the monetary conference, there was no agreement reached to hold a monetary conference while I or the President was in the room.

*Q. You seem to be leaving open an option.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I believe this must be based on a misunderstanding of either the German press officer or the translation from the German. There was no decision reached to hold a particular conference.

The subject matters were the ones I described. Individual members raised individual problems, but no conclusions were reached. And no decision was reached to hold a particular conference, which does not exclude that one could be held later. But no decision was reached to hold a conference now, and I did not even hear a proposal that one should be held on currency.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on the Turkish situation, there was a meeting today between the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers. Do you know anything about that meeting, whether they made any progress, and can you bring us up to date on what the situation is now in the House of Representatives regarding a vote?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have heard only the Greek Foreign Minister's view as to the meeting with the Turkish Foreign Minister, and he did not feel that great progress was made, but I have not yet had an opportunity to talk to the Turkish Foreign Minister. I believe in any event these two Foreign Ministers ought to comment about their own meeting, and I should not comment about a meeting in which we did not participate.

As far as the situation in the House of Representatives is concerned, I am a little bit behind events. The latest information I have was at noon, in which the legislative people reported to the President about pri-

marily the situation in the Senate. The latest information—it was supposed to come up for a vote at two o'clock this afternoon, and it cannot move to the House until the Senate has acted, and there were various parliamentary issues about unanimous consent.

We have not a clear estimate as to what will happen in the House of Representatives. We do have a clear estimate, however, about the consequences of what has happened; and we continue to believe it is in the interest of the United States, in the interest of Turkey, in the interest of Greece, and in the interest of Cyprus, that the Congress act along the lines of our recommendations.

*Q. Can I follow that up, Mr. Secretary. There was an impression this morning after the meeting that President Ford had with Demirel that the Turks might reconsider their actions on the U.S. bases or might go slow in taking them over in some way, in short, that they might have agreed with what you said yesterday about the value of these bases to NATO security. Did you find any cause for optimism in the session this morning between Ford and Demirel?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Our view has always been that our aid to Turkey is not a favor to Turkey any more than our bases in Turkey are a favor to the United States.

But, to answer your question specifically, we had no reason to believe, on the basis of the discussion this morning—even though we explored several possibilities—that there would be any prospect of a change in the closing down of American operations on these bases under present conditions.

I might add, incidentally, that one of the subjects that was also discussed between the Prime Minister and the President was the question of control of opium, in which the Turkish Prime Minister promised to do whatever was necessary to make sure that none of their poppy production would go into private channels, that all of it would be handled through Turkish governmental channels.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, along those lines, some of your congressional critics in Washington, specifically Congressman Brademas and others, are raising questions as to why Pres-*

*ident Ford has not offered to waive \$50 million in foreign weapon sales to Turkey under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Was that discussed today at all?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First of all, we have to be clear what it is that Congressman Brademas and Congressman Sarbanes have proposed to us. What they have proposed to us is that Turkey make some concessions first. After Turkey has made some concessions, they would hope still for the President to waive up to \$50 million of grant aid.

It is a subject that was discussed at some length between the President and Prime Minister Demirel, as it had been discussed in March, between myself and at that time the then Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, and as it was discussed on the visit of Assistant Secretary Hartman [Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs] in May, and as it was discussed on the occasion of my visit in May.

In other words, the proposal to waive \$50 million in grant aid has been put repeatedly to Turkey. The Turkish position has been that they do not want a gift of U.S. aid, that their objection is to the embargo of an ally with respect to purchases that Turkey had already made and with respect to the Turkish ability to buy American equipment for cash or credit. So Turkey has consistently refused this proposal as a question of principle because they feel that there is something contradictory about offering to give \$50 million for free while preventing them from buying, with their own money, American equipment or taking delivery of American equipment already purchased.

The President made an eloquent presentation of his authority in this, and he received the same answer that we had received on four previous occasions. It is absolutely incorrect to say that the United States has not attempted to use this possibility.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, so we understand that precisely, did the President offer to waive the \$50 million in exchange for returning the control of the American bases over to the United States?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The President offered

this as a possibility in order to solve the problem that is posed by the bases, and it was not accepted.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is there any particular impression of significance of the Brezhnev speech?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have not had an opportunity to analyze it with the various Kremlinologists, so our reaction is a relatively off-the-cuff reaction based on brief exchanges.

We thought that on the whole it was a moderate speech, and on the whole it was a conciliatory speech—which does not mean that we agree with every paragraph in it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is there anything in the speech today—you say on the whole it sounded conciliatory—is there anything in the speech today that bothered you?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It depends what interpretation you give to certain phrases. For example, on the one hand, the phrase “there should be no interference in the domestic affairs, the internal affairs of other countries,” has positive elements if you look at some of the things that have happened in Europe in the past two decades.

On the other hand, you can interpret it in another way—with respect to the application of Basket 3. I am assuming that those principles that have been agreed to in the document will be lived up to in their entirety.

We have stated repeatedly that to us the document of the European Security Conference will be a criterion for how the implementation of the process of détente is working.

*Q. Isn't it possible, though, sir, to put the interpretation on the Secretary's speech—when he says, “Don't dictate to us our internal affairs,” that he is saying in effect, “A pox on Basket 3”?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have attempted to say—I have said—that, if that is the interpretation, we would not agree with it. Our assumption is that those obligations specifically undertaken in the European Security

Conference will be carried out; that to the extent they will not be carried out that would, of course, raise serious questions. We do not interpret it in this way. I admit, however, that that phrase is capable of ambiguous interpretation.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned yesterday that you were going to seek to put Turkish aid on a new basis and favored a radical rather than a stopgap solution. Could you explain what you meant yesterday, and whether that was offered to the Turks, and what they said?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* What we believe and what we have believed for the last year—particularly since the negotiations started between the two sides—is that a global solution of the Cyprus problem would enable all of these elements that we are now discussing piecemeal to be dealt with in a coherent fashion.

One of the tragic aspects, as I view the situation, is that if the two sides could ever negotiate without artificial constraints, we judge the differences between the two sides to be not unbridgeable, but there are so many other elements that get involved—domestic situations, national pride, and other pressures—that have prevented a consecutive period of negotiation geared toward a rapid solution.

As far as U.S.-Turkish relationships are concerned, we continue to believe, as I said yesterday, that the fundamental security interests of Turkey and the United States require close association. But we have not found a way around the legislative obstacles that now exist.

*Q. Are you talking about some sort of a conference on the subject of Cyprus-Greece-Turkey-U.S. relations, or some such thing, to settle all the issues at once?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We strongly support a rapid solution of the Cyprus issue, and we have repeatedly offered our good offices to both of the parties. And both of the parties, and especially the Greek side, have urged us to remain active.

As you may know, the President had an opportunity after dinner last night for an extended conversation with Archbishop Makarios. But one of the sad aspects of the present situation is the deadlock that has resulted before the negotiations have ever really got rolling.

Helen [Helen Thomas, United Press International].

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us a curtain raiser on what the President is going to say tomorrow in view of the approach, the track he will take?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think the President obviously should speak for himself and will speak for himself. Basically, I think the President's speech will put forward our view as to the nature of détente, the importance of détente, the nature of it, the significance of the European Security Conference, what needs to be done in the future to give it complete political meaning, and what other tasks are ahead of us in addition to what was done here.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you said the President made an eloquent presentation of the constraints that are operating on him?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. I said with respect to Mr. Brokaw's [Tom Brokaw, NBC News] question, it was he made an eloquent presentation of the possibilities he has for waiving certain restrictions of the law in order to make clear that there was one limited area with respect to grant military aid in which he had discretion under existing law.

As Turkey has done on the previous occasions on which this was raised, they take the position that it is contradictory to be given for nothing certain amounts of aid while they are prohibited from taking possession of equipment they have already paid for and being prohibited to pay for their equipment.

They, in short, want the embargo lifted with respect to purchases. They do not particularly insist that it be lifted with respect to gifts, and we are in the paradoxical posi-

tion that we are pleading with them to take for nothing what they insist they want to pay for.

*Q. Did you tell the Turkish Prime Minister that all of this was the fault of the Congress?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The President did not discuss whose fault it was. The President explained to the Prime Minister what authority he had under existing legislation and told the Prime Minister that he would be prepared to exercise that authority.

I hope we will not reach the point where various parts of the American Government, the executive or the legislative, go around to foreign governments to line up support against other branches of the government, and this is not the policy of the President nor the policy of any other member of the Administration.

*Q. What are you going to do about Turkey now, Mr. Secretary, about the whole question, the bases and the Cyprus issue?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* With respect to the bases, these are decisions now that Turkey must make and Turkey must decide how far it wants to go in eroding a relationship that must, in the long term, be as much in its interests as in ours.

With respect to Cyprus, we remain prepared to use our good offices. In addition to whatever the United States might do on a national basis, we have talked individually to several of the members of the European Community, and we would encourage action by the European Community to help solve the disputes between Greece and Turkey.

We are prepared to join them, or we are prepared to act separately. But we cannot, by ourselves, create entirely new conditions. So we believe that the conflict between Greece and Turkey is a disaster for both countries and is a disaster for the Western alliance. We hope that all parties concerned—within the United States, as well as in the eastern Mediterranean—will understand the larger interest involved.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, are you certain that the Turks will still accept the quid pro quo for*

returning the bases for military aid or have relations been exacerbated by the latest House vote so that they might, even if the House were to go ahead with this aid—

*Secretary Kissinger:* It is our impression that the situation is still recoverable; in other words, that the bases could be substantially restored if the House reversed itself.

In addition, the President has made clear in his many briefings to Congressmen—and he has also made it clear to all the parties here—that, if the Congress reverses itself, the United States would feel a particular moral obligation to accelerate progress on the Cyprus issue. But in any event, we will do our best, though our ability to be effective has been reduced.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there was a meeting today between Demirel and Soviet leader Brezhnev. Is there any danger here that if action is not reversed, that Turkey could go into some kind of relationship with the Soviet Union, military relationship?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I consider it extremely unlikely that Turkey would go into a military relationship with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, as the relationship between Turkey and the United States deteriorates, Turkey will look for other connections.

In my judgment, they are not necessarily or not in all likelihood going to be Soviet connections. They could be in other areas. In any event, when one looks at the situation in the Mediterranean, on one end the event in Portugal, it seems to us extremely risky, by American actions, to break up the security arrangements in the eastern Mediterranean. And I say this without choosing between Greece and Turkey, because we require the friendship of both and we consider both equally important.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, if I may return to the conference for a moment and Mr. Brezhnev's speech, does it give you any pause when he praises the so-called "well-known humanistic policies of Lenin," which he wants to spread around the world?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* This was an interpretation of Lenin, which I would not have

put first on the agenda if I had been asked to give a lecture. [Laughter.]

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the Soviet Union, because of Helsinki, will make some new move in Asia—whether the Soviet Union would propose an Asian collective security system?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The Soviet Union has not shared with me the future plans of its foreign policy; but if the Soviet Union is thinking of an Asian collective security system, it would be a conference without American participation.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, how far is the United States prepared to go in preventing Israel from being thrown out of the United Nations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The United States has expressed its very strong opposition to either the expulsion or the suspension of Israel from the United Nations. The United States objects to this on the grounds that it is in violation of the charter.

The United States will certainly take definite and clear actions should the United Nations take a vote in violation of the charter. What this action will be, I do not think it is appropriate for me now to discuss but we believe that such a decision by the United Nations would have serious consequences for the world organization.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, we received some reports from various U.S. officials to the effect that the loss we have encountered in Turkey, as far as our intelligence-gathering capability, concerning missile developments and other military matters, is irreplaceable; and they speak in the most dire terms of what could happen if we do not in some way regain this capability in Turkey. Would you assess that for us?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have briefed members of the House of Representatives and Senators as to the installations that are relevant to that issue. We believe these installations—under present circumstances it is hard to see how they could be replaced.

For me to attempt an assessment here is impossible because it involves highly classi-



fied security information. But the blow would be very serious, especially with respect to certain categories of information that impinge on verification problems.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, Prime Minister Wilson today expressed concern about Portugal and you said it was greeted with dismay. Are the four powers any closer to trying to expel Portugal from NATO than they were before the Helsinki meeting?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No specific decision was made or indeed no particular procedures were discussed as to how the various countries could register their dismay, except to make sure that we would stay in close contact with each other. But it was recognized that events in Portugal are of profound consequence for NATO, for the political evolution

of Western Europe, and that they are incompatible in our present understanding of them with any concept of pluralistic democracy.

*Q. Then you did discuss attempts to expel Portugal?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I thought I said we did not.

*Q. You said no decision was made.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. What I attempted to say was the relationship—the impact of Portugal on NATO under these conditions—was discussed, as it was discussed already in Brussels, but no specific proposal with respect to it was made. The meeting was primarily an analysis of the situation rather than a discussion of courses of action.

*The press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.*

## Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act<sup>1</sup>

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which opened at Helsinki on 3 July 1973 and continued at Geneva from 18 September 1973 to 21 July 1975, was concluded at Helsinki on 1 August 1975 by the High Representatives of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Yugoslavia.

During the opening and closing stages of the Conference the participants were addressed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations as their guest of honour. The Director-General of UNESCO and the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe addressed the Conference during its second stage.

During the meetings of the second stage of the Conference, contributions were received, and statements heard, from the following non-participating Mediterranean States on various agenda items: the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Israel, the Kingdom of

Morocco, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia.

Motivated by the political will, in the interest of peoples, to improve and intensify their relations and to contribute in Europe to peace, security, justice and co-operation as well as to rapprochement among themselves and with the other States of the world,

Determined, in consequence, to give full effect to the results of the Conference and to assure, among their States and throughout Europe, the benefits deriving from those results and thus to broaden, deepen and make continuing and lasting the process of détente,

The High Representatives of the participating States have solemnly adopted the following:

### QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY IN EUROPE

The States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe,

*Reaffirming* their objective of promoting better relations among themselves and ensuring conditions in which their people can live in true and lasting peace free from any threat to or attempt against their security;

*Convinced* of the need to exert efforts to make détente both a continuing and an increasingly viable and comprehensive process, universal in scope, and

<sup>1</sup> Signed at Helsinki on Aug. 1.

that the implementation of the results of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe will be a major contribution to this process;

*Considering* that solidarity among peoples, as well as the common purpose of the participating States in achieving the aims as set forth by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, should lead to the development of better and closer relations among them in all fields and thus to overcoming the confrontation stemming from the character of their past relations, and to better mutual understanding;

*Mindful* of their common history and recognizing that the existence of elements common to their traditions and values can assist them in developing their relations, and desiring to search, fully taking into account the individuality and diversity of their positions and views, for possibilities of joining their efforts with a view to overcoming distrust and increasing confidence, solving the problems that separate them and co-operating in the interest of mankind;

*Recognizing* the indivisibility of security in Europe as well as their common interest in the development of co-operation throughout Europe and among themselves and expressing their intention to pursue efforts accordingly;

*Recognizing* the close link between peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole and conscious of the need for each of them to make its contribution to the strengthening of world peace and security and to the promotion of fundamental rights, economic and social progress and well-being for all peoples;

*Have adopted the following:*

## 1.

### (a) Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States

The participating States,

*Reaffirming* their commitment to peace, security and justice and the continuing development of friendly relations and co-operation;

*Recognizing* that this commitment, which reflects the interest and aspirations of peoples, constitutes for each participating State a present and future responsibility, heightened by experience of the past;

*Reaffirming*, in conformity with their membership in the United Nations and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, their full and active support for the United Nations and for the enhancement of its role and effectiveness in strengthening international peace, security and justice, and in promoting the solution of international problems, as well as the development of friendly relations and co-operation among States;

*Expressing* their common adherence to the principles which are set forth below and are in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, as well as their common will to act, in the application of these principles, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

*Declare* their determination to respect and put

into practice, each of them in its relations with all other participating States, irrespective of their political, economic or social systems as well as of their size, geographical location or level of economic development, the following principles, which all are of primary significance, guiding their mutual relations:

### I. *Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty*

The participating States will respect each other's sovereign equality and individuality as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, including in particular the right of every State to juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence. They will also respect each other's right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations.

Within the framework of international law, all the participating States have equal rights and duties. They will respect each other's right to define and conduct as it wishes its relations with other States in accordance with international law and in the spirit of the present Declaration. They consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement. They also have the right to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance; they also have the right to neutrality.

### II. *Refraining from the threat or use of force*

The participating States will refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the present Declaration. No consideration may be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in contravention of this principle.

Accordingly, the participating States will refrain from any acts constituting a threat of force or direct or indirect use of force against another participating State. Likewise they will refrain from any manifestation of force for the purpose of inducing another participating State to renounce the full exercise of its sovereign rights. Likewise they will also refrain in their mutual relations from any act of reprisal by force.

No such threat or use of force will be employed as a means of settling disputes, or questions likely to give rise to disputes, between them.

### III. *Inviolability of frontiers*

The participating States regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain

now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers.

Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State.

#### IV. *Territorial integrity of States*

The participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating States.

Accordingly, they will refrain from any action inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations against the territorial integrity, political independence or the unity of any participating State, and in particular from any such action constituting a threat or use of force.

The participating States will likewise refrain from making each other's territory the object of military occupation or other direct or indirect measures of force in contravention of international law, or the object of acquisition by means of such measures or the threat of them. No such occupation or acquisition will be recognized as legal.

#### V. *Peaceful settlement of disputes*

The participating States will settle disputes among them by peaceful means in such a manner as not to endanger international peace and security, and justice.

They will endeavour in good faith and a spirit of co-operation to reach a rapid and equitable solution on the basis of international law.

For this purpose they will use such means as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice including any settlement procedure agreed to in advance of disputes to which they are parties.

In the event of failure to reach a solution by any of the above peaceful means, the parties to a dispute will continue to seek a mutually agreed way to settle the dispute peacefully.

Participating States, parties to a dispute among them, as well as other participating States, will refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation to such a degree as to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and thereby make a peaceful settlement of the dispute more difficult.

#### VI. *Non-intervention in internal affairs*

The participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating State, regardless of their mutual relations.

They will accordingly refrain from any form of armed intervention or threat of such intervention against another participating State.

They will likewise in all circumstances refrain from any other act of military, or of political, economic or other coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by another participating State of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.

Accordingly, they will, inter alia, refrain from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities, or to subversive or other activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another participating State.

#### VII. *Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief*

The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

They will promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development.

Within this framework the participating States will recognize and respect the freedom of the individual to profess and practise, alone or in community with others, religion or belief acting in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.

The participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere.

The participating States recognize the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for which is an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-operation among themselves as among all States.

They will constantly respect these rights and freedoms in their mutual relations and will endeavour jointly and separately, including in co-operation with the United Nations, to promote universal and effective respect for them.

They confirm the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties in this field.

In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the participating States will act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They will also fulfill their obligations as set forth in the international declarations and agreements in this field, including inter alia the International Covenants on Human Rights, by which they may be bound.

#### VIII. *Equal rights and self-determination of peoples*

The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States.

By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development.

The participating States reaffirm the universal significance of respect for and effective exercise of equal rights and self-determination of peoples for the development of friendly relations among themselves as among all States; they also recall the importance of the elimination of any form of violation of this principle.

### IX. *Co-operation among States*

The participating States will develop their co-operation with one another and with all States in all fields in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In developing their co-operation the participating States will place special emphasis on the fields as set forth within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, with each of them making its contribution in conditions of full equality.

They will endeavour, in developing their co-operation as equals, to promote mutual understanding and confidence, friendly and good-neighbourly relations among themselves, international peace, security and justice. They will equally endeavour, in developing their co-operation, to improve the well-being of peoples and contribute to the fulfilment of their aspirations through, inter alia, the benefits resulting from increased mutual knowledge and from progress and achievement in the economic, scientific, technological, social, cultural and humanitarian fields. They will take steps to promote conditions favourable to making these benefits available to all; they will take into account the interest of all in the narrowing of differences in the levels of economic development, and in particular the interest of developing countries throughout the world.

They confirm that governments, institutions, organizations and persons have a relevant and positive role to play in contributing toward the achievement of these aims of their co-operation.

They will strive, in increasing their co-operation as set forth above, to develop closer relations among themselves on an improved and more enduring basis for the benefit of peoples.

### X. *Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law*

The participating States will fulfil in good faith their obligations under international law, both those obligations arising from the generally recognized principles and rules of international law and those obligations arising from treaties or other agreements, in conformity with international law, to which they are parties.

In exercising their sovereign rights, including the right to determine their laws and regulations, they will conform with their legal obligations under international law; they will furthermore pay due re-

gard to and implement the provisions in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

The participating States confirm that in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations and their obligations under any treaty or other international agreement, their obligations under the Charter will prevail, in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations.

All the principles set forth above are of primary significance and, accordingly, they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others.

The participating States express their determination fully to respect and apply these principles, as set forth in the present Declaration, in all aspects, to their mutual relations and co-operation in order to ensure to each participating State the benefits resulting from the respect and application of these principles by all.

The participating States, paying due regard to the principles above and, in particular, to the first sentence of the tenth principle, "Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law", note that the present Declaration does not affect their rights and obligations, nor the corresponding treaties and other agreements and arrangements.

The participating States express the conviction that respect for these principles will encourage the development of normal and friendly relations and the progress of co-operation among them in all fields. They also express the conviction that respect for these principles will encourage the development of political contacts among them which in turn would contribute to better mutual understanding of their positions and views.

The participating States declare their intention to conduct their relations with all other States in the spirit of the principles contained in the present Declaration.

### (b) *Matters related to giving effect to certain of the above Principles*

#### (i) *The participating States,*

*Reaffirming* that they will respect and give effect to refraining from the threat or use of force and convinced of the necessity to make it an effective norm of international life,

*Declare* that they are resolved to respect and carry out, in their relations with one another, inter alia, the following provisions which are in conformity with the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States:

—To give effect and expression, by all the ways and forms which they consider appropriate, to the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force in their relations with one another.

—To refrain from any use of armed forces inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of

the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, against another participating State, in particular from invasion of or attack on its territory.

—To refrain from any manifestation of force for the purpose of inducing another participating State to renounce the full exercise of its sovereign rights.

—To refrain from any act of economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by another participating State of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.

—To take effective measures which by their scope and by their nature constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

—To promote, by all means which each of them considers appropriate, a climate of confidence and respect among peoples consonant with their duty to refrain from propaganda for wars of aggression or for any threat or use of force inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, against another participating State.

—To make every effort to settle exclusively by peaceful means any dispute between them, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security in Europe, and to seek, first of all, a solution through the peaceful means set forth in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter.

To refrain from any action which could hinder the peaceful settlement of disputes between the participating States.

(ii) The participating States,

*Reaffirming* their determination to settle their disputes as set forth in the Principle of Peaceful Settlement of Disputes;

*Convinced* that the peaceful settlement of disputes is a complement to refraining from the threat or use of force, both being essential though not exclusive factors for the maintenance and consolidation of peace and security;

*Desiring* to reinforce and to improve the methods at their disposal for the peaceful settlement of disputes;

1. Are resolved to pursue the examination and elaboration of a generally acceptable method for the peaceful settlement of disputes aimed at complementing existing methods, and to continue to this end to work upon the "Draft Convention on a European System for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes" submitted by Switzerland during the second stage of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, as well as other proposals relating to it and directed towards the elaboration of such a method.

2. Decide that, on the invitation of Switzerland, a meeting of experts of all the participating States will be convoked in order to fulfil the mandate described in paragraph 1 above within the framework and

under the procedures of the follow-up to the Conference laid down in the chapter "Follow-up to the Conference".

3. This meeting of experts will take place after the meeting of the representatives appointed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the participating States, scheduled according to the chapter "Follow-up to the Conference" for 1977; the results of the work of this meeting of experts will be submitted to Governments.

2.

**Document on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament**

The participating States,

*Desirous* of eliminating the causes of tension that may exist among them and thus of contributing to the strengthening of peace and security in the world;

*Determined* to strengthen confidence among them and thus to contribute to increasing stability and security in Europe;

*Determined* further to refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States as adopted in this Final Act;

*Recognizing* the need to contribute to reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension, particularly in a situation where the participating States lack clear and timely information about the nature of such activities;

*Taking into account* considerations relevant to efforts aimed at lessening tension and promoting disarmament;

*Recognizing* that the exchange of observers by invitation at military manoeuvres will help to promote contacts and mutual understanding;

*Having studied* the question of prior notification of major military movements in the context of confidence-building;

*Recognizing* that there are other ways in which individual States can contribute further to their common objectives;

*Convinced* of the political importance of prior notification of major military manoeuvres for the promotion of mutual understanding and the strengthening of confidence, stability and security;

*Accepting* the responsibility of each of them to promote these objectives and to implement this measure, in accordance with the accepted criteria and modalities, as essentials for the realization of these objectives;

*Recognizing* that this measure deriving from political decision rests upon a voluntary basis;

*Have adopted the following:*

## I

### *Prior notification of major military manoeuvres*

They will notify their major military manoeuvres to all other participating States through usual diplomatic channels in accordance with the following provisions:

Notification will be given of major military manoeuvres exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with any possible air or naval components (in this context the word "troops" includes amphibious and airborne troops). In the case of independent manoeuvres of amphibious or airborne troops, or of combined manoeuvres involving them, these troops will be included in this total. Furthermore, in the case of combined manoeuvres which do not reach the above total but which involve land forces together with significant numbers of either amphibious or airborne troops, or both, notification can also be given.

Notification will be given of major military manoeuvres which take place on the territory, in Europe, of any participating State as well as, if applicable, in the adjoining sea area and air space.

In the case of a participating State whose territory extends beyond Europe, prior notification need be given only of manoeuvres which take place in an area within 250 kilometres from its frontier facing or shared with any other European participating State, the participating State need not, however, give notification in cases in which that area is also contiguous to the participating State's frontier facing or shared with a non-European non-participating State.

Notification will be given 21 days or more in advance of the start of the manoeuvre or in the case of a manoeuvre arranged at shorter notice at the earliest possible opportunity prior to its starting date.

Notification will contain information of the designation, if any, the general purpose of and the States involved in the manoeuvre, the type or types and numerical strength of the forces engaged, the area and estimated time-frame of its conduct. The participating States will also, if possible, provide additional relevant information, particularly that related to the components of the forces engaged and the period of involvement of these forces.

### *Prior notification of other military manoeuvres*

The participating States recognize that they can contribute further to strengthening confidence and increasing security and stability, and to this end may also notify smaller-scale military manoeuvres to other participating States, with special regard for those near the area of such manoeuvres.

To the same end, the participating States also recognize that they may notify other military manoeuvres conducted by them.

### *Exchange of observers*

The participating States will invite other participating States, voluntarily and on a bilateral

basis, in a spirit of reciprocity and goodwill towards all participating States, to send observers to attend military manoeuvres.

The inviting State will determine in each case the number of observers, the procedures and conditions of their participation, and give other information which it may consider useful. It will provide appropriate facilities and hospitality.

The invitation will be given as far ahead as is conveniently possible through usual diplomatic channels.

### *Prior notification of major military movements*

In accordance with the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations the participating States studied the question of prior notification of major military movements as a measure to strengthen confidence.

Accordingly, the participating States recognize that they may, at their own discretion and with a view to contributing to confidence-building, notify their major military movements.

In the same spirit, further consideration will be given by the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to the question of prior notification of major military movements, bearing in mind, in particular, the experience gained by the implementation of the measures which are set forth in this document.

### *Other confidence-building measures*

The participating States recognize that there are other means by which their common objectives can be promoted.

In particular, they will, with due regard to reciprocity and with a view to better mutual understanding, promote exchanges by invitation among their military personnel, including visits by military delegations.

\* \* \*

In order to make a fuller contribution to their common objective of confidence-building, the participating States, when conducting their military activities in the area covered by the provisions for the prior notification of major military manoeuvres, will duly take into account and respect this objective.

They also recognize that the experience gained by the implementation of the provisions set forth above, together with further efforts, could lead to developing and enlarging measures aimed at strengthening confidence.

## II

### *Questions relating to disarmament*

The participating States recognize the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament which are designed to complement political détente in Europe and to strengthen their security. They are convinced of the necessity to take effective measures in these fields which by their scope and by their nature con-

stitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and which should result in strengthening peace and security throughout the world.

### III

#### *General considerations*

Having considered the views expressed on various subjects related to the strengthening of security in Europe through joint efforts aimed at promoting détente and disarmament, the participating States, when engaged in such efforts, will, in this context, proceed, in particular, from the following essential considerations:

—The complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security;

—The interrelation between the security of each participating State and security in Europe as a whole and the relationship which exists, in the broader context of world security, between security in Europe and security in the Mediterranean area;

—Respect for the security interests of all States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe inherent in their sovereign equality;

—The importance that participants in negotiating fora see to it that information about relevant developments, progress and results is provided on an appropriate basis to other States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and, in return, the justified interest of any of those States in having their views considered.

ing countries throughout the world, including those among the participating countries as long as they are developing from the economic point of view; reaffirming their will to co-operate for the achievement of the aims and objectives established by the appropriate bodies of the United Nations in the pertinent documents concerning development, it being understood that each participating State maintains the positions it has taken on them; giving special attention to the least developed countries,

*Convinced* that the growing world-wide economic interdependence calls for increasing common and effective efforts towards the solution of major world economic problems such as food, energy, commodities, monetary and financial problems, and therefore emphasizes the need for promoting stable and equitable international economic relations, thus contributing to the continuous and diversified economic development of all countries,

*Having taken into account* the work already undertaken by relevant international organizations and wishing to take advantage of the possibilities offered by these organizations, in particular by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, for giving effect to the provisions of the final documents of the Conference,

*Considering* that the guidelines and concrete recommendations contained in the following texts are aimed at promoting further development of their mutual economic relations, and convinced that their co-operation in this field should take place in full respect for the principles guiding relations among participating States as set forth in the relevant document,

*Have adopted the following:*

#### 1. Commercial Exchanges

##### *General provisions*

The participating States,

*Conscious* of the growing role of international trade as one of the most important factors in economic growth and social progress,

*Recognizing* that trade represents an essential sector of their co-operation, and bearing in mind that the provisions contained in the above preamble apply in particular to this sector,

*Considering* that the volume and structure of trade among the participating States do not in all cases correspond to the possibilities created by the current level of their economic, scientific and technological development,

are resolved to promote, on the basis of the modalities of their economic co-operation, the expansion of their mutual trade in goods and services, and to ensure conditions favourable to such development;

recognize the beneficial effects which can result for the development of trade from the application of most favoured nation treatment;

will encourage the expansion of trade on as broad a multilateral basis as possible, thereby endeavouring to utilize the various economic and commercial possibilities;

recognize the importance of bilateral and multi-

#### CO-OPERATION IN THE FIELD OF ECONOMICS, OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND OF THE ENVIRONMENT

The participating States,

*Convinced* that their efforts to develop co-operation in the fields of trade, industry, science and technology, the environment and other areas of economic activity contribute to the reinforcement of peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole,

*Recognizing* that co-operation in these fields would promote economic and social progress and the improvement of the conditions of life,

*Aware* of the diversity of their economic and social systems,

*Reaffirming* their will to intensify such co-operation between one another, irrespective of their systems,

*Recognizing* that such co-operation, with due regard for the different levels of economic development, can be developed, on the basis of equality and mutual satisfaction of the partners, and of reciprocity permitting, as a whole, an equitable distribution of advantages and obligations of comparable scale, with respect for bilateral and multilateral agreements,

*Taking into account* the interests of the develop-

lateral intergovernmental and other agreements for the long-term development of trade;

note the importance of monetary and financial questions for the development of international trade, and will endeavour to deal with them with a view to contributing to the continuous expansion of trade;

will endeavour to reduce or progressively eliminate all kinds of obstacles to the development of trade;

will foster a steady growth of trade while avoiding as far as possible abrupt fluctuations in their trade;

consider that their trade in various products should be conducted in such a way as not to cause or threaten to cause serious injury—and should the situation arise, market disruption—in domestic markets for these products and in particular to the detriment of domestic producers of like or directly competitive products; as regards the concept of market disruption, it is understood that it should not be invoked in a way inconsistent with the relevant provisions of their international agreements; if they resort to safeguard measures, they will do so in conformity with their commitments in this field arising from international agreements to which they are parties and will take account of the interests of the parties directly concerned;

will give due attention to measures for the promotion of trade and the diversification of its structure;

note that the growth and diversification of trade would contribute to widening the possibilities of choice of products;

consider it appropriate to create favourable conditions for the participation of firms, organizations and enterprises in the development of trade.

### *Business contacts and facilities*

#### **The participating States,**

*Conscious* of the importance of the contribution which an improvement of business contacts, and the accompanying growth of confidence in business relationships, could make to the development of commercial and economic relations,

will take measures further to improve conditions for the expansion of contacts between representatives of official bodies, of the different organizations, enterprises, firms and banks concerned with foreign trade, in particular, where useful, between sellers and users of products and services, for the purpose of studying commercial possibilities, concluding contracts, ensuring their implementation and providing after-sales services;

will encourage organizations, enterprises and firms concerned with foreign trade to take measures to accelerate the conduct of business negotiations;

will further take measures aimed at improving working conditions of representatives of foreign organizations, enterprises, firms and banks concerned with external trade, particularly as follows:

—by providing the necessary information, including information on legislation and procedures relating to the establishment and operation of permanent representation by the above mentioned bodies;

—by examining as favourably as possible requests

for the establishment of permanent representation and of offices for this purpose, including, where appropriate, the opening of joint offices by two or more firms;

—by encouraging the provision, on conditions as favourable as possible and equal for all representatives of the above-mentioned bodies, of hotel accommodation, means of communication, and of other facilities normally required by them, as well as of suitable business and residential premises for purposes of permanent representation;

recognize the importance of such measures to encourage greater participation by small and medium sized firms in trade between participating States.

### *Economic and commercial information*

#### **The participating States,**

*Conscious* of the growing role of economic and commercial information in the development of international trade,

*Considering* that economic information should be of such a nature as to allow adequate market analysis and to permit the preparation of medium and long term forecasts, thus contributing to the establishment of a continuing flow of trade and a better utilization of commercial possibilities,

*Expressing their readiness* to improve the quality and increase the quantity and supply of economic and relevant administrative information,

*Considering* that the value of statistical information on the international level depends to a considerable extent on the possibility of its comparability,

will promote the publication and dissemination of economic and commercial information at regular intervals and as quickly as possible, in particular:

—statistics concerning production, national income, budget, consumption and productivity;

—foreign trade statistics drawn up on the basis of comparable classification including breakdown by product with indication of volume and value, as well as country of origin or destination;

—laws and regulations concerning foreign trade;

—information allowing forecasts of development of the economy to assist in trade promotion, for example, information on the general orientation of national economic plans and programmes;

—other information to help businessmen in commercial contacts, for example, periodic directories, lists, and where possible, organizational charts of firms and organizations concerned with foreign trade;

will in addition to the above encourage the development of the exchange of economic and commercial information through, where appropriate, joint commissions for economic, scientific and technical co-operation, national and joint chambers of commerce, and other suitable bodies;

will support a study, in the framework of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, of the possibilities of creating a multilateral system of notification of laws and regulations concerning foreign trade and changes therein;

will encourage international work on the har-



monization of statistical nomenclatures, notably in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.

## Marketing

### The participating States,

Recognizing the importance of adapting production to the requirements of foreign markets in order to ensure the expansion of international trade,

Conscious of the need of exporters to be as fully familiar as possible with and take account of the requirements of potential users,

will encourage organizations, enterprises and firms concerned with foreign trade to develop further the knowledge and techniques required for effective marketing;

will encourage the improvement of conditions for the implementation of measures to promote trade and to satisfy the needs of users in respect of imported products, in particular through market research and advertising measures as well as, where useful, the establishment of supply facilities, the furnishing of spare parts, the functioning of after sales services, and the training of the necessary local technical personnel;

will encourage international co-operation in the field of trade promotion, including marketing, and the work undertaken on these subjects within the international bodies, in particular the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.

## 2. Industrial co-operation and projects of common interest

### Industrial co-operation

#### The participating States,

Considering that industrial co-operation, being motivated by economic considerations, can

—create lasting ties thus strengthening long-term overall economic co-operation,

—contribute to economic growth as well as to the expansion and diversification of international trade and to a wider utilization of modern technology,

—lead to the mutually advantageous utilization of economic complementarities through better use of all factors of production, and

—accelerate the industrial development of all those who take part in such co-operation,

propose to encourage the development of industrial co-operation between the competent organizations, enterprises and firms of their countries;

consider that industrial co-operation may be facilitated by means of intergovernmental and other bilateral and multilateral agreements between the interested parties;

note that in promoting industrial co-operation they should bear in mind the economic structures and the development levels of their countries;

note that industrial co-operation is implemented by means of contracts concluded between competent organizations, enterprises and firms on the basis of economic considerations;

express their willingness to promote measures designed to create favourable conditions for industrial co-operation;

recognize that industrial co-operation covers a number of forms of economic relations going beyond the framework of conventional trade, and that in concluding contracts on industrial co-operation the partners will determine jointly the appropriate forms and conditions of co-operation, taking into account their mutual interests and capabilities;

recognize further that, if it is in their mutual interest, concrete forms such as the following may be useful for the development of industrial co-operation: joint production and sale, specialization in production and sale, construction, adaptation and modernization of industrial plants, co-operation for the setting up of complete industrial installations with a view to thus obtaining part of the resultant products, mixed companies, exchanges of "know-how", of technical information, of patents and of licences, and joint industrial research within the framework of specific co-operation projects;

recognize that new forms of industrial co-operation can be applied with a view to meeting specific needs;

note the importance of economic, commercial, technical and administrative information such as to ensure the development of industrial co-operation;

Consider it desirable:

—to improve the quality and the quantity of information relevant to industrial co-operation, in particular the laws and regulations, including those relating to foreign exchange, general orientation of national economic plans and programmes as well as programme priorities and economic conditions of the market; and

—to disseminate as quickly as possible published documentation thereon;

will encourage all forms of exchange of information and communication of experience relevant to industrial co-operation, including through contacts between potential partners and, where appropriate, through joint commissions for economic, industrial, scientific and technical co-operation, national and joint chambers of commerce, and other suitable bodies;

consider it desirable, with a view to expanding industrial co-operation, to encourage the exploration of co-operation possibilities and the implementation of co-operation projects and will take measures to this end, *inter alia*, by facilitating and increasing all forms of business contacts between competent organizations, enterprises and firms and between their respective qualified personnel;

note that the provisions adopted by the Conference relating to business contacts in the economic and commercial fields also apply to foreign organizations, enterprises and firms engaged in industrial co-operation, taking into account the specific conditions of this co-operation, and will endeavour to ensure, in particular, the existence of appropriate working conditions for personnel engaged in the implementation of co-operation projects;

consider it desirable that proposals for industrial co-operation projects should be sufficiently specific

and should contain the necessary economic and technical data, in particular preliminary estimates of the cost of the project, information on the form of co-operation envisaged, and market possibilities, to enable potential partners to proceed with initial studies and to arrive at decisions in the shortest possible time;

will encourage the parties concerned with industrial co-operation to take measures to accelerate the conduct of negotiations for the conclusion of co-operation contracts;

recommend further the continued examination—for example within the framework of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe—of means of improving the provision of information to those concerned on general conditions of industrial co-operation and guidance on the preparation of contracts in this field;

consider it desirable to further improve conditions for the implementation of industrial co-operation projects, in particular with respect to:

—the protection of the interests of the partners in industrial co-operation projects, including the legal protection of the various kinds of property involved;

—the consideration, in ways that are compatible with their economic systems, of the needs and possibilities of industrial co-operation within the framework of economic policy and particularly in national economic plans and programmes;

consider it desirable that the partners, when concluding industrial co-operation contracts, should devote due attention to provisions concerning the extension of the necessary mutual assistance and the provision of the necessary information during the implementation of these contracts, in particular with a view to attaining the required technical level and quality of the products resulting from such co-operation;

recognize the usefulness of an increased participation of small and medium sized firms in industrial co-operation projects.

### *Projects of common interest*

The participating States,

*Considering* that their economic potential and their natural resources permit, through common efforts, long-term co-operation in the implementation, including at the regional or sub-regional level, of major projects of common interest, and that these may contribute to the speeding-up of the economic development of the countries participating therein,

*Considering* it desirable that the competent organizations, enterprises and firms of all countries should be given the possibility of indicating their interest in participating in such projects, and, in case of agreement, of taking part in their implementation,

*Noting* that the provisions adopted by the Conference relating to industrial cooperation are also applicable to projects of common interest,

regard it as necessary to encourage, where appro-

priate, the investigation by competent and interested organizations, enterprises and firms of the possibilities for the carrying out of projects of common interest in the fields of energy resources and of the exploitation of raw materials, as well as of transport and communications;

regard it as desirable that organizations, enterprises and firms exploring the possibilities of taking part in projects of common interest exchange with their potential partners, through the appropriate channels, the requisite economic, legal, financial and technical information pertaining to these projects;

consider that the fields of energy resources, in particular, petroleum, natural gas and coal, and the extraction and processing of mineral raw materials, in particular, iron ore and bauxite, are suitable ones for strengthening long-term economic co-operation and for the development of trade which could result;

consider that possibilities for projects of common interest with a view to long-term economic co-operation also exist in the following fields:

—exchanges of electrical energy within Europe with a view to utilizing the capacity of the electrical power stations as rationally as possible;

—co-operation in research for new sources of energy and, in particular, in the field of nuclear energy;

—development of road networks and co-operation aimed at establishing a coherent navigable network in Europe;

—co-operation in research and the perfecting of equipment for multimodal transport operations and for the handling of containers;

recommend that the States interested in projects of common interest should consider under what conditions it would be possible to establish them, and if they so desire, create the necessary conditions for their actual implementation.

## **3. Provisions concerning trade and industrial co-operation**

### *Harmonization of standards*

The participating States,

*Recognizing* the development of international harmonization of standards and technical regulations and of international co-operation in the field of certification as an important means of eliminating technical obstacles to international trade and industrial co-operation, thereby facilitating their development and increasing productivity,

reaffirm their interest to achieve the widest possible international harmonization of standards and technical regulations;

express their readiness to promote international agreements and other appropriate arrangements on acceptance of certificates of conformity with standards and technical regulations;

consider it desirable to increase international co-operation on standardization, in particular by supporting the activities of intergovernmental and other appropriate organizations in this field.

### The participating States,

*Considering* that the prompt and equitable settlement of disputes which may arise from commercial transactions relating to goods and services and contracts for industrial co-operation would contribute to expanding and facilitating trade and co-operation,

*Considering* that arbitration is an appropriate means of settling such disputes,

recommend, where appropriate, to organizations, enterprises and firms in their countries, to include arbitration clauses in commercial contracts and industrial co-operation contracts, or in special agreements;

recommend that the provisions on arbitration should provide for arbitration under a mutually acceptable set of arbitration rules, and permit arbitration in a third country, taking into account existing intergovernmental and other agreements in this field.

### *Specific bilateral arrangements*

#### The participating States,

*Conscious* of the need to facilitate trade and to promote the application of new forms of industrial co-operation,

will consider favourably the conclusion, in appropriate cases, of specific bilateral agreements concerning various problems of mutual interest in the fields of commercial exchanges and industrial co-operation, in particular with a view to avoiding double taxation and to facilitating the transfer of profits and the return of the value of the assets invested.

## 4. Science and technology

### The participating States,

*Convinced* that scientific and technological co-operation constitutes an important contribution to the strengthening of security and co-operation among them, in that it assists the effective solution of problems of common interest and the improvement of the conditions of human life,

*Considering* that in developing such co-operation, it is important to promote the sharing of information and experience, facilitating the study and transfer of scientific and technological achievements, as well as the access to such achievements on a mutually advantageous basis and in fields of co-operation agreed between interested parties,

*Considering* that it is for the potential partners, i.e. the competent organizations, institutions, enterprises, scientists and technologists of the participating States to determine the opportunities for mutually beneficial co-operation and to develop its details,

*Affirming* that such co-operation can be developed and implemented bilaterally and multilaterally at the governmental and non-governmental levels, for example, through intergovernmental and other agreements, international programmes, co-operative proj-

ects and commercial channels, while utilizing also various forms of contacts, including direct and individual contacts,

*Aware* of the need to take measures further to improve scientific and technological co-operation between them,

### *Possibilities for improving co-operation*

Recognize that possibilities exist for further improving scientific and technological co-operation, and to this end, express their intention to remove obstacles to such co-operation, in particular through:

—the improvement of opportunities for the exchange and dissemination of scientific and technological information among the parties interested in scientific and technological research and co-operation including information related to the organization and implementation of such co-operation;

—the expeditious implementation and improvement in organization, including programmes, of international visits of scientists and specialists in connexion with exchanges, conferences and co-operation;

—the wider use of commercial channels and activities for applied scientific and technological research and for the transfer of achievements obtained in this field while providing information on and protection of intellectual and industrial property rights;

### *Fields of co-operation*

Consider that possibilities to expand co-operation exist within the areas given below as examples, noting that it is for potential partners in the participating countries to identify and develop projects and arrangements of mutual interest and benefit:

#### *Agriculture*

Research into new methods and technologies for increasing the productivity of crop cultivation and animal husbandry; the application of chemistry to agriculture; the design, construction and utilization of agricultural machinery; technologies of irrigation and other agricultural land improvement works;

#### *Energy*

New technologies of production, transport and distribution of energy aimed at improving the use of existing fuels and sources of hydroenergy, as well as research in the field of new energy sources, including nuclear, solar and geothermal energy;

#### *New technologies, rational use of resources*

Research on new technologies and equipment designed in particular to reduce energy consumption and to minimize or eliminate waste;

#### *Transport technology*

Research on the means of transport and the technology applied to the development and operation of international, national and urban transport networks including container transport as well as transport safety;

### *Physics*

Study of problems in high energy physics and plasma physics; research in the field of theoretical and experimental nuclear physics;

### *Chemistry*

Research on problems in electrochemistry and the chemistry of polymers, of natural products, and of metals and alloys, as well as the development of improved chemical technology, especially materials processing; practical application of the latest achievements of chemistry to industry, construction and other sectors of the economy;

### *Meteorology and hydrology*

Meteorological and hydrological research, including methods of collection, evaluation and transmission of data and their utilization for weather forecasting and hydrology forecasting;

### *Oceanography*

Oceanographic research, including the study of air/sea interactions;

### *Seismological research*

Study and forecasting of earthquakes and associated geological changes; development and research of technology of seism-resisting constructions;

### *Research on glaciology, permafrost and problems of life under conditions of cold*

Research on glaciology and permafrost; transportation and construction technologies; human adaptation to climatic extremes and changes in the living conditions of indigenous populations;

### *Computer, communication and information technologies*

Development of computers as well as of telecommunications and information systems; technology associated with computers and telecommunications, including their use for management systems, for production processes, for automation, for the study of economic problems, in scientific research and for the collection, processing and dissemination of information;

### *Space research*

Space exploration and the study of the earth's natural resources and the natural environment by remote sensing in particular with the assistance of satellites and rocket-probes;

### *Medicine and public health*

Research on cardiovascular, tumour and virus diseases, molecular biology, neurophysiology; development and testing of new drugs; study of contemporary problems of pediatrics, gerontology and the organization and techniques of medical services;

### *Environmental research*

Research on specific scientific and technological problems related to human environment.

### *Forms and methods of co-operation*

Express their view that scientific and technological co-operation should, in particular, employ the following forms and methods:

—exchange and circulation of books, periodicals and other scientific and technological publications and papers among interested organizations, scientific and technological institutions, enterprises and scientists and technologists, as well as participation in international programmes for the abstracting and indexing of publications;

—exchanges and visits as well as other direct contacts and communications among scientists and technologists, on the basis of mutual agreement and other arrangements, for such purposes as consultations, lecturing and conducting research, including the use of laboratories, scientific libraries, and other documentation centres in connexion therewith;

—holding of international and national conferences, symposia, seminars, courses and other meetings of a scientific and technological character, which would include the participation of foreign scientists and technologists;

—joint preparation and implementation of programmes and projects of mutual interest on the basis of consultation and agreement among all parties concerned, including, where possible and appropriate, exchanges of experience and research results, and correlation of research programmes, between scientific and technological research institutions and organizations;

—use of commercial channels and methods for identifying and transferring technological and scientific developments, including the conclusion of mutually beneficial co-operation arrangements between firms and enterprises in fields agreed upon between them and for carrying out, where appropriate, joint research and development programmes and projects;

consider it desirable that periodic exchanges of views and information take place on scientific policy, in particular on general problems of orientation and administration of research and the question of a better use of large-scale scientific and experimental equipment on a co-operative basis;

recommend that, in developing co-operation in the field of science and technology, full use be made of existing practices of bilateral and multilateral co-operation, including that of a regional or sub-regional character, together with the forms and methods of co-operation described in this document;

recommend further that more effective utilization be made of the possibilities and capabilities of existing international organizations, intergovernmental and non-governmental, concerned with science and technology, for improving exchanges of information and experience, as well as for developing other forms of co-operation in fields of common interest, for example:

—in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, study of possibilities for expanding multilateral co-operation, taking into account models for projects and research used in various international organizations; and for sponsoring conferences, symposia, and study and working groups such as those which would bring together younger scientists and technologists with eminent specialists in their field;

—through their participation in particular international scientific and technological co-operation programmes, including those of UNESCO and other

international organizations, pursuit of continuing progress towards the objectives of such programmes, notably those of UNISIST [World Science Information System] with particular respect to information policy guidance, technical advice, information contributions and data processing.

## 5. Environment

### The participating States,

*Affirming* that the protection and improvement of the environment, as well as the protection of nature and the rational utilization of its resources in the interests of present and future generations, is one of the tasks of major importance to the well-being of peoples and the economic development of all countries and that many environmental problems, particularly in Europe, can be solved effectively only through close international co-operation,

*Acknowledging* that each of the participating States, in accordance with the principles of international law, ought to ensure, in a spirit of co-operation, that activities carried out on its territory do not cause degradation of the environment in another State or in areas lying beyond the limits of national jurisdiction,

*Considering* that the success of any environmental policy presupposes that all population groups and social forces, aware of their responsibilities, help to protect and improve the environment, which necessitates continued and thorough educative action, particularly with regard to youth,

*Affirming* that experience has shown that economic development and technological progress must be compatible with the protection of the environment and the preservation of historical and cultural values; that damage to the environment is best avoided by preventive measures; and that the ecological balance must be preserved in the exploitation and management of natural resources,

### *Aims of co-operation*

Agree to the following aims of co-operation, in particular:

—to study, with a view to their solution, those environmental problems which, by their nature, are of a multilateral, bilateral, regional or sub-regional dimension; as well as to encourage the development of an interdisciplinary approach to environmental problems;

—to increase the effectiveness of national and international measures for the protection of the environment, by the comparison and, if appropriate, the harmonization of methods of gathering and analyzing facts, by improving the knowledge of pollution phenomena and rational utilization of natural resources, by the exchange of information, by the harmonization of definitions and the adoption, as far as possible, of a common terminology in the field of the environment;

—to take the necessary measures to bring environmental policies closer together and, where appropriate and possible, to harmonize them;

—to encourage, where possible and appropriate, national and international efforts by their interested

organizations, enterprises and firms in the development, production and improvement of equipment designed for monitoring, protecting and enhancing the environment.

### *Fields of co-operation*

To attain these aims, the participating States will make use of every suitable opportunity to co-operate in the field of environment and, in particular, within the areas described below as examples:

#### *Control of air pollution*

Desulphurization of fossil fuels and exhaust gases; pollution control of heavy metals, particles, aerosols, nitrogen oxides, in particular those emitted by transport, power stations, and other industrial plants; systems and methods of observation and control of air pollution and its effects, including long-range transport of air pollutants;

#### *Water pollution control and fresh water utilization*

Prevention and control of water pollution, in particular of transboundary rivers and international lakes; techniques for the improvement of the quality of water and further development of ways and means for industrial and municipal sewage effluent purification; methods of assessment of fresh water resources and the improvement of their utilization, in particular by developing methods of production which are less polluting and lead to less consumption of fresh water;

#### *Protection of the marine environment*

Protection of the marine environment of participating States, and especially the Mediterranean Sea, from pollutants emanating from land-based sources and those from ships and other vessels, notably the harmful substances listed in Annexes I and II to the London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by the Dumping of Wastes and Other Matters; problems of maintaining marine ecological balances and food chains, in particular such problems as may arise from the exploration and exploitation of biological and mineral resources of the seas and the sea-bed;

#### *Land utilization and soils*

Problems associated with more effective use of lands, including land amelioration, reclamation and recultivation; control of soil pollution, water and air erosion, as well as other forms of soil degradation; maintaining and increasing the productivity of soils with due regard for the possible negative effects of the application of chemical fertilizers and pesticides;

#### *Nature conservation and nature reserves*

Protection of nature and nature reserves; conservation and maintenance of existing genetic resources, especially rare animal and plant species; conservation of natural ecological systems; establishment of nature reserves and other protected landscapes and areas, including their use for research, tourism, recreation and other purposes;

#### *Improvement of environmental conditions in areas of human settlement*

Environmental conditions associated with trans-

port, housing, working areas, urban development and planning, water supply and sewage disposal systems; assessment of harmful effects of noise, and noise control methods; collection, treatment and utilization of wastes, including the recovery and recycling of materials; research on substitutes for non-biodegradable substances;

*Fundamental research, monitoring, forecasting and assessment of environmental changes*

Study of changes in climate, landscapes and ecological balances under the impact of both natural factors and human activities; forecasting of possible genetic changes in flora and fauna as a result of environmental pollution; harmonization of statistical data, development of scientific concepts and systems of monitoring networks, standardized methods of observation, measurement and assessment of changes in the biosphere; assessment of the effects of environmental pollution levels and degradation of the environment upon human health; study and development of criteria and standards for various environmental pollutants and regulation regarding production and use of various products;

*Legal and administrative measures*

Legal and administrative measures for the protection of the environment including procedures for establishing environmental impact assessments.

*Forms and methods of co-operation*

The participating States declare that problems relating to the protection and improvement of the environment will be solved on both a bilateral and a multilateral, including regional and sub-regional, basis, making full use of existing patterns and forms of co-operation. They will develop co-operation in the field of the environment in particular by taking into consideration the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Prague symposium on environmental problems.

The participating States are resolved that co-operation in the field of the environment will be implemented in particular through:

—exchanges of scientific and technical information, documentation and research results, including information on the means of determining the possible effects on the environment of technical and economic activities;

—organization of conferences, symposia and meetings of experts;

—exchanges of scientists, specialists and trainees;

—joint preparation and implementation of programmes and projects for the study and solution of various problems of environmental protection;

—harmonization, where appropriate and necessary, of environmental protection standards and norms, in particular with the object of avoiding possible difficulties in trade which may arise from efforts to resolve ecological problems of production processes and which relate to the achievement of certain environmental qualities in manufactured products;

—consultations on various aspects of environmental protection, as agreed upon among countries concerned, especially in connexion with problems which could have international consequences.

The participating States will further develop such co-operation by:

—promoting the progressive development, codification and implementation of international law as one means of preserving and enhancing the human environment, including principles and practices, as accepted by them, relating to pollution and other environmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of their States affecting other countries and regions;

—supporting and promoting the implementation of relevant international Conventions to which they are parties, in particular those designed to prevent and combat marine and fresh water pollution, recommending States to ratify Conventions which have already been signed, as well as considering possibilities of accepting other appropriate Conventions to which they are not parties at present;

—advocating the inclusion, where appropriate and possible, of the various areas of co-operation into the programmes of work of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, supporting such co-operation within the framework of the Commission and of the United Nations Environment Programme, and taking into account the work of other competent international organizations of which they are members;

—making wider use, in all types of co-operation, of information already available from national and international sources, including internationally agreed criteria, and utilizing the possibilities and capabilities of various competent international organizations.

The participating States agree on the following recommendations on specific measures:

—to develop through international co-operation an extensive programme for the monitoring and evaluation of the long-range transport of air pollutants, starting with sulphur dioxide and with possible extension to other pollutants, and to this end to take into account basic elements of a co-operation programme which were identified by the experts who met in Oslo in December 1974 at the invitation of the Norwegian Institute of Air Research;

—to advocate that within the framework of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe a study be carried out of procedures and relevant experience relating to the activities of Governments in developing the capabilities of their countries to predict adequately environmental consequences of economic activities and technological development.

## 6. Co-operation in other areas

### *Development of transport*

The participating States,

Considering that the improvement of the conditions of transport constitutes one of the factors essential to the development of co-operation among them,

Considering that it is necessary to encourage the development of transport and the solution of existing problems by employing appropriate national and international means,

Taking into account the work being carried out on these subjects by existing international organizations, especially by the Inland Transport Committee of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe,

note that the speed of technical progress in the various fields of transport makes desirable a development of co-operation and an increase in exchanges of information among them;

declare themselves in favour of a simplification and a harmonization of administrative formalities in the field of international transport, in particular at frontiers;

consider it desirable to promote, while allowing for their particular national circumstances in this sector, the harmonization of administrative and technical provisions concerning safety in road, rail, river, air and sea transport;

express their intention to encourage the development of international inland transport of passengers and goods as well as the possibilities of adequate participation in such transport on the basis of reciprocal advantage;

declare themselves in favour, with due respect for their rights and international commitments, of the elimination of disparities arising from the legal provisions applied to traffic on inland waterways which are subject to international conventions and, in particular, of the disparity in the application of those provisions; and to this end invite the member States of the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine, of the Danube Commission and of other bodies to develop the work and studies now being carried out, in particular within the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe;

express their willingness, with a view to improving international rail transport and with due respect for their rights and international commitments, to work towards the elimination of difficulties arising from disparities in existing international legal provisions governing the reciprocal railway transport of passengers and goods between their territories;

express the desire for intensification of the work being carried out by existing international organizations in the field of transport, especially that of the Inland Transport Committee of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, and express their intention to contribute thereto by their efforts;

consider that examination by the participating States of the possibility of their accession to the different conventions or to membership of international organizations specializing in transport matters, as well as their efforts to implement conventions when ratified, could contribute to the strengthening of their co-operation in this field.

### *Promotion of tourism*

The participating States,

Aware of the contribution made by international tourism to the development of mutual understanding among peoples, to increased knowledge of other

countries' achievements in various fields, as well as to economic, social and cultural progress,

Recognizing the interrelationship between the development of tourism and measures taken in other areas of economic activity,

express their intention to encourage increased tourism on both an individual and group basis in particular by:

—encouraging the improvement of the tourist infrastructure and co-operation in this field;

—encouraging the carrying out of joint tourist projects including technical co-operation, particularly where this is suggested by territorial proximity and the convergence of tourist interests;

—encouraging the exchange of information, including relevant laws and regulations, studies, data and documentation relating to tourism, and by improving statistics with a view to facilitating their comparability;

—dealing in a positive spirit with questions connected with the allocation of financial means for tourist travel abroad, having regard to their economic possibilities, as well as with those connected with the formalities required for such travel, taking into account other provisions on tourism adopted by the Conference;

—facilitating the activities of foreign travel agencies and passenger transport companies in the promotion of international tourism;

—encouraging tourism outside the high season;

—examining the possibilities of exchanging specialists and students in the field of tourism, with a view to improving their qualifications;

—promoting conferences and symposia on the planning and development of tourism;

consider it desirable to carry out in the appropriate international framework, and with the co-operation of the relevant national bodies, detailed studies on tourism, in particular:

—a comparative study on the status and activities of travel agencies as well as on ways and means of achieving better co-operation among them;

—a study of the problems raised by the seasonal concentration of vacations, with the ultimate objective of encouraging tourism outside peak periods;

—studies of the problems arising in areas where tourism has injured the environment;

consider also that interested parties might wish to study the following questions:

—uniformity of hotel classification; and

—tourist routes comprising two or more countries;

will endeavour, where possible, to ensure that the development of tourism does not injure the environment and the artistic, historic and cultural heritage in their respective countries;

will pursue their co-operation in the field of tourism bilaterally and multilaterally with a view to attaining the above objectives.

### *Economic and social aspects of migrant labour*

The participating States,

Considering that the movements of migrant

workers in Europe have reached substantial proportions, and that they constitute an important economic, social and human factor for host countries as well as for countries of origin,

*Recognizing* that workers' migrations have also given rise to a number of economic, social, human and other problems in both the receiving countries and the countries of origin,

*Taking due account* of the activities of the competent international organizations, more particularly the International Labour Organisation, in this area,

are of the opinion that the problems arising bilaterally from the migration of workers in Europe as well as between the participating States should be dealt with by the parties directly concerned, in order to resolve these problems in their mutual interest, in the light of the concern of each State involved to take due account of the requirements resulting from its socio-economic situation, having regard to the obligation of each State to comply with the bilateral and multilateral agreements to which it is party, and with the following aims in view:

to encourage the efforts of the countries of origin directed towards increasing the possibilities of employment for their nationals in their own territories, in particular by developing economic co-operation appropriate for this purpose and suitable for the host countries and the countries of origin concerned;

to ensure, through collaboration between the host country and the country of origin, the conditions under which the orderly movement of workers might take place, while at the same time protecting their personal and social welfare and, if appropriate, to organize the recruitment of migrant workers and the provision of elementary language and vocational training;

to ensure equality of rights between migrant workers and nationals of the host countries with regard to conditions of employment and work and to social security, and to endeavour to ensure that migrant workers may enjoy satisfactory living conditions, especially housing conditions;

to endeavour to ensure, as far as possible, that migrant workers may enjoy the same opportunities as nationals of the host countries of finding other suitable employment in the event of unemployment;

to regard with favour the provision of vocational training to migrant workers and, as far as possible, free instruction in the language of the host country, in the framework of their employment;

to confirm the right of migrant workers to receive, as far as possible, regular information in their own language, covering both their country of origin and the host country;

to ensure that the children of migrant workers established in the host country have access to the education usually given there, under the same conditions as the children of that country and, furthermore, to permit them to receive supplementary education in their own language, national culture, history and geography;

to bear in mind that migrant workers, particularly those who have acquired qualifications, can by re-

turning to their countries after a certain period of time help to remedy any deficiency of skilled labour in their country of origin;

to facilitate, as far as possible, the reuniting of migrant workers with their families;

to regard with favour the efforts of the countries of origin to attract the savings of migrant workers, with a view to increasing, within the framework of their economic development, appropriate opportunities for employment, thereby facilitating the reintegration of these workers on their return home.

### *Training of personnel*

**The participating States,**

*Conscious* of the importance of the training and advanced training of professional staff and technicians for the economic development of every country,

declare themselves willing to encourage co-operation in this field notably by promoting exchange of information on the subject of institutions, programmes and methods of training and advanced training open to professional staff and technicians in the various sectors of economic activity and especially in those of management, public planning, agriculture and commercial and banking techniques;

consider that it is desirable to develop, under mutually acceptable conditions, exchanges of professional staff and technicians, particularly through training activities, of which it would be left to the competent and interested bodies in the participating States to discuss the modalities—duration, financing, education and qualification levels of potential participants;

declare themselves in favour of examining, through appropriate channels, the possibilities of co-operating on the organization and carrying out of vocational training on the job, more particularly in professions involving modern techniques.

### **QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN**

**The participating States,**

*Conscious* of the geographical, historical, cultural, economic and political aspects of their relationship with the non-participating Mediterranean States,

*Convinced* that security in Europe is to be considered in the broader context of world security and is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area as a whole, and that accordingly the process of improving security should not be confined to Europe but should extend to other parts of the world, and in particular to the Mediterranean area,

*Believing* that the strengthening of security and the intensification of co-operation in Europe would stimulate positive processes in the Mediterranean region, and expressing their intention to contribute towards peace, security and justice in the region, in which ends the participating States and the non-participating Mediterranean States have a common interest,



*Recognizing* the importance of their mutual economic relations with the non-participating Mediterranean States, and conscious of their common interest in the further development of co-operation,

*Noting* with appreciation the interest expressed by the non-participating Mediterranean States in the Conference since its inception, and having duly taken their contributions into account,

*Declare their intention:*

—to promote the development of good-neighbourly relations with the non-participating Mediterranean States in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, on which their relations are based, and with the United Nations Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States and accordingly, in this context, to conduct their relations with the non-participating Mediterranean States in the spirit of the principles set forth in the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States;

—to seek, by further improving their relations with the non-participating Mediterranean States, to increase mutual confidence, so as to promote security and stability in the Mediterranean area as a whole;

—to encourage with the non-participating Mediterranean States the development of mutually beneficial co-operation in the various fields of economic activity, especially by expanding commercial exchanges, on the basis of a common awareness of the necessity for stability and progress in trade relations, of their mutual economic interests, and of differences in the levels of economic development, thereby promoting their economic advancement and well-being;

—to contribute to a diversified development of the economies of the non-participating Mediterranean countries, whilst taking due account of their national development objectives, and to co-operate with them, especially in the sectors of industry, science and technology, in their efforts to achieve a better utilization of their resources, thus promoting a more harmonious development of economic relations;

—to intensify their efforts and their co-operation on a bilateral and multilateral basis with the non-participating Mediterranean States directed towards the improvement of the environment of the Mediterranean, especially the safeguarding of the biological resources and ecological balance of the sea, by appropriate measures including the prevention and control of pollution; to this end, and in view of the present situation, to co-operate through competent international organizations and in particular within the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP);

—to promote further contacts and co-operation with the non-participating Mediterranean States in other relevant fields.

In order to advance the objectives set forth above, the participating States also declare their intention of maintaining and amplifying the contacts and dialogue as initiated by the CSCE with the non-participating Mediterranean States to include all

the States of the Mediterranean, with the purpose of contributing to peace, reducing armed forces in the region, strengthening security, lessening tensions in the region, and widening the scope of co-operation, ends in which all share a common interest, as well as with the purpose of defining further common objectives.

The participating States would seek, in the framework of their multilateral efforts, to encourage progress and appropriate initiatives and to proceed to an exchange of views on the attainment of the above purposes.

## CO-OPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FIELDS

*The participating States,*

*Desiring* to contribute to the strengthening of peace and understanding among peoples and to the spiritual enrichment of the human personality without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,

*Conscious* that increased cultural and educational exchanges, broader dissemination of information, contacts between people, and the solution of humanitarian problems will contribute to the attainment of these aims,

*Determined* therefore to co-operate among themselves, irrespective of their political, economic and social systems, in order to create better conditions in the above fields, to develop and strengthen existing forms of co-operation and to work out new ways and means appropriate to these aims,

*Convinced* that this co-operation should take place in full respect for the principles guiding relations among participating States as set forth in the relevant document,

*Have adopted* the following:

### 1. Human Contacts

*The participating States,*

*Considering* the development of contacts to be an important element in the strengthening of friendly relations and trust among peoples,

*Affirming*, in relation to their present effort to improve conditions in this area, the importance they attach to humanitarian considerations,

*Desiring* in this spirit to develop, with the continuance of détente, further efforts to achieve continuing progress in this field

*And conscious* that the questions relevant hereto must be settled by the States concerned under mutually acceptable conditions,

*Make it their aim* to facilitate freer movement and contacts, individually and collectively, whether privately or officially, among persons, institutions and organizations of the participating States, and to contribute to the solution of the humanitarian problems that arise in that connexion,

*Declare their readiness* to these ends to take measures which they consider appropriate and to conclude agreements or arrangements among themselves, as may be needed, and

Express their intention now to proceed to the implementation of the following:

*(a) Contacts and Regular Meetings on the Basis of Family Ties*

In order to promote further development of contacts on the basis of family ties the participating States will favourably consider applications for travel with the purpose of allowing persons to enter or leave their territory temporarily, and on a regular basis if desired, in order to visit members of their families.

Applications for temporary visits to meet members of their families will be dealt with without distinction as to the country of origin or destination: existing requirements for travel documents and visas will be applied in this spirit. The preparation and issue of such documents and visas will be effected within reasonable time limits; cases of urgent necessity—such as serious illness or death—will be given priority treatment. They will take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that the fees for official travel documents and visas are acceptable.

They confirm that the presentation of an application concerning contacts on the basis of family ties will not modify the rights and obligations of the applicant or of members of his family.

*(b) Reunification of Families*

The participating States will deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with the applications of persons who wish to be reunited with members of their family, with special attention being given to requests of an urgent character—such as requests submitted by persons who are ill or old.

They will deal with applications in this field as expeditiously as possible.

They will lower where necessary the fees charged in connexion with these applications to ensure that they are at a moderate level.

Applications for the purpose of family reunification which are not granted may be renewed at the appropriate level and will be reconsidered at reasonably short intervals by the authorities of the country of residence or destination, whichever is concerned; under such circumstances fees will be charged only when applications are granted.

Persons whose applications for family reunification are granted may bring with them or ship their household and personal effects; to this end the participating States will use all possibilities provided by existing regulations.

Until members of the same family are reunited meetings and contacts between them may take place in accordance with the modalities for contacts on the basis of family ties.

The participating States will support the efforts of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies concerned with the problems of family reunification.

They confirm that the presentation of an application concerning family reunification will not modify the rights and obligations of the applicant or of members of his family.

The receiving participating State will take appropriate care with regard to employment for persons from other participating States who take up permanent residence in that State in connexion with family reunification with its citizens and see that they are afforded opportunities equal to those enjoyed by its own citizens for education, medical assistance and social security.

*(c) Marriage between Citizens of Different States*

The participating States will examine favourably and on the basis of humanitarian considerations requests for exit or entry permits from persons who have decided to marry a citizen from another participating State.

The processing and issuing of the documents required for the above purposes and for the marriage will be in accordance with the provisions accepted for family reunification.

In dealing with requests from couples from different participating States, once married, to enable them and the minor children of their marriage to transfer their permanent residence to a State in which either one is normally a resident, the participating States will also apply the provisions accepted for family reunification.

*(d) Travel for Personal or Professional Reasons*

The participating States intend to facilitate wider travel by their citizens for personal or professional reasons and to this end they intend in particular:

—gradually to simplify and to administer flexibly the procedures for exit and entry;

—to ease regulations concerning movement of citizens from the other participating States in their territory, with due regard to security requirements.

They will endeavour gradually to lower, where necessary, the fees for visas and official travel documents.

They intend to consider, as necessary, means—including, in so far as appropriate, the conclusion of multilateral or bilateral consular conventions or other relevant agreements or understandings—for the improvement of arrangements to provide consular assistance.

\* \* \*

They confirm that religious faiths, institutions and organizations, practising within the constitutional framework of the participating States, and their representatives can, in the field of their activities, have contacts and meetings among themselves and exchange information.

*(e) Improvement of Conditions for Tourism on an Individual or Collective Basis*

The participating States consider that tourism contributes to a fuller knowledge of the life, culture and history of other countries, to the growth of understanding among peoples, to the improvement of contacts and to the broader use of leisure. They

intend to promote the development of tourism, on an individual or collective basis, and, in particular, they intend:

—to promote visits to their respective countries by encouraging the provision of appropriate facilities and the simplification and expediting of necessary formalities relating to such visits;

—to increase, on the basis of appropriate agreements or arrangements where necessary, co-operation in the development of tourism, in particular by considering bilaterally possible ways to increase information relating to travel to other countries and to the reception and service of tourists, and other related questions of mutual interest.

#### (f) Meetings among Young People

The participating States intend to further the development of contacts and exchanges among young people by encouraging:

—increased exchanges and contacts on a short or long term basis among young people working, training or undergoing education through bilateral or multilateral agreements or regular programmes in all cases where it is possible;

—study by their youth organizations of the question of possible agreements relating to frameworks of multilateral youth co-operation;

—agreements or regular programmes relating to the organization of exchanges of students, of international youth seminars, of courses of professional training and foreign language study;

—the further development of youth tourism and the provision to this end of appropriate facilities;

—the development, where possible, of exchanges, contacts and co-operation on a bilateral or multilateral basis between their organizations which represent wide circles of young people working, training or undergoing education;

—awareness among youth of the importance of developing mutual understanding and of strengthening friendly relations and confidence among peoples.

#### (g) Sport

In order to expand existing links and co-operation in the field of sport the participating States will encourage contacts and exchanges of this kind, including sports meetings and competitions of all sorts, on the basis of the established international rules, regulations and practice.

#### (h) Expansion of Contacts

By way of further developing contacts among governmental institutions and non-governmental organizations and associations, including women's organizations, the participating States will facilitate the convening of meetings as well as travel by delegations, groups and individuals.

## 2. Information

The participating States,

*Conscious* of the need for an ever wider knowledge and understanding of the various aspects of life in

other participating States,

*Acknowledging* the contribution of this process to the growth of confidence between peoples,

*Desiring*, with the development of mutual understanding between the participating States and with the further improvement of their relations, to continue further efforts towards progress in this field,

*Recognizing* the importance of the dissemination of information from the other participating States and of a better acquaintance with such information,

*Emphasizing* therefore the essential and influential role of the press, radio, television, cinema and news agencies and of the journalists working in these fields,

*Make it their aim* to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds, to encourage co-operation in the field of information and the exchange of information with other countries, and to improve the conditions under which journalists from one participating State exercise their profession in another participating State, and

*Express their intention* in particular:

#### (a) Improvement of the Circulation of, Access to, and Exchange of Information

##### (i) Oral Information

—To facilitate the dissemination of oral information through the encouragement of lectures and lecture tours by personalities and specialists from the other participating States, as well as exchanges of opinions at round table meetings, seminars, symposia, summer schools, congresses and other bilateral and multilateral meetings.

##### (ii) Printed Information

—To facilitate the improvement of the dissemination, on their territory, of newspapers and printed publications, periodical and non-periodical, from the other participating States. For this purpose:

they will encourage their competent firms and organizations to conclude agreements and contracts designed gradually to increase the quantities and the number of titles of newspapers and publications imported from the other participating States. These agreements and contracts should in particular mention the speediest conditions of delivery and the use of the normal channels existing in each country for the distribution of its own publications and newspapers, as well as forms and means of payment agreed between the parties making it possible to achieve the objectives aimed at by these agreements and contracts;

where necessary, they will take appropriate measures to achieve the above objectives and to implement the provisions contained in the agreements and contracts.

—To contribute to the improvement of access by the public to periodical and non-periodical printed publications imported on the bases indicated above. In particular:

they will encourage an increase in the number of places where these publications are on sale;

they will facilitate the availability of these periodical publications during congresses, conferences,

official visits and other international events and to tourists during the season;

they will develop the possibilities for taking out subscriptions according to the modalities particular to each country;

they will improve the opportunities for reading and borrowing these publications in large public libraries and their reading rooms as well as in university libraries.

They intend to improve the possibilities for acquaintance with bulletins of official information issued by diplomatic missions and distributed by those missions on the basis of arrangements acceptable to the interested parties.

### (iii) *Filmed and Broadcast Information*

—To promote the improvement of the dissemination of filmed and broadcast information. To this end:

they will encourage the wider showing and broadcasting of a greater variety of recorded and filmed information from the other participating States, illustrating the various aspects of life in their countries and received on the basis of such agreements or arrangements as may be necessary between the organizations and firms directly concerned;

they will facilitate the import by competent organizations and firms of recorded audio-visual material from the other participating States.

The participating States note the expansion in the dissemination of information broadcast by radio, and express the hope for the continuation of this process, so as to meet the interest of mutual understanding among peoples and the aims set forth by this Conference.

### (b) *Co-operation in the Field of Information*

—To encourage co-operation in the field of information on the basis of short or long term agreements or arrangements. In particular:

they will favour increased co-operation among mass media organizations, including press agencies, as well as among publishing houses and organizations;

they will favour co-operation among public or private, national or international radio and television organizations, in particular through the exchange of both live and recorded radio and television programmes, and through the joint production and the broadcasting and distribution of such programmes;

they will encourage meetings and contacts both between journalists' organizations and between journalists from the participating States;

they will view favourably the possibilities of arrangements between periodical publications as well as between newspapers from the participating States, for the purpose of exchanging and publishing articles;

they will encourage the exchange of technical information as well as the organization of joint research and meetings devoted to the exchange of experience and views between experts in the field of the press, radio and television.

### (c) *Improvement of Working Conditions for Journalists*

The participating States, desiring to improve the conditions under which journalists from one participating State exercise their profession in another participating State, intend in particular to:

—examine in a favourable spirit and within a suitable and reasonable time scale requests from journalists for visas;

—grant to permanently accredited journalists of the participating States, on the basis of arrangements, multiple entry and exit visas for specified periods;

—facilitate the issue to accredited journalists of the participating States of permits for stay in their country of temporary residence and, if and when these are necessary, of other official papers which it is appropriate for them to have;

—ease, on a basis of reciprocity, procedures for arranging travel by journalists of the participating States in the country where they are exercising their profession, and to provide progressively greater opportunities for such travel, subject to the observance of regulations relating to the existence of areas closed for security reasons;

—ensure that requests by such journalists for such travel receive, in so far as possible, an expeditious response, taking into account the time scale of the request;

—increase the opportunities for journalists of the participating States to communicate personally with their sources, including organizations and official institutions;

—grant to journalists of the participating States the right to import, subject only to its being taken out again, the technical equipment (photographic, cinematographic, tape recorder, radio and television) necessary for the exercise of their profession;\*

—enable journalists of the other participating States, whether permanently or temporarily accredited, to transmit completely, normally and rapidly by means recognized by the participating States to the information organs which they represent, the results of their professional activity, including tape recordings and undeveloped film, for the purpose of

\*While recognizing that appropriate local personnel are employed by foreign journalists in many instances, the participating States note that the above provisions would be applied, subject to the observance of the appropriate rules, to persons from the other participating States, who are regularly and professionally engaged as technicians, photographers or cameramen of the press, radio, television or cinema. [Footnote in original.]

publication or of broadcasting on the radio or television.

The participating States reaffirm that the legitimate pursuit of their professional activity will neither render journalists liable to expulsion nor otherwise penalize them. If an accredited journalist is expelled, he will be informed of the reasons for this act and may submit an application for re-examination of his case.

### 3. Co-operation and Exchanges in the Field of Culture

The participating States,

*Considering* that cultural exchanges and co-operation contribute to a better comprehension among people and among peoples, and thus promote a lasting understanding among States,

*Confirming* the conclusions already formulated in this field at the multilateral level, particularly at the Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies in Europe, organized by UNESCO in Helsinki in June 1972, where interest was manifested in the active participation of the broadest possible social groups in an increasingly diversified cultural life,

*Desiring*, with the development of mutual confidence and the further improvement of relations between the participating States, to continue further efforts toward progress in this field,

*Disposed* in this spirit to increase substantially their cultural exchanges, with regard both to persons and to cultural works, and to develop among them an active co-operation, both at the bilateral and the multilateral level, in all the fields of culture,

*Convinced* that such a development of their mutual relations will contribute to the enrichment of the respective cultures, while respecting the originality of each, as well as to the reinforcement among them of a consciousness of common values, while continuing to develop cultural co-operation with other countries of the world,

*Declare* that they jointly set themselves the following objectives:

(a) to develop the mutual exchange of information with a view to a better knowledge of respective cultural achievements,

(b) to improve the facilities for the exchange and for the dissemination of cultural property,

(c) to promote access by all to respective cultural achievements,

(d) to develop contacts and co-operation among persons active in the field of culture,

(e) to seek new fields and forms of cultural co-operation,

Thus *give expression* to their common will to take progressive, coherent and long-term action in order to achieve the objectives of the present declaration; and

*Express their intention* now to proceed to the implementation of the following:

### *Extension of Relations*

To expand and improve at the various levels co-operation and links in the field of culture, in particular by:

—concluding, where appropriate, agreements on a bilateral or multilateral basis, providing for the extension of relations among competent State institutions and non-governmental organizations in the field of culture, as well as among people engaged in cultural activities, taking into account the need both for flexibility and the fullest possible use of existing agreements, and bearing in mind that agreements and also other arrangements constitute important means of developing cultural co-operation and exchanges;

—contributing to the development of direct communication and co-operation among relevant State institutions and non-governmental organizations, including, where necessary, such communication and co-operation carried out on the basis of special agreements and arrangements;

—encouraging direct contacts and communications among persons engaged in cultural activities, including, where necessary, such contacts and communications carried out on the basis of special agreements and arrangements.

### *Mutual Knowledge*

Within their competence to adopt, on a bilateral and multilateral level, appropriate measures which would give their peoples a more comprehensive and complete mutual knowledge of their achievements in the various fields of culture, and among them:

—to examine jointly, if necessary with the assistance of appropriate international organizations, the possible creation in Europe and the structure of a bank of cultural data, which would collect information from the participating countries and make it available to its correspondents on their request, and to convene for this purpose a meeting of experts from interested States;

—to consider, if necessary in conjunction with appropriate international organizations, ways of compiling in Europe an inventory of documentary films of a cultural or scientific nature from the participating States;

—to encourage more frequent book exhibitions and to examine the possibility of organizing periodically in Europe a large-scale exhibition of books from the participating States;

—to promote the systematic exchange, between the institutions concerned and publishing houses, of catalogues of available books as well as of pre-publication material which will include, as far as possible, all forthcoming publications; and also to promote the exchange of material between firms publishing encyclopaedias, with a view to improving the presentation of each country;

—to examine jointly questions of expanding and improving exchanges of information in the various

fields of culture, such as theatre, music, library work as well as the conservation and restoration of cultural property.

### *Exchanges and Dissemination*

To contribute to the improvement of facilities for exchanges and the dissemination of cultural property, by appropriate means, in particular by:

—studying the possibilities for harmonizing and reducing the charges relating to international commercial exchanges of books and other cultural materials, and also for new means of insuring works of art in foreign exhibitions and for reducing the risks of damage or loss to which these works are exposed by their movement;

—facilitating the formalities of customs clearance, in good time for programmes of artistic events, of the works of art, materials and accessories appearing on lists agreed upon by the organizers of these events;

—encouraging meetings among representatives of competent organizations and relevant firms to examine measures within their field of activity—such as the simplification of orders, time limits for sending supplies and modalities of payment—which might facilitate international commercial exchanges of books;

—promoting the loan and exchange of films among their film institutes and film libraries;

—encouraging the exchange of information among interested parties concerning events of a cultural character foreseen in the participating States, in fields where this is most appropriate, such as music, theatre and the plastic and graphic arts, with a view to contributing to the compilation and publication of a calendar of such events, with the assistance, where necessary, of the appropriate international organizations;

—encouraging a study of the impact which the foreseeable development, and a possible harmonization among interested parties, of the technical means used for the dissemination of culture might have on the development of cultural co-operation and exchanges, while keeping in view the preservation of the diversity and originality of their respective cultures;

—encouraging, in the way they deem appropriate, within their cultural policies, the further development of interest in the cultural heritage of the other participating States, conscious of the merits and the value of each culture;

—endeavouring to ensure the full and effective application of the international agreements and conventions on copyrights and on circulation of cultural property to which they are party or to which they may decide in the future to become party.

### *Access*

To promote fuller mutual access by all to the achievements—works, experiences and performing arts—in the various fields of culture of their countries, and to that end to make the best possible efforts, in accordance with their competence, more particularly:

—to promote wider dissemination of books and artistic works, in particular by such means as:

facilitating, while taking full account of the international copyright conventions to which they are party, international contacts and communications between authors and publishing houses as well as other cultural institutions, with a view to a more complete mutual access to cultural achievements;

recommending that, in determining the size of editions, publishing houses take into account also the demand from the other participating States, and that rights of sale in other participating States be granted, where possible, to several sales organizations of the importing countries, by agreement between interested partners;

encouraging competent organizations and relevant firms to conclude agreements and contracts and contributing, by this means, to a gradual increase in the number and diversity of works by authors from the other participating States available in the original and in translation in their libraries and bookshops;

promoting, where deemed appropriate, an increase in the number of sales outlets where books by authors from the other participating States, imported in the original on the basis of agreements and contracts, and in translation, are for sale;

promoting, on a wider scale, the translation of works in the sphere of literature and other fields of cultural activity, produced in the languages of the other participating States, especially from the less widely-spoken languages, and the publication and dissemination of the translated works by such measures as:

encouraging more regular contacts between interested publishing houses;

developing their efforts in the basic and advanced training of translators;

encouraging, by appropriate means, the publishing houses of their countries to publish translations;

facilitating the exchange between publishers and interested institutions of lists of books which might be translated;

promoting between their countries the professional activity and co-operation of translators;

carrying out joint studies on ways of further promoting translations and their dissemination;

improving and expanding exchanges of books, bibliographies and catalogue cards between libraries;

—to envisage other appropriate measures which would permit, where necessary by mutual agreement among interested parties, the facilitation of access to their respective cultural achievements, in particular in the field of books;

—to contribute by appropriate means to the wider use of the mass media in order to improve mutual acquaintance with the cultural life of each;

—to seek to develop the necessary conditions for migrant workers and their families to preserve their links with their national culture, and also to adapt themselves to their new cultural environment;

—to encourage the competent bodies and enterprises to make a wider choice and effect wider distri-

bution of full-length and documentary films from the other participating States, and to promote more frequent non-commercial showings, such as premières, film weeks and festivals, giving due consideration to films from countries whose cinematographic works are less well known;

—to promote, by appropriate means, the extension of opportunities for specialists from the other participating States to work with materials of a cultural character from film and audio-visual archives, within the framework of the existing rules for work on such archival materials;

—to encourage a joint study by interested bodies, where appropriate with the assistance of the competent international organizations, of the expediency and the conditions for the establishment of a repertory of their recorded television programmes of a cultural nature, as well as of the means of viewing them rapidly in order to facilitate their selection and possible acquisition.

### *Contacts and Co-operation*

To contribute, by appropriate means, to the development of contacts and co-operation in the various fields of culture, especially among creative artists and people engaged in cultural activities, in particular by making efforts to:

—promote for persons active in the field of culture, travel and meetings including, where necessary, those carried out on the basis of agreements, contracts or other special arrangements and which are relevant to their cultural co-operation;

—encourage in this way contacts among creative and performing artists and artistic groups with a view to their working together, making known their works in other participating States or exchanging views on topics relevant to their common activity;

—encourage, where necessary through appropriate arrangements, exchanges of trainees and specialists and the granting of scholarships for basic and advanced training in various fields of culture such as the arts and architecture, museums and libraries, literary studies and translation, and contribute to the creation of favourable conditions of reception in their respective institutions;

—encourage the exchange of experience in the training of organizers of cultural activities as well as of teachers and specialists in fields such as theatre, opera, ballet, music and fine arts;

—continue to encourage the organization of international meetings among creative artists, especially young creative artists, on current questions of artistic and literary creation which are of interest for joint study;

—study other possibilities for developing exchanges and co-operation among persons active in the field of culture, with a view to a better mutual knowledge of the cultural life of the participating States.

### *Fields and Forms of Co-operation*

To encourage the search for new fields and forms of cultural co-operation, to these ends contributing to the conclusion among interested parties, where necessary, of appropriate agreements and arrange-

ments, and in this context to promote:

—joint studies regarding cultural policies, in particular in their social aspects, and as they relate to planning, town-planning, educational and environmental policies, and the cultural aspects of tourism;

—the exchange of knowledge in the realm of cultural diversity, with a view to contributing thus to a better understanding by interested parties of such diversity where it occurs;

—the exchange of information, and as may be appropriate, meetings of experts, the elaboration and the execution of research programmes and projects, as well as their joint evaluation, and the dissemination of the results, on the subjects indicated above;

—such forms of cultural co-operation and the development of such joint projects as:

international events in the fields of the plastic and graphic arts, cinema, theatre, ballet, music, folklore, etc.; book fairs and exhibitions, joint performances of operatic and dramatic works, as well as performances given by soloists, instrumental ensembles, orchestras, choirs and other artistic groups, including those composed of amateurs, paying due attention to the organization of international cultural youth events and the exchange of young artists;

the inclusion of works by writers and composers from the other participating States in the repertoires of soloists and artistic ensembles;

the preparation, translation and publication of articles, studies and monographs, as well as of low-cost books and of artistic and literary collections, suited to making better known respective cultural achievements, envisaging for this purpose meetings among experts and representatives of publishing houses;

the co-production and the exchange of films and of radio and television programmes, by promoting, in particular, meetings among producers, technicians and representatives of the public authorities with a view to working out favourable conditions for the execution of specific joint projects and by encouraging, in the field of co-production, the establishment of international filming teams;

the organization of competitions for architects and town-planners, bearing in mind the possible implementation of the best projects and the formation, where possible, of international teams;

the implementation of joint projects for conserving, restoring and showing to advantage works of art, historical and archaeological monuments and sites of cultural interest, with the help, in appropriate cases, of international organizations of a governmental or non-governmental character as well as of private institutions—competent and active in these fields—envisaging for this purpose:

periodic meetings of experts of the interested parties to elaborate the necessary proposals, while bearing in mind the need to consider these questions in a wider social and economic context;

the publication in appropriate periodicals of articles designed to make known and to compare, among the participating States, the most significant achievements and innovations;

a joint study with a view to the improvement and possible harmonization of the different sys-

tems used to inventory and catalogue the historical monuments and places of cultural interest in their countries;

the study of the possibilities for organizing international courses for the training of specialists in different disciplines relating to restoration.

\* \* \*

*National minorities or regional cultures.* The participating States, recognizing the contribution that national minorities or regional cultures can make to co-operation among them in various fields of culture, intend, when such minorities or cultures exist within their territory, to facilitate this contribution, taking into account the legitimate interests of their members.

#### 4. Co-operation and Exchanges in the Field of Education

The participating States,

*Conscious* that the development of relations of an international character in the fields of education and science contributes to a better mutual understanding and is to the advantage of all peoples as well as to the benefit of future generations,

*Prepared* to facilitate, between organizations, institutions and persons engaged in education and science, the further development of exchanges of knowledge and experience as well as of contacts, on the basis of special arrangements where these are necessary,

*Desiring* to strengthen the links among educational and scientific establishments and also to encourage their co-operation in sectors of common interest, particularly where the levels of knowledge and resources require efforts to be concerted internationally, and

*Convinced* that progress in these fields should be accompanied and supported by a wider knowledge of foreign languages,

*Express* to these ends their intention in particular:

##### (a) *Extension of Relations*

To expand and improve at the various levels co-operation and links in the fields of education and science, in particular by:

—concluding, where appropriate, bilateral or multilateral agreements providing for co-operation and exchanges among State institutions, non-governmental bodies and persons engaged in activities in education and science, bearing in mind the need both for flexibility and the fuller use of existing agreements and arrangements;

—promoting the conclusion of direct arrangements between universities and other institutions of higher education and research, in the framework of agreements between governments where appropriate;

—encouraging among persons engaged in education and science direct contacts and communications, including those based on special agreements or arrangements where these are appropriate.

##### (b) *Access and Exchanges*

To improve access, under mutually acceptable con-

ditions, for students, teachers and scholars of the participating States to each other's educational, cultural and scientific institutions, and to intensify exchanges among these institutions in all areas of common interest, in particular by:

—increasing the exchange of information on facilities for study and courses open to foreign participants, as well as on the conditions under which they will be admitted and received;

—facilitating travel between the participating States by scholars, teachers and students for purposes of study, teaching and research as well as for improving knowledge of each other's educational, cultural and scientific achievements;

—encouraging the award of scholarships for study, teaching and research in their countries to scholars, teachers and students of other participating States;

—establishing, developing or encouraging programmes providing for the broader exchange of scholars, teachers and students, including the organization of symposia, seminars and collaborative projects, and the exchanges of educational and scholarly information such as university publications and materials from libraries;

—promoting the efficient implementation of such arrangements and programmes by providing scholars, teachers and students in good time with more detailed information about their placing in universities and institutes and the programmes envisaged for them; by granting them the opportunity to use relevant scholarly, scientific and open archival materials; and by facilitating their travel within the receiving State for the purpose of study or research as well as in the form of vacation tours on the basis of the usual procedures;

—promoting a more exact assessment of the problems of comparison and equivalence of academic degrees and diplomas by fostering the exchange of information on the organization, duration and content of studies, the comparison of methods of assessing levels of knowledge and academic qualifications, and, where feasible, arriving at the mutual recognition of academic degrees and diplomas either through governmental agreements, where necessary, or direct arrangements between universities and other institutions of higher learning and research;

—recommending, moreover, to the appropriate international organizations that they should intensify their efforts to reach a generally acceptable solution to the problems of comparison and equivalence between academic degrees and diplomas.

##### (c) *Science*

Within their competence to broaden and improve co-operation and exchanges in the field of science, in particular:

To increase, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, the exchange and dissemination of scientific information and documentation by such means as:

—making this information more widely available to scientists and research workers of the other participating States through, for instance, participation in international information-sharing programmes or through other appropriate arrangements;



—broadening and facilitating the exchange of samples and other scientific materials used particularly for fundamental research in the fields of natural sciences and medicine;

—inviting scientific institutions and universities to keep each other more fully and regularly informed about their current and contemplated research work in fields of common interest.

To facilitate the extension of communications and direct contacts between universities, scientific institutions and associations as well as among scientists and research workers, including those based where necessary on special agreements or arrangements, by such means as:

—further developing exchanges of scientists and research workers and encouraging the organization of preparatory meetings or working groups on research topics of common interest;

—encouraging the creation of joint teams of scientists to pursue research projects under arrangements made by the scientific institutions of several countries;

—assisting the organization and successful functioning of international conferences and seminars and participation in them by their scientists and research workers;

—furthermore envisaging, in the near future, a “Scientific Forum” in the form of a meeting of leading personalities in science from the participating States to discuss interrelated problems of common interest concerning current and future developments in science, and to promote the expansion of contacts, communications and the exchange of information between scientific institutions and among scientists;

—foreseeing, at an early date, a meeting of experts representing the participating States and their national scientific institutions, in order to prepare such a “Scientific Forum” in consultation with appropriate international organizations, such as UNESCO and the ECE;

—considering in due course what further steps might be taken with respect to the “Scientific Forum”.

To develop in the field of scientific research, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, the co-ordination of programmes carried out in the participating States and the organization of joint programmes, especially in the areas mentioned below, which may involve the combined efforts of scientists and in certain cases the use of costly or unique equipment. The list of subjects in these areas is illustrative; and specific projects would have to be determined subsequently by the potential partners in the participating States, taking account of the contribution which could be made by appropriate international organizations and scientific institutions:

—*exact and natural sciences*, in particular fundamental research in such fields as mathematics, physics, theoretical physics, geophysics, chemistry, biology, ecology and astronomy;

—*medicine*, in particular basic research into cancer and cardiovascular diseases, studies on the diseases endemic in the developing countries, as well

as medico-social research with special emphasis on occupational diseases, the rehabilitation of the handicapped and the care of mothers, children and the elderly;

—*the humanities and social sciences*, such as history, geography, philosophy, psychology, pedagogical research, linguistics, sociology, the legal, political and economic sciences; comparative studies on social, socio-economic and cultural phenomena which are of common interest to the participating States, especially the problems of human environment and urban development; and scientific studies on the methods of conserving and restoring monuments and works of art.

#### (d) *Foreign Languages and Civilizations*

To encourage the study of foreign languages and civilizations as an important means of expanding communication among peoples for their better acquaintance with the culture of each country, as well as for the strengthening of international co-operation; to this end to stimulate, within their competence, the further development and improvement of foreign language teaching and the diversification of choice of languages taught at various levels, paying due attention to less widely-spread or studied languages, and in particular:

—to intensify co-operation aimed at improving the teaching of foreign languages through exchanges of information and experience concerning the development and application of effective modern teaching methods and technical aids, adapted to the needs of different categories of students, including methods of accelerated teaching; and to consider the possibility of conducting, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, studies of new methods of foreign language teaching;

—to encourage co-operation between institutions concerned, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, aimed at exploiting more fully the resources of modern educational technology in language teaching, for example through comparative studies by their specialists and, where agreed, through exchanges or transfers of audio-visual materials, of materials used for preparing textbooks, as well as of information about new types of technical equipment used for teaching languages;

—to promote the exchange of information on the experience acquired in the training of language teachers and to intensify exchanges on a bilateral basis of language teachers and students as well as to facilitate their participation in summer courses in languages and civilizations, wherever these are organized;

—to encourage co-operation among experts in the field of lexicography with the aim of defining the necessary terminological equivalents, particularly in the scientific and technical disciplines, in order to facilitate relations among scientific institutions and specialists;

—to promote the wider spread of foreign language study among the different types of secondary education establishments and greater possibilities of choice between an increased number of European languages; and in this context to consider, wherever appropriate, the possibilities for developing the re-

recruitment and training of teachers as well as the organization of the student groups required;

—to favour, in higher education, a wider choice in the languages offered to language students and greater opportunities for other students to study various foreign languages; also to facilitate, where desirable, the organization of courses in languages and civilizations, on the basis of special arrangements as necessary, to be given by foreign lecturers, particularly from European countries having less widely-spread or studied languages;

—to promote, within the framework of adult education, the further development of specialized programmes, adapted to various needs and interests, for teaching foreign languages to their own inhabitants and the languages of host countries to interested adults from other countries; in this context to encourage interested institutions to co-operate, for example, in the elaboration of programmes for teaching by radio and television and by accelerated methods, and also, where desirable, in the definition of study objectives for such programmes, with a view to arriving at comparable levels of language proficiency;

—to encourage the association, where appropriate, of the teaching of foreign languages with the study of the corresponding civilizations and also to make further efforts to stimulate interest in the study of foreign languages, including relevant out-of-class activities.

#### (e) Teaching Methods

To promote the exchange of experience, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, in teaching methods at all levels of education, including those used in permanent and adult education, as well as the exchange of teaching materials, in particular by:

—further developing various forms of contacts and co-operation in the different fields of pedagogical science, for example through comparative or joint studies carried out by interested institutions or through exchanges of information on the results of teaching experiments;

—intensifying exchanges of information on teaching methods used in various educational systems and on results of research into the processes by which pupils and students acquire knowledge, taking account of relevant experience in different types of specialized education;

—facilitating exchanges of experience concerning the organization and functioning of education intended for adults and recurrent education, the relationships between these and other forms and levels of education, as well as concerning the means of adapting education, including vocational and technical training, to the needs of economic and social development in their countries;

—encouraging exchanges of experience in the education of youth and adults in international understanding, with particular reference to those major problems of mankind whose solution calls for a common approach and wider international co-operation;

—encouraging exchanges of teaching materials—including school textbooks, having in mind the possibility of promoting mutual knowledge and facilitating the presentation of each country in such books—as well as exchanges of information on technical innovations in the field of education.

\* \* \*

*National minorities or regional cultures.* The participating States, recognizing the contribution that national minorities or regional cultures can make to co-operation among them in various fields of education, intend, when such minorities or cultures exist within their territory, to facilitate this contribution, taking into account the legitimate interests of their members.

### FOLLOW-UP TO THE CONFERENCE

The participating States,

*Having considered and evaluated* the progress made at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe,

*Considering further* that, within the broader context of the world, the Conference is an important part of the process of improving security and developing co-operation in Europe and that its results will contribute significantly to this process,

*Intending* to implement the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference in order to give full effect to its results and thus to further the process of improving security and developing co-operation in Europe,

*Convinced* that, in order to achieve the aims sought by the Conference, they should make further unilateral, bilateral and multilateral efforts and continue, in the appropriate forms set forth below, the multilateral process initiated by the Conference,

1. *Declare their resolve*, in the period following the Conference, to pay due regard to and implement the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference:

(a) unilaterally, in all cases which lend themselves to such action;

(b) bilaterally, by negotiations with other participating States;

(c) multilaterally, by meetings of experts of the participating States, and also within the framework of existing international organizations, such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and UNESCO, with regard to educational, scientific and cultural co-operation;

2. *Declare furthermore their resolve* to continue the multilateral process initiated by the Conference:

(a) by proceeding to a thorough exchange of views both on the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act and of the tasks defined by the Conference, as well as, in the context of the questions dealt with by the latter, on the deepening of their mutual relations, the improvement of security and the development of co-operation in Europe, and

the development of the process of détente in the future;

(b) by organizing to these ends meetings among their representatives, beginning with a meeting at the level of representatives appointed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This meeting will define the appropriate modalities for the holding of other meetings which could include further similar meetings and the possibility of a new Conference;

3. The first of the meetings indicated above will be held at Belgrade in 1977. A preparatory meeting to organize this meeting will be held at Belgrade on 15 June 1977. The preparatory meeting will decide on the date, duration, agenda and other modalities of the meeting of representatives appointed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs;

4. The rules of procedure, the working methods and the scale of distribution for the expenses of the Conference will, *mutatis mutandis*, be applied to the meetings envisaged in paragraphs 1 (c), 2 and 3 above. All the above-mentioned meetings will be held in the participating States in rotation. The services of a technical secretariat will be provided by the host country.

The original of this Final Act, drawn up in English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish, will be transmitted to the Government of the Republic of Finland, which will retain it in its archives. Each of the participating States will receive from the Government of the Republic of Finland a true copy of this Final Act.

The text of this Final Act will be published in each participating State, which will disseminate it and make it known as widely as possible.

The Government of the Republic of Finland is requested to transmit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the text of this Final Act, which is not eligible for registration under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations, with a view to its circulation to all the members of the Organization as an official document of the United Nations.<sup>2</sup>

The Government of the Republic of Finland is also requested to transmit the text of this Final Act to the Director-General of UNESCO and to the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.

Wherefore, the undersigned High Representatives of the participating States, mindful of the high political significance which they attach to the results of the Conference, and declaring their determination to act in accordance with the provisions contained in the above texts, have subscribed their signatures below:<sup>3</sup>

The Federal Republic of Germany:

HELMUT SCHMIDT, *Federal Chancellor*

The German Democratic Republic:

ERICH HONECKER, *First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany*

The United States of America:

GERALD R. FORD, *President of the United States of America*

The Republic of Austria:

BRUNO KREISKY, *Federal Chancellor*

The Kingdom of Belgium:

LEO TINDEMANS, *Prime Minister*

The People's Republic of Bulgaria:

TODOR JIVKOV, *First Secretary, Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bulgaria and President of the Council of State of the People's Republic of Bulgaria*

Canada:

PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU, *Prime Minister*

The Republic of Cyprus:

His Beatitude Archbishop MAKARIOS III, *President of the Republic of Cyprus*

Denmark:

ANKER JORGENSEN, *Prime Minister*

Spain:

CARLOS ARIAS NAVARRO, *Head of the Government*

The Republic of Finland:

URHO KEKKONEN, *President of the Republic*

The French Republic:

VALÉRY GISCARD D'ESTAING

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

The Rt. Hon. HAROLD WILSON, O.B.E., M.P., F.R.S., *First Lord of the Treasury and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*

The Hellenic Republic:

CONSTANTIN CARAMANLIS, *Prime Minister*

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<sup>2</sup> Journal no. 80/bis of the Co-ordinating Committee of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, July 18, 1975, reported that the delegate of Finland had on that day informed the committee of the intention of his government to send the following letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations:

"SIR, I have the honour to inform you that the High Representatives of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe have requested the Government of the Republic of Finland to transmit to you the text of the Final Act of the Conference signed at Helsinki on [1 August 1975].

"I have also been asked to request you, Mr. Secretary General, to arrange for the circulation of this Final Act to Member States of the Organization as an official document of the United Nations, and to draw your attention to the fact that this Final Act is not eligible, in whole or in part, for registration with the Secretariat under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations, as would be the case were it a matter of a treaty or international agreement, under the aforesaid Article.

"Accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration."

<sup>3</sup> The final act was signed in alphabetical order according to the French spelling of the names of the countries.

The Hungarian People's Republic:

JANOS KADAR, *First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, Member of the Presidential Council of the Hungarian People's Republic*

Ireland:

LIAM COSGRAVE, *Prime Minister*

Iceland:

GEIR HALLGRIMSSON, *Prime Minister*

The Italian Republic:

ALDO MORO, *Prime Minister of the Italian Republic and in his capacity as President in office of the Council of the European Communities*

The Principality of Liechtenstein:

WALTER KIEBER, *Head of Government*

The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg:

GASTON THORN, *Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs*

The Republic of Malta:

DOM MINTOFF, *Prime Minister, Minister for Commonwealth and Foreign Affairs*

The Principality of Monaco:

ANDRE SAINT-MLEUX, *Minister of State, President of the Government Council, Representing H.S.H. the Prince of Monaco*

Norway:

TRYGVE BRATTELI, *Prime Minister*

The Kingdom of the Netherlands:

J.M. DEN UYL, *Prime Minister*

Polish People's Republic:

EDWARD GIEREK, *First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Worker's Party*

Portugal:

FRANCISCO DA COSTA GOMES, *President of the Republic*

The Socialist Republic of Romania:

NICOLAE CEAUSESCU, *President of the Socialist Republic of Romania*

San Marino:

GIAN LUIGI BERTI, *Secretary of State for Foreign and Political Affairs*

The Holy See:

*Son Excellence Monseigneur* AGOSTINO CASAROLI, *Secretary of the Council for Church Public Affairs, Special Delegate of His Holiness Pope Paul VI*

Sweden:

OLOF PALME, *Prime Minister*

The Swiss Confederation:

PIERRE GRABER, *President of the Confederation, Head of the Federal Political Department*

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic:

GUSTAV HUSAK, *Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic*

The Republic of Turkey:

SULEYMAN DEMIREL, *Prime Minister*

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

L. BREJNEV, *General Secretary of the CC of the CPSU*

The Socialist Federal Republic of Jugoslavia:

JOSIP BROZ TITO, *President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Jugoslavia*

## President Ford Urges Action on Lifting Turkish Arms Embargo

*Following are statements by President Ford issued on July 24 and 25, together with the text of a message sent on July 28 by President Ford to Speaker of the House Carl Albert.*

### STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD, JULY 24

White House press release dated July 24

I am deeply disappointed by the refusal of the House of Representatives to partially lift the embargo on the shipment of arms to Turkey. It is my strong conviction that this negative vote can only do the most serious and irreparable damage to the vital national security interests of the United States, including our normally excellent relations with the Government of Turkey, U.S. security interests in the Atlantic alliance and the eastern Mediterranean, and U.S. efforts to assist the Governments of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus to reach a just and equitable Cyprus settlement. It will also seriously affect important interests elsewhere.

I and members of my Administration worked hard to persuade Members of the House of Representatives that vital national defense interests are at stake in this issue. I am very proud of those 206 Members of Congress of both parties, as well as the Members of the Senate who supported a similar measure, for casting their votes in the national interest. I deeply appreciate the efforts of the bipartisan leadership of the Congress and the members of the House and Senate Committees on International Relations and Foreign Affairs who supported the legislation. I will continue to make every

effort to assist in achieving an equitable settlement of the Cyprus dispute. I will work to reassure our allies Turkey and Greece of our continuing desire to maintain strong and effective relationships with them despite this setback. I hope the House of Representatives will reconsider its failure to act affirmatively.

#### STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD, JULY 25

White House press release dated July 25

I deeply regret the announcement of the Government of Turkey to suspend all American activities at joint U.S.-Turkish defense installations and to take over control and supervision of these important installations.

I repeatedly warned the House of Representatives of extremely serious consequences, such as this, if the United States failed to restore military sales and credits to our Turkish allies. I again want to praise those House Members of both parties who voted in the national interest. Now, as a result of yesterday's 223-206 vote in the House of Representatives, Turkey has today announced actions which I believe will work to the detriment of critically important U.S. security interests.

In view of these damaging developments, I urge the House of Representatives to reconsider its refusal to restore the traditional U.S.-Turkish defense relationship. Prompt, affirmative action by the House of Representatives is essential to the vital national defense interests of the United States, our partners in the eastern Mediterranean, and our allies in the Atlantic alliance.

#### TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT FORD TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, JULY 28

White House press release dated July 28

JULY 28, 1975.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: The consequences of the House action in failing to lift the arms embargo on Turkey are now becoming apparent. As President of the United States my responsibility for the na-

tional security and conduct of foreign affairs have led me to urge in the strongest terms that the House lift the embargo. Despite the House action and subsequent events, I do not believe that the situation is irretrievable today.

It is difficult to overstate the importance of the major installations we will lose in Turkey if we cannot remedy the action. Their loss would seriously downgrade our capabilities in major areas of national security. These installations are not replaceable.

In reviewing the debates of the last several months, any fairminded person would agree that there is not a fundamental dispute on the objective of achieving a peaceful and equitable solution to the tragic Cyprus problem. The Congress has chosen means to accomplish that end which in my judgment would not only delay and impede a Cyprus settlement but, as now can be seen clearly, cause a disastrous deterioration in our security relations with Turkey and in the Eastern Mediterranean in general. In addition, these effects will certainly not make for an improvement in relations between Greece and Turkey, without which a Cyprus settlement is not possible.

My Administration has been and will continue to pursue the cause of a just and peaceful settlement in Cyprus. But I must emphasize in the strongest terms how seriously hobbled our efforts will be if the embargo against Turkey is maintained.

I, therefore, urge through you, Mr. Speaker, the immediate reconsideration of last week's House action. Only if we preserve our vital security relations with Turkey will I be able usefully to assist the parties in the area toward better relations.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 94th Congress, 1st Session

Vietnam Humanitarian Assistance and Evacuation Act of 1975. Report of the House Committee on International Relations, together with dissenting, minority, and additional views, to accompany H.R. 6096; H. Rept. 94-155; April 18, 1975; 25 pp. Conference report; H. Rept. 94-176; April 28, 1975; 11 pp.

Enabling the United States to Render Assistance to, or in Behalf of, Certain Migrants and Refugees. Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary to accompany H.R. 6755. H. Rept. 94-197. May 9, 1975. 14 pp.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.

*Ratification deposited:* Kuwait, July 31, 1975.

##### Genocide

Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Done at Paris December 9, 1948. Entered into force January 12, 1951.<sup>1</sup>

*Notification of succession:* The Bahamas, August 5, 1975.

##### Oil Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended. Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900, 6109.

*Acceptance deposited:* Austria, May 19, 1975.

##### Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York December 21, 1965. Entered into force January 4, 1969.<sup>1</sup>

*Notification of succession:* The Bahamas, August 5, 1975.

##### Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions

<sup>1</sup> Not in force for the United States.

and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions.  
*Ratification deposited:* Brazil, August 8, 1975.

#### BILATERAL

##### Australia

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports from Australia of fresh, chilled or frozen meat of cattle, goats, and sheep, except lambs, during calendar year 1975. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 16 and June 20, 1975. Entered into force June 20, 1975.

##### Chile

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities relating to the agreement of October 25, 1974 (TIAS 7993). Signed at Santiago July 31, 1975. Entered into force July 31, 1975.

##### Czechoslovakia

Agreement extending the air transport agreement of February 28, 1969, as amended and extended (TIAS 6644, 7356, 7881). Effected by exchange of notes at Prague June 17 and July 29, 1975. Entered into force July 29, 1975; effective June 1, 1975.

##### Korea

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool and man-made fiber textiles, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 26, 1975. Entered into force June 26, 1975; effective October 1, 1974.

Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles with annex, as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington December 30, 1971. Entered into force December 30, 1971. TIAS 7250, 7310, 7496.  
*Terminated:* October 1, 1974.

Agreement concerning trade in wool and man-made fiber textile products with annexes, as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington January 4, 1972. Entered into force January 4, 1972; effective October 1, 1971. TIAS 7499, 7632.  
*Terminated:* October 1, 1974.

##### Luxembourg

Agreement amending Annex B of the mutual defense assistance agreement of January 27, 1950. Effected by exchange of notes at Luxembourg May 20 and July 11, 1974. Entered into force July 11, 1974.

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†408	8/11	Kissinger: American Bar Association, Montreal.
†408A	8/12	Kissinger: introductory remarks, Montreal, Aug. 11.
*409	8/13	Ad hoc groups of Advisory Committee on Law of the Sea, fall 1975.
*410	8/13	Shipping Coordinating Committee Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, working group on training and watchkeeping, Sept. 10.
†411	8/14	Kissinger: Southern Commodities Conference, Birmingham, Ala.
†411A	8/14	Hayes, Seibels, Allen, Sparkman, Kissinger: introductory remarks, Birmingham.
†411B	8/14	Kissinger: questions and answers, Birmingham.
†412	8/14	Kissinger: news conference, Birmingham.
†413	8/17	Kissinger: news conference, Vail, Colo.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

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## International Law, World Order, and Human Progress

*Address by Secretary Kissinger*<sup>1</sup>

President Fellers [James D. Fellers, President of the American Bar Association], President-elect [Lawrence E.] Walsh, ladies and gentlemen: I wonder if any of you have commented on the tableau we present today: an American Secretary of State addressing an assemblage of distinguished American attorneys on American attitudes toward international law in a foreign country. That this meeting should take place in Montreal with no hint of the inappropriate testifies to the understanding, mutual respect, and cooperation which surround the vast network of interconnections between the United States and Canada to an extent virtually without parallel among sovereign nations.

Our meeting here today is also witness to the openness of Canadian society and to its respect for open debate and honest differences. On several issues I will discuss today, Canadian and American positions are not identical; but the differences between us in the realm of international law and cooperation run only to details. The Canadian commitment to international cooperation in all areas and on a global scale is second to none. The United States shares this commitment and has welcomed the cooperation of Canada as we work toward common goals. I wish to acknowledge this kindred spirit as we benefit from Canadian hospitality today.

My friends in the legal profession like to remind me of a comment by a British judge

on the difference between lawyers and professors:

It's very simple (said Lord Denning). The function of lawyers is to find a solution to every difficulty presented to them; whereas the function of professors is to find a difficulty with every solution.

Today the number of difficulties seems to be outpacing the number of solutions—either because my lawyer friends are not working hard enough or because there are too many professors in government.

Law and lawyers have played a seminal role in American public life since the founding of the Republic. In this century lawyers have been consistently at the center of our diplomacy, providing many of our ablest Secretaries of State and diplomats and often decisively influencing American thinking about foreign policy.

This is no accident. The aspiration to harness the conflict of nations by standards of order and justice runs deep in the American tradition. In pioneering techniques of arbitration, conciliation, and adjudication, in developing international institutions and international economic practices, and in creating a body of scholarship sketching visions of world order, American legal thinking has reflected both American idealism and American pragmatic genius.

The problems of the contemporary world structure summon these skills and go beyond them. The rigid international structure of the cold war has disintegrated; we have entered an era of diffused economic power, proliferating nuclear weaponry, and multiple ideologies and centers of initiative. The challenge

<sup>1</sup> Made before the American Bar Association at Montreal, Quebec, Canada, on Aug. 11 (text of the two introductory paragraphs from press release 408A dated Aug. 12; balance of address from press release 408 dated Aug. 11).

of our predecessors was to fashion stability from chaos. The challenge of our generation is to go from the building of national and regional institutions and the management of crises to the building of a new international order which offers a hope of peace, progress, well-being, and justice for the generations to come.

Justice Holmes said of the common law that it "is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified." But international politics recognizes no sovereign or even quasi-sovereign power beyond the nation-state.

Thus in international affairs the age-old struggle between order and anarchy has a political as well as a legal dimension. When competing national political aims are pressed to the point of unrestrained competition, the precepts of law prove fragile. The unrestrained quest for predominance brooks no legal restraints. In a democratic society law flourishes best amidst pluralistic institutions. Similarly in the international arena stability requires a certain equilibrium of power. Our basic foreign policy objective inevitably must be to shape a stable and cooperative global order out of diverse and contending interests.

But this is not enough. Preoccupation with interests and power is at best sterile and at worst an invitation to a constant test of strength. The true task of statesmanship is to draw from the balance of power a more positive capacity to better the human condition—to turn stability into creativity, to transform the relaxation of tensions into a strengthening of freedoms, to turn man's pre-occupations from self-defense to human progress.

An international order can be neither stable nor just without accepted norms of conduct. International law both provides a means and embodies our ends. It is a repository of our experience and our idealism—a body of principles drawn from the practice of states and an instrument for fashioning new patterns of relations between states. Law is an expression of our own culture and yet a symbol of universal goals. It is the heritage

of our past and a means of shaping our future.

The challenge of international order takes on unprecedented urgency in the contemporary world of interdependence. In an increasing number of areas of central political relevance, the legal process has become of major concern. Technology has driven us into vast new areas of human activity and opened up new prospects of either human progress or international contention. The use of the oceans and of outer space, the new excesses of hijacking, terrorism, and warfare, the expansion of multinational corporations, will surely become areas of growing dispute if they are not regulated by a legal order.

The United States will not seek to impose a parochial or self-serving view of the law on others. But neither will we carry the quest for accommodation to the point of prejudicing our own values and rights. The new corpus of the law of nations must benefit all peoples equally; it cannot be the preserve of any one nation or group of nations.

The United States is convinced in its own interest that the extension of legal order is a boon to humanity and a necessity. The traditional aspiration of Americans takes on a new relevance and urgency in contemporary conditions. On a planet marked by interdependence, unilateral action and unrestrained pursuit of the national advantage inevitably provoke counteraction and therefore spell futility and anarchy. In an age of awesome weapons of war, there must be accommodation or there will be disaster.

Therefore there must be an expansion of the legal consensus, in terms both of subject matter and participation. Many new and important areas of international activity, such as new departures in technology and communication, cry out for agreed international rules. In other areas, juridical concepts have advanced faster than the political will that is indispensable to assure their observance—such as the U.N. Charter provisions governing the use of force in international relations. The pace of legal evolution cannot be allowed to lag behind the headlong pace of change in the world at large. In a world of 150 na-

tions and competing ideologies, we cannot afford to wait upon the growth of customary international law. Nor can we be content with the snail's pace of treatymaking as we have known it in recent years in international forums.

We are at a pivotal moment in history. If the world is in flux, we have the capacity and hence the obligation to help shape it. If our goal is a new standard of international restraint and cooperation, then let us fashion the institutions and practices that will bring it about.

This morning I would like to set forth the American view on some of those issues of law and diplomacy whose solution can move us toward a more orderly and lawful world. These issues emphasize the contemporary international challenge—in the oceans, where traditional law has been made obsolete by modern technology; in outer space, where endeavors undreamed of a generation ago impinge upon traditional concerns for security and for sovereignty; in the laws of war, where new practices of barbarism challenge us to develop new social and international restraint; and in international economics, where transnational enterprises conduct their activities beyond the frontier of traditional political and legal regulation.

I shall deal in special detail with the law of the sea in an effort to promote significant and rapid progress in this vitally important negotiation.

### **The Law of the Sea**

The United States is now engaged with some 140 nations in one of the most comprehensive and critical negotiations in history, an international effort to devise rules to govern the domain of the oceans. No current international negotiation is more vital for the long-term stability and prosperity of our globe.

One need not be a legal scholar to understand what is at stake. The oceans cover 70 percent of the earth's surface. They both unite and divide mankind. The importance of free navigation for the security of nations, including our country, is traditional; the eco-

nomic significance of ocean resources is becoming enormous.

From the 17th century until now, the law of the seas has been founded on a relatively simple precept: freedom of the seas, limited only by a narrow belt of territorial waters generally extending three miles offshore. Today the explosion of technology requires new and more sophisticated solutions.

—In a world desperate for new sources of energy and minerals, vast and largely untapped reserves exist in the oceans.

—In a world that faces widespread famine and malnutrition, fish have become an increasingly vital source of protein.

—In a world clouded by pollution, the environmental integrity of the oceans turns into a critical international problem.

—In a world where 95 percent of international trade is carried on the seas, freedom of navigation is essential.

Unless competitive practices and claims are soon harmonized, the world faces the prospect of mounting conflict. Shipping tonnage is expected to increase fourfold in the next 30 years. Large self-contained factory vessels already circle the globe and dominate fishing areas that were once the province of small coastal boats. The worldwide fish harvest is increasing dramatically, but without due regard to sound management or the legitimate concerns of coastal states. Shifting population patterns will soon place new strains on the ecology of the world's coastlines.

The current negotiation may thus be the world's last chance. Unilateral national claims to fishing zones and territorial seas extending from 50 to 200 miles have already resulted in seizures of fishing vessels and constant disputes over rights to ocean space. The breakdown of the current negotiation, a failure to reach a legal consensus, will lead to unrestrained military and commercial rivalry and mounting political turmoil.

The United States strongly believes that law must govern the oceans. In this spirit, we welcomed the U.N. mandate in 1970 for a multilateral conference to write a comprehensive treaty governing the use of the

oceans and their resources. We contributed substantially to the progress that was made at Caracas last summer and at Geneva this past spring, which produced a "single negotiating text" of a draft treaty. This will focus the work of the next session, scheduled for March 1976 in New York. The United States intends to intensify its efforts.

The issues in the law of the sea negotiation stretch from the shoreline to the farthest deep seabed. They include:

—The extent of the territorial sea and the related issues of guarantees of free transit through straits;

—The degree of control that a coastal state can exercise in an offshore economic zone beyond its territorial waters; and

—The international system for the exploitation of the resources of the deep seabeds.

If we move outward from the coastline, the first issue is the extent of the *territorial sea*, the belt of ocean over which the coastal state exercises sovereignty. Historically, it has been recognized as three miles; that has been the long-established U.S. position. Increasingly, other states have claimed 12 miles or even 200.

After years of dispute and contradictory international practice, the Law of the Sea Conference is approaching a consensus on a 12-mile territorial limit. We are prepared to accept this solution, provided that the unimpeded transit rights through and over straits used for international navigation are guaranteed. For without such guarantees, a 12-mile territorial sea would place over 100 straits—including the Straits of Gibraltar, Malacca, and Bab el Mandeb—now free for international sea and air travel under the jurisdictional control of coastal states. This the United States cannot accept. Freedom of international transit through these and other straits is for the benefit of all nations, for trade and for security. We will not join in an agreement which leaves any uncertainty about the right to use world communication routes without interference.

Within 200 miles of the shore are some of

the world's most important fishing grounds as well as substantial deposits of petroleum, natural gas, and minerals. This has led some coastal states to seek full sovereignty over this zone. These claims, too, are unacceptable to the United States. To accept them would bring 30 percent of the oceans under national territorial control—in the very areas through which most of the world's shipping travels.

The United States joins many other countries in urging international agreement on a 200-mile offshore *economic zone*. Under this proposal, coastal states would be permitted to control fisheries and mineral resources in the economic zone, but freedom of navigation and other rights of the international community would be preserved. Fishing within the zone would be managed by the coastal state, which would have an international duty to apply agreed standards of conservation. If the coastal state could not harvest all the allowed yearly fishing catch, other countries would be permitted to do so. Special arrangements for tuna and salmon, and other fish which migrate over large distances, would be required. We favor also provisions to protect the fishing interests of landlocked and other geographically disadvantaged countries.

In some areas the *continental margin* extends beyond 200 miles. To resolve disagreements over the use of this area, the United States proposes that the coastal states be given jurisdiction over continental margin resources beyond 200 miles, to a precisely defined limit, and that they share a percentage of financial benefit from mineral exploitation in that area with the international community.

Beyond the territorial sea, the offshore economic zone, and the continental margin lie the *deep seabeds*. They are our planet's last great unexplored frontier. For more than a century we have known that the deep seabeds hold vast deposits of manganese, nickel, cobalt, copper, and other minerals, but we did not know how to extract them. New modern technology is rapidly advancing the time when their exploration and commercial exploitation will become a reality.

The United Nations has declared the deep seabeds to be the "common heritage of mankind."<sup>2</sup> But this only states the problem. How will the world community manage the clash of national and regional interests or the inequality of technological capability? Will we reconcile unbridled competition with the imperative of political order?

The United States has nothing to fear from competition. Our technology is the most advanced, and our Navy is adequate to protect our interests. Ultimately, unless basic rules regulate exploitation, rivalry will lead to tests of power. A race to carve out exclusive domains of exploitation on the deep seabeds, even without claims of sovereignty, will menace freedom of navigation and invite a competition like that of the colonial powers in Africa and Asia in the last century.

This is not the kind of world we want to see. Law has an opportunity to civilize us in the early stages of a new competitive activity.

We believe that the Law of the Sea Treaty must preserve the right of access presently enjoyed by states and their citizens under international law. Restrictions on free access will retard the development of seabed resources. Nor is it feasible, as some developing countries have proposed, to reserve to a new international seabed organization the sole right to exploit the seabeds.

Nevertheless the United States believes strongly that law must regulate international activity in this area. The world community has a historic opportunity to manage this new wealth cooperatively and to dedicate resources from the exploitation of the deep seabeds to the development of the poorer countries. A cooperative and equitable solution can lead to new patterns of accommodation between the developing and industrial countries. It could give a fresh and concilia-

tory cast to the dialogue between the industrialized and so-called Third World. The legal regime we establish for the deep seabeds can be a milestone in the legal and political development of the world community.

The United States has devoted much thought and consideration to this issue. We offer the following proposals:

—An international organization should be created to set rules for deep seabed mining.

—This international organization must preserve the rights of all countries, and their citizens, directly to exploit deep seabed resources.

—It should also insure fair adjudication of conflicting interests and security of investment.

—Countries and their enterprises mining deep seabed resources should pay an agreed portion of their revenues to the international organization, to be used for the benefit of developing countries.

—The management of the organization and its voting procedures must reflect and balance the interests of the participating states. The organization should not have the power to control prices or production rates.

—If these essential U.S. interests are guaranteed, we can agree that this organization will also have the right to conduct mining operations on behalf of the international community primarily for the benefit of developing countries.

—The new organization should serve as a vehicle for cooperation between the technologically advanced and the developing countries. The United States is prepared to explore ways of sharing deep seabed technology with other nations.

—A balanced commission of consumers, seabed producers, and land-based producers could monitor the possible adverse effects of deep seabed mining on the economies of those developing countries which are substantially dependent on the export of minerals also produced from the deep seabeds.

The United States believes that the world community has before it an extraordinary

<sup>2</sup> For text of the Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (A/RES/2749 (XXV), adopted on Dec. 17, 1970), see BULLETIN of Feb. 1, 1971, p. 155.

opportunity. The regime for the deep seabeds can turn interdependence from a slogan into reality. The sense of community which mankind has failed to achieve on land could be realized through a regime for the oceans.

The United States will continue to make determined efforts to bring about final progress when the Law of the Sea Conference reconvenes in New York next year. But we must be clear on one point: The United States cannot indefinitely sacrifice its own interest in developing an assured supply of critical resources to an indefinitely prolonged negotiation. We prefer a generally acceptable international agreement that provides a stable legal environment *before* deep seabed mining actually begins. The responsibility for achieving an agreement before actual exploitation begins is shared by all nations. We cannot defer our own deep seabed mining for too much longer. In this spirit, we and other potential seabed producers can consider appropriate steps to protect current investment and to insure that this investment is also protected in the treaty.

The conference is faced with other important issues:

—Ways must be found to encourage marine scientific research for the benefit of all mankind while safeguarding the legitimate interests of coastal states in their economic zones.

—Steps must be taken to protect the oceans from pollution. We must establish uniform international controls on pollution from ships and insist upon universal respect for environmental standards for continental shelf and deep seabed exploitation.

—Access to the sea for landlocked countries must be assured.

—There must be provisions for compulsory and impartial third-party settlement of disputes. The United States cannot accept unilateral interpretation of a treaty of such scope by individual states or by an international seabed organization.

The pace of technology, the extent of economic need, and the claims of ideology and national ambition threaten to submerge the

difficult process of negotiation. The United States therefore believes that a just and beneficial regime for the oceans is essential to world peace.

For the self-interest of every nation is heavily engaged. Failure would seriously impair confidence in global treaty-making and in the very process of multilateral accommodation. The conclusion of a comprehensive Law of the Sea Treaty on the other hand would mark a major step toward a new world community.

The urgency of the problem is illustrated by disturbing developments which continue to crowd upon us. Most prominent is the problem of fisheries.

The United States cannot indefinitely accept unregulated and indiscriminate foreign fishing off its coasts. Many fish stocks have been brought close to extinction by foreign overfishing. We have recently concluded agreements with the Soviet Union, Japan, and Poland which will limit their catch; and we have a long and successful history of conservation agreements with Canada. But much more needs to be done.

Many within Congress are urging us to solve this problem unilaterally. A bill to establish a 200-mile fishing zone passed the Senate last year; a new one is currently before the House.

The Administration shares the concern which has led to such proposals. But unilateral action is both extremely dangerous and incompatible with the thrust of the negotiations described here. The United States has consistently resisted the unilateral claims of other nations, and others will almost certainly resist ours. Unilateral legislation on our part would almost surely prompt others to assert extreme claims of their own. Our ability to negotiate an acceptable international consensus on the economic zone will be jeopardized. If every state proclaims its own rules of law and seeks to impose them on others, the very basis of international law will be shaken, ultimately to our own detriment.

We warmly welcome the recent statement by Prime Minister Trudeau reaffirming the need for a solution through the Law of the



Sea Conference rather than through unilateral action. He said:

Canadians at large should realize that we have very large stakes indeed in the Law of the Sea Conference and we would be fools to give up those stakes by an action that would be purely a temporary, paper success.

That attitude will guide our actions as well. To conserve the fish and protect our fishing industry while the treaty is being negotiated, the United States will negotiate interim arrangements with other nations to conserve the fish stocks, to insure effective enforcement, and to protect the livelihood of our coastal fishermen. These agreements will be a transition to the eventual 200-mile zone. We believe it is in the interests of states fishing off our coasts to cooperate with us in this effort. We will support the efforts of other states, including our neighbors, to deal with their problems by similar agreements. We will consult fully with Congress, our states, the public, and foreign governments on arrangements for implementing a 200-mile zone by virtue of agreement at the Law of the Sea Conference.

Unilateral legislation would be a last resort. The world simply cannot afford to let the vital questions before the Law of the Sea Conference be answered by default. We are at one of those rare moments when mankind has come together to devise means of preventing future conflict and shaping its destiny rather than to solve a crisis that has occurred or to deal with the aftermath of war. It is a test of vision and will and of statesmanship. It must succeed. The United States is resolved to help conclude the conference in 1976, before the pressure of events and contention places international consensus irretrievably beyond our grasp.

#### **Outer Space and the Law of Nations**

The oceans are not the only area in which technology drives man in directions he has not foreseen and toward solutions unprecedented in history. No dimension of our modern experience is more a source of wonder than the exploration of space. Here, too, the extension of man's reach has come up

against national sensitivities and concerns for sovereignty. Here, too, we confront the potential for conflict or the possibility for legal order. Here, too, we have an opportunity to substitute law for power in the formative stage of an international activity.

Space technologies are directly relevant to the well-being of all nations. Earth-sensing satellites, for example, can dramatically help nations to assess their resources and to develop their potential. In the Sahel region of Africa we have seen the tremendous potential of this technology in dealing with natural disasters. The United States has urged in the United Nations that the new knowledge be made freely and widely available.

The use of satellites for broadcasting has a great potential to spread educational opportunities and to foster the exchange of ideas.

In the nearly two decades since the first artificial satellite, remarkable progress has been made in extending the reach of law to outer space. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 placed space beyond national sovereignty and banned weapons of mass destruction from earth orbit. The treaty also established the principle that the benefits of space exploration should be shared. Supplementary agreements have provided for the registry of objects placed in space, for liability for damage caused by their return to earth, and for international assistance to astronauts in emergencies. Efforts are underway to develop further international law governing man's activities on the moon and other celestial bodies.

Earth-sensing and broadcasting satellites, and conditions of their use, are a fresh challenge to international agreement. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space is seized with the issue, and the United States will cooperate actively with it. We are committed to the wider exchange of communication and ideas. But we recognize that there must be full consultation among the countries directly concerned. While we believe that knowledge of the earth and its environment gained from outer space should be broadly shared, we recog-

nize that this must be accompanied by efforts to insure that all countries will fully understand the significance of this new knowledge.

The United States stands ready to engage in a cooperative search for agreed international ground rules for these activities.

### Hijacking, Terrorism, and War

The modern age has not only given us the benefits of technology; it has also spawned the plagues of aircraft hijacking, international terrorism, and new techniques of warfare. The international community cannot ignore these affronts to civilization; it must not allow them to spread their poison; it has a duty to act vigorously to combat them.

Nations already have the legal obligation, recognized by unanimous resolution of the U.N. General Assembly, "to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating (or) acquiescing in" terrorist acts.<sup>3</sup> Treaties have been concluded to combat hijacking, sabotage of aircraft, and attacks on diplomats. The majority of states observe these rules; a minority do not. But events even in the last few weeks dramatize that present restraints are inadequate.

The United States is convinced that stronger international steps must be taken—and urgently—to deny skyjackers and terrorists a safehaven and to establish sanctions against states which aid them, harbor them, or fail to prosecute or extradite them.

The United States in 1972 proposed to the United Nations a new international Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism, covering kidnaping, murder, and other brutal acts. This convention regrettably was not adopted, and innumerable innocent lives have been lost as a consequence. We urge the United Nations once again to take up

and adopt this convention or other similar proposals as a matter of the highest priority.

Terrorism, like piracy, must be seen as outside the law. It discredits any political objective that it purports to serve and any nations which encourage it. If all nations deny terrorists a safehaven, terrorist practices will be substantially reduced—just as the incidence of skyjacking has declined sharply as a result of multilateral and bilateral agreements. All governments have a duty to defend civilized life by supporting such measures.

The struggle to restrain violence by law meets one of its severest tests in the law of war. Historically nations have found it possible to observe certain rules in their conduct of war. This restraint has been extended and codified especially in the past century. In our time, new, ever more awesome tools of warfare, the bitterness of ideologies and civil warfare, and weakened bonds of social cohesion have brought an even more brutal dimension to human conflict.

At the same time our century has also witnessed a broad effort to ameliorate some of these evils by international agreements. The most recent and comprehensive are the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the protection of war victims.

But the law in action has been less impressive than the law on the books. Patent deficiencies in implementation and compliance can no longer be ignored. Two issues are of paramount concern: First, greater protection for civilians and those imprisoned, missing, and wounded in war; and second, the application of international standards of humane conduct in civil wars.

An international conference is now underway to supplement the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the laws of war. We will continue to press for rules which will prohibit nations from barring a neutral country, or an international organization such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, from inspecting its treatment of prisoners. We strongly support provisions requiring full accounting for the missing in action. We

<sup>3</sup> For text of the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations (A/RES/2625 (XXV), adopted on Oct. 24, 1970), see BULLETIN of Nov. 16, 1970, p. 627.

will advocate immunity for aircraft evacuating the wounded. And we will seek agreement on a protocol which demands humane conduct during civil war, which bans torture, summary execution, and the other excesses which too often characterize civil strife.

The United States is committed to the principle that fundamental human rights require legal protection under all circumstances, that some kinds of individual suffering are intolerable no matter what threat nations may face. The American people and government deeply believe in fundamental standards of humane conduct; we are committed to uphold and promote them; we will fight to vindicate them in international forums.

### **Multinational Enterprises**

The need for new international regulation touches areas as modern as new technology and as old as war. It also reaches our economic institutions, where human ingenuity has created new means for progress while bringing new problems of social and legal adjustment.

Multinational enterprises have contributed greatly to economic growth in both their industrialized home countries, where they are most active, and in developing countries where they conduct some of their operations. If these organizations are to continue to foster world economic growth, it is in the common interest that international law, not political contests, govern their future.

Some nations feel that multinational enterprises influence their economies in ways unresponsive to their national priorities. Others are concerned that these enterprises may evade national taxation and regulation through facilities abroad. And recent disclosures of improper financial relationships between these companies and government officials in several countries raise fresh concerns.

But it remains equally true that multinational enterprises can be powerful engines for good. They can marshal and organize the resources of capital, initiative, research, technology, and markets in ways which vast-

ly increase production and growth. If an international consensus on the proper role and responsibilities of these enterprises could be reached, their vital contribution to the world economy could be further expanded.

A multilateral treaty establishing binding rules for multinational enterprises does not seem possible in the near future. However, the United States believes an agreed statement of basic principles is achievable. We are prepared to make a major effort and invite the participation of all interested parties.

We are now actively discussing such guidelines and will support the relevant work of the U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations. We believe that such guidelines must:

—Accord with existing principles of international law governing the treatment of foreigners and their property rights.

—Call upon multinational corporations to take account of national priorities, act in accordance with local law, and employ fair labor practices.

—Cover all multinationals, state owned as well as private.

—Not discriminate in favor of host-country enterprises except under specifically defined and limited circumstances.

—Set forth not only the obligations of the multinationals but also the host country's responsibilities to the foreign enterprises within their borders.

—Acknowledge the responsibility of governments to apply recognized conflict-of-laws principles in reconciling regulations applied by various host nations.

If multinational institutions become an object of economic warfare, it will be an ill omen for the global economic system. We believe that the continued operation of transnational companies, under accepted guidelines, can be reconciled with the claims of national sovereignty. The capacity of nations to deal with this issue constructively will be a test of whether the search for common solutions or the clash of ideologies will dominate our economic future.

Since the early days of the Republic, Americans have seen that their nation's self-interest could not be separated from a just and progressive international legal order. Our Founding Fathers were men of law, of wisdom, and of political sophistication. The heritage they left is an inspiration as we face an expanding array of problems that are at once central to our national well-being and soluble only on a global scale.

The challenge of the statesman is to recognize that a just international order cannot be built on power, but only on restraint of power. As Felix Frankfurter said:

Fragile as reason is and limited as law is as the expression of the institutionalized medium of reason, that's all we have standing between us and the tyranny of mere will and the cruelty of unbridled, unprincipled, undisciplined feeling.

If the politics of ideological confrontation and strident nationalism become pervasive, broad and humane international agreement will grow ever more elusive and unilateral actions will dominate. In an environment of widening chaos the stronger will survive and may even prosper temporarily. But the weaker will despair, and the human spirit will suffer.

The American people have always had a higher vision: a community of nations that has discovered the capacity to act according to man's more noble aspirations. The principles and procedures of the Anglo-American legal system have proven their moral and practical worth. They have promoted our national progress and brought benefits to more citizens more equitably than in any society in the history of man. They are a heritage and a trust which we all hold in common. And their greatest contribution to human progress may well lie ahead of us.

The philosopher Kant saw law and freedom, moral principle and practical necessity,

as parts of the same reality. He saw law as the inescapable guide to political action. He believed that sooner or later the realities of human interdependence would compel the fulfillment of the moral imperatives of human aspiration.

We have reached that moment in time where moral and practical imperatives, law, and pragmatism point toward the same goals.

The foreign policy of the United States must reflect the universal ideals of the American people. It is no accident that a dedication to international law has always been a central feature of our foreign policy. And so it is today—inescapably—as for the first time in history we have the opportunity and the duty to build a true world community.

## Delegation to 7th Special Session and 30th U.N. General Assembly

The Senate on August 1 confirmed the nominations of the following to be Representatives and Alternate Representatives of the United States to the seventh special session and to the thirtieth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations:

### *Representatives*

Daniel P. Moynihan  
W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.  
Donald M. Fraser, U.S. Representative from  
the State of Minnesota  
J. Herbert Burke, U.S. Representative from the  
State of Florida  
Clarence M. Mitchell, Jr.

### *Alternate Representatives*

Albert W. Sherer, Jr.  
Jacob M. Myerson  
Barbara M. White  
Carmen Maymi  
John H. Haugh

## President Ford Visits Romania and Yugoslavia Following European Security Conference

*After attending the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) at Helsinki, President Ford visited Romania (August 2-3) and Yugoslavia (August 3-4). Following are remarks by President Ford and President Nicolae Ceausescu of the Socialist Republic of Romania, the text of a joint communique signed at Sinaia, Romania, on August 3, remarks by President Ford and President Josip Broz Tito of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the text of a joint statement issued at Belgrade on August 4, and a statement by President Ford issued upon his return to Washington.<sup>1</sup>*

### ARRIVAL, BUCHAREST, AUGUST 2

White House press release (Bucharest) dated August 2

#### President Ceausescu<sup>2</sup>

Dear Mr. President of the United States of America, dear Mrs. Ford, ladies and gentlemen, dear comrades and friends: It is with great joy that I and my wife, all of us, have you as our guests and address to you, Mr. President, and to Mrs. Elizabeth Ford, as well as to your associates, our warm greetings and to extend to you our traditional bidding of welcome on the soil of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

I wish to make a particular note with satisfaction of the outward force taken by

<sup>1</sup> President Ford's address before the conference and remarks and joint statements issued during his visit to the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland en route to Helsinki are printed in the BULLETIN of Sept. 1, 1975. Additional remarks are printed in the Aug. 4 and Aug. 11 issues of the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents.

<sup>2</sup> President Ceausescu spoke in Romanian on all three occasions.

the Romanian-American relations, of the fact that in the last few years the economic exchanges have gone up strongly, that technical-scientific cooperation has been intensified, as well as the cultural and other exchanges between our two countries.

The very fact of your visit to Romania is, in my opinion, an eloquent expression of these relations, of the desire evinced by the Romanian and the American peoples to work more and more closely together in the mutual interest, as well as in the interests of their force of understanding, cooperation, and peace among all nations.

You are coming to Romania just a day after the successful conclusion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Thus your visit is a wonderful part of the spirit which permeates the documents that we have signed together yesterday in Helsinki and whereby we have asserted our common will on behalf of our peoples to develop cooperation on the principles of fully equal rights, respect for the independence, sovereignty of each nation, noninterference in internal affairs, and the renunciation of force and threat with the use of force in the settlement of problems between states.

As we have mentioned in the statement in Helsinki, in order to convey into real fact whatever we have agreed in the signed documents, sustained efforts are required in order to insure our peoples and the peoples of the world at large a better world and a world with more justice, in order to proceed in such a way as to insure that our children and mankind in general will never know the disasters of war and would live in peace and friendship.

During your brief visit to this country,

you will have an opportunity, Mr. President, to get to know the present-day interests and some of the achievements of the Romanian people on the way of building a new life of well-being and habit. You will be able, sir, to understand better the desire of the people of Romania to cooperate with the American people and to work together with all the peoples of the world irrespective of their social systems.

I should like your visit to mark a new, significant moment in the course of friendship and cooperation between our two countries and peoples.

With these thoughts in mind, I wish you to feel at home among the Romanian people, who greet you with esteemed friendship and its traditional hospitality.

#### **President Ford**

Mr. President, Mrs. Ceausescu, ladies and gentlemen: Mrs. Ford, our son Jack, and I are highly honored and greatly pleased to visit Romania. We are especially pleased to be in this unique land so rich in history, with such a great natural beauty and such a proud and independent people.

As you may recall, Mr. President, I met with a splendid group of young Romanians in the White House several months ago. I found them to be excellent and outstanding ambassadors of friendship between our two countries.

Mr. President, let us assure coming generations a more normal, relaxed, and peaceful world. We must find ways to increase real and direct cooperation among all peoples.

Among the principles we both cherish is the right of every nation to independence and sovereignty. We believe that every nation has the right to its own peaceful existence without being threatened by force, and we believe that all states are equal under law regardless of size, system, or level of development.

Principles such as these are included in the document we signed in Helsinki. We have both worked hard, Mr. President, and we must continue to devote our efforts to making all of these principles a reality in interna-

tional life in this spirit. I look forward to our discussions on the international problems that concern us both.

Our bilateral relations are good, Mr. President. I am very pleased that our Congress has approved the U.S.-Romanian trade agreement. This creates new opportunities, particularly in the mutually beneficial commercial and economic field. I am confident that we can continue to improve our relations in many, many other areas as well.

Mr. President, I know that our discussions will be very productive during my stay in your country. As during your visit to Washington in June, our goal will be to seek closer cooperation between Romania and the United States. I look forward to our talks that we will have in the hours ahead.

On behalf of the American people I bring to you and your family and the Romanian people warm, warm greetings and the very best wishes for peace and prosperity.

#### **TOASTS BY PRESIDENT FORD AND PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU, AUGUST 2<sup>3</sup>**

##### **President Ceausescu**

Mr. President, Mrs. Elizabeth Ford, ladies and gentlemen, friends and comrades: I should like once again to express our joy, our joy which we share, all of us, for having the President of the United States with us, and Mrs. Ford, too, and his associates, as our guests in Romania and with the fact that this visit is part of the continuous development of the friendly relations and cooperation between our two people.

I think I shall not be mistaken if I say that in this very place, six years ago, day for day, we welcomed the first President of the United States ever to visit Romania. By sheer coincidence, because it was not programmed to be so, you are coming to Romania precisely six years after.

At that time, that visit was regarded as a somewhat exceptional thing by some people,

<sup>3</sup> Given at a dinner hosted by President Ceausescu at Bucharest (text from White House press release (Bucharest)).

of course. Changes of particular importance have occurred in the world since.

But in the first place, I would like to mention with deep satisfaction the fact that relations between Romania and the United States have seen very strong progress—besides many agreements in these years, various years, among which the last agreement regards our trade relations which, I have to say, was today ratified unanimously by the Council of State while a few days ago it was adopted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States.

I can say that once this agreement has come into force, an agreement whereby our two countries mutually grant each other the most-favored-nation treatment—although I will have to recognize that Romania stands to gain significantly as a result of this—larger, broader prospects are opening up for the development of economic relations between our two countries.

In order not to have people believe that Romania will have I don't know what kind of advantages as a result, I have to say that this simply means that Romanian products are going to enjoy the same status as the produce of other countries on the U.S. market. It now follows, of course, for our goods to prove competitive both in terms of price, quality, and technical.

In the last few years our trade exchanges have gone up almost four times over. I am convinced that after this trade agreement has come into force in the forthcoming years, we can achieve a substantial increase in our economic exchanges and cooperative adventures, although fulfilling the target of \$1 billion per annum in the next three to four years.

As you see, Mr. President, we are also practical people, and we talk primarily of material things, things of economic exchanges. I should not fail to mention the fact that during these years we also concluded agreements in technology, science, culture, and there has been an intensive exchange of people in various walks of life between our two countries.

Only in the last few years more than 5,000 American young people spent several weeks

in Romania, and starting last year groups of Romanian young people also visited the United States, within the program appropriately called Ambassadors For Friendship. Indeed they are goodwill ambassadors for peace and friendship.

We attach special attention to such activities, not only or necessarily in connection with humanitarian problems as described in the documents we signed together yesterday but mainly with the need we feel for the people of our two countries—for the young people all over the world—to meet together to strengthen their cooperation so that in the future they can be at peace and work together with each other with no threat of force of war.

Bearing all this in mind, I wish to express my hope—more, indeed my conviction—that your visit to Romania is going to mark a moment of particular and new importance for the further extension of many-sided cooperation in all fields between our two countries.

I think I am not going to disclose a special secret if I simply mention that during our talks tonight we agreed to work in this direction with a conviction that this responds fully to the interests of our two peoples, to the interests of a general policy of cooperation and peace in the world.

In the international sphere, change has been perhaps even more important. It is true that fundamental changes have occurred in the manner people judge events, but in particular in the ratio of forces in the international arena.

Nowadays I think that nobody—or at least very few people—would regard as something strange or interpret as a heresy a visit by the President of the United States to Romania.

On the contrary, I would rather think it is vain [sic] regarded as something that should be normal for relations between states. This is the most telling proof of the depth of change in international relations.

That is why I take the liberty to say that the first visit six years ago by the President of the United States, to Romania, had a particular significance, not only for the rela-

tions between our two countries but also for the overall course for détente and cooperation in international terms.

The fact that two countries with different social systems and different insights—to say nothing about the difference between their heritage—were able to make a contribution, each one related to what it stands for, for the general course of peace, illustrates that today cooperation among states and among peoples, regardless of size, big and small, irrespective of their social system, becomes a factor of particular importance for the general force of events for insuring new policy based on people's rights and mutual respect among all the nations of the world.

This time is the first visit of a President of the United States to another country after the successful conclusion of the European Security Conference. I should like to interpret this as an expression of a beginning of the application of the points we have underscored by our signature yesterday together with the executives of the other participating states.

Of course, it just happened that this first visit was in Romania, but maybe now acquires a special significance. Maybe that significance is that two states with different social systems and different insights are firmly determined to take action in order to carry into effect things for which they had signed a day before.

No doubt there are still many problems in the world that await a solution. You mentioned them in your speech yesterday. So did I. Distinct efforts will still be required by all states in order to see to it that new relations are built among states and that the right of each nation is respected for a free development without fear of aggression and to insure the rights of each people to choose its own social system according to its own will.

There are problems in Europe. There are problems in Cyprus, in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Asia. But all of them could be solved starting from this new precedent of ruling out force, threat of the use of force. They could be solved by peaceful means so as to give a happier future to

the people, and in particular we should think of the future of our children, of our young people, and of the total mankind.

We can hardly overlook the fact that the problems of disarmament are a matter of concern for all people these days, but there are economic problems of most serious degree, the solution of which requires close cooperation in order to solve them in a way opening the road toward a new economic future and working toward more progress in the world, economic stability, and insuring the stability of all nations and a world of peace and cooperation.

Mr. President, in a country which has won its independence by long struggle, a country which has seen for hundreds of years the rule of foreign domination—and everything here has been achieved by struggle and by work, by toil, and sometimes by renouncing things which were necessary in order to insure economic and social progress of the country to make sure of its independence. That is precisely why we hoped so dearly from our hearts our own independent development, and that is why we understand so well the people who now wage their struggle for independence for economic and social development consonant with their own will.

The country is, I think, the decisive factor in the process of building a better world, a world with more justice, and world of lasting peace.

The peoples have reached great achievements in the fields of science and human knowledge in general. People now meet in the outer space and see eye to eye.

I think we should also set ourselves the goal to meet each other here on the Earth to understand each other, to work together with each other, in order to make it so that each nation can enjoy her fruits of science, technology, the advantages of everything that human civilization has created best.

It is in that spirit that Romania, my people, wish to cooperate closely with the people of America, with the United States of America, with all the peoples of the world, starting from a conviction that only on mutual respect and only on friendly cooperation can we note the future of human civilization,



can we build the world of peace for all.

With the conviction that the future will see even better cooperation between our two peoples and that your visit, sir, is going to give a new impetus to our cooperation, I would like once again to wish you to feel at home here during your brief visit to this country and to express my hope that at the appropriate time you might come again for a longer stay. I do hope that Mrs. Ford—as it happens the world over, given the private life of Presidents—in this respect will be successful in persuading you to come back to Romania for a longer stay.

May I ask all that are present in this hall to join me in this toast to the President of the United States of America and to the esteemed Mrs. Ford, for the continuous developments of friendly relations and cooperation between Romania and the United States, for the continued well-being and prosperity of the American people, for peace and cooperation among all the nations of the world, to the health of all of you.

#### **President Ford**

Mr. President, Mrs. Ceausescu, ladies and gentlemen: My visit to Romania is a very, very great pleasure. Because of some high-level meetings between our governments and the growing number of contacts at the ministerial level and between officials and specialists at all levels, we have witnessed in recent years improvement in U.S.-Romanian relations.

It seems very fortuitous and unique that within a day following the signing of the agreements in Helsinki that we have reaffirmed and expanded our fine personal relationship, that we have seen concrete evidence of better relations between the Romanian people and the American people, and that we have listened to the words of one of the leaders of the nations in Europe who has been strong and forthright that we should meet here on this occasion.

Our talks today, Mr. President, reaffirmed in the most positive terms our mutual interest in continuing to build our excellent bilateral relations.

Mr. President, my visit to Europe is significant for another reason. We both participated in the final stages of the European Security Conference at Helsinki.

As you, Mr. President, have pointed out on many, many occasions, the dynamics of change—social, technological, global, and dimensional—affect all nations. So can and should the results of Helsinki.

We welcome, Mr. President, the changing relationship being forged between East and West. This is a relationship in which Romania continues to assume a most important role. The efforts of the United States and Romania and those of the other 33 participating nations will be very useful, and deeds equal words.

Not the least result of the conference has been to show that smaller nations can make an independent, can make an equal and valuable contribution to the world.

On recognizing the importance of the conference's work, the United States views it as one important step in a continuing process. It is imperative that we work together to lessen the chances for conflict. Let all nations cooperate to lessen human poverty, human suffering, and human hunger.

The challenges we face require the best efforts and the best ideas of all concerned, and all nations must have a positive and active role to play.

Mr. President, my country fully recognizes the growing interdependence of mankind, the need for increased cooperation among the industrialized nations and a greater recognition of the concerns of the developing nations.

The United States will make full and fair contribution. We look to the other nations of the world to join with us in this important endeavor.

Mr. President, I came to Romania for another very important reason. This complex world is marked by diversity. We recognize the importance of close ties with a country that shows such independence and such vigor. We do not always agree, but we value the courage of a nation that wants to make its contribution to a better world by its own very special efforts.

Romania has won the admiration of the

American people for her positive contributions to world understanding. I am confident that Romania will contribute constructively in helping to find practical and durable solutions to the problems of today, as well as for tomorrow.

Mr. President, on behalf of Mrs. Ford and myself, I thank you and your very gracious wife for your warm hospitality. I raise my glass to you, Mr. President, and to the building of a more secure and prosperous international community in which both of our peoples will find peace and progress in the future.

#### REMARKS AT SINAIA, AUGUST 3<sup>4</sup>

##### President Ceausescu

Mr. President, gentlemen and comrades: I should like to express my satisfaction in connection with the signing of our communique today and the results of the visit paid to Romania by you, sir, and for discussions we had together as an expression of our mutual wish to extend our cooperation in all fields and to work together more closely in order to promote the policy of peace and international cooperation.

At the same time, we signed the documents whereby the two countries take note of the fact that the trade agreement has come into effect and have exchanged ratification instruments to that effect.

As a result, a better legal framework is being created for further expanding economic cooperation between our two countries.

I should like to express my satisfaction, the satisfaction of my government and of the Romanian people, with the fact that the relations between Romania and the United States have now been established on a mutually beneficial basis, that our two countries are now desirous to apply in the economic field the principles of mutual advantage through the mutual granting of the

most-favored-nation treatment.

During these two days, we had talks on many problems which pertained to the relations between the two countries and also to a number of international matters which are today of general concern to mankind and which are of interest today to our two countries as well.

I am glad to note that in these conversations of ours that the preoccupation and the common desire have emerged to find political solutions for the complex problems now confronting mankind and to insure the continued course toward détente, cooperation, and peace in the world.

That is why I should like to emphasize with great satisfaction that your visit to Romania, sir, although a short one, is now being concluded with the most favorable results, both with regard to the relations between Romania and the United States and the future prospects of these relations, as well as with respect to the need to take further action together in the service of peace and cooperation, in the service of building a world with more justice, a better world on our planet.

This setting in the mountains I think has also helped create a favorable climate, and I hope this will be reflected in the continued cooperation between our two countries and between the two of us, sir. I wish an ever better and better and fruitful cooperation between Romania and the United States. I wish that we can work together and to the good of our two peoples and of the cause of peace.

##### President Ford

Mr. President and distinguished guests: Let me say with great emphasis my appreciation for your warm hospitality and that of the Romanian people. It has been a wonderful experience for Mrs. Ford and myself to meet so many of your people, and it has been a glorious opportunity for me to not only see Bucharest but this superb area of your country where we are today.

I am especially grateful for the opportunity to have friendly, constructive, and frank discussions with you, not only on our

<sup>4</sup> Made upon signing the joint communique and the notices of acceptance of the U.S.-Romanian trade agreement (text from White House press release (Sinaia)).

bilateral relations but those problems that we see on a worldwide basis.

For the last several years, Mr. President, you have taken the leadership in bringing about an exchange in the area of culture, scientific matters, economic problems, between your country and our country; and the net result has been mutually beneficial to both.

The documents that we have just signed make possible the kind of trade relationship between your country and mine that will enhance the prosperity of both, make the life of your people and mine richer, and will be beneficial on a worldwide basis.

What I have signed on behalf of my country has received the endorsement of our government—the executive, the legislative—and therefore it is a true contract between your country and my country for all of the benefits that we can share equally.

I thank you again, and I thank the Romanian people.

### **JOINT COMMUNIQUE SIGNED AT SINAIA AUGUST 3**

White House press release (Sinaia) dated August 3

At the invitation of the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, and Mrs. Elena Ceausescu, the President of the United States, Gerald R. Ford, and Mrs. Elizabeth Ford, paid an official visit to Romania on August 2-3, 1975.

The distinguished guests visited places of cultural and social interest at Bucharest and Sinaia. They were given a warm welcome everywhere as an expression of the esteem and high regard in which the Romanian people hold their friends, the American people.

During the visit, President Ford and President Ceausescu held talks regarding the present stage of relations between Romania and the United States, as well as an exchange of views on a wide range of international problems of mutual interest. The talks took place in a cordial and friendly atmosphere reflecting mutual esteem and respect as well as the favorable course of Romanian-American relations in recent years.

The two Presidents noted with satisfaction that bilateral relations in the political, economic, technical-scientific, cultural and other fields have developed and diversified in recent years in the spirit of the principles inscribed in the Joint Declaration signed at Washington on December 5, 1973.

Reaffirming the adherence of their countries to the

principles in the Joint Declaration, the two Presidents resolved to continue to develop relations between the two states on the basis of these principles, in order to promote peace, international cooperation and the traditional friendship between the Romanian and American peoples.

The two Presidents gave a positive assessment to the evolution of economic links between the two countries. They resolved to continue to act to expand economic, industrial and technical-scientific cooperation and trade based on the principles and provisions of the Joint Declaration on Economic, Industrial, and Technological Cooperation between Romania and the United States adopted at Washington on December 5, 1973.

They noted also the importance of actions taken in recent years to encourage and intensify bilateral commerce, among these being the establishment and activity of the Romanian-American Joint Economic Commission and the Romanian-U.S. Economic Council, as well as joint production and commercial ventures.

The two Presidents hailed with deep satisfaction the conclusion of the Trade Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Romania and the United States of America, which represents a major contribution to the expansion of economic relations between the two countries. The two sides expressed the conviction that the entry into force of the Trade Agreement on August 3, 1975, by exchange of notices of acceptance during the visit, will help Romanian-American trade to grow and diversify, thereby influencing favorably the entire range of relations between the two states.

The two Presidents, taking note of the positive evolution of cooperative ties between economic organizations of the two countries, resolved to encourage wider links through joint activities, including the establishment of joint production and commercial ventures. To this end, the Romanian-American Joint Economic Commission, whose next session is scheduled soon in Washington, will examine appropriate ways and measures. The two Presidents decided that appropriate departments will begin, as soon as possible, the negotiation of a long-term accord on economic, industrial and technical collaboration, as well as an agricultural agreement. Possibilities for a bilateral maritime agreement will also be discussed.

The two Presidents welcomed progress achieved in technical and scientific cooperation and expressed themselves in favor of exploring possibilities for mutually beneficial cooperation through the conclusion of collaborative agreements on energy, including nuclear energy, environmental protection, public health, and in other fields.

Both sides noted the conclusion, in December 1974, of the first long-term governmental agreement on cooperation and exchanges in the fields of culture, education, science and technology and will

continue to give it full support. The two sides stressed the importance of this agreement for better mutual understanding of spiritual and material values, for expansion of links in these fields between their respective institutions, organizations and associations, and for contacts between citizens of both countries. In this context, the two Presidents welcomed exchanges and contacts between youth groups.

Regarding the coming anniversaries of major events in the histories of both nations—the Bicentennial of the United States and the Centennial of Romanian State independence—the two Presidents agreed that these events will provide occasions for further expanding mutual understanding.

The two Presidents noted that, in the spirit of the 1973 Declaration, a number of humanitarian problems have been solved. They agreed to continue to take action in this field.

President Ford expressed his concern over the recent disastrous floods which had affected Romania. He voiced admiration for the valiant efforts of the Romanian people to overcome the effects of this natural calamity. President Ceausescu thanked President Ford for his concern and the aid extended by the United States.

The two Presidents agreed that the successful conclusion of the work of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe represents an important step toward the achievement of greater security and cooperation on the continent. In order to achieve broader understanding among all the peoples of Europe, they stressed the need for abiding by and implementing all the provisions of the final act adopted at Helsinki. The two Presidents expressed their determination to strive for effective disarmament measures which strengthen the peace and security of all peoples in Europe.

The two Presidents emphasized their support for a just and equitable international order in which the right of each country, regardless of size or political, economic or social system, to choose its own destiny free from the use or threat of force will be respected. In such an international order, each country may develop freely on the basis of strict respect for independence, national sovereignty, juridical equality, and non-interference in its internal affairs.

During the talks, the two Presidents held an exchange of views on the complex economic problems which confront mankind. They noted that to solve these problems, account must be taken of the need to establish fair economic relations among all states and to create and consolidate an economic equilibrium which can assure stability on a world scale, in the interest of peace, international security and the general progress of all nations. Attention was given to effective means of reducing the gap between developed and developing countries.

The two Presidents reaffirmed the indissoluble link

between security and effective disarmament measures as well as the pressing need for continued vigorous negotiations toward further progress in the limitation of armaments, including nuclear armaments.

The two sides expressed their concern over the situation in the Middle East and underlined the need to reach, as soon as possible, a just and lasting peace in the region, in the spirit of Resolution 338 of the Security Council of the United Nations, taking into account the legitimate interests of all the peoples of the area, including the Palestinian people, and respect for the right to independence, sovereignty and security for all states in the area.

The two sides expressed concern over the evolution of the situation in Cyprus and favored a solution based on respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. They noted that the talks between the two communities on the island can contribute fruitfully to a solution of the situation.

The two Presidents agreed that good-neighborly relations of friendship among Balkan countries would contribute toward cooperation, security and improvement of the climate in Europe.

The two Presidents agreed to support the United Nations so that it may fulfill its mission of maintaining world peace and developing international cooperation and understanding.

The two Presidents welcomed the Romanian-American exchange of visits in many fields and at various levels which have taken place in recent years. In order to continue the positive direction of Romanian-American relations, they agreed to develop and intensify these periodic exchanges of views at all levels.

President Ford and Mrs. Ford expressed to President Nicolae Ceausescu and Mrs. Elena Ceausescu their deep appreciation for the extremely cordial reception which was accorded them in Romania.

The two sides agreed that this visit was another contribution to friendship and understanding between the Romanian and American Governments and peoples and to the valuable tradition of constructive dialogue which has evolved between the two countries.

SINAI, August 3, 1975.

GERALD R. FORD

*President of the United States of America*

NICOLAE CEAUSESCU

*President of the Socialist Republic of Romania*

### ARRIVAL, BELGRADE, AUGUST 3

White House press release (Belgrade) dated August 3

President Tito, ladies and gentlemen:  
Mrs. Ford, our son Jack, and I have looked

forward to this visit to Yugoslavia, a country of great beauty and a country with fierce pride in its independence.

It is also a very great pleasure for me to make my first visit here as President of the United States.

Twelve years ago I came to Yugoslavia as a Member of the Congress on a far less happy occasion—Skopje that day had been devastated by an earthquake. I remember the sad and very grim scene. Mrs. Ford and I visited Skopje. I am very pleased to learn that Skopje has been rebuilt into a beautiful and modern city.

This is representative of the progress made throughout Yugoslavia in recent years. It is a fine example of what creativity, hard work, and determination—well-known characteristics of the Yugoslav people—can achieve.

I am looking forward to my talks with you, Mr. President. You are truly respected in America and throughout the world as one of the great men of the postwar era. I am confident that our discussions of bilateral issues and questions affecting the peace and security and welfare of the world will add to our mutual understanding, to the friendly relations of our two countries, and the friendship between Yugoslavs and Americans.

Mr. President, you and I have just returned from Helsinki, where we attended the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This summit was another step in the continuing efforts to reduce tensions and increase international cooperation.

It represents progress which we, together with other conference participants, must build upon. Full implementation of the Helsinki documents promises greater security, greater cooperation, not only in Europe but among people everywhere.

The meeting of the United States, Yugoslavia, and 33 other states in Finland, also serves as the latest reminder that today's world finds the people of the world increasingly interdependent.

As we meet today and tomorrow in Belgrade, so soon after our participation together in the Helsinki Conference, we are

mindful of the need for cooperation by all nations on urgent international problems. I am confident that our discussions will make a very positive contribution in this direction.

Thank you—the people of Yugoslavia—for your gracious welcome to this great country.

Thank you very much.

#### TOAST BY PRESIDENT FORD, AUGUST 3<sup>5</sup>

Mr. President, Madame Broz, ladies and gentlemen: I am very, very delighted to be back in Yugoslavia. Twelve years is much too long to be away.

Mrs. Ford and I thank you most sincerely for the warm and wonderful welcome of your people and for your own very gracious remarks, Mr. President.

While I am deeply appreciative of the justly renowned Yugoslav hospitality shown to Mrs. Ford and to me personally, I am very mindful that this kind expression represents the friendship which the Yugoslav people feel for the American people.

I can assure you, Mr. President, that this sentiment is fully reciprocated on our part. We Americans have long valued our ties of friendship with Yugoslavia. Americans have particularly admired Yugoslavia's independent spirit. Whenever independence is threatened, people everywhere look to the example of the struggle of Yugoslavian people throughout their history. They take strength and they take inspiration from that example.

Mr. President, this spirit and your courageous leadership brought the Yugoslav people successfully through the harsh trials of World War II and its aftermath into an era of peace, stability, and economic growth.

Yugoslavia is confident of its place in the world and its prospects for the future, and I believe your confidence is fully justified.

American interest in Yugoslavia's continued independence, integrity, and well-being, expressed often in the past, remains undiminished. Tonight I have the pleasure

<sup>5</sup> Given at a dinner hosted by President Tito at Belgrade (text from White House press release (Belgrade)).

to reassert my nation's positive interest in the future of your nation.

Yugoslavs and Americans have both benefited from many joint efforts to speed the economic development of Yugoslavia. Our bilateral trade continues to grow. It has more than doubled in five years. Yugoslav-American economic councils have been established in Belgrade and in New York City. Many American firms are working closely with Yugoslav enterprises, such as the construction of your country's first nuclear power facility. Our Export-Import Bank plays a very positive role in supplying loans and guarantees. Yugoslav-American scientific, technological, and cultural cooperation and exchanges are an increasingly important part of our bilateral relations.

But our mutual accomplishments in dealing with economic problems must be viewed from the perspective of the interdependence of all nations.

We have been distressed by the intransigence and irresponsibility reflected in some of the discussions of vital issues in U.N. forums. The growing alienation between developing nations can only harm the best interests of both and jeopardize the solution of universal problems.

I assure you, Mr. President, that the United States will play its full role and its full part in efforts to resolve these issues in the best interests of all people.

Yugoslavia has taken a very prominent role in international affairs under your guidance, Mr. President. The United States recognizes that your country's policy of nonalignment makes an active contribution to greater understanding among people.

Yugoslavia and the United States have consistently worked for cooperation based on the equality of all members of the international community under the U.N. Charter in the settling of outstanding international problems.

Our two countries, as in the case of all friends, have had differences; but we are able to discuss them openly, as friends do, and to resolve them. The main point is that we are never in doubt about the importance of common goals or about our deep commit-

ment to the continuity of friendly relations.

At this time, with the aims of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe so clearly in our thoughts, let us emphasize the mutuality and the interdependence of our basic concerns for peace, security, and human progress in the years to come.

In that spirit, I ask you to join me in a toast to President Tito, whose courage, wisdom, and leadership have meant so much for Yugoslavia and the world, in which his country has played such an important part.

#### REMARKS AT CONCLUSION OF MEETINGS, AUGUST 4

White House press release (Belgrade) dated August 4

##### President Ford

The talks that we have had the last day have been too short, but we have discussed in great detail some of the very major matters that both of our countries are equally interested in.

We did discuss the bilateral relations between Yugoslavia and the United States. That included, of course, our economic relationships; it did, of course, include our military relationships. And in both instances I indicated very firmly that I would give both matters or problems my very personal attention because of their significance.

We did discuss the results of the CSCE Conference in Helsinki. It was agreed that this was a step forward, as both of us indicated in our speeches in Helsinki, but that we have to produce progress if we were to justify the action, and when we meet here in Belgrade two years from now, the success of Helsinki would be proven by the actions that have been taken in the interim.

We did, of course, discuss the problems of the Middle East. I indicated that the United States would continue its very vital interest in progress in the Middle East. I stated very emphatically that a stalemate in the Middle East was unacceptable. I indicated that moderation on the part of all parties was essential.

I also indicated that flexibility was neces-

sary if we were to achieve the kind of results that would avoid a potential serious development, a catastrophe, from the point of view of the world as a whole. Moderation, greater flexibility, are absolutely essential at the present time.

I, of course, thank the President for his cordial and friendly welcome, and I express to the Yugoslavian people my gratitude for the warm reception given to Mrs. Ford and myself and our son, and I look forward to an expanding and improving relationship between our peoples.

#### President Tito <sup>6</sup>

It is a little difficult for me to make a statement, as the President of the United States has already said all that I wanted to say.

I must say that the talks have been going in a very cordial and constructive spirit.

When we start, bilateral relations—we found that such relations are already very good, but we agreed that they could be better and that we intended to expand them in the future.

Both sides have obviously expressed concern about the situation in the Middle East. I think [in] that our views are quite identical, especially after I heard what President Ford said about the actions the United States intends to take in the future.

As far as the international situation is concerned, we didn't discuss it in detail, but we discussed more the economic situation. We found together that the economic situation is very serious and that it will be a matter of serious discussion at the forthcoming special session of the United Nations. And after I heard what President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger said about the attitude the United States are going to take, I think I can be hopeful that the special session will be a successful one.

I think the talks with President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger were in the spirit of the joint declaration we adopted in Helsinki.

I wish to say that the visit has been a

<sup>6</sup> President Tito spoke in Serbo-Croatian.

very successful one; it has enabled us to get to know each other a little better. I think President Ford has been able to see that the peoples of Yugoslavia—judging by the reception they gave you, sir—wish good relations with the United States of America.

So I thank you for your visit, which will be, I am sure, beneficial for both countries and for the future relations.

#### TOASTS BY PRESIDENT FORD AND PRESIDENT TITO, AUGUST 4 <sup>7</sup>

##### President Tito

Mr. President: May I again express once again my great satisfaction for having you in our country. Your visit is one more important contribution to our traditionally good relation, and I am convinced that the further cooperation between our two countries will be promoted in all fields.

Although your stay was short, you could, Mr. President, see for yourself that the peoples of Yugoslavia lavish friendship toward the American people and they wish the existing ties to be consolidated and sanctioned.

Yesterday and today we had very interesting talks which showed that your country, as well as ours, are very interested to peace in the world and progress in international cooperation. On many questions we have the same views, and we are equally ready to contribute to the solution of major international problems.

I think we are on the good road, because even on the question on which our positions are different, there has been new consideration being expressed and recognized for further dialogue. We know that the United States has a great responsibility for peace in the world and the development of international cooperation and that on your involvement depends in a large measure the solution of many questions.

We appreciate the effort you are engaging in this direction. Applying consistently the principles of the policy of nonalignment,

<sup>7</sup> Given at a working luncheon hosted by President Tito at Belgrade; President Tito spoke in Serbo-Croatian (text from White House press release (Belgrade)).

Yugoslavia endeavors—and we shall continue to do so in the future—to strengthen the spirit of cooperation between our peoples, to consolidate mutual confidence, and to build such international relations in which independence, equality, and cooperation among all peoples will come to more and more expression.

I wish, Mr. President, to assure you that the talks I had with you gave me great satisfaction. I hope that you will have again the opportunity to visit our country, to stay a little longer, and to get better to know our people and the effort they make in the building of a better life.

I would like, Mr. President, that you convey to the American people the feelings of sincere friendship of the peoples of Yugoslavia and our wishes for further prosperity of the United States of America.

I raise this glass to the good health and personal happiness of you personally, Mr. President, of Mrs. Ford and your family, to the health of your associates, to friendship between our two countries.

#### **President Ford**

Mr. President: As our visit in Yugoslavia draws to a close, let me express my deep appreciation on behalf of Mrs. Ford and our son Jack; and all of the American party join me in thanking you once more for the warm hospitality and deep friendship that you have shown us. We have had a marvelous time in Belgrade.

Mr. President, I especially appreciate having had this chance to hear your views on our bilateral questions and on the issues affecting the international community. I appreciate your long experience and wisdom reflected in each of the subjects discussed during our conversations here.

I have valued our discussions coming, as they do, immediately after the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in which both you and I participated, representing our two countries.

I am pleased, Mr. President, that you and I are agreed on the need for all participating states to implement its documents fully and

in good faith. If we do so, we will contribute to greater stability, increasing contacts between our peoples, greater cooperation throughout Europe. We will contribute, of course, to the important goal we both share—a world in which all peoples enjoy peace, prosperity, and security.

I am pleased that our views have been close on many, many of the matters facing our two peoples and all of mankind. It is essential that we now work to broaden our spirit of understanding and agreement, to achieve a better realization within the international community of the interdependence of human society and their problems. The need for cooperation in seeking solutions to the universal problems is very critical.

Mr. President, your country, with its own courageous determination to maintain its independence, can fully appreciate the importance to the American people of our celebration of our 200 years of freedom. It is a time for Americans to reflect upon the basic values that brought success to the original Thirteen Colonies' struggle for self-government.

We are proud of the significant contribution through the years of Yugoslav-Americans to our national growth and development. They constitute a bridge of understanding, good will, and kinship between Yugoslavia and the United States, and let us expand that bridge.

As I close, I raise my glass in deepest appreciation to you in a toast to you, Mr. President, and to Yugoslav-American friendship.

#### **JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED AT BELGRADE AUGUST 4**

White House press release (Belgrade) dated August 4

At the invitation of the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, the President of the United States of America, Gerald R. Ford, and Mrs. Ford paid an official visit to Belgrade, Yugoslavia, on August 3 and 4, 1975.

Continuing the established practice of regular contacts and consultations between the presidents of the two countries, Presidents Tito and Ford held cordial, open and constructive talks on a wide range of issues of mutual interest.



Taking part in the talks were:

From the Yugoslav side, Dr. Vladimir Bakaric, Vice President of the SFRY Presidency; Edvard Kardelj, Member of the SFRY Presidency; Dzemal Bijedic, President of the Federal Executive Council; Milos Minic, Vice President of the Federal Executive Council and Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs; Dimce Belovski, member of the Council of the Federation; Lazar Mojsov, Deputy Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs; Toma Granfil, Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States; Aleksandar Sokorac, Chief of Cabinet of the President of the Republic; Nikola Milicevic, Assistant Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs; Andjelko Blazevic, Foreign Policy Adviser to the President of the Republic; Svetozar Starcevic, Director for the North American Department, Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs;

From the United States side, Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Laurence H. Silberman, United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia; Robert T. Hartmann, Counselor to the President; Ronald H. Nessen, Press Secretary to the President; Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Richard B. Cheney, Deputy Assistant to the President; Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State; Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Department of State.

The President of the Federal Executive Council, Dzemal Bijedic, called on President Ford and conducted talks with him on matters concerning bilateral cooperation.

Presidents Tito and Ford reiterated the particular importance which the governments of Yugoslavia and the United States of America attach to the maintenance of peace and stability by the peaceful settlement of disputes, and by adherence to the principles of independence, mutual respect and full equality of sovereign states, regardless of differences or similarities in their social, political and economic systems, and in full accord with the spirit and principles of the United Nations Charter.

President Ford's visit provided an occasion for a thorough review of bilateral relations which continue to develop successfully. President Tito and President Ford confirmed that the principles contained in the joint statement, issued in Washington in October 1971, represent the continuing basis for relations and cooperation between Yugoslavia and the United States of America. In conversations between President Ford and President Tito further stimulus was given to these relations. The two Presidents noted that additional progress has been achieved in cooperation in the economic area and agreed that possibilities exist for further mutually beneficial development of trade, investment and other contemporary forms of economic cooperation. Con-

crete ways to achieve expansion in this field were discussed.

The two Presidents once again emphasized the significant contribution of exchanges in the sphere of social and physical sciences, culture, education, information, etc., to the deepening of mutual understanding and respect and agreed to make efforts to further develop such exchanges.

President Ford greeted the readiness of the Yugoslav government to contribute to the celebration of the 200th anniversary of the United States of America through various cultural and artistic presentations.

The two Presidents emphasized the deep historical and cultural ties which exist between their countries, and especially the part which Americans of Yugoslav origin have long played in strengthening the bonds of friendship between their new and former homelands and agreed that these ties should be strengthened.

The two Presidents expressed their satisfaction over the recent conclusion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. They consider that the consistent implementation of the provisions of the final act which the signatory countries pledged themselves to fulfill, will contribute significantly to the achievement of the Conference's important goals and encourage further efforts to strengthen peace and security in Europe and to improve political, economic and other relations among states and peoples.

President Tito and President Ford emphasized that the interdependence of all peoples and countries, developed and developing, is an essential factor in the search for a just and effective economic development. Reviewing the urgent problems facing mankind in the area of international economic relations, they agreed on the need to increase their efforts to find equitable solutions on the basis of improved international cooperation and respect for the interests of all.

The two Presidents reviewed a number of other important international problems, including the situation in the Middle East, the Mediterranean, Cyprus and the questions of disarmament.

President Tito particularly presented views on the importance of the policy of nonalignment in today's world. He also emphasized the significance of United States policies in international affairs. President Ford set forth United States positions on various matters including the significance of the Yugoslav policy of nonalignment in international affairs.

President Ford reaffirmed the steadfast interest of the United States and its support for the independence, integrity, and nonaligned position of Yugoslavia.

The two Presidents on this occasion reaffirmed the importance of periodic contacts and consultations at various levels in fields of mutual interest.

The principles set forth in this joint statement are

the foundation of United States-Yugoslav relations. They constitute the firm basis on which the friendly relations of the two countries will be conducted in the future.

#### **ARRIVAL STATEMENT, ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE, AUGUST 4<sup>8</sup>**

I am, of course, very glad to be home, but I am also very glad that I went to Europe. By representing the United States of America at the 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe at Helsinki, I was able to deliver in person a message of enormous significance to all Europeans.

That message was: America still cares. The torch in the Statue of Liberty still burns bright. We will stand for freedom and independence in 1976 as we did in 1776. The United States of America still believes that all men and women everywhere should enjoy the God-given blessings of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness in a world of peace.

The reception that I received from the peoples of the five countries I visited—West Germany, Poland, Finland, Romania, and Yugoslavia—was not a tribute to me so much as to the ideals and the continuing leadership of the United States in the worldwide effort for peace, progress, and prosperity for all nations.

That an American President could receive such warm and hospitable welcomes in the countries of Eastern Europe shows that the

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<sup>8</sup> As prepared for delivery; because of inclement weather, President Ford did not deliver the statement (text from White House press release).

message I brought to Helsinki came through loud and clear.

And we will continue to encourage the full implementation of the principles embodied in the CSCE declarations until the 1977 followup meeting to assess how well all the signatory states have translated these principles into concrete action for the benefit of their peoples and the common progress in Europe.

Europeans—East and West—will also be watching. If the principles of Helsinki are lived up to, as each leader solemnly pledged, then we can consider the conference a success in which we have played a significant part.

My reception in the Federal Republic of Germany and Finland and the personal talks that I was able to have with the leaders of our NATO allies and other governments were constructive and greatly gratifying. So were my discussions with General Secretary Brezhnev, which I am confident will lead to an accelerated disposition of some of the differences which existed before our meetings.

I believe we are on the right course and the course that offers the best hope for a better world. I will continue to steer that steady course, because this experience has further convinced me that millions of hopeful people, in all parts of Europe, still look to the United States of America as the champion of human freedom everywhere and of a just peace among the nations of the world.

I repeat: I am glad that I went; I am happy to be back.

## President Ford Interviewed for Public Television

*Following is an excerpt relating to foreign policy from the transcript of an interview with President Ford by Martin Agronsky and Paul Duke which was taped at the White House on August 7 and broadcast on Public Broadcasting Service stations that evening.<sup>1</sup>*

*Mr. Duke: . . . your trip to Helsinki has encountered a substantial degree of hostility in this country, as you perhaps well know, and rightly or wrongly some people are suggesting that the Russians were the winners at Helsinki and we were the losers. What is your response to that criticism?*

*President Ford:* I think that is a completely inaccurate interpretation concerning the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] Conference in Helsinki. I think it is a judgment some people make, but I thoroughly disagree with it.

Let me just put this in perspective, if I might. We predicated many of the decisions involving borders on what? Peace treaties signed by all of the countries in the 1940's and in subsequent years. No border was agreed to in Helsinki that wasn't previously agreed to by previous American Presidents or by previous governments in other countries.

We provided in that Helsinki agreement for peaceful change of borders. We made it far less likely that there will be military intervention by one country against another.

What we have really done is to make it possible for people in the East as well as in the West in Europe to communicate, to re-establish family relationships. We made it possible, if the agreement is lived up to.

*Mr. Agronsky: If the agreement is lived up to?*

*President Ford:* I will come to that in a minute, Martin.

We have made it possible for the news media to have greater freedom in all of the 35 countries.

Now, the question you ask is a very good one. Will the agreement be maintained? In my speech before the conference, I said, on paper this is good. We have two years between now and the next meeting in 1977, and the test will be, have all 35 countries lived up to the agreement? It offers a hope. The reality will depend upon the execution.

I happen to believe that world pressure will force all countries, Communist countries and other countries, to live up to the agreement.

*Mr. Duke: But let's just take one example, Mr. President. You talk about a peaceful change in borders being in the agreement. Now realistically speaking, do you think that the Russians would give up the Baltic territory which they took over at the end of World War II? Do you think they would give up the Eastern European countries? Do you think that they would negotiate to give back these countries their independence?*

*President Ford:* Let me put it the other way around. If we had not gone to Helsinki do you think the Russians would have permitted any of the things you are talking about? In Helsinki, they at least signed an agreement that says you can change borders by peaceful means.

*Mr. Duke: But does it mean anything, Mr. President?*

*President Ford:* Well, they have signed something that says you can change borders by peaceful means. Prior to Helsinki, there was no such agreement.

<sup>1</sup> For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Aug. 11, 1975, p. 838.

*Mr. Agronsky: Mr. President, you used a very good phrase at Helsinki. You said, "Peace is not a piece of paper," a very memorable phrase, and it conveys this idea that we are talking about now. Many of your critics—and let's take it all of the way from Solzhenitsyn to George Ball, a former Under Secretary of State—have voiced concern about legitimizing what, for example, George Ball calls the Soviet stolen empire, and asks, how do you reconcile that with Western ideals? The point Ball makes, the point Solzhenitsyn makes: that it is our obligation to follow policy that is more concerned with morality and principle than the acceptance of these borders would indicate.*

*President Ford: Well, Martin, I go back to the peace treaties of Yalta and Paris and Potsdam and the agreement by the Germans themselves to establish those borders. Those were peace treaties that established borders for all of Eastern Europe and all of Western Europe. Those are factual things done in the forties, the fifties, et cetera.*

*The Conference on European Security and Cooperation didn't change any of those; but it did say—and every one of the nations did sign something, that is different—that there can be peaceful adjustments of borders.*

*Mr. Duke: But despite what you are now saying, Mr. President, there is in this country, as you well know, a rising amount of criticism about détente itself, people questioning the value of détente. What is your feeling about this criticism, and do you think this is endangering détente?*

*President Ford: I hope it is not endangering détente, because I think there are many pluses to us and, yes, to the Soviet Union. It has to be a two-way street.*

*I believe that SALT One was an outgrowth of détente. Does anybody want to tear up SALT One? I don't think so. Anything that puts a lid or a limitation on the development of nuclear weapons, the expansion of nuclear weapons, any agreement that puts a lid or controls, that is good. So, détente helped achieve SALT One.*

*Détente may help—I hope it will—SALT Two, where we will put an actual cap on*

*nuclear weapons and other nuclear weapons systems.*

*Mr. Agronsky: One of the happiest dividends that détente could possibly produce would be a reduction of forces by the Soviet Union as well as the Western allies in Western Europe.*

*President Ford: I agree.*

*Mr. Agronsky: Was that raised at Helsinki? Did you get anywhere at all with that with Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]?*

*President Ford: As you know, historically, when CSCE was originally agreed to as a program, it was also agreed to that there would be negotiations for mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe—MBFR. Those negotiations have been going on now for about two years. They are presently stalled; but now that we have the Helsinki agreement, it is my judgment that we have opened up encouraging prospects for additional movement in the MBFR negotiations.*

*I think the allies and the West are getting together for perhaps a new position. I believe that the Soviet Union and its allies are taking a look at the current stalemated negotiations and may come up with some agreement.*

*The prospects for a mutual and balanced force reduction in Europe have been enhanced by the Helsinki agreement—no question about that whatsoever.*

*Mr. Duke: Well, Mr. President, to go back to SALT One for a moment, you said at a recent news conference that according to your investigation the Russians had not cheated on the agreement limiting the use of certain strategic weapons. Your old friend Melvin Laird had written an article suggesting they had cheated. Since then, you have talked to Mr. Laird. Have you changed your mind about what you said earlier?*

*President Ford: I naturally investigated the allegations that were made by a number of people, including Mel. And after a thorough investigation, I have come to the conclusion that a person might legitimately make the charge there had been violations,*

but on complete and total investigation I think any person who knew the facts as I know them would agree that there had been no violations of any consequence.

There are some ambiguities—I want to be frank about it—but all of the responsible, knowledgeable people in the Pentagon or in any of the other responsible agencies would agree with me there have been no serious violations, and any that have been called to their attention have been stopped.

*Mr. Duke: But you are suggesting there have been some infractions, then?*

*President Ford:* Very minor, but we have what we call a consultative group where if we think they are violating something we make that point. It is investigated, and, in the cases where there was any instance that might be an honest charge of a violation, they have been stopped.

The Soviet Union has raised some questions about certain activities that we have undertaken, and we have investigated them. And I think that arrangement of the consultative group has been very effective in making sure that SALT One was lived up to.

*Mr. Duke: Let me turn now to the Middle East, Mr. President.*

*Mr. Agronsky: You beat me to it.*

*Mr. Duke: We have had intensive negotiations going on now for about two months to try to get a peace treaty moving in this area. What is the prospect?*

*President Ford:* They are better today than they were yesterday, and they are a lot better today than they were last March when the negotiations unfortunately broke off.

*Mr. Duke: Does this mean you are increasingly optimistic?*

*President Ford:* I am optimistic on an increasing basis, but I have learned that until it is signed in black and white that I shouldn't predict that it will be finalized.

*Mr. Agronsky: Let me ask you—*

*Mr. Duke: Pardon me, Martin. I want to just ask you one more question in this area. Do you find the Russians are now less trou-*

*blesome in the Middle East in the efforts to achieve a peace agreement?*

*President Ford:* They have acted in a very responsible way, during my time, in the Middle East.

Let me just turn to the question of these negotiations that are going on between Israel on the one hand and Egypt on the other. Both of those countries have to understand that flexibility at this crucial time is important for the peace of that area of the world and possibly peace in the world. Israel has to be more flexible; I think Egypt has to respond. If there isn't movement in the Middle East right now, the potential for war is increased significantly. And a war in the Middle East today has broader potential ramification than any time in the past, and we have had four wars in the Middle East since 1946 or 1947.

A fifth one not only means that Israel will be fighting the Arabs, but the potential of a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union is a possibility.

*Mr. Agronsky: You must have raised that with Brezhnev. How did he react to it?*

*President Ford:* We talked about the Middle East. We told them, or I told him, what we were doing. Secretary Kissinger had had a previous meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko.

I repeat what I said a moment ago, Martin—the Soviet Union has acted in a very responsible way. I think they understand the potential consequences of no progress for continued peace and understanding in the Middle East.

*Mr. Duke: What do you see, sir, as our future policy toward South Viet-Nam? Do you think that we will recognize that Communist regime in the foreseeable future?*

*President Ford:* Their current actions certainly do not convince me that we should recognize South Viet-Nam or North Viet-Nam.

*Mr. Duke: What about their application to get into the U.N. General Assembly?*

*President Ford:* We have taken a very strong stand that we would not agree to the

admission of South or North Viet-Nam unless and until South Korea is admitted. We believe in universality across the board. We don't believe in kicking nations out—kicking Israel out, for example. We think that would be bad policy.

*Mr. Agronsky: Did Mr. Brezhnev say he agreed with you on that, they were supporting that movement?*

*President Ford:* We let it be known very, very strongly that we believe Israel should be permitted to be a member of the United Nations. That is our position. But on the other hand, we also believe that if you believe in universality, which includes South and North Viet-Nam, you have to have South Korea.

*Mr. Duke: Mr. President, when you first took office, you obviously relied a great deal upon Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Do you now make more of the decisions on your own? Do you rely less upon Mr. Kissinger?*

*President Ford:* I am not going to get into that discussion. Henry Kissinger and I have the closest possible rapport, personally and professionally. I see him every day for roughly an hour. We talk about the Middle East. We talk about SALT. We talk about our total foreign policy. It's a good relationship. It has been from the very first day. It is now. And I expect it to continue in the future. And I don't want to get into whether I do more or do less. We are a good team, and I think we have made some good decisions.

*Mr. Duke: Are you aware, Mr. President, of the criticism at the Capitol—*

*President Ford:* Oh, sure.

*Mr. Duke: —from Republicans and not just Democrats, that in the Turkish aid fight, for example, that Mr. Kissinger was responsible for your losing that battle to lift the ban against military aid?*

*President Ford:* I have heard those arguments, but I don't think they are valid. I think the Congress, or the House of Representatives in this case, made the most serious wrong decision since I have been in Washington, which is 27 years. The Congress

was totally wrong—or the House of Representatives. Why do I say that? First, they haven't solved the Cyprus problem. Number two, they have weakened NATO. Number three, because of the Turkish aid embargo, they have lessened our own national security capability by preventing us from using intelligence-gathering installations in Turkey.

*Mr. Duke: Are you saying Congress is harming our foreign policy?*

*President Ford:* There is no question about it. The decision of the House of Representatives to continue the Turkish arms embargo has seriously jeopardized our foreign policy and undercuts in a significant way our own national security, including that of NATO, and it hasn't solved—it has not solved the Cyprus problem.

*Mr. Agronsky: Mr. President, doesn't there have to be a concern for law? There was a law that said that aid that was given to Turkey could not be used as it was used against Cyprus.*

*President Ford:* We have lived up to the law. We have stopped, because Congress told us to, the shipment of military hardware that the Turks bought and paid for. And, incidentally, they bought and paid for the hardware, and because of congressional action the Turks are now being charged warehouse storage fees for equipment that they own that Congress said they couldn't get.

But anyhow, aside from that, which is, I think, a ridiculous development, we have lived up to the law. We are not sending them any military hardware and unfortunately the net result is what I told you.

But, Martin, I think you have to recollect a little bit. Who started the problem in Cyprus? It was the Greek Government, it was the previous Greek Government that tried to throw Makarios out and assassinate him and the previous Greek Government wanted to move in with Greek troops and take over Cyprus. And as a result of Greek violations, the Turks moved in and have, unfortunately, dominated the situation. But the whole program, or the whole problem, arose by the unwise action of the previous Greek Government.

## Prime Minister Miki of Japan Visits the United States

*Prime Minister Takeo Miki of Japan made an official visit to the United States August 2-10. He met with President Ford and other government officials at Washington August 5-6. Following are prepared texts of toasts exchanged by President Ford and Prime Minister Miki at a working dinner at the White House on August 5 and the texts of a U.S.-Japan joint announcement to the press and a joint statement by President Ford and Prime Minister Miki issued on August 6.*

### EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, AUGUST 5

#### President Ford <sup>1</sup>

Mr. Prime Minister: In the last 40 years, you have visited this country in many capacities—as a student, as a private citizen, as a representative of your government, as a statesman—but always as a good friend. Ten years ago, you came as Foreign Minister. We met two years ago when you visited Washington as Deputy Prime Minister. Today, I am honored to greet you as the Prime Minister of your great nation.

Mr. Prime Minister, you and I have participated in public life for many years. We appreciate the transformation in Japanese-American relations of the last 30 years. We understand the immense benefits our two peoples enjoy because of this very close friendship. The keystone of this relationship is a sound security accord. The United States remains firmly committed to the alliance with Japan—an undertaking we could not value more highly.

It is significant that your first trip abroad as Prime Minister is to the United States, just as my first overseas visit as President

was to Japan. These priorities reflect the order and standing of Japanese-American relations. They confirm our growing cooperation, which is basic to our respective foreign policies. Our visits accentuate the interdependence of our countries and the extent to which the security and prosperity of our two peoples have become interwoven in the second half of the 20th century.

Mr. Prime Minister, your visit provides a timely opportunity for us to review our cooperative efforts to deal with vital matters—food and energy, trade and development. Such issues will be the major focus of international relations for many years and perhaps for the remainder of this century.

The United States has admiration and respect for Japan's constructive contributions to the search for solutions to the world's economic and political problems. It is imperative that we continue working together. We can report to our peoples that our bilateral relations are respectfully intimate and remarkably free of trouble. We are approaching new international challenges with a growing knowledge of the underlying issues and with creative and responsive programs.

In your policy speech to the Diet in January, you said the whole of mankind shares a common fate aboard the ship called Earth. I agree completely. I would like Japanese-American relations to provide a pattern of cooperation for all countries. Mr. Prime Minister, Americans look forward with pleasant anticipation to the visit this fall of Their Imperial Majesties the Emperor and Empress. Our citizens will extend a warm welcome. I am convinced that the visit of Their Majesties will lend a new dimension to our relations. Mr. Prime Minister, I sincerely hope your visit with us will be as productive for you as my trip to Japan last year was for me.

<sup>1</sup> As prepared for delivery (text from White House press release).

Gentlemen, will you join me in a toast to His Imperial Majesty, to you, Mr. Prime Minister, to the people of Japan, to continued close cooperation between our two great countries.

**Prime Minister Miki<sup>2</sup>**

Mr. President, distinguished guests: I wish to express my heartfelt appreciation for the warm welcome extended to me and my party by you, Mr. President, and for the kind consideration of so many others in your government and of the American people.

When I met with you, Mr. President, in January of last year, you were Vice President and I was Deputy Prime Minister. To be honest, I could not anticipate at the time that our next round of talks would become a summit.

Since our very first meeting I, as a fellow parliamentarian, have felt a deep empathy with you for your devotion to harmony rather than confrontation in the conduct of public affairs. In my lengthy career as a parliamentarian, long before taking up the duties of Prime Minister, I too have consistently adhered to the principles of dialogue and reconciliation, rejecting violence and lawlessness.

Thus I sadly regret the persistence of movements which employ violence to impose their views on others. I yearn for the day when differences of opinion are reconciled by peaceful means, on the basis of mutual understanding and trust among human beings.

The unshakable friendship and mutual trust between our two peoples and the harmony of purposes we share as nations—these, Mr. President, are a great force for good in the world.

It is indeed our responsibility as heads of governments to protect, serve and advance the interests of our own peoples. Yet the goals we pursue together—world peace, stability, orderly economic progress, and the advancement of human dignity and toler-

<sup>2</sup> As prepared for delivery (text furnished by Embassy of Japan).

ance—these goals are also in the interests of all other peoples.

Believing this deeply, and in my heart, I truly welcome the great adventures and responsibilities which lie before us as Japan and the United States together work in permanent friendship to build a peaceful and better future for all mankind.

Mr. President, I ask all your guests to join me in toasting your health and the vigor and prosperity of the United States of America.

**JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT, AUGUST 6**

White House press release dated August 6

**U.S.-JAPAN JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PRESS  
FOLLOWING THE MEETINGS OF PRESIDENT GERALD  
R. FORD AND PRIME MINISTER TAKEO MIKI,  
AUGUST 6, 1975**

1. Prime Minister Miki and President Ford met in Washington August 5 and 6 for a comprehensive review of various subjects of mutual interest. The discussions between the two leaders, in which Minister for Foreign Affairs Miyazawa and Secretary of State Kissinger participated, were conducted in an informal and cordial atmosphere. Their meetings were productive and reflected the strength and breadth of the existing friendship between Japan and the United States.

2. The Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed the basic principles and common purposes underlying relations between Japan and the United States as set forth in the Joint Communiqué of November 20, 1974, on the occasion of the President's visit to Japan. In so doing, the Prime Minister and the President noted that Japan and the United States, while sharing basic values and ideals, differ in their national characteristics and the circumstances in which they are placed; and yet the two nations, acting together, have drawn upon the strengths inherent in such diversity to build a mature, mutually beneficial and complementary relationship.

They emphasized the fundamental importance in that relationship of constructive and creative cooperation between the two countries toward the shared goals of world peace and prosperity. Expressing satisfaction with the open and frank dialogue which has developed between the two Governments, they pledged to maintain and strengthen this consultation. To this end, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State will review twice a year bilateral and global matters of common concern.



3. The Prime Minister and the President discussed developments in Asia following the end of armed conflict in Indochina. The President, recognizing the importance of Asia for world peace and progress, reaffirmed that the United States would continue to play an active and positive role in that region and would continue to uphold its treaty commitments there. The Prime Minister and the President welcomed the efforts being made by many nations in Asia to strengthen their political, economic and social bases. They stated that Japan and the United States were prepared to continue to extend assistance and cooperation in support of these efforts. They agreed that the security of the Republic of Korea is essential to the maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula, which in turn is necessary for peace and security in East Asia, including Japan. They noted the importance of the existing security arrangements for maintaining and preserving that peace. At the same time they strongly expressed the hope that the dialogue between the South and North would proceed in order to ease tensions and eventually to achieve peaceful unification. In connection with the Korean question in the United Nations, the Prime Minister and the President expressed the hope that all concerned would recognize the importance of maintaining a structure which would preserve the armistice now in effect.

4. The Prime Minister and the President expressed their conviction that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States has greatly contributed to the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East and is an indispensable element of the basic international political structure in Asia, and that the continued maintenance of the Treaty serves the long-term interests of both countries. Further, they recognized that the United States nuclear deterrent is an important contributor to the security of Japan. In this connection, the President reassured the Prime Minister that the United States would continue to abide by its defense commitment to Japan under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in the event of armed attack against Japan, whether by nuclear or conventional forces. The Prime Minister stated that Japan would continue to carry out its obligations under the Treaty. The Prime Minister and the President recognized the desirability of still closer consultations for the smooth and effective implementation of the Treaty. They agreed that the authorities concerned of the two countries would conduct consultations within the framework of the Security Consultative Committee on measures to be taken in cooperation by the two countries.

5. The Prime Minister and the President discussed various international issues of common concern. The President noted that the United States would con-

tinue to seek an early conclusion to negotiations of the second agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic arms. The Prime Minister and the President expressed their strong hope that prompt progress be made through current efforts toward a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

6. The Prime Minister and the President expressed their concern over the recent trend toward nuclear proliferation in the world, and agreed that Japan and the United States should participate positively in international efforts for the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the development of adequate safeguards. They emphasized that all nuclear-weapon states should contribute constructively in the areas of nuclear arms limitation, the security of non-nuclear weapon states, and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Prime Minister expressed his intention to proceed with the necessary steps to bring about Japan's ratification of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty at the earliest possible opportunity.

7. In light of the increasing economic interdependence of the nations of the world, the Prime Minister and the President agreed that Japan and the United States share a special responsibility toward the development of a stable and balanced world economy. They agreed that the two countries would work in close consultation toward the resolution in a manner beneficial to all nations of problems relating to the general condition of the world economy, international finance, trade, energy, and cooperation between developed and developing nations. They noted with satisfaction that trade and investment relations between the two countries are expanding in a steady and mutually beneficial manner.

8. Observing the importance of free and expanding trade to the world economy, the Prime Minister and the President emphasized the need for an open international trading system, and affirmed that Japan and the United States would continue to play a positive and constructive role in the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations currently underway in Geneva within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

9. Recognizing that there remain elements of instability in the world energy situation, the Prime Minister and the President expressed their satisfaction with the progress thus far achieved in cooperation among consumer nations.

They agreed to maintain and strengthen cooperation between Japan and the United States in this field and in the development of their respective national energy efforts. Agreeing that mutual understanding and cooperation among all nations is fundamental to the solution of the international energy problem, they noted the urgent need for the develop-

ment of harmonious relations between oil producing and consuming nations. In this connection, they welcomed steps now being taken to resume the dialogue between oil producer and consumer nations, and expressed their determination that the two countries should further strengthen and coordinate their cooperative efforts for that purpose.

10. Noting the desirability of establishing adequate supply and distribution to meet the world's growing demand for food, the Prime Minister and the President agreed upon the importance of cooperation in agricultural development assistance to promote the food production capabilities of developing countries. The President further noted the need for the early establishment of an internationally coordinated system of nationally-held grain reserves. The Prime Minister stressed the need for a steady expansion of trade in agricultural products through cooperation between exporting and importing countries to their mutual benefit. The Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed the interest of the two countries in maintaining and strengthening the mutually beneficial agricultural trade between them.

11. Noting the need to assist the efforts of the developing countries to promote their own economic development and to meet the human aspirations of their peoples, the Prime Minister and the President agreed upon the importance of increased cooperation, both between Japan and the United States and with the developing countries, in such areas as development assistance and trade, including that of primary commodities.

12. The Prime Minister and the President expressed appreciation for the achievements recorded during the past decade by existing bilateral cooperative programs in the fields of medicine, science, and technology, and for the work underway in the panel for the review of Japan/U.S. Scientific and Technological Cooperation. They declared their satisfaction at the signing on August 5 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State of a new agreement between the two countries for cooperation in environmental protection. They recognized further that the promotion of mutual understanding through cultural and educational exchange is of basic importance to the strengthening of friendly relations between the Japanese and American peoples. In this regard, the Prime Minister expressed his intention of continuing to expand such exchange in addition to the promotion of Japanese studies in the United States and other projects thus far carried out by Japan, notably through the Japan Foundation. Welcoming the Prime Minister's statement, the President expressed his intention to continue his efforts to make expanded resources

available for further promoting cultural and educational exchange with Japan.

13. The Prime Minister conveyed on behalf of the people of Japan sincere congratulations to the people of the United States as they celebrate the 200th anniversary of their independence in the coming year. The President thanked the Prime Minister for these sentiments and expressed the deepest appreciation of the American people.

## JOINT STATEMENT, AUGUST 6

White House press release dated August 6

### JOINT STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD AND PRIME MINISTER TAKEO MIKI, AUGUST 6, 1975

The Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the United States, recognizing that the Japanese and American peoples share fundamental democratic values and are joined together by ties of mutual trust and cooperation, affirm that their two nations will continue to work together to build a more open and free international community, and state as follows:

—A more stable and peaceful world order requires the acceptance by all nations of certain principles of international conduct, and the establishment of a creative international dialogue—transcending differences of ideology, tradition or stages of development.

—Those principles must include respect for the sovereignty of all nations, recognition of the legitimate interests of others, attitudes of mutual respect in international dealings, determination to seek the peaceful resolution of differences among nations, and firm commitment to social justice and economic progress around the globe.

—Japan and the United States pledge to support these principles, and to nurture a dialogue among nations which reflects them. They will expand and strengthen their cooperation in many fields of joint endeavor. Recognizing that equitable and durable peace in Asia is essential to that of the entire world, Japan and the United States will extend every support to efforts of the countries of the region to consolidate such a peace.

—International economic and social relations should promote the prosperity of all peoples and aspirations and creativity of individuals and nations. The interests of developed as well as developing countries, and of consumers as well as producers of raw materials, must be accommodated in a manner which advances the well being of all and brings closer the goal of social and economic justice.

—In a world made small by science and technology, as well as by trade and communications, interdependence among nations has become a reality affecting the lives and welfare of all peoples. International economic institutions and systems must function in a manner reflecting that interdependence and promoting a cooperative rather than a confrontational approach to economic issues.

—The suffering caused by disease and hunger is a most serious and poignant impediment to a humane international economic and social order. The financial, educational and technological resources of developed countries give them a special responsibility for the alleviation of these conditions. It is imperative that there be an increasingly effective sharing of knowledge, resources and organizational skill among all countries to hasten the day when these scourges will be eliminated from the earth. In these endeavors also, Japan and the United States will contribute fully.

## **U.S.-Japan Environmental Agreement Signed at Washington**

### **DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT, JULY 31**

The Department of State announced on July 31 (press release 391) that the recently negotiated U.S.-Japan environmental agreement would be signed by Secretary Kissinger and Japanese Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa in a ceremony at the Department of State on August 5, in the presence of Prime Minister Miki of Japan.

This agreement aims at strengthening cooperation between the two countries in environmental protection through sponsorship of agreed cooperative projects, meetings, and visits as well as through an exchange of information. Coordination and review of these activities will reside with a joint planning and coordination committee which is scheduled to meet at ministerial level, as a rule once a year.

Nine major project areas have been selected for the initial activities under the agreement. These include photochemical smog, air-pollution-related meteorology,

automobile pollution control, solid waste management, sewage treatment technology, health effects of pollutants, management of bottom sediments containing toxic pollutants, environmental impact assessment, and identification and control of toxic substances. In all these areas Japanese and American cochairmen have been designated, and they have initiated correspondence to discuss specific areas of interest and set meeting dates. Work has already begun in some projects, and plans have been made for a conference in Cincinnati in October on sewage treatment technology and one in Tokyo in late November covering two areas, photochemical smog and air-pollution-related meteorology.

### **REMARKS AT SIGNING CEREMONY, AUGUST 5**

Press release 404 dated August 6

#### **Secretary Kissinger**

Mr. Foreign Minister, Mr. Prime Minister: We are very pleased on the occasion of this very fortuitous visit to be able to sign this agreement on the protection of the environment.

Our two nations have a very special relationship in very many fields, and our two nations also have a very special obligation in many fields. We are two great industrial countries, and we are interdependent in many important respects.

Both of us face the problem of how man can realize his interdependence and make progress without at the same time despoiling the environment in which he lives and making all the advancements in science and technology a detriment rather than a benefit.

Our two nations, representing such a large part of the most advanced technological output of the world, can set an example for other countries of how we can deal with this problem.

And I am particularly happy that we can

sign this agreement today when our old friend the Prime Minister is visiting us for the first time, because, as Minister of Environmental Affairs in the Government of Japan, he played such a distinguished role in the negotiations with Mr. Train [Russell E. Train, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency] and other American officials in bringing this document into effect.

Over three centuries ago the Japanese writer Kaibara Ekken described the inter-relationship of man and his environment. He was an avid amateur botanist, and he wrote:

All men in the world are children of nature and nature is the greatest parent of us all. Man should not, even in ignorance, oppose the way of nature or commit outrage against it. Nor should he waste, to gratify personal desire, the bounties that nature has provided.

For too long we have acted in ignorance, committed outrages against our environment, and wasted its bounties. With this agreement today, we take a small step toward the path set forth for us by this Japanese writer so long ago.

#### Foreign Minister Miyazawa

Mr. Prime Minister, Mr. Secretary of State, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency: It is indeed a great pleasure and privilege for me to sign today the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection.

This agreement symbolizes the beginning of a new field of formal cooperation in a broad cooperative relationship. Environmental problems are one of the most important questions which many countries of the world, particularly advanced industrial countries, are now facing; and international cooperation is no doubt a useful means to cope with them.

I sincerely hope that the cooperation which has been successfully carried out in the past will be expanded and strengthened, on the basis of this agreement we have now signed, in the future. In concluding my remarks, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to those who worked for the conclusion of this agreement.

## United States Extends Recognition to Sao Tome and Principe

*Following is the text of a letter dated July 12 from President Ford to President Manuel Pinto da Costa of the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am pleased to inform you that, as Sao Tome and Principe obtains its independence, the United States Government is extending recognition. With your agreement, it is our hope that diplomatic relations can be established between our countries and that the United States Ambassador to Gabon can be accredited as Ambassador to your country. Although he would reside in Gabon, he would maintain close contact with your Government.

I am confident that the friendship between our two countries will grow closer in the years ahead. You may be sure that we are in sympathy with your aspirations for the economic development of the islands and for the improved progress and welfare of your people.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, July 12, 1975.

## Eighth Round of U.S.-Spain Talks Held at Washington

*Joint U.S.-Spain Communiqué<sup>1</sup>*

The eighth round of negotiations between Spain and the United States took place in Washington from July 21 to July 23. As in earlier rounds, the Spanish delegation was led by Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs Juan Jose Rovira, and the American delegation was led by Ambassador-at-Large Robert J. McCloskey. The Ambassador of Spain in Washington, His Excellency Jaime Alba, participated as a member of the Spanish delegation.

The two delegations continued their work

<sup>1</sup> Issued on July 23 (text from press release 385).

on the key aspects of the defense relationship between the two countries. The two delegation heads also discussed in private these and other matters, including the progress being made by working groups acting under their direction.

The Committee on Military Matters, one of the working groups, reviewed in detail a presentation made by the Spanish delegation at the previous round regarding Spain's plans for the modernization of its armed forces. Special technical questions regarding proposed implementing annexes to the eventual agreement were considered by another group of experts.

In the interest of further facilitating progress, it was agreed that work at the expert level would continue in the interval before the next negotiating round, and it is expected that a group on taxes and customs will meet in Madrid on August 4.

The delegations agreed to hold the ninth round of negotiations in Madrid on August 18.

## Amendments to IMCO Convention Transmitted to the Senate

*Message From President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Senate of the United States:*

I transmit herewith for the advice and consent of the Senate amendments to articles 10, 16, 17, 18, 20, 28, 31 and 32 of the Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), which were adopted on October 17, 1974, by the Assembly of IMCO at its fifth extraordinary session held at London from October 16 to 18, 1974.

These amendments enlarge the membership of the IMCO Council from eighteen to twenty-four, insure equitable geographic representation of member States on the Council, and open participation on the Mari-

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on July 10 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. F., 94th Cong., 1st sess., which includes the texts of the amendments and the report of the Department of State.

time Safety Committee to all members of the Organization.

I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Department of State with respect to the amendments.

Support for these amendments will contribute to the United States' demonstrated interest in facilitating cooperation among maritime nations. To that end, I urge that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to these amendments and give its advice and consent to their acceptance.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *July 10, 1975.*

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal September 23, 1971. Entered into force January 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.

*Ratification deposited:* Romania (with a reservation), August 19, 1975.

##### Customs

Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation Council, with annex. Done at Brussels December 15, 1950. Entered into force November 4, 1952; for the United States November 5, 1970. TIAS 7063.

*Accession deposited:* Singapore, July 9, 1975.

##### Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna February 21, 1971.<sup>1</sup>

*Accession deposited:* Jordan, August 8, 1975.

##### Property—Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923, 7727.

*Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification of articles 1 through 12 deposited: Finland, July 21, 1975.*

### Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York December 21, 1965. Entered into force January 4, 1969.<sup>2</sup>

*Ratification deposited: Belgium, August 7, 1975.*

### Space

Convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force September 1, 1972; for the United States October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762.

*Ratification deposited: Singapore, August 19, 1975.*

### Terrorism—Protection of Diplomats

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited: Mongolia, August 8, 1975.*

### Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. *Ratification deposited: Israel, August 21, 1975.*

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force for the United States.

### Correction

The editor of the BULLETIN wishes to call attention to the following error which appears in the July 28 issue:

*p. 140, col. 1: The sixth line of the second paragraph of the statement should read: "Pioneer 11, which last December swept past".*

### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: August 18–24

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

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*414	8/18	U.S. National Committee for the International Radio Consultative Committee Study Groups 10 and 11, Sept. 16.
*415	8/18	U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, Sept. 24.
*416	8/18	Foreign journalists begin work-study tour of U.S.
*417	8/18	Shipping Coordinating Committee, Sept. 11.
*418	8/19	ABA Young Lawyers initiate legal services hotline for Vietnam refugees.
*419	8/19	Secretary's Advisory Committee on Private International Law, Study Group on Maritime Bills of Lading, Sept. 12.
*420	8/19	Secretary's Advisory Committee on Private International Law, Study Group on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, Cambridge, Mass., Sept. 13.
*421	8/19	Secretary's Advisory Committee on Private International Law, Sept. 19.
*422	8/21	American poet Clarence Major to attend Yugoslav festival.
†423	8/21	Kissinger: departure, Andrews AFB, Aug. 20.
†424	8/21	Kissinger, Allon: arrival, Jerusalem.
†426	8/22	Kissinger, Allon: statements following meeting, Jerusalem.
†427	8/22	Kissinger: arrival, Alexandria.
†428	8/22	Kissinger, Sadat: news conference, Alexandria.
†429	8/23	Kissinger, Fahmi: news conference, Alexandria.
†430	8/23	Kissinger: arrival, Damascus.
†431	8/23	Kissinger: departure, Damascus.
†432	8/24	Kissinger, Allon: questions and answers, Jerusalem.
†433	8/24	Kissinger, Allon: statements, Jerusalem.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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DEPOSITORY

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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## American Unity and the National Interest

*Address by Secretary Kissinger*<sup>1</sup>

Senator Sparkman [John J. Sparkman, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee], Senator Allen [James B. Allen], Mayor Seibels [George G. Seibels, Jr., Mayor of Birmingham], ladies and gentlemen: Let me thank you, first of all, for the warmth of this reception, which has been made possible by the persistence of your two Senators, which is as great as their abilities. I am pleased to be in a part of the country that has always stood for a strong America, an America that defends itself, its principles, and its friends.

Alabama's representatives in Washington—Senator Sparkman, Senator Allen, and Birmingham's own Congressman [John H.] Buchanan—have been supporters of a dynamic American foreign policy. They have been champions of that close relationship between the Congress and the executive which a purposeful foreign policy requires. They and the people of Alabama have understood that in this modern age America's safety and well-being are, to an unprecedented degree, bound up with our interests and responsibilities in the world.

I want to discuss with you today the basic elements of our foreign policy and why Americans can be proud of their nation's role in the world and confident of its future.

Since the first settlers sought refuge on this untamed continent, America has represented to all the world man's capacity to

shape his own destiny. And for the past 30 years global peace and prosperity have depended to an extraordinary degree on our efforts. When World War II ended, this country took the lead in helping Europe and Japan recover from devastation. We created institutions that have expanded trade and prosperity worldwide. We forged peacetime alliances with the major industrial democracies. We have maintained the balance of power; we have mediated conflict. We have fed the hungry, contributed to economic development, educated young men and women from other lands, and welcomed refugees from oppression to our shores.

No other nation has made such a contribution. No other nation can make such a contribution now. And today the age-old issues of war and peace, of maintaining stability and advancing human hopes, of preserving the peace and promoting progress, continue to summon a vigilant and purposeful America.

But Americans have a right to ask: The world may need us, but do we need the world? Do our policies abroad serve American interests and American ideals?

A look at our contemporary agenda leaves no doubt that peace for us is inseparable from global tranquillity and that our well-being is intimately bound up with the prosperity of the rest of the world.

—Never before in history have the weapons of war been so gigantic, so dangerous, and so unsuitable for the pursuit of political objectives. We have no more fundamental task than to maintain the strategic balance—for we otherwise risk our survival. We

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Southern Commodity Producers Conference at Birmingham, Ala., on Aug. 14 (text of the two introductory paragraphs from press release 411A; balance of address from press release 411).

have no more urgent obligation than to check the nuclear arms race—for we otherwise risk global holocaust.

—While in military terms the world is still bipolar, there are now many centers of economic power and political initiative. Clearly, political, military, and economic power are no longer synonymous. Of the democratic nations, only the United States is strong in every field. Thus our responsibilities are inescapable. Whether this country acts or fails to act has profound consequences.

—While the world has been free of war on a global scale for more than a generation, regional and local conflicts still abound. Unless they are resolved through diplomacy they pose grave risks to the general peace. We have seen all too clearly that conflict in the Middle East threatens confrontation between the superpowers and economic dislocation for all nations.

—The ever-present danger of local conflict takes on a more ominous dimension as we face the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If we do not halt their spread, nuclear war will become ever more possible and the risks of theft, accident, and blackmail will multiply. Should the United States withdraw from its security commitments, this process would accelerate, for nations which now rely on us may feel compelled to develop their own nuclear weapons.

—Events have proved that industrial and developing nations are part of a single international economic system on which the prosperity of all depends. The supply and price of energy, the availability of food and other vital raw materials, the strength of currencies, and the flow of trade are all vital for a healthy and productive American economy.

Much depends upon this generation of Americans. Because of our size, our strength, our traditions, America is a leader among nations whether we like it or not. We cannot always assure our preferred solutions, but few solutions are possible without our coop-

eration. If we do not care about global stability, if we do not help resist aggression if we do not work for a more equitable and productive world economy, if we do not promote liberty and justice, no nation will take our place—at least no nation that believes in our values. Force and the threat of force would become the rule of the day, and mankind's material and spiritual fortunes would be dealt grave blows. Ultimately we would pay the price ourselves.

Other nations must do more, but this nation must continue to do its share. We still have a unique and irreplaceable contribution to make to a world of peace and prosperity and justice. Our leadership remains needed to mobilize friends and allies to organize a wider international cooperation.

We have the advantage of the boundless assets with which this country is blessed: our industrial strength and agricultural productivity, the sinews of military power, and the talent of a free people.

But these will serve us little without unity and common purpose. We must know what we want for America, and we must be willing to defend and to promote it. We must avoid extremes of bellicosity followed by extremes of abdication. We need a steady course that our people can understand, which gives courage to our allies and pause to our adversaries. In this period of global change—when the simple categories of the immediate postwar period no longer match the complex realities of the modern world—dialogue, public support, and confidence are needed more than ever before.

The citizens of this country have met this challenge. Your sense of responsibility has sustained an enlightened American participation in the world. You knew that America could not thrive in isolation; you understood that our values deserved to be defended and promoted; you realized that the basic decency and generosity of the American people made our leadership not a matter of arrogant pride but a contribution to the well-being of mankind.

Today the issues that rent our unity in the

past decade are behind us. The resilience of our national spirit is being demonstrated anew. We can move forward together with confidence to face the great challenges of our time.

Let me now discuss the challenges we face and how we plan to meet them.

First, we have maintained and improved our national defense. Peace requires an equilibrium of power, and this government will maintain it. No great nation leaves its safety to the mercy or the good will of others. Any realistic hope of better relations with the Communist powers—and there is such hope—depends on a strong America which leaves other countries no realistic course except restraint and cooperation. So long as potential adversaries continue to expand and improve their forces, we will maintain a defense that cannot be challenged.

#### **Friends and Allies**

The second pillar of our foreign policy is steadfast support of allies. Our alliances with the major industrial democracies have prospered for 30 years because they reflect common interests in a new era as well as a shared heritage of principles and values. They are an essential element of global stability. These bonds were forged a generation ago to protect weaker allies against a military threat. Today we work together as equals on issues far beyond security. We have strengthened our European defenses, but we have also coordinated our respective approaches to easing tensions with the East; and we have cooperated closely in our economic and energy policies.

As a result, our ties with Europe and Japan have never been stronger. This was reaffirmed in the President's visit to the NATO summit in Brussels at the end of May, in his meeting with key allied leaders in Helsinki, and in his recent consultations in Washington with Prime Minister Miki of Japan. Beyond the technical problems of the daily agenda lies the deeper necessity for the great democracies to demonstrate that in an

age of turmoil they can shape their own destinies.

Our smaller allies and friends around the world are important factors in global stability. We have learned the lesson of Viet-Nam: American military involvement cannot substitute for a nation's efforts to mobilize its people to defend itself. Nor will we permit allies to blackmail us by pretending that their security means more to us than to them. But the fact remains that military assistance to allies is an essential national interest of the United States. It contributes to local or regional balances of power; it helps deter local conflict; it cements important political relations. And it makes much less likely the need for direct American involvement. When we cut off supplies to an ally, for whatever reason, we inflict a setback on ourselves—as has been demonstrated by the severe damage to our national security caused by the embargo of military supplies to Turkey. Nothing would undermine local or global stability more than if America were to prove unwilling to continue to provide material support to those small and brave friendly nations who want and need our help. If our adversaries maintain their support for their allies, by what reasoning—and at what price—can we do less?

#### **Relations With the Soviet Union**

On the basis of our strength and allied unity, this Administration has sought to place our relations with the Communist countries on a more stable and long-term basis. There must be no misunderstanding of what we are doing.

We are trying to manage a fundamental conflict of moral purposes and interests in the shadow of nuclear holocaust. We are striving to preserve peace while defending our essential values and ideals.

In a crisis situation, such as the *Mayaguez* incident, or the October 1973 Middle East alert, or the Jordanian crisis of 1970, or the Soviet attempt to build a naval base in Cuba in 1970, we have reacted firmly and decisively.

ly—and in the face of an outcry from some who now accuse us of being insufficiently vigilant. It is the firm policy of this Administration to resist encroachment and attempts to gain unilateral advantage.

At the same time, the hope for lasting peace depends on building habits of restraint and moderation among the superpowers. The United States has stated these principles on many occasions and embodied them in formal documents in our summit meetings with Soviet leaders. Similar principles of international conduct were stated in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe signed by 35 heads of government in Helsinki two weeks ago. They are not a guarantee of peace but a definition of peace, a standard of behavior to which we must insure adherence by our own determination and vigilance. They are a framework for our own efforts, not a substitute for them.

We also successfully engaged the Soviet Union in negotiations to resolve concrete political problems. This effort has brought some success. A Four-Power Agreement on Berlin in 1971 ended two decades of constant crisis. And our relationship with the Soviet Union has helped so far to restrain big-power conflict in the Middle East.

Central to our agenda has been the limitation of strategic nuclear armaments. In 1972 we reached an agreement which froze the Soviet numerical buildup for five years and restricted no American programs. Therefore we consider the 1972 SALT agreement to be unquestionably in America's interest. It prevented an existing missile gap from widening; and it permitted us to maintain and even to increase our lead in multiple warheads, bombers, and other areas of military technology.

Last November in Vladivostok President Ford reached agreement with General Secretary Brezhnev on the principles of a new accord which is also unmistakably in our interest. If achieved, this agreement will bring about strict numerical equality of strategic systems. It will limit the strategic arms competition for a 10-year period. Thus for the first time defense planning will not

be driven by fear of unknown military expansion by the other side. And once this common ceiling is implemented we can move immediately to negotiate mutual reductions.

We have negotiated other arms control agreements with the Soviet Union to prevent accidental war and to prohibit the stationing of nuclear weapons on the deep seabed or in outer space.

The negotiations in Vienna on force reductions in central Europe will be the next test for the process of relaxing tensions. If progress toward peace in Europe is to prove durable, it is time to reduce on a secure and mutual basis the large standing armed forces now facing each other in the center of the continent.

The United States pursues the process of easing tensions from a position of self-confidence and strength. It is not we who were on the defensive at Helsinki; it is not we who were being challenged by all the delegations to live up to the principles being signed. At Helsinki, for the first time in the postwar period, human rights and fundamental freedoms became recognized subjects of East-West discourse and negotiation. The conference put forward *our* standards of humane conduct, which have been—and still are—a beacon of hope to millions.

The winds of change are blowing from the West; the ideals of liberty and the challenges of technical innovation come from the West. The efforts of Communist countries to participate in the rest of the world, after decades of autarchy, are a sign of the vigor and attraction of our economic system. These are assets of our diplomacy, which we should be prepared to use.

In the age of thermonuclear weapons and strategic equality, the relaxation of tensions is the only responsible course and the only policy that can be pursued by any Administration charged with responsibility for the lives of Americans. The American people have no desire for a policy of confrontation for its own sake. When both sides have the military power to annihilate mankind, it would be utter recklessness to invite tension needlessly.

But the United States has never accepted that the Soviet Union is free to relax tensions selectively or as a cover for the pursuit of unilateral advantage. In Portugal, a focus of current concern, the Soviet Union should not assume that it has the option, either directly or indirectly, to influence events contrary to the right of the Portuguese people to determine their own future. The involvement of external powers for this purpose in a country which is an old friend and ally of ours is inconsistent with any principle of European security.

Events in Portugal have their origin in the dynamics of Portuguese history. But 80 percent of the Portuguese people have declared unmistakably their desire for a democratic system and democratic parties. The attempt by an antidemocratic and doctrinaire minority to thwart this desire is meeting inevitable and growing popular resistance.

The United States welcomed the Portuguese revolution. We and our allies have supported its aims diplomatically and materially. We sympathize with those moderate elements who seek to build Portugal by democratic means. We will oppose and speak out against the efforts of a minority that appears to be subverting the revolution for its own purposes. The Portuguese people should know that we and all the democratic countries of the West are deeply concerned about their future and stand ready to help a democratic Portugal.

And at some point we and our European allies must ask ourselves whether major Communist influence in a government is compatible with membership in an alliance dedicated to resisting Communist aggression.

This Administration shall never forget the moral difference between freedom and tyranny. Nor shall we forget that peace, too, is a moral imperative. We have been firm in the face of challenge even as we have sought to ease tensions and move the world closer to peace. We will not let the American people be lulled into a false sense of security. We shall continue on our course.

The combination of strength and concilia-

tion requires self-restraint in our public debate. Let us put an end to the swings between confrontation and false hopes, between belligerence and exhilaration, which have marked earlier periods. Let us not take for granted the stability and relative tranquility that we have achieved. Let us stop acting as if we had anything to fear from progress toward peace.

Let those who offer us tough rhetoric define what precisely they propose to do. What is their exact alternative? What borders do they plan to change and by what means? What level of expanded defense expenditures are they willing to sustain over what period of time and for what purpose? Are they not urging a policy of deliberate confrontation? Can we gain support from any of our major allies for such a radical alternative?

Above all let us face the fact that many of our difficulties abroad are of our own making. If we are to be vigilant against Communist encroachment, we must stop dismantling or demoralizing our intelligence services. If we are to maintain the world balance of power, we cannot assault our defense budget or impose arms embargoes against key allies. If we are to advance our interests in our diplomacy, we cannot deny ourselves flexibility by legislating blanket restrictions on economic relations with other countries. In short, America cannot be strong abroad unless it is strong at home.

### **The New Dimension of Economic Challenge**

Partly because of our success in maintaining the world balance of power and fostering the growth of other nations, a new dimension of economic issues is coming to the fore in international relations: energy, food, other commodities, and trade.

In this realm of diplomacy, the strength of the American economy is among our greatest assets. All of America's objectives—our military security, our economic well-being, our relations with allies and adversaries and developed and developing nations—hinge on the vitality of the American economy. As President Ford said, "A resurgent American economy would do more to restore

the confidence of the world in its own future than anything else we can do.”<sup>2</sup>

The world now needs that confidence. The industrialized nations have been undergoing the most serious economic crisis since the thirties. As then, they are learning that economic stagnation breeds political instability, that it undermines the public support which enables governments to act with assurance and democratic societies to thrive. And as then, we are learning how much the solution depends above all on an intangible quality of confidence and belief in a better future.

The industrial democracies are now being tested. They must surmount social and economic strains and reinvigorate their free institutions. President Ford's talks at Helsinki with allied leaders and his meeting in Washington with the Prime Minister of Japan focused on the crucial importance of a thriving American economy to world economic recovery; they produced a determination to deal with the global economic challenge cooperatively. The United States is prepared to intensify its consultations and to seek a coordinated approach. We are aware of our global responsibility and we shall meet it in the months to come.

The success of these efforts will be of vital importance to the rest of the world. The industrial nations account for 65 percent of the world's output and 70 percent of its trade. Thus, the economic well-being of the developing nations, too, depends on broad cooperation with the industrialized world. Unfortunately, too many nations seek to exact by ideological confrontation what can only be achieved through reasoned cooperative dialogue. The United States is prepared for a serious and constructive cooperative dialogue. We are ready to develop equitable economic relations with all nations. But we will never accept bloc pressure or blackmail.

Early next month, a special session of the U.N. General Assembly will convene in New York to deal with the issues of economic interdependence. It will be a fateful occasion

because it can determine the nature of the relationship between the developed and the developing countries. On the President's behalf I will present a series of American proposals looking toward a new approach to the relationship between the industrialized countries and those needing their help. We do so because we are convinced that our own economic health will be served by a world economy which is both expanding and perceived as fair. And our own security will be enhanced if we live in a world where frustration and despair give way to cooperation and a sense of our interdependence.

We enter this dialogue with confidence and good will. Our technological innovation, the productivity of our farms and industries, our educated and industrious people, and the blessing of our physical resources have given us the strength and responsibility for leadership.

In no area is this more striking than in the field of food. Our agricultural productivity is admired and desired all over the world. America's farmers and those who process and sell our food can be proud of their contribution to American strength in what is becoming an increasingly important dimension of our foreign policy and world leadership.

America has generously provided food aid to scores of foreign nations. But the gap between consumption and production is growing constantly. While we are prepared to continue food aid, this cannot provide a long-term answer to feeding the world's hungry. Therefore, a World Food Conference was convened in Rome last November at U.S. initiative. Acting on many American proposals, the conference organized a comprehensive international program to expand food production in developing countries and to channel resources—including the new wealth of the oil producers—to improving the financing, production, storage, and distribution of food.

We intend as a matter of principle to make our food policy a model for cooperative relations between producers and consumers of vital and scarce commodities and between developed and developing countries. In this

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<sup>2</sup> For excerpts from President Ford's state of the Union address on Jan. 15, see BULLETIN of Feb. 3, 1975, p. 133.



may we serve our own as well as a general interest. America's farmers will benefit from a steady global demand for their product; as world production is expanded, the burden of shortages and higher prices will be lifted from our consumers; our political relations with scores of developing nations will be enhanced, and conditions of order worldwide will be improved.

### The American Responsibility

Thirty years ago the United States was the world's only great power. Since then our allies and our adversaries have naturally grown in strength, recovering from the devastation of World War II. The cold war world of two rigid blocs now belongs to history: the Communist world is fragmented; our allies and friends and the new nations have asserted their own identities. The diversity even among the developing countries, among producers and consumers of vital materials such as oil, is increasingly apparent. We live in a world of some 150 independent nations, a world of diffused power, subject to the domination of no nation.

Such a world is an exciting challenge for America. For it is the kind of environment most consistent with *our* values. It is not we who have to fear from the relaxation of tensions or the spread of initiative and opportunity. We can only benefit from diversity, change, economic competition, the free flow of ideas, and the sharing of responsibilities. We have the capacity to shape from this complexity a new pattern of order and new hope for human progress.

But what this nation can do in the world depends upon how we conduct ourselves at home. For our national strength in every respect rests on our unity as a people.

There is a fundamental difference between the requirements of foreign policy and of domestic policy. In our own society, only some issues are matters of governmental concern; we can address these issues selectively, accommodate the different groups concerned, and legislate a solution that, hopefully, disposes of the problem.

Foreign policy, on the other hand, is the

sum total of our nation's action abroad. Our involvement with the world outside is continual. Our action cannot be fragmented into a series of individual compromises except at grave risk. Every decision sets in motion a sequence of events and is in turn perceived by other nations as symbolic of our intentions and capabilities. Though we are a system of separated powers in Washington, to the world we are *one* government and *one* nation.

Our democratic system, and the broad participation of all of our people and private and public institutions, present a constant challenge to fashion unity out of diversity. We have done so in moments of crisis in the past; we must do so today in a moment of historic opportunity.

And here the recent controversies between the two branches of our government give cause for serious concern. The Administration is held responsible for virtually all difficulties around the world—whether or not they resulted from its policies—and then is hamstrung in its capacity to act flexibly and purposefully.

—In energy, the lack of determined action on conservation and alternative sources seriously jeopardizes our efforts with other oil-consuming nations to reduce our vulnerability and to improve our bargaining position toward the producers.

—In Latin America, attempts to give impetus to a new dialogue are impaired by trade restrictions and automatic legislative sanctions that reduce our negotiating flexibility.

—In East-West relations, the leverage required to protect our national interest has been reduced by blanket legislative restrictions which have failed as well to achieve the humanitarian objectives they were meant to serve.

—In the eastern Mediterranean the stalemate over our military relations with Turkey threatens to unhinge the eastern flank of NATO. The President has proposed a compromise to break this congressional deadlock; the Senate, nearly half the House, and the leaders of both parties in both Houses, have

supported it. When the Congress reconvenes in September we hope for a rapid, cooperative solution before irreparable damage is done to our national security.

The country cannot afford the dominance of *either* branch over the other. This is not a constitutional or legal dispute. The issue is how to conduct a single, purposeful foreign policy in our democratic system. Our Constitution gives the Congress wide authority in key areas of our foreign and defense policy. But the President represents the nation abroad; he must have the possibility of shaping and carrying out a coherent policy. Accommodating special or parochial interests through a series of compromises does not necessarily produce coherence; contention between the executive and Congress risks falling between two stools on too many grave issues.

The two branches of our government have shown their ability in recent years to work cooperatively. On many issues honest differences of opinion were reconciled and a common position achieved—the Romanian trade agreement, the basic direction of our Middle East policy, the preparation for the special session of the General Assembly, and many issues in arms control and policy.

Let us build on this. The President is a man of Congress; he regards its members as his colleagues, and he has pledged to cooperate with them. The Administration will make every effort to consult, inform, and work with the Congress in making foreign policy. And let me say that the close cooperation between the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Administration has given strength and impetus to our foreign policy. When we are divided, when partisanship produces bitter debates, we can do damage that outlasts our present emotions; we harm not only the country's fortunes today but the hopes of future generations. But when we are united together there is no force stronger than the power of free men acting in unity.

Ladies and gentlemen, our nation has gone through a searing decade. Assassination, war, and internal turmoil have all left their mark upon us. We began the 1960's secure in our belief in the goodness of our purpose,

confident of our power to shape our future, and proud of our youthful vitality. Yet 15 years later, tested by extraordinary events, many came to believe that we were powerless to affect the world and that our boldness had given way to the weariness and timidity of old age.

Already we can begin to see that the pessimists, as so often, spoke too soon. Despite a constitutional crisis unmatched since the 1860's, our government remains strong and our freedoms stand undiminished. People the world over have been reminded by our adversity that their only real hope for a better life lies in America's continued commitment to a free and peaceful world. The Administration has responded by making clear that we will not retreat from our obligations abroad and that we will not be shaken by divided purpose at home.

Once again, a troubled world needs a strong and confident America. It offers us no simple choices but rather what Americans have always welcomed: a challenge to our courage, an opportunity to fresh accomplishment, a summons to greatness.

## Questions and Answers Following the Secretary's Birmingham Address

Press release 411B dated August 15

*Chairman J. D. "Jimmie" Hayes, president, Alabama Farm Bureau Federation: . . . Now, Dr. Kissinger being a wise man, I do not question his decisions, but he has invited a question-and-answer session, which I think perhaps should be limited to 15 minutes.*

*The first question: Are unions going to dictate foreign policy regarding loading and shipping of grain to Russia and other countries? [Applause.]*

*Secretary Kissinger: This is my first experience in having a question applauded. [Laughter.]*

The Administration has favored the sale of grain to the Soviet Union and to other countries. As I pointed out, we consider our agricultural productivity one of our most

important national assets, including the field of foreign policy.

We regret attempts that may be made by individual groups to influence the overall policy by such measures. It is my understanding that the Secretary of Labor and other senior officials are now talking to the unions concerned; and we are trying to meet those concerns that reflect their working conditions, freight rates, or similar matters. We hope that we can work out a cooperative solution very rapidly, because we think it is very important. [Applause.]

*Chairman Hayes: Do you have comments on the reports coming out of Washington that Israel and Egypt are close to signing a peace agreement?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* What is being discussed between Israel and Egypt at this moment is not a final peace agreement, but an interim step which, however, if it is achieved, would mark considerable progress on the road to peace, perhaps the biggest single one that has yet been taken.

The two parties are at this moment still in the process of negotiation, and there are still important issues that still remain to be resolved. However, progress has been made in recent weeks. The two sides, with American mediation, are negotiating with each other in good faith and seriously; and we are hopeful that further progress can be made. We should know within the next couple of weeks whether these hopes will be realized, but certainly over recent weeks progress has been made. [Applause.]

*Chairman Hayes: Perhaps this would be the appropriate place for the next question. You, Dr. Kissinger, have been quoted in the press recently as saying that we have a commitment to Israel—and continuing as an incomplete quotation—but this is not to be construed as a status quo. Would you comment on this?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The United States has no legal, formal commitment to Israel in the sense of an agreement ratified by the Congress. On the other hand, we have a close historical relationship. And successive administrations since the creation of the

State of Israel—of both of our major political parties—have affirmed that the survival and security of Israel represent a major American concern.

At the same time, we believe that progress toward peace in the Middle East is essential. We have supported an evolution in the relations between the Arab states and Israel by which they would negotiate a peace settlement and in which, in return for the relinquishing by Israel of Arab territories, the Arab countries would make commitments toward peace. [Applause.]

The United States has been the only country that has been able to move this negotiating process forward, and we remain committed to moving the process forward. Our basic commitment in the Middle East, therefore, is both to the survival and security of Israel but also to the achievement of a permanent peace. [Applause.]

*Chairman Hayes: The next question refers to your previous remarks, presumably about Portugal. The question is: Do you have any firm evidence that the Soviet Union is aiding the Communist Party's efforts to subvert the revolution in Portugal for its own purposes?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Undoubtedly there exists a school of thought right now in Washington that I have already said too much about Portugal. [Laughter.]

But there is some evidence along the lines that the question suggests. But above all, the purpose of my remarks is to make clear the fundamental American attitude toward any future action that might be contemplated.

We have to remember that events in Portugal have their own dynamics that rest on Portuguese conditions. We also have to remember that the influence of the Western democracies in the country furthest from the Soviet borders in Western Europe depends as much on the determination of the Western countries as it may on the influence of the Soviet Union. [Applause.]

*Chairman Hayes: Dr. Kissinger, you have been quoted as saying that we are living in a new world and in a new era and facing a new world and facing a new era. Would you like to expand on those comments?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That's another 45 minutes. [Laughter.] I am sure you will all be very patient.

What I meant with this remark was that, in the immediate postwar period, the world was essentially divided into two big blocs: the Communist bloc on the one side with the Soviet Union in the lead, the Western world on the other with the United States in the lead.

In the 30 years since the end of World War II, conditions have changed quite fundamentally. Western Europe and Japan have grown in strength and self-confidence and in their ability to play a political role. The Communist countries are characterized by the division between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China and by other fragmented trends.

In addition, the growth of nuclear weapons has given a new significance to the nature of military power so that where, in the immediate postwar period, it was possible to conduct a relatively simple foreign policy, now we live in a much more fluid world requiring much more complicated decisions and a world in which the question of peace and war takes on added urgency.

What we have attempted to do is to create a structure in which all these divergent forces can find a place in which we can defend our values and our interests, but at the same time reduce the dangers of nuclear war. [Applause.]

*Chairman Hayes:* We are going to have to limit it to about two more questions because of our time. This one says: Dr. Kissinger, what do you think of the world fund from which food can be purchased from any country where supply is available, instead of a world food bank?

*Secretary Kissinger:* We are not developing now a world food bank. We are in the process of developing for the special session of the General Assembly a number of proposals which include proposals in the field of food, in which our purpose is to use our productivity as a model and as a means to show how scarce resources can be used for the benefit of mankind, while at the same

time giving incentives to those who produce these commodities.

We have not yet finally decided on what these proposals should be.

We have advocated in the past the development of an agreement for nationally held grain reserves which would help our farmers during periods when there is a shortage of demand and which can be used in case there are major catastrophes in the world. We are in the process of negotiating this now.

Another purpose of this scheme would be to avoid putting ourselves in the position of being the sole country that holds reserves and, by establishing requirements for other countries holding reserves, to create a constant market for our agricultural products. [Applause.]

*Chairman Hayes:* We are approaching our deadline. This is the last question. The question is: The present Administration has promoted the philosophy of full agricultural production and the free market system. Do you think the government has a fair policy when it arbitrarily restricts the exporting of farm commodities?

*Secretary Kissinger:* I sometimes have the impression that the audience likes the questions better than the answers. [Laughter.]

We are committed to full agricultural production and the free market system, and we are not conscious that we have arbitrarily restricted the exporting of farm commodities.

In the present situation it is clear that the United States is the only country that has the reserves that other countries must purchase. Therefore, we are trying to bring about, in as orderly a manner as possible, the disposal of these reserves—precisely to avoid the pressures against the free market system that will inevitably develop if there are precipitous actions.

All the decisions that are being taken now are within the framework of the free market system, and they are designed to vindicate toward the farmers our request to them for full production and therefore our obligation to help them move that production. [Applause.]

## Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Birmingham August 14

Press release 412 dated August 14

*Mr. Al Fox of Birmingham News: Mr. Secretary, on behalf of the newspaper media of Alabama we welcome you and Mrs. Kissinger to our state. And we appreciate that you have taken the time to grant us this news conference.*

*Last month it was announced that negotiations, which had been initiated by Senator Sparkman apparently, had resulted in the return of some \$2 million to Southern Airways from a plane hijacked from Birmingham. Just how big a step is that toward renewing diplomatic relations with Cuba?*

*Secretary Kissinger: Well, we consider it a positive step and a sign of good will. We have indicated on our side that we are prepared to begin discussions with Cuba to see whether the outstanding issues can be settled. As these discussions proceed, we will be able to make a decision on when the time has come to resume diplomatic relations. That is premature now.*

*Of course, there is one other point that I made before, which is that I do not know whether we will count concessions that are made to Senators when the negotiations start with our government. [Laughter.]*

*Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been reported that the Soviet Union has resorted to the Helsinki agreement to protest the delayed decisions of the Common Market on economic or financial assistance to Portugal and has designs to interfere with that country's internal affairs. Does this concept of the Helsinki agreement agree with yours? And is there any other Communist action to which we might apply the same standard and use the same appeal?*

*Secretary Kissinger: We do not agree with this interpretation of the Helsinki document, and we support the attitude of the Common*

*Market, which was that they would be prepared to give economic assistance to a democratic Portugal. That is what I expressed this morning in my speech. So we do not agree with this interpretation, and our policy was stated this morning.*

*Q. Mr. Secretary, following up on the question, since the question of Portugal has been raised, it has been my understanding that you consider the problems in Portugal arising from their history and that—to use one of your phrases—the wounds have been self-inflicted, from our point of view. Now you seem to be warning the Soviet Union to stay out. But haven't you raised a strawman? What has the Soviet Union done to interfere in Portuguese domestic affairs?*

*Secretary Kissinger: As I said in answer to a question earlier, what I said this morning—what I have said in my prepared remarks—was addressed primarily to what might be done in the future and to some authoritative press comments that have been made in the Soviet Union in the last few days. Basically the trends in Portugal result from internal Portuguese developments, but the situation is reaching a point where temptation for outside intervention seems to be arising.*

*Q. Mr. Secretary, we received a report that a Colonel-General Michael Goleniewski, who was a Polish Army intelligence officer in World War II, had identified a list of KGB and GRU agents and officers which have since been arrested, tried, and convicted. The general, according to our source, also identified you, Mr. Kissinger, as having worked for a Soviet intelligence network—code name Odra, headquartered in West Germany during World War II—at the same time you were a U.S. Army counterintelligence interrogator and instructor in a military intelligence school in West Germany. Now, is this*

true? And if not, how do you explain your name being on General Goleniewski's list?

*Secretary Kissinger:* I don't know who Colonel Goleniewski is, but I think he should be given the Pulitzer Prize for fiction. [Laughter.]

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is the United States working to encourage a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Northern Ireland?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have not judged that this was the most fruitful area for our diplomatic activity, nor has there been any demand for our services. So we wish the parties well in efforts to settle it, but we have not been ourselves directly engaged.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you said in your speech that the United States will oppose the efforts of the minority that appears to be subverting revolution for its own purposes in Portugal. What precisely do you mean?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have indicated that we will support a democratic Portugal, and we have made clear our preferences. Beyond that there is not an enormous amount we can do.

I have also pointed out there is also the question which we have put to the other NATO allies; namely, for how long a government, should it become dominated by Communists, can remain in the NATO alliance.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, may I follow that up, please? In your speech you also spoke about the Soviet Union having an option to influence, either directly or indirectly, the course of events there. What do you have in mind by influencing the course of events directly or indirectly—their sending in military advisers or what?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Direct activities by its citizens or by people under its direct control.

*Q. Can you tell us in a practical way what benefit does the average American get from détente?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, the benefit to the average American from détente is: first of all, a condition of absence of tension and

reduced risk of war; secondly, the settlement of a number of outstanding political issues such as, for example, the issue of Berlin; third, restraint in other areas such as the Middle East; fourth, an easing of the arms race. And in return, we have given up no American interests.

So the question of relaxation of tension is—we should not delude ourselves—an issue that will be faced by any administration at any period. The objectives that I have described are the interests of all Americans as well as all other people, and that is what we get out of it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I understand that you have a meeting this afternoon with president of the International Longshoremen's Local 1410 of the Port of Mobile. What is the purpose of this meeting, specifically in relation to the ILA's national position on loading grain?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I do not have a separate meeting with—

*Q. He's involved in a meeting.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Whenever I make these visits around the country, I ask the local sponsors to organize meetings of local leaders. I do not select these leaders; I leave that to the sponsors, except that I ask them to be widely representative. It gives me an opportunity to find out what is on the minds of these leadership groups around the country—this plus the question periods at the end of my speeches. The purpose of these meetings is as much to inform me as to give me an opportunity to express our views. So I do not expect to have a separate conversation with this gentleman or to get into the question of grain loading or any such—this is being handled in Washington.

*Q. Mr. Kissinger, except for the Super K cartoons, you have not been in political cartoons until recently; and you have been depicted as giving away the store in Helsinki. How do you feel personally about cartoons?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I like the first set of cartoons better. The second set of cartoons—I wish each newspaper would bring this to the attention of their cartoonists. [Laughter.] As I keep pointing out around the country,

my father, who clips the newspaper articles, does not clip the second type.

Now, with respect to giving away the store in Helsinki, I think it is important to get Helsinki in perspective. These negotiations have been going on for over three years. For at least a year and a half, it has been known that in all probability that meeting would end with a summit. The conclusions were perfectly well known. The United States was not in the lead of this negotiation, but it went along with its West European allies and the other 34 countries present there.

So suddenly there has started a debate on what? The recognition of frontiers? You ask yourself "what frontiers?" The frontiers in the Balkans were established by the peace treaties of 1946 and 1947, in which we participated. The eastern frontiers of Poland were established in Yalta, in which we participated. The western frontiers of Poland were established provisionally in Potsdam, in which we participated. They were finally settled between the Federal Republic and Poland in 1971.

There are no unrecognized frontiers in Europe today. We did not recognize anything that has not long since been recognized by other countries or by previous American Administrations. I think we are punishing ourselves needlessly here over an issue that was not the principal issue at Helsinki.

The new things that were added to existing international agreements at Helsinki were all things that were in our favor. They were the human contacts; they were the peaceful changes of frontiers. Therefore I believe that these cartoons and other commentaries are totally wrong.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with the reports of an American presence in the Middle East, two questions: Can you tell us whether, in fact, there will be an American presence in the passes in the Sinai? And number two, if the agreement should call for such a presence, is it your intention to consult with Congress? Or, going beyond that, is it your intention not to allow an American presence in the Middle East unless you have*

*congressional endorsement for such an action?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* With respect to your first question, obviously there is no agreement as of now. There is not even an agreement as to the particular concept of an American presence. Therefore we have not had an opportunity, except in a general way, to sound out certain congressional leaders about the concept, and we have not been able to put before them any concrete propositions.

Secondly, if there is to be an American presence, it will under no circumstances be a military presence. The only presence that could possibly be considered is a presence of American civilian unarmed volunteers at the request of both parties to perform very limited technical functions, and in very small numbers.

Thirdly, if this happens, the United States would not proceed with it without congressional endorsement. We are not talking about consultation. We would ask the Congress to vote on this.

*Q. You would?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We would ask the Congress to vote before we would proceed.

*Q. Mr. Kissinger, this is fundamentally a farm meeting. How do you visualize the role of the American farmer in feeding the so-called hungry world?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, the United States has the greatest agricultural productivity in the world. The United States is the only country that consistently produces reserves in the sense of surpluses. Therefore, American farm productivity is one of our great assets, if we can put it into the service of the overall objectives of our foreign policy—as we have been able to, thanks to the productivity of our farmers and their willingness to produce at full capacity.

So the primary contribution that our farmers can make is to continue to produce at full capacity. We would like to have an opportunity to talk to farm leaders about how the product can be moved in a way that causes the least disruption of our own domestic markets. But these are matters that

are being handled by the Department of Agriculture at the moment, and I think it is working reasonably well.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, how serious is the threat to our security with the Turkish ouster of our forces, and do you foresee a return of these bases to our control very soon?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Turkey has not yet ousted our forces. Turkey has prohibited our bases from operating. The Administration has repeatedly stated that the decision to embargo aid to Turkey and the consequent closing of our bases have a very serious effect on our national security—first, because these bases are the source of irreplaceable intelligence; secondly, because Turkey is one of the key countries in NATO; and thirdly, because the decision does not help the countries it is designed to help.

We have opposed this decision. We have appealed to the Congress to reverse it. We do so not to win an argument with the House of Representatives, the Senate having voted on the basis of our recommendations; but we think this is a matter of overwhelming national interest; and we hope that the House will reverse itself when it returns.

*Q. I would like to ask you a question concerning Turkey. There are about 3,000 Greeks in the Birmingham area, and recently they became very enraged about what happened and they wrote Congressmen and Senators. They are similar to other ethnic groups around the United States with a lot of influence. Regarding Turkey, what do you think of the influence or pressure put by such ethnic minorities?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I have been at the receiving end of this from various groups, so I have had direct exposure to it.

I think it is inevitable that various ethnic groups will feel passionately about the interests of their ancestral countries. At the same time, it is also clear that the overwhelming majority of the representatives of these ethnic groups think of the interests of the United States. Even if we differ occasionally with their conception of these in-

terests, their motivation without any question is the same as those of any other group that is concerned with American foreign policy.

On certain issues, it can happen that ethnic groups feel passionately beyond what would be our assessment of even the best interests of the country or group that they represent. This has been our view of some of the pressures from the Greek constituents. We believe that the best means of producing a settlement on Cyprus and of helping Greece as well as Cyprus would be to follow our recommendations with respect to the embargo, because it would enhance our influence in Turkey. They have another judgment. But I think, in the nature of our system of a country composed of so many different ethnic groups, that it is inevitable that these pressures exist; and I would not criticize them.

*Q. Just to follow up, if I may, to your answer to Mr. Kalb's [Bernard Kalb, CBS News] question. If you do go to the Middle East and the issue of American presence in the Sinai is raised, are you suggesting now that you wouldn't be able to reach an interim agreement without coming back and getting congressional approval first?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, we are not party to the agreement. But the parties would have to understand that it would require congressional approval. And since there would be some period of time before such an agreement could be implemented anyway, we believe the Congress would act—we would certainly ask the Congress to act expeditiously, but we will ask for congressional approval before we actually encourage Americans to go there—encourage, because we will not send anybody; it would have to be volunteers.

*Q. Is it possible then that Congress could effectively veto an interim agreement in the Middle East?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* On the basis of the consultations that we have had, we do not expect that.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the Food for Peace pro-*



gram has not been labeled a magnificent success. How is it that agricultural sales to other nations are going to help our foreign policy?

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, first of all, I would not agree that the Food for Peace program has not been a success. I think it has on the whole been a very substantial success. Agricultural sales to other countries, in a world in which the disposition of commodities becomes one of the principal international issues, can set an example for the manner in which other international commodities should be handled; and secondly, if conducted on a long-term basis, can lead to a set of arrangements that would be of mutual benefit to the United States as well as to other countries.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, back to the technicians again. Just a month ago in Milwaukee you were considering either military or civilian technicians. What has happened to make you rule out military?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I do not remember that I—I think you must have misunderstood what I said then. But whatever I may have said then, our policy is clearly the one that I have stated now. We are talking about civilians—volunteers—approved by Congress.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke of the security and survival of the State of Israel. Is there any geographical configuration which you envision within which Israel's security and survival is in doubt?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have not thought it wise for the United States to put forward a proposal on a final settlement, which we believe should be negotiated between the parties concerned and which must have elements of final frontiers matched by complete peace commitments on the other side. But I do not think the United States should draw these lines.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, 30 years after the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki there is still criticism. Do you think it was necessary that we explode the*

*nuclear bombs in populated areas to bring a quicker end to the war?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have learned in my time in Washington that, in making complex decisions, it is very easy in retrospect to draw certain conclusions when one does not know all the pressures that operated on the people concerned and when the facts are clearer now than they were then. Therefore I would be very hesitant to second-guess a group of serious and concerned people with 30 years' hindsight.

*Senator Sparkman:* Mr. Secretary, may I say just a word on that?

The Secretary was not there when that happened. That was 1946. I was there. I was in the House of Representatives. I was on the Military Affairs Committee. General Marshall, who was then Chief of Staff, as I recall, testified before the House Military Affairs Committee that dropping that bomb on Hiroshima, as much as it may have shocked us, saved probably a million American lives that it would have cost us had we invaded Japan. It prevented the invasion.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, sir, in your speech you spoke of those who use tough rhetoric and urge policies of deliberate confrontation. Since we are in Alabama in a political year now, would you include Governor Wallace in that group of folks?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have not read any of his recent speeches, but I would include anybody who uses tough rhetoric. I leave it to you to determine who that might be. But I think that anybody who attacks the basic policy should not only attack it but should spell out an alternative and indicate the precise implications of his alternative. I am not talking about individuals; I am talking about policy directions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to return to the question of the Cuban return of ransom for a moment. It is apparent from the reports we have received down here that the State Department had only a marginal part in Senator Sparkman's negotiations. I was wondering if a possible explanation for this could be that there are recurring reports*

*that the State Department, unless a matter has your personal attention, doesn't know what to do.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First of all, this matter has my personal attention, so it is not a good example. Secondly, I am delighted by the result of this negotiation and by Senator Sparkman's role in it. Thirdly, with respect to the State Department, there are certain myths that are going to be repeated no matter what I may say or do. It will be repeated that I am secretive even though I am sure I have given more public speeches, held more press conferences, and met with more congressional committees than any Secretary of State before me.

It will be said that the State Department has no authority, even though I think most observers will have to agree that we have now the best group of Assistant Secretaries that has been assembled in decades, that they are known for their strong personalities, and that the best way to work with me in the State Department is to have strong views of your own. So I think it is absolutely incorrect. The thing that I hope will last longest of the organizational changes that have been made at the State Department is the quality, in a policy sense, of the people that are now in key positions.

Though the matter of Cuba happens to have my personal attention on top of it, I can operate as I do only because the Assistant Secretaries and the Under Secretaries are men of initiative and imagination.

*Mr. John W. Bloomer, managing editor, Birmingham News:* Mr. Secretary, I think it is time for me to speak. And I wish to express on behalf of the Alabama press our appreciation for your being with us, and particularly for your candid answers to our questions. I would also like to express appreciation to Senator Sparkman for being with us.

*Thank you, Mr. Secretary. [Applause.]*

## **U.S. Takes Steps To Conform With OAS Action on Cuba**

### *Department Statement*<sup>1</sup>

The Organ of Consultation of the OAS, acting under the Rio Treaty, adopted a resolution on July 29 which allows each member state to determine for itself the nature of its economic and diplomatic relations with the Government of Cuba. That action grew out of an earlier decision by the members of the OAS, on July 25, to adopt a protocol of amendment to the Rio Treaty which, once ratified, will lift sanctions by a simple majority vote.

In keeping with this action by the OAS, the United States is modifying the aspects of our Cuban denial policy which affect other countries. Effective today, August 21, 1975, it will be U.S. policy to grant licenses permitting transactions between U.S. subsidiaries and Cuba for trade in foreign-made goods when those subsidiaries are operating in countries where local law or policy favors trade with Cuba. Specific licenses will continue to be required in each case, and they will remain subject to regulations concerning U.S.-origin parts, components, strategic goods, and technology.

In order to conform further with the OAS action, we are taking appropriate steps so that effective immediately countries which allow their ships or aircraft to carry goods to and from Cuba are not penalized by loss of U.S. bilateral assistance. We are initiating steps to modify regulations which deny bunkering in the United States to third-country ships engaged in the Cuba trade. We will also seek legislation to eliminate similar restrictions on title I, P.L. 480, food sales to third countries.

<sup>1</sup>Read to news correspondents on Aug. 21 by Robert L. Funseth, Director, Office of Press Relations.

## Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Vail, Colo., August 17

Press release 413 dated August 17

*Mr. Ronald H. Nessen, Press Secretary to President Ford:* Let me read you two statements, and then Henry will be here to brief.

Secretary of State Kissinger will travel to the Middle East next week, leaving Washington on August 20. The discussions the United States has been conducting with the parties concerned, looking toward an interim agreement, have progressed to the point where the parties and the President believe it would be useful for the Secretary of State to travel to the area in an effort to bring the talks to a successful conclusion. The Secretary's visit to the Middle East will include several Arab countries and Israel.

The President has asked me to read you a statement.

[At this point Mr. Nessen read a statement by President Ford, the text of which follows.]

"I have worked many hours with the Secretary of State analyzing and assessing the situation in the Middle East, and I have now directed him to return to that region in an effort to bring the discussions to a successful conclusion.

"I am hopeful that the parties will successfully conclude an interim agreement, which not only would be in the best interest of the parties involved but also in the best interest of the entire Middle East region and indeed of the whole world.

"I am sure all Americans join me in wishing the Secretary of State success on this critically important mission."

*Secretary Kissinger:* We will go straight to the questions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us some of the issues that remain outstanding that you are going to be working on?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have made good

progress on many of the issues. We have agreement in principle on some of the lines, but some details remain to be negotiated.

We still have to work out the protocols and the details of the various disposition of forces after another interim agreement has been made.

There will be complicated issues of civilian administration, and there are one or two issues of principle there remaining outstanding. However, it is the President's judgment, the judgment of the parties, and my own that in the light of the good will that has been shown by both parties in recent weeks, in light of the progress that has been made, the remaining differences are surmountable; and this is the attitude with which I am going there.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, would you say that peace is at hand in the Middle East?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I haven't used that line for four years. [Laughter.]

*Q. Where are you going, exactly?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Wait a minute. You don't think I am finished with a 30-second answer. I haven't even placed my verb yet. [Laughter.]

This, of course, is not a peace agreement. This is an interim step toward peace between Egypt and Israel, if it should succeed. The issues between Israel and the other countries remain to be resolved, and the United States remains committed to a just and lasting peace, as called for by the U.N. Security Council resolution.

Both the United States and Israel and all the other parties that we are in touch with agree that this will not be the end of the process, but a stage in the process. Nevertheless, if it succeeds, it will be, and it can be, a very big step. It would be the first agree-

ment that has been made between an Arab state and Israel not under the immediate impact of military hostilities, the first one that will require some complicated arrangement of cooperation.

Therefore we hope that it will be a step toward that just and lasting peace which we are committed to try to bring about.

I think, Fran [Frances L. Lewine, Associated Press], you had a question.

*Q. What countries are you going to, exactly?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am going first to Israel. From there I will go to Alexandria, where President Sadat will be. Then we will have a shuttle, which we do not think should be as extended as the recent shuttles have been, because many issues of principle have already been settled; but while I am in the Middle East, I expect to visit Damascus, Amman, and Saudi Arabia to discuss with the other Arab countries our conception of progress toward peace in the Middle East.

*Q. Can you tell us who suggested a U.S. monitoring team in the Middle East, and isn't this fraught with danger, and I would like to know if it is tied to any money agreements of aid to Israel?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The idea of possible monitoring team has as yet not been finally decided. It is an issue that was first raised and which we have made clear we would agree to do only if both of the parties join in.

We have also made clear that the American participation would be of an entirely technical nature; that is to say, we would man certain kinds of warning equipment whose results would be given to both sides and the United Nations.

In other words, it would be an extension of the U-2 flights we are now undertaking at the request of both parties. Any Americans that are going to the Middle East would go only if approved by the Congress. It would be volunteers. They would have no military mission of any kind; and their primary function, their exclusive function, would be to give warning information to both sides and to the United Nations; and their numbers would be very small.

*Q. Who suggested it, and is it tied to any aid?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The issue of warning stations depends on the issue of the aid. The issue of the aid in turn to Israel has been discussed with Israel for many months, as we have, for that matter, discussed aid programs with Arab countries for many months.

We will submit in September, I would expect, an aid package for the entire Middle East, including Israel and those Arab countries that have been the recipients of aid last year; and this has been entrained as part of the reassessment in any event.

*Q. How much money does it entail?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The President has not yet made the final decision about the amount that we will request from the Congress, but this grows out of technical studies that we are undertaking jointly as to the needs of the parties and particularly the needs of Israel.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, alongside whatever agreements may be reached between Egypt and Israel, will there also be third-party agreements between the United States and both of these parties, and what will their nature be?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We still do not have any actual documents that have been agreed to between the parties. All we have are certain agreements in principle about the outlines of a possible agreement.

In the disengagement agreements, there was a formal agreement, then there was a protocol that was attached to that agreement, then there was separate understanding between the parties in which the United States acted as an intermediary and transmitted assurances from one party to the other.

Everything in which the United States is involved will be submitted to the Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee, and to the House International Relations Committee. There will be no secret understandings that are not submitted.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, have you set yourself a time limit for this particular trip?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have to be back on September 1 or 2 to speak at the special session of the General Assembly. That I have to do in any event no matter what the state of the negotiations is.

Now, it is theoretically possible I might go back to the Middle East from there, but I hope that we can make sufficient progress in 10 days. But I don't want to operate against a deadline. These issues—even when there is agreement in principle, the issues are enormously complex and there are so many different aspects of civilian as well as military arrangements that have to be made that I would hate to tie myself too closely.

Mr. Beckman [Aldo B. Beckman, Chicago Tribune Press Service].

*Q. I have two questions. One, can you tell us if the American volunteers will be armed, and secondly, when your earlier shuttle failed, I seem to recall your saying you wouldn't go back unless there was a 90 percent chance of success. Is there a 90 percent chance of success?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* You have to remember even if you say there is a 90 percent chance of success, if it fails, it fails 100 percent. We think there is a good chance of success—whether you express it at 80 percent or 90 percent, that is just guessing at it—we think there is now a good chance of success, or the President would not have authorized my return.

What was the other question?

*Q. Will the American volunteers be armed?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have not yet worked out this arrangement. If they are armed, it would be only for self-defense. It would not be for military operations. It would only be personal arms for really very immediate self-defense. They will not be authorized, under any circumstances, to conduct military operations or to defend themselves against military forces. If they have arms, it would be against marauders, but they are not there for a military function, and we are talking about very small numbers of about 100 or so.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, will this force be a uni-*

*lateral American force or will it be part of a U.N. force?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It is very difficult for me to talk about something that has not yet been agreed to and finally worked out. In any event, there will be a U.N. force standing between Israel and Egypt in a zone of a greater depth than has ever existed between the hostile forces in the Middle East.

So these would not be in direct contact with either of the hostile parties. They would work more closely with the United Nations.

*Q. Has the United States agreed in principle to compensate Israel for the loss of the Sinai oilfields?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We are discussing with Israel not so much compensation for the Sinai oil, but arrangements for alternative supplies of Sinai oil if Israel has difficulty arranging them for itself. We will take into account, in arriving at the economic aid figure, the additional foreign exchange requirement for Israel in the purchase of oil.

*Q. So we are going to pay for the replacements? That is what it amounts to?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It isn't going to be done exactly on that basis, but it will be taken into account.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, if I may change the subject, could you explain to us the situation surrounding the transfer of Ambassador Carter [W. Beverly Carter, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Tanzania] out of the State Department?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* To the best of my knowledge—and I am not always told everything in the State Department—Ambassador Carter has not been transferred out of the State Department. We have avoided any comment on a situation which, quite frankly, has not always been reported with full accuracy.

The problem that arises in the case of terrorist attacks on Americans has to be seen not only in relation to the individual case but in relation to the thousands of Americans who are in jeopardy all over the world. In every individual case, the overwhelming

temptation is to go along with what is being asked.

On the other hand, if terrorist groups get the impression that they can force a negotiation with the United States and an acquiescence in their demands, then we may save lives in one place at the risk of hundreds of lives everywhere else.

Therefore it is our policy—in order to save lives and in order to avoid undue pressure on Ambassadors all over the world, it is our policy that American Ambassadors and American officials not participate in negotiations on the release of victims of terrorists and that terrorists know that the United States will not participate in the payment of ransom and in the negotiation for it.

In any individual case, this requires heart-breaking decisions. It is our view that it saves more lives and more jeopardy and that it will help Ambassadors, who can then hide behind firm rules rather than leave it to the individual decision.

I think Ambassador Carter is a distinguished Foreign Service—he is not a Foreign Service officer—he is a distinguished Ambassador, and he has served well in Tanzania. I do not want to engage in a debate in which his concerns are very easily understandable and which we are trying to handle in as compassionate a manner as we can and without penalizing any individual concerned. But there are important issues of principle involved here.

*Q. What is going to happen to Ambassador Carter? He has the impression he has been transferred out of the State Department.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think that Ambassador Carter would be better advised to deal with the responsible officials of the State Department than to engage in an independent publicity campaign of his own.

We are reluctant to put forward our view of the situation, because we do not believe it would help anybody. We are trying to maintain a principle that terrorists cannot negotiate with American officials, and we are doing this in order to protect the thousands of Americans that could become victims all

over the world if we once started that process, and not only the American tourists and students but also American officials.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, one more question on this. I understand that President Ford wrote a letter to President Nyerere of Tanzania thanking him for his cooperation in this problem.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That is right.

*Q. And that that cooperation included releasing two of the terrorists of the organization that kidnaped the four young students. Now, isn't that cooperating with terrorists?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* After the event, President Ford did indeed write this letter, and in each individual case it is a matter of judgment of how rigidly that line is drawn and at what point one believes that the line has been breached. In any event, Ambassador Carter has not been transferred out of the State Department.

*Q. But out of his post?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I really am trying to avoid a detailed discussion of the issue, I think in the interest of all parties concerned.

*Q. Can we get a kind of outline of what the accords have been in terms of what has been printed? Is that the passes and the oil-fields?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I don't think I can go into something in which there are so many items that have only been agreed in principle and so many items that are not yet agreed to at all. Some of the things that have been printed are roughly accurate. Some of the things that have been printed are not accurate. I would not go firmly with any one of them.

*Q. I was going to ask the same question. Are the reports of the agreement in principle for a pullback from the passes and the oil-fields in exchange for a guarantee of nonbelligerence accurate? Is that the general scope of the agreement?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I do not think the issue of a formal issue of nonbelligerence is now before us, and I think it would be better

not to go into the precise details of the geographic separation until we are a little further ahead in the negotiations.

But it is known, of course, that the negotiations have involved the passes and the oilfields, and as I have already pointed out in answer to another question, that some of the economic discussions with Israel involved the problem of how to deal with Israel's foreign exchange problems in the absence of the oilfields; so that is a speculation that would be proper.

*Q. Are you going to see Mr. Gromyko [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko] on this trip?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I don't expect to see him, no, not on this trip. I expect to see Mr. Gromyko next when he comes to the General Assembly in the middle of September.

*Q. Between now and then, will there be any special arrangements or efforts to keep the Russians posted?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We will stay in touch with the Soviet Union and keep them generally informed.

*Q. As you pointed out, if there is an interim agreement, can you give us a more specific idea of the territories Israel may have to give up?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* As I pointed out on other occasions, in a lasting peace, a lasting peace will have to settle the frontier of Israel not just with Egypt but with all of its neighbors. It will have to take into account the Palestinian problem. It will have to spell out in great detail the reciprocal obligations for peace on the part of the Arab countries. And it will have to include guarantees—international, multilateral, bilateral, whatever may be devised for the final arrangements.

This interim agreement which we are now talking about is a step, we hope a significant step, toward this, but it will still be only a partial—we will only have traveled a part of the road.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in answering Jim Houghton's question, you said the formal issue of nonbelligerency, which is not a*

*question here, but what is Israel going to need in the way of some guidance, and what is Israel going to get? You have talked about the oilfields and the passes.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I do not think I ought to be into the provisions of an agreement which has so far been negotiated in a rather cumbersome process through Washington in which there are no documents yet agreed to by both sides, but only some concepts and general lines, and that will all be apparent when the agreement is negotiated, hopefully in the not too distant future.

*Q. On the question of compensation or whatever it may be called for the loss of the oilfields, are you talking about American compensation, American aid? Are you talking about Arab aid or some other form?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have the impression, but I have to confirm that when I get out there, that the Arabs are not yet ready to compensate Israel for any loss of oil revenues. We are talking about the fact that in setting the aid level for Israel, we will take into account the foreign exchange losses that Israel will suffer if, as a result of the agreements, it gives up the oilfields.

I think I will take one more question.

*Q. Can you give us any idea of whether you heard from the Israeli Cabinet this morning?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* This announcement is based on the decision of the Israeli Cabinet to invite me to come to Israel.

*Q. Is there any question about it? This morning there was a question about it.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Yes, there was in the sense that the Israeli Cabinet had to approve what the negotiating team and we worked out during the course of last week, and until the Israeli Cabinet had formally approved the results of last week's negotiations, we could not announce that a shuttle could, in fact, take place.

*Q. When are you leaving here?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am leaving here tomorrow afternoon, and I am leaving Washington Wednesday around midnight.

## America's Strength and Progress Toward Freedom and Peace

*Address by President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

I am very, very happy to have this opportunity to talk with my fellow Legionnaires about two things which the American Legion has always held dear: freedom and peace—for our country and for the world.

Freedom always comes first. Let there be no doubt about that. Patrick Henry answered that question for all of us some 200 years ago. The marines, the seamen, and the airmen who rescued the *Mayaguez* gave the same clear answer which was heard 'round the world. All Americans are terribly proud of their success.

But in today's world of technological terror, with weapons of awesome sophistication and destructiveness, it is difficult to see how freedom as we know it could survive another all-out war. It is even questionable whether a free society such as ours could survive an all-out, unrestricted arms race.

We are therefore confronted with this dilemma that has faced the American people and their government since the postwar Administrations of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower. The question is this: How do we preserve, protect, and defend our freedom and that of our allies? How do we advance the cause of freedom worldwide? And how do we, at the same time, preserve the general peace and create conditions that reduce the chances of war? How do we control the tremendous cost of maintaining the capabilities required for a potential major war?

These are exceedingly difficult questions to

answer. At times we have come perilously close to a major military confrontation. We have suffered some serious setbacks. And we are still unable to resolve some dangerous conflicts festering on nearly every continent in the world.

But we have prevented world war III. We have preserved civilization. Few who remember the immediate postwar period after World War II would say that the world is not calmer and better off today than it was.

The free world, as we define it, is essentially intact after 30 years of uneasy peace between the superpowers, instability in former colonial areas, and sporadic outbreaks of local and regional violence. And three decades of imperfect peace have permitted unprecedented gains in productivity and economic progress for much of mankind, including the United States.

Some fundamental lessons were learned in this period. They must not be forgotten.

First, the military might, the material strength, and moral purpose of the United States were absolutely essential to achieve the present level of international stability. They remain absolutely essential. We are still the principal defender of freedom throughout the world.

Second, our enormous defense capability and its economic base have been reinforced by the growing resources of our allies in Europe and in the Pacific and by the increasing interdependence of industrial democracies in both military and economic areas. They must continue.

Third, the policies of five American Presidents before me for strong national defense, for reduction of East-West tension and the

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<sup>1</sup> Made before the 57th National Convention of the American Legion at Minneapolis, Minn., on Aug. 19 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Aug. 25; introductory paragraphs omitted).



threat of thermonuclear war, and for the bolstering of our essential allies have had the unswerving and nonpartisan support of the Congress and the American people. I will continue to seek that support. But today I ask you, my fellow Legionnaires, to help me achieve that objective, and I know that I can count on your support.

We share a very deep concern over the cracks now appearing in the foundations of essential national unity on defense and foreign policy.

Without a clear consensus among 214 million Americans, the role of the United States as the champion of freedom and peace throughout the world would be crippled—crippled very seriously, if not fatally. The ability of a President to carry out his constitutional duties would be dangerously diminished. The temptation to potential adversaries to take advantage of any apparent weakness, disunity, and indecision could become irresistible. With your support and that of other Americans, my Administration will give them no such temptation.

#### **Insurance Policy for Peace**

George Washington, our first President, said the best way to preserve peace is to be prepared for war. In one way or another, each of President Washington's successors has repeated that truth. Unfortunately, we have historically ignored it. We have abruptly demobilized after every war, and the next generation—the next generation of Americans—paid very dearly for this folly. I see some danger signs of our doing it again, with the stakes infinitely higher than ever before.

That is why I say to you, I am determined to resist unilateral disarmament. I am equally committed to keeping America's defenses second to none.

Now that Americans are no longer fighting on any front, there are many sincere but, in my judgment, shortsighted Americans who believe that the billions for defense could be better spent for social programs to help the poor and disadvantaged.

But I am convinced that adequate spending for national defense is an insurance policy, an insurance policy for peace we cannot afford to be without. It is most valuable if we never need to use it. But without it, we could be wiped out.

Certainly the most important social obligation of government is to guarantee all citizens, including the disadvantaged, sufficient protection of their lives and freedoms against outside attack. Today, that protection is our principal hope of peace. What expense item in our Federal budget is more essential?

This is one place where second best is worth nothing. The proportion of Federal spending for national security and the proportion of our gross national product going for defense requirements have declined in recent years. The dollar figures in the Federal budget go up, but simply because of inflation. But the weapons we can purchase and the personnel we can afford have declined.

During the Viet-Nam war, defense spending concentrated—and properly so—on current combat requirements, shortchanging our long-range research and development efforts. If our technological lead is not rapidly recovered, this could be fatal to our qualitative superiority in the future. Scientific progress in the Pentagon must be an equal partner with the best in personnel and the best in weapons in maintaining peace and deterring war.

Our potential adversaries are certainly not reducing the levels of their military power. The United States, as a result, must be alert and strong, and it will be. The defense budget which I submitted for fiscal year 1976 represents, under these circumstances, the bare minimum required for our national security. I will vigorously resist all major cuts in every way I can, and I hope I have your help.

For the next fiscal year—1977—I honestly and sincerely hope to hold down our spending on nuclear forces. This tentative judgment is conditioned on real progress in SALT Two [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]. But the Congress and the American people must realize that, unless agreement is achieved, I

will have no choice but to recommend to the Congress an additional \$2 billion to \$3 billion for strategic weapons programs in current and coming fiscal years.

### The Process of Detente

In recent weeks, there has been a great deal said about the subject of *détente*. Today, let me tell you what I personally think about *détente*.

First of all, the word itself is confusing. Its meaning is not clear to everybody. French is a beautiful language, the classic language of diplomacy, but I wish there were one simple English word to substitute for "*détente*." Unfortunately, there isn't.

Relations between the world's two strongest nuclear powers can't be summed up in a catch phrase. *Détente* literally means "easing" or "relaxing," but definitely not—and I emphasize not—the relaxing of diligence or easing of effort. Rather, it means movement away from the constant crisis and dangerous confrontations that have characterized relations with the Soviet Union.

The process of *détente*—and it is a process—looks toward a saner and safer relationship between us and the Soviet Union. It represents our best efforts to cool the cold war, which on occasion became much too hot for comfort.

To me, *détente* means a fervent desire for peace, but not peace at any price. It means the preservation of fundamental American principles, not their sacrifice. It means maintaining the strength to command respect from our adversaries and provide leadership to our friends, not letting down our guard or dismantling our defenses or neglecting our allies. It means peaceful rivalry between political and economic systems, not the curbing of our competitive efforts.

Since the American system depends on freedom, we are confident that our philosophy will prevail. Freedom is still the wave of the future. *Détente* means moderate and restrained behavior between two superpowers, not a license to fish in troubled waters. It means mutual respect and reci-

procity, not unilateral concessions or one-sided agreements.

With this attitude, I shall work with determination for a relaxation of tensions. The United States has nothing to fear from progress toward peace.

Although we have still a long way to go, we have made some progress: a defusing of the Berlin time bomb, the ABM [antiballistic missile] treaty, the first SALT agreements and progress on SALT Two, the start of mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe, and other arms control agreements regarding space, the seabeds, and germ warfare.

We have established the basis for progress toward *détente* and cooperation in Europe as a result of the summit meeting of some 35 nations in Helsinki. But the principles we adopted there now must be put into practice—principles, I should say, will be put into practice. We cannot raise the hopes of our people and shatter them by unkept promises.

We are now carefully watching some serious situations for indications of the Soviet attitude toward *détente* and cooperation in European security. The situation in Portugal is one of them. We are deeply concerned about the future of freedom in Portugal, as we have always been concerned about the future of people throughout the world.

The reality of the Portuguese situation is apparent to all. The wishes of a moderate majority have been subverted by forces more determined than representative. We are hopeful that the sheer weight of numbers—the 80 percent of the Portuguese people who support the democratic process—will prevail in this conflict of ideologies. But they must find the solution in an atmosphere that is free from the pressures of outside forces.

So far, my meetings with General Secretary [Leonid I.] Brezhnev in Vladivostok and Helsinki have been constructive and helpful. Future success will of course depend on concrete developments.

Peace is the primary objective of the foreign and defense policies of the United States. It is easy to be a cold warrior in

peacetime. But it would be irresponsible for a President to engage in confrontation when consultation would advance the cause of peace.

So, I say to you—as I said to Mr. Brezhnev and the leaders of other European nations and Canada in Helsinki—peace is crucial, but freedom must come first.

Those who proclaimed American independence almost 200 years ago asserted not merely that all Americans should enjoy life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, but that all men everywhere are endowed by their Creator with such inalienable rights.

I told the leaders of Europe that these principles, though still being perfected, remain the guiding lights of American policy, that the American people are still dedicated to the universal advancement of individual rights and human freedom implicit in the Helsinki declaration.

It gave me great pride, as the spokesman of the United States at Helsinki, to say to both East and West: My country and its principles of freedom have given hope to millions in Europe and on every continent, and still does.

On the other hand, I emphasize that we are tired of having our hopes raised and then shattered by empty words and unkept promises.

I reminded all there in Helsinki that détente must be a two-way street because tensions cannot be eased with safety and security by one side alone.

Through détente, I hope that we are on a two-way street with the Soviet Union. But until I am certain of real progress, I must reserve final judgments about the defense budget and particularly our plans for strategic nuclear forces.

We will therefore continue to seek meaningful arms agreements. But this will be possible only with sufficient and credible strength of our own and in concert with our allies. Moreover, any agreements we reach must be verifiable for our security. To put it very practically, that is, we must possess the means of making sure that they are being honored. The time has not yet come when

we can entrust our hopes for peace to a piece of paper.

Thus, another essential element of any real arms limitation, whether of strategic systems or conventional forces, is our own intelligence capability. Sweeping attacks, overgeneralization, against our intelligence activities jeopardize vital functions necessary to our national security. Today's sensations must not be the prelude to tomorrow's Pearl Harbor.

I certainly do not condone improper activities or violations of the constitutional rights of Americans by any personnel or any agency of the Federal Government. On the basis of the comprehensive studies of our intelligence agencies by the Rockefeller Commission and by the Murphy Commission on the conduct of foreign policy, I will take administrative action and recommend legislation to the Congress for whatever must be done to prevent future abuses.

Intelligence in today's world is absolutely essential to our national security—even our survival. It may be even more important in peace than in war. Any reckless congressional action to cripple the effectiveness of our intelligence services in legitimate operations would be catastrophic. Our potential adversaries and even some of our best friends operate in all intelligence fields with secrecy, with skill, and with substantial resources. I know, and I know you know, that what we need is an American intelligence capacity second to none.

#### **Restoring Assistance to Turkey**

Finally—and this relates both to our vital intelligence installations and to the imperative need to strengthen key alliances such as NATO—let us now consider our relations with our friend and ally of many years, Turkey. How do you explain to a friend and an ally why arms previously ordered and paid for are not being delivered? How do you explain to your other allies the potential damage that this may cause to our NATO alliance? How do you justify to the American people the loss of strategic intelligence data,

with its attendant effect on our national security, that this action has caused?

I don't know, because I am at a loss to explain it myself. As a man of the Congress, and proudly so, for 25 years, the last thing I seek is confrontation with my friends, my former colleagues on Capitol Hill, both Democrats and Republicans.

Obviously I am troubled that the House of Representatives has refused to permit the shipment of arms to Turkey. But I respect the sincerity and the motives of those who support this position. However, I know when the bottom line of any issue is the ultimate security of the United States, which it is in this case, the Congress and the President always found a way to close ranks and to act as one.

This does not mean that one side or the other capitulates blindly. Let us put this issue on the table and once again debate it, not in a climate of fire and fury, but in a reasoned approach based on what is right and what is best for America.

I am convinced from my personal talks last month with the leaders of Greece and Turkey and Cyprus that their differences can be settled peacefully.

We can help—the Congress, the President, and the American people. We can help cool the passions that caused so much heartbreak in the Mediterranean.

The American political system is one of checks and balances. But it works best when the checks do not become roadblocks. As President, I need the cooperation and the full support of the Congress, which I know is as concerned as I am about our nation's security.

Just as important, your representatives in the Congress need to know where you stand. They have to realize that you place America's security above personal and political considerations.

This morning I am deeply honored to have had this great opportunity to meet with you here in the heartland of America and to share some of my deep concerns and some of my personal thoughts on the future of our nation.

But talk is only the starting point, and so I ask each of you, as well as this great organization, to join with me in the commitment that I have made for the reinforcement of lasting peace and the enlargement of human freedom. I ask this not only for ourselves but for our posterity and for all people who pray that the torch of liberty will continue to burn bright.

God helping us, freedom and peace will both prevail.

## **U.S. and Bahamas Fail To Agree on Spiny Lobster Fishing**

Press release 443 dated August 27

The Department of State announced on August 27 that the talks between the United States and the Bahamas designed to permit U.S.-based fishermen access to the Bahamian spiny lobster resource had failed.

David H. Wallace, chairman of the U.S. delegation to the talks, said that the United States had made a number of proposals which were, in the U.S. view, reasonable and in the interests of both governments. He indicated that he was authorized to consider any proposals which the Bahamian Government might wish to advance. Regrettably, the Bahamian Government refused to advance any counterproposals, stating it did not believe it proper to advance such proposals to the United States.

Proposals advanced by the United States included joint conservation measures and cooperation in scientific research, limitations on U.S. fishing efforts, measures to insure that there would be no competition for that portion of the resource Bahamian fishermen are able to take, license fees to be paid to the Bahamas, assistance in enforcement, and especially assistance in training Bahamian fishermen, he said. These proposals were not accepted by the Bahamians, who concluded that they could not find a basis for agreement with the United States.

The talks between the U.S. and Bahamas Governments were held in Nassau from

August 13 to 27 and have been suspended for further consideration of the matter by the respective governments.

Mr. Wallace expressed regret over the outcome, noting that it will cause severe hardship for many U.S. spiny lobster fishermen. He pointed out that U.S. fishermen have engaged in fishing for spiny lobster on the Bahamas Banks for many years. He also noted that a joint U.S.-Bahamian group of scientific experts had developed a report which clearly indicated a substantial availability of lobster on the banks which could be taken by American fishermen without prejudice to the stock or the plans of the Bahamas for expansion of their fishery.

On July 9 the Bahamas declared jurisdiction over the spiny lobster as a living resource of the continental shelf. Similar action was taken by the United States in January 1974 when it declared jurisdiction over the American lobster as a living resource of the continental shelf.

Mr. Wallace further indicated that he had made the following statement to the Bahamian delegation upon instructions from Washington:

Without questioning the validity of the Bahamian claim of jurisdiction over spiny lobster as a living resource of the continental shelf, the U.S. Government believes that the Bahamas have an obligation under international law to take into account the interests of fishermen that previously fished for spiny lobster in the area and to negotiate reasonable arrangements regarding U.S.-flag vessels to that end. We believe such arrangements would strengthen the interests of both countries in the conservation and effective utilization of the stocks and would not in any sense be incompatible with the interests or jurisdiction of the Bahamas.

Pending resolution of this issue, the United States calls on all concerned to avoid any acts or provocations that could result in violence. We call on the Government of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas to exercise restraint in this matter. For its part, the United States will enforce its laws to the fullest extent within the United States and with respect to American vessels.

The U.S. Government will continue to do everything possible to insure that transi-

tional arrangements will be made that fairly protect the interests of our fishermen and fishing vessels as well as those of the Bahamas. Accordingly, the U.S. Government immediately intends to pursue discussions between the two governments regarding the accepted methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes such as negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. In particular, we are suggesting to the Government of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas that the issue be submitted immediately to the International Court of Justice.

## **Department Declassifies Records for 1948 and 1949**

Press release 399 dated August 4

Effective August 4, the Department of State has declassified almost all of its foreign policy records for the years 1948 and 1949. This action has been taken by special administrative decision and does not void the Department's standing regulation that provides, on a continuing basis, for the opening of records 30 years old. The present decision is based on a provision of the regulations allowing for the opening of blocks of records less than 30 years old when this is administratively feasible and consistent with the national security. Many of the most important papers in the Department's files for 1948 and 1949 have already been declassified for publication in volumes of its series "Foreign Relations of the United States" that have been released or will be released in the near future.

The bulk of the Department's records for 1948 and 1949 are in the custody of the National Archives and Records Service. The central files and most of the "decentralized" files are in the National Archives building in Washington, D.C.; the Foreign Service post files are at the Washington National Records Center at Suitland, Md.; and some of the

“decentralized” files are in the Foreign Affairs Document and Reference Center in the Department of State.

Documents for 1948 and 1949 in these various locations may now be consulted by all researchers in accordance with the standard procedures of the National Archives. Inquiries about these documents should be addressed to the Chief of the Diplomatic Branch, Civil Archives Division, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C. 20408.

## President Ford Eases Restrictions on Meat Imports From Canada

### A P R O C L A M A T I O N <sup>1</sup>

#### TERMINATION OF TEMPORARY QUANTITATIVE LIMITATION ON THE IMPORTATION INTO THE UNITED STATES OF CERTAIN CATTLE, SWINE AND PORK FROM CANADA

WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 4335 of November 16, 1974, limiting imports into the United States of certain cattle, beef, veal, swine and pork from Canada, was issued pursuant to Section 252(a) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1882(a)) in response to Canada's imposing unjustifiable restrictions on cattle and meat imports from the United States, said Proclamation inserting item numbers 945.01 through 945.04 into subpart B of part 2 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS), and

WHEREAS, Canada has now lifted those unjustifiable restrictions on cattle imports from the United States, and

WHEREAS, Section 255(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1885(b)) authorizes the President to terminate in whole or in part any proclamation made pursuant to Section 252 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1882(a)), and

WHEREAS, I deem it necessary and appropriate to terminate in part the restrictions proclaimed in Proclamation No. 4335, specifically those imposing temporary quantitative limitations on the importation into the United States of certain cattle, swine and pork from Canada, in order to encourage the resolution of trade disputes between the United States and Canada,

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GERALD R. FORD, President of

<sup>1</sup> No. 4382, 40 *Fed. Reg.* 33425.

the United States of America, acting under authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes, including Section 255(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1885(b)) do hereby proclaim that:

1) So much of Proclamation No. 4335 as proclaimed temporary quantitative limitations on the importation into the United States of certain cattle, swine, and pork from Canada is terminated.

2) Subpart B of part 2 of the Appendix to the TSUS is amended as follows:

(a) By deleting from the superior heading immediately preceding item 945.01 the following:

(i) “the cattle, the swine,”

(ii) “, or the pork”

(iii) “cattle, swine,”

(iv) “or pork, respectively,”

(b) By deleting items 945.01, 945.02, and 945.04.

3) This Proclamation is effective with respect to articles entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption after 12:01 a.m., EDT, August 7, 1975.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this fifth day of August, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and seventy-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two-hundredth.

GERALD R. FORD.

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 94th Congress, 1st Session

Agreement for the Creation of an International Office of Epizootics. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany Ex. M. 93-2. S. Ex. Rept. 94-4. April 30, 1975. 7 pp.

Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting a draft of proposed legislation. H. Doc. 94-134. May 6, 1975. 2 pp.

International Petroleum Exhibition. Report of the Senate Committee on Commerce on S.J. Res. 59 authorizing the President to invite the states of the Union and foreign nations to participate in the International Petroleum Exposition to be held at Tulsa, Oklahoma, from May 16, 1976, through May 22, 1976. S. Rept. 94-118. May 12, 1975. 5 pp.

Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. 1661. S. Rept. 94-119. May 12, 1975. 31 pp.

## Draft Convention on Environmental Warfare Tabled in Geneva Disarmament Committee

*On August 21 the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Representatives to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) at Geneva tabled, in parallel, identical draft texts of a Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.<sup>1</sup> Following is a statement made before the conference that day by U.S. Representative Joseph Martin, Jr., together with the text of the draft convention.*

U.S. delegation press release (Geneva) dated August 21

### STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR MARTIN

The United States today is tabling a draft Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. A parallel draft is being tabled by the delegation of the Soviet Union. We are presenting the draft convention as a basis for consideration by all governments and for negotiation in the CCD.

Previous discussions in the U.N. General Assembly, in the series of bilateral meetings between representatives of the Soviet Union and my government, and here in this committee, have indicated clearly the serious concern felt by many states, including my own, over the potential catastrophic dangers to mankind if environmental modification techniques were to be developed as weapons

<sup>1</sup> The draft text is the result of bilateral talks held at Moscow Nov. 1-5, 1974, at Washington Feb. 24-Mar. 5, 1975, and at Geneva June 16-20, 1975, pursuant to the U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint statement of July 3, 1974.

of war. Comments made by the experts at our recent informal meetings on this subject underline the need to develop effective measures to control military or any other hostile use of those techniques having major adverse effects before such techniques can be developed and perfected.

In the past few weeks, various delegations have provided data on the existing state of the art in environmental modification and have hypothesized about the nature of possible future techniques. From these data we can see that, while environmental warfare is not practical on a militarily significant scale at present, understanding and technology in the field are increasing. Significant advances may be possible in the course of time. Some scientists believe, for example, that methods might be developed for intentionally and selectively effecting harmful changes in the composition of the earth's atmosphere or in its climate, or for causing floods or drought. An ambitious, incautious, or desperate state might then resort to the use of such techniques. At present there is an opportunity to prohibit such use. We should seize that opportunity.

The U.S. delegation believes that development of a generally accepted convention along the lines of the draft we are tabling today would best allow us to accomplish the objectives of the General Assembly, the CCD, and of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint statement of July 3, 1974. At the same time it would not discourage the development of peaceful and beneficial environmental modification techniques.

The formulation of a convention imposing

restraints on environmental warfare presented difficult and complex problems of definition. This is the case because the development of environmental modification techniques is still at an early stage and a treaty will necessarily have to deal with future discoveries. This draft seeks to resolve such definitional problems.

The draft convention would prohibit military or any other hostile use, as a means of destruction, damage, or injury, of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects. The prohibition against "military or any other hostile use" covers two types of environmental warfare. First, it covers the hostile use of environmental modification techniques in armed conflict or to initiate such conflict. Second, it covers the use of such techniques for the specific purpose of causing destruction, damage, or injury, even when no other weapons are used or there is no other military operation taking place. We believe this draft provides a basis for distinguishing between the use of environmental modification techniques as weapons, which is covered by the prohibition, and the environmental impact of other weapons, which is not covered.

The draft deals with environmental modification techniques whose use would have widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects. This is in order to focus on the most important aspects of the problem—potential applications of such techniques as weapons which could cause the gravest harm to man and his environment.

An important consideration in this regard is that in any limitation on the hostile uses of environmental modification techniques, the attainable degree of verification of compliance with treaty constraints obviously is related to the scale of activity. Accordingly, the possibilities for verification decrease as the size, duration, or severity of the activity diminishes.

Included in the proposed convention is an illustrative list of effects of environmental modification techniques subject to prohibi-

tion. The list includes earthquakes and tsunamis; an upset in the ecological balance of a region; or changes in weather patterns, the state of the ozone layer, climate patterns, or ocean currents.

The draft does not include a ban on military research or development. Such a ban would be ineffective in view of the dual applicability to civilian and military ends of much research and development in this field and the difficulties which could be encountered in determining whether all parties were observing the prohibition.

Mr. Chairman, let me now comment on specific portions of the draft convention itself.

The preamble briefly explains the problems the convention is designed to address and provides a framework for the specific obligations which follow. The second paragraph expresses the point that advances of science and technology are giving rise to the possibility that deliberate actions can release significant natural forces or significantly alter the natural state, thus giving man the potential of modifying the environment to his own ends. The third paragraph highlights the essential difference between the great harm which military uses of environmental modification techniques might produce and possible benefits which peaceful uses might bring. The fourth paragraph reflects the commitment to limit the potential danger to mankind from such military activities. The fifth places the agreement in the context of the goals and objectives of the international community.

Articles I and II taken together form the operative substance of the convention. They are closely interdependent. Article I contains the basic obligation not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage, or injury to another state party. It also provides for an obligation not to assist, encourage, or induce any other state, group of states, or international organization to engage in such use.



Article II provides a definition of environmental modification techniques. This term refers to techniques designed to manipulate deliberately the natural processes of the earth, its oceans and atmosphere, or of outer space. The article is, therefore, comprehensive in its coverage of the natural environment. Article II also provides an illustrative list of effects which serves to define the type of phenomena to which the prohibition applies.

Article III makes it clear that the treaty does not apply to the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes and that it does not stand in the way of international cooperation in this regard.

Article IV provides for the legal implementation of the convention within individual states party, wherever needed for domestic reasons.

Article V deals with problems that might arise in applying the convention's provisions. The article sets forth the basic undertaking for consultation and cooperation among the parties and a procedure for submitting complaints to the U.N. Security Council in the event a party believes that there has been a breach of obligation.

Articles VI through IX set out provisions covering such matters as amendments, duration, and entry into force. The draft contains blanks in articles VI, VIII, and IX where the convention's depositary or depositaries remain to be identified. In addition, paragraph 2 of article VI leaves open the number of instruments of acceptance of an amendment required for its entry into force for those governments that have accepted it, while paragraph 3 of article VIII leaves open the number of ratifications required to bring the convention into force. Article VII provides that the convention shall be of unlimited duration.

Mr. Chairman, in tabling this draft Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, the United States believes that it can serve as the basis for the CCD's further consideration of the subject.

We look forward to hearing views of other delegations on the proposal and hope that our deliberations will lead to early agreement.

## TEXT OF DRAFT CONVENTION

### CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF MILITARY OR ANY OTHER HOSTILE USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES

The States Party to this Convention,

Guided by the interest of consolidating peace, and wishing to contribute to the cause of limiting the arms race, and of bringing about disarmament, and of saving mankind from the danger of using new means of warfare;

Recognizing that scientific and technical advances may open new possibilities with respect to modification of the environment;

Realizing that military use of environmental modification techniques could have widespread, long-lasting or severe effects harmful to human welfare, but that the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes could improve the interrelationship of man and nature and contribute to the preservation and improvement of the environment for the benefit of present and future generations;

Desiring to limit the potential danger to mankind from means of warfare involving the use of environmental modification techniques;

Desiring also to contribute to the strengthening of trust among nations and to the further improvement of the international situation in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Have agreed as follows:

#### ARTICLE I

1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to another State Party.

2. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to assist, encourage or induce any State, group of States or international organization to engage in activities contrary to the provision of paragraph 1 of this article.

#### ARTICLE II

As used in Article I, the term "environmental modification techniques" refers to any technique for

changing—through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes—the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere, and atmosphere, or of outer space, so as to cause such effects as earthquakes and tsunamis, an upset in the ecological balance of a region, or changes in weather patterns (clouds, precipitation, cyclones of various types and tornadic storms), in the state of the ozone layer or ionosphere, in climate patterns, or in ocean currents.

#### ARTICLE III

The provisions of this Convention shall not hinder the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes by States Party, or international economic and scientific cooperation in the utilization, preservation and improvement of the environment for peaceful purposes.

#### ARTICLE IV

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes, in accordance with its constitutional processes, to take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent any activity in violation of the provisions of the Convention anywhere under its jurisdiction or control.

#### ARTICLE V

1. The States Party to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objectives of, or in the application of the provisions of this Convention. Consultation and cooperation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

2. Any State Party to this Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council.

3. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Party to the Convention of the results of the investigation.

4. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security

Council decides that such Party has been harmed or is likely to be harmed as a result of violation of the Convention.

#### ARTICLE VI

1. Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to \_\_\_\_\_ which shall circulate it to all States Party.

2. An amendment shall enter into force for all States Party which have accepted it, upon the deposit with \_\_\_\_\_ of instruments of acceptance by \_\_\_\_\_. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instruments of acceptance.

#### ARTICLE VII

This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

#### ARTICLE VIII

1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with \_\_\_\_\_.

3. This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by \_\_\_\_\_ in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article.

4. For those States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The \_\_\_\_\_ shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices.

6. This Convention shall be registered by \_\_\_\_\_ in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

#### ARTICLE IX

This Convention, the Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with \_\_\_\_\_ who shall send certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized thereto, have signed this Convention.

Done in \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_.

## U.S. Vetoes U.N. Admission of North and South Viet-Nam

*The U.N. Security Council had before it on August 6 a provisional agenda which included applications for U.N. membership from the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and the Republic of Korea; the Council voted to include the Vietnamese applications on the agenda but rejected the application of the Republic of Korea. As a result, on August 11 the United States voted against the Vietnamese applications for membership. Following are statements made in the Council on August 6 and August 11 by U.S. Representative Daniel P. Moynihan.*<sup>1</sup>

### STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN

#### Statement of August 6

USUN press release 82 dated August 6

We are at the end of another day in a dubious time in the history of the United Nations. The Security Council has had before it the simplest of matters. We have been asked to carry forward our duty under the charter to consider the admission of new members. The applications of these nations were before us. The United States was of course prepared to vote for the consideration of each of these three nations. The essential thrust of the charter toward universality required nothing less of us. Verily, it is a duty of a Security Council member to insure that the application of any entity bearing any resemblance to statehood—the application

<sup>1</sup>The Council on August 6 approved the inclusion on the agenda of the Vietnamese applications by votes of 14 to 0, with the United States abstaining; the vote on the inclusion of the South Korean application was 7 (U.S.) in favor, 6 against, with 2 abstentions. On August 11 the Council voted on the draft resolutions to admit South Viet-Nam and North Viet-Nam; the votes were 13 in favor, 1 against (U.S.), with 1 abstention (Costa Rica).

for admission to the United Nations—be referred to the Admissions Committee. It is the role of the Admissions Committee to consider whether the applicant in fact meets the requirements of the charter for membership.

Today we have had before us three applicants. The United States had been prepared to see each considered by the Admissions Committee, and as the United States has made clear, we have been prepared to vote for the admission of each and all of these applicants. We were prepared to see each of them admitted if all were admitted. Clearly, the Security Council action forecloses this opportunity for the 30th General Assembly, and we can only regret it.

#### Statement of August 11

USUN press release 83 dated August 11

The United States today has, for the first time, vetoed the admission of a new member to the United Nations. The veto was repeated a second time. This is an action my country hoped it would never take. As far back as 1948, in a resolution sponsored by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, who had served as a U.S. delegate to the first General Assembly, the U.S. Senate specially called on our executive to forswear our use of the veto in all questions involving the admission of new members. In 1949 the executive branch undertook to do just that. And so it is no small matter for us that we have felt forced to break with our practice of 30 years. The American people, and possibly peoples and governments elsewhere, will desire an explanation.

This is not difficult to provide. If our specific actions today are at variance with 30 years' practice, we nonetheless continue to act in support of the same principle, that of universal membership in the United Nations. What has changed is our judgment that if the United States acts in an open and accepting manner as applications for membership come before us, other members of the Security Council might do so as well. I be-

lieve it is fair to say that we did not change this judgment precipitously. In truth, an impartial observer might wonder that our practice persisted through a quarter century of vetoes by others.

What in the end changed our mind was the decisions of the Council taken at its 1834th meeting on August 6, 1975. It became absolutely clear on that occasion that the Security Council, far from being prepared to support the principle of universal membership, was denying to one applicant even the right to have its case considered. Never before has the Council gone so far as to refuse even to consider the application of an entity so widely regarded as a state as to have been accepted as a member of numerous specialized agencies, and also, on four separate occasions in the past, to have been proposed for membership by a clear majority of this same Security Council.

It may be recalled what I said, speaking for my government, on August 6. I said that the United States had made clear that we were prepared to vote for the admission of each and all of the three applicants then before us, which is to say the United States would have voted for the admission of the Republic of South Korea, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam. And I would like to take this occasion to welcome the representatives of those countries to this Council chamber.

Earlier that day a State Department spokesman had indicated that the United States would be equally willing to vote for the admission of North Korea as well. We would have done so in plain pursuit of the principle of universality. But the State Department spokesman said then, and I repeat now, that we would have and we will have nothing to do with selective universality, a principle which in practice admits only new members acceptable to the totalitarian states. I said on August 6 that the action of the Security Council that day foreclosed the admission of these new applicants for the coming General Assembly.

We clearly stated that we were prepared to act in favor of the admission of all three

states were the Council prepared to adhere to the principle of universality. The Council was not so prepared; indeed, the principle of universality seems gravely imperiled by what took place here on August 6.

The United Nations should be as near as possible to universal in membership. As new nations are formed, they should be seen as having a presumed right to membership, given their fealty to the charter. It is just that principle that has brought us from an original membership of 51 to the present membership of 138. It is just that principle which will take us still higher, for there are more than half a dozen new nations waiting in the wings. But we must not apply partisan political tests to membership. The United Nations cannot work if we do. It is because the United States desires that it should work that we have today made the hard decision to break with our practice of 30 years and block the membership of two nations whose sponsors have refused to act equitably toward the application of another nation.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Arbitration

Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; for the United States December 29, 1970. TIAS 6997.  
*Ratification deposited: Belgium, August 18, 1975.*

##### Energy

Agreement on an international energy program. Done at Paris November 18, 1974.<sup>1</sup>  
*Notifications of consent to be bound: Denmark, June 19, 1975; Ireland, July 28, 1975; Luxembourg, April 24, 1975.*

##### Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as amended.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

Done at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.

*Signature and acceptance:* Grenada, August 27, 1975.

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Done at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.  
*Signature and acceptance:* Grenada, August 27, 1975.

### Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization, as amended. Done at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force April 7, 1948; for the United States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086.  
*Accession deposited:* Tonga, August 14, 1975.

### Narcotic Drugs

Convention relating to the suppression of the abuse of opium and other drugs. Done at The Hague January 23, 1912. Entered into force February 11, 1915. 38 Stat. 1912.  
*Notification of succession:* The Bahamas, August 13, 1975.

Protocol amending the agreements, conventions and protocols on narcotic drugs concluded at The Hague on January 23, 1912 (38 Stat. 1912), at Geneva on February 11, 1925 and February 19, 1925, and July 13, 1931 (48 Stat. 1543), at Bangkok on November 27, 1931 and at Geneva on June 26, 1936. Done at Lake Success, New York December 11, 1946. TIAS 1671, 1859.  
*Notification of succession:* The Bahamas, August 13, 1975.

Protocol bringing under international control drugs outside the scope of the convention of July 13, 1931, for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs (48 Stat. 1543), as amended by the protocol signed at Lake Success on December 11, 1946 (TIAS 1671, 1859). Done at Paris November 19, 1948. Entered into force December 1, 1949; for the United States September 11, 1950. TIAS 2308.  
*Notification of succession:* The Bahamas, August 13, 1975.

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December 13, 1964; for the United States June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298.

*Notification of succession:* The Bahamas, August 13, 1975.

### Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972.  
*Ratification deposited:* Haiti, August 28, 1975.  
*Enters into force:* September 27, 1975.

### Oil Pollution

International convention on the establishment of an international fund for compensation for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels December 18, 1971.  
*Ratification deposited:* Algeria, June 2, 1975.

### Trade

Protocol of provisional application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva October 30, 1947. Entered into force January 1, 1948. TIAS 1700.

*Extended to:* Papua New Guinea, August 4, 1975.

## BILATERAL

### Chile

Agreement regarding the consolidation and re-scheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed or insured by the U.S. Government and its agencies, with annexes and statement. Signed at Washington July 3, 1975. Enters into force when the United States notifies Chile in writing that domestic U.S. laws and regulations covering debt rescheduling have been complied with.

### International Committee of the Red Cross

Agreement amending the grant agreement of February 20, March 16 and 17, 1975, as amended (TIAS 8032), concerning emergency relief and assistance to refugees, displaced persons, and war victims in the Republic of Viet-Nam, Laos, and the Khmer Republic. Signed at Geneva April 18 and 24, 1975. Entered into force April 24, 1975.

### Portugal

Agreement terminating the agreement of November 17, 1970, as amended, relating to trade in cotton textiles and providing for consultations on problems of market disruption from exports of cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and apparel products from Portugal. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington August 20, 1975. Entered into force August 20, 1975.

## PUBLICATIONS

### 1948 "Foreign Relations" Volume on Near East, South Asia, and Africa

Press release 403 dated August 6 (for release August 13)

The Department of State released on August 13 "Foreign Relations of the United States," 1948, volume V, "The Near East, South Asia, and Africa," part 1. This volume is the latest in the "Foreign Relations" series, which has been published continuously since 1861 as the official record of American foreign policy. Seven other volumes for 1948 and five for 1949 have already been released.

Part 1 of the present volume contains 532 pages and presents previously unpublished documentation

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

on U.S. participation in the development of the petroleum resources of the Near East; the aftermath of the "Pentagon Talks of 1947" between the United States and the United Kingdom concerning the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean; and U.S. relations with and assistance to Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Part 1 also includes documentation on U.S. participation in efforts to resolve the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and Hyderabad and on relations with India, Afghanistan, and the Union of South Africa.

Part 2 of this volume is now in preparation and will be published subsequently. It will contain documentation on the interest of the United States in the Arab-Zionist controversy over the future status of Palestine and the creation of the State of Israel.

The part of the volume now released was prepared by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs. Copies of volume V, part 1, for 1948 (listed as Department of State publication 8802; GPO cat. no. S1.1:948/v. V, pt. 1.) may be obtained for \$8.25 (domestic postpaid). Checks or money orders should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents and sent to the U.S. Government Book Store, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

## GPO Sales Publications

*Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.*

**Background Notes:** Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—\$21.80; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—\$23.10; plastic binder—\$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 30¢ each.

Fiji . . . . .	Cat. No. S1.123:F47	
	Pub. 8486	4 pp.
Guatemala . . . . .	Cat. No. S1.123:G93	
	Pub. 7798	5 pp.
Hungary. . . . .	Cat. No. S1.123:H89	
	Pub. 7915	7 pp.

**International Wheat Agreement, 1971—Modification and Extension of Wheat Trade Convention and Food Aid Convention.** Protocols with other governments. TIAS 7988. 62 pp. 75¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7988).

**Double Taxation—Earnings from Operation of Ships and Aircraft.** Agreement with Jordan. TIAS 8002. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8002).

**Cultural Relations.** Agreement with the Socialist Republic of Romania. TIAS 8006. 10 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8006).

**Trade in Cotton Textiles.** Agreement with Nicaragua terminating the agreement of September 5, 1972, as amended. TIAS 8007. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8007).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with the Khmer Republic. TIAS 8008. 32 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8008).

**Trade in Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textile Products.** Agreement with Singapore amending the agreement of October 30, 1973 and January 20, 1974. TIAS 8009. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8009).

### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: August 25–31

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*434	8/25	Study Group 2 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCIR, Sept. 25.
†435	8/25	Kissinger: comments to the press, Jerusalem, Aug. 24.
†436	8/25	Kissinger, Sadat: news conference, Alexandria.
†437	8/25	Kissinger, Sadat: news conference, Alexandria.
†438	8/25	Kissinger, Allon: comments to the press, Jerusalem.
†439	8/25	Kissinger: remarks, Jerusalem.
*440	8/26	U.S. Advisory Committee of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, Sept. 18.
†441	8/26	Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law, 1974, released.
†442	8/26	Kissinger, Allon: comments to the press, Jerusalem.
443	8/27	U.S.-Bahamas spiny lobster talks.
†444	8/28	Kissinger, Allon: remarks, Jerusalem, Aug. 27.
†445	8/28	Kissinger: remarks, Jerusalem, Aug. 27.
†446	8/29	Kissinger: remarks to the press, Jerusalem, Aug. 28.
†447	8/29	Kissinger, Sadat: remarks to the press, Alexandria, Aug. 28.
†448	8/29	Kissinger, Allon: remarks, Jerusalem.
†449	8/29	Kissinger: remarks, Jerusalem.
†451	8/30	Kissinger, Allon: remarks, Jerusalem.
*452	8/29	731 Fulbright-Hays scholarship winners named.
†453	8/31	Kissinger: remarks, Jerusalem.
†454	8/31	Kissinger: remarks, Jerusalem.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXXIII • No. 1891 • September 22, 1975

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LXXIII, No. 1891

September 22, 1975

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*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

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## Global Consensus and Economic Development

*Text of Address by Secretary Kissinger*<sup>1</sup>

We assemble here this week with an opportunity to improve the condition of mankind. We can let this opportunity slip away, or we can respond to it with vision and common sense.

The United States has made its choice. There are no panaceas available—only challenges. The proposals that I shall announce today on behalf of President Ford are a program of practical steps responding to the expressed concerns of developing countries. We have made a major effort to develop an agenda for effective international action; we are prepared in turn to consider the proposals of others. But the United States is committed to a constructive effort.

For some time the technical capacity has existed to provide a tolerable standard of life for the world's 4 billion people. But we, the world community, must shape the political will to do so. For man stands not simply at a plateau of technical ability; he stands at a point of moral choice. When the ancient dream of mankind—a world without poverty—becomes a possibility, our profound moral convictions make it also our duty. And the convening of this special session bears witness that economic progress has become a central and urgent concern of international relations.

The global order of colonial power that lasted through centuries has now disappeared; the cold war division of the world into two rigid blocs has now also broken

down, and major changes have taken place in the international economy. We now live in a world of some 150 nations. We live in an environment of continuing conflicts, proliferating weapons, new ideological divisions and economic rivalry. The developing nations have stated their claim for a greater role, for more control over their economic destiny, and for a just share in global prosperity. The economically advanced nations have stated their claim for reliable supplies of energy, raw materials, and other products at a fair price; they seek stable economic relationships and expanding world trade, for these are important to the well-being of their own societies.

These economic issues have already become the subject of mounting confrontation—embargoes, cartels, seizures, countermeasures—and bitter rhetoric. Over the remainder of this century, should this trend continue, the division of the planet between North and South, between rich and poor, could become as grim as the darkest days of the cold war. We would enter an age of festering resentment, increased resort to economic warfare, a hardening of new blocs, the undermining of cooperation, the erosion of international institutions—and failed development.

Can we reconcile our competing goals? Can we build a better world, by conscious purpose, out of the equality and cooperation of states? Can we turn the energies of all nations to the tasks of human progress? These are the challenges of our time.

We profoundly believe that neither the poor nor the rich nations can achieve their purposes in isolation. Neither can extort

<sup>1</sup>Read before the seventh special session of the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 1 by Daniel P. Moynihan, U.S. Representative to the United Nations (text from press release 450).

them from the other—the developing countries least of all, for they would pay the greater cost of division of the planet, which would cut them off needlessly from sources of capital and markets essential to their own progress.

The reality is that ample incentives exist for cooperation on the basis of mutual respect. It is not necessarily the case that if some grow worse off, others will be worse off. But there is an opposite proposition, which we believe is true: that an economic system thrives if all who take part in it thrive. This is no theory; it is our own experience. And it is an experience that we, a people uniquely drawn from all the other peoples of the world, truly desire and hope to share with others.

Therefore it is time to go beyond the doctrines left over from a previous century that are made obsolete by modern reality.

History has left us the legacy of strident nationalism—discredited in this century by its brutal excesses a generation ago and by its patent inadequacy for the economic needs of our time. The economy is global. Recessions, inflation, trade relations, monetary stability, gluts and scarcities of products and materials, the growth of transnational enterprises—these are international phenomena and call for international responses.

History has also left us discredited doctrines of economic determinism and struggle. One of the ironies of our time is that systems based on the doctrine of materialism that promised economic justice have lagged in raising economic welfare.

And contrary to the ideologies of despair, many developing countries have been increasing their per capita incomes at far faster rates than obtained historically in Europe and North America in comparable stages of their growth.

It is also ironic that a philosophy of non-alignment, designed to allow new nations to make their national choices free from the pressure of competing blocs, now has produced a bloc of its own. Nations with radically different economic interests and with entirely different political concerns are combined in a kind of solidarity that often clear-

ly sacrifices practical interests. And it is ironic also that the most devastating blow to economic development in this decade came not from "imperialist rapacity" but from an arbitrary, monopolistic price increase by the cartel of oil exporters.

The reality is that the world economy is a single global system of trade and monetary relations on which hinges the development of all our economies. The advanced nations have an interest in the growth of markets and production in the developing world; with equal conviction we state that the developing countries have a stake in the markets, technological innovation, and capital investment of the industrial countries.

Therefore the nations assembled here have a choice: We can offer our people slogans, or we can offer them solutions. We can deal in rhetoric, or we can deal in reality. My government has made its choice.

The United States firmly believes that the economic challenges of our time must unite us, and not divide us.

So let us get down to business. Let us put aside the sterile debate over whether a new economic order is required or whether the old economic order is adequate. Let us look forward and shape the world before us. Change is inherent in what we do and what we seek. But one fact does not change: that without a consensus on the realities and principles of the development effort, we will achieve nothing.

—There must be consensus, first and foremost, on the principle that our common development goals can be achieved only by cooperation, not by the politics of confrontation.

—There must be consensus that acknowledges our respective concerns and our mutual responsibilities. All of us have rights, and all of us have duties.

—The consensus must embrace the broadest possible participation in international decisions. The developing countries must have a role and voice in the international system, especially in decisions that affect them. But those nations who are asked to provide resources and effort to carry out the decisions must be accorded a commensurate voice.

We have learned from experience that the methods of development assistance of the 1950's and 60's are no longer adequate. Not only did the technical accomplishments of many programs fall short of expectations; the traditional approaches are less acceptable to the industrialized world because they have seemed to become an endless and one-sided financial burden. And they are less acceptable to the developing world because they have seemed to create a relationship of charity and dependency, inconsistent with equality and self-respect.

Therefore we must find new means. The United States offers today concrete proposals for international actions to promote economic development. We believe that an effective development strategy should concentrate on five fundamental areas:

—First, we must apply international cooperation to the problem of insuring basic economic security. The United States proposes steps to safeguard against the economic shocks to which developing countries are particularly vulnerable: sharp declines in their export earnings from the cycle of world supply and demand, food shortages, and natural disasters.

—Second, we must lay the foundations for accelerated growth. The United States proposes steps to improve developing countries' access to capital markets, to focus and adapt new technology to specific development needs, and to reach consensus on the conditions for foreign investment.

—Third, we must improve the basic opportunities of the developing countries in the world trading system so they can make their way by earnings instead of aid.

—Fourth, we must improve the conditions of trade and investment in key commodities on which the economies of many developing countries are dependent, and we must set an example in improving the production and availability of food.

—Fifth, let us address the special needs of the poorest countries, who are the most devastated by current economic conditions, sharing the responsibility among old and newly wealthy donors.

The determination of the developing na-

tions to mobilize their own effort is indispensable. Without it, no outside effort will have effect. Government policies to call forth savings, to institute land reform, to use external aid and capital productively, to manage and allocate national resources wisely, to promote family planning—for these there are no substitutes.

But there must be international as well as national commitment. The United States is prepared to do its part. The senior economic officials of our government have joined with me in developing our approach. Treasury Secretary Simon, with whom I have worked closely on our program, will discuss it tomorrow in relation to the world economy. The large congressional delegation that will attend the session, and the seriousness with which they and the executive branch have collaborated in preparing these proposals, are evidence of my country's commitment.

We ask in return for a serious international dialogue on the responsibilities which confront us all.

### **Insuring Economic Security**

Our first task is to insure basic economic security.

The swings and shocks of economic adversity are a global concern tearing at the fabric of developed and developing nations alike. The cycle of good times and bad, abundance and famine, does vast damage to lives and economies. Unemployment, falling standards of living, and the ravages of inflation fuel social and political discontent. We have recently seen the corrosive effects in many countries.

Developing economies are by far the most vulnerable to natural and manmade disasters—the vagaries of weather and of the business cycle. Sharp increases in the prices of oil and food have a devastating effect on their livelihood. Recessions in the industrial countries depress their export earnings.

Thus economic security is the minimum requirement of an effective strategy for development. Without this foundation, sound development programs cannot proceed and the great efforts that development requires

from poor and rich alike cannot be sustained.

And because economic security is a global problem, it is a global challenge:

—The industrial nations must work together more effectively to restore and maintain their noninflationary expansion;

—Nations which supply vital products must avoid actions which disrupt that expansion; and

—The international community must undertake a new approach to reduce drastic fluctuations in the export earnings of the developing countries.

Since the economic health of the industrial countries is central to the health of the global economy, their efforts to avoid the extremes of recession and inflation become an international, as well as a national, responsibility.

In a new departure this past year, the leaders of the United States and its major trading partners have begun closer coordination of their national economic policies. A shared sense of urgency, and the exchange of information about trends and intentions, have already influenced important policy decisions. President Ford intends to continue and intensify consultations of this kind. The successful recovery of the industrial economies will be the engine of international stability and growth.

Global economic security depends, secondly, on the actions of suppliers of vital products.

Thus the United States has believed that the future of the world economy requires discussions on energy and other key issues among oil consuming and producing nations. The Government of France is inviting industrialized, oil-producing, and developing nations to relaunch a dialogue this fall on the problems of energy, development, raw materials, and related financial issues. The United States has supported this proposal and worked hard to establish the basis for successful meetings.

But this dialogue is based on an approach of negotiation and consensus, not the exercise of brute economic power to gain unilateral advantage. The enormous, arbitrary increases in the price of oil of 1973 and 1974

have already exacerbated both inflation and recession worldwide. They have shattered the economic planning and progress of many countries. Another increase would slow down or reverse the recovery and the development of nearly every nation represented in this Assembly. It would erode both the will and the capacity in the industrial world for assistance to developing countries. It would, in short, strike a serious blow at the hopes of hundreds of millions around the world.

The forthcoming dialogue among consumers and producers is a test. For its part, the United States is prepared for cooperation. We will work to make it succeed, in our own self-interest and in the interest of all nations. We hope to be met in that same spirit.

The third basic factor in economic security is the stability of export earnings. The development programs—indeed, the basic survival—of many countries rest heavily on earnings from exports of primary products which are highly vulnerable to fluctuations in worldwide demand. Countries which depend on one product can find their revenues reduced drastically if its price drops or if exports fall precipitously. Most have insufficient reserves to cushion against sharp declines in earnings, and they cannot quickly increase the exports of other products. Facing such economic problems, most cannot borrow to offset the loss or can only do so at extremely high interest rates. In such situations countries are frequently forced to cut back on the imports on which their growth and survival depend. Thus the unpredictability of export earnings can make a mockery of development planning.

The question of stabilization of income from primary products has become central in the dialogue on international economic concerns. Price stabilization is not generally a promising approach. For many commodities it would be difficult to achieve without severe restrictions on production or exports, extremely expensive buffer stocks, or price levels which could stimulate substitutes and thereby work to the long-range disadvantage of producers. Even the most ambitious agenda for addressing individual commodi-

ties would not result in stabilization arrangements for all of them in the near term. And focusing exclusively on stabilizing commodity prices would not provide sufficient protection to the many developing countries whose earnings also depend on the exports of manufactured goods.

The U.S. Government has recently completed a review of these issues. We have concluded that, because of the wide diversity among countries, commodities, and markets, a new, much more comprehensive approach is required—one which will be helpful to exporters of all commodities and manufactured goods as well.

Let me set forth our proposal. The United States proposes creation in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of a new development security facility to stabilize overall export earnings.

—The facility would give loans to sustain development programs in the face of export fluctuations; up to \$2.5 billion, and possibly more, in a single year and a potential total of \$10 billion in outstanding loans.

—Assistance would be available to all developing countries which need to finance shortfalls in export earnings, unless the shortfalls are caused by their own acts of policy.

—The poorest countries would be permitted to convert their loans into grants under prescribed conditions. These grants would be financed by the proceeds of sales of IMF gold channeled through the proposed \$2 billion Trust Fund now under negotiation.

—Eligible countries could draw most, or under certain conditions all, of their IMF quotas in addition to their normal drawing rights. Much of that could be drawn in a single year, if necessary; part automatically, part subject to balance-of-payments conditions, and part reserved for cases of particularly violent swings in commodity earnings.

—Shortfalls would be calculated according to a formula geared to future growth as well as current and past exports. In this way the facility helps countries protect their development plans.

—This facility would replace the IMF's compensatory finance facility; it would not be available for industrial countries.

The United States will present its detailed proposals to the Executive Directors of the International Monetary Fund this month.

This development security facility would provide unprecedented protection against disruptions caused by reductions in earnings—both for countries whose exports consist of a few commodities and for those with diversified and manufactured exports, whose earnings also fluctuate with business cycles. In the great majority of countries, this new facility will cover nearly all the earnings shortfall.

This new source of funds also reinforces our more traditional types of assistance; without the stabilization of earnings, the benefits of concessional aid for developing countries are vitiated. For industrialized countries, it means a more steady export market. For developing countries, it helps assure that development can be pursued without disruption and makes them more desirable prospects in international capital markets. For consumers and producers, rich and poor alike, it buttresses economic security.

Thus the success of our efforts in this area will demonstrate that our interdependence can strengthen the foundations of prosperity for all while promoting progress in the developing countries.

### **Accelerating Economic Growth**

It is not enough to insure the minimal economic security of the developing countries. Development is a process of growth, acceleration, greater productivity, higher living standards, and social change. This is a process requiring the infusion of capital, technology, and managerial skills on a massive scale.

Developing countries themselves will have to provide most of the effort, but international support is indispensable. Even a moderate acceleration of recent growth rates will require some \$40 billion a year in outside capital by 1980. The requirement for tech-

nological innovation, though impossible to quantify, is similarly great.

How can these needs for capital, technology, and skills be met?

Bilateral concessional assistance from the industrialized countries has been one important source. Last year it amounted to some \$7.2 billion. This must continue to grow. But realistically, we cannot expect the level to increase significantly over the coming years. To put it frankly, the political climate for bilateral aid has deteriorated. In the industrial countries, support for aid has been eroded by domestic economic slowdown, compounded by energy problems; in the developing countries, there is resentment at forms of assistance which imply dependence.

The oil exporters have only begun to meet their responsibility for assistance to the poorer countries. Last year their concessional aid disbursements were roughly \$2 billion; they could, and must, rise substantially this year.

But the industrial nations and the oil exporters cannot, even together, supply all the new resources needed to accelerate development. It follows inescapably that the remaining needs for capital and technology can only be met, directly or indirectly, from the vast pool of private sources. This investment will take place only if the conditions exist to attract or permit it. The United States therefore believes it is time for the world community to address the basic requirements for accelerating growth in developing countries:

—First, developing countries must have better access to capital markets.

—Second, we must promote the transfer of technology.

—Third, it is time to reach an international consensus on the principles to guide the beneficial operation of transnational enterprises.

#### *Access to Capital Markets*

First, access to capital markets: The private capital markets are already a major source of development funds, either directly or through intermediaries. The World Bank and the regional development banks borrow

extensively to lend to developing nations. The United States urges the expansion of these programs. We are gratified that advanced countries outside of the Western Hemisphere are joining us shortly in a \$6 billion expansion of the Inter-American Development Bank. We will participate in negotiations for replenishment of the Asian Development Bank, and we are seeking congressional authority to join the African Development Fund.

But the developing countries that have been most successful and that no longer require concessional aid, especially in Asia and Latin America, have relied heavily on borrowing in the capital markets. Their future access must be assured.

We must now find new ways to enhance the opportunities of developing countries in the competition for capital. And we need to match in new ways potential sources of capital with the investment needs of developing countries.

Several courses of action offer promise.

First, the United States will support a major expansion of the resources of the World Bank's International Finance Corporation, the investment banker with the broadest experience in supporting private enterprise in developing countries. We propose a large increase in the IFC's capital, from the present \$100 million to at least \$400 million.

Second, the United States proposes creation of an International Investment Trust to mobilize portfolio capital for investment in local enterprises. The trust would attract new capital by offering investors a unique opportunity: participation in a managed broad selection of investments in developing country firms, public, private, and mixed. The International Finance Corporation would manage it and perhaps provide seed capital, but most of its funds would come from government and private investors. Investors would have their exposure to major losses limited by a \$200 million loss reserve provided by governments of industrialized, oil-producing, and developing nations. This institution could be a powerful link between the capital markets and the developing world



and could provide billions of dollars of essential resources.

Third, the United States will contribute actively to the work of the IMF-World Bank Development Committee to find ways to assist developing countries in their direct borrowing in the capital markets. It is encouraging that the Latin American countries are considering a regional financial safety net to underpin their access to capital markets by mutual commitments of financial backing.

Finally, we believe that all industrial countries should systematically review the conditions for developing-country access to their national markets to assure that they offer fair and open opportunity. The United States is prepared to provide technical assistance and expertise to developing countries ready to enter long-term capital markets, and we ask others to join us.

### *Transfer of Technology*

Developing countries need not only new funds but also new technology. Yet the mechanisms for the transfer of technology and for its local development are limited and are seldom at the sole command of national governments, and the technologies of industrial countries must often be adapted to local economic and social conditions. New institutions and new approaches are therefore required.

For technology to spur development, it must spur growth in priority areas: energy, food, other resources strategic to the developing economies, and industrialization itself.

First, *energy* is critical for both agricultural and industrial development. The enormous rise in the cost of oil in the last two years has more than wiped out the total of the foreign aid that developing countries have received. It has undermined their balance of payments and has mortgaged their future by forcing them into larger borrowing at higher interest rates. There is no easy short-term solution; but if energy dependence is to be reduced, efforts to exploit new and diversified sources must be intensified now.

The United States invites other nations to join us in an increase of bilateral support

for training and technical assistance to help developing countries find and exploit new sources of fossil fuel and other forms of energy.

Methods of discovering and using less accessible or low-grade resources must be fully utilized. So must technology to produce solar and geothermal power. And these techniques must be suited to the conditions of the developing countries.

The United States believes the topic of energy cooperation should be high on the agenda for the forthcoming dialogue between consumers and producers. We will propose, in this dialogue, creation of an International Energy Institute bringing together developed and developing, consumer and producer, on the particular problem of energy development. The International Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency should both find ways to give technical assistance and support to this institute.

A second critical area for technological innovation is *food production and improvement of nutrition*.

During the past decade, a number of international agricultural research centers have been established to adapt techniques to local needs and conditions. In 1971 the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research was formed to coordinate these efforts. The United States is prepared to expand the capacity of these institutions. In collaboration with national research organizations with more skilled manpower and funds, they could grow into a worldwide research network for development of agricultural technology.

We are also supporting legislation in the Congress to enable our universities to expand their technical assistance and research in the agricultural field.

*Nonfood agricultural and forestry products* are a third strategic area for technological assistance. The export earnings of many of the poorest countries—and the livelihood of many millions of their people—depend on such products as timber, jute, cotton, and natural rubber, some of which have encountered serious problems in the face of synthetics. They urgently need assistance

to improve the productivity and competitiveness of these products and to diversify their economies.

The United States therefore proposes creation of an organization to coordinate and finance such assistance. Its task will be to attract manpower and capital for research. The financing of this effort should be a priority task for the new International Fund for Agricultural Development.

But developing countries' need for technology is not only for development of strategic sectors but for the broad *promotion of industrialization* itself. This requires the broadest application of skills, resources, and information.

This is not an easy task. The storehouse of technology is already huge and is growing geometrically. Developing practical devices to transfer technology beyond those which already exist will require careful thought. We are prepared to join with other nations in examining new initiatives.

To this end the United States supports creation of an International Industrialization Institute to sponsor and conduct research on industrial technology together with the governments, industries, and research facilities of developing countries.

We support creation of an international center for the exchange of technological information, as a clearinghouse for the sharing of ongoing research and new findings relevant to development.

We will expand our bilateral support of industrial technology appropriate to developing country needs.

We will work with others in this organization in preparing guidelines for the transfer of technology and in the planning of a conference on science and technology for development.

### *Transnational Enterprises*

Access to capital markets and special programs to transfer new technology are but two factors of accelerated growth. There is a third—which may well be one of the most effective engines of development—the transnational enterprise.

Transnational enterprises have been powerful instruments of modernization both in

the industrial nations—where they conduct most of their operations—and in the developing countries, where there is often no substitute for their ability to marshal capital, management skills, technology, and initiative. Thus the controversy over their role and conduct is itself an obstacle to economic development.

It is time for the world community to deal with the problems, real and perceived, that have arisen. If the nations assembled here cannot reach consensus on the proper role of these enterprises, the developing countries could lose an invaluable asset. Let us make this issue a test of our capacity to accommodate mutual concerns in practical agreement.

For our part, the United States is prepared to meet the proper concerns of governments in whose territories transnational enterprises operate. We affirm that enterprises must act in full accordance with the sovereignty of host governments and take full account of their public policy. Countries are entitled to regulate the operations of transnational enterprises within their borders. But countries wishing the benefits of these enterprises should foster the conditions that attract and maintain their productive operation.

The United States therefore believes that the time has come for the international community to articulate standards of conduct for both enterprises and governments. The United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations and other international bodies have begun such an effort. We must reach agreement on balanced principles. These should apply to transnational enterprises in their relations with governments, and to governments in their relations with enterprises and with other governments. They must be fair principles, for failure to reflect the interests of all parties concerned would exacerbate rather than moderate the frictions which have damaged the environment for international investment. Specifically, the United States believes that:

—Transnational enterprises are obliged to obey local law and refrain from unlawful intervention in the domestic affairs of host

countries. Their activities should take account of public policy and national development priorities. They should respect local customs. They should employ qualified local personnel, or qualify local people through training.

—Host governments in turn must treat transnational enterprises equitably, without discrimination among them, and in accordance with international law. Host governments should make explicit their development priorities and the standards which transnational enterprises are expected to meet, and maintain them with reasonable consistency.

—Governments and enterprises must both respect the contractual obligations that they freely undertake. Contracts should be negotiated openly, fairly, and with full knowledge of their implications. Greater assurance that contracts will be honored will improve the international commercial environment, increase the flow of investment, and expand economic transactions. Destructive and politically explosive investment disputes, which spoil the climate for large commitments and investment, will occur less frequently.

—Principles established for transnational enterprises should apply equally to domestic enterprises, where relevant. Standards should be addressed not only to privately owned corporations, but also to state-owned and mixed transnational enterprises, which are increasingly important in the world economy.

A statement of principles is not the only or necessarily a sufficient way of resolving many of the problems affecting transnational enterprises. We must develop others:

—Governments must harmonize their tax treatment of these enterprises. Without coordination, host-country and home-country policies may inhibit productive investment.

—Factfinding and arbitral procedures must be promoted as means for settling investment disputes. The World Bank's International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes and other third-party facilities should be employed to settle the important disputes which inevitably arise.

—Laws against restrictive business prac-

tices must be developed, better coordinated among countries, and enforced. The United States has long been vigilant against such abuses in domestic trade, mergers, or licensing of technology. We stand by the same principles internationally. We condemn restrictive practices in setting prices or restraining supplies, whether by private or state-owned transnational enterprises or by the collusion of national governments.

—Insurance for foreign private investors should to the extent possible be multilateralized and should include financial participation by developing countries to reflect our mutual stake in encouraging foreign investment in the service of development.

—And there must be more effective bilateral consultation among governments to identify and resolve investment disputes before they become irritants in political relations.

The United States believes that just solutions are achievable—and necessary. If the world community is committed to economic development, it cannot afford to treat transnational enterprises as objects of economic warfare. The capacity of the international community to deal with this issue constructively will be an important test of whether the search for solutions or the clash of ideologies will dominate our economic future. The implications for economic development are profound.

### **Trade and Development**

The third basic area for our attention is trade. Improving the world trading system will magnify our success in every other sphere of the development effort.

Trade has been a driving force in the unprecedented expansion of the world economy over the last 30 years. Comparative advantage and specialization, the exchange of technology and the movement of capital, the spur to productivity that competition provides—these are central elements of efficiency and progress. Open trade promotes growth and combats inflation in all countries.

For developing nations, trade is perhaps the most important engine of development. Increased earnings from exports help pay

for both the imports that are essential to expand production and the food for growing populations. These earnings reduce dependence on aid, limit the accumulation of debt, and help finance essential borrowing. Growing export industries can provide jobs and increase the government revenues necessary for development programs. It is no accident, therefore, that the success stories in development of the past three decades have been those very countries that have taken full advantage of the opportunities in world trade.

But today the global trading system is threatened by the most serious recession since the Second World War. We face the danger of proliferating artificial barriers and unfair competition reminiscent of the 1930's, which contributed to economic and political disaster. Every day that economic recovery is delayed, the temptation grows to restrict imports, subsidize exports, and control scarce commodities. Concerted action is necessary now to safeguard and improve the open trading system on which the future well-being of all our countries depends.

The multilateral trade negotiations now taking place in Geneva are central to this effort. They will have a profound impact on the future of the world economy and the prospects for development. If these negotiations fail, all countries risk a slide into an increasingly fragmented, closed world of nationalism, blocs, and mounting frictions. If they succeed, all countries will benefit and there will be major progress toward a cooperative and prosperous world.

Many of the less developed nations are emerging as important commercial powers. But developing countries need assistance to take better advantage of trading opportunities, especially to help them open up new markets. In revising rules to govern trade we must take account of their particular needs. In this connection, regional trading associations can help many small countries by providing the economies of scale which result from larger markets.

Thus success in the negotiations depends

critically on promoting the interests of the developing countries. For if they do not help to make the rules, assume part of the responsibility to maintain a stable trade system, and share in the benefits of trade, the rules will be subject to increasing challenge, the stability of the system undermined, and the benefits for all nations jeopardized.

The United States therefore believes that a major goal of the multilateral trade negotiations should be to make the trading system better serve development goals. Let me briefly outline our policy.

—First, there must be fundamental structural improvement in the relationship of the developing countries to the world trading system. In the earlier stages of their development, they should receive special treatment through a variety of means—such as preferences, favorable concessions, and exceptions which reflect their economic status. But as they progress to a higher level of development, they must gradually accept the same obligations of reciprocity and stable arrangements that other countries undertake. At some point they must be prepared to compete on more equal terms, even as they derive growing benefits.

—Second, we must improve opportunities for the manufacturing sectors of developing countries. These provide the most promising new areas for exports at the critical stage in development, but the tariffs of industrial countries are a substantial obstacle. To ease this problem the United States has agreed to join other industrial countries in instituting generalized tariff preferences to permit developing countries enhanced access to the markets of industrialized nations.

I am pleased to announce today that the U.S. program will be put into effect on January 1, 1976. And before that date, we will begin consultations and practical assistance to enable exporting countries to benefit from the new trade opportunities in the American market, the largest single market for the manufactured goods of developing countries.

—Third, in keeping with the Tokyo Dec-

laration,<sup>2</sup> we should adapt rules of nontariff barriers to the particular situation of developing countries. In setting international standards for government procurement practices, for example, the United States will negotiate special consideration for the developing countries. We will also negotiate on the basis that under prescribed conditions, certain subsidies may be permitted without triggering countervailing duties for a period geared to achieving particular development objectives.

—Fourth, we will work for early agreement on tariffs for tropical products, which are a major source of earnings for the developing world. Moreover, the United States will implement its tariff cuts on these products as soon as possible.

—Finally, we are ready to join with other participants in Geneva to negotiate changes in the system of protection in the industrialized countries that favors the import of raw materials over other goods. Many countries impose low or no duties on raw materials and high duties on manufactured or processed goods; the tariff protection increases or “escalates” with the degree of processing. Nothing could be better calculated to discourage and limit the growth of processing industries in developing countries. The United States will give high priority in the Geneva negotiations to reducing these barriers.

The developing countries have obligations in return. The world needs a system in which no nation, developed or developing, arbitrarily withholds or interferes with normal exports of materials. This practice—by depriving other countries of needed goods—can trigger unemployment, cut production, and fuel inflation. It is therefore as disruptive as any of the other trade barriers I have discussed. We urge negotiations on rules to limit and govern the use of export restraints, a logical extension of existing

<sup>2</sup> For text of the declaration, approved at Tokyo on Sept. 14, 1973, by a ministerial meeting of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, see BULLETIN of Oct. 8, 1973, p. 450.

rules on imports. The United States will join others in negotiating supply-access commitments as part of the reciprocal exchange of concessions.

But commodities can be addressed only in part in the context of the trade negotiations. For some serious commodity problems, special arrangements and different institutional structures are required. Let me now turn to that subject.

### Commodity Trade and Production

Exports of primary products—raw materials and other commodities—are crucial to the incomes of developing countries. These earnings can lift living standards above bare subsistence, generate profits to support the first steps of industrialization, and provide tax revenues for education, health, and other social programs for development. The history of the United States—and many other countries—confirms the importance of commodities.

But this path can be precarious in an uncertain global environment. Those developing countries which are not oil exporters rely on primary commodities for nearly two-thirds of their export earnings. Yet their sales of raw materials and agricultural products have not grown as fast as those of industrial countries. Agricultural commodities, particularly, are vulnerable to the whims of weather and swings of worldwide demand. The market in minerals is especially sensitive to the pendulum of boom-and-bust in the industrial countries. The result is a cycle of scarcity and glut, of underinvestment and overcapacity.

Developing countries are hit hard by commodity cycles also as consumers; higher prices for energy imports, swings in the price and supply of food, and greater costs for other essential raw materials have been devastating blows, soaking up aid funds and the earnings by which they hoped to finance imports. All this can make a mockery of development plans.

But the problems of commodities are not the problems only of developing countries.

The industrialized countries are in fact the largest exporters of food and most minerals. Gyration prices complicate economic decisions in industrial countries. And consumers in industrial countries have painfully learned that high commodity prices leave their inflationary impact long after the commodity market has turned around.

Therefore both industrial and developing countries would benefit from more stable conditions of trade and an expansion of productive capacity in commodities.

Many solutions have been put forward to benefit producers of particular products: cartelization, price indexing, commodity agreements, and other methods. But reality demonstrates the interdependence of all our economies and therefore the necessity for approaches that serve global rather than narrow interests.

### *Food Security*

The most vital commodity in the world is food. The United States is its largest producer and exporter. We recognize our responsibility. We have also sought to make international collaboration in food a model for realistic and cooperative approaches to other international economic issues.

The U.S. policy is now one of maximum production. At home, we want a thriving farm economy and moderate prices for consumers. Internationally, we wish cooperative relations with nations that purchase from us, an open and growing market, and abundant supplies to meet the needs of the hungry through both good times and bad.

For hundreds of millions of people, food security is the single most critical need in their lives; for many it is a question of life itself. But food security means more than emergency relief to deal with crop failures, natural disasters, and pockets of famine. It means reasonable stability in the availability of food in commercial markets so that harvest failures in some parts of the world will not make food impossibly expensive elsewhere. We have seen with dramatic frequency in recent years how the international food market, strained to capacity, can shake the international economy. Its fluctuations have accelerated inflation, devastated devel-

opment plans, and wreaked havoc with human lives. Yet in good times, the world community has not summoned the will to take obvious corrective steps to stabilize the market structure.

The United States believes that a global approach to food security, which contains elements that can apply to other commodities, should follow these basic principles:

—The problem must be approached globally, comprehensively, and cooperatively, by consultation and negotiation among all significant producers and consumers;

—Producers should recognize the global interest in stability of supply, and consumers should recognize the interest of producers in stability of markets and earnings;

—Special consideration should be given to the needs of developing countries; and

—Where volatile demand is combined with limited ability to make short-term increases in production, buffer stocks may be the best approach to achieving greater security for both consumers and producers.

At the World Food Conference last November, which was convened at our initiative, the United States proposed a comprehensive international cooperative approach to providing food security. We proposed an international system of nationally held grain reserves, to meet emergencies and improve the market. The United States has since then offered specific proposals and begun negotiations. But the international effort lagged when improved harvests seemed to diminish the immediate danger of worldwide shortage.

My government today declares that it is time to create this reserve system. If we do not, future crises are inevitable. Specifically, we propose:

—To meet virtually all potential shortfalls in food grains production, total world reserves must reach at least 30 million tons of wheat and rice. We should consider whether a similar reserve is needed in coarse grains.

—Responsibility for holding reserves should be allocated fairly, taking into account wealth, production, and trade. The United States is prepared to hold a major share.

—Acquisition and release of reserves should be governed by quantitative standards

such as anticipated surpluses and shortfalls in production.

—Full participants in the system should receive assured access to supplies. Among major producers, full participation should require complete exchange of information and forecasts.

—Special assistance should be extended to developing countries that participate, to enable them to meet their obligation to hold a portion of global reserves.

The United States is ready to negotiate the creation of such a system. Let us move ahead rapidly.

### *Other Primary Commodities*

And let us apply the same approach of cooperation to other primary commodities that are similarly beset by swings of price and supply—and that are similarly essential to the global economy.

There is no simple formula that will apply equally to all commodities. The United States therefore proposes to discuss new arrangements in individual commodities on a case-by-case basis.

Buffer stocks can be an effective technique to moderate instability in supplies and earnings. On the other hand, price-fixing arrangements distort the market, restrict production, and waste resources for everyone. It is developing countries that can least afford this waste. Restricted production idles the costly equipment and economic infrastructure that takes years to build. Artificially high prices lead consumers to make costly investment in domestic substitutes, ultimately eroding the market power of the traditional producers.

Accordingly, the United States proposes the following approach to commodity arrangements:

—We recommend that a consumer-producer forum be established for every key commodity to discuss how to promote the efficiency, growth, and stability of its market. This is particularly important in the case of grains, as I have outlined. It is also important in copper, where priority should be given to creating a forum for consumer-producer consultation.

—The first new formal international agree-

ment being concluded is on tin. We have participated actively in its negotiation. President Ford has authorized me to announce that the United States intends to sign the tin agreement, subject to congressional consultations and ratification. We welcome its emphasis on buffer stocks, its avoidance of direct price fixing, and its balanced voting system. We will retain our right to sell from our strategic stockpiles, and we recognize the right of others to maintain a similar program.

—We are participating actively in negotiations on coffee. We hope they will result in a satisfactory new agreement that reduces the large fluctuations in prices and supplies entering the market.

—We will also join in the forthcoming cocoa and sugar negotiations. Their objective will be to reduce the risks of investment and moderate the swings in prices and supplies.

—We will support liberalization of the International Monetary Fund's financing of buffer stocks, to assure that this facility is available without reducing other drawing rights.

### *Comprehensive Program of Investment*

I have already announced my government's broad proposal of a development security facility, a more fundamental approach to stabilizing the overall earnings of countries dependent on commodities trade. My government also believes that an effective approach to the commodities problem requires a comprehensive program of investment to expand worldwide capacity in minerals and other critical raw materials. This is basic to the health of both industrial and developing economies.

There are presently no shortages in most basic raw materials, nor are any likely in the next two or three years. But the adequacy of supplies in years to come will be determined by investment decisions taken now. Because the technology for processing lower grade ores is extremely complex and the financing requirements for major raw material investments are massive, new projects take several years to complete. In some countries the traditional source of funds—private foreign investment—is no longer as welcome, nor are investors as interested, as in the past.

The United States therefore proposes a major new international effort to expand raw material resources in developing countries.

The World Bank and its affiliates, in concert with private sources, should play a fundamental role. They can supply limited amounts of capital directly; more importantly, they can use their technical, managerial, and financial expertise to bring together funds from private and public sources. They can act as intermediary between private investors and host governments and link private and public effort by providing cross-guarantees on performance. World Bank loans could fund government projects, particularly for needed infrastructure, while the International Finance Corporation could join private enterprise in providing loans and equity capital. The World Bank Group should aim to mobilize \$2 billion in private and public capital annually.

In addition, the United States will contribute to and actively support the new United Nations revolving fund for natural resources. This fund will encourage the worldwide exploration and exploitation of minerals and thus promote one of the most promising endeavors of economic development.

### **The Poorest Nations**

Any strategy for development must devote special attention to the needs of the poorest countries. The fate of 1 billion people—half the developing world and a quarter of mankind—will be affected by what we do or fail to do.

For the last four years, per capita income in the poorest countries—already below minimal standards for development—has declined. Their exports are most concentrated in the least dynamic sectors of world demand. It is they who have been most cruelly affected by the rise in the costs of oil, food, and other essential imports.

Whatever adversity the rest of mankind endures, it is these peoples who endure the most. Whatever problems we have, theirs are monumental. Whatever economic consequences flow from the decisions that we all make, the consequences are greatest for them. If

global progress in economic development falters, they will be submerged.

This challenge transcends ideology and bloc politics. No international order can be considered just unless one of its fundamental principles is cooperation to raise the poorest of the world to a decent standard of life.

This challenge has two dimensions. We must look to elemental economic security and the immediate relief of suffering. And we must give preference to these countries' needs for future economic growth.

### *Elemental Economic Security*

First, security means balance-of-payments support for the poorest countries during periods of adversity. For them global recessions and wide swings in prices of key commodities have a particularly disastrous impact. Yet these countries have very little access to short- and medium-term capital to help them weather bad times. The little finance to which they have access often involves interest rates that are too high considering their chronic debt-repayment problems.

To provide greater balance-of-payments support at more acceptable rates of interest for the poor nations, the United States last November proposed a Trust Fund in the International Monetary Fund of up to \$2 billion for emergency relief. Although this proposal met with wide support, it has been stalled by a dispute over an unrelated issue: the role of gold in the international monetary system. We cannot let this delay continue. The United States is making a determined effort to move forward the monetary negotiations at the IMF meetings now underway. If others meet us in this same spirit, we could reach a consensus on the Trust Fund by the next meeting in January.

Second, security requires stable export earnings. The new approach that we are proposing today for earnings stabilization can provide major new economic insurance in the form of loans and grants for the poorest countries.

Third, security means having enough to eat. There must be determined international cooperation on food.



The World Food Conference set a target of 10 million tons of food aid annually. This fiscal year the U.S. food aid budget provides for almost 6 million tons of food grains—60 percent of the world target, and a 20 percent increase over last year. Other producers must also provide their share.

Another priority in the poorest countries must be to reduce the tragic waste of losses after harvest from inadequate storage, transport, and pest control. There are often simple and inexpensive techniques to resolve these problems. Investment in such areas as better storage and pesticides could have a rapid and substantial impact on the world's food supply; indeed, the saving could match the total of all the food aid being given around the world. Therefore we urge that the Food and Agriculture Organization, in conjunction with the U.N. Development Program and the World Bank, set a goal of cutting in half these postharvest losses by 1985, and develop a comprehensive program to this end.

Finally, security means good health and easing the strains of population growth. Disease ravages the poorest countries most of all and exacts a devastating economic as well as human cost. At the same time we face the stark reality that there will be twice as many people to feed by the end of this century as there are today. One of the most promising approaches to these problems is the integrated delivery of basic health services at the community level, combining medical treatment, family planning, and nutritional information and using locally trained paramedical personnel. The United States will support a major expansion of the efforts already underway, including those in cooperation with the World Health Organization, to develop and apply these methods. We strongly urge the help of all concerned nations.

### *Future Economic Growth*

Programs to achieve minimum economic security, however essential, solve only part of the problem. We must help the poorest nations break out of their present stagnation and move toward economic growth.

This means, first of all, that they should

have preferential access to official, concessional financial aid. They have the least dynamic exports, but they lack the capital to develop new ones. They have the direst need for financing, but they have no access to capital markets and little ability to carry greater debt.

If these countries themselves can summon the effort required, outside assistance can be productive. All nations with the financial capacity must share the responsibility. We will do our part. More than 70 percent of our development assistance goes to low-income countries. More than 60 percent of this year's proposed programs is devoted to food and nutrition, which are of particular importance to the poorest.

The special financial needs of the poorest countries can be met particularly well by expanded low-interest loans of the international financial institutions. The International Development Association of the World Bank Group is a principal instrument whose great potential has not been fully realized. After congressional consultations, the United States will join others in a substantial fifth replenishment of the resources of the International Development Association, provided that the oil-exporting countries also make a significant contribution.

An effective strategy for sustained growth in the poorest countries must expand their agricultural production, for external food aid cannot possibly fill their needs. The current gap between what the developing countries need and what they can produce themselves is 15 million tons; at present rates of growth, the gap is expected to double or triple within the next decade. Failure to meet this challenge will doom much of the world to hunger and malnutrition and all of the world to periodic shortages and higher prices.

Traditional bilateral aid programs to boost agricultural production remain indispensable. President Ford is asking Congress for authorization to double our bilateral agricultural assistance this year to \$582 million. We urge the other affluent nations to increase their contributions as well.

Clearly a massive program of international cooperation is also required. More re-

search is needed to improve agricultural yields, make more efficient use of fertilizer, and find better farm management techniques. Technical assistance and information exchange are needed for training and for technological advance. Better systems of water control, transportation, and land management are needed to tap the developing countries' vast reserves of land, water, and manpower.

To mobilize massive new concessional resources for these purposes, the United States proposes the early establishment of the new International Fund for Agricultural Development. President Ford has asked me to announce that he will seek authorization of a direct contribution of \$200 million to the fund, provided that others will add their support for a combined goal of at least \$1 billion.

The International Fund for Agricultural Development can be the major source of new capital to attack the most critical problems of the poorest developing countries. The United States urges the world community to give it prompt and major support.

### **The Political Dimension**

In every area of endeavor that I have described—economic security, growth, trade, commodities, and the needs of the poorest—the developing countries themselves want greater influence over the decisions that will affect their future. They are pressing for a greater role in the institutions and negotiations by which the world economic system is evolving.

The United States believes that participation in international decisions must be widely shared, in the name of both justice and effectiveness. We believe the following principles should apply:

*The process of decision should be fair.* No country or group of countries should have exclusive power in the areas basic to the welfare of others. This principle is valid for oil. It also applies to trade and finance.

*The methods of participation must be realistic.* We must encourage the emergence of real communities of interest between nations, whether they are developed or develop-

ing, producer or consumer, rich or poor. The genuine diversity of interests that exists among states must not be submerged by bloc discipline or in artificial, unrepresentative majorities. For only genuine consensus can generate effective action.

*The process of decision should be responsive to change.* On many issues developing countries have not had a voice that reflects their role. This is now changing. It is already the guiding principle of two of the most successful international bodies, the IMF and the World Bank, where the quotas of oil-producing states will soon be at least doubled—on the basis of objective criteria. Basic economic realities, such as the size of economies, participation in world trade, and financial contributions, must carry great weight.

*Finally, participation should be tailored to the issues at hand.* We can usefully employ many different institutions and procedures. Sometimes we should seek broad consensus in universal bodies, as we are doing this week in this Assembly; sometimes negotiations can more usefully be focused in more limited forums, such as the forthcoming consumer-producer dialogue; sometimes decisions are best handled in large specialized bodies such as the IMF and World Bank, where voting power is related to responsibility; and sometimes most effective action can be taken in regional bodies.

Most relevant to our discussion here is the improvement of the U.N. system, so that it can fulfill its charter mandate "to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples." We welcome the thoughtful report by the Secretary General's group of 25 experts on structural reform in the U.N. system. We will seriously consider its recommendations. In our view, an improved U.N. organization must include:

—Rationalization of the U.N.'s fragmented assistance programs;

—Strengthened leadership within the central Secretariat and the entire U.N. system for development and economic cooperation;

—Streamlining of the Economic and Social Council;

—Better consultative procedures to insure effective agreement among members with a particular interest in a subject under consideration; and

—A mechanism for independent evaluation of the implementation of programs.

The United States proposes that 1976 be dedicated as a year of review and reform of the entire U.N. development system. An intergovernmental committee should be formed at this session, to begin work immediately on recommendations that can be implemented by the General Assembly in its 1976 session. We consider this a priority in any strategy for development.

Mr. President [Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Foreign Minister of Algeria], Mr. Secretary General, colleagues, ladies and gentlemen: I began today with the statement that we have, this week, an opportunity to improve the condition of mankind. This fact alone represents an extraordinary change in the human condition. Throughout history, man's imagination has been limited by his circumstances—which have now fundamentally changed. We are no longer confined to what Marx called "the realm of necessity." And it has always been the case that the wisest realists were those who understood man's power to shape his own reality.

The steps we take now are not limited by our technical possibilities, but only by our political will. If the advanced nations fail to respond to the winds of change, and if the developing countries choose rhetoric over reality, the great goal of economic development will be submerged in our common failure. The speeches made here this week will be placed alongside many other lofty pronouncements made over decades past in this organization on this subject, buried in the archives of oblivion.

But we would not all be here if we did not believe that progress is possible and that it is imperative.

The United States has proposed a program of action. We are prepared to contribute, if we are met in a spirit of common endeavor.

—We have proposed steps to improve basic economic security—to safeguard the world economy, and particularly the developing countries, against the cruel cycles that undermine their export earnings.

—We have proposed measures to improve developing countries' access to capital, new technology, and management skills to lift themselves from stagnation onto the path of accelerating growth.

—We have proposed structural improvements in the world trading system, to be addressed in the ongoing multilateral trade negotiations, to enhance developing countries' opportunities to earn their own way through trade.

—We have proposed a new approach to improving market conditions in food and other basic commodities, on which the economies and indeed the lives of hundreds of millions of people depend.

—We have proposed specific ways of giving special help to the development needs of the poorest countries.

My government does not offer these proposals as an act of charity, nor should they be received as if due. We know that the world economy nourishes us all; we know that we live on a shrinking planet. Materially as well as morally, our destinies are intertwined.

There remain enormous things for us to do. We can say once more to the new nations: We have heard your voices. We embrace your hopes. We will join your efforts. We commit ourselves to our common success.

## IMF and IBRD Boards of Governors Meet at Washington

*The Boards of Governors of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD; World Bank) and its affiliates held their regular annual meetings at Washington September 1-5. Following are remarks made by President Ford before the Boards of Governors on September 2 and a statement made that day by Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon, U.S. Governor of the Fund and Bank.*

### REMARKS BY PRESIDENT FORD

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 8.

Welcome again to Washington.

At your meeting last year, the major areas of concern were the international economic disruption resulting from the sharp increase in oil prices and worldwide inflation. Over the past year another problem—stagnation in world economics—has been a primary concern.

These problems—increased oil prices, inflation, and recession—are intimately related. Progress is needed in all three simultaneously. Individual governments have responded with policies to halt the decline in economic activity and restore economic health.

I am confident that these steps, combined with the resilience of people and institutions around the world, will succeed. But the forces of recovery do not always move quickly. Too many, today, national economies are in an uncomfortable and unavoidable period of waiting for the results of earlier actions.

Even in the midst of recession, inflation continues at an uncomfortably high rate. While some progress has been made, the simple truth is that reestablishment of a durable and noninflationary period of economic growth in the world will not be easy.

In the United States, recovery is well un-

derway. Each week brings additional evidence of renewed economic health, and I am determined to fight against an acceleration of inflation that could restrain this recovery.

The achievement of a durable economic recovery in America is also in the world interest. A sound, healthy, growing U.S. economy is the best lasting contribution that this nation can make to other nations. No other action by the United States will contribute as much to the welfare of the world economy.

A resurgent U.S. economy will assist the expansion of trade and promote prosperity for other countries.

The United States will continue to insure that goods, services, and capital move freely across our frontiers.

We will move forward with negotiations to remove trade barriers and bring about a more efficient use of world resources.

Our capital market will be kept open. The production of American goods in short supply will be increased.

All of these are firm commitments of the United States.

The United States is acutely aware that while recession and inflation and high oil prices have resulted in many hardships for the industrial nations, the economic consequences have been far more severe for the developing nations. In recent months my advisers and I have been studying means of alleviating the distress of the developing world. True to the traditions of the past, the United States recognizes its responsibilities to assist others in the most constructive way and we intend to live up to those responsibilities.

Yesterday in a speech delivered on his behalf at the United Nations, Secretary Kissinger set forth a wide range of initiatives directed to that purpose. Later this morning Secretary Simon will address several of these

proposals in this forum. These new programs, coupled with existing forms of aid, with the restoration of a forward momentum in the world economy, and with the critically important efforts of the developing nations to help themselves, should form the building blocks for a better life for people all around the world.

You meet as representatives of 127 politically independent nations but also as representatives of 127 economically interdependent nations. Each nation must be free to choose its own goals, establish its own priorities, and rely on its own institutions and traditions.

An international economic system which allows each nation maximum freedom of choice and economic independence is imperative.

Each government must make its own difficult choices about its own problems. No country can expect the actions of others to resolve its problems, and no country should follow economic policies designed to solve its economic problems at the expense of others.

Actions by any of us affect the ability of others to fulfill individual objectives. We must consult together. We must pull together.

The United States stands ready to work with all nations to strengthen international mechanisms and international practices which will enable each of us to pursue domestic goals in harmony with the welfare of others.

In reaching agreement over the weekend on the technically complex and politically sensitive questions of a major increase in quotas and on phasing gold out of the monetary system, you have already scored a major breakthrough. I am confident that in the coming months you will complete the comprehensive agreement, including an accord on exchange rates, that you have started so well.

As we face current world economic and social problems, there is a temptation to focus attention on the changes in the division of the existing levels of world resources and production. But we must all recognize that the problems of equity and fairness, whether domestic or international, can best and perhaps only be resolved in a world environment characterized by economic expansion.

It is the restoration of such a world that we must all seek together. If all the nations act in recognition that their own lasting prosperity requires the prosperity of others, we can restore international economic growth. You are here this week to carry on deliberations directed to this end. I welcome you, and I wish you great success.

Thank you very, very much.

## STATEMENT BY TREASURY SECRETARY SIMON

Department of the Treasury press release dated September 2

It is a privilege to address this distinguished audience once again and to share with you today the views of the United States on the major economic issues facing the world.

In general, the outlook for the international economy is now more hopeful than it was earlier this year. Most of the major industrial countries have adopted vigorous expansionary policies. Several nations, including the United States, have begun the process of recovery. Despite serious strains, the level of international cooperation remains undiminished. Few countries have resorted to policies which might yield domestic gains at the expense of their neighbors. And the more affluent nations are strengthening their efforts to assist those who are less fortunate.

Yet there can be no doubt that the pattern of progress is highly uneven. In a number of countries, the downward economic spiral continues still, becoming more prolonged and severe than once expected. The hardships created by an inflation of unparalleled strength, brutally sharp and unanticipated increases in the cost of energy, and a harsh recession—all of these remain a painful living reality in too many parts of the world. Thus, the urgent task still before us is to work together in restoring a broadly based forward momentum to the world economy which will provide the foundation for sustained, noninflationary growth in every nation.

As we press forward, it is essential that we maintain our bearings:

—We must carefully support and encour-

age the forces of recovery without yielding to the temptations of excessive stimulation.

—We must persevere in our efforts to control inflation without disrupting the process of recovery. A durable recovery will be possible only if we master the causes of inflation.

—We must reach a better accommodation on the problems of energy while continuing to support the oil-exporting nations in their quest for economic advancement.

—We must encourage economic development among poorer nations.

—And we must insure that we have a smoothly functioning monetary system.

Let me turn now to a more detailed consideration of each of these issues.

### Prospects for Economic Growth

The United States is acutely aware that its own economic policies bear heavily not only upon the livelihoods of our own citizens but upon those in other nations as well. While our economy is no longer as predominant in the world economy as it once was, our gross national product still amounts to over one-quarter of the world total and we represent the world's largest import market. Therefore the single most important contribution we can make to the health of the world economy is to achieve durable, noninflationary growth within our own borders.

Fortunately, there is now abundant evidence that an economic recovery is well underway in the United States. My government is determined to sustain this recovery while also bringing inflation under control and adopting those policy measures necessary for lasting growth.

We need not, and we should not, seek to choose among these objectives. We have learned from hard experience that all of our economic goals must be pursued simultaneously.

We will not provide excessive stimulation that would only intensify inflationary pressures, preempt the capital that is needed to sustain the recovery, and run the risk of setting off another vicious cycle of inflation and recession. Nor will we allow our concern with inflation to prevent us from active-

ly supporting the natural forces of recovery or taking additional expansionary measures if they should be needed. We are not ready to acquiesce in either stagnation or inflation as a way of life.

Some have suggested that in order to help other nations out of recession, the United States should embark upon much more stimulative fiscal and monetary policies. We respectfully disagree. Too many of our current domestic troubles are rooted in such excesses in the past. Since 1965 the average U.S. Federal budget deficit and the average annual growth in our money supply have been about three times as large as in the preceding decade. It is no accident that during the earlier period our country enjoyed reasonable price stability while in recent years we have had increasing difficulty in containing inflation. And inflationary expectations are now so deeply embedded in our society that they will not disappear quickly.

The financial sins of a decade cannot be forgiven by a day of penance. Our policies in the United States must be designed to attack the causes of inflation, not their results. In the long run, that will bring the most lasting benefits to us all.

While the revival of the U.S. economy will help to bolster both the economic prospects and the confidence of other nations, it would be unrealistic to expect that any single country could lead the rest of the world out of recession. Expanded world trade should not be regarded as the source, but as the product, of recovery.

Indeed, let us recognize that the process of solving our economic troubles must begin at home, with each country acting on its own to make the tough decisions that are essential for sound, durable growth. As that process spreads from one nation to the next, it will become mutually reinforcing and all nations will realize greater benefits. In addition to the expansionary efforts undertaken by the United States earlier this year, several other major industrialized nations have now adopted more stimulative policies. Taken together, these actions should provide a forward thrust to the world economy.

As our policies of expansion gradually take effect, we ask ourselves: Have we done enough? Should we do more to speed up the effects? To the extent that some of our people believe we are not moving rapidly enough to create jobs and to restore our standard of living, there may be adverse social and political pressures. Yet it is equally clear that if we overheat our economies, we will reignite the fires of inflation and create another recession with more serious economic and social consequences.

Our highest responsibility as finance ministers, I would respectfully suggest, is to pursue sound, balanced policies which promote economic growth without encouraging renewed inflation. That often proves to be politically unpopular in the short run, but in the long run it will do far more to create jobs and serve the best interests of our people than the palliatives so often urged upon us. History is littered with the wreckage of governments that have refused to face up to the ravages of inflation; and none of us can afford, either through shortsightedness or lack of determination, to yield to these temptations.

### **Impact of Escalating Oil Prices**

Beyond the problems of determining fiscal and monetary policies, nations must also deal with the difficulties created by high oil prices.

Almost two years after the first oil price shock, it is evident that we are only beginning to understand the full impact as well as the threat to our future which is posed by escalating oil prices. It is now obvious that the most serious consequences are not financial, but political and economic. While we must and will continue to devote special attention to the problems of the financial system in adjusting to new realities, we can be confident of our capacity to manage such problems. But the economic consequences of these oil policies—the higher costs that have come not just in energy but in many other vital commodities such as food, the structural adjustments that have been necessary, the loss of jobs, and the obstacles to

economic growth—cannot be so easily managed.

In our view, current price levels for international oil can be justified on neither economic nor financial grounds. The present pricing policies of the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] countries mean that cheap energy remains in the ground and that the prosperity of all nations is diminished. Moreover, high oil prices lie at the root of much of the world's recent inflation and the recession that followed. Yet, now the possibility of another increase in oil prices looms on the horizon. Let there be no misunderstanding about the result of another major price increase: it would seriously jeopardize the balance upon which global economic recovery now depends.

We urge the OPEC nations to recognize, as others have done in the past, that the prosperity of each nation is deeply intertwined with the prosperity of all nations.

Another price increase seems especially inappropriate in light of our efforts to address the legitimate problems facing the oil-exporting nations as well as other developing countries. We have taken significant steps to bring about a dialogue between producers and consumers. We have proposed the establishment of commissions to deal with critical problems in the areas of energy, raw materials, development, and related financial questions. Special bilateral programs have been set up with the oil-exporting countries, and considerable progress has been recorded.

All of these measures reflect our sincere desire to work cooperatively with the oil exporters as they strive for higher standards of living and more diversified economies. In turn, we urge that they work cooperatively with us and with other nations to enhance the prospects for a world economic recovery.

Let me add that the substantial financing requirements of industrial countries in this period of OPEC surpluses dictate that we continue to keep the adequacy of international financing arrangements under review. I am confident that in the future, as in the past two years, private financing mechanisms will continue to play the dominant

role in channeling OPEC funds to various borrowers. At the same time, we welcome the prospective establishment of the Financial Support Fund agreed upon among the member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. That fund will supplement IMF resources and provide needed insurance in an uncertain period. Particularly important in present circumstances is the assurance thereby provided that, if needed, financing will be available to facilitate the pursuit of sound expansionary policies by the industrial countries.

### Problems of the Developing Countries

Those who have suffered the most from higher oil prices and the deterioration in world economic conditions have been those who least deserve to suffer and are least able to protect themselves—the poor and the needy of the developing countries. In the industrialized nations, the problems of inflation, exorbitant energy prices, and the resulting recession have often meant hardships, but they have not brought large numbers of people to the edge of desperation. Hopes for the future may have been dampened, but they have not been crushed. Sadly, the same cannot be said of the less fortunate nations of the world, where hunger and illness are the immediate result of reduced incomes.

In these circumstances, the United States and other industrial nations are determined to make special efforts to assist developing nations in their efforts to sustain the momentum of their economic and social progress. We do so from a sense of compassion and out of a realization that the prosperity of the developing world also serves to support our own continued prosperity.

The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have already proven that they are highly effective instruments for working with developing countries in devising the most promising plans for economic growth. But we believe that more must now be done within the framework of those institutions to assist the developing countries.

Yesterday, in a speech read on his behalf at the United Nations, Secretary Kissinger

set forth a range of proposals that he and I, under the leadership of President Ford, have developed together. Three of those proposals are of particular importance for the Fund and the Bank:

—First, the United States proposes as a matter of high priority that a development security facility be created in the IMF to meet the needs of those developing nations suffering from sharp fluctuations in export earnings. It would replace the existing compensatory finance facility. We fully recognize that excessive fluctuations in export earnings can disrupt development efforts and that many producing nations lack sufficient financial reserves to cushion themselves against sharp drops in their earnings. We believe that compensatory facilities to finance shortfalls in export earnings would be both more effective and more efficient in reducing such disruptions than commodity-pricing arrangements.

Shortly after the completion of these meetings, we will submit detailed proposals to the Executive Board of the IMF calling for the creation of the facility. They will also call for broadening the purposes of the proposed Trust Fund, enabling it to provide grants to the poorest countries experiencing export shortfalls and allowing some use of the Trust Fund resources to supplement the proposed facility.

—Secondly, we pledge our support to a major expansion of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), permitting that organization to serve as a more effective catalyst for growth of the private sector in developing countries. We agree with Mr. McNamara [Robert S. McNamara, President, IBRD] that the role of the IFC in mobilizing additional private investment is now more important than ever. There can be little doubt that much of the increase in living standards within developing countries must come from increased private sector production of goods and services.

Arrangements should be made in the next few months to give the International Finance Corporation better tools to assist the domestic private sector and to make the IFC a full partner in the Bank Group. Moreover,



the IFC should play an active part in bringing together foreign and domestic investors. It should act aggressively to arrange financing for mineral production in developing countries, where, as an impartial international party, it can help to smooth relationships between international companies with technology and markets and national authorities who understandably wish to strike the best bargain for their countries. The IFC should also develop imaginative financial arrangements, including a new investment trust, so that equity shares in joint ventures can gradually be purchased by private individuals and firms in developing countries.

All of these activities will complement the ongoing work of the World Bank, which must continue to assist in financing related infrastructure such as ports and roads, and will, we expect, give higher priority to the most important aspect of identifying obstacles to private savings and domestic private investment in developing countries.

—Thirdly, the United States once again urges that agreement be promptly reached on the establishment of a Trust Fund managed by the IMF in order to provide highly concessional balance-of-payments financing for the poorest developing countries. Nearly a year has passed since my government first proposed the Trust Fund and urged that a portion of the IMF gold be sold to help finance this worthy cause. We are pleased that there has been increasing recognition that the Trust Fund concept represents the most effective means of providing fast-disbursing financial support. This is one way we can move ahead immediately to respond to the severe financing needs faced by the developing countries; we can agree now to see a portion of IMF gold used without waiting for time-consuming amendments of the articles. Even as we have delayed in establishing this fund, the need for it has grown. Let us resolve to act promptly.

In addition to these major initiatives, other steps should be taken so that the Bank and the Fund can more adequately meet today's needs.

As the oil facility of the IMF phases out this year, we should take action to assure

the immediate usability of all currencies held by the IMF. We also need to direct early attention to a review of the tranche policies of the Fund and to consider whether changes should be introduced in these policies in order to provide increased access to the Fund's regular drawing facilities. This would enable the Fund to play the expanded and more active role required of it in today's world.

The World Bank is by far the largest and most influential development lending institution and as such has a major role to play in assisting developing nations achieve their development goals. It is of the greatest importance that the quality of this work and the soundness of its financial position be sustained.

Since the lending program now being implemented by the Bank carries with it demanding assumptions about the Bank's long-term ability to borrow funds, it is important that the management and Executive Directors of the Bank work together to assess carefully the role the Bank should play in the development process in the next decade and to examine the implications of this for the capital of the Bank and the nature of its programs. With capital an increasingly scarce resource, critical for the growth of the developed as well as the developing countries, it is essential that we have a clear understanding of the priorities which should govern the lending of an institution whose borrowing now approaches \$5 billion per year. The United States will continue to provide strong support to the Bank, and we will assist in helping it maintain a sound financial position.

As I said last year, we support a substantial increase in World Bank share ownership and voting power for countries newly able to make a major contribution to development through the Bank Group. Such an increase should be determined country by country, and increases in capital should be accompanied by commensurate contributions to the International Development Association (IDA) to help the poorest countries as well as the middle-level countries.

I stress the importance of IDA contribu-

tions because of the Association's central role in meeting the needs of the poorest and least developed countries. They have the least ability to deal with the impact of economic events on their development, and only a combined effort of present members and nations newly able to contribute will enable IDA to assist those countries adequately in the future. Mr. McNamara has announced that negotiations for the next replenishment of IDA will commence in November. A satisfactory agreement on extending IDA's resources will be possible only with the full collaboration of all countries in a position to contribute.

Beyond these measures, developed nations must also support the longstanding development efforts such as the regional development banks and our bilateral assistance programs. These programs have shown their effectiveness over the years and deserve to be strongly supported. It is also important for all countries to open their capital markets to the borrowing of the Bank and of the developing countries themselves.

In setting forth these proposals today and reviewing the activities of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, I would be less than candid if I did not add that, in and of themselves, the measures I have outlined will not be sufficient to insure economic development. We must not mislead ourselves on this matter. Far more important to the developing nations than the financial assistance that industrialized countries may provide to them is the restoration of stable, noninflationary growth around the world. And in the long run, the policies and efforts of the developing countries themselves will be the most decisive. History has shown that no matter how generous others may be, those who have been helped the most are those who have helped themselves.

While the developed nations must provide financing and open up their markets, the effectiveness of such assistance depends heavily upon the ability of the developing countries themselves to assure the best use of all resources, domestic as well as foreign. Development assistance should be thought of not as an international welfare program to

redistribute the world's wealth, but as an important element of an international investment program to increase the rate of economic growth in developing nations and to provide higher living standards for people of every nation. The effectiveness of international investment, private and public, depends fundamentally on the policies and efforts of each developing country.

I am particularly struck by the impressive economic and social progress made by countries which participate fully in the world market, which rely on market forces to provide incentives for efficient use of resources, and which maintain a favorable climate for foreign and domestic private investment.

In short, the process of economic development requires the cooperation and full efforts of each of us in pursuing economic policies to maximize production, income, and trade for all countries.

#### **International Monetary Arrangements**

Let me turn now to a discussion of international monetary issues.

We have achieved a significant breakthrough in our meetings this week in resolving many of the most difficult international monetary issues before us and in paving the way for a final comprehensive agreement in January. The technically complex—and politically sensitive—question of arranging a major quota increase and allocating national shares is substantially resolved. We have also succeeded in settling the thorny issues involved in phasing gold out of the international monetary system. Both of these agreements required concessions by many, but the result provides concrete evidence of the continuing spirit of cooperation and good will on which these institutions are founded. Once again we have demonstrated that through patient negotiation it is possible to arrive at an accommodation of conflicting views which is acceptable to each of us and beneficial to all of us.

Let us now proceed to the final component of our negotiations—an agreement on amendment of the exchange rate provi-

sions of the articles—which will enable us to put into practice the accords reached here this week. Amended provisions are needed which give legal recognition to the realities of today's world and reflect the evolution of the system that has occurred in recent years.

Two and a half years ago the par value system gave way to a voluntary system of exchange rate practices under which some countries float independently, some float jointly, and some use pegged rates. We are fortunate that this system was actually in place before the oil crisis hit, and its flexibility has served us well in difficult circumstances.

Let those who see stability in par values review again the chaos and disorder of the losing years of the Bretton Woods system. Think back to those days of market closures which disrupted trade and commerce. Recall that the only sure winners were the speculators, who could be assured that with time and persistence they would inevitably carry the day. Remember, too, the hurried international conferences to try to patch together some solution so that markets might open again. Think back to the duration and difficulty of the Smithsonian negotiations and the tensions associated with those negotiations. Those were the days when our political cohesion was threatened by monetary difficulties.

The basic logic of the par value system implies a world which does not now exist—one in which prices are reasonably stable and in which current account balances adjust to capital flows that are relatively slow to change. But the world has changed, and we need a system that is adaptable and is appropriate for the world as it is today, not as it once was or as we might like it to be.

Today we have a system which is flexible and resilient. It has enabled exchange markets to remain open and viable in the face of pressures that would have previously been overwhelming. Even the massive accumulations by the OPEC countries and occasional significant fluctuations in particular exchange rates have not unsettled the system. It has been possible to relax or eliminate

many of the extensive restrictions on capital movements and to find viable alternatives to restrictive current account measures. The large payments deficits of today have provoked fewer import restrictions by major countries than did the comparatively minor payments difficulties of earlier years. Although rates of inflation have varied enormously, from 6 percent in some countries to 25 percent in others, the flexibility of our system has allowed exchange rates to move so as to reflect these divergences in costs and prices. Attempts to maintain fixed exchange rates under these circumstances would have quickly and inevitably collapsed under the strain.

Some contend that the abandonment of par values is one of the causes of the tidal wave of inflation which has swept the world and that the voluntary system fails to provide the discipline needed to induce countries to restrain their inflation. I cannot agree. It was inflation which made floating necessary. Of course, floating does not prevent home-grown inflation or protect a country from drastic real changes from abroad such as the sudden jump in oil prices. It can, however, shield a country from imported inflation that results from overly expansive fiscal and monetary policies abroad. As for floating as an instrument of discipline, I believe that when a depreciating exchange rate in a free market directly increases the costs of imported goods, that has more meaning to the general public and political leaders than the level of central bank reserves or official borrowing.

U.S. policy is to have our own exchange rate determined essentially by market forces, and not by arbitrary official actions. We do not propose to object if foreign countries elect to establish fixed exchange rates among themselves—the essence of a voluntary system is to permit a free choice—so long as our own desire for essential freedom of the dollar exchange rate is respected. We are prepared to intervene whenever necessary to maintain orderly exchange market conditions. However, sizable movements in exchange rates over a period of several months are not necessarily indicators of disorderly

markets—and the fact that such movements are sometimes reversed does not demonstrate that it would have been possible for governments to prevent the initial movement in rates, nor desirable to try.

When the pressures of inflation subside and economies recover, when periods of calm between unexpected shocks become longer, then the behavior of exchange rates will become more stable. The greater exchange stability we all would like to see can only be achieved through sound economic policies which result in greater domestic stability in all of our economies.

We believe strongly that countries must be free to choose their own exchange rate system and that all countries, whatever choice they make, must be subject to the same agreed-upon principles of international behavior. The right to float must be clear and unencumbered. In view of the great diversity in political systems, institutional arrangements, size of national economies, and degree of dependence on foreign trade and investment, our present world requires an open mind about the future.

I do not pretend to have the wisdom or the clairvoyance to predict the precise exchange arrangements the world may desire or require far in the future. Experience with the present articles provides clear evidence of the difficulty of specifying in rigid detail an exchange rate system that can be expected to last forever. We must deal with the world as it is today, and that now requires a system that can easily adapt to rapid change. I know this can be done. Our agreements this week on gold and quotas show that we can find answers to difficult problems—and that a mutually acceptable accommodation on exchange rates can be achieved. The United States will approach the search for a resolution of this problem with imagination and an appreciation of others' views. We know that others will do the same.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is apparent that the agenda for the future is formidable:

—To achieve lasting, noninflationary growth;

—To reach an accommodation on energy;

—To encourage economic development; and

—To maintain a monetary system adapted to today's needs.

Each of these demands our full attention. The agreements we have reached this week demonstrate that through cooperation and perseverance we can succeed. It is in that spirit that we must continue to move forward. I pledge to you that the United States will remain a reliable partner in this journey.

## IMF Interim Committee Holds Fourth Meeting

*Following is the text of a press communique issued on August 31 at the conclusion of the meeting of the Interim Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund. Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon headed the U.S. delegation to the meeting.*

1. The Interim Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund held its fourth meeting in Washington, D.C. on August 31, 1975 under the chairmanship of Mr. John N. Turner, Minister of Finance of Canada. Mr. H. Johannes Witteveen, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, participated in the meeting. The following observers attended during the Committee's discussions: Mr. Henri Konan Bédié, Chairman, Bank-Fund Development Committee, Mr. Gamani Corea, Secretary General, UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development], Mr. Wilhelm Haferkamp, Vice President, EC [European Community] Commission, Mr. René Larre, General Manager, BIS [Bank for International Settlements], Mr. Emile van Lennep, Secretary General, OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], Mr. F. Leutwiler, President, National Bank of Switzerland, Mr. Robert S. McNamara, President, IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development], and Mr. Gardner Patterson, Deputy Director General, GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade].

2. The Committee had a discussion of the world economic situation and outlook, and expressed its concern about the current severe problems of recession and unemployment, balance of payments disequilibria, and inflation. The Committee felt that industrial countries which have slack domestic demand conditions and relatively strong balance of

payments positions, and which have made progress in reducing inflation, should lead in the promotion of a satisfactory rate of expansion in world trade and activity. The Committee believed that, on the basis of such a coordinated policy approach, a resumption of economic growth might be expected for the industrial world during the latter part of 1975 or the first half of 1976. Although rates of price increase in industrial countries have generally been subsiding, the Committee noted the disturbing fact that economic recovery in the industrial world will get under way with rates of inflation still unacceptably high.

Throughout the Committee's discussion, particular concern was expressed for the many primary producing countries, and especially the developing countries, whose current account deficits have been greatly enlarged by the increase in import costs and the downturn in global demand. Resumption of growth in world trade is urgently needed to alleviate the plight of such countries. Moreover, the Committee feared that, unless they were able to obtain adequate financing, many primary producing countries might have difficulty in fending off pressures to restrain imports, either through deflationary demand measures that would undermine their development efforts or through resort to trade restrictions. In view of these dangers, the Committee expressed the hope that the Executive Board would consider various steps that might be taken by the Fund to meet the present urgent need for a greater volume of financing.

3. The Committee noted the improvements in the 1975 Oil Facility introduced as a result of the July review by the Executive Directors and endorsed the efforts now in progress to raise the amount of resources that the Fund would be able to borrow for the financing of purchases under that facility to the total of SDR [special drawing rights] 5 billion that was agreed at the meeting of the Committee in January 1975. The Committee also endorsed the intention of the Executive Directors to have another review of the 1975 Oil Facility at an early date, one purpose of which would be to determine what action needs to be taken in the best interests of the international community, and also to undertake at about the same time a broader examination of the Fund's policies on the use of its resources.

4. The Committee welcomed the establishment of a Subsidy Account to assist those members that have been most seriously affected by the current situation to meet the cost of using the Oil Facility and commended those members that have already stated their willingness to make contributions to that account. At the same time, the Committee expressed concern at the fact that the total amount of the contributions by members that have already stated their willingness to contribute is substantially short of the total support that was contemplated and

urged those members that have not yet pledged their support to make every effort to do so as soon as possible.

5. The Committee noted the progress made by the Executive Directors on the Sixth General Review of quotas within the framework of the understandings reached at previous meetings of the Committee. The Committee noted the agreement on increases in the quotas of almost all members. In particular, the increases for the industrial countries and for the major oil exporting members have been agreed. The differences that remain among the other members are few and are expected to be resolved soon. The Committee asked the Executive Directors to prepare and submit to the Board of Governors a resolution on increases in the quotas of individual members. The Committee also asked the Executive Directors to complete their work on the mode of payment of the increases in quotas on the basis of the understandings already reached in the Committee so that appropriate recommendations can be submitted to the Board of Governors at the same time as the resolution on increases in quotas. The Committee reiterated its view that all of the Fund's holdings of currency should be usable in its transactions. The Committee agreed that on the question of majorities for the adoption of decisions of the Fund on important matters, a majority of eighty-five per cent should be required under the amended Articles for those decisions that can now be taken by an eighty per cent majority. It also agreed that amendments of the Articles should become effective when accepted by three-fifths of the members having eighty-five per cent of the total voting power.

6. The Committee discussed the problem of gold, including the disposition of the gold holdings of the Fund. The elements of the consensus reached are described in this paragraph.

At the meeting of the Interim Committee on January 16, 1975, it was decided to move "toward a complete set of agreed amendments on gold, including the abolition of the official price and freedom for national monetary authorities to enter into gold transactions under certain specific arrangements, outside the Articles of the Fund, entered into between national monetary authorities in order to ensure that the role of gold in the international monetary system would be gradually reduced."

To implement this general undertaking, provision should be made for:

1. Abolition of an official price for gold.
2. Elimination of the obligation to use gold in transactions with the Fund, and elimination of the Fund's authority to accept gold in transactions unless the Fund so decides by an 85 per cent majority. This understanding would be without prejudice to the study of a Gold Substitution Account.
3. Sale of 1/6 of the Fund's gold (25 million

ounces) for the benefit of developing countries without resulting in a reduction of other resources for their benefit, and restitution of 1/6 of the Fund's gold to members. The proportion of any profits or surplus value of the gold sold for the benefit of developing countries that would correspond to the share of quotas of these countries would be transferred directly to each developing country in proportion to its quota. The rest of the Fund's gold would be subject to provisions in an amendment of the Articles that would create enabling powers exercisable by an 85 per cent majority of the total voting power.

The Committee noted that, in order to give effect to the understandings arrived at in this Committee, the countries in the Group of Ten have agreed to observe during the period referred to below the following arrangements, which could be subscribed to by any other member country of the Fund that wishes to do so. Other members might adhere to these arrangements, and on such occasions the necessary modifications in them would be made:

1. That there be no action to peg the price of gold.
2. That the total stock of gold now in the hands of the Fund and the monetary authorities of the Group of Ten will not be increased.
3. That the parties to these arrangements agree that they will respect any further condition governing gold trading that may be agreed to by their central bank representatives at regular meetings.
4. That each party to these arrangements will report semi-annually to the Fund and to the BIS the total amount of gold that has been bought or sold.
5. That each party agree that these arrangements will be reviewed by the participants at the end of two years and then continued, modified or terminated. Any party to these arrangements may terminate adherence to them after the initial two-year period.

Many members from developing countries expressed concern that the proposed arrangements for gold would give rise to a highly arbitrary distribution of new liquidity, with the bulk of gains accruing to developed countries. This would greatly reduce the chances of further allocations of SDRs, thereby detracting from the agreed objective of making the SDR the principal reserve asset and phasing out the monetary role of gold. This aspect should be studied, and measures explored to avoid these distortions.

7. The Committee noted the work done so far by the Executive Directors on the subject of the establishment of a trust fund and the possible sources of its financing in response to the request of the Development Committee. It was agreed to ask the

Executive Directors to pursue their work with a view to completing it at an early date, taking into account the understandings reached in the Committee with regard to the use of profits from the sale of part of the Fund's gold for the benefit of developing countries, without neglecting the consideration of other possible sources of financing.

8. It was agreed that acceptable solutions must be found on the subject of the exchange rate system under the amended Articles, so that these agreed solutions can be combined with those on quotas and gold. The Executive Directors were requested to continue their work in order to arrive at acceptable solutions and to prepare for submission to the Board of Governors, after examination by the Committee at its next meeting, appropriate proposals for amendment of the Fund's Articles on all aspects that have been under consideration.

9. The Committee noted that the Executive Directors are in the process of conducting a review of the Fund's facility on compensatory financing with a view to improving a number of its aspects. It was agreed to urge the Executive Directors to complete their work on this subject as soon as possible, taking into account the various proposals that have been made by members of the Committee.

## Death of Haile Selassie, Former Emperor of Ethiopia

*Haile Selassie, former Emperor of Ethiopia, died at Addis Ababa on August 27. Following is a statement by President Ford issued that day.*

White House press release dated August 27

It is with the deepest regret that we have learned of the death of Emperor Haile Selassie. For five decades, he was a towering leader not only of his own country but of the entire African Continent. At the time of the invasion of his country, he was an inspiration to everyone around the world who believes in national independence and peace with freedom among nations. As a friend of this country and as a symbol of the emergence of developing nations, he will be greatly missed. But his achievements—peaceful cooperation among African states and between African states and the rest of the world—will live on and continue to have fullest American support.

## President Praises Agriculture's Role in Economy and World Peace

*Following is an excerpt from remarks made by President Ford on August 18 at the Iowa State Fairgrounds.<sup>1</sup>*

Flying over mile after mile of the heartland of America to get here this afternoon, I couldn't help but think that these vast farmlands are perhaps our nation's greatest asset. The farm community, the men and women and children who are a part of it, are prime examples of the resourcefulness and the industry, of all that is good in this great land of ours.

What a remarkable achievement it is that less than 5 percent of America's population feeds the remaining 95 percent of us, with enough left over to significantly supplement the food needs of much of the rest of the world. I congratulate each of you who participate in this miracle of abundance. You should be very proud, as we are proud of you.

I think it is amazing that in our nation today one farmworker provides food for himself and 55 others. Output per manhour on the farm has nearly tripled in the last two decades.

There are reasons—understandable reasons—for this. One is the high capital investment in agriculture. Another is hard work by the men on the farm. And the third is individual initiative.

American farmers have moved very quickly to adopt new techniques, new machinery, and new science and technology. As a result, capital investment in American agriculture has reached more than \$98,000 per worker—the highest in the world. In contrast, capital investment in manufacturing in our country stands at \$55,000 per worker.

The results are here to see. The productive genius of American agriculture provides a

showcase filled with the bounty of our nation's farms.

And I am delighted—and I thank you, too—that farmers have responded so enthusiastically to the demands of the market for full production. Of course, I am concerned about crop losses in Iowa due to the dry weather the last several weeks. But the general abundance of the crop in the Middle West shows that gains can be made from a policy of full production.

Be assured—and I say this with emphasis—that this Administration's national farm policy is and will continue to be one of full production. It is good for everybody. It is a policy of fair prices and darn good income for farmers through commercial sales of their products on a worldwide basis.

It is a policy not of government handouts, but of government hands off. However—and this is equally important—let me assure you that your government will be involved when your interests are at stake.

For example, charges have been made by some foreign buyers that American grain shipments on occasion have been of lesser quality than specified by shippers and weights have been under what they should be.

Unfortunately, some of these charges are true, but our farmers are not at fault. And just as importantly, I will not permit our farmers' integrity to be jeopardized.

I can assure all farmers and their overseas customers that we will move vigorously to clean up the problem. We will demonstrate to the world the validity of America's reputation as an honest and dependable supplier of high-quality farm products. That's the kind you raise in Iowa. That's the kind we will ship from our ports.

In recent weeks, a great deal of interest has been aroused by Soviet purchases of American grain. So far—and I emphasize so far—these purchases total 9.8 million tons; that's about 382 million bushels.

As you all know, the Agriculture Department's August crop forecast, which was announced last week, calls for record crops of corn and wheat and above-average crops of

<sup>1</sup> For the complete text, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Aug. 25, 1975, p. 865.

other grains. Estimates of corn and wheat harvest were down slightly from the July 1 forecast because of dry weather, but we still expect a record crop. We are grateful, and we thank you.

Looking ahead—and I use these words advisedly—we anticipate further purchases of grain by the Soviet Union. While our crops look good and we expect a record harvest, it is still premature to confidently predict our final production.

Accordingly, as Secretary of Agriculture Butz said, we have asked American exporters to temporarily—and I emphasize temporarily—delay further sales to the Soviet Union.

Additional sales to the Soviet Union must be in our best national interest—in the interest of all Americans, farmers and consumers alike. We must be sure that we have enough grain to meet our needs and the needs of our traditional customers, who have consistently bought from us throughout the past several decades. Year in and year out, farm incomes are dependent on a pattern of expanding exports to long-term customers.

Let me emphasize that our sales of grain and other foodstuffs to the rest of the world is one of the brightest areas of our economy. These sales insure a firm, fair price for your hard work and your tremendous investment. These sales create jobs on the farm and in the factories of manufacturers and suppliers. They have given us self-sufficiency in nutrition that is the envy of the world.

Last year, U.S. farm exports shipped to purchasing nations totaled nearly \$22 billion. Since we imported less than \$10 billion in agricultural products, this means we received approximately \$12 billion net earnings from farm-product trade on a world-wide basis. I think this is a green harvest we all understand. And we should be proud of it.

Consider for a moment what would happen if that \$12 billion of positive foreign exchange were all of a sudden erased or eliminated. We would have a huge balance-of-payments deficit, our dollar would be

weakened in foreign markets, and we would pay higher and higher prices for the many things we import every day.

In short, our nation's farmers not only raise crops but our standard of living as well. And we are deeply grateful to you for that contribution to our national welfare. The foodstuffs that you produce and America exports are a dynamic contribution to a stable and orderly world.

As the race between the stork on the one hand and the plow accelerates, American farm exports become more and more and more important. By the year 2000, world population could be over 6½ billion people, instead of the 3.8 billion people it is today. This means that about 75 percent more people need to be fed—a massive challenge at a time when there is no new Western Hemisphere to discover nor any more virgin Iowa sod to plow.

A sound, fully productive agriculture is a very key element of this nation's quest for peace. Let me emphasize that. Fully productive agriculture is a key element of this nation's quest for peace.

The American farmer has become a vital part of this effort. Our agricultural abundance helped open the door to 800 million people on the mainland of China. It helped to improve relations with the Soviet Union. It helped to build bridges to the developing world. It enabled us to contribute over the past 20 years about \$25 billion worth of food to hungry mouths throughout the rest of the world.

We are truly a fortunate people, and the American farmer stands 10 feet tall in his contribution to this nation's greatness.

Man's future is virtually unlimited if approached with a spirit of optimism and open-mindedness. We can be optimistic because of the strength you in this great Midwest give to this nation and the sustenance that you give to the world in all parts of the globe. All Americans, indeed all people, are in your debt. I thank you.



# Trademark Registration Treaty Transmitted to the Senate

*Message From President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Senate of the United States:*

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to its ratification, I transmit herewith the Trademark Registration Treaty, signed at Vienna, Austria, on June 12, 1973, together with the Regulations under the Trademark Registration Treaty. I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Department of State with respect to the Treaty.

The Trademark Registration Treaty will establish an international trademark filing arrangement, through which persons and companies residing in one of the member States can more easily register trademarks (including service marks, and collective and certification marks) and maintain these property rights in all of the member States.

Separate actions in approximately 150 jurisdictions (i.e. States, possessions, territories, etc.) are now required of United States companies in order to extend the protection of a trademark throughout the world. The complexity and high cost of establishing and protecting trademarks in international markets through the diverse national laws and procedures is a serious problem for international business concerns.

This Treaty would alleviate these problems by establishing a uniform international registration procedure through which national trademark registration effects in the member countries may be secured, maintained and renewed on a central international register of marks. With a few exceptions, the effects of international registration are subject to the substantive legal requirements of the participating States.

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on Sept. 3 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. H, 94th Cong., 1st sess., which includes the texts of the treaty and regulations and the report of the Department of State.

One of the exceptions is that for the first three years after the filing date of the application for registration, no member State may refuse trademark protection on grounds that the mark has not been used during that period. Because of this provision, and others of lesser importance, it is necessary, in order to implement the Treaty, that our national trademark law ("Trademark Act of 1946, As Amended") be further amended. Opinion among interested persons and associations is divided as to the desirability of making the required amendments. So that this important legislative question may be considered in connection with the question of ratification, proposed implementing legislation will be forwarded to the Congress in the near future. Since the Treaty is not self-executing, the instrument of ratification will not be deposited until the necessary implementing legislation has been enacted.

It is important that a Treaty such as this one have the broadest possible membership. Since this Treaty was initiated by the United States, the interest of many countries is contingent on positive United States action. I recommend, therefore, that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the Treaty submitted herewith and give its advice and consent to ratification.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *September 3, 1975.*

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 94th Congress, 1st Session

Oversight Report on Assistance to Indochina Evacuation. A report of the House Committee on International Relations. H. Rept. 94-205. May 13, 1975. 9 pp.

Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975. Conference Report to accompany H.R. 6755. H. Rept. 93-230. May 20, 1975. 5 pp.

National Emergencies. Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary to accompany H.R. 3884. H. Rept. 94-238. May 21, 1975. 56 pp.

## PUBLICATIONS

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**Technical Assistance in Tax Administration.** Agreement with Trinidad and Tobago extending and amending the agreement of June 20, 1968, as amended and extended. TIAS 7968. 3 pp. 25¢ (Cat. No. S9.10:7968).

**Seismic Observations—Project Vela Uniform.** Agreement with Canada extending the agreement of May 18 and June 28 and 29, 1965, as amended and extended. TIAS 7997. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7997).

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**Scientific Cooperation.** Agreement with the Republic of China extending the agreement of January 23 1969. TIAS 8013. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8013).

**Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Mutual Defense Purposes.** Agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland amending the agreement of July 3, 1958, as amended. TIAS 8014. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8014).

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Aviation

**International air services transit agreement.** Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693.

*Acceptance deposited:* Nauru, August 25, 1975 effective September 24, 1975.

**Convention on international civil aviation.** Done at Chicago, December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.

*Adherence deposited:* Nauru, August 25, 1975.

##### Cultural Property

**Statutes of the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property,** as amended. Adopted at New Delhi November–December, 1956. Entered into force May 10, 1958; for the United States January 20, 1971. TIAS 7038.

*Accession deposited:* Australia, June 26, 1975.

##### Finance

**Tarbela Development Fund (Supplemental) Agreement,** 1975. Done at Washington August 15, 1975. Entered into force August 15, 1975.

##### Racial Discrimination

**International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination.** Done at New York December 21, 1965. Entered into force January 4, 1969.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Somalia, August 26, 1975.

##### Space

**Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space.** Opened for signature at New York January 14, 1975.<sup>2</sup>

*Signature:* German Democratic Republic, August 27, 1975.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force for the United States.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force.

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*455	8/31	Kissinger, Allon: remarks, Jerusalem.
*456	8/31	Kissinger, Sadat: news conference, Alexandria.
*457	9/1	Kissinger: remarks, Jerusalem.
†458	9/1	Kissinger, Rabin: remarks, Jerusalem.
†459	9/1	Kissinger, Sadat: news conference, Alexandria.
*460	9/3	Kissinger, Prince Sa'ud bin Faisal: departure, Taif, Sept. 2.
*461	9/3	Kissinger, Rifai: arrival, Amman, Sept. 2.
*462	9/3	Curley sworn in as Ambassador to Ireland (biographic data).
*463	9/3	U.S. delegation to 5th U.N. Congress on crime.
*464	9/5	Green appointed Coordinator of Population Affairs (biographic data).
*465	9/5	Advisory Committee on Transnational Enterprises Working Group on Information Disclosure, Sept. 24.
*466	9/5	15 foreign urban and regional planners to tour U.S.
†467	9/5	Kissinger, Waldheim: remarks at U.N. Headquarters.
†468	9/5	Kissinger: remarks at swearing-in of delegation to seventh special U.N. General Assembly.

\*Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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## New Agreement Between Egypt and Israel Negotiated Through Secretary Kissinger

*Secretary Kissinger left Washington August 20 for the Middle East and returned September 3. Following are his remarks at Andrews Air Force Base upon his departure, remarks upon his arrival at Jerusalem on August 21 by Foreign Minister Yigal Allon of Israel and Secretary Kissinger, a statement by President Ford issued on September 1, remarks by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel and Secretary Kissinger following the initialing of the Egypt-Israel agreement at Jerusalem that day, a news conference held by President Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt and Secretary Kissinger following the initialing of the agreement at Alexandria, and remarks by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger upon his arrival at Andrews Air Force Base on September 3, together with the texts of the agreement and annex and the U.S. proposal for an early-warning system in Sinai.<sup>1</sup>*

### DEPARTURE, ANDREWS AFB, AUGUST 20

Press release 423 dated August 21

*Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you feel as you depart on this journey?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The President has asked me to undertake this mission because we believe that after long and serious negotiations an agreement between the parties is possible. Obviously no area is more in need of progress toward peace than the Middle East, which has known four wars in

<sup>1</sup> Press releases issued by the Department of State containing other remarks and news conferences by Secretary Kissinger and foreign leaders during his trip are listed on p. 459.

two decades and whose upheavals affect both the well-being and security of the United States.

We will spare no effort; but of course, ultimately, the outcome depends upon the good will and determination of the parties. I am confident that if they continue with the attitude of recent weeks then we can continue the progress.

*Q. Do you expect a settlement, Mr. Secretary?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I am very hopeful, but important issues still remain to be settled and will require detailed examination.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you think is the maximum level at which the United States can extend further military and economic aid to Israel, assuming a settlement?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have always been committed to the survival and security of Israel, and we are now engaged in technical studies to see what is needed to do this at an appropriate level. No final decision has been made, but we are coming closer.

*Q. Military talks were suspended for the reassessment. Is the United States about to resume talks with Israel regarding the F-15, Lance missiles, and other sophisticated equipment they claim they need?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First of all, the pipeline to Israel has remained open throughout the reassessment. There were certain items that were kept for an examination of all of the issues, and I am confident that these items will be dealt with to the mutual satisfaction as we settle on an aid level.

*The press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.*

## ARRIVAL, JERUSALEM, AUGUST 21

Press release 424 dated August 21

### Foreign Minister Allon

I would like to welcome Secretary of State and Madame Kissinger, Mr. Sisco, and their team upon their arrival after a long interval. It is self-understood that the time which passed since March to this day was not wasted. All parties concerned did their best to contribute their share in getting the political momentum revived. Everyone who is interested to avoid stagnation and to achieve progress toward peace, just and lasting peace, based on mutual interests of our neighboring countries and Israel—and since we are concentrating on a possible interim agreement between Israel and Egypt, everyone who is interested in that should really do his best to find out whether such an agreement is possible or not.

Well, I was never good in mathematics, not good in mathematics, not to be too modest, and I cannot judge what are the prospects percentagewise. I am afraid that my American friends are better in mathematics than I am, but somehow I have the feeling, and I think that I can safely [say] that progress has been achieved more than ever before.

Nevertheless there is a lot of work to be done through the shuttle. We shall do our best to see to it that the shuttle will be crowned with success, because if such an agreement can hold it will serve the interests of Egypt and Israel and the rest of the world, in which the United States of America is occupying a leading position.

So welcome again and all the very best.

### Secretary Kissinger

Mr. Foreign Minister, thank you for your warm and generous comments.

I am very pleased to be back in Israel and at the renewed prospects for peace which have brought me here.

I left Israel last March with a heavy heart, fearing that still another horrible tragedy was in store for the people of Israel and the Middle East.

I return today with the same concerns but with renewed hope that a strong desire for peace will prevail over tendencies toward war. All parties have had an opportunity to reconsider their attitudes; sufficient progress has been made in the discussions during the interim to warrant a more intensive diplomatic effort in the days ahead.

President Ford has sent me here to provide the strongest possible U.S. support for progress toward peace and to consult with Israeli leaders on how best to do this in a manner which will protect Israel's security and maintain the closeness of U.S.-Israeli relations.

Americans know firsthand, from five years in Washington, Prime Minister Rabin's commitment to peace and his vigilance in protecting Israel's security. Joined by Foreign Minister Allon and Defense Minister Peres, I can recall the conviction and firmness with which they conducted discussions last March. Now five months later, the gap in the negotiations has been substantially narrowed by concessions on both sides. Israel's contribution reflects not a weakened resolve, but the conviction that Israel's strength, to which we have contributed and to which we shall continue to contribute, gives it the possibility to dedicate itself to peace without fear.

There are still issues to be resolved; but with good will, patience, and understanding on both sides, it should be possible to bring to a close this phase of diplomacy in the Middle East with positive results serving the interests of both sides and the cause of peace in the area.

I know these are not easy times for Israel. The striving for peace carries with it exertions and responsibilities no less awesome than sacrifices for war. Every course has risks. Together with our friends the Government of Israel, we believe that the risks of inaction are the gravest of all.

I know also that relations between Israel and the United States have gone through a difficult period. This has ended, and we have emerged from our dialogue strengthened in our friendship and determined to pursue common policies. Israel and the United States are bound together in com-



mon purposes—a world envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations, a world in which the resort to force becomes unnecessary and disputes are resolved by peaceful

means. Such a world is unthinkable without a secure Israel.

Peace in the Middle East depends on many factors, and both sides must make a contri-

*The following remarks and news conferences by Secretary Kissinger and foreign leaders issued during his August 20–September 3 trip are not printed in the BULLETIN.*

#### August 22

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Yigal Allon of Israel following a meeting (press release 426).

Alexandria. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger upon arrival at Ras el-Tin Palace (press release 427).

Alexandria. News conference by Secretary Kissinger and President Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt (press release 428).

#### August 23

Alexandria. News conference by Secretary Kissinger following a meeting with Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi of Egypt (press release 429).

Damascus. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger upon arrival (press release 430).

Damascus. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger upon departure (press release 431).

#### August 24

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Allon following a meeting (press release 432).

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Allon following a meeting (press release 433).

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger following a meeting (press release 435 dated August 25).

#### August 25

Alexandria. News conference by Secretary Kissinger and President Sadat before a meeting (press release 436).

Alexandria. News conference by Secretary Kissinger and President Sadat prior to the Secretary's departure (press release 437).

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Allon following a meeting (press release 438).

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger following a meeting (press release 439).

#### August 26

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Allon following a meeting (press release 442).

#### August 27

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Allon following a meeting (press release 444 dated August 28).

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger following a meeting (press release 445 dated August 28).

#### August 28

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger following a meeting (press release 446 dated August 29).

Alexandria. News conference by Secretary Kissinger and President Sadat before a meeting (press release 447 dated August 29).

#### August 29

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Allon following a meeting (press release 448).

Jerusalem. News conference by Secretary Kissinger following a meeting (press release 449).

#### August 30

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Allon following a meeting (press release 451).

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger following a meeting (press release 453).

#### August 31

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger (press release 454).

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Allon following a meeting (press release 455).

Alexandria. News conference by Secretary Kissinger and President Sadat before a meeting (press release 456).

#### September 1

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger following a meeting (press release 457).

#### September 2

Taif. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Prince Sa'ud ibn Faisal of Saudi Arabia prior to the Secretary's departure (press release 460 dated September 3).

Amman. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger and Prime Minister Zaid Rifai of Jordan upon the Secretary's arrival (press release 461 dated September 3).

bution. At the same time, we know very well that one of the principal ingredients of peace must be the steadfastness of the American-Israeli relationship, a steadfastness that contributed decisively to the creation of the State of Israel, a steadfastness which has helped protect Israel's security for over a quarter of a century, a steadfastness on which Israel can rely in the future.

It is in this spirit that we will be conducting our discussions with your governmental leaders, as equals joined in the common objective of achieving practical progress toward peace in the Middle East, as friends who only want the best for each other, as partners toward the goal which no people want more and deserve more than the people of Israel, whose heroism and suffering have created and preserved their state through all vicissitudes.

I fervently hope that when I leave Israel we can both say with pride that our talks have contributed to the security of Israel, to the strengthening of U.S.-Israeli relations, and to peace in the Middle East.

#### **STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD, SEPTEMBER 1**

White House press release dated September 1

The interim agreement being initialed by Egypt and Israel this evening reduces the risk of war in the Middle East and provides fresh opportunities for further progress toward peace for a troubled area whose turmoil has affected the lives and prosperity of peoples of all nations.

Under the agreement, Israel will withdraw its forces from the Sinai passes and oil-fields, both parties agree not to resort to force and to continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace settlement. I have consistently worked for this outcome. I am deeply gratified by it and proud of the contribution America has made. By reducing the dangers of military and economic warfare, this agreement is of great significance for the well-being of every American.

The parties have taken an important and indispensable step on the long and hard road

to peace. The countries concerned made clear that they wanted America's effort to continue. Following my meetings with President Sadat in Salzburg and with Prime Minister Rabin in Washington, the United States intensified its active mediation.

The agreement is fair and balanced, and we hope that as a further practical test of peace on the ground it will contribute to building the confidence between the two sides which is required if ultimate peace is to be achieved.

The United States does not consider this agreement an end in itself, and it is strongly committed to continue to help make progress on all aspects of the problem.

I will be speaking personally with Prime Minister Rabin of Israel and President Sadat of Egypt to congratulate them on their leadership and statesmanship which in large measure made the agreement possible.<sup>2</sup> I commend Secretary Kissinger for his tireless efforts in bringing about a successful conclusion to the negotiations.

#### **REMARKS FOLLOWING INITIALING OF AGREEMENT AT JERUSALEM, SEPTEMBER 1**

Press release 458 dated September 1

#### **Prime Minister Rabin**

My colleagues from the Israeli team have just initialed in the name of the Government of Israel the agreement between Egypt and Israel. We hope that this agreement and what will follow it will open a new chapter in the relations between these two countries and in the Middle East. We believe that the cause of peace needs to take risks for peace achievements. I believe that by this agreement we are embarking on the road that might be a long one but will lead to what all the people in the area want: a real peace between the countries, the Arab countries and Israel.

We know that the negotiations were not

<sup>2</sup> For transcripts of President Ford's telephone conversations with Secretary Kissinger, with Prime Minister Rabin, and with President Sadat on Sept. 1, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 8, 1975, p. 930.

easy. The differences were wide in the beginning, then they narrowed, and now we have initialed the agreement. We have had to overcome the experience of the last 28 years which has built up backlogs of suspicions, mistrust, and I hope by signing it—initialing it—today, we have overcome some of these problems.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to thank you personally, to thank the role that the U.S. Government has played in the achievement of this agreement. We know that you have spent a lot of effort. You have traveled all over the area. You have tried your best to help this agreement to be initialed, and you have succeeded. I would like to thank you in the name of the Government of Israel and myself for the role you have played in the achievement of this agreement.

I hope that, realizing the difficulties of the shuttle diplomacy, in the future you will encourage direct negotiations, and it will save you a lot of effort and a lot of time. [Laughter.]

Thank you very much.

#### Secretary Kissinger

Mr. Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, members of the Israeli negotiating team: On behalf of my colleagues, I would like to congratulate you on the successful completion of these negotiations. We have spent really months together on the very complicated and often painful process of beginning the road toward peace in the area. As you pointed out, Mr. Prime Minister, it is particularly difficult because of the legacy of historical experiences which all of the people in this area share which has produced such great destruction. It is also difficult because it is so hard to compare the tangible quality of territory against the intangible quality of political progress and yet the road to peace had to be traveled at some point. The first step was bound to be difficult.

We spent, in the last 10 days, many hours together in complicated and tenacious negotiations, but my colleagues and I never forgot what it means for the people of Israel and for the Government of Israel to find security and peace and how difficult it is for

a small country to make its decisions when it knows that it cannot afford to make any mistakes.

I share your hopes, Mr. Prime Minister, that the agreement initialed today will have a significance beyond its terms and that in its implementation the people of this area and the people of Israel will find an opportunity to begin, for the first time in a generation and for the first time in the history of Israel, to live in peace. My colleagues and I are thankful for the reception we have received here, and we leave with a feeling of friendship and commitment—both to the security of Israel and to the progress of peace in the Middle East.

No one is more dedicated, after these experiences, to direct negotiations than I. I shall do my best to foster them as you suggested, Mr. Prime Minister, but we will be available to be helpful—not me personally, don't be afraid [laughter]—at least as a government, and in any event, I hope that the implementation of this agreement and the documents that we have initialed today will be remembered as that point when peace at last began in the Middle East.

#### NEWS CONFERENCE FOLLOWING INITIALING OF AGREEMENT AT ALEXANDRIA, SEPTEMBER 1

Press release 459 dated September 1

*Q. [To President Sadat.] How will we, Mr. President, know, during the next three, four, or five months, that both sides are genuinely and honestly living up to the specifics of the agreements? What should we look for?*

*President Sadat:* Well, for our side, there has been a previous agreement that took place in 1974, and we were up to our word, and more than that, even after March—last March, we have proved on the ground, by opening the Suez Canal and taking the measures we took, that we are aiming at peace. I think this is the guarantee that you asked for.

Let us look forward for a new era, because I think this agreement that we have concluded today marks a turning point in the

conflict—in the Arab-Israeli conflict—and that is really what has always concerned me. It is not a bit of land there or here or a few kilometers there or here, but what concerned me always is that we should hit to peace. I think this is a very important turning point in the history of this conflict.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, what is the importance of this agreement to the American Government and the American people and to the peace in the world?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I agree with the President that this agreement can mark a turning point in the conflicts of this area and could be a very important step toward a just and lasting peace.

The U.S. Government has a very profound interest in contributing to the achievement of a just and lasting peace in this area because of its interest and longstanding friendship with all of the people of this area and because the conflicts in the Middle East have affected the peace and the well-being of many other parts of the world. It is for this reason that the United States is glad that it was able to contribute to this agreement and stands ready to continue its efforts until a just and lasting peace is achieved.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can the outcome of the Congress' deliberations on the agreement hamper it and is the United States committed to the peace movement in the Middle East irrespective of the outcome of Presidential elections?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The congressional deliberations can of course have an effect on the immediate situation, but we have consulted with enough congressional leaders to be confident that they will support the agreement that was made today. Secondly, the foreign policy of the United States is conducted on a bipartisan basis, and we expect that the main lines of the foreign policy would be continued no matter what Administration is in office.

*Q. Mr. President, can you tell us about the clause concerning the annual renewal of the U.N. mandate? A U.S. official was quoted this evening as saying it is understood that Egypt would agree to at least two renewals*

*of the mandate. Can you comment on that please, Mr. President?*

*President Sadat:* Will you please repeat the question?

*Q. Yes, sir. The question, Mr. President is, the agreement refers to annual renewals of the mandate. Have you given an understanding to Dr. Kissinger that there will be at least two renewals during the period of the life of the agreement?*

*President Sadat:* Well, we have agreed upon the yearly renewal of the mandate of the U.N. forces. The first year starts from the 24th of October. It will end on the 24th of October, 1976. This will be a few weeks before the elections. We know that the year of the elections, especially those few weeks at the end of it, is very critical. So there is really an understanding that we shall appreciate and renew for another year to give the American President the opportunity to prepare the—what we call—the home inside.

*Q. [Translated from Arabic.] Mr. President, does this new disengagement agreement help Egypt in the open-door economic policy and development?*

*President Sadat:* [Translated.] Egypt has actually begun, ever since the first disengagement agreement, has begun implementing the open-door economy. We have begun building the new basis of the society as stipulated by the October paper. We have begun reconstruction on the Canal Zone, and we have begun repairing and renovating the destroyed and damaged utilities—

*President Sadat:* [Interrupts translation.] infrastructure.

*President Sadat:* [Translation continuing.] —infrastructure. Certainly this agreement is a new push to help this matter.

*Q. [Translated from Arabic.] Mr. President, could you please clarify the early-warning points run or operated by American technicians? Do they serve one side or both sides and, hypothetically, if Egypt should launch an attack on Israel, would Israel be warned and, vice versa, if Israel should launch an aggression on Egypt, would we receive a warning?*

*President Sadat:* [Translated.] When I met with U.S. President Gerald Ford in Salzburg, we discussed the matter, and I take his opportunity to say that my theory or my view lies in two points that have been achieved. Optimism. I have always been optimistic; I was before and after March and now, and before and after Geneva. Secondly, I said that the cards of this game, if not all, but at least 99 percent of them, are in the hands of the United States. Some cried against this, but today it is clear that I was proven right. We discussed—that is, myself and U.S. President Ford—we discussed the early-warning positions or bases at Salzburg. And the idea behind the early warnings is that the United States is a witness to it—

*President Sadat:* [Interrupting translation.] It started like this. I added first the U.S. President to be witness between me and Israel. This is before raising the whole question of the stations—

*President Sadat:* [Translation continuing.] —to be a witness between us. Israel has an early-warning station, but we do not have or did not have, and I do not even have or did not have a place to find someone to sell me a base. I previously asked for it but I did not get it—

*President Sadat:* [Interrupting translation.] No, I was denied, I asked something on a very low level, but I was denied this.

*President Sadat:* [Translation continuing.] I asked for something much less than that, but I was denied that.

*President Sadat:* [Interrupting translation.] Quite right.

*President Sadat:* [Translation continuing.] U.S. President Ford agreed to sell me a station like the one Israel has. And the one that we have, if I may point out, is at the highest technological level, and it is very costly. But the U.S. President Ford agreed to sell this station to me to be a witness between us and Israel. Now the early-warning stations in Israel, it has Israeli technicians and U.S. technicians. In Egypt, it is manned by Egyptians plus U.S. technicians. Now in case of attack on Israel, the U.S. technicians would warn the Israelis, would warn us, and would notify the United Na-

tions. The same thing applies to the base in Egypt. Some have claimed that this is an American electronic base. But it is an Egyptian station sold to Egypt, and it is stipulated in the agreement that should Egypt wish to withdraw the civilian American technicians, then it can do so. Thank you.

*Q. Mr. President, can you see a day, in your lifetime, in which there might be peaceful trade, tourism, or the exchange of government officials between and among all the states of this region?*

*President Sadat:* Well, we repeat again, the same theory—as I told you before, we cannot jump to conclusions. This problem is a very difficult and complicated problem and needs time. You cannot come suddenly, after 27 years of hatred, violation, blood, wars, bitterness, all this, and ask me for tourism and economic relations or so.

What I say is this—let us create a new atmosphere. Up to this moment, neither of us have any confidence in the other, and I assure you, Dr. Kissinger had a hell of a time, here and there—really. Because of this, let us create a new atmosphere, and let us reach the state of nonbelligerency officially and with guarantees. Am I to live to reach the day you asked for, I do not know. This is in the hands of God.

*Q. Can I ask you to clarify two of your previous answers? First the one on the surveillance—are you saying that Egypt has the right to unilaterally withdraw from the surveillance system? As I read the proposal, it would require an agreement by both Israel and Egypt to have a withdrawal from the surveillance system. The other clarification—I am still not certain—is Egypt promising to guarantee the U.S. mandate for another two years beyond the present current year?*

*President Sadat:* For the second question, I have already answered, and I have answered quite clearly. We shall be renewing the mandate for a year starting next October up till October '76, and I said it will be a few weeks before the election and for that we are planning to renew another year.

*Q. Excuse me, sir, what would be the termination date for the U.N. mandate under that formula?*

*President Sadat:* Twenty-fourth of October, 1976.

*Q. The first year. Then what happens after the first year is the question. Will there be another automatic renewal?*

*President Sadat:* It will be. There is an understanding between us and the United States—not between me and Israel, because I do not know their conduct—but between me and the United States. Yes.

*Q. And then on the surveillance system, do you understand that Egypt has the right to unilaterally withdraw from the surveillance system if it chooses?*

*President Sadat:* It is a matter of sovereignty. Sure. It is a matter of sovereignty. How could I ask this when I asked first President Ford to be a witness. Didn't you hear the question I answered before?

*Q. Yes, Mr. President, I did. I was referring, however, to the proposal which says "if both parties to the Basic Agreement request the United States to conclude its role under this Proposal, the United States will consider such request conclusive"—the operative word being "both parties."*

*President Sadat:* My agreement is with the United States. I have nothing to do in this matter with Israel.

*Q. Mr. President, a few days ago you said you would like to see the Geneva Conference reconvene at the earliest possible date. Would you name specifically those parties that you would like to see participate in the Geneva Conference and the maximum amount of time that you think could pass before the Geneva Conference must be convened to consider an overall settlement in the region?*

*President Sadat:* Well, I had a telephone call from President Ford this afternoon, and I thanked him, and I showed our gratitude. I commended also the sincerity and tireless efforts of Dr. Kissinger. I told him that, in spite of the fact that I am not completely

satisfied with what we have already reached, I consider this a turning point in the Arab-Israeli conflict and a step toward peace based on justice.

And I told him to keep the momentum that he has already done his best, with Dr. Kissinger, to regain it after it has been delayed last year because of the incidents, the domestic incidents there in the United States. To keep the momentum, parallel step should be taken on the Syrian front. And then I urged him—I have great esteem and confidence in him—I urged him to start a dialogue with the Palestinians, because it is a fact that without the Palestinians we cannot reach the final peace that we are still after.

President Ford himself has proved to me in Salzburg that he dedicated himself to this cause. Have I answered your question?

*Q. Yes, Mr. President, but is there a maximum period of time that you believe can go by before Geneva could be or should be reconvened?*

*President Sadat:* Well, as I told you, now we must keep the momentum. To keep the momentum, there should be a parallel step on the Syrian front. After that comes Geneva.

*Q. Secretary Kissinger, did your negotiations in the area this time contain any talk about another disengagement in the Golan Heights, and if not, what are your plans?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I visited Syria and had extended talks with President Asad. As I pointed out earlier, the United States will continue its efforts to promote a lasting peace in the area. We will be prepared to help to contribute to another step between Syria and Israel, and we will begin explorations with the parties as soon as both are ready to begin talking.

*Q. Secretary Kissinger, what are the guarantees you feel that the United States can give to keep this momentum concerning peace in the Middle East, particularly if you have further steps concerning Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians, and how long do you think this operation will take?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Of course, we are talking about a process and, as President

Sadat pointed out, the distrust is deep, and as we have been in this negotiation, the issues become progressively more complicated. The United States has been in the position of being able to talk to both parties and being trusted by both parties. And that is the best guarantee we can offer for a continuation of the process.

*Q. Mr. President, if I can pick up two questions that emerged as a result of your replies. Number one, could you share with us some of the views that President Ford may have replied to you when you suggested that the United States start a dialogue with the Palestinians? And number two, you have made a central point of describing the American presence in the Sinai passes. You have used the word "witness." As you know, this issue is now under debate in the United States. Would you, sir, like Congress to pass, to approve that concept so that the American presence can be established as quickly as the protocols stipulate that this happen?*

*President Sadat:* On the second question, yes. Yes, I should like that the Congress not raise any problems concerning it. Because, after all, it is for the sake of peace. And the United States is the superpower that is responsible for peace, especially in this region, where she has, as I told you, all the cards in the game. What was the first question?

*Q. It dealt with—did President Ford in any way respond to your suggestion that he initiate a dialogue with the Palestinians?*

*President Sadat:* Well, President Ford replied to me that the United States will do its best to reach a just and peaceful solution in the area—and he had dedicated himself to this.

### ARRIVAL, ANDREWS AFB, SEPTEMBER 3

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 8

#### President Ford

Mr. Secretary and Nancy and the party that have spent so many hours and days in the Middle East: Let me say with great emphasis that I am delighted to welcome you,

Mr. Secretary, back from this very important mission of peace in the Middle East.

The success of that extraordinary mission is of tremendous importance, not only to the parties immediately involved but, in my judgment, all the world. The interim agreement that Secretary Kissinger negotiated with great skill and with enormous diligence provides an important contribution to our continuing efforts toward an overall settlement in the Middle East. For that all of us have great reason to be most grateful.

As far as both sides were concerned, war was an unacceptable alternative in the Middle East. Both sides felt that the risks of peace in the long run were more acceptable than the dangers of war. The agreement initialed this past week provides time that will be needed to work—and we intend to work very, very hard—toward concluding a lasting peace agreement in the Middle East.

America can be very proud of its role as peacemaker in these negotiations, a role which demanded the respect and the trust on each side, a role which demonstrated again America's credibility. We can be confident that the civilian American technicians who will help monitor the agreement will be making a similar contribution to peace. I trust that the Congress will agree that this very small contingent is an altogether proper contribution for the United States to make a stabilizing and secure situation in the Sinai.

Tonight, however, our thoughts are primarily centered on welcoming Secretary Kissinger back home. And welcome you are, Henry. Henry has carried the flag of peace through weeks and weeks of very difficult negotiations. His achievements on this occasion, as in the past, have been remarkable.

I am very delighted, Henry, to welcome you back with this successful negotiation. I know from personal experience how long and hard you have worked, how difficult the task and the problem has been, and I can say from a very personal point of view that I am most appreciative and deeply grateful. And I think my words are words of millions and millions and millions of Americans. We thank you very, very much.

## Secretary Kissinger

Mr. President, Mr. Vice President, ladies and gentlemen: It is good to be home again. I want to thank you, Mr. President, for the very warm words of welcome.

In these two weeks of negotiations, we have been in contact at least twice a day. And during these two weeks of negotiations, your message to me has been, as it was in the months previously to all of the parties, that a stalemate in the Middle East involved the risk of war and therefore a danger to the security of America, and it involved the danger of economic dislocation. And therefore, for the sake of the peoples of the area and for the sake of our own people, we should spare no effort to help the nations of the Middle East find the way toward peace.

I am glad that my colleagues and I could make a contribution to this effort in which the willingness to compromise of the parties played such a central role. And we all hope that this agreement will be the first step toward a lasting peace for an area whose suffering has lasted for a generation.

As the President pointed out, we are proud that America was the one country in the world sufficiently trusted by both sides to play this role and sufficiently trusted by both sides to be asked to help monitor some of the technical aspects of the agreement on a very small but central part of the area of disengagement.

So, once again, Mr. President, thank you for this very warm reception on behalf of Nancy and myself and all of my colleagues. And once again, it is good to be back.

## TEXTS OF AGREEMENT AND ANNEX AND U.S. PROPOSAL

### Agreement Between Egypt and Israel<sup>3</sup>

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel have agreed that:

#### ARTICLE I

The conflict between them and in the Middle East shall not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means.

The Agreement concluded by the Parties January 18, 1974, within the framework of the Geneva Peace

Conference, constituted a first step towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973.

They are determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338, this Agreement being a significant step towards that end.

#### ARTICLE II

The Parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other.

#### ARTICLE III

The Parties shall continue scrupulously to observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or para-military actions against each other.

The Parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the Annex and, when concluded, the Protocol shall be an integral part of this Agreement.

#### ARTICLE IV

A. The military forces of the Parties shall be deployed in accordance with the following principles:

(1) All Israeli forces shall be deployed east of the lines designated as Lines J and M on the attached map.

(2) All Egyptian forces shall be deployed west of the line designated as Line E on the attached map.

(3) The area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines E and F and the area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines J and K shall be limited in armament and forces.

(4) The limitations on armament and forces in the areas described by paragraph (3) above shall be agreed as described in the attached Annex.


(5) The zone between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines E and J, will be a buffer zone. In this zone the United Nations Emergency Force will continue to perform its functions as under the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of January 18, 1974.

(6) In the area south from Line E and west from Line M, as defined on the attached map, there will be no military forces, as specified in the attached Annex.

B. The details concerning the new lines, the re-deployment of the forces and its timing, the limitation on armaments and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance installations and the use of the roads, the United Nations functions and other arrangements will all be in accordance with the provisions of the Annex and map which are an integral part of this Agree-

<sup>3</sup> The agreement and annex were initialed on Sept. 1 at Jerusalem by representatives of Israel and at Alexandria by representatives of Egypt and signed at Geneva on Sept. 4.





**Egypt-Israel Agreement  
September 1975**

- Line E The Egyptian line
- Line J The Israeli line
- The lines E and J will extend 12 nautical miles into the Mediterranean Sea perpendicular to the direction of the coast and the area between the lines will be U.N. buffer zone
- Line K The limit of the Israeli area of limited forces and armaments
- Line F The limit of the Egyptian area of limited forces and armaments
- Line M The line separating the Israeli-controlled area from the area south of line E and west of line M, and the areas of buffer zones 2A and 2B
- BZ-1 The buffer zone between lines E and J
- BZ-2A, & BZ-2B The buffer zones along the Gulf of Suez
- ✕ — ✕ Road section for common use
- E-1 Egyptian surveillance station
- J-1 Israeli surveillance station
- USA-WS USA watch stations 1, 2 & 3
- USA-E-SF USA electronic sensor fields 1, 2, 3.
- UN Posts in the Hamam Farouh area

ment and of the Protocol which is to result from negotiations pursuant to the Annex and which, when concluded, shall become an integral part of this Agreement.

#### ARTICLE V

The United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall continue its functions and its mandate shall be extended annually.

#### ARTICLE VI

The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission for the duration of this Agreement. It will function under the aegis of the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East in order to consider any problem arising from this Agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of its mandate. The Joint Commission shall function in accordance with procedures established in the Protocol.

#### ARTICLE VII

Non-military cargoes destined for or coming from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal.

#### ARTICLE VIII

This Agreement is regarded by the Parties as a significant step toward a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement.

The Parties shall continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

#### ARTICLE IX

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the Protocol and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement.

Done at \_\_\_\_\_ on the \_\_\_\_\_ 1975,  
in four original copies.

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt      For the Government of Israel

\_\_\_\_\_  
WITNESS

### Annex to Egypt-Israel Agreement

Within 5 days after the signature of the Egypt-Israel Agreement, representatives of the two Parties shall meet in the Military Working Group of the Middle East Peace Conference at Geneva to begin preparation of a detailed Protocol for the implementation of the Agreement. The Working Group will complete the Protocol within 2 weeks. In order to facilitate preparation of the Protocol and implementation of the Agreement, and to assist in maintaining the scrupulous observance of the ceasefire and other elements of the Agreement, the two Parties have agreed on the following principles,

which are an integral part of the Agreement, as guidelines for the Working Group.

#### 1. Definitions of Lines and Areas

The deployment lines, areas of limited forces and armaments, Buffer Zones, the area south from Line E and west from Line M, other designated areas, road sections for common use and other features referred to in Article IV of the Agreement shall be as indicated on the attached map (1:100,000—U.S. Edition).

#### 2. Buffer Zones

(a) Access to the Buffer Zones will be controlled by the United Nations Emergency Force, according to procedures to be worked out by the Working Group and the United Nations Emergency Force.

(b) Aircraft of either Party will be permitted to fly freely up to the forward line of that Party. Reconnaissance aircraft of either Party may fly up to the middle line of the Buffer Zone between E and J on an agreed schedule.

(c) In the Buffer Zone, between line E and J there will be established under Article IV of the Agreement an Early Warning System entrusted to United States civilian personnel as detailed in a separate proposal, which is a part of this Agreement.

(d) Authorized personnel shall have access to the Buffer Zone for transit to and from the Early Warning System; the manner in which this is carried out shall be worked out by the Working Group and the United Nations Emergency Force.

#### 3. Area South of Line E and West of Line M

(a) In this area, the United Nations Emergency Force will assure that there are no military or paramilitary forces of any kind, military fortifications and military installations; it will establish checkpoints and have the freedom of movement necessary to perform this function.

(b) Egyptian civilians and third country civilian oil field personnel shall have the right to enter, exit from, work, and live in the above indicated area, except for Buffer Zones 2A, 2B and the United Nations Posts. Egyptian civilian police shall be allowed in the area to perform normal civil police functions among the civilian population in such numbers and with such weapons and equipment as shall be provided for in the Protocol.

(c) Entry to and exit from the area, by land, by air or by sea, shall be only through United Nations Emergency Force checkpoints. The United Nations Emergency Force shall also establish checkpoints along the road, the dividing line and at other points, with the precise locations and number to be included in the Protocol.

(d) Access to the airspace and the coastal area shall be limited to unarmed Egyptian civilian vessels and unarmed civilian helicopters and transport planes involved in the civilian activities of the area as agreed by the Working Group.

(e) Israel undertakes to leave intact all currently existing civilian installations and infrastructures.

(f) Procedures for use of the common sections of the coastal road along the Gulf of Suez shall be determined by the Working Group and detailed in the Protocol.

#### 4. *Aerial Surveillance*

There shall be a continuation of aerial reconnaissance missions by the United States over the areas covered by the Agreement (the area between lines F and K), following the same procedures already in practice. The missions will ordinarily be carried out at a frequency of one mission every 7-10 days, with either Party or the United Nations Emergency Force empowered to request an earlier mission. The United States Government will make the mission results available expeditiously to Israel, Egypt and the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East.

#### 5. *Limitation of Forces and Armaments*

(a) Within the Areas of Limited Forces and Armaments (the areas between lines J and K and lines E and F) the major limitations shall be as follows:

- (1) Eight (8) standard infantry battalions
- (2) Seventy-five (75) tanks
- (3) Seventy-two (72) artillery pieces, including heavy mortars (i.e. with caliber larger than 120 mm), whose range shall not exceed twelve (12) km.
- (4) The total number of personnel shall not exceed eight thousand (8,000).
- (5) Both Parties agree not to station or locate in the area weapons which can reach the line of the other side.
- (6) Both Parties agree that in the areas between lines J and K, and between line A (of the Disengagement Agreement of January 18, 1974) and line E, they will construct no new fortifications or installations for forces of a size greater than that agreed herein.

(b) The major limitations beyond the Areas of Limited Forces and Armament will be:

- (1) Neither side will station nor locate any weapon in areas from which they can reach the other line.
- (2) The Parties will not place anti-aircraft missiles within an area of ten (10) kilometres east of Line K and west of Line F, respectively.

(c) The United Nations Emergency Force will conduct inspections in order to ensure the maintenance of the agreed limitations within these areas.

#### 6. *Process of Implementation*

The detailed implementation and timing of the redeployment of forces, turnover of oil fields, and other arrangements called for by the Agreement, Annex and Protocol shall be determined by the

Working Group, which will agree on the stages of this process, including the phased movement of Egyptian troops to line E and Israeli troops to line J. The first phase will be the transfer of the oil fields and installations to Egypt. This process will begin within two weeks from the signature of the Protocol with the introduction of the necessary technicians, and it will be completed no later than eight weeks after it begins. The details of the phasing will be worked out in the Military Working Group.

Implementation of the redeployment shall be completed within 5 months after signature of the Protocol.

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For the Government  
of the Arab Republic  
of Egypt

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For the Government  
of Israel

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WITNESS

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#### **Proposal**

In connection with the Early Warning System referred to in Article IV of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel concluded on this date and as an integral part of that Agreement, (hereafter referred to as the Basic Agreement), the United States proposes the following:

1. The Early Warning System to be established in accordance with Article IV in the area shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement will be entrusted to the United States. It shall have the following elements:

a. There shall be two surveillance stations to provide strategic early warning, one operated by Egyptian and one operated by Israeli personnel. Their locations are shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement. Each station shall be manned by not more than 250 technical and administrative personnel. They shall perform the functions of visual and electronic surveillance only within their stations.

b. In support of these stations, to provide tactical early warning and to verify access to them, three watch stations shall be established by the United States in the Mitla and Giddi Passes as will be shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement. These stations shall be operated by United States civilian personnel. In support of these stations, there shall be established three unmanned electronic sensor fields at both ends of each Pass and in the general vicinity of each station and the roads leading to and from those stations.

2. The United States civilian personnel shall perform the following duties in connection with the operation and maintenance of these stations.

a. At the two surveillance stations described in paragraph 1 a. above, United States civilian personnel will verify the nature of the operations of

the stations and all movement into and out of each station and will immediately report any detected divergency from its authorized role of visual and electronic surveillance to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the United Nations Emergency Force.

b. At each watch station described in paragraph 1 b. above, the United States civilian personnel will immediately report to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the United Nations Emergency Force any movement of armed forces, other than the United Nations Emergency Force, into either Pass and any observed preparations for such movement.

c. The total number of United States civilian personnel assigned to functions under this Proposal shall not exceed 200. Only civilian personnel shall be assigned to functions under this Proposal.

3. No arms shall be maintained at the stations and other facilities covered by this Proposal, except for small arms required for their protection.

4. The United States personnel serving the Early Warning System shall be allowed to move freely within the area of the System.

5. The United States and its personnel shall be entitled to have such support facilities as are reasonably necessary to perform their functions.

6. The United States personnel shall be immune from local criminal, civil, tax and customs jurisdiction and may be accorded any other specific privileges and immunities provided for in the United Nations Emergency Force agreement of February 13, 1957.

7. The United States affirms that it will continue to perform the functions described above for the duration of the Basic Agreement.

8. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Proposal, the United States may withdraw its personnel only if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary. In the latter case the Parties to the Basic Agreement will be informed in advance in order to give them the opportunity to make alternative arrangements. If both Parties to the Basic Agreement request the United States to conclude

its role under this Proposal, the United States will consider such requests conclusive.

9. Technical problems including the location of the watch stations will be worked out through consultation with the United States.

HENRY A. KISSINGER  
*Secretary of State*

Accepted by: \_\_\_\_\_

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 94th Congress, 1st Session

Reductions in Supplemental Requests for Indochina and Additional Requests for Supplemental Appropriations for Assistance to Indochina Refugees. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting reductions in fiscal year 1975 supplemental requests for Indochina and additional supplemental appropriations requests for assistance to Indochina refugees. H. Doc. 94-133. May 6, 1975. 2 pp.

Construction at Diego Garcia. Message from the President of the United States transmitting a report that he has evaluated all military and foreign policy implications regarding the need for United States facilities at Diego Garcia, and certification that the construction of such facilities is essential to the national interest of the United States, pursuant to section 163(a)(1) of Public Law 93-552. H. Doc. 94-140. May 12, 1975. 1 p.

Security Assistance to Spain. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting notice of his intention to exercise his authority under section 614(A) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, to waive the restriction of section 620(m) of the act as it applies to security assistance to Spain for fiscal year 1975, pursuant to section 652 of the act. H. Doc. 94-142. May 12, 1975. 2 pp.

## Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of September 9

Press release 475 dated September 9

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of Soviet unhappiness over your latest peace mission in the Middle East, and in view of what appears to be growing skepticism at home about détente, I wonder whether you would tell us how you feel today about détente, whether you are satisfied that it works or perhaps disappointed by the interpretation in Moscow.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Détente has become almost a slogan in our public debate, and I think it is important to summarize again what it means to the United States.

The policy of relations with the Soviet Union, and of attempting to ease the tensions between the two great nuclear superpowers, derives from the conditions in which we find ourselves.

The United States and the Soviet Union have the capability of destroying humanity. Their conflicts, therefore, are different from the conflicts between nations throughout history. They have a special obligation to conduct their affairs in such a manner that the risk of war is minimized if this is at all possible.

It is this conviction that has led successive Administrations in attempting to find a relationship with the Soviet Union less prone to the dangers of conflicts that can arise sometimes even without the direct intentions of the two countries.

Now, this attempt to ease tensions takes place at several levels:

First, it takes place on the level of the control of arms, especially nuclear arms, and in that connection the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)—the agreement that has been concluded and the agreement that we are attempting to conclude—are of prime

significance. The problem of the nuclear arms race is a problem that must be dealt with that will be solved at some time—and the sooner the better.

Second, we are attempting to bring about restraint in areas of direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, such as in Central Europe. That has been reasonably successful.

Third, there is the problem of conflicts, disagreements, tensions in areas where there is no direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, such as the Middle East. In such areas, the conflict can develop as a result of the tensions that are inherent in the area, the lack of restraint of the superpowers, and other factors. In the conflict in peripheral areas, the process of relaxing tensions has not made as much progress as in the area of the control of armaments and in the areas where there has been a direct confrontation. In those areas, further efforts and mutual restraint are necessary.

We do not believe that relations with the Soviet Union are idyllic. We are ideological opponents. We have conflicting national interests in addition to the ideological differences. Nevertheless we believe we have an obligation to attempt to ease tensions, if only to demonstrate to our own people that if there is a conflict we have done everything in our power, honorably, to avoid it.

So, on the whole, we believe that the policy of relaxation of tensions is essential, that we are going to continue to pursue it, and that it can be done only on the basis of reciprocity. We will not give up vital American interests. We will resist attempts to exploit it, but we will cooperate on the basis

of reciprocity with any effort that can ease tensions on both sides, on the basis that the process is a two-way street.

### Defusing of Middle East Tensions

*Q. Mr. Secretary, with regard to this easing of tensions in the Middle East, you say that the United States won't give up any of its vital interests, and presumably the Soviet Union won't give up any of its vital interests. In peripheral areas such as these, is it not possible that what is considered progress by one side may be considered dangerous provocation by the other and thereby have an adverse effect on your general picture?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Of course, when you assess vital interests, you also have to remember that in order to vindicate them you have to survive. So that the definition that "both sides have a vital interest" must take into account the realities of the contemporary period.

I believe that it is—

*Q. I wasn't talking about that.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I will come to your question in a minute—or in five minutes. [Laughter.]

In the Middle East, I do not believe that the essential interests of the United States and the Soviet Union are in any sense incompatible. I do not believe that the recent agreement between Egypt and Israel is in any sense detrimental to the interests of the Soviet Union or a unilateral advantage for the United States.

The significance of the agreement is that it defuses the tensions in the area and if it is implemented properly will open, or can open, a door to general peace in the area.

And if we consider that every war in the Middle East has involved the danger of confrontation of the two nuclear superpowers, it is in the mutual interest of both the Soviet Union and the United States to reduce the tensions of war.

The United States seeks no unilateral advantage in the Middle East. The United States recognizes that in a final settlement in the Middle East, a Soviet role will be important; and therefore we are debating now

certain procedural questions about the Soviet role in the recent negotiations—rather than a unilateral advantage gained by the United States at the expense of the Soviet Union.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, a number of Pentagon officials have been saying that there is no military role that can be played by the 200 American civilian technicians in monitoring the agreement that could not be played by either airborne or satellite intelligence. Can you say, apart from the political or psychological effect of having these Americans in the Sinai passes, whether there is any monitoring function that is essential to their being there—in other words, that they have to be physically in the passes?*

### Monitoring Stations in the Sinai

*Secretary Kissinger:* These "Pentagon officials" have not shared their judgments either with me or with the President. And therefore I don't know who they are and on what their opinion is based.

The monitoring that is going to be done in the limited area in the Sinai—that is, the area that is geographically bounded by the Giddi Pass in the north and the Mitla Pass in the south—it is about a distance of roughly 20 miles. The monitoring has two strategic warning stations, one by Israel and one by Egypt, under American custody; and there will be Americans stationed at each of these stations.

And secondly, three manned tactical warning stations.

In the negotiations extending over several weeks that we participated in, neither of the parties thought that either of these types of stations was dispensable.

And I might also point out that there was a unanimous vote in the National Security Council before I left, which included the participation of the Defense Department, that agreed that as a last resort, if it was necessary to make the agreement, we should go ahead with the American technicians.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what about the risks that may emerge as a result of the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] threat that the "Palestine revolution regards the U.S.*

*military presence in the Sinai as an enemy target and should be shot by every struggler and every nationalist in our Arab nation"? How do you plan to handle that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There aren't that many strugglers in the Sinai, because it is a substantially unpopulated area; and the American warning stations are located in an area between the two armies, in an area that contains several thousand of the United Nations personnel and in which there is no civilian population of any kind.

Secondly, we believe that once the immediate passions have died down and the various Arab nations and the various groupings look at the agreement, they will realize that it was the only step possible toward peace that could now be taken and that, compared to the alternative of a stalemate, it was the best course for all of the parties in the area. So we believe, when a more sober calculation is undertaken, that all of the parties in the area will return to the realization that the process of negotiation is the only road by which peace can be achieved.

#### **Making U.S. Undertakings Public**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a good deal of backing and filling going on at the Hill about the issue of what is classified and what is "secret" and how to handle it, involving the U.S. commitment. And there does seem to be some confusion about secret or classified commitments made by the United States—either verbally or written—in the interim agreement, and I wonder if you could clear this up with answering two simple questions.*

*First, will the American people know every detail of any U.S. commitment to the parties? And will all of Congress know these commitments in toto, or will full disclosure be made only to committees or to certain members of certain committees?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have made an unprecedented effort to put before the Congress any American undertaking, to either of the parties. We have gone not only through any written undertakings that may exist but through the entire negotiating record to extract from it any undertaking of the United

States. We have put those before the relevant committees.

*Q. [Inaudible.]*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Let me finish—I will answer both of your questions.

We have put those before the relevant committees.

In addition, we have gone over the negotiating record with other members of the committees in order to make sure that their definition of what constitutes an undertaking does not differ from ours. Now, with respect to—And if there is a disagreement, we will work it out.

Now, with respect to what we consider to be undertakings, we are now working out with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and we will work out with the House International Relations Committee, a form in which these undertakings can be made public—the difficulty being that a few are not really “undertakings” in the strict sense, but general diplomatic statements of intention.

But any “undertaking” will be put before the entire Congress and before the public in a manner agreed to between the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House International Relations Committee, and the Administration.

*Q. Do I get from that that there is a portion of—what? the diplomatic intent?—that is not going to be made public under any circumstances?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Any undertaking of the United States will be made public.

There is, however, an area of diplomacy that no country has ever made public and that does not involve undertakings, commitments, of the United States.

We will go to the absolute limit, and we have made an absolutely unprecedented effort in making available documents that have never been made available to congressional committees before. We will then work with these committees on an agreed method of publication. And it will be the fullest disclosure of a diplomatic record that has ever been made.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, have you told these committees of Congress that the United States*

*will pay for 55 to 75 percent of the oil supplies of Israel for years to come?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First of all, that is not a correct statement of—

*Q. What is a correct statement in regard to what we will pay for Israeli oil for years to come?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* May I answer the first question?

We have put before these committees—and no doubt we will make public—any commitment, any undertakings of the United States with respect to the oil supply of Israel.

The United States has not committed itself to a separate funding of the oil purchases of Israel. The United States has agreed that it would take into account in its total aid package the additional sums that Israel has to spend for foreign purchases of oil.

There is no precise sum—in fact, there is no sum—attached to this general proposition, as will become apparent when the documentation becomes available.

#### **Further Negotiations in the Middle East**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you have said repeatedly—you have said repeatedly on this last trip—that the momentum now toward peace must be maintained. What does that mean in a specific practical way, beyond the rhetoric?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have maintained—and, indeed, it is part of the agreement—that the agreement between Egypt and Israel is not a final peace settlement. The agreement states it is considered a significant step toward peace. It is not a final peace agreement.

It has always been understood that a final settlement must involve the question of frontiers, must involve the question of reciprocal Arab commitments to peace, must involve some solution of the Palestinian question, and it must involve international guarantees of some sort. This can be pursued either by step-by-step policy—for example, through negotiations between Syria and Israel—or by a reconvening of the Geneva Conference, or by both efforts being pursued simultaneously.

The United States has repeatedly stated

its commitment to promote a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

We will be prepared to help the parties either in a multilateral framework or in a bilateral framework. And we believe—and we believe that the parties agree—that the process toward peace cannot be arrested.

*Q. What is your appraisal of the Syrian and Israeli interest in another step along this process?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, in the immediate future Israel and Egypt will have to negotiate the practical arrangements involved in their current agreement. That will take some weeks. Then the process of implementation will have to begin. But somewhere in this process, if Syria and Israel are prepared to start negotiations, and if it is their judgment that the United States can be helpful, we will be prepared to play a role.

#### **Visit of General Secretary Brezhnev**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, has the interim agreement had any visible effect on other areas of U.S.-Soviet relations? And in addition to that, whether it has or not, could you give us an assessment of the current state of SALT negotiations in particular—what obstacles there are, if you can tell us—and what the prospects are for the visit by Mr. Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] to the United States?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* As you know, Foreign Minister Gromyko is going to visit the General Assembly and on that occasion will pay his customary visit to Washington. I expect to meet with him several times while he is here. The President will meet with him for an extended review of the situation. On that occasion we will certainly review the situation in the Middle East, and at least from our side, we will make every effort to overcome whatever misunderstandings may exist.

As far as SALT is concerned, the basic issues of principle were settled at Vladivostok. Several other issues of great consequence have been settled in the meantime. We



are now down to two or three issues of great importance on which agreement has not yet been reached but on which, if agreement were reached, the negotiation could be concluded within six to eight weeks after that.

We expect to discuss those issues with Foreign Minister Gromyko when he is here, and we still expect to receive the General Secretary in Washington before the end of this year.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, this is somewhat—*

*Q. Mr. Secretary, that timetable would seem to run awfully late into the year. You say six to eight weeks after a breakthrough. And what is your estimate of a foreseeable date, even if all things would go somewhat—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I cannot give an estimate of a date, but I have said that we still expect to see Mr. Brezhnev here before the end of this year.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did the somewhat unprecedented intervention of your African desk with the Governor of Delaware on behalf of two members of ZANU [Zimbabwe African National Union], an African terrorist group without U.N. diplomatic credentials—did this have anything to do with the widely reported resignation of Ambassador Davis [Nathaniel Davis, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs]?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, because I don't even know what you're talking about.

*Q. It's been reported on page 1 of the Star and the Post, Mr. Secretary.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well—

*Q. You don't read those papers, or—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I don't want to offend the press, but I regret to say that I am not familiar with this particular incident—but I will be within 15 minutes of leaving here. [Laughter.]

#### Issues in Middle East Policy Reassessment

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in a memorandum of understanding some months ago the Administration announced there was a policy reassessment taking place regarding the Mid-*

*dle East. Are we ever to hear of that again—or if we're not, can you give us some tentative conclusions that may have been drawn as the result of this months-long reassessment?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The reassessment had two aspects. It had the aspect of the diplomatic framework within which progress toward peace could be pursued in the Middle East in the wake of the failure of the March shuttle. And, secondly, it had the aspect of the aid levels that were requested for both Israel and some of the Arab countries. Both of these issues were clearly related to each other.

In the wake of the March failure, we had to assess whether the step-by-step approach was still valid or whether a more comprehensive approach offered the only possibility. I think that the diplomatic framework of the reassessment has been settled by the recent negotiation between Egypt and Israel.

Similarly, the problem of aid levels is in the process of being settled. It's been substantially settled. And these will be submitted to the Congress before the end of the month, I would expect.

*Q. Yes, but to follow for a minute, in response to a question a while back I got the impression that we still have not made a decision whether step-by-step from here on in is the preferred approach. Is that correct?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Which approach should be pursued depends not only on the preferences of the United States but on the preferences of the parties, and the issue was not only which of these should be approached but in what manner it should be approached.

I believe that as a result of the examination here of recent months and of the events of recent weeks there is now a much greater clarity of the limits and the possibilities that exist in moving the process forward toward peace.

Similarly, as I pointed out, we will submit aid levels. And, of course, we had the benefit, during the reassessment, of learning the congressional judgment of appropriate aid levels in the letter of the 76 Senators and in other

approaches. And therefore, in assessing the aid levels, as I pointed out previously, what one has to consider is the difference between what would have been submitted or voted anyway and what is being requested as a result of the agreement. And we do not think that that is a very significant figure.

#### U.S. Personnel in the Sinai

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is there an intergovernment study underway now concerning the recruitment of American personnel to be sent to the Sinai? And if so, will these personnel be recruited from the Defense Department, from any of the government intelligence agencies—or if not, will these personnel reflect that work experience? And will the organization established to administer the monitoring function in the Sinai be a private corporation—perhaps like the Vinnell Corporation—or more like Air America?*  
[Laughter.]

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am not sure that I quite get the implication of that last remark. And I don't want you to explain it.  
[Laughter.]

We are undertaking a study, on an urgent basis, of all of these questions. Our preference is to recruit people out of civilian life. We have not yet made a decision as between a private organization or a governmentally sponsored one. It is clear that the personnel will not be under the Defense Department, because we do not want to give them a military role. The personnel will report to both sides and to the United Nations as well as to the U.S. Government.

But the questions you ask, which are important ones, we will be able to answer within about 10 days.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you said—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* You have to remember, incidentally, that American personnel will not begin manning these stations for five months after the implementing protocol has been signed, and that is about two to three weeks away. So we have about five and a half months to work out all the details.

#### Events in Portugal

*Q. I was going to ask you to evaluate the recent developments in Portugal with regard to your earlier statements on that country, also with regard to the role of the Soviet bloc in Portugal and with regard to the possibilities for American assistance to Portugal, economic assistance.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have made so many statements about Portugal that I'm not absolutely sure which ones you are referring to.

I was concerned, as were my colleagues, that events in Portugal might be dominated by a minority group—the Communist Party—distinguished primarily by its discipline and its dogmatism, against the expressed wishes of the overwhelming majority of the Portuguese people. And the United States, together with its West European allies, repeatedly pointed out its dismay at an evolution in which such a small minority would take over the effective control of Portugal.

Now, recent events have reduced at least some of the manifestations of this dominance. We are not yet clear what will emerge out of the deliberations, both with respect to the formation of a new government and with respect to the organization of the Revolutionary Council.

The Communist Party still remains a significant political force in Portugal—probably out of proportion to its numerical strength—and we cannot yet fully assess what is taking place within the military movement. But on the whole, we believe that the events of the last two weeks have been encouraging. The United States supports the emergence of a pluralistic system there reflecting the public's views as they were expressed in the election to the constitutional assembly. And we are working in the closest harmony on this problem with our European allies.

With respect to the Soviet Union, we have made clear our view about possible Soviet intervention in Portugal, and those views have not changed.

*Q. Will it be a matter of U.S. policy that*

any aid to Portugal will depend on whether or not we still think that the Communist Party remains a force beyond its numerical strength?

*Secretary Kissinger:* That will certainly influence our judgment.

#### **Soviet Role in Middle East Settlement**

*Q. You said the Soviet Union would continue to play a procedural role in the Middle East. Will it be just procedural? Could it be more than procedural?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, I did not say the Soviet Union would play only a procedural role. I said that the Soviet objection to the recent negotiation between Egypt and Israel seems to me to have concerned procedure more than substance. And I also said that in a final settlement in the Middle East, Soviet participation would be important—and not only procedural but substantive.

*Q. I meant to ask whether you could conceive of the possibility that the Soviets could play an actual peacekeeping role in the Middle East in the same way we will be in the Sinai passes.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, the role that the United States is playing is at the request of both parties. It was not proposed by the United States. In fact, I am giving away no secrets if I point out that we were not particularly anxious to play this role.

If both parties should ask the Soviet Union in some other area to play a similar role, that would be for both parties to discuss with the Soviet Union. I do not see that this is the most immediate foreign policy problem before us, however.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is there in the memorandum of understanding between the United States and Israel any sort of formal commitment to consult with Israel on the nature of assistance in the event of an attack by an outside power, and if so, why is it necessary?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The memorandum of understanding between us and Israel—which is not, incidentally, unprecedented, because this has been concluded after many previous

diplomatic watersheds—has traditionally been classified.

We will make public, as I have stated before, all of the essential undertakings, and I would rather deal with them as a unit than to deal with speculative clauses before the committees have fully considered them. This will be fully discussed.

#### **Attitudes Toward Egypt-Israel Agreement**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, why, in your judgment, has the Middle East agreement been such a hard sell for you and the Administration, especially in the Congress?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First of all, let me state my judgment of the agreement. I consider this agreement more significant than the previous two disengagement agreements that received much less criticism. It certainly gained some time for the peace process, and it may open the door to a general peace settlement.

Now, why has it been more difficult to present?

I think part of the reason is that it involves—in the year of the collapse of our Indochina effort—a commitment of some American personnel in a faraway part of the world. To be sure, the commitment is different from the Indochina commitment. It is for a peacekeeping role, and not for participation in a military conflict. But I think there may be a sort of subconscious rebellion against this.

Secondly, it coincides with our submission to the Congress of a substantial aid bill at a time when our country is undergoing a recession. And it may not be fully realized, first, that a substantial aid bill would have been submitted in any event, even without the agreement, and that, secondly, the costs of a war have been demonstrated to be incomparably higher than any aid bill that will be submitted this year.

So, for all these reasons, it has been a somewhat more complex case to make. And there may be the general attitude of suspicion that has befallen this town as a result of Watergate and other events.

But I must say, in fairness, that the questioning before the congressional committees has been very constructive. We have no complaint about harassment or negativism. I think serious people have made an effort to look into the implications for the United States of a major foreign policy move, and we think that the debate is, on the whole, a healthy one.

#### **Proposed Sale of Hawk Missiles to Jordan**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on a related part of the Middle East, do you think there is a compromise possible between the Administration and Congress on the projected sale of 14 Hawk missile batteries to Jordan?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First of all, the issue is not between the Administration and the Congress so much as between Jordan and the Congress, in the sense that a compromise must be acceptable to the Government of Jordan in order to be viable.

We are prepared to discuss with the congressional committees whether we can find some formula that would ease their concerns.

There are definite limits to what can be done, because King Hussein has pointed out on innumerable occasions that he will not compromise on the numbers.

Now, whether any compromise is possible with respect to deployment, rate of delivery, or similar matters, we are now exploring with the congressional committees in both the House and the Senate; and then, of course, we will have to discuss it with the Government of Jordan.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is there any basis for a new German-American offset agreement now that the deficits and the American balance of payments have disappeared?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I think it is no secret that your Chancellor is not an unqualified admirer of offset agreements. We have had some discussions on that subject, and we have not yet reached any conclusions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what are the prospects now for the normalization of relations with Cuba, especially in view of the recent forum*

*being held in Havana for the so-called independence of Puerto Rico?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have pursued a policy with respect to Cuba of moving by reciprocal steps toward an improvement of relations. This policy has shown some progress, and we are prepared to continue this policy.

At the same time, the meeting in Havana can only be considered by us as an unfriendly act and as a severe setback to this process and as a totally unwarranted interference in our domestic affairs.

#### **Soviet Purchases of U.S. Grain**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the Soviet Union's grain shortfall is estimated by U.S. Government agencies as anywhere from 20 to 50 million tons, and there has already been considerable opposition to shipping the 10 million tons that they have purchased. How do you see the Soviet grain deals relating to our foreign policy and détente as you have described it this morning?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, 50 million tons is a wild exaggeration. I have not seen any estimate like this. But at this moment we are not undertaking any new contracts for sale to the Soviet Union until the crop returns for October are in.

We are also interested in discussing with the Soviet Union the possibility of a long-term agreement which would avoid the fluctuations and the sudden invasions of our market and which would enable our farmers to plan over a more extended period of time and which would therefore have less of an impact, or a minimal impact, on our prices.

All of these are now under consideration, and they are not directly related to détente. They are being discussed on a general level.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is there some consideration being given to a long-term agreement which would involve a trade-off for oil or other Soviet resources?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There has been a very general discussion on that subject. There are no negotiations on that subject

going on right now. In fact, there are no negotiations going on either about the long-term agreement or about a possible use of Soviet resources. But if a long-term negotiation should begin, that is one of the factors that might be considered.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the Church committee [Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities] claims to have evidence that the CIA violated a Presidential directive on the destruction of biological toxins. What are the diplomatic consequences of this, and when did you first learn about it?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Frankly, I first learned about it on television this morning.

*Q. Ambassador Helms [Richard Helms, former Director of the CIA] apparently has been recalled to testify tomorrow.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That is right. I would assume that there has been some discussion between the White House and the Church committee on this subject, but I have been away for recent weeks.

I would have to know the quantities that are involved before I can make a judgment. We committed ourselves by treaty to destroy biological warfare agents.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you have talked an awful lot about the momentum, of the need for momentum, and certainly the Egyptians are discussing the need for momentum. On the other hand, the Israelis, in all of their public statements since the agreement, have indicated they have virtually nothing more to give; Premier Rabin talked about a few hundred yards in the Golan. In this case, have you perhaps simply postponed the inevitable, or do you think perhaps the Israelis are posturing at this stage?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I do not want to speculate about a negotiation that has not even been agreed to in principle at this moment and in which I have not heard the detailed position of either side.

Inevitably, somewhere along the line there must be further progress toward peace. And therefore any progress that has been made, even if it gains only time, permits time for

the peace process to occur under conditions of less pressure and less tension. What will develop in the Syrian-Israeli negotiation, I would have to leave to the beginning of such a negotiation, and I do not want to prejudge it now.

## Secretary Kissinger Holds Meeting With U.N. Secretary General

*Following are remarks made to the press by U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim and Secretary Kissinger following their meeting at U.N. Headquarters on September 5.*

Press release 467 dated September 5

*Secretary General Waldheim:* Ladies and gentlemen, the Secretary of State informed me in the conversation we had just now of the Sinai agreement. As you know, the United Nations will have to play an important role, an enlarged role in the implementation of that agreement, and it was therefore very helpful for me to hear from the Secretary of State the details about the agreement. I consider this exchange of views very helpful. It is evident that the United Nations has to do everything possible in order to contribute to a peaceful development in the area.

*Secretary Kissinger:* The Secretary General and I had an extremely cordial and very constructive talk. I explained to the Secretary General the aspects of the agreement in which the United Nations will be involved. The role of the United Nations will be very crucial in this, the first agreement that involves the restoration of civilian activities in an area that is being vacated and that has many elements of great complexity.

My impression of the conversation was that the Secretary General and his assistants believe these problems to be soluble and that they share our conviction that the United Nations can play a very important and very decisive role in moving the Middle East toward peace. So I have been very pleased by this meeting.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect the*

*Soviets to express their criticism of this agreement in the Security Council and to delay or to complicate the necessary deliberations in the Council?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I expect that when the Soviet Foreign Minister comes to New York he and I will have an extended conversation on the subject. I believe that at the end of that conversation we will reach an understanding about the relationship between the U.N. activities and the really rather small U.S. activities, which are not part of the U.N. mandate but which will nevertheless be related to the U.N. activities. So I do not expect that we will say it is an insoluble problem.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect any real problem with Congress on approving of this plan for civilians?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I had the impression in my congressional briefings yesterday that, when the Congress understands, as it is beginning to, that this is not comparable to Viet-Nam but is, rather, comparable to peacekeeping activities that many other nations have carried out, like Sweden, Finland, or all the nations that are part of UNEF [United Nations Emergency Force], that the U.S. warning system will actually be within the UNEF zone—when all of this is understood, it will be clear to the American public that this is a peacekeeping function carried out at the request of both parties, and not an attempt by the United States to support one party in a military operation against the other.

*Q. This morning, Mr. Secretary, when you replied briefly to a question, you said you would be talking to others besides the Soviet Representative in getting this straightened out in the Security Council. What did you mean by that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have two reasons for being here: one, the conversation just concluded with the Secretary General about the Egyptian-Israeli agreement; the second is to show U.S. support for this session of the special Assembly. Therefore I will be meeting with several of the Foreign Minis-

ters, mostly of the less developed countries, during the day to discuss with them their view of the special session. I intend to sit in for one of the speeches during the special session. So the rest of my conversations here will concern the work of the special session and not the recently concluded negotiations.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a lot of dissatisfaction expressed by the underdeveloped nations as to the speech which you prepared and that Mr. Moynihan delivered, mainly because your speech did not deal with the problem of massive debts of the underdeveloped nations. Now, what are your thoughts on the Swedish proposal for outright cancellation of debt burdens of the underdeveloped nations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The reports that I get about the reaction of the less developed countries—maybe from an intimidated staff—are not as negative as you describe. What we attempted to do in this speech is to put before the less developed nations our conception of how the problem of development would be dealt with in a conciliatory, cooperative, and constructive manner. We put forward a series of proposals. We do not consider them exhaustive. We are prepared, either within the framework of the United Nations or within the framework of the producer-consumer dialogue which is going to start in the fall, or in any other forum, to talk in what we hope is a constructive attitude about the problems of the developing nations. The particular Swedish proposal, I have not had a chance to study, but we did not present our program on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Quite frankly, we did not think that the reaction was as uniformly negative as you describe—in fact, quite the opposite.

*Q. Would you consider a moratorium on debt for the Third World nations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Debt rescheduling has been a part of our policy. On the whole, we prefer it not to take place on a general basis, but to be related to specific development objectives. So we would probably not favor a complete cancellation of all existing debts, but the problem of the accumulated debts is a subject we are prepared to discuss.

## Secretary Reaffirms U.S. Approach to U.N. General Assembly Issues

*Following are remarks made by Secretary Kissinger on September 5 at the swearing-in of the U.S. delegation to the seventh special session of the U.N. General Assembly.*

Press release 468 dated September 5

I am not quite sure what the status of this delegation has been during the first week of the special session, and I do not know whether everything they have done is illegal because they were not sworn in. [Laughter.] At any rate, I am delighted to participate in this ceremony.

The two sessions that are taking place this year, the special session and the General Assembly that is the part to follow, belong to the most important that the United Nations has had.

The special session, in which we are now engaged, responds to the call for development by the less developed nations—a call which the United States is taking extremely seriously. If the problem of peace is to build a world in which all of the participants have a sense of sharing, then it cannot be that the world remains divided among those who are prosperous and those who are at the margin of existence. But at the same time, if development is to succeed, it can only be on the basis of cooperation and not of confrontation. One cannot extort a moral duty.

And so the United States has put before the special session a program of some scope that we are prepared to discuss not on a take-it-or-leave-it basis but in a spirit that of developing a cooperative structure not based on slogans but on mutual respect.

In the General Assembly that is about to follow, we have the problem not only of development but of peace. There again the United States will approach the issues with the attitude that in our time the threat of war—and even more the conduct of war—is an absurdity and that we must find means

of regulating relations among countries and solving international problems based on some other principles than those that have characterized international relations traditionally.

This will be our attitude in the General Assembly, and we are proud to have so distinguished a delegation. I am delighted to be able to be present at the swearing in. I look forward to working closely with them.

I would like to take this opportunity also to thank the members of Congress who are here who have not been sworn in, who have acted as advisers to us in the special session and whose advice and cooperation played a large role in shaping the program we have put forward and whose assistance is essential in putting it through the Congress. Maybe we should swear them in, too. [Laughter.]

## Death of Eamon de Valera, Former President of Ireland

*Eamon de Valera, former President of Ireland, died at Dublin on August 29. Following is a statement by President Ford issued that day.*

White House press release dated August 29

It is with profound regret that I have learned of the death of Eamon de Valera, the former President of Ireland. I extend my deepest sympathy and that of the American people to his family and to the people and the Government of Ireland. For half a century, Mr. de Valera was a symbol of Ireland's ideals and aspirations. He served the Irish people devotedly and unstintingly, as parliamentarian, Prime Minister, and as President for 14 years. Mr. de Valera also personified the ties of kinship and friendship between Ireland and the United States. Together with the Irish people, we mourn his passing.

## Under Secretary Sisco Discusses Middle East in Public Television Interview

*Following is the transcript of an interview with Under Secretary for Political Affairs Joseph J. Sisco for "Martin Agronsky: Evening Edition" broadcast on public television on September 10. Interviewing Under Secretary Sisco were Martin Agronsky and John Wallach, diplomatic correspondent for the Hearst Newspapers.*

Press release 480 dated September 12

*Mr. Agronsky: . . . in Israel a gamble for peace. The question is, will the gamble succeed? And if it does, will Syria and Jordan then make peace with Israel? And how will the dangerous problem of the Palestinian Arabs be settled?*

*Tonight on "Evening Edition," a discussion of the prospects for peace in the Middle East and the new interim agreement with one of the key American negotiators of that agreement, Joseph Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Joining the discussion is John Wallach, diplomatic correspondent for the Hearst Newspapers, who accompanied Secretary of State Kissinger and Mr. Sisco on the mission to the Middle East.*

*Mr. Under Secretary, the first question is the obvious one. If it is a gamble for peace, how good is the gamble, and what next?*

*Mr. Sisco: I think it's a good one, Martin. I think that we've avoided stagnation and stalemate. I think it gives us time, and it gives us time to pursue further diplomacy. I think one of the greatest dangers in the Middle East is a situation where there may exist a diplomatic void. So I think that one of the strongest reasons why I'm very pleased that we've achieved this interim agreement is that I think that it provides*

*the basis for further diplomatic opportunities in the future.*

*Mr. Agronsky: Let's carry it to a negative prospect, too. Suppose it had not succeeded.*

*Mr. Sisco: Martin, that's a very good point, because my own feeling is that (1) the risk of war within the next year in the Middle East would have been very great indeed; and (2) even if one could take an optimistic view and say, well, perhaps some way or another we might have muddled through and there was no war, I think there was a great danger that there would at least have been an embargo applied with all of the economic dislocation in America and in the world generally, a worldwide depression. I just think that the significance of this agreement, with all of its risks, is very considerable indeed.*

*Mr. Wallach: Joe, the fire apparently has gone almost completely out of the Arab campaign to kick Israel out of the United Nations or to have it suspended from the General Assembly. Do you think part of that is due to the Secretary's success in reaching this agreement in the Middle East?*

*Mr. Sisco: There isn't any doubt in my mind, John. I said quite frankly before we'd achieved this agreement that the question of expulsion or suspension of Israel in the United Nations would become largely academic if we were able to achieve this agreement. And I believe it to be so at the moment.*

*Mr. Wallach: I'd like to get into another area, Martin, if we could for a moment. That's the area of the secret commitments and assurances, understandings, "undertakings," as the Secretary called them, that have apparently been given to Israel and communicated to Israel from Egypt through*



*the United States. In what form, Joe, will these be made public?*

*Mr. Sisco:* Well, first of all, the Secretary of State has made very clear, John, that any commitments that have been undertaken by the United States in connection with this agreement will be submitted to the appropriate committees of the Congress. We have done so already with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I will be submitting these undertakings to the House International Relations Committee tomorrow morning. We will be talking to both of these committees as to how these undertakings can be made public, because as far as the Administration is concerned, we have nothing to hide.

We think that the American people, as well as the Congress, should be fully cognizant of any undertakings that we have assumed; and I think it's important because, as you well know, we have all in this country suffered from the anguish of Viet-Nam, the concern that perhaps we were getting into something here that the American people might not go for. For this reason I think it is essential—and the Administration is approaching it in this way—that the information get to the American public.

*Mr. Wallach:* *The Secretary said that there are some undertakings that no country in the world would ever make public, that part of the diplomatic process must, by its very nature, remain confidential. Will the language of the commitments itself be made known to the American public?*

*Mr. Sisco:* We're discussing the form in which these commitments will be made public with the committees, so I don't really want to pronounce on that in any direct way. I think the important thing from the point of view of the Administration, from the point of view of the Congress, and from the point of view of the American people is that they should know what commitments have been undertaken, and I am confident that they will.

*Mr. Agronsky:* *Mr. Under Secretary, every word you say makes good sense; no one could argue with the whole attitude that*

*everything should be made public. But as you noted yourself, in the very recent past secret commitments have been made that involved this country [inaudible].*

*As you know, that was the motivation for the War Powers Act that was passed by the Congress of the United States. And so these concerns persist, no matter what you say.*

*Now, there is one central point, for example, in the agreement from the Israeli point of view that many of us who have followed the progress of these negotiations feel it is inconceivable for Israel to have accepted—that some kind of an agreement, up front from the United States—and I speak of oil. They gave up the Abu Rudeis fields, which provided them with more than 50 percent of their oil. If Israel were to be involved in a war, they could not exist without oil. They have now a three-month supply. That isn't sufficient for them to go to war. Their survival would be at stake. Therefore it seems inconceivable that Israel could have concluded this interim agreement with Egypt without some kind of a guarantee from the United States that that oil, if they were at war, would be made available to them through the auspices of the United States.*

*Now, questions have been raised: Would American warships convoy oil to Israel, which of course raises the prospect that the Soviets might object, and you then face a Soviet-American confrontation? How would Israel get its oil? What commitment has the United States made to Israel on this question?*

*Mr. Sisco:* Let me try to say a few things on this—

*Mr. Agronsky:* *You would agree that that's central.*

*Mr. Sisco:* Oh, it's central, of course. We've been told, by the way, that the Israelis have a six-month reserve of oil and frankly they would like to increase it. But be that as it may—

*Mr. Wallach:* *We're committed to help them increase it, aren't we?*

*Mr. Sisco:* Let me say a word both with

respect to the reserve, as well as really the central question that you have posed.

*Mr. Agronsky: Survival is what they're worried about.*

*Mr. Sisco:* Absolutely. We have made an undertaking with respect to being helpful to Israel, and the precise undertaking will be made public. But I think I can give you some indication. The reason why I am not going to be as precise as I would like is that we are discussing with the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the present time just what form these undertakings will be made public. Therefore I don't want to scoop, obviously, either of the committees.

But I can say this to you: that we have discussed with the Israelis how we can be helpful in their purchasing oil in circumstances where they might not be able to buy oil but there is no particular restriction on us. That's one set of circumstances where we have indicated that we might be helpful in their being able to purchase oil.

Another circumstance is the circumstance that you have described; namely, what if there were an embargo and what if that embargo, for example, were applied to Israel and likewise on the United States? That's another set of circumstances on which I don't want to be precise; but I think there are ways in which the United States can be helpful, and has indicated that it will be helpful, to Israel without doing any serious jeopardy to our own oil supply.

Now let me say one other thing.

*Mr. Agronsky: Not the jeopardy of our oil supply. I'm talking about raising the prospect of a confrontation with the Soviet Union, which might attempt to intercede on behalf of Arab countries to prevent Israel from getting the oil.*

*Mr. Sisco:* Well, first of all, the only source of supply for purchase of oil is not, as you know, only the Arab countries.

But let me put at rest one thing, because there have been news articles on the very point that you've raised, the implication being that somehow or another we would be-

come directly involved, involved, for example, in escorting vessels in order to actually supply Israel. Notice that I used the phrase "to help them buy oil." I can say to you categorically that there is no such assurance that the United States has undertaken to help escort vessels in order to actually supply oil to Israel. And I can say that quite categorically.

*Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Under Secretary, I can say to you categorically I find it inconceivable that Israel would place itself in that kind of jeopardy.*

*Mr. Sisco:* Well, I think I'll stand on what I had to say, Martin. As I say, I think we've indicated how we can be helpful in terms of the purchase of oil. We have undertaken no commitment whatsoever in terms of escort or—

*Mr. Wallach: Mr. Sisco, do you think the American people would support emergency shipments of oil to Israel when an oil embargo was actually in effect against this country?*

*Mr. Sisco:* Depends on the circumstances, John. For example, you know that one of the things that we have done with our European allies, who, after all, are the principal consumers of oil—we have entered into, in the context of the International Energy Agency, not only a conservation program but a sharing program. What would we and they do in circumstances where, say, the embargo were in effect? And there are procedures and sharing arrangements that have already been worked out that this government has agreed to with our European allies. For example, one element in that formula is that we would all, in those circumstances, apply a 7–10 percent reduction in our own consumption.

But there are arrangements that are possible, and I think that I've probably gone into this thing as much in detail as I can at this juncture. But quite frankly the American people are going to know what—

*Mr. Wallach: But, Joe, what I'd like to get at is the nature of some of these secret commitments, if I could for a minute. I mean, it's—*

Mr. Sisco: John, I object to the phrase "secret commitments." This is good news-worthy phraseology. This is not secret commitments. These are commitments that have been undertaken. They are private commitments in the sense that they are confidential exchanges between two governments. This is not a situation where the Administration is trying to make some secret agreement that it's going to hide from the American people. And I think this phrase is such a misnomer that I think that frankly we ought to—

Mr. Wallach: But Joe, it's a misnomer because of statements such as the following: Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres saying 24 hours after the agreement that the secret assurances in the agreement represent to most far-reaching American commitment to Israel's survival short of an actual mutual defense pact.

Mr. Sisco: John, look—

Mr. Wallach: Don't the American people deserve to know what in fact he is talking about?

Mr. Sisco: But, John, I've agreed with you. And my answer is, yes, they will be told. And so there is no argument.

Mr. Wallach: But then why are you arguing with my talking about specifics here and—

Mr. Sisco: Simply because of the fact that, as I explained here a moment ago to Martin, we are in a discussion with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee as to how these undertakings will be made public. I—

Mr. Wallach: Aren't you talking about sanitizing the assurances for the American public? I come back to my original question: Are you going to make public the language of these commitments so the American public will know, for example, whether the United States is committed simply to consult with Israel in the event of a third-power or Soviet attack, or whether we are committed to coordinate military strategy—whatever that may mean—in the event of a third-power attack?

Mr. Sisco: I—

Mr. Wallach: This is a semantic difference but an important difference.

Mr. Sisco: I am confident, John, that what will be made public will be the undertakings of the United States in a very clear-cut fashion.

Mr. Agronsky: You know, John, to the Under Secretary's amazement, I want to come to his defense on this. I think that since he is in the process of discussing this with the House Foreign Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—the [House] Foreign Affairs is now called International Relations, I believe—I think we have to accept that the process is ongoing and that at the moment he will indeed make good on his promise to us that it will be made public.

Mr. Wallach: But, Martin, if I can disagree with you. The Administration is asking for support for stationing 200 American civilian technicians in sensitive positions—

Mr. Agronsky: Well, I'm going to come to that.

Mr. Wallach: —in fact, before the American public is aware of what the secret assurances or commitments are.

Mr. Agronsky: Fair enough—

Mr. Wallach: And in fact the vote will be taken on this very crucial part of the agreement—and don't misunderstand me; I think the agreement is a very good one—but the vote will be taken before the public is aware of what in fact the United States has entered into.

Mr. Agronsky: The Under Secretary is delighted that you and I are arguing. Let's move to that particular problem.

Mr. Sisco: I don't accept the assumption that he's just made. Both committees are and will be fully informed, and he's made an assumption about the timing of the publication of these matters that I am not prepared to make at the moment.

Mr. Agronsky: OK. Well, let's go to the point. The 200 or 150 American technicians. Now, as you know one of the criticisms and one of the analogies that has been made was the initial American commitment in Vietnam, which first was advisers, then led to

military and then to an enormous involvement that at one point reached 550,000 American troops. Do you see any kind of an analogy? Do you regard that as an inaccurate analogy, for one thing? Are those Americans going to be in jeopardy in such a sense that it could lead to an American involvement in any fighting that might break out in the Middle East?

Mr. Sisco: Martin, I am very glad you raised this, because this is certainly understandably on the minds of the American people. I might add that it was very much on the minds of the negotiators as well.

First, let me say, as John indicated, these are civilians. They will be playing a technical surveillance role in the passes, not along the whole line. They will be in the U.N. buffer zone. Actually, they will be between the two armies. Now, in Viet-Nam, as you well know, we had military rather than civilian, and their role was on one side as against another.

Mr. Agronsky: —committed to one side.

Mr. Sisco: —committed to one side. This is an impartial role between the two sides at the request of the two sides. It is not the role of one adversary as against another, but rather, it's an impartial peacekeeping role at the request of both sides.

Mr. Wallach: Is there any risk?

Mr. Sisco: Well, I'd be a fool to say to you that there was absolutely no risk whatsoever. But I think the risk is indeed very, very minimal in terms of injury to our personnel. We have written into this agreement—this is in the public domain—that the United States has the unilateral right to withdraw these minimal number of personnel if the United States, that is, if the President feels that they are in jeopardy in any way. And he can do this unilaterally, Martin, without informing anyone. Or—

Mr. Wallach: Except Senator Church's—

Mr. Sisco: —or if, in another situation, if in fact we feel that the presence is no longer necessary. And as John has indicated, we have also accepted Senator Church's suggestion that we are prepared to pull them out automatically in the event of hostilities.

Mr. Wallach: Is there any protection for them, Joe, if in the unlikely event that they get shot at, are they allowed to protect themselves?

Mr. Agronsky: The Palestinians, for example, who have already [inaudible] themselves to that.

Mr. Wallach: Have threatened, that's right, threatened to shoot them. But aside from the Palestinian threat, are the U.N. troops that are in the area assigned to protect these men in any way? Is this part of their—

Mr. Sisco: The U.N. responsibility in the buffer zone is to police that zone to prevent any hostile activity and, obviously, to play this buffer role between the two sides.

On this question of the Palestinians, Martin, you want to remember that this huge buffer zone between the two sides is unpopulated—plenty of sand, with no more than a few bedouins here and there, in the north perhaps a few fishermen. But it is a highly unpopulated area; moreover, historically, as you well know, being so close to this and being familiar with the history, there have not been serious guerrilla problems in the Sinai. The guerrilla problems have been on the Lebanese border, in Syria, Jordan, and so on.

The chances of an American being hurt by a guerrilla are infinitesimally small, in my judgment, because it's a question of getting through two armies, it's a question of getting through a U.N. army, if you will, of 5,000. And of all the risks, I think that's a very, very minimal risk—

Mr. Wallach: Would you have been able to get the agreement without in a sense volunteering or proposing this civilian force for the passes?

Mr. Sisco: John, unfortunately, I don't believe we could have. And it's no secret, as you well know, that we agreed to this role of Americans very reluctantly, very reluctantly. It was only because we came to the judgment that unless we agreed, that there would be no agreement between the two sides that we very reluctantly agreed, although it was only 200 civilians.

Mr. Agronsky: Just for the record, can I

follow up, John, on this point. Who proposed it initially? The indication is that it came from Sadat when he met with President Ford at Salzburg. Is that so?

Mr. Sisco: It's an intricate history, but I think I can answer it for you.

The Israelis, as you know, have a major strategic intelligence installation at a place called Um Khushaib, which is in the U.N. buffer zone. Now, the Israelis were very, very anxious that they not only retain that installation but that installation be operated by Israelis.

At one point in the discussion, President Sadat did indicate that his preference obviously was for the installation not to be there at all in the buffer zone. But at one point he did suggest that perhaps Americans, and even the United Nations, might man this station. The Israelis did not agree with this, and therefore the discussions evolved in such a way that it was agreed, as it's contained in the agreement, that there would be one strategic early-warning station manned and operated by the Israelis. Likewise the Egyptians would have the right to build one not too far away in the passes, and in addition there would be three small manned tactical early-warning stations which would be manned by Americans.

There will be a few Americans at this large strategic station of the Israelis; there will be a few Americans at the large Egyptian installation; but this is largely in a custodial role. The Egyptians will in fact be operating their own. Our role will be in the manned stations in early warning.

Mr. Agronsky: And this is keyed to the [inaudible] acceptance on both sides of the—

Mr. Sisco: Absolutely keyed.

Mr. Wallach: Martin, I'd like to get into the Soviet attitude toward this entire package.

But before I do, I'd like to clarify one thing that you said, if I may. You said that the undertakings that America has made will be made public. The Secretary seemed to indicate yesterday at his news conference that what we will be communicating to Israel from Egypt in terms of whether or not

Egypt will relax the economic boycott against American firms that also deal with Israel, whether Egypt will let up on its propaganda against Israel in government-controlled media, whether it will permit some of the African countries which may want to resume relations with Israel to go ahead and do so or not at least actively campaign against them. But this part of the agreement will not be made public. Is that accurate or not?

Mr. Sisco: The American commitments, our undertakings, will be made public. Wherever we have played the role of a conduit, where we've been the messenger, if you will, between one side and another, this falls, in our judgment, within the confidentiality of the conduct of American diplomacy and that record—we will respect the views of the parties and that record will not be made public.

Mr. Wallach: And that presumably includes the commitment by Egypt to renew the agreement for two years in addition to the one that—

Mr. Sisco: I'm not going to get into the specifics of these, John. But again I want to reiterate—and this is really the key point—whatever American commitments, whatever American undertakings were assumed in relationship to this agreement not only will have been submitted to both appropriate committees of the Congress but it will be made public for the American people.

Mr. Wallach: I want to go on with the Soviet thing, because I really think that's important. The Secretary met with the highest ranking Soviet diplomat here 24 hours after he got back, Mr. [Yuly M.] Vorontsov. What was the meeting like, Joe? Was it icy? Was it cordial? Was it civilized? How do you assess the Soviet attitude toward this agreement?

Mr. Sisco: Let me say a few words about the Soviets. First of all, I think that there is a certain amount of displeasure which has been reflected by the Soviets—in my judgment, more with respect to the procedure than with the substance. There is no doubt, Martin, that the very fact that America has

been the one who has been asked to play this impartial third-party role between the two sides, that we've brought off this interim agreement—

*Mr. Agronsky: That puts their nose out of joint. You would think they would try to throw a monkey wrench. It's a diminution of Soviet influence.*

*Mr. Sisco: On the other hand, I myself am pretty well convinced that in the last analysis the Soviets will not see it to be in their interests to actually be obstructive in terms of the substance of the agreement itself. I think their own interest is such that they can't really, seriously, derive any real benefit from the situation in the Middle East, which might create a crisis.*

*Mr. Wallach: Do they gain from the agreement, in your view?*

*Mr. Sisco: My judgment is that not only do the parties and the peoples in the area gain from the agreement, I think all of the major powers gain because to the degree to which this contributes to stabilization, I think it reduces the risk of confrontation between the two of us.*

*Mr. Agronsky: We only have a moment or two. I'd like to pursue the Russian thing further but I think this is also significant. Your predecessor, not your immediate predecessor, but George Ball, who once held the office you hold, in a very critical piece in Newsweek magazine indicated that he thought the whole step-by-step thing was wrong, that it should have been the whole ball of wax from the beginning. He made the observation, "No matter what gestures we may make in the weeks ahead, it is smoking opium to assume we can go farther with step-by-step diplomacy."*

*Mr. Sisco: Well, my judgment is this: that this step that we've achieved creates new opportunities for diplomacy. We don't consider it to be an end in itself. We think there has to be progress on other fronts, and we intend to proceed on that basis. If we had moved—*

*Mr. Agronsky: Have we proceeded with Syria, for example?*

*Mr. Sisco: We have begun, we talked to President Asad twice while we were on this mission, and I can assure you, Martin, that we will be consulting with all the parties concerned in order to keep the momentum going. If we had gone ahead here some months ago and tried to achieve an overall settlement, where none of the parties were really able and willing to face up to the key fundamental issues, such as final borders, Jerusalem, the whole question of the Palestinians, I think we would have had chaos here months ago rather than a reasonably favorable circumstance today.*

*Mr. Wallach: Joe, the Secretary said yesterday, and it was an intriguing comment, that in a final settlement Soviet participation will be important.*

*Mr. Sisco: I would agree.*

*Mr. Wallach: Can you envisage an actual physical Soviet presence in some form in helping to guarantee a final settlement?*

*Mr. Sisco: I don't. I think this is largely academic at the moment.*

## **Under Secretary Sisco Interviewed on "Today" Show**

*Following is the transcript of an interview with Under Secretary for Political Affairs Joseph J. Sisco by Douglas Kiker and Richard Valeriani on the NBC "Today" show on September 11.*

Press release 476 dated September 11

*Mr. Kiker: Mr. Sisco, the United States is a party to this new agreement to a considerable extent. Parts of the agreement remain classified. You are giving those classified details to Members of Congress, but why not disclose all parts of the agreement to the American people? Also, why not disclose the details of the memorandum of agreement which the United States and Israel signed?*

*Mr. Sisco: Doug, we are discussing this matter, as you know, with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as well as with the House International Relations Commit-*

tee. We have made available the American undertakings on a classified basis to the Senate committee, and I will be doing the same this morning with the House International Relations Committee. Then we will discuss as to how these things will be made public. What I want to say to you is that any American undertakings in connection with this agreement will be made public.

*Mr. Valeriani: Will, for example, Mr. Sisco, the understanding between the United States and Israel that the United States might consult with Israel if it is attacked by an outside party—will that sort of thing be made public? Public in the sense that it will be made to the American public and not just to congressional committees?*

*Mr. Sisco: Whatever constitutes an undertaking will be made public—I do not want to comment specifically on any one element, but I am quite confident that when all of this is made public that it will be fully understood and I think that we will go ahead and complete these discussions with the two committees and, hopefully, move on to that.*

*Mr. Kiker: It has been said that we don't really know how much new economic and military aid is involved in this—we do know it is going to be considerable and that it is going to both sides, especially to Israel. Critics say that the United States bought this agreement by sweetening the pot, by throwing, in effect, billions of dollars or more additional aid to Israel. Are we buying peace in the Middle East?*

*Mr. Sisco: Not at all, Doug. First let me say that the figures I have seen in the press for Israel—that we will be committing well in excess of \$3 billion—these figures are highly exaggerated. That is the first point I want to make. Secondly, the figure will be substantial. We will be submitting a figure—the President will—as part of the overall aid package, as well as assistance figures for the Arabs.*

When I hear the word that we are “buying” this agreement I ask myself a couple of important questions: What would be the alternative if this agreement were not achieved? I happen to believe that if this

agreement had not been achieved there would be a high degree of possibility of war in the Middle East and the costs absolutely astronomical; even if there were not a war in the Middle East there would be circumstances of high tension, of the likelihood of the possibility of an embargo, for example, with all of the repercussions in this country, a worldwide depression. I think that as soon as we submit this figure, I think quite frankly, it is going to be a real bargain for peace.

*Mr. Kiker: But you are going to have a hard time getting Congress to approve this much money, aren't you?*

*Mr. Sisco: Not on the basis of consultations that the Secretary and I have been involved in. Yes, understandably, we as well as the members of the Congress realize that when substantial amounts of money are involved, we—all of us as citizens—have to pay for this. But I see, first of all, strong support for the agreement itself, and I see a good deal of understanding in terms of what is necessary in order to be helpful to the countries in the area.*

And I would add one other thing, particularly with reference to the Israeli aspects. You go back a few months ago; shortly after the suspension of the negotiations last March, you will recall that 76 Senators signed a letter emphasizing the importance of assistance for Israel. We have been, as you well know, committed to the survival of Israel for a long time.

And I think the other question one would ask is: What would have been appropriated by the Congress in any circumstance?

*Mr. Valeriani: Do you have a fallback position? What if Congress does not approve the stationing of American technicians in the Sinai, or what if Congress approves only a billion dollars instead of \$2 billion for Israel?*

*Mr. Sisco: On the first aspect, I expect overwhelming support of the Congress for the U.S. involvement in the surveillance system in the passes. Therefore I think this question is very academic indeed. Secondly, while a number of these discussions with respect to assistance have been in the environs*

surrounding the discussions with respect to the negotiations, there is no preconditional-ity involved. I am confident that the right kind of action is going to be taken by the Congress on both counts.

*Mr. Kiker: Tell us about these technicians. We are told that they will not be provided by the CIA; we are told they will not be provided by the Defense Department. So I would like to ask you two things. Where are they going to come from? And secondly, we are also told it will cost upward of \$200 million to station men and equipment in those passes. How much will it cost, and where will the technicians come from?*

*Mr. Sisco: The second question I can't give the answer to in precise terms because we are looking at the financial costs at the present time, and again, I think that figure is excessive.*

These are going to be civilians. We haven't made up our minds as to how they will be recruited. They are people that will have to have, obviously, a technical competence because what is involved here are three manned early-warning stations and you have got to have people who have this kind of technical capacity. But you are right: they are not going to be Defense Department people. However, we just haven't made up our minds where these will come from. We are looking into it right now.

*Mr. Kiker: The PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] already has said they will go in and kill them, that that is what should be done. Critics of this thing say we are going right into another Viet-Nam, starting out with technicians and ending up who knows where. Do you want to talk about that?*

*Mr. Sisco: I do, because, first of all, so far as any danger to the Americans in these passes from guerrillas or Palestinians, I think it is very far-fetched and very minimal indeed. The U.S. personnel are located in the U.N. buffer zone between two armies. As you know, Doug, there has never really been the guerrilla problem in the Sinai. It has*

always been on the Lebanese side and the Syrian side. And therefore the possibility of some guerrilla activity getting at the Americans is most minimal indeed. I think it is as little a risk as one can imagine, and so I can't get really too concerned.

I am also very glad that you raised this question of the analogy to Viet-Nam, and it is understandable. The Americans say to themselves, having gone through the anguish that we have—what about this, we are starting out with 200 civilians and is this going to grow as was the case in Viet-Nam? You have got to remember that in Viet-Nam these were military forces, military advisers on one side committed to one adversary as against another and very directly involved. This is an impartial peacekeeping role of 200 civilians there at the request of both sides—they are not military forces, and they are going to be performing a technical surveillance function. I think the analogy is completely different.

*Mr. Valeriani: Doesn't the agreement, in effect, make the United States a guarantor of peace, with the technicians, with the promises communicated to both sides, with the promise of aid?*

*Mr. Sisco: "A guarantor" is much too strong a term. Obviously we are involved on the basis of a presence. Obviously we are involved as the result of the fact we have been the principal negotiators at the request of both sides. But I want to stress with respect to this presence, we have written into the agreement, as you know, that the United States has the unilateral right to withdraw if the President decides that any American is in jeopardy, and for that matter, he has the right to withdraw the Americans if he feels our role is no longer necessary.*

*Mr. Kiker: Let me ask you a couple of things about what happens from this point on. For example, Sadat now says that ships bearing Israeli goods which are not military goods may go through the Suez Canal. When do you expect that to happen and do you really expect that to happen? Secondly, I gather that the withdrawal of the Israeli*



forces will take place during the next five months. Do you think that Israel will really meet this force deployment on time?

*Mr. Sisco:* On your second question, I do. I have no reason to believe that the implementation of the agreement will not take place within the time frame that has been agreed to. As you know, the working group of Egypt and Israel is meeting in Geneva right now. What they are doing, they are working out the details of implementation. Our hope and expectation is that they will wind up these discussions in roughly about 10 days.

Once they sign this protocol that gives all the details of implementation, very much the same as in the disengagement agreement of 1974, then the implementation will begin. The implementation, I think, will begin in the first instance in the south as it relates to the oilfields, and then subsequently as it relates to the north, getting at the key question of the movement of the Egyptian forces into the U.N. zone as well as the withdrawal of the Israeli forces out of the passes. This is to be completed within five months, and I have no reason whatsoever to doubt that this will take place in that time frame.

*Mr. Valeriani:* And the Israeli cargoes?

*Mr. Sisco:* On the Israeli cargoes, as Doug rightly has said, that is an explicit commitment in the agreement itself. It has been made public. I can't give you a specific time in terms of when that will be exercised. I have every confidence that any commitment made in the agreement by one side or the other—that each side has gone into this agreement, as difficult as it was to negotiate, in good faith.

*Mr. Valeriani:* Apart from the agreement itself, has the United States made any kind of a commitment, or have any kind of an understanding with Syria that we will now make a major effort to arrange negotiations between Syria and Israel on the Golan Heights?

*Mr. Sisco:* Understanding, no. But we have made it very clear to all concerned that we

are prepared to undertake a further serious effort to try to get negotiations going between Syria and Israel, either within diplomatic channels in the first instance—which was the way we prepared the groundwork for this latest agreement—and we don't even preclude the possibility of a Geneva conference before the end of the year.

The point is that we do not believe that the momentum can be lost. We think it is important that there be no diplomatic void, and as far as we are concerned we are ready to be helpful to the parties either in a multi-lateral framework or a bilateral framework, if this is their desire.

*Mr. Valeriani:* So there will be another shuttle in March is what you are saying?

*Mr. Sisco:* Well, I wouldn't make that kind of a rash prediction, Dick.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Aviation

Convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international transportation by air. Done at Warsaw October 12, 1929. Entered into force February 13, 1933; for the United States October 29, 1934. 49 Stat. 3000.

*Accessions deposited:* Iran, July 8, 1975; Sudan, February 11, 1975.

*Notifications that they continue to be bound:* Bahamas, May 15, 1975; Lesotho, April 29, 1975.

##### Coffee

Agreement amending and extending the international coffee agreement 1968. Approved by the International Coffee Council at London April 14, 1973. Entered into force October 1, 1973. TIAS 7809.

*Notification of separate membership:* Australia for Papua New Guinea, June 23, 1975.

Protocol for the continuation in force of the international coffee agreement 1968, as amended and

extended, with annex. Approved by the International Coffee Council at London September 26, 1974.<sup>1</sup>

*Applicable to:* Papua New Guinea, March 26, 1975.

### Load Lines

Amendments to the international convention on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720). Adopted at London October 12, 1971.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* German Democratic Republic, August 15, 1975.

### Narcotic Drugs

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.

*Proclaimed by the President:* August 29, 1975.

### Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972.

*Ratification deposited:* Panama, July 31, 1975.

*Corrected entry-into-force date:* August 30, 1975.

### Oil Pollution

International convention on civil liability for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. Entered into force June 19, 1975.<sup>2</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Monaco, August 21, 1975.

### Postal

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol signed at Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), as amended by additional protocol, general regulations with final protocol and annex, and the universal postal convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except for article V of the additional protocol, which entered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150.

*Accession deposited:* Haiti, May 27, 1975.

Additional protocol to the constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol signed at Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881). Signed at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except for article V which entered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150.

*Ratification deposited:* Nepal, June 6, 1975.

General regulations of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol and annex and the Universal Postal Convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971. TIAS 7150.

*Approval deposited:* Nepal, September 19, 1974.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force for the United States.

### Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780, 6284.

*Acceptance deposited:* Oman, August 20, 1975.

## BILATERAL

### Afghanistan

Agreement amending and extending the technical cooperation program agreement of June 30, 1953. Effected by exchange of notes at Kabul July 7 and August 12, 1975. Entered into force August 12, 1975; effective June 30, 1975.

### Bahrain

Agreement implementing articles 8 and 11 of the agreement of December 23, 1971 (TIAS 7263), relating to the deployment of the United States Middle East Force in Bahrain. Effected by exchange of notes at Manama July 31, 1975. Entered into force July 31, 1975.

### Chile

Agreement regarding the consolidation and re-scheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed or insured by the United States Government and its agencies, with annexes and statement. Signed at Washington July 3, 1975.

*Entered into force:* September 8, 1975.

### Dominican Republic

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports from the Dominican Republic of fresh, chilled or frozen meat of cattle, goats and sheep, except lambs, during calendar year 1975. Effected by exchange of notes at Santo Domingo April 21 and June 6, 1975. Entered into force June 6, 1975.

### Egypt

Agreement relating to the clearance of mines and unexploded ordnance from the Port Said area pursuant to the agreement of April 13 and 25, 1974 (TIAS 7882), on the clearance of mines. Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo July 6 and August 21, 1975. Entered into force August 21, 1975.

### International Labor Office

Agreement relating to a procedure to reimburse the International Labor Office for reimbursement of personnel subject to payment of United States income tax. Effected by exchange of notes at Geneva April 15 and May 16, 1975. Entered into force May 16, 1975, effective January 1, 1975.

### Pakistan

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of November 23, 1974 (TIAS 7971), with minutes. Signed at Islamabad August 7, 1975. Entered into force August 7, 1975.

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**Checklist of Department of State  
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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
†469	9/8	U.S. and Portugal terminate textile agreement.
*470	9/9	U.S. National Committee for International Radio Consultative Committee, Boulder, Colo., Oct. 14.
*471	9/9	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC) Oct. 14.
*472	9/9	SCC, Oct. 15.
*473	9/9	SCC, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, working group on radio communications, Oct. 16.
*474	9/9	SCC, U.S. National Committee for the Prevention of Marine Pollution, working group on reception facilities, Oct. 9.
475	9/9	Kissinger: news conference.
476	9/11	Sisco: interview on "Today" show.
*477	9/12	Lorenz receives Director General's Award for Reporting for 1975.
*478	9/12	Soviet media representatives visit U.S.
†479	9/12	Kissinger: interview on "Firing Line" recorded Sept. 10.
480	9/12	Sisco: interview on "Agronsky: Evening Edition," Sept. 10.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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
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